CHAPTER 3
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CLARIFICATION FOR RESEARCH

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter dealt with the history pertaining to the problem of land ownership by Black people in South Africa. The purpose of this chapter is to describe broadly the state of affairs of the discipline of Public Administration in terms of agreements and contradictions pertaining to its locus and focus. The discussion will then be narrowed to the specific topic of public policy administration. The discussion of Public Administration theory will also bear relevance to what is the core focus of this research undertaking, namely the administration of the LRAD programme.

The discussion of Public Administration theories cannot be undertaken and concluded without first considering the historical events concerning administrative theory development in general. In this manner, one can trace the following:

- the need to develop these theories in the first place, and who were the main players in the development of these theories;
- the approaches, assumptions and contributions made by various scholars to the broad field of administration and in particular public administration;
- the commonalities and disagreements among authors; and
- any real growth (i.e. new theories completely replacing old ones) in the science.

The generic approach to Public Administration as developed by Cloete (1998:123-281) shall serve as a basis for discussion in this chapter as well as in those that will follow.

3.2 DEFINING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

3.2.1 Understanding the concept of Public in Public Administration

Understanding the concept of public requires conceptual clarity between what is considered the public domain as opposed to the private domain. Parsons (2003:3) suggests that the existence of public policy presupposes that there is a domain of life
which is not driven by private or purely individual interests, but held in common. Weiner and Vining (2005:72), use the economic principle of market failure to allocate certain goods efficiently, to draw the distinction between public as opposed to private or collective goods. Weiner and Vining (2005:72) suggests that private goods have got two primary characteristics which define them, namely:

- rivalrous consumption, and
- excludable ownership.

*Rivalrous consumption* implies that what is consumed by one cannot be consumed by another (Weiner & Vining, 2005:72-73). Perfectly private goods such as clothes are characterized by complete rivalry, in a sense that the owner cannot share the use of such goods at the same time with other people. *Excludable ownership* means that one has complete control over the use of a good (Casella & Frey, 1992:642; Weiner & Vining, 2005:72). In democratic societies, the exclusion of others from the consumption of rivalrous goods is achieved by the granting of property rights to owners, which imposes a duty on non-owners to accept the ownership vested in the owner and comply (Weiner & Vining, 2005:73). In the context of land ownership and redistribution, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, offers guarantees in terms of respect for property rights, thus assigning private white-owned agricultural land targeted by the LRAD programme the qualities of being rivalrous and excludable in nature. The introduction of the principle of willing-seller, willing-buyer in the LRAD programme was probably applying itself to this reality.

Samuelson (in Parsons, 2003:10) argues that public goods are indivisible, non-excludable and are paid for by taxes and borrowing. *Price* in the context of public goods and services is a representation of the values and priorities of the legislature given the limited resources, and not value as in the market or private sector context. The government of the Republic of South Africa has, since 1994, adopted a developmental approach whereby the money of taxpayers’ is used to stimulate and facilitate development transactions which were meant to be developed through the private sector. One such intervention has been in land redistribution. The state provided grant funding for the acquisition of land, and this land is divisible, rivalrous and excludable in nature, thus challenging the argument presented above by Samuelson (in Parsons, 2003:10). The amount of money and other resources allocated to the LRAD programme does not
so much represent the maximum that the Government would like to achieve through the LRAD programme within a given time frame, but rather the priorities of the Government given the limited financial resources available to satisfy society’s diverse needs.

Buchanan (in Parsons, 2003:10-11) challenges the neat distinction provided by Samuelson above by suggesting that some public goods could have excludable characteristics. Weiner and Vining (2005:72) support the contestation by Buchanan (in Parsons, 2003:10-11) that public goods are in varying degrees non-rivalrous in consumption, non-excludable in use, or both. A good is non-rivalrous in consumption when more than one person can enjoy the benefits of consumption from a given level of supply at the same time (Weiner & Vining, 2005:72). An example given by Weiner & Vining (2005:72) is that of national defence, which can be enjoyed by all people at the same time without limiting the benefits enjoyed by others.

Goods are non-excludable “…if it is impractical for one person to maintain exclusive control over its use” (Weiner & Vining, 2005:72). An example is the fish resource found in the sea, which roam around and as such cannot be partitioned off to one area for the exclusive use by one individual (Weiner & Vining, 2005:72). Another example is that of water from a river, which cannot be partitioned off for the exclusive use by an individual. However, the use of such goods can also be regulated through the granting of specific rights to individuals or groups, which brings into the picture a third characteristic associated with demand for public goods, namely congestion. Congestion occurs when the excessive demand for and use of particular goods result in social costs to the individual. Non-rivalrous goods that can be consumed at the same time can experience a phenomenon of congestion, as such necessitating the introduction of mechanisms to regulate consumption. The introduction of the LRAD and other land reform programmes resulted in an increase in land prices, which in itself is a social cost to the intended beneficiaries of these programmes. The Government has options, but has not introduced any other regulatory mechanism than property evaluations to deal with this phenomenon.

The economic definition above does not adequately address the distinction between private and public. The traditional understanding by Public Administration scholars on the public in public administration has been in institutional terms (Henry, 2004:43). This
takes the view that the locus of public administration should be on tax supported or
government agencies (Henry, 2004:43). Government agencies are service oriented and
may pursue single or multiple objectives (Fesler, 1980:9-10). However, privatisation
resulted in excluding a government’s ability to utilise private entities and this form of
delivering services creates difficulties (Henry, 2004:43).

An alternative to the institutional approach described above is the normative definition
(Henry, 2004:44). According to Parsons (2003:3), “…the public comprises that
dimension of human activity which is regarded as requiring governmental or social
regulation or intervention, or at least common action”. The normative definition has
ethical undertones in that it concerns itself with aspects and dynamics which affect the
public interest. Public service norms such as impartiality, equality, openness and
representativeness became associated with the provision of public goods (Haque &
Lewis in Haque, 2000:601). The normative definition serves to:

- broaden the scope of public administration beyond traditional government
  institutions;
- create problems in terms of conceptual understanding of public interest (Henry,
  2004:44); and
- create contradictions between private and public interest, especially where
government has extended its reach into private entities.

The LRAD programme was introduced as a matter of public interest to redress past
historical injustices and to build a new society in which all have equitable access to
agricultural land as a means of production. The administration of this programme
extends the state’s responsibilities beyond conventional government institutions and into
transactions which are normally facilitated by market forces of demand and supply.

The third definition takes an organisational dimension that views public organisations as
more open to scrutiny, accessible and being impacted more by the task environment
than do private organisations (Fesler, 1980:11-12; Henry, 2004:44). In democratic
societies, the activities of public service organisations are more open to scrutiny by the
elected representatives, who exercise the oversight function on behalf of citizens. The
fact that public organisations act in the public interest makes them subject to forces that
limit their possible economically influenced performance. These limitations are
manifested in the extent to which the activities of public officials are circumscribed by law (Pfiffner & Presthus, 1967:6).

The above discussion serves to clarify the environment within which public institutions operate and also clarifies the differences between public administration and private sector management (Henry, 2004:45). The organisational dimension also impacts on the administration of the LRAD programme which, due to the sensitive nature of land redistribution, the programme is subjected to more scrutiny by those with diverse, but vested interests. The LRAD programme is also impacted by the co-operative governance regime and the new rights-based set of values, which came into being in 1994 and affect the administration of all government programmes.

3.2.2 Defining administration in Public Administration

A number of definitions have been provided by various scholars in an attempt to define the concept of administration. Coetzee (1988:4-5) and Botes et al. (1992:294-302) provide the following classification of definitions of the concept administration:

3.2.2.1 The comprehensive approach

Exponents of the comprehensive approach view administration as all organised activities undertaken in an institution aimed at achieving an objective (Botes et al., 1992:295). No distinction is drawn between clerical, professional and technical duties (Botes et al., 1992:295). It is also the view of Simon, Thompson and Smithburg (1991:4) that administration is “the activities of groups co-operating to accomplish common goals”.

Simon et al. (1991:4) highlight the contradiction that could emanate if co-operation is measured only in terms of the results, not the methods used. The word co-operate implies a sense of willingness among two or more people to work together, and does not take into account the use of authority in formal organisations to get the intended results (Waldo in Rosenbloom, Goldman & Ingraham, 1994:7).
3.2.2.2 The limited or functional approach

The limited approach to administration refers to the routine administrative activities assumed to be commonly carried out in both public and private institutions, and which are sometimes referred to as clerical work (Coetzee, 1988:5-6). These clerical functions are essential in terms of assisting the ‘professionals’ and ‘specialists’ in the implementation of government programmes, and are considered the domain of white-collar workers (Botes et al., 1992:296).

3.2.2.3 The public management approach

Those who advocate for the public management approach embrace the basic principles of Public Administration, but argue that large government institutions function like businesses and should be managed as such (Botes et al., 1992:297). This argument has much resonance with the propositions of the New Public Management approach, which will be discussed in detail under the sub-heading of organising.

3.2.2.4 The generic approach

The generic view considers administration as the functions that are common among the actions undertaken by a group of organisations within a particular institutional environment (e.g. government institutions) with the purpose of accomplishing the goals and objectives of public policies (Botes et al., 1992:298). According to Thornhill (2005:180), the generic and integrated functions (classified into conceptual and managerial) performed by all public service organisations could be divided as follows:

- systems and processes for policy-making;
- development of organisational structures;
- development of systems for appointment and utilisation of human resources;
- development of systems for the acquisition and utilisation of financial resources;
- development of efficient and effective work methods and procedures; and
- development of systems for the maintenance of effective control and accountability.
The generic approach as advocated by Cloete (1995:57-219) is adopted in this study. Since the case study research method is used in this study, it is important to provide a comprehensive analysis of all factors impacting on the effective administration of the LRAD programme. Having defined the different approaches to administration, the next section will provide some understanding of what effective administration is within the context of public institutions.

3.3 EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

The adjective effective is defined in The World Book Dictionary (1993) as ‘able to cause something’ and ‘able to cause some desired result’. In both definitions, the cause and effect relationship is implied between the end result and the cause of the of the end result. In organisation theory, there is no universal agreement to the meaning of the adverb effectiveness as well as the categories used to describe it (Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999:9). This is epitomised by the prevalence of models used for conceptualising organisational effectiveness (Daft & Rainey in Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999:13) such as:

- goal models, which perceive effectiveness in terms of achievement of organisational goals;
- internal process models, which perceive effectiveness in terms of the extent to which internal procedures and processes support the achievement of organisational goals;
- participant satisfaction models, which perceive effectiveness in terms of the extent to which the needs of participants were satisfied;
- resource dependence models, which perceive effectiveness in terms of the extent to which the organisation was to reduce its vulnerability by securing critical resources needed for achievement of organisational goals; and
- stakeholder models, which perceive effectiveness in terms of the extent to which competing expectations of stakeholders were managed and satisfied.

Cameron and Whetten (1981:526) argue that the categories of effectiveness mentioned above are constructs operationalised by researchers and as such do not take into account the definitions of respondents as informed by their experiences and perceptions of reality. Cameron and Whetten (1981:526), however, admit that as much as general conclusions can be made about organisational effectiveness, the concept can mean
different things to different people at different times during the life cycle of an organisation. An example is an assessment of effectiveness in terms of goal attainment. The assessment of a goal, which has a hierarchical, geographic and time dimension, can be affected by the understanding of reality that respondents have in terms of these dimensions (Botes et al., 1992:305).

The other factors influencing perceptions of organisational effectiveness are the extent to which certain issues have been given much prominence within an organisation and about which the respondents have the most information (Taylor & Fischke in Cameron & Whetten, 1981:526), as well as the position of respondents in the organisational hierarchy (Goodman & Pennings, Van de Ven & Ferry in Cameron & Whetten, 1981:526). However, while acknowledging the difficulties in reconciling the above-mentioned concerns, Rainey and Steinbauer (1999:13) define *effectiveness* as “…when the agency performs well in discharging its administrative and operational functions pursuant to the mission”. According to Rainey & Steinbauer (1999:13), the definition explicitly and implicitly deals with the following facets of effectiveness, namely:

- whether the organisation does well what it is supposed to do;
- whether employees perform their duties well;
- whether the actions and procedures of the organisation support the attainment of the organisational mission; and
- whether the organisation achieves its mission.

Hanekom (in Hanekom & Thornhill, 1995:20) is of the opinion that the study of public administration should focus on:

- the purpose of public institutions;
- the administrative means for achieving the purpose; and
- the role-defined power of bureaucrats in achieving positive results as envisaged by government.
Based on the suggestion by Hanekom (in Hanekom & Thornhill, 1995:20), studies on the effective administration of government policies and programmes should focus on:

- the achievement of purpose (i.e. the desired end result to be achieved by an individual organisation, or two or more organisations acting together);
- the actions and procedures undertaken to achieve particular ends (i.e. public service organisations viewed as a cluster of systems within systems arranged in a hierarchical manner, where administrative means are designed to enable the achievement of the desired end result by serving as inputs to other units within and without the organisation, vertically and horizontally); and
- the role of public officials in achieving the desired goals and objectives (i.e. public officials perceived as capable of determining and articulating the desired end result, articulating the predetermined desired end result, putting in place administrative means for achieving the end result, managing competing stakeholder interests and expectations, securing, transforming and energising resources to achieve the desired end result).

3.4 THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The practice of public administration as a critical instrument in the running of ancient empires, monarchies, democracies and dictatorships has been well documented by early philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Polybius (Coetzee, 1988,32; Thornhill, 2006:794). These philosophers, did however, not indicate the need to develop the subject as an academic discipline (Coetzee, 1988:33).

3.4.1 Cameralism

*Cameralism* is cited as “the first real training scheme” for officials in the service of a sovereign state (Coetzee, 1988:33). The scheme was in operation in Prussia, where professorships were awarded as early as 1729 by Friederick Wilhelm I (Coetzee, 1988:33; Thornhill, 2006:794). According to Coetzee, Cameralism was later changed to *Verwaltungslehre*, which emphasised law formalism or a legalistic approach, and was confined mainly to Germany.
A number of French scholars, namely Jean-Charles Bodin, *Principles d’admininstration publique* (1808); M. Vivien, *Etudes administratives* (1845); and L. Aucoc, *Conférences sur l’administration*; made contributions to the development of the subject through their writings about Public Administration as a separate subject (Coetzee, 1988:33). France played a leading role in Europe during this time in terms of development of the theory and practice of public administration, albeit from a legalistic approach (Coetzee, 1988:33). The legalistic approach is consistent with the views of scholars during the era of orthodoxy as well as Max Weber’s bureaucratic model, which all aimed at limiting or eliminating the discretionary powers of officials during policy administration.

### 3.4.2. The foundation

The beginning of the conscientious study of Public Administration is credited to Woodrow Wilson (Henry, 2004:29; Shafritz & Hyde, 1992:1). In Wilson’s (1941:486) own admission as well as recognising the important role played by the Cameralists, he notes that the science of administration has its origins in Europe, in countries with a different political and cultural background from that of America.

### 3.4.3 Public Administration definitions

Botes and Roux (in Botes *et al.*, 1996:257) note that the subject of Public Administration can denote both the science aspect of it (with capital letters) as well as an art (with lower-case letters) to denote the field of operation for practitioners, which in itself is the primary study focus area for Public Administration scholars. Public Administration is thus concerned with scholarly research about implementation of government policy by practitioners, alternatively known as public officials (Botes & Roux in Botes *et al.*, 1996:257). Though there is no confusion as to the locus of public administration, Thornhill (2006:804) argues for a reconsideration of the domain of public administration and by extension the study of Public Administration. The concept of *governance* though not universally defined, introduces a new approach whereby state institutions co-operate with one another as well as with the private sector and non-government organisations to provide services to the public (Thornhill, 2006:804). This new approach necessitates a consideration of phenomena derived from the private sector in the study of Public Administration and management (Thornhill, 2006:804).
Any attempt at discussing Public Administration as an academic discipline should begin by first defining the parameters and boundaries of the subject, which delimits and differentiates it from other scientific and humanistic disciplines (Stillman, 1984:1). The foregoing implicitly states that the boundaries of the discipline can be delineated. In his introductory statement, Wilson (1941:481) says that a practical science such as administration cannot be studied unless “there is a need to know it”. By the “need to know it”, Wilson (1941:481) refers to the need to define its boundaries, which will differentiate it from other disciplines.

