

CHAPTER 4: THE BABANGIDA REGIME: 27 AUGUST 1985 UNTIL 17 NOVEMBER 1993

4. Introduction.

This chapter will be devoted to the sixth Nigerian government under the rule of Babangida. In order to assess the reason for the recruitment of Babangida, the Buhari regime prior to the recruitment of Babangida was included. This leadership study is done by using the environment determined political leadership model as point of reference. This model includes a two-step approach, with the first step being an analysis of the historical situation of Nigeria and the second step the tabularisation of possible variable options. As in the previous chapter, step one will include the three identified phases of recruitment, wherein the micro -, macro - and global environment will be analysed according to personality (which includes role, task and values), organisation and setting. The tabularisation of possible variable options will provide answers and solutions on the question of undemocratic recruitment behaviour, as stated in chapter one.

Nigeria under the rule of Babangida provides the environment determined political leadership model with the opportunity to investigate the impact of the population (as part of the environment) on the origin of undemocratic behaviour (as found among the military). This is made possible as Nigeria developed a transitional society, at the time Babangida took power. In contrary to the previous chapter, this implies that the population was no longer the puppets of the military. This is illustrated in regular strikes and protests held against the military regime. Besides this challenging behaviour exhibited by the population, they still accepted military rule, but it was no longer wholeheartedly and

unconditionally. The opportunity lays in the fact that the environment variables exposed in this chapter, will be those forceful variables that inhibit or temper undemocratic recruitment behaviour or at least tempers military rule. It also presents the opportunity to investigate the behaviour of the political leader (as an ex-military leader) against opposition, as well as the action taken by him/her/them against this opposing behaviour and to determine whether a political leader's actions influence the population's behaviour. These findings can be compared to those found in other chapters, in order to assess their real contribution to the successful undemocratic recruitment of military leaders in the roles of political leaders. Another aspect that can be tested in this period of time, is the influence of the global environment on the undemocratic recruitment process, as Babangida's recruitment as political leader was unconditionally supported by the global environment. This was a result of the Cold War situation, which caused the Great Powers to accept almost all recruitment actions, as long as the leadership concurred with the prevailing power status.

4.1. Phase 1, The emergence of a challenger personality.

This phase, representing the different emerging Nigerian challenger personalities, began with the decline in support for the military regime of Gen. Buhari. It ended just before the coup d'état that took place in August 1985.

4.1.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the emergence of challenger personalities will be analysed, according to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The

aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments as observed during this phase, in order to isolate those factors that promote and / or deter undemocratic recruitment behaviour.

4.1.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

The analysis of these variables will expose those variables present in the environment, which contribute to the emergence of a challenger personality that threatens the existing political leader (s) and facilitates undemocratic recruitment attempts. Such an analysis also creates the opportunity to indicate those factors that prevent or strain undemocratic recruitment activities.

4.1.1.1.1. Micro environment.

This environment includes Babangida and Buhari as individuals, but also the military as a collective group. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be studied, in order to assess this environment-s contribution to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

a. Personality: Challenger

Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida was born in August 1941 in Minna (the Niger Province), as one of two children for Mahamadu and Aishatu Babangida (Alabi 1985:8). Both his parents died before his fourteenth birthday so that he was raised by his

family¹. He is married to Hajiya Mariya King and has four children².

According to Palmers= definition, Babangida can be considered a professional soldier. In 1962, after completing school in Minna, he joined the army. He did his military training in Nigeria, but also in India (1966-1967) and the United States of America (USA) (1972-1973 and 1980) (Alabi 1985:8 and Uwechue 1996a:67). Apart from experiencing war first hand during the civil war, his speciality field was armoured warfare. In 1981 he was promoted to the rank of Brig., as Director of Staff and Planning. It was in this position and later as Head of Staff, that he came to build up a huge following among the military. In March 1983 Pres. Shagari promoted him to the rank of Maj-Gen. During the Buhari regime, he became head of Army Staff and an influential member of the Military Supreme Council (MSC) (Alabi 1985:8, West Africa 1985a:1790 and Uwechue 1996a:67). His influence was due to the fact that he was the only member in the MSC that served on all military councils since 1975. This gave him experience in military government, and made him a sure candidate for future utilisation as political leader. That probably explains why he was the only MSC-member without a pure political appointment³ (West Africa 1985b:1949 and Uwechue 1996a:67).

1. In this time he became friends with the former military turned political leader of Nigeria, Gen. Abubakar.

2. His wife can be seen as the Hillary Rodham-Clinton of Nigerian politics. In 1989 she was appointed as Women of the Year by the *New Nigerian* and was awarded the International Recognition Award by the Harlem Women Committee of the USA (Uwechue 1996a:67 and Macaulay 1990:39).

3. His knowledge of politics was illustrated in an academical document, drafted in 1979, namely *Civil-Military Relationships, the Nigerian experience*. This document reflected his refined political

Babangida was loved by those who knew him and according to them had strong views about the dehumanisation of the people in Africa -which reflected the big heartiness his surname suggests (Alabi 1985:8 and Jason 1986:24). He had leadership qualities such as prominence, initiative and interaction. He had self-confidence and reflected a modest personal ambition. He was popular among the soldiers. In 1976 he gained their admiration, when he walked unarmed to Lt-Col Buka Suka Dimka to persuade him not to perform a coup d'état (Jason 1986:24). He was perceived by the military as a professional soldier without political ambition. This was because he refused demands of his friends and advisors to take the leadership position, after the coup d'état against Pres. Shagari. He felt Buhari had more administrative experience and was therefore more fit for the position of political leader (See Le Roux 1985:327, Diamond 1985:56, Diamond 1985/86:326, Taylor & Rosenbach 1984:200-208 and Finer 1988:9). As Head of Army Staff, Babangida travelled a lot and was exposed to the plurality of the Nigerian population. He communicated with all of his subordinates, relentless of parochial group or ethnic group. These actions made him a popular officer with a broad power base in the Army (Diamond 1985:56 and Diamond 1985/86:326). This broad support gave Babangida the opportunity to develop a challenger personality and to seize a chance at leadership when the situation arose.

