CHAPTER 1

PAUL TILLICH’S CHRONOLOGY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY

1:1 A Historical Frame of Reference

1:1:1 Tillich’s Background Was German

Paul Tillich’s German years 1886 to 1933 are necessary to understand his life, thought, and legacy. This chapter sets forth Tillich’s chronology and his autobiography. A historical frame of reference will be established based on Tillich’s own chronology and autobiography. An accurate philosophy will then be able to be drawn on Paul Tillich.

Tillich (1967:23-24) was born on August 20, 1886 in Starzeddel, Germany. He attended the humanistic Gymnasium in Konigsberg-Neumark from 1898 to 1900. He (ibid:24) writes: ‘from my twelfth to fourteenth year, I stayed as a pupil of the humanistic Gymnasium, and as a border of two elderly ladies, in Konigsberg-Neumark, a town of seven thousand people with the same kind of medieval remains but bigger and more famous for their Gothic perfection’. In 1900, Tillich’s father Johannes ‘was called to an important position in Berlin’ (ibid:29). Tillich (ibid:33) elaborates on the move to Berlin and his development to the year 1914:

I became a pupil at a humanistic Gymnasium in Old Berlin, passed my final examinations in 1904, and was matriculated in the theological faculties of Berlin, Tubingen, and Halle. In 1909 I took my first, in 1911 my second theological examination. In 1911 I acquired the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Breslau and in 1912 the degree of Licentiate of Theology in Halle. In the latter year I received ordination into the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the province of Brandenburg. Tillich joined the German Army as a war chaplain in 1914.
Tillich continues on the First World War and his position as chaplain. He (ibid:38-39) writes:

The First World War was the end of my period of preparation. Together with my whole generation I was grasped by the overwhelming experience of a nationwide community—the end of a merely individualistic and predominantly theoretical existence. I volunteered and was asked to serve as a war chaplain, which I did from September 1914 to September 1918.

Tillich (ibid:39) continues on the reality of the First World War:

The first weeks had not passed before my original enthusiasm disappeared; after a few months I became convinced that the war would last indefinitely and ruin all Europe. Above all, I saw that the unity of the first weeks was an illusion, that the nation was split into classes, and that the industrial masses considered the Church as an unquestioned ally of the ruling groups. This situation became more and more manifest toward the end of the war. It produced the revolution, in which imperial Germany collapsed. The way in which this situation produced the religious-socialist movement in Germany has often been described. I want, however, to add a few reflections. I was in sympathy with the social side of the revolution even before 1918, that side which soon was killed by the interference of the victors, by weakness of the socialists and their need to use the Army against the communists; also by inflation and the return of all the reactionary powers in the middle of the Twenties.

His academic career in Germany was as follows: ‘I was Lecturer in Theology in Berlin, Professor of the Science of Religion in Dresden and Professor Honorarius of Theology in Leipzig, Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-Main’ (Tillich 1966:58). Tillich omits the Marburg years from this description. He (1952:14) writes of the Marburg years:

It was a benefit when, after almost five years in Berlin, my friendly adviser, the minister of education, Karl Becker, forced me against my desire into a theological professorship in Marburg. During the three semesters of my teaching there I met the first radical effects of the neo-orthodox theology on theological students: cultural problems were excluded from theological thought; theologians like Schleiermacher, Harnack, Troeltsch, Otto, were contemptuously rejected; social and political ideas were banned from theological discussions. The contrast with the experiences in Berlin was overwhelming, at first depressing and then
inciting: a new way had to be found. In Marburg, in 1925, I began work on my Systematic Theology, the first volume of which appeared in 1951. At the same time that Heidegger was in Marburg as professor of philosophy, influencing some of the best students, existentialism in its twentieth century form crossed my path. It took years before I became fully aware of the impact of this encounter on my own thinking. I resisted, I tried to learn, I accepted the new way of thinking more than the answers it gave.

Tillich was ‘Privatdozent of theology at the University of Berlin (from 1919 to 1924)’ (ibid:13). Tillich taught at Marburg for three semesters beginning in 1924 (1952:14). In 1925, Tillich ‘was called to Dresden and shortly afterward to Leipzig’ (ibid:14). In 1929, Paul Tillich received a call to the University of Frankfurt (ibid:14). It was in April of 1933 that Tillich was dismissed from his teaching post at Frankfurt. Tillich left Germany arriving in the United States on November 3, 1933 (Pauck & Pauck 1976:138-139).

Tillich (1967:41-42) writes of his experience at Berlin from 1919 to 1924:

As a Privatdozent of Theology at the University of Berlin from (1919 to 1924), I lectured on subjects which included the relation of religion to politics, art, philosophy, depth psychology, and sociology. It was a “theology of culture” that I presented in my lectures on the philosophy of religion, its history and its structure. The situation during those years in Berlin was very favorable for such an enterprise. Political problems determined our whole existence; even after revolution and inflation they were matters of life and death. The social structure was in a state of dissolution; human relations with respect to authority, education family, sex, friendship, and pleasure were in a creative chaos. Revolutionary art came into the foreground, supported by the Republic, attacked by the majority of the people. Psychoanalytic ideas spread and produced a consciousness of realities which had been carefully repressed in previous generations. Participation in these movements created manifold problems, conflicts, fears, expectations, ecstasies, and despairs, practically as well as theoretically. All this was at the same time material for an apologetic theology.

Professor Tillich (ibid:43) tells of his experience at Dresden in 1925:
I was called to Dresden and shortly thereafter to Leipzig also. I went to Dresden, declining a more traditional theological position in Giessen because of the openness of the big city both spatially and culturally. Dresden was a center of visual art, painting, architecture, dance, opera, with all of which I kept in close touch.

Tillich (ibid:43) continues on the call to Frankfurt:

The cultural situation was not much different when, in 1929, I received and accepted a call as professor of philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. Frankfurt was the most modern and liberal university in Germany, but it had no theological faculty. So it was quite appropriate that my lectures moved on the boundary line between philosophy and theology and tried to make philosophy existential for the numerous students who were obliged to take the philosophical classes.

In another autobiography, Tillich (1936:40) concludes on his degrees and academic career:

my professional career: Doctor of Philosophy in Breslau, Licentiate of Theology and later Doctor of Theology (honoris causa) in Halle; Privat Dozent of Theology in Halle and Berlin; Professor of the Science of Religion in Dresden and at the same time Professor Honorarius of Theology in Leipzig; Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-the-Main.

In this version of his autobiography, Tillich (ibid:40) references an honorary doctorate in theology from Halle. He claims he was Privatdozent of Theology at Halle and Berlin. (ibid:40). Tillich’s (1948:ix-xxix) The Protestant Era is silent on both his honorary doctorate and his position at Halle. In his 1952 account, Tillich’s position is as ‘Privatdozent of theology at the University of Berlin (from 1919 to 1924)’ (Tillich 1952:13). In his 1966 autobiography, Tillich claims a ‘Doctor of Theology (honoris causa) in Halle’ (Tillich 1966:58). He states he ‘was Lecturer in Theology in Berlin’ but makes no mention of his lecturer position at Halle (ibid:58). In his 1967 autobiography, Tillich (1967:33) writes: ‘After the end of the war I became a
Privatdozent of Theology at the University of Berlin, the beginning of my academic career’. His position at the University of Berlin as a Privatdozent of Theology was the start of his academic career. It could be Tillich did work as Privatdozent of Theology at Halle when he was Privatdozent at the University of Berlin. This is based on what happened to Tillich while he was teaching at Dresden. He was at Dresden from 1925 to 1929. At Dresden, Tillich was ‘Professor of the Science of Religion in Dresden and at the same time Professor Honorarius of Theology in Leipzig’ (Tillich 1936:40). ‘Privatdozent of Theology in Halle and Berlin’ must mean at the same time (ibid:40).

Tillich (1967:33) does say he began his academic career at the University of Berlin. Tillich’s autobiographical accounts are unclear on this point of his being a Privatdozent at Halle. The comparision of the various Tillich autobiographical accounts show a discrepancy on this point. Thomas (2000:5-6) clarifies Tillich’s appointment at Halle:

In early 1916 Tillich obtained leave to go to Halle to deliver a trial lecture which he had been composing in the trenches. He was not able to do that until the following June; for, after the comparatively tranquil opening of 1916, he was involved in the battle for Verdun with its hellish struggle and enormous loss of life. Comforting the wounded and the dying and burying the dead, Tillich suffered seemingly endless anguish and-not surprisingly-his first nervous breakdown. Even so, he made a rapid enough recovery to be able to visit Halle in July to deliver his lecture, and as a result he was appointed Privatdozent of theology.

Thomas (ibid:10) continues: ‘Tillich had qualified as a Privatdozent in the University of Halle; but before the war ended he was advised to transfer that qualification to the University of Berlin, where he might well find an academic opportunity’. Thomas (ibid: 17) answers the question of Tillich’s honorary doctorate from Halle:

Already now a successful university teacher, Tillich had the good fortune to
be singled out for appointment as Professor of Religious Studies in the
department of humanities at the Dresden Institute of Technology, largely
on the strength of his reputation as a Schelling scholar. The combined
attention of a full professor’s salary and of the cultural opportunities of a
large city were irresistible. An interesting footnote can be added to the story
here: Tillich was helped to this position by Richard Kroner, who was already
in Dresden…. [B]y this time he had established himself as a successful author
with the publication of The Religious Situation (Die religiose Gegenwart, Berlin,
1925) and such important papers as his ‘Philosophy of religion’ (Lehrbuch der
Philosophie, ed. Max Desoir, Berlin, 1925). Evidently it was not only his Dresden
students who came to see Tillich as a rising star in the theological firmament; for
during his first years in Dresden he was awarded the honorary degree of doctor of
theology by the University of Halle.

Tillich’s honorary degree was granted by the University of Halle during his years
at the Dresden Institute of Technology.

In analysis, Tillich was born in Starzeddel, Germany on August 20, 1886. He
attended the humanistic Gymnasium first in Konigsberg-Neumark in 1898 and later in
Berlin in 1901. Tillich graduated from the Gymnasium in 1904. His university studies
followed in Berlin, Tubingen, and Halle. He graduated from university in 1907. Tillich
had to prepare to pass two theological exams in order to be ordained. His first exam
was taken in 1909 and the second exam attempted in 1911. Tillich received his Doctor of
Philosophy degree in 1911 from the University of Breslau. This was followed by the degree
Licentiate of Theology in 1912 from the University of Halle. Tillich was ordained by the
Evangelical Lutheran Church.

Tillich served as a chaplain in the German army from 1914 to 1918. His academic
teaching career began as Privatdozent of theology at Berlin (1919-1924), at Marburg (1924-
1925), at Dresden (1925-1929), Leipzig (1927-1929), and Frankfurt (1929-1933). His years
at Leipzig was as an adjunct professor in theology while he was serving at Dresden. Tillich
received an honorary doctorate from the University of Halle while he was teaching at Dresden.

1:2 Tillich Recalls the German Years – 1886 to 1904

1:2:1 Tillich’s Encounter With Nature And Fascination With History

Tillich reviews the details of his life of how he was influenced during those years in Germany. Two points that are striking in his recounting of the German years are his encounter with nature and his fascination with history (Tillich 1952:4-6). Paul Tillich was a Lutheran pastor’s son. He was raised in a manse which left a definite impression upon him and the experience of the Holy (ibid:6). He read Rudolph Otto’s *Idea of the Holy*. This work helped Tillich interpret his life, his experiences with nature, and the history of the Holy One. This became part of Tillich’s thinking from the beginning. It was like a compass and a constitution. Paul Tillich (1967:28) points to these experiences in nature, history, and Otto’s concept of the Holy as determining factors in the formation of his philosophy of religion. The mystical, sacramental, and aesthetic are three clear implications of the *Idea of the Holy* described by Rudolph Otto (ibid:28). The ethical and rational elements of religion became a necessary part of Tillich’s experience with the divine. In addition to Otto, Tillich names Schleiermacher with his emphasis on the mystical which contributed to both Christian and non-Christian mysticism (ibid:28-29). Tillich (1967:24-25) writes:

These early impressions may partly account for what has been challenged as the romantic trend in my feeling and thinking. One side of the so-called romanticism is my relationship to nature. It is expressed in a predominantly aesthetic meditative attitude toward nature as distinguished from a scientific-analytical or technical-controlling relation. It is the reason for the tremendous emotional impact that
Schellings’s philosophy of nature made upon me—although I was well aware that this philosophy was scientifically impossible. It is theologically formulated in my doctrine of the participation of nature in the process of fall and salvation.

Church festivals could run for days or even weeks. The mysteries that affected Tillich’s spirituality as a child were the sayings and concepts of the Bible. This worked to create an ecclesiastical background for Tillich (1936:41-42). Tillich stood within the Lutheran tradition. Tillich (ibid:54 in Carey 2002:4-5) writes: ‘I, myself, belong to Lutheranism by birth, education, religious experience, and theological reflection. I have never stood on the borders of Lutheranism and Calvinism….The substance of my religion is and remains Lutheran….Not only my theological, but also my philosophical thinking expresses the Lutheran substance’.

It is of interest that Tillich draws attention to the time of his birth as being that of the nineteenth century (Tillich 1936:23). He was raised initially in a small town in eastern Germany (ibid:29). Automobiles and the absence of a secondary railway created deep yearnings within Tillich for a greater adventure (ibid:29-30). His family took a yearly trip to the Baltic Sea. Its horizon stretched to infinity which was a real adventure for young Paul (ibid:29). Every year found the Tillich family making trips to Berlin which was an escape for Tillich from the humdrum of life in his small town. The city of Berlin was a great experience for Tillich as a child. Later, his father was called to an important position in Berlin. The Tillich family moved to Berlin in 1900. Paul Tillich remarks that he was able to learn the mysteries of a great city. This was one of the wonders of the world to the teenage Tillich (ibid:29).
The authoritarian nature of German society did not set well with Tillich. The highly structured bureaucratic society went back to a strong central government in Berlin. Officials were obedient to their superiors and they in turn displayed an authoritarian approach to those under their rule. A nationalistic spirit pervaded all of German society especially in the army. The army according to Tillich was an oppressive force on all of German society. Tillich did not outgrow the social impact of this until he was thirty years of age. Tillich was intimidated by the hierarchy which eventually stopped with the King of Prussia who was also the German Emperor. Those who did not give adherence to the King of Prussia and his house were considered less than patriotic (ibid:30-31). It took the first World War to end this rigid bureaucratic system that Tillich was raised under in Germany. Post-war Germany was a different society with adherence to democratic principles and allowance for those who espoused social revolution (ibid:31).

The home that Tillich grew up in was oppressive to his religious and political views. Tillich’s father was a very strong Lutheran in his beliefs. Tillich’s mother had a moral outlook of a Calvinist derived from Reformed Protestantism. Paul Tillich suffered during these years from guilt produced because parental authority was equated with divine authority. Yet, some of Tillich’s happiest memories were those of long philosophical discussions with his father (ibid:31-32). Tillich was an autonomous spirit. He rejected authority which took away his individual autonomy.
Tillich was very much an individual and his meaning in life came from being an individual rather than from society. Karl Barth accused Tillich of ‘still fighting against the Grand Inquisitor’ (ibid:32-33). The system of autonomy was Tillich’s Protestant Principle. This was his refutation whenever a heteronomous system appeared on Tillich’s horizon. This individual fight was always necessary and has always been necessary throughout history. Further, Tillich was accused of being both of the persuasion of neo-orthodoxy and of being a liberal. The two motives of being a romantic and a revolutionary were two accusations that Tillich had to fight throughout his life (ibid:33). Tillich (ibid:33) writes: ‘The balancing of these motives has remained the basic problem of my thought and of my life ever since’. It is important to note that these two elements which Tillich retained were a challenge to him throughout his entire life. The romantic and the revolutionary elements were acquired during the German years (ibid:33).