A number of definitions have been provided by different scholars, none of which adequately captures the essence of the area or subject matter of Public Administration (Stillman, 1984:1). The following are some of the definitions cited by Stillman (1984:2-3):

Williams (in Stillman, 1984:2-3) defines Public administration as all about the management of scarce resources to accommodate the goals of public policy. Gortner (in Stillman, 1984:2-3) considers Public administration a phenomenon that involves “coordination of all organized activity having as its purpose the implementation of public policy”. The co-ordination function as described above is what brings about a similarity between public and private institutions, since both require co-ordination of effort in order to achieve organisational objectives (Cloete, 1994:61). White (in Shafritz & Hyde, 1992:58) defines Public Administration as “the management of men and materials in the accomplishment of the purposes of the state”.

The main emphasis of these definitions is on the management of resources to accomplish predetermined policy objectives. Administration and management are “…the enabling functions required to give effect to political decisions/policies” (Thornhill, 2005:180). The new Government of the Republic of South Africa prescribes in the Public Finance Management Act (1/1999) that public service managers should, in implementing government policies and programmes, do so effectively and with efficiency. These definitions also affirm the politics and administration dichotomy by confining the role of practitioners of public administration to merely implementing decisions made by policy and lawmakers.
According to Nigro and Nigro (in Stillman, 1984:2-3), Public Administration:

- “…is a cooperative group effort in a public setting”;
- “…is a phenomenon that covers all three branches-executive, legislative, and judicial-and their inter-relationships”;
- “…has an important role in the formulation of public policy, and is thus part of the political process”;
- “…is different in significant ways from private administration”; and
- “…is closely associated with numerous private groups and individuals in providing services to the community”.

Public Administration may also be defined as “…all processes, organizations, and individuals (the latter acting in official positions and roles) associated with carrying out laws and other rules adopted or issued by legislatures, executives and courts” (Gordon in Stillman, 1984:2-3). Gordon further explains that this definition should be understood “…to include considerable administrative involvement in formulation as well as implementation of legislative and administrative orders…”. Wilson (1941:496) defines Public Administration as “detailed and systematic execution of public law”. According to White (1955:1) “public administration consists of all those operations having for their purpose the fulfilment or enforcement of public policy”. Starling (in Stillman, 1984:2-3) defines public administration as a “phenomenon that concerns the accomplishing side of government, that comprises all those activities involved in carrying out the policies of elected officials and some activities associated with the development of those policies and that comes after the last campaign promise and election-night cheer”.

The above definitions locate Public Administration within the political school of thought, emphasises the policy formulation role of public officials, and also bring into focus the managerial functions of ensuring co-operative group effort. The definitions also resonate with the comprehensive and generic views of what administration entails.

Stillman (1984: 1) attributes the problem of a lack of a universal definition which adequately captures the core of the subject to the rapid growth in the twentieth century of public administration, which became all-encompassing in terms of the role expectations of public administrators. The role expectations of public administrators
were mainly defined by the norms, values and expectations of a particular society, hence the definitions tend to be more descriptive than normative in nature.

The other problem attributed to a lack of a universal definition is the extent to which definitions have borrowed from other disciplines to undertake research on the practice of public administration. Fry (1989:13) maintains that Public Administration has borrowed much of its body of knowledge from other disciplines such as economics, business administration, sociology, psychology and political science and “draws what cohesiveness it possesses more from its object of analysis than its intellectual parentage”. He argues that the field of Public Administration has tended to grow more in a cumulative manner, rather than by substituting new ideas for old ones. O’Toole, Skowronek and Lustig (in White & Adams, 1994:29) maintain that the major trajectory in the development of the knowledge and theory in Public Administration was during the period 1877 to 1920 (the progressive era). These authors do not however maintain that nothing was done in subsequent years, and as Fry (1989:13) states, growth was cumulative rather than substitutive and reference was always made to theories developed during that period. What Fry seems to be decrying is:

- a lack of originality in the development of theories in the public service;
- a dearth of new theories to displace the existing and old ones; and
- the discipline taking more of the descriptive nature of the object of analysis, namely the practice of public administration.

Parker (in Stillman, 1984:3) takes a radical and positivist view that “no science or art can be identified by the title public administration, least of all any skill or coherent intellectual discipline”. Parker (in Stillman, 1984:3) states that “it does not, in itself, offer any promising opportunity to widen or make more precise any single aspect of scientific knowledge”. The views of these authors were informed by their positivist stance and understanding of what a scientific discipline is or should be.

A different view from that of Fry (1989:13), is presented by Mosher (in Stillman, 1984:3), namely that the elusiveness of the core of Public Administration gives the subject its strength since scholars will have to borrow from the concepts and theories of other disciplines to solve practical problems facing society. The view by Mosher (in Stillman, 1984:3) agrees with the views on the subjective and qualitative approach.
3.4.4 Public Administration and its locus within the political school of thought

The political school of thought emerged as the centre which was unifying a number of schools of thought which have emerged from the past eras (McCurdy, 1986:54). It served as a means of filtering out ideas borrowed from different disciplines (McCurdy, 1986:54). In terms of this school of thought, the locus of public administration is on the activities of government institutions, hence the conclusion that administration is concerned with the executive and operative aspect of government activities, and is the most visible (Wilson, 1941:482), and that administration is part and parcel of every activity of government (Gaus in Lynn, 2001: 153). This opinion on the locus of public administration is supported by White (1955:1), however White (1955:1) assumes that the problems as well as the administrative processes that public administration have to be concerned with, are the same, irrespective of the sphere of government.

The political school of thought provided incentives for the strengthening of relationships with political science (Hanekom in Hanekom & Thornhill, 1983:46), in terms of locus and focus, but also in terms of methods used to study social phenomena. For example, Public Administrationists who embraced the case study method, identified with an intellectual approach that is empirical, behavioural and interpretive in nature, and draws from the administrative experience of the practitioners, something that was not well accepted by those who have been reared in the field of political science (Henry, 2004:37). The disciples of the political school of thought view public administration as an extension of the process of governing (Mc Curdy, 1986:31), which Mc Curdy (1986:31) defines as “the act of exercising the authority of the state on behalf of persons within the political community”.

Cloete’s (1994:58-59) generic framework puts the locus of public administration within politics, as it clearly demonstrates the interface between politics and administration. However, the politics and administration dichotomy advocated by exponents of traditional public administration during the foundation years, was debunked, as public servants are viewed as having a will of their own, taking an active part in policy making and should be granted administrative discretion to implement policies in the best interest of the public (Gaus in Lynn, 2001:150; Key in Lynn, 2001:151).
Cloete (1994:64-86) identifies guidelines (tenets) which must be observed by political office-bearers and public officials operating within a democratic state, namely:

- political supremacy;
- public accountability;
- tenets of democracy;
- guidelines emanating from community values; and
- prescribed guidelines.

Only the guideline pertaining to political supremacy will be discussed. According to Cloete (1994:64-69), the legislature has political authority over the sphere of work of political office-bearers as well as public officials in terms of:

- establishment of executive or government institutions;
- determination of functional activities to be performed by government institutions;
- development of guidelines for appointment, remuneration, promotion, development and dismissal of political office-bearers and public officials;
- development of work procedures in respect of programmed decisions or decisions that pertain to work of a highly regulatory nature;
- collection of state revenue and equitable distribution thereof; and
- control measures required for political office-bearers and public officials to account to the legislature.

Cloete (1994:64-69) confirms that in spite of the involvement of public officials in policy development, the legislature has the supreme authority in terms of articulating the needs and demands of citizens, legislating and providing policy direction for government, as well as providing oversight over the activities of government. The next section discusses the administrative functions performed by government institutions over which the legislature has legislative authority.
3.5 PUBLIC POLICY

Policy is defined as “a desired course of action and interaction which is to serve as a guideline in the allocation of resources necessary to realise societal goals and objectives, decided upon by the legislator and made known either in writing or verbally”(Hanekom in Hanekom & Thornhill, 1995:54). The above definition specifies the following:

- a course of action selected among many possible alternatives has to be chosen to guide decision-making, which involves establishing policy guidelines in terms of how the process of formulating policies within an organisation shall be conducted as well as action to be followed to achieve the identified goals (a constitution is a useful document for this purpose in the public sector since it is the supreme policy which gives effect to and integrates all other policies);
- the emphasis on a desired course of action means that there is, or should be, criteria in place (e.g. legislation) to guide in the choice of the desired course of action from other potential courses of action that are not desired by decision-makers;
- a desired course of action is thus a means to realise the end, which are the broader societal goals and objectives;
- that the goals and objectives of society have already been clarified and that a public policy is concerned with the identification of the means to realise them;
- that a policy should prescribe who the important role players are that are necessary for putting into effect the desired course of action and how they should interact with one another, which implies that organisations responsible for execution of a policy would have to be identified or created, institutional arrangements in terms of rules of engagement, norms and standards to be adhered to and procedures for implementation would have to be prescribed as well;
- that for the desired course of action to be implemented, resources should be allocated by the legislature responsible for deciding on the desired course of action to support the implementation of a policy; and
- that a public policy should be made public to ensure that members of the public who are affected by the policy, either positively or negatively, become aware of the effects of the policy and respond appropriately.
Dye (2002:1) defines *public policy* as “anything a government chooses to do or not to do”. The criticism levelled against Dye’s definition is that it is too general and simplistic in that it fails to separate the substantive and significant issues that government decides to do or not to do from the trivial activities that public officials are engaged in including decisions that they make in the normal course of their work (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:5). However, Lipsky’s views (in Hupe & Hill, 2007:280) support the above view by Dye (not in the limited sense of the mundane administrative tasks as performed by clerks) to say that rather than formal laws and policy statutes it is “…the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures (that) effectively *become* the public policies they carry out”. According to Lipsky (in Hupe & Hill, 2007:280), public policy should not only be understood in terms of the formal laws and statutes, but as policy which is formed as it is implemented by public officials. Lipsky’s view (in Hupe & Hill, 2007:280) is consistent with the integrated approach to policy implementation.

Dye (2002:1) is of the view that public policy involves decisions taken only by government; therefore it excludes decisions taken by business, private and civic organisations (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:5). Business, private and civic organisations can and do make decisions that influence the policy agenda in terms of the gravity of a particular societal problem as well as possible measures available to solve the problem, but their decisions do not constitute public policy and can thus only serve to influence public policy (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:5).

The second aspect of Dye’s definition (2002:1) pertains to a choice that government can and has to make, which according to Howlett & Ramesh (2003:5), is to do something or to do nothing about a dysfunctional situation. The aspect of the definition which involves decisions about taking no action also constitutes a deliberate and conscious choice by government when faced by other alternatives, which involve taking a positive action, and constitutes public policy. An example is where government decides not to increase taxes or declines to approve additional funds for an organ of state (Howlett & Ramesh 2003:5).

Jenkin (in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:6) defines *public policy* as “a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those decisions
should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve”. The definition by Jenkin presents public policy-making as a process which involves a number of decisions, consisting of the selection of a goal or goals to be pursued, the choice of a course of action or actions to be followed in achieving the goal and the allocation of resources necessary for effective implementation of the desired course of action (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:6). Public policy-making is seen as a forward-looking process, which involves conceptualisation of the future idealised state of being of society, which can be seen as different from the current state of affairs or similar.

The definition by Jenkin (in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:6) indicates that such decisions are made by political actors as individuals or as a collective. Not only does public policy entail a single decision but a series of interrelated decisions, involving political executives and administrative executives. At the operational level, decisions made by the administrative executives can be about the functional activities of a department, or about support activities to line function staff (Howlett, et al. 2003:6). What is important is that such a series of coherent decisions should lead to successful administration of the desired course of action.

Jenkin (in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:6) highlights the fact that public policies are taken with due cognisance of the context within which such decisions have to be implemented. The contextual issues could involve external factors such as restrictions and obligations imposed by international treaties and conventions, as well as the influence exerted by powerful multilateral organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank in domestic policy formulation (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:6). Internal factors that can impose limitations could be the autonomy with which central government has to determine policy, as against the influence that business, private and civic organisations have and can exert on government in domestic policy formulation. Other factors relate to the capacity of the state, which is affected by factors such as the extent of coherence among spheres of government and organs of state, as well availability of technical expertise, financial resources, physical and information technology resources (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:6).

Anderson (in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:7) defines policy as “a purposive course of action followed by an actor or a set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern”.
The above definition shares similarities with Jenkin’s definition with regard to the goal oriented nature of a policy as well as the involvement of multiple actors. However, it brings in the problem-solving dimension (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:7). The notion of the existence of a problem as perceived or real implies that there is a gap between the current state of affairs and the idealised state of being of society. Since a policy is a socio-political construct designed “…as much through techniques and methods as through aims or content” (Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007:4) in order to deal with societal problems, those entrusted with formulating policies must be guided by particular criteria in terms of first identifying and prioritising the problems, as well as developing appropriate measures for dealing with the prioritised problems.

3.5.1 Policy analysis and formulation

Policy analysis as a scientific study area became firmly established and fully fledged within the social sciences after the Second World War (Roux, 2002:426). Policy analysis is defined as “…an attempt to measure the cost and benefits of policy alternatives and to evaluate the efficacy of existing policies” (Goldwin in Hanekom, 1992:65). Hanekom (in Roux, 2002:427) defines policy analysis as “an attempt to measure the costs and benefits of various policy alternatives or to evaluate the efficacy of existing policies; in other words, to produce and transform information relevant to particular policies into a form that could be used to resolve problems pertaining to those policies”. The above definitions assume a rational approach to policy analysis, an aspect which has been criticised for giving experts too much power thus leaving out the public (Walters, Aydelotte & Miller, 2000:350). Another criticism of the rational approach is that costs and benefits of policy alternatives may not be determined with scientific exactness, a situation described by Simon (in Parsons, 2003:278) as ‘bounded rationality’. However, frameworks are used in policy analysis to try and better understand phenomena, by simplifying and ordering the complexity of factors and social processes that affect problems (Parsons, 2003:57). Dunn (in Roux, 2002:427) defines policy analysis as “an applied social science discipline, which uses multiple methods of inquiry and argument to produce and transform policy relevant information that may be utilized in political settings to resolve policy problems”.

63
Analysis of public policy is, according to Dye (in Roux, 2002:427), an exercise undertaken to achieve the following objectives:

- **scientific objectives**: science expands the knowledge horizon of society by making known the cause and effect of particular policies, as well as the linkages between the policy and its environment;
- **professional objectives**: scientific knowledge puts public administrators in a better position to advice their political masters on better policy choices and the implications thereof; and
- **political objectives**: scientific knowledge gives the political executive comfort in knowing that it is pursuing meaningful policy interventions that will enable it to reach the policy goals.

The scientific study of policy analysis like any other study area has to follow a structured way of making an inquiry into policy problems. The following section gives insight into some of the questions that can be considered to structure the process of policy analysis. Leroy and Nelissen (in Runhaar, Dieperink & Driesen, 2006:37) draw the following distinction between the five themes guiding the formulation of research questions during policy analysis:

- **Policy content** theme requires of the researcher to have a good understanding of the environment which affects the functioning of the policy and informs its content (Brynard, 2007: 361) and specific questions to consider, according to Runhaar et al. (2006:37), could be:
  - what are the policy objectives (e.g. reduction of veld degradation), and what is the conceptual understanding of concepts central to the policy objective?
  - what problem definitions underlie the policy objectives, e.g. why is veld degradation a problem?
  - how valid are the assumptions of cause and effect between goals and means, e.g. how valid are the assumptions that if certain instruments/controls are put in place there will be an improvement in veld condition?
The above questions explore the rational assumptions required for the construction of the content of a policy. The assumption underlying the LRAD programme is that the problem of agricultural land deprivation for Black farmers can be adequately solved through:

- the Government improving the capacity of Black farmers to transact for land purchase in the property market (e.g. through provision of land purchase grants and reducing transaction costs for agricultural land purchase such as property valuation and registration costs); and
- the Government improving the capacity of Black farmers to farm the acquired farms on a sustainable basis (e.g. through the provision of post-transfer financial support as well as agricultural extension support).