The military had a challenger personality. This was due to the unitary and centralised character of the federal government, the history of military intervention, the fact that the armed forces and governing political party were one

thoughts. This made him a sure candidate for future coups d'état attempts and therefore feared by those who held political power.

organisation and that the Nigerian Defence Force (NDF) was a professional permanent force. The legacy of unitary and centralised government structures of the Federation formed a power locus that sparked off constant struggles for political power and the use of military resources to safeguard regional political interests on national level (Lardner 1990:51). When the military was recruited as political leaders, they used the federal political arena to further their own regional and ethnical interests. In doing so the military further became digested by regionalism, ethnicity and factionalism. Even worse, a new dividing dimension arose to give the old North-South struggle a new angle, namely religion: Christianity vs Muslim (Lardner 1990:50,52).

Buhari's regime alienated his own support base in his use of the National Security Organisation (NSO) against Northerners whom he suspected of partaking in coups d'état plans. His biggest opposition came from the military that were opposed to Northern dominance. In his government's campaign to convict corrupt officials and politicians, it became obvious that Buhari applied double standards. The former leaders of the previous government (the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) under the Shagari leadership) were mostly from the Northern region and they were Muslim. They were not as harshly prosecuted as culprits from other regions. The perception was created that Buhari's regime, which also over represented the Northern Hausa-Fulani Muslims, was a military wing of the NPN (See Diamond 1985/86:328, Joseph 1987:86 and Diamond 1987:202). The political -, economic - and social circumstances coincided with the characteristics of a Praetorian state. This inspired opposition from the Yoruba, Ibo and other minority groups (Diamond 1985/86:329). The only alternative to Buhari was an undemocratic recruitment attempt, initiated by a dissident

group in the military, as the macro environment could not deliver an opponent (See Palmer 1989:250 and Finer 1988:75).

b. Role: Challenger

Due to regionalism and ethnicity, the military was factionalised in opposing challenger personalities. These challenger personalities smouldered as Buhari increasingly abused military resources to attain personal power. The MSC, which was mainly composed of soldiers from the Northern Hausa-Fulani Muslim region, suspected all other soldiers of possible counter coups d'état. Those who were part of the coup d'état against Shagari and other former leaders were closely observed. This atmosphere of suspicion caused Buhari to utilise the NSO as a private espionage organisation. Tension arose between senior leaders in the MSC and caused distress among the junior officers. Rumours of a counter coup d'état began to surface time and again. The general feeling (including that of the Northern militia) was that Buhari and Idiagbon (his second in command) were busy to monopolise power and showed paranoid intolerance to debate and critique on and in the MSC (Diamond 1987:202 and Diamond 1985/86:236,329-330). The military under the leadership of Babangida analysed the situation, made a diagnosis and planned a solution: namely a coup d'état. It was their heads or that of Buhari.

c. Task: Challenger

The military set themselves the task to be recruited as political leaders. The Northern military would welcome any undemocratic recruitment attempt that would distribute political power to all the militia from the North and prevent other power groups in the militia (as the Ibo) from obtaining political power. The remainder of the militia opposed

Northern dominance and would therefore support any task aimed at toppling the Northern military. The junior officers were against the politicisation of the military and desired a return to civilian government. This led to talks by radical junior officers in July 1985 on performing a coup d'état (Diamond 1985:55).

d. Values: Challenger

In this stage of the Nigerian history, it was clear that the values of modernism did surface in the military, but it was still dominated by other values. The values of modernism⁴ were secondary to the values of regionalism, ethnicity, factionalism and religious differences. The latter values contributed to the development of a challenger personality, especially with the structural weaknesses present in the military organisation (as indicated in chapter three).

4.1.1.1.2. Macro environment.

The social, economic and political facets present in the Nigerian community, constitutes this environment. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be contemplated, in order to assess this environment's contribution to undemocratic recruitment attempts, in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

4. This is nationalism, a modern outlook, discipline, dedication and honesty (See Palmer 1989:251-252). These values were most likely to be found among the young soldiers, who had no political power or influence.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

The three decades in Nigeria before the 1985 coup d'état were characterised by interethnic tension, economic maladministration, political instability, corruption, civil war and military coups d'état (Le Roux 1985:324 and Diamond 1985/86:327). This weakened the macro environment and strengthened the micro environment. Since independence Nigeria had eight governments, from which only two were democratic (10 years) and the rest (20 years) military dictatorships. The average term of each government was about three years and nine months (I.C. 1990:2566). This obstructed any democratic form of government to develop into an institutionalised political culture. Instead, military rule and government were adopted as political culture. This obstructed the weakened macro environment from uniting against the military to demand a civilian government and created a non-challenger personality.

When Gen. Buhari announced a coup d'état against Pres. Shagari, the population (especially those not from the North) rejoiced. They felt that a civilian government (as in the case of Shagari⁵) cannot deliver free and fair elections and therefore a political democracy. They believed that the military would be an improvement on civilian government. When it became clear that the Buhari regime was no improvement to the Shagari government, due to autocratic actions⁶, the monopolisation of

5. Although the election of Shagari was an improvement to previous elections, Awolowo contested Shagari's victory. The understanding was that the candidate with 25% of votes in all regions would have become president and Shagari drew most of his support from the electorate in the North (See Van Rensburg 1981:269-270).

6. See Diamond (1985/86:328), Diamond (1987:201-202), Diamond (1985:54-55), Joseph (1987:86), Torimiro (1988:86-88) and (Legum 1987:B125).

power⁷, anti-democratic behaviour⁸, regionalism⁹ and factionalism¹⁰, the macro environment turned against Buhari. They formed a challenger personality that would support a new military group against Buhari. In its turn this led to more abuse of power from Buhari and harsher decrees to follow in order for him to stay in power. It indicated that a military regime without legitimacy can only be maintained by the use of state violence and as such promote an autocratic regime (Diamond 1987:201-202). This suppression transformed their challenger personality into a non-challenger personality.

