

CHAPTER 3: THE GOWON REGIME: 29 JULY 1966 - 29 JULY 1975

3. Introduction.

In this chapter the second Nigerian government under the rule of Gowon will be studied, using the environment determined political leadership model as point of departure. This entails a two-step approach, with the first step being an analysis of the historical situation of Nigeria and the second step the tabularisation of possible variable options in order to gain answers on the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders in the role of political leaders. Step one will include the three identified phases of recruitment, wherein the micro -, macro - and global environment will be analysed according to personality (which includes role, task and values), organisation and setting. The tabularisation of possible variable options will provide the opportunity for the testing of the environment determined political leadership model, in order to indicate the effectiveness of this model in answering the research problem as stated in chapter one.

This particular time in the history of Nigeria presents the environment determined political leadership model with the opportunity to investigate the origin of undemocratic recruitment behaviour as presented by military personnel, as Nigeria at that time had no previous history of military intervention that constituted a threat to political leadership, nor was any indications present that Nigeria was going to be plagued in future by the military utilising undemocratic recruitment options (especially coups d'état). The opportunity lays in the fact that the environment variables exposed in this chapter, will be those forceful variables that ignite undemocratic recruitment behaviour. These variables can then be double checked with those exposed

in the other chapters, in order to assess their real contribution to the successful recruitment of military leaders as political leaders in an undemocratic fashion. Another interesting element embedded in this history is the fact that two different coups d'état were performed successfully by two military leaders with total different personalities and different support bases under totally different circumstances. These differences are crucial for the testing of the environment determined political leadership model, as for one it isolates the importance of the environment in the undemocratic recruitment action, but also poses a healthy challenge in accommodating differences in the model.

3.1. Phase 1, The emergence of a challenger personality.

This phase, in which the different emerging challenger personalities in the Nigerian setting will be examined, begins in 1959 with the formation of the coalition government between the NCNC (National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons) and the NPC (Northern People's Congress), and ends before the failed January 1966 coup d'état (as example of an undemocratic recruitment attempt) of Maj. Nzeogwu.

3.1.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the development of challenger personalities will be analysed, according to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments as observed during this phase, in order to isolate those factors that promote undemocratic recruitment behaviour.

3.1.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

These variables, taken from Paige, need to be analysed in order to assess what factors in the environment contributes to the emergence of a challenger personality that opts for an undemocratic recruitment action in order to assume a political role. It also presents the possibility to isolate those factors that inhibit undemocratic recruitment actions.

3.1.1.1.1. Micro environment.

This environment includes Ironsi and Gowon as individuals, but also the military as a collective group. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be studied, in order to assess this environment's contribution to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

a. Personality: Challenger

The first coup d'état in Nigeria was not expected. By 1965 no undemocratic recruitment attempt took place in a former British colony; where British parliamentary institutions were followed and the Army received professional British training that highlighted discipline, order and obedience (See Schwarz 1968:192, Hatch 1971:235 and Okpaku 1974:241). In 1964 the Army showed its political neutrality by acting as impartial peacemakers during internal strife¹ and acted in this way again

1. During the unrest of 1964 in the Northern state, wherein many Tiv were killed, the Tiv regarded the military's role as being impartial.

during the election crises of 1964-1965². As part of the UN contingency in the Congo, they distinguished themselves as professional and disciplined soldiers (See Schwarz 1968:192 and Hatch 1971:235). Even the students of Armies in the new world, did not consider the political potential of this armies to be high (Feit 1968:179)

Despite professional values, the professionalism of the Nigerian Defence Force (NDF) is to be questioned if other dimensions are taken in account, such as the level of technical expertise of the Nigerian soldier. This level could not be compared to those of soldiers in developed countries. Nigeria had to rely on Britain for training, and thus the number of officers to receive advance training overseas was limited. In January 1966 only 22 out of 507 commissioned officers received advanced training outside Nigeria. This had the effect that military socialization among the officers-corp was slight and that they were equipped with only basic military skills. Thus, eliminating them from comparison to Palmers ideal of the professional soldier (Ollawa 1976:25 and See Palmer 1989:251-252).

Soon after independence, the social - and political contexts of military involvement in politics eroded values of military professionalism, and created factions in the micro environment to the disadvantage of the development of a Acorporate self-interest@. This created a Astructural weakness@ in the military; leading to a lack of cohesiveness (due to the absence of a Anational identification element@), thus affecting military professionalism and organisational experience

2. The military rejected the presidents plea for support, indicating that they can only accept orders from the prime minister. See par. 3.1.1.3.2 for a full account on the crisis.

furthermore³. This situation was worsened with the nigerianisation of the NDF in 1965. Nigerianisation led to the hastening of promotions, in an arbitrary fashion, in order to complete this process by 1966. It created jealousy as the newly appointed officers (mostly Ibo-s) were very young and educated (between 20 and 35), but had little chance for promotion in future. The older generation (mostly Hausa-Fulani) felt that the young soldiers were given an unfair advantage. To make matters worse, they were scorned by the younger soldiers; as they lacked professional or organisational experience, as well as the requisite educational qualifications. Due to the aforementioned problems, discipline and professionalism could not get institutionalised (See Oyediran 1979:23-24, Schwarz 1968:192-193, Hatch 1971:235-236 and Ollawa 1976:25-26).

As part of nigerianisation, Maj-Gen. Johnson Aguyi-Ironsi (an Ibo) was promoted as head of the Army. His appointment marked the beginning of the abuse of the military by the macro environment politicians, as the macro environment was engaged in a political battle between the Hausa-Fulani and Ibo for political dominance, and military power would have been handy to secure political power. This battle would soon contribute to the politicisation of the composition of the Army, as the Northern area (mostly Tiv and other middle belt ethnic groups that were against Hausa-Fulani dominance) dominated the rank and file in the general tasks area and the Sandhurst trained Ibo from the Western area the clerical and technical departments. With completion of the nigerianisation of the Army, the better educated and positioned Ibo dominated the officers-s corps. This arose ethnic suspicion, but was countered -in the beginning- by the rotation of service and

3. See Finer (1962:40-58) and also Janowitz (1964).

the moving of brigades from area to area (See Schwarz 1968:192-193 and Hatch 1971:235-236).

The politicisation of the military eroded their integrity. Fear for Ibo dominance in the military caused Northerner politicians to debate on whether courage or educational qualifications must become the criteria for recruitment and promotions in the Army. The NPC, which formed a government coalition with the Ibo NCNC, succeeded in adopting courage as criteria and accepting government policy providing for a quota system whereby the Northern area received a quota to reserve 50% of the NDF posts for Northerners and the Eastern and Western areas each 25%. With the establishment of the Mid-Western area in 1962, they received 4% deducted from that of the Western area. This quota system (backed by Britain) gave the Northern militia an unfair advantage to the other (See Oyediran 1979:23-24 and Hatch 1971:236). The quota system institutionalised the ethnic and regional factor in the micro environment which further weakened a national identification element and the development of a corporate self interest among the military.

Politicisation of military issues caused a strengthening of regionalism among the military, causing some soldiers to support disgruntled regional political groupings. This was illustrated during the 1964 elections, when a few Lt-Cols. under leadership of Ojukwu (an Ibo) promised Pres. Azikiwe (an Ibo) their support, if he would declare a state of emergency and absconded the election. Their idea was to promote Ibo dominance in the micro - and macro environment and to halt Northern dominance of the military. In the Western Yoruba area, Akintola (a discredited political leader) used the stationed battalion to keep him in power. Part of this military was opposed to Akintola and began to support his

opposition, the UPGA (United Peoples Grand Alliance) who later joined the government coalition. Other soldiers began to build up a collective resentment against the manoeuvres of the politicians who abuse their political positions to gain access to the community chest. They also suspected the top officers in the military of this manoeuvring (See Hatch 1971:230-231,237, Niven 1967:100-101,113 and Oyediran 1979:18).

