CHAPTER 6

THE GERMAN LEGACY

6:1 The German Years Ignored 1886-1933

6:1:1 Tillich’s Misunderstood And Misinterpreted

Legacy (Dictionary 2007:2) is defined as follows for our thesis: ‘Anything handed down from the past, as from an ancestor or predecessor: the legacy of ancient Rome’. The legacy of Paul Tillich for our thesis will be defined in terms of the German years from 1886 to 1933. Instead of focusing on the German years, his legacy is drawn from the American years 1933 to 1965. The following secondary sources substantiate the truth of focusing on Paul Tillich’s American years. Tillich brought damage and hopelessness to religion because of the gaps created by his existential concept of religion (Dourley 1975:48). Tillich added to the interest in the relationship between religion and culture in the United States (Killen 1956:247). Some scholars romanticized Tillich in terms of viewing his work as a divine revelation (Leibrecht 1975:19). Others viewed Tillich as a radical Protestant (Adams 1971:115). Tillich occupied a unique place in theology because of his concept of culture (Thomas 1963:18). Tillich was a great thinker whose ideas were universally heard and valued (Leibrecht 1972:19). Wheat (1970:276) evaluated Tillich as a scholar who gave a humanistic view of religion. He wondered why Tillich was so widely accepted in the light of his view of theism (ibid:272). Wheat’s observation of Tillich was that he was some type of supernaturalist (ibid:276). Tillich’s concept of culture was put within the realm of politics (Taylor 1991:54). A student of Tillich’s at Harvard wrote that Tillich was merely a religious existentialist (Church 1978:23). Others
held the same opinion of Tillich (Leibrecht 1959:19). Tillich was referred to as one of the few great men in our age who gave an outstanding existential analysis (ibid:23). Tillich’s legacy was to be seen as one who gave an ‘extremely vague’ interpretation of the Kingdom of God (Thomas 1963:153). Tillich was thought of as one whose model of knowledge was too simplistic and superficial (Wiebe 1999:27). Tillich had a great influence on American religious studies. Generations of Tillich’s students were given a new understanding of the depth and extensiveness of cultural settings (Wettstein 1984:113). Tillich’s ‘theology of culture was shaped in quite a different era (ibid:114). Tillich introduced the Marxian principle of a classless society as the only form of social organization to overcome the human predicament of ‘self-estrangement’ (Stumme 1978:255). Cole (1999:7) concluded Tillich’s life and legacy as merely a struggle to bring the contemporary secular into the sacred. Tillich’s work was the concept of providential history described in existential terms (Ashbrook 1988:79). The analysis that Tillich gave of the human predicament put him in the category of an original mind (Newport 1991:264). Tillich was to be remembered for his disdain of capitalism (Bandy 1999:17). Stone (1990:2) concurred with Bandy’s evaluation of Tillich’s legacy. Glazier (1993:130) concluded Tillich’s legacy to be a religious search for Utopia. Stone (1971:1) saw Tillich’s legacy to be that of a radical social thinker and a dangerous man. Tillich’s *Systematic Theology* was viewed as ‘frequently shelved as being somehow out of touch with new situations’ (Carey 2002:37). Parrella (1995:xviii) thought: ‘Tillich’s legacy is a gift not only to theologians and philosophers but also to scholars from a wide variety of other disciplines’. Kline (1991:54) writes: ‘we need theological faculties for the new, unifying culture springing from socialist soil; and the first and fundamental task of these faculties is a theology of culture’. These examples demonstrate his
legacy is stated in terms of broad generalizations from the American years 1933 to 1965. Paul Tillich’s German legacy is omitted. It needs to be defined based on historical research.

In analysis, the German years (1886-1933) have been ignored in Paul Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy. The focus on Tillich’s life is drawn from the American years (1933-1965). Conflicting views and a lack of historical consensus based on the American years is the result. The concentration of this chapter of our thesis is to define Tillich’s German legacy based on historical research.

6:2 Tillich’s Legacy was European, Continental, and German

6:2:1 Tillich was A German Theologian

The importance of the German years from 1886 to 1933 can be seen in the light of the conclusions drawn from Chapter 5. Tillich’s sources for his thought were European, Continental, and German. Tillich (1967:43-44) admits:

In the years from 1919 to 1933 I produced all my German books and articles with the exception of a few early ones. The bulk of my literary work consists of essays, and three of my books—Religiose Verwirklichung; The Interpretation of History, and The Protestant Era—are collections of articles which themselves are based on addresses or speeches. This is not accidental. I spoke or wrote when I was asked to do so, and one is more often asked to write articles than books. But there was another reason: Speeches and essays can be like screws, drilling into untouched rocks; they try to take a step ahead, perhaps successfully, perhaps in vain. My attempts to relate all cultural realms to the religious center had to use this method. It provided new discoveries—new at least for me—and as the reaction showed, not completely familiar to others. Essays like those on “The Idea of a Theology of Culture,” “The Overcoming of the Concept of Religion in the Philosophy of Religion,” “The Demonic,” “The Kairos,” “Belief-ful Realism,” “The Protestant Principle and the Proletarian Situation,” “The Formative Power of Protestantism.”

Horton (1952:27) thought the legacy of Tillich built on his place in Continental Protestant
theology to be like that of Barth ‘neo-orthodox’. He references Otto Piper’s theological categories based on pre World War I and post World War I. The first type was the ‘conservative’ type. The second category was ‘the progressive theology’. Barth and Tillich are included in this second category as progressive theologians. The ‘Bible and the traditional creeds contain, God’s living word, to the readers’. The ‘progressives’ retained the same emphasis upon doctrine and the role of the responsibility of the church. However, they did not share the attitude towards the state as ministers of ‘divine Providence’ (ibid:27-28). Horton thought Tillich is better viewed as a ‘progressive’ (ibid:28). This conclusion is reached based on Tillich’s The Interpretation of History (1936). Tillich (1936:28 in Kegley and Bretall 1952:28) writes: ‘Precisely in the protest against protestant orthodoxy (even in its moderate form of the nineteenth century) I had won my way through to autonomy’. Tillich embraced ecumenism which is so important for theology in its economic, political, and theological sense (ibid:28). Horton (ibid:29) writes: ‘Some of Barth’s most basic ideas appear unmistakenably in the early essay of Tillich from which we have just quoted: ‘Kierkegaard’s “infinite qualitative distinction’ between temporal and eternal reality; “no way” to cross this gulf from the manward or earthward side, whether by “natural theology” or by some other form of Nebenordung’. Tillich sided with Schleiermacher and Hegel against Barth affirming no need to overcome the ‘profane autonomy’ of secular culture (ibid:30). Tillich, by way of contrast, thought the duty of the theologian ‘to relate the Christian message to the cultural situation of the day’ (ibid:31). ‘Tillich’s method of correlation’ set him apart and made him unique from the other theologians. Tillich began his topic with ‘a philosophic analysis’ of
the human predicament. He ended by answering the question with the ‘Christian revelation’ in ‘symbolic and paradoxical’ terms (ibid:31). Horton (ibid:31) concludes this is part of Tillich’s legacy in ‘contemporary Continental Protestantism’. Further, the legacy of Paul Tillich must be seen as firm opposition to Hitler’s National Socialism. Emmanuel Hirsch, by way of contrast, became a follower of the Nazi revolution. Hirsch saw this as ‘a holy storm’, ‘a power full of blessing’, and ‘the work of the Almighty Lord’ (Tillich 1934:313 in Kegley and Bretall 1952:32). Horton (ibid:32) writes: ‘At many points Hirsch was startlingly close to the favorite doctrines of Tillich and the religious socialists. He spoke of the crisis of “autonomous” reason, the conflict with “demonic” forces, the importance of the “boundary situation”; and if he did not use the Greek term *kairos*, he spoke of the “religious meaning of our historic moment” in language that Tillich himself might have used’. Horton (ibid:32) continues: ‘In spite of all these similarities, there was a deep difference between Hirsch’s discernment of the hand of God in national socialism and Tillich’s discernment of it in social democracy’. Horton’s view must be seen in the light of the cultural context and contextualization. Tillich’s sharp observational skills brought out a major historiographical issue the ability to relate the present to the future. The difference was ‘a priestly sacramental attitude toward modern political movements, and a prophetic, eschatological attitude’ (ibid:32). However, Tillich’s discernment of ‘the hand of God’ was not in social democracy but socialism (ibid:32). Horton fails to realize democracy failed as a result of World War I, the German Revolution of 1918, and post war conditions in post World War I Germany. He does admit a very important conclusion in terms of the historiographical issue of progress and mankind’s transformation. Horton (ibid:33) writes: ‘What Tillich and the religious socialists intended with their doctrine
of *kairos* was to relate the Kingdom of God to human politics’.

Jean Richard’s argument for Tillich’s legacy is based on the German years. Richards (1995:43) proposes Tillich’s own methodology on the life of Karl Marx. Richards (ibid:43) writes:

I think that Tillich would agree with this procedure. This is exactly what he himself proposes in connection with Karl Marx. In the forward, to “The Socialist Decision,” he writes that he belongs to the generation of socialists that “holds fast to Marxism and defends it against the activism of the younger generation,” as well as against the positivism of the older generation. It is his generation that “goes back to the real Marx.” Then, in a footnote, Tillich explains what he means by the “real” Marx (der Wirkliche Marx): The “real” Marx is Marx in the context of his development, hence the unity of the younger and the older Marx.

Since objective historical truth is not possible, the uncertainty of Richards approach is evidenced. The unity of the younger and older Tillich is not possible given the subjectivity of Tillich’s own cultural situation. Clayton (1980:5) argues for the shortcomings of Tillich’s own methodology for Richards approach:

By incorporating the present cultural situation into his methodology Tillich gave to his theology a planned obsolescence which precludes his system’s having direct relevance for any but the cultural contexts in which and for which it was constructed. Tillich made no claim to speak ‘for all times’. He spoke, rather, out of his own time and to his own time. This holds not only for Tillich’s work as a whole, but also for the individual phases of his theological development.

Tillich wrote out of his own context to his generation in his time. He was a product of his own past- European, continental, and German. The historical situation from 1886 to 1933 was far different than the years 1933 to 1965. Clayton (ibid:6) gives examples of these differences referring to the *kairos*. Clayton (ibid:6) writes:

Speaking ‘out of the *kairos*’ meant for Tillich something different in 1919 than in 1926 or 1934 or 1956. The demands of the present were in each case understood
differently. In each case, Tillich rethought not only the nature of the present moment but also what would count as a kairos.

Clayton (ibid:6) points to Tillich’s concept of correlation: ‘As the time for which he was writing recedes into the past, so diminishes also the contemporary significance of his particular ‘correlation.’ Tillich’s obsolescence, in this sense, is a frank feature of his methodology’. Clayton (ibid:6) adds in conclusion: ‘Such obsolescence is said to be the fate of every theological system, for ‘every concrete system’ is transitory and…none can be final’. Richards granted does have some valid points. Richards (1995:43) writes: ‘It may be a simple matter of historical concern about the development of Tillich’s thought. ‘All will agree, I think, that such an inquiry into the roots of Tillich’s thought may always be interesting and useful’. The legacy of Paul Tillich is summed up in two key words in his German years. These keywords are spirit and community (ibid:44). Reference is made to Tillich’s lecture in Berlin ‘On the Idea of a Theology of Culture’ (ibid:44). This does not answer the problem of Tillich’s legacy during the German years since a theology of culture was a life long interest and work. Ratschow (1980:24) writes: ‘At the peak of this tendency is the theme of his life: the theology of culture’.

Ratschow (ibid:24) insists on the need to view the German years 1919 to 1933 as a unity. Ratschow (ibid:24) writes: ‘The period of Paul Tillich’s activity that we must now treat is a self-enclosed epoch of his scientific thinking. This epoch from 1919 to 1933 has a very distinctive character over against the preceding and following ones, and it must be viewed as a unity’. Richards (1995:45) makes some comments that prove helpful. Tillich’s writings from the German years 1919 to 1933 are categorized into three parts. ‘The System
of the Sciences’ from the year 1923, ‘belongs of course, to the philosophical layer’. There we find the Christian philosophy of the spirit, and the definition of the ‘functions of the spirit’. Richards (ibid:45) continues: ‘The second layer, the historical, is best illustrated by The Religious Situation, a book from 1926, where Tillich proceeds to a general and critical analysis of the bourgeois, capitalist society. To the same kind of historical analysis also belongs a publication in 1922, Mass and Spirit, which bears on the dark side of modern, enlightened society’. Richards (ibid:45) adds a third layer: ‘the normative and systematic, is constituted by the systematic studies on religious socialism, especially those of 1923 and 1924’.