The acceptance of military rule did not mean that the Nigerian community was indifferent to politics. Lots of influential pressure groups were formed, like the Union for Pilots, the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the Nigerian Bar Council (NBC) (Joseph 1987:84). There was a sophisticated press system that did not hesitate to expose corruption (Diamond 1985:55 and Legum 1987:B131). These influence groups rose against Buhari, when alienation took place between him and the macro environment¹¹.

7. See Diamond (1985/86:326), Diamond (1987:202), Torimiro (1988:88) and Legum (1987:B125-126).

8. See Diamond (1985/86:327-328), Diamond (1987:202), Torimiro (1988:86-88) and Legum (1987:B125).

9. See Diamond (1985/86:327-329), Diamond (1987:202) and Diamond (1985:55).

10. See Diamond (1985/86:329) and Diamond (1985:55).

11. The NMA initiated a strike in February 1985, due to difference with the government on medical issues and the shortage of medication. All groups opposed to the government were banned, including NANS (Diamond 1987:202 and Diamond 1985/86:328-329).

This acceptance of military rule was the result of the long term psychological conditioning of the macro environment that institutionalised military rule. The result was that the macro environment adopted measures to function in these regimes, which they consider to be a correctional system aimed at changing the state to the norm of a constitutional civilian government¹² (Joseph 1987:68). Of course, this acceptance of military rule also had to do with their resentment of corruption, violence and self importance, which were combined with party politics during election wars. Despite this tolerance of military rule, the macro environment in general had a deep philosophical attachment to Democracy (Diamond 1987:201). This contradictory support for both military and civilian rule, lead them to discourse on the viability of a diarchy. This indicated their support for the military to govern, but also their need to have a say in government (See Diamond 1987:223).

This say in government was even more demanded, in the wake of a dying economy. By 1983 Nigeria experienced harsh economic and political problems¹³ which were worsened by the huge burden of a rapid growing population (Le Roux 1985:324). The final blow came with the collapse of the oil market¹⁴. The slightest

12. This notion could have been strengthened by Gen. Obasanjo's voluntary handing of military political power to the elected civilian government of Pres. Shagari in October 1979. Still, the military regimes in Nigeria (up to Buhari) functioned from within an ethnic and regional bias.

13. See Holly (1991), Macgregor (1986:79), Van De Velde (1987:8-9), Torimiro (1988:87-88,102-104), Diamond (1985/86:327) and Legum (1987:B135).

14. The discovery of oil in the 1970's lead to urbanisation and created a relative high level of industrialisation. Due to the total reliance on oil for revenue, a decline in agricultural production took place. This created food shortages in times when oil revenues were too low for importing food products.

price drop had a chain reaction: causing the devaluation of the naira, strikes and labour unrest, inflation to soar above 40%, a growth rate of even 1% not to be reached, the adoption of recessive taxes and service fees as well as the accumulation of external debt to an amount of \$20 billion in 1984. The biggest problem was the decline in imports, causing lower productivity and the dismissal and pensioning of workers as well as a downsizing of the government (Diamond 1985/86:330, Diamond 1985:54 and Diamond 1987:202). This caused the macro environment to turn against Buhari and look for possible recruitment candidates in the micro environment.

b. Role: Non-challenger

The political role of Buhari was directed at acquiring personal power and to promote the political interests of the Northern militia. In pursuing this aim, he implemented draconian measures directed at retaining personal power and to suppress the opposition within the macro - and micro environment. These tasks clearly reflected his challenger personality and role.

c. Task: Non-challenger

Due to Buhari's use of power and the absence of political leaders in the macro environment, few tasks in the macro environment were directed at challenging Buhari. On the other hand, Buhari adopted tasks to safeguard his own environment as well as his personal power. He revoked all parts of the constitution of the Second Federal Republic referring to elections and judicial procedures on federal and state level. He revised the power of the executive part of government by creating a new governing body (the MSC), which executed legislation by means of decrees (Holly 1991). He

transformed the NSO into a private espionage organisation invested with powers to commit acts of atrocities and to eliminate opposition. He issued decree number two, giving the government absolute power to arrest any person deemed to be a danger to state security. This was soon to be used against political opponents and journalists (Diamond 1985/86:328, Diamond 1987:202 and Uwechue 1996a:67-68). Decree number three followed suit. It provided for the establishment of military tribunals to be used for prosecuting former corrupt officials. Although the population supported him in this at first, the sternness of the military actions shocked them¹⁵. Decree number four promised more suppression of the macro environment. The publication of deceitful articles that may ridicule or discredit the government were prohibited. This decree was further abused by the NSO to get rid of Buhari's opposition, included the banning of NANS and the NMA¹⁶ (Diamond 1985/86:328-329, Diamond 1987:202). The macro environment accepted this suppression as Buhari used the state apparatus against dissidents of his regime.

d. Values: Non-challenger

The macro environment formed available masses, not willing or able to unite against dictators, keeping to the values of ethnicity and regionalism eagerly advocated by their

15. The minimum sentence for corruption was 21 years in jail. The tribunals followed the military judicial procedures, whereby a person must prove his own innocence. There was no chance for appeal and all proceedings were held in camera. The Nigerian Bar boycotted these trials (Diamond 1987:202 and Diamond 1985/86:237).

16. The NSO was frequently used to brake up conferences of the ASUU and NANS, as well as to arrest their leaders. The NMA was banned and its leaders arrested due to differences with the government leading to a general strike early 1985 (Diamond 1987:202 and Diamond 1985/86:238-239).

respective political machines. These values contributed to the military's success in challenging the macro environment.