1:2:3 Tillich’s German Academic Training

Tillich elaborates on his years as ‘a pupil in a “humanistic Gymnasium”’ (ibid:34). He (ibid:34-35) writes:

A Gymnasium, compared with American institutions, consists of high school plus two years of college. The normal age for finishing the Gymnasium is eighteen. A humanistic Gymnasium has as its central subjects Greek and Latin. …The problem of the humanistic education is its relation to the religious tradition which, even without a special religious instruction, is that between religion and humanistic traditions (of which the scientific world view is only a part) have been, ever since the Renaissance, in continuous tension. The German humanistic Gymnasium was one of the places in which this tension was most manifest. While we were introduced into classical antiquity in formal
classes meeting about ten hours a week for about eight years, we encountered the Christian tradition at home, in the church, in directly religious instructions in school and outside the school, and in direct religious information in history, literature, and philosophy. The result of this tension was either a decision against one side or the other, or a general skepticism or a split-consciousness which drove one to attempt to overcome the conflict constructively. The latter way, the way of synthesis, was my own way. It follows the classical German philosophers from Kant to Hegel and has remained a driving force in all my theological work. It has found its final form in my Systematic Theology.

In his work The Interpretation of History, Tillich (1936:3) writes:

In the introduction to my Religiose Verwirklichung (Religious Realization) I had written: “The border line is the truly propitious place for acquiring knowledge.” When I received the invitation to give an account of how my ideas have grown from my life, it came to me that the concept of the border line might be the fitting symbol of the whole of my personal and intellectual development. It has been my fate, in almost every direction, to stand between alternative possibilities of existence, to be completely at home in neither, to take no definitive stand against each either. As fruitful as such a position is for thought, since thinking presupposes receptiveness to fresh possibilities, it is difficult and dangerous for life, which steadily demands decisions and thus exclusion of alternatives. From this disposition and these tensions have come both destiny and task.

It is not the purpose of this thesis to expound all the boundary concepts of Tillich. Our purpose is to point out that Tillich’s ideas, his destiny, and task were determined during the German years. In his 1966 On the Boundary, Tillich maintains the same concept as he held during the German years. He ascribes the two temperaments of his father and mother as contributing to his character (Tillich 1966:13-15). He tosses out the question of whether this was merely heredity or his recall of early childhood (ibid:14). He could not decide. Tillich spoke of his being on the boundary between the German city and country (ibid:15-19). His childhood experiences at the sea each year contributed to his later thinking. This was especially true with his theory of the Dynamic
Mass in the essay *The Mass and the Spirit* (ibid:18). Tillich acknowledges as well his doctrine of the Absolute stated in terms of both ground and abyss (ibid:18). It was the sea that fed Tillich’s imagination for these thoughts. Much of Tillich’s inspiration in his writing is attributed to being among trees and at the seaside (Tillich 1936:7-8).

Tillich (1966:18) refers to Nietzsche as deciding the validity of an idea only if it occurred in the realm of nature. Tillich had access to the children of the privileged bourgeois. This was due to his father’s social standing as a Lutheran pastor. He chose against the bourgeois. Tillich was opposed to the bourgeois which led him to the socialist position. He played as a child with the children of the aristocracy that owned land. These landowners were considered the old nobility (Tillich 1936:8-12). Later, Tillich would espouse the doctrine of Religious Socialism. Tillich (ibid:12) writes:

The fact also, that I never stood seriously on the border of, the small bourgeois type of life, but rather, like many of the same group repudiated it with an apparent, even if half-unconscious, arrogance, brought about an intellectual and personal destiny; intellectual insofar is the striving to come out of every sort of narrowness, brought constantly into the range of vision new possibilities and realms, and made the limitations, which is necessary for every intellectual and social realization difficult; personal, insofar as the middle class militaristic revolution affected the described group most forcibly and destroyed it with its intellectual and economic presuppositions. The answer to this partly justifiable, partly unjustifiable repudiation of the lower middle class by the intelligentsia, was the hateful persecution of German intelligentsia by the representatives of the romantic middle-class ideology.

Tillich attributes his socialistic beliefs to be the determiner of both his intellectual and personal destiny. New opportunities were open to Tillich as a result of his commitment to socialism. Further, Tillich (1936:12) experienced persecution based on German class
warfare (ibid:12). Tillich’s position on the boundary moves to that of reality and imagination. He (ibid:13) writes: ‘For some years certain ‘imaginative’ worlds constituted true reality for me, into which I withdrew as often as possible from the external reality not taken seriously by me. That was the time from my fourteenth to seventeenth years of age’. At age seventeen, this changed when he moved from a romantic imagination to what Tillich terms a philosophical imagination (ibid:13). Tillich excelled at turning abstract realities into concrete realities (ibid:13).

Tillich was marked out for theory. He (ibid:17) writes:

There was never any doubt in my own mind or in the judgment of others that I was marked out for theory, and not practical activity. Beginning with the first crisis, at the age of eight. I was marked out for theory, and not practical activity. When I encountered the conception of the “Infinite” through the absorption of Christian dogmatics in school and in pre-confirmation instruction, and through the eager devouring of popular books as Weltanschauung, it was clear that theoretical and not practical mastery of existence would be my task and destiny.

Tillich (ibid:17-18) denotes a second factor that kept him in the theoretical sphere:

My internal struggles for the truth of traditional religion also held me in the sphere of theory. In the life of religion, however, theory means something other than philosophical contemplation of Being. In religious truth the stake is one’s very existence and the question is to be or not to be. Religious truth is existential truth, and to that extent it cannot be separated from practice. Religious truth is acted-in accord with the Gospel of St. John.

However, Tillich (ibid:18) realized: ‘that one sided devotion to theory rested upon the same escape from reality as the flight into phantasy already mentioned’. Tillich’s early years should not be underestimated as to their formation on his life, thought, and the German legacy to follow.
In analyzing this section, Tillich recalls his encounter with nature and his fascination with history. He was the son of a Lutheran pastor. Tillich was raised in a church manse. His reading of Rudolph Otto’s *Idea of the Holy One* particularly Otto’s concept of the Holy contributed later to his philosophy of religion.

Tillich had a religious upbringing which created an ecclesiastical background for him. The Lutheran Church, church festivals, and sayings and concepts of the Bible were part of his early years. His childhood experiences contributed to his theological development. The medieval atmosphere of his small town and the family vacations at the Baltic Sea with its infinite horizon were contributing factors. Later, Tillich’s life in Berlin in 1900 contributed to his political and social views. Tillich’s home was not conducive to his religious and political views. His father was a Lutheran pastor with strong beliefs. His mother had the moral outlook of a Calvinist. His childhood play with the children of the old landed nobility (bourgeois) influenced Tillich towards socialism. Tillich understood the tensions as a child between the privileged and underprivileged class. His socialistic beliefs determined both his intellectual and personal destiny. Tillich’s years in the humanistic Gymnasium created an internal conflict with his Christian faith.

1:3 The Period of Tillich’s Preparation - 1905-1914 (includes two years of church work)

1:3:1 Tillich Educated in German Universities

Tillich had studied privately before his matriculation ‘as a student of theology’ (ibid:35). He (ibid:35) writes: ‘When I entered the university I had
a good knowledge of the history of philosophy and a basic acquaintance with
Kant and Fichte. Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling followed, and Schelling
became the special subject of my study. Both my doctoral dissertation and
my thesis for the degree of Licentiate of Theology dealt with Schelling’s
philosophy of religion’. Tillich (1952:5) believed ‘that nature mysticism was
possible and real’. Tillich (1967:36) concludes: ‘Nevertheless I was a theologian,
because the existential question of our ultimate concern and the existential answer
of the Christian message are and always have been predominant in my spiritual life’.

Tillich’s (ibid:36) comments on his reason for becoming a theologian:

The fifteen years from 1904 to 1909 in various ways contributed to this decision.
My experiences as a student of theology in Halle from 1905 to 1907 were quite
different from those of theological student Leverkuhn in Thomas Mann’s Doctor
Faustus in the same period. There was a group of great theologians to whom we
listened and with whom we wrestled intellectually in seminars and personal
discussions. One thing we learned above all was that Protestant theology is by
no means obsolete but that it can, without losing its Christian foundation incorporate
strictly scientific methods, a critical philosophy, a realistic understanding of men
and society, and powerful ethical principles and motives. Certainly we felt
that much was left undone by our teachers and had to be done by ourselves. But
this feeling of every new generation need not obviate the gratefulness for what it has
received from its predecessors.

Carey (2002:5) writes: ‘Many of Tillich’s formative mentors (Hegel, Kierkegaard,
Schelling) were Lutherans’. In addition, Carey (ibid:5) continues: ‘Tillich’s teachers
were predominantly Lutherans: Martin Kahler, Ernest Troeltsch, and Adolf Von Harnack
all stood in the Lutheran tradition, although they had their quarrels with the Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Prussia’.

Tillich joined the Wingolf Society at the University of Halle (Thomas 2000:4).
Carey (2002:3) confirms it was 1905 to 1907 that Tillich was a student at Halle. Thomas (2000:4) adds: ‘This was a non-residential society which aimed to provide university students with a sense of community, fostering this by formal social gatherings’. Tillich (1948:xiii) writes: ‘The power of the Protestant principle first became apparent to me in the classes of my theological teacher, Martin Kaehler [Kahler], a man who in his personality and theology combined traditions of Renaissance humanism and German classicism with a profound understanding of the Reformation with strong elements of the religious awakening of the middle of the nineteenth century’. Tillich (ibid:xv) continues: ‘The radical and universal interpretation of the idea of justification through faith had important theological consequences beyond the personal. If it is valid, no realm of life can exist without relation to something unconditional, to an ultimate concern’. Martin Kaehler and William Lutgert at the University of Halle were Tillich’s ‘most important teachers’ (Tillich 1936:32). Tillich confirms his debt to Kahler for the ‘insight he gave me into the all-controlling character of the Pauline-Lutheran idea of justification’ (ibid:32). He acknowledges his understanding of the Old Testament to Wellhausen and Gunkel (ibid:33). His ‘historical insights into the New Testament I owe principally to Albert Schweitzer’s The Quest of the Historical Jesus and Bultmann’s Synoptische Tradition (ibid:33). Another important figure was Jacob Bohme of whom Tillich (ibid:54) writes: ‘With him as mediator, Lutheran Mysticism had an influence on Schelling and German Idealism, and through Schelling again on Irrationalism and the philosophy of life of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’.
Tillich admits his thought to have been formed from those who proceeded him.

Further Tillich (ibid:36-37) admits:

Important influences on our theological existence came from other sides. One of them was our discovery of Kierkegaard and the shaking impact of his dialectical psychology. It was a prelude to what happened in the 1920s when Kierkegaard became the saint of the theologians as well as of the philosophers. But it was only a prelude; for the spirit of the nineteenth century still prevailed, and we hoped that the great synthesis between Christianity and humanism could be achieved with the tools of German classical philosophy. Another prelude to the things to come occurred in the period between my student years and the beginning of the First World War. It was the encounter with Schelling’s second period, especially with his so-called “Postive Philosophy.” Here lies the philosophically decisive break with Hegel and the beginning of that movement which today is called Existentialism. I was ready for it when it appeared in full strength after the First World War, and I saw it in the light of that general revolt against Hegel’s system of reconciliation which occurred in the decades after Hegel’s death and which, through Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche, has become decisive for the destiny of the twentieth century.

Tillich’s admission is advanced where he admits the influence of Kierkegaard Schelling, Marx and Nietzsche. It was through Schelling that enabled Tillich to break with Hegel. Tillich (1936:31) remembered how he had come under the influence of Schelling: ‘Partly by chance of a bargain purchase, and partly by inner affinity I came under the influence of Schelling, whose collected works I read through several times with enthusiasm’.

Tillich recalls with fondness his student years. He (ibid:37) writes:

But once more I must return to my student years. The academic life in Germany in these years was extremely individualistic. There were no dormitories for students and few, impersonal activities for the student body as such. The religious life was almost completely separated from the life of the churches; chaplains for the students did not exist and could hardly be imagined. The relation with the professors and their families was sporadic and in many cases completely absent. It is this situation which
made the fraternities in Germany much more important than they are in this country. My membership in such a fraternity with Christian principles was not only a most happy but also a most important experience. Only after the First World War, when my eyes became opened to the political and social scene, did I realize the tremendous dangers of our prewar academic privileges. And I looked with great concern at the revival of the fraternities in post-Hitler Germany. But in my student years the fraternity gave me a communion (the first one after the family) in which friendship, spiritual exchange on a very high level, intentional and unintentional education, joy of living, seriousness about the problems of communal life generally, and Christian communal life especially, could daily be experienced. I question whether without this experience I would have understood the meaning of the church existentially and theoretically.

Tillich concludes that this experience during his student years helped him in his understanding of the ‘meaning of the church existentially and theoretically’ (ibid:37). Later, Tillich (ibid:37-38) rejected the idealism of Troeltsch because his thinking made it impossible to deal with relativism. Tillich (ibid:38) conceived ‘a philosophy of history …of history of religious socialism’. On April 18, 1912 Tillich was ordained as a minister of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. It was during the next two years that Tillich worked as an Assistant Pastor in a working class neighborhood in Berlin (Thomas 2000:3). Tillich (1936:19) writes: ‘My university studies were succeeded by two years of church work and four years as field chaplain on the Western front’.

The critical analysis of this section points to Schelling becoming the focus of Tillich’s study. Tillich wrote two dissertations on Schelling’s work. His educational experience at Halle under Martin Kahler was theologically productive for Tillich./ He understood the Pauline-Lutheran idea of justification and the power of the Protestant principle. Jacob Bohme’s Lutheran Mysticism added to Tillich’s theological thought.
Tillich claims that Schelling’s Positive Philosophy was the beginning of the movement known as Existentialism. It was Schelling who made possible the break from Hegel between Tillich’s student years and the beginning of World War I. Tillich developed as well his own philosophy of the history of religious socialism. Tillich was ordained on April 18, 1912. He worked as an assistant pastor in the working man’s section of Berlin. The sequence of our thesis progresses to give attention to another autobiographical consideration on Tillich’s service in the German army from 1914 to 1918.

1:4 The War Years 1914-1918

1:4:1 Tillich Turns To Art And Karl Marx’s Thinking

Tillich (1967:33) ‘joined the German army as a war chaplain’. He (1952:12) writes: ‘I volunteered, and was asked to serve as a war chaplain, which I did from September, 1914, to September, 1919’. This must be a typographical error since the war ended in 1918. Tillich tells of the effects of the war on him:

Like most of the intellectuals of Germany before the War, my attitude towards politics had been essentially one of indifference. Neither did the ever-present consciousness of social guilt express itself in a political will. Only in the last year of the War, and in the months of collapse and revolution did the political backgrounds of the World War, the interrelation between Capitalism and Imperialism, the crisis of bourgeois society, the class cleavage, and so forth, become visible to me. The immense pressure that had rested upon us during the War, threatening to obscure the idea of God, or to color it demonically, found relief in the discovery of the human responsibility for the War and in the hope of the refashioning of human society.

