PAUL TILLICH’S LIFE, THOUGHT AND GERMAN LEGACY

(1886-1933)

by

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INTRODUCTION

1. AIM OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the study is to investigate the contribution of the German years from 1886 to 1933 in our understanding of Paul Tillich’s Life, Thought, and Legacy. The formation of a historical frame of reference and a historical philosophy will be formed where possible. This will aid the historical investigation in terms of the needed historical perspective. The importance of Tillich’s years in Germany has been overlooked by ecclesiastical writers. These years are often listed without giving them their proper emphasis and historical interpretation.

Tillich is a very colorful figure with his birth in the nineteenth century in Germany. He lived in Germany until he was forty-seven years of age. He was dismissed from his last university post by Hitler in 1933. His academic training was very impressive with a doctoral dissertation on Frederick Schelling. Tillich wrote a second dissertation on the guilt concept of Schelling for his licentiate in theology. The impact of the theological career of Tillich has been overlooked especially the year 1929 when he sought to fill a teaching post at the University of Frankfurt.
2. REASON FOR THE STUDY

American ecclesiastical writers in writing the biography of Paul Tillich have failed to realize the importance of the German years from his birth in 1886 to 1933. They emphasise the American years at Union Theological Seminary, Columbia University, Harvard University, and finally the University of Chicago. Tillich was a German whose theological thought had been formed from the thinking of Frederick Shelling. He had developed a political philosophy as well from the writings of men like Karl Marx. Tillich’s emphasis on existentialism was formed from his European background. Tillich sought to address religious problems. American pragmatism and the input of John Dewey have contributed much to the current misunderstanding that prevails in society concerning Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy. His years in Germany are listed but without historical research, interpretation, and meaning. Tillich is viewed in an American postmodern world as merely a philosophical theologian. The German years given their proper emphasis will show that Tillich the apostle to the intellectuals was a product of his German background. Tillich will be properly placed within the ecclesiastical spectrum.

3. HYPOTHESIS

Paul Tillich’s biographical details are the key to understanding his life, thought, and legacy. Our hypothesis is that Paul Tillich’s German years 1886 to 1933 are necessary to understand Tillich’s life, thought, and legacy.
4. STATEMENT PERSONAL

The writer approaches the life, thought, and legacy of Paul Tillich with great interest. Paul Tillich is one of the theological thinkers upon which modern religious and theological thought is based. The writer admits absolute objectivity does not exist. Secondly, the writer admits his own subjective context in the writing of the thesis. The Harvard system of documentation is to be followed.

I have a theological background with an earned Master of Theology degree from an accredited seminary. My Master of Arts in Humanities was with a concentration in Religion and Philosophy from California State University, Carson, California. I was ordained to the Christian ministry in 1976.

5. HISTORIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH

The writer will consider the older historiographical method at the outset of Chapter 2. This provides valuable tools which contribute to our historical insights and understanding in the writing of history. Our historiographical approach will turn then to consider modern historical issues in writing contemporary history. The definition of contemporary history, the problem of objectivity, the admission of the historian’s own subjectiveness, historical progress, the ecumenical perspective, the destination of history, the end of history, the role of ideology, and the relationship of church history to world history will be discussed and summarized. The thesis will be judged by historiography where it is applicable in the argumentation.

6. LITERATURE REVIEW

The older historiographical works with which reference is made to are Nevins (1938), Gustavson (1955), Bentley (1999), Gottschalk (1963), Ainslie (1921), Garraghan (1946), Meyer (1960), Schilpp (1939), Rouse (1948), Blackburn & Eley (1984), Von Ranke (1973).


These secondary sources will be especially helpful:


There are considerable resources available in the form of journal articles.

Journal articles will be listed in the References in accordance with Schwertner’s *Internationales Abkurzungsverzeichnis fur Theologie und Grenzgebiete* (1992).


7. **RESEARCH GAP**
The University of Cambridge defines research gap as follows:

Gap analysis consists of defining the present state, the desired or ‘target’ state, and hence the gap between them....In the later stages of problem solving the aim is to look at ways to bridge the gap defined and this may often be accomplished by…intermediate states from the desired state to the present state. [G]ap analysis alone however is not adequate for all problem situations as goals may evolve and emerge during the course of problem solving, ‘what ought to be’ can be a highly variable target (http://www.ifm.eng.cam.ac.uk/dstools/choosing/gapana.html).

The present state is a lack of a historical thesis written on Tillich’s German years (1886-1933). Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy during these years needs to be historically researched, given the proper historical meaning, and interpretation.

The desired state is a historical thesis on Tillich’s German years (1886-1933). This historically researched thesis would focus on Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy from the years (1886-1933). The research gap between the present state and the desired state is the intermediate state. The research gap between the present and desired state is outlined under ‘Literature Review’. The secondary sources listed as proving especially helpful are included in this intermediate state. The shortcomings of these fine works is that they are thematic, topical, and written in a deductive manner using the quantitative research method. Paul Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy is a historical thesis which is written using the inductive approach of qualitative research.

8. CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES FROM THE GERMAN YEARS (1886-1933)

The German controversies surrounding Tillich’s German years (1886-1933) are not the scope of our thesis. The German controversies during the German years have been included when they are a part of the historical context and background of Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy. The historical context and background includes
Tillich’s chronology and autobiography, Tillich’s contemporary historical views during the German years, the Paucks biographical account of Tillich’s German years, the Frankfurt years (1929-1933), major influences upon Tillich, Tillich’s German legacy, Tillich’s historically inherited ancestors, principles, and his theological concepts formed during the German years. The major controversies during the German years are part of the historical context and background of Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy from (1886-1933). These major controversies are part of the historical context and background. These major controversies are his marriage to Hannah Werner, Tillich’s religious socialism, the theological suspicion of heresy which caused Tillich to seek an adjunct position at Leipzig in theology during the Frankfurt years, the unfortunate incident at Frankfurt, the controversy generated by his books *The Religious Situation* and *The Socialist Decision*. The German controversies could be an additional thesis on Paul Tillich.

9. **WHAT IS NEW?**

Paul Tillich is allowed to tell his own story through the harmonization of his own autobiographical accounts. The primary and secondary sources throughout the thesis are allowed to speak for themselves. The thesis uses the qualitative method of research methodology. The qualitative research method makes use of the inductive approach to the study. The quotations which are rather lengthy if need be are given analysis and explanation as the argument is advanced. This is in stark contrast to the deductive method from the quantitative research method. Scholars who use this method approach Tillich with a preconceived idea. The material on
Tillich is then quoted or referred to support their idea. The difference is that the material used to fit the preconceived idea is taken out of context. The quotes and reference are made to say something that they do not say. The quantitative method of research methodology with its deductive approach impose upon Tillich a meaning that is not intended by the sources. My approach using the qualitative method of research with the inductive method allows the sources to speak for themselves. The use of the deductive method of quantitative research methodology is an eisegesis of Tillich. The study on Tillich is made to say something that was never intended to be said. The contrast is to be seen in the exegesis of qualitative research which uses the inductive method. The ideas from the study are lifted out of the document. The meaning comes from the sources rather than from the preconceived idea of the scholar. The kind of research methodology used for the study is important.

The new knowledge contributed to studies on Tillich is that Tillich’s life was determined in Germany during the German years because of his ever increasing commitment to religious socialism. His thinking was formed during the German years because of the numerous influences upon him. Tillich has left us a definite German legacy from the years (1886-1933). Tillich was a product of his German background. Paul Tillich was a German. He received German academic training in German universities. The thesis demonstrates the development of his thought during the German years. He was ordained to the Christian ministry based on German ministerial standards. He left us a German legacy from those years.
The new knowledge from our research findings will show Tillich’s life was determined in Germany, his thinking formed, and a definite legacy bequeathed to us from the German years (1886-1933).

The American perspectives on Tillich omit the German years (1886-1933). The issue is not a matter of the controversial issues surrounding the American perspective on Tillich. This fine idea could become the basis for an additional thesis on Paul Tillich. The focus of our thesis is the German years of Paul Tillich (1886-1933).

It needs to be emphasized again that it is necessary to quote the sources because of the inductive method of qualitative research methodology. It may appear that such lengthy quotes are not necessary at times. However, it is necessary to allow the sources to speak for themselves because qualitative research calls for the use of the inductive method rather than the deductive approach of quantitative research.

10. **THEOLOGICAL METHOD**

Tillich’s theological method during the German years was that of correlation. This has been argued in the thesis. This scheme is from Schelling. Tillich’s concept of being in relationship to his theological concepts formed during the German years is argued in Chapter 7. It is an ongoing debate which is beyond the scope of this thesis as to whether Tillich received his existential theology from Heidegger. Tillich spoke of Schelling as having developed existentialism long before Kierkegaard. This is argued in the thesis. Tillich’s emphasis on the New Being is beyond the scope of this thesis. This formed the basis for his lectures at
Union Seminary in New York during the American years. Tillich’s existentialism of being depicting man’s predicament is from the German years. Tillich saw in Kierkegaard’s thought mankind’s despair with outward reality. Tillich combined Marx’s thought with Kierkegaard’s thought. Marx pointed out the external tensions of the social process in which the individual exists. Karl Marx saw clearly the social contradictions in the individual’s experience because of the capitalistic system.

Tillich’s systematic theology began in Marburg in 1925.

11. CHAPTER OUTLINE

My hypothesis is an idea to be proven. Chapters 1 and 3 argue for the proof that Tillich’s life was determined in Germany. Chapters 4 and 5 argue for the proof that Tillich’s thinking was formed during the German years. Chapter 6 argues for a definite German legacy from those years. My chapters are points to prove the hypothesis/idea. My thesis follows a topical pattern whereby the main head is stated and the chapters become divisions/proofs of that topic. Chapter 2 is the discussion of the historical method and historical issues in the writing of contemporary history. The old historiography gives us valuable tools which contribute to our historical insights and understanding in the writing of history. These historical particulars will become useful where applicable in the argumentation of the thesis. Tillich has been judged throughout the thesis where applicable by the new historiography in the writing of contemporary history. As part of the older historiography, Von Ranke’s thought has been helpful pointing to the need for the hypothesis/guiding principle which the particulars of the study
will fit. Chapter 7 is as well a point to prove the hypothesis arguing for Tillich’s inheritance of historical principles and intellectual ancestors from 1886-1933.

My thesis progresses from a problem to a solution. The problem Tillich’s German years have been passed over without the necessary historical interpretation. The result is that Tillich is misinterpreted and misunderstood. My hypothesis is that the German years are necessary to understand Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy from 1886 to 1933. The new knowledge to surface is that Tillich’s life was determined in Germany, his thinking was formed, and a definite German legacy defined from those years. Tillich will be properly placed on the ecclesiastical spectrum.

The logical progression of the thesis is different than the division of analytical philosophy would be within the subject of Philosophy. This Church History thesis demonstrates its logical progression in the historical movement from Tillich’s life, to his thought, and then to his German legacy. It is demonstrated as well by analysis (synonym is logic) interacting with the sources throughout the sub-headings of the various chapters, chapter summaries, and by the final chapter.

The conclusion will present the research findings and the new knowledge.

Chapter 1 will focus on Paul Tillich’s life based on his own chronology and autobiography.

Chapter 2 will survey the older historiographical method and the newer historical issues in the writing of contemporary history.

Chapter 3 will consider the biographical details of Tillich’s life in Germany from his birth in 1886 to 1933 when he fled from Hitler.
Chapter 4 will examine Tillich’s years as ‘Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-the-Main’ (Tillich 1936:40). Tillich’s thinking was further developed at Frankfurt from 1929 to 1933. The thesis will seek to show Tillich’s purposes while teaching at the University of Frankfurt.

Chapter 5 will consider the influences which formed Tillich’s life, thought, and legacy.

Chapter 6 will deal with a discussion of Paul Tillich’s legacy from the German years.

Chapter 7 shows the wide variety of American value judgments on Paul Tillich. Scholars like Adams, and Leibrecht, Runyon, Carey and O’Keeffe argue that the German years are essential to a historical understanding of his life, thought, and legacy.

Chapter 8 will seek to summarize the thesis drawing the conclusions from the body of the thesis. Tillich will be judged by the standards of historiography. Concluding statements will be made concerning the Ontological question, and Paul Tillich’s German years (1886-1933). The thesis will end with the statement of the New Knowledge contributed to Tillich studies. The new knowledge will be stated in terms of the new historical insight gained from the study of Paul Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy from the German years (1886-1933).
1:1 A Historical Frame of Reference

Tillich’s Background Was German

Paul Tillich’s German years 1886 to 1933 are necessary to understand his life, thought, and legacy. This chapter sets forth Tillich’s chronology and his autobiography. A historical frame of reference will be established based on Tillich’s own chronology and autobiography. An accurate philosophy will then be able to be drawn on Paul Tillich.

Tillich (1967:23-24) was born on August 20, 1886 in Starzeddel, Germany. He attended the humanistic Gymnasium in Konigsberg-Neumark from 1898 to 1900. He (ibid:24) writes: ‘from my twelfth to fourteenth year, I stayed as a pupil of the humanistic Gymnasium, and as a border of two elderly ladies, in Konigsberg-Neumark, a town of seven thousand people with the same kind of medieval remains but bigger and more famous for their Gothic perfection’. In 1900, Tillich’s father Johannes ‘was called to an important position in Berlin’ (ibid:29).

Tillich (ibid:33) elaborates on the move to Berlin and his development to the year 1914:

I became a pupil at a humanistic Gymnasium in Old Berlin, passed my final examinations in 1904, and was matriculated in the theological faculties of Berlin, Tubingen, and Halle. In 1909 I took my first, in 1911 my second theological examination. In 1911 I acquired the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Breslau and in 1912 the degree of Licentiate of Theology in Halle. In the latter year I received ordination into the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the province of Brandenburg. Tillich joined the German Army as a war chaplain in 1914.
Tillich continues on the First World War and his position as chaplain. He (ibid:38-39) writes:

The First World War was the end of my period of preparation. Together with my whole generation I was grasped by the overwhelming experience of a nationwide community—the end of a merely individualistic and predominantly theoretical existence. I volunteered and was asked to serve as a war chaplain, which I did from September 1914 to September 1918.

Tillich (ibid:39) continues on the reality of the First World War:

The first weeks had not passed before my original enthusiasm disappeared; after a few months I became convinced that the war would last indefinitely and ruin all Europe. Above all, I saw that the unity of the first weeks was an illusion, that the nation was split into classes, and that the industrial masses considered the Church as an unquestioned ally of the ruling groups. This situation became more and more manifest toward the end of the war. It produced the revolution, in which imperial Germany collapsed. The way in which this situation produced the religious-socialist movement in Germany has often been described. I want, however, to add a few reflections. I was in sympathy with the social side of the revolution even before 1918, that side which soon was killed by the interference of the victors, by weakness of the socialists and their need to use the Army against the communists; also by inflation and the return of all the reactionary powers in the middle of the Twenties.

His academic career in Germany was as follows: ‘I was Lecturer in Theology in Berlin, Professor of the Science of Religion in Dresden and Professor Honorarius of Theology in Leipzig, Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-Main’ (Tillich 1966:58). Tillich omits the Marburg years from this description. He (1952:14) writes of the Marburg years:

It was a benefit when, after almost five years in Berlin, my friendly adviser, the minister of education, Karl Becker, forced me against my desire into a theological professorship in Marburg. During the three semesters of my teaching there I met the first radical effects of the neo-orthodox theology on theological students: cultural problems were excluded from theological thought; theologians like Schleiermacher, Harnack, Troeltsch, Otto, were contemptuously rejected; social and political ideas were banned from theological discussions. The contrast with the experiences in Berlin was overwhelming, at first depressing and then
inciting: a new way had to be found. In Marburg, in 1925, I began work on my Systematic Theology, the first volume of which appeared in 1951. At the same time that Heidegger was in Marburg as professor of philosophy, influencing some of the best students, existentialism in its twentieth century form crossed my path. It took years before I became fully aware of the impact of this encounter on my own thinking. I resisted, I tried to learn, I accepted the new way of thinking more than the answers it gave.

Tillich was ‘Privatdozent of theology at the University of Berlin (from 1919 to 1924)’ (ibid:13). Tillich taught at Marburg for three semesters beginning in 1924 (1952:14). In 1925, Tillich ‘was called to Dresden and shortly afterward to Leipzig’ (ibid:14). In 1929, Paul Tillich received a call to the University of Frankfurt (ibid:14). It was in April of 1933 that Tillich was dismissed from his teaching post at Frankfurt. Tillich left Germany arriving in the United States on November 3, 1933 (Pauck & Pauck 1976:138-139).

Tillich (1967:41-42) writes of his experience at Berlin from 1919 to 1924:

As a Privatdozent of Theology at the University of Berlin from (1919 to 1924), I lectured on subjects which included the relation of religion to politics, art, philosophy, depth psychology, and sociology. It was a “theology of culture” that I presented in my lectures on the philosophy of religion, its history and its structure. The situation during those years in Berlin was very favorable for such an enterprise. Political problems determined our whole existence; even after revolution and inflation they were matters of life and death. The social structure was in a state of dissolution; human relations with respect to authority, education family, sex, friendship, and pleasure were in a creative chaos. Revolutionary art came into the foreground, supported by the Republic, attacked by the majority of the people. Psychoanalytic ideas spread and produced a consciousness of realities which had been carefully repressed in previous generations. Participation in these movements created manifold problems, conflicts, fears, expectations, ecstasies, and despairs, practically as well as theoretically. All this was at the same time material for an apologetic theology.

Professor Tillich (ibid:43) tells of his experience at Dresden in 1925:
I was called to Dresden and shortly thereafter to Leipzig also. I went to Dresden, declining a more traditional theological position in Giessen because of the openness of the big city both spatially and culturally. Dresden was a center of visual art, painting, architecture, dance, opera, with all of which I kept in close touch.

Tillich (ibid:43) continues on the call to Frankfurt:

The cultural situation was not much different when, in 1929, I received and accepted a call as professor of philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. Frankfurt was the most modern and liberal university in Germany, but it had no theological faculty. So it was quite appropriate that my lectures moved on the boundary line between philosophy and theology and tried to make philosophy existential for the numerous students who were obliged to take the philosophical classes.

In another autobiography, Tillich (1936:40) concludes on his degrees and academic career:

my professional career: Doctor of Philosophy in Breslau, Licentiate of Theology and later Doctor of Theology (honoris causa) in Halle; Privat Dozent of Theology in Halle and Berlin; Professor of the Science of Religion in Dresden and at the same time Professor Honorarius of Theology in Leipzig; Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-the-Main.

In this version of his autobiography, Tillich (ibid:40) references an honorary doctorate in theology from Halle. He claims he was Privatdozent of Theology at Halle and Berlin. (ibid:40). Tillich’s (1948:ix-xxix) The Protestant Era is silent on both his honorary doctorate and his position at Halle. In his 1952 account, Tillich’s position is as ‘Privatdozent of theology at the University of Berlin (from 1919 to 1924)’ (Tillich 1952:13). In his 1966 autobiography, Tillich claims a ‘Doctor of Theology (honoris causa) in Halle’ (Tillich 1966:58). He states he ‘was Lecturer in Theology in Berlin’ but makes no mention of his lecturer position at Halle (ibid:58). In his 1967 autobiography, Tillich (1967:33) writes: ‘After the end of the war I became a
Privatdozent of Theology at the University of Berlin, the beginning of my academic career’. His position at the University of Berlin as a Privatdozent of Theology was the start of his academic career. It could be Tillich did work as Privatdozent of Theology at Halle when he was Privatdozent at the University of Berlin. This is based on what happened to Tillich while he was teaching at Dresden. He was at Dresden from 1925 to 1929. At Dresden, Tillich was ‘Professor of the Science of Religion in Dresden and at the same time Professor Honorarius of Theology in Leipzig’ (Tillich 1936:40). ‘Privatdozent of Theology in Halle and Berlin’ must mean at the same time (ibid:40).

Tillich (1967:33) does say he began his academic career at the University of Berlin. Tillich’s autobiographical accounts are unclear on this point of his being a Privatdozent at Halle. The comparision of the various Tillich autobiographical accounts show a discrepancy on this point. Thomas (2000:5-6) clarifies Tillich’s appointment at Halle:

In early 1916 Tillich obtained leave to go to Halle to deliver a trial lecture which he had been composing in the trenches. He was not able to do that until the following June; for, after the comparatively tranquil opening of 1916, he was involved in the battle for Verdun with its hellish struggle and enormous loss of life. Comforting the wounded and the dying and burying the dead, Tillich suffered seemingly endless anguish and-not surprisingly-his first nervous breakdown. Even so, he made a rapid enough recovery to be able to visit Halle in July to deliver his lecture, and as a result he was appointed Privatdozent of theology.

Thomas (ibid:10) continues: ‘Tillich had qualified as a Privatdozent in the University of Halle; but before the war ended he was advised to transfer that qualification to the University of Berlin, where he might well find an academic opportunity’. Thomas (ibid: 17) answers the question of Tillich’s honorary doctorate from Halle:

Already now a successful university teacher, Tillich had the good fortune to
be singled out for appointment as Professor of Religious Studies in the
deptartment of humanities at the Dresden Institute of Technology, largely
on the strength of his reputation as a Schelling scholar. The combined
attention of a full professor’s salary and of the cultural opportunities of a
large city were irresistible. An interesting footnote can be added to the story
here: Tillich was helped to this position by Richard Kroner, who was already
in Dresden….By this time he had established himself as a successful author
with the publication of *The Religious Situation (Die religiose Gegenwart, Berlin,
1925)* and such important papers as his ‘Philosophy of religion’ (*Lehrbuch der
Philosophie*, ed. Max Desoir, Berlin, 1925). Evidently it was not only his Dresden
students who came to see Tillich as a rising star in the theological firmament; for
during his first years in Dresden he was awarded the honorary degree of doctor of
theology by the University of Halle.

Tillich’s honorary degree was granted by the University of Halle during his years
at the Dresden Institute of Technology.

In analysis, Tillich was born in Starzeddel, Germany on August 20, 1886. He
attended the humanistic Gymnasium first in Konigsberg-Neumark in 1898 and later in
Berlin in 1901. Tillich graduated from the Gymnasium in 1904. His university studies
followed in Berlin, Tubingen, and Halle. He graduated from university in 1907. Tillich
had to prepare to pass two theological exams in order to be ordained. His first exam
was taken in 1909 and the second exam attempted in 1911. Tillich received his Doctor of
Philosophy degree in 1911 from the University of Breslau. This was followed by the degree
Licentiate of Theology in 1912 from the University of Halle. Tillich was ordained by the
Evangelical Lutheran Church.

Tillich served as a chaplain in the German army from 1914 to 1918. His academic
teaching career began as Privatdozent of theology at Berlin (1919-1924), at Marburg (1924-
1925), at Dresden (1925-1929), Leipzig (1927-1929), and Frankfurt (1929-1933). His years
at Leipzig was as an adjunct professor in theology while he was serving at Dresden. Tillich
received an honorary doctorate from the University of Halle while he was teaching at Dresden.

1:2 Tillich Recalls the German Years – 1886 to 1904

1:2:1 Tillich’s Encounter With Nature And Fascination With History

Tillich reviews the details of his life of how he was influenced during those years in Germany. Two points that are striking in his recounting of the German years are his encounter with nature and his fascination with history (Tillich 1952:4-6). Paul Tillich was a Lutheran pastor’s son. He was raised in a manse which left a definite impression upon him and the experience of the Holy (ibid:6). He read Rudolph Otto’s *Idea of the Holy*. This work helped Tillich interpret his life, his experiences with nature, and the history of the Holy One. This became part of Tillich’s thinking from the beginning. It was like a compass and a constitution. Paul Tillich (1967:28) points to these experiences in nature, history, and Otto’s concept of the Holy as determining factors in the formation of his philosophy of religion. The mystical, sacramental, and aesthetic are three clear implications of the *Idea of the Holy* described by Rudolph Otto (ibid:28). The ethical and rational elements of religion became a necessary part of Tillich’s experience with the divine. In addition to Otto, Tillich names Schleiermacher with his emphasis on the mystical which contributed to both Christian and non-Christian mysticism (ibid:28-29). Tillich (1967:24-25) writes:

> These early impressions may partly account for what has been challenged as the romantic trend in my feeling and thinking. One side of the so-called romanticism is my relationship to nature. It is expressed in a predominantly aesthetic meditative attitude toward nature as distinguished from a scientific-analytical or technical-controlling relation. It is the reason for the tremendous emotional impact that
Schellings’s philosophy of nature made upon me- although I was well aware that this philosophy was scientifically impossible. It is theologically formulated in my doctrine of the participation of nature in the process of fall and salvation.

Church festivals could run for days or even weeks. The mysteries that affected Tillich’s spirituality as a child were the sayings and concepts of the Bible. This worked to create an ecclesiastical background for Tillich (1936:41-42). Tillich stood within the Lutheran tradition. Tillich (ibid:54 in Carey 2002:4-5) writes: ‘I, myself, belong to Lutheranism by birth, education, religious experience, and theological reflection. I have never stood on the borders of Lutheranism and Calvinism….The substance of my religion is and remains Lutheran….Not only my theological, but also my philosophical thinking expresses the Lutheran substance’.

It is of interest that Tillich draws attention to the time of his birth as being that of the nineteenth century (Tillich 1936:23). He was raised initially in a small town in eastern Germany (ibid:29). Automobiles and the absence of a secondary railway created deep yearnings within Tillich for a greater adventure (ibid:29-30). His family took a yearly trip to the Baltic Sea. Its horizon stretched to infinity which was a real adventure for young Paul (ibid:29). Every year found the Tillich family making trips to Berlin which was an escape for Tillich from the humdrum of life in his small town. The city of Berlin was a great experience for Tillich as a child. Later, his father was called to an important position in Berlin. The Tillich family moved to Berlin in 1900. Paul Tillich remarks that he was able to learn the mysteries of a great city. This was one of the wonders of the world to the teenage Tillich (ibid:29).
Tillich’s German Society

The authoritarian nature of German society did not set well with Tillich. The highly structured bureaucratic society went back to a strong central government in Berlin. Officials were obedient to their superiors and they in turn displayed an authoritarian approach to those under their rule. A nationalistic spirit pervaded all of German society especially in the army. The army according to Tillich was an oppressive force on all of German society. Tillich did not outgrow the social impact of this until he was thirty years of age. Tillich was intimidated by the hierarchy which eventually stopped with the King of Prussia who was also the German Emperor. Those who did not give adherence to the King of Prussia and his house were considered less than patriotic (ibid:30-31). It took the first World War to end this rigid bureaucratic system that Tillich was raised under in Germany. Post-war Germany was a different society with adherence to democratic principles and allowance for those who espoused social revolution (ibid:31).

The home that Tillich grew up in was oppressive to his religious and political views. Tillich’s father was a very strong Lutheran in his beliefs. Tillich’s mother had a moral outlook of a Calvinist derived from Reformed Protestantism. Paul Tillich suffered during these years from guilt produced because parental authority was equated with divine authority. Yet, some of Tillich’s happiest memories were those of long philosophical discussions with his father (ibid:31-32). Tillich was an autonomous spirit. He rejected authority which took away his individual autonomy.
Tillich was very much an individual and his meaning in life came from being an individual rather than from society. Karl Barth accused Tillich of ‘still fighting against the Grand Inquisitor’ (ibid:32-33). The system of autonomy was Tillich’s Protestant Principle. This was his refutation whenever a heteronomous system appeared on Tillich’s horizon. This individual fight was always necessary and has always been necessary throughout history. Further, Tillich was accused of being both of the persuasion of neo-orthodoxy and of being a liberal. The two motives of being a romantic and a revolutionary were two accusations that Tillich had to fight throughout his life (ibid:33). Tillich (ibid:33) writes: ‘The balancing of these motives has remained the basic problem of my thought and of my life ever since’. It is important to note that these two elements which Tillich retained were a challenge to him throughout his entire life. The romantic and the revolutionary elements were acquired during the German years (ibid:33).

1:2:3 Tillich’s German Academic Training

Tillich elaborates on his years as ‘a pupil in a “humanistic Gymnasium”’ (ibid:34). He (ibid:34-35) writes:

A Gymnasium, compared with American institutions, consists of high school plus two years of college. The normal age for finishing the Gymnasium is eighteen. A humanistic Gymnasium has as its central subjects Greek and Latin. …The problem of the humanistic education is its relation to the religious tradition which, even without a special religious instruction, is that between religion and humanistic traditions (of which the scientific world view is only a part) have been, ever since the Renaissance, in continuous tension. The German humanistic Gymnasium was one of the places in which this tension was most manifest. While we were introduced into classical antiquity in formal
classes meeting about ten hours a week for about eight years, we encountered the Christian tradition at home, in the church, in directly religious instructions in school and outside the school, and in direct religious information in history, literature, and philosophy. The result of this tension was either a decision against one side or the other, or a general skepticism or a split-consciousness which drove one to attempt to overcome the conflict constructively. The latter way, the way of synthesis, was my own way. It follows the classical German philosophers from Kant to Hegel and has remained a driving force in all my theological work. It has found its final form in my Systematic Theology.

In his work *The Interpretation of History*, Tillich (1936:3) writes:

In the introduction to my *Religiose Verwirklichung* (Religious Realization) I had written: “The border line is the truly propitious place for acquiring knowledge.” When I received the invitation to give an account of how my ideas have grown from my life, it came to me that the concept of the border line might be the fitting symbol of the whole of my personal and intellectual development. It has been my fate, in almost every direction, to stand between alternative possibilities of existence, to be completely at home in neither, to take no definitive stand against each either. As fruitful as such a position is for thought, since thinking presupposes receptiveness to fresh possibilities, it is difficult and dangerous for life, which steadily demands decisions and thus exclusion of alternatives. From this disposition and these tensions have come both destiny and task.

It is not the purpose of this thesis to expound all the boundary concepts of Tillich.

Our purpose is to point out that Tillich’s ideas, his destiny, and task were determined during the German years. In his 1966 *On the Boundary*, Tillich maintains the same concept as he held during the German years. He ascribes the two temperaments of his father and mother as contributing to his character (Tillich 1966:13-15). He tosses out the question of whether this was merely heredity or his recall of early childhood (ibid:14). He could not decide. Tillich spoke of his being on the boundary between the German city and country (ibid:15-19). His childhood experiences at the sea each year contributed to his later thinking. This was especially true with his theory of the Dynamic
Mass in the essay *The Mass and the Spirit* (ibid:18). Tillich acknowledges as well his doctrine of the Absolute stated in terms of both ground and abyss (ibid:18). It was the sea that fed Tillich’s imagination for these thoughts. Much of Tillich’s inspiration in his writing is attributed to being among trees and at the seaside (Tillich 1936:7-8). Tillich (1966:18) refers to Nietzsche as deciding the validity of an idea only if it occurred in the realm of nature. Tillich had access to the children of the privileged bourgeois. This was due to his father’s social standing as a Lutheran pastor. He chose against the bourgeois. Tillich was opposed to the bourgeois which led him to the socialist position. He played as a child with the children of the aristocracy that owned land. These landowners were considered the old nobility (Tillich 1936:8-12). Later, Tillich would espouse the doctrine of Religious Socialism. Tillich (ibid:12) writes:

> The fact also, that I never stood seriously on the border of, the small bourgeois type of life, but rather, like many of the same group repudiated it with an apparent, even if half-unconscious, arrogance, brought about an intellectual and personal destiny; intellectual insofar is the striving to come out of every sort of narrowness, brought constantly into the range of vision new possibilities and realms, and made the limitations, which is necessary for every intellectual and social realization difficult; personal, insofar as the middle class militaristic revolution affected the described group most forcibly and destroyed it with its intellectual and economic presuppositions. The answer to this partly justifiable, partly unjustifiable repudiation of the lower middle class by the intelligentsia, was the hateful persecution of German intelligentsia by the representatives of the romantic middle-class ideology.

Tillich attributes his socialistic beliefs to be the determiner of both his intellectual and personal destiny. New opportunities were open to Tillich as a result of his commitment to socialism. Further, Tillich (1936:12) experienced persecution based on German class
warfare (ibid:12). Tillich’s position on the boundary moves to that of reality and imagination. He (ibid:13) writes: ‘For some years certain ‘imaginative’ worlds constituted true reality for me, into which I withdrew as often as possible from the external reality not taken seriously by me. That was the time from my fourteenth to seventeenth years of age’. At age seventeen, this changed when he moved from a romantic imagination to what Tillich terms a philosophical imagination (ibid:13). Tillich excelled at turning abstract realities into concrete realities (ibid:13).

Tillich was marked out for theory. He (ibid:17) writes:

There was never any doubt in my own mind or in the judgment of others that I was marked out for theory, and not practical activity. Beginning with the first crisis, at the age of eight. I was marked out for theory, and not practical activity. When I encountered the conception of the “Infinite” through the absorption of Christian dogmatics in school and in pre-confirmation instruction, and through the eager devouring of popular books as Weltanschauung, it was clear that theoretical and not practical mastery of existence would be my task and destiny.

Tillich (ibid:17-18) denotes a second factor that kept him in the theoretical sphere:

My internal struggles for the truth of traditional religion also held me in the sphere of theory. In the life of religion, however, theory means something other than philosophical contemplation of Being. In religious truth the stake is one’s very existence and the question is to be or not to be. Religious truth is existential truth, and to that extent it cannot be separated from practice. Religious truth is acted-in accord with the Gospel of St. John.

However, Tillich (ibid:18) realized: ‘that one sided devotion to theory rested upon the same escape from reality as the flight into phantasy already mentioned’. Tillich’s early years should not be underestimated as to their formation on his life, thought, and the German legacy to follow.
In analyzing this section, Tillich recalls his encounter with nature and his fascination with history. He was the son of a Lutheran pastor. Tillich was raised in a church manse. His reading of Rudolph Otto’s *Idea of the Holy One* particularly Otto’s concept of the Holy contributed later to his philosophy of religion.

Tillich had a religious upbringing which created an ecclesiastical background for him. The Lutheran Church, church festivals, and sayings and concepts of the Bible were part of his early years. His childhood experiences contributed to his theological development. The medieval atmosphere of his small town and the family vacations at the Baltic Sea with its infinite horizon were contributing factors. Later, Tillich’s life in Berlin in 1900 contributed to his political and social views. Tillich’s home was not conducive to his religious and political views. His father was a Lutheran pastor with strong beliefs. His mother had the moral outlook of a Calvinist. His childhood play with the children of the old landed nobility (bourgeois) influenced Tillich towards socialism. Tillich understood the tensions as a child between the privileged and underprivileged class. His socialistic beliefs determined both his intellectual and personal destiny. Tillich’s years in the humanistic Gymnasium created an internal conflict with his Christian faith.

1:3 The Period of Tillich’s Preparation - 1905-1914 (includes two years of church work)

1:3:1 Tillich Educated in German Universities

Tillich had studied privately before his matriculation ‘as a student of theology’ (ibid:35). He (ibid:35) writes: ‘When I entered the university I had
a good knowledge of the history of philosophy and a basic acquaintance with Kant and Fichte. Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling followed, and Schelling became the special subject of my study. Both my doctoral dissertation and my thesis for the degree of Licentiate of Theology dealt with Schelling’s philosophy of religion’. Tillich (1952:5) believed ‘that nature mysticism was possible and real’. Tillich (1967:36) concludes: ‘Nevertheless I was a theologian, because the existential question of our ultimate concern and the existential answer of the Christian message are and always have been predominant in my spiritual life’.

Tillich’s (ibid:36) comments on his reason for becoming a theologian:

The fifteen years from 1904 to 1909 in various ways contributed to this decision. My experiences as a student of theology in Halle from 1905 to 1907 were quite different from those of theological student Leverkuhn in Thomas Mann’s *Doctor Faustus* in the same period. There was a group of great theologians to whom we listened and with whom we wrestled intellectually in seminars and personal discussions. One thing we learned above all was that Protestant theology is by no means obsolete but that it can, without losing its Christian foundation incorporate strictly scientific methods, a critical philosophy, a realistic understanding of men and society, and powerful ethical principles and motives. Certainly we felt that much was left undone by our teachers and had to be done by ourselves. But this feeling of every new generation need not obviate the gratefulness for what it has received from its predecessors.

Carey (2002:5) writes: ‘Many of Tillich’s formative mentors (Hegel, Kierkegaard, Schelling) were Lutherans’. In addition, Carey (ibid:5) continues: ‘Tillich’s teachers were predominantly Lutherans: Martin Kahler, Ernest Troeltsch, and Adolf Von Harnack all stood in the Lutheran tradition, although they had their quarrels with the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Prussia’.

Tillich joined the Wingolf Society at the University of Halle (Thomas 2000:4).
Carey (2002:3) confirms it was 1905 to 1907 that Tillich was a student at Halle. Thomas (2000:4) adds: ‘This was a non-residential society which aimed to provide university students with a sense of community, fostering this by formal social gatherings’. Tillich (1948:xiii) writes: ‘The power of the Protestant principle first became apparent to me in the classes of my theological teacher, Martin Kaehler [Kahler], a man who in his personality and theology combined traditions of Renaissance humanism and German classicism with a profound understanding of the Reformation with strong elements of the religious awakening of the middle of the nineteenth century’. Tillich (ibid:xv) continues: ‘The radical and universal interpretation of the idea of justification through faith had important theological consequences beyond the personal. If it is valid, no realm of life can exist without relation to something unconditional, to an ultimate concern’. Martin Kaehler and William Lutgert at the University of Halle were Tillich’s ‘most important teachers’ (Tillich 1936:32). Tillich confirms his debt to Kahler for the ‘insight he gave me into the all-controlling character of the Pauline-Lutheran idea of justification’ (ibid:32). He acknowledges his understanding of the Old Testament to Wellhausen and Gunkel (ibid:33). His ‘historical insights into the New Testament I owe principally to Albert Schweitzer’s *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* and Bultmann’s *Synoptische Tradition* (ibid:33). Another important figure was Jacob Bohme of whom Tillich (ibid:54) writes: ‘With him as mediator, Lutheran Mysticism had an influence on Schelling and German Idealism, and through Schelling again on Irrationalism and the philosophy of life of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’.
Tillich admits his thought to have been formed from those who proceeded him.

Further Tillich (ibid:36-37) admits:

Important influences on our theological existence came from other sides. One of them was our discovery of Kierkegaard and the shaking impact of his dialectical psychology. It was a prelude to what happened in the 1920s when Kierkegaard became the saint of the theologians as well as of the philosophers. But it was only a prelude; for the spirit of the nineteenth century still prevailed, and we hoped that the great synthesis between Christianity and humanism could be achieved with the tools of German classical philosophy. Another prelude to the things to come occurred in the period between my student years and the beginning of the First World War. It was the encounter with Schelling’s second period, especially with his so-called “Postive Philosophy.” Here lies the philosophically decisive break with Hegel and the beginning of that movement which today is called Existentialism. I was ready for it when it appeared in full strength after the First World War, and I saw it in the light of that general revolt against Hegel’s system of reconciliation which occurred in the decades after Hegel’s death and which, through Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche, has become decisive for the destiny of the twentieth century.

Tillich’s admission is advanced where he admits the influence of Kierkegaard, Schelling, Marx and Nietzsche. It was through Schelling that enabled Tillich to break with Hegel. Tillich (1936:31) remembered how he had come under the influence of Schelling: ‘Partly by chance of a bargain purchase, and partly by inner affinity I came under the influence of Schelling, whose collected works I read through several times with enthusiasm’.

Tillich recalls with fondness his student years. He (ibid:37) writes:

But once more I must return to my student years. The academic life in Germany in these years was extremely individualistic. There were no dormitories for students and few, impersonal activities for the student body as such. The religious life was almost completely separated from the life of the churches; chaplains for the students did not exist and could hardly be imagined. The relation with the professors and their families was sporadic and in many cases completely absent. It is this situation which
made the fraternities in Germany much more important than they are in this country. My membership in such a fraternity with Christian principles was not only a most happy but also a most important experience. Only after the First World War, when my eyes became opened to the political and social scene, did I realize the tremendous dangers of our prewar academic privileges. And I looked with great concern at the revival of the fraternities in post-Hitler Germany. But in my student years the fraternity gave me a communion (the first one after the family) in which friendship, spiritual exchange on a very high level, intentional and unintentional education, joy of living, seriousness about the problems of communal life generally, and Christian communal life especially, could daily be experienced. I question whether without this experience I would have understood the meaning of the church existentially and theoretically.

Tillich concludes that this experience during his student years helped him in his understanding of the ‘meaning of the church existentially and theoretically’ (ibid:37).

Later, Tillich (ibid:37-38) rejected the idealism of Troeltsch because his thinking made it impossible to deal with relativism. Tillich (ibid:38) conceived ‘a philosophy of history …of history of religious socialism’. On April 18, 1912 Tillich was ordained as a minister of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. It was during the next two years that Tillich worked as an Assistant Pastor in a working class neighborhood in Berlin (Thomas 2000:3). Tillich (1936:19) writes: ‘My university studies were succeeded by two years of church work and four years as field chaplain on the Western front’.

The critical analysis of this section points to Schelling becoming the focus of Tillich’s study. Tillich wrote two dissertations on Schelling’s work. His educational experience at Halle under Martin Kahler was theologically productive for Tillich./ He understood the Pauline-Lutheran idea of justification and the power of the Protestant principle. Jacob Bohme’s Lutheran Mysticism added to Tillich’s theological thought.
Tillich claims that Schelling’s Positive Philosophy was the beginning of the movement known as Existentialism. It was Schelling who made possible the break from Hegel between Tillich’s student years and the beginning of World War I. Tillich developed as well his own philosophy of the history of religious socialism. Tillich was ordained on April 18, 1912. He worked as an assistant pastor in the working man’s section of Berlin. The sequence of our thesis progresses to give attention to another autobiographical consideration on Tillich’s service in the German army from 1914 to 1918.

1:4 The War Years 1914-1918

1:4:1 Tillich Turns To Art And Karl Marx’s Thinking

Tillich (1967:33) ‘joined the German army as a war chaplain’. He (1952:12) writes: ‘I volunteered, and was asked to serve as a war chaplain, which I did from September, 1914, to September, 1919’. This must be a typographical error since the war ended in 1918. Tillich tells of the effects of the war on him:

Like most of the intellectuals of Germany before the War, my attitude towards politics had been essentially one of indifference. Neither did the ever-present consciousness of social guilt express itself in a political will. Only in the last year of the War, and in the months of collapse and revolution did the political backgrounds of the World War, the interrelation between Capitalism and Imperialism, the crisis of bourgeois society, the class cleavage, and so forth, become visible to me. The immense pressure that had rested upon us during the War, threatening to obscure the idea of God, or to color it demonically, found relief in the discovery of the human responsibility for the War and in the hope of the refashioning of human society.

Tillich (1966:27) experienced ‘horror, ugliness and destructiveness of war’. He
sought comfort in paintings. He (ibid:27) continues: ‘My delight even in the poor reproductions obtainable at the military bookstores developed into a systematic study of the history of art. And out of this study came the experience of art’. Tillich received an Iron Cross for his courage to those who were wounded and dying during this war (Thomas 2000:3). Reimer (2004:34) writes: ‘Tillich soon after the First World War became a Religious Socialist’. Tillich (1967:39) saw Germany was divided into classes, the industrialized masses, the Church was seen as an ally of the ruling groups. He (ibid:39) writes: ‘This situation became more and more manifest toward the end of the war’. The First World War produced the revolution. The result was ‘imperial Germany collapsed’ (ibid:39). The ‘religious-socialist movement in Germany’ came into being (ibid:39). Tillich (ibid:39) elaborates on his sympathy for the social problems of Germany that: ‘has roots in my early childhood which are hard to trace’. He (ibid:39) concludes:

Perhaps it was a drop of the blood which induced my grandmother to build barricades in the revolution of 1848, perhaps it was the deep impression upon me made by the words of the Hebrew prophets against injustice and by the words of Jesus against the rich; all these were words I learned by heart in my early years. But whatever it was, it broke out ecstatically in those years and remained a continuing reality, although mixed with resignation and some bitterness about the division of the world into all-powerful groups between which the remnants of a democratic and religious socialism are crushed.

The First World War brought Tillich to a realization of the importance of painting. He longed for beauty rather than the ugliness produced by war (Tillich 1936:14-15). Thus began Tillich’s systematic study of art. Philosophical and theological interpretation was given to the art that Tillich studied. German
paintings reflected the longings of the lives of German society (ibid:15-17).

Tillich’s autonomy had been won by a long hard struggle up to the end of the First World War (ibid:22-23).

In interacting with the sources of this section, it was during the war years (1914-1918) that Tillich began his study of art. He longed for beauty from the horrors and devastation of World War I. Tillich’s systematic study of art resulted in a theology of art. Secondly, Tillich realized that German unity was a myth. Class warfare was very evident in German society. Tillich became interested in politics particularly the thinking of Karl Marx. Tillich became a socialist. The continuance of our thesis now considers Tillich’s post World War I German society.

1:5 Post World War I Germany

The ideal and reality were two elements to appear in post World War I German society. Professional schools appeared in Germany with their goal of providing professional training. The humanistic faculty of philosophy was free now from those restrictions of professional schools. The philosophic faculties were to be ruled by a predetermined idea of what philosophy was to be. The question of human existence was to be answered by the Logos (ibid:8). These German years clearly delineated for Tillich what the study of philosophy was to involve, the question of human existence, and the Logos. Political and religious alliances were to be at the very foremost of the academic study in postwar Germany. Spiritual and social problems that man faced in contemporary German society were to be addressed.
To some extent Tillich’s postwar German society determined his approach in his teaching career. The divide between the theoretical and the practical was with Tillich in postwar Germany (ibid:17-22). Yet events in Europe dictated a return to heteronomies both old and new (ibid:8).

In analyzing the material, postwar German society following World War I had to rethink the nature of its schools. Professional schools appeared which provided professional training. The humanistic faculty of philosophy was free from the restrictions of the professional schools. The philosophical faculty was to answer the question of human existence and the Logos. Academic study must include political and religious alliances. Human problems both the spiritual and the social were to be addressed by the philosophical faculty. The theoretical and the practical were very evident in Germany following the First World War. Tillich’s style of teaching was to some extent determined by this division within German education.

1:6 Tillich’s Commitment to Religious Socialism

1:6:1 Tillich’s Ever Increasing Commitment to Religious Socialism

Tillich experienced conflict in Germany based on class warfare. He had access to the children of the privileged class due to his father’s social standing. His childhood play was with the children of the aristocracy. These landowners were considered the old nobility. Tillich understood the tensions between the privileged and underprivileged classes (Tillich 1936:8-12). Later, Tillich would adopt the doctrine of religious socialism. Tillich (ibid:9-10) writes: ‘The special elaboration of religious socialism attempted by
me first in the *Grundlinien des religiosen Sozialismus* (Principles of Religious
Socialism), then in my book *Die sozialistische Entscheidung* (Socialistic Decision)
has its roots in this attitude’. Tillich joined a small socialist group which stood in
direct opposition to the bourgeois lifestyle (ibid:10). Tillich (ibid:11-12) writes:

The deep-rooted protest against the distinct bourgeois type of life was expressed
in my affection for the small social group, for which the name “Boheme” is
actually no longer an adequate term; which, however, has kept a joint relation
of intellectual productivity and criticism and genuine non-bourgeois life in
theory and practice. Artists, actors, journalists, and writers had a decided
influence within this group. [A]s theologian and academician I stood at the
border line. This group recognized itself by an obvious lack of certain
bourgeois conventionalities in thought and manners, and by an intellectual
radicalism and a marked ability for ironical self-criticism. They met not only
in certain cafes, houses, parlors, but also at certain places at the seashore, not
frequented by the lower middle class. They were inclined toward radical political
criticism and felt more akin with the communist worker than with the members of
their own class. They lived in the international movements of art and literature,
were skeptical, religiously radical and romantic; influenced by Nietzsche,
antimilitaristic, psychoanalytical and expressionistic. [T]he opponent of this
group was neither the feudal man nor well-to-do bourgeois; both were represented
in the “Boheme.” They sought admittance to it successfully and in exchange
offered social and economic privileges. Its opponent was the small bourgeois,
the middle class with its prejudices, its pretensions, its remoteness from the
intellectual, especially from problems of artistic nature, its need of security and
its distrust of the intelligentsia.

Tillich (ibid:12) elaborates:

The fact also, that I never stood seriously on the border of, the small bourgeois
type of life, but rather, like many of the same group repudiated it with an
apparent, even if half-consciousness, arrogance, brought about an intellectual
and personal destiny; intellectual insofar is the striving to come out of every
sort of narrowness, brought constantly into the range of vision new possibilities
and realms, and made the limitations, which is necessary for every intellectual
and social realization difficult’ personal, insofar as the middle class militaristic
revolution affected described group most forcibly and destroyed it with its
intellectual and economic presuppositions. The answer to this partly justifiable,
partly unjustifiable repudiation of the lower middle class by the intelligentsia,
was the hateful persecution of German intelligentsia by the representatives of the romantic middle-class ideology.

Tillich attributes his Christian socialistic philosophy as the determiner of his intellectual and personal destiny. New opportunities were open to Tillich as a result of his commitment to socialism. Secondly, Tillich experienced persecution as a result of German class warfare.

It was in 1920 that Tillich joined the ‘Berlin Group’. This group was also known as the ‘Kairos Circle’ (Thomas 2000:14). Thomas (ibid:14) adds: ‘Tillich was not only active as leader of the group but, as one of the main exponents of its ideas, he contributed many articles to the small journal which Mennicke edited Blatt für religiosen Sozialismus (Pages for Religious Socialism)’. Tillich (1936:19-20) writes:

Thus, when soon after the revolution the call was sounded for the religious-socialist movement I could not and would not refuse it. At first, indeed, that meant only theoretical work on the problem of “religion and socialism.” The working circle I belonged to was a group of professors: Mennicke, Heimann, Lowe, and others, all explicitly concerned with theory. But the goal of the work was ultimately political; thus it was inevitable that a number of problems of practical politics developed, leading to conflicts between theoretical and practical attitudes.

Tillich (1967:40-41) had turned to the thinking of Karl Marx. He (1936:62-63) writes of Marx:

According to Marx, philosophy as such (which he identified with philosophy of essence) seeks to obscure the contradiction of existence, to disregard that which is of importance to the real human being, namely the social contradictions which determine his existence in the world. These contradictions, concretely expressed, the conflict of the social classes, show that idealism is an ideology, namely a
system of concepts, whose function it is to cover up the contrast of reality.

Tillich (1967:40-41) elaborates further his relation to Karl Marx:

It has always been dialectical, combining a Yes and a No. The Yes was based on the prophetic, humanistic, and realistic elements in Marx’s passionate style and profound thought, the No on the calculating, materialistic, and resentful elements in Marx’s analysis, polemics, and propaganda. If one makes Marx responsible for everything done by Stalin and the system for which he stands, an unambiguous No against Marx is the necessary consequence. If one considers the transformation of the social situation in many countries, the growth of a definite social-consciousness in the industrial masses, the awakening of a social conscience in the Christian churches, the universal application of the economic-social method of analysis to the history of thought-all this under the influence of Marx-then the No must be balanced by a Yes.

Tillich (1936:44) writes of Religious Socialism:

Not until after the war did the reality and nature of this Christian Humanism become totally evident to me. The contact with the Worker’s movement, with the so-called de-Christianized masses, revealed clearly to me that here also, within the humanistic form, Christian substance was hidden, even though the Humanism bore the character of a materialistic popular philosophy, long since overcome in art and science. Here Apologetics was even more necessary than to the intelligentsia, but also much more difficult, because the religious opposition was made more acute by class opposition. Apologetics, without any regard for this class opposition such as the Church was attempting, was condemned to complete failure from the beginning. A successful activity on the part of the defenders of Christianity was possible only by their active participation in the class situation, i.e., Apologetics among the proletarian masses was and is possible only to “Religious Socialism.” Not Home Missions, but Religious Socialism is the necessary form of Christian activity among the proletarian workingmen, and is in particular the necessary form of Christian Apologetics. This apologetical element in Religious Socialism has often been obscured by its political element, so that the Church has never understood the indirect importance of Religious Socialism for the Church.

Tillich (ibid:55) writes of the opposition to Religious Socialism:

Two theological tendencies, definitely Lutheran, opposed religious Socialism. First of all, the religious Nationalism, which calls itself “Modern Lutheran Theology,” as represented by Emmanuel Hirsch, a former fellow-student of
mine, but now my opponent in theology and politics; and secondly, the falsely so-called “Dialectic Theology,” established by Karl Barth which in spite of the Calvinistic elements in Barth himself, has accepted a decisive Lutheran element in its conception of the idea of the Kingdom of God as purely transcendent.

Tillich (ibid:57) writes of the kairos: ‘The term is meant to express the fact that the struggle for a new social order cannot lead to a fulfillment such as is meant by the Kingdom of God, but that at a special time special tasks are demanded, and one special aspect of the Kingdom of God appears as a demand and expectation’. He (ibid:58) continues: ‘but it appears as a judgment to a given form of society and as a norm to a coming one. Thus, the decision for Socialism during a definite period may be the decision for the Kingdom of God, even though the Socialist ideal remains infinitely distant from the Kingdom of God’.

In analyzing, Tillich’s commitment to religious socialism was very evident from the time of his childhood play with the privileged class. His access to the children of the privileged class was due to his father’s social standing as a Lutheran pastor. Tillich joined the socialist Berlin group also known as the Kairos circle in 1920. He became one of the exponents of the ideas of the group. His views were determined by the thinking of Karl Marx. Tillich infused into the Marxist thought the religious concept of the kairos. The kairos was the fulfilled time. Tillich and his socialist friends expected a new world order that would result in the transformation of mankind. Our thesis advances to consider Tillich’s German academic career.
1:7 Tillich’s Academic Career at German Universities-1919-1933

1:7:1 Tillich The German Theologian

In 1919, Tillich ‘delivered his famous lecture on a theology of culture and art before the Berlin Kant Society’ (Thomas 2000:14). Tillich taught at German universities from 1919 to 1933. Tillich (1936:38) ‘tried to win for theology a legitimate place in the totality of knowledge’. He (ibid:38) writes:

Any one, standing on the border of philosophy and theology, will find it necessary to get a clear conception of the scientific relation of both. I made this attempt in my book, System der Wissenschaften (System of the Sciences). My final concern here was the question: ‘How is theology possible as a Science? How is it related, like its several offsprings, to the other sciences? What is outstanding in its method?

Tillich’s (ibid:38-39) efforts were directed as follows:

division of all methodical knowledge into sciences of thinking, being, and culture; further, by the development of a philosophy of meaning as a foundation of the whole system; then, by the definition of metaphysics as an attempt of the human mind to express the unconditioned in terms of rational symbols; and finally, by the definition of theology as theonomous metaphysics. The presupposition of the success of this attempt is, of course, that the theonomous character of knowing be acknowledged; that is to say, that thinking is rooted in the absolute as the foundation and abyss of meaning. Theology makes its subject expressly that which is the assumption of all knowledge, even though the assumption be unexpressed. Thus, theology and philosophy, religion, and knowledge embrace each other, and it is precisely this, which seems to me, as judged from the border, to be the true relation of each.

Adams (1965:149) informs us based on an article Tillich wrote in 1924 on Troeltsch:

This whole essay is as much a self-exposition of Tillich as it is an appreciation and criticism of Troeltsch. The fact that it touches upon most of the major concerns of Tillich’s writings indicates on the one hand the importance of Troeltsch as an influence upon Tillich and on the other the significance of Troeltsch as the point from which Tillich may be said to begin his own reflection in this area of thought. Both aspects of the relation to Troeltsch may perhaps be inferred from the fact that Tillich dedicated The System of the Sciences to Troeltsch.
Tillich’s years at the University of Berlin were from 1919 to 1924. It was here Tillich developed his theology of culture (Tillich 1967:41). Tillich (ibid: 41) related religion to other subjects ‘politics, art, philosophy, depth psychology, and sociology’.

It was at Marburg that Tillich was introduced to existentialism in its twentieth century form (1967:42). Tillich (1936:39-40) writes of the meaning of existentialism for him while at Marburg:

I was led to a new understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology. The lectures of Martin Heidegger given at Marburg, the impression of which on my Marburg students and upon some of my colleagues I experienced; then his writing, *Sein und Zeit* (Being and Time), also his interpretation of Kant, were of greater significance to followers and opponents of this philosophy than anything else since the appearance of Husserl’s *Logische Untersuchungen* (Logical Studies). I myself, was prepared in a threefold way to accept this philosophy. First, by an exact acquaintance with Schelling’s final period, in which he attempted, in opposition to Hegel’s philosophy of being, to pave a way for a philosophy of existence. Secondly, by my—even if limited—knowledge of Kierkegaard, the real founder of the philosophy of existence; and thirdly, by my dependence upon the philosophy of life. These three elements, comprised and submerged into a sort of Augustinian-colored mysticism, produced that which fascinated people in Heidegger’s philosophy. Many of its chief terms are found in sermon literature of German Pietism.

Tillich’s theology of culture, and his existential theology were formed during the German years at Berlin and Marburg respectively. It was at Marburg that Tillich was given new insight into the relationship between philosophy and theology. Tillich accepted this new learning.

Tillich (ibid:40) was ‘Professor of the Science of Religion in Dresden and at the same time Professor Honorarius of Theology in Leipzig’. Dresden was a great cultural center of ‘visual art, painting, architecture, dance, opera’ (Tillich 1967:43). The ‘cultural situation was
not much different’ when Tillich accepted a call to the University of Frankfurt in 1929 (ibid:43). At Frankfurt, he lectured ‘on the boundary between philosophy and theology’ (ibid:43).

Tillich’s commitment was to the protestant cause and autonomy. Tillich was opposed to religious heteronomy of Roman Catholicism. Tillich wondered if during the year 1933 that he might be forced to embrace Roman Catholicism. German Protestantism was at the time in a period of decline. He had decided if the choice became necessary that he would choose in favor of his Lutheran background (Tillich 1936:22-30).

In the analysis of this period, Tillich’s life is marked by his famous lecture before the Kant Society of Berlin in 1919. His lecture was on a theology of culture. Tillich tried to win a place for theology within the academic world. He related theology to other academic disciplines when he was teaching at Berlin from 1919 to 1924. Tillich’s philosophy of history became politically and socially oriented. Tillich’s years at Marburg (1924-1825) were the beginning of the development of his existential theology. Tillich taught at Frankfurt from 1929 to 1933. It was at Frankfurt that Tillich lectured on the boundary between philosophy and theology.

1:8 Summary

Tillich’s childhood experiences in nature, history, Rudolf Otto’s concept of the Holy became determining factors in forming his Christian philosophy of religion. Family vacations at the Baltic Sea with its horizon stretching to infinity create the concept of the infinite for him. His childhood play with the children of the privileged class helped him to understand the tension between the privileged and underprivileged class. His socialist beliefs were a determiner of his intellectual and personal destiny. His religious upbringing in a church
manse and a Lutheran pastor for a father created an ecclesiastical background for him.

He joined the Wingolf group during his student days at Halle. This helped him to understand the meaning of the church both existentially and theoretically. His two dissertations written on Schelling helped form his religious views.

His experience as a chaplain in the First World War (1914-1918) turned Tillich to the study of art. He longed for beauty amidst the ugliness, devastation, and horrors of war. This would eventuate in the systematic study of art and a theology of art. It was during the First World War that Tillich saw the German nation divided into classes. The industrial masses considered the church an ally of the ruling groups. Tillich turned to the thinking of Karl Marx. Tillich became a socialist.

Tillich’s lecture on a theology of culture was delivered to the Kant Society in Berlin in 1919. He related theology to politics, art, philosophy, depth psychology, and also sociology. Tillich tried to win a place for theology within the totality of knowledge. Tillich was Privatdozent of theology at the University of Berlin from 1919 to 1924. It was during this time that he developed his theology of culture. Tillich joined the Berlin group also known as the Kairos circle in 1920. This socialist group of intellectuals discarded the bourgeois viewpoint. Tillich became one of the leaders of the group. He was also one of the main exponents of its ideas. He combined his concept of the kairos with Marxist thought. The kairos was the right moment, the fulfilled time which would lead to a new social order. It was during Tillich’s time at Marburg (1924-1925) that existentialism in its 20th century form crossed his path. He accepted this new learning. Tillich developed an existential theology. It was at Frankfurt
(1929-1933) that Tillich lectured on the boundary between philosophy and theology.

Tillich’s ideas, his destiny, and task were determined during the German years. The progression of our thesis turns to consider the historiography for our study.
CHAPTER 2

HISTORIOGRAPHY

2:1 The Writing Of History

Nevins (1938:50) in his book The Gateway To History notes two elements that must be present in the writing of history. The most obvious is a body of materials that are trustworthy. The second key element is the application of the critical method to them. Nevins (ibid:51) calls the end product of trustworthy materials and the critical method applied to them ‘true history’.

History must be based on primary sources. These primary sources would include both eyewitnesses and the writings of the person under consideration. The eyewitnesses would have lived at the same time as the person or they may not have known the person. In our case, it could be the autobiographical sections and writings of Paul Tillich during the German years 1886 to 1933. Biographers such as the Paucks, and others who knew Tillich, and colleagues who may have worked with Tillich will prove helpful. Secondary sources would be considered the writings of those who lived in a different time period. They were not eyewitnesses to the historical person or event under study (ibid:53).

The sources for history can be material that was orally transmitted but for our thesis ‘printed books and papers’ (ibid:54-55). Personal observation is given a high priority by Nevins. This could be true of both Paul Tillich and of those who interviewed
Tillich. The primary sources will be expounded to let them speak for themselves in terms of Tillich’s life, thought, and his German legacy. Secondary sources deemed relevant to the writing of a historical thesis will be included.

The writing of history calls for an open mind. Nevins is pointing to the need for objectivity in writing history. Objectivity calls for impartiality. Biases and prejudices preventing a fair treatment of a thesis must be set aside. Conclusions must not be drawn until all the evidence has been examined. In addition, objectivity requires the historian to lift out the history, the historical facts, and the meaning of those facts gathered from ‘historical theory’ (ibid:207).

The nature of historical problems is that they come in a great array. This may range from the problem of time, identity, motive, character, and the origin of ideas (ibid:208). In the case of our thesis, a fresh interpretation of the material is our goal. The pertinent facts to the study of our thesis must be assembled (ibid:209-212). Nevins thought the ‘technicalities of logic’ referring to both induction and also deduction are an unproductive labor (ibid:213). Causes might be an important factor in the writing of some history without which the event under study would not have taken place (ibid:214). Both causes and effects in history are always events.

In evaluation, the writing of history requires trustworthy materials and the application of the critical method to them. Historical sources are divided into primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are written by eyewitnesses or by the person under study. Secondary sources are those written by scholars who lived in a different time period.
Nevin’s view of objectivity was to maintain an open mind, remain impartial, and set aside biases and prejudices. Analysis must be given to the evidence. An appropriate chapter summary must be made from the analysis. The conclusion will come at the end of the study. Historical problems are many and varied. The problem of time, identity, motive, character, and the origin of ideas are examples of historical problems. Events in history can be traced to a cause and effect relationship.

2:2 Historical Inquiry

2:2:1 The Historical Method

Our historical inquiry must be limited to the scope of our hypothesis. The German years 1886 to 1933 are the key to understanding the life, thought, and legacy of Paul Tillich. This is neither a systematization of Tillich’s thought nor a systematization of his systematic theology. Some causes will be able to be highlighted in our study while other causes will have to be rejected. The cause for Tillich to write *The Socialist Decision* is significant. What was the cause behind Tillich’s move to socialism? Tillich’s move to this political position and the writing of this work may have been the direct result of his service as a chaplain in World War I. It may have also been the result of the collapse of the German government and society after the war. Nevins points out the need for a working hypothesis in the writing of history (ibid:215-216). This hypothesis will be the basis for our selection or rejection of material. The hypothesis is the key to putting the thesis together. Nevins (ibid:215-
216) writes: ‘No sound historical work has ever been written which does not employ hypothesis literally to arrive at the explanations of complete occurrences’. The use of a hypothesis must be governed by three features. This is a reference to the need for objectivity. The historian must not allow bias or prejudice to influence his record of history. The second important feature in our striving for objectivity is that of oversimplification of our hypothesis. The historian must not reject the obvious with a novel interpretation (ibid:220-224). The thesis seeks to be free from bias, prejudice, oversimplification of a hypothesis, and also a novel interpretation. Subjectivity must be admitted since there is no absolute objectivity.

Ideas may play another important role in the historical method. This would be true in Germany during the late nineteenth and up to the mid-twentieth century (Gustavson 1955:152-163). Nevins (1938:238) argues that the world is ruled by ideas. He refers to Napoleon who thought ideas rule the world. Mankind is moved by the power of philosophical ideas. Idea’s are theoretically based with the conviction of what the historian deems either valid or invalid (Gustavson 1955:153). Nevins (1938:239) agrees with Gustavson that ideas influence the writing of history.

Nevins (ibid:241-243) draws our attention to the fact that all the important philosophies of history can be traced to the last three centuries. A close relationship is demonstrated between rationalism and modern history. Hegel’s philosophy of history during the years 1830-1831 had wide acceptance. Each particular century has been dominated by what is considered important in the writing of history. Hegel’s idea was confirmed as truth. The idea was countered by a negation which is often called
a anti-thesis. The conflict that occurs between the thesis and the anti-thesis will cause a new idea to emerge called synthesis. Nevins argues that this cycle repeats itself over and over again. Other historical methods have been put forward such as Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Another historical method is Marx’s interpretation of history (ibid:243-246).

Our thesis will follow the rational method of historical writing and interpretation. The historian needs to build his work on reasoned facts rather than the philosophic approach of beliefs. The reasoned facts from a historical frame of reference can be used to build a reasoned argument and proper conclusion. A philosophy can be determined based on the historical frame of reference, the reasoned argument, and conclusion. Secondly, our thesis will need to stick to one of the main purposes and features of writing history. A ‘powerful interpretive tendency’ will be a necessary element of our thesis (ibid:252). Gustavson (1955:218) refers to this as ‘historical-mindedness’. He bases his argument on the work of the German historian Leopold Von Ranke. Von Ranke’s thought was that the ‘historian must describe events as they actually happened, using eyewitness accounts and documents from the time, and that the historian must never permit his own predilections to enter into the narrative’ (ibid:174). Nevins (1938:252-253) argues that the growth of both Rationalism and the Age of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century is indispensable to the modern historical method. The best rationale to support any historical point in question is preferred because it lends the greatest objectivity. Nevins (ibid:257) argues that internal evidence
is of secondary importance. He claims that beginning with the French Revolution, the political ideas which were somewhat novel gave historiography a boost. This was by way of introducing a fresh number of interpretations. However, novel interpretations of history violate one of the conditions that is necessary to maintain objectivity in writing history. The important point for our thesis is in placing Tillich against the historical background of the German years. The importance of the historical background was one of the effects ‘at the end of the Napoleonic wars’. History came to be interpreted in the light of Nationalism rather than the common man (Nevins 1938:99-109).

The study and writing of history was helped by the adoption of new academic sciences of geography, economics, biology, sociology, and psychology. Nevins (1938:258) point is that the last two sciences sociology, and psychology were useful in historical interpretation. The interpretative historian may recognize three spheres in his positive philosophy. The first is theological phenomena explained supernaturally. The second phase is a metaphysical emphasis which is an abstract force. The third is a positive phase where phenomena referred to by succession, or a resemblance to some other historical fact is studied in this way (ibid:261). Gottschalk (1963:195) thought it necessary to create the totality of historical fact. Further, he adds that the documents under study should be looked at to solve ‘the problem of authenticity’. He is referring to textual criticism known as external criticism. Internal criticism looks at the author’s style, use of words, the historical documents, and materials suitable
to their times. Internal criticism deals with the problem of credibility. The historical facts must be obtained from the best sources available to the historian (ibid:139).