4.1.1.1.3. Global environment.

The term global environment refers to the leaders in the international arena and their social -, economic - and political actions. In order to evaluate this environment's contribution to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, the personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be examined in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

The tatters that the Nigerian economy was in after the AOil Boom¹⁷ had an adverse effect on Nigeria's grand foreign policy posture. They toned down on anti-Western pronouncements and repatriated the neighbours of bordering states that fled to Nigeria for a better life, but placed an additional burden on the economy. These pronouncements were necessary as the lack of stability caused by coups d'état¹⁸ frightened foreign investors, and Nigeria was in desperate need for economic aid and imports from the West (Olonisakin 1998a:7). This direction in their foreign policy influenced the global environment not to intervene in Nigerian affairs. Reality also indicated that intervention could cause the intervener to end up with a sick patient in need of intensive care. The West wanted to avoid such a situation at all cost. This

17. See Olonisakin (1998a:4-6) for a detailed account of this prosperous phase in the Nigerian economy.

18. Shagari, the first civilian leader, was toppled in 1983 by a coup d'état performed by Buhari. Buhari was replaced in 1985 by Babangida. This implies three governments in seven years.

reality provided the global environment with a non-challenger personality.

b. Role: Non-challenger

This non-challenger personality of the global environment resulted in a non-challenger role with this environment not intervening in military attempts to be recruited as political leaders. Military rule was seen as quite normal, as long as the interests of the global environment were not endangered.

c. Task: Non-challenger

Even though the global environment opposed Buhari's decrees, and Amnesty International condemned the arrest of journalists, this environment did not actively partake in tasks to oppose military rule in Nigeria (Diamond 1987:202 and Diamond 1985/86:328-329).

d. Values: Non-challenger

The global environment followed two opposing value systems: communism/socialism (Eastern Bloc) and capitalism/democracy (Western Bloc). Nigeria supported the values of the Western Bloc. As the two Blocs were opposing each other and both did not want a change in the status quo of global security, Nigerian values were not challenged. The result was that a non-challenger personality developed in the global environment.

4.1.1.2. Organisation.

4.1.1.2.1. Micro environment: Supportive

The military despised Buhari's aspirations for more personal power. The Northern militia wanted a share of his power and was concerned over the possibility of Northern political power being lost to the South in a counter coup d'état. The remainder rejected the centralisation of power in the hands of a Northerner (Buhari). As a group, the military challenged Buhari's position and would support any recruitment action to replace him with a new political leader.

4.1.1.2.2. Macro environment: Uninvolved

The institutionalisation of military rule as micro - and macro environment political culture, combined with prevailing regionalism, ethnicity and differences in religion, caused the deeply divided available masses in the macro environment not to unite against any dictator. Instead, they supported the no-nonsense approach of the military directed at diminishing political corruption, fostering discipline in the community, enforcing accountability and improving the economy (Diamond 1987:201 and Diamond 1985/86:327). Buhari moved swiftly against corruption, detaining politicians (including Shagari and Vice-Pres. Alex Ekwueme), most of the state governors, state and federal ministers as well as legislators. In doing so he received the support of students, trade unions, businessmen, professionals, intellectuals and the media.

After Buhari adopted tasks to promote and safeguard his own environment, the macro environment turned against him. His decrees and the use of the NSO deprived the macro environment of all political freedom, more severe than what prevailed

during Nigeria's colonial era (Diamond 1985/86:328 and Diamond 1987:202). The arrest of Shagari and Ekwueme as well as other politicians from the previous government, created a political power vacuum on macro environment level, making it impossible for the macro environment to oppose a military candidate in the process of recruiting a political leader¹⁹(Uwechue 1996a:67-68). Furthermore, his abuse of political power encouraged the formation of an uninvolved organisation in the macro environment.

4.1.1.2.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The global environment showed an uninvolved organisation, because they did not want to get involved in Nigerian domestic politics, and considered military governments and coups d'état to be accepted by the macro environment. Most important, the military governments sided with the Western Bloc and thus posed no threat to their interests.

4.1.1.3. Setting.

4.1.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The situation for Babangida was ideal to be recruited as political leader in an undemocratic fashion. He had a huge following in the military and could count on their support in the event of mobilising against Buhari, as he was considered to be apolitical and did not arouse opposition from the military of the other regions. The macro environment posed no threat to the possibility of mobilisation, as they formed an

19. Most of them were detained, but not charged. Michael Ajasin, a respected politician, was twice found innocent on charges of corruption, but Buhari refused to set him free (See Diamond 1987:202).

uninvolved organisation, with a non-challenger personality. The probability for a successful recruitment attempt was great, as the military had first hand experience in planning and executing coups d'état.

The tension between Babangida and Idiagbon (Buhari's second in command) increased daily and provided a possible trigger for a hastened undemocratic recruitment attempt. Idiagbon distrusted Babangida due to his history of coup d'état participation (Le Roux 1985:326-327). If Babangida did not react quickly, he could have ended in jail. This also applied to other militia in the MSC, suspected of opposing Buhari. The military were all too eager to support Babangida in toppling Buhari.

4.1.1.3.2. Macro environment: Discontent

The repressive actions of Buhari alienated him from the macro environment and by that forced the Nigerian population to look for other military redeemers, as they were too weakened by Buhari's measures to provide their own recruitment candidate.

4.1.1.3.3. Global environment: Untouched

Events in Nigeria were observed from the sideline. The global environment would only intervene in internal affairs, if the new military leader would change alliance to the Soviet Bloc. Babangida made sure that the West knows he was on their side.

4.1.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro (Buhari) environment	Global environment
Personality	Challenger	Non-challenger	Non-challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Uninvolved	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

The micro environment developed a challenger personality in reaction to the repression tasks undertaken by Buhari (macro environment). In their resentment of Buhari and the subsequent decision to dispose of him, the military formed a supportive organisation. The situation for their recruitment aspirations was ideal, as the micro environment was strengthened due to the institutionalisation of military rule by the macro environment.