In evaluation, Tillich’s legacy from the German years (1886-1933) is European, Continental, and German. The sources for his thought were derived from these categories. Tillich’s place during the German years was within Continental Protestant theology. Tillich should be understood as a progressive theologian. Tillich gave a philosophical analysis of the human predicament. This was followed by a theological answer to the existential question. His legacy must be seen as one of firm opposition to Adolf Hitler. Tillich saw the hand of divine providence in socialism rather than the National Socialism of the Nazis. Tillich and the religious socialists related the kingdom of God to politics. Tillich thought that the fulfilled time known as the kairos and the proletariat would bring about a new world order. The transformation of mankind would take place. Tillich’s German years must be viewed as a unity. He wrote out of his own context to his generation. He was a product of his European, Continental, and German background.
6.3 Tillich’s Early Writings

6.3.1 Tillich’s Ever Increasing Commitment To Religious Socialism

Part of Tillich’s legacy during the German years was religious socialism. Tillich thought Christianity must have a definite political involvement. Latourette (1953:1384) validates this point: ‘While in Germany, in addition to his writing and teaching in philosophy and theology he was active in politics’. Tillich’s concept of the kairos was important. Ratschow (1980:22) confirms Tillich’s German legacy of the kairos:

Admittedly, there are, even in this span of time, clear developments. For example, an important break lies in the year 1926, up to this point Tillich lives in the forward driving dynamics of a perception of the Kairos. From 1926 on, this conviction dies out. “The proletariat” did not prove to be the creative vitality that belonged to the Kairos. Hence, a “great imagination” enters, or a time of “hidden” creation. Tillich believed that he could ascertain such a change for the year 1926 with reference to all essential areas. His writings before and afterwards can indeed be fit into this observation of his.

Ratschow points to Tillich’s The Religious Situation and The Socialist Decision to prove that Tillich’s early writings were those of a political theologian and a religious socialist.

Ratschow (ibid:23) writes:

The whole breadth of Tillich’s turn toward life comes to light in the most widely circulated writing from these years—Die Religiose Lage der Gegenwart. The first part is concerned with the “scientific and aesthetic area.” The second part has to do with “politics and ethos.” The third part, with religion. Such a book “must say something about everything at present.” With those words Tillich introduces this investigation. This “everything at present” is the battle against bourgeois society which is presented in science, technics, and economy” “The battle dare not cease until we have a time whose existence and forms are intended as a vessel of eternal depth (Gestalt).”

Ratschow’s (ibid:23) argument turns now to Tillich’s The Socialist Decision: ‘Ever more
clearly in the course of the twenties does the initially indefinite ecstatic “mood” become concentrated upon the threatening “fatal destiny of the European peoples,” and it has become completely a “beliefful realism.”

John Carey (2002:39) points to Tillich’s legacy in politics and history. Carey (2002:39) writes: ‘I wish to consider two closely related yet distinct aspects of Tillich’s early works: his writings on politics and history. Tillich’s insights in both these areas are germane to our present theological interests, inasmuch as the ramifications of liberation theology and of the meaning of history are very much with us’. Carey (ibid:39) considers Tillich’s legacy against the context of his time. Carey (ibid:39) writes:

To appreciate Tillich’s approach to, and involvement with, the political situation of Germany in the 1920s and 1930s we need to recall some of the particular problems of that epoch: the emergence of the socialist parties as a challenge to the old structures and institutions of German life; the growing strength of the National Socialist (Nazi) Party; the opposition of the Lutheran Church to the parties of the left; the polarization of German society into parties of the left and right; the concern of a small group of German theologians and intellectuals to find a via media between the left and the right. Tillich’s own political stance—of helping to found and work for the Religious Socialist movement, is well known, and it is not my intent here to retell that story. It is important, however, to note how Tillich appraised the strengths and weaknesses of the theological left and right, and how he assessed both in light of the Christian claim.

Carey (ibid:39) argues that Tillich viewed political thought rooted in various aspects of human experience. Carey (ibid:39-40) continues:

The themes of political conservatism—law, order, structure, authority, continuity—are seen thereby not just as an ideology of recalcitrance but as legitimate extensions of a theological awareness of human nature. Liberal political thought, by contrast, derives from the related experience of coming to know change; the “is” of personal and social life is confronted by the “ought”, or as Tillich says, the myth of our origin is finally broken by an unconditioned demand.
Tillich wrote repeatedly in the 1920s and the early 1930s of the weaknesses and strengths of socialism (ibid:41). Carey (ibid:41) explains: ‘Tillich and his counterparts…consequently identified themselves as Religious Socialists and carried on a…quarrel with the Social Democratic Party’. Tillich (1930:208 in Carey 2002:41) writes: ‘It is the task of Religious Socialism to carry through a radical criticism of socialism, but on the ground of socialism Itself. Its criticism must not weaken the passion of the proletarian struggle. Rather it must strengthen this passion in that it deepens it; in that it holds up to socialism what the true meaning of its movement is, and makes this meaning the critical standard of the actual facts’. Tillich’s relationship to the political left was dialectical. Tillich attacked the political right. Tillich was relentless against the political right because the right sought ‘to perpetuate the capitalistic economy’ (ibid:41). Capitalism appealed to German unification ‘around supernaturalism’ (ibid:42). Capitalism carried with it ‘the demonic capacity to destroy nuances of judgment, justice, and diplomacy’ (ibid:42). Carey (ibid:42) clarifies: ‘Most crucially, however, politics of the right loses the capacity to distinguish the distance between God and the present political situation. Tillich in fact broke with his former colleague Emmanuel Hirsch on this very point, when Hirsch endorsed the Nazi movement and its call for a “New Germany”’. Further, Carey (ibid:42) cautions:

The political right, just like the left, is prone to a utopianism that overlooks the ambiguities of human history. The fact is, Tillich argued, that the politics of the right leads finally to the idea of a totalitarian state—a state in which culture, art, science, and social life are regulated, personal freedom is curtailed, minorities are persecuted, and even religious liberties are restricted. Born in insecurity and appealing for “reintegration” of a people, a totalitarian state destroys even as it ostensibly builds. Law and order are achieved at the expense of justice, and this for Tillich repudiates the prophetic element in the Christian tradition.
Carey (ibid:43) argues: ‘Much of what Tillich wrote at that time is dated and of interest only to historians’. However, Carey argues for three insights into ‘the theology of politics’ that is relevant for us today (ibid:43). Carey (ibid:43) lists them: ‘We too find ourselves in a polarized society; we are trying to cope with the breakdown of old mythologies and we now hear appeals for violent and/or nonviolent revolution. Our political consciousness was heightened by, for example, the Vietnam War, and sharp criticisms have been leveled by the youth culture which generally rejects both the parties and policies of traditional American politics’.

Tillich’s work argues for the exercise of caution ‘to beware of the utopianism of the left’ (ibid:43). A further legacy of Tillich is to exercise caution against any form of totalitarianism (ibid:43). Carey bases this interest in ‘Tillich’s work in modern Germany,…when Tillich struggled with the issues of history and politics in the days of the Weimar Republic’ (ibid:38).

Tillich has left us a legacy in his ‘serious grappling with Marxism’ (ibid:44). Carey (ibid:44) argues: ‘Tillich derived from Marx his themes of social justice, the destructive capacities of capitalistic-industrial states, and the ideologies which are developed by ruling groups to justify their place in the status quo’. Tillich called Marx ‘one of the great prophets of the nineteenth century’ (ibid:44).

Carey argues for a further legacy from Tillich’s early writings based ‘on the meaning of history’ (ibid:46). Tillich’s writings on history give ‘major alternatives to Pannenberg’s work’ (ibid:46). Carey (ibid:46) gives the background against which the choice of Tillich’s ‘writings on history’ is made. Carey (ibid:46) writes:
It is possible, of course, to see the problems of history as a perennial problem for theology: the twentieth century has seen the problem raised by Harnack, repudiated by Barth redefined by Bultmann, and reintroduced by Pannenberg. It lies beyond the scope of this article to trace this interesting and complex debate in detail; suffice it to say that the work of Pannenberg, so influential in German theology, has to be seen as a reaction to the Bultmannian existentialist approach to history. Pannenberg has denied the distinctions the Bultmannians make between Historie and Geschichte and the subsequent redefinition by Bultmann as to what “historical existence” means. Pannenberg has wanted to yoke modern theology more closely to historical and exegetical modes of biblical inquiry, and to set the stage for a theological historiography that would provide a historical argument for the factuality of the resurrection. Most recent evaluations of the problem of history have centered around the strengths and weaknesses of Pannenberg’s endeavors.

Carey (ibid:46) sets the perimeters for ‘Tillich’s approach to history’. Carey (ibid:46) writes: ‘it is important to note that Tillich always opposed the historical positivists who wanted to base Christianity upon scholarly evaluation of past events’. ‘History’, ‘argued Tillich in his early writings’, ‘is the totality of remembered events, which are determined by free human activity and are important for the life of human groups’ (Tillich 1938:108 in ibid:46-47). Carey (ibid:47) adds: ‘History involves free choices as to what is meaningful; it is filled with decisions and risks, of the kairos breaking in on the logos. The clue to history is not in proving past events but rather in purposeful action in the present’. Adams (1952:295 in ibid:47) writes: ‘The meaning of history can be discerned only in meaningful historical activity. The key to history is historical action, not a point above history; historical activity is active participation in the life of a historical group. The meaning of history manifests itself in the self-understanding of a historical group’. Carey (ibid:47) explains the meaning: ‘Tillich, in other words, is not interested as much in historical knowledge as he is in historical consciousness; the awareness of one’s fate in history, and of being so penetrated by the forces of history as to discern the creative significance
of the present moment. For Tillich, he who would understand history must be an actor within the context of events rather than a spectator’. Tillich (1938:106 in ibid:47) writes: ‘Since the only entrance to the interpretation of history is historical action, there is no serious grappling with the problem of history which has not been born out of the necessity or coming to a present historical decision’. Carey (ibid:47) concludes:

As a political theologian, then, Tillich attempted to yoke together political action with an understanding of history. His legacy to our generation in this regard is to remind us that from a Christian standpoint the problem of history always has contemporary implications. The historical question is not just “What can we learn about the past?” It also implies “What does the present require?” To follow Tillich’s reasoning here opens up a new range of questions about history as a problem in contemporary theology.

Carey (ibid:48) continues:

Similarly we can say that the impressive thing about the early Tillich as a political theologian was that he not only theorized about historical events, he was also deeply involved. The Berlin Circle of Religious Socialists, church conferences, youth meetings, anti-Nazi activities, helping the Jews—Tillich was there. Perhaps Tillich would feel that he did not live and write in vain if either by word or action he inspired a later generation of Christians to become serious participants in the ongoing struggle for justice in the arena of politics.

In interpretation, part of Tillich’s German legacy is religious socialism. Christianity requires political involvement. Tillich maintained the concept of the kairos up until 1926. Tillich’s *The Religious Situation* and his *The Socialist Decision* point to the fact that he was a political theologian and a religious socialist. Tillich’s legacy from these years in part is in politics and history. These areas are relevant to the present theological interests, liberation theology, and the meaning of history. Tillich’s writings during the 1920s and the early 1930s are on the strengths and weaknesses of socialism. Tillich has left us an example of the need for continued dialogue with Marx. Tillich demonstrated the need for
historical action in order to be able to understand history.

6:4 Schelling

6:4:1 Schelling’s Metaphysical Theology Becomes Part of Tillich’s German Legacy

Ratschow (1980:30) writes:

The twenties show us Tillich as he thought in constant alternations or correlations. There is culture and religion, there is society and history, the individual and religion, the individual and the masses, technics and culture, and art and faith. All these correlations are brought into a solution in a “schema” which, as we saw, comes from Schelling, and which is built according to a model (being-nonbeing transcends suprabeing).