A historical fact is defined by Gottschalk as one that is credible when tested by the historical method. Bentley (1999:36-42) argues there is historiography and then there is German historiography. He is referring to Von Ranke’s method. Much work has been done in historiography since Von Ranke. This will become apparent in our section on historical issues in the writing of contemporary history. Ainslie (1924:94) argues that humanistic history includes the rationalistic, the abstract, the individualistic, and the psychological. In addition, the social forces are dynamic in any society. Gustavson asks us to consider a German born in 1900. Gustavson (1955:26-27) writes:

> Germany was a well-ordered and prosperous empire. The First World War interrupted his normal pattern of life and probably brought death to one or more members of his family. He was probably himself in the army before the end of the war. Its conclusion brought collapse of the seemingly firm foundations of his world. Germany became a republic, amidst considerable confusion, in which he had to adjust to very different political surroundings. Inflation, unemployment, and depression followed, all this in his twenties, when he was trying to secure a niche in society and begin a family. In his early thirties, the Nazis took over, bringing a new set of circumstances, including renewed prosperity, dictatorship, mass hysteria, and concentration camps. Then came another war, the destruction of his home city by air attack, and ultimate enemy occupation. If his home was in the eastern zone of Germany, a Communist regime was imposed upon him, and if he lived east of the Oder, he became a homeless refugee.

Gustavson uses this example to make his point on the impact of social forces in history.

> The year 1914 in Germany was marked by a spirit of enthusiasm (Windelband 1955:231). The philosophy of history must be lived in the imagination of men. Dewey (1939:22) argued history is lived in man’s imagination. Philosophy is a further excursion
of the imagination into its own prior achievements (ibid:22). Iggers (1968:270) points out that the German view of history focused on the ‘importance of the historical situation’ in which history arises with all objective values, truths, and cognitions. Bentley (1999:182) refers to William Dilthey’s observation based on Von Ranke. Dilthey supported the view that history is relived in one’s imagination. The historical context is all important and becomes clearer when you know the parts.

Garraghan (1946:34-38) argues that the historical method embodies four elements. These elements are systematized knowledge, effective method, definite subject matter, and general truths. The systematized knowledge would be the primary and secondary sources from which the history is written. The effective method is the critique of these sources. The definite subject matter would be the acceptance of the material in line with our hypothesis. The rejection of material would be based on the hypothesis. Vehlen argues that history must be set in it’s historic setting. He illustrates this by arguing that the prewar German generations emphasized Nationalism and middle class parliamentary government (Meyer 1960:5). Meyer points to Eucken as one who spoke of the German spirit as a free spirit (ibid:45). Meyer’s logic is that the historical situation in Germany from 1914 to 1933 was one of the conception of the idea’s of the philosophers. More specifically, prior to this period, the German people had dreamed of unity which became a reality in 1807. This was as a result of the war that Germany had fought with France. It was the French philosopher, Rousseau who deified nature giving rise to the German conception of culture (ibid:91). This emphasis on
Nationalism was the result of the eighteenth century philosophy of the Enlightenment in Germany. During the eighteenth century, the emphasis was placed on the absolute and universal reason (Dewey 1915:98-102). Hegel taught that the German state was an organ of divinity. Patriotism became the German religion (ibid:98-102).

Gottschalk (1963:13) in his *Understanding History* points to the problem of ‘Internal Criticism’ as one of the first tasks confronting the historian in the writing of history. It must be emphasized that those particulars that are relevant to the hypothesis are accepted. The particulars that are not relevant to our hypothesis must be rejected. Analysis of documents is necessary for both credibility and to make sure that they fit the hypothesis under investigation. Discussion and development must include the historical context of the study. Gottschalk (ibid:140-141) argues that the historian’s task is to determine the necessary historical facts. A ‘credible’ according to Gottschalk is not what actually happened but it is as close as we can get to what actually happened (ie. Able to be believed or capable of belief). This is a reaction to the work of the historian Von Ranke. Von Ranke held that the historian must report what actually happened. He thought it possible to arrive at that which really happened.

What is objectivity? Gottschalk (ibid:140) thought the historian must establish verisimilitude rather than objective truth. He (ibid:140) argues for similar findings forming a historical consensus. He (ibid:140) writes: ‘It is not inconceivable that, in dealing with the same document, two historians of equal ability and training would extract the same isolated “facts” and agree with each other’s findings. In that way the elementary data of history are subject to proof’. A historical fact can thus be
defined as a particular that can be obtained from materials under study. Facts that can be observed, recorded, and attested to are rarely disputed. A value judgment is not necessary at this point nor would the fact become an inconsistency with other knowledge. The fact would seem favorable and logical to the historian. The acceptance of the fact or a body of facts acceptable to the historian will avoid a generalization (Gottschalk 1963:141). Carr (1961:7-8) writes of consensus: ‘there are certain basic facts which are the same for all historians and which form, so to speak, the backbone of history’. Next, the historian will have to act as the objector or the reader who may raise questions objecting to the factual piece of history. The Paucks do this in their treatment of the biographical details surrounding the life of Paul Tillich. The historical frame becomes the basis for the partial conclusion. This works to provide support in our understanding of Tillich’s life and development (Pauck 1976:1-12). However, the Pauck’s do not share Gottschalk’s view that the historian is blocked from being able to determine what actually happened. Direct observation can be made. The historical frame can be submitted to tests of reliability (Gottschalk 1963:141). Documentation is necessary in the writing of our thesis otherwise contradictions, debates will arise, and also generalizations.

Garraghan (1946:34) gives a nice summary of what is involved in the writing of our thesis based on the historical method. He notes that three important steps must take place. The first is a search must be conducted for sources. Secondly, the historian must appraise these sources. The third step in the historical method is a formal statement of the
findings from the historical sources. This is accompanied by argumentation when necessary. The body of the historian’s findings are presented objectively, and the significance of such is concluded. Exposition and synthesis will be necessary in the last step of writing a thesis (ibid:34). Further, Garraghan (ibid:135) argues that the critical method in history is the exercise of sound judgment and common sense on the part of the historian. A sound hermeneutic considers both the context of the written document and the historical background of the times (ibid:36).

Garraghan (ibid:46-47) discusses his view of objectivity in the writing of history. He defines objectivity as impartiality. This is the setting aside of all biases and personal preferences on the part of the historian. This will cause the historian to deal with the material based on the evidence alone. Garraghan’s source for this Von Ranke. The historian must record a thing ‘as it really happened’. He sets forth five principles that are required for the historian to remain objective in the writing of a historical work. The first principle is that ‘prepossessions and prejudices’ need not be set aside. Secondly, the historian does not need to approach his work emptying himself of previous philosophies of life, principles or theories. The historian can remain sympathetic to his subject and still remain objective. The historian will remain objective even when it is necessary to make judgments and draw conclusions. Finally, a historian does not need to know all the circumstances in any given historical work. Even then history can be written. Garraghan (1946:49) disagrees
with Gottschalk. The historian can construct history as it happened. He based his comments on Von Ranke’s historical theory (ibid:47).

Hegel and Kantian ideas remained in Germany after the year 1860. Hegel who taught at the University of Frankfurt taught positivity. Positivity is defined as the positive right is the natural right. Hegel taught further the self-development and self-realization of the primal Idea. The realization of the primal idea God led to a transcendental philosophy. Hegel’s ‘primal Idea’ was Absolute in character and came to be identified with the German state. Hegel’s philosophy furthered the political concept of totalitarianism (Rowse 1948:120). In 1867, Marx’s *Das Kapital* was published in Germany. This book argued that societies provide the framework to establish meaning for the individual (Bentley 1999:82-84). Marx stood Hegel on his head (ibid:87). The philosophic ideas of Fichte, Wagner, Nietzsche, and Spengler effected the German bourgeoisie (Blackbourn 1984:159-161).

It is necessary to make some comments on the writing of German history. German histories made little impact outside the Fatherland. An example of this is Voight’s history of Prussia which consisted of nine volumes dedicated to the Fatherland. The same was true of Luden’s history which was dedicated to the Fatherland. Bentley points to Von Ranke as the main German historian. Von Ranke saw German history as merely a concern with the state as the only agency of authority. This was true in Germany both domestically and externally. The German state was the ethical end in itself (Bentley 1999:36-37). The mainline of German historiography discovered historicism as an
antidote to intuition in theorizing about historical method. Humboldt’s lecture of 1821 talks in a sophisticated manner about history’s function of finding form within the chaos of designating events. Ethics becomes a product of that theatre of action which history considers. German historians reject an ethical code from above the events and allow the events to announce their own morality (ibid:36-37). Bentley writes: ‘What ought to succeed becomes a function of what has succeeded a doctrine with direct implications for the foregoing theory of the state’ (ibid:37). Historical knowledge must not emerge based on applying ‘conceptual schemata’ to the past. The analysis of individual instances and concrete events must become the basis for historical knowledge. German historicism did not remain in a static state during the nineteenth century. Styles of thought were prevalent between 1820 and 1870 in Germany. These styles of thought in writing German history are worth noting since Tillich was part of the nineteenth century. Such historical styles gained ascendancy between the foundations of the Empire and the cataclysm of 1914. Bentley does point out that German history had a close affinity to the British during this period. German historians often visited England as was the case with Von Ranke (ibid:38). It was later when ‘Wilhelmine’ historians considered only the state of Germany. A distaste became evident for anything beyond Germany. German provincialism was the historical perspective of the day. The ‘First World War’ seemed to validate German thinking. German historians became convinced that this was the correct historical method (ibid:38).
The older historiography gives us valuable tools which contribute to our historical insights and understanding in the writing of history. These historical particulars will become useful where applicable in the argumentation of the thesis approach.

In analysis of this subdivision, historical inquiry must be limited to the hypothesis of the study. The hypothesis becomes the basis for the inclusion or elimination of materials. It is important to build a historical frame of reasoned facts. This is to be preferred to the philosophic approach of beliefs. A philosophy must be based on the historical frame of reference (dates and events).

Events must be analyzed and interpreted. All views must considered in the study. The totality of historical fact is important for the historian. A difference of opinion exists between historians as to whether historical events can be really known. Historians talk of the credible which is as close as we can get to what happened. It is not what actually happened. Facts can be observed, recorded, and attested too. This consensus between historians is rarely disputed. The context of the history and the historical background of the times are important historical factors to the study. German historical knowledge was based on an analysis of both instances and events.

The historical method gives us valuable tools. This contributes to both our historical insight and understanding in the writing of a thesis. The particulars of the historical study will support the hypothesis. The goal of historiography is insight into the work at hand. Sequence, simultaneity, and individual developments must become part of the historian’s
grid. The thesis progresses to the definition of contemporary history and the historical issues related to the writing of contemporary history.

2:3 Contemporary History

2:3:1 The Debate Continues

History is indeed a science according to John Lewis Gaddis. Gaddis (2004:37-39) refers to both Carr and Bloch who ‘brought history into science’. They saw history science as a model for historians (ibid:37). Time and space, the present, the past, and the future become valid concerns for the historian (Barraclough 1979:1). Further, historians became concerned about contemporary history. What is contemporary history? Gaddis (2004:29) writes:

How, then do we think and write about something of which we’re a part? We do it first, I believe, by noting that although time itself is a seamless continuum, it doesn’t look that way to those who exist within it. Anyone with a minimal level of consciousness would see time as divided, like ancient Gaul, into three parts: What lies in the past, what is yet to come in the future – and most difficult of all to pin down – that elusive entity known as the present.

The Annales School of History introduced a number of social and economic concerns (Mennell 1996:3-13). Postmodern theorists ‘challenged the fundamental assumptions of conventional historical study’ (Southgate 2001:2). Time was now seen as being relative. The present fleets into the past. The present and the future became new concerns to the historian (Hall 2004:5). Robert Owen Keohane (1986:131) was typical of the new reality school of history to address the present, and the future as well as the
past. Jenkins (1991:12) clarifies: ‘The past that we ‘know’ is always contingent upon our own ‘present’. Historians suffered from a lack of objectivity (Spitzer 1996:2). Historians and contemporary historians were both affected by a lack of objectivity in their writings. Gaddis (2004:35) points out that the past was not accessible to either the historian of the past or the contemporary historian of the present. Gaddis (ibid:35) writes: ‘No Egyptologist has ever seen Ramses’. Historians thought it better to study long term trends in history as a way to deal with the problem of objectivity. Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre who founded the Annales School of History in 1929, were typical of historians wanting to study ‘long term historical structures’ (Furay & Salevouris 1988:223).

Contemporary history is history that is happening at the present time. The concept of relativity introduced by contemporary historians meant that past history and church history were contemporary in their own time. Their writings became good only for their generations. The reason is that they wrote within a particular historical setting with words good only for their generation (Chaney 1994:44). Elements of historical writing such as facts, memories, and interpretations came into question. A general consensus of historians argued for the need for objectivity. This would be accomplished by distinguishing between facts, opinions, memories, and interpretations (McCullagh 1987:7-12). McCullagh (1998:3) argues: ‘that historical interpretations are, to a large extent, subjective’. The historian must admit that his own presuppositions determine historical output (Conde 1999:40-43). Facts may be chosen on the basis of the historian’s beliefs. The historian decides on the facts to accept and those which are
to be rejected. This is a subjective choice in relationship to the facts of history (ibid:14). The interplay between facts and interpretation becomes a necessary admission on the part of the historian. The historian must admit ‘the fact that histories always contain acts of the creative imagination - means that histories are impossible to close down, because it is impossible to close down the imagination’ (Jenkins 1995:3). Callinicos (1995:76) brings out an important consideration in his discussion on facts. He (ibid:76) writes: ‘facts are refracted through the mind of the historian’. Gaddis (2004:36) adds to our discussion by saying: ‘A historical fact is an inference from the relics, the sociologist John Goldthorpe has observed. Included in this list is great ideas, documents deposited in archives’. Gaddis (2004:41) brings out the subjectivity involved in facts, memories, and interpretations:

For historians, too start with surviving structures, whether they be archives, artifacts, or even memories. They then deduce the processes that produced them. Like geologists and paleontologists, they must allow for the fact that most sources from the past don’t survive, and that most daily events don’t even generate a survivable record in the first place. Like biologists and astrophysicists, they must deal with ambiguous or even contradictory evidence, and like all scientists, who work outside laboratories, historians must use logic and imagination, to overcome the resulting difficulties, their own equivalent of thought experiments, if you will.

The memory of historians may be too short. Imagination is necessary in the writing of history. It must be a partial conclusion at this point that absolute objectivity is not possible for historians past and present (Hobsbawn 1998:128). Contemporary history has been problematic both in the twentieth century and at the present time. Southgate (1996:2) writes: ‘Postmodern theorists have challenged the fundamental assumptions of conventional historical study, and have gone so far as to question
the very point of persisting with the subject at all’. A difference of opinion exists as to
the perception of contemporary history. Hughes (1997:20) writes:

Directly or indirectly historians have always grappled with the present in their
dealings….For many, the present has been and continues to be, the primary
object of concern. Others have recognized the fundamental and inescapable
role of the present in shaping representations of the past. History, in this
sense, is always contemporary.

Subjective nature of contemporary history comes with different definitions
of what constitutes the subject. Gaddis (2004:15) thought that contemporary history
was ‘constantly being measured in terms of neglected metrics’. For Fulbrook
(2002:146) contemporary history is defined by it’s ‘forms and aims’. Fulbrook
(ibid:146) writes: ‘Most historical works will have, simultaneously, a variety of
purposes: not only to inform or instruct, but also to arouse emotional involvement
or invoke sympathy, to entertain; to persuade’. Gaddis (2004:30) has further thoughts
on the nature of contemporary history. He (ibid:30) writes:

St. Augustine doubted that present even exists, describing it as something that
“flies” with such speed from future to past, as not to be lengthened out with the
least stay. But the historian R.G. Collingswood, writing some fifteen centuries
late, took just the opposite view. “The present alone is actual,” he insisted,
using an Oxford illustration; the past and future had no existence comparable
to the way in which “when we are walking up to the Highpart Queen’s
Magdalen and All Souls exist. So what’s the problem here?

Gaddis (ibid:30) clarifies:

I prefer to think of the present as a singularity or a funnel, if you prefer a
more mundane metaphor, or a wormhole, if you favor a more exotic one
-through which the future has got to pass in order to become the past. The
present achieves the transformation by locking into place in order to become
the past. The present on the future side of the singularity, these are fluid,
decoupled, and therefore indeterminate; however, as they pass through it they fuse and cannot then be separated.

His view is one of many views of contemporary history. The past, present, and future are all interrelated and cannot be separated. Thus contemporary history has a fluid concept to it. Contemporary history is history of the historian’s present. It begins when the contemporary historian writes on the contemporary scene of his or her world. The production of new historical works may well replace past histories. Progress is made in contemporary history when the historian’s present and the historian’s contemporary world are included. Even continuity is a subjective concept of history that means different things to different people (Latourette 1953:xxi). For Gaddis (2004:30) continuity means: ‘patterns that extend across time’. History is constantly being rewritten with new discoveries, and perspectives. Historical value judgments are thought to lend to history a contemporary nature. It is at the point of a historical decision that history becomes contemporary history. Barraclough (1975:13) writes:

It goes without saying that we can only consider contemporary history in this way when we are clear what we mean by the term ‘contemporary’. The study of contemporary history has undoubtedly suffered because of the vagueness of its content and haziness of its limits. The word ‘contemporary’ inevitably means different things to different people; what is contemporary for me will not necessarily be contemporary for you.

Therbon (1999:93-135) assesses history to be in a state of flux, and in an ever changing state. Gaddis (1995:1) thought contemporary history was the present versus the past. Rigney (2001:6) thought cultural history had contributed much to contemporary history. He (ibid:6) writes: ‘There is something to be said for accepting the idea
that contested boundaries are inevitable in cultural practice’. Historical writing has changed during the last twenty years. Spitzer (1996:2) writes: ‘Over the past twenty years, powerful arguments have undermined our confidence in historical objectivity, in universal standards of truth, and even in the viability of the search for stable and determinate meanings’.

Contemporary history has become related to culture. The study of cultural history has widened the scope of contemporary history into the areas of both the social sciences and the humanities (McCullagh 1998:1-2). This has resulted in the need for historical analysis and interpretation. The inclusivism of contemporary history is particularly attractive with its inclusion of all peoples and cultures (Fullbrook 2002:145-146). Davidson (2004:155) attributes this widening of history into culture, the sciences, and the humanities to the work of Eric Hobsbawm and Edward Thompson.

The limitations of contemporary history have been debated in comparison to past historical works. The historical value judgments of contemporary historians have resulted in positives and negatives. Past historians and histories have taken on a reputation for all times. Contemporary historians argue that these historians and histories are unable to attend in the present. Contemporary history is subject to revision due to new sources. These contemporary histories may be more relevant than past works (ibid:155). Jenkins (2003:7) writes:

Let me begin with the idea that history is a discourse about, but categorically different, from the past. This might strike you as odd for you have missed the
distinction before, or if not, you may still not have bothered too much about it. One of the reasons why this is so, why the distinction is generally left unworked, is because as English-speakers, we tend to lose sight of the fact that there actually is this distinction between history-as that which has been written/recorded about the past-and the past itself, because the word history covers both things. It would be preferable, therefore, always to register this difference by using the term ‘the past’ for all that has gone on before everywhere, whilst using the word ‘historiography’ for history, historiography referring to the writings of historians. This would be good practice the past as the object of historians’ attention, historiography as the ways historians attend to it.

The nature of contemporary history is debated and continues to be debated.

In brief, the definition of contemporary history continues to be debated. A number of factors contribute to this ongoing debate. Some historians view history as a science. Others argue for the importance of social and economic concerns. Some contemporary historians argue for the time factor of the past, present, and future. The subjective element in the writing of history has entered the discussion. It is thought that the historian’s presuppositions determine the historical outcome. The historian needs to admit the subjective factor of the historical work. The interplay between facts and historical interpretation becomes a necessary part of the historian’s admission. Opinions, memory, and imagination enter into the writing of contemporary history. Absolute objectivity was not possible for past historians. It is not possible for historians writing in the present.

Contemporary history views the past, the present, and the future as being interrelated to each other. They are not able to be separated in the writing of contemporary history. History is constantly being revised and rewritten. Historical value judgments lend to history a contemporary nature. History is thought to be in an
an ever changing state of flux.

Contemporary history has become related to the study of cultural history. The scope of history has been widened to include the social sciences and the humanities. This has resulted in the need for analysis and interpretation rather than description and narratives.

Past history is compared to contemporary history. Contemporary historians argue that past historians and histories were unable to attend to the present. Objectivity is another historical issue in the writing of contemporary history.

2:4 Objectivity

2:4:1 No Absolute Objectivity

Objectivity is a key concept in modern historiography. Kenneth Scott Latourette (1953:xxi) writes on this subject: ‘If it is complained that this is not an “objective” approach, it must be remembered that pure objectivity does not exist’. It must be admitted in our discussion that absolute objectivity does not exist.

True objectivity is not possible. The historian is in his own context, ‘socially’, ‘culturally’, and ‘historically’ (Higashi 2004:85). The relative nature of contemporary history is seen in its constant revision and rewriting (Barraclough 1979:208). Lemon (2003:260) states it well: ‘The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but a practical question of existence of truth in history’. It was in the search for truth that the need arose for history to assert reality. Verifiability with reality became necessary in contemporary historical writing.
Consensus became another important factor in the historian’s work. The historian’s reputation was another variable that needed to be considered (Collier 2003:175). The contemporary historian must admit that he comes to his work with prior beliefs and suppositions (Conde 2001:40-43). The principle of change in culture, society, and our world enters into all considerations for our discussion of objectivity (Therbon 1999:15-30). The need for fairness and justice in historical judgments is necessary for the historian to maintain integrity (McCullagh 1998:7-12). Even the historian’s choice of facts is a subjective choice (Conde 2001:14). Though truth is relative, yet the Christian may have less of a problem with objectivity. Duncan (2007) writes: ‘For the Christian, this is perhaps less of an issue for the truth is the Word of God, who is Jesus Christ (John 14:6) and all other truth is measured against his standard’. Further, the contemporary historian must acknowledge and be aware of his own ‘self-conscious framework’ (Lemon 2003:374). All of this has led contemporary historians to declare that objectivity is elusive. Conde (2001:14) argues that objectivity is out of the historian’s reach because of the historian’s subjective choice of facts. In addition, selectivity linked to interpretation or value judgments takes away the possibility of absolute objectivity (Outhwaite 2004:226). Spitzer (1996:1) points out that the objectivity of facts has been called into question. What is the relationship between objectivity and facts? It must be admitted that no such thing exists as objectivity of facts. The interplay between fact and interpretation, and times past, present, and future does exist (Butterfield 1955:12-42). Collingswood (1994:190) argues that the
choice of facts reveals the selector’s own subjectivity. Wright (1992:14) argues for multiple verification when relating objectivity to interpretations. Logical consistency, general acceptance, with the historian’s reputation form a pattern of logical interpretation. Kennedy (2002:75) argues just the opposite that subjectivity of choice in writing history is unavoidable. The selection of facts and interpretations of the same by its very nature is a subjective choice. Continuity, causation, effect, motivation, and contingency contribute to the historiographical process. It is necessary to distinguish between facts, opinions, and memories (McCullagh 1987:7-12). The historiographical process is helped by these distinctions.

Outhwaite (2004:226) argues that the historian needs to distance himself from his biases and prejudices. Dingle (1937:43) concurs with this calling it an ‘ambiguous boundary’. Focault (2002:6) thought ‘history is subjectivity produced by philosophical reflection’. Selectivity of facts in relation to interpretation and historical judgments detract from objectivity. Lemon (2003:370) argues that the role of selectivity in the historian’s writing of contemporary history means the historical meaning of the present is subjective. The constant revision, rewriting, and emergence of new sources show the elusiveness of objectivity. Contemporary history is constantly being rewritten with new perspectives (Jenkins 2003:11).

Can objectivity be helped? Contemporary historians must be aware of their own background, views, biases, and prejudices. They should be aware as well that the sources they use may have biases embedded within them (Conde 2001:14).
The contemporary historian may fail to be self-conscious of the fact that the values
of the previous historian are hidden in the historical source (Lemon 2003:355).
Objectivity and time must be another consideration of the contemporary historian.
Gaddis (2004:31) speaks of the time-space relationship: ‘For our purposes, let us
define it simply as the location in which events occur, with the understanding that
“events” are those passages from the future through the present into the past’.

Should the contemporary historian be able to predict the future to better
understand the past? The historian should be able to predict the future to better
understand the past. However, the future might not be as the historian expects
regardless of lessons learned from the past (Harrison, Jones, & Lambert 2004:58).
The relativity of the historian’s views comes about because it is thought that the past
should illuminate the future. The historian’s choice argues in favor of subjectivity.
The past illuminating the future would argue for a higher objectivity. Is this not
the old argument that we learn lessons from past history? The present must enter
into this relationship between the past and the future. The present is where the
thought experiments take place (Bertens 1955:166). If historians are occupied with
the future then they distance themselves from the past. It has been argued that what
is known of the past blurs objectivity since it is only a partial picture. A variety of
perspectives exist on the issue in contemporary historiographical issues (Wright 1992:141).
The historical context and contextualization would argue as well for a higher
objectivity. Doubts about the historian’s ability to represent past realities as they
“really” were has a long history. It is distinguished in America by the names of Charles Beard and Carl Becker (Spitzer 1996:2). It is true that the past is gone and what exists of the past is only a partial representation. Spitzer (ibid:3) writes: ‘historical relativism is itself historically relative’. The Paucks (1976:1-12) used the memory of others in their writing of Paul’s Tillich’ past. Traditional historical research was value judgments based on the body of evidences. Fulbrook (2002:173) calls this a ‘subjective element in historical evaluation’. Hawkes (1963:42) writes concerning the facts of history:

They cannot be seen, felt, tasted, heard or smelled. They may be said to be symbolic or representative of something that once was real, but they have no objectivity equated objective reality of their own. In other words, ‘they exist only in the observer’s or historian’s mind (and thus they may be called “subjective”).

Further, the contemporary historian writes within a particular context. The historian’s attachment to his own personal setting argues against objectivity. The historian has a particular social, economic, cultural, and historical environment (Hobsbawm 1997:269-272 in Jenkins and Munslow 2004:66-69). Social historians thought objectivity was beyond the historian’s context. Social and political historians introduced a new way of thinking. Hobsbawm and Thompson sought to extend history to a view of the future. They argued that democracy had failed (Freedman 1990:57). Hobsbawm (1998:83) thought the traditional approach to history had been ‘turned upside down’. Hobsbawm had a greater understanding of the historical past based on class ideology. Gaddis (1998:24) refers to Karl Marx’s words: ‘Men make their own history, another keen long-term observer, Karl Marx, would later note, ‘but they
do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen
by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given, and transmitted from the
past’. Context and contextualization have become important concepts in historiography
and the writing of contemporary historiography. These two concepts were thought to
advance progress.

All aspects of time are seen now to be linked together (Gaddis 2004:36).
Progress came to be seen as the promise of a better future (Keohane 1986:205-206).
It involved as well ‘the commitment to a more egalitarian future’ (Fulbrook 2002:41).
Barraclough (1979:15) writes: ‘Whatever may be the problems of writing contemporary
history, the fact remains-as R.W. Seton-Watson long ago pointed out-that, from the
time of Thucydides onwards, much of the greatest history has been contemporary
history. Indeed, if it said-as historians sometimes say-that the idea of contemporary
history is a new fangled notion introduced after 1918 to pander to the demands of a
disillusioned public anxious to know what had gone wrong with the ‘war to end all
wars’. It is necessary to acknowledge the subjectivity of the historian.

In critique, absolute objectivity does not exist. This is because the historian writes
from his own context socially, culturally, and historically. Objectivity is thought by some
historians to be an elusive concept. Selectivity seen in the historian’s interpretation or value
judgments takes away any concept of absolute objectivity.

Objectivity of facts does not exist. The interplay between fact, interpretation, and
time does exist. Multiple verification has been argued in relating objectivity to interpretations.
The historian’s reputation, logical consistency, and general acceptance form a pattern of logical interpretation. It becomes necessary to distinguish between facts, opinions, and memories to aid the historiographical process. Historians must be aware of their own prior beliefs and realize that historical sources may have biases in them.

The historian should be able to predict the future. This will help the historian to better understand the past. The future may not turn out as the historian thought it would. This points to the relative nature of the historian’s views. The historian’s choices argue in favor of subjectivity. The past giving insight into the future argues for a higher objectivity. The present must be included in the time relationship. It is in the present that the thought experiment occurs. The past has gone from us. The past is represented at best by a partial representation.

The contemporary historian writes within a particular setting. His own setting argues against objectivity. Context and contextualization are thought to advance progress. Progress came to be seen as the realization of a better future. Subjectivity is another historical issue in the writing of contemporary history.

2:5 Subjectivity

2:5:1 The Subjective Nature Of The Historical Construct

The historian comes with values, and the vision of the future. The historian is subjective in the writing of history because of the historian’s particular past, and his present subjective context. The ambiguous nature of the historian’s writings is seen in the writing of a past event and the interpretation of that event. Jenkins (2003:8) writes: of this subjectivity: ‘The past has gone and history is what historians make of it when
they go to work’. The subjective nature of history can be seen in that at best history is the historian’s perspective. The subjectiveness of writing history can be seen as well in the historian’s interpretation of past history. Jenkins (2003:14) writes: ‘And this is that no matter how verifiable, how widely acceptable or checkable, history remains inevitably a personal construct, a manifestation of the historian’s perspective as narrative’. The historian must admit both their ‘assumptions’ and ‘preconceptions’ are subjective (Conde 2001:14). Holter’s (1983:5) comment on the subjectivity of the historian speaks of the historian’s own context, times, and values. He writes: ‘The historian cannot be objective, even if he tries; the times he lives in, the values associated with his upbringing, all enter into his work’. Subjectivity of choice in writing is unavoidable. The selection of facts and their interpretation of the same is by it’s very nature a subjective choice (Kennedy 2002:55-75). Political commitments may determine a historian’s outlook and writings (Prakash 2002:94). Every historical situation was rooted in a cultural, political, social, religious, and economic background. The historian’s subjectivity is seen in that their present situation will contain all of these variables (Lemon 2003:370).

Freedman (1990:57-58) argues that historical perspective is determined in part by the place economics plays in history. E. H. Carr argued in What is History? that historians ‘are shaped by their own society’ (Storry 1999:75-110). The historical scholar demonstrates commitment by his ability to endure and continue researching. The historian will make historical value judgments which are subjective by their very nature. The basis for historical value judgments will be the historian’s social,
cultural, political, and religious values. Historical decisions are based on the historian’s own personal criteria which is subjective (Wilson 1999:132). The historian must prioritize the importance of certain facts to the exclusion of others. This is a subjective choice. Biases cannot be done away with completely (Harrison, Jones, and Lambert 2004:52). Historical biases can be exposed when tested by historical moral standards (Turiel 2002:2). This is a much preferred view to the older traditional view of distancing oneself from your subject. Biases or prejudices may be hidden in the sources the historian has to work with. The historian must be conscious and aware of this vital variable. Hidden within these sources may be the historian’s commitment on a theological and political level (McCallum 1999:70). The relativism of the historian’s views must be acknowledged (Weber 1973:2). It is true that some historians have a greater level of consciousness than other historians (Butterfield 1955:4-5).

In review, the historian’s past, his present subjective context, and the historian’s writing of a past event argue in favor of subjectivity. The subjective nature of history can be seen in that history is the historian’s perspective. The historian’s interpretation is a personal construct. The historian must admit that their assumptions and preconceptions are subjective. Progress is another important historical issue in contemporary history.

2:6 Progress

2:6:1 A New Definition of Progress

Linear progress was a popular concept in some Christian circles in and up to the beginning of the twentieth century (Latourette 1953:1353). Confidence in
a golden era disappeared with wars, ‘ever increasing number of casualties, and
with devastating consequences’ (Diakonoff 1999:196). Diakonoff (1999:7)
speaks of progress: ‘Progress of the human society as a whole, of the conditions
of its existence, of the accessibility of material goods, etc. Here again an unlimited
or even an interruptedly linear progress is hardly possible’. The increase of natural
disasters, such as earthquakes, took away from confidence in the future. Famines
instead of plenty became the standard of the day. The HIV/AIDS disease hit all
societies around the world (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, and Davis 2003:3,5,17).
Progress needed to be redefined and a new approach to historiography became
necessary. Patterson (1999:14) states: ‘In a milieu shaped by the struggles for
political independence, social scientists also investigated the participation of natural
minorities, peasants, and tribal peoples in the national liberation movements and their
integration into the newly dependent states’. Historians wrote their histories emphasizing
analysis and explanation rather than as traditionally done with emphasis on descriptions
and narratives (Holter 1983:5). Emphasis was placed as well on patterns and
generalizations. Lemon (Fukuyama 1992:xii in Lemon 2003:391) writes: ‘Essentially,
we will find Fukuyama arguing that ‘History,…understood as a single, coherent,
evolutionary process, has reached its end-goal, such that we can expect no new
developments in the basic structure already characterizing the majority of the world’s
states-namely, the combination of free – market (i.e., capitalist) economies and liberal
-democratic political institutions’. Fukuyama argued that this meant ‘the demise of ‘historical world’ and the full arrival of ‘the post-historical’. Collingswood (1994:478) writes of progress: ‘This conception of development, or progress, defines a necessary character of every historical period’.

Historical focus was on the past. Twentieth century history focused on the now. The highest ideal of objectivity would be to interweave the present, the future view, and to have a greater insight, and understanding into the past. Oden (1964:130) disagreed emphasizing a covenant history. Oden (ibid:130) writes:

This is to be distinguished from that view which circumscribes history within the “Now”. Yet they are one and the same using different words to describe the same thing. The end result is decision making in the present.

Decision making became seen as necessary in the present. The future was affected by decision making in the present (Mandela 1995:24-25). The Christian perceived the new kairos or eschatological happening as conducive to both faith and freedom. Tillich (1977:162) speaking of the now states: ‘Human action will decide the future of Western Civilization’. Further, Tillich (ibid:162) argued: ‘There will be a New Enlightenment only if Western Society comes to an end’.

History had a new consciousness for those ‘in Christ’ in the religious realm (Juckes 1995:134). A new morality was to be seen in terms of decision making. History’s meaning would be known as a result of decision making. Tillich came to the realization of the necessity of the human will and action (Tillich 1977:162). The highest objectivity came to be seen as the historian projecting a vision of the future
with greater insight into the past. This view became preferred to the older traditional view of historians bound to their own situation. Lyotard (1993:xix) argued: ‘A proper determination of the nature of the political can bring history to an end, redeem humanity from necessity. However, the future may not occur as the historian foretold it’. Smith (1994:182) writes: ‘Empirical evidence is always at best in flux, in other words, in a process of change. The empirical given is always evolving from past to future’. For our purposes, progress is related to two purposes, the first is political, and the second is social. Even Barraclough (1975:233) admitted the contemporary period of history ‘a new epoch in the history of mankind’. He predicted changes would come about in both ‘the social environment’ and ‘in the political structure’. Some historians saw this as a new moral in history. Baudrillard, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Michael Focault ‘rendered traditional society theory obsolete’ (Atonio & Kellner 1994:127). Castoriadis (1998:53) speaks of ‘Marxism,…The ‘historical necessity’ it speaks of (in the sense this expression has commonly had, precisely that of a series of events that leads history towards progress) differs in no way, philosophically speaking from Hegelian Reason….it is a question of an alienation of man which is properly theological’. Castoriadis (ibid:58) continues: ‘The rationalization of production is the rationalization already created by capitalism, the sovereignty of the ‘economic’ and in all senses of the term; it is quantification, the plan that treats men and their activities as measurable variables’. In the modern world, people became subjected to quotas of production rather than existing to glorify
God. Apethker (1993:70) calls man’s subjection to production victimization. His (ibid:70) analysis is as follows: ‘Victimization may induce fear and even apathy, but it may provoke hatred for the oppressor and resistance to the oppression’. He (ibid:74) continues: ‘This concept is present among exploited peoples themselves; its forms, for example, a fundamental thread in both the creative and the historical literature of the African American people, or those in Latin America—both Christian and Marxist—who are struggling together for liberation from oppression and injustice. Neither it nor Marxism-Leninism denies the dehumanizing potential in impoverishment and extreme persecution, but they do deny that it is possible that those who persistently have right on their side and battle for it and that those who do not and battle against it do not, thereby, affect their respective characters and psychologies’? Apethker (1993:76) ‘emphasizes the importance of being in the world among people who are trying to fulfill the promise of a vision of a world transformed’. Holub (1992:167) exposes the capitalistic idea of progress. He (ibid:167) writes: ‘As such they propagate the conceptions of a world power to the capitalist mode of production. However, in that this group adheres to ‘a structure of feeling’ that propagates technological progress, a technocratically functionalist future, in an instrumentalist rationality’.

In assessing, progress was originally thought to be linear. Progress viewed as eventuating in a golden era disappeared because of wars and their devastation. The increase in natural disasters, famines, and disease have argued against the Christian concept of linear progress. This has led to the need to redefine progress. Historians wrote their
histories emphasizing the need for analysis and explanation rather than description and narrative. The triumph of capitalism in economics and democracy in politics was thought to be a confirmation of the concept of linear progress. The end of history was thought to have been reached.

Current history focuses on the present. Decision making in the present for the future has become a necessary historical variable. The new morality was to be seen in terms of decision making. Contemporary history became a new epoch in mankind’s history. Man’s social environment and political structure has changed. The question of man’s alienation became theological. Mankind became victimized through production quotas, the oppressor, and oppression. Christian Marxist peoples struggled for liberation from injustice.

2:7 Ecumenical Perspective

2:7:1 Ecumenicalism Defined

The ecumenical perspective is so important in the study of church history. Duff (1956:255) writes: ‘The whole history of the Ecumenical Movement and indeed the definition of its organized form as a ‘fellowship of churches’ from all continents makes it inevitable that the international order will be one of the primary concerns’. Bartholomew (1999:x) calls the ‘ecumenical movement,…the breath of all Christians’. Barnes (2003:13) concurs by arguing for a ‘wider ecumenism’. Graziano (1999:151) states the importance of ecumenicalism: ‘World Christian unity, referred to in the church
as ecumenicalism, is based on such biblical passages as John 17:21, where Jesus prays that humanity “may all be one,” united in the faith’. Campbell (1996:5) equates the ecumenical context with ‘a broad cultural movement that some describe as Postmodernism’.

Modern missions has given the impetus to the ecumenical perspective. Now, modern missions has become ‘the common property of mankind’ (Anderson 1961:xii). Ecumenicalism must be ‘without political exploitation’, or, as he puts it, ‘imperialistic aggrandizement’ (Brown 1978:30). The purpose of ecumenism is to bring the churches into union, and individuals into co-operation (Duff 1956:18). The modern missionary movement and Christian unity are key concepts in establishing the ecumenical perspective. Missionary endeavors brought about the need for ecumenism due to failures as well as successes. Duff (ibid:288) adds: ‘Ecumenism by definition,…,transcends narrow denominationalism while prizing the peculiar heritage of its component ecclesiastical traditions, and appreciating the distinct contributions each communion brings to the corporate whole’.

Church history has been defined as God’s presence in human communities. This process calls for an ever increasing awareness, consciousness, and acceptance. Progress is being made towards this goal. Historians seek the need for a concept of the church that is broad enough to include all (Sagovsky 2000:17). The intended result will be the unity of God’s people. The desired unity of all God’s people will require responsible stewardship and a commitment to mission. This must be seen as a universal ecumenical approach to history (Schafer 1993:50). All groups will have the
same equality in this universal vision. All God’s people and churches will belong to a universal Christian union that will require of them to be accountable to each other (Sagovsky 2000:173). A necessary theme in the discussion of ecumenism is dialogue (ibid: 9). A new openness with each other is necessary. This is based on honesty. This is another essential factor for ecumenical dialogues. This is a very liberating experience for individuals and churches.

In analysis, the ecumenical perspective is all important in the study of church history. This perspective has become necessary on an international scale. World Christian unity is taught in biblical passages such as John 17:21 by Jesus. Modern missions has given much impetus to the ecumenical perspective. Church history has been defined as God’s presence in human communities. Historians view the need for a church which is broad enough to include everybody. This will result in the unity of God’s people. It will require God’s people to manifest responsible stewardship and a commitment to mission. This is a universal ecumenical approach to history. It will become a very liberating experience for individuals and churches.

2:8 The Goal Of History

2:8:1 Christianity A Historical Materialistic Faith

For our purposes Christianity is a historical materialistic faith which must move towards a certain specified goal (Therbon 1999:31-52). This is the complete fulfillment of the kingdom of God (Afansayen 1987:166-167). The kingdom of God is in the
historical future beyond our present space and time world. Harrison (1908:66) writes: ‘One God, one Savior of all, one equal soul in all, one common life’. Historians deny this affirming that historical thinking is teleological. God is lord of history who is guiding the process to the end goal. Christians are pilgrims who are journeying to the future (Latourette 1953:1353).

Christian history has been considered linear which is in opposition to a cyclical approach to history. However, it is obvious that within progress towards the kingdom, God intervenes annually. His yearly intervention is illustrated in the Enthronement Psalms (eg. 47, 93, 96-99). In addition, great interventions of God have occurred in history for his people in Exodus (eg. 12-15). The yearly cyclical process does not mean that history is not moving towards a new kairos. Jesus instituted the eschaton with his announcement of ‘the Kingdom of God is upon you’ (Mk. 1:15). Christ carried out his ministry of reconciliation of the world to himself (2 Cor. 5:19). The culmination of Christ’s eschatological ministry will be delivering the kingdom to God the Father (1 Cor. 5:24). God hath made Christ lord of this age and the coming age (Latourette 1953:1353). In this sense, the gospel is beyond our history (Duncan 2007).

In scrutiny, Christianity is a historical materialistic faith which moves toward a specified goal. This is the complete fulfillment of the kingdom of God. God is lord of history who guides the process to the end goal.

Christian history has been evaluated as linear. This is in opposition to the cyclical approach to history. It is obvious that within the progress towards the kingdom that God
intervenes annually. The Enthronement Psalm (eg. 47, 93, 96-98) are examples of this
The yearly cyclical process does not mean that history is to moving towards a new kairos.
Additional biblical examples of history moving towards a new kairos are found in scripture
(Mk. 1:15, I Cor. 5:24). God hath made Christ lord of this age and the coming age.
In this sense, the gospel is beyond our history.

2:9 The End Of History

2:9:1 The Brevity of Ideological Systems

The end of history is not be confused with the goal of history. Francis
Fukuyama’s (1992) work created a great deal of discussion and controversy in the
historical world. He claimed that history had ended due to the triumph of liberal
democracy. He wondered if there was anything beyond a liberal democracy.
Was the triumph of the liberal democracy the climax and goal of history (Fukuyama
1992:xiii)? The final form of world politic is a liberal democracy. The final form of
world economics is capitalism. Hodgson (1999:2) writes:

Argued that liberal democracy marks the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological
evolution’ and ‘the final form of human government’. Liberal democracy ‘remains
the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures
around the globe’. It has been proclaimed that there is no alternative to liberal
democratic capitalism.

The liberal democracy sought to suppress all other alternatives to itself. Further, the
ideology of liberal democracy and capitalism argued that any other ideology was a
tool of the enemy. The liberal democracy stood for peace, freedom, and plenty.
Fukuyama’s view seen in the work of Jean Baudrillard and Jean-Francois Lyotard called it endism. The view of endism became very relevant with the new millennium in the year 2000 and ‘the environment as we know it’ (Sim 2001:27). The logic of modern science dictated universal evolution in the direction of capitalism. However, it was possible to be satisfied on one level but dissatisfied on other levels within this system. Grant (ibid: 27) argues that Lyotard is critical of what he calls ‘grand narratives’. These theories claim to be able to explain everything and to resist any attempt to change their form (or ‘narrative’). If this was true then the possibility of change political or otherwise was negated. The hope of the poor and the disadvantaged would be a disastrous result for the world. The rich by way of contrast would suffer a meaningless existence in life. The poor and disadvantaged of youth in all cultures would be affected as well. Equality in terms of income and assets, and the distribution of wealth would become an unrealistic goal (Van Parijs 1997: 249-250). Turiel (2002:298) argued that this was a moral issue. It would be all too true ‘that capital has the power to enlist and command obedience on a vast scale’ (Heilbroner 1985:46). The ‘claims of any Socialist or radical critique of the capitalistic system’ would be done away with. Further, in the postmodern condition, knowledge is the worlds most significant commodity. The control of knowledge means the exertion of political power. Two choices lay before our world. The first choice is capitalism’s centralized political control of all knowledge. The alternative is whereby all data banks are accessible to the general public. Working
class consciousness in western society has been ‘fragmented and sporadic’ (Tilley 1998:10).

It has been pointed out that the capitalistic use of ideology is with a unlimited power to ‘exploitation like taking unfair advantage’ (Van Parijs 1997:33). This view for the Christian and world history cannot be a true Christian perspective. The reason being for this is that if this were true then the dominance of a liberal democracy and capitalism would mean the kingdom of God had been reached. Therefore, a liberal democracy and capitalism may well be a temporary system. Van Parijs (ibid:186) writes: ‘Now, compare Eastern and Western Europe before the fall of the Berlin wall. How can you resist the presumption that, as far as economic efficiency is concerned, optimal capitalism is bound to have the upper hand? This is not more than a presumption, but one that is strong enough located the burden of proof firmly on the side of socialism’. Gray (1999:42) states of the endist view: ‘The distinguishing mark of the endist claim is the assertion that times have changed radically. This form of eschatological argument if permitted, effectively can disarm all rivals’. Such a view cannot be considered as true for the Kingdom of God would then be viewed politically in terms of the liberal democracy and economically in terms of capitalism.

In assaying, this is not be confused with the goal of history. Fukuyama’s work created a great deal of discussion and controversy. He argued that the triumph of the liberal democracy was the end of history. The final form of world politic is a liberal democracy.
The final form of world economics is capitalism.

The liberal democracy developed its own ideology. This ideology suppressed all alternative views to itself. Its argument was that any other ideology was a tool of the enemy. The logic of modern science was a universal evolution in the direction of capitalism. Satisfaction was possible at one level but not at other levels within this system. Caution was expressed in grand narratives that claimed to be able to explain everything. Any attempt to change the narrative was prohibited.

The class struggle between the rich and the poor becomes very evident within this system. Capitalism has the capital and power to maintain servitude on a world-wide scale. The control of knowledge is the world’s most significant commodity. This control translates into the exertion of political power. Capitalism has maintained a firm control of all knowledge. The second and better alternative is where all data banks of knowledge become accessible to the general public. The capitalistic view takes unfair advantage of people. This view for the Christian and world history cannot be a true Christian perspective. A liberal democracy and capitalism may well be a temporary system.

2:10 The Role Of Ideology

2:10:1 The Importance of Ideology

The preceding discussion shows the importance of the role of ideology. In his work Rethinking International Relations, Halliday (1994:58) argues for the necessity of a ‘historical materialist approach’. Chilcote (2000:xi) points out: ‘Political science and
political economy are deeply influenced by ideology’. In 1795, Antoine Destutt de Tracy ‘coined the word ideology’ which was a reference to ‘the theory of ideas in general’ (Rude 1995:9). Christianity is dependent on political structures. A political ideology has three aspects the vision for a future coherence theory, a consensus in form of coherent interpretation of reality, and action that results in the reorganizing of society (Praeger 2000:iii). This faith can be seen to have a historical reality with its own ideology and history. An awareness and consciousness of conditions is advantageous in the history of ideology. If this approach is followed, the civil order will not become idolatry. Evangelical religion has become a mirror reflecting the views of a liberal democracy and capitalism. It is through its use that the classes are oppressed. The oppressors gain strength, support, and the approval of the liberal democracy. Duncan (2007:17) points out that in South Africa the church opposed social injustices and called the system into question. The church must remain conscious of conditions. It must take action to challenge the dominant ideology of the the day. The importance of adhering to a material socio-economic base though often at an unconscious level for the church must be emphasized. The dominant class ideology that will not change in spite of social injustices must be identified. The bourgeois society of the day can often be traced back to the industrial capitalism from which are their roots. Unfortunately, the church wil often be what the sending body of their origin was (eg. Western Europe). This becomes a deep issue of faith which is related to ideology and context (Fitzgerald 2000:3-8). Ideologies must be critiqued which requires both a theological commitment, and a continual analysis of
of society along social and political lines. The result of all will be a theology of liberation with the transformation of mankind. The complete fulfillment of the kingdom of God will be realized. The contemporary political status will no doubt be challenged (Comaroff 1991: 159).

In a critical analysis, the role of ideology is important in politics and economics. Christianity is dependent on political structures. A political ideology has three aspects. These are the vision for a future coherence theory, a consensus in the interpretation of reality, and action resulting in the reorganization of society. This faith has its own historical reality, ideology, and history. Evangelical religion reflects the views of a liberal democracy and capitalism. It is through evangelical religion that the classes are oppressed. The oppressors gain strength, support, and appraisal from the liberal democracy.

The church in South Africa opposed social injustices. It called the system into question. The church must respond to the injustice of the day. A material socio-economic base even at an unconscious level must be insisted upon by the church. The dominant class ideology must be identified. Ideologies are in need of a constant critique and analysis. This must be done along social and political lines. The end result will be a liberation theology and the transformation of mankind. The complete fulfillment of the kingdom of God will be realized. The relationship of church history to world history must now be considered in our progression of thought in historical issues related the writing of contemporary history.
Ross (2006:4) affirms God’s universality with his reference to ‘the God of all history’. All history both ecclesiastical and secular lies within this all embracing scope (Latourette 1953:1352-1354). The Old and New Testaments demonstrate that the sacred has occurred within the context of world history (Hesselgrave & Rommen 1992:4-11). Christian historiography lies within the context of world history (eg. Lk. 2:1-2). The twentieth century witnessed a search for ‘consensus and a common past’ (Bowden 1991:90). Gilbert (1998:18) gives us further insight: ‘Most researchers chose to concentrate on generating empirical evidence of contextual effects from what are assumed to be relevant contextual units. These units are usually defined spatially or geographically-the county, the census tract, the neighborhood’.

The contextual conditions of the New Testament and the incarnation of Christ occurred within the historical background of the Roman Empire, and its Pax Romana (Latourette 1953:21). Christianity has occurred within time. It claims that all of history moves to a God ordained goal (Gustavson 1955:73). Smith (1981:3) elaborates further: ‘God is actively involved in the historical arena. It is, surely, altogether fitting that a Christian theologian should take history seriously’. Christianity is a historical religion occurring in time and history (ibid:95). The unfolding drama of sin and redemption has taken place (Latourette 1953:8). A teleological view of history has been introduced with order, purpose, design, and direction. Since Christianity is contextual, it is quite possible to write ecclesiastical history apart from and separate from world
history (Schafer 1993:50). The contextual approach to history is to focus on the local setting of Jesus of Nazareth (Mk. 1:9, 16, 21). New Testament history is interwoven within the framework of secular history. Many New Testament references are a direct reference to Roman history (eg. Caesar’s name and coins, Mk. 12:16).

The contextual approach to history does carry with it the perspective of universality. The contextual approach focuses on the local context. Duncan (2007) argues that faithfulness to one’s local setting will result in faithfulness to the Christian universal community. Hobsbawm alleges that universality ‘is the essence of all history’ (Lambert and Schofield 2004:177). The local context, the sitz im leben, focuses to a large extent on the church today. It has been argued that the word church is too ambiguous and undefined by the very nature of the word. The Scriptures, church denominations, and church history confirm this ambiguity as to the definition of the word church and its many meanings. The word church, should be abandoned and replaced by the word Christian. This should be done whenever reference is made to history (Kalu 2005:12-14 in Duncan 2007:19). Healy (2000:45) admits that the church as a model of an ‘institution’ is a problem. The church defined in this way has many disadvantages which work against meeting the needs of the people (Diakonoff 1999:207). The church based on the institutional model furthers its own development, denominationalism, and exclusivism. Lambsdorff (2004:131) points to corruption and distrust as the result of the church as a model of an institution.

The writing of contemporary history is a very exciting and thought provoking experience.
This is due to new emphases and recent developments within historiographical thinking, and writing.

In estimation, God must be seen as the God of all history. Ecclesiastical and secular history lies within this all embracing scope. The Old and New Testaments demonstrate that the sacred occurred within world history. The New Testament occurred within the historical background of the Roman Empire. Christianity claims that all history moves towards a God ordained goal. Christianity is a historical religion which took place in time and history. Christianity is a contextual religion. It is interwoven within the framework of secular history. The contextual approach to history carries with it the perspective of universality.

The word church is ambiguous and undefined. The Scriptures, church denominations, and church history confirm this ambiguity as to the definition of the word church and its many meanings. The word church should be done away with and replaced by the word Christian. This should be done whenever the reference is to history. The church defined as such at the present time works against meeting the needs of the people. The church based on the institutional model serves itself and denominationalism. Distrust and corruption result from the church as an institutional model.

2:12 Tillich’s Contemporary Historical View During The German Years (1886-1933)

Tillich embraced ecumenism which is so important for theology in its economic, political, and theological sense (Horton 1952:28). Tillich’s sharp observational skills brought out a major historiographical issue the ability to relate the present to the future. The difference was ‘a priestly sacramental attitude toward modern political movements,
and a prophetic eschatological attitude’ (ibid:32). Tillich’s discernment of ‘the hand of God’ was not in social democracy but socialism. Horton fails to realize democracy failed as a result of World War I, the German Revolution of 1918, and post war conditions in post World War I Germany. Horton does admit a very important conclusion in terms of the historiographical issue of progress and mankind’s transformation. Horton (ibid:33) writes: ‘What Tillich and the religious socialists intended with their doctrine of the kaïros was to relate the Kingdom of God to politics’. Niebuhr (1956:10) writes of Tillich’s

*The Religious Situation:*

Capitalist society….Its civilization is based upon faith in the self-sufficiency of the human and finite world; its hope and purpose is the establishment of human control over the world of nature and mind. Natural science, technique and capitalist economy—a trinity of powers which reinforce each other—support and control the civilization. The spirit of human and finite self-sufficiency is expressed in painting, sculpture, education, politics and religion and gives rise everywhere to an attitude of human domination over things in which there is no respect for the given and no true appreciation of human or any other kind of individuality.

Richards (1995:45) writes: ‘Tillich proceeds to a general and critical analysis of the bourgeois, capitalist society’. Tillich was able to project his vision into the future.

Ratschow (1980:23) confirms this:

Tillich’s eschatologically based devotion to life and its movement did not occur only in matters political. Indeed, even though the political was an earlier expression of the turn, it was not its real bearer. Instead, the political insights and impulses arose out of Tillich’s occupation with historical insights.

Ratschow (ibid:23) continues: ‘In history, however, Tillich’s eschatological movement is worked out basically as kaïros thinking. In kaïros thinking the political, historical, cultural, and religio-philosophical tendencies are reflected as in the prism that makes their acute significance visible’. Ratschow (ibid:26) writes of Tillich’s socialism:
Tillich maintains a socialism a movement to give meaning to his present. His socialism is ‘represented entirely according to the model of a religious faith…Tillich’s reflections on the “proletarian battle,” which is the cause at issue’. Tillich admitted his own subjectivity and cultural context for both himself and his writings. Ratschow (ibid:34) writes: ‘Rollo May tells of speaking with Tillich about how he, Tillich, imagined the effect of his writings among coming generations. Tillich shook his head in reply and opined, “I am too much determined by the present kairos.”’ Ratschow (ibid:34) concludes:

On this point, one must indeed say that Tillich wrote his apologetic theology strictly for his time. But in doing this, he transcended the questions of the time toward their solution. And that he did.

Leibrecht (1959:4) writes of Tillich’s political theology: ‘The prominence in his thought of the notion of kairos, the creative act in the moment of the invasion of the finite by the infinite…illustrates his insistence on speaking to men in the light of changing circumstances which confront them. With candor he has approached every facet of our tangled lives and has been a true guide to the perplexed in our century’.

Heiman (1952:312) writes: ‘In three versions of his autobiography, written for different occasions at different times, Tillich has emphasized the central importance in his development which he himself attributes to the doctrine of religious socialism…he implicitly claims central importance for religious socialism in the theonomous system which his theology is designed to build’. Heiman continues to argue for Tillich’s German legacy of religious socialism but attributes this to Tillich’s doctrine of the kairos. Heiman (ibid:313) views Tillich’s doctrine of the kairos as a generalization referring to his personal experience. Tillich saw the need to become involved in the endeavor for justice and peace upon his
return from World War I. This Tillich thought to be his foremost Christian duty to prevent the repetition of the catastrophe of World War I. Tillich thought this Christian duty to be both the thought and the necessary action prescribed by the prophets of the Old Testament. Further, Heiman (ibid:313) argues: ‘If the time was ripe in 1918, so also it is ripe at many other turning points of history, all of them characterized by “the invasion of the temporal by the Eternal”,…the call to the Eternal”…the call to the conditional “to surrender to the unconditional,…transforms the temporal’. The relevancy of Tillich’s rich contemporary historical view is obvious given this thinking on the destination of history, the transformation of mankind. Secondly, all of history lies within the divine order. Reisman (1990:31) writes of this new religious phenomenon: ‘Virtually every aspect of Capitalism and thus of economic activity is savagely denounced by large segments of public opinion’. Tillich’s legacy has given an awareness as to the destination of history. Wacquaint (1985:42) claims the transition has already been made ‘toward a Socialist world order’. Adorno (1990:199) in his work *Negative Dialectics* argues ‘capitalism realizes over the heads of men’.

Tillich stressed the importance of the concept of ideology. Tillich (1968:481) writes this is ‘another important concept for theology’. Tillich (1968:481-482) elaborates:

What is ideology? Every group or class has such a system of ideas. But ideology—can also mean…the most dangerous weapon in the class struggle—the unconscious production of ideas which justify the will-to-power of a ruling group. This is mostly on unconscious production, but it can be used in a conscious way. Marx used the word “ideology” as a weapon. It was probably his sharpest weapon against the ideas of the ruling classes with which the churches were allied. All the great European churches, the Orthodox, the Lutheran, and the Episcopalian were on the side of the ruling classes. The Roman Catholic church was better in this respect for it had preserved a tradition of social feeling and social analysis from its classical medieval period. Marx says that the religious symbolism of a transcendent fulfillment (of
heaven or immortality) is not merely the hope of every human being, but is the invention of the ruling classes to prevent the masses from seeking fulfillment in this life. This is formulated in the famous phrase that religion is the opiate of the people.

Siegfried (1952:71) argues that Tillich accepted the Marxist ideology and analysis.

As a Christian theologian, Tillich espoused the historic materialistic faith. He has inspired the disadvantaged, and oppressed peoples around the world. His Protestant theology during the German years 1919 to 1933 was a religious socialism that would bring the Kingdom of God and a new world for the millions oppressed by capitalism.


A third method of theology is the praxis approach of liberation theology. “Praxis” is a technical term designating a way to knowledge that binds together action, suffering, and reflection. The praxis method of theology is represented by… liberation theologians, most notably in Latin America.

Tillich’s legacy of a rich ecumenical theology has liberated many students. Braaten (1968:xvi) writes: ‘even students from backgrounds uncongenial to Tillich’s views on the Christian faith could not fail to learn from him as an interpreter of the Christian tradition. Many were liberated from the strait jacket of a given denominational tradition to become more open to the fullness of the common Christian heritage’.

Tillich (1968:479) writes:

that in Germany the social structure was always taken for granted as something ordained by God. This was in accordance with Lutheran doctrine. Sociological analysis was avoided….Marx received his sociological view partly from France and partly from his insight into the miserable social conditions of large sections of people in Europe. Man is not man as individual. The idea of the individual existing by himself is an illusion.
In summary, Tillich has left us a relevant contemporary historical legacy of the destination of history. The coming new kairos that will result in the complete transformation of mankind.

In investigation, Tillich has left us a German legacy of a contemporary historical view. Tillich embraced ecumenism. He was able to relate the present to the future. Tillich viewed divine providence to be seen in socialism. Tillich related his religious socialism to the kingdom of God and politics. His critical analysis of the bourgeois and capitalist society remains relevant for us today. Tillich stressed the importance of Marxist ideology and analysis. Tillich espoused the historic materialistic faith as a Christian theologian. Marx argued that religion was used by the bourgeois and the capitalistic society as a weapon to distract the masses from fulfillment in this life. Tillich’s historic materialistic faith has argued to be a rich legacy throughout Latin America. Tillich has inspired the disadvantaged and oppressed around the world. Tillich’s embrace of a rich ecumenical theology has liberated many students. Tillich’s rich legacy includes as well the destination of history. The coming new kairos will result in the complete transformation of mankind.

2:13 Summary

The writing of history requires trustworthy materials and the critical method. Analysis must be given to the historical evidence. Historical problems are many and varied (eg. the problem of time, identity, motive, character, the origin of ideas, cause and effect relationship). A hypothesis must be formed to begin a historical study. The hypothesis/idea/guiding principle must be proved. The historian will build a historical frame of reference of reasoned facts. A philosophy can be drawn from the historical frame of reference. The historical study must be
analyzed and interpreted. All views must be considered in the historical research. The totality of the historical fact is important to the historian. A difference of opinion has existed as to whether historical events can be really known. The discussion involves the fact that history can or cannot be known. Facts can be observed, recorded, and attested to by the historian. The context of the historian and the historical background of the historical study are important factors to the study. The particulars of the study must fit the hypothesis. Historical study must involve the presentation of the sources, the analysis, the summary (recapitulation), the overall conclusion of the research findings, and the new knowledge.

The definition of contemporary history is still being debated. Social and economic concerns, the time element, long term trends, and objectivity are some of the historical variables accounting for this debate. Others have thought contemporary history is history that is happening at the present time.

The historian’s presuppositions determine historical outcome. Facts, interpretations, opinions, memory, and imagination are all subjective choices. The subjectiveness of the historian’s social context means absolute objectivity in writing contemporary history is not possible.

The past, the present, and the future are all interrelated and are inseparable. History is constantly being revised and rewritten because of new sources and findings. The scope of history has been widened to include both the social sciences and the humanities. The result has been the need for analysis and interpretation. Contemporary historians argue that past historians did not attend to the present.
Absolute objectivity does not exist because the historian writes form a particular social, cultural, and historical context. The principle of change in culture, society, and our world argue against objectivity. The historian’s selectivity of facts, and value judgments argue in favor of subjectivity. The historian should be able to predict the future. This will help the historian to better understand the past. The future may not turn out as the historian predicted. The relative nature of the historian’s views are evident.

The subjective nature of writing contemporary history can be seen in the historian’s past, present subjective context, perspective, prior beliefs, presuppositions, and decision making. Historical biases can be tested by historical moral standards.

Other historical issues to be considered in the writing of contemporary history are progress, the ecumenical perspective, the goal of history, the end of history, the role of ideology, and the relationship of church history to world history. The Christian view of progress was to understand it from a linear perspective. Linear progress resulting in a golden era disappeared due to wars, the increase in natural disasters, famines, and diseases. Progress had to be redefined. Some thought that the triumph of capitalism in economics and a liberal democracy in politics to be linear progress. Further, the claim was made that this was the end of history. The focus on the present and decision making in the present for the future became a necessary part of the historical process. Man’s social and political structure had changed. Man’s alienation became a theological question. Mankind had become victimized and oppressed by the oppressor. Christian Marxist peoples struggled against these injustices. The ecumenical perspective has become necessary on an international scale. World Christian unity is based on biblical passages such as John 17:21. Modern missions advanced the
ecumenical perspective. Responsible stewardship and commitment became essential to the
cumenical perspective. This is a very liberating experience for both individuals and churches.
The goal of history had to be reconsidered and redefined. Christianity is a historical
materialistic faith moving towards the fulfillment of the kingdom of God. God is lord
of history. Cyclical progress is evident within progress towards the kingdom of God.
God intervenes annually as evidenced by the Enthronement Psalms (eg. 47, 93, 96-99).
This does not mean that history is not moving towards a new kairos. The end of history
is different from the goal of history. Fukuyama’s work argued for the triumph of
capitalism and democracy as the end of history. Capitalism’s ideology suppressed all
alternative views. The class struggle became very evident within this system. Capitalism’s
oppression of people made it very clear that this cannot be a true Christian perspective.
Ideology is important in both economics and politics. Christianity is dependent on
political structures. Evangelical religion maintains the views of its liberal democracy
and capitalistic system. The evangelical religion has become an oppressor of the classes.
The church needs to challenge social injustices. A material socio-economic base must be
emphasized by the church. Ideologies are in need of a constant critique and revision.
The critique must be along social and political lines. This will result in a liberation
theology, the transformation of mankind, and the complete fulfillment of the kingdom of
God. Church history lies within the scope and background of world history. God is the
God of all history. The Old and New Testaments occurred within world history. This
approach to contemporary history carries with it the universal perspective. The word
church should be replaced by the word Christian. The church is based on an institutional model. The church seeks to further its own ends and denominationalism. This is at the cost of not meeting the needs of the peoples. Corruption and distrust result from the institutional model of the church. Our thesis advances to the consideration of the biographical details of Paul Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy.
CHAPTER 3

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS

3:1 The Argument From Heredity

3:1:1 Tillich’s German Ancestry

Wilhelm and Marion Pauck begin their biography of Paul Tillich with his humble beginning in Starzeddel. This was a small village in the district of Guben near Berlin, Germany (Pauck & Pauck 1976:1). ‘This little place’, is now part of Poland. It is presently called Starosiedle which means ‘Old Homestead’ (ibid:1). The Paucks give an account of Tillich’s parents. Johannes Oskar Tillich was Paul Tillich’s father. His mother was Wilhelmina Mathilde nee Durselen. Johannes and Wilhelmina were married in October 1885. He was twenty eight years of age while Wilhelmina was twenty five years old. Paul Tillich’s birth was somewhat of a near tragedy in that the infant nearly died at birth. The Paucks (ibid:1) were able to get a copy of the birth announcement that Paul Tillich’s father gave to his parents. Johannes wrote:

Little Paul is still alive but his life is a continuous struggle with death; perhaps, but only perhaps, will this young life be victorious. Yet his breathing may stop at any moment. We have already given him up threes this night…he lay in a death struggle for nearly seven hours, then his body became warm again—to our terror I must say. The excitement, the wavering between fear and hope are nearly killing us too, despite all self-control.

The Paucks (ibid:2) speak of Tillich’s ‘lifelong dread of death—this melancholy preoccupation—may have had its beginning’. They (ibid:2) attribute this to ‘this first experience of his existence’. The Paucks (ibid:2) expound on the meaning of death for Tillich: ‘As a boy he repressed the knowledge of the untimely death of his
mother. As a young man, in World War I, he explained the death of a civilization and was transformed by it’.

The Paucks (ibid:2) develop this theme further of what it meant to Tillich later in life. They write:

For the mature Tillich, death represented the “absolutely unknown,” “the darkness in which there is no light at all,” “the real and ultimate object of fear from which all other fears derive their power,” “the anxiety of being eternally forgotten”—death meant parting, separation, isolation, and opposition. Tillich felt uneasy in the presence of the dying, partly because he was fearful of his own death; partly because he could not conceive that he would himself one day no longer be. For Tillich, death was never a friend or an achievement, but a stranger to be unmasked; yet he never thought of it as the ultimate victor. “For love,” he said, “is stronger than death.” The infant who won his early struggle over death became the man whose statement, “Being overcomes non-being,” is the very entrance to his thought.

On September 12, 1886, Paul Tillich was baptized by his father, Johannes Tillich. The Paucks (ibid:2) explain Tillich’s names: ‘In the fashion of the time, Tillich was given two middle names, Johannes for his father, Oskar for his paternal Grandfather’. The Paucks (ibid:2) continue: ‘He never used all his names; for the most of his life he was known as Paul J. Tillich, and after fame overtook him late in life, simply Paul Tillich’. Further, they (ibid:2) add: ‘As a child he was called Paulchen, as a young man Paul; in his maturity he was known as Paulus’.

