CHAPTER 7

PERSPECTIVE

7:1 American Synthesis

7:1:1 American Value Judgments Based on Quantitative’s Deductive Method

A lack of consensus exists in the American perspective on Paul Tillich. Carey (2002:147) saw Tillich as a bridge builder. Lyons (1969:12-13) applauds Tillich as an intellectual. Randall (1969:21) in the same volume denotes Tillich’s advancement of a ‘broad ecumenical definition of religion’. Braaten (1968:xiii) claims Tillich was a radical. Braaten (ibid:xiii) argues ‘it was the radicalism which moved the great prophetic spirits of the religious tradition’. Tillich’s Systematic Theology is the reason that he is regarded as a theologian (ibid:xv). Latourette (1953:1384) offers a synthesis of Tillich’s life rather than an analysis. Marty (1986:732-733) argues Tillich was outdated a nineteenth century scholar in the twentieth century. Marty brings out two more perspectives on Tillich. He regards him as a metaphysical theologian and a existential theologian. Tillich has added significantly to ecumenical progress between Protestants and Roman Catholics (Weigel 1956:141). Tillich is often perceived in the American spectrum as a theologian of culture (Reimer 2004:34). Thomas (1963:179) argues just the opposite that Tillich’s theology of culture was far too simplistic. Thomas contends that it was suitable only for a primitive society not a modern
Relativity and subjectivity are valid historiographical concepts and issues. However, Tillich is misinterpreted and misunderstood as a result of the confusion and conflict in the American perspective on Tillich.

Tillich suffered ad hominem attacks in his career in America. Carl Braaten expands on the concept of Tillich’s radicalism. He (1968:xiii) writes:

It has been said that the real Tillich is the radical Tillich but the radicalism which moved Paul Tillich was not the iconoclastic spirit of those who wish to create de Novo an original brand of Christianity; rather, it was the radicalism which moved the great prophetic spirits of religious tradition. Tillich’s term for it was the “Protestant principle.” This radical principle was to be used not against but for the sake of the “catholic substance” of the Christian tradition.

Braaten (ibid:xiv) seeks to clarify this issue in our thinking:

How can the radicalism of prophetic criticism which is implied in the principles of genuine Protestantism be united with the classical tradition, dogma, sacred law, sacraments, hierarchy, cult as preserved in the Catholic churches. Tillich also saw the danger in prophetic criticism. The prophet hopes to get to the heart of the matter with his knife of radical protest; the false prophet is known in the tradition as who cuts out the heart itself. It was the true radicalism rooted in Biblical prophetism which drove Tillich to criticize our religious and cultural forms of tradition. Thus, like the Old Testament prophets, his criticism of the tradition was always from the tradition, neutral or alien stand point outside the “theological circle.”

Braaten (ibid:xiv) concludes: ‘Most of Tillich’s commentators and critics in America have had the impression that Tillich was a radical, perhaps even dangerous, innovator’. Adams (1965:1) concurs:

Among contemporary theologians no one has more radically questioned prevailing ideas and practices in the Christian churches, especially among Protestants, than has Paul Tillich…. [P]aul Tillich sets forth his criticism of the church precisely as a theologian. For him, protest is an ineradicable element in Protestantism as such, and the first task of the theologian is to proclaim the protest.

Some scholars such as Kenneth Hamilton (1963:9) view Tillich as a philosophical theologian.
Hamilton (ibid:9) writes: ‘Paul Tillich’s philosophical theology is one of the most spectacular features of the contemporary theological landscape’. Hamilton’s (ibid:9) remarks on Tillich’s philosophical theology are worth noting:

Its influence is felt everywhere, and it has been much expounded, and defended, attacked and pronounced on. Philosophers as well as theologians have been intrigued by it. Yet, although the first volume of his Systematic Theology was published almost a dozen years ago, nearly all the critical writing on Tillich to date has been in essay form; and if ever a theology called for extended analysis, this one does.

Braaten (1968:xv) extols Tillich as a systematic theologian. The pragmatic evidence for this is his Systematic Theology. Braaten (ibid:xv) expounds:

His theology was a living dialogue with the great men and ideas of the past, with the fathers of the ancient church, both Greek and Latin, with the schoolmen and mystics of the medieval period, with Renaissance humanists and Protestant reformers, with the theologians of liberalism and their neo-orthodox critics. His method of handling the tradition was eminently dialectical, in the spirit of the sic et non of Abelard. Tillich’s Systematic Theology was built up through the rhythm of raising and answering existential questions.

Thomas (1963:172) argues that Tillich’s importance is that of a theologian ‘and most distinguished theologian’. Thomas (ibid:175-178) elaborates:

There is another respect in which Tillich might be thought to be very much the contemporary theologian. This is his emphasis on the apologetic function of theology. In his Introduction to Volume One of Systematic Theology he insists that the ‘situation’ cannot be excluded from theological work. Theology, he answers must answer the questions implied in the situation ‘in the power of the eternal message and with the means provided by the situation whose question it answers. Whether he has succeeded or not Tillich has attempted to present such a theology. Not since Schleiermacher has there been such a full-scale reconstruction or reinterpretation of theology, and indeed it might even be argued that what Tillich has done is more extensive and more thorough than was Schleiermacher’s work.

Again, one must admit the courage shown by the venture, but this is not to say that he has succeeded or that such work is necessary or desirable. That he has not at any rate been completely successful has been argued in our discussion of the main themes of his theology. Our further point is that there are many indications of his being not a modern theologian at all but rather a nineteenth-century thinker in twentieth-century dress. It is not without cause
that he describes himself as belonging to the nineteenth century. ‘I am’ he says, ‘one of those in my generation who, in spite of the radicalism with which they have criticized the nineteenth century, often feel a longing for its…unbroken cultural traditions’. Thus he is regarded by some as the modern ecumenical theologian or again as the contemporary theologian who can assist cultural reconstruction. Both are in a way aspects of the appeal which Tillich’s apologetic emphasis makes to the contemporary reader of theology. Tillich’s alleged modernity, Tillich appears to be a theologian capable of resolving the dilemma of the ecumenical movement because he is at once thoroughly Protestant and so open to the appeal of Catholicism. For him neither the ‘sacramental’ principle of Catholicism nor the ‘prophetic’ principle of Protestantism can stand on its own. Therefore, however inevitable may be the class between institutional Catholicism and institutional Protestantism there is he thinks, no essential conflict between these two principles. They are complimentary elements of the true ‘theonomous’ Christianity, and either, taken on its own, becomes ‘demonic’…[I]t may well be that Tillich’s contribution to the ecclesiological discussion of our time is yet to be made, but it is difficult to resist the suspicion that we shall not hear any startlingly modern message.

There is considerable disagreement between American theologians as to the interpretation and meaning of Paul Tillich.

In analysis, the American perspective on Paul Tillich lacks a consensus. A number of different views exist on Tillich. Tillich is misinterpreted and misunderstood because of the confusion and conflict created by the American perspective. An example of this is the view that Tillich is a radical man. Tillich’s radicalism is the Old Testament spirit of prophetic criticism. Tillich is also viewed as a philosophical theologian and a systematic theologian.

7:2 The German Years (1886 to 1933) Are Essential In Our Understanding of Tillich

7:2:1 Tillich’s Beginning (1886-1933)

Adams argues that it is impossible to understand Tillich without an understanding of the German years. Adams (1965:65-66) writes:
We can therefore better understand Tillich’s thought—and also some of his characteristic categories—if we observe the early development of his interest in art. [I]n his autobiographical sketch he tells us that his father, a Protestant minister in a small trans-Elbian town, not only maintained the musical traditions of the evangelical pastor’s household but also tried his hand at composing. The son was not himself inclined to the study of music. His first warm interest in art seems to have been in the field of literature, and he tells us of his early intoxication with the plays of Shakespeare and with Schelling’s philosophy of nature. He asserts that his “instinctive sympathy” for German existential philosophy undoubtedly goes back to the excitement created in him by the reading of Hamlet, a play that he calls “this most precious work of secular literature viewed existentially.” He was never in his youth greatly attracted to the writings of Goethe. The German poet’s works, he says, “seem to me to express too little of the ‘border-situation.’” As he grew older he turned his attention to the other arts, especially architecture and painting. The study of painting was for him an experience of decisive importance. Eventually he came into intimate association with the practicing artists of his generation. The most widely read book of his earlier period, The Religious Situation, was dedicated to an artist friend. …[H]e says that from his “pleasure in the poor reproductions that were obtainable at the military bookstores in the fields, there grew a systematic study of art,…[A] little later the early Christian art of Italy made “an overwhelming impression” upon him.

Further, ‘Tillich’s (ibid:67) comment on Rilke’s own art explicitly suggests what the metaphysical frisson—the philosophical and religious significance—of art is’. Tillich (1936:17 in ibid:67) writes: ‘Its profound psychoanalytic realism, the mystical fullness, the form charged with metaphysical import, all that made this poetry the expression of what in the concepts of my philosophy of religion I could seize only abstractly. To me and to my wife, who made poetry accessible to me, these poems became a book of devotion to be taken up again and again’. Adams (ibid:68) draws our attention to the fact: ‘In the comment on Rilke’s poetry we find two basic categories of Tillich’s philosophy of religion and of his theology of culture, namely, form and import (or meaning)’. Adams (ibid:68) points out the ‘special interest here is their place in his theology of culture’.
Tillich brings us to the ‘Tillichian idea of living on the border—this time the border between culture and religion’. Adams (ibid:68) adds it was: ‘From this border Tillich early developed his theology of culture and of art’. Adams (ibid:68) continues: ‘The outlines of his theology of culture were set forth in his 1919 lecture “Ueber die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur” the first work he published after the First World War’. Tillich (1919:9 in ibid:70-71) writes: ‘The task of theology is to outline a normative system from the point of view of a concrete standpoint and on the basis of the categories of the philosophy of religion, the individual standpoint being intimately related to the confessional and the universally religious-historical and the cultural-historical standpoint in general. This is not a hidden rationalism, for it involves the recognition of the concrete religious standpoint, and it is no indirect or concealed supernaturalism, as is to be found still in our History of Religion School, for it implies that on the basis of a philosophy of history all authoritarian limitations upon the individual standpoint are broken’. Adams shows that the early German years are the key to understanding Tillich’s life, thought, and legacy. Adams (ibid:33,42) uses other sources from the German years “Masse und Geist (1922)”, “Das System der Wissenschaften” (1923), and “Religiose Verwirklichung” (1929). Runyon (1984:274) writes of the importance of the kairos to aid in our understanding Tillich’s theology. Tillich was convinced as were ‘his friends in the Religious Socialist movement that a kairos was appearing on the horizon’. The kairos was a particular ‘moment in history’ (ibid:274). It was also ‘a fullness of time that becomes a watershed for the future’ (ibid:274). Runyon (ibid:275) writes of Marx’s influence:
Toward this end Tillich called attention to elements in Marxism that by his definition constituted authentic religious protest against the heteronomous character of bourgeois culture and the capitalistic economic spirit, and therefore sought to interpret for the church the genuine religious motifs in Marxism. At the same time he sought to show Marxists that socialism was not in opposition to religion as such, but only to the bourgeois form that religion had taken in church. Within socialism are genuine religious elements, he argued, which need to be recognized for the sake of the socialist cause. The first contribution of Religious Socialism was to expose the heteronomous nature of capitalist society, and the offshoots of it found in the church.