- *Policy process* theme explores the process used in policy formulation, stakeholders involved in the policy process, the influence that each stakeholder has and the relationship of stakeholders to one another (Runhaar et al., 2006:37). A *stakeholder* is broadly defined by Freeman and Reed (in Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997:856) as “an individual or group who can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives”. During the policy formulation process, public officials engage with other individuals and organisations that have a stake in the policy being proposed (Sharkansky, 1975:5). The rational actor mode to policy analysis perceives policy stakeholders as rational actors who participate in the policy process or develop policies in order to maximise self-interest as epitomised by increased power and resources (Ryan, 1999:40).

- *Policy organisation* theme explores the issue of organisation for policy implementation, by considering the organisational mechanisms put in place to implement policy (Runhaar et al., 2006:37). An *organisation* in this context refers to “a structured system of formal roles and functional relationships designed to carry out policies” (Pfiffner & Presthus, 1967:7). The LRAD programme has been designed to be administered through intergovernmental mechanisms.

- *Policy effects* theme explores the effects of policies, some of which can be anticipated while others cannot (Ho, 2000:1015; Sharkansky, 1975:9). According to Runhaar et al. (2006:37), the following questions could be asked:
  - whether the implementation of a particular policy resulted in the achievement of objectives;
o whether any side- or unintended effects can be observed;
o whether there is commonality or divergence among stakeholders in terms of how they evaluate the policy effects; and
o whether standards or indicators exist in terms of what defines success or failure of the policy.

The anticipated effects of the LRAD programme are:

- to change the agricultural land ownership structure in the country;
- to change the dualistic structure of farming:
  - from that which is characterised by White farmers who own the biggest chunk of agricultural land and farm mainly on a commercial basis, and Black farmers who own less agricultural land and farm for subsistence and semi-commercial reasons;
  - to that where:
    - Black farmers have more access to agricultural land;
    - Black farmers can become sustainable commercial farmers; and
    - the description and categorisation of farmers would ultimately not be on racial terms.
- **Policy context** theme explores the extent to which prevailing political, economic and socio-cultural events have shaped the policy content (Runhaar et al., 2006: 37). From the point of view of systems thinking, policies do not only emerge through a rational and structured process, but also through the influence on the administrative units of government by the external policy environment and vice versa (Sharkansky, 1975:11-12). The LRAD programme is a product of a negotiated political settlement; as such the contents of the programme, such as its emphasis on market-driven mechanisms and protection of property rights, reflect the influence of the neo-liberal agenda and political compromises of the pre-1994 period. A detailed discussion of these agreements is provided in Chapter 5.

Policy formulation involves possible solutions to problems or needs that have been identified (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:143). Harmon (in Denhardt and Hammond, 1992:51-52) adapts the managerial grid model of Robert Blake to demonstrate the different styles or behaviour adopted by public officials in policy formulation. The style adopted depends
on a combination of two factors, namely responsiveness and advocacy (Harmon in Denhardt & Hammond, 1992:51-52). The rational style involves a high level of responsiveness to predetermined policies from the legislature and the executive and very little advocacy in the form of policy formulation. The proactive style involves a high level of advocacy for new policies by public officials, including facilitating increased access of interest groups to the institutions of government, which enables them to maximise their influence on government policy. In the prescriptive style, public officials are perceived as technical experts who, by virtue of their expertise as well as intimate understanding of problems, must prescribe government policy. The reactive style recognises that public officials have a role in both policy formulation and implementation and that the two stages cannot be separated, however, the extent of their involvement is defined by the contextual issues behind the policy concerned. In the survival style, public officials adopt an incremental approach, which ensures continued survival of their programmes, by limiting access of political authorities and interest groups to their institutions (Harmon in Denhardt & Hammond, 1992:51-52). Public administrators involved in LRAD programme administration are assumed to have adopted a reactive style, which recognises:

- the role that they have played in formulating the contents of the programme;
- the role that they have played in terms of how the programme was implemented; and
- the role that they have continuously played in monitoring, evaluation and further reviews of the contents of the programme.

Solutions might be emanating from the agenda-setting stage, or they may be generated once a problem has reached the attention of government (Kingdon in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:143). The formulation stage also involves eliminating solutions that are considered not technically capable of solving the problem, but also those that are not feasible (Majone, Huitt, Meltsner, Dror & Webber in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:144). Public policy instruments structure public policies and represent the different dimensions through which the policy problem can be solved (Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007:5).
According to Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007:4), it is possible to observe different levels of a policy instrument. The first level is where a *policy instrument* itself is used as a type of institution governing society, examples of which are as follows:

- *statutory or authoritative instruments*, which involve granting permission for certain activities, prohibiting certain types of behaviour or making certain types of behaviour compulsory and are associated with a legalistic type of administration;
- *incentive instruments*, which assume that individuals, groups and organisations will not be motivated to take policy-relevant action unless they are incentivised, coerced, encouraged and influenced through what they perceive to be utility-maximizing tangible pay-offs;
- *capacity instruments*, which assume that there are certain constraints such as lack of information, lack of skills, poor education and lack of resources which prevent individuals, groups and organisations from making decisions or taking action that will lead to the realisation of policy goals; and
- *symbolic instruments*, which assume that individuals, groups and organisations are more likely to take policy-relevant action if there is congruency between the policy objectives and the belief systems of those affected by the policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1990:514-520).

The LRAD programme uses capacity instruments, of which the rationale for their use is that Black farmers:

- lack the information for them to:
  - transact in the property market; and
  - take advantage of the policy offerings made available by the post-1994 Government;
- lack the financial resources to purchase agricultural land;
- lack the skills to:
  - negotiate for land purchase with willing sellers of agricultural land in market-based land transactions;
  - plan their projects adequately; and
  - farm commercially and sustainably.
The second level of policy instrument is a *technique*, which is a device through which the policy instrument becomes operational, examples of which are:

- subsidies;
- standards;
- grants;
- arbitration;
- licensing;
- sanctions;
- education;
- contracts;
- privatisation;
- public corporations;
- quasi-government arrangements; and
- vouchers (Schneider Ingram, 1990:511-512).

The administration of the LRAD programme involves the use of:

- grants (e.g. planning grant, LRAD grant and CASP grant);
- education (e.g. agricultural extension); and
- contracts (e.g. the use of tenders to provide services such as property valuation).

The third level of policy instrument is a *tool*, which is a micro-device located within a technique. This could, for example, refer to specific text within the legislation indicating the types of obligations, the types of sanctions and the types of grants.

The tools approach attempts to match policies and instruments, with the capacity of the policy/instrument interplay to bring about the desired effects in society (Peters, 2000:40). Technical and political constraints faced by a state tend to place a limit on the options that are considered feasible. Substantive and procedural constraints also determine what is considered feasible (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:145).

Policy options differ in the extent to which they offer solutions to problems, with some calling for new and substantial policy change while others involve minor tinkering with existing policies and programmes (Majone in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:146). Some
policy instruments produce different effects depending on whether policy is implemented where government is the main or sole actor, or through a network (Peters, 2000:37). This necessitates continual adjustments to be made to policies in order to make them functional within a political system (Peters, 2000:37). Hall (in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:144) distinguishes between first-order change, whereby only the settings of existing policy instruments are varied, second-order change, which is brought about in the basic instruments used to effect a policy or programme and third-order change, whereby the goals of a policy are altered. The other consideration to make policies much more effective is to use multiple instruments within one policy, which, however, has a negative side-effect in terms of how to manage the policy by co-ordinating the different instruments to ensure effective policy implementation (Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007:5).

3.5.2 Public policy implementation

Implementation entails putting into effect the policy decisions taken during the decision stage and involves change from both organisational and policy perspectives (Slack, 2005:3). The literature on policy implementation went through three stages, namely:

- the era of description;
- the period of identifying factors responsible for effective implementation of policy as well as developing frameworks for implementation; and
- the current discourse on reconciling the divergent views regarding policy implementation frameworks (Ryan, 1999:44-45).

Implementation cannot be delinked from the policy content as well as processes involved in formulating policies (Brynard, 2005:659), hence implementation studies have all along been concerned with why a policy does or does not occur in reality as intended by the authors (Hill, 2003:267; Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002:390). In most cases during policy implementation, old policy objectives are continuously being transformed in line with given resources to implement them, or additional resources are being mobilised to implement old objectives (Brynard & Stone in Fox & Van Rooyen et al., 2004:41). The latter view is consistent with the incremental approach towards policy implementation.
Policy implementation happens at multiple levels, interorganisationally and intraorganisationally. According to Hanekom (in Hanekom & Thornhill, 1995:56-57), implementation of public policy involves:

- The translation of the ideas and intentions of the ruling party into an implementation or executive policy, which sets out the national priorities to be pursued by the government of the day as reflected in the national budget.
- Putting into effect the executive policy by translating it into an administrative policy, which spells out specific arrangements in terms of the organisational structure, income and expenditures, personnel, work procedures and methods, and finally controls necessary to implement the executive policy. Organs of state are empowered in terms of an act of parliament to develop regulations necessary to implement a public policy (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:187).

Ryan (1999: 37) is of the view that the way the means-end rationality as applied to policy implementation, has been influenced mainly by three analytic modes namely:

- the Weberian mode;
- the “rational actor” mode; and
- the “managerialist” mode.

The Weberian mode relied on the logic of a bureaucratic structure, where those in authority of organisations were assumed to have the knowledge to develop means to carry out the mandate of the political principals, as well as the authority to effect uniform implementation of the directives from above (Ryan, 1999:38-39). A policy, according to the Weberian mode and many other studies on policy implementation is regarded as an external stimulus to which public officials must respond (Spillane et al., 2002:391). Public officials are expected to develop a sound and structured implementation process, which serves as a link between theory and outcomes and through which the probability of achieving the outputs and outcomes as conceptualised in the policy content will be increased (Ethridge & Percy, 1993:343).

The process of policy implementation is, however, fraught with problems of balancing democratic principles with the bureaucratic flair of managers (Brynard, 2007:359). This was evidenced in the earlier debates concerning policy implementation models with
regard to top-down and bottom-up approaches (Brynard, 2007:359), which later shifted to an investigation into the reasons why public officials take the course of action they do rather than as expected by decision makers (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:190-191). The question at the core of the debate is what the role of public officials should be in the policy cycle, within a democratic dispensation (Friedrich & Finer in Feldman & Khademian, 2002:542). The majority of studies that perceive a policy as an external stimulus conclude that the reasons why policies do not occur as anticipated are:

- The stimulus is weak in the sense of being ambiguous, as such its poor implementation is a function of the poor wording of the policy (Firestone in Spillane et al., 2002:390-391). In order for public officials to implement a policy, they have to first understand what it means in general (Hill, 2003: 267) and secondly the implications for everyday practical implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky, Van Horn & Van Meter in Hill, 2003:267). Spillane et al. (2002:392-421) discuss from a psychological perspective the cognitive processes involved when public officials interpret public policy.

- The stimulus is not ambiguous, but is interpreted as being inconsistent with the interests and agendas of public officials and the organisations they manage. Poor implementation is attributed, firstly, to failure to notice (i.e. poor interpretation of policy) the relationship between the policy and the organisation’s mission, secondly, to officials giving selective attention or modifying policies to make them fit with the agendas and interests of organisations that they manage, thirdly, to officials simply ignoring these policies (Firestone in Spillane et al., 2002:390-391) and fourthly, to officials blocking the flow of political, financial, managerial and technical resources with respect to policies they are opposed to (Brynard, 2007:36).

- The stimulus is not ambiguous, but public officials are rational and utility-maximising actors who through corrupt practices capture political, managerial, financial and technical resources to promote their self-interests rather than the policies they are supposed to implement (Sajid in Brynard, 2007:360).
The above-mentioned interpretive ability of policy implementers is consistent with symbolic interactionism (Denzin, 1969:923-924; Sandfort, 2000:741-742; Sewell, 1992:4-21), which posits that:

- human beings live in an environment that does not have any intrinsic meaning and an inherent structure;
- the meaning attached to objects (i.e. an event around which to organise social action, such as a public policy) and the social structures that people create are constructed in a group or interactional perspective (such as in government departments);
- in the process of creating social meaning, people develop a social structure, which is composed of:
  - ‘schemas’, defined as the “generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social life” (Giddens in Sewell, 1992:8), that can be applied in a variety of contexts, of which in the organisational context can refer to the beliefs, knowledge and practices shared by all staff in terms of how policy should be implemented; and
  - the human resources (e.g. physical strength, dexterity, knowledge and emotional commitment) as well as non-human resources (e.g. physical, financial, managerial, technical and political resources), both of which “…are media of power and are unevenly distributed” (Sewell, 1992:9-10);
- there is duality of action between ‘generalizable procedures’ and resources (Sewell, 1992:12-26) in that:
  - the social structure enables and constrains action;
  - human beings are social agents capable of creating and transforming social structures, which structures also enable and constrain social action;
  - generalisable procedures can result in asymmetrical accumulation of resources (e.g. with some people becoming more informed and knowledgeable about the ‘generalisable procedures’), and can have a determining influence in terms of what resources to mobilise to effect social action (e.g. who should be consulted to interpret a policy); and
  - the pace and direction by which the generalisable procedures are transformed depend on the distribution of resources over time and space;
the social structures are a product of a process of inter-subjective meaning-making, and as such will continuously be negotiated, re-negotiated, and transformed; and

in the context of public policy, public officials develop a social structure for policy implementation which may not be consistent with management mandate or official rules but is manifested in the practices which they undertake as well as the meanings they attach to these practices (Sandfort, 2000:742), and which structure they internalise, institutionalise and transform by constantly negotiating and renegotiating its meaning depending on factors such as the content of the policy, the ambiguous nature of the policy and availability as well as distribution of resources.

Public officials thus exercise their will in terms of interpreting the policy implementation process, which can turn policy implementation into “...a political process that is concerned with who gets what, when, how, where, and from whom”, and not simply a managerial or administrative problem of transforming policy ideals into policy outputs (Brynard & Stone in Fox & Van Rooyen, 2004:39). In terms of the principal-agent theory, among the problems affecting implementation are such issues as indirect control by politicians of public officials who have too much discretionary power (Box, 1999:28; Brynard, 2009:564), and the fact that most policies are implemented in a complex intergovernmental context thus requiring intergovernmental co-ordinating mechanisms to be put in place (Brynard, 2009:565; Campbell and Szabolowski, Mayntz, Rogers & Whetton in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:191). Lipsky (in Dicke, 2004:233) argues that public officials operate in an environment that is too complex to be reduced to programmed decisions, and as such, argues for much discretion to be granted to public officials to perform their duties. According to Carrington (2005:143), there is no universally accepted definition of discretion; however it contains two fundamental characteristics, namely:

- the freedom that the decision-maker has to choose between two or more courses of action; and
- the freedom to choose whether to act or not based on one’s judgement or existing rules.
Arguments in favour of discretion (Appleby, Bohte & Meier, Denhardt, Gulick, Locke & Bryner, Ranson & Stewart, Rumgay & Brewster, Scott, Stone, Wilson in Carrington, 2005:143-145) are that policies cannot anticipate all eventualities and are at times vague, an issue already raised by Simon (in Parsons, 2003:278) with his idea of bounded rationality, and that due to limited resources improvisation is required.