Tillich’s German legacy is, in part, Schelling’s Christian philosophy. Tillich (1964:87) explains Schelling:

But then Schelling goes on to try to approach the God of revelation in terms of a third type of empiricism: “metaphysical empiricism” - a procedure that leads to a speculative reinterpretation of the history of religion. The speculative urge in his mind conquered the Existential restriction and humility that he had himself postulated. Although the philosophers of Existence denied Schelling’s “metaphysical Empiricism”—many of them were greatly disappointed by his Berlin lectures—they all demanded with him an “empirical” or experiential approach to Existence. And since they assumed that Existence is given immediately in the inner personal experience or concrete “Existence” of men, they all started with the immediate personal experience of the existing experience. They turned, not to the thinking subject, like Descartes, but to the existing subject to the “sum” in cogito ergo sum, as Heidegger puts it. The description of the sum, of the character of immediate personal experience, is different for each representative of Existential philosophy. But on the basis of this personal experience each of them develops a theory in rational terms, a philosophy. They all try to “think Existence,” to develop its implication, instead of simply living in “Existential” immediate experience.

Tillich recalls Schelling’s Berlin lectures. Tillich (1964:78) writes: ‘Schelling’s Berlin lectures are based on his development of the position achieved in the Philosophy of Freedom in 1809, and the Weltalter in 1811’. Tillich (ibid:78) continues: ‘In his Munich lectures in the later
twenties he had tried to show that the “positive philosophy,” as he calls his type of Existential philosophy, had predecessors in men like Pascal, Jacobi, and Hamann, and in the theosophic tradition stemming from Bohme’. Tillich relied heavily on Schellings’s Christian work *The Ages of the World* (ibid:78). Tillich (1936:31) admits: ‘I came under the influence of Schelling, whose collected works I read through several times with enthusiasm, and concerning whom I wrote my theses both for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and Licentiate of Theology’. Carey (2002:14) writes: ‘The concept of God was likewise a rich area for Tillich…and is obviously an area in which he made a major contribution to twentieth-century theology. ….He was indebted to…Friedrich Schelling’. Martin Marty (1986:732) writes of Tillich’s legacy:

Both in his lifetime and later, it was clear that Tillich was building his cathedral on what to many Anglo-Americans was a metaphysically condemned site. They don’t respond well to the Schellingesque idealism that Tillich found congenial. Yet the edifice—despite fissures under it and through it—stands.

Marty’s words confirm Tillich’s metaphysical theology to be derived from Schelling. His comments are based on a pragmatic view of the usefulness of such a legacy. Nevertheless, it is part of Tillich’s legacy from the German years. Marty’s evaluation is somewhat deficient in that no mention is made of Bohme.

In evaluation, Tillich’s German legacy is in part the thought of Schelling. Tillich’s constant alternations, or correlations are themes such as society and history, the individual and religion, and the individual and the masses. These themes were worked into a solution. This thought is derived from Schelling. Schelling’s Christian metaphysical theology had a predecessor in the theosophic thought of Bohme. Tillich
relied on Schelling’s thought. Tillich’s Christian metaphysical theology is derived from Schelling.

6:5 Bohme

6:5:1 Bohme’s Lutheran Mysticism Part of Tillich’s German Legacy

Tillich (1936:54) speaks of Lutheran mysticism. The mediator for such was Jakob Bohme. Tillich (ibid:54) writes: ‘With him as mediator, Lutheran Mysticism had an influence on Schelling and German Idealism, and through Schelling, again on Irrationalism and the philosophy of life of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’. Further, Tillich (1957:7-8 in Adams 1965:32) writes: ‘If Protestant theology wants to penetrate the ontological implications of the Christian symbols, it would do well to use the ideas of Boehme more than those of Aristotle….Boehme tried to describe in metaphysical-psychological symbols the living God in whom the roots of every life must be sought’. Adams (ibid:201) detects ‘the language of Jacob Boehme’ in Tillich’s thought. Adams (ibid:212) elaborates further:

With Jacob Boehme, for example, something breaks through the confines of mystical striving for unification with the Superbeing. For him, “the world of ideas is the revelation of the divine abyss.” Following Boehme and Schelling, Tillich holds that the idea carries within itself struggle, contrast, and harmony; this is the dynamic element that leads, or, as Tillich puts it, that leaps to history.

Tillich uses Boehme’s terms ground and abyss in his description of the demonic (ibid:23).

Adams (ibid:32) explains:

Tillich’s conception of ground and abyss, the absolute Something and the absolute Nothing. “Abyss” carries a double connotation: inexhaustible, restless, positive dynamic and threatening, disruptive dynamic. The concepts “ground” and “abyss” stem from Jacob Boehme.
Adams (ibid:251) continues: ‘With respect to both participation and separation, both mystical unity and the sense of guilt, Tillich exhibits affinity to Boehme’. Carey (2002:14) acknowledges Tillich’s debt ‘to the German mystic Jakob Bohme’. Przywara (1959:113) argues: ‘As Schelling was dependent upon Boehme and Franz von Baader, who developed an immanent philosophy of revelation, so Tillich in his turn interpreted this tradition in his first works, attempting to draw from it the final consequences for the development of a possible “Christian grammar” ’. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider Boehme’s influence on Schelling or Franz von Baader’s work. The influence of Boehme upon Schelling and in turn upon Tillich was as early as Tillich’s dissertations on Schelling (ibid:358). Boehme’s legacy to Tillich is to be understood both within Schelling’s thought and Tillich’s own thought. Boehme is part of Tillich’s legacy from the German years.

In breakdown, Tillich was indebted to the mediator for Lutheran mysticism who was Jacob Bohme. Bohme influenced Schelling, German Idealism, Irrationalism, and the philosophy of life of both the 19th and 20th centuries. Tillich’s concepts of ground and abyss are derived from Bohme.

6:6 The Protestant Principle

6:6:1 Part of Tillich’s Last Testament To Us

Oden (1964:20) argues that the Protestant principle is part of Paul Tillich’s German legacy. Oden (ibid:20) writes that it: ‘is not distinctively protestant at all, but it is equally a Platonic and Thomist principle, since it essentially holds that nothing finite is to be identified
as confused with the eternal’. Ratschow (1980:27) argues for Tillich’s Protestant principle as part of the Tillich legacy from the German years. Ratschow (ibid:27) viewed the Protestant principle as Tillich’s attempt to revitalize Kahler’s principle of justification. Tillich sought to free justification from any moral restraint with the inclusion of ‘thinking or doubt’ (ibid:27). Siegfried (1952:80-83) writes of the Protestant principle:

The whole work of Tillich has a definitely Protestant character. The emphasis on grace as the prius of action and thought, the unity of regeneration, judgment, and justification, the idea of kairos as a divine manifestation out of which political and social transformation follow—all this is essentially Protestant. But above all it is Tillich’s doctrine of the ultimate situation which shows the Protestant character of his thought. Grace appears at the boundary line of existence in the moment in which man is delivered to nothingness and despair. This makes the ultimate situation ambiguous. It is, on the one hand, the place of a complete loss of self; it is, on the other hand, the place where man can find his true being. Therefore Tillich can agree with Nietzsche, Freud, and the existentialists in their analysis of the human predicament, and he can agree with the reformers in their emphasis on the reality of grace as the foundation not only of the religious, but also of the secular realm. Beliefful realism is an eminently Protestant principle because it relates every religious element to a secular one and vice versa.

The relation of the Protestant principle to the Protestant reality leads to a series of questions which can only briefly be indicated. …Tillich follows Luther’s intuition of the relativity of all social orders. But he applies his principle also to the feudal-paternalistic order, which Luther thought to be valid for his time and beyond his time; he also applies it to the bourgeois-capitalistic order, which he criticizes in the name of religious socialism. At the same time he tries to find an immovable principle of ethics which unites absoluteness with openness for all historical relativities.

The second question to be discussed in the light of the Protestant principle is that of autonomy. Tillich…defines autonomy as the ability of man to discover the universal law of theoretical and practical reason in himself without dependence on heteronomous realities. But in view of the distortion of men’s autonomy in his state of estrangement, Tillich demands a theonomy which transcends autonomy as well as heteronomy.

The third and last question to which I want to point is that of the Protestant churches in the light of the Protestant principle. According to Tillich, their future is dependent on their theological openness toward the theoretical problems of the present situation in contrast to a theology of restoration and confessional isolation; it is dependent on their ethical openness to the social problems of today in contrast to the attempt to identify the
Christian message with a special political or economic structure; it is dependent on their acceptance of free groups which find a common liturgical and sacramental expression of their actual problems in distinction from an archaistic restitution of obsolete forms.

Siegfried (ibid:80) defines Tillich’s Protestant principle as all Tillich’s work which ‘is essentially Protestant’. Siegfried (ibid:80) links ‘the idea of a kairos as a divine manifestation out of which political and social transformation follow’ (ibid:80).

Siegfried (ibid:81) relates the Protestant principle to ‘the relativity of all social orders’.

He (ibid:82) points as well to the areas of autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy.

Finally, Siegfried (ibid:82-83) references the Protestant principle to the Protestant churches.

Tillich (1936:54-55) elaborates on the Protestant principle:

I, myself, belong to Lutheranism by birth, education, religious experience, and theological reflection. I have never stood on the borders of Lutheranism and Calvinism, not even now, after having experienced the fatal consequences of the Lutheran social ethics….The substance of my religion is and remains Lutheran….Not only my theological, but also my philosophical thinking expresses the Lutheran substance. Lutheranism up to this time has found immediate philosophical expression only in Lutheran mysticism and in its philosophical representative, Jakob Bohme, the “philosophus teutonicus.”

The Protestant principle was in part Tillich’s own subjective context. Tillich (1964:68) defines it as ‘the Protestant understanding of man and his predicament’. Tillich (ibid:68) writes:

The Protestant principle (which is not always effective in the preaching and teaching of the Protestant churches) emphasizes the infinite distance God and man. It emphasizes man’s finitude, his subjection to death, but above all, his estrangement from his true being and his bondage to demonic forces-forces of self-destruction. Man’s inability to liberate himself from this bondage has led the Reformers to the doctrine of a reunion with God in which God alone acts and man only receives. Such receiving, of course, is not possible in an attitude of passivity, but it demands the highest courage, namely the courage to accept the paradox that the “sinner is justified,” that it is man in anxiety, guilt, and despair who is the object of God’s unconditional acceptance.
It is readily observed the Protestant principle has a wider context. It is not simply that which is Protestant. Incorporated into Tillich’s thinking on the Protestant principle is also his existential theology of man’s predicament within a capitalistic system. Carey (2002:15-16) writes:

A related and likewise important debt is what Tillich drew from Luther’s theme that “God alone is God.” That same motif appears in Tillich as the concept of the “Protestant Principle,” whereby he argues that Protestantism as a movement affirms the fundamental dictum that “God alone is God,” and that no other person, object, or institution is worthy of our ultimate loyalty. In this way, Tillich felt that Protestantism is a corrective principle to Roman Catholic claims for the church, Orthodox claims for church councils, and Protestant fundamentalist claims for the unique authority of Scripture. Protestantism, Tillich maintained, lives where this principle is vital and has no authenticity where the principle is weak. I think this is a direct link between Luther and Tillich.

John Carey affirms Protestantism as a movement. Tillich’s Protestant principle is defined by Carey as a corrective principle. This is to be seen as an addition to Tillich’s essentially Protestant thought during the German years. Carey’s (ibid:16) argument is based on ‘various essays on Protestantism’ in Tillich’s The Protestant Era. The Protestant principle is part of Tillich’s legacy from the German years.

In analyzing the material, the Protestant principle relates every religious realm to a secular realm. The Protestant principle related to the Protestant reality leads to a series of questions. These are the relativity of social orders, autonomy, and the Protestant churches. Tillich’s Protestant principle is defined as all that is essentially Protestant. Tillich’s existential theology of man’s predicament within the capitalistic system is part of his thinking on the Protestant principle. The Protestant principle within the Protestant movement is to be seen as a corrective principle. Tillich’s thought is essentially Protestant
during the German years.

6:7 Philosophy of Religion

6:7:1 Philosophical Theology And Theology In Tension With The Other

Siegfried (1952:75) points to Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion as part of Tillich’s German legacy from 1919 to 1933. This was expressed in Tillich’s work *Religiose Verwirklichung* (ibid:75). Tillich was able to overcome the hurdle of ‘the division of a secular and a religious sphere’ (ibid:76). Siegfried (ibid:76) writes:

Tillich derives a normative idea of religion from a comparison of the sacramental, the mystical, and the prophetic types of religion. A synthesis of them, as given in Christianity, is considered the criterion of every religious reality. The history of religion is interpreted as a development of these types, driving from all sides to the Christian synthesis.