Thomas (1983:179) points to Tillich’s theology of culture formed during the German years from 1919 to 1933. Thomas (ibid:179) thought that Tillich’s interest in a theology of culture is an evidence of ‘his affinity with the nineteenth century’. Thomas (ibid:179) does admit the continuous problem of relating the Christian gospel argues for the ‘urgent need for cultural reconstruction’. Thomas (ibid:179) writes: ‘He has never abandoned the interest in culture which he inherits from Troeltsch…but for all that, he breathes throughout this interest in modern culture the spirit of an alien age. The simplicity of Tillich’s way of relating religion and culture is what reveals this best’. Thomas (ibid:179) refers to Tillich’s ‘central proposition….Religion is the substance of culture, culture is the expression of Religion’. Adams (1965:89) argues that Tillich’s relating of culture to religion is most significant. Adams (ibid:89) writes: ‘Yet he has given in his early works, especially in the lecture on “The Idea of a Theology of Culture,” certain of the basic principles that persist throughout all his writings. Especially significant are his conceptions of form and content and import, and also his interpretation of the nature of religion and of culture and of the relations between them’. Adams (ibid:90) relates Tillich’s theology of culture to art. He writes: ‘the most extensive discussions of particular works of art is to be found
in his “Masse und Geist,” published in 1922’. Adams (ibid:90) gives us understanding into

Tillich’s theology of art in *Masse und Geist*:

Tillich first examines early Gothic paintings of masses. In a “Carrying the Cross” portraying a crowd of followers, in a “Birth of Christ” with its shepherds and kings, or in a typical secular picture of a battle, he finds the crowd fully dominated by the overwhelming idea that it represents, whether it be the idea of the following, or of adoring worship, or of the battle….Two dimensional space unites the crowd to a *corpus mysticum* which is imbued with the transcendent life of a supranatural idea of cosmic scope.

Adams (ibid:95) develops his argument further based on Tillich’s “Kult und Form” written in 1930. He (ibid:95) writes:

This means that the creator of religious art, like any other artist, has the demand of truth placed upon him. It is a demand that may be responded to by a secularist as well as by a religious person. Religion has no monopoly on the way of depth into truth and reality. Indeed, at times it seems to be excluded from that way.

Tillich (1930:582-583 in ibid:95) writes:

It is a judgment upon religion, that it—the supposed witness to truth as such—is always shamed by the sincerity of those who stand far away from it, who remain entirely removed from its cultus and myth. These people must for their own sincerity’s sake remain aloof, so long as religious art is not an art expressing truth and reality. It is at the same time both characteristic and disgraceful for our religious situation that in this Exposition the secular objects alone are entirely penetrating and impressive, the things that are presented as expressly not for use in the cultus. A simple bowl even in the ultimate religious sense shames almost all the things that are assembled here as objects for the cultus. There are, to be sure, some items here which show creative power for purposes of public worship, and we are grateful to those who have broken new paths. But almost without exception these items are frustrated by the old, false understanding of worship of as a special sphere alongside the breadth and the reality of daily life. Almost always the cultus is removed from the present and thereby deprived of its ultimate seriousness. We are grateful that the Art Association has taken up the struggle for a new, contemporary, real art form, that it has taken up the struggle for an art that has the power of witness.

Tillich’s theology of culture and art was formed during the German years. It was during
this period that Tillich developed both a theology of culture and art. Adams (ibid:113-114) writes of Tillich’s ‘task of theology of culture’:

is to develop a systematic sketch of the nature of a religiously imbued culture; it is, in short, a normative cultural science. In order to accomplish his purpose the culture-theologian must have first a general religious conception of the nature of actual cultural creations; he must have also a philosophy of cultural history and a typology of cultural creations. We may simplify the characterization of these cultural sciences if we use Tillich’s central concept of meaning as the basis for unity and distinction. The three disciplines could, in terms of the concept of meaning, be characterized as (1) a theory of the principle of meaning; (2) a theory of the material of meaning—philosophy of history and typology of cultural creations; and (3) a theory of the norm of meaning. Throughout, the primary concern of the culture-theologian is the import that is realized or pointed to in cultural creations. He leaves the question of the appropriateness of forms to others. He attempts to show in a general way the direction in which he sees the fulfillment or frustration of meaning.

Adams claims: ‘This tripartite division corresponds to the construction of systematic cultural sciences set forth by Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung’ (Troeltsch 1924:28 in ibid:113). Adams (ibid:115) concludes: ‘With such a view of the theology of culture as this, in which the normative science of theology is integrally related to principles of meaning and to the history of culture as understood by the systematizer, it is extremely difficult to determine whether the theology is a historical theology related to a specifically Christian tradition or is a norm merely posited by the culture-theologian and used to explicate and justify certain aspects of a historical tradition’. Adams (ibid:115) continues: ‘Tillich himself attempts to combine in his writings the functions of the theologian of culture and of the Christian theologian. The culture of which he is a theologian has itself been partially nourished by Judeo-Christian influences’.
Tillich’s theology of culture an address delivered in Berlin in 1919 has ‘prepared the way for a truly ecumenical theology’ (Leibrecht 1959:17). This is another historiographical issue which contributes to contemporary history. Tillich (1919:35 in Adams 1965:43-44) writes of this lecture:

Religion is an experience of the Unconditioned and that means an experience of absolute reality on the ground of the experience of absolute nothingness; it will experience the nothingness of all existing things, the nothingness of values, the nothingness of the personal life; where this experience has led to the absolute, radical No, there it shifts into an equally absolute experience of reality, into a radical Yes. It is not a question of a new reality beside or above things; that would be only a thing of a higher order that would again fall under the No. Rather, right through things there forces itself upon us that reality which is at the same time the No and the Yes over things; it is not an existing thing, it is not the substance, the totality of the existing order; it is, if we may use a mystical formula, the Super-existing, that which is at the same time the absolute Nothing and the absolute Something. But the predicate “is” conceals the real situation, for it is not a question of an existent reality, it is rather a meaning-reality: the ultimate, the deepest, all shattering and every newly creating meaning-reality.

Tillich is dependent on Schelling which is often overlooked when trying to understand his life, thought, and ensuing legacy. Adams (ibid:130-131) refers to Tillich’s Interpretation of History: ‘Following the later Schelling, Tillich holds that “reality is not only the appearance of essence, but also the contradiction of it, and that, above all, human existence is the expression of the contradiction of its essence” ’. Tillich was dependent on Schelling’s work The Ages of The World. Adams (ibid:131-132) writes:

In Tillich’s view, this recognition of an import that constantly breaks through and shines through the formal system of the sciences represents again the transcending of idealism which was accomplished by Schelling in The Ages of The World (begun in 1811) he rejected the Hegelian dialectic in favor of a new realism, that is, in favor of an existential dialectic. Moreover, something of “the import that breaks and shines
through the formal system of the sciences” is to be observed already in Schelling’s *Lectures on the Methods of the Academic Disciplines* (1803). In the First Lecture, Schelling finds the presupposition of all science to be “the essential unity of the unconditioned ideal and the unconditioned real.”

Runyon (1984:272) concurs:

In Tillich’s own system, Schelling’s Ungrund becomes “the Unconditioned” or “the Unconditional (das Unbedingte), the original, the “Ground of Being,” or simply “Being-itself.” Tillich then distinguished between essential and existential dimensions of being: essence corresponds to Schelling’s potencies in their primeval, unrealized stage; existence corresponds to the actualization of the potential as being separates itself from its origins in essence and takes on concretion in the world. This movement frees essence for self-expression, but only at the price of the ontological gap that separates all existing things from their original essence. Tillich’s polarities (dynamic and form, individualization and participation, freedom and destiny) speak of the tension present both in essential and existential dimension of being. The lack of balance between these elements can result in the breakdown of existing structure accompanied by the threat of nonbeing.

Leibrecht (1959:6) confirms Tillich’s theology to be metaphysical: ‘we feel this passionate search for the lost identity in the ultimate union of the separated as the driving power behind all Tillich’s thought. This stress links Tillich to the fundamental thought of …Schelling’. Marty (1984:732) acknowledges Tillich’s theology to be from Schelling.

Adams (1965:153) argues that Tillich’s Christian metaphysical theology is derived from Bohme as well as Schelling. Adams (ibid:153-154) notes:

Implicit in the criticism directed by Tillich at Hegelianism and Kantianism is his appropriation of motifs….who in his view represent a more dynamic conception of reality and spirit. Chief among these are Boehme, [variant spelling of Bohme] ….Boehme’s theosophy represents for Tillich the modern fountain-head of that dynamic, voluntaristic outlook on the world which interprets it as an emanation of tensions between the universal will and the particular (eigene) will-tensions rising from an ultimate ground and abyss. This dialectical, dynamic philosophy reappears in the later Schelling’s “positive” theory of potencies and in his
doctrine of freedom. According to Schelling, the rational, “negative” conception of God is inadequate, for it extends only to the form; it does not touch the real.

Tillich stands in the theological tradition of the Neo-Platonic and its negative theology.

Adams (ibid:154) describes this theological orientation as follows:

‘ecstatic” orientation to the One beyond all existence and the accompanying “negative theology.” Dionysius speaks of God as nameless, beyond the highest name one can give Him. He is beyond God, if God is spoken of as a divine being. He is “unspeakable Darkness.’ This “abysmal” One is the source and substance of all being. Tillich’s emphasis upon the sense of participation in and separation from the unconditionally real and the unconditionally valid, his insistence upon the idea that the ultimate defies conception, that the forms drawn from the autonomous order must be used symbolically and paradoxically when applied to the theonomous order, are implications of a revised version of Neo-Platonic “ecstatic” and negative theology, with a positive reminiscent of Nicolas of Cusa.

Leibrecht (1959:8) argues in agreement with Adams that Tillich was a Christian metaphysical theologian ‘without falling into the irrationalism and emotionalism of many a romantic thinker, however, he shows the need of “ecstatic reason” to discover the unconditional in the conditional’. It was ‘the later writings of Schelling, the Schelling who opposed Hegel’s pure essentialism, his system of synthesis’. Schelling insisted ‘being precedes thought and act’. Schelling discovered ‘man’s actualization of freedom from his original sin, and accordingly develops a doctrine of grace and guilt’ (ibid:8).

Leibrecht stresses the importance of the German years for understanding Tillich’s theology. Leibrecht (ibid:10) writes: ‘The Christian doctrine of the Fall is accepted by Tillich as a valid symbol signifying man’s situation as one of estrangement. These notions of Tillich were shared by very few in the years just prior to World War I….most of the theologians of the period were busy condemning the mystical elements of
Christianity as un-Christian remnants of the Middle Ages, finding the essence of Christian religion in solid, practical ethics, the golden rule for modern man’. Leibrecht (ibid:19) continues: ‘much confusion…is dissipated if we remind ourselves Tillich has been a mystical Christian theologian’. Leibrecht’s (1959:6) point is well taken that Tillich’s theology was formed during the German years. Tillich’s (1923:132 in Adams 1965:165-166) Das System der Wissenschaften verifies his metaphysical theology during the German years. Tillich (ibid:132 in ibid:165-166) writes:

The goal of metaphysical knowledge is the unity of the concept of being and the concept of meaning; that is, a system that is at the same time a universal Gestalt and a universal framework of meaning. The approach of metaphysical knowledge is the unity of the apprehension of form and import, of the scientific and the aesthetic view, of the perception of being and the understanding of meaning. The method of metaphysical knowledge is the contemplation of the unconditioned import in the conditioned forms, which in the philosophy of the Renaissance was designed as the contemplation of the coincidentia oppositorum….Thus concepts like “intellectual contemplation,” “pure intuition,” the grasping of the “absolute identity” and of the “paradox”, etc. are expressions for the method of coincidence.