Arguments against the exercise of discretion (Bryner, Forsyth, Keiser & Soss, Keiser, Lipsky, Reiman, Rohr, Scott, Wilson in Carrington, 2005:146-147) are that:

- accountability and democracy might be compromised, a concern also raised by Harold Laski (in Im, 2001:104);
- discretionary decisions might be *ultra vires*;
- it might result in arbitrariness whereby different standards would be applied to different citizens; and
- due to the decline of financial resources, public officials might tread into the domain of politics when rationalising about ‘who gets what’.

According to Herring (in Shafritz & Hyde, 1992:75), during policy implementation, public officials are given wider discretion within the delimitations set by legislative principles, to interpret the purpose intended by the legislators (which in most instances is a product of political compromise), and to provide details in the form of regulations in terms of how legislation can be implemented. Although the role of public officials in policy implementation is not to determine the policy content, they are nevertheless drawn deep into the process of policy development in terms of interpreting how policies should be implemented. Policy implementation also entails engaging in a political process of reconciling rights, privileges and interests between interest groups, which makes them to lose their ‘political neutrality’ within the politics and administration continuum. In carrying out their duties, public officials would inevitably bestow benefits to some groups and individuals and deny others (Johnson, 1996:3).

A number of scholars (Fesler, 1980:4; Feldman & Khademian, 2002:542; Nzwei & Kuye, 2007:196) have argued that public officials do play a role in the entire policy process, but that their involvement should be confined within and guided by the values and goals of political principals. In carrying out their functions, public officials must remain vigilant and committed to detect any shortcomings (dysfunctional situation) that impact negatively on
the achievement of policy objectives of government, as well as raise them with the relevant legislature by way of policy proposals (Cloete, 1998:80). Feldman & Khademian (2002:542) argue that due to the expertise of public administrators they should play such an important role, and by doing so contribute towards attainment of democratic ideals for which political principals aspire to achieve. Nzwei & Kuye (2007: 200) emphasise the role that public officials do and can play in the policy domains within developmental states.

The almost 300 variables that have been identified to be the cause for why or why not effective implementation occurs (Hill, 2003:267), converge around five critical explanatory variables (Brynard and Stone in Fox & Van Rooyen, 2004:39; Hill, 2003:267; Spillane et al., 2002:389-390). These five interlinked variables, also known as the 5C protocol (Brynard & Stone in Fox & Van Rooyen, 2004:39), are as follows:

- The content of the policy, which includes:
  - policy goals;
  - the causal theory; and
  - methods/instruments used to implement the policy (Brynard, 2005:659).

- The institutional context or corridor through which policy must travel and by whose boundaries it is limited in the process of implementation. An organisation is part or sub-set of a larger social, economic, political and legal context or system, which can and does influence the implementation process (Brynard, 2005:659).

- The commitment of those entrusted with implementing the policy at various levels. Commitment refers to “an ability to maintain the focus on an initiative from its inception through to its delivery” (Brynard, 2009:561). The challenge of ensuring commitment by front line public officials is an issue common to all public organisations, and which requires managers to employ leadership skills (Riccucci, Meyers, Lurie, & Han, 2004:438). The other view to ensuring cascading of commitment from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy is that political backing or the exercise of political will is required (Brynard, 2009:561).

- The administrative capacity in the form of structural, technical ability, as well as organisational culture to carry out the changes demanded of it (Brynard, 2005:660). An organisation’s administrative capacity is influenced by its ability to
adjust in relation to the dimensions affecting administrative capacity, chief of which are public interest, participation in the local economy (economic dimension), and the available systems and tools that enhance or constrain public managers from achieving operating effectiveness (Wise, Sinclair & Amna, 1996:155).

- The support of clients and coalitions whose interests are enhanced or threatened by the policy (Brynard, 2005:661). Clients can also take part in policy implementation through co-production during the policy implementation process (O’Toole, 2000:266). The management and delivery of services are no longer the preserve of professionals and managerial staff (Bovaird, 2005:222), as such professionals and managerial staff have to trust the service users by giving them the room to make certain decisions and set key behaviours that are instrumental in initiating the service delivery process (Barnes, Marilyn, Harrison, Steve, Mort, Maggie, Shardlow, Polly & Wistow, Gerald in Bovaird, 2005:222).

### 3.6 ORGANISING FOR POLICY ADMINISTRATION

Organising consists of “classifying and grouping functions as well as allocating the groups of functions to institutions and workers in an orderly pattern so that everything the workers do will be aimed at achieving predetermined objectives” (Cloete, 1994:124). In classifying, grouping and allocating functions, the above definition deals with the activities involved in:

- constituting administrative executive institutions;
- allocating and distributing functions and power between the spheres of government; and
- determining the organisational structures of government institutions.

#### 3.6.1 The bureaucratic form of organisation

The definition by Cloete (1994:124) has similarities with the analytic model of bureaucratic organisation as described by Olsen (2006: 3), whereby an organisation is viewed in instrumental terms (i.e. efficient and effective execution of predetermined objectives, commands and orders from higher echelons in the administrative hierarchy). The political values and preferences of voters are translated into laws and regulations,
which are implemented and enforced by public officials (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005:201). Heywood (in Jordan, Wurzel & Zito, 2005:481) considers the following as the core functions of government:

- the ability to make law (legislation);
- the ability to implement law (execution); and
- the ability to interpret law (adjudication).

Government is typically associated with bureaucracy, legislation, financial control, regulation and force (Richards and Smith in Jordan et al., 2005:481), a system typical of command and control implemented within multi-level hierarchal organisations. Government must, within the context and limits of the enabling legislation, act on behalf of its legislature by issuing directives to the administrators/executives subordinate to it, to give effect to the provisions of the legislation (Cloete, 1998:59). Government also exercises control over directives given by ensuring that they were carried out in an economical, effective and efficient manner. According to Cloete (1998:59-60) governmental institutions must also perform the following functions on behalf of the legislature:

- make policy proposals (Bills) to enact new legislation or amend existing ones;
- make estimates of income and expenditure for the state departments or state institutions for approval by the legislature, in order for the administrative executives to carry out their assigned mandates; and
- submit reports to inform the legislature about the extent to which policies and programmes of government have been implemented by the administrative executives.

According to Olsen (2006: 2), the term *bureaucracy* could refer to the following:

- a *bureau* or *office*, which is a distinct organisational setting and which is “…formalized, hierarchical, specialized with a clear functional division of labour and demarcation of jurisdiction, standardized, rule based, and impersonal”;
- a *bureaucracy*, which refers to appointed, salary-dependent, professional, full-time administrative staff characterised by long-term employment contractual relations with the employer, and who are rewarded on the basis of “formal education, merit, and tenure”; and
• a **bureaucracy**, which is a normative hierarchical organisational structure founded on authority derived from legitimate, rational-legal political order which gives the state the power to “…define and enforce the legal order”.

The reference to rational does not connote rationalism but rather the authoritative ordering and structuring of the affairs of society by means of rules and regulations (Marais, 1991:231). The binding authority of the state can be claimed in the following hierarchical relationships (Olsen (2006:3):

  - between citizens and elected representatives;
  - between the legislature and government institutions;
  - within government institutions (e.g. authority relations between managers and staff); and
  - between government institutions and citizens (as subjects of the law).

The third description pertaining to the binding authority of the state as discussed above is consistent with the traditional, classic and top-down form where bureaucracy is viewed either as an ideal-type (i.e. ultimate form of bureaucracy when viewed as a continuum of different forms of bureaucracy that can exist, and not the idealised form) bureaucracy or in institutional terms as described by Olsen (2006:3). The ideal-type analytical model of bureaucratic organisation developed by Weber came about not because Weber had a particular interest in the civil service (Marais, 1991:231). Though Weber did not study the civil service of the time, the civil service presented Weber with an ideal platform to exemplify his concept of legal-rational authority. According to Weber (Marais, 1991:232), the concept of legal-rational authority occupies a lower status than traditional and charismatic authority and could be exemplified as an instrument of societal domination (Marais, 1991:231). According to Shafritz & Hyde (1992:41), Weber extrapolated from the real world the key features which, when all of them are present, should constitute an ideal type bureaucracy in its mature stage. **Bureaucratisation**, which refers to “the emergence and growth of bureaucratic forms and not the perversions and illegitimate extension of the power to bureaucrats” (Olsen, 2006:3), becomes manifest due to the fact that bureaucracy as practice (e.g. public administration) approximates (i.e. is not fully developed) the ideal-type bureaucracy as visualised by Weber (Olsen, 2006:4).
Shafritz & Hyde (1992:41) suggest that where some features are absent or not fully developed in a given organisation, this does not nullify it from being called a bureaucracy, and that this should rather be construed as an immature form of bureaucracy. An ideal type therefore does not represent the best form of bureaucracy as viewed from a normative point of view, but rather one that is fully developed (Rosenbloom et al., 1994:1). In terms of organising and efficiency, Weber prescribed a hierarchical arrangement characterised by a formalised structure of superior and subordinate relationships. The formalised structure spelt out in a top-down fashion clear jurisdictional areas in terms of duties to be performed, as well as a differentiated system of authority scaled down to the lowest level of management, with delimitations to prevent the arbitrary exercise of authority (Shafritz & Hyde, 1992:51).

The conduct of duties by employees, whose appointments into these organisations were based on expertise (Weber in Shafritz & Hyde, 1992:52-53), was structured by rules and regulations, which had an effect of:

- predetermining and categorising the situations which they had to deal with;
- prescribing and programming their response to the various categories of situations, thereby reducing room for arbitrary decisions, which can impinge on the rights of the subordinates as well as members of the public;
- making employees to be as impartial as possible, and whose true measure of efficiency was the effective implementation of the rules, irrespective of whether the situation at hand demands of them to act otherwise, which Weber (in Shafritz & Hyde, 1992:53) referred to as “loyalty devoted to impersonal and functional purposes”; and
- reducing communication and interaction among employees at the workplace only to those issues prescribed by regulations, resulting in the reduction of friction as a result of peripheral and personal issues encroaching onto the operations of the organisation (Merton in Shafritz & Hyde, 1992:101).

Bureaucracy in institutional terms is underlined by the normative principles and societal values that define the raison d’être, organisational form and administrative behaviour underlying public service organisations (Olsen, 2006:3). These normative values are “part of society's long term commitment to a Rechtsstaat and procedural rationality for coping with conflicts and power differentials” (Olsen, 2006:3). Though the policy
outcomes reached are important, more emphasis is put on whether procedural issues of
erationality and administrative justice were observed in reaching the outcome (Olsen,
2006:3).

Administrative behaviour is thus governed by:

- observance of the constitutional principles and the rule of law;
- ensuring that due process is followed;
- adherence to codes of appropriate behaviour;
- adherence to professional standards; and
- the existence of a system of procedures based on rational reasons of cause and
effect.

3.6.2 The organisational structure of government

Each state has an organisational structure which places the legislative institutions above
political executive institutions (e.g. the national government, or in the context of a
province the provincial government), and the political executive above administrative
executives (i.e. heads of department) (Cloete, 1998:59). The legislature is responsible
for approval of policy, which gives effect to the actions of the political and administrative
executives (Cloete, 1998:85). The functional activities cannot be undertaken unless
policy has been approved to state that:

- a particular function would be carried out by the state;
- an organisation has been created to carry out the functions;
- funds have been approved to carry out the function/s;
- procedural guidelines and methods for executing work have been developed;
- procedures for recruitment and retention of personnel have been approved; and
- control measures have been developed to ensure that policy objectives are
achieved (Cloete, 1998:85).

When designing an organisational structure of government in a democratic state, the
question of the merits and demerits of centralisation and decentralisation arises. *Administrative decentralisation* is defined as the transfer of authority in public planning,
management and decision-making from national to sub-national levels of government
(Work, 2002:5; Pillay, McCoy & Asia, 2001:2). A discussion of decentralisation is also a
discussion of governance structures, and as Feldman and Khademian (2002:544) observe, governance is about how interactions or relationships are structured. The constitution of a country (i.e. with specific reference to a federal type of organisational arrangement) sets limits and provides guidelines in terms of:

- the rationale for centralisation and decentralisation;
- the functional responsibilities of each sphere of government;
- the management of concurrent functions; and
- the management of dispute between government institutions.

The arguments in favour of decentralisation are as follows:

- **Improved allocative efficiency:**
  It is argued that when decisions are taken closer to the people who receive government services, such decisions are more likely to reflect and respond to their needs (Akin, Hutchinson, & Strumpf, 2001:1; Campos-Outcalt, Kewa & Thomason, 1995:1091; Faguet, 2000:128; Faguet, 2003:2). The policy choices taken in a central government will not yield the ideal outcomes because public officials would be far removed from the problems needing the attention of policymakers (Faguet, 2000:128).

- **Improved governance:**
  Government activities, which became a common feature of many countries after colonialism, are perceived to be ill-informed about the needs of people (as a result of being far removed from where services are supposed to be delivered) (Faguet, 2003:2). By bringing government closer to the people, this will improve people’s participation in the processes of government thereby improving the governance of policies and programmes (Smoke, 2003:9).

- **Improved equity:**
  It is argued that by bringing functions and resources closer to the people, as well as the decision-making power, government would be able to do a better job of targeting poverty alleviation, by distributing and redistributing public resources in an equitable manner (Smoke, 2003:9).
Arguments in favour of centralisation include the following:

- Some functions have to be centralised, in particular to ensure that national standards and norms as well as international conventions are adhered to (Shah, 1994:11; Smoke, 2003:10).
- Decentralisation may cause disparities between communities and regions with weak organisational capacity, which can result in development initiatives being hijacked by elites to further their own ends (Faguet, 2000:130; Smoke, 2003:10).

The different forms in which decentralisation can become manifest depend on whether political or administrative power and decision-making, or both, are transferred to sub-national governments or spheres of government. These different forms, namely deconcentration, delegation and devolution, have been ably described by various authors (Manor, 2003:1; Hicks in Klugman, 1994:5; Mills in Kawonga, 2004:1). Fesler (in Hutchcroft, 2001:31) argues that administrative systems be judged on a comparative basis with respect to decentralisation along the centralisation-decentralisation continuum, but cautions that both extremes of the continuum do not exist in reality since a state cannot completely centralise without risking compromising its capacity to render services, and that neither can it completely decentralise without risking complete withering of the state (Migdal in Luiz, 2000:230). In this context, administrative systems are in comparative perspective, “either more or less centralised or more of less decentralised” (Hutchcroft, 2001:31). The degree of decentralisation is manifested first by the extent to which certain functional responsibilities, financial and other resources are allocated to lower spheres of government, and secondly by the extent to which decisions pertaining to the execution of functions as well as the acquisition, utilisation and management of resources assigned to lower spheres of government are decentralised too (Stegarescu, n.d:2).

Administrative decentralisation can be manifested as follows:

Delegation of authority:

_Delegation_ refers to “…assignment of specific decision making authority - i.e. the transfer of managerial responsibility for specifically defined functions to public organizations (e.g. parastatals) outside the normal bureaucratic structure of central_
government” (Rondinelli in Klugman, 1994:4). The institutions to which decision-making authority has been assigned receive a portion of/or their full budget from central government, and have to account to a national department for the execution of functions assigned to them, as well as the utilisation of resources.

**Devolution of power:**

*Devolution* refers to the “…transfer of responsibility for governing, understood more broadly - i.e. the creation or strengthening, financially or legally, of sub-national units of governments, whose activities are substantially outside the direct control of central government” (Rondinelli in Klugman, 1994:4). Devolution involves much more extensive transfer of authority to lower level government structures, and usually involves recognition of the corporate or legal status of the entity in the constitution of a country in its own right, and in relation to other entities within a federal system of government (Hutchcroft, 2001:30).

