CHAPTER 4

THE FRANKFURT YEARS

4:1 On The Border Between Philosophy And Theology

4:1:1 Tillich’s Understanding of Theology

Tillich was Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-the-Main (Tillich 1936:40) (1929-1933). Tillich (ibid:38) writes: ‘Anyone standing on the border of philosophy and theology will find it necessary to get a clear conception of the scientific relation of both’. Tillich (ibid:39) continues: ‘By the appearance of the so-called ‘Existential Philosophy’ in Germany, I was led to a new understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology’. Tillich (ibid:40) begins to show the relationship between philosophy and theology by recalling his intellectual development and career. Tillich (ibid:40) writes: ‘To these ideas, which are characterized as standing between philosophy and theology, corresponded my professional career. Doctor of Philosophy in Breslau, Licentiate of Theology in Halle and Berlin; Professor of the Science of Religion in Dresden and the same time Professor Honorarius of Theology in Leipzig; Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-the-Main’. Tillich’s (1948:83-84) view of the relationship between
philosophy and theology helps us to better understand the Frankfurt years. Tillich (ibid:83-84) writes:

The term “philosophical theology” points to a theology that has a philosophical character....As long as theological thought has existed, there have been two types, of theology, a philosophical one and-let me call it- a “kerygmatic” one. Kerygmatic is derived from the New Testament word keryigma, “message.” It is a theology that tries to reproduce the content of the Christian message in an ordered and systematic way, without referring to philosophy. In contrast to it, philosophical theology, although based on the same keryigma, tries to explain the contents of the keryigma in close interrelation with philosophy. The tension and mutual fertilization between these two types is a main event and a fortunate one in all history of Christian thought. The fight of the traditionalists of the early church against the rising logos-Christology, the struggle between the mystics and dialecticians in the early Middle Ages, between Biblicism and scholasticism in the later Middle Ages, between the Reformers and the Aristotelian scholastics, the attack of the Ritschlians on speculative theology, and of the Barthians on a philosophy of religion—all this and much more was the consequence of the existence of a philosophical and a kerygmatic theology. The duality is natural. It is implied in the very word “theology,” the syllable “theo” pointing to the keryigma, in which God is revealed, and the syllable “logy” pointing to the endeavor of human reason to receive the message. This implies further that kerygmatic theology and philosophical theology demand each other and are wrong in the moment in which they become exclusive. No kerygmatic theology ever existed which did not use philosophical terms and methods. And no philosophical theology ever existed-deserving the name “theology”—which did not try to explain the content of the message.

Tillich (ibid:84) continues as to the ‘theological ideal’: ‘Therefore, the theological ideal is the complete unity of both types, an ideal which is reached only by the greatest theologians and ever by them only appropriately. The fact that every human creativity has its typological limitations makes it desirable that theological faculties should include a representative of kerygmatic and one of philosophical theology, whether the latter is called apologetics, speculative theology, Christian philosophy of
religion, or philosophical theology’. Tillich (ibid:86) elaborates further: ‘But philosophy, before attempting a description of the world in unity with all kinds of scientific and nonscientific experience, tries to understand being itself and the categories and structures which are common to all kinds of beings. This makes the division between philosophy and theology impossible, for, whatever the relation of God, world, and man may be, it lies in the frame of being; and any interpretation of the meaning and structure of being as being; unavoidably has consequences for the interpretation of God, man, and the world in their interrelations’. Paul Tillich (ibid:87) concludes: ‘In which philosophy shows kerygmatic and therefore a theological character, for this is the task of theology: to ask for being as far as it gives us ultimate concern. Theology deals with what concerns us inescapably, ultimately, unconditionally’. Tillich (ibid:87) adds: ‘Philosophy asks the questions theology supplies the answers’. Carey (2002:37) asked Protestant and Roman Catholic scholars at Tubingen, Germany concerning ‘contemporary German theological scene’, and the exploration of Tillich’s work. The answer is rather surprising but pertains to Tillich’s ontological theology: ‘An embarrassed silence followed, and then one theologian noted that there was little interest in Germany in Tillich’s ontological approach to theology, and that in fact there was considerable sentiment in Germany that after Tillich came to America and began to develop his systematic theology he removed himself from the matrix and methodologies of Continental theology’. Tillich’s (1948:83) Frankfurt years carry with them the Tillichean understanding of ‘the relationship between
philosophy and theology’. Tillich’s theology was built on the ontological model. Horton (1952:45) visited Frankfurt shortly after Tillich had left in 1933. Horton (ibid:45) writes: ‘His teaching at Frankfurt was so much concerned with art, science, economics, politics, and general culture that hostile critics frequently charged him with deserting his job as a philosopher of religion’. The bias of the critics must be admitted and allowed for since they would be in all likelihood, National Socialists loyal to Adolf Hitler. The Frankfurt years are understood even better when Tillich’s boundary and border line concept are understood. Tillich (1966:13) writes:

In the introduction to my Religiose Verwirklichung (Religious Realization), I wrote: “The boundary is the best place for acquiring knowledge.” When I was asked to give an account of the way my ideas have developed from my life, I thought that the concept of the boundary might be the fitting symbol for the whole of my personal and intellectual development. At almost every point, I have had to stand between alternative possibilities of existence, to be completely at home in neither and to take no definitive stand against either. Since thinking presupposes receptiveness to new possibilities, this position is fruitful for thought; but it is difficult and dangerous in life, which again and again demands decisions and the exclusion of alternatives. This disposition and its tension have determined both my destiny and my work.

Ratschow (1980:22) clarifies this further for us:

Paul Tillich wrote two autobiographical sketches—the first one in his fiftieth year, the second in the year 1952. In the first sketch from 1936, Tillich describes his destiny as an existence “on the boundary.” Of course, every life can be understood as always lived on “boundaries,” for life is transition. But Tillich’s sense of his existence as running on boundaries had a particular intensity, directness, and totality. For him, moreover, these boundaries are not only transitions but also battlegrounds, controversies, difficult tensions, and ever new endurance tests.

In scrutiny, the Frankfurt years give us a better understanding of how Tillich
understood the relationship between philosophy and theology. Philosophic theology and kerygmatic theology are both necessary aspects of theology. They should not be separated from each other.

4:2 The Union of Philosophy And Theology

4:2:1 Tillich’s Theological Experience At Frankfurt

Tillich sought to show the union of philosophy and theology. This became possible through the explanation of Schelling’s Christian philosophy of existence. Tillich (1936:35) writes: ‘I thought that, fundamentally, I had found the union of theology and philosophy in the philosophical explanation of the Christian doctrine through the older Schelling, in his founding of a Christian philosophy of existence in contrast to Hegel’s humanistic philosophy of essence and in his interpretation of history as the History of Salvation. I must confess that even today I find more “theonomous philosophy” in Schelling than in any of the other idealists’. Tillich (1936:35) preferred Schelling’s metaphysical thought to that of Hegel’s ‘philosophy of essence, and his interpretation of history as history of salvation’. The problem was that Schelling’s metaphysical religious thought failed to achieve ‘a unity of theology and philosophy’ (ibid:35). The First World War proved to be a catastrophe for the survival of German idealism. Schelling’s thought aimed at the union of philosophy and theology. It failed because it did not include Tillich’s concept of the abyss (ibid:35). The result of all of this was the birth of Tillich’s philosophy of religion. The union of theology and philosophy is the result of Tillich’s
philosophy of religion. His philosophy of religion abides on the border between theology and philosophy (ibid:36). Neither academic discipline of theology nor philosophy are lost. Tillich’s philosophy of religion expressed in philosophical terms the concept of the abyss and ‘the idea of justification a limitation of philosophy’ (ibid:36). Tillich (ibid:36) claimed his philosophy of religion was determined by both the ‘religious reality’ and the philosophical concept of the abyss (ibid:36).

In his effort to show the union of theology and philosophy at Frankfurt, Tillich gave a critical analysis. He rejected Neo-Kantianism, the philosophy of values, and also phenomenology. Neo-Kantianism didn’t include the experience of the abyss. Tillich (ibid:36) rejected the philosophy of values since it comprehended religion as a sphere of values. All this was assumed in the experience of the abyss. Tillich (1959:74) defines the abyss: ‘That which is expressed is the “dimension of depth” in the encountered reality, the ground and abyss in which every thing is rooted’. Phenomenology lacked the dynamic element of the abyss (ibid:36-37). Instead, Tillich was attracted to a philosophy of life as described by Nietzsche (ibid:36-37). Nietzsche expressed the concept of the abyss, more clearly than the thought of the others. Tillich came to depend on Schelling’s philosophy of life. It was Schelling’s philosophy that made it possible for Tillich to be able to approach and interpret Nietzsche. The philosophy of life became attractive to Tillich in the years after the First World War. The philosophy of life was a reaction against the ‘years of death and hunger’. The German Revolution of 1918 gave new direction to Tillich’s thinking. His Christian philosophy of history became sociologically and politically
oriented (ibid:37). However, the philosophy of history had originated not with Tillich but with Ernst Troeltsch. Tillich adapted it making it his own. Tillich heard Troeltsch on this subject in Berlin. Troeltsch (1958:168-169) wrote:

There is just one thing which the original Protestantism so long as it held strictly to its fundamental idea, did not and could not do-and the omissions is of the highest significance for the whole understanding of its relation to the modern world: it never elevated artistic feeling into the principle of a philosophy of life, of metaphysics or ethics. It could not do that, because its asceticism and its absolute metaphysical dualism made it impossible. It could not reconcile itself to the admission of art as an end in itself, as a particular way of knowing God and the world which is necessarily in some way or other bound up with his principle, and the not less closely connected transfiguration of the sensuous, and the sense of the world as harmony.

Troeltsch was speaking on the philosophy of history which had not been treated since Hegel’s death (Tillich 1936:37). Troeltsch failed due to his adherence to German idealism. He was unable to succeed because of the barrier of historical relativism. Tillich repudiated Troeltsch’s idealism. Tillich justified his decision to discard historical relativism because of the damaging effect of World War I on Germany. Tillich espoused a new philosophy of history the ‘the philosophy of history of religious Socialism’ (ibid:38). Adams (Tillich 1924:352-353 in Adams 1965:150) clarifies:

Tillich believes Troeltsch was never able to resolve the tensions in the way in which he hoped to, for in the struggle over the contradiction between the absolute and “the preponderance lay on the side of the relative.” “It was not for external reasons alone that he abandoned theology.” Not that his passage from theology to philosophy was simply a passage from the absolute to the relative. “The opposite would be more correct.” His actual intention was to move from the false absolute to the genuine. But in his striving for standards Troeltsch attached himself to that wing of Kantianism which moved in the scientific methodology in accord with Windelband and Rickert.

In inspection, one of Tillich’s goals at Frankfurt was to bring about the union
of philosophy and theology. Tillich developed his own Christian philosophy of religion. Nietzsche’s philosophy of life became attractive to Tillich. He was able to interpret Nietzsche because of Schelling’s work. Tillich developed a new philosophy of history that was sociologically and politically oriented.

4:3 Another Dimension Between Philosophy And Theology—Religion And Culture

4:3:1 The Relationship of Religion To Culture

Tillich sought to show another aspect of the union of theology and philosophy. This was the dimension between theology and philosophy of religion and culture.