Adams (ibid:165) argues: ‘concepts employed by metaphysics are symbol-concepts and that they are therefore to be interpreted paradoxically’. The religious and theological import of Tillich is thus realized in ‘the paradoxical immanence of the transcendent’ (ibid:166). Adams (ibid:166) continues: ‘Owing to the symbolic character of metaphysical concepts, metaphysics is described as “the mythical will to apprehend the Unconditioned”. Adams (ibid:166) bases this on Tillich’s 1930 work Religiose Verwirklichung. Tillich is perceived during the German years as merely a Christian philosopher of religion. Adams (ibid:187-188) clarifies this matter:
Accordingly, philosophy of religion is the theory of the religious function and its categories. The student of religion passes thence by way of transition through history of religions to theology, the normative and systematic presentation of the concrete realization of the concept of religion. Thus philosophy of religion and theology are two elements in a cultural science of religion. They may never properly be separated entirely. Every theology is dependent upon the concept of the essence of religion already presupposed. Every philosophy of religion is in the end dependent upon the normative concept of religion. And both, are dependent upon the comprehension of the socio-historical material. By this systematization Tillich indicates not only that theology itself requires the work of a methodical philosophy of religion which deals with the problem of the essence of religion and with the theory of meaning. He indicates also that some particular normative system of religion—some theology—as a background for every philosophy of religion. In other words, the philosopher of religion is a theologian malgré lui. Tillich presents the evidence for this in many of his other writings.

At times, Tilich’s theology may seem hard to decipher. The reason is Tillich switches back and forth between his Christian philosophy and his Christian theology (ibid:259-260).

Adams (ibid:260) writes:

The first reason is that his philosophy of religion frequently presents ideas that are obviously drawn from Christian theology or that presupposes some Christian idea. Indeed, at times the reader supposes that he is reading general philosophical discourse; then he is told that the idea just expounded is the essential meaning of the doctrine of justification by faith or of the Logos. As a pedagogical method and as a method of persuasion this procedure has been markedly successful, particularly in his philosophy of culture and his philosophy of religion. It represents the fulfillment of the task Tillich set for himself: to express in an effective way the enduring but language-frustrated doctrines of Christianity.

Tillich (1919:38 in Adams 1965:81) gives us a further glimpse into his theology of culture formed during the years in Germany. He (ibid:38 in ibid:81) writes:

We have assigned to theology the task of bringing to systematic expression a concrete religious point of view, on the basis of a universal formation of concepts (the philosophy of religion) and by means of an arrangement presupposing a philosophy of history. The task of the theology of culture corresponds to this. It undertakes a universal religious analysis of all cultural creations, it sets forth a philosophy of history and a typological scheme of the great cultural creations from the viewpoint
of the religious import realized in them, and it creates on the basis of its concrete religious standpoint the ideal sketch of a religiously imbued culture. There is therefore a threefold task for the theology of culture, corresponding to the threefold character of systematic cultural sciences in general and to the systematic science of religion in particular: (1) A general (universal) religious analysis of culture; (2) A religious typology and a philosophy of cultural history; (3) A concrete religious systematization of culture.

Adams (ibid:82-83) clarifies:

It would be wrong, however, to suppose that the task of the theologian of culture is merely analytical. After making the religious analysis of culture with a view to determining the (religious) import of the different cultural productions and functions, the culture-theologian undertakes the synthetic task of setting forth the normative, systematic outline of a religiously imbued culture. The synthesis not only brings together the different cultural functions but also overcomes the culture-destroying contradiction between religion and culture.

Tillich (1919:41 in ibid:83) explains: ‘in which in place of the opposition between science and dogma there appears a science religious in itself, in place of the distinction between art and the form of the cultus there appears an art religious in itself, in place of the dualism of state and church a state-form religious in itself, etc. Only with this breadth of goal is the task of the theology of culture to be conceived’. Adams (ibid:83) concludes: ‘This description of the synthetic task of the theologian of culture is of primary significance for an understanding of Tillich’s idea of the kind of society to be striven for, namely the theonomous society. Frequently he refers to the high Middle Ages as having closely approximated this idea. He thinks that our society could move in the same direction by adopting religious socialism, though in 1926 he did not think this movement had much promise of success in the Protestant churches of Germany’.

Leibrecht (1959:7) brings out a different aspect of Tillich’s 1919 lecture in
Berlin on a theology of culture. Leibrecht (ibid:7) argues:

His basic criticism of so-called bourgeois capitalism has been that it precluded, for many, the possibility of being creative. A new social order must first of all provide everyone with the opportunity to work creatively, each in his own life in the spirit of arts, among whom Tillich moves freely and has many friends. Creative art, thought and work as participation in the creative ground and thus expressions of the ultimate-are enterprises of infinite importance. This is the key assumption which underlines Tillich’s concern for culture as expression of religion, and for religion as the ground of culture. In his lecture on “The Theology of Culture” (1919), which made him well known in Europe overnight, he speaks of the artist as the priest of the future church.

Leibrecht (ibid:7) passes Tillich’s socialistic views off as romanticism: ‘with the romantics Tillich further shares a certain disdain for the bourgeois world of self-sufficiency and easy satisfaction, as well as a lively sympathy with those who protest against this world’. It is obvious that this runs contrary to capitalism as an economic system and a liberal democracy as a political system. Leibecht (ibid:10) contradicts himself by saying:

Tillich was merciless in his attack on the spirit of placid finitude which he saw expressed in most of the artistic, political, cultural, and even ecclesiastical world of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In his eyes, Western bourgeois society and its civilization were doomed to destruction, not from without but from within. Accordingly, his method became radical analysis, and his words had the sharpness of a surgeon’s knife cutting into a cancerous tumor.

Religious socialism was part of Tillich’s political theology during the German years. Leibrecht (ibid:11) writes: ‘World War I came. It broke the nineteenth century man’s world to pieces….The demand of the hour, as Tillich saw it, was for the intellectual to identify his existence with that of the rebelling proletarian’. Leibrecht (ibid:11) informs
Together with some of his friends, Tillich founded a movement for “religious socialism.” They wanted to relate socialism to its own depth, interpreting its true meaning to its followers. Although Tillich and his friends anxiously awaited the new that was to come—the expectancy gave an urgent enthusiasm to all their writings—they were from the beginning quite sober about utopian ideas.

Runyon (1984:277) argues: ‘Tillich and the Religious Socialists wanted to make history too, but they were too circumspect, too reflective, and finally too bourgeois to succeed’.

Runyon (ibid:275) admits: ‘Tillich agreed with the Marxist analysis that class warfare is part and parcel of the capitalist orientation. The owners of the instruments of production will inevitably be in opposition to those who are dependent upon those means of production for their own existence’. Tillich (1971:48 in ibid:275) argues: ‘[T]he heteronomous situation becomes even more demonic when the owners also control the structures that are meant to insure justice; for justice will be interpreted in terms of what is good for the owners and for the kind of stability in society they desire’. Carey (2002:47) confirms the fact that Tillich was also ‘a political theologian’.

It was during the German years that Tillich began his systematic theology while teaching at the University of Marburg (Tillich 1952:14). It was here at Marburg that Tillich came across existentialism in its twentieth century form (ibid:14). Tillich (1944:319 in Adams 1965:12) writes:

Something very tragic tends to happen in all periods of man’s spiritual life: truths, once, deep and powerful, discovered by the great geniuses with profound suffering and incredible labor, become shallow and superficial when used in daily conversation. How can this happen? It can happen and it unavoidably happens, because there is no depth without the way to depth. Truth without the way to truth is dead; and if it is still
used, in detachment, it contributes only to the surface of things.

Adams (ibid:12) interprets: ‘These words come very near to expressing the sentiments of the existential philosopher Heidegger, though Tillich does not agree with Heidegger’s atheistic position’. Tillich’s theology was formed during the German years. Tillich’s theology was a theology of art and culture, a metaphysical theology derived from Schelling and Bohme, a political theology of religious socialism, the beginning of his first volume of his *Systematic Theology*, and an existential theology. All of this originated from the German years 1886 to 1933.

In evaluation, the German years (1886-1933) are essential in our understanding of Tillich. Tillich can be understood by beginning with his early interest in art. His interest in art and the systematic study of art grew out of his experience as a chaplain in the German army in World War I. It was during the German years that Tillich had an interest in German mysticism through German poetry. Tillich’s theology of culture and art was developed while in his native country. His theology of culture was set forth in his 1919 lecture “Über die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur”. Other works written by Tillich during the German years are his *Masse und Geist* (1922), *Das System der Wissenschaften* (1923), and his *Religiose Verwirklichung* (1929).

Tillich’s *Kult und Form* written in 1930 explains Tillich’s concept that real art should depict life. The depiction of life as it really is has the power of witness.

Tillich’s theology of culture has a three fold division. This division is a theory of the principle of meaning, a theory of the material meaning (philosophy of history and
typology of cultural creations), and a theory of the norm of meaning. This division corresponds to Troeltsch’s construction of the systematic cultural sciences. His theology of culture address in 1919 in Berlin prepared the way for an ecumenical theology. This is another historical issue that contributes to contemporary history.

Tillich was very dependent on Schelling’s thought especially his work *The Ages Of The World*. Tillich’s theology is Schelling’s metaphysical theology. Tillich’s Christian metaphysical theology is derived as well from Bohme. Tillich stands in the theological tradition of Neo-Platonism. Tillich referred to the divine as the One or the God who is above God. He is unspeakable Darkness or the abysmal One. Tilllich was a Christian metaphysical theologian. Tillich’s Christian theology is filled with metaphysical concepts. Tillich is hard to understand at times because he switches back between his Christian philosophy and his Christian theology.

Tillich’s theology of culture set forth the need for a concrete religious point of view based on the universal concepts of the Christian philosophy of religion. A universal religious analysis of all cultural creations is necessary. The function of the theologian of culture is not merely analytical. The religious analysis of culture must be followed by a synthesis. The result will be a systematic outline of the religiously imbued culture.

Tillich wanted a new social order that would give equal opportunity for all. Religious socialism was Tillich’s political theology during the German years. World War I came with the result that Tillich saw clearly the need for the intellectual to identify with the proletariat. Tillich became one of the founders of the religious socialist movement. Tillich
was a political theologian.

It was during the Marburg years (1924-1925) that Tillich began his systematic theology. Existentialism in its 20th century form presented itself to Tillich while at Marburg. Our thesis turns to consider Tillich’s ‘intellectual ancestry’ (Adams 1965:22).