Tillich (1966:27) experienced ‘horror, ugliness and destructiveness of war’. He
sought comfort in paintings. He (ibid:27) continues: ‘My delight even in the poor reproductions obtainable at the military bookstores developed into a systematic study of the history of art. And out of this study came the experience of art’. Tillich received an Iron Cross for his courage to those who were wounded and dying during this war (Thomas 2000:3). Reimer (2004:34) writes: ‘Tillich soon after the First World War became a Religious Socialist’. Tillich (1967:39) saw Germany was divided into classes, the industrialized masses, the Church was seen as an ally of the ruling groups. He (ibid:39) writes: ‘This situation became more and more manifest toward the end of the war’. The First World War produced the revolution. The result was ‘imperial Germany collapsed’ (ibid:39). The ‘religious-socialist movement in Germany’ came into being (ibid:39). Tillich (ibid:39) elaborates on his sympathy for the social problems of Germany that: ‘has roots in my early childhood which are hard to trace’. He (ibid:39) concludes:

Perhaps it was a drop of the blood which induced my grandmother to build barricades in the revolution of 1848, perhaps it was the deep impression upon me made by the words of the Hebrew prophets against injustice and by the words of Jesus against the rich; all these were words I learned by heart in my early years. But whatever it was, it broke out ecstatically in those years and remained a continuing reality, although mixed with resignation and some bitterness about the division of the world into all-powerful groups between which the remnants of a democratic and religious socialism are crushed.

The First World War brought Tillich to a realization of the importance of painting. He longed for beauty rather than the ugliness produced by war (Tillich 1936:14-15). Thus began Tillich’s systematic study of art. Philosophical and theological interpretation was given to the art that Tillich studied. German
paintings reflected the longings of the lives of German society (ibid:15-17).

Tillich’s autonomy had been won by a long hard struggle up to the end of the First World War (ibid:22-23).

In interacting with the sources of this section, it was during the war years (1914-1918) that Tillich began his study of art. He longed for beauty from the horrors and devastation of World War I. Tillich’s systematic study of art resulted in a theology of art. Secondly, Tillich realized that German unity was a myth. Class warfare was very evident in German society. Tillich became interested in politics particularly the thinking of Karl Marx. Tillich became a socialist. The continuance of our thesis now considers Tillich’s post World War I German society.

1:5 Post World War I Germany

The ideal and reality were two elements to appear in post World War I German society. Professional schools appeared in Germany with their goal of providing professional training. The humanistic faculty of philosophy was free now from those restrictions of professional schools. The philosophic faculties were to be ruled by a predetermined idea of what philosophy was to be. The question of human existence was to be answered by the Logos (ibid:8). These German years clearly delineated for Tillich what the study of philosophy was to involve, the question of human existence, and the Logos. Political and religious alliances were to be at the very foremost of the academic study in postwar Germany. Spiritual and social problems that man faced in contemporary German society were to be addressed.
To some extent Tillich’s postwar German society determined his approach in his teaching career. The divide between the theoretical and the practical was with Tillich in postwar Germany (ibid:17-22). Yet events in Europe dictated a return to heteronomies both old and new (ibid:8).

In analyzing the material, postwar German society following World War I had to rethink the nature of its schools. Professional schools appeared which provided professional training. The humanistic faculty of philosophy was free from the restrictions of the professional schools. The philosophical faculty was to answer the question of human existence and the Logos. Academic study must include political and religious alliances. Human problems both the spiritual and the social were to be addressed by the philosophical faculty. The theoretical and the practical were very evident in Germany following the First World War. Tillich’s style of teaching was to some extent determined by this division within German education.

1:6 Tillich’s Commitment to Religious Socialism

1:6:1 Tillich’s Ever Increasing Commitment to Religious Socialism

Tillich experienced conflict in Germany based on class warfare. He had access to the children of the privileged class due to his father’s social standing. His childhood play was with the children of the aristocracy. These landowners were considered the old nobility. Tillich understood the tensions between the privileged and underprivileged classes (Tillich 1936:8-12). Later, Tillich would adopt the doctrine of religious socialism. Tillich (ibid:9-10) writes: ‘The special elaboration of religious socialism attempted by
me first in the *Grundlinien des religiosen Sozialismus* (Principles of Religious Socialism), then in my book *Die sozialistische Entscheidung* (Socialistic Decision) has its roots in this attitude’. Tillich joined a small socialist group which stood in direct opposition to the bourgeois lifestyle (ibid:10). Tillich (ibid:11-12) writes:

The deep-rooted protest against the distinct bourgeois type of life was expressed in my affection for the small social group, for which the name “Boheme” is actually no longer an adequate term; which, however, has kept a joint relation of intellectual productivity and criticism and genuine non-bourgeois life in theory and practice. Artists, actors, journalists, and writers had a decided influence within this group. [A]s theologian and academician I stood at the border line. This group recognized itself by an obvious lack of certain bourgeois conventionalities in thought and manners, and by an intellectual radicalism and a marked ability for ironical self-criticism. They met not only in certain cafes, houses, parlors, but also at certain places at the seashore, not frequented by the lower middle class. They were inclined toward radical political criticism and felt more akin with the communist worker than with the members of their own class. They lived in the international movements of art and literature, were skeptical, religiously radical and romantic; influenced by Nietzsche, antimilitaristic, psychoanalytical and expressionistic. [T]he opponent of this group was neither the feudal man nor well-to-do bourgeois; both were represented in the “Boheme.” They sought admittance to it successfully and in exchange offered social and economic privileges. Its opponent was the small bourgeois, the middle class with its prejudices, its pretensions, its remoteness from the intellectual, especially from problems of artistic nature, its need of security and its distrust of the intelligentsia.

Tillich (ibid:12) elaborates:

The fact also, that I never stood seriously on the border of, the small bourgeois type of life, but rather, like many of the same group repudiated it with an apparent, even if half-consciousness, arrogance, brought about an intellectual and personal destiny; intellectual insofar is the striving to come out of every sort of narrowness, brought constantly into the range of vision new possibilities and realms, and made the limitations, which is necessary for every intellectual and social realization difficult’ personal, insofar as the middle class militaristic revolution affected described group most forcibly and destroyed it with its intellectual and economic presuppositions. The answer to this partly justifiable, partly unjustifiable repudiation of the lower middle class by the intelligentsia,
was the hateful persecution of German intelligentsia by the representatives of the romantic middle-class ideology.

Tillich attributes his Christian socialistic philosophy as the determiner of his intellectual and personal destiny. New opportunities were open to Tillich as a result of his commitment to socialism. Secondly, Tillich experienced persecution as a result of German class warfare.

It was in 1920 that Tillich joined the ‘Berlin Group’. This group was also known as the ‘Kairos Circle’ (Thomas 2000:14). Thomas (ibid:14) adds: ‘Tillich was not only active as leader of the group but, as one of the main exponents of its ideas, he contributed many articles to the small journal which Mennicke edited Blätter für religiosen Sozialismus (Pages for Religious Socialism)’. Tillich (1936:19-20) writes:

Thus, when soon after the revolution the call was sounded for the religious-socialist movement I could not and would not refuse it. At first, indeed, that meant only theoretical work on the problem of “religion and socialism.” The working circle I belonged to was a group of professors: Mennicke, Heimann, Lowe, and others, all explicitly concerned with theory. But the goal of the work was ultimately political; thus it was inevitable that a number of problems of practical politics developed, leading to conflicts between theoretical and practical attitudes.

Tillich (1967:40-41) had turned to the thinking of Karl Marx. He (1936:62-63) writes of Marx:

According to Marx, philosophy as such (which he identified with philosophy of essence) seeks to obscure the contradiction of existence, to disregard that which is of importance to the real human being, namely the social contradictions which determine his existence in the world. These contradictions, concretely expressed, the conflict of the social classes, show that idealism is an ideology, namely a
system of concepts, whose function it is to cover up the contrast of reality.

Tillich (1967:40-41) elaborates further his relation to Karl Marx:

It has always been dialectical, combining a Yes and a No. The Yes was based on the prophetic, humanistic, and realistic elements in Marx’s passionate style and profound thought, the No on the calculating, materialistic, and resentful elements in Marx’s analysis, polemics, and propaganda. If one makes Marx responsible for everything done by Stalin and the system for which he stands, an unambiguous No against Marx is the necessary consequence. If one considers the transformation of the social situation in many countries, the growth of a definite social-consciousness in the industrial masses, the awakening of a social conscience in the Christian churches, the universal application of the economic-social method of analysis to the history of thought—all this under the influence of Marx—then the No must be balanced by a Yes.

Tillich (1936:44) writes of Religious Socialism:

Not until after the war did the reality and nature of this Christian Humanism become totally evident to me. The contact with the Worker’s movement, with the so-called de-Christianized masses, revealed clearly to me that here also, within the humanistic form, Christian substance was hidden, even though the Humanism bore the character of a materialistic popular philosophy, long since overcome in art and science. Here Apologetics was even more necessary than to the intelligentsia, but also much more difficult, because the religious opposition was made more acute by class opposition. Apologetics, without any regard for this class opposition such as the Church was attempting, was condemned to complete failure from the beginning. A successful activity on the part of the defenders of Christianity was possible only by their active participation in the class situation, i.e., Apologetics among the proletarian masses was and is possible only to “Religious Socialism.” Not Home Missions, but Religious Socialism is the necessary form of Christian activity among the proletarian workingmen, and is in particular the necessary form of Christian Apologetics. This apologetical element in Religious Socialism has often been obscured by its political element, so that the Church has never understood the indirect importance of Religious Socialism for the Church.

Tillich (ibid:55) writes of the opposition to Religious Socialism:

Two theological tendencies, definitely Lutheran, opposed religious Socialism. First of all, the religious Nationalism, which calls itself “Modern Lutheran Theology,” as represented by Emmanuel Hirsch, a former fellow-student of
mine, but now my opponent in theology and politics; and secondly, the falsely so-called “Dialectic Theology,” established by Karl Barth which in spite of the Calvinistic elements in Barth himself, has accepted a decisive Lutheran element in its conception of the idea of the Kingdom of God as purely transcendent.

Tillich (ibid:57) writes of the kairos: ‘The term is meant to express the fact that the struggle for a new social order cannot lead to a fulfillment such as is meant by the Kingdom of God, but that at a special time special tasks are demanded, and one special aspect of the Kingdom of God appears as a demand and expectation’. He (ibid:58) continues: ‘but it appears as a judgment to a given form of society and as a norm to a coming one. Thus, the decision for Socialism during a definite period may be the decision for the Kingdom of God, even though the Socialist ideal remains infinitely distant from the Kingdom of God’.

In analyzing, Tillich’s commitment to religious socialism was very evident from the time of his childhood play with the privileged class. His access to the children of the privileged class was due to his father’s social standing as a Lutheran pastor. Tillich joined the socialist Berlin group also known as the Kairos circle in 1920. He became one of the exponents of the ideas of the group. His views were determined by the thinking of Karl Marx. Tillich infused into the Marxist thought the religious concept of the kairos. The kairos was the fulfilled time. Tillich and his socialist friends expected a new world order that would result in the transformation of mankind. Our thesis advances to consider Tillich’s German academic career.
1:7 Tillich’s Academic Career at German Universities-1919-1933

1:7:1 Tillich The German Theologian

In 1919, Tillich ‘delivered his famous lecture on a theology of culture and art before the Berlin Kant Society’ (Thomas 2000:14). Tillich taught at German universities from 1919 to 1933. Tillich (1936:38) ‘tried to win for theology a legitimate place in the totality of knowledge’. He (ibid:38) writes:

Any one, standing on the border of philosophy and theology, will find it necessary to get a clear conception of the scientific relation of both. I made this attempt in my book, System der Wissenschaften (System of the Sciences). My final concern here was the question: “How is theology possible as a Science? How is it related, like its several offsprings, to the other sciences? What is outstanding in its method?

Tillich’s (ibid:38-39) efforts were directed as follows:

division of all methodical knowledge into sciences of thinking, being, and culture; further, by the development of a philosophy of meaning as a foundation of the whole system; then, by the definition of metaphysics as an attempt of the human mind to express the unconditioned in terms of rational symbols; and finally, by the definition of theology as theonomous metaphysics. The presupposition of the success of this attempt is, of course, that the theonomous character of knowing be acknowledged; that is to say, that thinking is rooted in the absolute as the foundation and abyss of meaning. Theology makes its subject expressly that which is the assumption of all knowledge, even though the assumption be unexpressed. Thus, theology and philosophy, religion, and knowledge embrace each other, and it is precisely this, which seems to me, as judged from the border, to be the true relation of each.

Adams (1965:149) informs us based on an article Tillich wrote in 1924 on Troeltsch:

This whole essay is as much a self-exposition of Tillich as it is an appreciation and criticism of Troeltsch. The fact that it touches upon most of the major concerns of Tillich’s writings indicates on the one hand the importance of Troeltsch as an influence upon Tillich and on the other the significance of Troeltsch as the point from which Tillich may be said to begin his own reflection in this area of thought. Both aspects of the relation to Troeltsch may perhaps be inferred from the fact that Tillich dedicated The System of the Sciences to Troeltsch.
Tillich’s years at the University of Berlin were from 1919 to 1924. It was here Tillich developed his theology of culture (Tillich 1967:41). Tillich (ibid: 41) related religion to other subjects ‘politics, art, philosophy, depth psychology, and sociology’.

It was at Marburg that Tillich was introduced to existentialism in its twentieth century form (1967:42). Tillich (1936:39-40) writes of the meaning of existentialism for him while at Marburg:

I was led to a new understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology. The lectures of Martin Heidegger given at Marburg, the impression of which on my Marburg students and upon some of my colleagues I experienced; then his writing, Sein und Zeit (Being and Time), also his interpretation of Kant, were of greater significance to followers and opponents of this philosophy than anything else since the appearance of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Studies). I myself, was prepared in a threefold way to accept this philosophy. First, by an exact acquaintance with Schelling’s final period, in which he attempted, in opposition to Hegel’s philosophy of being, to pave a way for a philosophy of existence. Secondly, by my—even if limited—knowledge of Kierkegaard, the real founder of the philosophy of existence; and thirdly, by my dependence upon the philosophy of life. These three elements, comprised and submerged into a sort of Augustinian-colored mysticism, produced that which fascinated people in Heidegger’s philosophy. Many of its chief terms are found in sermon literature of German Pietism.

Tillich’s theology of culture, and his existential theology were formed during the German years at Berlin and Marburg respectively. It was at Marburg that Tillich was given new insight into the relationship between philosophy and theology. Tillich accepted this new learning.

Tillich (ibid:40) was ‘Professor of the Science of Religion in Dresden and at the same time Professor Honorarius of Theology in Leipzig’. Dresden was a great cultural center of ‘visual art, painting, architecture, dance, opera’ (Tillich 1967:43). The ‘cultural situation was
not much different’ when Tillich accepted a call to the University of Frankfurt in 1929 (ibid:43). At Frankfurt, he lectured ‘on the boundary between philosophy and theology’ (ibid:43).