The genealogy of the Tillich family first appears in the records of the thirteenth century in middle and eastern Germany. The Paucks point out that it was not until the Hussite wars, when Slavic elements were absorbed, the Tillichs were one hundred percent German (ibid:2). The Paucks (ibid:2) write of Tillich’s relatives: ‘The earliest of whom details are known were two brothers, Johannes,
and Theodricus, both of whom studied at the Augustinian monastery, St. Moritz vor den Toren von Naumburg’.

In 1392, Johannes who was a monk later became a prior. Johannes studied at the University of Prague in 1384. The Paucks bring out a very interesting detail that this was during the lifetime of John Huss. Theodricus was at the University of Leipzig from 1410 onward. The Paucks (ibid:2-3) elaborate: ‘He was a provost, a lecturer at the university, and the author of two histories’. The 1630’s was an unfortunate decade for the Tillich family. The whole family of George Tielich with the exception of two more elderly uncles were wiped out by the Bubonic plague (ibid:3). The Paucks (ibid:3) write of George Tielich: ‘This ancestor was born in 1624, around the time of Jacob Boehme, and lived to be seventy-four’. It was an interesting point that his younger brother who was called Paulus died in infancy. It was George who studied theology at the University of Leipzig in the year 1648. George Tielich became a minister. The Paucks (ibid:3) raise an interesting point on Tielich’s sermons. They (ibid:3) write: ‘He was criticized for discussing politics too freely in the pulpit and was dismissed from one of his pastorates for reasons unknown’.

The Paucks (ibid:3) delve deeply into Paul Tillich’s family roots. The Paucks (ibid:3) write:

The Tillich family produced musicians and manufacturers as well as monks and ministers; many of them were blessed with double talents. Indeed, the name Tillich, originally “Dietrich,” means “rich or powerful folk.” This power or talent expressed itself to an unusual degree in the immediate forbears of Paul Tillich.
His great-grandfather Wilhelm, known by his second name Samuel, was a skilled musician who played the flute, clarinet, guitar, and violin. Married twice, he raised a family of six and supported himself by selling cloth. Oskar, his youngest son, born in 1828, owned a copper and silver workshop; he made a great deal of money—all of which he lost before World War I—and lived to the ripe age of eighty-six. It is probably Oskar’s wife that Tillich refers when he mentions a grandmother who built barricades in the revolution of 1848 from whom he surmises he may have inherited a drop of socialist blood.

The Paucks (ibid:3-4) give an elaborate description of Paul Tillich’s father, Johannes.

Johannes Tillich, Oskar’s son, and Paul’s father, was the first Lutheran pastor in the Tillich family. Good-looking, with small features, he wore a black beard which he kept expertly trimmed. He moved gracefully and was clever with his hands, but tended to be melancholy and meditative, was a hypochondriac, and incessantly smoked cigars, unlike his son who never smoked. A pastor and church administrator, Johannes included in his functions that of school inspector and superintendent of thirty ministers. He examined candidates for the ministry, was a traditionalist. Lutheran of decided views, and ultimately became a Konsistorialrat, i.e., member of the Consistory of the Province of Brandenburg of the Evangelical Church of Prussia, with headquarters in Berlin.

Further, the Paucks (ibid:4) continue:

He was a dignified man and, partly because of his elevated position, exuded an air of authority. Some, including his son Paul, thought of him as more strict than in fact he was, perhaps because of his beard and black suits. He was a master of exact formulation and greatly relished debate. He never openly criticized, but discussed quietly. Philosophy, particularly the tensions between Greek and Christian thought, fascinated him. In this intellectual adventure he included his son in early exchanges.

Johannes was a very good debater which activity he thoroughly enjoyed. The Paucks note a very admirable trait in Johannes. He was not one to openly criticize others. He would discuss the matter privately and quietly if at all possible. Tillich gained an appreciation from his father in the realms of Greek philosophy and Christian thought. Johannes was very talented in that he played both the piano
and loved to compose, and write poems. These poems were set to music something that Paul, his son, was not able to do. Johannes wrote lullabies for his grandchildren who adored him greatly. The Paucks write that Johannes Tillich came to know himself through music (ibid:4). Paul came to know himself through painting (ibid:4).

The Paucks (ibid:4) argue that for Johannes philosophy, in particular the tensions created ‘between Greek and Christian thought, fascinated him’. ‘In this intellectual adventure’, Johannes ‘included his son in early exchanges’ (ibid:4). Wilhelm and Marion Pauck (ibid:4) give additional insight into the character of Johannes Tillich:

Johannes Tillich was a typical Prussian or German father. He regarded it as improper to express satisfaction directly to his son, but it was important for him to praise his son to other people. Moreover, he played the customary role of the parent: the father had to be the figure of authority. In this, as in everything else, he was a pillar of the Prussian society. While Paul greatly respected and sometimes feared him, he also loved him; indeed, their relationship was softened by a benevolent, even sentimental understanding, a protective and secret pride. The same may be said of Johannes’s attitudes toward his two daughters, who in turn respected and loved him. He urged them to carve out professions of their own, with a liberality of mind unusual for his time.

The Paucks provide less description of Paul Tillich’s mother. The Paucks (ibid:5) write:

The image of Mathilde Durselen Tillich, Paul’s mother, is ghostly; very little is remembered about her. Her face was narrow and long, with small serious eyes and a generous but sad mouth. Her background was liberal and bourgeois. Her father, Gustav, was a Rhenish bon vivant who lived to the age of ninety and was inordinately fond of women. Tillich loved his grandfather Durselen, who called him Paulichen or Paulchen (“little Paul”), and felt he had inherited from him his great affection for women. A popular man, Durselen enjoyed drinking beer at the Wirtshaus at dusk.

Tillich’s mother was ‘inflexible’ (ibid:5). Further, the Paucks (ibid:5) write of her:
She was a “Calvinist,” especially about eating, and had an absolute idea that the children must get out into the open air every day. One Christmas day, Tillich’s father successfully interceded for them, saying it would be nice for them to stay at home and play with their new toys. Nevertheless, young Paul adored his mother. “My whole life was embedded in her,” he once said. “I couldn’t imagine any other woman.” Shortly before her death he said to her, “I would like to marry you.” She died of cancer when she was forty-three.

In analysis, the Paucks give an account of Tillich’s birth experience. Tillich nearly died as an infant at birth. The genealogy of the Tillich family is traced back to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Paul Tillich came from a line of scholars. Johannes and Theodricus were brothers who studied at an Augustinian monastery. The Tillich genealogy included those who were musicians, manufacturers, monks, and ministers.

A vivid description is given of Johannes who was Paul Tillich’s father. He was a Lutheran pastor. Johannes was a very talented individual who played the piano. He loved the tensions between Greek and Christian thought. The Paucks argue that Tillich was raised in a very strict home. His mother came from both a liberal and bourgeois background. She was a very rigid person who was not at all flexible.

3:2 The Argument From The Environment

3:2:1 Tillich’s Formative Years In Germany

Paul Tillich’s childhood surroundings were very nice. The Paucks (ibid:5) write: ‘As a small child, Tillich played in a beautiful garden outside the parish house in Starzeddel where he was born; Tillich’s father enlarged the garden by having a barn removed. Nearby was a great park belonging to the lord of the manor, Prince Schoneich
Carolath’ (ibid:5). Paul looking out of the parish house windows could see the nests of birds and their coming, and going. A nearby school for girls was separated by a stone wall. Their were chickens strolling about in the courtyard. Tillich enjoyed the large garden and played well with other children in the village. He had a very normal childhood (ibid:5).

The Paucks (ibid:5-6) tell us ‘in the long winter’ that Tillich ‘battled with snowballs’. ‘In the milder seasons’, Tillich played hide and seek with the other children (ibid:5). He played other childhood games such as robber and princess, and also a game very much like hockey. In the year 1888, ‘Johanna Marie’ was born to Johannes and Mathilde (ibid:6). The Tillich family moved to Schonfliess in 1891 where Johannes took up his work as superintendent (ibid:6).

Tillich grew up in a sort of medieval atmosphere as illustrated by his life at Schonfliess. It was a small town of ‘about three thousand people’ (ibid:6). It had ‘a very large, very old and beautiful church, an old city hall, and many ancient houses, none more than two stories high’ (ibid:6). The streets were cobblestone. Grass grew up between the cobblestones. Transportation was by horse and carriage. There were no cars in Schonfliess in the year 1891. This small town was the site of great horse auctions. The children of the town were free for a day whenever the horses were sold (ibid:6).

The Paucks (ibid:6) write: ‘When Tillich was not playing with his young sisters (Elisabeth Johanna Mathilda was born in 1893) his favorite sport was to walk along the top of the town wall, as Goethe in his childhood had done in Frankfurt, and survey the realm. Later in life, he still dreamed of that wall, remembering the turrets and towers
that marked the entrance to the town’ (ibid:6).

The Paucks (ibid:6) continue:

Outside the town nearby, was a lake where the boy and his father sailed; his father held the tiller while young Paul handled the foresail. Once there was a terrible storm and they were forced to leave the boat on shore at some distance and walk home, returning only the next day to sail it back. Tillich remembered the waves and wind on the water. One night he dreamed that tremendous waves from the lake were rushing up over the wall to engulf the town. On another occasion when Tillich, out alone, came home very late from the lake, his father, who had been fearing he had drowned, spanked him. It was the only time his father punished him in this way.

The Paucks (ibid:6) give additional information on the years at Schonfliess:

The years in Schonfliess were orderly, quiet, simple. In the fall, Paul and his sisters roamed over farms and fields. They pulled up weeds, built a hut, made a fire of potato leaves. They played “soldier.” Tillich had a gun which he made himself, and used an old iron pipe for a cannon as they ran about the land. He was a protector to his young sisters, helping them overcome their timidity.

Elisabeth married a Lutheran pastor by the name of Erhard Seeberger. She bore three children for Erhard a son and two daughters. She was special to Paulus throughout her entire life because she was the youngest of his sisters (ibid:7). The Paucks (ibid:7) write of Johanna, his older sister:

He shared a deeper, almost mystical relationship. They fought a good deal in the early years. Indeed, Tillich, a serious, somewhat spoiled child, occasionally had terrible fits of temper, but his anger never lasted long and he did not bear grudges. As time went on, these siblings became of “one heart, one mind.” Johanna was an unusually beautiful girl, with philosophical inclinations and a passion for wild flowers.

However, Paul Tillich’s questions caused her to have serious doubts about her faith.

The Paucks (ibid:7) inform their readers: ‘As she was about to be confirmed, Tillich caused her anguish by asking her critical questions; it is said he roused doubt in her
mind about her faith’.

Paul Tillich’s schooling began at age six in the grammar school. It was opposite the Gothic church where his father, Johannes Tillich, was the pastor. Paulus was given instruction in religion four hours a week. This consisted of learning ‘the catechism, hymns, and Bible stories’ (ibid:7). Further, the Paucks (ibid:7) add that Tillich’s early years as a child and on into his teens revolved around the Church and the Church festivals. Time was measured in terms of the Christian festivals. The year for young Tillich was the church year. The greatest times of the year for him were Advent and Christmas (ibid:7).

Tillich ‘loved to build, and, in the typical month-long preparations for the German Christmas, would construct a church with a candle in it’ (ibid:7). The Paucks (ibid:7) give a detailed account:

This was his offering, placed under the Christmas tree. At other times, he made creches. The building was done very carefully, systematically, with great finesse, using small red, white, and blue squares or blocks from a Steinbaukasten [child’s box of stone blocks]. He spent hours making the thing perfect. Balance was his goal. By the time he was fourteen or fifteen this and similar constructions were his favorite hobby.

The Paucks (ibid:7-8) speak of the ‘indelible impression made by the Christian symbols on Tillich’s receptive mind was for him a first experience of the holy as an indestructible good’.

The Paucks (ibid:6) continue on Tillch’s life at Schonfliess. The beautiful, old, and large church was a striking feature on the landscape of Schonfliess (ibid:6). The town wall around Schonfliess became part of Tillich’s dreams later in life (ibid:6). The sea
played a large part in Tillich’s early years (ibid:6). Later, he dreamed that the waves engulfed the entire town.

Tillich and his sister, Johanna, had a deep ‘almost mystical relationship’ (ibid:7). Tillich was a critical religious thinker even at this early age (ibid:7). His questions caused his sister to doubt her faith. His early goal was balance in his construction of a model church with a candle (ibid:7). His upbringing was religious in the grammar school. Here he learned the catechism, hymns, and Bible stories (ibid:7). The Christian symbols were for him the first experience of the holy. It became ‘the foundation of all his religious and theological work’ (ibid:7-8).

In evaluation, Paul Tillich was raised in a church manse. He had very nice childhood surroundings. He played in a large garden in Starzeddel where he was born. The family moved to Schonfliess in 1891. This small town had a medieval like atmosphere. It had cobblestone streets, a very old beautiful church, an old city hall, and ancient houses. The church and religious instruction in the grammar school were very much central to Tillich’s life. Tillich was intellectually inclined as a child. He raised critical questions which caused his sister, Johanna to doubt her faith. Paul Tillich’s hobby was to build model churches and buildings. These Christian symbols left a definite impression upon his mind for his later religious and theological work.
3:3 The Argument For Socialism

3:3:1 The Early Influences of Socialism

Tillich was fortunate during his years growing up in Germany. His father, Johannes, had many of the old landed nobility in his church (ibid:8). The parents of Paul Tillich had considerable social contact with this privileged class of people (ibid:8).

The Paucks (1976:8) write:

The Tillichs were far from wealthy, indeed actually poor, but because his father’s church district included members of the old landed nobility with whom he and his wife had social contact, young Paul visited the manor houses too and played with their children. He was proud of this; also conscious of the tension between the two sets of friends, at an early age he developed a sense of guilt about the underprivileged. When he was ten, for example, he used his enormous energy to help some Polish workers load sand onto a truck near the railway station.

Tillich did have a close friend among the landed nobility by the name of Eckhart von Sydow (ibid:8). Von Sydow’s forefathers had been servants to the Kings of Prussia (ibid:8). These incidents and this friendship made a deep and lasting impression upon the young Paul Tillich (ibid:8). He taught Tillich to play chess and checkers. He introduced Tillich to Darwin (ibid:8). Von Sydow had considerable intellectual ability in both classical and modern art (ibid:8). In the year 1912, he introduced Tillich ‘to the work of Sigmund Freud’ (ibid:8). After World War I, he introduced Tillich to Expressionist painting (ibid:8).

Tillich (1966:20) did not want to become bourgeois ‘as so often happened in socialism’. Even at an early age, Paul Tillich had an inward drive to conform to the socialist principles (ibid:20). Tillich (1936:9) wrote later: ‘My position on the border resulted in my opposition to the bourgeoisie, to which in point of class I belong myself, and prevented me from becoming myself bourgeoisie,…on the contrary, I made the
attempt to incorporate into socialism those elements of the feudal tradition which have an inward affinity with the socialist idea’.

In critique, Tillich played as a child with the children of the old nobility. This privilege was due to his father’s social standing as a pastor. Paul Tillich was aware of the tension that existed between the privileged and underprivileged class. He helped some Polish workers load bags of sand onto a truck near a railway station. Tillich had a friend Eckhart von Sydow from the privileged class. He would later introduce Tillich to Freud’s work and Expressionist paintings. Tillich did not want to become part of the bourgeois. He had an inward drive to conform to socialist principles.

3:4 The Argument From The Times

3:4:1 The Times Were Wilhelminian

The times were Wilhelminian (Pauck and Pauck 1976:9). The Paucks (ibid:9) write of these times:

Tillich’s sense of identification with the Prussian nobility was entirely natural. The times were Wilhelminian: once his father accepted a call to Berlin, young Tillich saw there the reigning Kaiser, Wilhelm II. The capital was a booming industrial city at the heart of the German empire. It was the turn of the century: cannon were fired at midnight to mark the moment.

The thought of Immanuel Kant and the German society resulted in the submission of the individual to the whole (Tillich 1966:21-22). The era that Tillich was raised in was one of social stability, peace, and prosperity (Pauck and Pauck 1976:17). The Paucks (ibid:9) tell: ‘The boy’s father took him out into the Berlin streets that night
to behold the bright celebration’. Paul Tillich would walk to school ‘each morning’ (ibid:9). His route took him to behold ‘the produce market (Markthalle) where food and flowers were sold’ (ibid:9). The market had ‘the variety of sights and smells’ which worked to stir the imagination of young Paul Tillich (ibid:9). The view of the Kaiser with his many parades was another stirring sight in Berlin (ibid:9). The big city of Tillich’s youth impacted his life. Tillich (1936:6) recounts:

Thus I was saved from romantic enmity against technical civilizations and was taught to appreciate the importance of the big city for the critical side of intellectual and artistic life. Later there was added to this a vital and thoughtful understanding of the world of Bohemianism, possible only in the large cities and also an esthetic appreciation of the internal and external immensity of the metropolis; and finally I gained personal experience of the political and social movements that are concentrated in the capital.

Later, Tillich (1966:22) would belong to a small group called ‘Bohemia’ in his early adult years while he was living in Germany. This was a group of ‘artists, actors, journalist and writers’ (ibid:22). These intellectuals discarded the bourgeois viewpoint (ibid:22).

In breakdown, the times were Wilhelminian for Paul Tillich in Berlin where the family had moved to in 1900. Tillich was raised in an era of stability, peace, and prosperity. It was here that young Tillich saw the reigning Kaiser, Wilhelm II. The Kaiser had many parades in Berlin which was a stirring sight for Paul Tillich. Young Paul learned to appreciate technical civilizations. He came to appreciate the big city for the critical aspect of both the intellectual and artistic life. Later, Tillich would join a small group called ‘Bohemia’. This group comprised of intellectuals discarded the viewpoint of the bourgeois.
3:5 The Argument From Development

3:5:1 Tillich’s Education Was A German Education

In 1898, Paul Tillich was sent to Königsberg to attend ‘the “Humanistic” Gymnasium there, living meanwhile in a boarding house’ (ibid:10). This was a period of loneliness for the young Tillich. It was during this time that Paul began to read his Bible. At the Gymnasium, he was given an education in the humanities, ‘especially Latin and Greek’ (ibid:10). January 4, 1901, Tillich attended the Friedrich Wilhelm Gymnasium (ibid:10). The Paucks (ibid:10) add an interesting point to Tillich’s years in ‘the “Humanistic” Gymnasium’. They (ibid: 10) write:

Tillich has said amazingly little about his Gymnasium years. This is difficult to explain, since most people so vividly remember their teachers, friends, and particularly the mischievous capers in which between the ages of twelve and seventeen, they tend to engage. Perhaps in Tillich’s case the move to Berlin was responsible. It meant a switch from school to school, from country to city. His grades were not outstanding, but genugend or adequate. A certain preoccupation with higher academic memories of the time are therefore not of people and events but of his thorough training in Latin and Greek. Later he was inordinately proud of his command of these languages and frequently built his lectures and sermons around the Latin or Greek etymology of a word or phrase.

His childhood and early adolescence was quite normal. He loved sailing, and wandering throughout the countryside. He loved playing in the garden behind his home ‘in the Neunburgerstrasse’ (ibid:11). The Paucks (ibid:11) write: ‘The most beautiful tree in the garden was a walnut, near which they planted lilies, violets, and other flowers’ (ibid:11). Paul played happily for many long hours with his sisters and
friends. They played croquet, boccia, ‘and invented guessing games for their amusement’ (ibid:11). The Paucks (ibid:11) add: ‘Tillich’s ‘romantic imagination’ or capacity for dreamy fantasy was formulated only much later in philosophical language’. The turmoil which Paul Tillich faced was in regard to his questions concerning Christianity (ibid:12). Tillich (1966:24) spoke of this time as being between reality and imagination. He withdrew into a world of both fantasy, and philosophic imagination (ibid:24-25). The Paucks (ibid:12) write of Tillich’s views: ‘These often ran counter to the authority of his father’s orthodox views’. Tillich turned to a young man named Eric Harder. Paul Tillich shared his heart and doubts with him (ibid:12). The Paucks (ibid:12) write: ‘Harder permitted him the luxury of doubt, and thus helped him at a crucial time in his development’.

Paul Tillich was confirmed on March 23, 1902, at his father’s church in Berlin. Young Paul chose as his text, Mt. 11:28: ‘Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden’ (ibid:13). Tillich (1948:93-94 in Pauck and Pauck 1976:13) commented on his choice of this text:

I was asked with a kind of astonishment and even irony why I had chosen that particular passage. For I was living under happy conditions, and being only fifteen years old was without any apparent labor and burden. I could not answer at that time; I felt a little embarrassed, but basically right.

Johannes Tillich gave his son and the other confirmands a life verse, Jn. 8:32 (ibid:13). He warned them all not to lose their passion for truth in later adulthood. Paul Tillich lived a life marked by a great deal of drive and energy to excel (ibid:13). In 1903, Tillich’s mother died of cancer. The Paucks (ibid:13) write: ‘He always left the
impression that her death occurred when he was an extremely young child’. The Paucks (ibid:13) add: ‘The facts contradict this, for he was already seventeen’.

The Paucks argue that Tillich exaggerated when it came to his relationship to his father. Tillich’s exaggeration had to do with his ‘fears of disapproval’ (ibid:14).

The Paucks (ibid:14) claim he blew this ‘out of proportion’ (ibid:14). The Paucks base this on their correspondence (ibid:14). The Paucks (ibid:14) write: ‘Yet the letters between them, written during his university years and after, reveal a deeply moving mutual tenderness, understanding, and concern’.

Tillich was an avid reader. Tillich came across some interesting reading during his last year of studies at the Gymnasium (ibid:15). The Paucks (ibid:15) write:

Tillich came upon Schwegler’s *Geschichte der Philosophie* [History of Philosophy] in the dusty corner of a country preacher’s bookstore, and found Fichte’s *Theory of Sciences* among a wagonload of books on a Berlin street. He also purchased Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* from a bookshop for fifty German pennies. He read these books over and over again and later claimed that they had introduced him to the most difficult parts of German philosophy. The discussions he had with his father and his perusal of these three volumes enabled him from the very beginning of his university career to converse intelligently with older students and young instructors about idealism and realism, freedom and determinism, God and the world.

Adams (1965:2-6) argues that it was Fichte’s *Theory of Sciences* that helped him to interpret the difficult parts of German philosophy. The Paucks (1976:15) want to include the discussions that he had with his father. Further, it was when Tillich was eighteen that he ‘was headed for a career in ministry’ (ibid:15).

In 1904, Tillich graduated from the Friedrich Wilhelm Gymnasium in Berlin (Pauck & Pauck 1976:15). He commenced his studies at the University of Berlin studying Assyrian under Delitzsch in 1904 (ibid:16). He took another course...
in the history of philosophy ‘by the famous Hegelian Adolph Lasson’ (ibid:16). It was during his time in Berlin that he met Hermann Schafft (ibid:16). Tillich became Schafft’s closest friend. It is interesting to note that the Paucks attribute Tillich’s finding of Schelling’s works in a bookstore in Friedrichstrasse to ‘one day, by chance and destiny’ (ibid:16).

The Paucks (ibid:16) gives us insight into theological education at this time:

Theological study was divided into three sections: that of exegetical and historical matters during the first year, systematics during the second, and practical theology (preaching, counseling, and religious education) in the third. Students were given sufficient academic freedom to specialize in their own field of interest. More important perhaps was the fact that the order of study was not held to rigidly. There was a certain mobility, permitting a student to put in some time in several universities. Thus Tillich spent one semester each at Berlin and Tubingen, and two whole years in Halle.

Carey (2002:3) summarizes Tillich’s academic study which followed his time at the University of Berlin. Carey (ibid:3) writes: ‘He attended lectures in theology at the University of Halle from 1905 to 1907, where he came under the influence of the distinguished German theologian Martin Kahler. In 1910 he received his doctorate of Philosophy from the University of Breslau and in 1912 his licentiate in Theology from the University of Halle. For each degree he wrote a dissertation dealing with aspects of Schelling’s philosophy of religion’. Carey does not mention Tillich’s studies at Tubingen. The Paucks (1976:17) write: ‘During the summer semester of 1905, when he went to Tubingen, he took courses on the Gospel of John, in church history, psychology, and basic problems of philosophy’. The Paucks (ibid:16) add a footnote to help the reader understand the German academic calendar. They (ibid:16)
write: ‘The spring and fall terms familiar in the U.S. in the old two-term academic year were known in Germany as winter and summer sessions’. Tillich read Schelling’s Christian philosophy, and ‘what Schelling said, Tillich made his own’ (ibid:18).

It was at Halle that Tillich came under the influence of Martin Kahler (ibid:19). Tillich learned the Pauline-Lutheran doctrine of justification from Kahler. Two traditions existed side by side at the University of Halle. The first was the pietistic thought of August Hermann Francke. The other tradition was the rationalism of Christian Wolff and the Enlightenment (ibid:19). In his study at Halle, Tillich was influenced by Fritz Medicus. He was a lecturer in the subject of philosophy (ibid:19). The Paucks (ibid:20) write of his influence on Tillich: ‘His knowledge of German classical philosophy was mediated to Tillich in these years’. At Halle, Tillich joined the Wingolf society of which his father, Johannes, had been a member (ibid:22). This was a student group which allowed the students to socialize, exchange views, and hammer out the tenets for their group (ibid:23).

Tillich completed his theological studies on October 22, 1907 (ibid:28). Tillich was twenty one years of age (ibid:28). The Paucks (ibid:28) add: ‘During the next fourteen months he took courses leading to a doctoral degree and crammed earnestly for his initial theological examination—the first obligatory step toward ordination’. The Paucks (ibid:28) explain the examinations which Tillich needed to pass to be ordained. The Paucks (ibid:28-29) write:

Once a student (theologiae studiosus) had passed the first, largely academic, theological examination, he was considered a theological candidate (theologiae
candidates). A second, more practical theological examination was then required and if the candidate passed this final test he could be ordained. The examinations leading to the Christian ministry were given by the *Konsistorium* (of which Johannes Tillich was a member) and were quite different from university examinations. Indeed, tension frequently developed between the church and the university in this regard….In addition to the rigorous preparation needed for the examinations, a ministerial candidate had to spend a year studying liturgics, preaching, and the catechism at some seminary for preachers before ordination could take place.

Tillich engaged in pastoral work beginning on January 1, 1909 as an assistant to Pastor Ernst Klein (ibid:29). The Paucks give insight into Tillich’s first theological examination:

The Paucks (ibid:32-33) write:

In the spring of that same year, 1909, Tillich had passed his first theological or church examination. There is no record of his grade, but since theological students were expected to attain high marks, it may be safely assumed that he had done very well. He was now a theological candidate, and in the fall, when the idyll in Lichentrade had come to an end, he returned to Berlin and proceeded to complete his practical theological education by entering the Domstift, a college or training school for preachers, where he remained a full year.

Tillich graduated from the Domstift. Tillich ‘served as vicar attached to Dr. Lang, a superintendent of the church district of Nauen, a suburb near Berlin’ (ibid:35). It was on August 22, 1910 that Tillich received the ‘degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Breslau’ (ibid:287). The Paucks (ibid:34) write:

For this and other reasons which remain obscure—perhaps through a connection his father made for him—Tillich submitted this second piece of writing on Schelling to the University of Breslau. It was entitled, “The Conception of the History of Religions in Schelling’s Positive Philosophy: Its Presuppositions and Principles.” On the recommendation of Professor Eugen Kuhnemann, a specialist in German idealist literature, that university accepted his work and awarded him the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
The Paucks (ibid:35) add concerning Tillich’s theological career:

A little over a year later, on 16 December 1911, Tillich took the final examination for the degree of Licentiate of Theology. He had submitted his original dissertation on Schelling to the University of Halle, entitled, as noted earlier, “Mysticism and Guilt Consciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical Development.” Early in 1912 that university awarded him the Licentiate of Theology degree, which qualified him to teach theology on the university level. His academic training was now behind him.

It was July 27, 1912 when ‘he passed the final church board examination’ (ibid:35). Tillich was ‘ordained in St. Matthew’s Evangelical Church, Berlin, on 18 August 1912, two days before his twenty-sixth birthday’ (ibid:35). Tillich worked for two years as an assistant pastor in the ‘Moabit or workers section of Berlin’ (ibid:35). The Paucks (ibid:35) add: ‘It was an assignment he urgently required in order to support himself’. In 1913, Tillich negotiated with the University of Halle applying for a teaching post on the faculty (ibid:36). The Paucks (ibid:36-37) expand on Tillich’s efforts:

He sought permission, in other words, to teach or lecture at the university level. In order to obtain it, he had to write a Habilitationsschrift, or qualifying thesis. This represented the final prerequisite to becoming a member of a German university faculty. Once it was written, the candidate had to submit to a colloquium with the faculty. Tillich chose to write on “the concept of the supernatural in German theology during the period of the Enlightenment,” and for the next two years, he labored on the thesis in his spare time.

Tillich and his friend Richard Wegener were convinced of ‘the need of apologetics’ (ibid:37). Tillich and Wegener ‘with the permission of the church administration, inaugurated a series of evening meetings’ (ibid:36). These meetings were called ‘Vernunft-Abende’ (ibid:37). The Paucks (ibid:37) explain the meaning of this venture
as ‘evenings of reason’ (ibid:37). The Paucks (ibid:37) continue on the nature and importance of this venture:

They found sponsors who were willing to open their homes to the members of these discussion groups: artists, businessmen, society women, students, philosophers, lawyers—Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. Tillich and Wegener spoke to such groups on a variety of topics which they planned together, sometimes at the Englisches Cafe in Berlin. While Wegener helped to define the subject matter of the lectures, and discussions, it was Tillich who presented most of them. He spoke on “The Courage to Find Truth,” “The Protest of Doubt,” “The Mysticism of Art and Religious Mysticism,” “Mysticism and Consciousness of Guilt,” “Culture and Religion,” and so on.

The Paucks (ibid:37-38) inform the reader of Tillich and Wegener’s thinking:

For a while they both thought that a reconciliation between traditional Christianity and modern secularism would be achieved by the formation of a new ministerial office for which “apologists” should be trained. Indeed, they thought of founding a new religious order for that purpose. But the “evenings of reason” lasted only a little over a year. Wegener in particular began to doubt their real value, since they were being infiltrated by lecturers from the audience and the discussions were becoming too general in tone.

Johannes Tillich informed his son of a theological position that was open at Bonn (ibid:38). This was ‘the position of inspector or head of a theological students’ seminary’ (ibid:38). The Paucks (ibid:38) expand on the meaning of this opportunity.

Professor Ecke had been in touch with Johannes Tillich and it was fairly certain that the younger Tillich would get the job if he applied for it. The position would have given him a place to live, an income of 1,500 German marks, and most important of all, time to complete a paper for presentation to the theological faculty at Halle enabling him to qualify for a position of Privatdozent. Wegener, among others, pressed him to go to Bonn, urging him to write one book and project six more. But the job did not materialize when it was discovered that Tillich was a bachelor; it was essential that the inspector be a married man. He was not too disappointed, for by then he had decided that he did not want to live in a small city.
Tillich was twenty-seven years of age. The Paucks (ibid:38) add: ‘he had already demonstrated intellectual gifts of a high order, but in his emotional life he was a late bloomer’. They relate their judgment of his emotional life to his ‘Wingolf days’ (ibid:38). The Paucks (ibid:38) write:

He had held faithfully to the vow of his Wingolf days, remaining only casually related to members of the opposite sex. Wegener the skeptic, who enjoyed breaking the rules, tried to influence him in the direction of liberation from his vow and from his father’s authority. A sort of inner freedom was beginning to develop at this time, but his outer freedom was limited. He had gone often to the Friedrichstrasse and the Kurfurstendamm, sat at cafes and observed the world around him, yet was not a participant in it.

Tillich met ‘Margarethe Karla Mathilda Katharina Maria Wever, called Grethi’ (ibid:38). Paul Tillich and Grethi announced their engagement in January 1914 (ibid:39). It was the fall of that year on September 28 that Paul Tillich and Grethi were married (ibid:39). The Paucks (ibid:39) give the reader insight into the times. Wilhelm and Marion Pauck (ibid:39) write: ‘Happiness was not a part of any man’s destiny in 1914. Spring and summer passed, the thunderclouds of World War I gathering overhead broke open in August’. Paul Tillich ‘volunteered for military service’ October 1 (ibid:39). Sarajevo had shattered the Wilhelm era of peace and prosperity (ibid:40).

In examination, Tillich attended the humanistic Gymnasium school in Konigsberg-Neumark in 1898. He received an education in the humanities, Latin, and Greek. Tillich faced inner turmoil during this time. This was due to the questions that he had concerning Christianity. He graduated from the Friedrich Wilhelm Gymnasium in Berlin in 1904. Tillich
came across Schelling’s works in a bookstore. In 1905-1907, he studied theology at Halle. Tillich came under the influence of Martin Kahler. He learned the Pauline-Lutheran doctrine of justification from Kahler. He learned German classical philosophy from Fritz Medicus. In 1907, Tillich completed his theological studies on October 21, 1907. In 1910, he received the Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Breslau. In 1912, he received his Licentiate in Theology from the University of Halle. It was following his ordination on August 18, 1912 that Tillich spent two years as an assistant pastor in the workers’ section of Berlin.

Tillich’s dissertations was based on the work of Schelling. Tillich held the Christian religious views of Schelling.

Paul Tillich married Grethi on September 28, 1914. He joined the German army as a chaplain on October 1, 1914.

Tillich was a German trained academic. His academic and theological education was obtained in German schools. Tillich’s ordination was based on German ministerial standards.

3:6 The Argument From Experience

3:6:1 World War I A Turning Point In Tillich’s Life

Tillich was appointed as a chaplain. He was ‘assigned to the Fourth Artillery Regiment of the Seventh Reserve Division’ (ibid:41). The Paucks (ibid:41) give a moving account of Tillich’s early war experience leading to a
metal. The Paucks (ibid:41) write:

In October of the first year of the war he moved with an army transport to the western front. During the next three weeks he led nineteen worship services, under trees, in caves, and in trenches, all under fire. (In a report to his commanding general he suggested holding services indoors in future.) On 3 December his father received a telegram: “Today I was given the Iron Cross. Paul.”

The year 1914 gave way to 1915 (ibid:43). Tillich experienced the horrors and suffering of war. The Paucks (ibid:45) write;

On 30 and 31 October, the German armies attacked near Tahure. Many officers and countless men were killed. Mass burials followed. Tillich became a grave-digger as well as pastor. He preached a sermon in Tahure which he considered the best of his war sermons. It was based on 2 Corinthians 4:17-18: “Our troubles are slight and short-lived; and their outcome an eternal glory which outweighs them far. Meanwhile our eyes are fixed, not on things that are seen, but on the things that are unseen: for what is seen passes away; what is unseen is eternal.” He continually comforted the men by praising them for their courage in the face of blood and death in the cold rain and on the slimy earth.

The Paucks (ibid:46) continue:

The first days of November 1915 continued to be engulfed in blood and death. Some of the best officers in Tillich’s division died, men who had befriended him and to whom he felt intimately bound. An inner grimness filled his spirit as he threw the sticky claylike soil upon coffins closed over men in their best years, men he regarded as worthy and good. He no longer thought of his own death; he felt he was already in death, gripped by its force. He did not know that this was only the beginning of the violence and horror by which he was to be shaken, only the beginning of suffering, of inconceivable human misery.

Tillich was planning a lecture which he hoped to give at Halle on February 2 or 3. He had written to Johannes his father earlier on January 13. Paul Tillich asked his father to come to Halle. The Paucks (ibid:47) explain that Tillich had been given a leave for this purpose. Tillich was preparing
this lecture while in the trenches (ibid:47). The Paucks (ibid:47) continue:

‘The early months of 1916 were reasonably quiet’. Tillich began to think
‘about the exploitation of the common man at the hands of powers he had always
taken for granted: the landed aristocracy, the army, and the church’ (ibid:48).

Tillich’s ‘Seventh Division became involved in the battle for Verdun in late
May’ (ibid:49). The Paucks (ibid:49) recall the words of one of Tillich’s
letters: ‘Hell rages around us’. On July 3, 1916, Tillich presented a paper to the
theological faculty at Halle. He delivered his trial lecture on July 20. He was
appointed Privatdozent of theology (ibid:49-50).

Tillich clashed with his superior over the power of prayer in battle.
The general thought that prayer would give protection to a soldier from the
gunfire of the battle. Tillich ‘argued against this, freely defending his views to
his military superior’ (ibid:50). The general had Tillich transferred from ‘the
Fourth Artillery Regiment to the Sanitation Company of the Seventh Division’
(ibid:50). The transfer to the new division took place on October 5, 1916 (ibid:
50). Tillich was ‘stationed in northern France until the end, living through the
offenses at Amiens and Aisne-Marne and the final defeat in the Champagne’
(ibid:50). Germany faced a grave situation in 1917. The Paucks (ibid:52) call
that winter ‘the turnip winter’. The food supply for Germany was ‘the lowly turnip’
(ibid:52). The war dragged on and soon the year 1918 came for Tillich (ibid:54).
The Paucks (ibid:54) add: ‘In April 1918 Tillich’s nerves failed once more’. It
was on May 1, 1918 that Tillich asked to be discharged from army service (ibid: 54). On June 10, Tillich was given ‘the Iron Cross First Class’ (ibid:55). On August 1, Tillich was assigned to a ‘military base in west Berlin, as army chaplain until the end of the war’ (ibid:55). It was in November of that year that the German High Command requested an end to the war (ibid:55). November 9 brought an end to the war. An armistice was signed on November 11, 1918 (ibid:55).

Art became an escape for him during the war. Tillich became interested in studying art and also the ‘history of painting’ (ibid:47). The Paucks (ibid:47) write of this interest: ‘He bought some art books in a military bookstore; though the reproductions were poor, he became so immersed in them that he could forget the ugliness around him. For the moment his absorption was merely an escape, but by the end of the war it had become vastly more important to him’.

Ratschow (1980:21) writes of Tillich’s interest in socialism:

The second matter that became clear to Tillich during the war and that released something dormant in him, or awakened something long asleep, was the new political interest in the socialist “motif” of political life and of human life in general. In his letters and retrospects, as well as in the reports of others, this whole realm of Tillich’s thoughts appears—and how could it have been otherwise initially?—unclear and still emotionally bound. Tillich himself traced his ideas about religious socialism back to his experiences in the war. When one notices how papers from him on this theme appear immediately in 1919, it is clear that things long since experienced but halted by events now make room for themselves. Tillich, in his daily life with soldiers and in his observation of the war, became alert to the dangers of nationalism and its implications of power politics. To be sure, Tillich never espoused the uncritically exuberant ideology which holds, in effect, that one can get along in the world without power. For that, his insight into the wake created by the chaotic tendencies in human nature was much too deep.
But with the war the necessity of social and democratic action had become inescapably clear to Tillich.

In interaction with the sources, two major points stand out from Tillich’s experience during the German years. The years as a chaplain from 1914 to 1918 drove Tillich to the study of art. This was the beginning of what would eventuate in a systematic study of art and a theology of art. He longed for beauty amidst the horrors and suffering of World War I. It was during the war that Tillich realized that German unity was a myth. Tillich turned to the thinking of Karl Marx and became a socialist.

3:7 The Argument From The German Academic Career 1919-1933

3:7:1 Tillich’s German Teaching Career

Tillich began his academic career as a Privadozent at the University of Berlin in 1919 (Pauck & Pauck 1976:60). The Paucks (ibid:59-60) write:

A friend of his father’s Bishop Gustav Haendler of Berlin, became Tillich’s sponsor, appointing him as one of his vicars. The position, which Tillich later described as a sinecure, enabled him to earn some money while establishing himself; when the appointment ran out, Hugo Simon, a banker and friend, supported him for a year. In those days, the post of Privadozent was somewhat analogous to that of an instructor in an American university. He was not paid a full salary but was entitled to receive the fees paid by his students. In other words, he was given the opportunity to establish himself as a scholar and lecturer. He was expected to launch his reputation through publishing books and articles. It was a cruel system at best, especially since it assumed that a Privadozent had a private income. In times of inflation and economic chaos it was a desperate situation in which to find oneself.

The Paucks (ibid:57) describe the setting:

As capital of a defeated nation it was permeated by the aftermath of war. The people were nervous and hungry, the streets filled with beggars and
cripples. Drugpushers and swindlers wore horn-rimmed glasses and combed their hair back flat in what was called the Bolshevik manner, their necks cleanly shaven and powdered. A cynical, half-insolent tone was adopted generally, masking a terrible insecurity. Women wore their hair very short; their shapeless dresses did not reach to the knee; old fashioned or beautiful clothes had been sacrificed to the war. At the beginning of the twenties, Berlin smelled of cheap perfume and gasoline. There was a sense of hysteria everywhere as new inflationary levels were reached, soon every day, then hour by hour.

The Paucks (ibid:57) continue:

The city was drab. Houses were being rebuilt; for a time scaffolding seemed a permanent part of the scene. The brilliance of the imperial epoch had been tarnished, but Berlin slowly became the center of the most vibrant cultural life in Europe.

Tillich was busy lecturing at the University of Berlin. He was lecturing outside the university as well (ibid:58). The Paucks (ibid:58) write: ‘he combined writing serious articles, essays, and book reviews with the publication of fugitive journalistic pieces; he sought the company of esoteric intellectual groups which shared his own interests: politics, religious socialism, painting, economics, the theater, and later depth psychology’. The Paucks (ibid:59) write of Tillich’s thinking:

Caught between the conservative Christian traditions of the nineteenth century and the bold radical creativity marking the new style of the twentieth, he could not side with either the one or the other. He sought to combine the two. Freud’s psychoanalysis, Cezanne’s Expressionism,” Marx’s socialism, all became material for his Christian apologetic theology. He said neither yes nor no: he said both. The split did indeed remain, despite his great efforts to heal or to hide it—much later he called it “the boundary.”

On August 16, 1919, Tillich addressed the Kant Society in Berlin. His lecture was ‘On the Idea of a Theology of Culture’ (ibid:64). Tillich was one of three
speakers in September 1919 at a ‘conference of all Continental religious socialists’ (ibid:70). Tillich shared the spotlight with the American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr (ibid:70). It was in 1920 that Tillich joined the ‘kairos circle’ (ibid:70). The Paucks (ibid:70) confirm this group was also known as the Berlin group. The leaders of this group were ‘Gunther Dehn and Karl Mennicke’ (ibid:70).

Tillich’s personal life was suffering. Tillich and Grethi divorced which became official on February 22, 1921 (ibid:81). Tillich met an art teacher named Hannah Werner (ibid:85). She was engaged to another man by the name of Albert Gottschow (ibid:86). On July 13, 1920, Gottschow and Werner were married in the ‘town of Marburg’ (ibid:86). It was in the ‘spring of 1921’ that Hannah visited Tillich (ibid:86). She pretended to ‘visit her sister Marie-Luise, who lived in Berlin’ (ibid:86). Hannah ‘returned to her husband’ (ibid:86). However, it was ‘not until several months later’, that Hannah learned she was carrying Albert’s baby. The Paucks (ibid:86) write: ‘Hannah left Albert, this time permanently’. She lived for a time in Frede Fritz’s home, then moved to Marburg, where on 5 June 1922 she gave birth to a boy’. Hannah moved back to Berlin to be in the neighborhood in which Tillich lived. She divorced Gottschalk which ‘divorce was granted in December 1923’ (ibid:86) Tillich and Hannah were married ‘on 22 March 1924 in the home of Erhard Seeberger, the officiating minister and now her brother-in-law’ (ibid:86). The Paucks (ibid:86) add: ‘The marriage was unhappy from the beginning’. Carey (2002:133) explains how this comment was rather unacceptable to some academics and friends of Paul and Hannah. Earlier,
Hannah Tillich had written *From Time to Time* (ibid:103). This work was published in 1973 (ibid:103). This work by Hannah Tillich aroused interest in ‘Tillich’s life and its relationship to his thought’ (ibid:133). Carey (ibid:133) writes: ‘Her book was eventually translated into German but that process was delayed considerably because the *Tillich Gesellschaft* threatened any German publisher of the book with a lawsuit. Many German friends of both Paulus and Hannah were deeply offended by her book and to this day have not forgiven her for writing it’. Carey (ibid:133) continues: ‘The next step in this controversy came in 1975 with the long-awaited biography of Marion Pauck and Wilhelm Pauck, *Paul Tillich: His Life and Thought*, volume 1’. Carey (ibid:133) explains:

> It was understood that this book was to be more or less the “authorized” biography of Tillich, and most Tillich scholars knew that it was nearly ten years in the making. Friends on both sides of the Atlantic waited to see how the Paucks would treat this delicate matter of the Tillich marriage and Tillich’s pattern of relationships, as well as well as integrate the relationship of Tillich’s life and thought. Although informative and bringing together many sources from Tillich’s early years in Germany to which most Americans had no access, the Pauck volume drew sharp criticisms from both Americans and Germans.

The comment on the Tillich marriage was the result of interviews with Marie-Luise Werner and Paul Tillich (ibid:302). Marie-Luise Werner was the married sister of Hannah Tillich (ibid:86). Jerald Brauer (1976:1017-1020) wrote a three page article on the Pauck’s book. Brauer (ibid:1020) claimed at least four interviews were improperly conducted with key persons. Brauer (ibid:1020) bases his claim on the four individuals who did not receive transcripts of their interview to guarantee accuracy. It could just as easily be argued that those interviewed read and checked the Paucks
written transcript at the time of the interview. Carey (2002:133-134) has exaggerated Brauer’s claim for the Paucks ‘poor methodology in the use of interview information’. The Paucks (1976:vii-xii) work is an exhaustive treatment with many collaborators ten years in the making. Tillich expressed perfect confidence in the Paucks ability to write his biography. The Paucks (1976:xi) write: ‘Finally, we are grateful to Paul Tillich for his confidence in us’. This comment came from the last meeting that the Paucks had with Tillich in the summer of 1965 (ibid:xii). Tillich died on October 22, 1965 (ibid:290). Brauer’s (1976:1019) objection is: ‘Nobody who worked closely with Tillich during the last rich and full three years of his life—students or colleagues would recognize that picture of Paul Tillich’. Brauer is typical of those who view Tillich based on the American years from 1933 to 1965. Brauer omits the German years from 1886 to 1933. Brauer’s (ibid:1019) picture of Tillich was based on the last three years of Tillich’s life at the University of Chicago. This was from 1962 to 1965 (Pauck and Pauck 1976:289). Brauer did not know Tillich during the German years 1886 to 1933. The American years are beyond the scope of our thesis. Brauer’s article stresses the importance of the need for our thesis based on Tillich’s German years. Further, Jerald Brauer (ibid:1018) objects to any exposure of Tillich’s weaknesses and shortcomings. Brauer (ibid:1018) writes: ‘Each time Tillich is compared with Pauck, he comes off badly’. The comparison which Brauer had in mind was comparing Wilhelm Pauck’s coming to America with that of Paul Tillich. Further, Brauer (ibid:1020) writes: ‘As I have said, it provides no clues to the relationship
between Tillich’s life and thought beyond those in his own autobiography’. However, Brauer contradicts himself with this statement. Brauer (ibid:1017) admitted just the opposite at the beginning of his article: ‘This disappointing book adds nothing but detail, much of it unnecessary, to three short autobiographies by Paul Tillich’. Brauer’s (ibid:1017-1020) comments are personal, petty, and self-serving. He disagrees over the number of volumes in the Pauck’s work. The Pauck’s book lacked a point of view and exposed Tillich the man with his flaws, his weaknesses, and shortcomings.

Carey’s (2002:133-134) comments on this matter lack convincing support (ibid:133-134). Carey (ibid:134) is far too general in his comment concerning ‘knowledgeable people in Germany were taken aback by some errors of dates, places, and events which seemed to them to compromise the validity of the entire effort’. This comment is redundant on Carey’s part. It is a restatement of Jerald Brauer’s argument. Carey’s interpretation of the validity of the Pauck work lacks support. Carey refers to Renate Albrecht who ‘was convinced that a reliable and balanced assessment of Tillich’s life and thought would have to be done in Germany’ (ibid:134). The subjective nature of this comment without adequate support points to bias. This is an ad hominem argument against the Paucks. Carey (ibid:134) admits that not all share Brauer’s and Albrecht’s views. Gerhard Wehr’s Paul Tillich quotes the Paucks (ibid:134). The Gesammelte Werke volume 5 ‘avoids the major controversies of the Hannah Tillich depiction of Paulus’ (ibid:134-135). Carey (ibid:135) elaborates:
‘Margot Hahl, one of the coeditors, contributed a remembrance of Paulus and Hannah which, while acknowledging that there were some tensions and ambivalence in the relationship, denies the Pauck evaluation that “the marriage was unhappy from its beginning” (Pauck, page 86). Further, Carey adds: ‘The detailed footnotes of this volume suggest that one major purpose was to correct the factual errors in the Pauck book (compare pages 25, 49-50, 73-74, 109-110, 141, 198)’. Carey (ibid:135) admits the real problem is their view of Tillich. He (ibid:135-136) writes: ‘All of these studies reflect that Tillich’s German friends (that is, those active in the Tillich Gesellschaft) either did not “see” (or fundamentally disagreed with) the shortcomings in Tillich the man which the Paucks discovered. For some in the Tillich circle in Germany, Tillich was practically comparable to Goethe in his profundity of thought, and universality of interests, and for anyone to point to personal shortcomings (vanity, ego, and the loss of prophetic consciousness) was regarded as petty and self-serving’.

It was ‘Carl Becker, Prussian Minister of Education, who greatly respected Tillich and bore him warm affection, in negotiations which took place in late 1923 urged him to accept the Marburg associate professorship’ (Pauck & Pauck 1976:95). Tillich and Hannah moved to Marburg ‘in the spring of 1924’ (ibid:94). The Paucks (ibid:95) present a less than perfect Tillich. They (ibid:95) write: ‘He taught at Marburg for three semesters, and his experience during this brief period, though painful, helped him establish himself’. The Paucks (ibid:95) are insightful on Tillich’s experience at Marburg. They (ibid:95) write:
The majority of the Marburg students were Barthians. Unlike his students at the University of Berlin, who from the beginning had been responsive to Tillich’s political and cultural interests, they expected him to address himself to the theological upheaval caused by Karl Barth, in which Rudolf Bultmann, the professor of New Testament who later became world-famous as advocate of the exegetical program of demythologization, and the philosopher Martin Heidegger, later one of the chief spokesmen of Existentialism were involved. Both had only recently come to Marburg, and like Tillich they stood at the beginning of their careers. They greatly impressed their students, who tended to identify themselves with their teaching to such a degree that they rejected or at least radically neglected all other views, particularly those connected with theological or cultural liberalism.

The Paucks (ibid:95) note Tillich’s response to all of this. The Paucks (ibid:95) write:

Tillich was aware that he would have to struggle to maintain himself. Yet he ignored the wishes of his Barthian students and insisted on developing his own ideas. He began to formulate his systematic theology and gave a course on it during his last term. In the first two he concentrated on philosophy of religion and the Protestant mystics.

Tillich’s relationship to both Bultmann and Heidegger was only on a professional level (ibid:98). The Tillichs moved to Dresden in 1925. Tillich taught at Dresden from 1925 to 1929 (ibid:100). Ratschow (1980:24) writes: ‘Then he accepted a call as ordinarius (tenured professor) of Religionswissenschaft in the “division of cultural sciences” of the Technische Hochschule’. Further, it was ‘from the winter semester of 1927-28 on, Tillich gave lectures in Leipzig—mostly the same as in Dresden—under a commission to teach (Lehrauftrag) from the theological faculty of Leipzig’ (ibid:24). At Dresden, Tillich received an honorary Doctor of Theology degree from the University of Halle. The Paucks (1976:102) report the exact
The theological faculty of Halle has unanimously voted to grant the Professor of the Philosophy of Religion at the Dresden Institute of Technology, Paul Tillich, Lic. Theol., Ph.D., the rights and privileges of the degree Doctor of Theology, Ph.D., the rights and privileges of the degree Doctor of Theology, honoris causa. With conceptual acuteness and dialectical skill he has developed a program in the philosophy of religion and placed it in the framework of general scholarship. Through his teaching he has instilled in his students his own enthusiastic interest in his goal, namely to combine philosophy and sociology with living religion.

The date of this citation is ‘24 December 1925’ (ibid:102). This came from the office of the ‘dean of the theological faculty’ Wilhelm Lutgert (ibid:102). He had been one of Tillich’s teachers at Halle during his university years (ibid:20). The Paucks (ibid:98) point out: ‘It was ironically not a theologian but a philosopher who helped advance Tillich to a full professorship, albeit not at the university level. This was Richard Kroner, a well-to-do member of the faculty of the Institute of Technology in Dresden’. Kroner was impressed by Tillich’s ‘work on Schelling’ and Tillich’s The System of the Sciences (ibid:99). Earlier on May 1, 1925 a contract had been drawn up for him. Tillich was ‘appointed to a full professorship of religious studies in the Department of the Humanities of the Dresden Institute of Technology’ (ibid:99). The Paucks (ibid:107) clarify Tillich’s reason for accepting an ‘adjunct professorship of systematic theology at the University of Leipzig’ (ibid:107). They (ibid:107) write: ‘Partly because of the suspicion of heresy hung over Tillich in theological circles, and partly too because his Dresden post had drawn him out of the mainstream of theological development, after a time he began to fear he was drifting away from his true calling: theology’. Tillich gave an address in Leipzig ‘in June 1927’ (ibid:107). The title of the
‘inaugural address’ was on ‘The Idea of Revelation’ (ibid:107).

Tillich resigned in March of 1929 from Dresden. The school had failed to receive accreditation (ibid:112). Tillich accepted an appointment at the University of Frankfurt (Carey 2002:3). The University of Frankfurt was under the leadership of Kurt Reizler. He became the curator of the University in 1928. Reizler had to find a successor to Hans Cornelius who was a Kantian scholar. He wanted a teacher who could relate his philosophy to contemporary events. Karl Becker put forward Paul Tillich’s name. Tillich’s salary was larger than in Dresden as he was guaranteed an additional 7,500 German marks. This was in addition to Tillich’s salary. He was forgiven his debt to the German Ministry of Education which he incurred from his moving expenses. The University provided as well a housing stipend for him. Tillich was very happy to be a full professor at an accredited German university (ibid:110-112). The Paucks (ibid:113) make an interesting point on whom Tillich thought he was replacing. They (ibid:113) write: ‘Tillich always wrote and spoke of being the successor of Scheler in Frankfurt rather than of Cornelius, which he technically was. What he meant was that he was Scheler’s spiritual successor in a way he could not have been to Cornelius’. The Paucks (ibid:113) continue: ‘He and Scheler, Tillich insisted, shared an interest in ethics, personality, history, and philosophy, while with Kantian logic as represented by Cornelius he felt no such kinship’. Carey (2002:3) writes of the Frankfurt years: ‘While at Frankfurt, Tillich became engaged with other leading
philosophers and social scientists in what was known as the “Frankfurt School” and was quite active in the German political scene’. Carey (ibid:4) continues:

‘Tillich was dismissed by the Nazis from his position at the University of Frankfurt on April 13, 1933, and in December of the same year he and his family came to America’. The Paucks (1976:118) add: ‘Tillich himself was in the unique position of being the only theologian on the faculty of the university, a Christian scholar teaching philosophy in a secular setting’. Tillich became widely known throughout Germany ‘in the two or three years that followed Tillich’s establishment at the University of Frankfurt’ (ibid:120). He gave many speeches outside the university which brought him into conflict with the Nazis (ibid:120). In 1929, Tillich joined the Social Democratic Party. He became involved in establishing a socialist magazine called ‘Neue Blatter fur den Sozialismus [New Leaves or “Pages” for Socialism], edited by August Rathmann’ (ibid:124). Tillich wrote The Socialist Decision which did not appear until ‘the end of 1932’ (ibid:126-127). An incident took place at the University of Frankfurt which made matters worse for Tillich. The Paucks (ibid:127) write:

In July fighting suddenly broke out among the students. Storm troopers and Nazi students rioted and beat up left-wing and Jewish students until blood flowed freely. In the classroom where he was lecturing, Tillich was suddenly thrown back into his World War I role of dragging the wounded and the unconscious to safety. Shaken and enraged by the sight of violence, seized by a fresh recognition of the power of the irrational and destructive forces around him, Tillich made a public speech in defense of the left-wing and Jewish students, defending freedom of thought and action and demanding that the Nazi students be expelled from the university.

Tillich’s name appeared in the German April 13, 1933 newspapers under the group
of ‘left-wing intellectuals, members of the Communist or Socialist Parties, the politically suspect’ (ibid:130). Tillich was considered an enemy of the state (ibid:130). Tillich was suspended on April 13 (ibid:130).

In analyzing, Tillich developed his theology of culture during the German years. He gave his famous lecture before the Kant Society in Berlin in 1919. It was during his years as a Privatdozent at the University of Berlin from 1919 to 1924 that Tillich related theology to other academic subjects such as philosophy, art, politics, depth psychology, and sociology.

In 1920, Tillich joined the kairos circle. This group was also known as the Berlin group. It was at Marburg from 1924 to 1925 that existentialism in its 20th century form crossed Tillich’s path. Tillich’s German academic career years show an increasing commitment to religious socialism. In 1929, Tillich joined the Social Democratic Party. It was while he was teaching at Frankfurt that Tillich wrote his book *The Socialist Decision*. His book appeared at the end of 1932. He was dismissed from his post at the University of Frankfurt on April 13, 1933.

### 3:8 Summary

The Paucks have given us insight into Paul Tillich’s birth and his near death experience as an infant. The Paucks trace the Tillich genealogy back to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Paul Tillich came from a line of scholars. Johannes and Theodricus were brothers who studied at an Augustinian monastery. The Tillich genealogy included gifted musicians, business men, monks, and ministers.

The Paucks give us a vivid description of Paul Tillich’s father, mother, his home,
and his surroundings. Paul Tillich was raised in a church manse in Starzeddel where he was born. His nice surroundings included a very large garden to play in. The Tillich family moved to Schonfleiss in 1891. Tillich was raised here in a medieval atmosphere. His childhood was quite normal playing with his two sisters, sailing with his father, and walking on top of the town wall.

Paul Tillich’s intellectual inclinations came out with his questions on Christianity. This caused his sister to doubt her faith. His upbringing was religious. The church was very much central to Paul Tillich’s life. His hobby was building models of churches. This left a definite impression on his mind for Christian symbols.

Tillich’s commitment to religious socialism can be traced back to his childhood. He played with the children of the landed nobility due to his father’s social standing as a Lutheran pastor. Tillich understood the tensions between the privileged and underprivileged class. His friend, Eckhart von Sydow, was from the privileged class. He introduced Tillich to Freud’s work and to Expressionist painting.

Tillich was raised in an era of stability, peace, and prosperity. The times were Wilhelminian. The Tillich family moved to Berlin in 1900. Paul Tillich experienced the life of the big city and the military parades of Kaiser Wilhelm II. It was in growing up in Berlin that he gained an appreciation for both the intellectual and artistic life. Later, Tillich joined a group called ‘Bohemia’ which discarded the bourgeois viewpoint.

His academic studies followed the normal pattern for a German boy. Tillich studied at the Gymnasium in Konigsberg in 1898. He studied at the Gymnasium in Berlin in 1901. He received an education in the humanities, Latin, and Greek. Tillich
graduated from the Friedrich Wilhelm Gymnasium in Berlin in 1904. Tillich was an avid reader. He read Schwegler’s *History of Philosophy*, Fichte’s *Theory of Sciences*, and Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. He came across Schelling’s works in a bookstore. Tillich’s university years followed. He completed his theological studies in 1907 at the age of twenty one. In the next fourteen months, Tillich studied for his doctoral degree and crammed for his first theological examination. He had to prepare to pass a second theological examination in order for him to be ordained. He began his pastoral work on January 1, 1909. In the spring of 1909, Tillich passed his first theological exam. In the fall of 1909, Tillich returned to Berlin to complete his practical theological education at the Domstift. The Domstift was a training school for preachers. He graduated a year later from the Domstift. On August 22, 1910, Tillich received his Doctor of Philosophy degree. On December 16, 1911, Tillich took his final examination for the degree Licentiate of Theology. Tillich wrote both his dissertations on Schelling. On July 27, 1912, Tillich passed the final church board examination. It was on August 18, 1912, Tillich was ordained in his father’s church in Berlin.

Tillich was a German educated theological scholar and clergyman. His academic and pastoral training was from German universities, the German standards for ministerial ordination, and university lecturing. Tillich’s development took place during the German years.

Tillich and his friend Richard Wegener held lectures on apologetics in private settings. Tillich developed a number of lectures on religious themes. On September
28, 1914, Paul Tillich married Grethi. Tillich joined the German army as a chaplain on October 1, 1914.

Tillich suffered greatly from the horrors of World War I. He suffered nervous breakdowns during the war. On June 10, 1918, Tillich received the Iron Cross First Class medal. It was during the First World War that Tillich became interested in socialism. In 1919, Tillich’s papers were on the theme of religious socialism.

Paul Tillich related theology in his lectures at Berlin to other academic subjects. It was in 1919 that he delivered his lecture at the Kant Society in Berlin on a theology of culture. In September 1919, he spoke at a conference of religious socialists. The German years demonstrate Tillich’s increased commitment to socialism. He joined the Kairos Circle also known as the Berlin group in 1920. In 1929, Tillich joined the Social Democratic Party. His book *The Socialist Decision* appeared at the end of 1932. He appealed to the German people to accept religious socialism rather than Nazism.

Tillich had divorced Grethi on February 22, 1921. He married Hannah Werner on March 22, 1924. The Paucks comment on Tillich’s marriage to Hannah Werner. It was not a happy marriage from the beginning. This comment was not well received either by German or American friends. Jerald Brauer who knew Tillich during his last three years at the University of Chicago thought the Paucks biography of Tillich couldn’t possibly be true. Their depiction of Paul Tillich during the German years was not the Paul Tillich that Jerald Brauer knew. The basis for Brauer’s view was his personal knowledge of Paul Tillich during the last three years of Tillich’s life at the University of Chicago.
It was at Marburg in 1924-1925 that existentialism in its 20th century form crossed Tillich's path. Tillich held a full professorship in religious studies in the Department of Humanities at the Dresden Institute of Technology from 1925 to 1929. He was also an adjunct professor of theology at Leipzig from 1927 to 1929. Tillich taught at the University of Frankfurt from 1929 to 1933. It was at Frankfurt that Tillich supported the rights of left-wing and Jewish students. This was during an incident when Nazi storm troopers and students beat them up. Tillich was listed as an enemy of the state in German newspapers on April 13, 1933. He was dismissed from his teaching post at the University of Frankfurt. He and his family left for America towards the end of 1933. The procession of our thesis turns to consider what Tillich tried to accomplish in his teaching at the University of Frankfurt.
CHAPTER 4

THE FRANKFURT YEARS

4:1 On The Border Between Philosophy And Theology

4:1:1 Tillich’s Understanding of Theology

Tillich was Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-the-Main (Tillich 1936:40) (1929-1933). Tillich (ibid:38) writes: ‘Anyone standing on the border of philosophy and theology will find it necessary to get a clear conception of the scientific relation of both’. Tillich (ibid:39) continues: ‘By the appearance of the so-called “Existential Philosophy” in Germany, I was led to a new understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology’. Tillich (ibid:40) begins to show the relationship between philosophy and theology by recalling his intellectual development and career. Tillich (ibid:40) writes: ‘To these ideas, which are characterized as standing between philosophy and theology, corresponded my professional career. Doctor of Philosophy in Breslau, Licentiate of Theology in Halle and Berlin; Professor of the Science of Religion in Dresden and the same time Professor Honorarius of Theology in Leipzig; Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-the-Main’. Tillich’s (1948:83-84) view of the relationship between
philosophy and theology helps us to better understand the Frankfurt years. Tillich (ibid:83-84) writes:

The term “philosophical theology” points to a theology that has a philosophical character. As long as theological thought has existed, there have been two types, of theology, a philosophical one and—let me call it—a “kerygmatic” one. Kerygmatic is derived from the New Testament word kerygma, “message.” It is a theology that tries to reproduce the content of the Christian message in an ordered and systematic way, without referring to philosophy. In contrast to it, philosophical theology, although based on the same kerygma, tries to explain the contents of the kerygma in close interrelation with philosophy. The tension and mutual fertilization between these two types is a main event and a fortunate one in all history of Christian thought. The fight of the traditionalists of the early church against the rising logos-Christology, the struggle between the mystics and dialekticians in the early Middle Ages, between Biblicism and scholasticism in the later Middle Ages, between the Reformers and the Aristotelian scholastics, the attack of the Ritschlians on speculative theology, and of the Barthians on a philosophy of religion—all this and much more was the consequence of the existence of a philosophical and a kerygmatic theology. The duality is natural. It is implied in the very word “theology,” the syllable “theo” pointing to the kerygma, in which God is revealed, and the syllable “logy” pointing to the endeavor of human reason to receive the message. This implies further that kerygmatic theology and philosophical theology demand each other and are wrong in the moment in which they become exclusive. No kerygmatic theology ever existed which did not use philosophical terms and methods. And no philosophical theology ever existed—deserving the name “theology”-which did not try to explain the content of the message.

Tillich (ibid:84) continues as to the ‘theological ideal’: ‘Therefore, the theological ideal is the complete unity of both types, an ideal which is reached only by the greatest theologians and ever by them only appropriately. The fact that every human creativity has its typological limitations makes it desirable that theological faculties should include a representative of kerygmatic and one of philosophical theology, whether the latter is called apologetics, speculative theology, Christian philosophy of
religion, or philosophical theology’. Tillich (ibid:86) elaborates further: ‘But philosophy, before attempting a description of the world in unity with all kinds of scientific and nonscientific experience, tries to understand being itself and the categories and structures which are common to all kinds of beings. This makes the division between philosophy and theology impossible, for, whatever the relation of God, world, and man may be, it lies in the frame of being; and any interpretation of the meaning and structure of being as being; unavoidably has consequences for the interpretation of God, man, and the world in their interrelations’. Paul Tillich (ibid:87) concludes: ‘In which philosophy shows kerygmatic and therefore a theological character, for this is the task of theology: to ask for being as far as it gives us ultimate concern. Theology deals with what concerns us inescapably, ultimately, unconditionally’. Tillich (ibid:87) adds: ‘Philosophy asks the questions theology supplies the answers’. Carey (2002:37) asked Protestant and Roman Catholic scholars at Tubingen, Germany concerning ‘contemporary German theological scene’, and the exploration of Tillich’s work. The answer is rather surprising but pertains to Tillich’s ontological theology: ‘An embarrassed silence followed, and then one theologian noted that there was little interest in Germany in Tillich’s ontological approach to theology, and that in fact there was considerable sentiment in Germany that after Tillich came to America and began to develop his systematic theology he removed himself from the matrix and methodologies of Continental theology’. Tillich’s (1948:83) Frankfurt years carry with them the Tillichean understanding of ‘the relationship between
philosophy and theology’. Tillich’s theology was built on the ontological model. Horton (1952:45) visited Frankfurt shortly after Tillich had left in 1933. Horton (ibid:45) writes: ‘His teaching at Frankfurt was so much concerned with art, science, economics, politics, and general culture that hostile critics frequently charged him with deserting his job as a philosopher of religion’. The bias of the critics must be admitted and allowed for since they would be in all likelihood, National Socialists loyal to Adolf Hitler. The Frankfurt years are understood even better when Tillich’s boundary and border line concept are understood. Tillich (1966:13) writes:

In the introduction to my Religious Verwirklichung (Religious Realization), I wrote: “The boundary is the best place for acquiring knowledge.” When I was asked to give an account of the way my ideas have developed from my life, I thought that the concept of the boundary might be the fitting symbol for the whole of my personal and intellectual development. At almost every point, I have had to stand between alternative possibilities of existence, to be completely at home in neither and to take no definitive stand against either. Since thinking presupposes receptiveness to new possibilities, this position is fruitful for thought; but it is difficult and dangerous in life, which again and again demands decisions and the exclusion of alternatives. This disposition and its tension have determined both my destiny and my work.