The macro environment had a non-challenger personality and role due to their lack of nationalism, the institutionalisation of military rule and repression of Buhari. This weakened the macro environment so that it could not pose a threat or counter to the micro environment. Because of Buhari's harsh measures to suppress macro environment opinion, they became uninvolved. The macro environment would approve of any other military regime, and in that reflected a setting of discontent. The swopping of one military regime to another was eased by the uninvolvedness of the global environment in Nigerian affairs.

4.2. Phase 2, The recruitment phase.

This phase began with the execution of the 27 August 1985 coup d'état (as undemocratic recruitment attempt) and ended directly with the success of it. This constitutes the actual recruitment effort of military leaders to assume a political role.

4.2.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the recruitment phase in the recruitment stage will be analysed, according to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments, present in this phase, that contributes to the success of recruitment behaviour.

4.2.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

An analysis of the abovementioned variables in this phase will expose those factors in the different environments which will contribute to the actual success of the recruitment of a military leader in the role of political leader.

4.2.1.1.1. Micro environment.

In the following section, the personality, role, task and values of this environment are reflected on to determine the contribution this environment has on the successful performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the recruitment phase.

a. Personality: Challenger

Southern fears for continued Northern political dominance, the NSO-s use as a secret police and Buhari-s continuous accumulation of personal power made the possibility of counter coups d'état possible. The Northern military themselves was fearful, because of Buhari and Idiagbon-s use of the NSO against Northern dissidents. The Northern military had to react before a Southern undemocratic recruitment attempt would leave them without direct dominance or before the NSO would eliminate them. This atmosphere of distrust created enormous tension in the MSC (See Legum 1987:B125,131-132, Diamond 1985/86:328, Lardner 1990:50,52 and Joseph 1987:86).

Against this background, the sixth coup d'état in Nigeria was planned. Maj-Gen. Babangida was one of the masters involved in planning the coup d'état against Buhari. The undemocratic recruitment attempt was a success because he and the military had experience in the execution of coups d'état²⁰ and therefore kept the two most important aspects of a coup d'état in mind. That is the involvement of strategically placed mid-level commanders commanding infantry and tank units and the application of the main principles of warfare: speed, surprise and co-ordination (SAGD 1994:4-14 and Palmer 1989:237-238). The performance of a coup d'état reflected the challenger personality of the military.

b. Role: Challenger

The challenger role of the military became clear on performing an undemocratic recruitment attempt. In the aftermath of the

20. Babangida was also a specialist in meganised and tank warfare.

coup d'état, Babangida declared that he is not going to continue Buhari's miscarriage of justice against the macro environment. He promised to unite Nigeria as a nation and not to govern by means of power; but to respect civilian freedom and other fundamental rights (Lardner 1990:51). He restated the military's political role in presenting the coup d'état masters as the saviours of the Nigerian population and declared that they reacted by public demand (See Palmer 1989:236, Le Roux 1985:327 and Legum 1987:B124). This showed once again the reformist nature of the military, again coloured by regionalism. Only the Northern region and its military supporters would benefit from this coup d'état.

c. Task: Challenger

The military had one task: to be recruited as political leaders. Babangida and his military supporters therefore reacted swiftly to safeguard their own groups' recruitment as political leader and to prevent Buhari from further repressing them. The challenge of Buhari and Idiagbon was facilitated by Babangida's support in the micro environment, the uninvolved organisational nature of the macro environment and his knowledge of staging coups d'état (Diamond 1985/86:326 and Torimiro 1988:88).

d. Values: Challenger

The values of regionalism and ethnicity factionalised the military on ethnic and religious grounds. It promoted a challenger personality and thus contributed to the decision to stage an undemocratic recruitment attempt against Buhari.

4.2.1.1.2. Macro environment.

The personality, role, task and values of this environment are studied in order to determine the contribution of this environment to the success of undemocratic recruitment actions, in terms of the recruitment phase.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

The autocratic government of Buhari, his monopolising of power and demonstration of antidemocratic behaviour testified to his challenger personality. Due to this behaviour of Buhari, but also regionalism, factionalism, corruption and the economic recession, the macro environment revealed a non-challenger personality. They would accept any other military leader as political leader, if only to get rid of Buhari.

b. Role: Non-challenger

The macro environment developed a non-challenger role, due to the challenger role of Buhari and consequent harsh measures to control unrest and opposition. This set the scene for any military group to pass themselves as the redeemers of Nigeria.

c. Task: Non-challenger

Buhari's task to advance his own personal power alienated the macro environment. They took no tasks upon themselves to challenge the military government, as they were weakened due to regionalism, ethnicity, religious differences and suppression.

d. Values: Non-challenger

As indicated in chapter three, the lack of central values or nationalism promoted a non-challenger personality in the macro environment.

4.2.1.1.3. Global environment.

The identified variables present in the global environment need to be studied in order to establish what variables in specific contribute or inhibit the successful recruitment of military leaders in the role of political leaders.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

Against the background of the Cold War, the Western Bloc would not have intervened in the domestic squabbles of a state, if that state or squabble did not present a threat to their interests. Because the Nigerian military sided with the Western Bloc, the Western Bloc would not develop a challenger personality against military government, as the military was not seen as a threat to their interests. Rather, in most cases military regimes were perceived to be more proficient in securing Western interests, than a civilian government.

b. Role: Non-challenger

The global environment had a non-challenger role, as (in general) it contributed to the legitimisation of military regimes and approved the utilisation of undemocratic methods to obtain political leadership.

c. Task: Non-challenger

The global environment did not undertake any tasks to challenge the Buhari government, as a military government was of no threat to them.

d. Values: Non-challenger

The conflicting values of the global environment (Western/Eurocentric/Democracy/Capitalism vs Eastern/Communist/Socialist) promoted a non-challenger personality as Nigeria openly supported the Western view. In doing so Babangida's undemocratic recruitment attempt escaped global condemnation.

4.2.1.2. Organisation.

The organisation of all three mentioned environments needs to be identified, in order to determine what variables contribute and/or temper the successful execution of an undemocratic recruitment action.