Tillich’s commitment was to the protestant cause and autonomy. Tillich was opposed to religious heteronomy of Roman Catholicism. Tillich wondered if during the year 1933 that he might be forced to embrace Roman Catholicism. German Protestantism was at the time in a period of decline. He had decided if the choice became necessary that he would choose in favor of his Lutheran background (Tillich 1936:22-30).

In the analysis of this period, Tillich’s life is marked by his famous lecture before the Kant Society of Berlin in 1919. His lecture was on a theology of culture. Tillich tried to win a place for theology within the academic world. He related theology to other academic disciplines when he was teaching at Berlin from 1919 to 1924. Tillich’s philosophy of history became politically and socially oriented. Tillich’s years at Marburg (1924-1825) were the beginning of the development of his existential theology. Tillich taught at Frankfurt from 1929 to 1933. It was at Frankfurt that Tillich lectured on the boundary between philosophy and theology.

1:8 Summary

Tillich’s childhood experiences in nature, history, Rudolf Otto’s concept of the Holy became determining factors in forming his Christian philosophy of religion. Family vacations at the Baltic Sea with its horizon stretching to infinity create the concept of the infinite for him. His childhood play with the children of the privileged class helped him to understand the tension between the privileged and underprivileged class. His socialist beliefs were a determiner of his intellectual and personal destiny. His religious upbringing in a church
manse and a Lutheran pastor for a father created an ecclesiastical background for him.

He joined the Wingolf group during his student days at Halle. This helped him to understand the meaning of the church both existentially and theoretically. His two dissertations written on Schelling helped form his religious views.

His experience as a chaplain in the First World War (1914-1918) turned Tillich to the study of art. He longed for beauty amidst the ugliness, devastation, and horrors of war. This would eventuate in the systematic study of art and a theology of art. It was during the First World War that Tillich saw the German nation divided into classes. The industrial masses considered the church an ally of the ruling groups. Tillich turned to the thinking of Karl Marx. Tillich became a socialist.

Tillich’s lecture on a theology of culture was delivered to the Kant Society in Berlin in 1919. He related theology to politics, art, philosophy, depth psychology, and also sociology. Tillich tried to win a place for theology within the totality of knowledge. Tillich was Privatdozent of theology at the University of Berlin from 1919 to 1924. It was during this time that he developed his theology of culture. Tillich joined the Berlin group also known as the Kairos circle in 1920. This socialist group of intellectuals discarded the bourgeois viewpoint. Tillich became one of the leaders of the group. He was also one of the main exponents of its ideas. He combined his concept of the kairos with Marxist thought. The kairos was the right moment, the fulfilled time which would lead to a new social order. It was during Tillich’s time at Marburg (1924-1925) that existentialism in its 20th century form crossed his path. He accepted this new learning. Tillich developed an existential theology. It was at Frankfurt
(1929-1933) that Tillich lectured on the boundary between philosophy and theology.

Tillich’s ideas, his destiny, and task were determined during the German years. The progression of our thesis turns to consider the historiography for our study.
CHAPTER 2

HISTORIOGRAPHY

2:1 The Writing Of History

Nevins (1938:50) in his book *The Gateway To History* notes two elements that must be present in the writing of history. The most obvious is a body of materials that are trustworthy. The second key element is the application of the critical method to them. Nevins (ibid:51) calls the end product of trustworthy materials and the critical method applied to them ‘true history’.

History must be based on primary sources. These primary sources would include both eyewitnesses and the writings of the person under consideration. The eyewitnesses would have lived at the same time as the person or they may not have known the person. In our case, it could be the autobiographical sections and writings of Paul Tillich during the German years 1886 to 1933. Biographers such as the Paucks, and others who knew Tillich, and colleagues who may have worked with Tillich will prove helpful. Secondary sources would be considered the writings of those who lived in a different time period. They were not eyewitnesses to the historical person or event under study (ibid:53).

The sources for history can be material that was orally transmitted but for our thesis ‘printed books and papers’ (ibid:54-55). Personal observation is given a high priority by Nevins. This could be true of both Paul Tillich and of those who interviewed
Tillich. The primary sources will be expounded to let them speak for themselves in terms of Tillich’s life, thought, and his German legacy. Secondary sources deemed relevant to the writing of a historical thesis will be included.

The writing of history calls for an open mind. Nevins is pointing to the need for objectivity in writing history. Objectivity calls for impartiality. Biases and prejudices preventing a fair treatment of a thesis must be set aside. Conclusions must not be drawn until all the evidence has been examined. In addition, objectivity requires the historian to lift out the history, the historical facts, and the meaning of those facts gathered from ‘historical theory’ (ibid:207).

The nature of historical problems is that they come in a great array. This may range from the problem of time, identity, motive, character, and the origin of ideas (ibid:208). In the case of our thesis, a fresh interpretation of the material is our goal. The pertinent facts to the study of our thesis must be assembled (ibid:209-212). Nevins thought the ‘technicalities of logic’ referring to both induction and also deduction are an unproductive labor (ibid:213). Causes might be an important factor in the writing of some history without which the event under study would not have taken place (ibid:214). Both causes and effects in history are always events.

In evaluation, the writing of history requires trustworthy materials and the application of the critical method to them. Historical sources are divided into primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are written by eyewitnesses or by the person under study. Secondary sources are those written by scholars who lived in a different time period.
Nevin’s view of objectivity was to maintain an open mind, remain impartial, and set aside biases and prejudices. Analysis must be given to the evidence. An appropriate chapter summary must be made from the analysis. The conclusion will come at the end of the study. Historical problems are many and varied. The problem of time, identity, motive, character, and the origin of ideas are examples of historical problems. Events in history can be traced to a cause and effect relationship.

2:2 Historical Inquiry

2:2:1 The Historical Method

Our historical inquiry must be limited to the scope of our hypothesis. The German years 1886 to 1933 are the key to understanding the life, thought, and legacy of Paul Tillich. This is neither a systematization of Tillich’s thought nor a systematization of his systematic theology. Some causes will be able to be highlighted in our study while other causes will have to be rejected. The cause for Tillich to write *The Socialist Decision* is significant. What was the cause behind Tillich’s move to socialism? Tillich’s move to this political position and the writing of this work may have been the direct result of his service as a chaplain in World War I. It may have also been the result of the collapse of the German government and society after the war. Nevins points out the need for a working hypothesis in the writing of history (ibid:215-216). This hypothesis will be the basis for our selection or rejection of material. The hypothesis is the key to putting the thesis together. Nevins (ibid:215-
216) writes: ‘No sound historical work has ever been written which does not employ hypothesis literally to arrive at the explanations of complete occurrences’. The use of a hypothesis must be governed by three features. This is a reference to the need for objectivity. The historian must not allow bias or prejudice to influence his record of history. The second important feature in our striving for objectivity is that of oversimplification of our hypothesis. The historian must not reject the obvious with a novel interpretation (ibid:220-224). The thesis seeks to be free from bias, prejudice, oversimplification of a hypothesis, and also a novel interpretation. Subjectivity must be admitted since there is no absolute objectivity.

Ideas may play another important role in the historical method. This would be true in Germany during the late nineteenth and up to the mid-twentieth century (Gustavson 1955:152-163). Nevins (1938:238) argues that the world is ruled by ideas. He refers to Napoleon who thought ideas rule the world. Mankind is moved by the power of philosophical ideas. Idea’s are theoretically based with the conviction of what the historian deems either valid or invalid (Gustavson 1955:153). Nevins (1938:239) agrees with Gustavson that ideas influence the writing of history.

Nevins (ibid:241-243) draws our attention to the fact that all the important philosophies of history can be traced to the last three centuries. A close relationship is demonstrated between rationalism and modern history. Hegel’s philosophy of history during the years 1830-1831 had wide acceptance. Each particular century has been dominated by what is considered important in the writing of history. Hegel’s idea was confirmed as truth. The idea was countered by a negation which is often called
a anti-thesis. The conflict that occurs between the thesis and the anti-thesis will cause a new idea to emerge called synthesis. Nevins argues that this cycle repeats itself over and over again. Other historical methods have been put forward such as Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Another historical method is Marx’s interpretation of history (ibid:243-246).

Our thesis will follow the rational method of historical writing and interpretation. The historian needs to build his work on reasoned facts rather than the philosophic approach of beliefs. The reasoned facts from a historical frame of reference can be used to build a reasoned argument and proper conclusion. A philosophy can be determined based on the historical frame of reference, the reasoned argument, and conclusion. Secondly, our thesis will need to stick to one of the main purposes and features of writing history. A ‘powerful interpretive tendency’ will be a necessary element of our thesis (ibid:252). Gustavson (1955:218) refers to this as ‘historical-mindedness’. He bases his argument on the work of the German historian Leopold Von Ranke. Von Ranke’s thought was that the ‘historian must describe events as they actually happened, using eyewitness accounts and documents from the time, and that the historian must never permit his own predilections to enter into the narrative’ (ibid:174). Nevins (1938:252-253) argues that the growth of both Rationalism and the Age of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century is indispensable to the modern historical method. The best rationale to support any historical point in question is preferred because it lends the greatest objectivity. Nevins (ibid:257) argues that internal evidence
is of secondary importance. He claims that beginning with the French Revolution, the political ideas which were somewhat novel gave historiography a boost. This was by way of introducing a fresh number of interpretations. However, novel interpretations of history violate one of the conditions that is necessary to maintain objectivity in writing history. The important point for our thesis is in placing Tillich against the historical background of the German years. The importance of the historical background was one of the effects ‘at the end of the Napoleonic wars’. History came to be interpreted in the light of Nationalism rather than the common man (Nevins 1938:99-109).

The study and writing of history was helped by the adoption of new academic sciences of geography, economics, biology, sociology, and psychology. Nevins (1938:258) point is that the last two sciences sociology, and psychology were useful in historical interpretation. The interpretative historian may recognize three spheres in his positive philosophy. The first is theological phenomena explained supernaturally. The second phase is a metaphysical emphasis which is an abstract force. The third is a positive phase where phenomena referred to by succession, or a resemblance to some other historical fact is studied in this way (ibid:261). Gottschalk (1963:195) thought it necessary to create the totality of historical fact. Further, he adds that the documents under study should be looked at to solve ‘the problem of authenticity’. He is referring to textual criticism known as external criticism. Internal criticism looks at the author’s style, use of words, the historical documents, and materials suitable
to their times. Internal criticism deals with the problem of credibility. The historical facts must be obtained from the best sources available to the historian (ibid:139).

A historical fact is defined by Gottschalk as one that is credible when tested by the historical method. Bentley (1999:36-42) argues there is historiography and then there is German historiography. He is referring to Von Ranke’s method. Much work has been done in historiography since Von Ranke. This will become apparent in our section on historical issues in the writing of contemporary history. Ainslie (1924:94) argues that humanistic history includes the rationalistic, the abstract, the individualistic, and the psychological. In addition, the social forces are dynamic in any society. Gustavson asks us to consider a German born in 1900. Gustavson (1955:26-27) writes:

Germany was a well-ordered and prosperous empire. The First World War interrupted his normal pattern of life and probably brought death to one or more members of his family. He was probably himself in the army before the end of the war. Its conclusion brought collapse of the seemingly firm foundations of his world. Germany became a republic, amidst considerable confusion, in which he had to adjust to very different political surroundings. Inflation, unemployment, and depression followed, all this in his twenties, when he was trying to secure a niche in society and begin a family. In his early thirties, the Nazis took over, bringing a new set of circumstances, including renewed prosperity, dictatorship, mass hysteria, and concentration camps. Then came another war, the destruction of his home city by air attack, and ultimate enemy occupation. If his home was in the eastern zone of Germany, a Communist regime was imposed upon him, and if he lived east of the Oder, he became a homeless refugee.

Gustavson uses this example to make his point on the impact of social forces in history.

The year 1914 in Germany was marked by a spirit of enthusiasm (Windelband 1955:231). The philosophy of history must be lived in the imagination of men. Dewey (1939:22) argued history is lived in man’s imagination. Philosophy is a further excursion
of the imagination into its own prior achievements (ibid:22). Iggers (1968:270) points out that the German view of history focused on the ‘importance of the historical situation’ in which history arises with all objective values, truths, and cognitions. Bentley (1999:182) refers to William Dilthey’s observation based on Von Ranke. Dilthey supported the view that history is relived in one’s imagination. The historical context is all important and becomes clearer when you know the parts.

Garraghan (1946:34-38) argues that the historical method embodies four elements. These elements are systematized knowledge, effective method, definite subject matter, and general truths. The systematized knowledge would be the primary and secondary sources from which the history is written. The effective method is the critique of these sources. The definite subject matter would be the acceptance of the material in line with our hypothesis. The rejection of material would be based on the hypothesis. Vehlen argues that history must be set in its historic setting. He illustrates this by arguing that the prewar German generations emphasized Nationalism and middle class parliamentary government (Meyer 1960:5). Meyer points to Eucken as one who spoke of the German spirit as a free spirit (ibid:45). Meyer’s logic is that the historical situation in Germany from 1914 to 1933 was one of the conception of the idea’s of the philosophers. More specifically, prior to this period, the German people had dreamed of unity which became a reality in 1807. This was as a result of the war that Germany had fought with France. It was the French philosopher, Rousseau who deified nature giving rise to the German conception of culture (ibid:91). This emphasis on
Nationalism was the result of the eighteenth century philosophy of the Enlightenment in Germany. During the eighteenth century, the emphasis was placed on the absolute and universal reason (Dewey 1915:98-102). Hegel taught that the German state was an organ of divinity. Patriotism became the German religion (ibid:98-102).

Gottschalk (1963:13) in his *Understanding History* points to the problem of ‘Internal Criticism’ as one of the first tasks confronting the historian in the writing of history. It must be emphasized that those particulars that are relevant to the hypothesis are accepted. The particulars that are not relevant to our hypothesis must be rejected. Analysis of documents is necessary for both credibility and to make sure that they fit the hypothesis under investigation. Discussion and development must include the historical context of the study. Gottschalk (ibid:140-141) argues that the historian’s task is to determine the necessary historical facts. A ‘credible’ according to Gottschalk is not what actually happened but it is as close as we can get to what actually happened (ie. Able to be believed or capable of belief). This is a reaction to the work of the historian Von Ranke. Von Ranke held that the historian must report what actually happened. He thought it possible to arrive at that which really happened.

What is objectivity? Gottschalk (ibid:140) thought the historian must establish verisimilitude rather than objective truth. He (ibid:140) argues for similar findings forming a historical consensus. He (ibid:140) writes: ‘It is not inconceivable that, in dealing with the same document, two historians of equal ability and training would extract the same isolated “facts” and agree with each other’s findings. In that way the elementary data of history are subject to proof’. A historical fact can thus be
defined as a particular that can be obtained from materials under study. Facts that can be observed, recorded, and attested to are rarely disputed. A value judgment is not necessary at this point nor would the fact become an inconsistency with other knowledge. The fact would seem favorable and logical to the historian. The acceptance of the fact or a body of facts acceptable to the historian will avoid a generalization (Gottschalk 1963:141). Carr (1961:7-8) writes of consensus: ‘there are certain basic facts which are the same for all historians and which form, so to speak, the backbone of history’. Next, the historian will have to act as the objector or the reader who may raise questions objecting to the factual piece of history. The Paucks do this in their treatment of the biographical details surrounding the life of Paul Tillich. The historical frame becomes the basis for the partial conclusion. This works to provide support in our understanding of Tillich’s life and development (Pauck 1976:1-12). However, the Pauck’s do not share Gottschalk’s view that the historian is blocked from being able to determine what actually happened. Direct observation can be made. The historical frame can be submitted to tests of reliability (Gottschalk 1963:141). Documentation is necessary in the writing of our thesis otherwise contradictions, debates will arise, and also generalizations.