Ratschow (1980:22) clarifies this further for us:

Paul Tillich wrote two autobiographical sketches—the first one in his fiftieth year, the second in the year 1952. In the first sketch from 1936, Tillich describes his destiny as an existence “on the boundary.” Of course, every life can be understood as always lived on “boundaries,” for life is transition. But Tillich’s sense of his existence as running on boundaries had a particular intensity, directness, and totality. For him, moreover, these boundaries are not only transitions but also battlegrounds, controversies, difficult tensions, and ever new endurance tests.

In scrutiny, the Frankfurt years give us a better understanding of how Tillich
understood the relationship between philosophy and theology. Philosophic theology and kerygmatic theology are both necessary aspects of theology. They should not be separated from each other.

4:2 The Union of Philosophy And Theology

4:2:1 Tillich’s Theological Experience At Frankfurt

Tillich sought to show the union of philosophy and theology. This became possible through the explanation of Schelling’s Christian philosophy of existence. Tillich (1936:35) writes: ‘I thought that, fundamentally, I had found the union of theology and philosophy in the philosophical explanation of the Christian doctrine through the older Schelling, in his founding of a Christian philosophy of existence in contrast to Hegel’s humanistic philosophy of essence and in his interpretation of history as the History of Salvation. I must confess that even today I find more “theonomous philosophy” in Schelling than in any of the other idealists’. Tillich (1936:35) preferred Schelling’s metaphysical thought to that of Hegel’s ‘philosophy of essence, and his interpretation of history as history of salvation’. The problem was that Schelling’s metaphysical religious thought failed to achieve ‘a unity of theology and philosophy’ (ibid:35). The First World War proved to be a catastrophe for the survival of German idealism. Schelling’s thought aimed at the union of philosophy and theology. It failed because it did not include Tillich’s concept of the abyss (ibid:35). The result of all of this was the birth of Tillich’s philosophy of religion. The union of theology and philosophy is the result of Tillich’s
philosophy of religion. His philosophy of religion abides on the border between theology and philosophy (ibid:36). Neither academic discipline of theology nor philosophy are lost. Tillich’s philosophy of religion expressed in philosophical terms the concept of the abyss and ‘the idea of justification a limitation of philosophy’ (ibid:36). Tillich (ibid:36) claimed his philosophy of religion was determined by both the ‘religious reality’ and the philosophical concept of the abyss (ibid:36).

In his effort to show the union of theology and philosophy at Frankfurt, Tillich gave a critical analysis. He rejected Neo-Kantianism, the philosophy of values, and also phenomenology. Neo-Kantianism didn’t include the experience of the abyss. Tillich (ibid:36) rejected the philosophy of values since it comprehended religion as a sphere of values. All this was assumed in the experience of the abyss. Tillich (1959:74) defines the abyss: ‘That which is expressed is the “dimension of depth” in the encountered reality, the ground and abyss in which every thing is rooted’.

Phenomenology lacked the dynamic element of the abyss (ibid:36-37). Instead, Tillich was attracted to a philosophy of life as described by Nietzsche (ibid:36-37). Nietzsche expressed the concept of the abyss, more clearly than the thought of the others. Tillich came to depend on Schelling’s philosophy of life. It was Schelling’s philosophy that made it possible for Tillich to be able to approach and interpret Nietzsche. The philosophy of life became attractive to Tillich in the years after the First World War. The philosophy of life was a reaction against the ‘years of death and hunger’. The German Revolution of 1918 gave new direction to Tillich’s thinking. His Christian philosophy of history became sociologically and politically
oriented (ibid:37). However, the philosophy of history had originated not with Tillich but with Ernst Troeltsch. Tillich adapted it making it his own. Tillich heard Troeltsch on this subject in Berlin. Troeltsch (1958:168-169) wrote:

There is just one thing which the original Protestantism so long as it held strictly to its fundamental idea, did not and could not do-and the omissions is of the highest significance for the whole understanding of its relation to the modern world: it never elevated artistic feeling into the principle of a philosophy of life, of metaphysics or ethics. It could not do that, because its asceticism and its absolute metaphysical dualism made it impossible. It could not reconcile itself to the admission of art as an end in itself, as a particular way of knowing God and the world which is necessarily in some way or other bound up with his principle, and the not less closely connected transfiguration of the sensuous, and the sense of the world as harmony.

Troeltsch was speaking on the philosophy of history which had not been treated since Hegel’s death (Tillich 1936:37). Troeltsch failed due to his adherence to German idealism. He was unable to succeed because of the barrier of historical relativism. Tillich repudiated Troeltsch’s idealism. Tillich justified his decision to discard historical relativism because of the damaging effect of World War I on Germany. Tillich espoused a new philosophy of history the ‘the philosophy of history of religious Socialism’ (ibid:38). Adams (Tillich 1924:352-353 in Adams 1965:150) clarifies:

Tillich believes Troeltsch was never able to resolve the tensions in the way in which he hoped to, for in the struggle over the contradiction between the absolute and “the preponderance lay on the side of the relative.” “It was not for external reasons alone that he abandoned theology.” Not that his passage from theology to philosophy was simply a passage from the absolute to the relative. “The opposite would be more correct.” His actual intention was to move from the false absolute to the genuine. But in his striving for standards Troeltsch attached himself to that wing of Kantianism which moved in the scientific methodology in accord with Windelband and Rickert.

In inspection, one of Tillich’s goals at Frankfurt was to bring about the union
of philosophy and theology. Tillich developed his own Christian philosophy of religion. Nietzsche’s philosophy of life became attractive to Tillich. He was able to interpret Nietzsche because of Schelling’s work. Tillich developed a new philosophy of history that was sociologically and politically oriented.

4:3 Another Dimension Between Philosophy And Theology-Religion And Culture

4:3:1 The Relationship of Religion To Culture

Tillich sought to show another aspect of the union of theology and philosophy. This was the dimension between theology and philosophy of religion and culture. Tillich (1959:40) began by defining religion: ‘Being ultimately concerned about that which is and should be our ultimate concern. This means that faith is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, and the belief in the existence of a highest being God, and the theoretical and practical consequences of such a belief’. Religion defined by Tillich was absolute and universal. His proof for this claim is the absolute and universal nature of religion as evidenced in the idea of God. Religion is not a sub category of culture. Neither is religion to be placed as being an entirely separate realm from culture (Tillich 1936:50). Culture has a claim upon philosophy. Culture decides the forms and context that expresses the ‘Absolute’. Culture’s substance is religion. Religion’s form is culture. Tillich (ibid:50) explains the one difference: ‘In religion the substance which is the unconditioned source and abyss of meaning is designated, and the cultural forms serve as symbols for it’ whereas in culture the form, which is the conditioned meaning
becomes perceptible only indirectly, throughout the autonomous form’. Culture seeks to understand man’s finiteness and search for the infinite. Religion by way of contrast must include ‘the autonomous form’ the ‘Logos’ (ibid:50). Tillich concludes by saying that these ideas were the foundation for both a philosophy of religion and a philosophy of culture (ibid:50). Tillich was then able to treat cultural movements from the perspective of religion (ibid:50-51).

Tillich wanted to show the relation of religion to culture. Culture that included politics, art, depth psychology and also sociology (Tillich 1966:7). Tillich (1967:43) writes: ‘Frankfurt was the most modern and liberal university in Germany, but it had no theological faculty. So it was quite natural that my lectures moved on the boundary line between philosophy and theology and tried to make philosophy existential for the numerous students obliged to take philosophical classes’.

German culture had experienced culture shocks at all levels due to the devastation of World War I. Germany was experiencing two digit inflation. The German people were open to these new ideas. Tillich formed an apologetical theology. This became part of his curriculum while he was teaching at Frankfurt. Dresden had been a center of the visual arts including painting, architecture, dance, and opera. Tillich (1966-9-10) writes: ‘The cultural situation was not much different when, in 1929, I received and accepted a call as professor of philosophy at Frankfurt’. Tillich brought the culture of Berlin, Dresden and Frankfurt to bear in his lectures in Frankfurt. This element became an important part of Tillich’s efforts to show the
union of theology and philosophy. Ratschow (1980:24) writes:

In 1929 Tillich was called to the chair that Scheler had held in Frankfurt as ordinarius for philosophy and sociology; he remained there until 1933. The lectures from this time indicate no specifically theological themes, with the exception of a course Dogmatics I, in Marburg. The themes are all on religion and culture, on the social situation, or on “religious experience,” the “religious interpretation of being,” and the “essence of religion.” In the themes of these lectures and in the way that Tillich moved from university to university is reflected the tendency of Tillich’s working. At the peak of this tendency is the theme of his life: the theology of culture.

Ratschow gives us further insight into Tillich’s theology of culture. Ratschow (ibid:24) writes: ‘In this problem his historical elan, his religio-philosophical system, his political theory, and his religious passion were brought together’.

In analysis, Tillich tried to demonstrate another dimension of the union between philosophy and theology. This was the union of religion and culture. Culture’s substance is religion. Religion’s form is culture. Tillich related religion to politics, art, depth psychology, and sociology.

The German people were open to new ideas as a result of the culture shocks from World War I and two digit inflation. Tillich formed an apologetical theology. This became part of his curriculum while he was teaching at Frankfurt.

4:4 Tillich’s Role At Frankfurt

4:4:1 Tillich A Sacred Theologian In A Secular Setting

Tillich accepted the position in Frankfurt with the title Professor of Philosophy
and Sociology (Pauck and Pauck 1976:112-113). Fritz Medicus wrote a public endorsement of Tillich in a ‘leading Swiss newspaper’. The Paucks (ibid:113) write:

‘Tillich’s former teacher and friend Fritz Medicus, who had observed Tillich’s popularity at a seminar in Davos during the summer of 1928, wrote a tremendously enthusiastic piece for the *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, the leading Swiss newspaper, proclaiming that the appointment of Tillich to Scheler’s chair was the beginning of a new philosophical era. His experience in Davos convinced him that his former pupil, whom he described as a genius, had rescued the Schellingian philosophy from the dusty theory in which it was held captive and transformed it into meaning for a responsible way of life’. The Paucks (ibid:113) add: ‘Tillich’s formal task at the University of Frankfort [Frankfurt] was in fact to teach social education, and in his lectures and seminars between the years 1929 and 1933 he thus emphasized the aspects of social ethics, historical action, and political direction rather than the speculative or metaphysical interest of the thinkers with whom he dealt in the classroom. More than ever he felt obliged to make philosophical questions existential for the numerous students for whom philosophical courses were mandatory’. The Paucks (ibid:113) continue: ‘He gave courses on Kant, Hegel, and Schelling, on Locke and Thomas Aquinas’. Tillich lectured: ‘on “Being and Action,” “The Masses and The Spirit,” Philosophy of Religion,” and “The History of Philosophy.” He offered a course on questions of systematic theology only during the last semester in Frankfort and then only in an informal colloquial way’ (ibid:113-114). Ratschow (1980:24) argues
for Tillich’s ‘systematic science of culture’ during the German university years.

Ratschow (ibid:24) continues: ‘Its dialectic is rooted in the fact that every science must use universal concepts to set forth a concrete normative science of its own does not wish to remain without fruit in a merely general validity’. Ratschow (ibid:24) argues: ‘This is also true for theology. As a normative science—that is, as part of the concretizing that is turned toward life—it is a part of the science of religion’. Ratschow (ibid:24) reveals Tillich’s conception of theology. Ratschow (ibid:25) writes: ‘Since Tillich conceives of theology as the normative part of a science of religion, the problem of cultural theology can be discussed only in the large horizon of religion and culture. At this time, moreover, religion for Tillich is the experience of unconditional (Schlechthinning) nothingness’. Ratschow (ibid:25) concludes:

Where this experience leads to the “absolute radical No,” it “changes…into a radical Yes.” In the complexes of No and Yes, that which is “above being” (das Uberseiende) announces itself as the reality of meaning. The definition of religion shows the unambiguos structure of Schelling’s triangular model: being and nonbeing transcend toward Suprabeing (Ubersein). Even here, however, this scheme is directed to what will later be shown to be structure of justification.

The Paucks (1976:114) commenting on Tillich’s time at Frankfurt write:

‘The period at Frankfort [Frankfurt] turned out to be the richest and most successful of Tillich’s German career’. The Paucks (ibid:114) add:

From the beginning, as Medicus had predicted, he attracted a large and enthusiastic group of students, which steadily increased. In these years, which he and his illustrious colleagues (to whom he referred as “glorious”) described later in ever more glowing and romantic reminiscences as the “golden age” of
German university life, Tillich deepened and refined his teaching skills.

The Paucks (ibid:114) speak well of Tillich:

He sought the truth, as of old, in his non authoritarian way. That was unusual for a theologian. His colleagues soon learned that he had somehow freed himself from the stuffy moralism of his Protestant background. Moreover, he did not merely teach his students; he lived with them and mobilized their intellectual forces. The largeness of his nature, the broadmindedness that gave others confidence to speak their own words, became more and more evident.

Tillich made his students feel worthwhile and intelligent by his responses to their questions and input (ibid:114). Moreover, Tillich had the great ability to be a very good listener. Tillich was a very open person. He was able to employ the Socratic method of teaching whereby he obtained answers to his questions (ibid:114). He had two assistants while he was at the University of Frankfurt. The first was Harald Polechau ‘whom Tillich brought from Berlin’. Polechau was writing his dissertation at this time. Tillich had a second assistant by the name of Theodor Wiesengrund. He was known by Teddy or Adorno (ibid:114-115).

Tillich became well known throughout Germany as the result of his position at the University of Frankfurt (ibid:120). The Paucks (ibid:122) add: ‘The menace of National Socialist power, at first mere parody and a shadow, suddenly became a grotesque and brutal reality’. At Frankfurt, Tillich had a wide circle of friends that met to discuss academic questions (ibid:119). Tillich described this group as ‘religious, philosophical, prophetic’ (ibid:119). The
Paucks (ibid:118) write: ‘Horkheimer, Lowe, Mannheim, Mennicke, Pollock and Reizler, who came as ‘thought-provoker” ex officio, were all members’.

Dorrien (2003:487) writes of Tillich’s activities at Frankfurt:

Shortly after Tillich arrived at Frankfurt, he helped engineer a faculty position for Max Horkheimer, who became director of the neo-Marxist Institut fur Sozialforschung, later named as the Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School critical theorists were more inclined to theory than practical political engagement, and theoretically most of them were socialists positioned between the compromised revisionism of the German Social Democratic Party and the compromised revisionism of and the antidemocratic collectivism of the Communists.

Donnelly (2003:2) writes: ‘This bringing together and fusing of religious and Marxist thought in the early Tillich has been the subject of special study for a number of scholars, most notably Guy Hammond, Terry O’Keeffe, Richard Quinney, Ronald Stone, and John Stumme’. Donnelly (ibid:2) argues that Tillich was ‘widely perceived as a Marxist, and not without good reason’.

Donnelly points to Tillich’s commitment to Marxism. Tillich (1936:63 in Donnelly 2003:27) admits his debt to Marx: ‘ I owe to Marx, first of all, the insight into the ideological character not only idealism but of all systems of thought, religious as well as profane which as the servants of power hinder, even though unconsciously, the more righteous form of social reality’. Further, Donnelly (2003:2-3) lists a number of journals which support Tillich’s commitment to this important ideology. Donnelly (ibid:2-3) lists: ‘ “Review of Metaphysics” (Cohen 1950:4:13-24), the “Journal of Religion” (Kucheman 1972:52:268-286), the “American Journal of Theology and Philosophy” (1984:5:1:13-24), the “Journal of

Thomas (1963:14) argues that Tillich’s public speaking brought him into conflict with the growing Nazi movement in Germany. His argument is built on Tillich biographical details (1963:14). Tillich was convinced of the need for religious socialism for Germany (Thomas 2000:43). Thomas (ibid:43) argues based on Tillich’s book *The Socialist Decision*. It contained Tillich’s ‘developed political theology’ (ibid:43). This book showed Tillich’s commitment to ‘socialist politics’, and it was ‘a deliberate attack on the growing attraction of Nazism’ (ibid:43).

The critical analysis of this section shows that Tillich was Professor of Philosophy at Frankfurt. Tillich was replacing Scheler. Scheler was to replace Cornelius. Scheler died before his appointment was to begin. Tillich emphasized the social, historical action, and political direction. Tillich made his philosophical questions existential while he was at Frankfurt. Tillich attracted a large number of students at Frankfurt. This was his most successful teaching period. Tillich became involved with the *Institute for Social Research* at Frankfurt. The early Tillich had fused together religious and Marxist thought into religious socialism.
4:5 The Political And Economic Background

4:5:1 The Rise of Hitler And The Great Depression

Paul Tillich’s years at Frankfurt were lived out against the background of political turmoil and turbulence in Germany. Thomas (ibid:19) writes: ‘As the 1920s wore on, the National Socialist Movement grew in strength and influence. Thomas (ibid:43) continues: ‘By the end of the decade, the threat it posed was sufficient’. The Great Depression which had its origin in the Wall Street Crash that occurred on October 29, 1929 in the United States sent financial shockwaves around the globe. By mid 1930’s the economic pressures of the Great Depression were causing the German democratic government to come apart (Duiker and Spielvogel 2007:646-649). January 30, 1933, saw Hitler named as Chancellor of Germany by Hindenburg’s concession (ibid:687). In March, 1933, Hitler became dictator of all of Germany (ibid:687). Tillich’s years in Frankfurt were overshadowed by the rise of Adolf Hitler. Tillich (1977:xxxiii) writes:

‘The political events of recent years have been decisive in providing the impulse to begin and complete the book: the decline of the political influence of the Social Democrats, the apparently final split in the proletarian working class, the triumphal advance of National Socialism, the consolidation of the late-capitalistic powers on a military basis, the increasingly perilous situation in foreign affairs’.

In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles had laid heavy war ‘reparations for all the damage to which the Allied governments and their people were subject as a result of the war’ on Germany (Duiker and Spielvogel 2007:644). Barnett (1998:19)
In 1919, however, most Germans longed not for democracy but for stability and order. The Weimar Republic, its birth accompanied by right-wing soldiers’ uprisings and Communist attempts at revolution, was an uncertain government in a volatile environment. It was burdened by the social and economic costs of the war and the additional obligations of paying war reparations, which the victorious European powers had set at 132 billion gold marks.

The Dawes Plan of 1924 was drawn up by an international commission. It gave Germany a loan of two hundred million. Reparations were reduced and made dependent upon Germany’s ability to pay (Duiker and Spielvogel 2007:646-647).

The Americans made heavy investments in Europe which created European prosperity during the years 1924 to 1929. In 1928, American investors called in these loans made to Germany. This was so as to be able to invest in the New York stock market. The October 1929 stock market crash led American investors to have to withdraw even more loaned money to Germany (ibid:647). Duiker and Spielvogel (ibid:649) write:

Germany experienced runaway inflation in 1922 and 1923; widows, orphans, the retired elderly, army officers, teachers, civil servants, and others who lived on fixed incomes all watched their monthly stipends become worthless and their lifetime savings evaporate. Their economic losses increasingly pushed the middle class to the rightest parties that were hostile to the republic. To make matters worse, after a period of prosperity from 1924 to 1929, Germany faced the Great Depression. Unemployment increased to 3 million in March 1930 and 4.4 million by December of the same year. The depression paved the way for the rise of extremist parties.

In inquiry, Tillich’s Frankfurt years were lived out against the background of political turmoil and economic instability. The treaty of Versailles had laid heavy war reparation payments on Germany. The booming New York stock market of 1928 caused American investors to withdraw loans made to Germany. This was in order that
they could invest in the New York stock market. The crash of the New York stock market in 1929 sent financial shockwaves around the globe. American investors called in more loans made to Germany. The Hindenberg democratic government was coming apart. Hindenberg made a concession to Adolf Hitler on January 30, 1933. Hitler was named Chancellor of Germany. Later, in March, 1933, Hitler became dictator of all of Germany.

4:6 Tillich’s Closing Days At Frankfurt

4:6:1 Tillich’s Appeal To The German People

Tillich produced his book *The Socialist Decision* during his German years. Stumme (1977:xxiii) writes: ‘Tillich wrote the bulk of *The Socialist Decision* during the summer of 1932 in the mountains of Sils Maria, Switzerland’,….But it was too late. Historical events foreclosed any genuine decision; on 30 January 1933, Adolf Hitler took power, and the barbaric future began’. Stumme (ibid:xxiii-xxiv) continues: ‘*The Socialist Decision* was suppressed and all the socialist literature of Alfred Protte, Tillich’s publisher, was confiscated. Later, the remaining copies of the work were destroyed when the Protte warehouse in Potsdam was leveled by Allied bombs’. Stumme (ibid:xxiv) concludes: ‘The book’s public existence was extremely short-lived, and no reviews of it were printed. Like other anti-Nazi material, *The Socialist Decision* was consumed by the fires of repression’. Carey (2002:4) writes: ‘Tillich was dismissed
by the Nazis from his position at the University of Frankfurt on April 13, 1933, and in December of the same year he and his family came to America’.

In examination, Tillich’s book *The Socialist Decision* did not come out soon enough. It was published in 1933 by Alfred Protte. Hitler took power on January 30, 1933. All socialist literature was confiscated. Allied bombs leveled the Protte warehouse. Tillich was dismissed from his teaching position at Frankfurt by the Nazis on April 13, 1933. It was in December of 1933 that Tillich and his family came to America.

4:7 Summary

Tillich was Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-the-Main. He sought to get a clear conception of the scientific relationship of philosophy to theology. This helps us in our understanding of the Frankfurt years. Tillich distinguished between two kinds of theology. Philosophic theology is philosophical in character. The second kind of theology is kerygmatic theology. Kerygmatic is derived from the New Testament word for message. It tries to reproduce the Christian message in a systematic way without referring to philosophy. Philosophical theology is also based on the kerygma. It tries to explain the contents of the kerygma in close interrelation with philosophy. Kerygmatic theology and philosophical theology are interdependent on each other. Kerygmatic theology has always used philosophical terms and methods. Philosophical theology has always tried to explain the content of the message. The theological ideal is the unity of both types of theology. Philosophical theology is also called apologetics, speculative theology, and also Christian philosophy of religion.
Philosophy attempts a description of the world in unity with all kinds of scientific and nonscientific experience. However, it must first try to understand being itself, the categories, and the structures common to all kinds of beings. This makes the division between philosophy and theology impossible because of the relation of God, world, and man. Whatever the relation is it lies within the frame of being. Philosophy asks the questions. Theology supplies the answers. The Frankfurt years (1929-1933) show the Tillichean understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Tillich’s theology is built on the ontological model.

The Frankfurt years help us in our understanding of Tillich’s boundary and borderline concept. This is a metaphysical concept pointing to Tillich’s destiny as existence on the boundary. The boundaries had particular intensity, directness, and totality for Tillich. These boundaries are transitions, battlegrounds, controversies, difficult tensions, and endurance tests.

Tillich tried to show the union between philosophy and theology at Frankfurt. This became possible because of the explanation that Schelling’s Christian philosophy of existence provided. However, Schelling’s Christian philosophy didn’t the unity of theology and philosophy. It failed to do so because it didn’t include Tillich’s concept of the abyss. The result was the birth of Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion. The union of theology and philosophy was achieved because of Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion. His Christian philosophy of religion abides on the border between theology and philosophy. The abyss is that which is expressed in dimension of depth. The ground
and abyss is that in which everything is rooted.

Tillich was attracted to the philosophy of life. He could interpret Nietzsche because of Schelling. The German revolution of 1918 gave new direction to Tillich’s thinking. His Christian philosophy of history became sociologically and politically oriented. Tillich redefined his Christian philosophy of history as a result of Troeltsch’s philosophy of history. Tillich’s new Christian philosophy of history became the Christian philosophy of religious socialism.

A second dimension of the union between philosophy and theology was that of religion and culture. Tillich defined religion as ultimate concern concerning that which should be our ultimate concern. Faith is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern. Faith is also the belief in the highest being’s existence God, the theoretical, and the practical consequences of such belief. Culture decides the forms and the context that expresses the Absolute. Culture’s substance is religion. Religion’s form is culture. Tillich showed the relationship of religion to culture. Culture included politics, art, Philosophy, depth psychology, and sociology.

Frankfurt didn’t have a theological faculty. It was natural for Tillich’s lectures to move on the boundary between philosophy and theology. Tillich tried to make philosophy existential for his numerous students.

The German people were open to new ideas due to the culture shocks of World War I and two digit inflation. Tillich formed an apologetical theology. This became part of his curriculum when he was teaching at Frankfurt. Tillich lectured on the themes
of religion and culture, the social situation, religious experience, the religious interpretation of being, and the essence of religion. Tillich’s theology of culture was the theological problem that joined together his historical elan, his religio-philosophical system, his political theory, and his religious passion.

Tillich accepted his position in Frankfurt as Professor of Philosophy and Sociology. Fritz Medicus, a former teacher wrote an article about Tillich in a leading Swiss newspaper. The article pointed out that Tillich’s appointment as a successor of Scheler was the beginning of a new philosophical era. Tillich became well known throughout Germany as a result of his position at the University of Frankfurt. Tillich had a wide circle of friends at Frankfurt. They met to discuss academic questions in the Frankfurt School (Institute for Social Research). The early Tillich fused together religious and Marxist thought. Tillich was perceived as a Marxist.

Tillich’s Frankfurt years (1929-1933) were characterized by political turmoil and economic instability. The Wall Street Crash on October 29, 1929 in the United States sent financial shockwaves around the globe. The German democratic government collapsed. On January 30, 1933, Hitler was named Chancellor of Germany by the concession of Hindenburg. March 1933 saw Hitler becoming dictator of all of Germany.

Tillich’s closing days at Frankfurt saw the completion of his book *The Socialist Decision*. This book was published in 1933. Hitler’s barbaric reign began on January 30, 1933. *The Socialist Decision* and all socialist literature was suppressed and confiscated. The remaining copies of *The Socialist Decision* were destroyed when the
Alfred Protte warehouse was levelled by Allied bombs. Tillich was dismissed by the Nazis on April 13, 1933. He and his family came to America in December of 1933. The procession of our thesis is to consider the influences on Tillich during the years 1886 to 1933.
CHAPTER 5

INFLUENCES

5:1 Academic

Influences (Dictionary 2008:1) is defined as ‘the capacity or power of persons or things to be a compelling force on or produce effects on the actions, behavior, opinions, etc., of others’.

Paul Tillich’s life had many influences on it during the German years. Bernard Martin (1963:2) argues that Tillich’s biographical data ‘sets forth the major facts of Tillich’s life’. Martin (ibid:7) seeks to explain what ‘incidents’ and ‘experiences of his personal historical destiny have been of basic importance in molding his thought’.

In addition, Martin (ibid:7) argues for the ‘crucial intellectual influences upon’ Tillich’s life. Tillich had studied philosophy on his own. He had a working knowledge of the history of philosophy and familiarity with Fichte and Kant. At the University, he had studied Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling. His concentration was focused on Schelling’s Christian philosophy of religion (ibid:17). Tillich had studied theology at the University of Berlin, Tubingen, and also Halle. He took his first theological exam in 1909. His second theological exam was written in 1911. He received the Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Breslau in 1911. In 1912, Tillich received the Licentiate of Theology
from the University of Halle (ibid:17). Paul Tillich was interested in the ideological character not only of ‘idealism’ but as well ‘all systems of thought both religious and profane’. He had learned earlier from Kierkegaard that truth is always to be found in the context of the knower (ibid:21). It was during the German years that Tillich became interested in the social movements of his day. He had a profound interest in Marx who had a new and a different emphasis of economic materialism (ibid:21). The thought of Kierkegaard held that every human being exists in a situation of despair (ibid:21). The German masses were involved in a class struggle during and after World War I. Marx thought every system of harmony was untrue (ibid:21). Tillich was now able to connect truth to a particular psychological or social situation. Further, Marx’s doctrine of economic materialism confirmed Kierkegaard’s doctrine of self-alienation (Tillich 1936:65). Martin (1963:21) argues that Marx was one of the definite influences on Tillich. Martin (ibid:21) writes of Marx’s influence on Tillich: ‘his debt to him for many…insights’.

Martin follows the biographical details of Paul Tillich’s life to establish his argument. In 1900, the Tillich family moved to Berlin, Germany. Tillich’s father, Johannes had accepted a church position as pastor. Martin (Tillich 1936:6 in Martin 1963:16) quotes Tillich: ‘I was saved from romantic enmity against technical civilizations and was taught to appreciate the importance of the big city for the critical side of intellectual and artistic life. Later there was added to this a vital and thoughtful understanding of the world of Bohemianism, possible only in the large cities; and also an aesthetic appreciation of the internal and external immensity of the metropolis’. Tillich
(ibid:6 in ibid:16) gained ‘personal experience’ of both the political and the social movements in Berlin. Tillich (1952:9) graduated from the Gymnasium in 1904. He developed a love for both the Greek language, culture, and as well Greek philosophy (ibid:9). Tillich (ibid:10) confirms that he (ibid:10) had studied philosophy on his own prior to beginning his theological studies at the university. Tillich (ibid:10) had a knowledge of both Fichte and Kant when he entered the university. Tillich (ibid:10) studied Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling during his university days. Tillich studied theology at the Universities of Berlin, Tubingen, and Halle (Martin 1963:17). In 1909, he took his first theological exam. In 1911, his second theological exam (ibid:17). In 1911, Tillich received the Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Breslau. In 1912, he received the Licentiate of Theology at Halle (ibid:17). His doctoral dissertation and his Licentiate of Theology were both written on the work of Friedrich Schelling (Tillich 1952:10 in ibid:17). Schelling’s work made an impact on Tillich’s life. Martin doesn’t draw this conclusion from Tillich’s biographical data. His purpose comes out in that his argument is to support only the theme of his book *The Existential Theology of Paul Tillich* (ibid:26). Martin (ibid:26) argues: ‘Kierkegaard and Heidegger remain his philosophic heroes and the existentialist doctrine of man continues to be for him the most valuable and enlightening account that has been given of the human predicament in modern times’.

Tillich (1936:31-33) recalls his theological training and reading:

During the writing of these works, [his two dissertations on Schelling] I was a student of Protestant theology, and at the conclusion of my studies became assistant pastor at various parishes of the Old Prussian United Church. At that time, Martin Kahler and Wilhelm Lutgert from Halle were my most important teachers.
The former was a personality of overwhelming ethical and religious power and intellectual concentration; as teacher and writer difficult to understand; profoundest and in many respects the most modern representative of the theology of mediation of the nineteenth century; an opponent of Albert Ritschl, herald of the theological doctrine of justification, and critic of idealism and humanism, out of which he himself evolved. I am indebted to him primarily for the insight he gave me into the all-controlling character of the Pauline-Lutheran idea of justification.…

At this point, I parted soon from the teachings of the theologians in Halle and became less and less in accord with the new supranaturalism, which has grown up within Barth’s theology, and wishes to repeat the dogmatic doctrines of the Reformation, by discarding the scientific work of two hundred years. At first it was the interpretation of the Old Testament by Wellhausen and Gunkel, the so-called religions-geschichtliche Methode, which fascinated me and revealed to me the Old Testament in its fundamental meaning for Christianity and humanity. My preference for the Old Testament and the spirit of prophetic criticism and expectation has stayed with me and through the bearing of this upon my political attitude, it has become decisive for the shaping of my life and thought.…My historical insights into the New Testament I owe principally to Albert Schweitzer’s “The Quest of the Historical Jesus” and Bultmans Synoptische Tradition. Ernst Troeltsch caused my transfer of interest from all mediating-theological and apologetic remains in Church History and in the problem of historical criticism.

Martin’s view of Tillich as merely an existential theologian does not do justice to Tillich. Tillich (1936:31-33) argues for Schelling’s Christian philosophy of religion and the Old Testament prophetic criticism for his political attitude.

In partition, Tillich was indebted to both Kierkegaard and Marx. Kierkegaard gave Tillich insight on man’s existence in a situation of despair or self-alienation. Marx’s interpretation of history as a class struggle gave Tillich insight into the situation of the German masses during and after World War I. Schelling’s views became Tillich’s views. Tillich wrote both his doctoral dissertation and his dissertation for Licentiate of Theology on Schelling. Tillich had insight from Martin Kahler into the Pauline-Lutheran idea of justification. Wellhausen and Gunkel gave Tillich insight into the Old Testament.
Tillich’s political attitude was influenced by the spirit of prophetic criticism from the Old Testament.

5:2 Life Experiences

5:2:1 Tillich’s Religious Situation

Martin does draw a conclusion from the biographical data of Tillich’s church service and duty as a chaplain in World War I. Tillich served as a chaplain in the German army from September 1914 to September 1918. Martin (1963:20) points out Tillich saw World War I as a disaster for Europe. The unity of the German nation was a myth. Germany was divided into conflicting classes. Further, the proletariat viewed the church as the ally of the ruling classes. The conflict between the masses and the ruling class led to the revolution of 1918. The result was Imperial Germany collapsed. Martin (1963:20) argues: ‘Tillich in deep sympathy with social aspects of the short-lived revolution. He became one of the founders of German religious socialism; and as one of the major theoreticians of the movement, developed some of its key concepts’. Niebuhr (1956:10) interprets Tillich’s *The Religious Situation* as a revolt ‘against the spirit of capitalist society’. Niebuhr (ibid:10) writes:

Capitalist society, however, is not a scheme of economic organization only; it is also a culture with a definitely religious character. Its civilization is based…the establishment of human control over the world of nature and mind. Natural science, technique and capitalist economy…control the civilization.

Tillich became involved in the social movements (Martin 1963:20). Tillich incorporated
Marx’s thought into his life and teaching. Tillich (1956:122-125) writes:

Among the ideas which betray the true character of capitalist society is its conception of the state. In the pre-capitalist period of the state as the law giving and law-enforcing community possessed the unction and sanctity which naturally belongs to it when the whole community regards it as the fundamental structure of the social life, determining all aspects of the social culture….[T]he capitalist conception of the state may be characterized as its complete secularization….[T]he vital force which supported the capitalistic state was nationalism….[I]n…socialism….[I]ts…contradiction.

He developed the concept of the kairos which was espoused during the regular meetings of religious socialism (Tillich 1936:57-58 in Martin 1963:20).

Ludwig Feuerbach who lived from 1804-1872 thought the ‘true sense of Theology is Anthropology (Feuerbach 1989:xvii in Crockett 2001:108). Tillich’s (1977:13-15) *The Socialist Decision* demonstrates the inclusion of anthropology. This was an appeal to the German people to accept Socialism rather than Nazism. Tillich sought justice in the realms of economics and politics. Tillich wanted a meaningful society that would make the question of Marxism to Christianity an open question (Stumme 1977:xxvi).

In evaluating, Tillich’s experience as a chaplain in the Germany army from 1914 to 1918 deeply affected Tillich’s views. He saw the unity of the German nation as a myth. Germany was experiencing class warfare. The proletariat distrusted the church and the ruling classes. It was conflict between the masses and the ruling classes that led to the revolution of 1918. Tillich became a religious socialist. He was one of the founders and theoreticians of the religious socialist movement. His books *The Religious Situation* and *The Socialist Decision* demonstrate Tillich’s commitment to
religious socialism. *The Religious Situation* was written against the spirit of the capitalist society. His book *The Socialist Decision* was an appeal to the German people to accept religious socialism rather than Nazism.

### 5:3 Marx

#### 5:3:1 Marx’s Influence On Tillich


That Paul Tillich was interested in the thought of Karl Marx is widely known among Tillich scholars. Tillich’s early German writings on socialism, his sympathy for the social critiques of religion, and his efforts to promulgate a religious-socialist movement in Germany are all evidences of his debt to Karl Marx. Tillich was deeply influenced by Marx’s critique of capitalism, and he used that critique in his numerous early assessments of capitalism as the basic source of economic injustice in the modern world.

Carey (Tillich 1948:907 in ibid:29) continues:

Tillich consistently refused to join the ranks of those who dismiss Marx as a diabolical thinker who unleashed the wave of communist terror upon the earth. Quite the contrary, he saw many key insights in Marx’s thought as having relevance for the twentieth century because Marx interpreted history “in a way which makes even his erroneous prophecies significant.

Tillich (1977:109) writes of Marx:

For Marx, too, being must move in the direction of that which is demanded, so that the demand does not remain abstract and impotent. In his analysis of capitalist society these basic presuppositions receive concrete application and are elaborated by means of scientific methods. The structure of capitalism itself drives towards its transmutation into socialism, towards the classless society.

Tillich (1977:160) took seriously Marx’s words on ‘another possibility: chaos’. Tillich (ibid:160-161) writes:
If, in the encounter between the bourgeoisie and political romanticism, the bourgeois principle should once again gain a complete victory, the increasingly severe crises would make chaos virtually inevitable. If on the other hand political romanticism and, with it, militant nationalism proves victorious, a self-annihilating struggle of the European peoples is inevitable. *The salvation of European society from a return to barbarism lies in the hands of socialism.*

Tillich (1936:66 in ibid:29) argues for the need to appropriate, criticize, and continue the dialogue with Marx. Carey (2002:29-30) argues:

Tillich felt that there are far-reaching analogies between Marx’s interpretation of history and the perspective of the Old Testament prophets. Both saw history in dynamic terms, as a struggle between good and evil powers. Humanity is called to identify itself with the historical group that carries on the fight for good. Redemption is the conquest and extermination of evil in history. In this sense Marx, like the prophets, set himself against the “nonhistorical” interpretations of history which attempt to understand history through categories of nature or space.

Carey (ibid:30) concludes: ‘Tillich recognized, of course, that Marx had shifted the prophetic concept of transcendence to the material realm of immanence, but he insisted nevertheless that Marx shows a greater affinity to the prophets than do most of the comfortable churches of our day’.

Carey (2002:30) points out: ‘Tillich gives priority to Marx’s view of justice’. Carey argues that economics as the basis for historical change is an oversimplification (ibid:30). Yet Carey (ibid:30-31) admits the ‘significance of the economic factor in life, and in being aware of the physical needs of persons’. Tillich saw in Marx the prophetic voice ‘for justice in the social order’ (ibid:31).

Tillich saw in Marx the importance of an approach to the interpretation of history that allows for ‘decision and involvement’ (ibid:31). Carey (2002:32) argues:

Related to this understanding of truth is Marx’s trenchant criticism of the ideologies
developed by all societies to justify the status quo. Marx developed this point as a part of his attack on Idealism; as opposed to appeals to a transcendent order, he wanted to stress the primacy of humanity’s actual situation. Ideologies that are presented as eternal truths, independent of humanity’s concrete situation, distort the actual human situation, and keep us from taking the necessary steps to improve our conditions. This, too, Tillich saw as a valid insight, and he appropriated this into his own understanding of history.

Carey (Tillich 1936:63 in ibid:32) quotes Tillich: ‘I owe to Marx, first of all, the insight into the ideological character, not only of idealism but of all systems of thought, religious as well as profane, which as the servants of power hinder, even though unconsciously, the more righteous form of social reality’. Tillich (1938:116-117 in ibid:32) admitted the accuracy of Marx’s thought that religion was an ideology of the privileged classes.

Carey (Tillich 1936:192-194 in ibid:34) makes an interesting point on the need for a revolution by the proletariat. Carey writes:

It is interesting that Tillich nowhere criticized Marx’s doctrine of the necessity of a revolution by the proletariat, although his own identification with the German Social Democratic party suggests his preference for working for social change within the context of existing political structures. The reason for Tillich’s silence may lie in his concept of power. He recognized that when a ruling group no longer expresses the will of the majority of citizens, a revolutionary situation is created, and justice in such instances is often on the side of the revolutionary forces. Tillich admits that there are ambiguities involved in determining when the time is ripe for a political revolution, but he was not willing to say that revolutions *ipso facto* are always wrong.

Further, Carey makes another interesting point on Tillich which is beyond the scope of this thesis on the German years. Carey (ibid:23) writes: ‘What is less well known, even among Tillich scholars, is that Tillich had a lifelong interest in Marx and Marxism’. Tillich’s statement of Marxian thought has always been contingent on the dialectical which combines a yes and a no. The positive element on Marx’s thought in Tillich’s life
was ‘on prophetic, humanistic, and realistic elements’ (Martin 1963:22). The no or the negative element of Marxian thought in Tillich’s life was ‘in Marx’s analysis, polemics, and propaganda’ (ibid:22). Carey’s conclusion on Marx’s influence is important for our thesis. Carey (ibid:35) writes: ‘There is no doubt that Karl Marx exerted a greater influence on Tillich than anyone else concerning political consciousness and the interpretation of history’. Carey’s critique of Tillich’s criticism of Marx is largely based on documents from the American years 1933-1965 which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Carey (ibid:34) argues that Tillich felt Marx was mistaken in his thinking on the proletariat. Marx made the rise of the proletariat ‘the focal point of history’. Carey (2002:29-35) agrees that Tillich’s thinking on Karl Marx was always dialectical. This was a combination of both positive and negative elements. The positive would be that Tillich saw in Marx the voice of the Old Testament prophets (ibid:29). Tillich admired Marx’s view of justice with the call for the need for a just society (ibid:30). Tillich admired Marx’s historical approach with the need for decision and involvement (ibid:31). Tillich agreed with Marx on Marx’s criticism of ideologies that were oppressive to the human situation (ibid:32). The negative for Tillich would be Marx’s failure to distinguish the divine from human ecclesiastical expressions. Marx’s interpretation of history did not allow for the kairos, his interpretation of history was too utopian, a wrong emphasis on the proletariat, and some of Marx’s thought was not relevant for the twentieth century (ibid:33-34). Carey (ibid:34) lists Marx’s irrelevant thought as follows: ‘Marx’s theories of work and value, accumulation and concentration of wealth, the scientific study of history, and so forth’.
In breakdown, Tillich was deeply influenced by Karl Marx. It was Marx’s critique of capitalism that Tillich used in his early writings. Tillich pointed out that capitalism was the cause of economic injustice in the world. Tillich saw in Marx the spirit of the Old Testament prophets. Tillich argued for the need to continue the dialogue with Marx. Tillich admitted his debt to Marx. Karl Marx had a greater influence on Tillich than anyone else in both Tillich’s political view and his interpretation of history.

5:4 Art

5:4:1 Tillich’s Theology Of Art

Tillich became interested in painting during his time as a chaplain in World War I. Palmer (Pauck and Pauck 1976:51 in Palmer 1984:3) writes: ‘For Tillich’s appreciation of painting began in the trenches, during the First World War and thus belongs to the most shattering and formative period of his life. During his four years of military service as an army chaplain, Tillich survived the offensives at Verdun, Amiens and Aisne-Marne, received the Iron Cross, sustained two nervous breakdowns, and emerged with a consciousness of suffering and death from which, so his biographers record, he never fully recovered’. Palmer (ibid:3) continues: ‘Throughout this time painting provided him with his principal means of relaxation and escape, an inevitable reaction’. Tillich (1966:27-28 in ibid:3) tells that this was due ‘to the horror, ugliness and destructiveness of war. My delight even in the poor reproductions obtainable at the military bookstores developed into a systematic study of the history of art. And out
of this study came the experience of art’. Palmer (ibid:3) relates another experience that made a great impact on Tillich during Tillich’s last furlough of World War I. Palmer (ibid:3) writes:

During his last furlough of the war, Tillich visited the Kaiser Friedrich Museum in Berlin. There he saw Botticelli’s ‘Madonna with Singing Angels’, the picture hanging alone on a wall opposite the entrance. The setting itself was dramatic and the painting’s impact on him enormous: ever afterwards Tillich was to speak of it as a moment of ‘revelation’, as an experience in which he had been grasped not only by the beauty and power of visual art but by the reality of the absolute.

Tillich (1952:13) became a Privatdozent of theology at the University of Berlin from 1919 to 1924. He tried to relate religion to other subjects of which art was one. Tillich (ibid:13) continues: ‘Revolutionary art came into the foreground, supported by the Republic, attacked by the majority of the people’. Tillich’s theology of culture was also a theology of art. Art had a great influence on Tillich during his years in as a chaplain in the German army in World War I.

In dissection, Tillich’s experience as a chaplain in World War I led to his interest in art. Tillich longed for beauty amidst the horrors of World War I. He sought relief and escape in the paintings of the military bookshops. Tillich’s interest in art and his systematic study of art resulted in a theology of art.

5:5  Freud

5:5:1  The Common Bond

During the German years, Tillich thought the ‘new depth psychology of Freud’
‘a little short of revelatory’ (Martin 1963:23). Freud was another intellectual influence upon Tillich. Tillich had been introduced to Freud’s work by Eckart Von Sydow (Pauck & Pauck 1976:75). The Paucks (ibid:223) tell us that Tillich’s interest in Freud grew ‘which he had nourished since 1919’. Tillich lectured ‘on subjects which included the relation of religion to politics, art, philosophy, depth psychology, and sociology’ (Tillich 1967:41). This was when Tillich was at the University of Berlin as a Privatdozent of theology from 1919 to 1924 (ibid:41). Tillich (ibid:41) continues:

‘I presented in my lectures on the philosophy of religion, its history and its structure. The situation during those years in Berlin was very favorable for such an enterprise…. Psychoanalytic ideas spread and produced a consciousness of realities which had been carefully repressed in previous generations’. Cooper (2006:15) explains: ‘Freud used psychological terminology and Luther used theological concepts, both pointed toward the fundamental human dilemma—the darker regions of the psyche have a multitude of maneuvers for keeping themselves unknown’. Cooper (ibid:21) continues: ‘It is Tillich’s understanding of the demonic which draws deeply from both Freud and Marx. Freud reinstated the psychological bondage of the will, which seems to reflect a kind of demonic activity’. Cooper (ibid:21) concludes: ‘Marx, on the other hand, describes the undercurrents of class conflict and economic injustice which represent social demons’. Tillich (1966:69 in Cooper 2006:21) tells of his concept of the demonic:

The only sufficient term I found was in the New Testament use of the “demonic,”
which is in stories about Jesus: similar to being possessed. That means a force, under a force, which is stronger than the individual good will. And so I used that term. Of course I emphasized very much I don’t mean in a mythological sense— as little demons or a personal Satan running around the world—but I mean it as structures which are ambiguous, both to a certain extent creative, but ultimately destructive. I had to find a term which covers the transpersonal power which takes hold of men and society.

Further, both Tillich’s existentialism and Freud’s psychoanalysis shared ‘a common revolt’ (Cooper 2006:66). This was against the philosophy of consciousness which reached its peak with Hegel. Cooper (ibid:66) continues:

The “philosophy of consciousness” takes human thought at face value. Existentialism and psychoanalysis, on the other hand, view consciousness as governed by the impulses and irrational urges beneath it….Tillich believes this conflict has gone on for centuries: Aquinas vs. Duns Scotus, Erasmus vs. Luther, Descartes vs. Pascal, Hegel vs. Kierkegaard, and so on. The philosophy of consciousness reached its zenith in Hegel, who provoked a rebellion in such masters of suspicion as Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud. Tillich, as we might suspect, highlights Schelling as a very important player in this revolt against the finality of finite reason.

In addition, both ‘existentialism and psychoanalysis are concerned with estrangement (ibid:66). Tillich (1964:116) adds: ‘now through Freud’ came ‘methodological scientific words’. Cooper (2006:66) expands and clarifies Tillich’s words: ‘Freud is especially important because he offered empirical, methodological procedures for demonstrating the power of the irrational unconsciousness. While previous thinkers had offered insightful intuition, Freud attempted to provide these intuitions with a scientific foundation’.

Armbruster (1967:15) concludes: ‘Two other intellectual movements played an important role in Tillich’s formation: existentialism and psychoanalysis’.

In brief, Tillich found in Freud confirmation for his existentialism. Freud’s thought
was taken up with the human psyche. Tillich tried to relate religion to depth psychology when he was a Privatdozent at the University of Berlin from 1919 to 1924. Freud’s psychoanalysis was a revolt against Hegel’s philosophy of consciousness. Tillich’s existentialism shared the same revolt against Hegel. Both existentialism and psychoanalysis were concerned with man’s estrangement. Tillich’s understanding of the demonic was drawn from Freud.

5:6 Heidegger

5:6:1 A New Understanding

Heidegger was another intellectual influence on Tillich’s life. Tillich came to the University of Marburg in 1924. Heidegger was lecturing on existentialism. Martin (1963:18) argues: ‘Heidegger himself has contributed very importantly to Tillich’s intellectual development’. Tillich (1936:40 in Martin 1963:19) calls the intellectual influence of Heidegger ‘upon his thinking: ‘of a prime order of magnitude’.

Achtemeier (1969:27) writes: ‘the fundamental question with which Heidegger sets out to deal with is the question of “Being”’. Godbieba (1995:1) adds: ‘Any attempt on a discussion about the religious status of God in postmodern philosophy of religion must reckon with Martin Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology and its effect of questioning all contemporary conceptions of God to the point of instability. Heidegger’s critique of the identification of God with Being, an identification “goes without saying” for centuries is the crucial step in the attempt to overcome metaphysics, and also influences continental philosophy’s critique of foundations’.
Tillich (1936:39) experienced the lectures of Martin Heidegger: ‘by the appearance of the so-called “Existential Philosophy” in Germany, I was led to a new understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology. The lectures of Martin Heidegger given at Marburg, the impression of which on my Marburg students and upon some of my colleagues I experienced; then his writing Sein Und Zeit (Being and Time)’. However, Tillich subjects Heidegger’s thought on existentialism in part to Soren Kierkegaard. Bove (1995:19) recognizes this academic maneuver by Paul Tillich. Hamilton (1963:38) traces the evolution of Tillich’s thinking on the subject of existentialism. This intellectual influence reaches to both the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries: ‘Tillich regards the existentialist way of thought, reaching through Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche in the nineteenth century to Heidegger and Sartre in the twentieth, as one of the great formative influences in the evolution of his own thinking’. Baron (2003:1) admits these intellectual influences: ‘Tillich’s thought was guided by ontological/existential categories’. The proof of this came out in Robinson’s Honest to God (1963). Le Mahieu (2001:7) argues that Robinson presented God as the ‘Ground of Our Being’. His argument is that Robinson borrowed this concept from Tillich and others. Le Mahieu (ibid:7) continues: ‘Robinson adopted the existential language of Paul Tillich’.

In analysis, Heidegger gave Tillich a new understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology.
5:7 Husserl

5:7:1 Tillich’s Clear Philosophical Theological Thinking

Another intellectual influence on Tillich’s thinking was that of Edward Husserl. Martin (1963:19) acknowledges this intellectual source: ‘Aside from Heidegger, the modern German philosopher to whom Tillich is most indebted is probably Edmund Husserl. Husserl’s “Logische Untersuchungen” appeared to Tillich the most forceful refutation of positivism and particularly of that form of it, psychologism, which is of most significance for the philosophy of religion’. Martin (ibid:19) continues: ‘For Tillich, Husserl’s doctrine was the most satisfying confirmation of what he claims to have learned from Kant and Fichte, and to Husserl’s phenomenology he owes, as we shall observe, much of this conception of the general nature of philosophical reflection’.

In reasoning, Husserl aided Tillich’s understanding of the nature of philosophical reflection. Husserl’s phenomenology confirmed for Tillich what he had previously studied from Fichte and Kant.

5:8 Nature and Schelling

5:8:1 Schelling The Basis For Tillich’s Theology

Tillich had a romantic relation to nature. Tillich (1952:3-4) admits his early years in Schonfliess-Neumark, and in Konigsberg-Neumark ‘may partly account for what has been challenged as the romantic trend in my feeling and thinking’. Tillich (ibid:4) continues: ‘It is expressed in a predominantly aesthetic-meditative attitude
toward nature as distinguished from a scientific-analytical or technical-controlling relation. It is the reason for the tremendous emotional impact that Schelling’s philosophy of nature made upon me—although I was well aware that this philosophy was scientifically impossible. It is theologically formulated in my doctrine of the participation of nature in the process of fall and salvation’. Tillich (ibid:4) points to three possible causes that account for his romanticism to nature. Tillich (ibid:4) writes: ‘First, I find the actual communication with nature daily in my early years, in my later years for several months of every year’. Tillich (ibid:5) adds: ‘A second cause of the romantic relation to nature is the impact of poetry. The German poetic literature, even aside from the romantic school, is full of expressions of nature mysticism. There are verses of Goethe, Holderlin, Novalis, Eichendorff, Nietzsche, George, and Rilke which never have ceased to move me as deeply as they did when I first heard them’. Tillich (ibid:5) continues:

A third cause of this attitude toward nature came out of my Lutheran background. Theologians, know that one of the points of disagreement between the two wings of the Continental Reformation, the Lutheran and the Reformed, was the so called “Extra Calvinisticum,” the doctrine that the finite is not capable of the infinite. (non capax infiniti), and that consequently in Christ the two natures, the divine and the human, remain outside each other. Against this doctrine the Lutherans asserted the “Infra Lutheranum”; namely, the view that the finite is capable of the infinite, and consequently that in Christ there is a mutual indwelling of the two natures. The difference means that on Lutheran ground the vision of the presence of the infinite in everything finite was theologically affirmed, that nature mysticism was possible and real, whereas on Calvinistic ground such an attitude is suspect of pantheism and the divine transcendence is understood in a way which for a Lutheran is suspect of deism.
Tillich (ibid:5) concludes: ‘Romanticism means not only a special relation to nature; it means also a special relation to history. To grow up in towns in which every stone is witness of a period many centuries past produces a feeling of history, not as a matter of knowledge, but as a living reality in which the past participates in the present’.

Tillich (ibid:4) admits the tremendous emotional impact that Schelling’s Christian philosophy of nature made upon him. Tillich’s (1936:7) own autobiography bears out the truth of this point: ‘Schelling’s Philosophy of Nature, which I read in a state of intoxication, as it were, surrounded by the beauties of nature became for me the direct expression of this feeling for nature’. Schelling was the subject of Tillich’s doctoral dissertation and his Licentiate in Theology. Tillich (1966:47) writes: ‘I read through his collected works several times, and eventually made his work the subject of my dissertations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and Licentiate of Theology’. Walter Leibrecht (1972:25) writes: ‘But follows …Schelling where he visualizes both otherness and being dynamically united in ultimate reality. It is the awareness of this problem which has led Tillich to venture a new synthesis, witnessed to the final identity in the ultimate ground’. Hutchinson (1953:138) draws our attention to the intellectual influence of Schelling on Tillich. He claimed Schelling advocated the ‘Existentialist protest’ long before Kierkegaard. Tillich denotes the importance of Schelling’s work in his work, On The Boundary. Tillich (1966:56) highlights Schelling’s Christian philosophy of existence as one of the factors that caused him to accept the existential position. Schelling’s philosophy of existence was derived from Jacob Bohme.
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Tillich (1936:54-55) writes of Bohme’s influence: ‘With him as mediator, Lutheran Mysticism had an influence on Schelling and German Idealism, and through Schelling, again on Irrationalism and the philosophy of life of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’. The Paucks (1976:175) add that Tillich was a Christian thinker who held the religious views of Schelling. Tillich (1936:31) admitted that Schelling had become the basis for this thought and development. Falk (1961:1-28) argues that Tillich relied heavily on Schelling’s *The Ages of the World*. Falk (ibid:26-27) is referring to Tillich’s second dissertation for the degree of Licentiate in Theology. Russell Re Manning (2005:77-83) affirms Schelling’s Christian metaphysical theology to be Tillich’s position. Tillich (1936:35) admits that Schelling had become the basis for his theonomous philosophy. Tillich (ibid:37) was able to interpret Nietzsche’s philosophy of life because of Schelling. Tillich (ibid:37) writes: ‘The historical dependence of the philosophy of life on Schelling made it easy for me to approach it’. Wheat (1970:102) acknowledges Tillich’s reliance on Schelling: ‘Tillich read Schelling’s collected works through several times as a student and wrote two dissertations (1911 and 1912) dealing with Schelling’s thought’. Wheat (ibid:214) argues that Tillich outlined Schelling’s thought ‘in mysticism and theism’. God is man who was mediated to Tillich by Schelling (ibid:188). Wheat concludes by arguing that Tillich copied Schelling (ibid:262). Scharlemann (2006:225) reviewed Tillich’s two dissertations on Schelling. He argues that Schelling was as much a contributor to theology as he was to philosophy. Tillich (ibid:225) was ‘centrally occupied with the principle of identity’ based on Schelling’s thought. Carey (2002:14) argues:
The concept of God was likewise a rich area for Tillich (see, for example, his Systematic Theology, volume 1) and is obviously an area in which he made a major contribution to twentieth-century theology. Tillich, however, drew on a wide variety of sources as he tried to understand the problem of God. He was indebted to the German idealistic philosopher Friedrich Schelling. Carey misses the essence of Schelling’s Christian thought. He does argue for Tillich’s debt to Schelling which is important for our chapter on the influences on Tillich during the German years (1886 to 1933). Carey (ibid:21) adds: ‘Scholars have tended therefore to probe his relationship to Schelling’. Tillich made Schelling’s Christian philosophy his own thought.

In judgment, Tillich’s romanticism to nature determined the romantic trend in his thinking. Romanticism is defined as an ‘aesthetic-meditative attitude to nature’. Tillich’s daily communication with nature, German poetry, and his Lutheran background account for his romanticism to nature. Romanticism meant as well a interest in history. Tillich attributes this to the medieval towns in which he grew up. Schelling’s Christian philosophy of nature expressed Tillich’s romanticism to nature. Schelling became the subject of both Tillich’s doctoral dissertation, and his Licentitate of Theology. Schelling’s views made it possible for Tillich to accept the existential position. Tillich’s own admission is that Schelling had become the basis for his thought and development. Schelling’s Christian metaphysical theology became Tillich’s religious views. The Paucks, Falk, Re Manning, Wheat, Scharlemann, and Carey argue for Tillich’s reliance on Schelling’s thought.
Another intellectual influence on Paul Tillich was Jacob Bohme. Tillich (1966:75) calls him the ‘philosophical spokesman for German mysticism’. Bohme’s thought was an elaboration of mystical Lutheranism (ibid:75). It was through Bohme that Lutheran mysticism influenced both Schelling, German Idealism, and in turn Tillich. Schelling’s work was derived from Bohme. Tillich’s work was derived from Schelling’s Christian philosophy (ibid:75). Adams (1965:32) writes: ‘The concepts “ground” and “abyss” stem from Jacob Boehme.. As we shall observe again and again, Boehme is a major source for certain crucial elements in Tillich’s outlook’. Carey (2002:14) writes: ‘He was indebted…, to the German mystic Jakob Bohme’.

In analysis, Jacob Bohme advocated Lutheran mysticism. Bohme’s German Christian mysticism influenced the thinking of Schelling, German Idealism, and Tillich. Tillich derived his concepts of ground and abyss from Bohme. Bohme was another major source for Tillich’s views.
5:10 Barth

5:10:1 Barth’s Supernaturalism Rejected By Tillich

Tillich stood with Barth in the dialectical movement (Horton 1952:26). Horton (ibid:26-27) writes:

As an associate of Karl Barth in the “dialectical theology” movement, and later as a critic of Barth, he left a mark upon Continental theology which years of absence have not obliterated….The term “neo-orthodox” is becoming canonical to designate the position of Karl Barth and other contemporary theologians who undertake to correct modern theology by going back to the Protestant Reformers. Since Tillich owes much to Luther, and since he undoubtedly considered himself an associate of Barth in the early days of “dialectical theology,” this would seem to entitle us to pin the label “neo-orthodox” on him, too.

Horton (ibid:27) states: ‘His article in Kant-Studien, XXVII (1922), where he speaks (p.447) of his “spiritual comradeship” with Barth and Gogarten in a theology of “paradox” to which they and he had independently been led. Barth, Tillich, and Otto Piper belonged to the group of theologians called progressives after World War I’. Horton (ibid:28) clarifies for us:

It is far more appropriate to consider Tillich as a “progressive” than as an “orthodox” of any kind. His autobiographical introduction to “The Interpretation of History” points out that “precisely in the protest against the Protestant orthodoxy (even in its moderate form of the nineteenth century) I had won my way through to autonomy.”… This fear of a new orthodoxy was one of the causes of his eventual break with Barth. [T]illich makes it very clear that he has never completely repudiated liberalism either in the economic-political sense or in the theological sense.

Tillich rejected any intellectual influence that would have been derived from either Karl Barth or Emmanuel Hirsch. It was both Hirsch and Barth who opposed socialism (Tillich 1966:76). Adams (1965:19) argues that Tillich ‘radically criticized Barthianism’. Tillich thought Barth deficient because of his reliance on the thinking of Immanuel Kant. Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ for Tillich was too abstract. It gave no importance to facing ‘the
present concretely’ (ibid:20). Cremer points to an article that Tillich wrote in 1923, in which he uses both Marx and Nietzsche to refute Barth. Cremer (1995:295) writes:

In an article entitled “Critical and Positive Paradox,” written in 1923, Tillich attacked the unending and unresolved nature of the Barthian dialectic. He claimed that there must be some point of reference, an absoluteness that is not purely transcendent but reachable in part by human consciousness, despite the fact that Barth’s dialectic theology forbade such a conception of the ineffable. The dialectic itself, Tillich claimed was not absolute, and therefore there must be an unconditioned starting point.

In examination, any religious sentimentalism with Karl Barth was short lived. Tillich rejected Barth’s supernaturalism. Further, Barth opposed the religious socialism which Tillich advocated. Tillich became a radical opponent of Karl Barth and his neo-orthodox theology.

5:11 Hegel

5:11:1 Hegel Rejected By Tillich

Tillich uses both Feuerbach and Marx to refute Hegelianism’s lack of social concern (Adams 1965:22). Tillich’s (1966:56) ontology is not derived from the Hegelian categories. Leibrecht (1972:25) argues that Tillich did follow Hegel’s thinking. This was ‘in terms of eternal separation of spirit from itself and its eternal return to itself within the divine ‘ (ibid:25). Leibrecht (ibid:25) develops his argument by saying: ‘His thought comes to Hegel again in his deeper insights penetrating to an essential metaphysics in describing the essential structures of being’. Tillich’s use of such terminology such as ‘synthesis’ demonstrates
the intellectual influence of Hegel upon his life and thought (ibid:25). Wheat (1970:102) argues for many of Tillich’s concepts to be derived from Hegel. The concept of self-transcendence that Tillich uses is also used by Hegel (ibid:102). Tillich’s thought emphasizes the concept of the dialectic. Tillich spoke of Hegel’s concept of the ‘great synthesis’. It was Hegel who put forward the idea of thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis (ibid:105).

John Powell Clayton (1980:132-133) recognized Tillich’s use of Hegel’s thought. Clayton (ibid:135) adds: ‘Even though Tillich’s theory of culture is not simply Hegelian, he was nonetheless much influenced by the tradition in which culture was principally Geistesleben’. Tillich ‘even before entering the University...became acquainted with...Hegel’ (Thomas 1963:11). Clayton (1980:135) speaking of Tillich’s relationship to Hegel ‘even when he criticized the idealist tradition, Tillich remained tangled to some extent in its web’.

Hegelian ideas remained popular in Germany after 1860 (Bentley 1999:86). Rowse (1948:120) characterized Hegel’s thought as transcendental, ‘absolute in character’, and the primal ‘Idea’. Hegel analyzed art, and aesthetics. He taught earlier at the University of Frankfurt where Tillich was a professor from 1929 to 1933 (Harris 1996:34). Stumme (1977:xviii) argues that it was Tillich’s ‘intention to return to the Hegelian sources of the Marxist dialectic and to reconstruct socialist theory on this basis’. Tillich rejected Hegel’s political views. Tillich viewed Hegel as an agent of the German state. He (ibid:80) writes: ‘Hegel’s effort to establish a philosophical foundation for positive Christianity, especially his ambiguous Christology, was the most important alliance of bourgeoisie and feudalism’. Tillich (1952:11) does confirm a ‘decisive break’ from Hegel:

Another prelude to the things to come occurred in the period between my student
years and the beginning of the First World War. It was the encounter with Schelling’s second period, especially with his so-called “positive philosophy.” Here lies the philosophically decisive break with Hegel, and the beginning of that movement which is today Existentialism. I was ready for it when it appeared in full strength after the First World War, and I saw it in the light of the general revolt against Hegel’s system of reconciliation which occurred in the decades after Hegel’s death, and which through Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche has become decisive for the destiny of the twentieth century.

Niebuhr (1952:217) argues for the difference between Tillich and Hegel based on Tillich’s Systematic Theology, vol. 1. He (ibid:217) writes:

Paul Tillich’s magnum opus, his Systematic Theology, of which unfortunately only the first volume is available at the time this analysis of his work is attempted, will become a landmark in history of modern theology for two reasons. First, his ontological speculations are more rigorous and include all of the disciplines of culture more imaginatively than anything which has been done in the realm of philosophy of religion or natural theology in our day or in many decades. Secondly, it distinguishes itself from the natural theology inspired by Hegel and Kant in the past two centuries by a fuller appreciation of the limits of reason in penetrating to the ultimate mystery or in comprehending the mystery of human existence.

Tillich (1964:84) writes: ‘Schelling calls the claim of Hegel’s rational system to embrace not only the real, the What, but also its reality, the That, a “deception.” No ‘merely logical process is also a process of real becoming’. John Carey (2002:14) claims Tillich ‘was indebted …to Georg Hegel as he combined the categories of biblical faith with issues raised by Western philosophy. Tillich felt that one could grasp the mystery of the Divine through the Judeo-Christian tradition and also through various philosophical systems’.

In evaluation, Tillich and Hegel may have used similar terminology. Tillich had studied Hegel’s thought. Tillich viewed Hegel as an agent of the German state. He perceived Hegel as a promoter of the alliance between the bourgeoisie and feudalism.
Tillich maintained that Schelling’s thought made it possible to relinquish Hegel between his student years and the beginning of World War I. Those who promote Hegel’s influence on Tillich do so from a rationalistic perspective.

**5:12 Nietzsche**

**5:12:1 Nietzsche Accepted Because Of Schelling**

Another intellectual influence on Tillich’s thinking was Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s thought contained revolutionary romanticism (Tillich 1977:38-39). Tillich (1966:56) was very enthusiastic about Nietzsche’s ‘philosophy of life’. Hutchinson (1953:141) confirms Tillich’s words:

> It was in the name of life that Nietzsche fought against the “nihilism” of the technical culture. Many followed him in all spheres of spiritual creativity. He and the movement of which he is the most conspicuous symbol saw more clearly than Kierkegaard and Marx the deepest roots of the dehumanizing and depersonalizing implications of modern society.

Tillich’s doctrine of ‘will to power’ is Nietzsche’s thought of ‘the self-affirmation of life’. This is the ability of one to affirm one’s own existence in life (ibid:142). Nuovo (1987:21) acknowledges Tillich’s fascination with ‘Nietzsche’s concept of the creative’.

Tillich (1966:54) writes:

> The ecstatic influence of existence so prevalent after the war as a reaction against the wartime years of death and hunger made Nietzsche’s affirmation of life very attractive. Because it is, at least partly, historically rooted in Schelling’s thought, I could readily accept it. I might well have developed my philosophy along these lines, incorporating pagan elements instead of Jewish and Catholic motifs; but the experience of the German revolution of 1918 decisively redirected my concerns toward a sociologically based and politically oriented philosophy of history.
Nietzsche’s thought was acceptable to Tillich because it was ‘partly, historically rooted in Schelling’s thought’ (ibid:54). Carey (2002:55) adds: ‘In this typology Tillich clearly sides with the philosophers of life…Nietzsche’.

Logically, Tillich found Nietzsche’s thought very attractive. Nietzsche’s revolutionary romanticism, his philosophy of life, the concepts of the self-affirmation of life, and the creative were acceptable to Tillich because of its historical roots in Schelling. Nietzsche’s thought was evaluated based on Schelling. Tillich sided with the philosophers of life.