Tillich (1959:40) began by defining religion: ‘Being ultimately concerned about that which is and should be our ultimate concern. This means that faith is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, and the belief in the existence of a highest being God, and the theoretical and practical consequences of such a belief’. Religion defined by Tillich was absolute and universal. His proof for this claim is the absolute and universal nature of religion as evidenced in the idea of God. Religion is not a sub category of culture. Neither is religion to be placed as being an entirely separate realm from culture (Tillich 1936:50). Culture has a claim upon philosophy. Culture decides the forms and context that expresses the ‘Absolute’. Culture’s substance is religion. Religion’s form is culture. Tillich (ibid:50) explains the one difference: ‘In religion the substance which is the unconditioned source and abyss of meaning is designated, and the cultural forms serve as symbols for it’ whereas in culture the form, which is the conditioned meaning
becomes perceptible only indirectly, throughout the autonomous form’. Culture seeks to understand man’s finiteness and search for the infinite. Religion by way of contrast must include ‘the autonomous form’ the ‘Logos’ (ibid:50). Tillich concludes by saying that these ideas were the foundation for both a philosophy of religion and a philosophy of culture (ibid:50). Tillich was then able to treat cultural movements from the perspective of religion (ibid:50-51).

Tillich wanted to show the relation of religion to culture. Culture that included politics, art, depth psychology and also sociology (Tillich 1966:7). Tillich (1967:43) writes: ‘Frankfurt was the most modern and liberal university in Germany, but it had no theological faculty. So it was quite natural that my lectures moved on the boundary line between philosophy and theology and tried to make philosophy existential for the numerous students obliged to take philosophical classes’.

German culture had experienced culture shocks at all levels due to the devastation of World War I. Germany was experiencing two digit inflation. The German people were open to these new ideas. Tillich formed an apologetical theology. This became part of his curriculum while he was teaching at Frankfurt. Dresden had been a center of the visual arts including painting, architecture, dance, and opera. Tillich (1966-9-10) writes: ‘The cultural situation was not much different when, in 1929, I received and accepted a call as professor of philosophy at Frankfurt’. Tillich brought the culture of Berlin, Dresden and Frankfurt to bear in his lectures in Frankfurt. This element became an important part of Tillich’s efforts to show the
union of theology and philosophy. Ratschow (1980:24) writes:

In 1929 Tillich was called to the chair that Scheler had held in Frankfurt as ordinarius for philosophy and sociology; he remained there until 1933. The lectures from this time indicate no specifically theological themes, with the exception of a course Dogmatics I, in Marburg. The themes are all on religion and culture, on the social situation, or on “religious experience,” the “religious interpretation of being,” and the “essence of religion.” In the themes of these lectures and in the way that Tillich moved from university to university is reflected the tendency of Tillich’s working. At the peak of this tendency is the theme of his life: the theology of culture.

Ratschow gives us further insight into Tillich’s theology of culture. Ratschow (ibid:24) writes: ‘In this problem his historical elan, his religio-philosophical system, his political theory, and his religious passion were brought together’.

In analysis, Tillich tried to demonstrate another dimension of the union between philosophy and theology. This was the union of religion and culture. Culture’s substance is religion. Religion’s form is culture. Tillich related religion to politics, art, depth psychology, and sociology.

The German people were open to new ideas as a result of the culture shocks from World War I and two digit inflation. Tillich formed an apologetical theology. This became part of his curriculum while he was teaching at Frankfurt.

4:4 Tillich’s Role At Frankfurt

4:4:1 Tillich A Sacred Theologian In A Secular Setting

Tillich accepted the position in Frankfurt with the title Professor of Philosophy
and Sociology (Pauck and Pauck 1976:112-113). Fritz Medicus wrote a public endorsement of Tillich in a ‘leading Swiss newspaper’. The Paucks (ibid:113) write: ‘Tillich’s former teacher and friend Fritz Medicus, who had observed Tillich’s popularity at a seminar in Davos during the summer of 1928, wrote a tremendously enthusiastic piece for the *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, the leading Swiss newspaper, proclaiming that the appointment of Tillich to Scheler’s chair was the beginning of a new philosophical era. His experience in Davos convinced him that his former pupil, whom he described as a genius, had rescued the Schellingian philosophy from the dusty theory in which it was held captive and transformed it into meaning for a responsible way of life’. The Paucks (ibid:113) add: ‘Tillich’s formal task at the University of Frankfort [Frankfurt] was in fact to teach social education, and in his lectures and seminars between the years 1929 and 1933 he thus emphasized the aspects of social ethics, historical action, and political direction rather than the speculative or metaphysical interest of the thinkers with whom he dealt in the classroom. More than ever he felt obliged to make philosophical questions existential for the numerous students for whom philosophical courses were mandatory’. The Paucks (ibid:113) continue: ‘He gave courses on Kant, Hegel, and Schelling, on Locke and Thomas Aquinas’. Tillich lectured: ‘on “Being and Action,” “The Masses and The Spirit,” Philosophy of Religion,” and “The History of Philosophy.” He offered a course on questions of systematic theology only during the last semester in Frankfort and then only in an informal colloquial way’ (ibid:113-114). Ratschow (1980:24) argues
for Tillich’s ‘systematic science of culture’ during the German university years.

Ratschow (ibid:24) continues: ‘Its dialectic is rooted in the fact that every science must use universal concepts to set forth a concrete normative science of its own does not wish to remain without fruit in a merely general validity’. Ratschow (ibid:24) argues: ‘This is also true for theology. As a normative science—that is, as part of the concretizing that is turned toward life—it is a part of the science of religion’. Ratschow (ibid:24) reveals Tillich’s conception of theology. Ratschow (ibid:25) writes: ‘Since Tillich conceives of theology as the normative part of a science of religion, the problem of cultural theology can be discussed only in the large horizon of religion and culture. At this time, moreover, religion for Tillich is the experience of unconditional (Schlechthinning) nothingness’. Ratschow (ibid:25) concludes:

Where this experience leads to the “absolute radical No,” it “changes…into a radical Yes.” In the complexes of No and Yes, that which is “above being” (das Uberseiende) announces itself as the reality of meaning. The definition of religion shows the unambiguous structure of Schelling’s triangular model: being and nonbeing transcend toward Suprabeing (Ubersein). Even here, however, this scheme is directed to what will later be shown to be structure of justification.

The Paucks (1976:114) commenting on Tillich’s time at Frankfurt write:

‘The period at Frankfort [Frankfurt] turned out to be the richest and most successful of Tillich’s German career’. The Paucks (ibid:114) add:

From the beginning, as Medicus had predicted, he attracted a large and enthusiastic group of students, which steadily increased. In these years, which he and his illustrious colleagues (to whom he referred as “glorious”) described later in ever more glowing and romantic reminiscences as the “golden age” of
German university life, Tillich deepened and refined his teaching skills. The Paucks (ibid:114) speak well of Tillich:

He sought the truth, as of old, in his non authoritarian way. That was unusual for a theologian. His colleagues soon learned that he had somehow freed himself from the stuffy moralism of his Protestant background. Moreover, he did not merely teach his students; he lived with them and mobilized their intellectual forces. The largeness of his nature, the broadmindedness that gave others confidence to speak their own words, became more and more evident.

Tillich made his students feel worthwhile and intelligent by his responses to their questions and input (ibid:114). Moreover, Tillich had the great ability to be a very good listener. Tillich was a very open person. He was able to employ the Socratic method of teaching whereby he obtained answers to his questions (ibid:114). He had two assistants while he was at the University of Frankfurt. The first was Harald Polechau ‘whom Tillich brought from Berlin’. Polechau was writing his dissertation at this time. Tillich had a second assistant by the name of Theodor Wiesengrund. He was known by Teddy or Adorno (ibid:114-115).

Tillich became well known throughout Germany as the result of his position at the University of Frankfurt (ibid:120). The Paucks (ibid:122) add: ‘The menace of National Socialist power, at first mere parody and a shadow, suddenly became a grotesque and brutal reality’. At Frankfurt, Tillich had a wide circle of friends that met to discuss academic questions (ibid:119). Tillich described this group as ‘religious, philosophical, prophetic’ (ibid:119). The
Paucks (ibid:118) write: ‘Horkheimer, Lowe, Mannheim, Mennicke, Pollock and Reizler, who came as ‘thought-provoker’ ex officio, were all members’.

Dorrien (2003:487) writes of Tillich’s activities at Frankfurt:

Shortly after Tillich arrived at Frankfurt, he helped engineer a faculty position for Max Horkheimer, who became director of the neo-Marxist Institut fur Sozialforschung, later named as the Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School critical theorists were more inclined to theory than practical political engagement, and theoretically most of them were socialists positioned between the compromised revisionism of the German Social Democratic Party and the compromised revisionism of the Communists.

Donnelly (2003:2) writes: ‘This bringing together and fusing of religious and Marxist thought in the early Tillich has been the subject of special study for a number of scholars, most notably Guy Hammond, Terry O’Keeffe, Richard Quinney, Ronald Stone, and John Stumme’. Donnelly (ibid:2) argues that Tillich was ‘widely perceived as a Marxist, and not without good reason’. Donnelly points to Tillich’s commitment to Marxism. Tillich (1936:63 in Donnelly 2003:27) admits his debt to Marx: ‘I owe to Marx, first of all, the insight into the ideological character not only idealism but of all systems of thought, religious as well as profane which as the servants of power hinder, even though unconsciously, the more righteous form of social reality’. Further, Donnelly (2003:2-3) lists a number of journals which support Tillich’s commitment to this important ideology. Donnelly (ibid:2-3) lists: ‘“Review of Metaphysics” (Cohen 1950:4:13-24), the “Journal of Religion” (Kucheman 1972:52:268-286), the “American Journal of Theology and Philosophy” (1984:5:1:13-24), the “Journal of

Thomas (1963:14) argues that Tillich’s public speaking brought him into conflict with the growing Nazi movement in Germany. His argument is built on Tillich biographical details (1963:14). Tillich was convinced of the need for religious socialism for Germany (Thomas 2000:43). Thomas (ibid:43) argues based on Tillich’s book *The Socialist Decision*. It contained Tillich’s ‘developed political theology’ (ibid:43). This book showed Tillich’s commitment to ‘socialist politics’, and it was ‘a deliberate attack on the growing attraction of Nazism’ (ibid:43).

The critical analysis of this section shows that Tillich was Professor of Philosophy at Frankfurt. Tillich was replacing Scheler. Scheler was to replace Cornelius. Scheler died before his appointment was to begin. Tillich emphasized the social, historical action, and political direction. Tillich made his philosophical questions existential while he was at Frankfurt. Tillich attracted a large number of students at Frankfurt. This was his most successful teaching period. Tillich became involved with the *Institute for Social Research* at Frankfurt. The early Tillich had fused together religious and Marxist thought into religious socialism.
4:5 The Political And Economic Background

4:5:1 The Rise of Hitler And The Great Depression

Paul Tillich’s years at Frankfurt were lived out against the background of political turmoil and turbulence in Germany. Thomas (ibid:19) writes: ‘As the 1920s wore on, the National Socialist Movement grew in strength and influence. Thomas (ibid:43) continues: ‘By the end of the decade, the threat it posed was sufficient’. The Great Depression which had its origin in the Wall Street Crash that occurred on October 29, 1929 in the United States sent financial shockwaves around the globe. By mid 1930’s the economic pressures of the Great Depression were causing the German democratic government to come apart (Duiker and Spielvogel 2007:646-649). January 30, 1933, saw Hitler named as Chancellor of Germany by Hindenburg’s concession (ibid:687). In March, 1933, Hitler became dictator of all of Germany (ibid:687). Tillich’s years in Frankfurt were overshadowed by the rise of Adolf Hitler. Tillich (1977:xxxiii) writes:

‘The political events of recent years have been decisive in providing the impulse to begin and complete the book: the decline of the political influence of the Social Democrats, the apparently final split in the proletarian working class, the triumphal advance of National Socialism, the consolidation of the late-capitalistic powers on a military basis, the increasingly perilous situation in foreign affairs’.