Garraghan (1946:34) gives a nice summary of what is involved in the writing of our thesis based on the historical method. He notes that three important steps must take place. The first is a search must be conducted for sources. Secondly, the historian must appraise these sources. The third step in the historical method is a formal statement of the
findings from the historical sources. This is accompanied by argumentation when necessary. The body of the historian’s findings are presented objectively, and the significance of such is concluded. Exposition and synthesis will be necessary in the last step of writing a thesis (ibid:34). Further, Garraghan (ibid:135) argues that the critical method in history is the exercise of sound judgment and common sense on the part of the historian. A sound hermeneutic considers both the context of the written document and the historical background of the times (ibid:36).

Garraghan (ibid:46-47) discusses his view of objectivity in the writing of history. He defines objectivity as impartiality. This is the setting aside of all biases and personal preferences on the part of the historian. This will cause the historian to deal with the material based on the evidence alone. Garraghan’s source for this Von Ranke. The historian must record a thing ‘as it really happened’. He sets forth five principles that are required for the historian to remain objective in the writing of a historical work. The first principle is that ‘prepossessions and prejudices’ need not be set aside. Secondly, the historian does not need to approach his work emptying himself of previous philosophies of life, principles or theories. The historian can remain sympathetic to his subject and still remain objective. The historian will remain objective even when it is necessary to make judgments and draw conclusions. Finally, a historian does not need to know all the circumstances in any given historical work. Even then history can be written. Garraghan (1946:49) disagrees
with Gottschalk. The historian can construct history as it happened. He based his comments on Von Ranke’s historical theory (ibid:47).

Hegel and Kantian ideas remained in Germany after the year 1860. Hegel who taught at the University of Frankfurt taught positivity. Positivity is defined as the positive right is the natural right. Hegel taught further the self-development and self-realization of the primal Idea. The realization of the primal idea God led to a transcendental philosophy. Hegel’s ‘primal Idea’ was Absolute in character and came to be identified with the German state. Hegel’s philosophy furthered the political concept of totalitarianism (Rowse 1948:120). In 1867, Marx’s Das Kapital was published in Germany. This book argued that societies provide the framework to establish meaning for the individual (Bentley 1999:82-84). Marx stood Hegel on his head (ibid:87). The philosophic ideas of Fichte, Wagner, Nietzsche, and Spengler effected the German bourgeoisie (Blackbourn 1984:159-161).

It is necessary to make some comments on the writing of German history. German histories made little impact outside the Fatherland. An example of this is Voight’s history of Prussia which consisted of nine volumes dedicated to the Fatherland. The same was true of Luden’s history which was dedicated to the Fatherland. Bentley points to Von Ranke as the main German historian. Von Ranke saw German history as merely a concern with the state as the only agency of authority. This was true in Germany both domestically and externally. The German state was the ethical end in itself (Bentley 1999:36-37). The mainline of German historiography discovered historicism as an
antidote to intuition in theorizing about historical method. Humboldt’s lecture of 1821 talks in a sophisticated manner about history’s function of finding form within the chaos of designating events. Ethics becomes a product of that theatre of action which history considers. German historians reject an ethical code from above the events and allow the events to announce their own morality (ibid:36-37). Bentley writes: ‘What ought to succeed becomes a function of what has succeeded a doctrine with direct implications for the foregoing theory of the state’ (ibid:37). Historical knowledge must not emerge based on applying ‘conceptual schemata’ to the past. The analysis of individual instances and concrete events must become the basis for historical knowledge. German historicism did not remain in a static state during the nineteenth century. Styles of thought were prevalent between 1820 and 1870 in Germany. These styles of thought in writing German history are worth noting since Tillich was part of the nineteenth century. Such historical styles gained ascendancy between the foundations of the Empire and the cataclysm of 1914. Bentley does point out that German history had a close affinity to the British during this period. German historians often visited England as was the case with Von Ranke (ibid:38). It was later when ‘Wilhelmine’ historians considered only the state of Germany. A distaste became evident for anything beyond Germany. German provincialism was the historical perspective of the day. The ‘First World War’ seemed to validate German thinking. German historians became convinced that this was the correct historical method (ibid:38).
The older historiography gives us valuable tools which contribute to our historical insights and understanding in the writing of history. These historical particulars will become useful where applicable in the argumentation of the thesis approach.

In analysis of this subdivision, historical inquiry must be limited to the hypothesis of the study. The hypothesis becomes the basis for the inclusion or elimination of materials. It is important to build a historical frame of reasoned facts. This is to be preferred to the philosophic approach of beliefs. A philosophy must be based on the historical frame of reference (dates and events).

Events must be analyzed and interpreted. All views must considered in the study. The totality of historical fact is important for the historian. A difference of opinion exists between historians as to whether historical events can be really known. Historians talk of the credible which is as close as we can get to what happened. It is not what actually happened. Facts can be observed, recorded, and attested too. This consensus between historians is rarely disputed. The context of the history and the historical background of the times are important historical factors to the study. German historical knowledge was based on an analysis of both instances and events.

The historical method gives us valuable tools. This contributes to both our historical insight and understanding in the writing of a thesis. The particulars of the historical study will support the hypothesis. The goal of historiography is insight into the work at hand. Sequence, simultaneity, and individual developments must become part of the historian’s
The thesis progresses to the definition of contemporary history and the historical issues related to the writing of contemporary history.

2:3 Contemporary History

2:3:1 The Debate Continues

History is indeed a science according to John Lewis Gaddis. Gaddis (2004:37-39) refers to both Carr and Bloch who ‘brought history into science’. They saw history science as a model for historians (ibid:37). Time and space, the present, the past, and the future become valid concerns for the historian (Barraclough 1979:1). Further, historians became concerned about contemporary history. What is contemporary history? Gaddis (2004:29) writes:

How, then do we think and write about something of which we’re a part? We do it first, I believe, by noting that although time itself is a seamless continuum, it doesn’t look that way to those who exist within it. Anyone with a minimal level of consciousness would see time as divided, like ancient Gaul, into three parts: What lies in the past, what is yet to come in the future – and most difficult of all to pin down – that elusive entity known as the present.

The Annales School of History introduced a number of social and economic concerns (Mennell 1996:3-13). Postmodern theorists ‘challenged the fundamental assumptions of conventional historical study’ (Southgate 2001:2). Time was now seen as being relative. The present fleets into the past. The present and the future became new concerns to the historian (Hall 2004:5). Robert Owen Keohane (1986:131) was typical of the new reality school of history to address the present, and the future as well as the
past. Jenkins (1991:12) clarifies: ‘The past that we ‘know’ is always contingent upon our own ‘present’. Historians suffered from a lack of objectivity (Spitzer 1996:2). Historians and contemporary historians were both affected by a lack of objectivity in their writings. Gaddis (2004:35) points out that the past was not accessible to either the historian of the past or the contemporary historian of the present. Gaddis (ibid:35) writes: ‘No Egyptologist has ever seen Ramses’. Historians thought it better to study long term trends in history as a way to deal with the problem of objectivity. Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre who founded the Annales School of History in 1929, were typical of historians wanting to study ‘long term historical structures’ (Furay & Salevouris 1988:223).

Contemporary history is history that is happening at the present time. The concept of relativity introduced by contemporary historians meant that past history and church history were contemporary in their own time. Their writings became good only for their generations. The reason is that they wrote within a particular historical setting with words good only for their generation (Chaney 1994:44). Elements of historical writing such as facts, memories, and interpretations came into question. A general consensus of historians argued for the need for objectivity. This would be accomplished by distinguishing between facts, opinions, memories, and interpretations (McCullagh 1987:7-12). McCullagh (1998:3) argues: ‘that historical interpretations are, to a large extent, subjective’. The historian must admit that his own presuppositions determine historical output (Conde 1999:40-43). Facts may be chosen on the basis of the historian’s beliefs. The historian decides on the facts to accept and those which are
to be rejected. This is a subjective choice in relationship to the facts of history (ibid:14).
The interplay between facts and interpretation becomes a necessary admission on the part of the historian. The historian must admit ‘the fact that histories always contain acts of the creative imagination - means that histories are impossible to close down, because it is impossible to close down the imagination’ (Jenkins 1995:3). Callinicos (1995:76) brings out an important consideration in his discussion on facts. He (ibid:76) writes: ‘facts are refracted through the mind of the historian’. Gaddis (2004:36) adds to our discussion by saying: ‘A historical fact is an inference from the relics, the sociologist John Goldthorpe has observed. Included in this list is great ideas, documents deposited in archives’. Gaddis (2004:41) brings out the subjectivity involved in facts, memories, and interpretations:

For historians, too start with surviving structures, whether they be archives, artifacts, or even memories. They then deduce the processes that produced them. Like geologists and paleontologists, they must allow for the fact that most sources from the past don’t survive, and that most daily events don’t even generate a survivable record in the first place. Like biologists and astrophysicists, they must deal with ambiguous or even contradictory evidence, and like all scientists, who work outside laboratories, historians must use logic and imagination, to overcome the resulting difficulties, their own equivalent of thought experiments, if you will. The memory of historians may be too short. Imagination is necessary in the writing of history. It must be a partial conclusion at this point that absolute objectivity is not possible for historians past and present (Hobsbawn 1998:128). Contemporary history has been problematic both in the twentieth century and at the present time. Southgate (1996:2) writes: ‘Postmodern theorists have challenged the fundamental assumptions of conventional historical study, and have gone so far as to question
the very point of persisting with the subject at all’. A difference of opinion exists as to
the perception of contemporary history. Hughes (1997:20) writes:

Directly or indirectly historians have always grappled with the present in their dealings….For many, the present has been and continues to be, the primary object of concern. Others have recognized the fundamental and inescapable role of the present in shaping representations of the past. History, in this sense, is always contemporary.

Subjective nature of contemporary history comes with different definitions of what constitutes the subject. Gaddis (2004:15) thought that contemporary history was ‘constantly being measured in terms of neglected metrics’. For Fulbrook (2002:146) contemporary history is defined by it’s ‘forms and aims’. Fulbrook (ibid:146) writes: ‘Most historical works will have, simultaneously, a variety of purposes: not only to inform or instruct, but also to arouse emotional involvement or invoke sympathy, to entertain; to persuade’. Gaddis (2004:30) has further thoughts on the nature of contemporary history. He (ibid:30) writes:

St. Augustine doubted that present even exists, describing it as something that “flies” with such speed from future to past, as not to be lengthened out with the least stay. But the historian R.G. Collingswood, writing some fifteen centuries late, took just the opposite view. “The present alone is actual,” he insisted, using an Oxford illustration; the past and future had no existence comparable to the way in which “when we are walking up to the Highpart Queen’s Magdalen and All Souls exist. So what’s the problem here?

Gaddis (ibid:30) clarifies:

I prefer to think of the present as a singularity or a funnel, if you prefer a more mundane metaphor, or a wormhole, if you favor a more exotic one -through which the future has got to pass in order to become the past. The present achieves the transformation by locking into place in order to become the past. The present on the future side of the singularity, these are fluid,
decoupled, and therefore indeterminate; however, as they pass through it they fuse and cannot then be separated.

His view is one of many views of contemporary history. The past, present, and future are all interrelated and cannot be separated. Thus contemporary history has a fluid concept to it. Contemporary history is history of the historian’s present. It begins when the contemporary historian writes on the contemporary scene of his or her world. The production of new historical works may well replace past histories. Progress is made in contemporary history when the historian’s present and the historian’s contemporary world are included. Even continuity is a subjective concept of history that means different things to different people (Latourette 1953:xxi). For Gaddis (2004:30) continuity means: ‘patterns that extend across time’. History is constantly being rewritten with new discoveries, and perspectives. Historical value judgments are thought to lend to history a contemporary nature. It is at the point of a historical decision that history becomes contemporary history. Barraclough (1975:13) writes:

It goes without saying that we can only consider contemporary history in this way when we are clear what we mean by the term ‘contemporary’. The study of contemporary history has undoubtedly suffered because of the vagueness of its content and haziness of its limits. The word ‘contemporary’ inevitably means different things to different people; what is contemporary for me will not necessarily be contemporary for you.

Therbon (1999:93-135) assesses history to be in a state of flux, and in an ever changing state. Gaddis (1995:1) thought contemporary history was the present versus the past. Rigney (2001:6) thought cultural history had contributed much to contemporary history. He (ibid:6) writes: ‘There is something to be said for accepting the idea
that contested boundaries are inevitable in cultural practice’. Historical writing has changed during the last twenty years. Spitzer (1996:2) writes: ‘Over the past twenty years, powerful arguments have undermined our confidence in historical objectivity, in universal standards of truth, and even in the viability of the search for stable and determinate meanings’.

Contemporary history has become related to culture. The study of cultural history has widened the scope of contemporary history into the areas of both the social sciences and the humanities (McCullagh 1998:1-2). This has resulted in the need for historical analysis and interpretation. The inclusivism of contemporary history is particularly attractive with its inclusion of all peoples and cultures (Fullbrook 2002:145-146). Davidson (2004:155) attributes this widening of history into culture, the sciences, and the humanities to the work of Eric Hobsbawm and Edward Thompson.

The limitations of contemporary history have been debated in comparison to past historical works. The historical value judgments of contemporary historians have resulted in positives and negatives. Past historians and histories have taken on a reputation for all times. Contemporary historians argue that these historians and histories are unable to attend in the present. Contemporary history is subject to revision due to new sources. These contemporary histories may be more relevant than past works (ibid:155). Jenkins (2003:7) writes:

Let me begin with the idea that history is a discourse about, but categorically different, from the past. This might strike you as odd for you have missed the
distinction before, or if not, you may still not have bothered too much about it.
One of the reasons why this is so, why the distinction is generally left un worked,
is because as English-speakers, we tend to lose sight of the fact that there
actually is this distinction between history-as that which has been written/
recorded about the past-and the past itself, because the word history covers both
things. It would be preferable, therefore, always to register this difference by
using the term ‘the past’ for all that has gone on before everywhere, whilst using
the word ‘historiography’ for history, historiography referring to the writings
of historians. This would be good practice the past as the object of historians’
attention, historiography as the ways historians attend to it.

The nature of contemporary history is debated and continues to be debated.

In brief, the definition of contemporary history continues to be debated. A number
of factors contribute to this ongoing debate. Some historians view history as a science.
Others argue for the importance of social and economic concerns. Some contemporary
historians argue for the time factor of the past, present, and future. The subjective element
in the writing of history has entered the discussion. It is thought that the historian’s
presuppositions determine the historical outcome. The historian needs to admit the
subjective factor of the historical work. The interplay between facts and historical
interpretation becomes a necessary part of the historian’s admission. Opinions, memory,
and imagination enter into the writing of contemporary history. Absolute objectivity was
not possible for past historians. It is not possible for historians writing in the present.