5:13 Buber

5:13:1 Tillich And Buber A Common Background

Diamond (1967:244) argues Buber and Tillich had ‘much in common in the way of background and perspective’. Novak (1992:159) emphasises: ‘As a model for Jewish-Christian dialogue, this role that Buber played for Tillich’s own thought is not to be underestimated’. Novak refers to an incident that took place back in the 1920’s in Germany at ‘a conference of religious socialists’. Tillich had wanted to change the name God and find a word to replace it. Buber replied: ‘Aber Gott ist ein Urwort! (God is a primordial word!)’ (ibid:159). Tillich (1936:46-47) writes:

Wherever the question of the language of the Christian gospel is taken seriously, for example in the Neuwerk-Kreis, and in the magazine of the same name, edited by my old friend and fellow-combatant, Herman Schafft, great difficulties arise. It
is certain that the original religious terminology, as it is used in the Bible and in the
liturgies of the Ancient church, cannot be supplanted. There are religious original
or archetypal words (Urworte) of mankind, as Martin Buber remarked to me some
time ago. But these original or archetypal words have been robbed of their original
power by our objective thinking, and the scientific conception of the world, and thus,
have become subject to dissolution. In face of what the archetypal word “God” means,
rational criticism is powerless. In face of an objectively existing God, atheism is right.
A situation is hopeless and meaningless in which the speaker means the original word,
and the listener hears the objective word. Thus, we may understand the proposal which
is meant symbolically rather than literally, that the church impose a thirty-year silence
upon all of its archetypal words. But if it should do this, as it did in a few instances,
it would be necessary to develop a new terminology.

In interacting, Buber and Tillich shared a German background, religious socialism,
and the question of the language of the Christian gospel. Buber stimulated Tillich’s thinking
on the language of the Christian gospel.

5:14 Troeltsch

5:14:1 Troeltsch Influences Tillich’s Christian History of Philosophy

Tillich’s thought was intellectually influenced by Troeltsch. Tillich used Troeltsch’s
thought as the basis for the furtherance and development of his own thinking. Tillich
(1966:54-55) writes:

My study of Troeltsch had paved the way for this change of direction. I clearly remember
the statement he made during his first Berlin lecture on the philosophy of history,
claiming that his was the first philosophical treatment of this subject at the University of
Berlin since Hegel’s death. Although we were to a great extent agreed about the problems
involved, I repudiated his idealistic point of departure. Troeltsch’s idealism made it
impossible for him to overcome what he called historicism, against which he fought.
Historicism could be overcome only by a generation that had been forced to make
fundamental historical decisions. In light of the necessity of facing history squarely
-a demand that is both grounded in and limited by the Christian paradox-I sought to
develop a philosophy of history that could become also a philosophy of religious
socialism.

Tillich rejected Troeltsch’s idealism. Tillich developed a philosophy of history which lent itself to a Christian philosophy of religious socialism (ibid:54-55). Siegfried (1952:68-69) draws a further clarification between Troeltsch and Tillich. Siegfried (ibid:68-69) writes:

The medieval theologians in their all-embracing “Summae,” fulfilled the want in a classical way. The Reformers gave it a new impetus through their doctrine of the “two realms,” which liberated the secular realm from ecclesiastical control and related it directly to God as an expression of his creative power. This is the basis of the idea of a “theonomous culture” which plays such a role in Tillich’s thought. German classical philosophy elaborated this idea, and liberal theology (from Schleiermacher to Harnack and Troeltsch) followed its lead. The difference between Tillich on the one hand, and idealism and liberal theology, on the other, was from the very beginning his emphasis on a radical criticism of culture as such, and not only of particular manifestations of man’s cultural life. The Yes and No of the Unconditional over against everything human was understood in its full depth, according to the interpretation of the Unconditional not only as the ground, but also as the abyss of everything finite. In this point Tillich is only partly at odds with the liberal theology, for liberals like Wobbermin and Harnack have seriously warned of the optimism of the late nineteenth century, and have pointed to the critical function of Protestantism in a world of unavoidable fragments and distortions. …Tillich has always tried to relate theology and ontology; furthermore, he has elaborated an ontology of his own in order to show how all realms of reality are translucent to the divine ground of being and meaning.

Siegfried (ibid:71) continues:

The spiritual shock produced by the catastrophes of the First World War drove members of the older as well as the younger generation in Germany to look for a radical reorientation in all realms of life. This is true of the liberal theologians who much earlier had created the Evangelical Social Congress, and who, at this critical moment, tried to transform it into a tool for a democratic and social renewal. Men like Rade, the editor of Die Christliche Welt (the German counterpart of The Christian Century), Adolph Harnack, Ernst Troeltsch, and Rudolf Otto belonged to their group. But the younger generation, of whom Tillich was one of the leaders, reached beyond the limited goal of a political and social reform. The reality and power of the socialist movement grasped their imagination. They joined the attacks on the bourgeois world and did so just at the moment in which the socialist movement, after having been excluded in imperial Germany from any participation in political responsibility, was obliged to take over the full responsibility in the most tragic
moment of German history.

Tillich represented something more magnificent the splendor of religious socialism explained ‘in religious terms’ (ibid:71).

In assaying, Troeltsch’s influence is seen in helping Tillich define his Christian philosophy of history. Tillich’s Christian philosophy was a Christian philosophy of the history the Christian philosophy of the history of religious socialism.

5:15 Luther

5:15:1 Similarities Between Tillich And Luther’s Theology

Horton (1952:27) argues that Tillich ‘owes much to Luther’. The similarities between Luther and Tillich are those that fit within Tillich’s religious socialism. Tillich and Luther thought human nature to be ‘finite freedom’ (Siegfried 1952:81). A further comparison between Tillich and Luther would be ‘Luther’s intuition of the relativity of all social orders’ (ibid:81). Tillich and Luther spoke on the subject of ethics. Tillich’s comments compared to Luther are ‘in broad and general terms’ (Thomas 1952:92). Luther’s ‘justification by faith’ and the authority of the Bible though relative, for Tillich was ‘the ‘New Being’ in Jesus as the Christ’ (ibid:94). Carey (2002:9) points out four areas of ‘affinities between Luther and Tillich’. Carey (ibid:9-20) lists the theological method, concept of God, the human condition, and the concept of justification. Carey (ibid:9,12) writes:

The issue of theological method needs to be discussed primarily because of the study by Wayne G. Johnson, Theological Method in Luther and Tillich. This book was Johnson’s doctoral dissertation at the University of Iowa and argues the thesis that there is a general
similarity between Luther’s theological method and that of Tillich. It is an open question in Luther scholarship whether Luther in fact had a clearly defined theological method. Johnson argues, however, that the key for Luther as a theologian was his understanding of law and gospel…[W]hat evidence…Tillich’s method of correlation is in fact similar to (or derives from) Luther’s working hypothesis of law and gospel?…I do not think Johnson establishes this case in his book, and in his…Systematic Theology Tillich never refers to law-and-gospel scheme.

Carey (ibid:10) argues that the Law was God’s commands in the Decalogue and at other places in the Pentateuch. Luther felt as well it was ‘that natural law of God…broadly written on the minds of all persons everywhere’. The Law had two uses one was civil and the other usage was theological (ibid:10). Carey (ibid:11) elaborates on Tillich’s theological method:

Tillich took the problem of theological method more seriously than did Luther because he struggled with some ambiguities Luther did not feel. Tillich was also more interested than Luther ever was in the philosophical issues related to the nature of theological language and religious knowledge. In a formal sense, I would argue that Tillich is actually closer to Thomas Aquinas than to Luther in theological method.

Tillich and Luther are similar in their theological method because: ‘Both thinkers, for example, are persuaded that theology is tied to the human experience and that in our experience we can know the saving reality of God’ (ibid:12). Further, both Tillich and Luther believed that theology is existential dealing with the ‘profound issues of life’ (ibid:12). Carey (ibid:12) points to the concept of God. Luther argued against the rationalistic concept of God that God was ‘sheer will’ (ibid:13). Luther believed the theme of the sovereignty of God, God’s presence through creation, God’s absolute power, God’s attributes both hidden and revealed. Luther spoke against idols. Luther’s problems dealt with the Medieval church and Rome’s authority (ibid:13-14). The concept of God was ‘a rich area for Tillich’ (ibid:14). Carey (ibid:14) adds: ‘In his approach to “God language,” Tillich was clearly concerned to move
beyond the inadequate theistic understandings of God (that is, God as a person or as a being) and to press for a larger and more comprehensive understandings of God. Tillich understood that the biblical concept of transcendence needed to be replaced with more adequate metaphors that can do justice to a scientific understanding of the universe’. The concept of the demonic was involved in Tillich’s concept of God. Carey (ibid:14) writes: ‘Tillich insisted that the Divine contained within itself the element of nonbeing as well as being’. Carey (ibid:14) continues: ‘This is a relative type of nonbeing as opposed to an absolute type of nonbeing, but is an insight through which Tillich thought one could understand the elements of mystery and depth in the Deity. There is an irrational dimension in the Divine’. Carey (ibid:15) concludes: ‘Tillich felt a clear affinity with Luther concerning the irrational, hidden, mysterious dimension of God’. Luther’s theme ‘God alone is God’ is seen in Tillich’s concept the ‘Protestant Principle’ (ibid:15). A third similarity between Tillich and Luther is ‘in their understanding of the human situation’ (ibid:16). Luther believed in the total ‘fallenness’ of man (ibid:16). Luther thought man was ‘enslaved by demonic forces’ (ibid:16). Man’s will was not able ‘to cooperate with God’ (ibid:16). Tillich described the human situation by the terms ‘estrangement’ and ‘alienation’ (ibid:17). The fourth area of similarity between Luther and Tillich is in the area of justification (ibid:18). Carey (ibid18) writes: ‘Briefly put, Luther—drawing heavily on the apostle Paul—felt that our deliverance from sin is a free act of God’. Carey (ibid:19) writes of Tillich’s thought on justification: ‘Tillich stands very close to Luther on the matter of justification, but again uses a different vocabulary’.

In evaluating, similarities of thought do exist between Luther and Tillich. These fit
Tillich’s religious socialism. These similarities are human nature as finite freedom, Luther’s intuition of relativity of social orders, Luther’s justification by faith is Tillich’s New Being in Jesus and the Protestant principle, theological method, the concept of God, and the human condition. Tillich and Luther thought theology tied to human experience. Theology is existential. Luther argued against the rationalistic concept of God. Luther and Tillich’s affinity can be seen as well in their concept of the irrational, the hidden, and the mysterious. They had a similar belief concerning man’s situation. Luther believed in man’s fallenness. Tillich used the terms estrangement and alienation to describe the same.

5:16 The Man Tillich

5:16:1 Tillich’s Exceptional Interpersonal Skills

Ratschow argues that ‘Tillich was able to transcend the problems of his time’ (Carey 2002:135). It was Tillich’s ability to assess and make value judgments which were based on his historical context of Germany in the 1920’s and 1930’s (ibid:39). Carey’s (ibid:39) point is well taken: ‘It is important, however, to note how Tillich appraised the strengths and weaknesses of the theological left and right, and how he assessed both in the light of the Christian claim’. Carr (1961:76) adds that moral judgments occur within ‘a conceptual framework which is itself the creation of history’. Tillich (1952:13-14) argues in terms of environment and social forces rather than personality or his ability to make value judgments. Ratschow (1980:8) argues:

He appropriated the problems of his generation in an extremely personal way. He worked them out as his destiny. One can also say that Tillich identified himself completely with the problems of his generation even though they
affected others more strongly and more deeply than him.

Ratschow (ibid:8) continues: ‘Tillich identified himself with everything he met….It was these identifications which led to the consequence that everyone who met him believed himself to be quite specifically and quite exclusively the one about whom Tillich was concerned and that never had he been so well understood by another human being as here by Tillich’. Ratschow (ibid:8) elaborates further: ‘In such identifications one thing was quite decisive. Personal meetings with Tillich always ran their course completely without any aggression on Tillich’s side’. Ratschow (ibid:8) adds: ‘That is also a striking feature in his works—they contain no polemics or surreptitious defensiveness’. Ratschow adds an interesting point on how Tillich handled objections. He (ibid:9) writes:

He sought to understand questioners and to grasp critical objections correctly while himself learning in the process. Because Tillich devoted himself completely to those whom he met and opened himself without mental reservations, such an identification could take place. One can also put it thus: Tillich entered fully and completely into the situation of the one with whom he was in contact. The magic of his person lay in the seriousness of this devotion.

Ratschow (ibid:34) concludes:

On this point, one must indeed say that Tillich wrote his apologetic theology strictly for his time. But in doing this, he transcended the questions of the time toward their solution. In them, he arrived at concepts of so great human depth that they can be intelligible to every time, even though what is involved is a humanity and a human spirituality which as such can prove to be time bound

In analyzing the material, the problems of Tillich’s time influenced him. Tillich was able to analyze the problems of his generation. He provided a working solution for these problems. This became for Tillich his destiny. Tillich was very personable in his identifications with others. Tillich was focused and devoted to those he met. Tillich wrote
an apologetic theology which Ratschow thought good only for Tillich’s German generations.

5:17 Summary

The views of Kierkegaard and Marx influenced Tillich’s existential and political theology. Tillich’s political theology was formed as well from the Old Testament prophets. It was their spirit of prophetic criticism that Tillich saw in Marx. Schelling’s Christian philosophy became the basis for Tillich’s Christian theology. Tillich’s books *The Religious Situation* and *The Socialist Decision* are evidences of Tillich’s commitment to religious socialism.

Tillich’s experience as a chaplain in the German army in World War I led Tillich to accept the views of Karl Marx. His army experience was the beginning of his theology of art. He longed for beauty and an escape amidst the horrors and suffering of the First World War.

Tillich found in Freud confirmation for his theology of existentialism, and a shared revolt against Hegel’s philosophy of consciousness. Existentialism and psychoanalysis were concerned with man’s estrangement. Tillich’s doctrine of the demonic was drawn from Freud’s thinking.

Heidegger gave Tillich a new understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Husserl’s thought confirmed Tillich’s previous study of Fichte and Kant. Husserl aided Tillich’s understanding of the nature of philosophical reflection. Tillich’s greatest influence was his romanticism to nature, and the Christian philosophy of Schelling. Bohme’s Lutheran mysticism completed Tillich’s Christian
metaphysical theology. Tillich rejected Barthianism. Tillich became a radical opponent of Karl Barth. Hegel and Tillich may have used similar terminology. Hegel was viewed by Tillich as a promoter of the alliance between the bourgeoisie and feudalism. Tillich was able to discard Hegel because of Schelling’s thought. Nietzsche’s thought was accepted by Tillich because it had historical roots in Schelling. Tillich sided with the philosophers of life. Buber was a stimulus to Tillich’s thinking on the language of the Christian gospel. Troeltsch helped Tillich define what his philosophy of history should be a Christian philosophy of the history of religious socialism. Luther’s influence on Tillich can only be seen in terms of similarities. These similarities are those which fit within Tillich’s religious socialism, political, and existential theology.

Tillich analyzed the problems of his time. He developed a working solution which became his destiny. Tillich had great interpersonal skills.

Schelling and Bohme had the greatest influence on Tillich in determining his Christian theological views. Tillich maintained that Schelling had discovered existentialism long before Kierkegaard. Marx had the greatest influence on Tillich in terms of determining Tillich’s political theology. The sequence of our thesis moves now to consider the Tillich legacy from the German years.
6:1 The German Years Ignored 1886-1933

6:1:1 Tillich’s Misunderstood And Misinterpreted

Legacy (Dictionary 2007:2) is defined as follows for our thesis: ‘Anything handed down from the past, as from an ancestor or predecessor: the legacy of ancient Rome’. The legacy of Paul Tillich for our thesis will be defined in terms of the German years from 1886 to 1933. Instead of focusing on the German years, his legacy is drawn from the American years 1933 to 1965. The following secondary sources substantiate the truth of focusing on Paul Tillich’s American years. Tillich brought damage and hopelessness to religion because of the gaps created by his existential concept of religion (Dourley 1975:48). Tillich added to the interest in the relationship between religion and culture in the United States (Killen 1956:247). Some scholars romanticized Tillich in terms of viewing his work as a divine revelation (Leibrecht 1975:19). Others viewed Tillich as a radical Protestant (Adams 1971:115). Tillich occupied a unique place in theology because of his concept of culture (Thomas 1963:18). Tillich was a great thinker whose ideas were universally heard and valued (Leibrecht 1972:19). Wheat (1970:276) evaluated Tillich as a scholar who gave a humanistic view of religion. He wondered why Tillich was so widely accepted in the light of his view of theism (ibid:272). Wheat’s observation of Tillich was that he was some type of supernaturalist (ibid:276). Tillich’s concept of culture was put within the realm of politics (Taylor 1991:54). A student of Tillich’s at Harvard wrote that Tillich was merely a religious existentialist (Church 1978:23). Others
held the same opinion of Tillich (Leibrecht 1959:19). Tillich was referred to as one of the few great men in our age who gave an outstanding existential analysis (ibid:23). Tillich’s legacy was to be seen as one who gave an ‘extremely vague’ interpretation of the Kingdom of God (Thomas 1963:153). Tillich was thought of as one whose model of knowledge was too simplistic and superficial (Wiebe 1999:27). Tillich had a great influence on American religious studies. Generations of Tillich’s students were given a new understanding of the depth and extensiveness of cultural settings (Wettstein 1984:113). Tillich’s ‘theology of culture was shaped in quite a different era (ibid:114). Tillich introduced the Marxian principle of a classless society as the only form of social organization to overcome the human predicament of ‘self-estrangement’ (Stumme 1978:255). Cole (1999:7) concluded Tillich’s life and legacy as merely a struggle to bring the contemporary secular into the sacred. Tillich’s work was the concept of providential history described in existential terms (Ashbrook 1988:79). The analysis that Tillich gave of the human predicament put him in the category of an original mind (Newport 1991:264). Tillich was to be remembered for his disdain of capitalism (Bandy 1999:17). Stone (1990:2) concurred with Bandy’s evaluation of Tillich’s legacy. Glazier (1993:130) concluded Tillich’s legacy to be a religious search for Utopia. Stone (1971:1) saw Tillich’s legacy to be that of a radical social thinker and a dangerous man. Tillich’s *Systematic Theology* was viewed as ‘frequently shelved as being somehow out of touch with new situations’ (Carey 2002:37). Parrella (1995:xviii) thought: ‘Tillich’s legacy is a gift not only to theologians and philosophers but also to scholars from a wide variety of other disciplines’. Kline (1991:54) writes: ‘we need theological faculties for the new, unifying culture springing from socialist soil; and the first and fundamental task of these faculties is a theology of culture’. These examples demonstrate his
legacy is stated in terms of broad generalizations from the American years 1933 to 1965. Paul Tillich’s German legacy is omitted. It needs to be defined based on historical research.

In analysis, the German years (1886-1933) have been ignored in Paul Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy. The focus on Tillich’s life is drawn from the American years (1933-1965). Conflicting views and a lack of historical consensus based on the American years is the result. The concentration of this chapter of our thesis is to define Tillich’s German legacy based on historical research.

6:2 Tillich’s Legacy was European, Continental, and German

6:2:1 Tillich was A German Theologian

The importance of the German years from 1886 to 1933 can be seen in the light of the conclusions drawn from Chapter 5. Tillich’s sources for his thought were European, Continental, and German. Tillich (1967:43-44) admits:

In the years from 1919 to 1933 I produced all my German books and articles with the exception of a few early ones. The bulk of my literary work consists of essays, and three of my books-Religiose Verwirklichung; The Interpretation of History, and The Protestant Era-are collections of articles which themselves are based on addresses or speeches. This is not accidental. I spoke or wrote when I was asked to do so, and one is more often asked to write articles than books. But there was another reason: Speeches and essays can be like screws, drilling into untouched rocks; they try to take a step ahead, perhaps successfully, perhaps in vain. My attempts to relate all cultural realms to the religious center had to use this method. It provided new discoveries-new at least for me-and as the reaction showed, not completely familiar to others. Essays like those on “The Idea of a Theology of Culture,” “The Overcoming of the Concept of Religion in the Philosophy of Religion,” “The Demonic,” “The Kairos,” “Belief-ful Realism,” “The Protestant Principle and the Proletarian Situation,” “The Formative Power of Protestantism.”

Horton (1952:27) thought the legacy of Tillich built on his place in Continental Protestant
theology to be like that of Barth ‘neo-orthodox’. He references Otto Piper’s theological categories based on pre World War I and post World War I. The first type was the ‘conservative’ type. The second category was ‘the progressive theology’. Barth and Tillich are included in this second category as progressive theologians. The ‘Bible and the traditional creeds contain, God’s living word, to the readers’. The ‘progressives’ retained the same emphasis upon doctrine and the role of the responsibility of the church. However, they did not share the attitude towards the state as ministers of ‘divine Providence’ (ibid:27-28). Horton thought Tillich is better viewed as a ‘progressive’ (ibid:28). This conclusion is reached based on Tillich’s *The Interpretation of History* (1936). Tillich (1936:28 in Kegley and Bretall 1952:28) writes: ‘Precisely in the protest against protestant orthodoxy (even in its moderate form of the nineteenth century) I had won my way through to autonomy’. Tillich embraced ecumenism which is so important for theology in its economic, political, and theological sense (ibid:28). Horton (ibid:29) writes: ‘Some of Barth’s most basic ideas appear unmistakenably in the early essay of Tillich from which we have just quoted: ‘Kierkegaard’s “infinite qualitative distinction’ between temporal and eternal reality; “no way” to cross this gulf from the manward or earthward side, whether by “natural theology” or by some other form of Nebenordung’. Tillich sided with Schleiermacher and Hegel against Barth affirming no need to overcome the ‘profane autonomy’ of secular culture (ibid:30). Tillich, by way of contrast, thought the duty of the theologian ‘to relate the Christian message to the cultural situation of the day’ (ibid:31). ‘Tillich’s method of correlation’ set him apart and made him unique from the other theologians. Tillich began his topic with ‘a philosophic analysis’ of
the human predicament. He ended by answering the question with the ‘Christian revelation’ in
‘symbolic and paradoxical’ terms (ibid:31). Horton (ibid:31) concludes this is part of Tillich’s
legacy in ‘contemporary Continental Protestantism’. Further, the legacy of Paul Tillich must be
seen as firm opposition to Hitler’s National Socialism. Emmanuel Hirsch, by way of contrast,
became a follower of the Nazi revolution. Hirsch saw this as ‘a holy storm’, ‘a power full of
blessing’, and ‘the work of the Almighty Lord’ (Tillich 1934:313 in Kegley and Bretall 1952
:32). Horton (ibid:32) writes: ‘At many points Hirsch was startlingly close to the favorite
doctrines of Tillich and the religious socialists. He spoke of the crisis of “autonomous”
reason, the conflict with “demonic” forces, the importance of the “boundary situation”’; and
if he did not use the Greek term kairos, he spoke of the “religious meaning of our historic
moment” in language that Tillich himself might have used’. Horton (ibid:32) continues:
‘In spite of all these similarities, there was a deep difference between Hirsch’s discernment of
the hand of God in national socialism and Tillich’s discernment of it in social democracy’.
Horton’s view must be seen in the light of the cultural context and contextualization. Tillich’s
sharp observational skills brought out a major historiographical issue the ability to relate the
present to the future. The difference was ‘a priestly sacramental attitude toward modern
political movements, and a prophetic, eschatological attitude’ (ibid:32). However, Tillich’s
discernment of ‘the hand of God’ was not in social democracy but socialism (ibid:32).
Horton fails to realize democracy failed as a result of World War I, the German Revolution of
1918, and post war conditions in post World War I Germany. He does admit a very important
conclusion in terms of the historiographical issue of progress and mankind’s transformation.
Horton (ibid:33) writes: ‘What Tillich and the religious socialists intended with their doctrine
of *kairos* was to relate the Kingdom of God to human politics’.

Jean Richard’s argument for Tillich’s legacy is based on the German years. Richards (1995:43) proposes Tillich’s own methodology on the life of Karl Marx. Richards (ibid:43) writes:

I think that Tillich would agree with this procedure. This is exactly what he himself proposes in connection with Karl Marx. In the forward, to “The Socialist Decision,” he writes that he belongs to the generation of socialists that “holds fast to Marxism and defends it against the activism of the younger generation,” as well as against the positivism of the older generation. It is his generation that “goes back to the real Marx.” Then, in a footnote, Tillich explains what he means by the “real” Marx (der Wirkliche Marx): The “real” Marx is Marx in the context of his development, hence the unity of the younger and the older Marx.

Since objective historical truth is not possible, the uncertainty of Richards approach is evidenced. The unity of the younger and older Tillich is not possible given the subjectivity of Tillich’s own cultural situation. Clayton (1980:5) argues for the shortcomings of Tillich’s own methodology for Richards approach:

By incorporating the present cultural situation into his methodology Tillich gave to his theology a planned obsolescence which precludes his system’s having direct relevance for any but the cultural contexts in which and for which it was constructed. Tillich made no claim to speak ‘for all times’. He spoke, rather, out of his own time and to his own time. This holds not only for Tillich’s work as a whole, but also for the individual phases of his theological development.

Tillich wrote out of his own context to his generation in his time. He was a product of his own past- European, continental, and German. The historical situation from 1886 to 1933 was far different than the years 1933 to 1965. Clayton (ibid:6) gives examples of these differences referring to the *kairos*. Clayton (ibid:6) writes:

Speaking ‘out of the kairos’ meant for Tillich something different in 1919 than in 1926 or 1934 or 1956. The demands of the present were in each case understood
differently. In each case, Tillich rethought not only the nature of the present moment but also what would count as a kairos.

Clayton (ibid:6) points to Tillich’s concept of correlation: ‘As the time for which he was writing recedes into the past, so diminishes also the contemporary significance of his particular ‘correlation.’ Tillich’s obsolescence, in this sense, is a frank feature of his methodology’. Clayton (ibid:6) adds in conclusion: ‘Such obsolescence is said to be the fate of every theological system, for ‘every concrete system’ is transitory and…none can be final’. Richards granted does have some valid points. Richards (1995:43) writes: ‘It may be a simple matter of historical concern about the development of Tillich’s thought. ‘All will agree, I think, that such an inquiry into the roots of Tillich’s thought may always be interesting and useful’. The legacy of Paul Tillich is summed up in two key words in his German years. These keywords are spirit and community (ibid:44). Reference is made to Tillich’s lecture in Berlin ‘On the Idea of a Theology of Culture’ (ibid:44). This does not answer the problem of Tillich’s legacy during the German years since a theology of culture was a life long interest and work. Ratschow (1980:24) writes: ‘At the peak of this tendency is the theme of his life: the theology of culture’.

Ratschow (ibid:24) insists on the need to view the German years 1919 to 1933 as a unity. Ratschow (ibid:24) writes: ‘The period of Paul Tillich’s activity that we must now treat is a self-enclosed epoch of his scientific thinking. This epoch from 1919 to 1933 has a very distinctive character over against the preceding and following ones, and it must be viewed as a unity’. Richards (1995:45) makes some comments that prove helpful. Tillich’s writings from the German years 1919 to 1933 are categorized into three parts. ‘The System
of the Sciences’ from the year 1923, ‘belongs of course, to the philosophical layer’. There we find the Christian philosophy of the spirit, and the definition of the ‘functions of the spirit’. Richards (ibid:45) continues: ‘The second layer, the historical, is best illustrated by The Religious Situation, a book from 1926, where Tillich proceeds to a general and critical analysis of the bourgeois, capitalist society. To the same kind of historical analysis also belongs a publication in 1922, Mass and Spirit, which bears on the dark side of modern, enlightened society’. Richards (ibid:45) adds a third layer: ‘the normative and systematic, is constituted by the systematic studies on religious socialism, especially those of 1923 and 1924’.

In evaluation, Tillich’s legacy from the German years (1886-1933) is European, Continental, and German. The sources for his thought were derived from these categories. Tillich’s place during the German years was within Continental Protestant theology. Tillich should be understood as a progressive theologian. Tillich gave a philosophical analysis of the human predicament. This was followed by a theological answer to the existential question. His legacy must be seen as one of firm opposition to Adolf Hitler. Tillich saw the hand of divine providence in socialism rather than the National Socialism of the Nazis. Tillich and the religious socialists related the kingdom of God to politics. Tillich thought that the fulfilled time known as the kairos and the proletariat would bring about a new world order. The transformation of mankind would take place. Tillich’s German years must be viewed as a unity. He wrote out of his own context to his generation. He was a product of his European, Continental, and German background.
6:3 Tillich’s Early Writings

6:3:1 Tillich’s Ever Increasing Commitment To Religious Socialism

Part of Tillich’s legacy during the German years was religious socialism. Tillich thought Christianity must have a definite political involvement. Latourette (1953:1384) validates this point: ‘While in Germany, in addition to his writing and teaching in philosophy and theology he was active in politics’. Tillich’s concept of the kairos was important. Ratschow (1980:22) confirms Tillich’s German legacy of the kairos:

Admittedly, there are, even in this span of time, clear developments. For example, an important break lies in the year 1926, up to this point Tillich lives in the forward driving dynamics of a perception of the Kairos. From 1926 on, this conviction dies out. “The proletariat” did not prove to be the creative vitality that belonged to the Kairos. Hence, a “great imagination” enters, or a time of “hidden” creation. Tillich believed that he could ascertain such a change for the year 1926 with reference to all essential areas. His writings before and afterwards can indeed be fit into this observation of his.

Ratschow points to Tillich’s The Religious Situation and The Socialist Decision to prove that Tillich’s early writings were those of a political theologian and a religious socialist. Ratschow (ibid:23) writes:

The whole breadth of Tillich’s turn toward life comes to light in the most widely circulated writing from these years—Die Religiose Lage der Gegenwart. The first part is concerned with the “scientific and aesthetic area.” The second part has to do with “politics and ethos.” The third part, with religion. Such a book “must say something about everything at present.” With those words Tillich introduces this investigation. This “everything at present” is the battle against bourgeois society which is presented in science, technics, and economy” “The battle dare not cease until we have a time whose existence and forms are intended as a vessel of eternal depth (Gestalt).”

Ratschow’s (ibid:23) argument turns now to Tillich’s The Socialist Decision: ‘Ever more
clearly in the course of the twenties does the initially indefinite ecstatic “mood” become concentrated upon the threatening “fatal destiny of the European peoples,” and it has become completely a “beliefful realism.”

John Carey (2002:39) points to Tillich’s legacy in politics and history. Carey (2002:39) writes: ‘I wish to consider two closely related yet distinct aspects of Tillich’s early works: his writings on politics and history. Tillich’s insights in both these areas are germane to our present theological interests, inasmuch as the ramifications of liberation theology and of the meaning of history are very much with us’. Carey (ibid:39) considers Tillich’s legacy against the context of his time. Carey (ibid:39) writes:

To appreciate Tillich’s approach to, and involvement with, the political situation of Germany in the 1920s and 1930s we need to recall some of the particular problems of that epoch: the emergence of the socialist parties as a challenge to the old structures and institutions of German life; the growing strength of the National Socialist (Nazi) Party; the opposition of the Lutheran Church to the parties of the left; the polarization of German society into parties of the left and right; the concern of a small group of German theologians and intellectuals to find a via media between the left and the right. Tillich’s own political stance, of helping to found and work for the Religious Socialist movement, is well known, and it is not my intent here to retell that story. It is important, however, to note how Tillich appraised the strengths and weaknesses of the theological left and right, and how he assessed both in light of the Christian claim.

Carey (ibid:39) argues that Tillich viewed political thought rooted in various aspects of human experience. Carey (ibid:39-40) continues:

The themes of political conservatism—law, order, structure, authority, continuity—are seen thereby not just as an ideology of recalcitrance but as legitimate extensions of a theological awareness of human nature. Liberal political thought, by contrast, derives from the related experience of coming to know change; the “is” of personal and social life is confronted by the “ought”, or as Tillich says, the myth of our origin is finally broken by an unconditioned demand.
Tillich wrote repeatedly in the 1920s and the early 1930s of the weaknesses and strengths of socialism (ibid:41). Carey (ibid:41) explains: ‘Tillich and his counterparts...consequently identified themselves as Religious Socialists and carried on a...quarrel with the Social Democratic Party’. Tillich (1930:208 in Carey 2002:41) writes: ‘It is the task of Religious Socialism to carry through a radical criticism of socialism, but on the ground of socialism Itself. Its criticism must not weaken the passion of the proletarian struggle. Rather it must strengthen this passion in that it deepens it; in that it holds up to socialism what the true meaning of its movement is, and makes this meaning the critical standard of the actual facts’. Tillich’s relationship to the political left was dialectical. Tillich attacked the political right. Tillich was relentless against the political right because the right sought ‘to perpetuate the capitalistic economy’ (ibid:41). Capitalism appealed to German unification ‘around supernaturalism’ (ibid:42). Capitalism carried with it ‘the demonic capacity to destroy nuances of judgment, justice, and diplomacy’ (ibid:42). Carey (ibid:42) clarifies: ‘Most crucially, however, politics of the right loses the capacity to distinguish the distance between God and the present political situation. Tillich in fact broke with his former colleague Emmanuel Hirsch on this very point, when Hirsch endorsed the Nazi movement and its call for a “New Germany”.’ Further, Carey (ibid:42) cautions:

The political right, just like the left, is prone to a utopianism that overlooks the ambiguities of human history. The fact is, Tillich argued, that the politics of the right leads finally to the idea of a totalitarian state—a state in which culture, art, science, and social life are regulated, personal freedom is curtailed, minorities are persecuted, and even religious liberties are restricted. Born in insecurity and appealing for “reintegration” of a people, a totalitarian state destroys even as it ostensibly builds. Law and order are achieved at the expense of justice, and this for Tillich repudiates the prophetic element in the Christian tradition.
Carey (ibid:43) argues: ‘Much of what Tillich wrote at that time is dated and of interest only to historians’. However, Carey argues for three insights into ‘the theology of politics’ that is relevant for us today (ibid:43). Carey (ibid:43) lists them: ‘We too find ourselves in a polarized society; we are trying to cope with the breakdown of old mythologies and we now hear appeals for violent and/or nonviolent revolution. Our political consciousness was heightened by, for example, the Vietnam War, and sharp criticisms have been leveled by the youth culture which generally rejects both the parties and policies of traditional American politics’.

Tillich’s work argues for the exercise of caution ‘to beware of the utopianism of the left’ (ibid:43). A further legacy of Tillich is to exercise caution against any form of totalitarianism (ibid:43). Carey bases this interest in ‘Tillich’s work in modern Germany,…when Tillich struggled with the issues of history and politics in the days of the Weimar Republic’ (ibid:38).

Tillich has left us a legacy in his ‘serious grappling with Marxism’ (ibid:44). Carey (ibid:44) argues: ‘Tillich derived from Marx his themes of social justice, the destructive capacities of capitalistic-industrial states, and the ideologies which are developed by ruling groups to justify their place in the status quo’. Tillich called Marx ‘one of the great prophets of the nineteenth century’ (ibid:44).

Carey argues for a further legacy from Tillich’s early writings based ‘on the meaning of history’ (ibid:46). Tillich’s writings on history give ‘major alternatives to Pannenberg’s work’ (ibid:46). Carey (ibid:46) gives the background against which the choice of Tillich’s ‘writings on history’ is made. Carey (ibid:46) writes:
It is possible, of course, to see the problems of history as a perennial problem for theology: the twentieth century has seen the problem raised by Harnack, repudiated by Barth redefined by Bultmann, and reintroduced by Pannenberg. It lies beyond the scope of this article to trace this interesting and complex debate in detail; suffice it to say that the work of Pannenberg, so influential in German theology, has to be seen as a reaction to the Bultmannian existentialist approach to history. Pannenberg has denied the distinctions the Bultmannians make between Historie and Geschichte and the subsequent redefinition by Bultmann as to what “historical existence” means. Pannenberg has wanted to yoke modern theology more closely to historical and exegetical modes of biblical inquiry, and to set the stage for a theological historiography that would provide a historical argument for the factuality of the resurrection. Most recent evaluations of the problem of history have centered around the strengths and weaknesses of Pannenberg’s endeavors.

Carey (ibid:46) sets the perimeters for ‘Tillich’s approach to history’. Carey (ibid:46) writes: ‘it is important to note that Tillich always opposed the historical positivists who wanted to base Christianity upon scholarly evaluation of past events’. ‘History’, ‘argued Tillich in his early writings’, ‘“is the totality of remembered events, which are determined by free human activity and are important for the life of human groups” ’(Tillich 1938:108 in ibid:46-47). Carey (ibid:47) adds: ‘History involves free choices as to what is meaningful; it is filled with decisions and risks, of the kairos breaking in on the logos. The clue to history is not in proving past events but rather in purposeful action in the present’. Adams (1952:295 in ibid:47) writes: ‘The meaning of history can be discerned only in meaningful historical activity. The key to history is historical action, not a point above history; historical activity is active participation in the life of a historical group. The meaning of history manifests itself in the self-understanding of a historical group’. Carey (ibid:47) explains the meaning: ‘Tillich, in other words, is not interested as much in historical knowledge as he is in historical consciousness; the awareness of one’s fate in history, and of being so penetrated by the forces of history as to discern the creative significance
of the present moment. For Tillich, he who would understand history must be an actor within the context of events rather than a spectator’. Tillich (1938:106 in ibid:47) writes: ‘Since the only entrance to the interpretation of history is historical action, there is no serious grappling with the problem of history which has not been born out of the necessity or coming to a present historical decision’. Carey (ibid:47) concludes:

As a political theologian, then, Tillich attempted to yoke together political action with an understanding of history. His legacy to our generation in this regard is to remind us that from a Christian standpoint the problem of history always has contemporary implications. The historical question is not just “What can we learn about the past?” It also implies “What does the present require?” To follow Tillich’s reasoning here opens up a new range of questions about history as a problem in contemporary theology.

Carey (ibid:48) continues:

Similarly we can say that the impressive thing about the early Tillich as a political theologian was that he not only theorized about historical events, he was also deeply involved. The Berlin Circle of Religious Socialists, church conferences, youth meetings, anti-Nazi activities, helping the Jews—Tillich was there. Perhaps Tillich would feel that he did not live and write in vain if either by word or action he inspired a later generation of Christians to become serious participants in the ongoing struggle for justice in the arena of politics.

In interpretation, part of Tillich’s German legacy is religious socialism. Christianity requires political involvement. Tillich maintained the concept of the kairos up until 1926. Tillich’s *The Religious Situation* and his *The Socialist Decision* point to the fact that he was a political theologian and a religious socialist. Tillich’s legacy from these years in part is in politics and history. These areas are relevant to the present theological interests, liberation theology, and the meaning of history. Tillich’s writings during the 1920s and the early 1930s are on the strengths and weaknesses of socialism. Tillich has left us an example of the need for continued dialogue with Marx. Tillich demonstrated the need for
historical action in order to be able to understand history.

6:4 Schelling

6:4:1 Schelling’s Metaphysical Theology Becomes Part of Tillich’s German Legacy

Ratschow (1980:30) writes:

The twenties show us Tillich as he thought in constant alternations or correlations. There is culture and religion, there is society and history, the individual and religion, the individual and the masses, technics and culture, and art and faith. All these correlations are brought into a solution in a “schema” which, as we saw, comes from Schelling, and which is built according to a model (being-nonbeing transcends suprabeing).

Tillich’s German legacy is, in part, Schelling’s Christian philosophy. Tillich (1964:87) explains Schelling:

But then Schelling goes on to try to approach the God of revelation in terms of a third type of empiricism: “metaphysical empiricism”—a procedure that leads to a speculative reinterpretation of the history of religion. The speculative urge in his mind conquered the Existential restriction and humility that he had himself postulated. Although the philosophers of Existence denied Schelling’s “metaphysical Empiricism”—many of them were greatly disappointed by his Berlin lectures—they all demanded with him an “empirical” or experiential approach to Existence. And since they assumed that Existence is given immediately in the inner personal experience or concrete “Existence” of men, they all started with the immediate personal experience of the existing experience. They turned, not to the thinking subject, like Descartes, but to the existing subject to the “sum” in cogito ergo sum, as Heidegger puts it. The description of the sum, of the character of immediate personal experience, is different for each representative of Existential philosophy. But on the basis of this personal experience each of them develops a theory in rational terms, a philosophy. They all try to “think Existence,” to develop its implication, instead of simply living in “Existential” immediate experience.

Tillich recalls Schelling’s Berlin lectures. Tillich (1964:78) writes: ‘Schelling’s Berlin lectures are based on his development of the position achieved in the Philosophy of Freedom in 1809, and the Weltalter in 1811’. Tillich (ibid:78) continues: ‘In his Munich lectures in the later
twenties he had tried to show that the “positive philosophy,” as he calls his type of Existential
philosophy, had predecessors in men like Pascal, Jacobi, and Hamann, and in the theosophic
tradition stemming from Bohme’. Tillich relied heavily on Schellings’s Christian work *The
Ages of the World* (ibid:78). Tillich (1936:31) admits: ‘I came under the influence of Schelling,
whose collected works I read through several times with enthusiasm, and concerning whom I
wrote my theses both for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and Licentiate of Theology’.
Carey (2002:14) writes: ‘The concept of God was likewise a rich area for Tillich…and is
obviously an area in which he made a major contribution to twentieth-century theology.
…..He was indebted to…Friedrich Schelling’. Martin Marty (1986:732) writes of Tillich’s
legacy:

Both in his lifetime and later, it was clear that Tillich was building his cathedral on what
to many Anglo-Americans was a metaphysically condemned site. They don’t respond
well to the Schellingesque idealism that Tillich found congenial. Yet the edifice—despite
fissures under it and through it—stands.

Marty’s words confirm Tillich’s metaphysical theology to be derived from Schelling. His
comments are based on a pragmatic view of the usefulness of such a legacy. Nevertheless,
it is part of Tillich’s legacy from the German years. Marty’s evaluation is somewhat deficient
in that no mention is made of Bohme.

In evaluation, Tillich’s German legacy is in part the thought of Schelling. Tillich’s
constant alternations, or correlations are themes such as society and history, the
individual and religion, and the individual and the masses. These themes were worked
into a solution. This thought is derived from Schelling. Schelling’s Christian
metaphysical theology had a predecessor in the theosophic thought of Bohme. Tillich
relied on Schelling’s thought. Tillich’s Christian metaphysical theology is derived from Schelling.

6:5 Bohme

6:5:1 Bohme’s Lutheran Mysticism Part of Tillich’s German Legacy

Tillich (1936:54) speaks of Lutheran mysticism. The mediator for such was Jakob Bohme. Tillich (ibid:54) writes: ‘With him as mediator, Lutheran Mysticism had an influence on Schelling and German Idealism, and through Schelling, again on Irrationalism and the philosophy of life of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’. Further, Tillich (1957:7-8 in Adams 1965:32) writes: ‘If Protestant theology wants to penetrate the ontological implications of the Christian symbols, it would do well to use the ideas of Boehme more than those of Aristotle…Boehme tried to describe in metaphysical-psychological symbols the living God in whom the roots of every life must be sought’. Adams (ibid:201) detects ‘the language of Jacob Boehme’ in Tillich’s thought. Adams (ibid:212) elaborates further:

With Jacob Boehme, for example, something breaks through the confines of mystical striving for unification with the Superbeing. For him, “the world of ideas is the revelation of the divine abyss.” Following Boehme and Schelling, Tillich holds that the idea carries within itself struggle, contrast, and harmony; this is the dynamic element that leads, or, as Tillich puts it, that leaps to history.

Tillich uses Boehme’s terms ground and abyss in his description of the demonic (ibid:23).

Adams (ibid:32) explains:

Tillich’s conception of ground and abyss, the absolute Something and the absolute Nothing. “Abyss” carries a double connotation: inexhaustible, restless, positive dynamic and threatening, disruptive dynamic. The concepts “ground” and “abyss” stem from Jacob Boehme.
Adams (ibid:251) continues: ‘With respect to both participation and separation, both mystical unity and the sense of guilt, Tillich exhibits affinity to Boehme’. Carey (2002:14) acknowledges Tillich’s debt ‘to the German mystic Jakob Bohme’. Przywara (1959:113) argues: ‘As Schelling was dependent upon Boehme and Franz von Baader, who developed an immanent philosophy of revelation, so Tillich in his turn interpreted this tradition in his first works, attempting to draw from it the final consequences for the development of a possible “Christian grammar” ’.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider Boehme’s influence on Schelling or Franz von Baader’s work. The influence of Boehme upon Schelling and in turn upon Tillich was as early as Tillich’s dissertations on Schelling (ibid:358). Boehme’s legacy to Tillich is to be understood both within Schelling’s thought and Tillich’s own thought. Boehme is part of Tillich’s legacy from the German years.

In breakdown, Tillich was indebted to the mediator for Lutheran mysticism who was Jacob Bohme. Bohme influenced Schelling, German Idealism, Irrationalism, and the philosophy of life of both the 19th and 20th centuries. Tillich’s concepts of ground and abyss are derived from Bohme.

6:6 The Protestant Principle

6:6:1 Part of Tillich’s Last Testament To Us

Oden (1964:20) argues that the Protestant principle is part of Paul Tillich’s German legacy. Oden (ibid:20) writes that it: ‘is not distinctively protestant at all, but it is equally a Platonic and Thomist principle, since it essentially holds that nothing finite is to be identified
as confused with the eternal’. Ratschow (1980:27) argues for Tillich’s Protestant principle as part of the Tillich legacy from the German years. Ratschow (ibid:27) viewed the Protestant principle as Tillich’s attempt to revitalize Kahler’s principle of justification.

Tillich sought to free justification from any moral restraint with the inclusion of ‘thinking or doubt’ (ibid:27). Siegfried (1952:80-83) writes of the Protestant principle:

The whole work of Tillich has a definitely Protestant character. The emphasis on grace as the prius of action and thought, the unity of regeneration, judgment, and justification, the idea of kairos as a divine manifestation out of which political and social transformation follow—all this is essentially Protestant. But above all it is Tillich’s doctrine of the ultimate situation which shows the Protestant character of his thought. Grace appears at the boundary line of existence in the moment in which man is delivered to nothingness and despair. This makes the ultimate situation ambiguous. It is, on the one hand, the place of a complete loss of self; it is, on the other hand, the place where man can find his true being. Therefore Tillich can agree with Nietzsche, Freud, and the existentialists in their analysis of the human predicament, and he can agree with the reformers in their emphasis on the reality of grace as the foundation not only of the religious, but also of the secular realm. Beliefful realism is an eminently Protestant principle because it relates every religious element to a secular one and vice versa.

The relation of the Protestant principle to the Protestant reality leads to a series of questions which can only briefly be indicated. …Tillich follows Luther’s intuition of the relativity of all social orders. But he applies his principle also to the feudal-paternalistic order, which Luther thought to be valid for his time and beyond his time; he also applies it to the bourgeois-capitalistic order, which he criticizes in the name of religious socialism. At the same time he tries to find an immovable principle of ethics which unites absoluteness with openness for all historical relativities.

The second question to be discussed in the light of the Protestant principle is that of autonomy. Tillich…defines autonomy as the ability of man to discover the universal law of theoretical and practical reason in himself without dependence on heteronomous realities. But in view of the distortion of men’s autonomy in his state of estrangement, Tillich demands a theonomy which transcends autonomy as well as heteronomy.

The third and last question to which I want to point is that of the Protestant churches in the light of the Protestant principle. According to Tillich, their future is dependent on their theological openness toward the theoretical problems of the present situation in contrast to a theology of restoration and confessional isolation; it is dependent on their ethical openness to the social problems of today in contrast to the attempt to identify the
Christian message with a special political or economic structure; it is dependent on their acceptance of free groups which find a common liturgical and sacramental expression of their actual problems in distinction from an archaistic restitution of obsolete forms.

Siegfried (ibid:80) defines Tillich’s Protestant principle as all Tillich’s work which ‘is essentially Protestant’. Siegfried (ibid:80) links ‘the idea of a kairos as a divine manifestation out of which political and social transformation follow’ (ibid:80).

Siegfried (ibid:81) relates the Protestant principle to ‘the relativity of all social orders’.

He (ibid:82) points as well to the areas of autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy.

Finally, Siegfried (ibid:82-83) references the Protestant principle to the Protestant churches.

Tillich (1936:54-55) elaborates on the Protestant principle:

I, myself, belong to Lutheranism by birth, education, religious experience, and theological reflection. I have never stood on the borders of Lutheranism and Calvinism, not even now, after having experienced the fatal consequences of the Lutheran social ethics….The substance of my religion is and remains Lutheran….Not only my theological, but also my philosophical thinking expresses the Lutheran substance. Lutheranism up to this time has found immediate philosophical expression only in Lutheran mysticism and in its philosophical representative, Jakob Bohme, the “philosophus teutonicus.”

The Protestant principle was in part Tillich’s own subjective context. Tillich (ibid:68) defines it as ‘the Protestant understanding of man and his predicament’. Tillich (ibid:68) writes:

The Protestant principle (which is not always effective in the preaching and teaching of the Protestant churches) emphasizes the infinite distance God and man. It emphasizes man’s finitude, his subjection to death, but above all, his estrangement from his true being and his bondage to demonic forces-forces of self-destruction. Man’s inability to liberate himself from this bondage has led the Reformers to the doctrine of a reunion with God in which God alone acts and man only receives. Such receiving, of course, is not possible in an attitude of passivity, but it demands the highest courage, namely the courage to accept the paradox that the “sinner is justified,” that it is man in anxiety, guilt, and despair who is the object of God’s unconditional acceptance.
It is readily observed the Protestant principle has a wider context. It is not simply that which is Protestant. Incorporated into Tillich’s thinking on the Protestant principle is also his existential theology of man’s predicament within a capitalistic system. Carey (2002:15-16) writes:

A related and likewise important debt is what Tillich drew from Luther’s theme that “God alone is God.” That same motif appears in Tillich as the concept of the “Protestant Principle,” whereby he argues that Protestantism as a movement affirms the fundamental dictum that “God alone is God,” and that no other person, object, or institution is worthy of our ultimate loyalty. In this way, Tillich felt that Protestantism is a corrective principle to Roman Catholic claims for the church, Orthodox claims for church councils, and Protestant fundamentalist claims for the unique authority of Scripture. Protestantism, Tillich maintained, lives where this principle is vital and has no authenticity where the principle is weak. I think this is a direct link between Luther and Tillich.

John Carey affirms Protestantism as a movement. Tillich’s Protestant principle is defined by Carey as a corrective principle. This is to be seen as an addition to Tillich’s essentially Protestant thought during the German years. Carey’s (ibid:16) argument is based on ‘various essays on Protestantism in Tillich’s The Protestant Era. The Protestant principle is part of Tillich’s legacy from the German years.

In analyzing the material, the Protestant principle relates every religious realm to a secular realm. The Protestant principle related to the Protestant reality leads to a series of questions. These are the relativity of social orders, autonomy, and the Protestant churches. Tillich’s Protestant principle is defined as all that is essentially Protestant. Tillich’s existential theology of man’s predicament within the capitalistic system is part of his thinking on the Protestant principle. The Protestant principle within the Protestant movement is to be seen as a corrective principle. Tillich’s thought is essentially Protestant
during the German years.

6:7 Philosophy of Religion

6:7:1 Philosophical Theology And Theology In Tension With The Other

Siegfried (1952:75) points to Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion as part of Tillich’s German legacy from 1919 to 1933. This was expressed in Tillich’s work *Religiose Verwirklichung* (ibid:75). Tillich was able to overcome the hurdle of ‘the division of a secular and a religious sphere’ (ibid:76). Siegfried (ibid:76) writes:

Tillich derives a normative idea of religion from a comparison of the sacramental, the mystical, and the prophetic types of religion. A synthesis of them, as given in Christianity, is considered the criterion of every religious reality. The history of religion is interpreted as a development of these types, driving from all sides to the Christian synthesis.

Siegfried (ibid:76-77) concludes:

But is not possible to see the historical movement driving in a quite different direction? Moreover, is this not the attitude of the religions and quasi religions which are in competition with Christianity? Although Tillich is open to all forms of religious realizations, he has not shown the foundation of his normative concept in a convincing way.

Tillich (1923:149 in Adams 1965:185) viewed philosophy of religion and theology as standing in tension with one another. Adams (ibid:187) explains: ‘Thus philosophy of religion and theology are two elements in a cultural science of religion. They may never properly be separated entirely’. Adams (ibid:187-188) continues: ‘Every theology is dependent upon the concept of the essence of religion already presupposed. Every philosophy of religion is in the end dependent upon the normative concept of religion’. Tillich’s
philosophy of religion is different than the normal conception of philosophy of religion in a university curriculum. Adams (ibid:187) writes:

The disciplines belonging to philosophy of religion proper are arranged in accord with the system set forth earlier for the normative sciences. That is, they are distributed in the tripartite classification: philosophy of meaning, intellectual history, and the normative system—Theology. Every cultural science consciously or unconsciously flows in these three channels.

In Chapter 4 on page 127, the thesis explained Tillich’s philosophy of religion. Tillich had tried to show the unity of theology and philosophy during his years at the University of Frankfurt (Tillich 1936:35). He thought this possible because of Schelling’s Christian philosophy of existence. Schelling’s Christian metaphysical religious thought failed to achieve the unity of theology and philosophy (ibid:35). The First World War proved disastrous for Tillich and his entire generation. World War I proved a catastrophe for the survival of German idealism. Schelling’s Christian philosophy was drawn into the abyss (ibid:35). If a reunion of theology and philosophy was to be achieved then justice would need to be done to the abyss which was the experience of Tillich and his generation. Tillich’s philosophy of religion came into being to satisfy this need and demand (ibid:35).

The critical analysis of this section, shows Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion is part of his German legacy. Philosophy of religion and theology are two elements in a cultural science of religion. Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion contained a philosophy of meaning, intellectual history, and theology.
6:8 Religious Socialism

6:8:1 Tillich’s Legacy Religious Socialism

Tillich’s (1936:19) words explain the German problem:

Like most of the intellectuals of Germany before the war, my attitude towards politics had been essentially one of indifference. Neither did the ever-present consciousness of social guilt express itself in a political will. Only in the last year of the war, and in the months of collapse and revolution did the political backgrounds of the World War, the interrelation between Capitalism and Imperialism, the crisis of bourgeois society, the class cleavage, and so forth, became visible to me.

Tillich became interested in the thinking of Karl Marx. Carey (2002:23) writes: ‘Tillich was deeply influenced by Marx’s critique of capitalism, and he used that critique in his numerous early assessments of capitalism as the basic source of economic injustice in the modern world’. Tillich (1936:188) reflecting upon Marx’s thought writes: ‘The assumption that after the removal of the class contrast through the proletariat revolution, a complete homogeneity of society could come into existence, would force one to expect a static-vegetative final state. Such an expectation, of course, would not mean the beginning, as Marx thinks, but rather the end of history’. This conclusion reached by Paul Tillich stands in stark contrast to Fukuyama’s position of the triumph of Capitalism in economics, and liberal democracy in politics (Alsayyad 2003:54). Tillich’s Marxism viewed the proletariat as the one to bring about the final transformation of history and mankind. Tillich (1977:161) writes: ‘Proletariat is the key to a contemporary social situation. The reason being that they are close to the negative side’. Tillich (ibid:161) continues:

It will hold this postion as long as bourgeois capitalism lasts. When compared to the reality of the split between the classes, every other fact about society becomes less important. Every social group is drawn into the structure of confrontation that is inherent in the liberal bourgeois system. The proletariat by its very existence is thrust towards socialism. It cannot do otherwise as long as, and insofar as, it is the proletariat.
At the same time, the notion that the victory of socialism can be won by the proletariat alone must be contested. Certainly it cannot be done without the proletariat, for the proletariat is the necessary condition for any realization of socialism. But it is, at least for the present, not the sufficient condition. Precisely the situation that drives the proletariat into socialism also creates the limits of the proletariat’s ability to achieve socialism by itself.

Tillich names two forms of political romanticism the conservative and the revolutionary (ibid:27). Tillich (ibid:27) writes: ‘The conservative form is based on the attempt to defend the spiritual and social residues of the bond of origin against the autonomous system, and whenever possible to restore past forms. It appears in groups that have not yet been completely integrated into bourgeois society: primarily landowners, peasants, nobles, priests, artisans’. Tillich (ibid:27) contrasts the conservative with the revolutionary form. Tillich (ibid:27) writes:

The revolutionary form tries to gain a basis for new ties to the origin by a devastating attack on the rational system. It is carried out by those groups that have entered into the inner structure of the rational system, without having lost continuity with the groups of origin from which they are descended. But now they feel threatened by complete absorption into the system, on the one hand, and by the mechanization and loss of status which this system effects, on the other hand. Here we find primarily office employees, certain groups of bureaucrats, and those intellectuals who have no chance of being incorporated into the rational system; but there are also some farmers and artisans who are being hit specially hard by the crisis, to the point of hopelessness. These two groups can become partners in common action, but at the same time they have inner tensions, tensions that become sharper as it becomes clearer that the revolutionary groups want to get rid not only of the drawbacks of the rational system but also of the advantages it has given to the conservative groups.

The revolutionary groups want to get rid of the bourgeois system with its drawbacks and advantages. Tillich (ibid:44) writes of the justification for all of this: ‘it lies precisely at the point where socialism also struggles against bourgeois society. It lies in the protest of human beings against the dehumanizing consequences of an exclusively rational system’. Tillich
(1936:198) writes in religious terms: ‘the proletariat, as bearer of the coming fulfillment of human existence, rising beyond that experience, has an objective quality of holiness, a “vocation” on the strength of which it can wage the victorious power for battle’. Tillich (ibid:198) continues: ‘At the same time, however, the holiness of power is the critical norm to which it is always subject. This norm is identical with the respective symbols of transcendence beyond the sphere of the structure of power’. Tillich (ibid:198) adds: ‘Such symbols are justice (not in the legal, but in the prophetic sense); love (which in Christianity is more a concept of expectation than one of experience); society without classes (whose pathos is the suspension of the order of force); the identity of all existence (in which the Indian-world consciousness advances beyond the order of power)’. Tillich’s German legacy includes a religious socialism that sought to cure the social ills of his time a capitalist economy and liberal democracy. Tillich (ibid:199) concludes: ‘These norms, of course, cannot be handled mechanically but must always be proclaimed anew to the powers. They are thereby made concrete and filled with the problems of the condition of society at the time, but they always point beyond them’.

Tillich (ibid:275) keeps coming back to Marx’s thought: ‘If Marx says that the pre-history of mankind ends and its history begins with classless society, one might ask whether this history really is history, or whether all real history does not rather belong to what he calls pre-history. With respect to the ultimate, all history is pre-history, and only through being “pre-history” does it have historical meaning’. Adams (1965:214) argues: ‘In his sympathetic, if also critical, treatment of Marxism he asserts that the Marxist revolt against
a capitalist society represented a justifiable revolt against exploitation in the direction of a
new meaning in life—a meaning that involves a wider participation of men in the satisfactions
of security and creativity’. Siegfried (1952:71) writes of the importance
of the Marxist ideology:

Even more important, and certainly more difficult to deal with, was the Marxist
concept of “ideology.” Ideology in Marxism designates the intellectual “superstructure”
which men build on the basis of the economic social “substructure.” It includes law
and morals, metaphysics, art, and religion. If a society is split, the ideologies are also
split, and each group uses its special ideology as an instrument in the class struggle.

Carey (2002:32) writes:

Tillich recognized the truth of most of what Marx said about religion as an ideology
of the privileged class. The established churches have become yoked to the present
social order. The needs and yearnings of people other than the middle class go
unheeded. Marx can therefore serve as a spur to prod the churches into self-criticism,
and to remind the churches that they live by the “Protestant Principle,” not by their
stake in the established social order.

Tillich (1972:176) recalls Marx’s legacy: ‘No one was more aware of this than Karl Marx
when he constructed his interpretation of history, describing how each new period was
prepared in the womb of the preceding one—for instance, the socialist in the womb of the
bourgeois period, and the latter in the womb of the late medieval period’. Tillich (ibid:
410-411) writes: ‘of great synthesis…the turning point for many of the actual problems
of today, including world revolution and the East-West conflict…a world-historical
movement which has directly or indirectly influenced our whole century’. Tillich (ibid:436-
437) remembered Marx’s concept of religion:

Marx explained religion in terms of the social existence of men, and more particularly
in the class situation of men. Religion is the escape of those who are oppressed by
the upper classes into an imaginary fulfillment in the realm of the absolute. Marx’s
negation of religion is a result of his understanding of the social condition of man. Tillich (1936:63 in Carey 2002:32) acknowledged his legacy from Karl Marx. Carey (2002:33-34) adds a word of caution in terms of Tillich’s legacy from Marx. Carey (ibid:33) writes:

Because Marx saw the churches as an extension of the privileged class, he also denied that there was any depth reality to which the churches attempt to bear witness. As a result Marx’s interpretation of history is dependent upon immanent processes; it cannot account for the idea of *kairos*, of the external breaking into time, shaking and transforming the temporal. In the last analysis Tillich felt that Marx’s perspective on history is one-dimensional: it lacks any awareness of the power of being that sustains all of life and history.

In other words, Marx’s view was seen by Tillich as lacking the religious element of the *kairos* and religious socialist thinking. Secondly, Carey (Tillich 1936:188 in ibid:33) argues that Tillich thought a classless society would lead to ‘a “static vegetative” stage in history’. Carey (ibid:33) argues that Tillich faulted Marx’s thinking at this point because it was an unworkable utopian scheme. Carey (ibid:34) continues: ‘Tillich felt that Marx placed the focal point of history at the wrong place when he pointed to the rise of the proletariat’. This is only because Carey bases his opinion on Marx’s lack of a religious dimension in the case of the proletariat. Carey (ibid:34) argues: ‘The future of society cannot be made contingent upon any one class; it will rather rest with the small community of people (which transcends all class lines) who sense the power of “New Being”: persons who are aware of the Unconditional, open to the *kairos*, yet aware of the logos structure of life and time’. Siegfried (1952:71) writes ‘a religious interpretation of the class struggle was not without its antecedents’. Siegfried (ibid:71) continues:
thirty-five years ago the great German sociologist Max Weber had shown that after the dissolution of the personal relation between master and servant in the competitive society, the struggle of labor against capital is justified from a Christian point of view. Moreover, fifteen years ago the Swiss leader of religious socialism, H. Kutter, had powerfully pointed to the prophetic character of the socialist fight against the supremacy of the bourgeois class, and above all against the bourgeois church. In the same spirit Tillich asserted that the situation of the class struggle cannot be overcome without the instrument of the class struggle. A new order must be brought about, an order in which the class struggle will disappear.

Tillich (1988:125) writes: ‘Marx saw much more clearly than Kierkegaard that it is not a system of thought but the reality of modern society that is responsible for the reduction of the person to a commodity’. Tillich (ibid:126) highlights two concepts that deal with Marx’s view of man the first is ‘dehumanization’ and the second is ‘real humanism’. Tillich (ibid:126) explains: ‘Both show Marx is concerned with the loss of salvation of the “person” in the technical society as he experienced it’.

Runyon (1984:277) writes: ‘Needless to say, Tillich was not successful in his efforts. Religious Socialism was squelched soon after the Nazi victory, and Tillich found himself job hunting’. Runyon (ibid:277) concludes: ‘Tillich and the Religious Socialists wanted to make history too, but they were too circumspect, too reflective, and finally too bourgeois to succeed’. Bonhoeffer (1965:108f in Carey 1984:277-278) writes of Tillich and the Religious Socialists:

Tillich set out to interpret the evolution of the world itself—against its will—in a religious sense, to give it its whole shape through religion. That was very courageous of him, but the world unseated him and went on by itself: he too sought to understand the world better than it understood itself, but it felt entirely misunderstood, and rejected the imputation. (Of course the world does need to be understood better than it understands itself but not religiously as the Religious Socialists desired.).

Heiman (1952:312) writes of Tillich’s religious socialism: ‘In three versions of his
autobiography, written for different occasions at different times, Tillich has emphasized the central importance in his development which he himself attributes to the doctrine of religious socialism….he implicitly claims central importance for religious socialism in the theonomous system which his theology is designed to build’. Hummel (1995:15-16) argues: ‘However much Tillich sympathized with the prophetic setting out of the socialist movement in the 1920s because he hoped that this would provoke the church in rediscovering the prophetic element in faith and in preaching, however distinctily he criticized this autonomistic view of man, and the world, he held this view to be the proper utopianism of the movement’. Taylor (1991:21) elaborates how the legacy of Tillich’s religious socialism has affected our modern world. Taylor (ibid:21) argues Tillich has provided an example:

Most notably, the comunidades de bases throughout Latin America, forged for survival in regions of suffering, giving rise to socialist dreaming and practice. Theologians speaking from these communities such as Gustavo Guitierrez, affirm the socialist vision but also proclaim that their affiliation is sustained by a Christian faith that is able to generate prophetic critique of socialism. Other theologians working in close contact with alienated and oppressed groups also dwell on this creative tension. James Cone and Cornel West do so in connection with the aspirations of Afro-American groups….and a number of North Atlantic theologians, male and female, who say Yes and No by sifting through the western Marxisms of Lukacs, Gramsci, Goldman or Habermas. Each in their own way forge new Christian approaches to socialist versions. Where Tillich saw the socialist vision being dreamed, he saw real signs, albeit fragmentary ones, of the fulfillment of the Kingdom of God.

Tillich’s religious socialism, part of his German legacy, lives on in our modern world today.

In interaction, it was during the last year of World War I that the political backgrounds became clear to Tillich. Tillich became interested in the thinking of Karl Marx. Tillich saw religious socialism as the means by which the end of history could be reached. Class warfare could be removed by a proletarian revolution. This view stands in stark contrast
Fukuyama’s position of the end of history. Fukuyama thought the triumph of capitalism in economics and the liberal democracy in politics to be the end of history. Tillich’s Marxist perception passed on to us views the proletariat as the one to bring about the final transformation of history and mankind. Tillich combined Marxist thought with the religious concept of the kairos. The kairos was a decisive and fulfilled moment which would result in a new world order.

6:9 Kairos

6:9:1 The Key To World Transformation

Scharf (1999:155-157) develops Tillich’s doctrine of the kairos based on a Tillich article from 1922. Tillich’s kairos is ‘the right or opportune time’ (ibid:155). Tillich (1922:347 in ibid:155) writes: ‘We are of the conviction that presently a kairos, an epochal moment of history is visible’. Scharf (1999:156) adds: ‘This kairos for him is located in socialism, and he sees Religious Socialism as the “attempt at interpreting and forming socialism from [the direction of] the unconditioned and from [the direction of] kairos”’. Tillich is speaking ‘in the mode of a prophet in this spirited, early document’ (ibid:156).

Scharf (ibid:156) continues: ‘He speaks from the perspective of the unconditioned, that is, he assumes the prophetic role of announcing the opportune time for God’s rule’. Scharf (ibid:157) concludes: ‘Religious Socialism is the voice of the prophet for the European situation in 1922’. Tillich (1922:350 in ibid:157) thought: ‘Religious Socialism in the last analysis shall know no other task as the one to call [people] to a great consciousness for
history and to a proclaimer of the Kairos’. Tillich (1936:129 in Adams 1965:203) defines kairos: ‘In this dynamic thinking in terms of creation, time is all-decisive, not empty time, pure expiration; not mere duration either, but rather qualitatively fulfilled time, the moment that is creation and fate. We call this fulfilled moment, the moment of time approaching us as decision, Kairos’. Tillich explains the origin of the word kairos and his usage:

In doing this we take up a word that was, to be sure, created by the Greek linguistic sense, but attained the deeper meaning of fullness of time, of decisive time, only in the thinking of early Christianity and its historical consciousness. The thinking in the Kairos, which is the determinant of the second line explained in our historical consideration, is opposed to the thinking in the timeless Logos, which belongs to the methodical main line. Thus the correctness of our original distinction becomes apparent, and at the same time the question of the essential relationship between Kairos and Logos becomes urgent.