In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles had laid heavy war ‘reparations for all the damage to which the Allied governments and their people were subject as a result of the war’ on Germany (Duiker and Spielvogel 2007:644). Barnett (1998:19)
writes:

In 1919, however, most Germans longed not for democracy but for stability and order. The Weimar Republic, its birth accompanied by right-wing soldiers’ uprisings and Communist attempts at revolution, was an uncertain government in a volatile environment. It was burdened by the social and economic costs of the war and the additional obligations of paying war reparations, which the victorious European powers had set at 132 billion gold marks.

The Dawes Plan of 1924 was drawn up by an international commission. It gave Germany a loan of two hundred million. Reparations were reduced and made dependent upon Germany’s ability to pay (Duiker and Spielvogel 2007:646-647).

The Americans made heavy investments in Europe which created European prosperity during the years 1924 to 1929. In 1928, American investors called in these loans made to Germany. This was so as to be able to invest in the New York stock market. The October 1929 stock market crash led American investors to have to withdraw even more loaned money to Germany (ibid:647). Duiker and Spielvogel (ibid:649) write:

Germany experienced runaway inflation in 1922 and 1923; widows, orphans, the retired elderly, army officers, teachers, civil servants, and others who lived on fixed incomes all watched their monthly stipends become worthless and their lifetime savings evaporate. Their economic losses increasingly pushed the middle class to the rightest parties that were hostile to the republic. To make matters worse, after a period of prosperity from 1924 to 1929, Germany faced the Great Depression. Unemployment increased to 3 million in March 1930 and 4.4 million by December of the same year. The depression paved the way for the rise of extremist parties.

In inquiry, Tillich’s Frankfurt years were lived out against the background of political turmoil and economic instability. The treaty of Versailles had laid heavy war reparation payments on Germany. The booming New York stock market of 1928 caused American investors to withdraw loans made to Germany. This was in order that
they could invest in the New York stock market. The crash of the New York stock market in 1929 sent financial shockwaves around the globe. American investors called in more loans made to Germany. The Hindenberg democratic government was coming apart. Hindenberg made a concession to Adolf Hitler on January 30, 1933. Hitler was named Chancellor of Germany. Later, in March, 1933, Hitler became dictator of all of Germany.

4:6 Tillich’s Closing Days At Frankfurt

4:6:1 Tillich’s Appeal To The German People

Tillich produced his book *The Socialist Decision* during his German years. Stumme (1977:xxiii) writes: ‘Tillich wrote the bulk of *The Socialist Decision* during the summer of 1932 in the mountains of Sils Maria, Switzerland’,….But it was too late. Historical events foreclosed any genuine decision; on 30 January 1933, Adolf Hitler took power, and the barbaric future began’. Stumme (ibid:xxiii-xxiv) continues: ‘*The Socialist Decision* was suppressed and all the socialist literature of Alfred Protte, Tillich’s publisher, was confiscated. Later, the remaining copies of the work were destroyed when the Protte warehouse in Potsdam was leveled by Allied bombs’. Stumme (ibid:xxiv) concludes: ‘The book’s public existence was extremely short-lived, and no reviews of it were printed. Like other anti-Nazi material, *The Socialist Decision* was consumed by the fires of repression’. Carey (2002:4) writes: ‘Tillich was dismissed
by the Nazis from his position at the University of Frankfurt on April 13, 1933, and in December of the same year he and his family came to America’.

In examination, Tillich’s book *The Socialist Decision* did not come out soon enough. It was published in 1933 by Alfred Protte. Hitler took power on January 30, 1933. All socialist literature was confiscated. Allied bombs leveled the Protte warehouse. Tillich was dismissed from his teaching position at Frankfurt by the Nazis on April 13, 1933. It was in December of 1933 that Tillich and his family came to America.

4:7 Summary

Tillich was Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-the-Main. He sought to get a clear conception of the scientific relationship of philosophy to theology. This helps us in our understanding of the Frankfurt years. Tillich distinguished between two kinds of theology. Philosophic theology is philosophical in character. The second kind of theology is kerygmatic theology. Kerygmatic is derived from the New Testament word for message. It tries to reproduce the Christian message in a systematic way without referring to philosophy. Philosophical theology is also based on the kerygma. It tries to explain the contents of the kerygma in close interrelation with philosophy. Kerygmatic theology and philosophical theology are interdependent on each other. Kerygmatic theology has always used philosophical terms and methods. Philosophical theology has always tried to explain the content of the message. The theological ideal is the unity of both types of theology. Philosophical theology is also called apologetics, speculative theology, and also Christian philosophy of religion.
Philosophy attempts a description of the world in unity with all kinds of scientific and nonscientific experience. However, it must first try to understand being itself, the categories, and the structures common to all kinds of beings. This makes the division between philosophy and theology impossible because of the relation of God, world, and man. Whatever the relation is it lies within the frame of being. Philosophy asks the questions. Theology supplies the answers. The Frankfurt years (1929-1933) show the Tillichean understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Tillich’s theology is built on the ontological model.

The Frankfurt years help us in our understanding of Tillich’s boundary and borderline concept. This is a metaphysical concept pointing to Tillich’s destiny as existence on the boundary. The boundaries had particular intensity, directness, and totality for Tillich. These boundaries are transitions, battlegrounds, controversies, difficult tensions, and endurance tests.

Tillich tried to show the union between philosophy and theology at Frankfurt. This became possible because of the explanation that Schelling’s Christian philosophy of existence provided. However, Schelling’s Christian philosophy didn’t the unity of theology and philosophy. It failed to do so because it didn’t include Tillich’s concept of the abyss. The result was the birth of Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion. The union of theology and philosophy was achieved because of Tillich’s Christian philosophy of religion. His Christian philosophy of religion abides on the border between theology and philosophy. The abyss is that which is expressed in dimension of depth. The ground
and abyss is that in which everything is rooted.

Tillich was attracted to the philosophy of life. He could interpret Nietzsche because of Schelling. The German revolution of 1918 gave new direction to Tillich’s thinking. His Christian philosophy of history became sociologically and politically oriented. Tillich redefined his Christian philosophy of history as a result of Troeltsch’s philosophy of history. Tillich’s new Christian philosophy of history became the Christian philosophy of religious socialism.

A second dimension of the union between philosophy and theology was that of religion and culture. Tillich defined religion as ultimate concern concerning that which should be our ultimate concern. Faith is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern. Faith is also the belief in the highest being’s existence God, the theoretical, and the practical consequences of such belief. Culture decides the forms and the context that expresses the Absolute. Culture’s substance is religion. Religion’s form is culture. Tillich showed the relationship of religion to culture. Culture included politics, art, Philosophy, depth psychology, and sociology.

Frankfurt didn’t have a theological faculty. It was natural for Tillich’s lectures to move on the boundary between philosophy and theology. Tillich tried to make philosophy existential for his numerous students.

The German people were open to new ideas due to the culture shocks of World War I and two digit inflation. Tillich formed an apologetical theology. This became part of his curriculum when he was teaching at Frankfurt. Tillich lectured on the themes
of religion and culture, the social situation, religious experience, the religious interpretation of being, and the essence of religion. Tillich’s theology of culture was the theological problem that joined together his historical elan, his religio-philosophical system, his political theory, and his religious passion.

Tillich accepted his position in Frankfurt as Professor of Philosophy and Sociology. Fritz Medicus, a former teacher wrote an article about Tillich in a leading Swiss newspaper. The article pointed out that Tillich’s appointment as a successor of Scheler was the beginning of a new philosophical era. Tillich became well known throughout Germany as a result of his position at the University of Frankfurt. Tillich had a wide circle of friends at Frankfurt. They met to discuss academic questions in the Frankfurt School (Institute for Social Research). The early Tillich fused together religious and Marxist thought. Tillich was perceived as a Marxist.

Tillich’s Frankfurt years (1929-1933) were characterized by political turmoil and economic instability. The Wall Street Crash on October 29, 1929 in the United States sent financial shockwaves around the globe. The German democratic government collapsed. On January 30, 1933, Hitler was named Chancellor of Germany by the concession of Hindenburg. March 1933 saw Hitler becoming dictator of all of Germany.

Tillich’s closing days at Frankfurt saw the completion of his book *The Socialist Decision*. This book was published in 1933. Hitler’s barbaric reign began on January 30, 1933. *The Socialist Decision* and all socialist literature was suppressed and confiscated. The remaining copies of *The Socialist Decision* were destroyed when the
Alfred Protte warehouse was levelled by Allied bombs. Tillich was dismissed by the Nazis on April 13, 1933. He and his family came to America in December of 1933. The procession of our thesis is to consider the influences on Tillich during the years 1886 to 1933.
CHAPTER 5

INFLUENCES

5:1 Academic

Influences (Dictionary 2008:1) is defined as ‘the capacity or power of persons or things to be a compelling force on or produce effects on the actions, behavior, opinions, etc., of others’.

Paul Tillich’s life had many influences on it during the German years. Bernard Martin (1963:2) argues that Tillich’s biographical data ‘sets forth the major facts of Tillich’s life’. Martin (ibid:7) seeks to explain what ‘incidents’ and ‘experiences of his personal historical destiny have been of basic importance in molding his thought’. In addition, Martin (ibid:7) argues for the ‘crucial intellectual influences upon’ Tillich’s life. Tillich had studied philosophy on his own. He had a working knowledge of the history of philosophy and familiarity with Fichte and Kant. At the University, he had studied Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling. His concentration was focused on Schelling’s Christian philosophy of religion (ibid:17). Tillich had studied theology at the University of Berlin, Tubingen, and also Halle. He took his first theological exam in 1909. His second theological exam was written in 1911. He received the Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Breslau in 1911. In 1912, Tillich received the Licentiate of Theology
from the University of Halle (ibid:17). Paul Tillich was interested in the ideological character not only of ‘idealism’ but as well ‘all systems of thought both religious and profane’. He had learned earlier from Kierkegaard that truth is always to be found in the context of the knower (ibid:21). It was during the German years that Tillich became interested in the social movements of his day. He had a profound interest in Marx who had a new and a different emphasis of economic materialism (ibid:21). The thought of Kierkegaard held that every human being exists in a situation of despair (ibid:21). The German masses were involved in a class struggle during and after World War I. Marx thought every system of harmony was untrue (ibid:21). Tillich was now able to connect truth to a particular psychological or social situation. Further, Marx’s doctrine of economic materialism confirmed Kierkegaard’s doctrine of self-alienation (Tillich 1936:65). Martin (1963:21) argues that Marx was one of the definite influences on Tillich. Martin (ibid:21) writes of Marx’s influence on Tillich: ‘his debt to him for many…insights’.