**Deconcentration of power:**

*Deconcentration* refers to the transfer of administrative powers, and sometimes administrative personnel, from higher to lower levels in political systems (Manor, 2003:1). *Deconcentration* is also defined as “shifting power from central offices to peripheral offices of the same administrative structure” (Bossert in Pillay et al., 2001:3). Hutchcroft’s (2001:30) definition is consistent with the above definitions, but instead of emphasis on power, puts emphasis on the intraorganisational transfer of “particular functions” and “workloads” to regional or local offices. According to Hutchcroft (2001:30), the central transferring office retains the bulk of the authority for the development of policies, irrespective of whether implementation of policy and discretion in terms of which it has to be implemented has been granted to lower-level offices.

**Fiscal de-centralisation:**

Manor (2003:1) defines *fiscal decentralisation* as “the transfer of funds and/or tax raising powers from higher levels to lower levels in political systems”. The transfer of authority to lower levels (in terms of the above-mentioned forms of decentralisation) to provide
services or execute certain functions derived from the constitution is characterised by the following:

- it is accompanied by decentralisation to utilise financial resources;
- the authority to raise own revenue may or may not form part of decentralisation;
- the fiscal distribution from national government is usually conditional in nature; and
- tax equalisation, whereby the burden of raising revenue to finance equitable distribution (i.e. where poorer regions get relatively more funds) to all areas falls disproportionately on those areas that are better off (Boadway, 2001:93).

The interdependency between national government and other spheres of government pertaining to redistribution and allocation of resources needs to be managed in such a way that the disadvantages of decentralisation as discussed above are minimised (Boadway, 2001:94). In addition, the following adverse effects can materialise if the interdependency relationship is not managed well (Boadway, 2001:95-96):

- negative fiscal inefficiencies, caused by the differential capacity to provide public services at comparable tax rates, causing households and businesses to relocate to areas where they believe they will receive better net fiscal benefits; and
- fiscal inequity, whereby, due to the above-mentioned problem of differential capacity, there would be inequitable treatment of citizens whereby some would receive better quality and quantity of public services when compared with others.

The structures and bureaucratic systems of government are not self-implementing. They are being brought to life, managed and implemented by human beings. The brief discussion that follows provides the contributions made by a number of scholars in terms of understanding the role of human behaviour in organisations.

### 3.6.3 Alternative views to understanding human behaviour in organisations

A number of scholars from the social and psychological perspectives have provided alternative views, and which tend to contradict (directly or indirectly) the structural, hierarchical, and top-down authority based assumptions made by exponents of the bureaucratic form of organising (Nyhan, 2000:87).
Robbins (1980:40-45) gives a summary of the contributions as follows:

*The human relations movement*:
- that group behaviour has an influence on individual worker behaviour;
- that group standards impact on the output of individual workers; and
- that money does not have much impact on the output of the individual worker.

*Decision science movement*:
- that decision-making is part and parcel of all administrative processes; as such optimisation models and tools were developed to enhance decision-making by rationally bounded public officials.

*Behavioural movement*:
- that the generic principles contradict one another, as such contingency management should thus be adopted to decide on the conditions that should guide certain management decisions;
- that informal organisations have a role in the attainment of organisational goals;
- that individual goals can be integrated into organisational goals; and
- that an employee must be consulted by managers in planning and implementing their work hence the concept participatory management.

*Organisational-humanist movement*:
- that a more humanistic and democratic form of management at the workplace is required.

*Systems movement*:
- that an organisation should be viewed internally as a system that receives inputs, processes them and converts them into outputs; and
- that when viewed from an external point of view, organisations are sub-systems of a larger system, which provides it with inputs, while the organisation also produces outputs, which also serve as inputs to other organisations.

The above viewpoints put an emphasis on how managers should manage their employees and organisations to improve on the probability of achieving policy outputs. The administrative reforms undertaken by a number of countries assumed a managerial approach to the provision of public services. These interventionist measures were adopted because of the conviction by their exponents that the traditional bureaucratic
form of government is inefficient, wasteful, and do not lead to effective achievement of policy goals. These reforms are collectively referred to as New Public Management.

3.6.4 The New Public Management

A number of public sector reforms undertaken in several countries (e.g. United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada) have been codified as ‘New Public Management’ by scholars of Public Administration and Public Management (Box, 1999:21; Carstens & Thornhill, 2000:177; Dunleavy & Hood, 1994:9; Kaboolian, 1998:189). Reform refers to “the process or procedure of becoming better by removing or abandoning imperfections, faults and errors” (Thornhill in Carstens & Thornhill, 2000:178). New Public Management generally refers to reform measures to reorganise the public service by bringing it closer to the private sector in terms of:

- management practices;
- reporting; and
- accounting (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994:9).

According to critics of the New Public Management, the malfunctions of bureaucracies are:

- inefficiency;
- ineffectiveness;
- high costs; and
- the self-serving behaviour of bureaucrats.

The idea of post-bureaucratic organisations was bandied around by those who predicted the demise of bureaucratic organisations (Hodgson, 2004:83; Kernaghan, 2000:92). Public choice theorists viewed decision-making within organisations as a rational process where a ‘self-interested’ man would adopt maximisation strategies (Ostrom & Ostrom in Rosenbloom et al., 1994:23). Maximisation implies consistent choice of strategies that would yield the highest benefits in terms of own preferences (Ostrom & Ostrom in Rosenbloom et al., 1994:23). Public choice theorists argue that government officials are rational beings, but who pursue the maximisation of self-interest, thus contributing to inefficiency and ineffectiveness in government (McCurdy, 1986:44). Organisational performance cannot therefore be achieved through administrative
reforms initiated by officials themselves, but by employing incentives similar to those used in the competition model in order to bring about change (McCurdy, 1986:44).

Douglas (in Dunleavy & Hood, 1994:9) identifies two key aspects of reorganising the public service, which the New Public Management approach attempts to achieve, namely:

- to reduce the distinctive features of public service organisations as opposed to private sector organisations pertaining to:
  - personnel management;
  - reward structure; and
  - general management;
- to reduce the level of formalisation and standardisation, which limits discretionary powers of managers, particularly around issues of:
  - appointment and management of staff;
  - contracts in general; and
  - acquisition and management of funds.

The administrative reforms have in many instances changed the way in which the public sector works by creating a three-way split of functions namely:

*The policy development function:* This function is carried out by political office-bearers who are in charge of development of macro-policies and resource allocation. The separation of politics from administration in a way resuscitates the politics and administration dichotomy in its assumption that by removing administrators from the strife, rigour and potential distractions of policy-making, efficiency and effectiveness will be achieved (Manning, 2001:299)

*The commissioning function:* This function is carried out by public officials within government departments who have to ensure that the macro-policies are implemented. Their tenure of office as well as performance management is contract based (Christensen & Laegreid, 2001:79) and is informed by the underlying assumptions behind the principal-agent theory (Box, 1999:28).
However, performance contracts can promote:

- the ‘check-list mentality’, i.e. the attitude whereby if public managers are of the view that certain responsibilities do not form part of their performance targets, they will not perform even though such responsibilities are critical for promoting the general welfare of society; and

- the pursuit of self-interest, i.e. pursuit of individual or organisational performance targets which are incentive based, at the expense of collective interest, e.g. failure to co-operate with other officials or organisations for the joint achievement of collective objectives of government (Christensen & Laegreid, 2001:86).

Public officials develop specifications, negotiate, enter into and manage contracts with service providers. Government's role is to create competition internally and externally in the supply of public services (Warner & Hefetz, 2008:156).

*The provision of services function:* Box (1999:31) draws a distinction between provision and production of public services, with *provision* relating to a policy decision made by elected representatives whether a service should be provided by government, and if the answer is yes, *production* refers to how such a service should be delivered to the public.

Martin (2000:216-222), reflecting on the implementation of the best value regime in the United Kingdom, outlines four methods by which the provision and production of services can take place:

- In-house provision by government departments: The focus is on incremental improvements in the quality and/or cost-effectiveness of the service being provided, by using service-based performance indicators or benchmarking against other departments that provide the same service.
- Provision of services through market mechanisms: Government departments procure services from the market via tender systems, with the aim of either reducing the cost of public services or bringing capital
injection through public-private partnerships for services that government does not have sufficient funds (Grimshaw, Vincent & Willmott, 2002:476). The provision of services through market mechanisms also involves creation of quasi-governmental institutions that compete with private sector entities through the tender systems for the right to deliver public services (Manning, 2001:299).

- Provision of services based on cross-cutting issues and common clients: The provision of services is structured around common or cross-cutting policy issues as well as those targeting specific clients, e.g. services targeting women, youth and disabled people. This method requires the clustering of services, as well as the application of methods to better co-ordinate functions which are carried across organisational boundaries.

- Provision of integrated services to specific communities: Local communities are given the power e.g. through ward councillors, to design a menu of services by prioritising those that are important to them, including how they should be implemented. The planning and implementation of these integrated public services require cross-cutting service teams from governmental institutions to assist communities, which again pose a challenge of co-ordination.

The criticisms against New Public Management are as follows:

- Where the all-or-nothing approach or complete outsourcing is pursued, there is a danger that public services might not be delivered should the contract fail (Warner & Hefetz, 2008:157-158). To mitigate against this potential risk, Warner & Hefetz (2008:157-158) support the notion of a mixed service delivery, which ensures that government develops internal capacity to be a player in the market for delivery of public services to ensure a fail-safe delivery.

- Privatisation has high transaction costs associated with developing and monitoring contracts (Kavanagh & Parker, Sclar in Warner & Hefetz, 2008:157; Walsh & Davis in Enwistle & Martin, 2005:234).
In explaining transaction costs, Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke (2006:326) distinguish between:

- asset-specific services, which are highly specialised investments that cannot be used for other organisational activities or marketed to other service purchasers; and
- ease of measurement services, which are easily measurable in terms of output, outcome, quality and quantity.

Since there would be few service providers willing to invest in asset-specific services, contracting on these services can leave government with only one service provider retaining the monopoly to render such services. This situation can be exploited by increasing the price and lowering the quality of services provided, resulting in high transaction costs for government (Brown et al., 2006:326). Contracting for difficult-to-measure services leaves government vulnerable to service providers’ exploitation of the information gap by varying the quality and quantity of services provided, with the result that putting more effort and resources into managing these difficult-to-measure contracts increases transaction costs (Brown et al., 2006:326).

Giving citizens a voice and continual involvement in the service delivery process is critical for effective delivery of public services (Crocker, Denhardt & Denhardt, Mintrom, Osborne & Pla.nick, Potapchuck, Schechter in Warner & Hefetz, 2008:157). However, market delivery, which treats citizens as clients, does not sufficiently give citizens a voice in the service delivery process (Warner & Hefetz, 2008:161). The norms borrowed from the private sector by exponents of New Public Management are at odds with the values of “democratic politics and administration” as epitomised by “accountability, citizen participation, open policy-making processes, and stewardship” (Terry in Box, 1999:33).

New Public Management is a double-edged sword which creates a paradox by prescribing for both centralisation and decentralisation of power, in that politicians as agents of the public must be given more power to control public officials, while at the same time it is argued that for public officials to perform their work efficiently, they need to be free from political interference and given administrative discretion (Christensen & Laegreid, 2001:78). By granting public officials too much administrative discretion and flexibility to apply their entrepreneurial flair in deciding how funds should be utilised for
the achievement of public goals, the accountability relationship between the public and political office bearers, as well as between public officials and political office-bearers could be undermined (Box, 1999:35).

By assuming that citizens would vote with their feet to indicate the types, quality and quantity of services they want, New Public Management relies on the use of market forces to ensure accountability (Kaboolian, 1998:191). Though the market value of efficiency is desired, the application of private sector-derived entrepreneurial techniques runs the risk of:

- turning public officials into independent actors separated from the public whom they serve as well as the political officials to whom they are accountable;
- turning public officials into actors whose values are not sympathetic to and driven by the public interest;
- going against the public service value of equal treatment of citizens because efficiency, cost recovery and profit maximisation are pursued, with the resultant marginalisation of the resource-poor ‘customers’, who are the primary concern of most government programmes; and
- yielding policy outcomes that were not anticipated (Box, 1999:35).

In spite of criticisms of the bureaucratic forms of organising, it has endured not so much as a result of its academic correctness, but due to the apparent benefits it offers those who find themselves secure within its prescriptions (Thornhill, 2006:798). Different states thus continue to adopt the bureaucratic form of organising, and many government functions remain performed by vertically integrated bureaucratic organisations (Manning, 2001:300). The following section further considers the different forms through which the administration of public policy can be organised.

### 3.6.5 Governance

The definition of governance takes on a number of different meanings, depending on the types of actors involved (Driesen in Runhaar, et al., 2006:35). According to Jordan et al. (2005:478), the term *governance* has a much wider appeal than the narrow term of *government*, since it covers a whole range of institutions and relationships that are involved in the process of governing. The central question at the core of governance is
how can government agencies, programmes and activities be organised and managed such that public purposes are achieved (Heinrich & Lynn, 2000:1).

Osborne and Gaebler (in Jordan et al., 2005:480) distinguish between steering (setting policy goals) and rowing (achieving policy goals through the selection and use of policy instruments). The word steer (a person) is defined as “to guide; lead”; whereas row (of the boat) is defined as “to be moved by the use of oars” or “to cause [a boat] to move by the use of oars” (The World Book Dictionary, 1993). Steering involves identification of, as well as leading or guiding towards a destination. Governance in this context is an output or outcome-based activity measured in substantive terms of end results, such as the indicators of governance (Olowu & Sako, 2002:15). Rowing involves the structural mechanisms and processes involved in activating and sustaining action towards a destination. Governance in this context is perceived as a dynamic process involving the interrelationship between a number of factors which affect the achievement of an output or outcome (Olowu & Sako, 2002:15).

According to Jordan et al. (2005:480-481), to understand the meaning of the terms in relation to each other, government and governance can be placed along a continuum, with one extreme end representing government, which represents much state involvement in steering and rowing, and on the other extreme end being governance, which symbolises much control by civil society and other economic actors in steering and rowing.

Governance is first perceived as the “regimes of laws, administrative rules, judicial rulings, and practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable government activity” (Heinrich & Lynn, 2000:4). Governance, according to this definition, is an end in itself, since it represents a culmination of a process, which translates competing societal values into operational guidelines for setting and implementing government policy priorities.

The constitutive aspect of governance deals more with substantive issues of rule-making at a political level, in terms of:

- determining the rules of engagement between various structures of society;
• determining the form of the political system and by extension, that of public administration;
• defining the role of the legislature as both the legislative and oversight body of government;
• determining the functions of the political executive as well as parameters within which it should go about exercising the power of the state;
• determining the role of the judiciary as the independent body responsible for interpreting and enforcing government legislation, as well as developing and maintaining standards for administrative justice; and
• establishing mechanisms for articulation and reconciliation of divergent societal values.

Within the development debate, the constitutive side is seen as an independent or explanatory variable for development (Hyden & Court in Olowu & Sako, 2002:19). International development agencies have coined the term *good governance*, which is equated to and seen to symbolise values of liberal democratic Western societies (Janning in Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004:144-145; Hyden & Court in Olowu & Sako, 2002:25). The concept of *good governance*, which is linked to the World Bank’s involvement in sub-Saharan Africa (Kooiman, 1999:71), “…marries the new public management to the advocacy of liberal democracy” (Rhodes in Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004:145). The presence of features of liberal democratic values within a political system and thus perceived as good governance, has not found universal acceptance, especially in countries with different societal values from those found in Western societies (Hyden & Court in Olowu & Sako, 2002:25). An alternative approach has therefore been the adoption of a human rights approach to symbolise good governance (Hyden & Court in Olowu & Sako, 2002:25).

The human rights approach places emphasis on values that promote human development, namely:
• that citizens or people are at the centre of all government development efforts, such as, for example, land redistribution;
• that poor people should not just be treated as beneficiaries of benevolent charity programmes of the rich, but as people who are entitled to a decent standard of living; and
that how people are governed is as important as the outcomes of development itself (Hyden & Court in Olowu & Sako, 2002:25).