Siegfried (ibid:76-77) concludes:

But is not possible to see the historical movement driving in a quite different direction? Moreover, is this not the attitude of the religions and quasi religions which are in competition with Christianity? Although Tillich is open to all forms of religious realizations, he has not shown the foundation of his normative concept in a convincing way.

Tillich (1923:149 in Adams 1965:185) viewed philosophy of religion and theology as standing in tension with one another. Adams (ibid:187) explains: ‘Thus philosophy of religion and theology are two elements in a cultural science of religion. They may never properly be separated entirely’. Adams (ibid:187-188) continues: ‘Every theology is dependent upon the concept of the essence of religion already presupposed. Every philosophy of religion is in the end dependent upon the normative concept of religion’. Tillich’s
philosophy of religion is different than the normal conception of philosophy of religion in a university curriculum. Adams (ibid:187) writes:

The disciplines belonging to philosophy of religion proper are arranged in accord with the system set forth earlier for the normative sciences. That is, they are distributed in the tripartite classification: philosophy of meaning, intellectual history, and the normative system—theology. Every cultural science consciously or unconsciously flows in these three channels.

In Chapter 4 on page 127, the thesis explained Tillich’s philosophy of religion. Tillich had tried to show the unity of theology and philosophy during his years at the University of Frankfurt (Tillich 1936:35). He thought this possible because of Schelling’s Christian philosophy of existence. Schelling’s Christian metaphysical religious thought failed to achieve the unity of theology and philosophy (ibid:35). The First World War proved disastrous for Tillich and his entire generation. World War I proved a catastrophe for the survival of German idealism. Schelling’s Christian philosophy was drawn into the abyss (ibid:35). If a reunion of theology and philosophy was to be achieved then justice would need to be done to the abyss which was the experience of Tillich and his generation. Tillich’s philosophy of religion came into being to satisfy this need and demand (ibid:35).

The critical analysis of this section, shows Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion is part of his German legacy. Philosophy of religion and theology are two elements in a cultural science of religion. Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion contained a philosophy of meaning, intellectual history, and theology.
6:8 Religious Socialism

6:8:1 Tillich’s Legacy Religious Socialism

Tillich’s (1936:19) words explain the German problem:

Like most of the intellectuals of Germany before the war, my attitude towards politics had been essentially one of indifference. Neither did the ever-present consciousness of social guilt express itself in a political will. Only in the last year of the war, and in the months of collapse and revolution did the political backgrounds of the World War, the interrelation between Capitalism and Imperialism, the crisis of bourgeois society, the class cleavage, and so forth, became visible to me.

Tillich became interested in the thinking of Karl Marx. Carey (2002:23) writes: ‘Tillich was deeply influenced by Marx’s critique of capitalism, and he used that critique in his numerous early assessments of capitalism as the basic source of economic injustice in the modern world’. Tillich (1936:188) reflecting upon Marx’s thought writes: ‘The assumption that after the removal of the class contrast through the proletariat revolution, a complete homogeneity of society could come into existence, would force one to expect a static-vegetative final state. Such an expectation, of course, would not mean the beginning, as Marx thinks, but rather the end of history’. This conclusion reached by Paul Tillich stands in stark contrast to Fukuyama’s position of the triumph of Capitalism in economics, and liberal democracy in politics (Alsayyad 2003:54). Tillich’s Marxism viewed the proletariat as the one to bring about the final transformation of history and mankind. Tillich (1977:161) writes: ‘Proletariat is the key to a contemporary social situation. The reason being that they are close to the negative side’. Tillich (ibid:161) continues:

It will hold this postion as long as bourgeois capitalism lasts. When compared to the reality of the split between the classes, every other fact about society becomes less important. Every social group is drawn into the structure of confrontation that is inherent in the liberal bourgeois system. The proletariat by its very existence is thrust towards socialism. It cannot do otherwise as long as, and insofar as, it is the proletariat.
At the same time, the notion that the victory of socialism can be won by the proletariat alone must be contested. Certainly it cannot be done without the proletariat, for the proletariat is the necessary condition for any realization of socialism. But it is, at least for the present, not the sufficient condition. Precisely the situation that drives the proletariat into socialism also creates the limits of the proletariat’s ability to achieve socialism by itself.

Tillich names two forms of political romanticism the conservative and the revolutionary (ibid:27). Tillich (ibid:27) writes: ‘The conservative form is based on the attempt to defend the spiritual and social residues of the bond of origin against the autonomous system, and whenever possible to restore past forms. It appears in groups that have not yet been completely integrated into bourgeois society: primarily landowners, peasants, nobles, priests, artisans’. Tillich (ibid:27) contrasts the conservative with the revolutionary form.

Tillich (ibid:27) writes:

The revolutionary form tries to gain a basis for new ties to the origin by a devastating attack on the rational system. It is carried out by those groups that have entered into the inner structure of the rational system, without having lost continuity with the groups of origin from which they are descended. But now they feel threatened by complete absorption into the system, on the one hand, and by the mechanization and loss of status which this system effects, on the other hand. Here we find primarily office employees, certain groups of bureaucrats, and those intellectuals who have no chance of being incorporated into the rational system; but there are also some farmers and artisans who are being hit specially hard by the crisis, to the point of hopelessness. These two groups can become partners in common action, but at the same time they have inner tensions, tensions that become sharper as it becomes clearer that the revolutionary groups want to get rid not only of the drawbacks of the rational system but also of the advantages it has given to the conservative groups.

The revolutionary groups want to get rid of the bourgeois system with its drawbacks and advantages. Tillich (ibid:44) writes of the justification for all of this: ‘it lies precisely at the point where socialism also struggles against bourgeois society. It lies in the protest of human beings against the dehumanizing consequences of an exclusively rational system’. Tillich
writes in religious terms: ‘the proletariat, as bearer of the coming fulfillment of human existence, rising beyond that experience, has an objective quality of holiness, a “vocation” on the strength of which it can wage the victorious power for battle’. Tillich (ibid:198) continues: “At the same time, however, the holiness of power is the critical norm to which it is always subject. This norm is identical with the respective symbols of transcendence beyond the sphere of the structure of power”. Tillich (ibid:198) adds: ‘Such symbols are justice (not in the legal, but in the prophetic sense); love (which in Christianity is more a concept of expectation than one of experience); society without classes (whose pathos is the suspension of the order of force); the identity of all existence (in which the Indian-world consciousness advances beyond the order of power)’. Tillich’s German legacy includes a religious socialism that sought to cure the social ills of his time a capitalist economy and liberal democracy. Tillich (ibid:199) concludes: ‘These norms, of course, cannot be handled mechanically but must always be proclaimed anew to the powers. They are thereby made concrete and filled with the problems of the condition of society at the time, but they always point beyond them’.

Tillich (ibid:275) keeps coming back to Marx’s thought: ‘If Marx says that the pre-history of mankind ends and its history begins with classless society, one might ask whether this history really is history, or whether all real history does not rather belong to what he calls pre-history. With respect to the ultimate, all history is pre-history, and only through being “pre-history” does it have historical meaning’. Adams (1965:214) argues: ‘In his sympathetic, if also critical, treatment of Marxism he asserts that the Marxist revolt against
a capitalist society represented a justifiable revolt against exploitation in the direction of a new meaning in life—a meaning that involves a wider participation of men in the satisfactions of security and creativity’. Siegfried (1952:71) writes of the importance of the Marxist ideology:

Even more important, and certainly more difficult to deal with, was the Marxist concept of “ideology.” Ideology in Marxism designates the intellectual “superstructure” which men build on the basis of the economic social “substructure.” It includes law and morals, metaphysics, art, and religion. If a society is split, the ideologies are also split, and each group uses its special ideology as an instrument in the class struggle.

Carey (2002:32) writes:

Tillich recognized the truth of most of what Marx said about religion as an ideology of the privileged class. The established churches have become yoked to the present social order. The needs and yearnings of people other than the middle class go unheeded. Marx can therefore serve as a spur to prod the churches into self-criticism, and to remind the churches that they live by the “Protestant Principle,” not by their stake in the established social order.

Tillich (1972:176) recalls Marx’s legacy: ‘No one was more aware of this than Karl Marx when he constructed his interpretation of history, describing how each new period was prepared in the womb of the preceding one—for instance, the socialist in the womb of the bourgeois period, and the latter in the womb of the late medieval period’. Tillich (ibid: 410-411) writes: ‘of great synthesis…the turning point for many of the actual problems of today, including world revolution and the East-West conflict…a world-historical movement which has directly or indirectly influenced our whole century’. Tillich (ibid:436-437) remembered Marx’s concept of religion:

Marx explained religion in terms of the social existence of men, and more particularly in the class situation of men. Religion is the escape of those who are oppressed by the upper classes into an imaginary fulfillment in the realm of the absolute. Marx’s
negation of religion is a result of his understanding of the social condition of man. Tillich (1936:63 in Carey 2002:32) acknowledged his legacy from Karl Marx. Carey (2002:33-34) adds a word of caution in terms of Tillich’s legacy from Marx. Carey (ibid:33) writes:

Because Marx saw the churches as an extension of the privileged class, he also denied that there was any depth reality to which the churches attempt to bear witness. As a result Marx’s interpretation of history is dependent upon immanent processes; it cannot account for the idea of *kairos*, of the external breaking into time, shaking and transforming the temporal. In the last analysis Tillich felt that Marx’s perspective on history is one-dimensional: it lacks any awareness of the power of being that sustains all of life and history.

In other words, Marx’s view was seen by Tillich as lacking the religious element of the *kairos* and religious socialist thinking. Secondly, Carey (Tillich 1936:188 in ibid:33) argues that Tillich thought a classless society would lead to ‘a “static vegetative” stage in history’. Carey (ibid:33) argues that Tillich faulted Marx’s thinking at this point because it was an unworkable utopian scheme. Carey (ibid:34) continues: ‘Tillich felt that Marx placed the focal point of history at the wrong place when he pointed to the rise of the proletariat’. This is only because Carey bases his opinion on Marx’s lack of a religious dimension in the case of the proletariat. Carey (ibid:34) argues: ‘The future of society cannot be made contingent upon any one class; it will rather rest with the small community of people (which transcends all class lines) who sense the power of “New Being”: persons who are aware of the Unconditional, open to the *kairos*, yet aware of the logos structure of life and time’. Siegfried (1952:71) writes ‘a religious interpretation of the class struggle was not without its antecedents’. Siegfried (ibid:71) continues:
thirty-five years ago the great German sociologist Max Weber had shown that after the dissolution of the personal relation between master and servant in the competitive society, the struggle of labor against capital is justified from a Christian point of view. Moreover, fifteen years ago the Swiss leader of religious socialism, H. Kutter, had powerfully pointed to the prophetic character of the socialist fight against the supremacy of the bourgeois class, and above all against the bourgeois church. In the same spirit Tillich asserted that the situation of the class struggle cannot be overcome without the instrument of the class struggle. A new order must be brought about, an order in which the class struggle will disappear.

Tillich (1988:125) writes: ‘Marx saw much more clearly than Kierkegaard that it is not a system of thought but the reality of modern society that is responsible for the reduction of the person to a commodity’. Tillich (ibid:126) highlights two concepts that deal with Marx’s view of man the first is ‘dehumanization’ and the second is ‘real humanism’. Tillich (ibid:126) explains: ‘Both show Marx is concerned with the loss of salvation of the “person” in the technical society as he experienced it’.

Runyon (1984:277) writes: ‘Needless to say, Tillich was not successful in his efforts. Religious Socialism was squelched soon after the Nazi victory, and Tillich found himself job hunting’. Runyon (ibid:277) concludes: ‘Tillich and the Religious Socialists wanted to make history too, but they were too circumspect, too reflective, and finally too bourgeois to succeed’. Bonhoeffer (1965:108f in Carey 1984:277-278) writes of Tillich and the Religious Socialists:

Tillich set out to interpret the evolution of the world itself—against its will—in a religious sense, to give it its whole shape through religion. That was very courageous of him, but the world unseated him and went on by itself: he too sought to understand the world better than it understood itself, but it felt entirely misunderstood, and rejected the imputation. (Of course the world does need to be understood better than it understands itself but not religiously as the Religious Socialists desired.).