In short, colonialism, military involvement in internal politics, an unprofessional military service (due to nigerianisation) and the continuing politicisation of military issues (i.e. quota system and courage-as-recruitment debate) created the chance for the military to develop a challenger personality. This personality was spurred by the fact that major military groups shared a common ethnic and political background. Therefore, the military was abused by the different ethnic groups to obtain or sustain a dominant political position.

b. Role: Challenger

The involvement of the military in Nigerian domestic politics and their utilisation as political power multiplier by the different ethnic political groups, created various challenger personalities in the military. This can be seen in the different challenger roles that surfaced in the military during this phase. Some military members became aware of the fact that the military was the only viable alternative to the political organisations present in the macro environment. In realising that, they opposed the macro environment and developed a challenger role. This was true for some senior Ibo officers, who adopted a challenger role directed at promoting Ibo military dominance in the political field. The Hausa-Fulani military embraced a challenger role directed at

supporting and expanding their political power in the macro environment, backed by military resources. Some junior officers opposed the macro environment, because they were tired of the corruption and incompetence of politicians, as well as the greed and selfishness of political parties. They were upset with the politicians' acceptance that they will do their dirty work. They began envisioning a transformed Nigeria and believed that this could only happen by destroying the political class by means of an alliance of progressive forces. They saw the military as an alternative to corruption and incompetence (See Cohen 1974:217 and Niven 1967:113).

c. Task: Challenger

As indicated thus far, the military was far from professional, lacked integrity, organisational experience, training and was politicised. This structural weakness was reflected in the different tasks undertaken by the military, reflecting a challenger personality. One group wanted to get rid of corrupt politicians and their military puppets, and as such revealed a challenger personality. Another part wanted to pursue military involvement in support of regional political dominance (i.e. Ujukwe and Akintola) of their own ethnic group. This indicated that the micro environment was ready to undertake tasks to be recruited as political leaders in an undemocratic fashion, as to ensure their political dominance in the macro environment.

d. Values: Challenger

In general, according to Feit (1968:188), the military enjoys specific moral advantages: the moral force associated with self sacrifice, discipline, and courage; freedom from the taint of corruption; and the conception of representing

something over and above the passing regimes^o. This notion of Feit is not true of Nigerian soldiers, including the group of young soldiers= who wanted to get rid of corruption, as their opposition to military intervention in politics were rooted in ethnic bias. In general, the Nigerian soldier cannot be considered professional, as their attitudes and behaviour patterns do not coincide with that of professionalism. This includes features which emphasised norms of nationalism and national service, as well as a tolerance to all community groups. The reason these values were not absorbed by the military, was the low frequency of study trips abroad, inadequate socialisation, the fact that promotions were not coupled to that of performance and that military efficiency and prestige were absent, as Nigerian soldiers did not utilise modern weapon systems (See Palmer 1989:251-252). Therefore, they embraced regionalism and ethnicity as values, as were commonly encountered among the African military at the beginning of decolonisation.

3.1.1.1.2. Macro environment.

This environment constitutes the social, economic and political facets present in the Nigerian community. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be contemplated, in order to evaluate this environment=s contribution to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

a. Personality: Challenger

The macro environment lacked national political leadership⁴. The reason for this can be found in the history of the colonisation of Nigeria, where three different nations: the Yoruba, Ibo and Hausa-Fulani, were jostled into one state run by a colonial system⁵. These groups were at different stages of development (modernised South versus authoritarian North) and had mounting tension between them. They would have developed into different nation states had colonisation not taken place (See Hatch 1971:197, Legum 1966:19 and Smythe 1958:216)⁶. Each of these groups had its own charismatic political leader: Azikiwe (Ibo, East), Awolowo (Yoruba, West) and Alhaji Ahmadu, the Sardauna of Sokoto (Hausa-Fulani, North) (See Muffet 1968:140 and Smythe 1958:217). In a united Nigeria, no national leader came forward from the civil service⁷, intellectuals, educational world, female

4. Smythe (1958:215-227) analyses the lack of coherent national leadership in Nigeria, in detail.

5. Feit (1968:180-182) suggested that the traditional African system joined the colonial system and by doing so not only preserved tribal authority, but legitimise both native authority and colonial rule. The outcome was a political system that was a combination of administrative and traditional rule (called the Aindirect rule®).

6. In 1900 the Northern and Southern states of Nigeria were declared as protectorates and Lagos as a colony. In 1906 Lagos and the Southern state united. In 1914 the three territories combined to form Nigeria under the indirect rule of Britain (Van Rensburg 1981:262 and Oyediran 1979:4).

7. Muffet (1968:138-140) claims that the civil services= role as an elite force in Nigeria is overrated and that its influence had declined by the time of the first coup d'état, as the civil service formed ethnic ethnic centres which contributed to interregional stress. This notion is supported by Feit (1968:185-186) who indicated that the civil service formed part of the corruption network partaking in nepotism, bribery etc. They frustrated the ethnic based politicians and this led to continuous **(footnote 7 continues from p.46)** tension between them and a downscale of the civil servants= political influence.

organisations, military, businessmen and the labour field to fulfill national aspirations and to challenge these three regional political leaders (See Smythe 1958:223-225)⁸. It was clear that one of the three would dominate the macro environment and subsequently strengthen the regionality of politics to weaken the macro environment. As the Sardauna had Britain's support due to the colonial system, he was in a better position to shape the macro environment.

The Yoruba had an advantage to the other groups in terms of organisation and wealth; due to their established state system and sound commercial position as well as an early association with Britain. Immigrants from Sierra Leone brought a European education to the Yoruba, teaching them techniques to consolidate their early economic lead and helping them in concentrating on self protection (Hatch 1971:200 and Legum 1966:19). Their constant wars with the Northern Muslim left them with an attitude of hostility towards the North (Legum 1966:19). The Hausa-Fulani in the most populous Northern area was no homogeneous group, differing from Kano to Katsina and Sokoto. Due to their Muslim Emirs, they formed holistically a traditional group supporting Islam. From early times they had been trying to impose their Muslim rule on the Southern part of Nigeria (both the Ibo and Yoruba parts). Since the creation of Nigeria, they were dependant on the Ibo and others for developing trade skills in their community (See Hatch 1971:200, Niven 1967:14,17 and Legum 1966:19). The Ibo had no centralised system of government and were utterly individualistic. They became migrate workers without sharing

8. Smythe (1958:223-225) also included traditional chiefs to this list. According to Muffet (1968:129-133) the Native Authorities, which is represented by the traditional chiefs, must collectively be seen as a community leadership of first importance, and even a major factor in the collapse of the Ironsi regime. According to the author this group is represented by the Sardauna.

their knowledge and skills with the communities where they stayed. As such they formed separate elements in the community with little cultural contact and were generally considered to be imposters (Hatch 1971:198,200). The Ibo realised that education would prove to be their salvation and eagerly began to educate themselves. This educational process brought them nearer to each other as a group (but not as a Nigerian nation). This and the fact that they used a traditional expanded family structure for economic and social protection, created some community cohesion (See Hatch 1971:200 and Legum 1966:19). From the aforementioned it is evident that the macro environment was ethnic driven and as such revealed a challenger personality.

This ethnic alignment of Nigeria along with uneven economic growth in the different regions (especially in the poor Northern region) created deepening socio-economic inconsistencies. This would throughout the history of Nigeria highlight the differences between the ethnic groups, to keep ethnicity and regionalism alive. In the 1960's the economic policy of Nigeria led to a moderate but speedy industrialisation as well as an abyss between rural and urban regions and an even more uneven distribution of wealth. It created regional inequality forcing the Ibo in the East to migrate for economic survival and left the Yoruba in the West with most of the socio-economic fruits (See Iwayemi 1979:52, Smythe 1958:216 and Hatch 1971:198,200,224). This created tension between the Ibo and the Yoruba. The struggle for economic means changed regionalism into ethnicity and all of it into politics. This deepened the challenger personalities of the three groups.

A lack of nationalism spurred the establishment of political parties based on regionalism and ethnicity, unlike in the rest

of Africa (See Okpaku 1974:272, Oyediran 1979:6 and Hatch 1971:201,204-205). The first politicians were mostly notables, traditional leaders or their relatives. Their political activities were marginal, as they represented themselves and the conservative and traditional components of the macro environment. Thus, not posing a threat to Britain and therefore favoured by Britain in the political terrain (Feit 1968:182-183). It was up to the regional leaders, Azikiwe and Awolowo, to try and improve nationalism from a party (region) political perspective. Azikiwe even succeeded in creating a reputation as national leader, but it did not last long, as these new political entrepreneurs were supported by political machines (or personal ethnic machines) and not mass parties^o (See Hatch 1971:205 and Smythe 1958:215). According to Feit (1968:184) a political machine differs from a political party, in that it exists solely to stay in power. It gave rewards and bribes to all that would contribute to its existence. This gave way for the latter development of the Nigerian system of political economy. Therefore regionalism dominated the political scene and was deepened because of conflict created by the accumulation of wealth. By 1963 these political machines set their aim at national domination, in order to broaden their corruption scope and in doing so endangered the federation. The Action Group (AG) and NCNC amalgamated into a Southern Ibo front and aroused Northern suspicions of a possible Ibo attempt to test Northern political dominance (Feit 1968:186-187). It hampered cooperation on national level and also robbed the macro environment of a solid leadership. These actions further fuelled the development of opposing challenger personalities.