In the context of public policy formulation and implementation, governance implies “an arrangement or configuration of distinct but interrelated elements in the form of: statutes, including policy mandates; organizational, financial, and programmatic structures; resource levels; administrative rules and norms - that constrains and enables the tasks, priorities, and values that are incorporated into regulatory, service production, and service delivery processes” (Heinrich & Lynn, 2000:4). A given configuration of factors induces public programmes and performance of government institutions, as well as mediates the effects of particular strategies undertaken to bring about specific changes in society (Heinrich & Lynn, 2000:5). This is achieved through a process which distributes resources and responsibilities, and links the objectives of various stakeholders, established and concretised through the legislative process, with the operational activities within government agencies to produce specific outputs and outcomes (Heinrich & Lynn, 2000:4).

A configuration of factors within the political and administrative system of government:
- represents a complex pattern or structure of interaction;
- is subject to the dynamic forces at play, which seek to induce change or bring about stability; and
- emphasises the goals, intentions, powers, opportunities and responsibilities of the individual actors (micro-level), organisations and management (meso-level) and states or provinces (macro-level) interacting within a hierarchical system of systems within systems (Kooiman, 1994:40-41).

Interaction represents the dynamic forces that operate within society, and consists of three elements, namely action level, structural level and the level (micro-, meso-, and macro-) where the interaction between different units in a system takes place (Kooiman, 1994:38). Interaction can become manifest in three forms as interference, interplay and intervention (Kooiman, 1994: 38). Interference is basic to all forms of natural and social life and within the context of social life, is concerned with the processes, structures and human dynamics whose purpose it is to bring order within a complex system of human interactions at the level of a community (Kooiman, 1994:38). Through institutional
analysis, often referred to as ‘new institutionalism’, scientists are able to gain better insight into how individuals, communities, organisations and societies develop rules which structure relationships into rule-based ones (Sawyer in Akinola, 2007:224).

Interplay represents more organised interactions of a mutually beneficial nature, which takes place in formal structures (Kooiman, 1994:38), an example of which is the interorganisational, government with society or network approach. Society as a system of human interaction and co-operation must develop institutional arrangements to ensure collective action, sustained livelihoods and survival (Akinola, 2007:225). Institutions, which interpret the rules or prescriptions that humans develop in order to organise and co-ordinate “…all forms of repetitive and structured interactions” (Akinola, 2007:224, Powell & Di Maggio in Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007:8), must be constantly reviewed against the consequences which they produce. They should as well be harmonised with each other. Institutions come into being due to a need to deal with exogenous variables impacting on the group, community, society and organisations (Akinola, 2007:225). Participants interacting within rule-bound settings are confronted with choices about strategies and actions to take in order to deal with exogenous variables, and with each choice follow certain consequences (Akinola, 2007:224).

Governance can generally be perceived as “directed influence of social processes” (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan (1997:2). Intervention is an organised and directed activity, which in most cases represent a top down government and society interaction where government is the major player in the process of interaction (Kooiman, 1994:38).

The interventionist role is consistent with the idea of the state as:

- an arena or platform through which different interest groups interact, and is capable of mediating their conflicting and self-interested views, beliefs and needs; and
- an actor in its own right, autonomous in its actions and capable of transforming society (Martinussen in Luiz, 2000:228).

Government uses policy instruments as institutions to regulate, prescribe and structure interactions and power relations between members of society as they attempt to gain mastery of their external environment (Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007:8). In an attempt to
reconcile the definition of governance within public policy with the dynamics of structures, complexity of interactions, as well as the diversity of policy actors, which together serve to determine solutions and outcomes to identified socio-political problems, Kooiman (1994:43) proposes the concept of governability. **Governability** is a concept which balances the need for society to be governed in the direction that solves a socio-political problem, with the capacity required to govern the socio-political problem (Kooiman, 1994:43). Positive outcomes can lead to the re-enforcement of existing institutional arrangements to deal with a particular exogenous variable, whilst negative consequences may result in participants re-evaluating the institutional arrangements and effecting changes which might lead to new forms of interactions as well as outcomes (Akinola, 2007:2005).

The complexity in terms of needs as well as capacity required to govern differs from one policy domain to the other, hence a need to make adjustments to accommodate these dynamics (Kooiman, 1994:43). The adjustment involves a continuous process of fine-tuning policy instruments by:

- revisiting the needs in terms of looking at the multiplicity of appropriate solutions available to socio-political problems;
- revisiting the capacity issue by identifying how the identified solutions can be effectively implemented; and
- integrating the above two through a process which links certain solutions to central government only, others to government structured as intergovernmental relations, and finally to government-private sector partnerships (Kooiman, 1994:43).

The concept **governability** represents a synthesis of governance as mechanisms for control with governance as network management. Given the vertical and horizontal segmentation of the state (Eising & Kohler-Koch in Van Kersbergen Van Waarden, 2004:150), governance through intergovernmental structures manifests itself as “implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors” converge in terms of managing power relations within a multilevel government institutions (Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004:150-151). In structural terms, a hierarchy can be viewed as “a centralized network in which the vast majority of ties flow
to or from a particular node” (Podolny & Page, 1998:59), such as the relationship between national and provincial government.

Inherent within the organisational structure of a state is the authority which is defined in the constitutive policies in terms of what each sphere of government can and cannot do. Intergovernmental relations (IGR) refers to “the interaction and mutual impact between governments at the different levels (spheres) of government” (Pauw, Woods, Van der Linde, Fourie & Visser, 2002:26). Intergovernmental relations involve complex and interdependent relations among various spheres of government, as well as the co-ordination of public policies among the spheres through programme reporting requirements, grants in aid, the planning and budgetary process, and informal communication among officials (Fox & Meyer in Fox & Van Rooyen, 2004:100). Malan (in Fox & Van Rooyen, 2004:100) is of the opinion that IGR also involves fiscal and administrative processes for sharing of financial and other resources among the three spheres of government. Intergovernmental relations can take the form of (O’Toole & Meier, 2004:471):

- service agreements;
- intergovernmental regulations; and
- regular ties based on and sustained by intergovernmental aid, particularly grant in aid.

Based on the above definition by Fox & Meyer (in Fox & Van Rooyen, 2004:100), IGR requires the recognition of three important elements:

- interdependency in the formulation and implementation of public policy, whereby the three spheres of government have to capacitate one another by sharing resources and information that are crucial for formulation and implementation of public policy;
- co-ordination of the implementation of public policy in terms of the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, which entails assigning clear responsibilities and ensuring that there are no jurisdictional overlaps on policy matters; and
- informal but regular communication to discuss issues of mutual interest.
Governance can alternatively be viewed as networks of formal and informal and public/private interactions between multisector organisations for the achievement of objectives. In the context of public management literature, Agranoff and McGuire (in Berry, Brower, Choi, Goa, Jang, Kwon & Word, 2004:544) refer to networks as “multi-organizational arrangements for solving problems that cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by single organizations”. The network approach is consistent with the understanding by public administrators of governance as a concept that transcends the narrow institutional boundaries of public administration (Hyden & Court in Olowu & Sako, 2002:16). According to Milward and Provan (in Hill & Hupe, 2002:14), governance “…is concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rules and collective action, often including agents in the private and non-profit sectors, as well as within the public sector” as well as “…the means for achieving direction, control, and co-ordination of wholly or partially autonomous individuals or organizations on behalf of interests to which they jointly contribute” (Heinrich & Lynn, 2000:2). Stoker (in Jordan et al., 2005:481) is of the opinion that “…the very essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on the recourse to the authority and sanctions of government”.

Governance as horizontal institutional arrangements of governing refers to the granting of a much greater role by the state and multinational bodies to private economic actors and elements in civil society in policy-making, administration and implementation (Swyngedouw, 2006: 1992). In the context of a failing or failed state, the emergence of such horizontal institutional arrangements is perceived as:

- empowering; and
- democracy enhancing and more effective ways of governing, compared with the “…sclerotic, hierarchical and bureaucratic state forms that conducted the art of governing during much of the 20th century” (Swyngedouw, 2006:1992).

Governance requires “social partners and the knowledge of how to concert action among them…” (O’Toole in Heinrich & Lynn, 2000:3). The network approach emphasises a shift in terms of managing socio-political problems where government is:

- seen as the sole player in determining the appropriate ‘governing needs’ or policy instruments, and
- perceived to have the ‘governing capacity’ to deal effectively with identified socio-political problems (Kooiman, 1994:44-45).
Government and governance do and can interact along a continuum, with much state role at one extreme end and civil society role at the other extreme end as follows:

- complementing one another without merging (co-existence);
- merging with one another (fusion);
- competing and conflicting with each other (competition); and
- one replacing the other (replacement) (Eberlein & Kerwerin in Jordan et al., 2005:481).

This interaction arrangement is represented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: A simple typology of governance types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>determines</td>
<td>determines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>societal goals</td>
<td>societal goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Government selects policy instruments**
  - STRONG GOVERNMENT (hierarchical steering from the centre)

- **Society selects policy instruments**
  - HYBRID TYPES

(Society is ‘self-steering’ and ‘self-organising’)

Source: Jordan et al. (2005:484)

Two or more organisations can engage in interorganisational relationships and exchange resources among each other with a view of achieving objectives unique to each institution or those to which they contribute jointly towards their achievement (Van de Ven in Broom, Casey & Ritchey, 1997:90). According to Van de Ven and Walker (in Broom et al., 1997:90), three conditions must be present for interorganisational relationships to be formed, namely:

- due to the scarcity of some resources experienced by one organisation in relation to another, a dependency relationship on the other organisation can develop (Shermerhorn, 1975:848);
due to a need for specialised skills or services essential for the achievement of organisational goals and objectives (Jackson, 1995:239-243); and

when organisations operate within a similar policy domain, such as the agrarian and land reform policy domain, where they might be:

- servicing the same clients;
- providing the same services;
- requiring or having the same skills in order to carry out their functional responsibilities; and
- responding to the same client needs.

In the above context, the relationship might take the form of competition. Organisational action by members participating in goal-directed networks based on policy domain similarity or goal consensus is not only driven by narrow individual organisational goals but also by network-level goals (e.g. the need to reduce competition and conflict among members, improved client service, attracting network-wide funding and other critical resources) (Provan & Kenis, 2007:239).

Oliver (in Broom et al., 1997:90-91) characterises the types of interorganisational transactions or exchanges as follows:

1. Necessity: This arrangement is common in public service organisations (Isett & Provan, 2005:150-151), and is the kind or interorganisational relationship that is derived from legal or regulatory authority, and is political in nature (Rodriguez, Langley, Béland & Denis, 2007:154). The governing authority mandates organisations to co-operate with one another. In this arrangement, one or two institutions are formally given the mandate to intervene by convening institutions who out of their own accord do not see the necessity of convening, and the manner in which the intervention takes place (i.e. mechanisms for initiating and sustaining the interorganisational relationships) is prescribed and performance monitored within the hierarchy of the bureaucracy (Benson in Rodriguez, et al., 2007:156).

2. Asymmetry: Organisations that are resource dependent might form interorganisational relationships where power relationships are imbalanced. Such relationships sometimes come about with a loss of authority from a resource dependent organisation. For organisations to participate, they first have to satisfy
themselves that the incentives for participation are sufficiently enough to meet their interests (Rodriguez et al., 2007:156).

Oliver (1991:146) draws from a number of studies to highlight that both institutional theory and resource dependence theory converge around the following viewpoints:

- A variety of pressures from the external environment limits the choices that organisations can make.
- Organisations share collective and interconnected environments. In the context of networks, the concept of legitimacy, which is used more in institutional theory, has relevance.
- For organisations to survive, they must respond to a number of expectations and demands.

The divergent points are that resource dependence theory emphasises the need for organisations to adapt to uncertainties or pressures imposed by the task environment, by coping with and managing difficult interdependencies, as well as ensuring a stable flow of future resources to the organisation (Boyd, 1990:419; Heimovics, Herman & Coughlin, 1993:420; Oliver, 1991:148; Rowley, 1997:895; Tolbert, 1985:1). According to the resource dependence theory, the external locus of power lies with those who control resources, and that in order to achieve internal stability in terms of flow of resources, organisations are perceived to be powerful in a sense of being able to exercise influence over exchange partners (Oliver, 1991:149).

Casciaro and Piskorski (2005:169-172) believe that the extent to which an organisation is capable of managing constraints that affect the flow of resources depends on the following:

a) The extent to which (when viewed as a dyadic relationship) Organisation $i$ is dependent on Organisation $j$ for the supply of critical resources, and the extent to which Organisation $j$ is dependent on Organisation $i$ for the supply of critical resources. If Organisation $i$ is more dependent on Organisation $j$, than $j$ is on organisation $i$, a power imbalance will occur. Organisation $i$ will not be in a position of power to deal effectively with the constraints imposed by Organisation $j$, should Organisation $j$ decide to limit or curtail the flow of critical resources for
Organisation i’s survival or fulfilment of its organisational purpose. The opposite is true for Organisation j in relation to Organisation i.

The above illustration is based on dyadic relationships, which are considered building blocks of networks (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007:483). However, dyadic-based research is limiting since networks happen most of the time in a multiorganisational environment (Provan, et al., 2007:483).

b) If Organisation i is dependent entirely or to a great extent on Organisation j for the supply of critical resources, and there is very limited or no alternative sources or providers of such critical resources, and Organisation j is able to source from alternative providers the critical resources for which it is currently dependent on Organisation i, the capacity of Organisation i to deal with constraints imposed by Organisation j will be further diminished. The opposite is true for Organisation j in relation to Organisation i.

3. Reciprocity: Interorganisational relationships might be established with the purpose of collaboration, co-ordination and co-operation as opposed to domination and control. Such mutual exchanges recognises that the benefits of establishing and maintaining relationships outweigh the disadvantages, some of which might involve transaction costs of maintaining the relationships as well as temporary loss of autonomy. Rodriguez et al. (2007:157) are of the view that these kind of relationships (which they refer to as clan-based governance mechanisms) symbolises maturity in that they do not simply rely on regulatory mechanisms as in bureaucratic or hierarchical mechanisms, neither do they work on the basis of institutions manipulating interests or extracting benefits from the relationship as in market-based mechanisms, but are based on the “existence of shared values and beliefs to enhance coordination”.

4. Efficiency: Interorganisational relationships can develop due to the need to improve internal efficiency in terms of input-output relationships. An example could be the need to reduce the costs of certain transactions. Transaction costs can, for example, be reduced where relationships based on trust have been established, thus obviating the need for establishing and maintaining formally structured relationships (Isett & Provan, 2005:150). However, a trade-off needs to be made between the pursuit of administrative efficiency in network governance such as the increased ability to meet multiple client needs with fewer resources (i.e. when insufficient resources of an organisation are leveraged to achieve more) and the need for involvement in the inclusive decision-
making processes of the network structure, given the fact that the more organisational representatives participate in the decision-making process of the network, the more time-consuming and resource-intensive a process it becomes (Bovaird, 2005:223; Provan & Kennis, 2007:242). Burnout has been cited as one of the symptoms of waning levels of enthusiasm that can be observed as the activities and frustrations of the network begin to take their toll on the energies and resources on a sub-set of network participants (Weiner & Alexander in Provan & Kennis, 2007:242), with the result that they begin to participate less in the activities of the network, thus inadvertently giving more control of network activities to a few or even one organisation (i.e. greater centralisation of governance) thus reducing overall network effectiveness (Provan & Kennis, 2007:242).

5. Stability: Organisations operate in a dynamic and unstable environment whereby future flows of resources cannot be ascertained in a predictable manner. In order to manage this potential source of instability and guarantee flows of resources in future, organisations enter into interorganisational relations. Bozeman, Galaskiewicz & Muller (in Isett & Provan, 2005:151) are of the view that public service organisations experience much more turbulence than private sector ones due to ever-changing funding priorities, appointment of new administrators, and alterations to existing contracts as a result of election cycles, a situation that disrupts their operations and thus creates a need for them to maintain stable partnerships and interorganisational relationships “…that are likely to go beyond what one might witness in most business settings”.