Martin follows the biographical details of Paul Tillich’s life to establish his argument. In 1900, the Tillich family moved to Berlin, Germany. Tillich’s father, Johannes had accepted a church position as pastor. Martin (Tillich 1936:6 in Martin 1963:16) quotes Tillich: ‘I was saved from romantic enmity against technical civilizations and was taught to appreciate the importance of the big city for the critical side of intellectual and artistic life. Later there was added to this a vital and thoughtful understanding of the world of Bohemianism, possible only in the large cities; and also an aesthetic appreciation of the internal and external immensity of the metropolis’. Tillich
(ibid:6 in ibid:16) gained ‘personal experience’ of both the political and the social movements in Berlin. Tillich (1952:9) graduated from the Gymnasium in 1904. He developed a love for both the Greek language, culture, and as well Greek philosophy (ibid:9). Tillich (ibid:10) confirms that he (ibid:10) had studied philosophy on his own prior to beginning his theological studies at the university. Tillich (ibid:10) had a knowledge of both Fichte and Kant when he entered the university. Tillich (ibid:10) studied Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling during his university days. Tillich studied theology at the Universities of Berlin, Tubingen, and Halle (Martin 1963:17). In 1909, he took his first theological exam. In 1911, his second theological exam (ibid:17). In 1911, Tillich received the Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Breslau. In 1912, he received the Licentiate of Theology at Halle (ibid:17). His doctoral dissertation and his Licentiate of Theology were both written on the work of Friedrich Schelling (Tillich 1952:10 in ibid:17). Schelling’s work made an impact on Tillich’s life. Martin doesn’t draw this conclusion from Tillich’s biographical data. His purpose comes out in that his argument is to support only the theme of his book *The Existential Theology of Paul Tillich* (ibid:26). Martin (ibid:26) argues: ‘Kierkegaard and Heidegger remain his philosophic heroes and the existentialist doctrine of man continues to be for him the most valuable and enlightening account that has been given of the human predicament in modern times’.

Tillich (1936:31-33) recalls his theological training and reading:

> During the writing of these works, [his two dissertations on Schelling] I was a student of Protestant theology, and at the conclusion of my studies became assistant pastor at various parishes of the Old Prussian United Church. At that time, Martin Kahler and Wilhelm Lutgert from Halle were my most important teachers.
The former was a personality of overwhelming ethical and religious power and intellectual concentration; as teacher and writer difficult to understand; profoundest and in many respects the most modern representative of the theology of mediation of the nineteenth century; an opponent of Albert Ritschl, herald of the theological doctrine of justification, and critic of idealism and humanism, out of which he himself evolved. I am indebted to him primarily for the insight he gave me into the all-controlling character of the Pauline-Lutheran idea of justification.…

At this point, I parted soon from the teachings of the theologians in Halle and became less and less in accord with the new supranaturalism, which has grown up within Barth’s theology, and wishes to repeat the dogmatic doctrines of the Reformation, by discarding the scientific work of two hundred years. At first it was the interpretation of the Old Testament by Wellhausen and Gunkel, the so-called religions-geschichtliche Methode, which fascinated me and revealed to me the Old Testament in its fundamental meaning for Christianity and humanity. My preference for the Old Testament and the spirit of prophetic criticism and expectation has stayed with me and through the bearing of this upon my political attitude, it has become decisive for the shaping of my life and thought….My historical insights into the New Testament I owe principally to Albert Schweitzer’s “The Quest of the Historical Jesus” and Bultman’s Synoptische Tradition. Ernst Troeltsch caused my transfer of interest from all mediating-theological and apologetic remains in Church History and in the problem of historical criticism.

Martin’s view of Tillich as merely an existential theologian does not do justice to Tillich. Tillich (1936:31-33) argues for Schelling’s Christian philosophy of religion and the Old Testament prophetic criticism for his political attitude.

In partition, Tillich was indebted to both Kierkegaard and Marx. Kierkegaard gave Tillich insight on man’s existence in a situation of despair or self-alienation. Marx’s interpretation of history as a class struggle gave Tillich insight into the situation of the German masses during and after World War I. Schelling’s views became Tillich’s views. Tillich wrote both his doctoral dissertation and his dissertation for Licentiate of Theology on Schelling. Tillich had insight from Martin Kahler into the Pauline-Lutheran idea of justification. Wellhausen and Gunkel gave Tillich insight into the Old Testament.
Tillich’s political attitude was influenced by the spirit of prophetic criticism from the Old Testament.

5:2 Life Experiences

5:2:1 Tillich’s Religious Situation

Martin does draw a conclusion from the biographical data of Tillich’s church service and duty as a chaplain in World War I. Tillich served as a chaplain in the German army from September 1914 to September 1918. Martin (1963:20) points out Tillich saw World War I as a disaster for Europe. The unity of the German nation was a myth. Germany was divided into conflicting classes. Further, the proletariat viewed the church as the ally of the ruling classes. The conflict between the masses and the ruling class led to the revolution of 1918. The result was Imperial Germany collapsed. Martin (1963:20) argues: ‘Tillich in deep sympathy with social aspects of the short-lived revolution. He became one of the founders of German religious socialism; and as one of the major theoreticians of the movement, developed some of its key concepts’. Niebuhr (1956:10) interprets Tillich’s The Religious Situation as a revolt ‘against the spirit of capitalist society’. Niebuhr (ibid:10) writes:

Capitalist society, however, is not a scheme of economic organization only; it is also a culture with a definitely religious character. Its civilization is based…the establishment of human control over the world of nature and mind. Natural science, technique and capitalist economy…control the civilization.

Tillich became involved in the social movements (Martin 1963:20). Tillich incorporated
Marx’s thought into his life and teaching. Tillich (1956:122-125) writes:

Among the ideas which betray the true character of capitalist society is its conception of the state. In the pre-capitalist period of the state as the law giving and law-enforcing community possessed the unction and sanctity which naturally belongs to it when the whole community regards it as the fundamental structure of the social life, determining all aspects of the social culture…. [T]he capitalist conception of the state may be characterized as its complete secularization…. [T]he vital force which supported the capitalistic state was nationalism…. [I]n… socialism…. [I]ts… contradiction.

He developed the concept of the kairos which was espoused during the regular meetings of religious socialism (Tillich 1936:57-58 in Martin 1963:20).

Ludwig Feuerbach who lived from 1804-1872 thought the ‘true sense of Theology is Anthropology (Feuerbach 1989:xvii in Crockett 2001:108). Tillich’s (1977:13-15) The Socialist Decision demonstrates the inclusion of anthropology. This was an appeal to the German people to accept Socialism rather than Nazism. Tillich sought justice in the realms of economics and politics. Tillich wanted a meaningful society that would make the question of Marxism to Christianity an open question (Stumme 1977:xxvi).

In evaluating, Tillich’s experience as a chaplain in the Germany army from 1914 to 1918 deeply affected Tillich’s views. He saw the unity of the German nation as a myth. Germany was experiencing class warfare. The proletariat distrusted the church and the ruling classes. It was conflict between the masses and the ruling classes that led to the revolution of 1918. Tillich became a religious socialist. He was one of the founders and theoreticians of the religious socialist movement. His books The Religious Situation and The Socialist Decision demonstrate Tillich’s commitment to
religious socialism. *The Religious Situation* was written against the spirit of the capitalist society. His book *The Socialist Decision* was an appeal to the German people to accept religious socialism rather than Nazism.

5:3  Marx

5:3:1  Marx’s Influence On Tillich


That Paul Tillich was interested in the thought of Karl Marx is widely known among Tillich scholars. Tillich’s early German writings on socialism, his sympathy for the social critiques of religion, and his efforts to promulgate a religious-socialist movement in Germany are all evidences of his debt to Karl Marx. Tillich was deeply influenced by Marx’s critique of capitalism, and he used that critique in his numerous early assessments of capitalism as the basic source of economic injustice in the modern world.

Carey (Tillich 1948:907 in ibid:29) continues:

Tillich consistently refused to join the ranks of those who dismiss Marx as a diabolical thinker who unleashed the wave of communist terror upon the earth. Quite the contrary, he saw many key insights in Marx’s thought as having relevance for the twentieth century because Marx interpreted history “in a way which makes even his erroneous prophecies significant.

Tillich (1977:109) writes of Marx:

For Marx, too, being must move in the direction of that which is demanded, so that the demand does not remain abstract and impotent. In his analysis of capitalist society these basic presuppositions receive concrete application and are elaborated by means of scientific methods. The structure of capitalism itself drives towards its transmutation into socialism, towards the classless society.

Tillich (1977:160) took seriously Marx’s words on ‘another possibility: chaos’. Tillich (ibid:160-161) writes:
If, in the encounter between the bourgeoisie and political romanticism, the bourgeois principle should once again gain a complete victory, the increasingly severe crises would make chaos virtually inevitable. If on the other hand political romanticism and, with it, militant nationalism proves victorious, a self-annihilating struggle of the European peoples is inevitable. *The salvation of European society from a return to barbarism lies in the hands of socialism.*

Tillich (1936:66 in ibid:29) argues for the need to appropriate, criticize, and continue the dialogue with Marx. Carey (2002:29-30) argues:

Tillich felt that there are far-reaching analogies between Marx’s interpretation of history and the perspective of the Old Testament prophets. Both saw history in dynamic terms, as a struggle between good and evil powers. Humanity is called to identify itself with the historical group that carries on the fight for good. Redemption is the conquest and extermination of evil in history. In this sense Marx, like the prophets, set himself against the “nonhistorical” interpretations of history which attempt to understand history through categories of nature or space.

Carey (ibid:30) concludes: ‘Tillich recognized, of course, that Marx had shifted the prophetic concept of transcendence to the material realm of immanence, but he insisted nevertheless that Marx shows a greater affinity to the prophets than do most of the comfortable churches of our day’.

Carey (2002:30) points out: ‘Tillich gives priority to Marx’s view of justice’. Carey argues that economics as the basis for historical change is an oversimplification (ibid:30). Yet Carey (ibid:30-31) admits the ‘significance of the economic factor in life, and in being aware of the physical needs of persons’. Tillich saw in Marx the prophetic voice ‘for justice in the social order’ (ibid:31).

Tillich saw in Marx the importance of an approach to the interpretation of history that allows for ‘decision and involvement’ (ibid:31). Carey (2002:32) argues:

Related to this understanding of truth is Marx’s trenchant criticism of the ideologies
developed by all societies to justify the status quo. Marx developed this point as a part of his attack on Idealism; as opposed to appeals to a transcendent order, he wanted to stress the primacy of humanity’s actual situation. Ideologies that are presented as eternal truths, independent of humanity’s concrete situation, distort the actual human situation, and keep us from taking the necessary steps to improve our conditions. This, too, Tillich saw as a valid insight, and he appropriated this into his own understanding of history.

Carey (Tillich 1936:63 in ibid:32) quotes Tillich: ‘I owe to Marx, first of all, the insight into the ideological character, not only of idealism but of all systems of thought, religious as well as profane, which as the servants of power hinder, even though unconsciously, the more righteous form of social reality’. Tillich (1938:116-117 in ibid:32) admitted the accuracy of Marx’s thought that religion was a ideology of the privileged classes.