Nationalism was further obstructed by the constitutional history of Nigeria, shaped by the colonial system. The Westminster style of democracy and constitutions did not

provide for the development of political parties and parliamentary opposition, and gave most of the power to the central government. It divided Nigeria according to Britain's 'divide-and-rule' strategy in three nations along political, administrative and economic lines (See Oyediran 1979:3-6, Hatch 1971:206, Niven 1967:90-91,94 and Van Rensburg 1981:263,265). Apart from the federal civil service and foreign service⁹ the army seemed like the only national institution (Oyediran 1979:6). During the bargaining process for the MacPherson constitution, the North demanded 50% representation in the Central Legislative Assembly. They received it with the support of Britain (See Oyediran 1979:7 Hatch 1971:216 and Niven 1967:92). This shifted the tension between the Ibo and Yoruba to tension between the Ibo and the Hausa-Fulani. The ethnic tension between the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani became politicised with calls from the Ibo and other minority groups for the creation of new states in order to balance the North's political power (See Oyediran 1979:10-12 and Hatch 1971:219-220). This gave way for numerous leaders to step forward and obstruct national leadership¹⁰.

Elections in Nigeria showed that parties were ethnic driven and determined to dominate their own region to the expense of cooperation at federal government level (See Van Rensburg 1981:263 and Hatch 1971:215-216). Mobilisation for elections took the shape of fierce wars because of politicians fighting

9. Apart from the federal civil servants, the biggest part of the civil service operated on regional level leaving it impossible to embrace nationalism. The top civil servants were soon co-opted by corrupt regional politicians. Due to regionalism it could not present a balance to the military even though it shared bureaucracy similarities with the military (See Olugbemi 1970:97-98 and Asiodu 1979:75-78).

10. Smythe (1958:216) indicated that these leaders enjoyed no following, but: 'stands as another obstacle to be overcome in the drive for unification'.

to gain an opportunity to drink from the state's money well. These mobilisations ended in brutalities and caused the population to speak of 'Demo-crazy'. The population became cynical about Democracy and tired of politicians' abuse of power and squandering of huge sums of money on elections. The political class and Democracy became discredited. The election crises of December 1964 and October 1965¹¹, the census dispute¹² and general strike of 1964¹³ further eroded the legitimacy of the civilian government in the eyes of the macro environment. Minorities felt excluded from the power politics played by the majority and began to rebel against neglect of the regional governments¹⁴. The conflict between political parties¹⁵ intensified ethnic conflict, deepened social tension, caused election manipulation, led to an increase in criminality and disillusioned the intelligentsia. It also increased trust in the state's oppression machinery in maintaining stability (See Ostheimer 1973:58-59, Oyediran

11. See par. 3.1.1.3.2

12. Representation in the parlement were based on population numbers. As parties represented regions and ethnic groups, regions resorted to rigging census results. This happened in 1962 and 1963 resulting in unrest and tension between the Ibo (NCNC) and Hausa-Fulani (NPC) (See Van Rensburg 1981:264, Oyediran 1979:16-17, Niven 1967:100 and Hatch 1971:229).

13. With encouragement of the Labour Party in Britain plenty of trade unions were formed from the cultural organisations. Regionalism and ethnicity barred them from uniting to oppose the government as culture protection was transformed into political separatism (Hatch 1971:201-202). See Niven (1967:89) and Hatch (1971:208,227,231) for discussion of general labour actions.

14. In 1964 the Tiv, from the middle belt in the Northern area rebelled whereupon 300 were killed and the Army was ordered to control the area (Hatch 1971:228-231). This rebellion was the result of general believe that the election system favoured the Northern Region.

15. Ostheimer (1973:59) called it 'power deflation', a term used by Chalmers Johnson (*Revolutionary Change*, London: University of London, 1970).

1979:9-10, Van Rensburg 1981:265, Hatch 1971:216,221,227, Kirk-Greene 1971a:9, Cohen 1974:216-217 and Niven 1967:93). Furthermore, it conditioned the population in accepting the use of state machinery by an ethnic group in order to enforce their political will. Democracy, or any other form of government, did not have the opportunity to develop in a political culture for Nigeria (Okpaku 1974:272). As Feit (1968:187) correctly noted, with the collapse of the central administrative grid that created an artificial unity, the Nigerian state was coming apart.

b. Role: Challenger

The Hausa-Fulani (supported by Britain) formed the strongest homogeneous power structure based on ethnic alliance. The Ibo and Yoruba also developed a challenger personality as this ethnic system fostered the development of challenger personalities in the absence of nationalism (See Muffet 1968:125-127). The effect of colonialism left the remainder of the macro environment with a non-challenger role on national level, due to the fact that Nigeria had no national structures other than the defence force and no national political role for small groups to play¹⁶. The three dominant groups had a regional role to play, namely to promote their own different and sometimes opposing interests¹⁷. This was extended to socio-economic matters, such as the development of a system of political economy. Regionalism caused the macro

16. This agrees to Muffets= (1968:127) argument on an Available mass®, an expression borrowed from Kornhauser (*The Politics of Mass Society*, London, Routledge & Kegan, 1972).

17. This supports Muffets= (1968:127) theory that in an ethnic system the acceptance of government policies or modernisation are coupled to a leadership supported by the group(s) at which policies are aimed. This also illustrated why the Nzeogwu-Coup d'état would not have succeeded.

environment to involve the military in politics which lead to the abuse of the military to ensure political dominance of one ethnic group over another. The stage was set for a final confrontation for political domination.

c. Task: Challenger

The macro environment embraced tasks set at promoting regional interests. It negatively influenced the macro environment in that the resultant quota system, ban on creation of new states, census rigging, and courting of the global environment (especially Britain) alienated some groups in the macro environment, contributed to a negative perception of politicians, a distrust in Democracy and a lack of nationalism. This caused smaller groups to feel powerless.

d. Values: Challenger

The problem of unity and stability in Nigeria are correctly seen by Mahammadu and Haruna (in Oyediran 1979:25) as a lack of deeply rooted national shared values. In a community where there is a lack of deeply rooted central values that transcends ethnic boundaries, disputes are settled along ethnic lines and so the struggle for the political loot took an ethnical character. No effort was made by the Nigerian political elite to establish nationally shared values that could act as nucleus from where national unity could be built around. Due to this, the macro environment turned to values of own interest and ethnicity, usually expressed in corruption and greed with no consideration for honesty and accountability. The community came to accept these values and those who resisted, were conformed by use of the state apparatus (Mahammadu and Haruna 1979:25-26). These values spread to the community as a whole and established ethnical

nepotism (Hatch 1971:234). In such circumstances Democracy has no chance to be institutionalised. This cancer was not even tempered by the Christian and Muslim religion. Although the Muslim religion (which accounted for 45% of the population) cannot be negated in the internal politics of Nigeria, they were more loyal to their ethnic group or family group than to the religion itself (Van Rensburg 1981:260-261).