7:3 Tillich’s Intellectual Ancestry During The German Years

7:3:1 German Ancestors And Inherited Principles

Adams argues that Tillich was the recipient of ‘historically inherited…principles’ (ibid:17). Adams (ibid:17) writes: ‘Hence there is in his method, as in all critical methods, a constant interplay between reality as immediately experienced and reality as interpreted by historically inherited and tentatively held principles. Indeed, the tentative character of his approach aims to exhibit something of the spirit of science’. Further, Adams (ibid:22) argues for Tillich’s major concepts being formed from his ‘intellectual ancestry’. Adams (ibid:22) names these intellectual ancestors Kierkegaard, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, and Marx. Jacob Boehme is another of Tillich’s intellectual ancestors (ibid:32). Further Tillich used ‘the concept of meaning’ which was also used by ‘the existential school, such as Heidegger and Jaspers, Barth and Brunner, but also among those of the idealistic and Neo-Kantian tradition, such as Dilthey, Bretano, Rickert, Windelband, Eucken, Troeltsch, Hartmann, and Husserl, and among writers like Oswald Spengler and Theodor Lessing’ (ibid:56-57). Leibnitz is included as one of the intellectual ancestors (ibid:50). Adams (ibid:50) writes: ‘The concept of Gestalt appears again and again in the history of Western thought from Plato and Aristotle, through Bruno, Leibnitz, Kant, Goethe, and
Schelling to contemporary Gestalt psychology. It is employed by Tillich, in the interpretation of all aspects of life, in the interpretation of nature, the sciences, art and religion. Gestalt is defined as ‘a form’.

Adams (ibid:22) elaborates upon Feuerbach and Marx. He (ibid:22) writes: ‘The social aspects of the reaction against Hegelianism may be symbolized by the names of Feuerbach and Marx’. Tillich (1942:256 in ibid:22) writes that Feuerbach’s concept of materialism: ‘is another expression of the emphasis on existence—a word used by him against Hegel’. Adams (ibid:22) adds concerning Marx: ‘But Marx goes even further in his reaction against Hegel, in effect transferring the Kierkegaardian concern with inward tensions of the individual to a concern with the outward tensions of social process’. Adams (ibid:29) continues on Marx the intellectual ancestor of Tillich: ‘Marx set off an earthquake in social life and thought when he questioned whether there is an intellectual and moral history independent of its economic and social basis’. Nietzsche was another intellectual ancestor who influenced Tillich (ibid:33). Tillich (1936:7-8 in ibid:33) writes: ‘It was Nietzsche who said that no idea could be true unless it was thought in the open air. Obedient to the saying, many of my ideas have been conceived in the open and even much of my writing has been done among trees or on the seaside’.

Kant, Rothe, and Troeltsch contribute to the ‘typology of authority’ of autonomy (ibid:53). Tillich (1919:801 in ibid:53) writes:

In every autonomy, that is, in every secular culture there is a dual element: the “nomos,” the form or “law” which is supposed to be radically carried out in accord with the unconditioned demand for meaning, and the “autos,” the self-assertion of the conditione
which in the finding of a form loses the unconditioned meaning. Autonomy is therefore always at the same time obedience and contradiction to the Unconditioned. It is obedience in so far as it subjects itself to the unconditioned demand for meaning; it is contradiction in so far as it denies the unconditioned meaning itself. Autonomous culture is, as the myth puts it, always at the same time \textit{hybris} and a gift of God.

Schelling with his Christian philosophy and theology was another intellectual ancestor who had a great influence upon Tillich (ibid:22). Tillich’s (1923:90,101 in ibid:58) view of individuality is a ‘restatement of certain aspects of conceptions that appear in the writings of Dilthey and Troeltsch’. Adams (ibid:58) writes:

\begin{quote}
Spirit is, in short, creative in the realm of meaning. Although spirit is not divorced from the realm of causality, it is characteristically oriented to the realm of meaning, where individuality expresses itself by living in and beyond reality, by accommodating itself to the nature of being but by also giving to being a novel expression. The realm of meaning then presupposes thought and existence but goes beyond both into the realm of the creative where meaning of life is experienced and realized in some new form.
\end{quote}

Adams lists Schelling, Dilthey, and Troeltsch as additional intellectual ancestors. Tillich’s thought was formed during the German years from these intellectual ancestors.

In analysis, Tillich was the recipient of historically inherited principles during the years in his native Germany. Tillich’s intellectual ancestors were Kierkegaard, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Marx, and Jacob Bohme. Tillich used the concept of meaning from the existential school. Heidegger, Jaspers, Barth, Brunner, Dilthey, Bretano, Rickert, Windelband, Eucken, Troeltsch, Hartmann, Husserl, Spengler, and Lessing used this concept. Leibnitz was another intellectual ancestor. The concept of Gestalt (form) appears in the history of Western thought. Nietzsche was another intellectual ancestor. Tillich’s major concepts were formed during the German years.
Adams (ibid:18) points to Tillich’s concept of the present. Adams (ibid:18) writes:

Prominent among the concepts is an idea, already mentioned, which runs through all of Tillich’s life and thought, namely, the concept of the present. This emphasis corresponds to his conviction that Protestantism should in both its protest and its positive realizations be concrete and contemporaneous. It corresponds also to his conviction that the existential element in philosophy involves not only the individual but also the total social situation. Thus religious knowledge includes knowledge of the present. Protestant protest and realization are protest and realization in the present. Only through concern with the present can concern with the future lead to fulfillment. Without concern for the present, irrelevance, disillusionment, futility, and even self-destruction ensue. With it, the ultimate seriousness of a divinely sponsored adventure appears….Neither Protestant protest nor Protestant realization finds relevant expression in antiquarian restoration, for the demand of history is that of “transforming the past into the future.” The demand is that we allow our past and our present to be grasped by, and imbued with, the creative and re-creative power that has worked hitherto and that awaits new reception or release.

Adams (ibid:20) continues:

But if Protestantism is to fulfill its proper task at any given time, it must in an ultimate sense penetrate the present not merely as a concept but also as a reality. It must penetrate the concrete present. It must be practical in the sense that it must deal with the present as it concerns us in the very depth of our being.

Adams (ibid:23) moves to a second concept formed during the German years of decision.

Adams brings out Tillich’s religious socialism without naming it. It is the concept of decision which will eventuate in the end of Western society. Adams (ibid:23-24) writes:

If the concept of the Present is the central concept that integrates the tensions characteristic of an epoch, the concept of decision is the idea that integrates the tensions of an individual or a group as it confronts the present. The manner in which the past is transformed into the future depends upon the kind of decision with which man meets the present. And if that decision is to take time by the forelock, it must be daring decision, for there are in this world no guarantees of success in man’s rendezvous with time.
Tillich (1927:469 in ibid:24) writes: ‘The act of daring is an act that pushes ahead into the uncertain, an act that renounces securities and risks assured possessions’. Adams (ibid:27) writes based on Tillich’s 1929 article *Philosophie und Schicksal* which appeared in *Kant-Studien*:

The human situation with respect to freedom and necessity can be described also in terms of freedom and *fate*. Freedom is always entangled in fate, which involves three things. First, fate is related to freedom: where there is no freedom there is no fate, and where there is no fate there is no freedom. A merely physical object that is conditioned in all ways is entirely without fate because it is wholly bound to necessity. On the other hand, anyone whose freedom is absolute, whose freedom is not jeopardized by an ever intruding necessity, has no fate. Second, all freedom is subjected to necessity: no being has unconditional power over itself; and when it acts as though it did have, it is driven by inexhaustible desire from one illusion to another until it encounters resistance and penalty. Third, freedom and fate do not appear separately and alternately; they interpenetrate each other in every event: every man’s character and every civilization’s character are the result of creative freedom but they are also “conditioned by events that in their origin go back to past generations, back to much earlier manifestations of the continuing and living fabric of humanity.” Thus they are, as we have already indicated, conditioned by national, economic, and geographic factors, and also by unconscious vitalities and tensions. These factors always affect philosophy and theology as well as other human endeavors. Man is thrown into existence at a particular time and place in unity with all other beings. Yet he feels himself responsible for his existence in the context of his unity with, and differentiation from, all other beings. Hence human existence is always comprised of both the fated (or given) fact and the responsible act; freedom and necessity, fate and guilt presuppose each other and they cannot be separated.

Next, Adams (ibid:28) argues that Tillich relates decision to depth:

But, as Tillich understands it, decision is not merely decision between surface alternatives of existence. It possesses a dimension of *depth*. To speak of depth, of the depths, the ground, the abyss, is for Tillich highly characteristic. Instead of looking up and away from reality he prefers to look down through it.

Tillich had an interest in depth psychology, and sociology (Adams 1965:29). Depth is another basic concept from the German years that runs all through Tillich’s thought
Adams clarifies: ‘Although depth is a dimension of space, it is employed as a symbol for a spiritual quality’ (ibid:28). Adams (ibid:28) continues:

There are two meanings of “depth” when considered in the religious sense. It is either the opposite of shallow or the opposite of high. “Truth is deep and not shallow. Suffering is depth and not height. Both are deep, the light of truth and the darkness of suffering. There is depth in God and there is a depth out of which the psalmist cried to God.” We think of truth as deep, and we think of suffering as deep. We use the same spatial symbol for both of them, because the search for truth and the experiences of disappointment and suffering drive us to dig deeper than the surface of things.

Another Tillichian concept is the ‘ultimate depth of history, to the depth of the supporting creative powers. This depth Tillich calls “the infinite and inexhaustible ground of being”’ (Tillich 1929:325 in ibid:31). Adams (ibid:31) continues:

It is the depth that is the ground of hope. It is the dynamic source of all creative decision. The way to it leads beyond woe to joy, for the end of the way to the depth is joy.

American commentators would do well to pay attention to Tillich’s ‘own autobiographical sketch’ (Adams 1965:33). It is Tillich’s love and infatuation with nature which is prominent in his theology (ibid:33). Tillich (1936:7-8 in ibid:33) confirms this for us: ‘Most important, however, was the fact that from my eighth year onward annually I spent some weeks, later even months, by the seaside. The experience of the infinite bordering upon the finite, as one has it by the sea, responded to my tendency toward the border and supplied my imagination with a symbol from which feeling could win substance and thinking productivity’. Adams (ibid:34) continues: ‘In his autobiographical sketch Tillich speaks of living on the boundary between various
possibilities of existence. Now the notion of the border-situation is given a different
turn, a “deeper” metaphysical interpretation, and it is related to the central Tillichian
concept of the *Unconditioned*. Adams bases this on Tillich’s *The Interpretation of History*.
Adams (ibid:34) writes: ‘The Interpretation of History, pp. 3-73. Tillich speaks of his
life as being lived on the boundaries between city and country, between social classes,
between reality and imagination, theory and practice, heteronomy and autonomy,
thought and philosophy, church and society, religion and culture, Lutheranism and
socialism, idealism and Marxism, home and alien land’. The concept of the border
is another concept formed during the German years as evidenced from Tillich’s *The
Interpretation of History* (ibid:34). Adams (ibid:36) writes: ‘The metaphysical concept
of the “human boundary-situation” as the limit of human possibility—in distinction from
the idea of the border as a line between contrasting possibilities of existence—has been
used also by a number of other theologians and some secular philosophers, especially
Kierkegaard, Barth, and Jaspers’. Tillich uses it in a different way as ‘contrasting
possibilities of existence’ (ibid:36). Adams (ibid:41) draws our attention to the interplay
between these concepts: ‘in order to avoid these errors of interpretation, the concept of
the boundary situation must be understood in relation to the concept of the *Unconditioned*
and its corollaries, the ideas of “the form of grace” and the *Kairos*’. Adams (ibid:41)
expands upon Tillich’s concept of the Unconditioned:

Tillich has nowhere written in systematic essay on the concept of the Unconditioned.
This is unfortunate, for his many and scattered references to it make for great difficulty in securing a consistent and synoptic view of it. The difficulty is increased by the fact that Tillich’s language is obscure and by the fact also that Tillich has not remained consistent in his definitions.