4.2.1.2.1. Micro environment: Supportive

On 27 August 1985, Babangida (with the support of some military) took political power by means of a coup d'état, as it was the most common undemocratic recruitment method used in Nigeria and proved to be highly successful (See Joseph 1987:68, Diamond 1985:55 and Legum 1987:B124). The execution went smooth, with no loss of life. This was due to the military's knowledge of coups d'état, the fact that Buhari lost the macro environments support, that it was staged on a Muslim holiday and that Idiagbon visited Mecca (Legum 1987:B124 and West Africa 1985a:1789).

The typical pattern of coups d'état in Africa was followed. The most important government buildings and broadcasting corporations were taken over, after which the coup d'état was announced on radio (See Palmer 1989:236, Le Roux 1985:327 and Legum 1987:B124). After the announcement Babangida cited Buhari's abuse of power, violation of human rights by key persons in the MSC and the failure to address the economic problems as reason for the undemocratic recruitment attempt (Holly 1991).

4.2.1.2.2. Macro environment: Uninvolved

The macro environment was alienated from Buhari and thus developed an uninvolved organisation. The high frequency of military intervention and government in Nigeria robbed the civilian institutions from a chance to get accepted by the population. Due to this, the military was more institutionalised as civilian political institutions and the population regarded civilian institutions unfavourable (Palmer 1989:239). This explains why the population once again accepted a military regime with anticipation and confidence (Lardner 1990:50).

4.2.1.2.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The global environment did not organise against Babangida's undemocratic recruitment attempt. They formed an uninvolved organisation as coups d'état were common to Nigerians and the global environment.

4.2.1.3. Setting.

Again the settings of the three identified environments are analysed, in order to determine how this factor contributes to

the successful execution of an undemocratic recruitment attempt.

4.2.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The situation was ideal for Babangida to stage a coup d'état. He had the support of the micro environment and the noninvolvement of the macro environment to his favour. From the previous it is clear that the following factors also counted in his favour:

- # Ease of intervention.
- # Conservation of military autonomy.
- # Military factions.
- # Lack of military professionalism.
- # Conflicting values (also at macro environment level).
- # Intervention of the military in civil political conflicts (also at macro environment level).

4.2.1.3.2. Macro environment: Discontent

The following factors contributed to the downfall of Buhari:

- # Low institutionalisation.
- # Civil incompetence and power vacuums.
- # The society's culture.

4.2.1.3.3. Global environment: Untouched

Due to the Cold War, no serious pressure was put on Nigeria to diverge from a military regime to a democratically elected civilian government.

4.2.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro environment	Global environment
Personality	Challenger	Non-challenger	Non-challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Uninvolved	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

The micro environment found support for their recruitment attempt, as the situation was ideal for such an attempt to succeed. This was due to the pressing resistance against Buhari's regime and the possibility of a loss in political power by the Northern military if another military faction performs an undemocratic recruitment attempt. The recruitment of Babangida as new political leader was eased, as Buhari lost support for his leadership in both the micro - and macro environment and because coups d'état were seen by the global environment as a natural event in Nigeria.

4.3. Phase 3, The institutionalisation phase.

Babangida will remain the leader of Nigeria, as long as he controls the military resources and are supported by the micro environment. In this phase Babangida is treated as part of the micro environment, as he had no opposition in the military (due to the renewed control over the military resources) and no opposition to the institutionalisation of his regime would come from the macro environment, due to the lack of national

leadership. This phase concludes with the attempted coup d'état against his government in December 1985.

4.3.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

During this step, the institutionalisation phase in the recruitment process will be studied, referring to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments, encountered in this phase, that contributes to or hinders the success of establishing a military leader as political leader and ensures or deters the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

4.3.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

An analysis of the personality, role, task and values as encountered in this phase, will indicate those variables in the micro -, macro - and global environment which contributes to or deters the eventual institutionalisation of a military leader in the role of political leader.

4.3.1.1.1. Micro environment.

In order to determine the environment's contribution to or hindrance of the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime, the personality, role, task and values of the identified environments are reflected on.

a. Personality: Compromiser

Due to the situation in the micro environment as described in phase two²¹, Babangida adopted a compromiser personality in order for his regime to be institutionalised. In doing so he proved to be intelligent, courageous and bold. For the first time in the Nigerian history, a truly modernising regime²² took power (although only for a short while²³).

He broadened his support base by revealing extraordinary sensitivity for socio-, political - and economic tendencies in the political system. He also anticipated development and changes in the population when formulating a policy or following a strategy. Furthermore, he revealed political ingenuity through his skill in compromise, by identifying alternative strategies and options, in effective group diplomacy and political diplomacy, in communicating individually with a variety of individuals with different interests, in effectively expressing the sentiments/interests of a broad group of people through the written and spoken word and in having the courage and conviction to follow a predetermined strategy (See Bekker 1994:184-185).

21. This situation refers to fears for counter coups d'état due to regionalism, ethnicity and factionalism in the micro environment.

22. According to Palmer (1989:147-149) a modernising regime places emphasis on the mobilisation of material and human resources of the state to hasten social and economic reform. It is also characterised by legitimacy problems due to value conflicts and internal fragmentation. In a modernising regime, time becomes a crucial variable and excessive trust is placed on the military. These problems were all masterfully sidestepped by Babangida.

23. In 1987 he began the first postponement of civilian transition, by changing the election date from 1 October 1990 to 1992.

b. Role: Compromiser

In Babangida's maiden speech, he remarked: 'We do not intend to lead a country where individuals are under fear of expressing themselves.....We recognize that a government, be it civilian or military, needs the consent of the people if it is to govern effectively' (Diamond 1985:56). In this he indicated a compromising role in order to institutionalise his regime. This compromising role also consists of a reformist role (modernisation) as can be seen in his handling of political, social and economic issues²⁴. This gave way for Nigeria's first affair with nationalism.

c. Task: Compromiser

The success of Babangida in institutionalising his regime, came from the tasks he adopted to safeguard his own environment and in not challenging other environments. He had three mutually dependent tasks (related to his reformist role), namely political -, social - and economic reform.