Networks have been characterised as being flexible in comparison with hierarchy based mechanisms of policy administration, by members being able to work with one another quickly and efficiently, and exchange resources and expertise to implement projects that would not have been possible to achieve through the bureaucratic, hierarchical mechanisms (Kapucu & Van Wart in Provan & Kennis, 2007:244). Stability is also essential for:

- building consistent long-term relationships among network members, which include understanding each other’s strengths and weaknesses; and
- efficient network management over time, thus the need to get a balance between network flexibility and stability (Provan & Kennis, 2007:245).

6. Legitimacy: Organisations sometimes establish interorganisational relationships because of their symbolic nature. Such symbolic postures could be assumed as a way of
seeking legitimacy and acceptance from external constituents, by behaving in a manner that shows that they are in agreement with their norms, rules and expectations. For example, some public organisations that are involved in the administration of the LRAD programme, may take specific administrative actions, e.g. availing human resources, which are construed as being supportive of the goals and objectives of the programme, when in reality this participation is merely symbolic, serving mainly to extract from national government resources that are for the benefit of such organisations, and not supportive towards the joint administration of the programme. Such symbolic postures add value only to the organisation that has adopted such postures, by way of ensuring its continued existence, as well as flow of resources.

For networks to be effective, participants in a network environment must come to accept that interactions among them and co-ordinated efforts are legitimate ways of conducting business, and a network itself must gain external legitimacy as a representative decision-making entity and not simply a group of organisations that come together to discuss common concerns (Provan & Kennis, 2007:243). The challenge in making networks effective is therefore to balance the internal legitimacy needs of participant organisations to function as independent decision-making entities, with the external legitimacy needs of the network as a decision-making structure (Provan & Kennis, 2007:244). In the context of the LRAD programme, the basic structure of the network, as well as its authority to co-ordinate the administration of LRAD programme applications, has been legitimised in the policy framework of the Government. This network is thus not just a meeting of a group of organisations, which came together to discuss the administration of land reform programmes, but a properly constituted decision-making structure, which must be recognised as such.

The above examples do not represent the exhaustive list of possible scenarios pertaining to the issue of power relations between organisations. A number of permutations can yield different scenarios in terms of the power differentials between exchanging organisations. The above discussion is important in examining the power relationships that can happen when government departments are jointly responsible for administering public policies. The discussion will also assist in getting insight into how and why organisations co-operate with each other or not, when viewed from a resource exchange point of view. The issue of managing the inflow and outflow of resources is
critical to building administrative capacity within public institutions, which in turn has an influence on implementation effectiveness (Brynard, 2005:661). Public institutions are dependent on the inflow of financial resources, as appropriated by the legislature, for them to function effectively. They are also dependent on the inflow of other resources (e.g. human resources as well as information resources) from other public institutions, for programmes that are administered jointly. Financial resources must not only be adequate to support effective administration of the organisation, but also to support other programmes of government for which the organisation is responsible for their joint administration. Since the LRAD programme is administered jointly by a number of organisations, public institutions with weak administrative capacity may not effectively support the administration of the programme.

Institutional theory emphasises that organisations have choices to make, which is to either not take any action (non-choice action) or to take action. Non-choice action is manifested by conformity and institutionalised habits, social obligation and conventional behaviour, which are derived from beliefs, practices and conventions, which have been externally validated and taken for granted as the only way/s or obvious way of conducting an organisational activity (Berger, Luckman & Scott, 1987:495). Organisations can take action (consciously or not) that conforms to the norms, values, expectations and socially accepted forms of behaviour as imposed and legitimised by the external institutional environment (the state, professions, interest groups and public opinion in general) upon organisations sharing a similar institutional environment, an example of which could be government departments (Meyer & Rowan in Scott, 1987:496; Oliver, 1991:148). This results in the reproduction or imitation of organisational structures, routinisation of certain activities and standardisation of practices (Zucker in Scott, 1987:496-497; Oliver, 1991:149). The effective administration of the LRAD programme could, for example, be hampered by institutionalised habits and conventional behaviours, which are accepted and taken for granted by administrators, and externally legitimised by political office-bearers and the society they represent, as the only way of conducting the affairs of the Government.

The institutional theory perspective suggests that the external locus of power lies with those who shape and enforce institutional rules and beliefs (i.e. organisations are perceived as powerless to influence the institutional environment), hence the motive for
organisations is to achieve legitimacy (socially and politically accepted as worthy) and stability (e.g. survival as well as flow of future resources) by conforming to the dictates of enforcers of institutional rules (Oliver, 1991:149). Institutionalisation infuses an organisation with value in the form of orderly and stable actions, which are critical for the continued survival of the organisation (Selznick, 1996:271). Cognisance must be taken of the fact that, in the context of government institutions, the power to shape and enforce institutional rules as well as control resources could be located in one source; as such the discussion of the typology will attempt to incorporate this specific context.

Oliver (1991:151) is of the opinion that the divergent views between the two theories as discussed above can be reconciled. The reconciliation of views can come about if institutional theorists recognise the fact that institutions are not as passive as they portray them to be, but are active agents who can adopt different strategic postures in relation to pressures from the institutional environment. As Scott (2008:437) notes, institutionalised systems can undergo change such as exogenous change occasioned by disruptions in the neighbouring macro-political, economic or social systems, which for so long have been the source of rules and norms that have been legitimising the existence of the institution in its current form.

3.6.6 The structure and performance of policy administration networks

Community and government organisations can, if they work together, leverage their own resources and expertise by drawing from other organisations in the network, thus resulting in much more effectiveness in the delivery of services (Chisholm, Provan & Milward in Provan, Veazie, Staten & Teufel-Shone, 2005:603). In spite of the advantages of multiorganisational networks, these are difficult to establish let alone sustain (Wandersman, Goodman & Butterfoss, Weiner & Alexander in Provan et al., 2005:604).
Some of the problems cited with respect to establishing and sustaining networks are:

- inadequate financial support, coupled with the requirement to spend scarce resources, which are critical for sustaining the activities of the organisation (Shermerhorn, 1975:850);
- perceptions of erosion of managerial or decision-making autonomy (Shermerhorn, 1975:849);
- conflicting stakeholder interests; and
- corrosion of organisational identity and strategic role and position (Shermerhorn, 1975:849).

According to Berry et al. (2004:546), the developing literature on public management networks discusses two broad questions, namely:

- How the structure of networks (e.g. questions of network density, as well as network actor centrality in relation to other network partners) affects effective delivery of services. Density, which has attributes of high and low density, is a term used in social network analysis to describe the extent to which network members are interconnected, and is considered as the ratio of the number of ties that exist between members of a network in relation to the number of ties that are possible within a network should all members be connected to one another (Huang & Provan, 2006:442; Rowley, 1997:896). Centrality refers to the position of an actor within a network in relation to others, and which position has the potential to assign the actor the positional status of being more or less powerful in relation to other actors (Rowley, 1997:898). According to Rowley (1997:898-899), centrality has three components, namely:
  - Degree centrality, which is the measure of the number of ties a network actor has with others within the network (Huang & Provan, 2006:441). It is assumed that the more ties a network actor has, the more access he has to alternative sources of information and resources. According to the resource dependence theory as discussed above, the ability of an organisation to have alternative sources of resources is critical not only for internal stability, but also for it to support the administration of programmes for which it is jointly responsible and/or accountable.
o Closeness centrality, which measures the extent to which a network actor can access independently all the network actors with whom he/she has ties, i.e. the ability to access other network actors through the least number of intermediaries. It is assumed that a network actor with a high network centrality, i.e. with the least number of intermediaries, is less dependent on others to secure critical resources, and is also able to communicate information quickly thus influencing the network. An organisation, that is jointly administering the LRAD programme, will be constrained if it has to rely on an intermediary to secure from its source, critical resources on which it is dependent. Where an organisation does not have to rely on intermediaries for the supply of critical resources, as well as for communication of information to network members, such an organisation will be in a much more powerful position to influence the activities of the network co-ordinating the administration of the LRAD programme.

o Betweenness centrality, which measures the extent to which a network actor serves as an intermediary between pairs of other network actors. It is assumed that network actors with a high network centrality (serving as an intermediary for a great number of network pairs) enjoy positional advantage since other actors must go through it to communicate information or exchange resources. Such actors are capable of influencing the behaviour of other network actors, thus impacting on the extent of achievement of outputs and outcomes by the network co-ordinating the administration of the LRAD programme.

Multiplexity measures the strength of the relationship an organisation establishes and maintains with other organisations in a network (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007:484), and is a measure of trust (Isset Provan, 2005:158). This is determined by measuring the number and types of links, e.g. service delivery programmes, research programmes, client referrals and shared personnel an organisation has with other organisations within a network (Provan et al., 2007:484). An organisation that has multiple links with another organisation can sustain ties with that organisation even when one of the links gets broken (Provan, et al., 2007:484). In the context of the LRAD programme, the DACE and NWPLRO can, on the basis of the multiple links they have for example managed to
establish, sustain the administration of the LRAD programme even when one of the links has been severed.

In conducting network analysis, some concepts are critical for data collection and measurement. Only those concepts that are relevant to this research are mentioned below:

- **Network bounding** has to do with a decision on which organisations should be included in the network for data collection (i.e. those that are bound together by collective ties) (Laumann, Mardsen & Prensky in Foster-Fishman, Salem, Allen, & Fahrbach, 2001:882; Provan et al., 2005:605).
- **Link content**, whereby organisations can have operational, technical and administrative links (Isett & Provan, 2005:155), which connect pairs of organisations together, e.g. links through resources, some of which might be shared while others may be critical to one organisation only, links through clients, shared information, funds, contractual obligations, as well as obligations emanating from legislation and joint programmes (Foster-Fisherman, et al., 2001:883; Provan, et al., 2005:605). These links can be formal, i.e. the existence of a legally binding contract or written agreement and informal, i.e. not regulated by any formal contract but happens when organisations exchange resources and support one another in the fulfilment of organisational goals and objectives (Isett & Provan, 2005:156).
- **Frequency of links**, which establishes whether links occur regularly or occasionally.
- **Level of interaction**, which establishes whether interaction takes place at the top management or operational level (inter or intraorganisationally). In conducting network analysis, the level of analysis should be considered. Shermerhorn (1975:850) provides a simplification of Merret’s (in Shermeron, 1975:849) analysis by suggesting the following:
  - intra-organisational level of analysis, which focuses on the characteristics or factors within an organisation that are used to determine an organisation’s predisposition to co-operate with others;
• comparative level of analysis, which considers the characteristics (in terms of compatibility or divergence) of potentially co-operating organisations as a predictor of predisposition to co-operate; and
• external environmental factors, which considers the existence of factors external to the environment (e.g. those forming the institutional context unique to an individual organisation or those forming the institutional context common to both organisations) and which provide a motivational influence on organisations to co-operate.

Trust, which establishes whether the relationships are based on formal contractual agreements, rules and regulations, or whether they are underpinned by a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill, whereby each member of the network demonstrates a sense of obligation to act in good faith and in turn expect others to do likewise (Podolny & Page 1998:60-61). It was already mentioned above that trust reduces the transaction costs of managing relationships (i.e. as trust increases, the need to manage relationships through costly formal mechanisms gets reduced) (Isett & Provan, 2005:150). However, the task environment of the public sector sometimes necessitates maintaining formal contractual relations (Fogarty in Isett & Provan, 2005:151) even when the level of trust has increased because of the following reasons:

• it may be a requirement to do so (statutory or in terms of instructions from a higher level in the hierarchy), especially where public financial resources are to be spent;
• there may be an expectation that government institutions would develop formal contracts to govern their relationships with other organisations, due to the highly regulatory nature by which government is administered;
• it may be a requirement for the purpose of maintaining certain minimum standards of service delivery, and to ensure that there is equal treatment of citizens in terms of service delivery;
• to avoid a situation in which familiarity breeds contempt, whereby relationships based on friendship could result in a drop of service standards over time; and
• to ensure that clients with multiple needs can obtain the full range of services especially where the basket of services required goes beyond the capacity of one institution to provide (Isett & Provan, 2005:157).
Provan and Kenis (in Provan et al., 2007:504) identify a typology of mechanisms that can be used to govern networks as follows:

- **Shared or self governance,** which is about managing “self organizing, inter-organizational networks” (Rhodes in Kickert et al., 1997:xii) which have the following characteristics:
  - interdependence between network organisations in terms of resources, expertise, authority and information;
  - continuing interaction between network organisations brought about by the need to exchange resources and negotiate goals and means of attaining them;
  - game-like interactions regulated by negotiated and agreed rules of the game and based on trust;
  - interaction not being subject to any foreign authority;
  - being self-regulating and autonomous;
  - organisations constituting a network make strategic and operational decisions in terms of how the network should operate;
  - there is no formal structure governing the interactions among members; and
  - the activities of the network as well as the monitoring thereof take place through formal meetings as well as ongoing interactions and collaborations among network members.

- **Lead organisations,** whereby in a goal-directed network, which is common within the public service and is characterised by organisations constituting the network sharing a common purpose and understanding the need to work together to achieve multiorganisational objectives of government (Provan & Kennis, 2007:231), one organisation amongst them:
  - enjoys more positional power in relation to others within the network,
  - has more resources;
  - enjoys legitimacy to play a lead role;
- co-ordinates decision-making within the network, irrespective of whether network members may be interacting independently between themselves; and
- assumes responsibility for maintaining internal relationships within the network as well as developing new external relationships.

The concept of a lead organisation has much resonance to programmes of government such as the LRAD programme. A lead organisation is identified, and given the legitimacy and authority to make specific decisions, as well as manage and account for the resources that have been allocated for the administration of the programme. However, in spite of lead organisations being identified and legitimised to lead the administration of the LRAD programme, some organisations can dominate the network, thus influencing how the structure, power relations and performance of the network evolve over time (Fried et al. in Provan et al., 2007:506). These may not be official lead organisations as legitimised by government, but may dominate as a result of having ample resources or due to contextual factors such as geographical proximity (Fried et al. in Provan et al., 2007:506).

- Network administration organisation (NAO), whereby the activities of the network are governed by an external organisation (even an individual) that is not part of the network. The role of the external organisation (or individual) might be to oversee the activities of the network, or render support for the effective performance of the network (Provan et al., 2007:506).


McGuire (2002:601-607) and Agranoff and McGuire (in Berry et al., 2004:546) suggest four tasks that a network manager need to perform in order to establish and maintain the activities of a network, namely:

- to identify potential and necessary participants and to make them interested in participating in the activities of the network, a task which also
involves getting resources for the network to get started and becoming functional;

- to develop a framework of rules and values that will inform the context under which participation will take place;
- to mobilise participants towards a common and holistic purpose, as well as strategies for achieving the end; and
- to facilitate effective and sustained interaction among participants with a view of achieving a common purpose.

It could thus be argued that the network responsible for the administration of the LRAD programme is not self-implementing. For the network to function, and for effective administration of the programme to take place, administrators of public institutions legitimised as lead organisations, must undertake the above-mentioned activities.

3.7 FINANCING THE ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

A government pursues a number of policies and programmes to satisfy the diverse needs of the citizens, as well as fulfil international obligations. The policies and programmes that a government undertake have direct and indirect financial implications and have to be funded (Botes et al., 1992:314). The funds required to implement government policies and programmes are derived from the public (Cloete, 1994:145) as such government receives and keeps public funds temporarily in trust until it has been satisfactorily allocated to satisfy identified needs, demands and desires (Botes et al., 1992:314-315). In democratic states, for government to have the authority to collect revenue required to run its services, the elected representatives must develop and adopt a financial policy, which grants the state powers and provides mechanisms to collect, distribute, utilise and account for the utilisation of funds (Cloete, 1994:145; Fourie, 2007:733). The constitution of a country forms the cornerstone upon which a financial policy can be built and anchored (Cloete, 1994:145).