A further problem is that Tillich’s reference to the Unconditioned: ‘is variously referred to as the unconditioned transcendent, the unconditionally real, the unconditionally powerful, the unconditionally personal, the unconditionally perfect, the inaccessible holy, the eternal, the unconditional demand, and the unconditional meaning’ (ibid:41). Tillich (1932:7 in ibid:41) explains: ‘it would not be worthwhile to speak at all of the fact that all sorts of things, ideas or feelings or deeds, move out of the past into the future…if all this were nothing but a moving, a flowing, a becoming and decaying without ultimate meaning or final importance’. Adams (ibid:34) notes:

It should be observed here that in his later writings Tillich does not use the substantive form, “the Unconditioned.” He tends to use instead the existential formulation, “object of unconditional concern.” If the substantive form appears, he speaks of “being itself,” “ground of being,” “power of being.”

Schelling’s Christian philosophy and theology runs throughout all of Tillich’s thought. Adams (ibid:45-46) confirms this point:

In other words, it is “the unconditioned of being” when he writes like Schelling’s Unvordenkliche, it is that which all thinking and all being must presuppose and it is also ultimately inaccessible to thought. It is a symbol of that which does not lend itself to intellectual realization, a symbol of the inner transcension of things. But the symbolic character of the Unconditioned as pointing to what is anterior and inaccessible to all thought does not deprive it of reality or of amenability to human apprehension; it lifts the reality out of the conditioned into the unconditioned sphere, concerning which we can speak only in symbols.

Adams (ibid:41-42) summarizes:

The direction of consciousness toward unconditioned meaning is a necessary function that constitutes the reality of the meaning. The prius of every individual apprehension
of meaning is the unconditioned meaning itself, the prius of every form of meaning is the direction toward the unconditioned form, and the prius of every content of meaning is the unconditioned import. It is senseless to ask whether there is an unconditioned meaning, for the very question presupposes an ultimate meaning. It is also senseless to ask whether the Unconditional “exists,” for if it were something established in the temporal order it would no longer be the Unconditional; moreover, it would some object the “existence” of which would be susceptible—at least theoretically—of proof. But the Unconditioned cannot be proved. It can only be pointed to as the meaning that is the foundation of all meaning-fulfillment.

Tillich (1932:11 in ibid:43) adds:

We find self-transcendence in every time, openness to the eternal, a hallowing of time; but upon the other hand we see the appropriation of the eternal, the self-sufficiency of time, the secularization of the holy. There is a movement to and fro between self-transcendence and self-sufficiency, between the desire to be a mere vessel and the desire to be the content, between turning points to the eternal and the turning points towards the self. In this action and reaction we discern the religious situation of every present at its profoundest level.

Adams (ibid:43) draws out the meaning of the Unconditioned it: ‘is the symbol of this ultimate concern; it is that to which all genuine religious symbols, including the word “God” points when they are alive’.

Adams points to the relative nature of Tillich’s writings which is in line with modern historiographical issues in writing contemporary history. Adams brings out the evolving nature of Tillich’s writings. Tillich (1923:130 in ibid:42) writes:

The unconditioned meaning should not be interpreted as being some ethereal or pure spiritual reality. As will be indicated later, it is inherent in the nature of being to strive for meaning-fulfillment. Hence the term “meaning” involves something ontological as well as axiological.

Adams (ibid:42) compares:

The above formulations appear relatively early in Tillich’s writings (1923). Almost twenty years later, he says that direction toward the Unconditioned is a matter of decision and faith, of orienting ourselves, to a creative reality, a transcendent order that informs but also contradicts the order to which we
belong. It involves receiving the transcendent reality as a gift, an unconditional power, that grasps us and gives the passing fact and decision unconditional seriousness and meaning.

The American years (1933-1965) are beyond the scope of this thesis but this comparison is drawn to show the relative nature of this concept from the German years. *Form of grace* is another Tillichian concept from the German years. Adams (ibid:50) summarizes:

‘This inner inexhaustibility of being, when it expresses the Unconditioned, becomes a *form of grace*. It is a form or *Gestalt* in the sense that it is a dynamic form-creating tendency, it is perceptible in the present, and it appears through the medium of a form of existence’. Adams (ibid:50) adds:

In other words, it is an “ecstatic” form of being, open to the infinite—as judgment and as anticipation of fulfillment—and to the incursion of the new form. It bespeaks both the divine Yes and the divine No. This conception is manifestly a sort of ideal type, for the perfect form of grace never appears. Fate is an ingredient of every action, not only in the sense that fulfillment is always ambiguous, but also in the sense that man cannot control it or induce it, he can only prepare for it through the “ecstatic” operation of faith.

Adams (ibid:50) writes of the form of grace:

The violation or frustration of the form of grace appears in a variety of ways. It may appear in the distortion, the sin, of arrogant self-inflation. (Of this we shall speak presently.) Or it may appear where there is a spirit of *self-sufficient finitude*, the ethos of pure *secularism*. In its truncated orientation, self-sufficient finitude is to be contrasted with the form of grace: it is tangible in the present but it ignores the protest against self-identification with the Unconditioned because it imagines it is immune to such distortion. And yet, it had its origin in protest against this very distortion.

Adams (Tillich 1929:16 in ibid:52) clarifies based on Tillich’s writing:

For Tillich, both the protests and the forms of grace in “secularism” are often more effective than so-called “religious” protest; certainly, they are more soundly religious than the self-styled religious institution or personality which is actually demonic. For this reason Tillich speaks of the secularism that in actuality recognizes the boundary-situation, and that is, in reality if not in word aware of the Unconditioned,
as a Protestant secularism and as a concealed form of grace. Protestant secularism may conceal within itself a latent protest against itself. Hence it may be attacked, not only from the outside, but also from its own depths.

Adams (ibid:52) continues to explain:

There are, then, different types of “religion” and different types of “secularism.” Both religion and secularism may manifest truly religious forms of grace and truly demonic forms of distortion. The churches have no monopoly on the forms of grace, and secularism has no monopoly on self-sufficient finitude.

Tillich understood the ‘ambivalent character of secularism as well as of “religion” …in terms of the threefold distinction between autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy’ (ibid:52). Adams (ibid:52-53) explains:

true religion is defined as relatedness to the Unconditioned. Culture, on the other hand, is defined as relatedness to the conditioned forms of meaning and their fulfillment. The fulfillment of cultural effort occurs only when culture in all its forms gives expression to the unconditioned meaning. But culture as such—in contrast to religion—actually relates itself to the conditioned forms and their unity without giving heed to the unconditioned meaning. The attitude here represented is called “autonomy.”

Tillich (1929:195 in ibid:53) writes of autonomy: ‘is the attempt of man to rely upon himself, to find in his own existence the fulfillment of its meaning’. Adams (ibid:53) points to Tillich’s proof of the inadequacy of autonomy. Tillich (1936:23 in ibid:53) argues that the ‘historical proof of the inability of autonomy’ is to be seen in ‘development of Greek philosophy from its ‘first appearance of rational autonomy…to its decline into skepticism and probabilism and its inversion into the ‘new archaicism’ of late antiquity’. Adams (ibid:53) adds: ‘The modern history of autonomy has pursued the same course, ending in the emptiness of present-day capitalism’. Heteronomy, by way of contrast, ‘garbs a portion of human-religious reality in the unconditioned validity of the divine, it raises protest’ (ibid:53). Tillich (1936:25-26 in ibid:53) denies heteronomy’s claim over reality, life and doctrine. He (ibid:25-26 in ibid:53)
writes: ‘this claim is established by a finite, historical reality, is the root of all heteronomy and of all demonry’. Demonry with its ‘destructive and creative elements’ is to be found in secularism and religion (ibid:51).

Autonomy and heteronomy are unable to deal with the ‘fundamental theological problem’ (Adams 1965:54). Tillich (1936:25 in ibid:54) writes: ‘the relation of the absolute, which is assumed in the idea of God, and of the relative, which belongs to human religion’. Adams (ibid:54) expands:

They both become empty because in opposite ways the unconditioned meaning is lost. They both subsist on theonomy and fall to pieces as soon as the theonomous synthesis has entirely disappeared. This is the synthesis in which the boundary-situation and relatedness to the Unconditioned appear together, the synthesis that emerges when the recognition of the unconditioned demand for meaning is joined with autonomous consciousness of form. Only when these elements are together can persuasion and creativity subsist.

Adams (Tillich 1929:57 in ibid:54-55) continues based on Tillich’s 1929 Religiose Verwirklichung:

But again, theonomy may become an abstraction and lose its existential relevance. In order to achieve relevance it must combine a sense of the universal with a sense of the demands of a particular situation. It must combine Logos with Kairos. Man cannot with impunity think timelessly. Heteronomy attempts to do so by claiming finality for one form. Autonomy attempts to do so by claiming the self-sufficiency of a particular set of cultural norms. But time demands new decisions, new ways of giving expression to the unconditioned meaning. The term Kairos, taken from the New Testament and meaning “the fullness of time,” expresses the fact that every moment approaches men as fate and as the demand for decision. Hence it expresses the fact that “at a special time special tasks are demanded.”

Adams (ibid:55) adds: ‘This insight becomes decisive not only for Tillich’s philosophy of history but also for his theory of truth’. Tillich (Tillich 1929:18-19 in ibid:55) states of his theory of truth:
Truth is not statically apprehended, as is attempted by both Catholicism and classicism, but rather it is apprehended dynamically....The truth stands in fate just as does existence. The truth of every religious realization is its standing in the depth of historical fate, its standing in the Kairos, in the transcendentally shattered present. The dynamic truth is the living, moving element of all that is here thought and said. It is an expression of the boundary-situation, and also each of these ideas and concepts. None of them can be separated from the dynamics of cognition. Each of them is justified in so far—and only in so far—as it is an adequate expression of our Present, of our Kairos.

Adams (ibid:56) writes of Tillich’s concept of meaning: ‘it is the most comprehensive and characteristic of all Tillich’s concepts’. Tillich’s interest in meaning has to do with the ‘problem of the meaning of life….characteristic concern of the human spirit….life in the spirit of existential philosophy….not how to live but why to live’ (ibid:56).