Babangida's political expertise came to the fore in his handling of crucial and possibly explosive political tasks. Well aware of the macro environments democratical pursuit, Babangida adopted the title of president and formed a presidential advice committee that acted as a cabinet (the Political Bureau) and dismantled the Federal Executive Council and National Council of States (See Diamond 1985/86:327, Diamond 1987:202-203 and Legum 1987:B124). The Political Bureau consisted out of 17 members, chosen from an array of disciplines, representing different political and ideological viewpoints and reflecting the federal character of Nigeria.

24. This role was not prolonged.

They had to make arrangements to prepare the population for transition to a civilian government. After travelling Nigeria, they reported in 1987 that a socialist ideology was the political preference of the population (See Fadugba 1986:6-7, Adamu 1990:46, Lloegbunam 1990:2582, West Africa 1987a:1617 and Nwagboso 1989:1453). Babangida rejected it, noting that he did not want to impose ideology on the population. Due to the ethnic tension in the MSC, he reorganised it (and renamed it to the Armed Forces Military Council (AFMC)) to distribute power evenly and to enhance consensus (See Diamond 1987:203, West Africa 1985a:1789 and Legum 1987:B126). It consisted of 22 ministers, 12 officers and 10 civilians, all chosen on merit and representing Nigeria as a nation. The civilians were ardent Buhari enemies, had influence and popular support. This step brought technical knowledge to the government, which would help Babangida in obtaining certain goals. It also broadened his support base (See Finer 1988:12, Adeyanju 1985:14, Joseph 1987:86, Diamond 1985:56, Diamond 1985/85:332, Diamond 1987:203 and Legum 1987:B127-128). He released the political activists, journalists, writers, editors and intellectuals jailed by Buhari and revoked decree number four and the ban on the National Union of Students (NUS) and the NMA. He exposed the NSO leadership and restructured it (See Joseph 1987:84, Diamond 1985/86:331, Diamond 1987:203, Diamond 1985:56, Torimiro 1988:88, Fadugba 1986:6 and Legum 1987:B125). In these political tasks, Babangida introduced a new concept to the Nigerian political terrain, namely military democracy (See Joseph 1987:87).

Babangida announced the handing of government to a democratically elected civilian government and initiated a transition programme aimed at fostering a democratic culture and the gradual transfer of power to an elected, civilian

government. By establishing forums²⁵ for population participation, he communicated his personal commitment to a responsive and liberal government to the macro environment and encouraged them to give inputs to government policy whereby a viable political system for the future could be established. He even involved them in important questions like accepting an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan (See West Africa 1986:332, Diamond 1987:203,223 and Legum 1987:126-127). He tried to bring about a new system of accountability in the public sector and to diminish corruption²⁶ (Torimiro 1988:89). This led Diamond (1987:222) to observe that Nigerians are: A proud and politically mobilised domestic public@.

His biggest task as reformist was to tackle the economic crises. The oil boom of the 1970's created a rich class, the Wabenzi, and established a culture of squandering and extravagance. By adopting the credo A service and repair@ as opposed to A discard@ and by stimulating productivity and self sufficiency outside the oil industry, Babangida set to change this culture. He also formulated government policy to counter it, for example the Realistic Exchange Rate Policy (RERP) and the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) (Diamond 1987:204). The adoption of the SFEM is seen by Diamond(1987:204) as: A one of the boldest domestic policy moves by any military government in Nigerian history@. He was bold in his approach and spared no one. Even soldiers= salaries were cut (See Joseph 1987:88, Diamond 1985/86:204 and Legum 1987:B127). His measures proved to be of value in 1986, when

25. This includes the Constitutional Revision Committee, National Election Committee (NEC) and Population Bureau.

26. He abolished the practise of liscensing imports that opened doors for grave corruption (Diamond 1987:204 and Legum 1987:B129).

the oil price dropped against all expectation (See Diamond 1987:222).

The harsh socio -, economic - and political situation did not dilute the military's interventionist foreign policy. This can be seen in the Nigerian military intervention in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1991). This new direction was the result of the personal desire of Babangida to attain international prestige, to consolidate the domestic power base and to divert attention from home (See Olonisakin 1998a:8,10-11).

d. Values: Compromiser

Babangida possessed reformist values as well as a commitment to consensus government and nationalism. These values increased the possibility of his regime to be institutionalised.

4.3.1.1.2. Macro environment.

The personality, role, task and values of the macro environment are studied, in order to assess the contribution of this environment towards the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

The macro environment's personality also had an effect on Babangida's acceptance of a compromiser personality in establishing his regime. The non-challenger personality of the macro environment was the result of state oppression against them. Babangida had either to continue this oppression or to make compromises. Compromises would have been the most viable options as strikes and antigovernment

rallies against Buhari indicated that the macro environment had to be oppressed in order to be silenced. Diamond (1987:202-203) observed that the Nigerian macro environment was a proud nation that placed a high premium on their personal freedom. In this spirit the discourse on diarchy began.

b. Role: Non-challenger

The non-challenger role of the macro environment accepted Babangida as saviour. They still believed that the military had a place in politics, but as would be seen in the compromiser personality of Babangida, the Buhari regime changed their blind acceptance of military political involvement to include a demand for civilian inputs in government and even the right to form a civilian government.

c. Task: Non-challenger

The macro environment performed no tasks to prevent Babangida's regime from being institutionalised. The reason for this can be located in the legitimacy that Babangida acquired from the macro environment. This was due to his use of democratic legitimacy symbols; namely radiating central community values and political values, aligning his aims with the value system of the population, recruiting himself as president, symbolically representing the whole of Nigeria and following a consensus government style (See Bekker 1994:183,191-193).

d. Values: Non-challenger

The dominant values in the macro environment were still ethnicity and regionalism, but modernisation values became stronger and began to challenge these values. Babangida

succeeded in altering the Nigerian culture of accepting military rule. His planned transition programme underplayed the values of ethnicity, regionalism and factionalism. Although nationalism was still not present, a huge stride was taken in the direction of establishing a democratic culture. Ironically, this legacy of him contributed to his downfall later on.