Carey (Tillich 1936:192-194 in ibid:34) makes an interesting point on the need for a revolution by the proletariat. Carey writes:

It is interesting that Tillich nowhere criticized Marx’s doctrine of the necessity of a revolution by the proletariat, although his own identification with the German Social Democratic party suggests his preference for working for social change within the context of existing political structures. The reason for Tillich’s silence may lie in his concept of power. He recognized that when a ruling group no longer expresses the will of the majority of citizens, a revolutionary situation is created, and justice in such instances is often on the side of the revolutionary forces. Tillich admits that there are ambiguities involved in determining when the time is ripe for a political revolution, but he was not willing to say that revolutions ipso facto are always wrong.

Further, Carey makes another interesting point on Tillich which is beyond the scope of this thesis on the German years. Carey (ibid:23) writes: ‘What is less well known, even among Tillich scholars, is that Tillich had a lifelong interest in Marx and Marxism’. Tillich’s statement of Marxian thought has always been contingent on the dialectical which combines a yes and a no. The positive element on Marx’s thought in Tillich’s life
was ‘on prophetic, humanistic, and realistic elements’ (Martin 1963:22). The no or the negative element of Marxian thought in Tillich’s life was ‘in Marx’s analysis, polemics, and propaganda’ (ibid:22). Carey’s conclusion on Marx’s influence is important for our thesis. Carey (ibid:35) writes: ‘There is no doubt that Karl Marx exerted a greater influence on Tillich than anyone else concerning political consciousness and the interpretation of history’. Carey’s critique of Tillich’s criticism of Marx is largely based on documents from the American years 1933-1965 which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Carey (ibid:34) argues that Tillich felt Marx was mistaken in his thinking on the proletariat. Marx made the rise of the proletariat ‘the focal point of history’. Carey (2002:29-35) agrees that Tillich’s thinking on Karl Marx was always dialectical. This was a combination of both positive and negative elements. The positive would be that Tillich saw in Marx the voice of the Old Testament prophets (ibid:29). Tillich admired Marx’s view of justice with the call for the need for a just society (ibid:30). Tillich admired Marx’s historical approach with the need for decision and involvement (ibid:31). Tillich agreed with Marx on Marx’s criticism of ideologies that were oppressive to the human situation (ibid:32). The negative for Tillich would be Marx’s failure to distinguish the divine from human ecclesiastical expressions. Marx’s interpretation of history did not allow for the kairos, his interpretation of history was too utopian, a wrong emphasis on the proletariat, and some of Marx’s thought was not relevant for the twentieth century (ibid:33-34). Carey (ibid:34) lists Marx’s irrelevant thought as follows: ‘Marx’s theories of work and value, accumulation and concentration of wealth, the scientific study of history, and so forth’. 
In breakdown, Tillich was deeply influenced by Karl Marx. It was Marx’s critique of capitalism that Tillich used in his early writings. Tillich pointed out that capitalism was the cause of economic injustice in the world. Tillich saw in Marx the spirit of the Old Testament prophets. Tillich argued for the need to continue the dialogue with Marx. Tillich admitted his debt to Marx. Karl Marx had a greater influence on Tillich than anyone else in both Tillich’s political view and his interpretation of history.

5:4 Art

5:4:1 Tillich’s Theology Of Art

Tillich became interested in painting during his time as a chaplain in World War I. Palmer (Pauck and Pauck 1976:51 in Palmer 1984:3) writes: ‘For Tillich’s appreciation of painting began in the trenches, during the First World War and thus belongs to the most shattering and formative period of his life. During his four years of military service as an army chaplain, Tillich survived the offensives at Verdun, Amiens and Aisne-Marne, received the Iron Cross, sustained two nervous breakdowns, and emerged with a consciousness of suffering and death from which, so his biographers record, he never fully recovered’. Palmer (ibid:3) continues: ‘Throughout this time painting provided him with his principal means of relaxation and escape, an inevitable reaction’. Tillich (1966:27-28 in ibid:3) tells that this was due ‘to the horror, ugliness and destructiveness of war. My delight even in the poor reproductions obtainable at the military bookstores developed into a systematic study of the history of art. And out
of this study came the experience of art’. Palmer (ibid:3) relates another experience that made a great impact on Tillich during Tillich’s last furlough of World War I. Palmer (ibid:3) writes:

During his last furlough of the war, Tillich visited the Kaiser Friedrich Museum in Berlin. There he saw Botticelli’s ‘Madonna with Singing Angels’, the picture hanging alone on a wall opposite the entrance. The setting itself was dramatic and the painting’s impact on him enormous: ever afterwards Tillich was to speak of it as a moment of ‘revelation’, as an experience in which he had been grasped not only by the beauty and power of visual art but by the reality of the absolute.

Tillich (1952:13) became a Privatdozent of theology at the University of Berlin from 1919 to 1924. He tried to relate religion to other subjects of which art was one. Tillich (ibid:13) continues: ‘Revolutionary art came into the foreground, supported by the Republic, attacked by the majority of the people’. Tillich’s theology of culture was also a theology of art. Art had a great influence on Tillich during his years in as a chaplain in the German army in World War I.

In dissection, Tillich’s experience as a chaplain in World War I led to his interest in art. Tillich longed for beauty amidst the horrors of World War I. He sought relief and escape in the paintings of the military bookshops. Tillich’s interest in art and his systematic study of art resulted in a theology of art.

5:5 Freud

5:5:1 The Common Bond

During the German years, Tillich thought the ‘new depth psychology of Freud’
‘a little short of revelatory’ (Martin 1963:23). Freud was another intellectual influence upon Tillich. Tillich had been introduced to Freud’s work by Eckart Von Sydow (Pauck & Pauck 1976:75). The Paucks (ibid:223) tell us that Tillich’s interest in Freud grew ‘which he had nourished since 1919’. Tillich lectured ‘on subjects which included the relation of religion to politics, art, philosophy, depth psychology, and sociology’ (Tillich 1967:41). This was when Tillich was at the University of Berlin as a Privatdozent of theology from 1919 to 1924 (ibid:41). Tillich (ibid:41) continues: ‘I presented in my lectures on the philosophy of religion, its history and its structure. The situation during those years in Berlin was very favorable for such an enterprise…. Psychoanalytic ideas spread and produced a consciousness of realities which had been carefully repressed in previous generations’. Cooper (2006:15) explains: ‘Freud used psychological terminology and Luther used theological concepts, both pointed toward the fundamental human dilemma—the darker regions of the psyche have a multitude of maneuvers for keeping themselves unknown’. Cooper (ibid:21) continues: ‘It is Tillich’s understanding of the demonic which draws deeply from both Freud and Marx. Freud reinstated the psychological bondage of the will, which seems to reflect a kind of demonic activity’. Cooper (ibid:21) concludes: ‘Marx, on the other hand, describes the undercurrents of class conflict and economic injustice which represent social demons’. Tillich (1966:69 in Cooper 2006:21) tells of his concept of the demonic:

The only sufficient term I found was in the New Testament use of the “demonic,”
which is in stories about Jesus: similar to being possessed. That means a force, under a force, which is stronger than the individual good will. And so I used that term. Of course I emphasized very much I don’t mean in a mythological sense-as little demons or a personal Satan running around the world-but I mean it as structures which are ambiguous, both to a certain extent creative, but ultimately destructive. I had to find a term which covers the transpersonal power which takes hold of men and society.

Further, both Tillich’s existentialism and Freud’s psychoanalysis shared ‘a common revolt’ (Cooper 2006:66). This was against the philosophy of consciousness which reached its peak with Hegel. Cooper (ibid:66) continues:

The “philosophy of consciousness” takes human thought at face value. Existentialism and psychoanalysis, on the other hand, view consciousness as governed by the impulses and irrational urges beneath it….Tillich believes this conflict has gone on for centuries: Aquinas vs. Duns Scotus, Erasmus vs. Luther, Descartes vs. Pascal, Hegel vs. Kierkegaard, and so on. The philosophy of consciousness reached its zenith in Hegel, who provoked a rebellion in such masters of suspicion as Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud. Tillich, as we might suspect, highlights Schelling as a very important player in this revolt against the finality of finite reason.

In addition, both ‘existentialism and psychoanalysis are concerned with estrangement (ibid:66). Tillich (1964:116) adds: ‘now through Freud’ came ‘methodological scientific words’. Cooper (2006:66) expands and clarifies Tillich’s words: ‘Freud is especially important because he offered empirical, methodological procedures for demonstrating the power of the irrational unconsciousness. While previous thinkers had offered insightful intuition, Freud attempted to provide these intuitions with a scientific foundation’.

Armbruster (1967:15) concludes: ‘Two other intellectual movements played an important role in Tillich’s formation: existentialism and psychoanalysis’.

In brief, Tillich found in Freud confirmation for his existentialism. Freud’s thought
was taken up with the human psyche. Tillich tried to relate religion to depth psychology when
he was a Privatdozent at the University of Berlin from 1919 to 1924. Freud’s psychoanalysis
was a revolt against Hegel’s philosophy of consciousness. Tillich’s existentialism shared
the same revolt against Hegel. Both existentialism and psychoanalysis were concerned with
man’s estrangement. Tillich’s understanding of the demonic was drawn from Freud.

5:6 Heidegger

5:6:1 A New Understanding

Heidegger was another intellectual influence on Tillich’s life. Tillich came
to the University of Marburg in 1924. Heidegger was lecturing on existentialism.
Martin (1963:18) argues: ‘Heidegger himself has contributed very importantly to
Tillich’s intellectual development’. Tillich (1936:40 in Martin 1963:19) calls the
intellectual influence of Heidegger ‘upon his thinking: ‘of a prime order of magnitude’.
Achtemeier (1969:27) writes: ‘the fundamental question with which Heidegger sets
out to deal with is the question of “Being”’. Godbieba (1995:1) adds: ‘Any attempt on a
discussion about the religious status of God in postmodern philosophy of religion must
reckon with Martin Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology and its effect of questioning
all contemporary conceptions of God to the point of instability. Heidegger’s critique
of the identification of God with Being, an identification “goes without saying” for
centuries is the crucial step in the attempt to overcome metaphysics, and also influences
continental philosophy’s critique of foundations’.
Tillich (1936:39) experienced the lectures of Martin Heidegger: ‘by the appearance of the so-called “Existential Philosophy” in Germany, I was led to a new understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology. The lectures of Martin Heidegger given at Marburg, the impression of which on my Marburg students and upon some of my colleagues I experienced; then his writing Sein Und Zeit (Being and Time)’. However, Tillich subjects Heidegger’s thought on existentialism in part to Soren Kierkegaard. Bove (1995:19) recognizes this academic maneuver by Paul Tillich. Hamilton (1963:38) traces the evolution of Tillich’s thinking on the subject of existentialism. This intellectual influence reaches to both the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries: ‘Tillich regards the existentialist way of thought, reaching through Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche in the nineteenth century to Heidegger and Sartre in the twentieth, as one of the great formative influences in the evolution of his own thinking’. Baron (2003:1) admits these intellectual influences: ‘Tillich’s thought was guided by ontological/existential categories’. The proof of this came out in Robinson’s Honest to God (1963). Le Mahieu (2001:7) argues that Robinson presented God as the ‘Ground of Our Being’. His argument is that Robinson borrowed this concept from Tillich and others. Le Mahieu (ibid:7) continues: ‘Robinson adopted the existential language of Paul Tillich’.