Heiman (1952:313) puts Tillich’s doctrine of the kairos within the historical context: ‘More specifically, the doctrine of the kairos can be understood as a generalization of Tillich’s personal experience, upon returning from the First World War in recognizing participation in the struggle for justice and peace and against a repetition of the catastrophe as his supreme Christian duty true to the line of thought and action laid down by the great prophets of the Old Testament’. Runyon (1984:274-275) argues differently that Tillich expected a new world order:

Tillich and his friends in the Religious Socialist movement were convinced that a kairos was appearing on the horizon. They saw in the combination of the socialist critique and the authentic Christian substance of culture congruent elements that together could lead to a new order, a new configuration of social, political, and economic structures and values. With this the cause of justice could be served, human integrity enhanced, and the power of being brought to a new and genuine expression. In order to effect such a combination, lines of communication would have to be opened up between Christians and Marxists. The common assumption that the church and the socialist movement stand in absolute contradiction to each other would have to be overcome. To this end Tillich called attention to elements in Marxism that by his definition
constituted authentic religious protest against the heteronomous character of bourgeois culture and the capitalistic economic spirit, and therefore sought to interpret for the church the genuine religious motifs in Marxism. At the same time he sought to show Marxists that socialism was not in opposition to religion as such, but only to the bourgeois form that religion had taken in the church. Within socialism are genuine religious elements, he argued, which need to be recognized for the sake of the socialist cause.

Ratschow (1980:22) furnishes insight into Tillich’s thinking on the kairos based on the year 1926:

Admittedly, there are, even in this span of time, clear developments. For example, an important break lies in the year 1926, up to this point Tillich lives in the forward driving dynamics of a perception of the Kairos. From 1926 on, this conviction dies out. “The proletariat” did not prove to be the creative vitality that belonged to the Kairos. Hence, a “great imagination” enters, or a time of “hidden” creation. Tillich believed that he could ascertain such a change for the year 1926 with reference to all essential areas.

Tillich’s kairos did not occur because the proletariat was a false hope. Tillich’s (1922:347 in Scharf 1999:156) article *Kairos* expressed his conviction that a new kairos ‘an epochal moment of history is visible’. Tillich (1948:176-177 in Carey 2002:34) faults Marx because his focal point for history was the rise of the proletariat. Carey argues based on Tillich’s *The Protestant Era* (1948) (Carey 2002:34). Clayton (1980:5) argues:

Speaking ‘out of the kairos’ meant something different in 1919 than in 1926 or 1934 or 1956. The demands of the present were in each case understood differently. In each case, Tillich rethought not only the nature of the present moment but also what would count as a kairos.

Heiman (1952:313) argues for the distinction in Tillich’s German legacy between *kairos* and *kairoi*. The latter is the plural form of *kairos*. Heiman (ibid:313) writes:

In other words, these turning points of history reflect the one great kairos, in which “the eternal has broken into the temporal”, and which, according to Tillich’s elaborate doctrine, is the center of history in the sense that it sheds the light of
meaningfulness on the whole of history and all its parts, while history without this center would be nothing but an empty, meaningless irrelevant sequence of facts, as it appeared to the classical philosophers. It is in this sense that Tillich wants the secondary kairoi to be understood: ‘we must conceive of the kairos in universal terms’.

Heiman’s (ibid:313) words are not based on the original Kairos (1922) article. Heiman’s comments are based on Tillich’s perception of the kairos in Tillich’s The Protestant Era (1948) from the American years 1933 to 1965. Heiman and Carey argue based on a work from the American years. These years are beyond the scope of this thesis. The German years (1886 to 1933) are ignored.

Siegfried (1952:73) saw many problems with the doctrine of the kairos. He (ibid:73-74) writes:

If the kairos doctrine is carried through specifically, many difficulties arise. The question was: In view of the radical No of the divine judgment over everything finite, how can man’s creative impetus be preserved? Is man’s creativity not reduced to meaninglessness by the dialectical No? Tillich answers with the concept “Gestalt of Grace” (Gestalt=form,structure). In a “Gestalt of Grace” the unconditional breaks into the conditional. It is not a reality alongside other realities, not a thing which could be seen and grasped; but it is manifest for the intuition of faith in nature and history, in the depth of people’s souls, and in the structures of the social life, but above all in the Church, in its message and its sacraments. The participation in such “Gestalten of Grace” makes creative action possible, in spite of the radical No both of prophetic and of rational criticism. For the Gestalt precedes the critique, giving it norm and power….Summing up the distinction between Barth and Tillich, one can say that whereas Barth puts the whole of reality into the brackets of a Yes and No, and accepts in a positivistic way the world in its estrangement from God, Tillich drives, on the basis of the same Yes and No, toward what he calls Glaubiger Realismus (Belief-ful or Self transcending Realism)….On his way to this concept, Tillich spoke of the “transcendent meaning” of all cultural forms, and he distinguished between those in which this “meaning” is manifest and those in which it is hidden.

Niebuhr (1956:10-13) writes of belief-ful realism:

The revolt against capitalist civilization has not been confined to communism. On
the contrary, communism in its later phase, since it has lost the prophetic character of its early years, has adopted much of the spirit of capitalism so that the Russian Revolution may be regarded as one of the greatest triumphs of the spirit of capitalist society. The revolt against this spirit became manifest first of all in art. Its precursors were Cezanne, van Gogh, and Gauguin. In literature Strindberg and Nietzsche were its earliest prophets. In science Einstein, Planck and Bohr and other founders of the new science of the twentieth century, in philosophy Bergson, Simmel and Husserl, in psychology Freud, in education a multitude of reformers, in morals the youth movement—all are representative of the revolt. Tillich attempts to interpret the significance of these tendencies as protests against the spirit of capitalist society and as prophecies of a new attitude. [T]he new attitude which is developing in consequence of these revolutions may be described in religious terms, he believes, as an attitude of “belief-ful realism.”…[A] belief-ful realism is first of all an attitude in which the reference to the transcendent and eternal source of meaning and ground of being is present. This reference has been absent from capitalist society with its reliance on intra-worldly, intra-temporal sources of meaning, its exaltation of the finite into an absolute…”.[B]elief-ful realism,” Tillich writes, “is a total attitude toward reality”.

In examination, Tillich’s kairos is the opportune time or the right time. Tillich thought that a new kairos was soon to appear on the horizon back in 1922. The kairos was a very important part of Tillich’s religious socialism. Tillich spoke in the prophetic spirit of the Old Testament prophets. Tillich’s thinking on the kairos changed in the year 1926. The proletariat had failed to bring about the necessary revolution. Tillich’s belief in the kairos as a religious socialist gave way to Belief-ful realism. This revolt against the spirit of capitalism was now to be seen in revolutionary art. This new attitude towards reality is described in religious terms. This attitude looks beyond the finite capitalistic system to both the transcendent, the eternal source of meaning, and the ground of being.
6:10  Theology of Culture And Art

6:10:1  Theology Developed From The German Years

Tillich delivered a lecture to the ‘Berlin branch of the Kant-Gesellschaft’ in 1919 (Siegfried 1952:68). The paper was entitled ‘The Idea of a Theology of Culture’ (ibid:68). *Ueber die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur* is found in Tillich’s book *Religionsphilosophie der Kultur* (Adams 1965:69). Tillich’s lecture ‘was a program for further elaboration in philosophy of religion as well as in theology’ (Siegfried 1952:68). Siegfried (ibid:68) continues: ‘The term “theology of culture” was “created by Tillich in a moment in which the so-called “liberal theology” stood before its catastrophe denounced by many, including Tillich himself, as a surrender of the Christian message to cultural trends”. The catastrophe to which Siegfried refers was World War I. Thomas (1963:12) referring to Tillich’s ‘theology of culture’ writes: ‘This is what he taught in the historical and systematic courses he gave between 1919 and 1924’. Tillich (1967:41) was Privatdozent at the University of Berlin. Baumgarten (1995:149) argues that Tillich’s legacy was his theology of culture. Tillich (1964:v) confirms this to be part of his German legacy. He (ibid:v) writes:

The purpose of this book is indicated in its title: Theology of Culture. The title is an abbreviation of the title of my first published speech, given in the Berlin section of the Kant-Gesellschaft: *Ueber die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur* (On the Idea of a Theology of Culture). It is a source of great satisfaction to me that after the passing of forty years I can take the title for this volume from my first important speech. In spite of the fact that during most of my adult life I have been a teacher of Systematic Theology, the problem of religion and culture has always been in the center of my interest.

Oden (1964:20) concurs that this was part of Tillich’s German legacy his theology of culture. Wettstein (1984:113) argues for Tillich’s influence in religious studies. He (ibid:113) writes:
In his theology of culture, Paul Tillich has exerted a particularly pervasive influence on American religious studies. Bringing the broad categories of *Kulturstudien* to our preoccupations with society and social role-conflict, he opened generations of his students to an awareness of the depth and extensiveness of the cultural setting that shapes as well as receives or rejects theological address. The proliferation of courses in our universities on religion and literature or the arts and the styles of thought emerging from them are in no small measure the consequence of Tillich’s work as a theologian of culture.

Wettstein (ibid:113) continues: ‘Rather than integrating itself around a common world view perspective, or value system, it has become a pluralist. Rather than being oriented to humanist concerns, it has become technological. Kenneth E. Boulding describes this development perceptively in terms of the emergence of a “super-culture,” the product of “the Great Transition” that began with the rise of science’. Wettstein (ibid:114) expands upon the demands of a technological culture:

While the thoroughly technological superculture may leave the formation of values to the traditional or folk cultures that subsist alongside it, through their institutions of family, church, and peer group, the superculture does require certain kinds of value transformation. It needs loyalties to “larger and more abstract entities” than the family, such as the corporation, an interest in world order, expanding views of the universe, judgment by role or function rather than race, ethnic group or sex. If traditional cultures contradict these values that conform to supercultural requirements, they will be overcome. Boulding’s description elicits our recognition: in that superculture we live and move and do all of our work, if not all of our thinking. It is a new “post-civilizational” cultural reality of enormous importance; and it has yet to show us the first signs of being “theonomous.”

Wettstein (ibid:114-115) considers whether Tillich’s theology of culture is still relevant. He argues:

Tillich’s theology of culture was shaped in a quite different era. That religion is the substance of which culture is the form may make sense in an integrated, traditional society, but does it when that substance is fragmented? Tillich’s assertion that the quest for the Unconditioned (das Unbedingte) is the driving force of culture gives any technology, by definition, a countercultural commitment. Or in terms of Tillich’s tripartite form/content/substance analysis of cultural activity, a technological culture represents the triumph of form, the subjugation of content and the elimination of substance. Our only viable response must then be to disengage from the superculture
if we cannot dismantle it, and return to expressive painting, free verse and leathercraft. However, on closer examination, Tillich’s thought proves to be much more complex; it provides remarkable insight into the human meanings of technology and the urgency to deal with it effectively.

Tillich’s theology of culture was formed during the German years. Wettstein admits the subjective nature of Tillich’s work and context. Tillich (1959:42 in Carey 1984:115) wrote: ‘religion is the substance of culture, [and] culture is the form of religion’. Wettstein (ibid:115) argues this ‘implies the cultural formation of every religious act, the religious implications in every cultural act, and an essential, if not always obvious, integration of the two’. Wettstein (ibid:115) argues ‘our religious substance’ is ‘fragmented into pluralism’. Wettstein (ibid:132) concludes: ‘As the theology of culture engages in the debates proposing to establish modes of technology assessment, the principle will be clear; the assessment cannot be left in the hands of technologists alone. Certainly, particular evaluations cannot be made without them and they are to be encouraged to raise the questions of ends Tillich invoked, but the measurement of costs in relation to specific ends cannot be relegated to technological rationales’. Tillich scholars must be included in future technological assessments of Tillich’s theology of culture.

Carey (2002:92-93) writes of pluralism:

Perhaps the most fundamental issue that has recast Tillich’s world, however, has been the emergence of pluralism. We speak much more now of studies of comparative cultures with all of their symbolisms and histories. We recognize—painfully for some of us, of course—the distinctive perspectives of gender, race, and social class on intellectual issues. We speak in theology as well as in biblical studies about “social location” as a way of identifying the person, the time, the place, and the culture that are mirrored in a particular theological perspective….Pluralism of course contains with it an acknowledgment of relativism. That once-dreaded word was defined by van Buren
as being the view that “there is more than one way to look at any matter, and that what is said can be called true or false only in the terms provided by the particular point of reference. That viewpoint has certainly been widespread in aesthetics, modern physics, and literary, as well as in contemporary theology.

Carey (ibid:93) argues that Postmodernism is another ‘shaping intellectual influence in our time’. Professor Carey (ibid:97) writes: ‘Postmodernism maintains that reality is undecidable and the world is no particular way at all. It is now clear that older thought systems were expressed through political ideologies…that aesthetic, literary, and theological opinions are in fact simply culturally conditional statements of personal judgment’. Carey (ibid:97) sees ‘common concerns’ between ‘Tillich scholars and Postmodernists’. He (ibid:97-98) writes of these ‘common concerns’:

Both criticize misleading dogmatic pronouncements that are associated with religious traditions. Both expose the arrogance with which some groups claim that they know the will of God. Both agree that religious groups mirror the ethos of their geographical region and middle-class constituencies. Both acknowledge the privileging of white males in our society and the privileging of some people’s experience and thoughts over others. Insofar as Postmodernism exposes the biases and assumptions that have shaped our intellectual, political, and social life, it has value for those who continue to work in a Tillichian spirit.

Professor Carey (ibid:100) concludes:

Out of a simple concern for fairness, we might be moved to support the voices of disadvantaged or pressed peoples. We will see through the ideologies of Euro-American culture. We may say less about “Truth” and more about “meaning.” We might pay more attention to the findings of social scientists who ask about the self and its communities rather than to offer theological pronouncements about how God acts in history. Postmodernism recasts the theological agenda in substance and in style.

Professor Carey (ibid:100) clarifies Tillich’s thought in relationship to Postmodernism.

Although Postmodernism thought has provoked much criticism, what is troubling for
some theologians is how much truth there is in its various observations. Although I once thought (with Tillich) that theology could be done from a more-or-less neutral perspective that could illumine our plight as human beings, I now believe that all theological work is contextual and limited. We might be able to talk about our personal absolutes even when we can no longer presume an ultimate Absolute. Tillich, however, does provide a corrective to the power of Postmodernist thought. He recognized that human beings live by faith, trust, passions, and symbols. Even if these are not empirically proveable they have power to shape life and destiny. Such visions do become personal absolutes and most people need something like that to live a purposeful life.

Adams (1965:66) writes of the beginning of Tillich’s study of art. Adams (ibid:66) states: ‘Tillich’s knowledge and appreciation of art are, so to speak, the jewels he found in the adversity of four years of military service as a chaplain during the First World War. In his years at the front he determined to find respite from the bludgeoning of war by devoting his leisure to the study of art’. Tillich’s enjoyment of paintings would be followed by ‘a systematic study of history of art’. He deemed the paintings as a source of revelation for example ‘the Botticelli painting’. A philosophical and theological interpretation would then be made of the new revelation. Basic categories in Tillich’s theology of culture be derived that of form and substance. Ratschow (1980:21) writes: ‘This sequence-especially this birth of a concept is still Schelling. Simultaneously, it is both an existential occurrence, and as well existentially (existential) describable as understanding’ (ibid:21). The ‘ecstatic experience’ will eventuate in concepts based on this experience. Ratschow (ibid:21) gives us understanding as to how Tillich ‘received the objects of the world around him’. Baumgarten argues that Tillich’s interest in art is part of his theological legacy. Baumgarten (1995:149) writes:

Two aspects of Paul Tillich’s theological legacy are his theology of culture and his interest
in the visual arts. Instead, these two areas are intertwined. Tillich’s aesthetics supports his theology of culture, which in turn was derived, in part, from his experience with art. Art serves and is explicated by Tillich’s theology of culture.

Tillich (1936:49 in Adams 1965:68) writes: ‘If any one, being impressed by the mosaics of Ravenna or the ceiling paintings of the Sistine Chapel, or by the portraits of the older Rembrandt, should be asked whether his experience was religious or cultural, he would find the answer difficult to give’. Tillich (ibid:49 in ibid:68) answers:

Perhaps it would be correct to say that his experience was cultural as to form, and religious as to substance. It is cultural because it is not attached to specific ritual activity; and religious, because it evokes questioning as to the absolute or the limits of human experience. This is equally true of painting, of music, and poetry, of philosophy and science. And that which is valid in the intuition and knowledge of the world is equally valid in the practical shaping of law and custom, in morality and education, in community and style. Wherever human existence in thought or action, becomes a subject of doubts and questions, wherever unconditioned meaning becomes visible in works which have only conditioned meaning in themselves, there culture is religious. Through the experience of the substantially religious character of culture, I was led to the border of culture and religion, which I have never deserted.

Adams (ibid:68) adds: ‘Thus we are brought again to the characteristically Tillichian idea of living on the border—this time the border between culture and religion’. Adams (ibid:68) continues: ‘From this border Tillich early developed his theology of culture and art. The outlines of his theology of culture were set forth in his 1919 lecture *Ueber die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur*, the first work he published after the First World War’. Later, Tillich (1956:86) in his *The Religious Situation* writes: ‘The revolt against the spirit of capitalist society has been least ambiguously expressed in painting since the beginning of the century’. Tillich (ibid:87) writes:

With a will to create objectively, Cezanne battled with the form and restored to things their real metaphysical meaning. With passionate force van Gogh revealed the creative
dynamic in light and color and the Scandinavian Munch showed the cosmic dread present in nature and mankind. Upon this basis new forces developed everywhere in Italy, in France, in Germany and in Russia. Expressionism proper arose with a revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary force.

Tillich (ibid:101) concludes: ‘If we would characterize in summary fashion the religious situation of the present…the realism and impressionism of the capitalist period have been destroyed in the development of symbolism, mysticism and expressionism but that a new realism is about to gain ascendancy; with emotional zeal at first, then with objective and metaphysical intuition it has uncovered the demonism present in the social world and, perhaps, as in the case of metaphysics and painting, it may be at the point of developing into a belief-ful realism’. Niebuhr (1956:10-11) writes: ‘Tillich argues that what we are witnessing and participating in is…a revolt against the spirit of capitalist society…. [T]he revolt against this spirit became manifest first of all in art. Its precursors were Cezanne, van Gogh and Gauguin’. The second meaning of Tillich’s legacy of a theology of art argues for a revolt against the capitalistic spirit.

In analyzing this section, Tillich’s theology of culture was developed during the German years. His theology of culture was developed while he was at Berlin (1919-1924). His theology of art can be traced to his experience as a chaplain in World War I. He began the systematic study of art. Tilich developed a theology of art based on Schelling’s method. The painting was viewed as revelation. The theologian would next derive an interpretation of the revelation. A theology could be formed from these divine revelations.

The legacy of Tillich’s theology of culture is debated today. It is argued that Tillich’s theology of culture is too simplistic in a pluralistic culture. The rise of science is seen as
responsible for the emphasis on culture in today’s world rather than Tillich’s theology of culture. Our world view has become pluralistic, fragmented, and technological. The question is debated whether Tillich’s theology of culture is still relevant. Others argue that Tillich’s theology of culture provides insight into the human meanings of technology and the urgency to deal with technology. Pluralism with its relativism and Postmodernism shape intellectual influence in our modern world. Pluralism argues for a number of views. Postmodernism argues that the world is no particular way at all. Reality cannot be decided in the modern world. Some have argued for common ground between Tillich and the Postmodernists. The fallacy of this argument is that things that are similar are not the same.

6:11 Existential Theology

6:11:1 The Question of Being

Tillich (1964:76) writes of existentialism:

The distinctive way of philosophizing which today calls itself Existenzphilosophie or “Existential philosophy” emerged as one of the major currents of German thought under The Weimar Republic, counting among its leaders such men as Heidegger and Jaspers. But its history goes back at least a century, to the decade of the 1840’s, when its main contentions were formulated by thinkers like Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Marx, in sharp criticism of the reigning “rationalism” or panlogism of the Hegelians; and in the next generation Nietzsche and Dilthey were among its protagonists. Its roots are still more ancient, deeply embedded in the pre-Cartesian German tradition of supra-rationalism and Innerlichkeit represented by Bohme.

Tillich (ibid:77) writes of Schelling: ‘This appeal to “Existence” emerged just a hundred years in the decade from 1840 to 1850. During the winter of 1841-1842 Schelling delivered his lectures Die Philosophie der Mythologie und der Offenbarung in the University of Berlin
before a distinguished audience including Engels, Kierkegaard, Bakunin, and Burckhardt’.

Re Manning (2005:60) interprets Tillich’s existential theology as pointing to Schelling. Re Manning (ibid:60) argues: ‘already in the 1920s Tillich’s philosophical position shifts to a more existentialist formulation. However, it must be remembered that Tillich always considered existentialism as the fulfillment of German Idealism and Schelling as the real founder of existentialism’. Scharlemann (1989:100-107 in ibid:60) represents the opposite view of the impact of Heidegger on Tillich. Re Manning (ibid:60) states Scharlemann’s position. Re Manning (ibid:60) adds: ‘In addition, although it is undeniable that Tillich’s thought was affected by his contact with Heidegger from 1925 onwards, such that the ‘question of being’ came to occupy a more central position’. Re Manning (ibid:60) adds a word of caution: ‘the impact can be overstated’. Thomas (2000:60) writes of Tillich’s existential theological legacy: ‘The questions from which theology takes its rise then, are ‘existential questions’. Thomas (ibid:60) argues: ‘They are the perennial questions of mankind about itself: we ourselves are indeed the questions. Though Tillich says that this is something much older than existentialism, there can be no doubt that this is where we see the significant influence of Heidegger’s existentialism on his theological development….Tillich was won from resisting Heidegger’s thought to an arduous learning from it’. Thomas (ibid:12) argues for Heidegger’s influence on Tillich in Tillich’s view of human life as tragedy, finitude, and temporality. Rollo May (1973:8 in Thomas 2000:12) argues that Tillich’s World War I experiences especially the the dying and the dead from ‘the battle of Marne’ caused Tillich to become an existentialist. Thomas (ibid:12) referring to Tillich clarifies: ‘but, again, and again, he used to argue that
existentialism had its origin in the work of Schelling’. Adams (1965:22) presents the balanced view:

Since his concept of the present and its connection with the existential attitude is so fundamental for Tillich’s outlook, it may be well to indicate here the principal ancestry of these ideas. Kierkegaard is, of course, the principal ancestor of contemporary existential philosophy, and especially significant is his resistance to the rationalistic dialect....But Kierkegaard’s main concern was with the individual’s “existential” confrontation with ultimate reality. Tillich shares this concern, but he is also interested in other metaphysical aspects ...and in the social aspects of the reaction against Hegelianism. The metaphysical aspect is to be seen in his great interest in Schelling’s overcoming of idealism ...by a positive philosophy...in Schelling’s qualification of the philosophy of identity in terms of a self-seeking, self-isolating freedom issuing in the consciousness of guilt. (Tillich’s first two dissertations dealt with Schelling).

Carey (2002:96) does not acknowledge Heidegger’s influence on Tillich. Carey (ibid:96) argues referring to Postmodernism: ‘Scholars in the field recognize affinities with the earlier thought of...Martin Heidegger’.

In dissection, Tillich claimed existential theology began with Schelling. Tillich had become acquainted with Kierkegaard’s existentialism. Existentialism in its 20th century form presented itself to Tillich when he was teaching at the University of Marburg. Tillich considered existentialism as the fulfillment of German classical philosophy. Tillich’s existential theology cannot be attributed to Martin Heidegger. Tillich was able to accept existentialism because of Schelling.

6:12 Systematic Theology, vol 1

6:12:1 Tillich’s Existential Theology

Adams (ibid:154) argues for two lines of thought in Tillich’s theology. Adams (ibid:154)
views ‘the critical-rational-transcendental line from Kant to Hegel, and the existential-creative line from Jacob Boehme, Fichte, and Schelling through Nietzsche, with their concepts of ground and abyss, of freedom, and of creative spirit’. Thomas (2000:68) argues: ‘Above all, he [the theologian] must recognize that in that legacy there are ‘existential questions’ implied ‘to which his theology intends to be the answer’. Thomas bases this upon Tillich’s *Systematic Theology, vol. 1* (Tillich 1951:44 in ibid:68). Tillich (1967:42) writes of this volume: ‘In Marburg, in 1925, I began work on my *Systematic Theology*, the first volume of which appeared in 1951’. Tillich’s *Systematic Theology* is beyond the scope of this thesis. Siegfried (1952:77-79) argues for Tillich’s *Systematic Theology* as part of Tillich’s legacy for the German situation. Siegfried (ibid:78-79) writes:

In his discussion of existentialism, Tillich gives a thorough analysis of the relationship of essence and existence which belongs to the most important sections of his first volume. He tries to overcome the uprootedness of existentialism by pointing to the essential structures of being which are present and creative even in the most disrupted forms of existence. In this he follows the Thomist and Neo-Thomist tradition (as in the work of Gilson and Mounier). On the other hand, he deviates from it by emphasizing the “structure of destruction” within existence and the impossibility of regaining our essential wholeness except through the healing power of the New Being.

Tillich thought the duty of the theologian to ‘relate the Christian message to the cultural situation of the day’ (Horton 1951:29).

In scrutiny, Tillich began his systematic theology during the years at Marburg (1924-1925). Tillich’s existential theology is best seen as thought derived from Bohme, Fichte, Schelling, and Nietzsche. Tillich’s existentialism raised philosophical questions. Tillich’s
theology provided the answers. Tillich’s existential theology became a very important part of the first volume of his systematic theology.

6:13 Correlation

6:13:1 The Theological Concept of Correlation From The German Years

Tillich used the method known as correlation to raise existential theological questions. He would give a theological answer to the existential question. Clayton (1980:16) argues:

one can analyse terms thought by Tillich to be correlates, such as religion and culture….most previous studies of correlation in Tillich’s thought have concentrated almost exclusively upon the alleged correlation of theology and philosophy. A careful analysis of the development of Tillich’s concept of correlation, however, would make clear that, though not wholly mistaken, this is a somewhat restricted view of correlation. As a corrective to such studies, I have stressed the inclusive character of correlation as a relationship between culture and religion generally, and not merely philosophy and theology.

Clayton (ibid:31) continues: ‘correlation became Tillich’s mediating principle between religion and culture’. Ratschow (1980:30) clarifies this concept for the German years.

Ratschow (ibid:30) writes:

The twenties show us Tillich as he thought in constant alternations or correlations. There is culture and religion, there is society and history, the individual and religion, the individual and the masses, technics and culture, and art and faith. All these correlations are brought to a solution in a “schema” which, as we saw, comes from Schelling and which is built according to model (being-nonbeing transcends suprabeing).

Ratschow argues that all these correlations were Tillich’s themes in the twenties. They ‘were brought to a solution’ ‘a “schema” which, as we saw, comes from Schelling’.

Tillich’s existential theology was worked into his Systematic Theology, vol 1 which
he began during the German years while he was at Marburg. Existential questions raised by Tillich were given a theological answer. Clayton and Ratschow bring out a second meaning of correlation as the relationship between these areas in Tillich’s thought. The method of correlation is part of Tillich’s German legacy. ‘Tillich’s method of correlation’ ‘set him apart and made him unique from other theologians. Tillich began his topic with a philosophic existential analysis of the human predicament. He ended by answering the question with the ‘Christian revelation’ in ‘symbolic and paradoxical’ terms’ (Horton 1952:31). Allen (2008:29) writes: ‘The language of “correlation” in contemporary theology is most associated with Paul Tillich, who sought to correlate present issues and experience with biblical texts’. Tillich has left us a rich legacy of the contemporary historical view of the world.

In analysis, Tillich’s method of correlation raised existential theological questions. A theological answer was then provided to the existential question. Tillich’s correlation must also be seen as alternate positions on a number of subjects. These subjects were religion and culture, society and history, the individual and religion, the individual and the masses, technics and culture, and art and faith.

6:14 Tillich Legacy Updated

6:14:1 Tillich’s Rich German Legacy

Ratschow (1980:19) has given us awareness of Tillich’s activities in 1917. In August 1917, Tillich was relieved of his duties as a chaplain. He was able to
resume his academic study of Husserl, Lotze, Sigwart, Windeld and Rickert, and also Lask with regard to their logic. Tillich worked through as well the aesthetics of both Hartmann and Lipps. Ratschow (ibid:19) continues: ‘He also works through Hermann Ebbinghaus’s psychology’. Ratschow (ibid:19) writes of a December 1917 letter: ‘shows Tillich busy with “theoretical doubt” ’. Further, Ratschow (ibid:39) informs the reader of letters which were found in Hirsch’s estate. Ratschow (ibid:39) writes: ‘From this correspondence only a few letters-three of Tillich and three of Hirsch- from the period December 1917 to July 1918 have been found in Hirsch’s estate. Are these perhaps the most important letters from the correspondence, which Hirsch preserved for that reason?’ Tillich’s concern in these letters was objectivity, reconciliation of faith and doubt, Otto’s “The Idea of the Holy” led to ‘new depth or revelation of being’, and mutual agreement that religion must be explained (ibid:1980:19-20). The comment on Otto’s book was from a letter dated May 29, 1917 (ibid:20). They both agreed on the need for explanation of religion (ibid:29).

Ratschow (ibid:38) speaks of a 1913 manuscript of a brief outline for a systematic theology. This German theological adventure took place with the help of his friend Richard Wengener. Tillich composed a manuscript together with Wengener. ‘Kirkliche Apologetik’ was a summarization of the aims of both Tillich and Wengener from their (1912) lectures. These lectures were called Vernunft-Abende. They were ‘evenings for Reason’ which was a starting point for their scholarly theological concerns (ibid:38).

Tillich (1936:9-10) admits to his own legacy of socialism: ‘the special elaboration
of religious socialism attempted by me first in Grundregeln des religiosen Sozialismus (Principles of Religious Socialism) then in my book Die sozialistische Entscheidung (Socialistic Decision) has its root in this attitude’. Thomas (1988:201) notes two works of Tillich during the German years 1923 to 1926. The first is the ‘Das System der Wissenschaften Nach Gegenstand und Methoden Ein Entwurf’. Thomas (1988:201) writes: ‘This early work was published in translation as The System of the Sciences According to Objects and Methods. Translated with an Introduction by Paul Wiebe’. The work known as The Religious Situation translated by Richard Niebuhr published in 1956, was first published in Germany in 1926 as ‘Die religiöse Lage der Gegenwart’ (ibid:202). In 1932, while at the University of Frankfurt, ‘The Socialist Decision was published’ (ibid:203). Thomas has as his source the Paul Tillich Archives at Harvard Divinity School.


The Tillich materials at Harvard are in two categories, the first and most notable of which include his unpublished lectures, class notes, discussion transcripts, personal files, and assorted memorabilia and manuscripts. This material is organized in the following manner. Series A. Early German Notebooks, including the miscellaneous versions of Tillich’s first two dissertations on Schelling, and notes on ethics, apologetics, dogmatics, Old Testament and New Testament, Hegel, art and religion, history of philosophy, and the history of Protestantism. Series B. Tillich’s early German published works, including lectures before 1933, theological writings, notes for seminars and courses (ethics, the interpretation of history, philosophy of religion, the present situation, doctrines of man existentialism). Also here are letters, notes, addresses, comments, sermons, baptisms, and copies of Tillich’s works translated from English. Series C. Early unpublished notebooks in English (mostly Tillich’s courses at Union Theological Seminary, New York, in the 1930s). Series D. Unpublished English manuscripts.
Series E. Primarily of interest to editors and others who might wish to consult Tillich’s first draft of…books.
Series D, probably of most interest to Tillich scholars in America, covers a wide range of topics, and because of the interest and curiosity of those who have been influenced by Tillich.

Carey (ibid:123-124) continues:

Not all of the material at Harvard, however, is available. The Tillich Estate (of which Robert C. Kimball of the Starr-King School of Theology in Berkeley, California is literary executor) has “flagged” most of the manuscripts that are in near-finished form, presumably because of the possibility of their eventual publication. (These manuscripts can be read with permission of the Harvard librarian but cannot be photocopied or quoted without permission of the Tillich estate.) The Estate has flagged much of Tillich’s personal correspondence, including his correspondence with his family. It is my understanding that this material will not be made available to the public for fifty years…. [T]he second part of the Paul Tillich Archives includes the chronological shelving of all the German and English writings, including chapters in various anthologies, reprinted material, translations of his books into various languages, and book reviews…. copies of secondary works and dissertations dealing with Tillich’s thought, and these additions add considerably to the research value of the collections.

Carey (ibid:124) concludes: ‘Although it is personally moving and professionally interesting to review the memorabilia and unpublished work of Tillich, I finished my perusals of the Harvard archives with the distinct impression that most everything of consequence that Tillich had to say as a theologian has found its way into print’. Carey (ibid:127) has visited as well the Paul Tillich Archives in Germany in 1980 and again in 1998. The Tillich Archives were originally at Gottingen. Frau Gertraut Stober was in charge of the materials. The Tillich materials were moved in the 1970s to the University of Marburg. Dr. Uwe Bredehorn was in charge of the Tillich materials at Marburg. Carey (ibid:127) continues:

The accumulated materials in Marburg are roughly a European counterpart to the Paul Tillich Archives at Harvard. Most of Tillich’s original manuscripts are in fact at Harvard;
one project of the Marburg archive has been to obtain copies of those Harvard manuscripts. Even the originals of most of Tillich’s early German writings are at Harvard but they have been copied on microfilm and are now available at Marburg as well.

Carey (ibid: 128) adds:

Now also available is a six-volume condensation (or distillation) of the out-of-print, fourteen-volume *Gesammelte Werke*, in a German-English series entitled “Main Works/ Hauptwerke,” in which German works appear in German and English works in English. …[T]he creation of the Marburg archive was (and still is) a project of the German Paul Tillich Society (*Deutsche Paul-Tillich-Gesellschaft*). It was organized in 1960 by German friends of Paul Tillich.

In the 1970s Tillich’s works were published in Germany as a series called *Erganzungs-und Nachlassabande zu den Gesammelten Werken von Paul Tillich* (ibid:127).

Carey (ibid:129-131) evaluates the Paul Tillich German Archives:

it is stronger on Tillich’s early German writings and lectures (that is, prior to 1933) and on his trips back to Germany from 1948 to 1963. There has also been a major effort to obtain a copy of every published work of Tillich’s…. [T]he archive has had two different blocks of unpublished materials. The first group of materials was compiled by Frau Stober over many years and contains early writings, remarks, lectures, handwritten outlines…. [T]hese materials span the period from 1907 to 1963…. sixty-four sermons that he preached from 1909 to 1913, and 140 talks or sermons that he gave as a chaplain during the World War I. (The recent work of Professor Erdmann Sturm has probed the substance of these sermons,… [T]he second group of unpublished materials was acquired from Frau Renate Albrecht…. [I]n our computer age, however, specific requests for materials can be faxed to an inquirer.

Three German books are of interest dealing with ‘Tillich’s life and thought’ (ibid:134). The first work is Gerhard Wehr’s *Paul Tillich*. Carey (ibid:134) writes of it: ‘It is enriched by many photographs of various other people and scenes in Germany and America to give some flavor of Tillich’s *Sitz im Leben*…. Methodologically he draws heavily on Tillich’s own autobiographical writings, quotes the Pauck volume three times, Rollo May once, and Hannah Tillich twice (but not from her critical passages)’. Carey (ibid:134) evaluates: ‘a semipopular
treatment in paperback….The “main themes” (Elemente Theologischen Denkens) are treated in twenty-two pages and the story of how the Gesammelte Werke came into being is told in four pages’. Carey (ibid:134) concludes: ‘Tillich’s life story is told with no reference to the Hannah Tillich controversy’. Another German work is Ein Lebensbild in Dokumenten: Briefe, Tagebuch-Auszüge, Berichte: ‘This work divides Tillich’s life into definable periods (childhood and youth; student days in Berlin, Tubingen, and Halle; vicar and assistant Pastor; the First World War; war letters to Maria Klein (a student); marriage with Grete Wever; and so forth) (ibid:134)’. Carey (ibid:134) clarifies referring to this work: ‘It appears as volume 5 in the new series of the Gesammelte Werke’. A third work was by Professor Carl Heinz Ratschow entitled Paul Tillich. Carey (ibid:135) writes: ‘This essay was translated by Robert P. Scharlemann and published in 1980 by the North American Paul Tillich Society’.

The 1913 systematic theology manuscript appears in ‘Uwe Carsten Scharf’s The Paradoxical Breakthrough of Revelation. Erdmann Sturm has done editing on the 1970s books ‘Erganzungs-und Nachlassbande….Sturm’s work has exposed both German- and English-speaking scholars to a whole corpus of Tillich’s earlier work in philosophy and culture’ (ibid:137). Carey (ibid:137-138 ) writes of Sturm’s efforts: ‘The most creative aspect of Sturm’s work on Tillich, in my opinion, is related to the work he has done on Tillich’s sermons while Tillich was a young vicar in the old Lutheran church of Brandenburg….[S]turm’s assessment is that Tillich’s early sermons vacillate between the two themes of apologetics and pastoral care’. Carey (ibid:138) adds:

Sturm thinks we can trace an evolution in Tillich’s preaching from his 1908 probationary sermon (preached to the Royal Consistory, on I Corinthians 3:21-23, to qualify him as a
licensed preacher) through the Lichtenrade sermons (1909) and the Nauen sermons of 1911-1912. By the time of the Nauen sermons Tillich seemed to move away from apologetics, and to stress more the mystical themes of communion with God and participation in eternity in time.

Carey (ibid:139) continues:

Sturm’s assessment of Tillich’s war sermons in the trenches as a young chaplain in the German army. Sturm uncovered directives from the German general staff that chaplains were not to speak of military or political matters in sermons unless their comments were in favor of military and political leaders. It was understood (not surprisingly) to be the task of chaplains to speak out against “murmuring” and discontent among the troops, to interpret defeats theologically, to be a pastoral presence amid death and dying, and to interpret suffering and death theologically—that is, as “sacrificial” deaths for the Fatherland. To do this Tillich used a lot of texts from the Old Testament, and frequently compared the plight of German soldiers to the situation of the Israelites in conducting a “holy war.”

Tillich has left us a rich legacy from the German years 1886 to 1933, European, Continental, and German, his early writings, Schelling’s Christian philosophy of religion, Bohme’s Christian mysticism, the Protestant principle, Tillich’s philosophy of religion, religious socialism, his doctrine of the kairos, a theology of culture and art, an existential theology, the first volume of his systematic theology, the concept of correlation, a contemporary historical view, and archived memorials to his remembrance.

In analyzing the material, Tillich has left us a number of written and printed materials. Three letters were found from Tillich in the estate of Emmanuel Hirsch dating from December 1917 to July 1918. Objectivity, the reconciliation of faith and doubt, Ottio’s “Idea of the Holy”, and a mutual agreement that religion must be explained were the content of these letters. A 1913 manuscript has been found which was a very brief outline for a systematic theology. The Paul Tillich Archives at Andover-Harvard
Theological Library and the Paul Tillich German Archives at Marburg are part of the
Tillich legacy. Most of all which Tillich had to say as a theologian has found its way
into print.

A six-volume condensation *Main Works/Hauptwerke* of the fourteen-volume out
of print *Gesammelte Werke* is available. This is a German-English series. In the 1970s,
a series called *Erganzungs-und Nachlassabande zu den Gesammelten Werken von Paul
Tillich* was published.

Three books which exist on Tillich’s life and thought are Gerhard Wehr’s *Paul
Tillich*, another German work is *Ein Lebensbild in Dokumenten: Briefe, Tagebuch-Auszuge,
Berichte*, and Carl Heinz Ratschow’s *Paul Tillich*.

The 1913 manuscript appears in Scharf’s *The Paradoxical Breakthrough of
Revelation*. Thurman Sturm has done editing on Tillich’s sermons both as a young
vicar and as a chaplain in World War I.

**6:15 Summary**

Tillich’s legacy from the German years (1886-1933) is the focus of our thesis
rather than the American years (1933-1965). Tillich’s legacy has been defined from the
American years. The result is a great deal of conflict and a lack of consensus. The
legacy from the German years is ignored. Tillich’s German legacy is European, Continental,
and German. Tillich’s method of correlation set him apart from others. He began with
a philosophical analysis of the human situation. Tillich answered this by Christian revelation
in both symbolic and paradoxical terms. Tillich’s religious socialism and the concept of the kairos are very much part of his German legacy. Tillich was a product of his own background. Tillich wrote for his own generation. The German years must be understood as a unity. His early writings are part of his legacy *The System of the Sciences* (1923), *The Religious Situation* (1926), and *Mass and Spirit* (1922). Tillich’s held to the concept of the kairos until 1926. The proletariat had failed to bring about the new world order. Tillich’s early writings tell of his political theology and his religious socialism. An example of this would be his book *The Socialist Decision*. It was an appeal to the German people to accept socialism and an attack upon Nazism. In his 1926 *Die religiose Lage der Gegenwart*, Tillich began to speak of a new attitude called belief-ful realism. This new attitude towards reality was manifested in revolutionary art against the spirit of capitalism.

Tillich’s legacy is in politics and history. This legacy can be seen today in Liberation Theology and the meaning of history. Capitalism had the demonic tendency to destroy the meaning of judgment, justice, and also diplomacy. Tillich has left us a political theology. Tillich’s legacy is a caution against any form that totalitarianism may take. It is also to be seen in his serious exposition of Marxism. Tillich’s kairos anticipated a new world order and the transformation of society. Tillich’s legacy is to be seen as well in his belief that historical action is required for those who would attempt the interpretation of history. As a political theologian, Tillich united political action with an understanding of history. His religious socialism was the fusion of the religious and Marxist thought.

Schelling’s Christian philosophy and Bohme’s Lutheran mysticism is also part of
Tillich’s German legacy. Schelling and Bohme were the sources of Tillich’s theological views. Tillich’s Protestant principle is also part of his legacy. The Protestant understanding of man and his predicament. This has the wider concept of Tillich’s existential theology of man’s predicament within a capitalistic system. Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion and theology have become two key elements in a cultural science of religion. These cannot be separated one from the other.

Tillich’s theology of culture and art is part of his legacy from the years (1919-1933). Tillich related theology to other academic subjects such as philosophy, art, depth psychology, and sociology. Tillich’s theology of art can be traced to its beginning in Tillich’s years as a chaplain in World War I (1914-1918). Pluralism has challenged Tillich’s theology of culture. More than one view must be considered on a subject. Postmodernism must be taken into account when considering Tillich’s German legacy. Reality cannot be decided according to the postmodernists. The world is no particular way at all.

Tillich’s existential theology is part of his legacy from his years in Germany. Tillich’s *Systematic Theology, vol. I* is a discussion of existentialism. Tillich gives an analysis of the relationship between essence and existence. Tillich raised existential theological questions. The Christian message gave theological answers to the existential questions. Correlations are to be seen as well as constant alternations on theological themes. These theological themes form part of his legacy.

Tillich has left us a contemporary historical view. Tillich discerned the hand of God in socialism. He and his fellow religious socialists related their concept of the kairos
to the kingdom of God in politics.

Tillich has left us a number of materials that have been archived from his German years. A 1913 brief outline of a systematic theology, the Tillich archives at Andover-Harvard Theological Library, and the Paul Tillich Archives in Germany at the University of Marburg are examples that contain Tillich’s written and printed work. The Marburg archive has as its goal to obtain copies of the Harvard manuscripts. The originals of most of Tillich’s early German writings are at Harvard. Tillich’s fourteen-volume Gesammelte Werke is now available in a German-English series of six-volumes entitled Main Works/ Hauptwerke. Another series of Tillich’s works is Ein Lebensbild in Dokumenten: Briefe, Tagebuch-Auszuge, Berichte. This work divides Tillich’s life into definable periods. The 1913 brief outline for a systematic theology is to be found in Scharf’s book The Paradoxical Breakthrough of Revelation. Sturm has done editing on the 1970s books Erganzungs-und Nachlassbande. Sturm has also edited Tillich’s sermons as a young vicar and later as a war chaplain in World War I. The movement of our thesis progresses to the perspective on Paul Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy (1886-1933).
CHAPTER 7

PERSPECTIVE

7:1 American Synthesis

7:1:1 American Value Judgments Based on Quantitative’s Deductive Method

A lack of consensus exists in the American perspective on Paul Tillich. Carey (2002:147) saw Tillich as a bridge builder. Lyons (1969:12-13) applauds Tillich as an intellectual. Randall (1969:21) in the same volume denotes Tillich’s advancement of a ‘broad ecumenical definition of religion’. Braaten (1968:xiii) claims Tillich was a radical. Braaten (ibid:xiii) argues ‘it was the radicalism which moved the great prophetic spirits of the religious tradition’. Tillich’s *Systematic Theology* is the reason that he is regarded as a theologian (ibid:xv). Latourette (1953:1384) offers a synthesis of Tillich’s life rather than an analysis. Marty (1986:732-733) argues Tillich was outdated a nineteenth century scholar in the twentieth century. Marty brings out two more perspectives on Tillich. He regards him as a metaphysical theologian and a existential theologian. Tillich has added significantly to ecumenical progress between Protestants and Roman Catholics (Weigel 1956:141). Tillich is often perceived in the American spectrum as a theologian of culture (Reimer 2004:34). Thomas (1963:179) argues just the opposite that Tillich’s theology of culture was far too simplistic. Thomas contends that it was suitable only for a primitive society not a modern
culture. Relativity and subjectivity are valid historiographical concepts and issues. However, Tillich is misinterpreted and misunderstood as a result of the confusion and conflict in the American perspective on Tillich.

Tillich suffered ad hominem attacks in his career in America. Carl Braaten expands on the concept of Tillich’s radicalism. He (1968:xiii) writes:

It has been said that the real Tillich is the radical Tillich but the radicalism which moved Paul Tillich was not the iconoclastic spirit of those who wish to create de Novo an original brand of Christianity; rather, it was the radicalism which moved the great prophetic spirits of religious tradition. Tillich’s term for it was the “Protestant principle.” This radical principle was to be used not against but for the sake of the “catholic substance” of the Christian tradition.

Braaten (ibid:xiv) seeks to clarify this issue in our thinking:

How can the radicalism of prophetic criticism which is implied in the principles of genuine Protestantism be united with the classical tradition, dogma, sacred law, sacraments, hierarchy, cult as preserved in the Catholic churches. Tillich also saw the danger in prophetic criticism. The prophet hopes to get to the heart of the matter with his knife of radical protest; the false prophet is known in the tradition as who cuts out the heart itself. It was the true radicalism rooted in Biblical prophetism which drove Tillich to criticize our religious and cultural forms of tradition. Thus, like the Old Testament prophets, his criticism of the tradition was always from the tradition, neutral or alien stand point outside the “theological circle.”

Braaten (ibid:xiv) concludes: ‘Most of Tillich’s commentators and critics in America have had the impression that Tillich was a radical, perhaps even dangerous, innovator’. Adams (1965:1) concurs:

Among contemporary theologians no one has more radically questioned prevailing ideas and practices in the Christian churches, especially among Protestants, than has Paul Tillich…. [P]aul Tillich sets forth his criticism of the church precisely as a theologian. For him, protest is an ineradicable element in Protestantism as such, and the first task of the theologian is to proclaim the protest.

Some scholars such as Kenneth Hamilton (1963:9) view Tillich as a philosophical theologian.
Hamilton (ibid:9) writes: ‘Paul Tillich’s philosophical theology is one of the most spectacular features of the contemporary theological landscape’. Hamilton’s (ibid:9) remarks on Tillich’s philosophical theology are worth noting:

Its influence is felt everywhere, and it has been much expounded, and defended, attacked and pronounced on. Philosophers as well as theologians have been intrigued by it. Yet, although the first volume of his Systematic Theology was published almost a dozen years ago, nearly all the critical writing on Tillich to date has been in essay form; and if ever a theology called for extended analysis, this one does.

Braaten (1968:xv) extols Tillich as a systematic theologian. The pragmatic evidence for this is his Systematic Theology. Braaten (ibid:xv) expounds:

His theology was a living dialogue with the great men and ideas of the past, with the fathers of the ancient church, both Greek and Latin, with the schoolmen and mystics of the medieval period, with Renaissance humanists and Protestant reformers, with the theologians of liberalism and their neo-orthodox critics. His method of handling the tradition was eminently dialectical, in the spirit of the sic et non of Abelard. Tillich’s Systematic Theology was built up through the rhythm of raising and answering existential questions.

Thomas (1963:172) argues that Tillich’s importance is that of a theologian ‘and most distinguished theologian’. Thomas (ibid:175-178) elaborates:

There is another respect in which Tillich might be thought to be very much the contemporary theologian. This is his emphasis on the apologetic function of theology. In his Introduction to Volume One of Systematic Theology he insists that the ‘situation’ cannot be excluded from theological work. Theology, he answers must answer the questions implied in the situation ‘in the power of the eternal message and with the means provided by the situation whose question it answers. Whether he has succeeded or not Tillich has attempted to present such a theology. Not since Schleiermacher has there been such a full-scale reconstruction or reinterpretation of theology, and indeed it might even be argued that what Tillich has done is more extensive and more thorough than was Schleiermacher’s work. Again, one must admit the courage shown by the venture, but this is not to say that he has succeeded or that such work is necessary or desirable. That he has not at any rate been completely successful has been argued in our discussion of the main themes of his theology. Our further point is that there are many indications of his being not a modern theologian at all but rather a nineteenth-century thinker in twentieth-century dress. It is not without cause
that he describes himself as belonging to the nineteenth century. ‘I am’ he says, ‘one of those in my generation who, in spite of the radicalism with which they have criticized the nineteenth century, often feel a longing for its…unbroken cultural traditions’. Thus he is regarded by some as the modern ecumenical theologian or again as the contemporary theologian who can assist cultural reconstruction. Both are in a way aspects of the appeal which Tillich’s apologetic emphasis makes to the contemporary reader of theology….

[T]illich’s alleged modernity, Tillich appears to be a theologian capable of resolving the dilemma of the ecumenical movement because he is at once thoroughly Protestant and so open to the appeal of Catholicism. For him neither the ‘sacramental’ principle of Catholicism nor the ‘prophetic’ principle of Protestantism can stand on its own. Therefore, however inevitable may be the class between institutional Catholicism and institutional Protestantism there is he thinks, no essential conflict between these two principles. They are complimentary elements of the true ‘theonomous’ Christianity, and either, taken on its own, becomes ‘demonic’…[I]t may well be that Tillich’s contribution to the ecclesiological discussion of our time is yet to be made, but it is difficult to resist the suspicion that we shall not hear any startlingly modern message.

There is considerable disagreement between American theologians as to the interpretation and meaning of Paul Tillich.

In analysis, the American perspective on Paul Tillich lacks a consensus. A number of different views exist on Tillich. Tillich is misinterpreted and misunderstood because of the confusion and conflict created by the American perspective. An example of this is the view that Tillich is a radical man. Tillich’s radicalism is the Old Testament spirit of prophetic criticism. Tillich is also viewed as a philosophical theologian and a systematic theologian.

7:2 The German Years (1886 to 1933) Are Essential In Our Understanding of Tillich

7:2:1 Tillich’s Beginning (1886-1933)

Adams argues that it is impossible to understand Tillich without an understanding of the German years. Adams (1965:65-66) writes:
We can therefore better understand Tillich’s thought—and also some of his characteristic categories—if we observe the early development of his interest in art. In his autobiographical sketch he tells us that his father, a Protestant minister in a small trans-Elbian town, not only maintained the musical traditions of the evangelical pastor’s household but also tried his hand at composing. The son was not himself inclined to the study of music. His first warm interest in art seems to have been in the field of literature, and he tells us of his early intoxication with the plays of Shakespeare and with Schelling’s philosophy of nature. He asserts that his “instinctive sympathy” for German existential philosophy undoubtedly goes back to the excitement created in him by the reading of Hamlet, a play that he calls “this most precious work of secular literature viewed existentially.” He was never in his youth greatly attracted to the writings of Goethe. The German poet’s works, he says, “seem to me to express too little of the ‘border-situation.’ “ As he grew older he turned his attention to the other arts, especially architecture and painting. The study of painting was for him an experience of decisive importance. Eventually he came into intimate association with the practicing artists of his generation. The most widely read book of his earlier period, The Religious Situation, was dedicated to an artist friend. ...[H]e says that from his “pleasure in the poor reproductions that were obtainable at the military bookstores in the fields, there grew a systematic study of art,...[A] little later the early Christian art of Italy made “an overwhelming impression” upon him.

Further, ‘Tillich’s (ibid:67) comment on Rilke’s own art explicitly suggests what the metaphysical frisson—the philosophical and religious significance—of art is’. Tillich (1936:17 in ibid:67) writes: ‘Its profound psychoanalytic realism, the mystical fullness, the form charged with metaphysical import, all that made this poetry the expression of what in the concepts of my philosophy of religion I could seize only abstractly. To me and to my wife, who made poetry accessible to me, these poems became a book of devotion to be taken up again and again’. Adams (ibid:68) draws our attention to the fact: ‘In the comment on Rilke’s poetry we find two basic categories of Tillich’s philosophy of religion and of his theology of culture, namely, form and import (or meaning)’. Adams (ibid:68) points out the ‘special interest here is their place in his theology of culture’.
Tillich brings us to the ‘Tillichian idea of living on the border—this time the border between culture and religion’. Adams (ibid:68) adds it was: ‘From this border Tillich early developed his theology of culture and of art’. Adams (ibid:68) continues: ‘The outlines of his theology of culture were set forth in his 1919 lecture “Ueber die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur” the first work he published after the First World War’. Tillich (1919:9 in ibid:70-71) writes: ‘The task of theology is to outline a normative system from the point of view of a concrete standpoint and on the basis of the categories of the philosophy of religion, the individual standpoint being intimately related to the confessional and the universally religious-historical and the cultural-historical standpoint in general. This is not a hidden rationalism, for it involves the recognition of the concrete religious standpoint, and it is no indirect or concealed supernaturalism, as is to be found still in our History of Religion School, for it implies that on the basis of a philosophy of history all authoritarian limitations upon the individual standpoint are broken’. Adams shows that the early German years are the key to understanding Tillich’s life, thought, and legacy. Adams (ibid:33,42) uses other sources from the German years “Masse und Geist (1922)”, “Das System der Wissenschaften” (1923), and “Religiose Verwirklichung” (1929). Runyon (1984:274) writes of the importance of the kairos to aid in our understanding Tillich’s theology. Tillich was convinced as were ‘his friends in the Religious Socialist movement that a kairos was appearing on the horizon’. The kairos was a particular ‘moment in history’ (ibid:274). It was also ‘a fullness of time that becomes a watershed for the future’ (ibid:274). Runyon (ibid:275) writes of Marx’s influence:
Toward this end Tillich called attention to elements in Marxism that by his definition constituted authentic religious protest against the heteronomous character of bourgeois culture and the capitalistic economic spirit, and therefore sought to interpret for the church the genuine religious motifs in Marxism. At the same time he sought to show Marxists that socialism was not in opposition to religion as such, but only to the bourgeois form that religion had taken in church. Within socialism are genuine religious elements, he argued, which need to be recognized for the sake of the socialist cause. The first contribution of Religious Socialism was to expose the heteronomous nature of capitalist society, and the offshoots of it found in the church.

Thomas (1983:179) points to Tillich’s theology of culture formed during the German years from 1919 to 1933. Thomas (ibid:179) thought that Tillich’s interest in a theology of culture is an evidence of ‘his affinity with the nineteenth century’. Thomas (ibid:179) does admit the continuous problem of relating the Christian gospel argues for the ‘urgent need for cultural reconstruction’. Thomas (ibid:179) writes: ‘He has never abandoned the interest in culture which he inherits from Troeltsch…but for all that, he breathes throughout this interest in modern culture the spirit of an alien age. The simplicity of Tillich’s way of relating religion and culture is what reveals this best’. Thomas (ibid:179) refers to Tillich’s ‘central proposition….Religion is the substance of culture, culture is the expression of Religion’. Adams (1965:89) argues that Tillich’s relating of culture to religion is most significant. Adams (ibid:89) writes: ‘Yet he has given in his early works, especially in the lecture on “The Idea of a Theology of Culture,” certain of the basic principles that persist throughout all his writings. Especially significant are his conceptions of form and content and import, and also his interpretation of the nature of religion and of culture and of the relations between them’. Adams (ibid:90) relates Tillich’s theology of culture to art. He writes: ‘the most extensive discussions of particular works of art is to be found
in his “Masse und Geist,” published in 1922’. Adams (ibid:90) gives us understanding into

Tillich’s theology of art in *Masse und Geist*:

Tillich first examines early Gothic paintings of masses. In a “Carrying the Cross” portraying a crowd of followers, in a “Birth of Christ” with its shepherds and kings, or in a typical secular picture of a battle, he finds the crowd fully dominated by the overwhelming idea that it represents, whether it be the idea of the following, or of adoring worship, or of the battle….Two dimensional space unites the crowd to a *corpus mysticum* which is imbued with the transcendent life of a supranatural idea of cosmic scope.

Adams (ibid:95) develops his argument further based on Tillich’s “Kult und Form” written in 1930. He (ibid:95) writes:

This means that the creator of religious art, like any other artist, has the demand of truth placed upon him. It is a demand that may be responded to by a secularist as well as by a religious person. Religion has no monopoly on the way of depth into truth and reality. Indeed, at times it seems to be excluded from that way.

Tillich (1930:582-583 in ibid:95) writes:

It is a judgment upon religion, that it—the supposed witness to truth as such—is always shamed by the sincerity of those who stand far away from it, who remain entirely removed from its cultus and myth. These people must for their own sincerity’s sake remain aloof, so long as religious art is not an art expressing truth and reality. It is at the same time both characteristic and disgraceful for our religious situation that in this Exposition the secular objects alone are entirely penetrating and impressive, the things that are presented as expressly not for use in the cultus. A simple bowl even in the ultimate religious sense shames almost all the things that are assembled here as objects for the cultus. There are, to be sure, some items here which show creative power for purposes of public worship, and we are grateful to those who have broken new paths. But almost without exception these items are frustrated by the old, false understanding of worship of as a special sphere alongside the breadth and the reality of daily life. Almost always the cultus is removed from the present and thereby deprived of its ultimate seriousness. We are grateful that the Art Association has taken up the struggle for a new, contemporary, real art form, that it has taken up the struggle for an art that has the power of witness.

Tillich’s theology of culture and art was formed during the German years. It was during
this period that Tillich developed both a theology of culture and art. Adams (ibid:113-114) writes of Tillich’s ‘task of theology of culture’:

is to develop a systematic sketch of the nature of a religiously imbued culture; it is, in short, a normative cultural science. In order to accomplish his purpose the culture-theologian must have first a general religious conception of the nature of actual cultural creations; he must have also a philosophy of cultural history and a typology of cultural creations. We may simplify the characterization of these cultural sciences if we use Tillich’s central concept of meaning as the basis for unity and distinction. The three disciplines could, in terms of the concept of meaning, be characterized as (1) a theory of the principle of meaning; (2) a theory of the material of meaning—philosophy of history and typology of cultural creations; and (3) a theory of the norm of meaning. Throughout, the primary concern of the culture-theologian is the import that is realized or pointed to in cultural creations. He leaves the question of the appropriateness of forms to others. He attempts to show in a general way the direction in which he sees the fulfillment or frustration of meaning.

Adams claims: ‘This tripartite division corresponds to the construction of systematic cultural sciences set forth by Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung’ (Troeltsch 1924:28 in ibid:113). Adams (ibid:115) concludes: ‘With such a view of the theology of culture as this, in which the normative science of theology is integrally related to principles of meaning and to the history of culture as understood by the systematizer, it is extremely difficult to determine whether the theology is a historical theology related to a specifically Christian tradition or is a norm merely posited by the culture-theologian and used to explicate and justify certain aspects of a historical tradition’. Adams (ibid:115) continues: ‘Tillich himself attempts to combine in his writings the functions of the theologian of culture and of the Christian theologian. The culture of which he is a theologian has itself been partially nourished by Judeo-Christian influences’.
Tillich’s theology of culture an address delivered in Berlin in 1919 has ‘prepared the way for a truly ecumenical theology’ (Leibrecht 1959:17). This is another historiographical issue which contributes to contemporary history. Tillich (1919:35 in Adams 1965:43-44) writes of this lecture:

Religion is an experience of the Unconditioned and that means an experience of absolute reality on the ground of the experience of absolute nothingness; it will experience the nothingness of all existing things, the nothingness of values, the nothingness of the personal life; where this experience has led to the absolute, radical No, there it shifts into an equally absolute experience of reality, into a radical Yes. It is not a question of a new reality beside or above things; that would be only a thing of a higher order that would again fall under the No. Rather, right through things there forces itself upon us that reality which is at the same time the No and the Yes over things; it is not an existing thing, it is not the substance, the totality of the existing order; it is, if we may use a mystical formula, the Super-existing, that which is at the same time the absolute Nothing and the absolute Something. But the predicate “is” conceals the real situation, for it is not a question of an existent reality, it is rather a meaning-reality: the ultimate, the deepest, all shattering and every newly creating meaning-reality.

Tillich is dependent on Schelling which is often overlooked when trying to understand his life, thought, and ensuing legacy. Adams (ibid:130-131) refers to Tillich’s Interpretation of History: ‘Following the later Schelling, Tillich holds that “reality is not only the appearance of essence, but also the contradiction of it, and that, above all, human existence is the expression of the contradiction of its essence”’. Tillich was dependent on Schelling’s work The Ages of The World. Adams (ibid:131-132) writes:

In Tillich’s view, this recognition of an import that constantly breaks through and shines through the formal system of the sciences represents again the transcending of idealism which was accomplished by Schelling in The Ages of The World (begun in 1811) he rejected the Hegelian dialectic in favor of a new realism, that is, in favor of an existential dialectic. Moreover, something of “the import that breaks and shines
through the formal system of the sciences” is to be observed already in Schelling’s *Lectures on the Methods of the Academic Disciplines* (1803). In the First Lecture, Schelling finds the presupposition of all science to be “the essential unity of the unconditioned ideal and the unconditioned real.”

Runyon (1984:272) concurs:

In Tillich’s own system, Schelling’s Ungrund becomes “the Unconditioned” or “the Unconditional (das Unbedingte), the original, the “Ground of Being,” or simply “Being-itself.” Tillich then distinguished between essential and existential dimensions of being: essence corresponds to Schelling’s potencies in their primeval, unrealized stage; existence corresponds to the actualization of the potential as being separates itself from its origins in essence and takes on concretion in the world. This movement frees essence for self-expression, but only at the price of the ontological gap that separates all existing things from their original essence. Tillich’s *polarities* (dynamic and form, individualization and participation, freedom and destiny) speak of the tension present both in essential and existential dimension of being. The lack of balance between these elements can result in the breakdown of existing structure accompanied by the threat of nonbeing.

Leibrecht (1959:6) confirms Tillich’s theology to be metaphysical: ‘we feel this passionate search for the lost identity in the ultimate union of the separated as the driving power behind all Tillich’s thought. This stress links Tillich to the fundamental thought of …Schelling’. Marty (1984:732) acknowledges Tillich’s theology to be from Schelling.

Adams (1965:153) argues that Tillich’s Christian metaphysical theology is derived from Bohme as well as Schelling. Adams (ibid:153-154) notes:

Implicit in the criticism directed by Tillich at Hegelianism and Kantianism is his appropriation of motifs…who in his view represent a more dynamic conception of reality and spirit. Chief among these are Boehme, [variant spelling of Bohme] ….Boehme’s theosophy represents for Tillich the modern fountain-head of that dynamic, voluntaristic outlook on the world which interprets it as an emanation of tensions between the universal will and the particular (eigene) will-tensions rising from an ultimate ground and abyss. This dialectical, dynamic philosophy reappears in the later Schelling’s “positive” theory of potencies and in his
doctrine of freedom. According to Schelling, the rational, “negative” conception of God is inadequate, for it extends only to the form; it does not touch the real.

Tillich stands in the theological tradition of the Neo-Platonic and its negative theology. Adams (ibid:154) describes this theological orientation as follows:

‘ecstatic” orientation to the One beyond all existence and the accompanying “negative theology.” Dionysius speaks of God as nameless, beyond the highest name one can give Him. He is beyond God, if God is spoken of as a divine being. He is “unspeakable Darkness.’ This “abysmal” One is the source and substance of all being. Tillich’s emphasis upon the sense of participation in and separation from the unconditionally real and the unconditionally valid, his insistence upon the idea that the ultimate defies conception, that the forms drawn from the autonomous order must be used symbolically and paradoxically when applied to the theonomous order, are implications of a revised version of Neo-Platonic “ecstatic” and negative theology, with a positive reminiscent of Nicolas of Cusa.

Leibrecht (1959:8) argues in agreement with Adams that Tillich was a Christian metaphysical theologian ‘without falling into the irrationalism and emotionalism of many a romantic thinker, however, he shows the need of “ecstatic reason” to discover the unconditional in the conditional’. It was ‘the later writings of Schelling, the Schelling who opposed Hegel’s pure essentialism, his system of synthesis’. Schelling insisted ‘being precedes thought and act’. Schelling discovered ‘man’s actualization of freedom from his original sin, and accordingly develops a doctrine of grace and guilt’ (ibid:8).

Leibrecht stresses the importance of the German years for understanding Tillich’s theology. Leibrecht (ibid:10) writes: ‘The Christian doctrine of the Fall is accepted by Tillich as a valid symbol signifying man’s situation as one of estrangement. These notions of Tillich were shared by very few in the years just prior to World War I….most of the theologians of the period were busy condemning the mystical elements of
Christianity as un-Christian remnants of the Middle Ages, finding the essence of
Christian religion in solid, practical ethics, the golden rule for modern man’. Leibrecht
(ibid:19) continues: ‘much confusion…is dissipated if we remind ourselves Tillich has
been a mystical Christian theologian’. Leibrecht’s (1959:6) point is well taken that Tillich’s
theology was formed during the German years. Tillich’s (1923:132 in Adams 1965:165-166)
Das System der Wissenschaften verifies his metaphysical theology during the German years.
Tillich (ibid:132 in ibid:165-166) writes:

The goal of metaphysical knowledge is the unity of the concept of being and the concept
of meaning; that is, a system that is at the same time a universal Gestalt and a universal
framework of meaning. The approach of metaphysical knowledge is the unity of the
apprehension of form and import, of the scientific and the aesthetic view, of the
perception of being and the understanding of meaning. The method of metaphysical
knowledge is the contemplation of the unconditioned import in the conditioned forms,
which in the philosophy of the Renaissance was designed as the contemplation of the
coincidentia oppositorum….Thus concepts like “intellectual contemplation,” “pure
intuition,” the grasping of the “absolute identity” and of the “paradox”, etc. are
expressions for the method of coincidence.

Adams (ibid:165) argues: ‘concepts employed by metaphysics are symbol-concepts and
that they are therefore to be interpreted paradoxically’. The religious and theological import
of Tillich is thus realized in ‘the paradoxical immanence of the transcendent’ (ibid:166).
Adams (ibid:166) continues: ‘Owing to the symbolic character of metaphysical concepts,
metaphysics is described as “the mythical will to apprehend the Unconditioned’. Adams
(ibid:166) bases this on Tillich’s 1930 work Religiose Verwirklichung. Tillich is perceived
during the German years as merely a Christian philosopher of religion. Adams (ibid:187-188)
clarifies this matter:
Accordingly, philosophy of religion is the theory of the religious function and it categories. The student of religion passes thence by way of transition through history of religions to theology, the normative and systematic presentation of the concrete realization of the concept of religion. Thus philosophy of religion and theology are two elements in a cultural science of religion. They may never properly be separated entirely. Every theology is dependent upon the concept of the essence of religion already presupposed. Every philosophy of religion is in the end dependent upon the normative concept of religion. And both, are dependent upon the comprehension of the socio-historical material. By this systematization Tillich indicates not only that theology itself requires the work of a methodical philosophy of religion which deals with the problem of the essence of religion and with the theory of meaning. He indicates also that some particular normative system of religion—some theology—as a background for every philosophy of religion. In other words, the philosopher of religion is a theologian *malgré lui*. Tillich presents the evidence for this in many of his other writings.