4.3.1.1.3. Global environment.

The personality, role, task and values of the global environment need to be studied, in order to determine this environment's contribution to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

The global environment continued their non-challenger personality, after the announcement of Babangida's maiden speech and his allegiance to the West (Diamond 1985:56).

b. Role: Non-challenger

The global environment continued with a non-challenger role.

c. Task: Non-challenger

The global environment did not adopt challenger tasks to prevent the Babangida regime from obtaining institutionalisation.

d. Values: Non-challenger

The global values concurred with those of Babangida, spurring him to establish his regime.

4.3.1.3. Organisation.

In order to assess the contribution of organisation to the eventual institutionalisation of the military leader as political leader, the role of the organisation as present in the micro -, macro - and global environment needs to be examined.

4.3.1.3.1. Micro environment: Supportive

The Babangida regime had a supportive organisation due to the effective co-optation of most members of the micro environment to the AFRC. This was done by correcting the ethnical imbalance of the MSC by appointing a majority of ethnic minority states from the Midnorth. He divided Idiagbon's superpost in two: Head General Staff (responsible for political administration) and Joint Head of Staff (responsible for military administration). He appointed an Ibo, Eko Ebitu Ukiwe to the post of Head General Staff. For all practical reasons this was the post of the second in command (See Diamond 1985:56, Diamond 1985/86:331-332, Alabi 1985:8 and Legum 1987:B127-128,132). This indicated his commitment to the federal character of Nigeria as well as a reasoned action not to endanger the federation.

He improved his support with the radical young military (suspected of planning undemocratic recruitment attempts against Buhari), by appointing six of them as military governors. This taught them the frustration of government and to accept the reality that changes took time (Diamond 1985:56 and Joseph 1987:87). The fact that the attempted counter coup d'état of December 1985 was warded off, showed the support that Babangida built up among all of the military in the micro

environment and the wisdom to co-opt the junior officers (See Finer 1988:17-18, Joseph 1987:87 and Legum 1987:B126)

4.3.1.3.2. Macro environment: Supportive

Due to the footwork of this political Maradona, Babangida founded a supportive organisation in the macro - and micro environment. He adopted the low profile tactics of the Murtala and Obasanjo military regimes in order to gain the support of the macro environment²⁷. His restructuring of regional politics (See tasks) also contributed to a broader support base in the macro environment.

4.3.1.3.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The Babangida regime was supported (though not openly) by the global environment, as Babangida was hailed as a democratically orientated leader. This contributed to the institutionalisation of his regime.

4.3.1.4. Setting.

The setting of the three identified environments is analysed, to establish how this factor contributes to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

4.3.1.4.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The consensus government style created an ideal situation for the Babangida regime to be institutionalised. The

27. He exchanged his presidential mercedes for a peugeot 504 and forced the government officials to do the same. He avoided unpopular policy because he listened to the population and acted on public debate (Diamond 1987:222 and Fadugba 1986:6).

undemocratic recruitment attempt cycle ended here, but it was also the beginning of phase one of the Abacha undemocratic recruitment attempt to take place.

4.3.1.4.2. Macro environment: Ideal

The support of the macro environment to Babangida's military regime made the situation ideal for his regime to be institutionalised.

4.3.1.4.3. Global environment: Untouched

The global environment welcomed the new democratic military regime, as it could help in promoting stability in the west African region. This implied that Western involvement in this area would be minimised. This was of course welcomed by a number of states in the global community.

4.3.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro environment	Global environment
Personality	Compromiser	Non-challenger	Non-challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Supportive	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Ideal	Untouched

The compromiser personality of Babangida gave him the support of the micro -, macro - and global environment and contributed to the legitimisation and institutionalisation of his regime.

4.4. Summary

In this chapter it was assessed that the micro environment presented a strong challenger personality from the onset. This challenger personality was strongly supported by the rank and file in the military, as the Hausa-Fulani dominated the political field (macro environment) and gained full monopoly of the military resources. The existing apolitical military, were gradually eliminated as factor, by utilisation in external ECOMOG operations. This eliminated internal factionalisation of the military that could hinder a supportive organisation. Besides the challenger personality in the military, other challenger personalities existed. The macro environment developed growing resentment for those who govern, due to incidences of corruption, ethnical rivalry, regionalism, as well as a history of military intervention, religious differences and factionalism. As the macro environment was divided by ethnic division that eroded a supportive organisation, this challenger personality was turned against each other. The result was that the Nigerian political destination was left in the hands of the micro environment. The use of state violence and oppression to deal with the opposition of the military government further weakened the macro environment and resulted in a non-challenger personality and unsupportive organisation. The non-challenger personality of the global environment did the situation no good. The Great Powers, caught in the Cold War situation, did not want to become involved in Africa's domestic problems and trusted the military to stabilise the continent. This resulted in the legitimisation of military governments on an external level as a spin off effect. This background created the perfect setting for an undemocratic recruitment

action to be attempted, and if successful, to institutionalise a military government.

This chapter indicates the importance of a strong macro environment (which reflects a supportive organisation), in deterring undemocratic recruitment attempts and institutionalising military leaders in the role of political leaders. This strength can only be obtained, if the macro environment unites against common adversaries. The influence of the global - and macro environment on the recruitment of leaders, as well as leadership style, was also highlighted in this chapter. For one, the situation of military intervention in Nigeria continued and was accepted, as long as it suited the global environment. Furthermore, fears for a counter coup d'état by Southerners and alienation in the Northern military camp (due to Buhari's regime) not only forced Babangida to adopt a compromiser personality, but formed the foundation for the institutionalisation of his regime.