3.1.1.1.3. Global environment.

This environment represents the leaders in the international arena and their social -, economic - and political actions. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be examined, in order to evaluate this environment's contribution to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

a. Personality: Challenger

Since independence Nigeria, the showcase of Africa Democracy, courted the West- especially Britain. Although a member of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), it distanced itself from Communism and refused the Eastern Bloc's foreign assistance¹⁸. The leaders distanced themselves from radical African leaders, such as Nkhrumah and Sèkou Touré, and ignored the Apartheid problem in Southern Africa. In general they did not pursue an Africa focused foreign policy. The reason for this attitude was based on a dependance on the West for an export market and foreign assistance (See Olonisakin 1998a:2 and Ogunbadejo 1980:748). Britain adopted a challenger personality in the

18. See Aluko, O (1981), Idang (1974) and Akinyemi (1978) for a detailed analysis of Nigerian foreign policy.

rush to get rid of her colonies and in protecting her interests. This rush started in response to the United States of America (USA) and Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) dismay of colonialism and to court the USA in obtaining postwar financial support. It bequeathed Nigeria with no political structures, other than the existing administrative-traditional system, but left her with a strong developed army used to intimidate other colonial masters with (Okpaku 1974:241 and Feit 1968:183-184). Britain kept a concerned eye on her own interests as well as that of her conservative feudal allies from the Northern area and even promoted this areas interests to the disadvantage of the other areas (See Okpaku 1974:275, Oyediran 1979:5-7, Niven 1967:94 and Van Rensburg 1981:263). In Nigeria's demand for independence Britain scrutinised the situation to make sure that the majority of parties were not out to change Nigeria's economic dependance and orientation. They also made sure that the NPC's fear for political domination by the Southern schooled Ibos did not realise by enforcing a 50% representation for the Northern area in the Federal Legislative Assembly. The Ibo and minority ethnic groups demand for the creation of new states to counter this Northern political dominance were countered by threats to stall Nigerian independence (See Oyediran 1979:10-12, Kirk-Greene 1971a:11 and Hatch 1971:219-220)¹⁹. The Southerners hoped that the 1963 census would favour them to that of the Northern region. When Britain rejected the claims of the other regions that their population grew and those of the North remained constant, unrest broke loose. Balewa, the Hausa-Fulani prime minister, announced a new census for 1963. During this election the other regions

19. Only by using a political crisis in 1963 in the Western area, the minority groups succeeded in creating the Midwestern region. This transformed the minority problem in an election issue which deepened ethnic strife.

results were acknowledged, but the Northern region's population grew 67%. This British interference and challenger personality fuelled tension between the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani (See Van Rensburg 1981:264, Oyediran 1979:16-17, Niven 1967:100 and Hatch 1971:229).

b. Role: Challenger

Britain had a challenger role regarding the protection of own interests and in promoting that of her allies in the Northern region. This of course fuelled the development of challenger personalities in the micro and macro environment and set the stage for the future recruitment confrontation as alternative political leaders.

c. Task: Challenger

Britain undertook tasks to safeguard her own interests and that of the Northern region, i.e. mediating that the North receives 50% of representation in the Central Legislative Assembly. This disturbed the other major ethnic groups and promoted the development of challenger personalities.

d. Values: Challenger

Britain supported Eurocentric Western values, like expressed in the Westminster state system, and enforced these values on Nigeria as to promote her own interest. With the dawn of the colonial era, it was considered improper for ex-colonial masters to openly meddle in the domestic affairs of erstwhile colonies. This was mainly voiced by the USA, and easily enforced as post-war aid depended on good relations with the USA. This change in affairs discouraged direct British

intervention, but the influence exerted by Britain still encouraged the development of challenger personalities.

3.1.1.2. Organisation.

The organisation of the micro -, macro - and global environment is going to be examined, in order to evaluate the contribution of organisation (in terms of the development of a challenger personality) to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action.

3.1.1.2.1. Micro environment: Supportive

Okpaku (1974:241) justly observes that: Awhen the machinery of the state falls apart due to factionalism or failure to institute reforms, the army emerges as one of the country=s distinct and united castes@ (Also see Feit 1968:187). By virtue of its military arsenal, the military always constitutes a potential challenger personality, but is always a challenge to a weakened macro environment (as the Nigerian state clearly was at this stage). Niven (1967:111) argues justly that a military government was inevitable, because no other group were sufficiently organised to overthrow the government. The military had according to Feit (1968:188) everything structured for centralised control and co-ordination. In Nigeria the military lacked support of all of its members, due to regionalism, but the main role players in the military (at that stage the Northerners) gave their separate support to the different macro environment ethnic political representatives. This implies a supportive organisation. As the Northerners were in command of most of the military arsenal, as well as dominated the political arena, their supportive organisation posed the biggest threat to the macro environment.

3.1.1.2.2. Macro environment: Non-supportive

The macro environment had in toto a non-supportive organisation, due to the prevalence of regionalism which hampered nationalism. Political leaders only bargained for the support of the group which interests it guarded and in the process alienated other groups in the community. This caused a further fragmentation of the Nigerian community, which not only contributed to tension between the different groups, but seriously jeopardised any attempts to reach nationalism.

3.1.1.2.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

This environment-s organisation can be defined as uninvolved, due to the Cold War situation. Although Britain supported the traditional Northern leaders, the Cold War situation and the anticolonialism stance of the USA opted Britain to retreat from direct interference in Nigerian domestic situations, in fear of being isolated in the global environment.

3.1.1.3. Setting.

The setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment is going to be examined, in order to establish how the setting contributes in terms of the development of a challenger personality to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment attempt.

3.1.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The setting for a military takeover was ideal, because the military were politicised and formed the only alternative to the government (as only national organisation). This was due

to the resources they had to their disposal; namely a superior organisation, emotionalised symbolical status and a weapon monopoly (Finer 1962:5). They could easily mobilise support for a recruitment attempt in the micro and macro environment, as military survival was coupled to political survival. This pertains mainly to the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani military, as they emerged as the dominant challenger personalities.

3.1.1.3.2. Macro environment: Discontent

During the federal elections all social powers and institutions became politicised. The result was a deepening of regionalism which created a setting of discontent within the macro environment. The president had to indicate a prime minister from the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). Azikiwe refused and threatened to resign while Balewa refused the president's advice to declare the election void. Four days of total confusion and no government followed. A negotiated settlement drafted by Sir Ademola (chief justice of the federation) and Sir Mbanefo (chief justice of the Eastern region) was accepted to establish a broad based national government after new elections were held in boycotted regions, grievances were taken to court and a commission was appointed to review the constitution. In March 1965 the re-election took place, with the AG once again losing most in the negotiations, by not being included in the broad national government (Hatch 1971:231).

After this election the Western region collapsed in anarchy and chaos, because the elections were fought for economic and political benefits. The United Peoples Grand Alliance (UPGA) saw the election as a chance to add the Western region to the Eastern and Midwestern regions already under their control. That would have ensured them a majority in the senate as well

as stronger bargaining power against the NPC and possible control over the federal parliament (Hatch 1971:232). The Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP)²⁰ realised this and manipulated the process to their own advantage. The election ended in violence and the two parties both claimed to be the winners (Hatch 1971:233 and Oyediran 1979:19). The leader of the AG, Adegbenro, was jailed for suspected plotting against the government. This presented Akintola (the former political leader of the NNDP) with the opportunity to establish a new government in this region. This act caused an open rebellion against government power and authority wherein about 2 000 people lost their lives. Balewa, Bello (the political leader from the Northern region) and Akintola conspired to stop an AG-NCNC alliance to capture the Western region. There were even rumours of arresting pro-UPGA leaders in this area, dismantling army elements suspected of supporting the UPGA and forcing Gen. Ironsi to take leave. Nigeria began to hope for a coup d'état, but did not expect it to happen in a federal system (Van Rensburg 1981:264, Oyediran 1979:10,20-22, Hatch 1971:233 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:33). It was clear that the macro environment was severely weakened and could not unite support to deter a military onslaught on the political power of the macro environment.

3.1.1.3.3. Global environment: Untouched

The global environment had an untouched setting, as Britain could muster support to promote her own interests (and that of her Northern ally) due to the demarcation of the world in influence spheres. Britain would not intervene in Nigerian affairs directly, as she knew such an action would cause her

20. Akintola's party, the United Peoples Party (UPP)-formed after his expulsion from the AG, united with a splinter group of the NCNC, to form the NNDP.

to loose USA financial assistance. Britain and the rest of the global environment would pursue this untouched setting, as long as their interests were not endangered.

3.1.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro environment	Global environment
Personality	Challenger	Challenger ²¹	Challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Nonsupportive ²²	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

All three major personalities in the Nigerian micro - and macro environment revealed a challenger personality. The Hausa-Fulani and Ibo military had a supportive organisation, as it was utilised by the macro environment to secure their political domination or to obtain political domination and was supported by their own ethnic groups. The macro environment in toto is characterised by opposing regional factions. This weakened environment resembled a non-supportive organisation.

21. The Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo formed challenger political actors, but the rest of the population can be described as Available masses@.

22. This fact supports Muffets (1968:125-140) conclusions that the failure to maintain contact with the masses have a detrimental affect on political leadership. In this case it created the opportunity for a coup d'état.