In analysis, Heidegger gave Tillich a new understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology.
5:7 Husserl

Tillich’s Clear Philosophical Theological Thinking

Another intellectual influence on Tillich’s thinking was that of Edward Husserl. Martin (1963:19) acknowledges this intellectual source: ‘Aside from Heidegger, the modern German philosopher to whom Tillich is most indebted is probably Edmund Husserl. Husserl’s “Logische Untersuchungen” appeared to Tillich the most forceful refutation of positivism and particularly of that form of it, psychologism, which is of most significance for the philosophy of religion’. Martin (ibid:19) continues: ‘For Tillich, Husserl’s doctrine was the most satisfying confirmation of what he claims to have learned from Kant and Fichte, and to Husserl’s phenomenology he owes, as we shall observe, much of this conception of the general nature of philosophical reflection’.

In reasoning, Husserl aided Tillich’s understanding of the nature of philosophical reflection. Husserl’s phenomenology confirmed for Tillich what he had previously studied from Fichte and Kant.

5:8 Nature and Schelling

Schelling The Basis For Tillich’s Theology

Tillich had a romantic relation to nature. Tillich (1952:3-4) admits his early years in Schonfliess-Neumark, and in Konigsberg-Neumark ‘may partly account for what has been challenged as the romantic trend in my feeling and thinking’. Tillich (ibid:4) continues: ‘It is expressed in a predominantly aesthetic-meditative attitude
toward nature as distinguished from a scientific-analytical or technical-controlling relation. It is the reason for the tremendous emotional impact that Schelling’s philosophy of nature made upon me- although I was well aware that this philosophy was scientifically impossible. It is theologically formulated in my doctrine of the participation of nature in the process of fall and salvation’. Tillich (ibid:4) points to three possible causes that account for his romanticism to nature. Tillich (ibid:4) writes: ‘First, I find the actual communication with nature daily in my early years, in my later years for several months of every year’. Tillich (ibid:5) adds: ‘A second cause of the romantic relation to nature is the impact of poetry. The German poetic literature, even aside from the romantic school, is full of expressions of nature mysticism. There are verses of Goethe, Holderlin, Novalis, Eichendorff, Nietzsche, George, and Rilke which never have ceased to move me as deeply as they did when I first heard them’. Tillich (ibid:5) continues:

A third cause of this attitude toward nature came out of my Lutheran background. Theologians, know that one of the points of disagreement between the two wings of the Continental Reformation, the Lutheran and the Reformed, was the so called “Extra Calvinisticum,” the doctrine that the finite is not capable of the infinite. (non capax infiniti), and that consequently in Christ the two natures, the divine and the human, remain outside each other. Against this doctrine the Lutherans asserted the “Infra Lutheranum”; namely, the view that the finite is capable of the infinite, and consequently that in Christ there is a mutual indwelling of the two natures. The difference means that on Lutheran ground the vision of the presence of the infinite in everything finite was theologically affirmed, that nature mysticism was possible and real, whereas on Calvinistic ground such an attitude is suspect of pantheism and the divine transcendence is understood in a way which for a Lutheran is suspect of deism.
Tillich (ibid:5) concludes: ‘Romanticism means not only a special relation to nature; it means also a special relation to history. To grow up in towns in which every stone is witness of a period many centuries past produces a feeling of history, not as a matter of knowledge, but as a living reality in which the past participates in the present’.

Tillich (ibid:4) admits the tremendous emotional impact that Schelling’s Christian philosophy of nature made upon him. Tillich’s (1936:7) own autobiography bears out the truth of this point: ‘Schelling’s Philosophy of Nature, which I read in a state of intoxication, as it were, surrounded by the beauties of nature became for me the direct expression of this feeling for nature’. Schelling was the subject of Tillich’s doctoral dissertation and his Licentiate in Theology. Tillich (1966:47) writes: ‘I read through his collected works several times, and eventually made his work the subject of my dissertations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and Licentiate of Theology’. Walter Leibrecht (1972:25) writes: ‘But follows …Schelling where he visualizes both otherness and being dynamically united in ultimate reality. It is the awareness of this problem which has led Tillich to venture a new synthesis, witnessed to the final identity in the ultimate ground’. Hutchinson (1953:138) draws our attention to the intellectual influence of Schelling on Tillich. He claimed Schelling advocated the ‘Existentialist protest’ long before Kierkegaard. Tillich denotes the importance of Schelling’s work in his work, On The Boundary. Tillich (1966:56) highlights Schelling’s Christian philosophy of existence as one of the factors that caused him to accept the existential position. Schelling’s philosophy of existence was derived from Jacob Bohme.
Tillich (1936:54-55) writes of Bohme’s influence: ‘With him as mediator, Lutheran Mysticism had an influence on Schelling and German Idealism, and through Schelling, again on Irrationalism and the philosophy of life of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’. The Paucks (1976:175) add that Tillich was a Christian thinker who held the religious views of Schelling. Tillich (1936:31) admitted that Schelling had become the basis for this thought and development. Falk (1961:1-28) argues that Tillich relied heavily on Schelling’s *The Ages of the World*. Falk (ibid:26-27) is referring to Tillich’s second dissertation for the degree of Licentiate in Theology. Russell Re Manning (2005:77-83) affirms Schelling’s Christian metaphysical theology to be Tillich’s position. Tillich (1936:35) admits that Schelling had become the basis for his theonomous philosophy. Tillich (ibid:37) was able to interpret Nietzsche’s philosophy of life because of Schelling. Tillich (ibid:37) writes: ‘The historical dependence of the philosophy of life on Schelling made it easy for me to approach it’. Wheat (1970:102) acknowledges Tillich’s reliance on Schelling: ‘Tillich read Schelling’s collected works through several times as a student and wrote two dissertations (1911 and 1912) dealing with Schelling’s thought’. Wheat (ibid:214) argues that Tillich outlined Schelling’s thought ‘in mysticism and theism’. God is man who was mediated to Tillich by Schelling (ibid:188). Wheat concludes by arguing that Tillich copied Schelling (ibid:262). Scharlemann (2006:225) reviewed Tillich’s two dissertations on Schelling. He argues that Schelling was as much a contributor to theology as he was to philosophy. Tillich (ibid:225) was ‘centrally occupied with the principle of identity’ based on Schelling’s thought. Carey (2002:14) argues:
The concept of God was likewise a rich area for Tillich (see, for example, his Systematic Theology, volume 1) and is obviously an area in which he made a major contribution to twentieth-century theology. Tillich, however, drew on a wide variety of sources as he tried to understand the problem of God. He was indebted to the German idealistic philosopher Friedrich Schelling.

Carey misses the essence of Schelling’s Christian thought. He does argue for Tillich’s debt to Schelling which is important for our chapter on the influences on Tillich during the German years (1886 to 1933). Carey (ibid:21) adds: ‘Scholars have tended therefore to probe his relationship to Schelling’. Tillich made Schelling’s Christian philosophy his own thought.

In judgment, Tillich’s romanticism to nature determined the romantic trend in his thinking. Romanticism is defined as an ‘aesthetic-meditative attitude to nature’. Tillich’s daily communication with nature, German poetry, and his Lutheran background account for his romanticism to nature. Romanticism meant as well a interest in history. Tillich attributes this to the medieval towns in which he grew up. Schelling’s Christian philosophy of nature expressed Tillich’s romanticism to nature. Schelling became the subject of both Tillich’s doctoral dissertation, and his Licentitate of Theology. Schelling’s views made it possible for Tillich to accept the existential position. Tillich’s own admission is that Schelling had become the basis for his thought and development. Schelling’s Christian metaphysical theology became Tillich’s religious views. The Paucks, Falk, Re Manning, Wheat, Scharlemann, and Carey argue for Tillich’s reliance on Schelling’s thought.
Another intellectual influence on Paul Tillich was Jacob Bohme. Tillich (1966:75) calls him the ‘philosophical spokesman for German mysticism’. Bohme’s thought was an elaboration of mystical Lutheranism (ibid:75). It was through Bohme that Lutheran mysticism influenced both Schelling, German Idealism, and in turn Tillich. Schelling’s work was derived from Bohme. Tillich’s work was derived from Schelling’s Christian philosophy (ibid:75). Adams (1965:32) writes: ‘The concepts “ground” and “abyss” stem from Jacob Boehme. As we shall observe again and again, Boehme is a major source for certain crucial elements in Tillich’s outlook’. Carey (2002:14) writes: ‘He was indebted…, to the German mystic Jakob Bohme’.

In analysis, Jacob Bohme advocated Lutheran mysticism. Bohme’s German Christian mysticism influenced the thinking of Schelling, German Idealism, and Tillich. Tillich derived his concepts of ground and abyss from Bohme. Bohme was another major source for Tillich’s views.
5:10  Barth

5:10:1  Barth’s Supernaturalism Rejected By Tillich

Tillich stood with Barth in the dialectical movement (Horton 1952:26). Horton (ibid:26-27) writes:

As an associate of Karl Barth in the “dialectical theology” movement, and later as a critic of Barth, he left a mark upon Continental theology which years of absence have not obliterated….The term “neo-orthodox” is becoming canonical to designate the position of Karl Barth and other contemporary theologians who undertake to correct modern theology by going back to the Protestant Reformers. Since Tillich owes much to Luther, and since he undoubtedly considered himself an associate of Barth in the early days of “dialectical theology,” this would seem to entitle us to pin the label “neo-orthodox” on him, too.

Horton (ibid:27) states: ‘His article in Kant-Studien, XXVII (1922), where he speaks (p.447) of his “spiritual comradeship” with Barth and Gogarten in a theology of “paradox” to which they and he had independently been led. Barth, Tillich, and Otto Piper belonged to the group of theologians called progressives after World War I’. Horton (ibid:28) clarifies for us:

It is far more appropriate to consider Tillich as a “progressive” than as an “orthodox” of any kind. His autobiographical introduction to “The Interpretation of History” points out that “precisely in the protest against the Protestant orthodoxy (even in its moderate form of the nineteenth century) I had won my way through to autonomy.”… This fear of a new orthodoxy was one of the causes of his eventual break with Barth. [T]illich makes it very clear that he has never completely repudiated liberalism either in the economic-political sense or in the theological sense.

Tillich rejected any intellectual influence that would have been derived from either Karl Barth or Emmanuel Hirsch. It was both Hirsch and Barth who opposed socialism (Tillich 1966:76). Adams (1965:19) argues that Tillich ‘radically criticized Barthianism’. Tillich thought Barth deficient because of his reliance on the thinking of Immanuel Kant. Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ for Tillich was too abstract. It gave no importance to facing ‘the
present concretely’ (ibid:20). Cremer points to an article that Tillich wrote in 1923, in which he uses both Marx and Nietzsche to refute Barth. Cremer (1995:295) writes:

In an article entitled “Critical and Positive Paradox,” written in 1923, Tillich attacked the unending and unresolved nature of the Barthian dialectic. He claimed that there must be some point of reference, an absoluteness that is not purely transcendent but reachable in part by human consciousness, despite the fact that Barth ‘s dialectic theology forbade such a conception of the ineffable. The dialectic itself, Tillich claimed was not absolute, and therefore there must be an unconditioned starting point.