Adams (ibid:60) sums up: ‘we may say that meaning is understood as…Gestalt…existence rises above itself into that creative realm made up of value, being, and import, all together pulsating with the powerfulness and holiness of the divine’. Next, Adams turns to Tillich’s definition of theonomy (ibid:60). Tillich (1931:1128-1129 in ibid:60-61) writes of theonomy:

Theonomy, originally signifying a law or validity within divine sanction in contrast to the law emanating from the self or autonomy, has in contemporary discussion acquired a more definite meaning. It is sharply distinguished from heteronomy, i.e., from the shattering of autonomously validated forms of human thought and action by a law alien and external to the spirit. Theonomy is in contrast to heteronomy an imbuing of autonomous forms with transcendent import. It originates not through the renunciation of autonomy, as does, for example, the Roman Catholic idea of authority, but only through the deepening of autonomy in itself to the point where it transcends itself. The transcending of the autonomous forms in culture and society, their being impressed or imbued by a principle supporting and at the same time breaking through them but not shattering them: that is theonomy. In this sense the early and in part still the high Middle Ages is a theonomous period, while at the end of the contrast to this development the church set up resistance by becoming heteronomous. The struggle for the idea of tolerance on the soil of capitalistic society destroys the political power of heteronomy and gives to the autonomous principles a possibility of free development. But the autonomy left to its own devices leads to increasing emptiness and—and since there cannot be
a vacuum even in the spiritual realm—it finally becomes imbued with demonically destructive forces. The insight into this whole complex of cultural development has led to the demand for a new theonomy.

Tillich relates theonomy to religious socialism. Leibrecht (1959:17) maintains Tillich’s call to theonomy:

*is his greatest challenge to modern thought.* His is a vision of culture in which ultimate concern informs the whole web of life and thought and for which the ultimate unity is an ever-presented horizon with this idea of theonomy. Tillich overcomes the easy deification of culture by liberal theology and yet makes religion relevant to culture in a profound way. He bridges the gap which Barth and the existentialists alike have been able to see but not to overcome. Religion is understood by Tillich as the root of culture, and the culture as the efflorescence of religion. Accordingly, Tillich has been successful, as perhaps no other modern writer, in showing the essential relatedness of each cultural expression to its religious ground. The Church has been powerfully called back out of its self-chosen ghetto, out of its disregard for culture, to do its task for the world.

Leibrecht (ibid:17) continues: ‘This emphasis has also prepared the ground for a truly ecumenical theology. Tillich has provided in his concept of theonomy a creative possibility for a fruitful encounter of the Protestant and Catholic principles in the present ecumenical discussion’. It is theonomy which ‘includes not only the Protestant principle of protest’ but also the ‘Protestant eschatological prophetism’ (ibid:17). This ‘may be united with the priestly sacramentalism on a foundation of the awareness of the holiness of being, and the reconciling force of the New Being’ (ibid:17). Further, ‘the prophet speaking the word of crisis becomes the priest healing that which is broken, through the power of the New Being, by uniting the separated with its ultimate ground’ (ibid:17). Leibrecht (ibid:17-18) speaks of Tillich’s prophetic spirit during those years in Germany. Leibrecht (ibid:17-18) writes:

In the moment of crisis and revolution, when the old world was tumbling, Tillich thought
he saw the time wide open for further realization of his vision of theonomy through religious socialism. He visualized a dehumanized, dishonored proletariat longing for full manhood as the bearer into reality of this new theonomy. But as it was once with Moses, so it was with Tillich: when he returned from his mountain with the new law of theonomy, the people were still dancing around the golden calf. The socialists and proletarians had joined in the round dance with the bourgeois who had managed to save their properties as well as their comfortable mentality through the crisis. His book, *The Religious Situation*, written in 1925, shows Tillich’s disappointment. Here he wrote that “a frost has fallen upon all the things of which we have spoken, whether it be the youth movement or the philosophy of life, whether it be expressionism or religious socialism.” It was heteronomy and not theonomy which the man of the twenties had chosen, politically as well as theologically. Tillich was by now, as a theologian as well as a political thinker, far from the midstream in Europe.

These concepts the present, decision, fate, depth, ultimate depth, boundary, Unconditioned, the form of grace, kairos, self-sufficient finitude, secularism, autonomy, heteronomy, theonomy, demonry, and meaning are concepts formed during the German years. They are evidence from his writings during the German years. Adams (ibid:17) argues of Tillich: ‘What he sees and what he names with his own words—the concrete, dynamic, tensional, and tragic qualities, the intimate and the ultimate qualities of experience—he associated with a Protestant interpretation of the nature and meaning of life….Protestant principles as he understands them’. ‘Historically inherited’ and ‘intellectual ancestry’ are further proof of these concepts from the German years as necessary to understand Tillich his life, thought, and German legacy (ibid:17,22).

In inspection, Tillich’s major concepts were formed during the German years. These major concepts were the present, decision, fate, depth, ultimate depth of history, the unconditional, the boundary (border), form of grace, kairos, self-sufficient finitude, secularism, the threefold distinction between anatonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy, and demonry a
concepts formed during the German years.

7:5 The System of The Sciences And Tillich’s Theology of Culture

7:5:1 Tillich Related Theology To Science

Tillich has given attention to questions that have been neglected (Adams 1965:182).

Tillich (1936:38 in ibid:182) asks:

How is theology possible as a science? How is it related to the other sciences? What is its outstanding method?

Adam’s (ibid:120-121) writes of Tillich’s Das System der Wissenschaften:

Yet, the book is one in which a theologian attempts to overcome the disruption of meaning incident to the separation of theology from other concerns…[A]lthough Tillich’s interest was at first in the cultural sciences, this study pushed him more and more to raise questions concerning the relations between all the sciences. These questions were posed as a result of the encroachments of positivism from the direction of the natural sciences and of historicism from the direction of studies in historical methodology. These pressures had the effect of questioning the fundamental legitimacy of theology as such, even where this query was not raised an equally devastating challenge was posed in the name of the relativity of all knowledge.

Tillich (1923:v in ibid:121) writes:

It became more and more clear to me that a system of the sciences is not only the goal but also the starting point of all knowledge. Only the most radical empiricism can dispute that. For the radical empiricist there can be no system at all. But whoever wishes to develop a fully critical and self-conscious attitude toward scientific knowledge—and that is a necessity not only for the worker in the cultural sciences—must be aware of the scientist’s place in the totality of knowledge, both in regard to the material he deals with and in regard to the methods employed. For all science functions in the service of the one truth, and science collapses if it loses the sense of the connection with the whole.

Adams (ibid:121-122) clarifies:

Clearly, he wished to overcome the disruption of meaning and conviction which had been brought about by the fragmentation of life and of the sciences and by the enervating struggle between religion and science and between theological truth and other forms of truth. In other words, he wished to develop further his theology of
culture by setting forth a system of the sciences. If the service of truth was to possess the dimension of depth it would have to be truth that would at the same time take all the sciences into account and give them an ultimate—that is, a theological—orientation.

This can be seen as Tillich’s desire to win theology a legitimate place within the totality of knowledge and the other sciences (ibid:120-121). Adams (ibid:124) discusses Tillich’s approach. Adams (ibid:124-125) writes:

Tillich adopts and adapts a general pattern proposed by Fichte, a pattern that enables him to set forth the implications of his own realism. Tillich was stimulated by the discussion of the differences between, and the respective methods of, the natural and the cultural sciences, discussions carried on by Dilthey and also by the neo-Kantians….we must take note of a fundamental insight that informs Tillich’s whole effort, an insight that possesses special significance with respect to his intention to devise a system of the sciences which will give a significant place to theology. Having already developed the outlines of a theology of culture, Tillich in *The System of The Sciences* approaches the general problem of the system with the apparatus already constructed.

While an exposition of *The System of The Sciences* is beyond the scope of this thesis, yet the author seeks to set it within the scope of the hypothesis of our thesis. *The System of The Sciences* is to be understood for our purpose how it relates to theology and the German years. Adams (ibid:149-150) continues:

Perhaps we can best understand Tillich’s concept of metalogic if we examine in further detail what he means to reject. We shall in this way also bring into relief what he means to reject. We shall in this way also bring into relief the religious basis of his whole “system.” One could scarcely find a more revealing statement of Tillich’s conception of the task that lay before him, and thus of the purpose of metalogic, than appears in his essay on Ernst Troeltsch….Tillich dedicated *The System of The Sciences* to Troeltsch. When Tillich says that “the motivating energy of this powerful intellect” issued from “the tension between the absolute and the relative,” he expresses one of the major tensions of his own thought and experience….But Tillich believes Troeltsch was never able to resolve the tensions in the way in which he hoped to, for in the struggle over the contradiction between
the absolute and the relative “the preponderance lay on the side of the relative.” “It was not for this reason alone that he abandoned theology.”

Adams (ibid:149) bases this on Tillich’s (1924) article on Ernst Troeltsch.

Adams (ibid:156) writes: ‘Tillich holds that every spiritual act is the establishing of norms and that cultural science is normative insofar as it shares productivity in the act’.

The discussion closes with the concerns of ‘philosophy, metaphysics, and theology’ (ibid:160). Adams (ibid:173) draws our attention to the all encompassing role of theology:

Summarizing the whole discussion of theology we may now define its disciplines in this fashion: Systematic Theology as a theonomous theory of the norms of meaning embraces theonomous metaphysics oriented to the living confessions (dogmatics), theonomous ethics or ethos (the theory of piety), the theory of the forms of devotion (liturgics), and the theory of the cultus-community; add to these disciplines the theonomous theory of the principles of meaning (philosophy or philosophy of religion) and the theonomous theory of the material of meaning (historical theology and theonomous cultural history); all together these disciplines constitute the theonomous cultural science of theology.

Adams (ibid:177-178) concludes: ‘This brings us to a consideration of Tillich’s conception of the relation between theology and the “living confessions,” and of his conception of the relation between theology and the other cultural sciences….The way in which he as a theologian would bring together motifs from what he calls kerygmatic theology and philosophical theology’. The distinction between kerygmatic theology and philosophical theology has been dealt with in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

In examination, Tillich envisioned devising a system of the sciences in which a significant place would be given to theology. Tillich’s *Das System der Wissenschaften* sought to win for theology a legitimate place within the totality of knowledge and the other
7:6 American Misconception

7:6:1 American Analytical Philosophers Find Tillich’s Work Not Empirically Verifiable

Tillich is perceived in America as more of a philosopher of religion during the German years. This view originates with analytical philosophers of religion within the Anglo-American philosophical community. It is obvious that the distinction is not made between the German years and the American years. Rowe (1989:201) writes: ‘Philosophers of religion within the analytical tradition have not, on the whole, been seriously interested in the philosophical theology of Tillich. And those few who have taken an interest in Tillich have been mainly critical, at best calling his work unclear—and a work confused’. Rowe (ibid:201) argues that this is due to logical positivism. Rowe (ibid:201) continues: ‘Like so much else in theology and metaphysics, Tillich’s work failed to satisfy the positivist’s longing for the empirically verifiable. Logical positivism gave way to ordinary language philosophy, a method of thought that viewed with great suspicion the use of ordinary words …far removed from their ordinary meaning and setting’. This criticism stemming from the American years (1933 to 1965) is beyond the scope of this thesis. It argues for the need of our thesis because of the failure to distinguish the German years (1886-1933) from the American years (1933 to 1965). Secondly, it argues for the hypothesis of our thesis that Paul Tillich’s German years are essential to understanding his life, thought, and legacy. Tillich’s philosophy of religion presupposes a number of disciplines. Adams (1965:187) writes:

Philosophy of religion must presuppose a familiarity with the materials which the
disciplines of the history of religions, the psychology of religion, the typology of religion, and the sociology of religion provide. But its own task is not empirical; it considers what ought to be and not what is. As a normative science it sets forth “what is deemed to be religion, in a creative, productive synthesis.” The disciplines belonging to philosophy of religion proper are arranged in accord with the system set forth earlier for the normative sciences. That is, they are distributed in the tripartite classification; philosophy of meaning, intellectual history, and the normative system—theology. Every cultural science consciously or unconsciously flows in these three channels.