The global environment interfered (though not obviously) in Nigerian affairs, creating the opportunity for the Hausa-Fulani in the macro environment to dominate the political arena (macro environment). This interference spurred the Ibo military and their macro environment group to develop a challenger personality, as the political power balance between the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani groups in the macro environment was disturbed. The setting for the micro environment to be recruited as political leaders was ideal, as their leaders had support, a weapon monopoly, a weakened macro environment and an untouched global environment setting to their favour. It was thus between the Ibo or Hausa-Fulani military to opt for recruitment as political leader. This option would only be successful for the group who controlled the weapon monopoly.

3.2. Phase 2, The recruitment phase.

This phase represents the 14-15 January 1966 coup d'état of Maj. Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu and the 29 July 1966 coup d'état leaving Lt-Col Gowon as political leader. This constitutes the actual recruitment effort of military leaders to assume a political role.

3.2.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the recruitment phase in the recruitment stage will be analysed, according to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments, present in this phase, that contributes to the success of recruitment behaviour.

3.2.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

The analysis of personality, role, task and values in this phase will indicate those factors in the micro -, macro - and global environment which will contribute to the actual successful recruitment of a military leader in an undemocratic fashion as political leader.

3.2.1.1.1. Micro environment.

The personality, role, task and values of this environment are reflected on, in order to determine this environment's contribution to the successful performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the recruitment phase.

a. Personality: Challenger

As indicated in phase one, the military was factionalised due to structural weaknesses. The Ibo military was the first to show their challenger personality by heading an undemocratic recruitment attempt in January 1966 against the macro environment (NNA government). The aftermath of this undemocratic recruitment attempt left Ironsi as political leader²³. The situation in the NDF worsened as Ironsi became politically inclined. His military leadership was ineffective, factionalised the military and arouse ethnic conflict. After the May 1966 killings, the Army became involved in a spiral of violence. Ibo officers with troops from other ethnic groups lived in fear for revenge (Cohen 1974:217,219). Later it became clear that the coup d'état of

23. See *Nigeria*, (In Africa Digest Year, 13(5):117-119, April 1966) for detailed account of the first coup d'état.

Nzeogwu only got rid of dishonest and honest politicians (Hatch 1971:239).

In reaction to their lost political domination, the Northern region got rid of Southern domination on 29 July 1966 in a counter coup d'état. In planning to topple Ironsi, Gowon played no instrumental role. The biggest instigators were the Northern political leaders and traditional rulers, alienated by Ironsi, who according to Ollawa (1976:9) 'came to question and even to challenge the legitimacy of the military in changing the fundamental structures of the political system'²⁴. Gowon became new High Commander of the Army and political leader, because he could unite the two opposing factions in the military. He was supported by the Northern region due to his acknowledgment that Nigeria must not become a union. He was accepted by the Southern region because he was a Christian from the Anga ethnic group in the Plato region of Northern Nigeria and not a Hausa-Fulani or Muslim (Ostheimer 1973:63 and Africa Report 1973:16). The apolitical military accepted him, because he was a professional soldier who did not head an undemocratic recruitment attempt in order to obtain political power. He joined the Army in 1954, underwent officers training at Teshie (Ghana), Eaton Hall, Sandhurst, Hythe and Warminster in Britain from 1955-1957. He partook in border patrols in Cameroon and served in the UN peace force in the Congo during the early 1960's. After he trained at the staff college in Camberly, he was promoted to the rank of Lt- Col (Uwechue 1996a:241 and Hatch 1971:240). He was known in the military for his leadership qualities such as initiative, insight and persuasiveness. As an intellectual he acted reasonably. Other qualities included: his youth and energy as

24. This is understandable, as they lament their lost political power.

well as a reformative, honest, humble and shy disposition (Hatch 1971:240).

b. Role: Challenger

The challenger role of the military was evident in performing coups d'état. In both coups d'état the military presented themselves as a balance for ethnical majority domination, stated that they had a correctional role to play and to renew the society on political -, social - and economic level and redeem them from Agangster politicians@(Van Rensburg 1981:264). This correlates with Huntingtons= idea (1962:32-33) of a reform coup d'état. But, as Ollawa (1976:26-27) suggested, it cannot be termed reform coups d'état, as this correctional role was not expressed or supported by the military in general, because social background influenced the ideology and goal orientations of each respective military group. The structural weakness of the micro environment caused military groups to team up against the government, without having a predominant leader to head it. In both coups d'état the new leaders found themselves: Aat the head of a revolution not of [their] own making@ (Schwarz 1968:200). The reason for this was the use of soldiers collectively (as individual military leadership was absent) as a power tool by the macro environment to ensure political dominance of one ethnic group above another. This explains why the first coup d'état looked like an Ibo military effort to reform Nigeria, but ended in efforts to advantage the Ibo by expanding their power to the federal system²⁵(See Mahamadu and Haruna 1979:27, Okpaku 1974:272 and Ostheimer 1973:61.

25. Even though historical evidence lacks to support this statement; the killing of traditional Ibo political rivals and ethnic groups other than Ibo=s and the majority Ibo leadership in the coup d'état indicated the Ibo military=s political aspirations.

The structural weakness of the military gave them a lack in ability to build supporting coalitions. This posed a problem as the partisanship that characterised both coups d'état alienated some segments of the micro and macro environment. It had an effect on later attempts to legitimise their role and to broaden their support base (See Ollawa 1976:23-28).

c. Task: Challenger

In both coups d'état the military indicated that they wanted far reaching changes in the structure and attitude of the Nigerian community (Van Rensburg 1981:264). This was hinted by the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani factions, but both were exercised to the detriment of other ethnical groups. The vision of regional power made them to mobilise against the macro environment in order to achieve political power on national level.

d. Values: Challenger

Ostheimer (1973:60) correctly noted that: Awhen officers conclude that civilian rule is contradictory to the country's development, the disposition to intervene= appears@. This notion is also true for officers who conclude that civilian rule is contradictory to the military's own power position. In both coups d'état the leaders depicted themselves as reformists, but their desire to change the society was coloured with ethnicity and regionalism. This regionalism fostered conflict with the macro environment in both coups d'état.

3.2.1.1.2. Macro environment.

In order to determine this environment's contribution to the successful performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the recruitment phase, the personality, role, task and values of this environment is analysed.

a. Personality: Challenger

The political leadership of Ironsi was met with more excitement than were shown for independence (Van Rensburg 1981:265). He immediately received the support of the intelligentsia, students (National Union of Nigerian Students-NUNS), Emirs, Chiefs and Trade Unions. The members of the civil service were overjoyed because they could fill the vacuum left after the dismissal of the ministers²⁶. The NPC, NNDP, AG and NCNC sent messages of support to him (See Niven 1967:116 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:38-39,44). Even though he was an Ibo, the macro environment did not suspect him of partaking in plans to bring about Ibo political dominance. This was due to their perception of the NDF as a national institution and Ironsi's brave efforts to halt the coup d'état of Nzeogwu (Ostheimer 1973:61). For a while Nigeria united as a nation because Ironsi met their expectations. He appointed commissions of inquiry to analyse the previous constitution (that favoured the North) in order to find reasons for the lack of national unity, a weakened central government and the appearance of regionalism. A military government, federalism,

26. Together with the local military, the civil service formed part of the regional cabinets in the place of executive councils (Niven 1967:116 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:38-39,44). Their previous prestige and power was thus restored, and they could once again exercise regional influence (Muffet 1968:140). This contributed to Ironsi's downfall as they were alienated in his quest to centralise the country (See Feit 1968:188-189).

one party and multiparty election systems, as well as party politics would have been investigated to find reasons for the prevalence of ethnicity, nepotism, and power abuse in order to avoid it in future (Okpaku 1974:184-185 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:43).