Heiman (1952:312) writes of Tillich’s religious socialism: ‘In three versions of his
autobiography, written for different occasions at different times, Tillich has emphasized the central importance in his development which he himself attributes to the doctrine of religious socialism….he implicitly claims central importance for religious socialism in the theonomous system which his theology is designed to build’. Hummel (1995:15-16) argues: ‘However much Tillich sympathized with the prophetic setting out of the socialist movement in the 1920s because he hoped that this would provoke the church in rediscovering the prophetic element in faith and in preaching, however distinctily he criticized this autonomistic view of man, and the world, he held this view to be the proper utopianism of the movement’. Taylor (1991:21) elaborates how the legacy of Tillich’s religious socialism has affected our modern world. Taylor (ibid:21) argues Tillich has provided an example:

Most notably, the comunidades de bases throughout Latin America, forged for survival in regions of suffering, giving rise to socialist dreaming and practice. Theologians speaking from these communities such as Gustavo Guitierrez, affirm the socialist vision but also proclaim that their affiliation is sustained by a Christian faith that is able to generate prophetic critique of socialism. Other theologians working in close contact with alienated and oppressed groups also dwell on this creative tension. James Cone and Cornel West do so in connection with the aspirations of Afro-American groups….and a number of North Atlantic theologians, male and female, who say Yes and No by sifting through the western Marxisms of Lukacs, Gramsci, Goldman or Habermas. Each in their own way forge new Christian approaches to socialist versions. Where Tillich saw the socialist vision being dreamed, he saw real signs, albeit fragmentary ones, of the fulfillment of the Kingdom of God.

Tillich’s religious socialism, part of his German legacy, lives on in our modern world today.

In interaction, it was during the last year of World War I that the political backgrounds became clear to Tillich. Tillich became interested in the thinking of Karl Marx. Tillich saw religious socialism as the means by which the end of history could be reached. Class warfare could be removed by a proletarian revolution. This view stands in stark contrast
Fukuyama’s position of the end of history. Fukuyama thought the triumph of capitalism in economics and the liberal democracy in politics to be the end of history. Tillich’s Marxist perception passed on to us views the proletariat as the one to bring about the final transformation of history and mankind. Tillich combined Marxist thought with the religious concept of the kairos. The kairos was a decisive and fulfilled moment which would result in a new world order.

6:9 Kairos

6:9:1 The Key To World Transformation

Scharf (1999:155-157) develops Tillich’s doctrine of the kairos based on a Tillich article from 1922. Tillich’s kairos is ‘the right or opportune time’ (ibid:155). Tillich (1922:347 in ibid:155) writes: ‘We are of the conviction that presently a kairos, an epochal moment of history is visible’. Scharf (1999:156) adds: ‘This kairos for him is located in socialism, and he sees Religious Socialism as the “attempt at interpreting and forming socialism from [the direction of] the unconditioned and from [the direction of] kairos”’. Tillich is speaking ‘in the mode of a prophet in this spirited, early document’ (ibid:156). Scharf (ibid:156) continues: ‘He speaks from the perspective of the unconditioned, that is, he assumes the prophetic role of announcing the opportune time for God’s rule’. Scharf (ibid:157) concludes: ‘Religious Socialism is the voice of the prophet for the European situation in 1922’. Tillich (1922:350 in ibid:157) thought: ‘Religious Socialism in the last analysis shall know no other task as the one to call [people] to a great consciousness for
history and to a proclaimer of the Kairos’. Tillich (1936:129 in Adams 1965:203) defines kairos: ‘In this dynamic thinking in terms of creation, time is all-decisive, not empty time, pure expiration; not mere duration either, but rather qualitatively fulfilled time, the moment that is creation and fate. We call this fulfilled moment, the moment of time approaching us as decision, Kairos’. Tillich explains the origin of the word kairos and his usage:

In doing this we take up a word that was, to be sure, created by the Greek linguistic sense, but attained the deeper meaning of fullness of time, of decisive time, only in the thinking of early Christianity and its historical consciousness. The thinking in the Kairos, which is the determinant of the second line explained in our historical consideration, is opposed to the thinking in the timeless Logos, which belongs to the methodical main line. Thus the correctness of our original distinction becomes apparent, and at the same time the question of the essential relationship between Kairos and Logos becomes urgent.

Heiman (1952:313) puts Tillich’s doctrine of the kairos within the historical context: ‘More specifically, the doctrine of the kairos can be understood as a generalization of Tillich’s personal experience, upon returning from the First World War in recognizing participation in the struggle for justice and peace and against a repetition of the catastrophe as his supreme Christian duty true to the line of thought and action laid down by the great prophets of the Old Testament’. Runyon (1984:274-275) argues differently that Tillich expected a new world order:

Tillich and his friends in the Religious Socialist movement were convinced that a kairos was appearing on the horizon. They saw in the combination of the socialist critique and the authentic Christian substance of culture congruent elements that together could lead to a new order, a new configuration of social, political, and economic structures and values. With this the cause of justice could be served, human integrity enhanced, and the power of being brought to a new and genuine expression. In order to effect such a combination, lines of communication would have to be opened up between Christians and Marxists. The common assumption that the church and the socialist movement stand in absolute contradiction to each other would have to be overcome. To this end Tillich called attention to elements in Marxism that by his definition
constituted authentic religious protest against the heteronomous character of bourgeois culture and the capitalistic economic spirit, and therefore sought to interpret for the church the genuine religious motifs in Marxism. At the same time he sought to show Marxists that socialism was not in opposition to religion as such, but only to the bourgeois form that religion had taken in the church. Within socialism are genuine religious elements, he argued, which need to be recognized for the sake of the socialist cause.

Ratschow (1980:22) furnishes insight into Tillich’s thinking on the kairos based on the year 1926:

Admittedly, there are, even in this span of time, clear developments. For example, an important break lies in the year 1926, up to this point Tillich lives in the forward driving dynamics of a perception of the Kairos. From 1926 on, this conviction dies out. “The proletariat” did not prove to be the creative vitality that belonged to the Kairos. Hence, a “great imagination” enters, or a time of “hidden” creation. Tillich believed that he could ascertain such a change for the year 1926 with reference to all essential areas.

Tillich’s kairos did not occur because the proletariat was a false hope. Tillich’s (1922:347 in Scharf 1999:156) article Kairos expressed his conviction that a new kairos ‘an epochal moment of history is visible’. Tillich (1948:176-177 in Carey 2002:34) faults Marx because his focal point for history was the rise of the proletariat. Carey argues based on Tillich’s The Protestant Era (1948) (Carey 2002:34). Clayton (1980:5) argues:

Speaking ‘out of the kairos’ meant something different in 1919 than in 1926 or 1934 or 1956. The demands of the present were in each case understood differently. In each case, Tillich rethought not only the nature of the present moment but also what would count as a kairos.

Heiman (1952:313) argues for the distinction in Tillich’s German legacy between kairos and kairoi. The latter is the plural form of kairos. Heiman (ibid:313) writes:

In other words, these turning points of history reflect the one great kairos, in which “the eternal has broken into the temporal”, and which, according to Tillich’s elaborate doctrine, is the center of history in the sense that it sheds the light of
meaningfulness on the whole of history and all its parts, while history without this center would be nothing but an empty, meaningless irrelevant sequence of facts, as it appeared to the classical philosophers. It is in this sense that Tillich wants the secondary kairoi to be understood: ‘we must conceive of the kairos in universal terms’.

Heiman’s (ibid:313) words are not based on the original Kairos (1922) article. Heiman’s comments are based on Tillich’s perception of the kairos in Tillich’s The Protestant Era (1948) from the American years 1933 to 1965. Heiman and Carey argue based on a work from the American years. These years are beyond the scope of this thesis. The German years (1886 to 1933) are ignored.

Siegfried (1952:73) saw many problems with the doctrine of the kairos. He (ibid:73-74) writes:

If the kairos doctrine is carried through specifically, many difficulties arise. The question was: In view of the radical No of the divine judgment over everything finite, how can man’s creative impetus be preserved? Is man’s creativity not reduced to meaninglessness by the dialectical No? Tillich answers with the concept “Gestalt of Grace” (Gestalt=form,structure). In a “Gestalt of Grace” the unconditional breaks into the conditional. It is not a reality alongside other realities, not a thing which could be seen and grasped; but it is manifest for the intuition of faith in nature and history, in the depth of people’s souls, and in the structures of the social life, but above all in the Church, in its message and its sacraments. The participation in such “Gestalten of Grace” makes creative action possible, in spite of the radical No both of prophetic and of rational criticism. For the Gestalt precedes the critique, giving it norm and power…. [S]umming up the distinction between Barth and Tillich, one can say that whereas Barth puts the whole of reality into the brackets of a Yes and No, and accepts in a positivistic way the world in its estrangement from God, Tillich drives, on the basis of the same Yes and No, toward what he calls Glaubiger Realismus (Belief-ful or Self transcending Realism)….On his way to this concept, Tillich spoke of the “transcendent meaning” of all cultural forms, and he distinguished between those in which this “meaning” is manifest and those in which it is hidden.

Niebuhr (1956:10-13) writes of belief-ful realism:

The revolt against capitalist civilization has not been confined to communism. On
the contrary, communism in its later phase, since it has lost the prophetic character of its early years, has adopted much of the spirit of capitalism so that the Russian Revolution may be regarded as one of the greatest triumphs of the spirit of capitalist society. The revolt against this spirit became manifest first of all in art. Its precursors were Cezanne, van Gogh, and Gauguin. In literature Strindberg and Nietzsche were its earliest prophets. In science Einstein, Planck and Bohr and other founders of the new science of the twentieth century, in philosophy Bergson, Simmel and Husserl, in psychology Freud, in education a multitude of reformers, in morals the youth movement—all are representative of the revolt. Tillich attempts to interpret the significance of these tendencies as protests against the spirit of capitalist society and as prophecies of a new attitude. [T]he new attitude which is developing in consequence of these revolutions may be described in religious terms, he believes, as an attitude of “belief-ful realism.”…[A] belief-ful realism is first of all an attitude in which the reference to the transcendent and eternal source of meaning and ground of being is present. This reference has been absent from capitalist society with its reliance on intra-worldly, intra-temporal sources of meaning, its exaltation of the finite into an absolute….”[B]elief-ful realism,” Tillich writes, “is a total attitude toward reality”.

In examination, Tillich’s kairos is the opportune time or the right time. Tillich thought that a new kairos was soon to appear on the horizion back in 1922. The kairos was a very important part of Tillich’s religious socialism. Tillich spoke in the prophetic spirit of the Old Testament prophets. Tillich’s thinking on the kairos changed in the year 1926. The proletariat had failed to bring about the necessary revolution. Tillich’s belief in the kairos as a religious socialist gave way to Belief-ful realism. This revolt against the spirit of capitalism was now to be seen in revolutionary art. This new attitude towards reality is described in religious terms. This attitude looks beyond the finite capitalistic system to both the transcendent, the eternal source of meaning, and the ground of being.
Tillich delivered a lecture to the ‘Berlin branch of the Kant-Gesellschaft’ in 1919 (Siegfried 1952:68). The paper was entitled ‘The Idea of a Theology of Culture’ (ibid:68). *Ueber die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur* is found in Tillich’s book *Religionsphilosophie der Kultur* (Adams 1965:69). Tillich’s lecture ‘was a program for further elaboration in philosophy of religion as well as in theology’ (Siegfried 1952:68). Siegfried (ibid:68) continues: ‘The term ‘theology of culture’ was ‘created by Tillich in a moment in which the so-called “liberal theology” stood before its catastrophe denounced by many, including Tillich himself, as a surrender of the Christian message to cultural trends’. The catastrophe to which Siegfried refers was World War I. Thomas (1963:12) referring to Tillich’s ‘theology of culture’ writes: ‘This is what he taught in the historical and systematic courses he gave between 1919 and 1924’. Tillich (1967:41) was Privatdozent at the University of Berlin. Baumgarten (1995:149) argues that Tillich’s legacy was his theology of culture. Tillich (1964:v) confirms this to be part of his German legacy. He (ibid:v) writes:

> The purpose of this book is indicated in its title: Theology of Culture. The title is an abbreviation of the title of my first published speech, given in the Berlin section of the Kant-Gesellschaft: *Ueber die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur* (On the Idea of a Theology of Culture). It is a source of great satisfaction to me that after the passing of forty years I can take the title for this volume from my first important speech. In spite of the fact that during most of my adult life I have been a teacher of Systematic Theology, the problem of religion and culture has always been in the center of my interest.