Contemporary history views the past, the present, and the future as being
interrelated to each other. They are not able to be separated in the writing of
contemporary history. History is constantly being revised and rewritten. Historical
value judgments lend to history a contemporary nature. History is thought to be in an
an ever changing state of flux.

Contemporary history has become related to the study of cultural history. The scope of history has been widened to include the social sciences and the humanities. This has resulted in the need for analysis and interpretation rather than description and narratives.

Past history is compared to contemporary history. Contemporary historians argue that past historians and histories were unable to attend to the present. Objectivity is another historical issue in the writing of contemporary history.

2:4 Objectivity

2:4:1 No Absolute Objectivity

Objectivity is a key concept in modern historiography. Kenneth Scott Latourette (1953:xxi) writes on this subject: ‘If it is complained that this is not an “objective” approach, it must be remembered that pure objectivity does not exist’.

It must be admitted in our discussion that absolute objectivity does not exist. True objectivity is not possible. The historian is in his own context, ‘socially’, ‘culturally’, and ‘historically’ (Higashi 2004:85). The relative nature of contemporary history is seen in its constant revision and rewriting (Barraclough 1979:208). Lemon (2003:260) states it well: ‘The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but a practical question of existence of truth in history’. It was in the search for truth that the need arose for history to assert reality. Verifiability with reality became necessary in contemporary historical writing.
Consensus became another important factor in the historian’s work. The historian’s reputation was another variable that needed to be considered (Collier 2003:175). The contemporary historian must admit that he comes to his work with prior beliefs and suppositions (Conde 2001:40-43). The principle of change in culture, society, and our world enters into all considerations for our discussion of objectivity (Therbon 1999:15-30). The need for fairness and justice in historical judgments is necessary for the historian to maintain integrity (McCullagh 1998:7-12). Even the historian’s choice of facts is a subjective choice (Conde 2001:14). Though truth is relative, yet the Christian may have less of a problem with objectivity. Duncan (2007) writes: ‘For the Christian, this is perhaps less of an issue for the truth is the Word of God, who is Jesus Christ (John 14:6) and all other truth is measured against his standard’. Further, the contemporary historian must acknowledge and be aware of his own ‘self-conscious framework’ (Lemon 2003:374). All of this has led contemporary historians to declare that objectivity is elusive. Conde (2001:14) argues that objectivity is out of the historian’s reach because of the historian’s subjective choice of facts. In addition, selectivity linked to interpretation or value judgments takes away the possibility of absolute objectivity (Outhwaite 2004:226). Spitzer (1996:1) points out that the objectivity of facts has been called into question. What is the relationship between objectivity and facts? It must be admitted that no such thing exists as objectivity of facts. The interplay between fact and interpretation, and times past, present, and future does exist (Butterfield 1955:12-42). Collingswood (1994:190) argues that the
choice of facts reveals the selector’s own subjectivity. Wright (1992:14) argues for multiple verification when relating objectivity to interpretations. Logical consistency, general acceptance, with the historian’s reputation form a pattern of logical interpretation. Kennedy (2002:75) argues just the opposite that subjectivity of choice in writing history is unavoidable. The selection of facts and interpretations of the same by its very nature is a subjective choice. Continuity, causation, effect, motivation, and contingency contribute to the historiographical process. It is necessary to distinguish between facts, opinions, and memories (McCullagh 1987:7-12). The historiographical process is helped by these distinctions.

Outhwaite (2004:226) argues that the historian needs to distance himself from his biases and prejudices. Dingle (1937:43) concurs with this calling it an ‘ambiguous boundary’. Focault (2002:6) thought ‘history is subjectivity produced by philosophical reflection’. Selectivity of facts in relation to interpretation and historical judgments detract from objectivity. Lemon (2003:370) argues that the role of selectivity in the historian’s writing of contemporary history means the historical meaning of the present is subjective. The constant revision, rewriting, and emergence of new sources show the elusiveness of objectivity. Contemporary history is constantly being rewritten with new perspectives (Jenkins 2003:11).

Can objectivity be helped? Contemporary historians must be aware of their own background, views, biases, and prejudices. They should be aware as well that the sources they use may have biases embedded within them (Conde 2001:14).
The contemporary historian may fail to be self-conscious of the fact that the values of the previous historian are hidden in the historical source (Lemon 2003:355). Objectivity and time must be another consideration of the contemporary historian. Gaddis (2004:31) speaks of the time-space relationship: ‘For our purposes, let us define it simply as the location in which events occur, with the understanding that “events” are those passages from the future through the present into the past’.

Should the contemporary historian be able to predict the future to better understand the past? The historian should be able to predict the future to better understand the past. However, the future might not be as the historian expects regardless of lessons learned from the past (Harrison, Jones, & Lambert 2004:58). The relativity of the historian’s views comes about because it is thought that the past should illuminate the future. The historian’s choice argues in favor of subjectivity. The past illuminating the future would argue for a higher objectivity. Is this not the old argument that we learn lessons from past history? The present must enter into this relationship between the past and the future. The present is where the thought experiments take place (Bertens 1955:166). If historians are occupied with the future then they distance themselves from the past. It has been argued that what is known of the past blurs objectivity since it is only a partial picture. A variety of perspectives exist on the issue in contemporary historiographical issues (Wright 1992:141). The historical context and contextualization would argue as well for a higher objectivity. Doubts about the historian’s ability to represent past realities as they
“really” were has a long history. It is distinguished in America by the names of Charles Beard and Carl Becker (Spitzer 1996:2). It is true that the past is gone and what exists of the past is only a partial representation. Spitzer (ibid:3) writes: ‘historical relativism is itself historically relative’. The Paucks (1976:1-12) used the memory of others in their writing of Paul’s Tillich past. Traditional historical research was value judgments based on the body of evidences. Fulbrook (2002:173) calls this a ‘subjective element in historical evaluation’. Hawkes (1963:42) writes concerning the facts of history:

They cannot be seen, felt, tasted, heard or smelled. They may be said to be symbolic or representative of something that once was real, but they have no objectivity equated objective reality of their own. In other words, ‘they exist only in the observer’s or historian’s mind (and thus they may be called “subjective”).

Further, the contemporary historian writes within a particular context. The historian’s attachment to his own personal setting argues against objectivity. The historian has a particular social, economic, cultural, and historical environment (Hobsbawm 1997:269-272 in Jenkins and Munslow 2004:66-69). Social historians thought objectivity was beyond the historian’s context. Social and political historians introduced a new way of thinking. Hobsbawm and Thompson sought to extend history to a view of the future. They argued that democracy had failed (Freedman 1990:57). Hobsbawm (1998:83) thought the traditional approach to history had been ‘turned upside down’. Hobsbawm had a greater understanding of the historical past based on class ideology. Gaddis (1998:24) refers to Karl Marx’s words: ‘Men make their own history, another keen long-term observer, Karl Marx, would later note, ‘but they
do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen
by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given, and transmitted from the
past’. Context and contextualization have become important concepts in historiography
and the writing of contemporary historiography. These two concepts were thought to
advance progress.

All aspects of time are seen now to be linked together (Gaddis 2004:36). Progress came to be seen as the promise of a better future (Keohane 1986:205-206). It involved as well ‘the commitment to a more egalitarian future’ (Fulbrook 2002:41). Barraclough (1979:15) writes: ‘Whatever may be the problems of writing contemporary history, the fact remains-as R.W. Seton-Watson long ago pointed out-that, from the
time of Thucydides onwards, much of the greatest history has been contemporary
history. Indeed, if it said-as historians sometimes say-that the idea of contemporary
history is a new fangled notion introduced after 1918 to pander to the demands of a
disillusioned public anxious to know what had gone wrong with the ‘war to end all
wars’. It is necessary to acknowledge the subjectivity of the historian.

In critique, absolute objectivity does not exist. This is because the historian writes
from his own context socially, culturally, and historically. Objectivity is thought by some
historians to be an elusive concept. Selectivity seen in the historian’s interpretation or value
judgments takes away any concept of absolute objectivity.

Objectivity of facts does not exist. The interplay between fact, interpretation, and
time does exist. Multiple verification has been argued in relating objectivity to interpretations.
The historian’s reputation, logical consistency, and general acceptance form a pattern of logical interpretation. It becomes necessary to distinguish between facts, opinions, and memories to aid the historiographical process. Historians must be aware of their own prior beliefs and realize that historical sources may have biases in them.

The historian should be able to predict the future. This will help the historian to better understand the past. The future may not turn out as the historian thought it would. This points to the relative nature of the historian’s views. The historian’s choices argue in favor of subjectivity. The past giving insight into the future argues for a higher objectivity. The present must be included in the time relationship. It is in the present that the thought experiment occurs. The past has gone from us. The past is represented at best by a partial representation.

The contemporary historian writes within a particular setting. His own setting argues against objectivity. Context and contextualization are thought to advance progress. Progress came to be seen as the realization of a better future. Subjectivity is another historical issue in the writing of contemporary history.

2:5 Subjectivity

2:5:1 The Subjective Nature Of The Historical Construct

The historian comes with values, and the vision of the future. The historian is subjective in the writing of history because of the historian’s particular past, and his present subjective context. The ambiguous nature of the historian’s writings is seen in the writing of a past event and the interpretation of that event. Jenkins (2003:8) writes: of this subjectivity: ‘The past has gone and history is what historians make of it when
they go to work’. The subjective nature of history can be seen in that at best history is the historian’s perspective. The subjectiveness of writing history can be seen as well in the historian’s interpretation of past history. Jenkins (2003:14) writes: ‘And this is that no matter how verifiable, how widely acceptable or checkable, history remains inevitably a personal construct, a manifestation of the historian’s perspective as narrative’. The historian must admit both their ‘assumptions’ and ‘preconceptions’ are subjective (Conde 2001:14). Holter’s (1983:5) comment on the subjectivity of the historian speaks of the historian’s own context, times, and values. He writes: ‘The historian cannot be objective, even if he tries; the times he lives in, the values associated with his upbringing, all enter into his work’. Subjectivity of choice in writing is unavoidable. The selection of facts and their interpretation of the same is by it’s very nature a subjective choice (Kennedy 2002:55-75). Political commitments may determine a historian’s outlook and writings (Prakash 2002:94). Every historical situation was rooted in a cultural, political, social, religious, and economic background. The historian’s subjectivity is seen in that their present situation will contain all of these variables (Lemon 2003:370).

Freedman (1990:57-58) argues that historical perspective is determined in part by the place economics plays in history. E. H. Carr argued in What is History? that historians ‘are shaped by their own society’ (Storry 1999:75-110). The historical scholar demonstrates commitment by his ability to endure and continue researching. The historian will make historical value judgments which are subjective by their very nature. The basis for historical value judgments will be the historian’s social,
cultural, political, and religious values. Historical decisions are based on the historian’s own personal criteria which is subjective (Wilson 1999:132). The historian must prioritize the importance of certain facts to the exclusion of others. This is a subjective choice. Biases cannot be done away with completely (Harrison, Jones, and Lambert 2004:52). Historical biases can be exposed when tested by historical moral standards (Turiel 2002:2). This is a much preferred view to the older traditional view of distancing oneself from your subject. Biases or prejudices may be hidden in the sources the historian has to work with. The historian must be conscious and aware of this vital variable. Hidden within these sources may be the historian’s commitment on a theological and political level (McCallum 1999:70). The relativism of the historian’s views must be acknowledged (Weber 1973:2). It is true that some historians have a greater level of consciousness than other historians (Butterfield 1955:4-5).

In review, the historian’s past, his present subjective context, and the historian’s writing of a past event argue in favor of subjectivity. The subjective nature of history can be seen in that history is the historian’s perspective. The historian’s interpretation is a personal construct. The historian must admit that their assumptions and preconceptions are subjective. Progress is another important historical issue in contemporary history.

2:6 Progress

2:6:1 A New Definition of Progress

Linear progress was a popular concept in some Christian circles in and up to the beginning of the twentieth century (Latourette 1953:1353). Confidence in
a golden era disappeared with wars, ‘ever increasing number of casualties, and with devastating consequences’ (Diakonoff 1999:196). Diankonoff (1999:7) speaks of progress: ‘Progress of the human society as a whole, of the conditions of its existence, of the accessibility of material goods, etc. Here again an unlimited or even an interruptedly linear progress is hardly possible’. The increase of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, took away from confidence in the future. Famines instead of plenty became the standard of the day. The HIV/AIDS disease hit all societies around the world (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, and Davis 2003:3,5,17). Progress needed to be redefined and a new approach to historiography became necessary. Patterson (1999:14) states: ‘In a milieu shaped by the struggles for political independence, social scientists also investigated the participation of natural minorities, peasants, and tribal peoples in the national liberation movements and their integration into the newly dependent states’. Historians wrote their histories emphasizing analysis and explanation rather than as traditionally done with emphasis on descriptions and narratives (Holter 1983:5). Emphasis was placed as well on patterns and generalizations. Lemon (Fukuyama 1992:xii in Lemon 2003:391) writes: ‘Essentially, we will find Fukuyama arguing that ‘History,…understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process, has reached its end-goal, such that we can expect no new developments in the basic structure already characterizing the majority of the world’s states-namely, the combination of free – market (i.e., capitalist) economies and liberal
-democratic political institutions’. Fukuyama argued that this meant ‘the demise of ‘historical world’ and the full arrival of ‘the post-historical’. Collingswood (1994:478) writes of progress: ‘This conception of development, or progress, defines a necessary character of every historical period’.

Historical focus was on the past. Twentieth century history focused on the now. The highest ideal of objectivity would be to interweave the present, the future view, and to have a greater insight, and understanding into the past. Oden (1964:130) disagreed emphasizing a covenant history. Oden (ibid:130) writes:

This is to be distinguished from that view which circumscribes history within the “Now”. Yet they are one and the same using different words to describe the same thing. The end result is decision making in the present.

Decision making became seen as necessary in the present. The future was affected by decision making in the present (Mandela 1995:24-25). The Christian perceived the new kairos or eschatological happening as conducive to both faith and freedom. Tillich (1977:162) speaking of the now states: ‘Human action will decide the future of Western Civilization’. Further, Tillich (ibid:162) argued: ‘There will be a New Enlightenment only if Western Society comes to an end’.