When Ironsi came to repeat the same mistakes as the politicians, he lost credibility and support. He made no effort to gain support from the macro environment, but sought for support amongst the Ibo in the civil service and militia²⁷. His government became a desperate improvisation and he a child of circumstance (Cohen 1974:218). Rumours began to surface, accusing Ironsi and Nzeogwu for partaking in an Ibo conspiracy to topple the federation. This rumour fuelled the Northern population to an uprising, led by the NPC leadership and civil servants that could lose their jobs due to Ironsi's reforms (Cohen 1974:218 and Feit 1968:191). It became clear that the civil service, the traditional authorities and the mass of people developed a feeling of alienation and a challenger personality in response to Ibo domination (Muffet 1968:140 and Feit 1968:190). This anger was soon directed against the Ibos. This opened the door for Gowon to step in as new leader, as the macro environment knew that Ironsi could only be toppled by utilising military power.

b. Role: Challenger

In the beginning Ironsi (now leader of the macro environment) fought for nationalism and an apolitical military, as well as

27. Ironsi did not wait for the results of one of his Commissions of Inquiry, but adopted measures to favour Ibo interests. This was shown in adopting Decree 34, that gave an unfair advantage for the appointment of Ibos in the civil service (Cohen 1974:218 and Feit 1968:190).

condemned corruption, nepotism, bribery and tribalism. His political position led him to assume a role to advance Ibo political interest. In this he enraged the macro environment, especially the Hausa-Fulani. The macro environment began to believe that his government was an Ibo effort to establish political dominance on national level. Further coups d'état were expected, but it was unsure from which region (North or South) it would come, as the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba in the macro environment both reflected challenger personalities (See Hatch 1971:239 and Feit 1968:189-190).

c. Task: Challenger

Due to a lack of macro environment leadership and the nearing rebel forces, the macro environment handed their political tasks to Ironsi on a silver plate. After Nzeogwu surrendered, Ironsi made national tasks his concern²⁸: building a nation, trying to improve the economy, fighting to diminish corruption and dishonesty in the public sector, promising to call for referendums on all important matters, promising to keep ethnicity out of the government and announcing to hand back the government to civilians in three years time (See Hatch 1971:238, Niven 1967:118-120 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:42,47,51-52). After he became politicised, he made grave political mistakes. Cohen (1974:217) reasoned that Ironsi made political mistakes in trying to cover up his real intentions of Ibo dominance. The reason for this cover up was a fear for a counter coup d'état. In the eyes of the Hausa-Fulani

28. He had no political or economic policy to implement, because he became the political leader by accident (Ofoegbu in Oyediran 1970:124). As soldier he also had difficulty in handling political problems. Both this facts accounts for his haphazardous way of governing.

military, Ironsi became part of the political struggle for Ibo rule.

He underplayed the existing regional/ethnic borders by trying to change Nigeria into a unitarian state. In an ethnic divided state like Nigeria, it was political suicide because fears of the Northern region for Ibo dominance could spark off a civil war (which happened later). This fear was fuelled by his insensitivity towards ethnic sentiments. He appointed an Ibo, Dr. Francis Nwokedi, in a one man commission to investigate the unification of the civil service²⁹. He appointed, against the will of the Superior Military Council (SMC), 21 officers to the rank of Lt-Col, of which 18 were Ibo-s. He ignored pleas from the Northern region to execute the leaders of the January 1966 coup d'état and by doing so he strengthened the believe that he was a co-plotter to this coup d'état. The tension broke into violence when he announced Decree 34, Act 24 of 1966: the new unitary constitution, before any commission could hand in their reports on the matter (See Mahamadu and Haruna 1979:28, Niven 1967:121, Kirk-Greene 1971a:48 and Hatch 1971:239).

In reaction to this, the Northern region demanded a referendum, or secession from Nigeria. Unrest broke loose and many Ibo-s died in ethnic violence. This indicates the prevalence of challenger personalities. This crisis once gave the Hausa-Fulani military the opportunity to step in, overthrow the Ibo dominated government and to install Hausa-Fulani dominance.

29. The existing regional civil services were regarded by the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba as a front against Ibo domination.

d. Values: Challenger

The macro environment was dominated by ethnic and regional values. These values promoted a constant challenger personality and subsequently rivalry. This rivalry culminated during the second coup d'état, dividing Nigeria into two regionally opposing camps: the Northern Region and Eastern Region (where no coup d'état took place) (Schwarz 1968:209).

3.2.1.1.3. Global environment.

The personality, role, task and values of the global environment need to be studied as to evaluate the factors present in this environment which contribute to the successful recruitment of a military leader in the role of political leader.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

The non-challenger personality of former colonial powers had a decisive role in the success of performing coups d'état³⁰. The military was cognisant of the fact that France, Britain and Belgium would only react if they were invited by a strong civilian regime that was popular enough to resist the first onslaughts of an undemocratic recruitment attempt or revolution. The events of 1964 in Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda were evident thereof. Events in Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Togo, Central African Republic, Zanzibar and

30. Articles, such as that of Louchheim, D.H, *The Military's Economic Legacy*, (In Africa Report 11(3):18, March 1966), indicates the West's acceptance of military rule. In this specific article the military's economic legacy is praised for ridding the Nigerian economy of politics and regionalism. Even Brown-Peterside, G, *Nigeria in Perspective: Why Balewa Died*, (In Africa Report 11(3):17, March 1966) suggested that the military takeover came just in time, for the country Required stern measures.

Dahomey taught the military that coups d'état which were populist and/or unforeseen and irreversible, raised no eyebrows in Europe (Ostheimer 1973:60). The second undemocratic recruitment attempt was easier, because the Northern region had the support of Britain. After the coup d'état of January 1966, the foreign policy of the military remained what it had been since independence: pro-West with no involvement in African affairs (Ogunbadejo 1980:751).

b. Role: Non-challenger

The global environment had a non-challenger role, because (as stated previously) it did not want to become involved in internal conflicts. The second coup d'état raised no concern, because it was lead by the traditional allies of Britain.

c. Task: Non-challenger

The global environment still had a non-challenger role as it took no challenger tasks upon them.

d. Values: Non-challenger

The values of the global environment did not challenge the micro environment in performing the two coups d'état, as coups d'état were hailed as a stabilising action.

3.2.1.2. Organisation.

The organisation of the micro -, macro - and global environment is going to be examined, in order to evaluate the contribution of this variable to the successful performance of an undemocratic recruitment action.

3.2.1.2.1. Micro environment: Supportive

Nzeogwu with the support of five Ibo-s (Majs. Onwuategu, Ifeajuna, Okafor, Chukukwa and Capt. Nwobosi) and a Yoruba (Maj. Ademoyega) instigated the first coup d'état on 14 January 1966³¹. In the aftermath of the coup d'état, Sir Ahmadu Bello (the Sardauna of Sokoto and premier of the Northern region), Brig. Ademulegun (Akintola-s military ally), Sir Tafawa Balewa (the prime minister) and Akintola lost their lives. Ironsi escaped from an assassination attempt. Due to Ironsi-s and the remaining military-s efforts, the coup d'état was unsuccessful (See Mahamadu and Haruna 1979:27, Van Rensburg 1981:264, Ostheimer 1973:61, Hatch 1971:237 and Niven 1967:113-115). This undemocratic recruitment attempt was supported by the Ibo military, but because they didn't have absolute control over the military resources, the attempt was vigorously opposed from the Northerner military. Their aim however was reached, as Ironsi became the new political leader.

On 29 July 1966 the second coup d'état took place in reaction to Ironsi-s political mistakes. Ironsi, who toured Nigeria in an attempt to gain support from the alienating macro environment, was killed in Ibadan by Cols. from the Northern region, but his death only became known in January 1967. The Northern rebels demanded that the unification decree (Decree 34) be revoked or that the Northern region was allowed to secede, and demanded a return to the status quo before 15 January 1966. The military second in command, Brig-Gen. Ogundipe (a Yoruba) was left with the task to negotiate with the rebels and to suppress the coup d'état. He was unsure of support from the Northern military and asked Lt-Col Yakubu

31. This coup d'état came a day after the Africa Summit in Lagos on the Rhodesian crisis and the Akintola-Bello-Balewa negotiations on the political crisis in the Western region.

Gowon (as a Northerner) on 31 July to negotiate with them (See Ostheimer 1973:63, Cohen 1974:219, Kirk-Greene 1971a:53-54 and Hatch 1971:239-240). After two days of complete chaos, Aa day of complete vacuum, with no one willing to take the lead@, Gowon was appointed on 1 August 1966 not only

as head of Army, but also as the new political leader of Nigeria (Schwarz 1968:209).

3.2.1.2.2. Macro environment: Non-supportive

The macro environment faced some crises during the first undemocratic recruitment attempt. They could not appoint a vice prime minister to take command of the loyal troops of Ironsi because Pres. Azikiwe was in London and his substitute in Lagos, they did not know if Balewa was still alive, were not sure weather they could appoint a prime minister without Azikiwe and did not know who to appoint. This lack of leadership and power caused Ironsi to ask for control over the government to halt the nearing rebels. On 16 January, Ironsi was appointed as head of the federal government indicating that it would only be temporary. Maj. Nzeogwu surrendered immediately. This was a dream undemocratic recruitment attempt for Ironsi (See Ostheimer 1973:61, Okpaku 1974:271-272, Niven 1967:115-117, Kirk-Greene 1971a:35-38 and Hatch 1971:238).