Oden (1964:20) concurs that this was part of Tillich’s German legacy his theology of culture. Wettstein (1984:113) argues for Tillich’s influence in religious studies. He (ibid:113) writes:
In his theology of culture, Paul Tillich has exerted a particularly pervasive influence on American religious studies. Bringing the broad categories of *Kulturstudien* to our preoccupations with society and social role-conflict, he opened generations of his students to an awareness of the depth and extensiveness of the cultural setting that shapes as well as receives or rejects theological address. The proliferation of courses in our universities on religion and literature or the arts and the styles of thought emerging from them are in no small measure the consequence of Tillich’s work as a theologian of culture.

Wettstein (ibid:113) continues: ‘Rather than integrating itself around a common world view perspective, or value system, it has become a pluralist. Rather than being oriented to humanist concerns, it has become technological. Kenneth E. Boulding describes this development perceptively in terms of the emergence of a “super-culture,” the product of “the Great Transition” that began with the rise of science’. Wettstein (ibid:114) expands upon the demands of a technological culture:

While the thoroughly technological superculture may leave the formation of values to the traditional or folk cultures that subsist alongside it, through their institutions of family, church, and peer group, the superculture does require certain kinds of value transformation. It needs loyalties to “larger and more abstract entities” than the family, such as the corporation, an interest in world order, expanding views of the universe, judgment by role or function rather than race, ethnic group or sex. If traditional cultures contradict these values that conform to supercultural requirements, they will be overcome. Boulding’s description elicits our recognition: in that superculture we live and move and do all of our work, if not all of our thinking. It is a new “post-civilizational” cultural reality of enormous importance; and it has yet to show us the first signs of being “theonous.”

Wettstein (ibid:114-115) considers whether Tillich’s theology of culture is still relevant. He argues:

Tillich’s theology of culture was shaped in a quite different era. That religion is the substance of which culture is the form may make sense in an integrated, traditional society, but does it when that substance is fragmented? Tillich’s assertion that the quest for the Unconditioned (das Unbedingte) is the driving force of culture gives any technology, by definition, a countercultural commitment. Or in terms of Tillich’s tripartite form/content/susbsstance analysis of cultural activity, a technological culture represents the triumph of form, the subjugation of content and the elimination of substance. Our only viable response must then be to disengage from the superculture
if we cannot dismantle it, and return to expressive painting, free verse and leathercraft. However, on closer examination, Tillich’s thought proves to be much more complex; it provides remarkable insight into the human meanings of technology and the urgency to deal with it effectively.

Tillich’s theology of culture was formed during the German years. Wettstein admits the subjective nature of Tillich’s work and context. Tillich (1959:42 in Carey 1984:115) wrote: ‘religion is the substance of culture, [and] culture is the form of religion’. Wettstein (ibid:115) argues this ‘implies the cultural formation of every religious act, the religious implications in every cultural act, and an essential, if not always obvious, integration of the two’. Wettstein (ibid:115) argues ‘our religious substance’ is ‘fragmented into pluralism’.

Wettstein (ibid:132) concludes: ‘As the theology of culture engages in the debates proposing to establish modes of technology assessment, the principle will be clear; the assessment cannot be left in the hands of technologists alone. Certainly, particular evaluations cannot be made without them and they are to be encouraged to raise the questions of ends Tillich invoked, but the measurement of costs in relation to specific ends cannot be relegated to technological rationales’. Tillich scholars must be included in future technological assessments of Tillich’s theology of culture.

Carey (2002:92-93) writes of pluralism:

Perhaps the most fundamental issue that has recast Tillich’s world, however, has been the emergence of pluralism. We speak much more now of studies of comparative cultures with all of their symbolisms and histories. We recognize—painfully for some of us, of course—the distinctive perspectives of gender, race, and social class on intellectual issues. We speak in theology as well as in biblical studies about “social location” as a way of identifying the person, the time, the place, and the culture that are mirrored in a particular theological perspective….Pluralism of course contains with it an acknowledgment of relativism. That once-dreaded word was defined by van Buren
as being the view that “there is more than one way to look at any matter, and that what is said can be called true or false only in the terms provided by the particular point of reference. That viewpoint has certainly been widespread in aesthetics, modern physics, and literary, as well as in contemporary theology.

Carey (ibid:93) argues that Postmodernism is another ‘shaping intellectual influence in our time’. Professor Carey (ibid:97) writes: ‘Postmodernism maintains that reality is undecidable and the world is no particular way at all. It is now clear that older thought systems were expressed through political ideologies…that aesthetic, literary, and theological opinions are in fact simply culturally conditional statements of personal judgment’. Carey (ibid:97) sees ‘common concerns’ between ‘Tillich scholars and Postmodernists’. He (ibid:97-98) writes of these ‘common concerns’:

Both criticize misleading dogmatic pronouncements that are associated with religious traditions. Both expose the arrogance with which some groups claim that they know the will of God. Both agree that religious groups mirror the ethos of their geographical region and middle-class constituencies. Both acknowledge the privileging of white males in our society and the privileging of some people’s experience and thoughts over others. Insofar as Postmodernism exposes the biases and assumptions that have shaped our intellectual, political, and social life, it has value for those who continue to work in a Tillichian spirit.

Professor Carey (ibid:100) concludes:

Out of a simple concern for fairness, we might be moved to support the voices of disadvantaged or pressed peoples. We will see through the ideologies of Euro-American culture. We may say less about “Truth” and more about “meaning.” We might pay more attention to the findings of social scientists who ask about the self and its communities rather than to offer theological pronouncements about how God acts in history. Postmodernism recasts the theological agenda in substance and in style.

Professor Carey (ibid:100) clarifies Tillich’s thought in relationship to Postmodernism.

Although Postmodernism thought has provoked much criticism, what is troubling for
some theologians is how much truth there is in its various observations. Although I once thought (with Tillich) that theology could be done from a more-or-less neutral perspective that could illumine our plight as human beings, I now believe that all theological work is contextual and limited. We might be able to talk about our personal absolutes even when we can no longer presume an ultimate Absolute. Tillich, however, does provide a corrective to the power of Postmodernist thought. He recognized that human beings live by faith, trust, passions, and symbols. Even if these are not empirically proveable they have power to shape life and destiny. Such visions do become personal absolutes and most people need something like that to live a purposeful life.

Adams (1965:66) writes of the beginning of Tillich’s study of art. Adams (ibid:66) states: ‘Tillich’s knowledge and appreciation of art are, so to speak, the jewels he found in the adversity of four years of military service as a chaplain during the First World War. In his years at the front he determined to find respite from the bludgeoning of war by devoting his leisure to the study of art’. Tillich’s enjoyment of paintings would be followed by ‘a systematic study of history of art’. He deemed the paintings as a source of revelation for example ‘the Botticelli painting’. A philosophical and theological interpretation would then be made of the new revelation. Basic categories in Tillich’s theology of culture be derived that of form and substance. Ratschow (1980:21) writes: ‘This sequence-especially this birth of a concept is still Schelling. Simultaneously, it is both an existential occurrence, and as well existentialistically (existential) describable as understanding’ (ibid:21). The ‘ecstatic experience’ will eventuate in concepts based on this experience. Ratschow (ibid:21) gives us understanding as to how Tillich ‘received the objects of the world around him’. Baumgarten argues that Tillich’s interest in art is part of his theological legacy. Baumgarten (1995:149) writes:

Two aspects of Paul Tillich’s theological legacy are his theology of culture and his interest
in the visual arts. Instead, these two areas are intertwined. Tillich’s aesthetics supports his theology of culture, which in turn was derived, in part, from his experience with art. Art serves and is explicated by Tillich’s theology of culture.

Tillich (1936:49 in Adams 1965:68) writes: ‘If any one, being impressed by the mosaics of Ravenna or the ceiling paintings of the Sistine Chapel, or by the portraits of the older Rembrandt, should be asked whether his experience was religious or cultural, he would find the answer difficult to give’. Tillich (ibid:49 in ibid:68) answers:

Perhaps it would be correct to say that his experience was cultural as to form, and religious as to substance. It is cultural because it is not attached to specific ritual activity; and religious, because it evokes questioning as to the absolute or the limits of human experience. This is equally true of painting, of music, and poetry, of philosophy and science. And that which is valid in the intuition and knowledge of the world is equally valid in the practical shaping of law and custom, in morality and education, in community and style. Wherever human existence in thought or action, becomes a subject of doubts and questions, wherever unconditioned meaning becomes visible in works which have only conditioned meaning in themselves, there culture is religious. Through the experience of the substantially religious character of culture, I was led to the border of culture and religion, which I have never deserted.

Adams (ibid:68) adds: ‘Thus we are brought again to the characteristically Tillichian idea of living on the border—this time the border between culture and religion’. Adams (ibid:68) continues: ‘From this border Tillich early developed his theology of culture and art. The outlines of his theology of culture were set forth in his 1919 lecture Ueber die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur, the first work he published after the First World War’. Later, Tillich (1956:86) in his The Religious Situation writes: ‘The revolt against the spirit of capitalist society has been least ambiguously expressed in painting since the beginning of the century’.

Tillich (ibid:87) writes:

With a will to create objectively, Cezanne battled with the form and restored to things their real metaphysical meaning. With passionate force van Gogh revealed the creative
dynamic in light and color and the Scandinavian Munch showed the cosmic dread present in nature and mankind. Upon this basis new forces developed everywhere in Italy, in France, in Germany and in Russia. Expressionism proper arose with a revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary force.

Tillich (ibid:101) concludes: ‘If we would characterize in summary fashion the religious situation of the present…the realism and impressionism of the capitalist period have been destroyed in the development of symbolism, mysticism and expressionism but that a new realism is about to gain ascendantcy; with emotional zeal at first, then with objective and metaphysical intuition it has uncovered the demonism present in the social world and, perhaps, as in the case of metaphysics and painting, it may be at the point of developing into a belief-ful realism’. Niebuhr (1956:10-11) writes: ‘Tillich argues that what we are witnessing and participating in is…a revolt against the spirit of capitalist society….[T]he revolt against this spirit became manifest first of all in art. Its precursors were Cezanne, van Gogh and Gauguin’. The second meaning of Tillich’s legacy of a theology of art argues for a revolt against the capitalistic spirit.

In analyzing this section, Tillich’s theology of culture was developed during the German years. His theology of culture was developed while he was at Berlin (1919-1924). His theology of art can be traced to his experience as a chaplain in World War I. He began the systematic study of art. Tillich developed a theology of art based on Schelling’s method. The painting was viewed as revelation. The theologian would next derive an interpretation of the revelation. A theology could be formed from these divine revelations.

The legacy of Tillich’s theology of culture is debated today. It is argued that Tillich’s theology of culture is too simplistic in a pluralistic culture. The rise of science is seen as
responsible for the emphasis on culture in today’s world rather than Tillich’s theology of culture. Our world view has become pluralistic, fragmented, and technological. The question is debated whether Tillich’s theology of culture is still relevant. Others argue that Tillich’s theology of culture provides insight into the human meanings of technology and the urgency to deal with technology. Pluralism with its relativism and Postmodernism shape intellectual influence in our modern world. Pluralism argues for a number of views. Postmodernism argues that the world is no particular way at all. Reality cannot be decided in the modern world. Some have argued for common ground between Tillich and the Postmodernists. The fallacy of this argument is that things that are similar are not the same.

6:11 Existential Theology

6:11:1 The Question of Being

Tillich (1964:76) writes of existentialism:

The distinctive way of philosophizing which today calls itself *Existenzphilosophie* or “Existential philosophy” emerged as one of the major currents of German thought under The Weimar Republic, counting among its leaders such men as Heidegger and Jaspers. But its history goes back at least a century, to the decade of the 1840’s, when its main contentions were formulated by thinkers like Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Marx, in sharp criticism of the reigning “rationalism” or panlogism of the Hegelians; and in the next generation Nietzsche and Dilthey were among its protagonists. Its roots are still more ancient, deeply embedded in the pre-Cartesian German tradition of suprarationalism and *Innerlichkeit* represented by Bohme.