History had a new consciousness for those ‘in Christ’ in the religious realm (Juckes 1995:134). A new morality was to be seen in terms of decision making. History’s meaning would be known as a result of decision making. Tillich came to the realization of the necessity of the human will and action (Tillich 1977:162). The highest objectivity came to be seen as the historian projecting a vision of the future
with greater insight into the past. This view became preferred to the older traditional view of historians bound to their own situation. Lyotard (1993:xix) argued: ‘A proper determination of the nature of the political can bring history to an end, redeem humanity from necessity. However, the future may not occur as the historian foretold it’. Smith (1994:182) writes: ‘Empirical evidence is always at best in flux, in other words, in a process of change. The empirical given is always evolving from past to future’. For our purposes, progress is related to two purposes, the first is political, and the second is social. Even Barraclough (1975:233) admitted the contemporary period of history ‘a new epoch in the history of mankind’. He predicted changes would come about in both ‘the social environment’ and ‘in the political structure’. Some historians saw this as a new moral in history. Baudrillard, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Michael Focault ‘rendered traditional society theory obsolete’ (Atonio & Kellner 1994:127). Castoriadis (1998:53) speaks of ‘Marxism,…The ‘historical necessity’ it speaks of (in the sense this expression has commonly had, precisely that of a series of events that leads history towards progress) differs in no way, philosophically speaking from Hegelian Reason….it is a question of an alienation of man which is properly theological’. Castoriadis (ibid:58) continues: ‘The rationalization of production is the rationalization already created by capitalism, the sovereignty of the ‘economic’ and in all senses of the term; it is quantification, the plan that treats men and their activities as measurable variables’. In the modern world, people became subjected to quotas of production rather than existing to glorify
God. Apeteker (1993:70) calls man’s subjection to production victimization. His (ibid:70) analysis is as follows: ‘Victimization may induce fear and even apathy, but it may provoke hatred for the oppressor and resistance to the oppression’. He (ibid:74) continues: ‘This concept is present among exploited peoples themselves; its forms, for example, a fundamental thread in both the creative and the historical literature of the African American people, or those in Latin America—both Christian and Marxist—who are struggling together for liberation from oppression and injustice. Neither it nor Marxism-Leninism denies the dehumanizing potential in impoverishment and extreme persecution, but they do deny that it is possible that those who persistently have right on their side and battle for it and that those who do not and battle against it do not, thereby, affect their respective characters and psychologies’? Apeteker (1993:76) ‘emphasizes the importance of being in the world among people who are trying to fulfill the promise of a vision of a world transformed’. Holub (1992:167) exposes the capitalistic idea of progress. He (ibid:167) writes: ‘As such they propagate the conceptions of a world power to the capitalist mode of production. However, in that this group adheres to ‘a structure of feeling’ that propagates technological progress, a technocratically functionalist future, in an instrumentalist rationality’.

In assessing, progress was originally thought to be linear. Progress viewed as eventuating in a golden era disappeared because of wars and their devastation. The increase in natural disasters, famines, and disease have argued against the Christian concept of linear progress. This has led to the need to redefine progress. Historians wrote their
histories emphasizing the need for analysis and explanation rather than description and narrative. The triumph of capitalism in economics and democracy in politics was thought to be a confirmation of the concept of linear progress. The end of history was thought to have been reached.

Current history focuses on the present. Decision making in the present for the future has become a necessary historical variable. The new morality was to be seen in terms of decision making. Contemporary history became a new epoch in mankind's history. Man’s social environment and political structure has changed. The question of man’s alienation became theological. Mankind became victimized through production quotas, the oppressor, and oppression. Christian Marxist peoples struggled for liberation from injustice.

2:7 Ecumenical Perspective

2:7:1 Ecumenicalism Defined

The ecumenical perspective is so important in the study of church history. Duff (1956:255) writes: ‘The whole history of the Ecumenical Movement and indeed the definition of its organized form as a ‘fellowship of churches’ from all continents makes it inevitable that the international order will be one of the primary concerns’. Bartholomew (1999:x) calls the ‘ecumenical movement,…the breath of all Christians’. Barnes (2003:13) concurs by arguing for a ‘wider ecumenism’. Graziano (1999:151) states the importance of ecumenicalism: ‘World Christian unity, referred to in the church
as ecumenicalism, is based on such biblical passages as John 17:21, where Jesus prays that humanity “may all be one,” united in the faith’. Campbell (1996:5) equates the ecumenical context with ‘a broad cultural movement that some describe as Postmodernism’. 

Modern missions has given the impetus to the ecumenical perspective. Now, modern missions has become ‘the common property of mankind’ (Anderson 1961:xii). Ecumenicalism must be ‘without political exploitation’, or, as he puts it, ‘imperialistic aggrandizement’ (Brown 1978:30). The purpose of ecumenism is to bring the churches into union, and individuals into co-operation (Duff 1956:18). The modern missionary movement and Christian unity are key concepts in establishing the ecumenical perspective. Missionary endeavors brought about the need for ecumenism due to failures as well as successes. Duff (ibid:288) adds: ‘Ecumenism by definition,…,transcends narrow denominationalism while prizing the peculiar heritage of its component ecclesiastical traditions, and appreciating the distinct contributions each communion brings to the corporate whole’.

Church history has been defined as God’s presence in human communities. This process calls for an ever increasing awareness, consciousness, and acceptance. Progress is being made towards this goal. Historians seek the need for a concept of the church that is broad enough to include all (Sagovsky 2000:17). The intended result will be the unity of God’s people. The desired unity of all God’s people will require responsible stewardship and a commitment to mission. This must be seen as a universal ecumenical approach to history (Schafer 1993:50). All groups will have the
same equality in this universal vision. All God’s people and churches will belong to a
universal Christian union that will require of them to be accountable to each other
(Sagovsky 2000:173). A necessary theme in the discussion of ecumenism is dialogue
(ibid: 9). A new openness with each other is necessary. This is based on honesty. This
is another essential factor for ecumenical dialogues. This is a very liberating experience
for individuals and churches.

In analysis, the ecumenical perspective is all important in the study of church
history. This perspective has become necessary on an international scale. World Christian
unity is taught in biblical passages such as John 17:21 by Jesus. Modern missions has
given much impetus to the ecumenical perspective. Church history has been defined as
God’s presence in human communities. Historians view the need for a church which is
broad enough to include everybody. This will result in the unity of God’s people. It will
require God’s people to manifest responsible stewardship and a commitment to mission.
This is a universal ecumenical approach to history. It will become a very liberating
experience for individuals and churches.

2:8 The Goal Of History

2:8:1 Christianity A Historical Materialistic Faith

For our purposes Christianity is a historical materialistic faith which must move
towards a certain specified goal (Therbon 1999:31-52). This is the complete fulfillment
of the kingdom of God (Afansayen 1987:166-167). The kingdom of God is in the
historical future beyond our present space and time world. Harrison (1908:66) writes: ‘One God, one Savior of all, one equal soul in all, one common life’. Historians deny this affirming that historical thinking is teleological. God is lord of history who is guiding the process to the end goal. Christians are pilgrims who are journeying to the future (Latourette 1953:1353).

Christian history has been considered linear which is in opposition to a cyclical approach to history. However, it is obvious that within progress towards the kingdom, God intervenes annually. His yearly intervention is illustrated in the Enthronement Psalms (eg. 47, 93, 96-99). In addition, great interventions of God have occurred in history for his people in Exodus (eg. 12-15). The yearly cyclical process does not mean that history is not moving towards a new kairos. Jesus instituted the eschaton with his announcement of ‘the Kingdom of God is upon you’ (Mk. 1:15). Christ carried out his ministry of reconciliation of the world to himself (2 Cor. 5:19). The culmination of Christ’s eschatological ministry will be delivering the kingdom to God the Father (1 Cor. 5:24). God hath made Christ lord of this age and the coming age (Latourette 1953:1353). In this sense, the gospel is beyond our history (Duncan 2007).

In scrutiny, Christianity is a historical materialistic faith which moves toward a specified goal. This is the complete fulfillment of the kingdom of God. God is lord of history who guides the process to the end goal.

Christian history has been evaluated as linear. This is in opposition to the cyclical approach to history. It is obvious that within the progress towards the kingdom that God
intervenes annually. The Enthronement Psalm (eg. 47, 93, 96-98) are examples of this. The yearly cyclical process does not mean that history is to moving towards a new kairos. Additional biblical examples of history moving towards a new kairos are found in scripture (Mk. 1:15, I Cor. 5:24). God hath made Christ lord of this age and the coming age. In this sense, the gospel is beyond our history.

2:9 The End Of History

2:9:1 The Brevity of Ideological Systems

The end of history is not be confused with the goal of history. Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) work created a great deal of discussion and controversy in the historical world. He claimed that history had ended due to the triumph of liberal democracy. He wondered if there was anything beyond a liberal democracy. Was the triumph of the liberal democracy the climax and goal of history (Fukuyama 1992:xiii)? The final form of world politic is a liberal democracy. The final form of world economics is capitalism. Hodgson (1999:2) writes:

Argued that liberal democracy marks the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ and ‘the final form of human government’. Liberal democracy ‘remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe’. It has been proclaimed that there is no alternative to liberal democratic capitalism.

The liberal democracy sought to suppress all other alternatives to itself. Further, the ideology of liberal democracy and capitalism argued that any other ideology was a tool of the enemy. The liberal democracy stood for peace, freedom, and plenty.
Fukuyama’s view seen in the work of Jean Baudrillard and Jean-Francois Lyotard called it endism. The view of endism became very relevant with the new millennium in the year 2000 and ‘the environment as we know it’ (Sim 2001:27). The logic of modern science dictated universal evolution in the direction of capitalism. However, it was possible to be satisfied on one level but dissatisfied on other levels within this system. Grant (ibid: 27) argues that Lyotard is critical of what he calls ‘grand narratives’. These theories claim to be able to explain everything and to resist any attempt to change their form (or ‘narrative’). If this was true then the possibility of change political or otherwise was negated. The hope of the poor and the disadvantaged would be a disastrous result for the world. The rich by way of contrast would suffer a meaningless existence in life. The poor and disadvantaged of youth in all cultures would be affected as well. Equality in terms of income and assets, and the distribution of wealth would become an unrealistic goal (Van Parijs 1997: 249-250). Turiel (2002:298) argued that this was a moral issue. It would be all too true ‘that capital has the power to enlist and command obedience on a vast scale’ (Heilbroner 1985:46). The ‘claims of any Socialist or radical critique of the capitalistic system’ would be done away with. Further, in the postmodern condition, knowledge is the worlds most significant commodity. The control of knowledge means the exertion of political power. Two choices lay before our world. The first choice is capitalism’s centralized political control of all knowledge. The alternative is whereby all data banks are accessible to the general public. Working
class consciousness in western society has been ‘fragmented and sporadic’ (Tilley 1998:10).

It has been pointed out that the capitalistic use of ideology is with a unlimited power to ‘exploitation like taking unfair advantage’ (Van Parijs 1997:33). This view for the Christian and world history cannot be a true Christian perspective. The reason being for this is that if this were true then the dominance of a liberal democracy and capitalism would mean the kingdom of God had been reached. Therefore, a liberal democracy and capitalism may well be a temporary system.

Van Parijs (ibid:186) writes: ‘Now, compare Eastern and Western Europe before the fall of the Berlin wall. How can you resist the presumption that, as far as economic efficiency is concerned, optimal capitalism is bound to have the upper hand? This is not more than a presumption, but one that is strong enough located the burden of proof firmly on the side of socialism’. Gray (1999:42) states of the endist view: ‘The distinguishing mark of the endist claim is the assertion that times have changed radically. This form of eschatological argument if permitted, effectively can disarm all rivals’. Such a view cannot be considered as true for the Kingdom of God would then be viewed politically in terms of the liberal democracy and economically in terms of capitalism.

In assaying, this is not be confused with the goal of history. Fukuyama’s work created a great deal of discussion and controversy. He argued that the triumph of the liberal democracy was the end of history. The final form of world politic is a liberal democracy.
The final form of world economics is capitalism.

    The liberal democracy developed its own ideology. This ideology suppressed all alternative views to itself. Its argument was that any other ideology was a tool of the enemy. The logic of modern science was a universal evolution in the direction of capitalism. Satisfaction was possible at one level but not at other levels within this system. Caution was expressed in grand narratives that claimed to be able to explain everything. Any attempt to change the narrative was prohibited.

    The class struggle between the rich and the poor becomes very evident within this system. Capitalism has the capital and power to maintain servitude on a world wide scale. The control of knowledge is the world’s most significant commodity. This control translates into the exertion of political power. Capitalism has maintained a firm control of all knowledge. The second and better alternative is where all data banks of knowledge become accessible to the general public. The capitalistic view takes unfair advantage of people. This view for the Christian and world history cannot be a true Christian perspective. A liberal democracy and capitalism may well be a temporary system.

2:10 The Role Of Ideology

2:10:1 The Importance of Ideology

    The preceding discussion shows the importance of the role of ideology. In his work Rethinking International Relations, Halliday (1994:58) argues for the necessity of a ‘historical materialist approach’. Chilcote (2000:xi) points out: ‘Political science and
political economy are deeply influenced by ideology’. In 1795, Antoine Destutt de Tracy ‘coined the word ideology’ which was a reference to ‘the theory of ideas in general’ (Rude 1995:9). Christianity is dependent on political structures. A political ideology has three aspects the vision for a future coherence theory, a consensus in form of coherent interpretation of reality, and action that results in the reorganizing of society (Praeger 2000:iii). This faith can be seen to have a historical reality with its own ideology and history. An awareness and consciousness of conditions is advantageous in the history of ideology. If this approach is followed, the civil order will not become idolatry. Evangelical religion has become a mirror reflecting the views of a liberal democracy and capitalism. It is through its use that the classes are oppressed. The oppressors gain strength, support, and the approval of the liberal democracy. Duncan (2007:17) points out that in South Africa the church opposed social injustices and called the system into question. The church must remain conscious of conditions. It must take action to challenge the dominant ideology of the the day. The importance of adhering to a material socio-economic base though often at an unconscious level for the church must be emphasized. The dominant class ideology that will not change in spite of social injustices must be identified. The bourgeois society of the day can often be traced back to the industrial capitalism from which are their roots. Unfortunately, the church wil often be what the sending body of their origin was (eg. Western Europe). This becomes a deep issue of faith which is related to ideology and context (Fitzgerald 2000:3-8). Ideologies must be critiqued which requires both a theological commitment, and a continual analysis of
of society along social and political lines. The result of all will be a theology of liberation with the transformation of mankind. The complete fulfillment of the kingdom of God will be realized. The contemporary political status will no doubt be challenged (Comaroff 1991: 159).

In a critical analysis, the role of ideology is important in politics and economics. Christianity is dependent on political structures. A political ideology has three aspects. These are the vision for a future coherence theory, a consensus in the interpretation of reality, and action resulting in the reorganization of society. This faith has its own historical reality, ideology, and history. Evangelical religion reflects the views of a liberal democracy and capitalism. It is through evangelical religion that the classes are oppressed. The oppressors gain strength, support, and appraisal from the liberal democracy.

The church in South Africa opposed social injustices. It called the system into question. The church must respond to the injustice of the day. A material socio-economic base even at an unconscious level must be insisted upon by the church. The dominant class ideology must be identified. Ideologies are in need of a constant critique and analysis. This must be done along social and political lines. The end result will be a liberation theology and the transformation of mankind. The complete fulfillment of the kingdom of God will be realized. The relationship of church history to world history must now be considered in our progression of thought in historical issues related the writing of contemporary history.
2:11 The Relationship of Church History To World History

2:11:1 World History The Background For Ecclesiastical History

Ross (2006:4) affirms God’s universality with his reference to ‘the God of all history’. All history both ecclesiastical and secular lies within this all embracing scope (Latourette 1953:1352-1354). The Old and New Testaments demonstrate that the sacred has occurred within the context of world history (Hesselgrave & Rommen 1992:4-11). Christian historiography lies within the context of world history (eg. Lk. 2:1-2). The twentieth century witnessed a search for ‘consensus and a common past’ (Bowden 1991:90). Gilbert (1998:18) gives us further insight: ‘Most researchers chose to concentrate on generating empirical evidence of contextual effects from what are assumed to be relevant contextual units. These units are usually defined spatially or geographically-the county, the census tract, the neighborhood’.