During Ironsi=s rule ethnic tension between the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani escalated. This tension was volatile in the Northern region where the Ibo formed a rich political elite group dominating the civil service, commercial and industrial life. They were out to destroy all feudal structures in the North and resented the Alazy, backwards and feudal@ population (Van Rensburg 1981:265). The Northern region became determined to

take revenge on the Ibo for the massacres of the first coup d'état (Mahammadu and Haruna 1979:28). In May, killings against the Ibo began. This increased after July so that by September almost 30 000 Ibo-s were killed in the Northern region and 600 000 had to flee to the Eastern area. The army partook in these killings (See Okpaku 1974:273, Niven 1967:123 and Hatch 1971:241). The killing of Ibo-s caused Lt-Col Ojukwu (the Ibo governor of the Eastern region) to deport all other ethnic groups from the Northern and Western region living in his area. This resulted in more attacks (Van Rensburg 1981:266).

3.2.1.2.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

Organisations in the global environment did not oppose the coups d'état nor supported it. The press in Africa hailed the first undemocratic recruitment attempt, believing it would bring prosperity to Nigeria. This was due to their perception that a coup d'état is a viable African political solution (Kirk-Greene 1971a:39). The second coup d'état only became known to Britain after the rebels hijacked a British plane on its way to London to take family members of the Northern soldiers to Kano (Schwarz 1968:209).

3.2.1.3. Setting.

The setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment is analysed, in order to establish how this factor contributes to the successful performance of an undemocratic recruitment attempt.

3.2.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

From the previous it is clear that the following factors led to an ideal situation that contributed to the downfall of the civilian - and Ironsi government:

- # Ease of intervention.
- # Conservation of political/military autonomy.
- # Military factions.
- # Lack of military professionalism.
- # Conflicting values (also at macro environment level).
- # Intervention of the military in civil political conflicts (also at macro environment level).

3.2.1.3.2. Macro environment: Discontent

The following factors were contributive to a situation that led to the downfall of the civilian - and Ironsi government:

- # Low institutionalisation.
- # Civil incompetence and power vacuums.
- # The society's culture.

3.2.1.3.3. Global environment: Untouched

The demonstration effect had an impact on the execution of the two coups d'état. Events in Dahomey, Central African Republic, Upper-Volta and Ghana held valuable lessons for the military which they could implement in successfully executing an undemocratic recruitment attempt, without fear for global interference (Ostheimer 1973:60). This indicated the untouched character of the global setting.

3.2.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro environment	Global environment
Personality	Challenger	Challenger	Non-challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Non-supportive	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

The micro environment performed coups d'état, because they had the support of the micro - and macro environment. The micro environment was invited by the macro environment to take the political leadership role. When the new military leaders (seen as macro leaders) made the same mistakes as the previous civilian leaders, the macro environment challenged the micro environment once again. They could not get support or present a national alternative political leader, as the macro environment was weakened by regionalism and ethnicity. This meant they could not mobilise against the micro environment. The transition from military leader to political leader was eased by the uninvolvedness of the global environment.

3.3. Phase 3, The institutionalisation phase.

After forming the new government, Gowon would stay in power as long as he had the power to establish his regime and were allowed to do so by the political elite (especially the military who hold the arms monopoly). In this phase, Gowon is addressed as part of the macro environment, and not as part of

the micro environment, as he was recruited to the macro environment and therefore challenged from within the micro environment for political dominance.

3.3.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the institutionalisation phase in the recruitment process will be reflected on, referring to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments, encountered in this phase, that contributes to the success of establishing a military leader as political leader and ensures the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

3.3.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

The analysis of personality, role, task and values in this phase will indicate those factors in the micro -, macro - and global environment which contribute to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

3.3.1.1.1. Micro environment.

The personality, role, task and values of this environment are contemplated, in order to determine this environment's contribution to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Challenger

The military was characterised by a challenger personality which culminated in two coups d'état directed at obtaining

political domination in the macro environment. This challenger personality was softened by the death of many officers in the course of the two coups d'état, which placed pressure on the remaining officers to handle the huge administration of Nigeria. This kept them busy enough not to be tempted by staging another coup d'état. This gave Gowon time to muster support to institutionalise his regime. Another softening action was the co-opting (only nominally) of civilians to supplement the military personnel. With these actions the military received a diarchic character, Gowon broadened his support base and streamlined the government (See Kirk-Greene 1971a:56).

b. Role: Challenger

With a military regime as a certainty for governing Nigeria, Gowon wanted to adopt a transformer role for the NDF. The visioned role of Gowon for the military was reflected in the tasks he adopted to institutionalise his regime.

c. Task: Challenger

The military had the task of governing Nigeria and to establish the military regime of Gowon. The task posed a challenge to the opponents of a military government. The civil war endangered this regime, but it created a chance for the military (and Gowon) to do what they know best (namely war) and at the same time to establish a military regime. The termination of the war brought an unknown feeling of nationalism to Nigeria and a feeling of peaceful reconciliation unknown to any previous civil war. The fierce critiques of federation were silenced. Gowon symbolised the atmosphere of reconciliation (Van Rensburg 1981:266).

d. Values: Challenger

Gowon wanted to establish discipline, nationalism and honesty as values to build a professional military force in the future. He therefore set the example by refusing to live in the State Palace, and choosing a two-storey house in Dodan Military Barracks in Lagos. These values opposed that of his opposition (Africa Report 1973:16 and Mahamadu and Haruna 1979:36-37).

3.3.1.1.2. Macro environment.

The personality, role, task and values of the macro environment are analysed, in order to determine this environment's contribution to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Compromiser

Gowon had a reputation as a compassionate and humane leader. He stood aloof from ethnic animosities that divided Nigeria (Africa Report 1973:16-17). As Christian, he might have opted for a peaceful establishment of his regime and not by the use of force. He showed a compromiser personality that dictated the way in which he had to establish his regime and seek support for his efforts.

The challenger personalities in the macro environment (the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani political elites) also influenced him towards developing a compromiser personality, as the micro environment experienced structural weaknesses and a personnel shortage. Therefore, he needed support for the effort to institutionalise his military regime. He immediately found support from the Western and Midwestern regions and after

releasing the captured political leaders (amongst them Awolowo) in the Southern region, they too pledged their support to him. Only the Eastern part refused to do so (Kirk-Greene 1971a:55). Ojukwu considered Gowon to be a puppet of the Northern militia, determined to capture their lost political power. This region gradually began to distance them from Gowon and broke of all ties with Lagos. On 9 August 1966 Ojukwu began to arrange for secession (See Mahammadu and Haruna 1979:29, Van Rensburg 1981:266, Okpaku 1974:273 and Hatch 1971:242). This challenger personality of the macro environment had to be considered in establishing the new regime.

b. Role: Compromiser

Gowon had the immediate role to establish his regime; to attend to the problem of nation building and to restore professionalism and morale to the Army (See Van Rensburg 1981:266, Okpaku 1974:273 Hatch 1971:242 and Africa Report 1973:16). In order to do so, he announced on 4 August 1966 that Decree 34 was going to be revoked, advice committees on national matters are going to be established and that there was going to be a return to civilian government (Kirk-Greene 1971a:56).

Despite the Ojukwu group, the broader macro environment available masses had no political role to play. They accepted Gowon's leadership, as the military was the most institutionalised and organised to govern. In this they contributed to the establishment of Gowon's regime. The challenger role of the Ojukwu group had to be reckoned with in institutionalising the Gowon regime. This shaped Gowon's compromiser personality.

c. Task: Compromiser

Gowon's primary task was to safeguard his own regime and to challenge the dissident micro environment that supported Ojukwu. In this attempt he followed a compromiser approach. He announced in his maiden speech that he did not support a union, and thus is going to revoke Decree 34, was going to move back to a federation and was going to appoint a commission headed by civilians to formulate new constitutional provisions. He was also going to establish advice committees on national matters, and was going to hand power to a civilian government in 1976 (See Africa Report 1973:17, Ostheimer 1973:63 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:54-56). On 27 May 1967 Gowon announced the creation of a 12-state structure for Nigeria, instead of four big areas, with military personnel as governors. His plan was to erode the structural base of regional strife in Nigerian politics. In this he gained support from the minority groups from the Eastern region (See Van Rensburg 1981:266, Mahamadu and Haruna 1979:30). In order to stop the slaughtering of soldiers, he sent the Eastern officers and troops home and withdrew the Northern troops from the Southern region. He also released Awolowo and other prisoners from the Western region (See Ostheimer 1973:63 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:54-55).

d. Values: Compromiser

The established values of the macro environment, as indicated in phase one and two, eased the recruitment of a military leader as political leader, as the divided macro environment was no opposition for the micro environment. Even so, these values hampered Gowon in institutionalising his regime, as he needed broad national support in order to suppress Ojukwu.