Tillich (ibid:77) writes of Schelling: ‘This appeal to “Existence” emerged just a hundred years in the decade from 1840 to 1850. During the winter of 1841-1842 Schelling delivered his lectures *Die Philosophie der Mythologie und der Offenbarung* in the University of Berlin
before a distinguished audience including Engels, Kierkegaard, Bakunin, and Burckhardt’.

Re Manning (2005:60) interprets Tillich’s existential theology as pointing to Schelling.

Re Manning (ibid:60) argues: ‘already in the 1920s Tillich’s philosophical position shifts to a more existentialist formulation. However, it must be remembered that Tillich always considered existentialism as the fulfillment of German Idealism and Schelling as the real founder of existentialism’. Scharlemann (1989:100-107 in ibid:60) represents the opposite view of the impact of Heidegger on Tillich. Re Manning (ibid:60) states Scharlemann’s position. Re Manning (ibid:60) adds: ‘In addition, although it is undeniable that Tillich’s thought was affected by his contact with Heidegger from 1925 onwards, such that the ‘question of being’ came to occupy a more central position’. Re Manning (ibid:60) adds a word of caution: ‘the impact can be overstated’. Thomas (2000:60) writes of Tillich’s existential theological legacy: ‘The questions from which theology takes its rise then, are ‘existential questions’. Thomas (ibid:60) argues: ‘They are the perennial questions of mankind about itself: we ourselves are indeed the questions. Though Tillich says that this is something much older than existentialism, there can be no doubt that this is where we see the significant influence of Heidegger’s existentialism on his theological development….Tillich was won from resisting Heidegger’s thought to an arduous learning from it’. Thomas (ibid:12) argues for Heidegger’s influence on Tillich in Tillich’s view of human life as tragedy, finitude, and temporality. Rollo May (1973:8 in Thomas 2000:12) argues that Tillich’s World War I experiences especially the the dying and the dead from ‘the battle of Marne’ caused Tillich to become an existentialist. Thomas (ibid:12) referring to Tillich clarifies: ‘but, again, and again, he used to argue that
existentialism had its origin in the work of Schelling’. Adams (1965:22) presents the
the balanced view:

Since his concept of the present and its connection with the existential attitude is so fundamental for Tillich’s outlook, it may be well to indicate here the principal ancestry of these ideas. Kierkegaard is, of course, the principal ancestor of contemporary existential philosophy, and especially significant is his resistance to the rationalistic dialect….But Kierkegaard’s main concern was with the individual’s “existential” confrontation with ultimate reality. Tillich shares this concern, but he is also interested in other metaphysical aspects …and in the social aspects of the reaction against Hegelianism. The metaphysical aspect is to be seen in his great interest in Schelling’s overcoming of idealism …by a positive philosophy…in Schelling’s qualification of the philosophy of identity in terms of a self-seeking, self-isolating freedom issuing in the consciousness of guilt. (Tillich’s first two dissertations dealt with Schelling).

Carey (2002:96) does not acknowledge Heidegger’s influence on Tillich. Carey (ibid:96)
argues referring to Postmodernism: ‘Scholars in the field recognize affinities with the earlier
thought of…Martin Heidegger’.

In dissection, Tillich claimed existential theology began with Schelling. Tillich
had become acquainted with Kierkegaard’s existentialism. Existentialism in its 20th century
form presented itself to Tillich when he was teaching at the University of Marburg. Tillich
considered existentialism as the fulfillment of German classical philosophy. Tillich’s
existential theology cannot be attributed to Martin Heidegger. Tillich was able to accept
existentialism because of Schelling.

6:12 Systematic Theology, vol 1

6:12:1 Tillich’s Existential Theology

Adams (ibid:154) argues for two lines of thought in Tillich’s theology. Adams (ibid:154)
views ‘the critical-rational-transcendental line from Kant to Hegel, and the existential-creative line from Jacob Boehme, Fichte, and Schelling through Nietzsche, with their concepts of ground and abyss, of freedom, and of creative spirit’. Thomas (2000:68) argues: ‘Above all, he [the theologian] must recognize that in that legacy there are ‘existential questions’ implied ‘to which his theology intends to be the answer’. Thomas bases this upon Tillich’s Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Tillich 1951:44 in ibid:68). Tillich (1967:42) writes of this volume: ‘In Marburg, in 1925, I began work on my Systematic Theology, the first volume of which appeared in 1951’. Tillich’s Systematic Theology is beyond the scope of this thesis. Siegfried (1952:77-79) argues for Tillich’s Systematic Theology as part of Tillich’s legacy for the German situation. Siegfried (ibid:78-79) writes:

In his discussion of existentialism, Tillich gives a thorough analysis of the relationship of essence and existence which belongs to the most important sections of his first volume. He tries to overcome the uprootedness of existentialism by pointing to the essential structures of being which are present and creative even in the most disrupted forms of existence. In this he follows the Thomist and Neo-Thomist tradition (as in the work of Gilson and Mounier). On the other hand, he deviates from it by emphasizing the “structure of destruction” within existence and the impossibility of regaining our essential wholeness except through the healing power of the New Being.

Tillich thought the duty of the theologian to ‘relate the Christian message to the cultural situation of the day’ (Horton 1951:29).

In scrutiny, Tillich began his systematic theology during the years at Marburg (1924-1925). Tillich’s existential theology is best seen as thought derived from Bohme, Fichte, Schelling, and Nietzsche. Tillich’s existentialism raised philosophical questions. Tillich’s
theology provided the answers. Tillich’s existential theology became a very important part of the first volume of his systematic theology.

6:13 Correlation

6:13:1 The Theological Concept of Correlation From The German Years

Tillich used the method known as correlation to raise existential theological questions. He would give a theological answer to the existential question. Clayton (1980:16) argues:

one can analyse terms thought by Tillich to be correlates, such as religion and culture….most previous studies of correlationship in Tillich’s thought have concentrated almost exclusively upon the alleged correlation of theology and philosophy. A careful analysis of the development of Tillich’s concept of correlation, however, would make clear that, though not wholly mistaken, this is a somewhat restricted view of correlation. As a corrective to such studies, I have stressed the inclusive character of correlation as a relationship between culture and religion generally, and not merely philosophy and theology.

Clayton (ibid:31) continues: ‘correlation became Tillich’s mediating principle between religion and culture’. Ratschow (1980:30) clarifies this concept for the German years.

Ratschow (ibid:30) writes:

The twenties show us Tillich as he thought in constant alternations or correlations. There is culture and religion, there is society and history, the individual and religion, the individual and the masses, technics and culture, and art and faith. All these correlations are brought to a solution in a “schema” which, as we saw, comes from Schelling and which is built according to model (being-nonbeing transcends suprabeing).

Ratschow argues that all these correlations were Tillich’s themes in the twenties. They ‘were brought to a solution’ ‘a “schema” which, as we saw, comes from Schelling’.

Tillich’s existential theology was worked into his Systematic Theology, vol 1 which
he began during the German years while he was at Marburg. Existential questions raised by Tillich were given a theological answer. Clayton and Ratschow bring out a second meaning of correlation as the relationship between these areas in Tillich’s thought. The method of correlation is part of Tillich’s German legacy. ‘Tillich’s method of correlation’ ‘set him apart and made him unique from other theologians. Tillich began his topic with a philosophic existential analysis of the human predicament. He ended by answering the question with the ‘Christian revelation’ in ‘symbolic and paradoxical’ terms’ (Horton 1952:31). Allen (2008:29) writes: ‘The language of “correlation” in contemporary theology is most associated with Paul Tillich, who sought to correlate present issues and experience with biblical texts’. Tillich has left us a rich legacy of the contemporary historical view of the world.

In analysis, Tillich’s method of correlation raised existential theological questions. A theological answer was then provided to the existential question. Tillich’s correlation must also be seen as alternate positions on a number of subjects. These subjects were religion and culture, society and history, the individual and religion, the individual and the masses, technics and culture, and art and faith.

6:14 Tillich Legacy Updated

6:14:1 Tillich’s Rich German Legacy

Ratschow (1980:19) has given us awareness of Tillich’s activities in 1917.

In August 1917, Tillich was relieved of his duties as a chaplain. He was able to
resume his academic study of Husserl, Lotze, Sigwart, Windeld and Rickert, and also Lask with regard to their logic. Tillich worked through as well the aesthetics of both Hartmann and Lipps. Ratschow (ibid:19) continues: ‘He also works through Hermann Ebbinghaus’s psychology’. Ratschow (ibid:19) writes of a December 1917 letter: ‘shows Tillich busy with “theoretical doubt”’. Further, Ratschow (ibid:39) informs the reader of letters which were found in Hirsch’s estate. Ratschow (ibid:39) writes: ‘From this correspondence only a few letters-three of Tillich and three of Hirsch- from the period December 1917 to July 1918 have been found in Hirsch’s estate. Are these perhaps the most important letters from the correspondence, which Hirsch preserved for that reason?’ Tillich’s concern in these letters was objectivity, reconciliation of faith and doubt, Otto’s “The Idea of the Holy” led to ‘new depth or revelation of being’, and mutual agreement that religion must be explained (ibid:1980:19-20). The comment on Otto’s book was from a letter dated May 29, 1917 (ibid:20). They both agreed on the need for explanation of religion (ibid:29).

Ratschow (ibid:38) speaks of a 1913 manuscript of a brief outline for a systematic theology. This German theological adventure took place with the help of his friend Richard Wengener. Tillich composed a manuscript together with Wengener. ‘Kirchliche Apologetik was a summarization of the aims of both Tillich and Wengener from their (1912) lectures. These lectures were called Vernunft-Abende. They were ‘evenings for Reason’ which was a starting point for their scholarly theological concerns (ibid:38).

Tillich (1936:9-10) admits to his own legacy of socialism: ‘the special elaboration
of religious socialism attempted by me first in Grundregein des religiosen Sozialismus (Principles of Religious Socialism) then in my book Die sozialistische Entscheidung (Socialistic Decision) has its root in this attitude’. Thomas (1988:201) notes two works of Tillich during the German years 1923 to 1926. The first is the ‘Das System der Wissenschaften Nach Gegenstanden und Methoden Ein Entwurf’. Thomas (1988:201) writes: ‘This early work was published in translation as The System of the Sciences According to Objects and Methods. Translated with an Introduction by Paul Wiebe’. The work known as The Religious Situation translated by Richard Niebuhr published in 1956, was first published in Germany in 1926 as ‘Die religiose Lage der Gegenwart’ (ibid:202). In 1932, while at the University of Frankfurt, ‘The Socialist Decision was published’ (ibid:203).

Thomas has as his source the Paul Tillich Archives at Harvard Divinity School. John Carey (2002:117) has written a research report on the Tillich Archives at Andover-Harvard Theological Library. Carey (ibid:117-118) writes:

The Tillich materials at Harvard are in two categories, the first and most notable of which include his unpublished lectures, class notes, discussion transcripts, personal files, and assorted memorabilia and manuscripts. This material is organized in the following manner. Series A. Early German Notebooks, including the miscellaneous versions of Tillich’s first two dissertations on Schelling, and notes on ethics, apologetics, dogmatics, Old Testament and New Testament, Hegel, art and religion, history of philosophy, and the history of Protestantism. Series B. Tillich’s early German published works, including lectures before 1933, theological writings, notes for seminars and courses (ethics, the interpretation of history, philosophy of religion, the present situation, doctrines of man existentialism). Also here are letters, notes, addresses, comments, sermons, baptisms, and copies of Tillich’s works translated from English. Series C. Early unpublished notebooks in English (mostly Tillich’s courses at Union Theological Seminary, New York, in the 1930s). Series D. Unpublished English manuscripts.
Series E. Primarily of interest to editors and others who might wish to consult Tillich’s first draft of...books.
Series D, probably of most interest to Tillich scholars in America, covers a wide range of topics, and because of the interest and curiosity of those who have been influenced by Tillich.