In examination, any religious sentimentalism with Karl Barth was short lived. Tillich rejected Barth’s supernaturalism. Further, Barth opposed the religious socialism which Tillich advocated. Tillich became a radical opponent of Karl Barth and his neo-orthodox theology.

5:11 Hegel

5:11:1 Hegel Rejected By Tillich

Tillich uses both Feuerbach and Marx to refute Hegelianism’s lack of social concern (Adams 1965:22). Tillich’s (1966:56) ontology is not derived from the Hegelian categories. Leibrecht (1972:25) argues that Tillich did follow Hegel’s thinking. This was ‘in terms of eternal separation of spirit from itself and its eternal return to itself within the divine ‘ (ibid:25). Leibrecht (ibid:25) develops his argument by saying: ‘His thought comes to Hegel again in his deeper insights penetrating to an essential metaphysics in describing the essential structures of being’. Tillich’s use of such terminology such as ‘synthesis’ demonstrates
the intellectual influence of Hegel upon his life and thought (ibid:25). Wheat (1970:102) argues for many of Tillich’s concepts to be derived from Hegel. The concept of self-transcendence that Tillich uses is also used by Hegel (ibid:102). Tillich’s thought emphasizes the concept of the dialectic. Tillich spoke of Hegel’s concept of the ‘great synthesis’. It was Hegel who put forward the idea of thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis (ibid:105).

John Powell Clayton (1980:132-133) recognized Tillich’s use of Hegel’s thought. Clayton (ibid:135) adds: ‘Even though Tillich’s theory of culture is not simply Hegelian, he was nonetheless much influenced by the tradition in which culture was principally Geistesleben’. Tillich ‘even before entering the University...became acquainted with...Hegel’ (Thomas 1963:11). Clayton (1980:135) speaking of Tillich’s relationship to Hegel ‘even when he criticized the idealist tradition, Tillich remained tangled to some extent in its web’.

Hegelian ideas remained popular in Germany after 1860 (Bentley 1999:86). Rowse (1948:120) characterized Hegel’s thought as transcendental, ‘absolute in character’, and the primal ‘Idea’. Hegel analyzed art, and aesthetics. He taught earlier at the University of Frankfurt where Tillich was a professor from 1929 to 1933 (Harris 1996:34). Stumme (1977:xviii) argues that it was Tillich’s ‘intention to return to the Hegelian sources of the Marxist dialectic and to reconstruct socialist theory on this basis’. Tillich rejected Hegel’s political views. Tillich viewed Hegel as an agent of the German state. He (ibid:80) writes: ‘Hegel’s effort to establish a philosophical foundation for positive Christianity, especially his ambiguous Christology, was the most important alliance of bourgeoisie and feudalism’. Tillich (1952:11) does confirm a ‘decisive break’ from Hegel:

Another prelude to the things to come occurred in the period between my student
years and the beginning of the First World War. It was the encounter with Schelling’s second period, especially with his so-called “positive philosophy.” Here lies the philosophically decisive break with Hegel, and the beginning of that movement which is today Existentialism. I was ready for it when it appeared in full strength after the First World War, and I saw it in the light of the general revolt against Hegel’s system of reconciliation which occurred in the decades after Hegel’s death, and which through Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche has become decisive for the destiny of the twentieth century.

Niebuhr (1952:217) argues for the difference between Tillich and Hegel based on Tillich’s Systematic Theology, vol. 1. He (ibid:217) writes:

Paul Tillich’s magnum opus, his Systematic Theology, of which unfortunately only the first volume is available at the time this analysis of his work is attempted, will become a landmark in history of modern theology for two reasons. First, his ontological speculations are more rigorous and include all of the disciplines of culture more imaginatively than anything which has been done in the realm of philosophy of religion or natural theology in our day or in many decades. Secondly, it distinguishes itself from the natural theology inspired by Hegel and Kant in the past two centuries by a fuller appreciation of the limits of reason in penetrating to the ultimate mystery or in comprehending the mystery of human existence.

Tillich (1964:84) writes: ‘Schelling calls the claim of Hegel’s rational system to embrace not only the real, the What, but also its reality, the That, a “deception.” No ‘merely logical process is also a process of real becoming’. John Carey (2002:14) claims Tillich ‘was indebted …to Georg Hegel as he combined the categories of biblical faith with issues raised by Western philosophy. Tillich felt that one could grasp the mystery of the Divine through the Judeo-Christian tradition and also through various philosophical systems’.

In evaluation, Tillich and Hegel may have used similar terminology. Tillich had studied Hegel’s thought. Tillich viewed Hegel as an agent of the German state. He perceived Hegel as a promoter of the alliance between the bourgeoisie and feudalism.
Tillich maintained that Schelling’s thought made it possible to relinquish Hegel between his student years and the beginning of World War I. Those who promote Hegel’s influence on Tillich do so from a rationalistic perspective.

5:12 Nietzsche

5:12:1 Nietzsche Accepted Because Of Schelling

Another intellectual influence on Tillich’s thinking was Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s thought contained revolutionary romanticism (Tillich 1977:38-39). Tillich (1966:56) was very enthusiastic about Nietzsche’s ‘philosophy of life’. Hutchinson (1953:141) confirms Tillich’s words:

It was in the name of life that Nietzsche fought against the “nihilism” of the technical culture. Many followed him in all spheres of spiritual creativity. He and the movement of which he is the most conspicuous symbol saw more clearly than Kierkegaard and Marx the deepest roots of the dehumanizing and depersonalizing implications of modern society.

Tillich’s doctrine of ‘will to power’ is Nietzsche’s thought of ‘the self-affirmation of life’. This is the ability of one to affirm one’s own existence in life (ibid:142). Nuovo (1987:21) acknowledges Tillich’s fascination with ‘Nietzsche’s concept of the creative’.

Tillich (1966:54) writes:

The ecstatic influence of existence so prevalent after the war as a reaction against the wartime years of death and hunger made Nietzsche’s affirmation of life very attractive. Because it is, at least partly, historically rooted in Schelling’s thought, I could readily accept it. I might well have developed my philosophy along these lines, incorporating pagan elements instead of Jewish and Catholic motifs; but the experience of the German revolution of 1918 decisively redirected my concerns toward a sociologically based and politically oriented philosophy of history.
Nietzsche’s thought was acceptable to Tillich because it was ‘partly, historically rooted in Schelling’s thought’ (ibid:54). Carey (2002:55) adds: ‘In this typology Tillich clearly sides with the philosophers of life...Nietzsche’.

Logically, Tillich found Nietzsche’s thought very attractive. Nietzsche’s revolutionary romanticism, his philosophy of life, the concepts of the self-affirmation of life, and the creative were acceptable to Tillich because of its historical roots in Schelling. Nietzsche’s thought was evaluated based on Schelling. Tillich sided with the philosophers of life.

5:13 Buber

5:13:1 Tillich And Buber A Common Background

Diamond (1967:244) argues Buber and Tillich had ‘much in common in the way of background and perspective’. Novak (1992:159) emphasises: ‘As a model for Jewish-Christian dialogue, this role that Buber played for Tillich’s own thought is not to be underestimated’. Novak refers to an incident that took place back in the 1920’s in Germany at ‘a conference of religious socialists’. Tillich had wanted to change the name God and find a word to replace it. Buber replied: ‘Aber Gott ist ein Urwort! (God is a primordial word!’) (ibid:159). Tillich (1936:46-47) writes:

Wherever the question of the language of the Christian gospel is taken seriously, for example in the Neuwerk-Kreis, and in the magazine of the same name, edited by my old friend and fellow-combatant, Herman Schafft, great difficulties arise. It
is certain that the original religious terminology, as it is used in the Bible and in the
liturgies of the Ancient church, cannot be supplanted. There are religious original
or archetypal words (Urworte) of mankind, as Martin Buber remarked to me some
time ago. But these original or archetypal words have been robbed of their original
power by our objective thinking, and the scientific conception of the world, and thus,
have become subject to dissolution. In face of what the archetypal word “God” means,
rational criticism is powerless. In face of an objectively existing God, atheism is right.
A situation is hopeless and meaningless in which the speaker means the original word,
and the listener hears the objective word. Thus, we may understand the proposal which
is meant symbolically rather than literally, that the church impose a thirty-year silence
upon all of its archetypal words. But if it should do this, as it did in a few instances,
it would be necessary to develop a new terminology.

In interacting, Buber and Tillich shared a German background, religious socialism,
and the question of the language of the Christian gospel. Buber stimulated Tillich’s thinking
on the language of the Christian gospel.

5:14 Troeltsch

5:14:1 Troeltsch Influences Tillich’s Christian History of Philosophy

Tillich’s thought was intellectually influenced by Troeltsch. Tillich used Troeltsch’s
thought as the basis for the furtherance and development of his own thinking. Tillich
(1966:54-55) writes:

My study of Troeltsch had paved the way for this change of direction. I clearly remember
the statement he made during his first Berlin lecture on the philosophy of history,
claiming that his was the first philosophical treatment of this subject at the University of
Berlin since Hegel’s death. Although we were to a great extent agreed about the problems
involved, I repudiated his idealistic point of departure. Troeltsch’s idealism made it
impossible for him to overcome what he called historicism, against which he fought.
Historicism could be overcome only by a generation that had been forced to make
fundamental historical decisions. In light of the necessity of facing history squarely
-a demand that is both grounded in and limited by the Christian paradox-I sought to
develop a philosophy of history that could become also a philosophy of religious
socialism.

Tillich rejected Troeltsch’s idealism. Tillich developed a philosophy of history which lent itself to a Christian philosophy of religious socialism (ibid:54-55). Siegfried (1952:68-69) draws a further clarification between Troeltsch and Tillich. Siegfried (ibid:68-69) writes:

The medieval theologians in their all-embracing “Summae,” fulfilled the want in a classical way. The Reformers gave it a new impetus through their doctrine of the “two realms,” which liberated the secular realm from ecclesiastical control and related it directly to God as an expression of his creative power. This is the basis of the idea of a “theonomous culture” which plays such a role in Tillich’s thought. German classical philosophy elaborated this idea, and liberal theology (from Schleiermacher to Harnack and Troeltsch) followed its lead. The difference between Tillich on the one hand, and idealism and liberal theology, on the other, was from the very beginning his emphasis on a radical criticism of culture as such, and not only of particular manifestations of man’s cultural life. The Yes and No of the Unconditional over against everything human was understood in its full depth, according to the interpretation of the Unconditional not only as the ground, but also as the abyss of everything finite. In this point Tillich is only partly at odds with the liberal theology, for liberals like Wobbermin and Harnack have seriously warned of the optimism of the late nineteenth century, and have pointed to the critical function of Protestantism in a world of unavoidable fragments and distortions. …Tillich has always tried to relate theology and ontology; furthermore, he has elaborated an ontology of his own in order to show how all realms of reality are translucent to the divine ground of being and meaning.