This broad national support required the presence of national values. In Nigeria these values were still absent.

3.3.1.1.3. Global environment.

The personality, role, task and values of this environment need to be studied, in order to determine this environment's contribution to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

The global environment had a non-challenger personality and allowed Gowon to establish its regime. In Africa, Gowon and Mobutu Sese Seko maintained close relations as pro-Western allies, and failed to focus on African affairs (Africa Report 1973:16 and Ogunbadejo 1980:751).

b. Role: Non-challenger

The global environment identified no role to challenge the Gowon regime. They were content not to intervene in household affairs. Britain believed that the colonial system would take care of her affairs (See Feit 1968:185).

c. Task: Non-challenger

The global environment adopted tasks to safeguard their own interests by selling weapons to Ojukwu and handing them emergency food supplies. Despite this, they did not adopt tasks to challenge Gowon, as they refused diplomatic status to Biafra.

d. Values: Non-challenger

This environment supported Western values, such as democratic government but with the same breath hailed coups d'état as a stabilising influence. This signifies the double standards the West revealed when dealing with African matters.

3.3.1.3. Organisation.

The role of organisation in the micro -, macro - and global environment needs to be examined, in order to evaluate this factor's contribution to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

3.3.1.3.1. Micro environment: Supportive

In January 1967, several top officers from all Nigerian regions attended a meeting in Aburi (Ghana) under the chairmanship of Gen. Ankrah. During this meeting it was decided on a loose federal structure and regional autonomy for Nigeria. Gowon and Ojukwu interpreted the findings differently. Gowon saw it as weaker federation and Ojukwu as a confederation wherein Ibo's could be free to do as they please. Ojukwu declared the Eastern region as an independent republic, The Republic of Biafra. A civil war broke out that lasted 30 months and cost the life of one million people. This action of the Ojukwu military group indicated a supportive organisation and constituted a threat to the institutionalisation of Gowon's regime, as this element of the micro environment had military resources and a challenger personality (See Van Rensburg 1981:266, Mahammadu and Haruna 1979:30, Niven 1967:123-124, Africa Report 1973:17 and Hatch 1971:242).

3.3.1.3.2. Macro environment: Supportive

Due to the compromiser personality of Gowon, he gained the support of most of the prominent groups in the macro environment, with the exception of Ojukwu's supporters, in institutionalising his regime.

3.3.1.3.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The war became internationalised³² but Biafra was not given any diplomatic status by Europe due to pressure from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The USSR tried to use this crisis to alter Nigeria's non-aligned policy. They send trade and technical missions to each region, and promised to help with development programmes. The USA, France and Britain refused to help the federal government, because they did not want to meddle in Nigeria's internal affairs. This forced Gowon to turn to Moscow. This action, and the believe that the federal government would quickly deal with the Biafrans, let Britain to side with the federal government. Although the USSR and Britain became the major partners of the federal government, the USSR's influence passed its peak in 1969. Even though France sided with Biafra, economic relations between France and Lagos prospered during the civil war. The USA left Britain alone to defend their territorial supremacy, but was a major contributor to relief efforts. France, Portugal, China and overseas oil firms also backed Biafra (Ogunbadejo 1980:751-754 and Olonisakin 1998a:3).

Nigeria succeeded in influencing the OAU to accept their territorial integrity and to isolate Biafra diplomatically.

32. The international community sold weapons to Ojukwu and donated emergency food to the starving population (Mahammadu and Haruna 1979:33).

Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Haiti supported Biafra because it feared a strong Nigeria that could dominate the West-African sub region (Mahammadu and Haruna 1979:35). The OAU's involvement limited the scale of international involvement and helped the federal government to succeed in suppressing Ibo secession (Ogunbadejo 1980:754).

3.3.1.3. Setting.

The setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment is analysed, in order to establish how this factor contributes to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

3.3.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The effective end of the civil war as well as the national feeling gained by it, created an ideal situation for the military to institutionalise their regime, as they were idolised by the macro environment.

3.3.1.3.2. Macro environment: Ideal

The macro environment supported the military for ending the civil war and obtained a sense of nationalism. In this, the ideal situation was created for Gowon to remain in power and to institutionalise his regime³³.

33. On 29 July 1975 while Gowon attended a meeting of the OAU in Kampala, Gen. Murtala Muhammed toppled his regime in a coup d'état (Van Rensburg 1981:267).

3.3.1.3.3. Global environment: Ideal

After the civil war ended, the global environment once again became untouched by the situation in Nigeria and Gowon's regime.

3.3.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro environment	Global environment
Personality	Challenger	Compromiser	Non-challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Supportive	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Ideal	Untouched

Due to serious factionalisation of the military (wherein neither the Hausa-Fulani nor the Ibo could gain full control over the military resources), Gowon revealed a compromiser personality. This personality gave him the support of the macro environment to institutionalise his regime. This institutionalisation was threatened by the micro environment, who revealed a challenger personality, as the Ibo military opted for secession. This led to a national war. Due to the role of the military and Gowon, the war gave his regime the necessary legitimisation. His effort was smoothed, as the global environment did not want to dispose of him, as he was pro-West and pro-Britain.

3.4. Summary.

In this chapter it was appraised that the Nigerian military presented a challenger personality in the Hausa-Fulani -, Ibo - and a-Political military groups. From these groups only the Hausa-Fulani and Ibo presented a danger to the political leadership in the macro environment, as they were utilised by the politicians to ensure their regional political power. This action of the politicians strongly indicates the lack of national political leadership and support this environment experienced. This marked the beginning of the recruitment of the military in the role of political leaders, as they were involved in politics and thus became politicised. The Ibo were the first to seize the opportunity and succeeded, because the head of the military, Ironsi (who was an Ibo) merely had to ask for the political leadership. As his recruitment was neither undemocratic nor forceful and did not look like an attempt of the Ibo military at obtaining a political position, the weakened macro environment and uninvolved global environment accepted it unconditionally. When Ironsi came to demonstrate favouritism to the Ibo, the Hausa-Fulani military challenger personality opposed his political position. This Hausa-Fulani military had the support of Britain and with their help gained control over the military resources. This resource they turned against the macro environment (that still lacked political leadership) in order to topple Ironsi. The result was an undemocratic recruitment attempt against the Ironsi government, without an individual leader among the Hausa-Fulani military to lead the undemocratic action or to assume the vacated political position. The collective leadership of the Hausa-Fulani military ignited this recruitment attempt, as the Hausa-Fulani controlled the weapon monopoly. After the recruitment attempt was facilitated, a leader was chosen to assume the political role.

This leader, Gowon, was chosen by the Hausa-Fulani military because he conformed to the requirements set by the environment, namely a compromiser personality with a broad-based support. Gowon as the military's choice was important, as he succeeded in institutionalising a military regime because he had the macro environment's support and revealed a compromiser personality that accommodated the Ibo. His regime further gained legitimacy when he successfully managed Nigeria through a devastating civil war and gained respect as political leader from the macro - and global environment.

This chapter indicates that the environment has an effect on recruitment and can even cause a change in leadership style. This indicates a direct interaction between leadership and environment. Another aspect exposed in this chapter is the fact that a weakened environment creates the opportunity for a stronger environment to develop a challenger personality and to challenge that weakened environment. This challenger personality will react on a weakened macro environment if it found support and/or is backed by military resources. This is illustrated in the reaction of Ironsi on the power vacuum found in the macro environment. Therefore it became clear that a macro environment without support can hardly be challenging and must therefore be considered to be a weakened environment. On the other hand, a micro environment without support indicates a low probability for the successful undemocratic recruitment of the military in the role of political leader. It was further assessed that the micro environment needs control over the mobilisation of military resources in order to ensure their recruitment. The importance of the global environment on the recruitment process of military leaders in the role of political leaders was also exposed.