At times, Tillich’s theology may seem hard to decipher. The reason is Tillich switches back and forth between his Christian philosophy and his Christian theology (ibid:259-260).

Adams (ibid:260) writes:

The first reason is that his philosophy of religion frequently presents ideas that are obviously drawn from Christian theology or that presupposes some Christian idea. Indeed, at times the reader supposes that he is reading general philosophical discourse; then he is told that the idea just expounded is the essential meaning of the doctrine of justification by faith or of the *Logos*. As a pedagogical method and as a method of persuasion this procedure has been markedly successful, particularly in his philosophy of culture and his philosophy of religion. It represents the fulfillment of the task Tillich set for himself: to express in an effective way the enduring but language-frustrated doctrines of Christianity.

Tillich (1919:38 in Adams 1965:81) gives us a further glimpse into his theology of culture formed during the years in Germany. He (ibid:38 in ibid:81) writes:

We have assigned to theology the task of bringing to systematic expression a concrete religious point of view, on the basis of a universal formation of concepts (the philosophy of religion) and by means of an arrangement presupposing a philosophy of history. The task of the theology of culture corresponds to this. It undertakes a universal religious analysis of all cultural creations, it sets forth a philosophy of history and a typological scheme of the great cultural creations from the viewpoint
of the religious import realized in them, and it creates on the basis of its concrete religious standpoint the ideal sketch of a religiously imbued culture. There is therefore a threefold task for the theology of culture, corresponding to the threefold character of systematic cultural sciences in general and to the systematic science of religion in particular: (1) A general (universal) religious analysis of culture; (2) A religious typology and a philosophy of cultural history; (3) A concrete religious systematization of culture.

Adams (ibid:82-83) clarifies:

It would be wrong, however, to suppose that the task of the theologian of culture is merely analytical. After making the religious analysis of culture with a view to determining the (religious) import of the different cultural productions and functions, the culture-theologian undertakes the synthetic task of setting forth the normative, systematic outline of a religiously imbued culture. The synthesis not only brings together the different cultural functions but also overcomes the culture-destroying contradiction between religion and culture.

Tillich (1919:41 in ibid:83) explains: ‘in which in place of the opposition between science and dogma there appears a science religious in itself, in place of the distinction between art and the form of the cultus there appears an art religious in itself, in place of the dualism of state and church a state-form religious in itself, etc. Only with this breadth of goal is the task of the theology of culture to be conceived’. Adams (ibid:83) concludes: ‘This description of the synthetic task of the theologian of culture is of primary significance for an understanding of Tillich’s idea of the kind of society to be striven for, namely the theonomous society. Frequently he refers to the high Middle Ages as having closely approximated this idea. He thinks that our society could move in the same direction by adopting religious socialism, though in 1926 he did not think this movement had much promise of success in the Protestant churches of Germany’.

Leibrecht (1959:7) brings out a different aspect of Tillich’s 1919 lecture in
Berlin on a theology of culture. Leibrecht (ibid:7) argues:

His basic criticism of so-called bourgeois capitalism has been that it precluded, for many, the possibility of being creative. A new social order must first of all provide everyone with the opportunity to work creatively, each in his own life in the spirit of arts, among whom Tillich moves freely and has many friends. Creative art, thought and work as participation in the creative ground and thus expressions of the ultimate-are enterprises of infinite importance. This is the key assumption which underlines Tillich’s concern for culture as expression of religion, and for religion as the ground of culture. In his lecture on “The Theology of Culture” (1919), which made him well known in Europe overnight, he speaks of the artist as the priest of the future church.

Leibrecht (ibid:7) passes Tillich’s socialistic views off as romanticism: ‘with the romantics Tillich further shares a certain disdain for the bourgeois world of self-sufficiency and easy satisfaction, as well as a lively sympathy with those who protest against this world’. It is obvious that this runs contrary to capitalism as an economic system and a liberal democracy as a political system. Leibecht (ibid:10) contradicts himself by saying:

Tillich was merciless in his attack on the spirit of placid finitude which he saw expressed in most of the artistic, political, cultural, and even ecclesiastical world of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In his eyes, Western bourgeois society and its civilization were doomed to destruction, not from without but from within. Accordingly, his method became radical analysis, and his words had the sharpness of a surgeon’s knife cutting into a cancerous tumor.

Religious socialism was part of Tillich’s political theology during the German years. Leibrecht (ibid:11) writes: ‘World War I came. It broke the nineteenth century man’s world to pieces….The demand of the hour, as Tillich saw it, was for the intellectual to identify his existence with that of the rebelling proletarian’. Leibrecht (ibid:11) informs
Together with some of his friends, Tillich founded a movement for “religious socialism.” They wanted to relate socialism to its own depth, interpreting its true meaning to its followers. Although Tillich and his friends anxiously awaited the new that was to come—the expectancy gave an urgent enthusiasm to all their writings—they were from the beginning quite sober about utopian ideas.

Runyon (1984:277) argues: ‘Tillich and the Religious Socialists wanted to make history too, but they were too circumspect, too reflective, and finally too bourgeois to succeed’.

Runyon (ibid:275) admits: ‘Tillich agreed with the Marxist analysis that class warfare is part and parcel of the capitalist orientation. The owners of the instruments of production will inevitably be in opposition to those who are dependent upon those means of production for their own existence’. Tillich (1971:48 in ibid:275) argues: ‘[T]he heteronomous situation becomes even more demonic when the owners also control the structures that are meant to insure justice; for justice will be interpreted in terms of what is good for the owners and for the kind of stability in society they desire’. Carey (2002:47) confirms the fact that Tillich was also ‘a political theologian’.

It was during the German years that Tillich began his systematic theology while teaching at the University of Marburg (Tillich 1952:14). It was here at Marburg that Tillich came across existentialism in its twentieth century form (ibid:14). Tillich (1944:319 in Adams 1965:12) writes:

Something very tragic tends to happen in all periods of man’s spiritual life: truths, once, deep and powerful, discovered by the great geniuses with profound suffering and incredible labor, become shallow and superficial when used in daily conversation. How can this happen? It can happen and it unavoidably happens, because there is no depth without the way to depth. Truth without the way to truth is dead; and if it is still
used, in detachment, it contributes only to the surface of things.

Adams (ibid:12) interprets: ‘These words come very near to expressing the sentiments of the existential philosopher Heidegger, though Tillich does not agree with Heidegger’s atheistic position’. Tillich’s theology was formed during the German years. Tillich’s theology was a theology of art and culture, a metaphysical theology derived from Schelling and Bohme, a political theology of religious socialism, the beginning of his first volume of his *Systematic Theology*, and an existential theology. All of this originated from the German years 1886 to 1933.

In evaluation, the German years (1886-1933) are essential in our understanding of Tillich. Tillich can be understood by beginning with his early interest in art. His interest in art and the systematic study of art grew out of his experience as a chaplain in the German army in World War I. It was during the German years that Tillich had an interest in German mysticism through German poetry. Tillich’s theology of culture and art was developed while in his native country. His theology of culture was set forth in his 1919 lecture “Über die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur”. Other works written by Tillich during the German years are his *Masse und Geist* (1922), *Das System der Wissenschaften* (1923), and his *Religiose Verwirklichung* (1929).

Tillich’s *Kult und Form* written in 1930 explains Tillich’s concept that real art should depict life. The depiction of life as it really is has the power of witness.

Tillich’s theology of culture has a three fold division. This division is a theory of the principle of meaning, a theory of the material meaning (philosophy of history and
typology of cultural creations), and a theory of the norm of meaning. This division corresponds to Troeltsch’s construction of the systematic cultural sciences. His theology of culture address in 1919 in Berlin prepared the way for an ecumenical theology. This is another historical issue that contributes to contemporary history.

Tillich was very dependent on Schelling’s thought especially his work *The Ages Of The World*. Tillich’s theology is Schelling’s metaphysical theology. Tillich’s Christian metaphysical theology is derived as well from Bohme. Tillich stands in the theological tradition of Neo-Platonism. Tillich referred to the divine as the One or the God who is above God. He is unspeakable Darkness or the abysmal One. Tilllich was a Christian metaphysical theologian. Tillich’s Christian theology is filled with metaphysical concepts. Tillich is hard to understand at times because he switches back between his Christian philosophy and his Christian theology.

Tillich’s theology of culture set forth the need for a concrete religious point of view based on the universal concepts of the Christian philosophy of religion. A universal religious analysis of all cultural creations is necessary. The function of the theologian of culture is not merely analytical. The religious analysis of culture must be followed by a synthesis. The result will be a systematic outline of the religiously imbued culture.

Tillich wanted a new social order that would give equal opportunity for all. Religious socialism was Tillich’s political theology during the German years. World War I came with the result that Tillich saw clearly the need for the intellectual to identify with the proletariat. Tillich became one of the founders of the religious socialist movement. Tillich
was a political theologian.

It was during the Marburg years (1924-1925) that Tillich began his systematic theology. Existentialism in its 20th century form presented itself to Tillich while at Marburg. Our thesis turns to consider Tillich’s ‘intellectual ancestry’ (Adams 1965:22).

7:3 Tillich’s Intellectual Ancestry During The German Years

7:3:1 German Ancestors And Inherited Principles

Adams argues that Tillich was the recipient of ‘historically inherited…principles’ (ibid:17). Adams (ibid:17) writes: ‘Hence there is in his method, as in all critical methods, a constant interplay between reality as immediately experienced and reality as interpreted by historically inherited and tentatively held principles. Indeed, the tentative character of his approach aims to exhibit something of the spirit of science’. Further, Adams (ibid:22) argues for Tillich’s major concepts being formed from his ‘intellectual ancestry’. Adams (ibid:22) names these intellectual ancestors Kierkegaard, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, and Marx. Jacob Boehme is another of Tillich’s intellectual ancestors (ibid:32). Further Tillich used ‘the concept of meaning’ which was also used by ‘the existential school, such as Heidegger and Jaspers, Barth and Brunner, but also among those of the idealistic and Neo-Kantian tradition, such as Dilthey, Bretano, Rickert, Windelband, Eucken, Troeltsch, Hartmann, and Husserl, and among writers like Oswald Spengler and Theodor Lessing’ (ibid:56-57). Leibnitz is included as one of the intellectual ancestors (ibid:50). Adams (ibid:50) writes: ‘The concept of Gestalt appears again and again in the history of Western thought from Plato and Aristotle, through Bruno, Leibnitz, Kant, Goethe, and
Schelling to contemporary Gestalt psychology. It is employed by Tillich, in the interpretation of all aspects of life, in the interpretation of nature, the sciences, art and religion’. Gestalt is defined as ‘a form’.

Adams (ibid:22) elaborates upon Feuerbach and Marx. He (ibid:22) writes: ‘The social aspects of the reaction against Hegelianism may be symbolized by the names of Feuerbach and Marx’. Tillich (1942:256 in ibid:22) writes that Feuerbach’s concept of materialism: ‘is another expression of the emphasis on existence—a word used by him against Hegel’. Adams (ibid:22) adds concerning Marx: ‘But Marx goes even further in his reaction against Hegel, in effect transferring the Kierkegaardian concern with inward tensions of the individual to a concern with the outward tensions of social process’. Adams (ibid:29) continues on Marx the intellectual ancestor of Tillich: ‘Marx set off an earthquake in social life and thought when he questioned whether there is an intellectual and moral history independent of its economic and social basis’. Nietzsche was another intellectual ancestor who influenced Tillich (ibid:33). Tillich (1936:7-8 in ibid:33) writes: ‘It was Nietzsche who said that no idea could be true unless it was thought in the open air. Obedient to the saying, many of my ideas have been conceived in the open and even much of my writing has been done among trees or on the seaside’.

Kant, Rothe, and Troeltsch contribute to the ‘typology of authority’ of autonomy (ibid:53). Tillich (1919:801 in ibid:53) writes:

In every autonomy, that is, in every secular culture there is a dual element: the “nomos,” the form or “law” which is supposed to be radically carried out in accord with the unconditioned demand for meaning, and the “autos,” the self-assertion of the condition
which in the finding of a form loses the unconditioned meaning. Autonomy is therefore always at the same time obedience and contradiction to the Unconditioned. It is obedience in so far as it subjects itself to the unconditioned demand for meaning; it is contradiction in so far as it denies the unconditioned meaning itself. Autonomous culture is, as the myth puts it, always at the same time *hybris* and a gift of God.

Schelling with his Christian philosophy and theology was another intellectual ancestor who had a great influence upon Tillich (ibid:22). Tillich’s (1923:90,101 in ibid:58) view of individuality is a ‘restatement of certain aspects of conceptions that appear in the writings of Dilthey and Troeltsch’. Adams (ibid:58) writes:

Spirit is, in short, creative in the realm of meaning. Although spirit is not divorced from the realm of causality, it is characteristically oriented to the realm of meaning, where individuality expresses itself by living in and beyond reality, by accommodating itself to the nature of being but by also giving to being a novel expression. The realm of meaning then presupposes thought and existence but goes beyond both into the realm of the creative where meaning of life is experienced and realized in some new form.

Adams lists Schelling, Dilthey, and Troeltsch as additional intellectual ancestors. Tillich’s thought was formed during the German years from these intellectual ancestors.

In analysis, Tillich was the recipient of historically inherited principles during the years in his native Germany. Tillich’s intellectual ancestors were Kierkegaard, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Marx, and Jacob Bohme. Tillich used the concept of meaning from the existential school. Heidegger, Jaspers, Barth, Brunner, Dilthey, Bretano, Rickert, Windelband, Eucken, Troeltsch, Hartmann, Husserl, Spengler, and Lessing used this concept. Leibnitz was another intellectual ancestor. The concept of Gestalt (form) appears in the history of Western thought. Nietzsche was another intellectual ancestor. Tillich’s major concepts were formed during the German years.
7:4 Tillich’s Major Concepts Were Formed During The German Years

7:4:1 Tillich New Theological Vocabulary From The German Years

Adams (ibid:18) points to Tillich’s concept of the present. Adams (ibid:18) writes:

Prominent among the concepts is an idea, already mentioned, which runs through all of Tillich’s life and thought, namely, the concept of the present. This emphasis corresponds to his conviction that Protestantism should in both its protest and its positive realizations be concrete and contemporaneous. It corresponds also to his conviction that the existential element in philosophy involves not only the individual but also the total social situation. Thus religious knowledge includes knowledge of the present. Protestant protest and realization are protest and realization in the present. Only through concern with the present can concern with the future lead to fulfillment. Without concern for the present, irrelevance, disillusionment, futility, and even self-destruction ensue. With it, the ultimate seriousness of a divinely sponsored adventure appears….Neither Protestant protest nor Protestant realization finds relevant expression in antiquarian restoration, for the demand of history is that of “transforming the past into the future.” The demand is that we allow our past and our present to be grasped by, and imbued with, the creative and re-creative power that has worked hitherto and that awaits new reception or release.

Adams (ibid:20) continues:

But if Protestantism is to fulfill its proper task at any given time, it must in an ultimate sense penetrate the present not merely as a concept but also as a reality. It must penetrate the concrete present. It must be practical in the sense that it must deal with the present as it concerns us in the very depth of our being.

Adams (ibid:23) moves to a second concept formed during the German years of decision.

Adams brings out Tillich’s religious socialism without naming it. It is the concept of decision which will eventuate in the end of Western society. Adams (ibid:23-24) writes:

If the concept of the Present is the central concept that integrates the tensions characteristic of an epoch, the concept of decision is the idea that integrates the tensions of an individual or a group as it confronts the present. The manner in which the past is transformed into the future depends upon the kind of decision with which man meets the present. And if that decision is to take time by the forelock, it must be daring decision, for there are in this world no guarantees of success in man’s rendezvous with time.
Tillich (1927:469 in ibid:24) writes: ‘The act of daring is an act that pushes ahead into the uncertain, an act that renounces securities and risks assured possessions’. Adams (ibid:27) writes based on Tillich’s 1929 article Philosophie und Schicksal which appeared in Kant-Studien:

The human situation with respect to freedom and necessity can be described also in terms of freedom and fate. Freedom is always entangled in fate, which involves three things. First, fate is related to freedom: where there is no freedom there is no fate, and where there is no fate there is no freedom. A merely physical object that is conditioned in all ways is entirely without fate because it is wholly bound to necessity. On the other hand, anyone whose freedom is absolute, whose freedom is not jeopardized by an ever intruding necessity, has no fate. Second, all freedom is subjected to necessity: no being has unconditional power over itself; and when it acts as though it did have, it is driven by inexhaustible desire from one illusion to another until it encounters resistance and penalty. Third, freedom and fate do not appear separately and alternately; they interpenetrate each other in every event: every man’s character and every civilization’s character are the result of creative freedom but they are also “conditioned by events that in their origin go back to past generations, back to much earlier manifestations of the continuing and living fabric of humanity.” Thus they are, as we have already indicated, conditioned by national, economic, and geographic factors, and also by unconscious vitalities and tensions. These factors always affect philosophy and theology as well as other human endeavors. Man is thrown into existence at a particular time and place in unity with all other beings. Yet he feels himself responsible for his existence in the context of his unity with, and differentiation from, all other beings. Hence human existence is always comprised of both the fated (or given) fact and the responsible act; freedom and necessity, fate and guilt presuppose each other and they cannot be separated.

Next, Adams (ibid:28) argues that Tillich relates decision to depth:

But, as Tillich understands it, decision is not merely decision between surface alternatives of existence. It possesses a dimension of depth. To speak of depth, of the depths, the ground, the abyss, is for Tillich highly characteristic. Instead of looking up and away from reality he prefers to look down through it.

Tillich had an interest in depth psychology, and sociology (Adams 1965:29). Depth is another basic concept from the German years that runs all through Tillich’s thought
Adams clarifies: ‘Although depth is a dimension of space, it is employed as symbol for a spiritual quality’ (ibid:28). Adams (ibid:28) continues:

There are two meanings of “depth” when considered in the religious sense. It is either the opposite of shallow or the opposite of high. “Truth is deep and not shallow. Suffering is depth and not height. Both are deep, the light of truth and the darkness of suffering. There is depth in God and there is a depth out of which the psalmist cried to God.” We think of truth as deep, and we think of suffering as deep. We use the same spatial symbol for both of them, because the search for truth and the experiences of disappointment and suffering drive us to dig deeper than the surface of things.

Another Tillichian concept is the ‘ultimate depth of history, to the depth of the supporting creative powers. This depth Tillich calls “the infinite and inexhaustible ground of being”‘ (Tillich 1929:325 in ibid:31). Adams (ibid:31) continues:

It is the depth that is the ground of hope. It is the dynamic source of all creative decision. The way to it leads beyond woe to joy, for the end of the way to the depth is joy.

American commentators would do well to pay attention to Tillich’s ‘own autobiographical sketch’ (Adams 1965:33). It is Tillich’s love and infatuation with nature which is prominent in his theology (ibid:33). Tillich (1936:7-8 in ibid:33) confirms this for us: ‘Most important, however, was the fact that from my eighth year onward annually I spent some weeks, later even months, by the seaside. The experience of the infinite bordering upon the finite, as one has it by the sea, responded to my tendency toward the border and supplied my imagination with a symbol from which feeling could win substance and thinking productivity’. Adams (ibid:34) continues: ‘In his autobiographical sketch Tillich speaks of living on the boundary between various
possibilities of existence. Now the notion of the border-situation is given a different
turn, a “deeper” metaphysical interpretation, and it is related to the central Tillichian
concept of the Unconditioned’. Adams bases this on Tillich’s The Interpretation of History.
Adams (ibid:34) writes: ‘The Interpretation of History, pp. 3-73. Tillich speaks of his
life as being lived on the boundaries between city and country, between social classes,
between reality and imagination, theory and practice, heteronomy and autonomy,
thought and philosophy, church and society, religion and culture, Lutheranism and
socialism, idealism and Marxism, home and alien land’. The concept of the border
is another concept formed during the German years as evidenced from Tillich’s The
Interpretation of History (ibid:34). Adams (ibid:36) writes: ‘The metaphysical concept
of the “human boundary-situation” as the limit of human possibility—in distinction from
the idea of the border as a line between contrasting possibilities of existence—has been
used also by a number of other theologians and some secular philosophers, especially
Kierkegaard, Barth, and Jaspers’. Tillich uses it in a different way as ‘contrasting
possibilities of existence’ (ibid:36). Adams (ibid:41) draws our attention to the interplay
between these concepts: ‘in order to avoid these errors of interpretation, the concept of
the boundary situation must be understood in relation to the concept of the Unconditioned
and its corollaries, the ideas of “the form of grace” and the Kairos’. Adams (ibid:41)
expands upon Tillich’s concept of the Unconditioned:

Tillich has nowhere written in systematic essay on the concept of the Unconditioned.
This is unfortunate, for his many and scattered references to it make for great difficulty in securing a consistent and synoptic view of it. The difficulty is increased by the fact that Tillich’s language is obscure and by the fact also that Tillich has not remained consistent in his definitions.

A further problem is that Tillich’s reference to the Unconditioned: ‘is variously referred to as the unconditioned transcendent, the unconditionally real, the unconditionally powerful, the unconditionally personal, the unconditionally perfect, the inaccessible holy, the eternal, the unconditional demand, and the unconditional meaning’ (ibid:41)…. Tillich (1932:7 in ibid:41) explains: ‘it would not be worthwhile to speak at all of the fact that all sorts of things, ideas or feelings or deeds, move out of the past into the future…if all this were nothing but a moving, a flowing, a becoming and decaying without ultimate meaning or final importance’. Adams (ibid:34) notes:

   It should be observed here that in his later writings Tillich does not use the substantive form, “the Unconditioned.” He tends to use instead the existential formulation, “object of unconditional concern.” If the substantive form appears, he speaks of “being itself,” “ground of being,” “power of being.”

Schelling’s Christian philosophy and theology runs throughout all of Tillich’s thought.

Adams (ibid:45-46) confirms this point:

   In other words, it is “the unconditioned of being” when he writes like Schelling’s Unvordenkliche, it is that which all thinking and all being must presuppose and it is also ultimately inaccessible to thought. It is a symbol of that which does not lend itself to intellectual realization, a symbol of the inner transcendence of things. But the symbolic character of the Unconditioned as pointing to what is anterior and inaccessible to all thought does not deprive it of reality or of amenability to human apprehension; it lifts the reality out of the conditioned into the unconditioned sphere, concerning which we can speak only in symbols.

Adams (ibid:41-42) summarizes:

   The direction of consciousness toward unconditioned meaning is a necessary function that constitutes the reality of the meaning. The prius of every individual apprehension
of meaning is the unconditioned meaning itself, the prius of every form of meaning is the direction toward the unconditioned form, and the prius of every content of meaning is the unconditioned import. It is senseless to ask whether there is an unconditioned meaning, for the very question presupposes an ultimate meaning. It is also senseless to ask whether the Unconditional “exists,” for if it were something established in the temporal order it would no longer be the Unconditional; moreover, it would some object the “existence” of which would be susceptible—at least theoretically—of proof. But the Unconditioned cannot be proved. It can only be pointed to as the meaning that is the foundation of all meaning-fulfillment.

Tillich (1932:11 in ibid:43) adds:

We find self-transcendence in every time, openness to the eternal, a hallowing of time; but upon the other hand we see the appropriation of the eternal, the self-sufficiency of time, the secularization of the holy. There is a movement to and fro between self-transcendence and self-sufficiency, between the desire to be a mere vessel and the desire to be the content, between turning points to the eternal and the turning points towards the self. In this action and reaction we discern the religious situation of every present at its profoundest level.

Adams (ibid:43) draws out the meaning of the Unconditioned it: ‘is the symbol of this ultimate concern; it is that to which all genuine religious symbols, including the word “God” points when they are alive’.

Adams points to the relative nature of Tillich’s writings which is in line with modern historiographical issues in writing contemporary history. Adams brings out the evolving nature of Tillich’s writings. Tillich (1923:130 in ibid:42) writes:

The unconditioned meaning should not be interpreted as being some ethereal or pure spiritual reality. As will be indicated later, it is inherent in the nature of being to strive for meaning-fulfillment. Hence the term “meaning” involves something ontological as well as axiological.

Adams (ibid:42) compares:

The above formulations appear relatively early in Tillich’s writings (1923). Almost twenty years later, he says that direction toward the Unconditioned is a matter of decision and faith, of orienting ourselves, to a creative reality, a transcendent order that informs but also contradicts the order to which we
belong. It involves receiving the transcendent reality as a gift, an unconditional power, that grasps us and gives the passing fact and decision unconditional seriousness and meaning.

The American years (1933-1965) are beyond the scope of this thesis but this comparison is drawn to show the relative nature of this concept from the German years. *Form of grace* is another Tillichian concept from the German years. Adams (ibid:50) summarizes: ‘This inner inexhaustibility of being, when it expresses the Unconditioned, becomes a *form of grace*. It is a form or *Gestalt* in the sense that it is a dynamic form-creating tendency, it is perceptible in the present, and it appears through the medium of a form of existence’. Adams (ibid:50) adds:

In other words, it is an “ecstatic” form of being, open to the infinite—as judgment and as anticipation of fulfillment—and to the incursion of the new form. It bespeaks both the divine Yes and the divine No. This conception is manifestly a sort of ideal type, for the perfect form of grace never appears. Fate is an ingredient of every action, not only in the sense that fulfillment is always ambiguous, but also in the sense that man cannot control it or induce it, he can only prepare for it through the “ecstatic” operation of faith.

Adams (ibid:50) writes of the form of grace:

The violation or frustration of the form of grace appears in a variety of ways. It may appear in the distortion, the sin, of arrogant self-inflation. (Of this we shall speak presently.) Or it may appear where there is a spirit of *self-sufficient finitude*, the ethos of pure *secularism*. In its truncated orientation, self-sufficient finitude is to be contrasted with the form of grace: it is tangible in the present but it ignores the protest against self-identification with the Unconditioned because it imagines it is immune to such distortion. And yet, it had its origin in protest against this very distortion.

Adams (Tillich 1929:16 in ibid:52) clarifies based on Tillich’s writing:

For Tillich, both the protests and the forms of grace in “secularism” are often more effective than so-called “religious” protest; certainly, they are more soundly religious than the self-styled religious institution or personality which is actually demonic. For this reason Tillich speaks of the secularism that in actuality recognizes the boundary-situation, and that is, in reality if not in word aware of the Unconditioned,
as a Protestant secularism and as a concealed form of grace. Protestant secularism may conceal within itself a latent protest against itself. Hence it may be attacked, not only from the outside, but also from its own depths.

Adams (ibid:52) continues to explain:

There are, then, different types of “religion” and different types of “secularism.” Both religion and secularism may manifest truly religious forms of grace and truly demonic forms of distortion. The churches have no monopoly on the forms of grace, and secularism has no monopoly on self-sufficient finitude.

Tillich understood the ‘ambivalent character of secularism as well as of “religion”’

…in terms of the threefold distinction between autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy’

(ibid:52). Adams (ibid:52-53) explains:

true religion is defined as relatedness to the Unconditioned. Culture, on the other hand, is defined as relatedness to the conditioned forms of meaning and their fulfillment. The fulfillment of cultural effort occurs only when culture in all its forms gives expression to the unconditioned meaning. But culture as such—in contrast to religion—actually relates itself to the conditioned forms and their unity without giving heed to the unconditioned meaning. The attitude here represented is called “autonomy.”

Tillich (1929:195 in ibid:53)writes of autonomy: ‘is the attempt of man to rely upon himself, to find in his own existence the fulfillment of its meaning’. Adams (ibid:53) points to Tillich’s proof of the inadequacy of autonomy. Tillich (1936:23 in ibid:53) argues that the ‘historical proof of the inability of autonomy’ is to be seen in ‘development of Greek philosophy from its ‘first appearance of rational autonomy…to its decline into skepticism and probabilism and its inversion into the ‘new archaicism’ of late antiquity’. Adams (ibid:53) adds: ‘The modern history of autonomy has pursued the same course, ending in the emptiness of present-day capitalism’. Heteronomy, by way of contrast, ‘garbs a portion of human-religious reality in the unconditioned validity of the divine, it raises protest’ (ibid:53). Tillich (1936:25-26 in ibid:53) denies heteronomy’s claim over reality, life and doctrine. He (ibid:25-26 in ibid:53)
writes: ‘this claim is established by a finite, historical reality, is the root of all heteronomy and of all demonry’. Demonry with its ‘destructive and creative elements’ is to be found in secularism and religion (ibid:51).

Autonomy and heteronomy are unable to deal with the ‘fundamental theological problem’ (Adams 1965:54). Tillich (1936:25 in ibid:54) writes: ‘the relation of the absolute, which is assumed in the idea of God, and of the relative, which belongs to human religion’. Adams (ibid:54) expands:

They both become empty because in opposite ways the unconditioned meaning is lost. They both subsist on theonomy and fall to pieces as soon as the theonomous synthesis has entirely disappeared. This is the synthesis in which the boundary-situation and relatedness to the Unconditioned appear together, the synthesis that emerges when the recognition of the unconditioned demand for meaning is joined with autonomous consciousness of form. Only when these elements are together can persuasion and creativity subsist.

Adams (Tillich 1929:57 in ibid:54-55) continues based on Tillich’s 1929 Religiose Verwirklichung:

But again, theonomy may become an abstraction and lose its existential relevance. In order to achieve relevance it must combine a sense of the universal with a sense of the demands of a particular situation. It must combine Logos with Kairos. Man cannot with impunity think timelessly. Heteronomy attempts to do so by claiming finality for one form. Autonomy attempts to do so by claiming the self-sufficiency of a particular set of cultural norms. But time demands new decisions, new ways of giving expression to the unconditioned meaning. The term Kairos, taken from the New Testament and meaning “the fullness of time,” expresses the fact that every moment approaches men as fate and as the demand for decision. Hence it expresses the fact that “at a special time special tasks are demanded.”

Adams (ibid:55) adds: ‘This insight becomes decisive not only for Tillich’s philosophy of history but also for his theory of truth’. Tillich (Tillich 1929:18-19 in ibid:55) states of his theory of truth:
Truth is not statically apprehended, as is attempted by both Catholicism and classicism, but rather it is apprehended dynamically. The truth stands in fate just as does existence. The truth of every religious realization is its standing in the depth of historical fate, its standing in the Kairos, in the transcendentally shattered present. The dynamic truth is the living, moving element of all that is here thought and said. It is an expression of the boundary-situation, and also each of these ideas and concepts. None of them can be separated from the dynamics of cognition. Each of them is justified in so far—and only in so far—as it is an adequate expression of our Present, of our Kairos.

Adams (ibid:56) writes of Tillich’s concept of meaning: ‘it is the most comprehensive and characteristic of all Tillich’s concepts’. Tillich’s interest in meaning has to do with the ‘problem of the meaning of life….characteristic concern of the human spirit….life in the spirit of existential philosophy….not how to live but why to live’ (ibid:56).

Adams (ibid:60) sums up: ‘we may say that meaning is understood as…Gestalt…existence rises above itself into that creative realm made up of value, being, and import, all together pulsating with the powerfulness and holiness of the divine’. Next, Adams turns to Tillich’s definition of theonomy (ibid:60). Tillich (1931:1128-1129 in ibid:60-61) writes of theonomy:

Theonomy, originally signifying a law or validity within divine sanction in contrast to the law emanating from the self or autonomy, has in contemporary discussion acquired a more definite meaning. It is sharply distinguished from heteronomy, i.e., from the shattering of autonomously validated forms of human thought and action by a law alien and external to the spirit. Theonomy is in contrast to heteronomy an imbuing of autonomous forms with transcendent import. It originates not through the renunciation of autonomy, as does, for example, the Roman Catholic idea of authority, but only through the deepening of autonomy in itself to the point where it transcends itself. The transcending of the autonomous forms in culture and society, their being impressed or imbued by a principle supporting and at the same time breaking through them but not shattering them: that is theonomy. In this sense the early and in part still the high Middle Ages is a theonomous period, while at the end of the contrast to this development the church set up resistance by becoming heteronomous. The struggle for the idea of tolerance on the soil of capitalistic society destroys the political power of heteronomy and gives to the autonomous principles a possibility of free development. But the autonomy left to its own devices leads to increasing emptiness and—and since there cannot be
a vacuum even in the spiritual realm—it finally becomes imbued with demonically destructive forces. The insight into this whole complex of cultural development has led to the demand for a new theonomy.

Tillich relates theonomy to religious socialism. Leibrecht (1959:17) maintains Tillich’s call to theonomy:

is his greatest challenge to modern thought. His is a vision of culture in which ultimate concern informs the whole web of life and thought and for which the ultimate unity is an ever-presented horizon with this idea of theonomy. Tillich overcomes the easy deification of culture by liberal theology and yet makes religion relevant to culture in a profound way. He bridges the gap which Barth and the existentialists alike have been able to see but not to overcome. Religion is understood by Tillich as the root of culture, and the culture as the efflorescence of religion. Accordingly, Tillich has been successful, as perhaps no other modern writer, in showing the essential relatedness of each cultural expression to its religious ground. The Church has been powerfully called back out of its self-chosen ghetto, out of its disregard for culture, to do its task for the world.

Leibrecht (ibid:17) continues: ‘This emphasis has also prepared the ground for a truly ecumenical theology. Tillich has provided in his concept of theonomy a creative possibility for a fruitful encounter of the Protestant and Catholic principles in the present ecumenical discussion’. It is theonomy which ‘includes not only the Protestant principle of protest’ but also the ‘Protestant eschatological prophetism’ (ibid:17). This ‘may be united with the priestly sacramentalism on a foundation of the awareness of the holiness of being, and the reconciling force of the New Being’ (ibid:17). Further, ‘the prophet speaking the word of crisis becomes the priest healing that which is broken, through the power of the New Being, by uniting the separated with its ultimate ground’ (ibid:17). Leibrecht (ibid:17-18) speaks of Tillich’s prophetic spirit during those years in Germany. Leibrecht (ibid:17-18) writes:

In the moment of crisis and revolution, when the old world was tumbling, Tillich thought
he saw the time wide open for further realization of his vision of theonomy through religious socialism. He visualized a dehumanized, dishonored proletariat longing for full manhood as the bearer into reality of this new theonomy. But as it was once with Moses, so it was with Tillich: when he returned from his mountain with the new law of theonomy, the people were still dancing around the golden calf. The socialists and proletarians had joined in the round dance with the bourgeois who had managed to save their properties as well as their comfortable mentality through the crisis. His book, *The Religious Situation*, written in 1925, shows Tillich’s disappointment. Here he wrote that “a frost has fallen upon all the things of which we have spoken, whether it be the youth movement or the philosophy of life, whether it be expressionism or religious socialism.” It was heteronomy and not theonomy which the man of the twenties had chosen, politically as well as theologically. Tillich was by now, as a theologian as well as a political thinker, far from the midstream in Europe.

These concepts the present, decision, fate, depth, ultimate depth, boundary, Unconditioned, the form of grace, kairos, self-sufficient finitude, secularism, autonomy, heteronomy, theonomy, demonry, and meaning are concepts formed during the German years. They are evidence from his writings during the German years. Adams (ibid:17) argues of Tillich: ‘What he sees and what he names with his own words—the concrete, dynamic, tensional, and tragic qualities, the intimate and the ultimate qualities of experience—he associated with a Protestant interpretation of the nature and meaning of life….Protestant principles as he understands them’. ‘Historically inherited’ and ‘intellectual ancestry’ are further proof of these concepts from the German years as necessary to understand Tillich his life, thought, and German legacy (ibid:17,22).

In inspection, Tillich’s major concepts were formed during the German years. These major concepts were the present, decision, fate, depth, ultimate depth of history, the unconditional, the boundary (border), form of grace, kairos, self-sufficient finitude, secularism, the threefold distinction between anatonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy, and demonry a
concepts formed during the German years.

**7:5 The System of The Sciences And Tillich’s Theology of Culture**

**7:5:1 Tillich Related Theology To Science**

Tillich has given attention to questions that have been neglected (Adams 1965:182).

Tillich (1936:38 in ibid:182) asks:

How is theology possible as a science? How is it related to the other sciences? What is its outstanding method?

Adam’s (ibid:120-121) writes of Tillich’s *Das System der Wissenschaften*:

Yet, the book is one in which a theologian attempts to overcome the disruption of meaning incident to the separation of theology from other concerns…[A]lthough Tillich’s interest was at first in the cultural sciences, this study pushed him more and more to raise questions concerning the relations between all the sciences. These questions were posed as a result of the encroachments of positivism from the direction of the natural sciences and of historicism from the direction of studies in historical methodology. These pressures had the effect of questioning the fundamental legitimacy of theology as such, even where this query was not raised an equally devastating challenge was posed in the name of the relativity of all knowledge.

Tillich (1923:v in ibid:121) writes:

It became more and more clear to me that a system of the sciences is not only the goal but also the starting point of all knowledge. Only the most radical empiricism can dispute that. For the radical empiricist there can be no system at all. But whoever wishes to develop a fully critical and self-conscious attitude toward scientific knowledge—and that is a necessity not only for the worker in the cultural sciences—must be aware of the scientist’s place in the totality of knowledge, both in regard to the material he deals with and in regard to the methods employed. For all science functions in the service of the one truth, and science collapses if it loses the sense of the connection with the whole.

Adams (ibid:121-122) clarifies:

Clearly, he wished to overcome the disruption of meaning and conviction which had been brought about by the fragmentation of life and of the sciences and by the enervating struggle between religion and science and between theological truth and other forms of truth. In other words, he wished to develop further his theology of
culture by setting forth a system of the sciences. [I]f the service of truth was to possess the dimension of depth it would have to be truth that would at the same time take all the sciences into account and give them an ultimate—that is, a theological—orientation.

This can be seen as Tillich’s desire to win theology a legitimate place within the totality of knowledge and the other sciences (ibid:120-121). Adams (ibid:124) discusses Tillich’s approach. Adams (ibid:124-125) writes:

Tillich adopts and adapts a general pattern proposed by Fichte, a pattern that enables him to set forth the implications of his own realism. Tillich was stimulated by the discussion of the differences between, and the respective methods of, the natural and the cultural sciences, discussions carried on by Dilthey and also by the neo-Kantians….we must take note of a fundamental insight that informs Tillich’s whole effort, an insight that possesses special significance with respect to his intention to devise a system of the sciences which will give a significant place to theology. [H]aving already developed the outlines of a theology of culture, Tillich in The System of The Sciences approaches the general problem of the system with the apparatus already constructed.

While an exposition of The System of The Sciences is beyond the scope of this thesis, yet the author seeks to set it within the scope of the hypothesis of our thesis. The System of The Sciences is to be understood for our purpose how it relates to theology and the German years. Adams (ibid:149-150) continues:

Perhaps we can best understand Tillich’s concept of metalogic if we examine in further detail what he means to reject. We shall in this way also bring into relief what he means to reject. We shall in this way also bring into relief the religious basis of his whole “system.” One could scarcely find a more revealing statement of Tillich’s conception of the task that lay before him, and thus of the purpose of metalogic, than appears in his essay on Ernst Troeltsch….Tillich dedicated The System of The Sciences to Troeltsch. [W]hen Tillich says that “the motivating energy of this powerful intellect” issued from “the tension between the absolute and the relative,” he expresses one of the major tensions of his own thought and experience….But Tillich believes Troeltsch was never able to resolve the tensions in the way in which he hoped to, for in the struggle over the contradiction between
the absolute and the relative “the preponderance lay on the side of the relative.” “It was not for this reason alone that he abandoned theology.”

Adams (ibid:149) bases this on Tillich’s (1924) article on Ernst Troelstch.

Adams (ibid:156) writes: ‘Tillich holds that every spiritual act is the establishing of norms and that cultural science is normative insofar as it shares productivity in the act’.

The discussion closes with the concerns of ‘philosophy, metaphysics, and theology’ (ibid:160). Adams (ibid:173) draws our attention to the all encompassing role of theology:

Summarizing the whole discussion of theology we may now define its disciplines in this fashion: Systematic Theology as a theonomous theory of the norms of meaning embraces theonomous metaphysics oriented to the living confessions (dogmatics), theonomous ethics or ethos (the theory of piety), the theory of the forms of devotion (liturgics), and the theory of the cultus-community; add to these disciplines the theonomous theory of the principles of meaning (philosophy or philosophy of religion) and the theonomous theory of the material of meaning (historical theology and theonomous cultural history); all together these disciplines constitute the theonomous cultural science of theology.

Adams (ibid:177-178) concludes: ‘This brings us to a consideration of Tillich’s conception of the relation between theology and the “living confessions,” and of his conception of the relation between theology and the other cultural sciences….The way in which he as a theologian would bring together motifs from what he calls kerygmatic theology and philosophical theology’. The distinction between kerygmatic theology and philosophical theology has been dealt with in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

In examination, Tillich envisioned devising a system of the sciences in which a significant place would be given to theology. Tillich’s Das System der Wissenschaften sought to win for theology a legitimate place within the totality of knowledge and the other
7:6 American Misconception

7:6:1 American Analytical Philosophers Find Tillich’s Work Not Empirically Verifiable

Tillich is perceived in America as more of a philosopher of religion during the German years. This view originates with analytical philosophers of religion within the Anglo-American philosophical community. It is obvious that the distinction is not made between the German years and the American years. Rowe (1989:201) writes: ‘Philosophers of religion within the analytical tradition have not, on the whole, been seriously interested in the philosophical theology of Tillich. And those few who have taken an interest in Tillich have been mainly critical, at best calling his work unclear—and a work confused’. Rowe (ibid:201) argues that this is due to logical positivism. Rowe (ibid:201) continues: ‘Like so much else in theology and metaphysics, Tillich’s work failed to satisfy the positivist’s longing for the empirically verifiable. Logical positivism gave way to ordinary language philosophy, a method of thought that viewed with great suspicion the use of ordinary words …far removed from their ordinary meaning and setting’. This criticism stemming from the American years (1933 to 1965) is beyond the scope of this thesis. It argues for the need of our thesis because of the failure to distinguish the German years (1886-1933) from the American years (1933 to 1965). Secondly, it argues for the hypothesis of our thesis that Paul Tillich’s German years are essential to understanding his life, thought, and legacy. Tillich’s philosophy of religion presupposes a number of disciplines. Adams (1965:187) writes:

Philosophy of religion must presuppose a familiarity with the materials which the
disciplines of the history of religions, the psychology of religion, the typology of religion, and the sociology of religion provide. But its own task is not empirical; it considers what ought to be and not what is. As a normative science it sets forth “what is deemed to be religion, in a creative, productive synthesis.” The disciplines belonging to philosophy of religion proper are arranged in accord with the system set forth earlier for the normative sciences. That is, they are distributed in the tripartite classification; philosophy of meaning, intellectual history, and the normative system—religion. Every cultural science consciously or unconsciously flows in these three channels.

Adams (ibid:185) adds: ‘for Tillich, on the other hand, philosophy—or philosophy of religion—and theology must always stand in tension or in correlation with each other’.

Further the reader is told ‘Tillich’s general philosophy was presupposed in his classification of the sciences. We find here that his general philosophy is presupposed not only in his philosophy of religion but also even in his definition of religion’ (ibid:191). At times, Tillich’s theology may be hard to decipher (ibid:259). Tillich’s philosophy of religion presents ideas from his Christian theology or draws on Christian ideas. Adams claims that Tillich changed his view of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Tillich sought to make the Christian character of his theology more explicit. In 1925, and in that period, Tillich viewed philosophy as dealing with the theory of the principles of meaning. Later, he argued that philosophy raises the questions and systematic theology provides the answers. This later development in Tillich’s thinking is called the method of correlation (ibid:259-260).

Adams (ibid:277) concludes with this appreciation for Tillich’s theological work during the German years (1886 to 1933):

The greatest achievement of Paul Tillich has been manifest in his genius for devising new categories or for giving old or forgotten categories new meaning.
Few theologians in our time have given currency to so many novel or virtually novel concepts. Belief-ful realism, the dimension of depth, the boundary-situation, form of grace, theonomy, the demonic, and Kairos are concepts to which he has given vivid and powerful meaning. These are words “in which the powerfulness of the word pulsates.” In Tillich’s hands they also readily lend themselves to the illuminating of specific elements in the Biblical and in church traditions. He has discovered anew a reality that was “apprehended, in fact, involves much more than his explication of themes from German classical philosophy, important as this may be. Moreover, he has had measurable success in accomplishing what he originally envisaged as a worthy task for the Protestant theologian of our day.

In analyzing the sources, Tillich is perceived as a Christian philosopher of religion in America. This view originates with the analytical philosophers. Analytical philosophers who were interested in Tillich called his work both unclear and confused. This is due to logical positivism. Tillich’s work was not empirically verifiable. Logical positivism was followed by the ordinary philosophy of language.

Philosophical theology and kerygmatic theology must stand in correlation with each other. In 1925, Tillich viewed philosophy as dealing with the principles of meaning. Later, Tillich maintained philosophy raised the questions and theology providing the answers to the questions. Tillich’s greatest accomplishment for his theological work during the German years was in the devising of new categories. It was also in supplying old or forgotten categories with new meaning. Logical positivism viewed this with great suspicion in America. The removal of ordinary words from their ordinary meaning and setting. This criticism stemming from the American years (1933-1965) is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Tillich’s religious socialism has been misunderstood. Tillich (1977:70) explains:

It was the basic purpose of religious socialism to disclose and to resolve the conflict in socialist belief. Appealing both to Marx and to the prophetic, early Christian-end expectation, it devoted itself to uncovering the element of faith in socialism and making it explicit. Only from this perspective can religious socialism be understood. There is also a socialist movement within the church whose goal is to make the church accessible to the socialist worker and vice versa. This task is indeed necessary and is of considerable importance; but it is not fundamentally decisive. Religious socialism is the attempt to bring into awareness the element of faith at work in socialism, to reveal socialism’s inner conflict, and to lead it to a solution that has symbolic power.

Religious socialism included the concept of revolution. Tillich (ibid:79) writes:

For the success of the revolution depends on the inspiring power of an expectation in which all aspects of human existence find a new fulfillment; and the success of the revolution requires persons whose being and consciousness is formed through their anticipation of the coming fulfillment.

[T]he religious foundation of socialism—socialist belief and its roots in human existence—have been shown. Socialism is religious if religion means living out of the roots of human being. But this concept of religion, which especially religious socialism presents as the only legitimate one, is very different from the concept of religion assumed in socialism’s programmatic statements. When the Erfurt Program declared religion to be a private matter, it was thinking of a separate sphere of human thought and action existing alongside numerous other spheres.

The Erfurt Program was a Manifesto adopted by the German Social Democrats at their party congress in the year 1891 (ibid:79). Tillich (ibid:132) elaborates further upon the nature and expectations of socialism:

This is why socialism, at least in principle, must look beyond itself and its own achievement of a new social order. Socialism is not the end of socialism’s striving. To be sure, socialist belief is historically dependent on the prophetic expectation of a millennium, but it transcends the utopian form that this belief assumed under the domination of the bourgeois principle. It is precisely at this point that religious socialism has tried to penetrate and purify socialist belief. Through the concept of the kairos, it has attempted to clarify the limits as well as the
validity and meaning of concrete expectation. Expectation as such, expectation as a human attitude, comes into being in terms of a definite content of expectation pertinent to a particular time. *Expectation is always bound to the concrete, and at the same time transcends every instance of the concrete.* It possesses a content that is dependent on the spiritual or social group involved, yet it transcends this content. The vitality and depth of socialist faith lies in the fact that it so distinctly—and so dangerously—embodies the tension. For the most perilous posture one can assume is that of expectation.

Tillich (ibid:145) argues that religious socialism’s attitude must be applied to religion and to the to the churches. Tillich (ibid:145) explains:

This applies, first of all, to its attitude toward religion and the churches. Socialism is quite justified in continuing to attempt to limit the political influence of the churches as they are presently structured, but it is quite unjustified in its privatization of religion along the lines of the liberal idea of tolerance. Socialism has a twofold task *vis-à-vis* the churches. *First of all, it must represent the socialist idea within their midst.* It must bring to expression in the churches the prophetic element that is alive in socialism, and on which all religious groups in the Judeo-Christian tradition depend. Socialism has to demonstrate that they have limited and even betrayed the attitude of expectation which they themselves once possessed, in favor of the powers related to the myth of origin. *Socialism has to strengthen the prophetic as opposed to the priestly element in the churches.* “Religious Socialism” has attempted to do just this…Protestantism has the possibility of taking the socialist principle into itself under the aspect of the New Testament concept of the *kairos.* Catholicism does not appear to have this possibility, at least not at present.

In analysis, the element of faith must be made clear in religious socialism. Tillich’s concept of religious socialism included the concept of revolution. Further, one of the goals of socialism is to make socialism accessible to the workers and the church to the workers. Religious socialism looks for a new world order. Its prophetic expectation transcends the bourgeois principle of domination. This is achieved through the concept of the kairos. The key element of expectation is included within religious socialism. The socialist idea must much be represented to the churches. The churches have the prophetic element but have discarded it. They have betrayed this concept for the powers of the myth of origin.
Religious socialism’s emphasis of the prophetic must be emphasized to the churches. The churches must exchange their priestly emphasis for the prophetic emphasis of religious socialism. Religious socialism can adopt the socialist principle under the New Testament concept of the kairos. Catholicism could not do this when Tillich wrote his book *The Socialist Decision* because they emphasized the priestly.

7:8 Tillich and the Institute for Social Research

7:8:1 Tillich Developed His Religious Socialism Apart From The Frankfurt Institute

O’Keeffe (1984:68) writes: ‘A number of recent commentators on Paul Tillich’s social and political thought have drawn attention to links between Tillich and the Frankfurt School—the Institut fur Sozialforschung, or the Institute for Social Research, founded in 1923, whose personnel included Max Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal, Erich Fromm, Karl August Wittfogel, and others’.

O’Keeffe (ibid:67-68) continues:

Do the links that can be established enable us to talk about an interdependence between Tillich’s socialist thought and the Critical Theory of the institute, of a mutual influence and a shared perspective between the Frankfurt School and the Marxism of Tillich? The Frankfurt Institute was founded in 1923 and officially opened in June 1924. The idea of such an institute had come from the wealthy Felix Weil, whose doctorate at Frankfurt School had been in political science. His dissertation, the practical problems of implementing socialism, was published in a series of monographs edited by the Marxist Karl Korsch.

O’Keeffe (ibid:68) furnishes the background:

Together with a number of like-minded Marxists, he had helped to organize a Marxist work week in Thuringen in 1922. The participants included Korsch, Georg Lukacs, Weil’s close friend Fredrich Pollock (an economist), Karl August Wittfogel (a member of the German Communist Party), and Richard Sorge (later to gain fame as a Russian spy in the Far East). Much of the discussion centered on Korsch’s as yet unpublished manuscript *Marxism and Philosophy*. Plans for a second Marxist week were soon
replaced by the proposal to create an independently endowed institute whose aim would be the application of radical Marxist ideas in a scholarly manner. The initial suggestion of calling it an Institute for Marxism was abandoned as too provocative and the title Institute for Social Research was adopted. It was to be attached to the University of Frankfurt and the director was to be a professor of the university. After the sudden death of the person nominated to head the institute—a leftwing economist, from Aachen, Kurt Albert Gerlach—it was decided to appoint Carl Grunberg, a prominent Austro-Marxist and professor of law and political science at Vienna. Grunberg, in his first speech as director, made clear his commitment and that of the institute to “Scientific” Marxism.

O’Keeffe (ibid:68) continues: ‘The institute gathered together a group of like-minded Marxists. Max Horkheimer, a close friend of Pollock, had completed his dissertation on Kant under Hans Cornelius, the professor of philosopher at Frankfurt’. O’Keeffe (ibid:69) adds an interesting point: ‘There were a number of committed Communist party members recruited. Franz Borkeneau, Julian Gomperz, Henryk Grossman, and Wittfogel. Close links were established between the institute and the Marx-Engels Institute under David Ryazanon’.

O’Keeffe (ibid:69) stresses the importance of the early publications of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research: ‘This initial characterization of the Institute for Social Research is important since it makes clear that the common thread binding together the members of the institute was Marxism’. The reference to this beginning is the publications of the Institute under Grunberg:

Grossman’s *The Law of Accumulation of Capital and Collapse in the Capitalist System*; Pollock’s *Experiments in Economic Planning in the Soviet Union 1917-1927*; and Wittfogel’s *Economy and Society of China* (only published in 1931). The vehicle for the Institute’s writings was Grunberg’s *Archiv* (whose full title was *Archive for the History of Socialism and the Labour Movement*).
Next, O’Keeffe (ibid:69) expands upon the character of the Institute for Social Research.

The Institute was thus firmly within the stream of interpretation and applications of Marxist theory that was widespread in Western Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. After the initial excitement generated by the Russian Revolution of 1917, crucial theoretical questions were raised both by the advent of Socialism in underdeveloped, non-capitalist Russia, and by the failure of socialism in developed, capitalist countries of the West like Germany. Other theoretical questions were raised by the development within Marxism of a rigid orthodoxy for which strictly philosophical questions seemed irrelevant.

O’Keeffe (ibid:69) continues his exposition: ‘A rigid application of the thesis that superstructural elements of society (law, religion, philosophy, morality, and culture) were dependent epiphenomena of an economic base suggested that scientific socialism consisted simply in describing the dialectical laws governing changes in the economic structure, with little point in superstructural analyses that were mainly dismissed as ideology. The Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt undertook the task of developing Marxist thought and theory within the context of Germany.

Social philosophy also known as Critical Theory, and an ‘attempt to create a methodological synthesis of Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxism” were the key elements of the institute (ibid:75). O’Keeffe (ibid:75) explains:

In 1932, with Erich Fromm’s membership in the institute, this work was launched. Insofar as the institute had undertaken to analyze the superstructural elements of bourgeois society, the distortion and alienation of consciousness that was produced required an explanation which, while remaining true to a materialist, historical account, showed how it was possible for distortions to occur. Indeed, it demonstrated how consciousness is manipulated by hidden forces, and in particular how bourgeois ideology could obscure for the proletariat its own economic exploitation. Marxist historical materialism needed to be supplemented by a psychoanalytical account, based in the Freudian theory of “drives” in order to clarify the way ideologies are produced and maintained to manipulate a class-divided society.
Fromm (1973:172 in Carey 1984:75) writes: ‘Psychoanalysis can show that man’s ideologies are the products of certain wishes, instinctual drives, interests and needs, which themselves, in large measure, unconsciously find expression as rationalizations, that is, as ideologies’. O’Keeffe’s insight is interesting at this point in terms of the influence of the German years (1886 to 1933) on Tillich. O’Keeffe (1984:75-76) continues:

Tillich’s extensive writings on socialist themes, culminating (though not ending) with *The Socialist Decision*; appear in great part to parallel many preoccupations of critical theory. The well-known professional and personal links between Tillich and all core members of the institute, particularly Horkheimer, Pollock, Adorno, and Lowenthal, make plausible the attribution of mutual influence. After all, Tillich made possible Horkheimer’s replacement of Grunbeg as director of the institute in 1930. Tillich was appointed as professor of philosophy and sociology at Frankfurt in 1929 succeeding Hans Cornelius. (Max Scheler had been appointed but died almost immediately after.) Horkheimer was at that time a *Privatdozent*, and Volume 14 of Tillich’s *Gesammelte Werke* lists a number of courses taught jointly by Tillich and Horkheimer on (Locke), and Tillich and Adorno (on Hegel’s philosophy of history).

Tillich played a prominent role in and ‘a similar interest in applying a critical analysis to superstructural elements of bourgeois society in order to bring out the contradictions and tensions inherent in that society that point forward to a socialist transformation’ (ibid: 78). O’Keeffe (ibid:78) confirms: ‘This is the task undertaken in *The Religious Situation* in 1926 and continued in *The Socialist Decision*. O’Keeffe (ibid:78) argues: ‘Ideology must not be analyzed and dismissed as the simple mirror-reflection of the economic structure. Tillich recognized as early as 1926 that such a thesis is both philosophically self-defeating…and misses the point of ideology-criticism as a weapon in the class struggle’.
O’Keeffe (ibid:81) concludes: ‘Tillich’s Marxism is not worked out in interdependence with the work of the Institute for Social Research. The development of his socialist thought can be charted from the earliest socialist writings of 1919—in which theoretical questions are hardly raised—through numerous articles and books until *The Socialist Decision* of 1933’.

O’Keeffe (ibid:82) bases this on correspondence from Leo Lowenthal in 1979 and 1980 who was ‘the last surviving member of the “inner group” of the Frankfurt School’ (ibid:82). O’Keeffe (ibid:83) adds a second opinion to the same effect based on correspondence from Adolf Lowe in 1980:

Lowe, showing much more respect for Tillich as a socialist, was nonetheless quite definite when asked about a relationship between Tillich’s thought and Critical Theory. “If I see it rightly,” he replied, “there is none.” He saw no mutual influence or interdependence between the thought of *The Socialist Decision* and the Frankfurt School’s brand of Marxism. “It is my firm conviction that there is no connection or mutual influence relating to Tillich’s socialism and critical theory.”

In critique, Tillich’s religious socialism was developed apart from the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. Social philosophy (Critical Theory) was an attempt to draw a synthesis between Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxism. This was an important part of the life of the institute. Tillich played a major role in the Marxist critique of bourgeois society. Tillich focused on the contradictions and tensions in bourgeois society.

7:9 Theology of Eros

7:9:1 Tillich’s Interest In Eros

Carey (ibid:61-62) argues based on Alec Irwin’s book *Paul Tillich and the Theology of the Erotic*: ‘Irwin’s book helped me understand better than I had before Tillich’s lifelong interest in the concept of eros, and the rich and diverse ways in which Tillich saw the power of eros at work in the world….Irwin reminds us that Tillich’s lifelong interest in eros is one of
those rich themes’. A further contribution of Irwin’s work is to bring out the work of Ander’s Nygren’s book *Agape and Eros* (ibid:62). Carey (ibid:62-63) continues:

Irwin gives an insightful analysis of what was at stake between Tillich and Nygren, with their two ways of seeing the world, their two theological systems, and their two ways of interpreting Agape, and Eros. Nygren, mirroring a Barthian theological perspective that dominated a whole generation, saw agape and eros as “dangerous rivals.”

Nygren (1991:205 in ibid:63) writes agape and eros: ‘represent two streams that run throughout the whole history of religion, alternately clashing against one another and mingling with one another’. Carey (ibid:63) adds:

Nygren saw agape as God’s free gift, the heart of an authentically Christian life. Eros, by contrast, represents human love and striving, shaped by the beauty and worth of its object. Eros, argued Nygren, is tainted by human emotions and drives, and lacks the purity or selflessness of agape. It is *other* than agape.

Carey (ibid:63) continues: ‘Tillich’s reply to Nygren was that any attempt to pit eros and agape against each other generally presupposes that eros is to identified with *epithymia*, the desire for sexual satisfaction. Tillich stressed the ontological unity of love, and that both eros and agape can be shaped by the divine Spirit. A third area which Irwin’s work contributes to for the purposes of our thesis on the German years is ‘Tillich’s engagement with Freud’ (ibid:63). Carey (ibid:63) explains:

Although there is much in Freud that Tillich felt has significance for Christian theology, Tillich criticized Freud for not making a distinction between the human being’s “essential and existential nature” (he felt Freud had not vision of a healed or whole person) and also for holding such a puritanical and negative attitude toward sex (see Systematic Theology 2:54).
This last point is beyond the scope of our thesis based on Tillich’s production of his second volume during the American years 1933 to 1965. The weakest chapter in Irwin’s book is ‘chapter 4, when he writes about Tillich’s personal life’ (ibid:63). Carey (ibid:63) acknowledges Hannah Tillich’s two books which are beyond the scope of this thesis.

A further surprise is Irwin’s book is only partly about Paul Tillich. It is ‘basically a book about the concept of eros, both as this idea was interpreted by Tillich but also how eros is such a major theme with current feminist and womanist theologians’ (ibid:64).

Carey (ibid:66-67) draws three conclusions concerning Tillich’s theology of eros:

On the whole Tillich was quite theoretical and abstract in his reflections on eros. He was preoccupied with the relationship between agape and eros, and the unity of the four different components of love. To read Tillich on eros reminds us that he was essentially a theologian and not an ethicist….[F]or all of what Tillich saw at stake in tension between agape and eros, he did not comment upon patriarchy as an ideology, nor did he comment upon heterosexism as an ideology that is so powerful in the shaping of gender roles in our society….Tillich did not write about sexual abuse….Tillich recognized problems that are intrinsic to conventional middle-class marriage, but did not criticize marriage as it is currently understood by feminists as hierarchical, male-supportive, and linked with patriarchy and capitalism. Tillich was a powerful force, however, in trying to interject into Christian thought a positive force, to the negativity about sexuality that has come through the tradition. He furthermore linked eros with concerns for justice, and stood against all those persons who would want to make of eros and sexuality something shameful or simple. He reminded us of its complexity, of its power, and of its redemptive capabilities.

This is included in our thesis on the German years because Tillich had ‘lifelong interest in the concept of eros’ (ibid:62).

Adams, Leibrecht, Runyon, Carey, O’Keeffe, and Irwin argue that Paul Tillich’s German years 1886 to 1933 are necessary to understand Tillich’s life, thought, and legacy.
In evaluation, Tillich had a life long interest in the erotic. Paul Tillich stressed the ontological unity of love. Eros and agape love can be shaped by the divine Spirit. Irwin’s work *Paul Tillich and the Theology of the Erotic* brought out a third area of interest. This was confirmation of Tillich’s interest in Freudian thought. Tillich criticized Freud for his puritanical and negative attitude toward sex. Irwin’s book is partly about Paul Tillich. It is a book about the concept of eros.

**7:10 Summary**

The American perspective on Paul Tillich shows considerable disagreement and conflict as to the meaning of Paul Tillich. The American years (1933-1965) are emphasized while the German years (1886-1933) are omitted. The result is Tillich is misinterpreted and misunderstood. A lack of consensus exists on the American perspective of Paul Tillich. The German years are essential to our understanding of Tillich.

Tillich’s theology was formed during the years in his native country. This was the development of a theology of culture and art, a Christian metaphysical theology derived from Schelling and Bohme, a political theology of religious socialism, the beginning of his first volume of his systematic theology, and a Christian existential theology.

Tillich inherited historical principles during his days in Germany. These intellectual ancestors included Kierkegaard, Schelling, Bohme, Marx, and Nietzsche. Further, Tillich developed his major theological concepts from 1886 to 1933. The concepts of the present, decision, fate, depth, ultimate depth of history, the unconditional, the boundary, form of grace, kairos, self-sufficient finitude and secularism, the threefold distinction between autonomy,
heteronomy, and theonomy, and demonry were formed during the German years.

Tillich tried to win a legitimate place for theology within all knowledge and the sciences.

The American misconception of Tillich argues for the need of our thesis on the German years (1886-1933). Tillich is viewed as a philosophical theologian in America. This view originates with the analytical philosophers. They called Tillich’s work both unclear and confused. This can be traced to logical positivism. Tillich’s work was not empirically verifiable. Logical positivism gave way to ordinary philosophy language. This new philosophy viewed changing the meaning and setting of words with great suspicion.

Philosophical theology and kerygmatic theology are dependent on each other. Tillich’s view of philosophy changed during the early years. He maintained at a later date that philosophy raised the existential questions. Theology provided the answers to these questions. Tillich’s genius during these years was in his devising of new categories and reloading old or forgotten categories with new meaning.

Tillich had developed his religious socialism apart from the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxism were important to the life of the institute. Tillich gave the Marxist critique of bourgeois society. He tried to demonstrate both the contradictions and tensions within the capitalistic bourgeois society.

Tillich had a lifelong interest in the theological concept of eros. He thought that both eros and agape love were a product of the divine Spirit. Irwin’s book confirmed
Tillich’s interest in Freud. However, Tillich did criticize Freud for his puritanical and negative attitude toward sex. The progression of our thesis now works to conclude.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

8:1 Chapter 1 conclusions

Tillich (1952:4-6) recalls those years in Germany (1886 to 1933). Two points stand out in Tillich’s mind. He recalls his encounter with nature. He had a fascination with history. Tillich was raised in a church manse which left a definite impression upon him. He was the son of a Lutheran pastor. Further the experience of the Holy from Otto’s book *Idea of the Holy* helped Tillich to be able to interpret his life, his experiences with nature, and gave him a history of the Holy One. It was these experiences in nature, history, and Otto’s concept of the Holy which were determining factors in his own formation of a philosophy of religion (Tillich 1967:28). Otto’s work had three clear implications for the *Idea of the Holy* the mystical, sacramental, and aesthetic (ibid:28). Otto’s work became part of Tillich’s thinking from the beginning. It became like a compass and a constitution to him. The ethical and the national elements became a necessary part of his experience with the divine. Schleiermacher was another religious thinker who left an impression upon Tillich with his emphasis on the mystical. Schleiermacher contributed to both Christian and non-Christian mysticism (ibid:28). It was these early impressions in Germany that Tillich thought perhaps might have accounted for the romanticism in both his feeling and thinking (ibid:24-25). Tillich’s initial relationship to nature and the impact of Schelling’s Christian philosophy of nature were both from the German years (ibid:24-25).
Church festivals, the sayings and concepts of the Bible worked to create an ecclesiastical background for him (Tillich 1936:41-42). Tillich stood within the Lutheran tradition in Germany (ibid:54 in Carey 2002:4-5). Tillich was raised in a small town in eastern Germany (Tillich 1936:29). The absence of automobiles and a secondary railway created yearnings for adventure within Tillich (ibid:29-30). The yearly vacation to the Baltic Sea with its horizon to infinity created the concept of the infinite for young Paul (ibid:29). The yearly trip to Berlin was another adventure for Paul and the Tillich family. The Tillich family moved to Berlin in 1900. Tillich learned the mysteries of a great city (ibid:29).

The authoritarian nature of German society with its beaucratic structure and strong central government did not sit well with Tillich. The First World War ended this rigid beaucratic system. Post-war Germany became open to democratic principles and allowed for those espousing social revolution (ibid:31). Tillich’s home that he grew up in was oppressive both to his religious and political views. Tillich’s father was a Lutheran with strong beliefs. Tillich’s mother had the outlook of a Calvinist (ibid:31). However, some of Tillich’s happiest memories were the long philosophical discussions with his father (ibid:31-32). Tillich had an autonomous spirit. Tillich was accused of being a Neo-Orthodox and a liberal. He was accused as well of being not only a romantic but a revolutionary as well (ibid:33). The balancing of these motives was a lifelong problem for Tillich (ibid:33).

His years in the humanistic Gymnasium gave him a humanistic education. This created an internal conflict for Tillich with the Christian tradition. He learned the Christian tradition at home, and in the church. Religious instruction was given in school. Religious information
was available in history, literature, and philosophy (ibid:34-35). The two temperaments of his parents contributed to his character (Tillich 1966:13-15). He could not decide whether this was just heredity or a recall of his childhood (ibid:14). His childhood experiences at the sea each year contributed to his later thinking. This was true with his essay *The Mass and the Spirit* (ibid:18). His doctrine of the Absolute stated in terms of both ground and abyss originated here with his experiences at the sea (ibid:18). The sea contributed to Tillich’s imagination for this thinking. His inspiration for writing is attributed to being among trees and the seaside.

Tillich’s Religious Socialism is to be traced to his childhood experiences in Germany. His childhood play with the children of the German aristocracy due to his father’s social standing as a Lutheran pastor. These landowners were considered the old nobility (Tillich 1936:8-12). This determined both his ‘intellectual and personal destiny’ (ibid:12). Tillich attributes his socialistic beliefs as the determiner of both his intellectual and personal destiny (ibid:12). Tillich experienced persecution based on German class warfare.