Siegfried (ibid:71) continues:

The spiritual shock produced by the catastrophes of the First World War drove members of the older as well as the younger generation in Germany to look for a radical reorientation in all realms of life. This is true of the liberal theologians who much earlier had created the Evangelical Social Congress, and who, at this critical moment, tried to transform it into a tool for a democratic and social renewal. Men like Rade, the editor of Die Christliche Welt (the German counterpart of The Christian Century), Adolph Harnack, Ernst Troeltsch, and Rudolf Otto belonged to their group. But the younger generation, of whom Tillich was one of the leaders, reached beyond the limited goal of a political and social reform. The reality and power of the socialist movement grasped their imagination. They joined the attacks on the bourgeois world and did so just at the moment in which the socialist movement, after having been excluded in imperial Germany from any participation in political responsibility, was obliged to take over the full responsibility in the most tragic
moment of German history.

Tillich represented something more magnificent the splendor of religious socialism explained ‘in religious terms’ (ibid:71).

In assaying, Troeltsch’s influence is seen in helping Tillich define his Christian philosophy of history. Tillich’s Christian philosophy was a Christian philosophy of the history the Christian philosophy of the history of religious socialism.

5:15 Luther

5:15:1 Similarities Between Tillich And Luther’s Theology

Horton (1952:27) argues that Tillich ‘owes much to Luther’. The similarities between Luther and Tillich are those that fit within Tillich’s religious socialism. Tillich and Luther thought human nature to be ‘finite freedom’ (Siegfried 1952:81). A further comparision between Tillich and Luther would be ‘Luther’s intuition of the relativity of all social orders’ (ibid:81). Tillich and Luther spoke on the subject of ethics. Tillich’s comments compared to Luther are ‘in broad and general terms’ (Thomas 1952:92). Luther’s ‘justification by faith’ and the authority of the Bible though relative, for Tillich was ‘the ‘New Being’ in Jesus as the Christ’ (ibid:94). Carey (2002:9) points out four areas of ‘affinities between Luther and Tillich’. Carey (ibid:9-20) lists the theological method, concept of God, the human condition, and the concept of justification. Carey (ibid:9,12) writes:

The issue of theological method needs to be discussed primarily because of the study by Wayne G. Johnson, Theological Method in Luther and Tillich. This book was Johnson’s doctoral dissertation at the University of Iowa and argues the thesis that there is a general
similarity between Luther’s theological method and that of Tillich. It is an open question in Luther scholarship whether Luther in fact had a clearly defined theological method. Johnson argues, however, that the key for Luther as a theologian was his understanding of law and gospel…[W]hat evidence…Tillich’s method of correlation is in fact similar to (or derives from) Luther’s working hypothesis of law and gospel?...I do not think Johnson establishes this case in his book, and in his…*Systematic Theology* Tillich never refers to law-and-gospel scheme.

Carey (ibid:10) argues that the Law was God’s commands in the Decalogue and at other places in the Pentateuch. Luther felt as well it was ‘that natural law of God…broadly written on the minds of all persons everywhere’. The Law had two uses one was civil and the other usage was theological (ibid:10). Carey (ibid:11) elaborates on Tillich’s theological method:

> Tillich took the problem of theological method more seriously than did Luther because he struggled with some ambiguities Luther did not feel. Tillich was also more interested than Luther ever was in the philosophical issues related to the nature of theological language and religious knowledge. In a formal sense, I would argue that Tillich is actually closer to Thomas Aquinas than to Luther in theological method.

Tillich and Luther are similar in their theological method because: ‘Both thinkers, for example, are persuaded that theology is tied to the human experience and that in our experience we can know the saving reality of God’ (ibid:12). Further, both Tillich and Luther believed that theology is existential dealing with the ‘profound issues of life’ (ibid:12). Carey (ibid:12) points to the concept of God. Luther argued against the rationalistic concept of God that God was ‘sheer will’(ibid:13). Luther believed the theme of the sovereignty of God, God’s presence through creation, God’s absolute power, God’s attributes both hidden and revealed. Luther spoke against idols. Luther’s problems dealt with the Medieval church and Rome’s authority (ibid:13-14). The concept of God was ‘a rich area for Tillich’ (ibid:14). Carey (ibid:14) adds: ‘In his approach to “God language,” Tillich was clearly concerned to move
beyond the inadequate theistic understandings of God (that is, God as a person or as a being) and to press for a larger and more comprehensive understandings of God. Tillich understood that the biblical concept of transcendence needed to be replaced with more adequate metaphors that can do justice to a scientific understanding of the universe’. The concept of the demonic was involved in Tillich’s concept of God. Carey (ibid:14) writes: ‘Tillich insisted that the Divine contained within itself the element of nonbeing as well as being’. Carey (ibid:14) continues: ‘This is a relative type of nonbeing as opposed to an absolute type of nonbeing, but is an insight through which Tillich thought one could understand the elements of mystery and depth in the Deity. There is an irrational dimension in the Divine’. Carey (ibid:15) concludes: ‘Tillich felt a clear affinity with Luther concerning the irrational, hidden, mysterious dimension of God’. Luther’s theme ‘God alone is God’ is seen in Tillich’s concept the ‘Protestant Principle’ (ibid:15). A third similarity between Tillich and Luther is ‘in their understanding of the human situation’ (ibid:16). Luther believed in the total ‘fallenness’ of man (ibid:16). Luther thought man was ‘enslaved by demonic forces’ (ibid:16). Man’s will was not able ‘to cooperate with God’ (ibid:16). Tillich described the human situation by the terms ‘estrangement’ and ‘alienation’ (ibid:17). The fourth area of similarity between Luther and Tillich is in the area of justification (ibid:18). Carey (ibid18) writes: ‘Briefly put, Luther—drawing heavily on the apostle Paul—felt that our deliverance from sin is a free act of God’. Carey (ibid:19) writes of Tillich’s thought on justification: ‘Tillich stands very close to Luther on the matter of justification, but again uses a different vocabulary’.

In evaluating, similarities of thought do exist between Luther and Tillich. These fit
Tillich’s religious socialism. These similarities are human nature as finite freedom, Luther’s intuition of relativity of social orders, Luther’s justification by faith is Tillich’s New Being in Jesus and the Protestant principle, theological method, the concept of God, and the human condition. Tillich and Luther thought theology tied to human experience. Theology is existential. Luther argued against the rationalistic concept of God. Luther and Tillich’s affinity can be seen as well in their concept of the irrational, the hidden, and the mysterious. They had a similar belief concerning man’s situation. Luther believed in man’s fallenness. Tillich used the terms estrangement and alienation to describe the same.

5:16 The Man Tillich

5:16:1 Tillich’s Exceptional Interpersonal Skills

Ratschow argues that ‘Tillich was able to transcend the problems of his time’ (Carey 2002:135). It was Tillich’s ability to assess and make value judgments which were based on his historical context of Germany in the 1920’s and 1930’s (ibid:39). Carey’s (ibid:39) point is well taken: ‘It is important, however, to note how Tillich appraised the strengths and weaknesses of the theological left and right, and how he assessed both in the light of the Christian claim’. Carr (1961:76) adds that moral judgments occur within ‘a conceptual framework which is itself the creation of history’. Tillich (1952:13-14) argues in terms of environment and social forces rather than personality or his ability to make value judgments. Ratschow (1980:8) argues:

He appropriated the problems of his generation in an extremely personal way. He worked them out as his destiny. One can also say that Tillich identified himself completely with the problems of his generation even though they
affected others more strongly and more deeply than him.

Ratschow (ibid:8) continues: ‘Tillich identified himself with everything he met….It was these identifications which led to the consequence that everyone who met him believed himself to be quite specifically and quite exclusively the one about whom Tillich was concerned and that never had he been so well understood by another human being as here by Tillich’. Ratschow (ibid:8) elaborates further: ‘In such identifications one thing was quite decisive. Personal meetings with Tillich always ran their course completely without any aggression on Tillich’s side’. Ratschow (ibid:8) adds: ‘That is also a striking feature in his works—they contain no polemics or surreptitious defensiveness’. Ratschow adds an interesting point on how Tillich handled objections. He (ibid:9) writes:

He sought to understand questioners and to grasp critical objections correctly while himself learning in the process. Because Tillich devoted himself completely to those whom he met and opened himself without mental reservations, such an identification could take place. One can also put it thus: Tillich entered fully and completely into the situation of the one with whom he was in contact. The magic of his person lay in the seriousness of this devotion.

Ratschow (ibid:34) concludes:

On this point, one must indeed say that Tillich wrote his apologetic theology strictly for his time. But in doing this, he transcended the questions of the time toward their solution. In them, he arrived at concepts of so great human depth that they can be intelligible to every time, even though what is involved is a humanity and a human spirituality which as such can prove to be time bound

In analyzing the material, the problems of Tillich’s time influenced him. Tillich was able to analyze the problems of his generation. He provided a working solution for these problems. This became for Tillich his destiny. Tillich was very personable in his identifications with others. Tillich was focused and devoted to those he met. Tillich wrote
an apologetic theology which Ratschow thought good only for Tillich’s German generations.

5:17 Summary

The views of Kierkegaard and Marx influenced Tillich’s existential and political theology. Tillich’s political theology was formed as well from the Old Testament prophets. It was their spirit of prophetic criticism that Tillich saw in Marx. Schelling’s Christian philosophy became the basis for Tillich’s Christian theology. Tillich’s books The Religious Situation and The Socialist Decision are evidences of Tillich’s commitment to religious socialism.

Tillich’s experience as a chaplain in the German army in World War I led Tillich to accept the views of Karl Marx. His army experience was the beginning of his theology of art. He longed for beauty and an escape amidst the horrors and suffering of the First World War.

Tillich found in Freud confirmation for his theology of existentialism, and a shared revolt against Hegel’s philosophy of consciousness. Existentialism and psychoanalysis were concerned with man’s estrangement. Tillich’s doctrine of the demonic was drawn from Freud’s thinking.

Heidegger gave Tillich a new understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Husserl’s thought confirmed Tillich’s previous study of Fichte and Kant. Husserl aided Tillich’s understanding of the nature of philosophical reflection. Tillich’s greatest influence was his romanticism to nature, and the Christian philosophy of Schelling. Bohme’s Lutheran mysticism completed Tillich’s Christian
metaphysical theology. Tillich rejected Barthianism. Tillich became a radical opponent of Karl Barth. Hegel and Tillich may have used similar terminology. Hegel was viewed by Tillich as a promoter of the alliance between the bourgeoisie and feudalism. Tillich was able to discard Hegel because of Schelling’s thought. Nietzsche’s thought was accepted by Tillich because it had historical roots in Schelling. Tillich sided with the philosophers of life. Buber was a stimulus to Tillich’s thinking on the language of the Christian gospel. Troeltsch helped Tillich define what his philosophy of history should be a Christian philosophy of the history of religious socialism. Luther’s influence on Tillich can only be seen in terms of similarities. These similarities are those which fit within Tillich’s religious socialism, political, and existential theology.

Tillich analyzed the problems of his time. He developed a working solution which became his destiny. Tillich had great interpersonal skills.

Schelling and Bohme had the greatest influence on Tillich in determining his Christian theological views. Tillich maintained that Schelling had discovered existentialism long before Kierkegaard. Marx had the greatest influence on Tillich in terms of determining Tillich’s political theology. The sequence of our thesis moves now to consider the Tillich legacy from the German years.