Carey (ibid:123-124) continues:

Not all of the material at Harvard, however, is available. The Tillich Estate (of which Robert C. Kimball of the Starr-King School of Theology in Berkeley, California is literary executor) has “flagged” most of the manuscripts that are in near-finished form, presumably because of the possibility of their eventual publication. (These manuscripts can be read with permission of the Harvard librarian but cannot be photocopied or quoted without permission of the Tillich estate.) The Estate has flagged much of Tillich’s personal correspondence, including his correspondence with his family. It is my understanding that this material will not be made available to the public for fifty years. The second part of the Paul Tillich Archives includes the chronological shelving of all the German and English writings, including chapters in various anthologies, reprinted material, translations of his books into various languages, and book reviews....copies of secondary works and dissertations dealing with Tillich’s thought, and these additions add considerably to the research value of the collections.

Carey (ibid:124) concludes: ‘Although it is personally moving and professionally interesting to review the memorabilia and unpublished work of Tillich, I finished my perusals of the Harvard archives with the distinct impression that most everything of consequence that Tillich had to say as a theologian has found its way into print’. Carey (ibid:127) has visited as well the Paul Tillich Archives in Germany in 1980 and again in 1998. The Tillich Archives were originally at Gottingen. Frau Gertraut Stober was in charge of the materials. The Tillich materials were moved in the 1970s to the University of Marburg. Dr. Uwe Bredehorn was in charge of the Tillich materials at Marburg. Carey (ibid:127) continues:

The accumulated materials in Marburg are roughly a European counterpart to the Paul Tillich Archives at Harvard. Most of Tillich’s original manuscripts are in fact at Harvard;
one project of the Marburg archive has been to obtain copies of those Harvard manuscripts. Even the originals of most of Tillich’s early German writings are at Harvard but they have been copied on microfilm and are now available at Marburg as well.

Carey (ibid: 128) adds:

Now also available is a six-volume condensation (or distillation) of the out-of-print, fourteen-volume *Gesammelte Werke*, in a German-English series entitled “Main Works/Hauptwerke,” in which German works appear in German and English works in English. ....[T]he creation of the Marburg archive was (and still is) a project of the German Paul Tillich Society (Deutsche Paul-Tillich-Gesellschaft). It was organized in 1960 by German friends of Paul Tillich.

In the 1970s Tillich’s works were published in Germany as a series called Erganzungs-und Nachlassabande zu den Gesammelten Werken von Paul Tillich (ibid:127).

Carey (ibid:129-131) evaluates the Paul Tillich German Archives:

it is stronger on Tillich’s early German writings and lectures (that is, prior to 1933) and on his trips back to Germany from 1948 to 1963. There has also been a major effort to obtain a copy of every published work of Tillich’s....[T]he archive has had two different blocks of unpublished materials. The first group of materials was compiled by Frau Stober over many years and contains early writings, remarks, lectures, handwritten outlines....[T]hese materials span the period from 1907 to 1963....sixty-four sermons that he preached from 1909 to 1913, and 140 talks or sermons that he gave as a chaplain during the World War I. (The recent work of Professor Erdmann Sturm has probed the substance of these sermons,...[T]he second group of unpublished materials was acquired from Frau Renate Albrecht....[I]n our computer age, however, specific requests for materials can be faxed to an inquirer.

Three German books are of interest dealing with ‘Tillich’s life and thought’ (ibid:134).

The first work is Gerhard Wehr’s *Paul Tillich*. Carey (ibid:134) writes of it: ‘It is enriched by many photographs of various other people and scenes in Germany and America to give some flavor of Tillich’s *Sitz im Leben*….Methodologically he draws heavily on Tillich’s own autobiographical writings, quotes the Pauck volume three times, Rollo May once, and Hannah Tillich twice (but not from her critical passages)’.

Carey (ibid:134) evaluates: ‘a semipopular
The “main themes” (*Elemente Theologischen Denkens*) are treated in twenty-two pages and the story of how the *Gesammelte Werke* came into being is told in four pages’. Carey (ibid:134) concludes: ‘Tillich’s life story is told with no reference to the Hannah Tillich controversy’. Another German work is *Ein Lebensbild in Dokumenten: Briefe, Tagebuch-Auszuge, Berichte*: ‘This work divides Tillich’s life into definable periods (childhood and youth; student days in Berlin, Tubingen, and Halle; vicar and assistant Pastor; the First World War; war letters to Maria Klein (a student); marriage with Grete Wever; and so forth) (ibid:134)’. Carey (ibid:134) clarifies referring to this work: ‘It appears as volume 5 in the new series of the *Gesammelte Werke*’. A third work was by Professor Carl Heinz Ratschow entitled Paul Tillich. Carey (ibid:135) writes: ‘This essay was translated by Robert P. Scharlemann and published in 1980 by the North American Paul Tillich Society’.

The 1913 systematic theology manuscript appears in ‘Uwe Carsten Scharf’s *The Paradoxical Breakthrough of Revelation*. Erdmann Sturm has done editing on the 1970s books ‘*Erganzungs-und Nachlassbande*…Sturm’s work has exposed both German- and English-speaking scholars to a whole corpus of Tillich’s earlier work in philosophy and culture’ (ibid:137). Carey (ibid:137-138) writes of Sturm’s efforts: ‘The most creative aspect of Sturm’s work on Tillich, in my opinion, is related to the work he has done on Tillich’s sermons while Tillich was a young vicar in the old Lutheran church of Brandenburg…[S]turm’s assessment is that Tillich’s early sermons vacillate between the two themes of apologetics and pastoral care’. Carey (ibid:138) adds:

Sturm thinks we can trace an evolution in Tillich’s preaching from his 1908 probationary sermon (preached to the Royal Consistory, on I Corinthians 3:21-23, to qualify him as a
licensed preacher) through the Lichtenrade sermons (1909) and the Nauen sermons of 1911-1912. By the time of the Nauen sermons Tillich seemed to move away from apologetics, and to stress more the mystical themes of communion with God and participation in eternity in time.

Carey (ibid:139) continues:

Sturm’s assessment of Tillich’s war sermons in the trenches as a young chaplain in the German army. Sturm uncovered directives from the German general staff that chaplains were not to speak of military or political matters in sermons unless their comments were in favor of military and political leaders. It was understood (not surprisingly) to be the task of chaplains to speak out against “murmuring” and discontent among the troops, to interpret defeats theologically, to be a pastoral presence amid death and dying, and to interpret suffering and death theologically—that is, as “sacrificial” deaths for the Fatherland. To do this Tillich used a lot of texts from the Old Testament, and frequently compared the plight of German soldiers to the situation of the Israelites in conducting a “holy war.”

Tillich has left us a rich legacy from the German years 1886 to 1933, European, Continental, and German, his early writings, Schelling’s Christian philosophy of religion, Bohme’s Christian mysticism, the Protestant principle, Tillich’s philosophy of religion, religious socialism, his doctrine of the kairos, a theology of culture and art, an existential theology, the first volume of his systematic theology, the concept of correlation, a contemporary historical view, and archived memorials to his remembrance.

In analyzing the material, Tillich has left us a number of written and printed materials. Three letters were found from Tillich in the estate of Emmanuel Hirsch dating from December 1917 to July 1918. Objectivity, the reconciliation of faith and doubt, Ottio’s “Idea of the Holy”, and a mutual agreement that religion must be explained were the content of these letters. A 1913 manuscript has been found which was a very brief outline for a systematic theology. The Paul Tillich Archives at Andover-Harvard
Theological Library and the Paul Tillich German Archives at Marburg are part of the Tillich legacy. Most of all which Tillich had to say as a theologian has found its way into print.

A six-volume condensation *Main Works/Hauptwerke* of the fourteen-volume out of print *Gesammelte Werke* is available. This is a German-English series. In the 1970s, a series called *Erganzungs-und Nachlassabande zu den Gesammelten Werken von Paul Tillich* was published.

Three books which exist on Tillich’s life and thought are Gerhard Wehr’s *Paul Tillich*, another German work is *Ein Lebensbild in Dokumenten: Briefe, Tagebuch-Auszuge, Berichte*, and Carl Heinz Ratschow’s *Paul Tillich*.

The 1913 manuscript appears in Scharf’s *The Paradoxical Breakthrough of Revelation*. Thurman Sturm has done editing on Tillich’s sermons both as a young vicar and as a chaplain in World War I.

**6:15 Summary**

Tillich’s legacy from the German years (1886-1933) is the focus of our thesis rather than the American years (1933-1965). Tillich’s legacy has been defined from the American years. The result is a great deal of conflict and a lack of consensus. The legacy from the German years is ignored. Tillich’s German legacy is European, Continental, and German. Tillich’s method of correlation set him apart from others. He began with a philosophical analysis of the human situation. Tillich answered this by Christian revelation.
in both symbolic and paradoxical terms. Tillich’s religious socialism and the concept of the kairos are very much part of his German legacy. Tillich was a product of his own background. Tillich wrote for his own generation. The German years must be understood as a unity. His early writings are part of his legacy *The System of the Sciences* (1923), *The Religious Situation* (1926), and *Mass and Spirit* (1922). Tillich’s held to the concept of the kairos until 1926. The proletariat had failed to bring about the new world order. Tillich’s early writings tell of his political theology and his religious socialism. An example of this would be his book *The Socialist Decision*. It was an appeal to the German people to accept socialism and an attack upon Nazism. In his 1926 *Die religiose Lage der Gegenwart*, Tillich began to speak of a new attitude called belief-ful realism. This new attitude towards reality was manifested in revolutionary art against the spirit of capitalism.

Tillich’s legacy is in politics and history. This legacy can be seen today in Liberation Theology and the meaning of history. Capitalism had the demonic tendency to destroy the meaning of judgment, justice, and also diplomacy. Tillich has left us a political theology. Tillich’s legacy is a caution against any form that totalitarianism may take. It is also to be seen in his serious exposition of Marxism. Tillich’s kairos anticipated a new world order and the transformation of society. Tillich’s legacy is to be seen as well in his belief that historical action is required for those who would attempt the interpretation of history. As a political theologian, Tillich united political action with an understanding of history. His religious socialism was the fusion of the religious and Marxist thought.

Schelling’s Christian philosophy and Bohme’s Lutheran mysticism is also part of
Tillich’s German legacy. Schelling and Bohme were the sources of Tillich’s theological views. Tillich’s Protestant principle is also part of his legacy. The Protestant understanding of man and his predicament. This has the wider concept of Tillich’s existential theology of man’s predicament within a capitalistic system. Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion and theology have become two key elements in a cultural science of religion. These cannot be separated one from the other.

Tillich’s theology of culture and art is part of his legacy from the years (1919-1933). Tillich related theology to other academic subjects such as philosophy, art, depth psychology, and sociology. Tillich’s theology of art can be traced to its beginning in Tillich’s years as a chaplain in World War I (1914-1918). Pluralism has challenged Tillich’s theology of culture. More than one view must be considered on a subject. Postmodernism must be taken into account when considering Tillich’s German legacy. Reality cannot be decided according to the postmodernists. The world is no particular way at all.

Tillich’s existential theology is part of his legacy from his years in Germany. Tillich’s *Systematic Theology, vol. I* is a discussion of existentialism. Tillich gives an analysis of the relationship between essence and existence. Tillich raised existential theological questions. The Christian message gave theological answers to the existential questions. Correlations are to be seen as well as constant alternations on theological themes. These theological themes form part of his legacy.

Tillich has left us a contemporary historical view. Tillich discerned the hand of God in socialism. He and his fellow religious socialists related their concept of the kairos
to the kingdom of God in politics.

Tillich has left us a number of materials that have been archived from his German years. A 1913 brief outline of a systematic theology, the Tillich archives at Andover-Harvard Theological Library, and the Paul Tillich Archives in Germany at the University of Marburg are examples that contain Tillich’s written and printed work. The Marburg archive has as its goal to obtain copies of the Harvard manuscripts. The originals of most of Tillich’s early German writings are at Harvard. Tillich’s fourteen-volume Gesammelte Werke is now available in a German-English series of six-volumes entitled Main Works/Hauptwerke. Another series of Tillich’s works is Ein Lebensbild in Dokumenten: Briefe, Tagebuch-Auszuge, Berichte. This work divides Tillich’s life into definable periods. The 1913 brief outline for a systematic theology is to be found in Scharf’s book The Paradoxical Breakthrough of Revelation. Sturm has done editing on the 1970s books Erganzungs-und Nachlassbande. Sturm has also edited Tillich’s sermons as a young vicar and later as a war chaplain in World War I. The movement of our thesis progresses to the perspective on Paul Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy (1886-1933).