Adams (ibid:185) adds: ‘for Tillich, on the other hand, philosophy—or philosophy of religion—and theology must always stand in tension or in correlation with each other’.

Further the reader is told ‘Tillich’s general philosophy was presupposed in his classification of the sciences. We find here that his general philosophy is presupposed not only in his philosophy of religion but also even in his definition of religion’ (ibid:191).

At times, Tillich’s theology may be hard to decipher (ibid:259). Tillich’s philosophy of religion presents ideas from his Christian theology or draws on Christian ideas. Adams claims that Tillich changed his view of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Tillich sought to make the Christian character of his theology more explicit. In 1925, and in that period, Tillich viewed philosophy as dealing with the theory of the principles of meaning. Later, he argued that philosophy raises the questions and systematic theology provides the answers. This later development in Tillich’s thinking is called the method of correlation (ibid:259-260).

Adams (ibid:277) concludes with this appreciation for Tillich’s theological work during the German years (1886 to 1933):

The greatest achievement of Paul Tillich has been manifest in his genius for devising new categories or for giving old or forgotten categories new meaning.
Few theologians in our time have given currency to so many novel or virtually novel concepts. Belief-ful realism, the dimension of depth, the boundary-situation, form of grace, theonomy, the demonic, and Kairos are concepts to which he has given vivid and powerful meaning. These are words “in which the powerfulness of the word pulsates.” In Tillich’s hands they also readily lend themselves to the illuminating of specific elements in the Biblical and in church traditions. He has discovered anew a reality that was “apprehended, in fact, involves much more than his explication of themes from German classical philosophy, important as this may be. Moreover, he has had measurable success in accomplishing what he originally envisaged as a worthy task for the Protestant theologian of our day.

In analyzing the sources, Tillich is perceived as a Christian philosopher of religion in America. This view originates with the analytical philosophers. Analytical philosophers who were interested in Tillich called his work both unclear and confused. This is due to logical positivism. Tillich’s work was not empirically verifiable. Logical positivism was followed by the ordinary philosophy of language.

Philosophical theology and kerygmatic theology must stand in correlation with each other. In 1925, Tillich viewed philosophy as dealing with the principles of meaning. Later, Tillich maintained philosophy raised the questions and theology providing the answers to the questions. Tillich’s greatest accomplishment for his theological work during the German years was in the devising of new categories. It was also in supplying old or forgotten categories with new meaning. Logical positivism viewed this with great suspicion in America. The removal of ordinary words from their ordinary meaning and setting. This criticism stemming from the American years (1933-1965) is beyond the scope of this thesis.
7:7 Tillich’s The Socialist Decision

7:7:1 Tillich’s Socialist Decision A Message To Both Socialists And The Church

Tillich’s religious socialism has been misunderstood. Tillich (1977:70) explains:

It was the basic purpose of religious socialism to disclose and to resolve the conflict in socialist belief. Appealing both to Marx and to the prophetic, early Christian-end expectation, it devoted itself to uncovering the element of faith in socialism and making it explicit. Only from this perspective can religious socialism be understood. There is also a socialist movement within the church whose goal is to make the church accessible to the socialist worker and vice versa. This task is indeed necessary and is of considerable importance; but it is not fundamentally decisive. Religious socialism is the attempt to bring into awareness the element of faith at work in socialism, to reveal socialism’s inner conflict, and to lead it to a solution that has symbolic power.

Religious socialism included the concept of revolution. Tillich (ibid:79) writes:

For the success of the revolution depends on the inspiring power of an expectation in which all aspects of human existence find a new fulfillment; and the success of the revolution requires persons whose being and consciousness is formed through their anticipation of the coming fulfillment.

[T]he religious foundation of socialism—socialist belief and its roots in human existence—have been shown. Socialism is religious if religion means living out of the roots of human being. But this concept of religion, which especially religious socialism presents as the only legitimate one, is very different from the concept of religion assumed in socialism’s programmatic statements. When the Erfurt Program declared religion to be a private matter, it was thinking of a separate sphere of human thought and action existing alongside numerous other spheres.

The Erfurt Program was a Manifesto adopted by the German Social Democrats at their party congress in the year 1891 (ibid:79). Tillich (ibid:132) elaborates further upon the nature and expectations of socialism:

This is why socialism, at least in principle, must look beyond itself and its own achievement of a new social order. Socialism is not the end of socialism’s striving. To be sure, socialist belief is historically dependent on the prophetic expectation of a millennium, but it transcends the utopian form that this belief assumed under the domination of the bourgeois principle. It is precisely at this point that religious socialism has tried to penetrate and purify socialist belief. Through the concept of the kairos, it has attempted to clarify the limits as well as the
validity and meaning of concrete expectation. Expectation as such, expectation as a human attitude, comes into being in terms of a definite content of expectation pertinent to a particular time. *Expectation is always bound to the concrete, and at the same time transcends every instance of the concrete.* It possesses a content that is dependent on the spiritual or social group involved, yet it transcends this content. The vitality and depth of socialist faith lies in the fact that it so distinctly—and so dangerously—embodies the tension. For the most perilous posture one can assume is that of expectation.

Tillich (ibid:145) argues that religious socialism’s attitude must be applied to religion and to the churches. Tillich (ibid:145) explains:

This applies, first of all, to its attitude toward religion and the churches. Socialism is quite justified in continuing to attempt to limit the political influence of the churches as they are presently structured, but it is quite unjustified in its privatization of religion along the lines of the liberal idea of tolerance. Socialism has a twofold task *vis-à-vis* the churches. *First of all, it must represent the socialist idea within their midst.* It must bring to expression in the churches the prophetic element that is alive in socialism, and on which all religious groups in the Judeo-Christian tradition depend. Socialism has to demonstrate that they have limited and even betrayed the attitude of expectation which they themselves once possessed, in favor of the powers related to the myth of origin. *Socialism has to strengthen the prophetic as opposed to the priestly element in the churches.* “Religious Socialism” has attempted to do just this….Protestantism has the possibility of taking the socialist principle into itself under the aspect of the New Testament concept of the *kairos.* Catholicism does not appear to have this possibility, at least not at present.

In analysis, the element of faith must be made clear in religious socialism. Tillich’s concept of religious socialism included the concept of revolution. Further, one of the goals of socialism is to make socialism accessible to the workers and the church to the workers. Religious socialism looks for a new world order. Its prophetic expectation transcends the bourgeois principle of domination. This is achieved through the concept of the *kairos.* The key element of expectation is included within religious socialism. The socialist idea must much be represented to the churches. The churches have the prophetic element but have discarded it. They have betrayed this concept for the powers of the myth of origin.
Religious socialism’s emphasis of the prophetic must be emphasized to the churches. The churches must exchange their priestly emphasis for the prophetic emphasis of religious socialism. Religious socialism can adopt the socialist principle under the New Testament concept of the kairos. Catholicism could not do this when Tillich wrote his book *The Socialist Decision* because they emphasized the priestly.

7:8 Tillich and the Institute for Social Research

7:8:1 Tillich Developed His Religious Socialism Apart From The Frankfurt Institute

O’Keeffe (1984:68) writes: ‘A number of recent commentators on Paul Tillich’s social and political thought have drawn attention to links between Tillich and the Frankfurt School—the Institut fur Sozialforschung, or the Institute for Social Research, founded in 1923, whose personnel included Max Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal, Erich Fromm, Karl August Wittfogel, and others’.

O’Keeffe (ibid:67-68) continues:

Do the links that can be established enable us to talk about an interdependence between Tillich’s socialist thought and the Critical Theory of the institute, of a mutual influence and a shared perspective between the Frankfurt School and the Marxism of Tillich? The Frankfurt Institute was founded in 1923 and officially opened in June 1924. The idea of such an institute had come from the wealthy Felix Weil, whose doctorate at Frankfurt School had been in political science. His dissertation, the practical problems of implementing socialism, was published in a series of monographs edited by the Marxist Karl Korsch.

O’Keeffe (ibid:68) furnishes the background:

Together with a number of like-minded Marxists, he had helped to organize a Marxist work week in Thuringen in 1922. The participants included Korsch, Georg Lukacs, Weil’s close friend Fredrich Pollock (an economist), Karl August Wittfogel (a member of the German Communist Party), and Richard Sorge (later to gain fame as a Russian spy in the Far East). Much of the discussion centered on Korsch’s as yet unpublished manuscript *Marxism and Philosophy*. Plans for a second Marxist week were soon
replaced by the proposal to create an independently endowed institute whose aim would be the application of radical Marxist ideas in a scholarly manner. The initial suggestion of calling it an Institute for Marxism was abandoned as too provocative and the title Institute for Social Research was adopted. It was to be attached to the University of Frankfurt and the director was to be a professor of the university. After the sudden death of the person nominated to head the institute—a leftwing economist, from Aachen, Kurt Albert Gerlach—it was decided to appoint Carl Grunberg, a prominent Austro-Marxist and professor of law and political science at Vienna. Grunberg, in his first speech as director, made clear his commitment and that of the institute to “Scientific” Marxism.

O’Keeffe (ibid:68) continues: ‘The institute gathered together a group of like-minded Marxists. Max Horkheimer, a close friend of Pollock, had completed his dissertation on Kant under Hans Cornelius, the professor of philosopher at Frankfurt’. O’Keeffe (ibid:69) adds an interesting point: ‘There were a number of committed Communist party members recruited. Franz Borkeneau, Julian Gomperz, Henryk Grossman, and Wittfogel. Close links were established between the institute and the Marx-Engels Institute under David Ryazanon’. O’Keeffe (ibid:69) stresses the importance of the early publications of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research: ‘This initial characterization of the Institute for Social Research is important since it makes clear that the common thread binding together the members of the institute was Marxism’. The reference to this beginning is the publications of the Institute under Grunberg:

Grossman’s *The Law of Accumulation of Capital and Collapse in the Capitalist System*; Pollock’s *Experiments in Economic Planning in the Soviet Union 1917-1927*; and Wittfogel’s *Economy and Society of China* (only published in 1931). The vehicle for the Institute’s writings was Grunberg’s *Archiv* (whose full title was *Archive for the History of Socialism and the Labour Movement*).
Next, O’Keeffe (ibid:69) expands upon the character of the Institute for Social Research.

The Institute was thus firmly within the stream of interpretation and applications of Marxist theory that was widespread in Western Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. After the initial excitement generated by the Russian Revolution of 1917, crucial theoretical questions were raised both by the advent of Socialism in underdeveloped, non-capitalist Russia, and by the failure of socialism in developed, capitalist countries of the West like Germany. Other theoretical questions were raised by the development within Marxism of a rigid orthodoxy for which strictly philosophical questions seemed irrelevant.