On the boundary of both reality and imagination would lead to Tillich’s movement from a romantic imagination to a philosophic one (ibid:13). Tillich excelled at turning abstract realities into concrete reality (ibid:13). Tillich was marked out for theory rather than practical activity (ibid:17). Tillich had an internal struggle during these early German years for the truth of traditional religion (ibid:17-18). Tillich came to realize religious truth is existential truth (ibid:17-18). Religious truth cannot be separated from practice. These early childhood experiences determined the direction of Tillich’s life, thought, and legacy.
Tillich’s academic preparation took place during the German years 1905 to 1914. This includes two years of church work. He had a knowledge of the history of philosophy and a basic acquaintance with Fichte and Kant before entering the university (Tillich 1936:35). His study of Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling followed during his university years (ibid:35). Schelling became the object of Tillich’s study during the German years. Tillich’s doctoral dissertation and his thesis for the degree of Licentiate of Theology were based on Schelling’s work (ibid:35). Tillich came to believe that nature mysticism was both ‘possible’ and ‘real’ (Tillich 1967:36). His existentialism raised questions that only the Christian message could answer (ibid:36). Existential theology inherited during the German years became predominant in his spiritual life (ibid:36). Tillich received his Protestant theology from his predecessors during the German years (ibid:36). His formative mentors Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Schelling were Lutherans. His teachers were mainly Lutherans. This includes Kahler, Troeltsch, and Von Harnack (Carey 2002:5). The power of the Protestant principle became evident during the German years in the classes of Martin Kahler (Tillich 1948:xiii). Tillich confirms his debt to Kahler for the Pauline-Lutheran idea of justification (Tillich 1936:32). Tillich’s understanding of the Old Testament came from Wellhausen and Gunkel, his historical insights into the New Testament to Schweitzer’s The Quest of the Historical Jesus and Bultmann’s Synoptische Tradition (ibid:33). Jacob Bohme was another figure who Tillich considered the mediator of Lutheran mysticism (ibid:54). Bohme influenced both Schelling, and German Idealism. Schelling influenced both Irrationalism and the nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy of life (ibid:54). Tillich (ibid:36-37) admits the important influence
of Kierkegaard’s existentialism on his theological existence. It was Schelling’s Positive Philosophy which made possible a ‘decisive break from Hegel’. Marx and Nietzsche are two other important influences on Tillich’s own life and thinking. His membership in a fraternity during his student years helped him understand the ‘meaning of the church existentially, and theoretically’ (ibid:37).

Tillich joined the German army as a chaplain during World War I (Tillich 1967:33). It was during these war years (1914-1918) that Tillich would begin his study of art. This would eventuate in a theology of art. It was ‘soon after the First World War’ that Tillich ‘became a Religious Socialist’ (Reimer 2004:34). Tillich (1967:39) saw Germany was divided into classes. The industrialized masses viewed the church as an ally of the ruling groups. Tillich saw the collapse of Imperial Germany (ibid:39). Tillich was in sympathy with the social problems of Germany (ibid:39). Tillich was uncertain whether ‘the roots’ were to be traced to his childhood or inherited from his grandmother in the revolution of 1848 (ibid:39).

The ideal and reality were two elements to appear in post World War I Germany. Professional Schools provided practical training. The humanistic faculty of philosophy answered questions of existence by the Logos (Tillich 1936:8). Tillich’s postwar German society determined his approach in his teaching career. The curriculum was to include the question of human existence, the Logos, political and religious alliances, and spiritual and social problems. These were the issues to be addressed (ibid:17-22).

Tillich joined the ‘Berlin Group’ (1920). They were also known as the ‘Kairos Circle’ (Thomas 2000:14). Tillich (1967:40-41) had turned to the thinking of Karl Marx. Marx saw
philosophy as an attempt to obscure the social contradictions in man’s existence (Tillich 1936:62-63). Tillich embraced the prophetic, humanistic, and realistic in Marx. Tillich’s No was on the ‘calculating, materialistic, and resentful elements’ in Marx’s analysis, polemics, and propaganda’ (Tillich 1967:40-41). The practical aspects of Marx’s thought changed Tillich’s No into a Yes (ibid:40-41). Tillich developed his doctrine of the kairos during the German years (ibid:57). In 1919, Tillich delivered his famous Berlin lecture on a theology of culture and art. This was given before the Berlin Kant Society (Thomas 2000:14).

Tillich’s teaching career from 1919 to 1933 was at German universities. He tried to win a place for theology ‘in the totality of knowledge’ (Tillich 1936:38). Tillich related religion to ‘politics, art, philosophy, depth psychology and sociology’ (Tillich 1967:41). It was at the University of Berlin (1919-1924) that Tillich developed his theology of culture (ibid:41). It was at Marburg that Tillich was introduced to existentialism in its twentieth century form (ibid:42). Tillich claims he was led to a new understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology (Tillich 1936:39-40). Tillich experienced the lectures of Martin Heidegger at Marburg (ibid:39-40). Tillich’s theology of culture and art and his existential theology were formed during the German years. Tillich taught at Marburg for three semesters beginning in 1924 (Tillich 1952:14). In 1925, Tillich began working on his first volume of his Systematic Theology at Marburg (Tillich 1967:42). He was called to Dresden in 1925 (Tillich 1952:14). Tillich served at Dresden from 1925 to 1929. He was ‘Professor of the Science of Religion in Dresden and at the same time Professor Honorarius of Theology
in Leipzig’ (Tillich 1936:40). It was while at Dresden that Tillich was awarded the honorary doctorate from the University of Halle (Thomas 2000:17). Tillich taught at Leipzig from 1927 to 1929 while serving at Dresden. Tillich was called to the University of Frankfurt in 1929. He lectured at Frankfurt on the boundary between philosophy and theology (Tillich 1967:43). He taught at Frankfurt from 1929 to 1933. Tillich’s public lectures and speeches throughout Germany brought him into conflict with the Nazis. Tillich maintains this was long before the year 1933. He was dismissed from his teaching post in Frankfurt in 1933. He and his family left Germany for the United States at the end of 1933 (Tillich 1952:14). Paul Tillich’s German years (1886-1933) are necessary to be able to understand Tillich’s life, thought, and his German legacy. The knowledge of Tillich during these years is central to a historical understanding. The German years determined Tillich. In chapter 2, the historiography was considered related to our thesis.

8:2 Chapter 2 conclusions

The older historiographical method argued for historical problems ranging from the problem of time, identity, motive, character, and the origin of ideas (Nevins 1938:208). Nevins (ibid:213) thought ‘technicalities of logic’ referring to induction and deduction an unproductive labor. Causes and effects must be considered by the historian (ibid:214). It is necessary to form a working hypothesis (ibid:215-224). The hypothesis must be governed by three features. The three features are the need for objectivity, the setting aside of bias or prejudice, guarding against oversimplification, and a novel interpretation. The historian must remember the importance of ideas (Gustavson 1955:152-163). Nevins
(1938:241-256) points to past histories such as Hegel’s philosophy of history, Darwin’s theory of natural selection, and Marx’s interpretation of history. Nevins (ibid:252) argues for the need for reasoned facts and a historical frame of reference. Insights from other academic disciplines must be used (ibid:258). Gottschalk (1963:195) argued for the creation of the totality of the historical fact. Textual criticism was divided into external and internal. The external criticism had to do with the problem of authenticity. Internal criticism had to do with the author’s writing style, words, and the problem of credibility. The historical method embodies systematized knowledge, effective method, definite subject matter, and general truths (Garraghan 1946:34-38).

History involves the search for sources, appraisal of the materials, and appropriate conclusions drawn from the body of the paper (ibid:34).

Von Ranke thought history must be recorded as it happened (ibid:47). Von Ranke (1973:39) thought a generalization or principle would surface that would guide the historian. Debates took place as to whether all of the past can or cannot be known (ibid:26-54). Von Ranke (ibid:50) argued that it is not necessary to know everything to be able to write history. Von Ranke (ibid:39) maintained a philosophy can be formed from the principle which has surfaced. Gottschalk (1963:140-141) argued that it is not possible to get to what happened. The historian can only hope for the credible not what happened but as close as we can get to what happened. Garraghan (1946:46-47) argued the goal of the historian is to arrive at what happened. Von Ranke emphasized individual developments (1973:26-27), the relationships between events (ibid:40), sequence, and simultaneity (ibid:49-50). The particulars of the historical study would support the generalization or principle. The principle will unify an
explain all of the particulars (ibid:40-50). Our second chapter turned from the consideration of the older historical method to historical issues in the writing of contemporary history.

Difference of opinion exists as to the definition of contemporary history (Hughes 1997:20). Therbon (1999:93-195) thought history to be in a state of flux, and in an ever changing state. Chaney (1994:14) thought contemporary history is history that is happening at the present time. The problem of objectivity is a contemporary historiographical issue in the writing of history. Latourette (1953:xxi) argued that pure objectivity doesn’t exist. The admission of the historian’s own subjectiveness is a necessary part of writing history. Jenkins (2003:14) argues that history remains a personal construct of the historian. Another important issue in the writing of history is progress. Diankonoff (1999:196) thought human confidence in a golden era had disappeared. Apetheke (1993:70-74) writes of victimization and exploited peoples. Latin Americans who are both Christians and Marxists struggling for liberation from social injustices and oppression. The ecumenical perspective is so necessary for theology. Duff (1956:255) argues for the importance of the ecumenical movement as a primary concern. Graziano (1999:1510 concurs as to the importance of ecumenism. This is a liberating experience for both individual Christians and churches. Next, the goal of history must be considered as a key issue in contemporary history. Our Christianity is a historic materialist faith which moves to a certain goal (Therbon 1999:31-52). The end of history must be considered as well by the historian. Was the triumph of the liberal democracy the climax and goal of history (Fukuyama 1992:xiii)? Is the final form of world economics capitalism? Turiel (2002:298) argued that this is a moral issue. The role of ideology is of prime importance in the writing of contemporary history. Halliday (1994:58) argues for a historical materialist
approach. Chilliote (2000:xi) points out: ‘political science and political economy are deeply influenced by ideology’. Evangelical religion mirrors the views of a liberal democracy and the capitalistic economic system. The contemporary political status will no doubt be challenged (Comaroff 1991:159). Finally, the relationship of church history to world history was considered. Ross (2006:4) refers to ‘the God of all history’. All history both ecclesiastical and secular lies within this all embracing scope (Latourette 1953:1352-1354). Our thesis considered Tillich’s biographical details.

8:3 Chapter 3 conclusions

The Paucks argue that the German years 1886 to 1933 are necessary to understand Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy. The German years determined the direction of Tillich’s life, thought, and his legacy. Their argument is based on heredity, environment, socialism, the times, the argument from development, the argument from experience, and the argument from the German academic career. The Paucks (1976:2) trace Tillich’s genealogy back to the records of the thirteenth century in middle and eastern Germany. The earliest relatives Johannes and Theodricus studied at the Augustinian monastery St. Noritz Vorden Toren von Naumberg. In 1392, Johannes was a monk. He studied at the University of Prague in 1384. Theodricus was at the University of Leipzig from 1410 onward. Theodricus was a provost, lecturer, and author of two histories (ibid:2-3). In 1630, the Bubonic plague wiped out the entire Tielich family with the exception of two elderly uncles (ibid:3). George Tielich was born in 1624 around the time of Jacob Bohme (ibid:3). George’s younger
brother Paulus died in infancy. George had studied theology at the University of Leipzig in 1648 (Pauck and Pauck 1976:3). His sermons were criticized because of his emphasis on politics (ibid:3). The Tillich family produced manufacturers, monks, and ministers (ibid:3). Tillich’s great grandfather Wilhelm Samuel played the flute, clarinet, guitar, and violin.

Oskar, Wilhelm’s youngest son, was a copper and silver tradesman. Tillich refers to Oskar’s wife in his comment on her building barricades in the revolution of 1848 (ibid:3). Johannes Tillich, Paul’s father, was a Lutheran pastor, a church administrator, a school inspector, and a superintendent (ibid:3-4). He was a master of both speech and debate. He loved the tension between Greek and Christian thought. He included Paul in this adventure (ibid:4). Johannes played the piano and wrote and composed poems (ibid:4). Tillich’s mother, Mathilde Durselen came from a liberal and bourgeois background (ibid:5). Tillich’s grandfather Durselen loved Paul. He had a great affection for women which Paul thought that he had inherited (ibid:5).

Tillich grew up in a medieval environment at Schonfliess (ibid:6). Tillich was a critical religious thinker from an early age (ibid:7). His questions caused his sister, Johannes, to doubt her faith. His upbringing was religious in the grammar school. He learned the catechisms, hymns, and Bible stories (ibid:7). Tillich built a model church with a candle in it for the German Christmas (ibid:7). This became his favorite hobby by the time he was fourteen or fifteen (ibid:7). The Paucks (ibid:7-8) argue an ‘indelible impression’ was created in Tillich’s receptive young mind by these Christian symbols. Tillich understood the struggle between the privileged class and the poor from his childhood (ibid:8). He was conscious of the tension between these classes (ibid:8). Tillich had a sense of guilt because of the underprivileged
Tillich had a friend among the landed nobility by the name of Eckhart von Sydow (Pauck and Pauck 1976:8). These incidents and this friendship made a deep and a lasting impression upon Paul (ibid:8). Von Sydow taught him to play chess and checkers, introduced him to both Darwin and Freud (ibid:8). It was after the First World War that he introduced him to expressionist painting (ibid:8). Tillich had even from an early age an inward drive to conform to socialist principles (ibid:20).

The times for Tillich were Wilhelminian (ibid:9). Kant’s work and the German society required submission (Tillich 1966:21-22). Tillich was raised in an era of peace and prosperity (Pauck and Pauck 1976:17). Tillich belonged to a small group which was called Bohemia (Tillich 1966:22). These intellectuals artists, actors, journalists, writers discarded the bourgeois viewpoint (ibid:22).

Tillich’s development took place as well in Germany. He was sent to the Humanistic Gymnasium in Kongigsberg-Neumark in 1898 (ibid10). He received a education in the humanities, in Latin, and also Greek (ibid:10). Tillich faced inner turmoil in regard to his questions concerning Christianity (Pauck and Pauck 1976:12). Tillich shared his thoughts and heart with Eric Harder (ibid:12). His confirmation was on March 23, 1902 in his father’s church in Berlin (ibid:13). His text was Mt. 11:28 which caused his hearers to ask as to his choice of this passage. In 1903, Tillich’s mother died. Tillich read Schwegler’s Geschichte der Philosophie in his last years at the Gymnasium (ibid:15). Fichte’s Theory of Sciences helped him interpret the difficult parts of German philosophy (Adams 1965:2-6). The Pauks (1976:15) include philosophical discussions with his father, Johannes, as important in his development.
Tillich studied at the University of Berlin under Deltizsch in 1904 (ibid:16). Tillich had come across Schelling’s works in a bookstore in Friedrichstrasse. The Paucks (ibid:16) attribute this to ‘one day, by chance and destiny’ (ibid:16). Tillich studied at the University of Halle from 1905 to 1907. He came under the influence of Martin Kahler (Carey 2002:3). He received his Doctor of Philosophy degree in 1910 from the University of Breslau. In 1912, he received his Licentiate of Theology from the University of Halle. He wrote a dissertation for each degree based on Schelling’s work (ibid3). Earlier, Tillich went to Tubingen in the summer of 1905 (Pauck and Pauck 1976:17). He came under the pietistic thought of August Hermann Francke at Halle. A second tradition of the rationalism of Christian Wolff and the Enlightenment was to be found at Halle as well (ibid:19). Tillich was influenced as well by Fritz Medicus a lecturer at Halle in philosophy (ibid:19). German classical philosophy was mediated to Tillich by Medicus (ibid:20). Tillich’s theological education was received during the German years. His lines of thought were developed during his years as a student (ibid:28-33). Tillich had two theological exams to pass to be ordained (ibid:28-29). Tillich began his pastoral work on January 1, 1909. In the spring of 1909, Tillich passed his first theological exam. In the fall of 1909, Tillich returned to Berlin to complete his practical theological training. He entered the Domstift a training school for preachers. Tillich remained here for one year. Tillich graduated from the Domstift (ibid:29-35). The Paucks (ibid:34) thought that Tillich’s father had made the connection for his son to receive the Doctor of Philosophy degree from Breslau. It was on December 16, 1911 that Tillich took his final theological exam for the degree Licentiate of Theology at Halle. In 1912, he was qualified to
teach theology on the university level. July 27, 1912 saw Tillich passing his final church board exam. Tillich was ordained in his father’s church in Berlin on August 18, 1912 (Pauck and Pauck 1976:35). Tillich had to write a Habilitationsschrift a qualifying thesis to be able to teach in Germany on the university level (ibid:36-37). Tillich was a German educated theological scholar and clergyman. His academic and pastoral training was from German universities, and the German standards for ministerial ordination, and university lecturing. Tillich’s development took place during the German years.

It was on September 28, 1914 that Tillich married Margarethe Karla Mathilda Maria Wever (ibid:38). Soon Tillich enlisted as a chaplain in the German army (ibid:45). Art became an escape for Tillich during the war. He became interested in studying art and ‘the history of painting’ (ibid:47). He brought art books in a military bookstore. Tillich immersed himself in the study of art to deal with the ugliness and destruction of war all around him (ibid:47). It was during the war that Tillich became aware of the need for the socialist motif in politics (Ratschow 1980:21). Ratschow argues that it was obvious that Tillich traced his ideas concerning religious socialism back to his war experiences. Tillich’s socialist ideas appeared soon after the war (ibid:21).

The Paucks argue that Tillich’s German academic career was a determiner of his life, thought, and legacy. Tillich combined Freud’s psychoanalysis, Cezanne’s expressionism, and Marx’s socialism into his Christian apologetic theology (ibid:59). It was during his German years that Tillich developed his 1919 lecture ‘On the Idea of a Theology of Culture’ (ibid:64). Tillich spoke at a Continental conference for religious socialists in September 1919.
Tillich belonged to the socialist ‘Kairos Circle’ (ibid:70). Tillich divorced Grethi on February 22, 1921 (Pauck and Pauck 1976:81). He married Hannah Werner on March 22, 1924 (ibid:86). Tillich’s experience at Marburg drove him in the direction of political, cultural, and existential theological interests. The majority of the students at Marburg were Barthians (ibid:95). Tillich’s political and cultural interests were not permitted at Marburg. Marburg was a stark contrast to Berlin (ibid:95). Tillich began the formulation of his systematic theology at Marburg (ibid:95). Bultmann and Heidegger were at Marburg at the same time (ibid:95). In 1925, the Tillichs moved to Dresden. Tillich taught at Dresden from 1925 to 1929. He taught as well at Leipzig at the same time from the winter semester of 1927-28 on. This was by appointment from the theological faculty (Ratschow 1980:24). It was at Dresden that Tillich received the honorary Doctor of Theology degree from the University of Halle (Pauck and Pauck 1976:102). In March 1929, Tillich resigned from Dresden. The Dresden school had failed to receive accreditation (ibid:112). In June of 1929, Tillich accepted a call to the University of Frankfurt. At the same time, Tillich gave his inaugural lecture on ‘Philosophy and Destiny’ (ibid:112-113). Tillich became active with other philosophers and social scientists in the ‘Frankfurt School’. Tillich was active as well in the German political scene (Carey 2002:3). Tillich was dismissed from his position at the University of Frankfurt on April 13, 1933 (ibid:3). Tillich was the only theologian teaching on the university faculty. He was a Christian scholar teaching in a secular university setting (Pauck and Pauck 1976:118). In July 1932, Nazi storm troopers and Nazi students ‘beat up left-wing and Jewish students’ (ibid:127). The Paucks (ibid:127) add: ‘In 1932, Tillich was dean of the
philosophical faculty’. Tillich demanded the expulsion of the Nazi students (ibid:127). Tillich’s German academic career came to an end in 1933. The Paucks argue that Tillich had developed his theology of culture and art at Berlin. He developed his existential theology, and started his Systematic Theology at Marburg. His political and cultural views were not permitted at Marburg. Tillich’s years at Dresden and Leipzig led to his Frankfurt years. Tillich’s name had appeared in April 13, German newspapers in 1933 within the group of ‘left-wing intellectuals, members of the Communist or Socialist Parties’ (ibid:130). Tillich’s German academic years had determined the direction of his life, thought, and legacy. Tillich’s German years (1886-1933) are necessary to understand his life, thought, and legacy.

### 8:4 Chapter 4 conclusions

Tillich admits his intellectual development and career was formed during his German years (1886-1933). Tillich explored the relationship of philosophy and theology at the University of Frankfurt. His professional career was the suitable background to undertake this endeavor. Tillich had a new understanding of the relation of philosophy and theology to each other. This was because of the ‘Existential Philosophy’ in Germany (Tillich 1936:39-40). Tillich’s view of the ‘conception of the scientific relation of both’ has helped us to understand his Frankfurt years (1929-1933) (ibid:38). Tillich distinguished between a philosophical theology and a kerygmatic theology (1948:83-84). Kerygmatic theology reproduces the content of the Christian message in an orderly and systematic way. Reference is not made to philosophy. Kerygma is the New Testament word for message. Philosophical theology is based on the
kerygma. Philosophical theology tries to explain the kerygma in terms of its close interrelation with philosophy (ibid:83-84). The unity of both types of theology is the theological ideal. Theological faculties need a representative of each type of theology on its faculty. Tillich calls philosophical theology by the names of apologetics, speculative theology, and Christian philosophy of religion. Tillich writes of philosophy it ‘tries to understand being itself and the categories and structures common to all kinds of beings’ (ibid:86). This must occur before it can attempt ‘a description of the world in unity with all kinds of scientific and non-scientific experience’ (ibid:86). Tillich’s theology was formed during the German years. The separation of philosophy from theology and theology from philosophy is impossible. Philosophy shows the kerygmatic and theological character which is the task of theology. Theology’s task is to discern being which gives ‘ultimate concern’ (ibid:87). Philosophy asks the questions. Theology supplies the answers (ibid:87).

The Frankfurt years for Tillich carry with them ‘the relationship between philosophy and theology’ (ibid:83). Tillich’s theological views were formed during the German years. Horton (1952:45) visited Frankfurt shortly after Tillich had left in 1933. Horton (ibid:45) found that critics of Tillich’s at Frankfurt charged him with deserting his job as a philosopher of religion. They claimed his teaching was only concerned with art, economics, politics, and general culture. The Frankfurt years can be understood as well from Tillich’s boundary or border-line concept. This boundary concept explains how Tillich’s ideas developed in Germany. Tillich admits his ‘personal and intellectual development’ took place during the German years (Tillich 1966:13). His experiences in Germany during those years consisted
of ‘alternative possibilities of existence’ (ibid:13). Tillich (ibid:13) writes that the early experiences in Germany ‘determined both my destiny and my work’ (ibid:13).

Paul Tillich’s German years (1886-1933) are necessary to understand his life, thought, legacy. Tillich found Schelling’s Christian metaphysical thought did not achieve the desired unity between philosophy and theology that he had hoped for (Tillich 1936:35). Tillich’s concept of the abyss was not included (ibid:35). Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion was born. This resulted for Tillich in the union of philosophy and theology. Tillich’s philosophy of religion expressed in philosophical terms the concept of the abyss and ‘the idea of justification a limitation of philosophy’ (ibid:36). Tillich gave a critical analysis of Neo-Kantianism, the philosophy of values, and phenomenology (ibid:36-37). Tillich was attracted to Nietzsche’s philosophy of life (ibid:36-37). Tillich came to depend on Schelling’s Christian philosophy of life. Tillich’s Christian philosophy of history became sociologically and politically oriented due to the German revolution of 1918 (ibid:37).

Tillich discarded historical relativism because of the effects of World War I on Germany. Tillich’s new Christian philosophy of history was the history of religious socialism (ibid:38). Secondly, Tillich sought to show the unity of another dimension between philosophy and theology at Frankfurt. This was the unity of religion and culture. Culture’s substance is religion. Religion’s form is culture (ibid:50). Culture included politics, art, depth psychology, and sociology (Tillich 1966:7).
Tillich (1967:43) admits: ‘Frankfurt was the most modern and liberal university in Germany, but it had no theological faculty. So it was quite natural that my lectures moved on the boundary line between philosophy and theology’. Tillich (1936:40) was ‘Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-the-Main’. His former teacher Fritz Medicus wrote an article in the leading Swiss newspaper on Tillich. He claimed Tillich’s appointment to Scheler’s chair heralded a new philosophical era. Tillich had transformed Schelling theory into ‘meaning for a responsible way of life’ (Pauck and Pauck 1976:113). Tillich was to teach social education. His lectures and seminars emphasised ‘social ethics, historical action and political direction’. Tillich gave a greater emphasis to this than to metaphysical thinkers (ibid:113). Ratschow (1980:24) argues for Tillich’s ‘systematic science of culture’ during the German university years. Theology is ‘part of the science of religion’ (ibid:24). The Frankfurt years were the most rewarding of his university years in Germany (Pauck and Pauck 1976:114). Tillich became well known throughout Germany as a result of his position at the University of Frankfurt (ibid:120).

Tillich’s Frankfurt years were overshadowed by National Socialism (ibid:122). Tillich had helped Max Horkheimer obtain a position at the University of Frankfurt (Dorrien 2003:487). Horkheimer was the director of the Institut fur Sozialforschung. This became known as the Frankfurt School (ibid:487). Donnelly (2003:2) argues for Tillich’s religious and Marxist thought being formed during the German years. Guy Hammond, Terry O’Keeffe, Richard Quinney, Ronald Stone, and John Stumme argue for the ‘fusing of religious and Marxist thought in the early Tillich’ (ibid:2). Tillich’s public speaking at Frankfurt brought him into
conflict with the growing Nazi movement in Germany (Thomas 1963:14). Thomas (2000:43) argues Tillich was convinced of the need for religious socialism for Germany. Tillich’s book *The Socialist Decision* contained his political theology and his commitment to ‘socialist politics’ (ibid:43). It was an attack on Nazism (ibid:43).

Tillich’s Frankfurt years were characterized by political turmoil and economic turbulence. The Great Depression was felt in Germany by the middle of 1930/ The German democratic government was coming apart (Duiker and Spielvogel 2007:646-649). Hitler was named Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933 (ibid:687). In March 1933, Hitler became dictator of all of Germany (ibid:687). It was during the years in Frankfurt that Tillich wrote *The Socialist Decision* (Stumme 1977:xxiii). The Treaty of Versailles (1919) laid heavy war reparations on Germany (Duiker and Spielvogel 2007:644). The Dawes Plan of 1924 was drawn up by an international commission. This made war reparation payments dependent on Germany’s ability to pay (ibid:646-647). The Americans made heavy investments in Europe. This created European prosperity during the years 1924 to 1929. In 1928, American investors called the loans in made to Germany. This was so investments could be made in the New York stock market. The October 1929 stock market crash made it necessary for American investors to withdraw even more money loaned to Germany (ibid:647). Stumme (1977:xxiii) writes: ‘Historical events foreclosed any genuine socialist decision’. Carey (2002:4) adds the concluding note: ‘Tillich was dismissed by the Nazis from his position at the University of Frankfurt on April 13, 1933, and in December of the same year he and his family came to America’. Tillich’s German years had determined the direction of his life, thought, and his
legacy. The German years (1886-1933) are to understand Tillich.

8:5 Chapter 5 conclusions

Martin (1963:7) ‘sets forth the major facts of Tillich’s life and seeks to explain what incidents and experiences of his personal historical destiny have been of basic importance in molding his thought, as well as the crucial intellectual influences upon it’.

Tillich had a working knowledge of Fichte and Kant before entering university. At university, he studied Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling. Tillich’s concentration was focused on Schelling’s Christian philosophy of religion (ibid:17). Marx, and Kierkegaard were intellectual influences on Tillich (ibid:21). Marx’s doctrine of economic materialism confirmed Kierkegaard's doctrine of self-alienation (Tillich 1936:65). The Tillichs family moved to Berlin in 1900. This helped Paul Tillich to understand the necessity of the big city for ‘the critical side of intellectual and artistic life’ (Tillich 1936:6 in Martin 1963:16). Tillich gained from ‘personal experience’ of both the political and social movements in Berlin (ibid:6 in ibid:16). Tillich’s doctoral dissertation and his dissertation for the Licentiate of Theology were both written on the work of Friedrich Schelling (Tillich 1952:10 in ibid:17). Martin claims that for Tillich: ‘Kierkegaard and Heidegger remain his philosophic heroes’. Tillich (1936:31-33) admits these intellectual influences on his life during the German years. Martin Kahler, and Wilhelm Lutgert of Halle were important teachers to Tillich as a student of Protestant theology. Tillich was given insight by Kahler into the Pauline-Lutheran idea of justification. Tillich parted company with the theologians of Halle. He was not interested in the ‘new supranaturalism’ which he viewed as Barth’s theology. Tillich (ibid:31-36) names Wellhausen and Gunkel for further insight into the Old Testament.
Schweitzer’s *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* for ‘historical insights into the New Testament’. Tillich acknowledges as well Bultmann’s *Synoptische Tradition*.


Marx was another scholar of whom Tillich was interested in (Carey 2002:3). Carey (ibid:23) affirms Tillich’s debt to Marx. This is evidenced by ‘Tillich’s early writings on socialism, his sympathy for the social critiques of religion, and his efforts to promulgate a religious-socialist movement in Germany’ (ibid:23). Tillich (1936:63) admitted his debt to Marx. Tillich added that Marx’s influence was dialectical combining a Yes and a No. The prophetic, humanistic, and the realistic formed the Yes. The materialistic of Marx’s analysis polemics, and propaganda formed the No (Martin 1963:22). Carey (2002:29-32) argues that Tillich saw in Marx the voice of the Old Testament prophets,
Marx’s view of justice, his historical approach with the need for decision and involvement, and the Marxian criticism of oppressive ideologies to the human situation. The No for Tillich would be Marx’s failure to distinguish the divine from the human ecclesiastical expressions, and his interpretation of history was too utopian.

Tillich became interested in painting during his time as a chaplain in World War I (Pauck and Pauck 1976:51 in Palmer 1984:3). This was a form of relaxation and escape within the context of the horrors of World War I (Tillich 1966:27-28 in ibid:3). His last furlough of the war saw Tillich visiting the Kaiser Fredrich Museum in Berlin. Boticelli’s ‘Madonna with singing angels,’ had an enormous impact on him. His experience as a German chaplain from 1914 to 1918 during World War I turned Tillich both to the thinking of Karl Marx, religious socialism, and art. Tillich (1952:13) related religion to art. Later, revolutionary art came into the picture. This was when Tillich was a Privatdozent at the University of Berlin from 1919 to 1924. Tillich developed his theology of culture and art during the German years (ibid:13).

Freud was another intellectual influence on Tillich during the German years. Tillich had been introduced to Freud by Eckart von Sydow (Pauck and Pauck 1976:75). Tillich had been interested in Freud since 1919 (ibid:223). Tillich (1967:41) lectured on the relation of religion to depth psychology. This was when Tillich was teaching at the University of Berlin (ibid:41). Cooper (2006:21) argues for Tillich’s concept of the demonic being drawn from Freud and Marx’s social demons. Freud’s psychological bondage of the will reflected demonic activity (ibid:21). Tillich’s existentialism and Freud’s psychoanalysis shared a common bond
a revolt against the philosophy of consciousness (ibid:66). Both existentialism and psychoanalysis were concerned with man’s estrangement (ibid:66). These two intellectual movements existentialism and psychoanalysis were important in Tillich’s formation during the German years (Armbruster 1967:15). Freud confirmed Tillich’s existential theology.

Martin (1963:18) argues for Heidegger’s influence on Tillich. Tillich (1836:40 in ibid:19) called Heidegger’s influence ‘upon his thinking of a prime order of magnitude’. The presence of existential philosophy in Germany gave Tillich a new understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Tillich admits to having experienced Martin Heidegger’s lectures during his years at Marburg (1924-1925) (Tillich 1936:39). Martin points to another intellectual influence that of Edward Husserl on Tillich (Martin 1963:19). Husserl’s doctrine confirmed what he had learned from both Kant and Fichte (ibid:19) Husserl’s Logische Untenschungen was a powerful force for refuting positivism.

Nature and Schelling played a great part in Tillich’s life, thought, and legacy. Tillich (1952:4-5) developed in Germany a romanticism to nature. He communed with nature daily in his early years. In his later years, every year for several months was spent at the seashore. Secondly, his romantic relationship to nature is accounted for by the impact of German poetic literature with its expression full of nature mysticism. Thirdly, Tillich explains his romanticism to nature on the basis of his Lutheran background. Nature mysticism was both possible and real. Tillich’s romanticism to nature meant as well a special relationship to history. His growing up in towns where every stone is centuries old (ibid:5). Schelling’s Christian
philosophy of religion had a great emotional impact upon Tillich. Tillich’s (1936:7)
acknowledges Schelling’s influence on him. Schelling’s work would become the subject
of both Tillich’s dissertations (Tillich 1966:47). Jacob Bohme was another theological influence
on Tillich. Tillich considered Bohme the mediator of Lutheran mysticism (ibid:75). It was
through Bohme that Lutheran mysticism influenced Schelling, German Idealism, and Tillich.
Tillich’s concepts of both ground and abyss are derived from Bohme (Adams 1965:32).

Tillich (1922:447 in Kegley and Bretall 1952:27) spoke ‘of his “spiritual
comradeship” with Barth and Gogarten’. Horton (1952:28) argues for labeling Tillich as
progressive theologian. Tillich rejected both Barth and Hirsch who opposed socialism

Hegel is another intellectual thinker to consider as to whether he exerted an intellectual
Tillich’s admission of acquaintance with Hegel in the university. Stumme (1977:xviii)
argued that Tillich planned to return to Hegelian sources ‘of the Marxist dialectic and to
reconstruct social theory on this basis’. Tillich (1977:80) viewed Hegel’s effort ‘to establish
a philosophical foundation for positive Christianity, especially his ambiguous Christiology,
was the most important expression of the alliance of the bourgeoisie and feudalism’. Tillich
(1952:11) confirms a ‘decisive break’ from Hegel because of his encounter with Schelling’s
second period, especially with his so-called “positive philosophy.” Here lies the
philosophically decisive break with Hegel, and the beginning of that movement which is today
Existentialism’. This made possible Tillich’s decisive break from Hegel’s philosophy.

Niebuhr (ibid:217) argues for the uniqueness of Tillich’s *Systematic Theology* the first volume. It is a very rigorous work with ‘all the disciplines of culture’. Secondly, it is to be distinguished from Hegel’s and Kant’s natural theology. Tillich gives ‘a fuller appreciation of the limits of reason’. Niebuhr is referring to Tillich’s first volume of his theology. Another intellectual influence on Tillich was Nietzsche. Tillich (1966:56) was attracted to Nietzsche’s ‘philosophy of life’. Nietzsche’s thought was acceptable to Tillich because it was rooted in Schelling.

Diamond (1967:244) and Novak (1992:159) argue for the influence of Buber on Tillich. Novak (ibid:159) emphasises an incident in Germany at ‘a conference of religious Socialists’. Tillich wanted to replace the word God but Buber replied ‘Aber Gott ist ein Urwort (God is a primordial word!)’ (ibid:159). Tillich (1936:46-47) recalls this incident. Buber was another stimulus to Tillich’s thinking on the language of the gospel.

Troeltsch was another influence on Tillich. He drove Tillich to develop a new Christian philosophy of history. Tillich’s Christian philosophy of history was a philosophy of the history of religious socialism (Tilich 1966:54-55). Siegfried (1952:68-69) argues for Troeltsch as a liberal theologian. Tillich, by way of contrast, carried out ‘a radical criticism of culture’.

Troeltsch sought political and social reform. Tillich represented liberal theology but he represented something more magnificent the splendor of religious socialism based on Marxism (ibid:70-71). Troeltsch helped Tillich define his Christian philosophy of history.

Horton (1952:27) argues for Tillich’s debt to Luther. Siegfried (1952:81) points out similarities between Luther and Tillich. These being human nature as ‘finite freedom’ and
‘the relativity of all social orders’. Luther’s ‘justification by faith’ was Tillich’s ‘the “New Being” in Jesus as the Christ’ (Thomas 1963:94). Carey (2002:9) saw four areas of ‘genuine affinities between Luther and Tillich’. Carey (ibid:9-20) lists these as theological method, the concept of God, the human condition and the concept of justification. These similarities fit within Tillich’s political and existential theology.

Ratschow argues that Tillich in his writings ‘was able to transcend the problems of his time’ (ibid:135). Ratschow (1980:34) writes that Tillich ‘transcended the questions of the time toward their solution’. Tillich (1952:13-14) argued in terms of environment and social forces rather than personality or his ability to make value judgments. Ratschow (1980:34) argued that Tillich’s apologetic theology was ‘strictly for his time’. Ratschow (ibid:8) does argue for Tillich as one who fulfills the Great man theory. Martin (1963:25) concludes: ‘The major outlines of his thought seem to have been fairly well fixed long before he left Germany’. Tillich’s German years (1886-1933) show the many influences upon him. The German years are necessary to be to understand Tillich’s life, thought, and legacy. Our thesis turns now to the conclusions from Tillich’s legacy from his years in Germany.

8:6 Chapter 6 conclusions

Tillich’s German years (1886-1933) have been ignored. Tillich’s legacy to us is European, Continental, and German (Horton 1952:27). Tillich was able to relate the present to the future (ibid:32). Tillich’s discernment of the hand of God ‘was not in social democracy but socialism (ibid:32). Tillich and the religious socialists related the Kingdom of God to politics (ibid:33). Clayton (1980:6) argues that Tillich wrote for his own generation and for his own time. Clayton (ibid:6) argues that Tillich’s theological system is obsolete. Richards (1995:44)
wants to sum up Tillich’s German legacy in two words ‘spirit and community’. Reference is made to Tillich’s lecture given in Berlin On The Idea of a Theology of Culture (ibid:44).

Tillich’s theology of culture was his life long interest and work (Ratschow 1980:24).

Ratschow (ibid:24) argues for the importance of the German years (1886-1933) to be seen as a unity. Richards (1995:45) points to Tillich’s writings from the German years as part of his German legacy. These writings are The System of the Sciences (1923), The Religious Situation (1926), Mass and Spirit (1922), and Kirche und Kultur (1924)

Richards (ibid:45) adds: ‘systematic studies on religious socialism’. Tillich’s early writings are part of his German legacy. Ratschow (1980:23) points to Tillich’s The Religious Situation and The Socialist Decision. Tillich’s The Religious Situation argues against the bourgeois capitalist society. This society is presented ‘in science, technics, and economy’ (ibid:23). The Socialist Decision ‘concentrated upon the threatening “fatal destiny of the European peoples,” and it has become completely a “beliefful realism” ’ (ibid:23).

John Carey (2002:39) points to Tillich’s legacy in politics and history. Carey argues with Tillich’s early works in mind on these two subjects. Tillich’s insight in both politics and history is part of our current theological interest. Carey (ibid:39) has in mind ‘the ramifications of liberation theology and of the meaning of history’. Carey (ibid:41) argues for Tillich and his associates as Religious Socialists. They had a continual quarrel with the Social Democratic Party (ibid:41). Tillich repeatedly wrote of the weaknesses and strengths of socialism ‘in the 1920s and early 1930s’ (ibid:41). Capitalism made the appeal to German unification ‘around supernaturalism’ (ibid:42). Tillich broke with Hirsch over his endorsing
the Nazi movement and its call for a “New Germany” (ibid:42). Carey (ibid:43) held that Tillich’s writings were ‘dated and of interest only to historians’.

Carey points out similarities between Tillich’s situation and our own situation. He (ibid:43) argues for three insights ‘we live in a polarized society, we try to cope with the breakdown of old mythologies and we now hear appeals for violent and/or nonviolent revolution’. Further Tillich’s work argues for caution of any ‘utopianism of the left’ ‘and any form of totalitarianism of the left as well as the right’ (ibid:43). Carey (ibid:44) adds that Tillich has left a legacy in terms of his ‘serious grappling with Marxism’. Carey (ibid:46) argues for Tillich’s further legacy in that his early writings were devoted to ‘the meaning of history’ (ibid:46). Tillich’s work provides a ‘major alternative to Pannenberg’s work’ (ibid:46). Carey (ibid:47) argues that Tillich ‘is not interested as much in historical knowledge as...historical consciousness, the awareness of one’s fate in history, and of being so penetrated by the forces of history as to discern the creative significance of the present moment’.

Tillich (1938:106 in ibid:47) writes: ‘Since the only entrance to the interpretation of history is historical action, there is no serious grappling with the problem of history which has not been born out of the necessity for coming to a present historical decision’.

Tillich’s (1964:87) German legacy is in part Schelling’s Christian philosophy of religion. Carey (2002:14) writes of Tillich’s contribution to twentieth-century theology with his concept of God and his debt to ‘Fredrich Schelling’. Tillich’s (1936:54) Lutheran mysticism mediated by Jakob Bohme is also part of Tillich’s German legacy. The ideas of Bohme would enable Protestant theology to ‘penetrate the ontological implications of the Christian symbols’ (Adams
Bohme’s thought is to be found in Tillich (ibid:201).

The Protestant principle is also part of the German legacy from Tillich (Ratschow 1980:27). Siegfried (1952:80-83) argues for the Protestant principle as part of Tillich’s legacy. Tillich’s work has a definite Protestant character. Siegfried names grace, ‘the unity of regeneration, judgment, and justification’, and the kairos. The kairos is a divine manifestation from which political and social transformation will occur. Tillich related the Protestant principle to the Protestant character. He ‘follows Luther’s intuition of the relativity of all social orders. But he applies his principle also to the feudal-paternalistic order, which Luther thought to be valid for his time and beyond’ (ibid:81). Tillich ‘applies it to the bourgeois-capitalistic order, which he criticizes in the name of religious socialism’ (ibid:81).

Another question to be considered in the light of the Protestant principle is Tillich’s demand for a theonomy transcending autonomy and heteronomy. Siegfried considers the Protestant churches in the light of this principle (ibid:82). Siegfried (ibid:82) argues that according to Tillich the future of the Protestant churches is their need for a ‘theological openness’ to ‘the theoretical problems of the present situation’. The need for an ‘ethical openness toward the social problems of today in contrast to the attempt to identify the Christian message with a special political or economic structure’ (ibid:82). Tillich (1936:54-55) confirms his Protestant principle from the German years. He claims to belong to Lutheranism by his birth, his education, his religious experience, and theological reflection. Secondly, Tillich claims not to have stood on the borders of either Lutheranism or Calvinism. His religion remains Lutheran. His philosophical thinking expressed the substance of Lutheranism. This is expressed in the
Lutheran mysticism of Jakob Bohme. The Protestant principle originated in Tillich’s own subjective context. Tillich (1964:68) widens the Protestant principle defining it in terms of ‘the Protestant understanding of man and his predicament’. Tillich relates the Protestant principle to his existential theology of man’s predicament. Carey (2002:15-16) argues that Luther’s theme ‘God alone is God’ is Tillich’s ‘concept of the “Protestant Principle”’. Carey (ibid:15-16) argues: ‘Tillich felt that Protestantism is a corrective principle to Roman Catholic claims for the church, Orthodox claims for church councils, and Protestant fundamentalist claims for the unique authority of Scripture’. The Protestant principle was part of the Tillichian legacy from the German years.

Tillich’s philosophy of religion becomes part of his German legacy (Siegfried 1952:75). This was expressed in Tillich’s work *Religiose Verwirklichung* (ibid:75). Tillich argues for ‘a normative idea of religion from a comparison of the sacramental, the mystical, and the prophetic types of religion’ (ibid:76). Tillich gives a synthesis of them within Christianity. Tillich considers this ‘the criterion of every religious reality’ (ibid:76). The history of religion is interpreted by Tillich as the development of ‘these types’ (ibid:76). Siegfried (ibid:76) argues that Tillich arrives at a Christian synthesis (ibid:76). Siegfried (ibid:76-77) concludes that Tillich has shown a concept that fits all ‘religions and quasi religions’ which compete with Christianity. Tillich (1923:149 in Adams 1965:185) viewed philosophy of religion and theology as standing in tension with each other. Adams (ibid:87) argues: ‘philosophy of religion and theology are two elements in a cultural science of religion’. Tillich’s philosophy of religion formed during the German years had a ‘tripartite classification’ (ibid:187). The division is
‘philosophy of meaning, intellectual history, and the normative system—theology’.

Schelling’s Christian philosophy of religion was drawn into the abyss (Tillich 1936:35). World War I was disastrous for Tillich and the German people. Schelling’s Christian philosophy was unable to bring about the unity between theology and philosophy.

If a reunion of philosophy and theology was to be achieved then justice would need to be done to the abyss. Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion came into being to satisfy this need (ibid:35).

Religious Socialism was part of Tillich’s German legacy. Tillich (1936:19) writes: ‘Only in the last year of the war, and in the months of collapse and revolution did the political backgrounds of the World War, the interrelation between Captialism and Imperialism, the crisis of bourgeois society, the class cleavage, and so forth, become visible to me’. Carey (2002:23) argues for Marx’s influence on Tillich. Tillich (1936:188) argued that the removal of class conflict by a proletariat revolution would end in a ‘static-vegetative final state’.

Tillich (1977:161) viewed the proletariat as the factor to bring transformation of history and mankind. Tillich added a religious aspect to his socialism (Siegfried 1952:70-71). Tillich’s German legacy includes a religious socialism that sought to cure the ills of his time a capitalist economy and a political liberal democracy. Adams (1965:214) argues that Tillich asserted that ‘the Marxist revolt against capitalist society represented a justifiable revolt’. It would result in ‘a wider participation of men in the satisfactions of security and creativity’ (ibid:214).

Tillich was well aware of the concept of Marxist ideology (Siegfried 1952:71). Carey (2002:23) argued for Tillich’s recognition of Marxian truth that religion was an ideology of the privileged.
The churches are ‘yoked to the present social order’. Tillich (1972:410-411) argued a: ‘great synthesis is the turning point for many of the actual problems of today, including world revolution and the East-West conflict…a world-historical movement which has directly or indirectly influenced our whole century’. Tillich (1936:63 in Carey 2002:32) acknowledged his legacy from Marx. Carey (ibid:33) adds that Marx’s thinking did not allow for Tillich’s kairos and his religious socialist thinking. Tillich (1988:126) argues that Marx’s view of man saw clearly his ‘dehumanization’ and the need for ‘real humanism’. Tillich (ibid:126) explains: ‘Both show Marx is concerned with the loss of salvation of the “person” in the technical society as he experienced it’. Runyon (1984:277) states that Tillich, and ‘Religious Socialism was squelched soon after the Nazi victory’. Bonhoeffer (1965:108f in Carey 1984:277-278) adds that the world did not want a religious orientation. Heiman (1952:312) argues that Tillich acknowledged the ‘central importance in his development which he himself attributes to the doctrine of religious socialism’. Taylor (1991:21) claims that Tillich’s legacy of religious has affected our modern world. Tillich’s socialist vision has been realized in Latin America. Taylor (ibid:21) continues: ‘Other theologians working in close contact with alienated and oppressed groups also dwell on this creative tension. James Cone and Cornell West do so in connection with the aspirations of Afro-American groups….and a number of North Atlantic theologians, male and female, who say Yes and No by sifting through the Western Marxisms of Lukacs, Gramsci, Goldman or Habermas’.

Tillich’s doctrine of the kairos was also part of Tillich’s legacy from the German years (1886-1933). The kairos is the ‘fulfilled time’. The moment that is both ‘creation and
fate’ (Tillich 1936:129 in Adams 1965:203). Tillich expected a new social, political, and economic order for Germany (Runyon 1984:274-275). Ratschow (1980:22) argues that Tillich’s conviction of the kairos died out from 1926 on. Heiman (1952:313) argues for the distinction between kairos and kairoi. The turning points of history would be the one great kairos. This center of history sheds light on the whole of history and its parts. Thus the kairos gives meaningfulness to both the whole of history and the parts of history. History without this center would be a ‘meaningless irrelevant sequence of facts, as it appeared to the classical philosophers’ (ibid:313). The kairos must be understood ‘in universal terms’ (ibid:313).

Tillich developed a new concept of belief-ful realism during the German years. This becomes part of Tillich’s legacy from the German years. Belief-ful realism is ‘a total attitude toward reality’ (Niebuhr 1956:13). Tillich (1956:86) argues: ‘The revolt against the spirit of capitalist society has been least ambiguously expressed in painting since the beginning of the century’. Tillich (ibid:90) continues: ‘The extent to which this protest was historically justified became apparent….A realism has suddenly appeared in art….which one may possibly speak of as the beginnings of a belief-ful realism’.

Tillich’s theology of culture is part of his German legacy. Tillich delivered this lecture in Berlin in 1919 (Siegfried 1952:68). Baumgarten (1993:149) argues for his theology of culture as part of his German legacy. Oden (1964:20) concurs with Baumgarten’s view. Wettstein (1984:113) argues that Tillich’s theology of culture has ‘exerted a particularly pervasive influence on American religious studies’. Tillich ‘opened generations
of his students to an awareness of the depth and extensiveness of the cultural setting that
that shapes as well as receives or rejects theological address’ (ibid:113). Boulding argues that it
has nothing to do with Tillich but the interest in culture is to be accounted for by ‘the rise of
science’ (ibid:313). Wettstein (ibid:114-115) argues that Tillich’s theology of culture is not
relevant because our society is fragmented. Wettstein (ibid:115) sees the contemporary problem
of ‘religious substance fragmented into pluralism’. Tillich’s theology of culture finds itself in a
 technological culture (ibid:132). It cannot be left in the hands of ‘technologists’ and
‘technological rationales’ (ibid:132). Carey (2002:92-93) argues that the emergence of pluralism
‘has recast Tillich’s world’. Pluralism carries with it the acknowledgment of relativism. The
view that there is more than one way to look at something has become part of contemporary
theology.

Tillich’s legacy has to deal with Postmodernism. Professor Carey (2002:97) writes:
‘Postmodernism maintains that reality is undecidable and the world is no particular way at
all. It is now clear that older thought systems were expressed through political ideologies…
that aesthetic, literary, and theological opinions are in fact simply culturally conditioned
statements of personal judgment’. Carey (ibid:97-98) points out the common ground between
Tillich and the Postmodernists. They ‘both criticize misleading…pronouncements’ ‘in religious
traditions’ (ibid:97). Further they both expose the arrogance of groups who claim to know the
will of God, both agree that religious groups reflect both their geographical region, and also
the middle class, both reveal both the biases and assumptions that have formed our ‘intellectual,
political, and social life’ (ibid:97-98). Postmodernism may move us to ‘support the voices of
disadvantaged or pressed peoples’ (ibid:100). Tillich provides a corrective to Postmodernist thought with his recognition that people live by ‘faith, trust, passions, and symbols’ (ibid:100).

Tillich’s ‘knowledge and appreciation of art’ begins with his service in World War I as an army chaplain. He sought relief in art from the ugliness of war (Adams 1965:66). Tillich devoted his time ‘to the study of art’ (ibid:66). This grew to a ‘a systematic study of the history of art’ (ibid:66). A philosophical and theological interpretation of the art would follow. Ratschow (1980:21) adds: ‘This sequence-especially this birth of a concept is still Schelling’. Tillich’s theology of art grew out of his experience in the German army as a chaplain in World War I. The art piece would be ‘cultural as to form and religious as to substance’ (Tillich 1936:49 in Adams 1965:68). Tillich comes full circle to his idea of living on the border ‘between religion and culture’ (ibid:68). Adams (ibid:68) argues: ‘From this border Tillich early developed his theology of culture and art. The outlines of his theology of culture were set forth in his 1919 lecture “Ueber die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur,” the first work he published after the First World War’. Later, Tillich saw ‘the revolt against the spirit of capitalist society…expressed in painting since the beginning of the century’ (Tillich 1956:86). Tillich’s theology of culture was also a theology of art. This is part of Tillich’s legacy from the German years.

Tillich’s existential theology is part of his German legacy. Tillich (1964:76) argues that the history of existentialism goes back to a century before ‘to the decade of the 1840’s’. It was formulated by Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Marx (ibid:76). Tillich (ibid:76) continues: ‘In the next generation’ it was seen in Nietzsche and Dilthey. The roots of existentialism go back
to Bohme’ (ibid:76). Further Tillich traces existentialism back to Schelling’s 1841-1842 lecture at the University of Berlin (ibid:77). Re Manning (2005:60) argues that Tillich’s existential theology points to Schelling. Tillich considered Schelling the ‘founder of existentialism’ (ibid:60). Tillich considered existentialism the fulfillment of German Idealism (ibid:60). Scharlemann argues just the opposite that Tillich’s existentialism was due to the impact of Heidegger from 1925 on (ibid:60). The ‘question of being’ occupied ‘a more central position’ in Tillich’s thought (ibid:60). Thomas (2000:60) argues for the influence of Heidegger on Tillich. Thomas (ibid:60) writes: ‘there can be no doubt that this is where we see the significant influence of Heidegger’s existentialism on his theological development’. Adams (1965:22) argues: ‘Kierkegaard is, of course, the principal ancestor of contemporary existential philosophy’. Kierkegaard’s interest was the individual’s confrontation with reality. Tillich shared this concern. Tillich had the additional metaphysical concern in Schelling (ibid:22).

Tillich’s systematic theology was begun in Marburg in 1925 (Tillich 1967:42). Siegfried (1952:77-79) argues for Tillich’s Systematic Theology as part of Tillich’s German legacy. Niebuhr (1952:217) writes: ‘Paul Tillich’s magnum opus, of which unfortunately only the first volume is available at the time this analysis of his work is attempted, will undoubtedly become a landmark in the history of modern theology for two reasons’. Niebuhr (ibid:217) continues:

First, his ontological speculations are more rigorous and include all of the disciplines of culture more imaginatively than anything which has been done in the realm of philosophy
of religion or natural theology in our day or in many decades. Secondly, it distinguishes itself from the natural theology inspired by Hegel and Kant in the past two centuries by a fuller appreciation of the limits of reason in penetrating to the ultimate mystery or in comprehending the mystery of human existence. There is therefore a larger place for the kerygmatic dimension of theology than in all recent theologies which sought to accommodate the Christian Gospel within the limits of ontological speculations. Tillich’s method is always to press ontological questions until it is proved that metaphysics points beyond its own speculations to a dimension of reality in which the Biblical assertions and affirmations about God’s “mighty act,” revelation as apprehended by faith, become relevant and meaningful.

Correlation is a Tillichian concept that is part of the German legacy. Clayton (1980:16) argues correlation is more than just existentialism raising questions which theology will answer. Ratschow (1980:30) argues for ‘constant alternations or correlations’ in Tillich. Ratschow (ibid:30) writes of these alternations or correlations: ‘Culture and religion, there is society and history, the individual and religion, the individual and the masses, technics and culture, and art and faith’. Tillich worked the correlations into a ‘schema’ which comes from Schelling (ibid:30).

Tillich’s contemporary historical view is his embrace of ecumenism which is so important for theology. Horton (1952:28) writes: ‘Tillich makes it very clear that he has never completely repudiated liberalism, either in the economic-political sense or in the theological sense. For liberal theology’s contribution to Biblical and historical criticism he remains grateful, while turning against the humanistic pride of certain idealistic doctrines’. Tillich was able to relate the present to the future (ibid:32). Tillich’s relevant contemporary historical legacy included the transformation of the social order in politics, and economics (Ratschow 1980:23). Tillich related our historic materialistic faith to the Kingdom of God. All history lies
within the divine order (Ratschow 1980:23-36). Tillich (1968:481-482) saw clearly the
importance of an ideology.

Tillich’s German legacy updated includes an awareness of Tillich’s activities in
1917 (Ratschow 1980:17). Three letters were found in Hirsch’s estate from Tillich (ibid:39).
A brief outline of systematic theology from a 1913 manuscript (ibid:38). A number of Tillich’s
early German works are now available. Tillich’s 1929 Religiose Verwirklichung expresses
Tillich’s philosophy of religion (Siegfried 1952:75). The Paul Tillich Archives are at Andover—
perusals of the Harvard archives with the distinct impression that most everything of
consequence that Tillich had to say as a theologian has found its way into print’. The Paul
Tillich Archives at Marburg contains materials ‘roughly a European counterpart to the Paul
Tillich Archives at Harvard’ (ibid:127). Carey (ibid:127) continues: ‘Most Tillich’s original
manuscripts are in fact at Harvard; one project of Marburg archive has been to obtain copies
of those Harvard manuscripts. Even the originals of most of Tillich’s early German writings
are at Harvard but they have been copied on microfilm and are now available in Marburg as
well’. Marburg ‘is stronger on Tillich’s early writings and lectures (that is, prior to 1933)’.

Carey names three books dealing with ‘Tillich’s life and thought’ (ibid:134). The
first work is Gerhard Wehr’s Paul Tillich. Further, a Main Works/Hauptwerke is now available
in a six volume condensed version of the out of print ‘fourteen-volume Gesammelte Werke’
(ibid:128). Wehr’s book is ‘a semi-popular treatment in paper back’ (ibid:134). It has ‘many
photographs of various other people and scenes in Germany and America’ (ibid:134). The
‘main themes…are treated in twenty-two pages and the story of how the Gesammelte Werke came into being is told in four pages’ (ibid:134). Wehr tells Tillich’s life story without referring ‘to the Hannah Tillich controversy ‘ (ibid:134). This is beyond the scope of our present thesis. A second German work is Ein Lebsensbild in Dokumenten: Briefe, Tagebuch—Auszuge, Berichte. Tillich’s life is divided into various periods (ibid:134). The third work is Professor Carl Heinz Ratschow’s work Paul Tillich (ibid:135). This work was translated by Robert Scharlemann. It was published in 1980 by the North American Paul Tillich Society.

Tillich’s 1913 systematic theology manuscript appears in Scharf’s The Paradoxical Breakthrough of Revelation (ibid:137). Further Erdmann Sturm has done considerable editing on Tillich’s ‘pre-World War I writings’ (ibid:137). Carey (137) points out Sturm’s editing ‘of the Erganzungs- und Nachlassbanke two volumes entitled Religion, Kultur, Gesellschaft: unveroffentliche Texte aus der deutschen Zeit (1908-1913)’. Carey (ibid:137) adds: ‘Sturm’s work has exposed both German- and English speaking scholars to a whole corpus of Tillich’s earlier work in philosophy and culture’. Sturm has done work on Tillich’s early sermons as a young vicar. This includes his war sermons as a chaplain (ibid:137-138). Our thesis turns to chapter 7 conclusions.

8:7 Chapter 7 conclusions

A lack of consensus exists on the American perspective on Paul Tillich. This confusion and conflict leads to a misinterpretation and misunderstanding in the historical perspective on Tillich. James Luther Adams argues that the German years (1886-1933) are necessary to understand Tillich’s life, thought, and legacy. It was here during the German years that Tillich’s
theology of art was formed (Adams 1965:65-66). This Adams argues is necessary to understand Tillich’s thought and some of his categories (ibid:65-66). The religious significance of Rilke’s poetry was full of metaphysical substance for Tillich (ibid:67). It was during the German years that Tillich’s ‘basic categories’ for his philosophy of religion and theology of culture were formed (ibid:68). Adams work is a thematic presentation. Nevertheless, Adams argues that Tillich’s German years are necessary to understand his life, thought, and legacy. Adams bases his arguments on Tillich’s early writings Masse und Geist (1922), Das System der Wissenschaften (1923), and Religiose Verwirklichung (1929) (ibid:20,22,33,42). Tillich set forth his theology of culture and art during the German years (ibid:65-68).

Tillich’s concept of meaning and the associated disciplines are ‘a theory of the principle of meaning’, ‘a theory of the material of meaning—philosophy of history and typology of cultural creations’, and ‘a theory of the norm of meaning’ (ibid:113). This is to be seen in terms of Tillich as ‘the culture-theologian’ (ibid:113).

Adams (ibid:187) argues that Tillich’s: ‘philosophy of religion and theology are two elements in a cultural science of religion’. Adams (ibid:187-188) continues:

They may never properly be separated entirely. Every theology is dependent upon the concept of the essence of religion already presupposed. Every philosophy of religion is in the end dependent upon the normative concept of religion. And both are dependent upon the comprehension of the socio-historical material.

Leibrecht (1959:7) argues that Tillich’s criticism was of the bourgeois capitalism. He desired a new social order that would allow all ‘the opportunity to work creatively, each in his own life, in the spirit of artists’. Religious socialism was Tillich’s political theology during the German years (ibid:10-11). Leibrecht (ibid:7) is mistaken when he passes Tillich’s socialism off as creativity and romanticism. Leibrecht’s pattern is to deny and then to affirm Tillich’s religious socialism. Runyon (1984:277) confirms that Tillich was a religious socialist. Tillich’s thought was based on the Marxist analysis of Capitalism (ibid:275). Carey (2002:47) confirms Tillich was also a political theologian.

It was during the German years that Tillich began his *Systematic Theology* (Tillich 1952:14). Adams (1965:12) saw in Tillich words that came ‘very near to expressing the sentiments of the existential philosopher Heidegger’. Adams (ibid:17) argues that Tillich’s method was ‘a constant interplay between reality as immediately experienced and reality as…historically inherited’. Adams brings out both the importance of the German years and as well Tillich’s historical ancestors. Adams (ibid:22) writes of ‘the intellectual ancestry of these ideas’. Adams (ibid:22) lists Kierkegaard, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Marx, and Jacob Bohme. Tillich’s concept of meaning was also used by the existential school (ibid:56).
Adams lists ‘Heidegger and Jaspers, Barth and Brunner’. This concept was also used by thinkers of ‘the idealistic and Neo-Kantian tradition’ (ibid:56). Adams (ibid:56-57) includes in this category ‘Dilthey, Bretano, Rickert, Windelband, Eucken, Troeltsch, Hartmann, Husserl’, ‘and among writers like Oswald Spengler and Theodor Lessing’. Tillich (1919: 31 in Adams 1965:71) shows familiarity with Nietzsche concept of ‘the creative’. Tillich’s concept of autonomy had historical ancestors. Adams (ibid:53) writes: ‘Kant, Rothe, and Troeltsch are the principal figures who contribute to this typology of authority’.

Adams lists the major concepts that were formed in Germany during Tillich’s German years (1886-1933). These are ‘the present’ (ibid:18), ‘decision’ (ibid:23), ‘fate’ (ibid:27), ‘depth’ (ibid:28), ‘ultimate depth of history’ (ibid:31), ‘form (Gestalt) of grace’ (Tillich 1929: 15 in ibid:36), ‘metaphysical concept of the “human boundary-situation” ’ (ibid:36), and ‘the Unconditioned’ (ibid:41). Adams (ibid:41) adds of ‘the concept of the Unconditioned and its corollaries, the ideas of “the form of grace” and the Kairos’. Two additional concepts are ‘self-sufficient finitude’, and ‘secularism’ (ibid:50). ‘Demonry’ includes both the ‘destructive and creative elements’ (ibid:51). Demonry is to be found both in secularism and also in religion (ibid:51). Adams (ibid:56) lists meaning as well within the Tillichean ideas.

Tillich had sought to win a place for theology within the totality of knowledge and also the other sciences during the German years (ibid:120-121). Tillich ‘adopts and adapts a general pattern proposed by Fichte’ (ibid:124). It was during the German years that Tillich’s religious socialism was developed earlier and apart from the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (O’Keeffe 1984:81).
Adams, Leibrecht, Runyon, Carey, and O’Keeffe argue that the German years (1886-1933) are necessary to understand Tillich’s life, thought, and legacy.

**8:8 Judged By The Standards of Historiography**

Tillich realized a liberal democracy and capitalism was a temporary state of flux. Tillich was able to project a vision of the future based on his concept of the kairos. The kairos, a special moment in history, would bring about a new social world order. Tillich admitted the subjectiveness of his own context. Tillich realized progress is achieved objectively through a political and social purpose. He was a contributor to the ecumenical perspective which is so important for theology. He viewed the destination of history to be world transformation of society including the West. Tillich deemed this necessary for the fulfillment of the Kingdom God. Tillich refuted the liberal democracy and economic capitalism of his day with his Marxian analysis of the German bourgeois society. Tillich’s Christianity was the historic materialistic faith. Tillich’s ideology consisted of religious socialism with a vision of the future. Tillich called into question the social order of his day. Religious socialism was the necessary social order that post World War I Germany needed. Thus Tillich realized the importance of his own historical, religious and political context with the rise of Hitler, Nazism, and National Socialism in Germany. Tillich viewed those outside the church as manifesting a greater display of works and grace than those inside the church. Tillich saw church history against and within the background of world history. Tillich judged by the standards of historiography in the writing of contemporary history and church history is far from outdated. Tillich remains relevant even though he was a product of his German years from 1886 to 1933.
8.9 Concluding Comment(s)

8:9:1 The Ontological Question

The ‘ontological question is’ : ‘what is being itself’ (Tillich 1951:163). This question has been discussed throughout the thesis. The importance of this question deserves some concluding remarks. Tillich names four levels of ‘ontological concepts’ (ibid:164). These are the ‘basic ontological structure which is the implicit condition of the ontological question’, ‘the elements’ constituting ‘the ontological structure’, ‘characteristics of being’, and ‘the categories of being and knowing’ (ibid:164). The ‘basic ontological structure ‘contains’ the subject-object structure of being’ (ibid:164). This involves a ‘self-world structure’ (ibid:164). Progression continues to the ‘second level of ontological analysis’ which deals with the elements of the structure of being (ibid:165). Tillich points out three pairs of elements that form the ontological structure. These are ‘individuality and universality’, ‘dynamics and form’, ‘freedom and destiny’. The first element is the power of being (ibid:165). The second element of dynamics and form points to ‘the belongingness of being’ (ibid:165). Being is seen as ‘a part of a universe of being’ (ibid:165). The characteristics of ontological being express two things. These are being’s power to exist and essential, and existential being. The categories are the forms of both thought and being (ibid:165). Tillich (ibid:164)) makes a very important statement: ‘But the arena of ontological discussion is not the theological arena, although the theologian must be familiar in it’. The existential analysis of the human situation correlates with the theological. Tillich’s theological method of correlation calls for an existential analysis of the human situation. The existential problem is given a theological answer from the Christian
faith. The sources of systematic theology are the Bible, Church history, and religion, and culture. The theological answer can be formed as well from our experience. The norm of theology is a value judgment in relationship to the content of the Christian faith (ibid:28-34).

8:9:2 Paul Tillich’s German Years (1886-1933)

The German years (1886-1933) are necessary to understand Paul Tillich’s life, thought, and his German legacy. The German years determined the direction of Paul Tillich’s life, his thinking, and his legacy. Tillich’s own chronology and autobiographies, the Pauck’s biography, the Frankfurt years (1929-1933), the influences on Tillich’s life during the German years, his German legacy, and scholars such as Adams, Leibrecht, Runyon, Carey, O’Keeffe, and Irwin argue for the affirmation of our hypothesis.

9.0 New Knowledge

Paul Tillich is allowed to tell his own story through the harmonization of his own autobiographical accounts. The primary and secondary sources throughout the thesis are allowed to speak for themselves. The thesis uses the qualitative method of research methodology. The qualitative research method makes use of the inductive approach to the study. The quotations which are rather lengthy if need be are given analysis and explanation as the argument is advanced. The exegesis of the qualitative research method using the inductive approach lifts the ideas out of the study. The meaning comes from the sources rather than from a preconceived idea. The thesis using the qualitative research method with its inductive approach has established the importance of Paul Tillich’s German years (1886-1933).
The new knowledge contributed to studies on Tillich is that Tillich’s life was determined in Germany during the German years. This is because of his ever increasing commitment to religious socialism. His thinking was formed during the German years because of the numerous influences upon him. Tillich has left us a definite German legacy from the years (1886-1933). Tillich was a product of his German background. Paul Tillich was a German. He received German academic training in German universities. The thesis demonstrates the development of his thought during the German years. He was ordained to the Christian ministry based on German ministerial standards. The new knowledge from our research findings shows Tillich’s life was determined in Germany, his thinking formed, and a definite legacy bequeathed to us from the German years (1886-1933).


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