The contextual conditions of the New Testament and the incarnation of Christ occurred within the historical background of the Roman Empire, and its Pax Romana (Latourette 1953:21). Christianity has occurred within time. It claims that all of history moves to a God ordained goal (Gustavson 1955:73). Smith (1981:3) elaborates further: ‘God is actively involved in the historical arena. It is, surely, altogether fitting that a Christian theologian should take history seriously’. Christianity is a historical religion occurring in time and history (ibid:95). The unfolding drama of sin and redemption has taken place (Latourette 1953:8). A teleological view of history has been introduced with order, purpose, design, and direction. Since Christianity is contextual, it is quite possible to write ecclesiastical history apart from and separate from world
history (Schafer 1993:50). The contextual approach to history is to focus on the local setting of Jesus of Nazareth (Mk. 1:9, 16, 21). New Testament history is interwoven within the framework of secular history. Many New Testament references are a direct reference to Roman history (eg. Caesar’s name and coins, Mk. 12:16).

The contextual approach to history does carry with it the perspective of universality. The contextual approach focuses on the local context. Duncan (2007) argues that faithfulness to one’s local setting will result in faithfulness to the Christian universal community. Hobsbawm alleges that universality ‘is the essence of all history’ (Lambert and Schofield 2004:177). The local context, the sitz im leben, focuses to a large extent on the church today. It has been argued that the word church is too ambiguous and undefined by the very nature of the word. The Scriptures, church denominations, and church history confirm this ambiguity as to the definition of the word church and its many meanings. The word church, should be abandoned and replaced by the word Christian. This should be done whenever reference is made to history (Kalu 2005:12-14 in Duncan 2007:19). Healy (2000:45) admits that the church as a model of an ‘institution’ is a problem. The church defined in this way has many disadvantages which work against meeting the needs of the people (Diakonoff 1999:207). The church based on the institutional model furthers its own development, denominationalism, and exclusivism. Lambsdorff (2004:131) points to corruption and distrust as the result of the church as a model of an institution.

The writing of contemporary history is a very exciting and thought provoking experience.
This is due to new emphases and recent developments within historiographical thinking, and writing.

In estimation, God must be seen as the God of all history. Ecclesiastical and secular history lies within this all embracing scope. The Old and New Testaments demonstrate that the sacred occurred within world history. The New Testament occurred within the historical background of the Roman Empire. Christianity claims that all history moves towards a God ordained goal. Christianity is a historical religion which took place in time and history. Christianity is a contextual religion. It is interwoven within the framework of secular history. The contextual approach to history carries with it the perspective of universality.

The word church is ambiguous and undefined. The Scriptures, church denominations, and church history confirm this ambiguity as to the definition of the word church and its many meanings. The word church should be done away with and replaced by the word Christian. This should be done whenever the reference is to history. The church defined as such at the present time works against meeting the needs of the people. The church based on the institutional model serves itself and denominationalism. Distrust and corruption result from the church as an institutional model.

2:12 Tillich’s Contemporary Historical View During The German Years (1886-1933)

Tillich embraced ecumenism which is so important for theology in its economic, political, and theological sense (Horton 1952:28). Tillich’s sharp observational skills brought out a major historiographical issue the ability to relate the present to the future. The difference was ‘a priestly sacramental attitude toward modern political movements,
and a prophetic eschatological attitude’ (ibid:32). Tillich’s discernment of ‘the hand of God’ was not in social democracy but socialism. Horton fails to realize democracy failed as a result of World War I, the German Revolution of 1918, and post war conditions in post World War I Germany. Horton does admit a very important conclusion in terms of the historiographical issue of progress and mankind’s transformation. Horton (ibid:33) writes: ‘What Tillich and the religious socialists intended with their doctrine of the kairos was to relate the Kingdom of God to politics’. Niebuhr (1956:10) writes of Tillich’s

*The Religious Situation:*

Capitalist society….Its civilization is based upon faith in the self-sufficiency of the human and finite world; its hope and purpose is the establishment of human control over the world of nature and mind. Natural science, technique and capitalist economy—a trinity of powers which reinforce each other—support and control the civilization. The spirit of human and finite self-sufficiency is expressed in painting, sculpture, education, politics and religion and gives rise everywhere to an attitude of human domination over things in which there is no respect for the given and no true appreciation of human or any other kind of individuality.

Richards (1995:45) writes: ‘Tillich proceeds to a general and critical analysis of the bourgeois, capitalist society’. Tillich was able to project his vision into the future.

Ratschow (1980:23) confirms this:

Tillich’s eschatologically based devotion to life and its movement did not occur only in matters political. Indeed, even though the political was an earlier expression of the turn, it was not its real bearer. Instead, the political insights and impulses arose out of Tillich’s occupation with historical insights.

Ratschow (ibid:23) continues: ‘In history, however, Tillich’s eschatological movement is worked out basically as kairos thinking. In kairos thinking the political, historical, cultural, and religio-philosophical tendencies are reflected as in the prism that makes their acute significance visible’. Ratschow (ibid:26) writes of Tillich’s socialism:
Tillich maintains a socialism a movement to give meaning to his present. His socialism
is ‘represented entirely according to the model of a religious faith…Tillich’s reflections
on the “proletarian battle,” which is the cause at issue’. Tillich admitted his own
subjectivity and cultural context for both himself and his writings. Ratschow (ibid:34)
writes: ‘Rollo May tells of speaking with Tillich about how he, Tillich, imagined the
effect of his writings among coming generations. Tillich shook his head in reply and opined,
“I am too much determined by the present kairos.” Ratschow (ibid:34) concludes:

On this point, one must indeed say that Tillich wrote his apologetic theology strictly
for his time. But in doing this, he transcended the questions of the time toward their
solution. And that he did.

Leibrecht (1959:4) writes of Tillich’s political theology: ‘The prominence in his thought
of the notion of kairos, the creative act in the moment of the invasion of the finite by the
infinite…illustrates his insistence on speaking to men in the light of changing circumstances
which confront them. With candor he has approached every facet of our tangled lives and
has been a true guide to the perplexed in our century’.

Heiman (1952:312) writes: ‘In three versions of his autobiography, written for
different occasions at different times, Tillich has emphasized the central importance in his
development which he himself attributes to the doctrine of religious socialism…he implicitly
claims central importance for religious socialism in the theonomous system which his theology
is designed to build’. Heiman continues to argue for Tillich’s German legacy of religious
socialism but attributes this to Tillich’s doctrine of the kairos. Heiman (ibid:313) views
Tillich’s doctrine of the kairos as a generalization referring to his personal experience.
Tillich saw the need to become involved in the endeavor for justice and peace upon his
return from World War I. This Tillich thought to be his foremost Christian duty to prevent
the repetition of the catastrophe of World War I. Tillich thought this Christian duty to be
both the thought and the necessary action prescribed by the prophets of the Old Testament.
Further, Heiman (ibid:313) argues: ‘If the time was ripe in 1918, so also it is ripe at many
other turning points of history, all of them characterized by “the invasion of the temporal by
the Eternal”,…the call to the Eternal”…the call to the conditional “to surrender to the
unconditional,…transforms the temporal’. The relevancy of Tillich’s rich contemporary
historical view is obvious given this thinking on the destination of history, the transformation
of mankind. Secondly, all of history lies within the divine order. Reisman (1990:31) writes
of this new religious phenomenon: ‘Virtually every aspect of Capitalism and thus of economic
activity is savagely denounced by large segments of public opinion’. Tillich’s legacy has given
an awareness as to the destination of history. Wacquaint (1985:42) claims the transition
has already been made ‘toward a Socialist world order’. Adorno (1990:199) in his work
*Negative Dialectics* argues ‘capitalism realizes over the heads of men’.

Tillich stressed the importance of the concept of ideology. Tillich (1968:481)
writes this is ‘another important concept for theology’. Tillich (1968:481-482) elaborates:

What is ideology? Every group or class has such a system of ideas. But ideology-
can also mean…the most dangerous weapon in the class struggle-the unconscious
production of ideas which justify the will-to-power of a ruling group. This is mostly
on unconscious production, but it can be used in a conscious way. Marx used the
word “ideology” as a weapon. It was probably his sharpest weapon against the ideas
of the ruling classes with which the churches were allied. All the great European
churches, the Orthodox, the Lutheran, and the Episcopalian were on the side of the
ruling classes. The Roman Catholic church was better in this respect for it had
preserved a tradition of social feeling and social analysis from its classical medieval
period. Marx says that the religious symbolism of a transcendent fulfillment (of
heaven or immortality) is not merely the hope of every human being, but is the invention of the ruling classes to prevent the masses from seeking fulfillment in this life. This is formulated in the famous phrase that religion is the opiate of the people.

Siegfried (1952:71) argues that Tillich accepted the Marxist ideology and analysis.

As a Christian theologian, Tillich espoused the historic materialistic faith. He has inspired the disadvantaged, and oppressed peoples around the world. His Protestant theology during the German years 1919 to 1933 was a religious socialism that would bring the Kingdom of God and a new world for the millions oppressed by capitalism.


A third method of theology is the praxis approach of liberation theology. “Praxis” is a technical term designating a way to knowledge that binds together action, suffering, and reflection. The praxis method of theology is represented by… liberation theologians, most notably in Latin America.

Tillich’s legacy of a rich ecumenical theology has liberated many students. Braaten (1968:xvi) writes: ‘even students from backgrounds uncongenial to Tillich’s views on the Christian faith could not fail to learn from him as an interpreter of the Christian tradition. Many were liberated from the strait jacket of a given denominational tradition to become more open to the fullness of the common Christian heritage’.

Tillich (1968:479) writes:

that in Germany the social structure was always taken for granted as something ordained by God. This was in accordance with Lutheran doctrine. Sociological analysis was avoided….Marx received his sociological view partly from France and partly from his insight into the miserable social conditions of large sections of people in Europe. Man is not man as individual. The idea of the individual existing by himself is an illusion.
In summary, Tillich has left us a relevant contemporary historical legacy of the destination of history. The coming new kairos that will result in the complete transformation of mankind.

In investigation, Tillich has left us a German legacy of a contemporary historical view. Tillich embraced ecumenism. He was able to relate the present to the future. Tillich viewed divine providence to be seen in socialism. Tillich related his religious socialism to the kingdom of God and politics. His critical analysis of the bourgeois and capitalist society remains relevant for us today. Tillich stressed the importance of Marxist ideology and analysis. Tillich espoused the historic materialistic faith as a Christian theologian. Marx argued that religion was used by the bourgeois and the capitalistic society as a weapon to distract the masses from fulfillment in this life. Tillich’s historic materialistic faith has argued to be a rich legacy throughout Latin America. Tillich has inspired the disadvantaged and oppressed around the world. Tillich’s embrace of a rich ecumenical theology has liberated many students. Tillich’s rich legacy includes as well the destination of history. The coming new kairos will result in the complete transformation of mankind.

2:13 Summary

The writing of history requires trustworthy materials and the critical method. Analysis must be given to the historical evidence. Historical problems are many and varied (eg. the problem of time, identity, motive, character, the origin of ideas, cause and effect relationship). A hypothesis must be formed to begin a historical study. The hypothesis/idea/guiding principle must be proved. The historian will build a historical frame of reference of reasoned facts. A philosophy can be drawn from the historical frame of reference. The historical study must be
analyzed and interpreted. All views must be considered in the historical research. The totality of the historical fact is important to the historian. A difference of opinion has existed as to whether historical events can be really known. The discussion involves the fact that history can or cannot be known. Facts can be observed, recorded, and attested to by the historian.

The context of the historian and the historical background of the historical study are important factors to the study. The particulars of the study must fit the hypothesis. Historical study must involve the presentation of the sources, the analysis, the summary (recapitulation), the overall conclusion of the research findings, and the new knowledge.

The definition of contemporary history is still being debated. Social and economic concerns, the time element, long term trends, and objectivity are some of the historical variables accounting for this debate. Others have thought contemporary history is history that is happening at the present time.

The historian’s presuppositions determine historical outcome. Facts, interpretations, opinions, memory, and imagination are all subjective choices. The subjectiveness of the historian’s social context means absolute objectivity in writing contemporary history is not possible.

The past, the present, and the future are all interrelated and are inseparable. History is constantly being revised and rewritten because of new sources and findings. The scope of history has been widened to include both the social sciences and the humanities. The result has been the need for analysis and interpretation. Contemporary historians argue that past historians did not attend to the present.
Absolute objectivity does not exist because the historian writes from a particular social, cultural, and historical context. The principle of change in culture, society, and our world argue against objectivity. The historian’s selectivity of facts, and value judgments argue in favor of subjectivity. The historian should be able to predict the future. This will help the historian to better understand the past. The future may not turn out as the historian predicted. The relative nature of the historian’s views are evident.

The subjective nature of writing contemporary history can be seen in the historian’s past, present subjective context, perspective, prior beliefs, presuppositions, and decision making. Historical biases can be tested by historical moral standards.

Other historical issues to be considered in the writing of contemporary history are progress, the ecumenical perspective, the goal of history, the end of history, the role of ideology, and the relationship of church history to world history. The Christian view of progress was to understand it from a linear perspective. Linear progress resulting in a golden era disappeared due to wars, the increase in natural disasters, famines, and diseases. Progress had to be redefined. Some thought that the triumph of capitalism in economics and a liberal democracy in politics to be linear progress. Further, the claim was made that this was the end of history. The focus on the present and decision making in the present for the future became a necessary part of the historical process. Man’s social and political structure had changed. Man’s alienation became a theological question. Mankind had become victimized and oppressed by the oppressor. Christian Marxist peoples struggled against these injustices. The ecumenical perspective has become necessary on an international scale. World Christian unity is based on biblical passages such as John 17:21. Modern missions advanced the
ecumenical perspective. Responsible stewardship and commitment became essential to the ecumenical perspective. This is a very liberating experience for both individuals and churches. The goal of history had to be reconsidered and redefined. Christianity is a historical materialistic faith moving towards the fulfillment of the kingdom of God. God is lord of history. Cyclical progress is evident within progress towards the kingdom of God. God intervenes annually as evidenced by the Enthronement Psalms (eg. 47, 93, 96-99). This does not mean that history is not moving towards a new kairos. The end of history is different from the goal of history. Fukuyama’s work argued for the triumph of capitalism and democracy as the end of history. Capitalism’s ideology suppressed all alternative views. The class struggle became very evident within this system. Capitalism’s oppression of people made it very clear that this cannot be a true Christian perspective. Ideology is important in both economics and politics. Christianity is dependent on political structures. Evangelical religion maintains the views of its liberal democracy and capitalistic system. The evangelical religion has become an oppressor of the classes. The church needs to challenge social injustices. A material socio-economic base must be emphasized by the church. Ideologies are in need of a constant critique and revision. The critique must be along social and political lines. This will result in a liberation theology, the transformation of mankind, and the complete fulfillment of the kingdom of God. Church history lies within the scope and background of world history. God is the God of all history. The Old and New Testaments occurred within world history. This approach to contemporary history carries with it the universal perspective. The word
church should be replaced by the word Christian. The church is based on an institutional model. The church seeks to further its own ends and denominationalism. This is at the cost of not meeting the needs of the peoples. Corruption and distrust result from the institutional model of the church. Our thesis advances to the consideration of the biographical details of Paul Tillich’s life, thought, and German legacy.