O’Keeffe (ibid:69) continues his exposition: ‘A rigid application of the thesis that superstructural elements of society (law, religion, philosophy, morality, and culture) were dependent epiphenomena of an economic base suggested that scientific socialism consisted simply in describing the dialectical laws governing changes in the economic structure, with little point in superstructural analyses that were mainly dismissed as ideology. The Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt undertook the task of developing Marxist thought and theory within the context of Germany.

Social philosophy also known as Critical Theory, and an ‘attempt to create a methodological synthesis of Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxism” were the key elements of the institute (ibid:75). O’Keeffe (ibid:75) explains:

In 1932, with Erich Fromm’s membership in the institute, this work was launched. Insofar as the institute had undertaken to analyze the superstructural elements of bourgeois society, the distortion and alienation of consciousness that was produced required an explanation which, while remaining true to a materialist, historical account, showed how it was possible for distortions to occur. Indeed, it demonstrated how consciousness is manipulated by hidden forces, and in particular how bourgeois ideology could obscure for the proletariat its own economic exploitation. Marxist historical materialism needed to be supplemented by a psychoanalytical account, based in the Freudian theory of “drives” in order to clarify the way ideologies are produced and maintained to manipulate a class-divided society.
Fromm (1973:172 in Carey 1984:75) writes: ‘Psychoanalysis can show that man’s ideologies are the products of certain wishes, instinctual drives, interests and needs, which themselves, in large measure, unconsciously find expression as rationalizations, that is, as ideologies’. O’Keefe’s insight is interesting at this point in terms of the influence of the German years (1886 to 1933) on Tillich. O’Keefe (1984:75-76) continues:

Tillich’s extensive writings on socialist themes, culminating (though not ending) with The Socialist Decision; appear in great part to parallel many preoccupations of critical theory. The well-known professional and personal links between Tillich and all core members of the institute, particularly Horkheimer, Pollock, Adorno, and Lowenthal, make plausible the attribution of mutual influence. After all, Tillich made possible Horkheimer’s replacement of Grunbeg as director of the institute in 1930. Tillich was appointed as professor of philosophy and sociology at Frankfurt in 1929 succeeding Hans Cornelius. (Max Scheler had been appointed but died almost immediately after.) Horkheimer was at that time a Privatdozent, and Volume 14 of Tillich’s Gesammelte Werke lists a number of courses taught jointly by Tillich and Horkheimer on (Locke), and Tillich and Adorno (on Hegel’s philosophy of history).

Tillich played a prominent role in and ‘a similar interest in applying a critical analysis to superstructural elements of bourgeois society in order to bring out the contradictions and tensions inherent in that society that point forward to a socialist transformation’ (ibid: 78). O’Keefe (ibid:78) confirms: ‘This is the task undertaken in The Religious Situation in 1926 and continued in The Socialist Decision’. O’Keefe (ibid:78) argues: ‘Ideology must not be analyzed and dismissed as the simple mirror-reflection of the economic structure. Tillich recognized as early as 1926 that such a thesis is both philosophically self-defeating…and misses the point of ideology-criticism as a weapon in the class struggle’.
O’Keeffe (ibid:81) concludes: ‘Tillich’s Marxism is not worked out in interdependence with the work of the Institute for Social Research. The development of his socialist thought can be charted from the earliest socialist writings of 1919—in which theoretical questions are hardly raised—through numerous articles and books until The Socialist Decision of 1933’.

O’Keeffe (ibid:82) bases this on correspondence from Leo Lowenthal in 1979 and 1980 who was ‘the last surviving member of the “inner group” of the Frankfurt School’ (ibid:82). O’Keeffe (ibid:83) adds a second opinion to the same effect based on correspondence from Adolf Lowe in 1980:

Lowe, showing much more respect for Tillich as a socialist, was nonetheless quite definite when asked about a relationship between Tillich’s thought and Critical Theory. “If I see it rightly,” he replied, “there is none.” He saw no mutual influence or interdependence between the thought of The Socialist Decision and the Frankfurt School’s brand of Marxism. “It is my firm conviction that there is no connection or mutual influence relating to Tillich’s socialism and critical theory.”

In critique, Tillich’s religious socialism was developed apart from the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. Social philosophy (Critical Theory) was an attempt to draw a synthesis between Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxism. This was an important part of the life of the institute. Tillich played a major role in the Marxist critique of bourgeois society. Tillich focused on the contradictions and tensions in bourgeois society.

7:9 Theology of Eros

7:9:1 Tillich’s Interest In Eros

Carey (ibid:61-62) argues based on Alec Irwin’s book Paul Tillich and the Theology of the Erotic: ‘Irwin’s book helped me understand better than I had before Tillich’s lifelong interest in the concept of eros, and the rich and diverse ways in which Tillich saw the power of eros at work in the world….Irwin reminds us that Tillich’s lifelong interest in eros is one of
those rich themes’. A further contribution of Irwin’s work is to bring out the work of Ander’s Nygren’s book *Agape and Eros* (ibid:62). Carey (ibid:62-63) continues:

Irwin gives an insightful analysis of what was at stake between Tillich and Nygren, with their two ways of seeing the world, their two theological systems, and their two ways of interpreting Agape, and Eros. Nygren, mirroring a Barthian theological perspective that dominated a whole generation, saw agape and eros as “dangerous rivals.”

Nygren (1991:205 in ibid:63) writes agape and eros: ‘represent two streams that run throughout the whole history of religion, alternately clashing against one another and mingling with one another’. Carey (ibid:63) adds:

Nygren saw agape as God’s free gift, the heart of an authentically Christian life. Eros, by contrast, represents human love and striving, shaped by the beauty and worth of its object. Eros, argued Nygren, is tainted by human emotions and drives, and lacks the purity or selflessness of agape. It is *other* than agape.

Carey (ibid:63) continues: ‘Tillich’s reply to Nygren was that any attempt to pit eros and agape against each other generally presupposes that eros is to identified with *epithymia*, the desire for sexual satisfaction. Tillich stressed the ontological unity of love, and that both eros and agape can be shaped by the divine Spirit. A third area which Irwin’s work contributes to for the purposes of our thesis on the German years is ‘Tillich’s engagement with Freud’ (ibid:63). Carey (ibid:63) explains:

Although there is much in Freud that Tillich felt has significance for Christian theology, Tillich criticized Freud for not making a distinction between the human being’s “essential and existential nature” (he felt Freud had not vision of a healed or whole person) and also for holding such a puritanical and negative attitude toward sex (see *Systematic Theology* 2:54).
This last point is beyond the scope of our thesis based on Tillich’s production of his second volume during the American years 1933 to 1965. The weakest chapter in Irwin’s book is ‘chapter 4, when he writes about Tillich’s personal life’ (ibid:63). Carey (ibid:63) acknowledges Hannah Tillich’s two books which are beyond the scope of this thesis. A further surprise is Irwin’s book is only partly about Paul Tillich. It is ‘basically a book about the concept of eros, both as this idea was interpreted by Tillich but also how eros is such a major theme with current feminist and womanist theologians’ (ibid:64).

Carey (ibid:66-67) draws three conclusions concerning Tillich’s theology of eros:

On the whole Tillich was quite theoretical and abstract in his reflections on eros. He was preoccupied with the relationship between agape and eros, and the unity of the four different components of love. To read Tillich on eros reminds us that he was essentially a theologian and not an ethicist….[F]or all of what Tillich saw at stake in tension between agape and eros, he did not comment upon patriarchy as an ideology, nor did he comment upon heterosexism as an ideology that is so powerful in the shaping of gender roles in our society….Tillich did not write about sexual abuse….[T]illich recognized problems that are intrinsic to conventional middle-class marriage, but did not criticize marriage as it is currently understood by feminists as hierarchical, male-supportive, and linked with patriarchy and capitalism. Tillich was a powerful force, however, in trying to interject into Christian thought a positive force, to the negativity about sexuality that has come through the tradition. He furthermore linked eros with concerns for justice, and stood against all those persons who would want to make of eros and sexuality something shameful or simple. He reminded us of its complexity, of its power, and of its redemptive capabilities.

This is included in our thesis on the German years because Tillich had ‘lifelong interest in the concept of eros’ (ibid:62).

Adams, Leibrecht, Runyon, Carey, O’Keeffe, and Irwin argue that Paul Tillich’s German years 1886 to 1933 are necessary to understand Tillich’s life, thought, and legacy.
In evaluation, Tillich had a life long interest in the erotic. Paul Tillich stressed the ontological unity of love. Eros and agape love can be shaped by the divine Spirit. Irwin’s work *Paul Tillich and the Theology of the Erotic* brought out a third area of interest. This was confirmation of Tillich’s interest in Freudian thought. Tillich criticized Freud for his puritanical and negative attitude toward sex. Irwin’s book is partly about Paul Tillich. It is a book about the concept of eros.

**7:10 Summary**

The American perspective on Paul Tillich shows considerable disagreement and conflict as to the meaning of Paul Tillich. The American years (1933-1965) are emphasized while the German years (1886-1933) are omitted. The result is Tillich is misinterpreted and misunderstood. A lack of consensus exists on the American perspective of Paul Tillich. The German years are essential to our understanding of Tillich.

Tillich’s theology was formed during the years in his native country. This was the development of a theology of culture and art, a Christian metaphysical theology derived from Schelling and Bohme, a political theology of religious socialism, the beginning of his first volume of his systematic theology, and a Christian existential theology.

Tillich inherited historical principles during his days in Germany. These intellectual ancestors included Kierkegaard, Schelling, Bohme, Marx, and Nietzsche. Further, Tillich developed his major theological concepts from 1886 to 1933. The concepts of the present, decision, fate, depth, ultimate depth of history, the unconditional, the boundary, form of grace, kairos, self-sufficient finitude and secularism, the threefold distinction between autonomy,
heteronomy, and theonomy, and demonry were formed during the German years. Tillich tried to win a legitimate place for theology within all knowledge and the sciences.

The American misconception of Tillich argues for the need of our thesis on the German years (1886-1933). Tillich is viewed as a philosophical theologian in America. This view originates with the analytical philosophers. They called Tillich’s work both unclear and confused. This can be traced to logical positivism. Tillich’s work was not empirically verifiable. Logical positivism gave way to ordinary philosophy language. This new philosophy viewed changing the meaning and setting of words with great suspicion.

Philosophical theology and kerygmatic theology are dependent on each other. Tillich’s view of philosophy changed during the early years. He maintained at a later date that philosophy raised the existential questions. Theology provided the answers to these questions. Tillich’s genius during these years was in his devising of new categories and reloading old or forgotten categories with new meaning.

Tillich had developed his religious socialism apart from the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxism were important to the life of the institute. Tillich gave the Marxist critique of bourgeois society. He tried to demonstrate both the contradictions and tensions within the capitalistic bourgeois society.

Tillich had a lifelong interest in the theological concept of eros. He thought that both eros and agape love were a product of the divine Spirit. Irwin’s book confirmed
Tillich’s interest in Freud. However, Tillich did criticize Freud for his puritanical and negative attitude toward sex. The progression of our thesis now works to conclude.