In democratic states, an annual budget is an expression of the popular will of the electorate, as interpreted by political office-bearers, and is presented to elected representatives in the legislature for consideration and approval (Willoughby in Shafritz & Hyde, 1992:25-26).
The annual budget serves the following purposes:

- it is an important public policy document spelling out the priorities of government with regard to the administration of the land reform policy, as well as the source of funds (Fourie, 2007:734; Thornhill in Hanekom & Thornhill, 1995:122);
- it spells out what government aims to achieve with the different land reform programmes it allocates money to (Botes et al., 1992:142);
- it outlines the work programmes of the DOA, the DLA, the NWPLRO and the DACE with regard to the administration of the LRAD programme (Cloete, 1994:146; Botes et al., 1992:142);
- it is an instrument for stimulating the economy in the agriculture and other sectors, through, for example the land purchase and post-settlement grants, (Botes et al., 1992:142); and
- it is a control instrument used by accounting officers as well as those entrusted with oversight responsibilities, in ensuring that expenditure is aligned towards supporting the administration of the LRAD programme (Fourie, 2007:734; Thornhill in Hanekom & Thornhill, 1995:123).

3.8 STAFFING PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

The function of staffing public organisations involves firstly the provision of personnel and secondly getting staff to perform their duties (Cloete, 1994:165). *Human resource management* is an umbrella term that broadly refers to functions that involve attracting suitable skills to the organisation, development of staff, motivation of staff and staff retention (Jackson, 1995:238). According to Jackson (1995:238), *human resource management* encompasses the following:

- practices for human resource recruitment, selection and appraisal;
- formal human resource policies, which enable or constrain human resource practices; and
- the overarching philosophies as manifested by the existence of specific values guiding human resource management in an organisation or set of organisations.
In the public sector, the staffing function is performed in a regulated environment guided by the following imperatives:

- **Over-arching policy governing the public service**: The legislature pronounces on the overarching values guiding society in general, including those guiding public administration in particular as outlined in Section 195 of the Constitution, 1996. These values serve as the foundation for the human resource management and development legislation, as well as other policies governing employment conditions in the public service, which outline the rights, privileges and obligations of public servants (Botes et al., 1992:323). Government policies and programmes are not self-administering, but are administered by public servants. The effective administration of government programmes depends on the conditions created by these overarching policies on the acquisition and utilisation of human resources, but also on the individual attributes of managers.

- **Organising**: The function of organising public service organisations is formally delegated by the legislature to political office-bearers heading executive institutions (Cloete, 1994:169). Organising not only entails the creation and adoption of an organisational structure, but also the continual review of the organisational structure to ensure that:
  - it fits in with the purpose of the organisation, which may be reviewed from time to time to do away with old functions or create as well as add new functions;
  - new posts are created; and
  - dysfunctional posts are abolished.

With the coming in of new political administrations, new programmes may be introduced, or old ones modified to deal with new mandates. For new or modified programmes to be administered effectively, the organisational structures of implementing institutions must be adapted to fit the new purpose. Depending on a country-specific situation, the organising function can be carried out as follows:

- where political office-bearers would on the recommendation of the administrative executive, approve an organisational structure suitable for carrying out line functions; and
where, after consultation with the public service commission, the political office bearer would approve an organisational structure (Cloete, 1994:169-171).

- Finance: Given the fact that personnel expenditure usually constitute the largest portion of the overall budget expenditure (Botes et al., 1992:324), measures must be put in place to ensure that the staffing function is performed efficiently and effectively (Cloete, 1994:172). Government departments are not always allocated the funds they have requested, hence the need to efficiently and effectively manage personnel, to achieve more outputs with the limited resources.

- Procedures and personnel methods: Personnel procedures are prescribed in terms of the law to ensure that decisions relating to personnel management are not *ultra vires* and arbitrary (Botes et al., 1992:324). Procedures promote uniform human resource practices through which public service managers can achieve effective administration of government programmes.

- Control: The legislature puts measures in place to ensure that those delegated with the functions of staffing the public service, account for what has been done with the delegated functions, and are able to demonstrate that personnel have been managed well in terms of the efficient and effective administration of government programmes (Cloete, 1994:174).

Human resource management may be understood in terms of the following broad but overlapping domains (Jackson, 1995: 239-243).

General systems theory: Organisations are perceived as open systems, which are dependent on the external environment for inputs, which inputs are then converted into outputs, which may serve as inputs for other organisations. The function of human resource management is to acquire the necessary skills (inputs) in the labour market, and convert or align (throughput) their behaviours to the expectations of the organisation such that their performance would result in the production of the desired outputs.

Role behaviour perspective: This perspective views organisations as social systems where individuals have multiple role behaviours. *Role behaviours* are defined as “the recurring actions of an individual, appropriately interrelated with
the repetitive activities of others so as to yield a predictable outcome” (Katz & Kahn in Jackson, 1995:239). The function of human resource management is to:

- take note of the role behaviours expected by the organisation, which are influenced by the institutional context impacting on the organisation;
- communicate these expectations widely;
- measure performance against the identified expectations; and
- support behaviour that meets the expectations of other role partners (e.g. managers, peers and clients).

In the context of public organisations’ behaviours, an example is communication, referring to observable activities conducted with the purpose of linking related tasks (Van Wart, 2005:22). The quality of behaviour displayed is influenced by the repertoire of traits and skills that a person has (Van Wart, 2005:22).

The following are some of the behaviours expected of managers and leaders (Van Wart, 2005: 157-271).

- task-oriented behaviours, which involve monitoring and assessing work, operations planning, clarifying roles and objectives, informing, delegating, problem-solving and managing technical innovation and creativity;
- people-oriented behaviours, which involve consulting, planning and organising personnel, developing staff, motivating, building and managing teams, managing conflict and managing personnel change; and
- organisational-oriented behaviours, which involve scanning the environment, strategic planning, articulating the mission and vision, networking and partnering, performing general management functions, decision-making and managing organisational change.

The New Public Management approach, for example, defines the role that administrative leaders of public institutions should play in the implementation of government programmes. The movement focuses on the role and survival tactics of political appointees heading government institutions (Kettl in Rosenbloom et al., 1994:42). Their roles are perceived to be:

- the development of strategies for the efficient and effective achievement of their institutional programmes;
building political support internally and externally for the strategic directions they intend to take; and
• ensuring that their institutions have the necessary capacity to function (Kettl in Rosenbloom et al., 1994:42).

In line with the New Public Management approach, the management of institutions administering the LRAD programme has to ensure that strategies are put in place for the achievement of the land redistribution goals and objectives as agreed to by the political principals.

The strategic direction adopted by management involves a constant process of adapting the organisation to its task environment, characterised by:
• political constraints, which influence the type and amount of resources available to the LRAD programme, as government priorities change;
• constraints imposed by the behaviour of public officials, which may not be supportive of the effective administration of the programme; and
• cognitive as well as personality constraints of the head of the institution (Kettl in Rosenbloom et al., 1994:42).

Institutional theory: Organisations are viewed as social entities participating in and depending on the social system for their legitimate existence and continued survival. Organisations adopt survival strategies by seeking and securing legitimacy (i.e. social approval of their activities) from multiple stakeholders (e.g. government with respect to laws and resources, professional bodies and other organisations operating within the same policy domain) who control needed resources.

The result is the institutionalisation over time of certain practices and behaviours (i.e. due to conscious or unconscious conformity to the expectations of external stakeholders). Human resource management can be viewed in terms of:
• practices which, when viewed in historical terms, have over time become institutionalised, and assumed as acceptable form of behaviour from the point of view of the expectations of external stakeholders; and
practices which have been accepted as the norm by other organisations within the same institutional context, and have been copied into the organisation irrespective of whether they have much utility for the organisation concerned.

Some of the human resource practices finding expression within government institutions responsible for the administration of the LRAD programme may have been institutionalised as described above. However, they may be of limited utility in terms of promoting the effective administration of the programme.

Resource dependence theory: Organisations are viewed as social entities that interact with other organisations in order to secure supply of critical human resources. Organisations involved in administering the LRAD programme have to secure the supply of human resources (i.e. skills) which they are in short supply of individually and collectively (as a network), in order to ensure achievement of the goals and objectives of the programme.

Those organisations that are in control of critical resources (e.g. skills which may not be easily accessible elsewhere in the job market), enjoy asymmetrical positional power in relation to those that do not. Human resource management activities and processes thus involve managing this delicate asymmetrical power relationship, by building the required human resource capacity, with the ultimate aim of reducing the vulnerability of the resource-dependent organisation and ensuring effective administration of a government programme.

3.9 WORK METHODS AND PROCEDURES

It has been mentioned above that administration is a goal-directed undertaking, which requires the co-ordination of efforts between two or more people. Work procedures are “ways in which officials carry out work in order to give legality and legitimacy to government actions” (Botes et al., 1992:331). For work procedures to assume the status of legality and legitimacy, they must be reduced to writing and made known to those who have to implement them as well as those affected by them (Botes et al., 1992:332).
The activities of officials administering the LRAD programme should be guided by written procedures, which will ensure the following:

- that the actions of public officials administering the programme are legal and legitimate;
- that all applicants get equal treatment;
- that the activities of organisations administering the programme are co-ordinated towards achievement of the common land redistribution goal of the Government;
- effective performance management of employees administering the programme;
- effective training and development of staff; and

Written work procedures have their shortcomings in that:

- by pre-empting the behaviour that public servants should take according to predetermined set of scenarios, they attempt to reduce public officials' behaviour to that of robots (Cloete, 1994:195);
- public officials are confronted by situations that are different from those anticipated by policy-makers and those anticipated by written procedure manuals, as such, flexibility is required; and
- by being developed in a rigid and inflexible manner, work procedures can promote the red tape in government organisations whereby public officials would devote loyalty to them rather than perceiving them for their instrumental value, namely to enable the achievement of organisational goals (Cloete, 1994:195).

3.10 PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, CONTROL AND POLICY EVALUATION

In modern democratic civilisations, public functionaries are required to account for every action which they perform pertaining to the execution of their official duties (Cloete, 1994:210). Public accountability cannot be effected properly unless relevant and timely information is made available (Cameron, 2004:59). Hupe and Hill (2007:286) are of the view that the concept public accountability can assume different manifestations, and to understand the forms through which public accountability takes place, the environmental context under which lower level public officials implement government programmes
should be understood. The environmental context is influenced by the nature of the governance regime as either manifested by:

- a hierarchal, authority based arrangement;
- a network arrangement, as well as
- professional requirements (Hupe & Hill, 2007:288).

Hupe and Hill (2007:288) identify three variants of public accountability. *Public administrative accountability* distinguishes between three sub-types of administrative accountability, which all share a vertical orientation in terms of accountability. *Political accountability* refers to accountability to political organs of representative democracy. Willoughby (in Shafritz & Hyde, 1992:34) is of the opinion that if administrators are to be given greater discretion in terms of deciding on the methods to be used to implement the will of the state, the legislature must demand accountability on those given such discretionaty powers. According to Willoughby (in Shafritz & Hyde, 1992:34), this would ensure the correlation between legislative and administrative action.

*Legal accountability* or *organisational accountability*, which is derived from implementation of rules and regulations, refers to accountability to supervisors for the performance of duties. *Managerial accountability* is referred to by exponents of The New Public Management approach as the development and use of managerial tools such as performance indicators to hold public officials accountable.

*Professional accountability* refers to a situation where professionals are held to account or hold others accountable for the performance of their duties, as measured by the standards and expectations of the profession. This form of accountability can happen vertically, where the profession has a system of rules, norms, standards and procedures for enforcing accountability, or the manager assumes both roles of supervisor and professional.

Professional accountability can also happen horizontally where members of a particular profession (peers) hold each other to account by making professional judgements on each other’s work. Horizontal accountability can also happen where members of different professions or professional organisations co-operate in co-production of an output, where the quality and quantity of the final outcome are determined by the
collective inputs of members, and co-operating members hold each other to account by passing judgements on the quality of each individual/organisation’s contribution to the achievement of shared outcomes.

According to Hill (in Hupe & Hill, 2007:295), a policy system involves “a nested sequence of decisions about structure, financing and about the management of outputs for which different actors may be accountable, perhaps in different ways”. The point therefore is that the different accountability measures are all relevant, but their relevance and importance differ according to the environmental context for which they must be applied (Hupe & Hill, 2007:295). The choice and application of one type of accountability measure or combination thereof, is a value-laden exercise that is informed more by practical considerations as defined by the environmental context rather than political ideology (Hupe & Hill, 2007:295). The criteria by which public officials are held accountable differ from country to country. In the South African context, the Constitution, 1996, prescribes that members of the Cabinet are collectively and individually accountable to Parliament. The norms and values that inform public service accountability in South Africa have been described in Section 195 of the Constitution, 1996. These include traditional norms and values such as equality, impartiality, administrative justice and the general welfare.

South Africa and a number of other countries have introduced administrative reforms popularly described as New Public Management, promoting and giving more prominence to the economic values of efficiency, effectiveness and economy (Haque, 2000:601). In addition to traditional norms and values guiding public accountability, Section 195 of the Constitution, 1996, also prescribes the economic values of efficiency, effectiveness and economy.

The discussion that follows pertaining to control and policy evaluation will be confined to the understanding of accountability as political, legal and managerial. In this context, the legislature is put at the centre of the activities that government functionaries perform. The legislature represents the views of the electorate in terms of the needs, demands and problems that must be solved at a given time, as well as the structure of government institutions required to deal with these issues. It legislates in order to put in place policies and programmes, establish government institutions, as well as allocate funds. The
legislature also plays an oversight role on behalf of citizens to ensure that the needs and demands of the citizens receive attention, and that those who have been given the delegated authority have used their powers and the allocated resources to promote the general welfare of society as defined by the legislature (Van der Nest, Thornhill & De Jager, 2008:547).

Control is an administrative function executed with the purpose of ensuring that those who have been delegated authority by the legislature to implement policies of government broadly and the LRAD programme in particular, use their powers to advance the general welfare of the beneficiaries of these policies and programmes (Cloete, 1994:205). They are also expected to achieve the goals and objectives of the LRAD programme effectively and efficiently (Fourie, 2007:733). According to Schutte (in Fourie, 2007:733) the control function can be subdivided into four stages, which in the context of the LRAD programme entail the following:

- the setting of performance standards in the form of area of agricultural land to be redistributed;
- the recording, measurement and reporting of activities undertaken by officials administering the programme;
- the evaluation of performance to identify deviations from standards; and
- the implementation of measures to correct deviations from the set performance standards.

The following parameters can be used for exercising control (Thornhill in Hanekom & Thornhill, 1995:228-229).

- Goals: In the narrow sense of individual organisations, a goal is essential for measuring the overall effectiveness of public service organisations. However, in the broader sense of understanding different levels of policy, a goal (derived from the political policy of the ruling party) provides the broad policy direction, which serves to orientate the activities of government (Thornhill in Hanekom & Thornhill, 1995:229).
- Sub-goals: For the political policy of the ruling party to have the desired effect on society, it must be transformed by the elected representatives serving in the executive structure of government (i.e. cabinet) into the executive policy or policy
of the government of the day. The executive policy can take the form of legislation or programmes (Botes et al., 1992:311). Legislation contains specific but less detailed guidelines, which serve as a framework authorising and prohibiting different types of actions to be undertaken by appointed public officials, thus the need to develop detailed and implementable guidelines to give effect to government policy (Thornhill in Hanekom & Thornhill, 1995:229).

- Programmes: a programme provides detailed guidelines for implementation of government policy by managers (Botes et al., 1992:311). It outlines key results (outputs) to be achieved, the administrative means for achieving the results, specific and much more detailed actions to be undertaken by managers, and can thus serve as a parameter to exercise control in terms of achievement of policy goals (Thornhill in Hanekom & Thornhill, 1995:229).

*Policy evaluation* “assesses the effectiveness of a public policy in terms of its perceived intentions and results” (Gerston in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:207). The entire policy may be perceived to be a failure, or a specific programme within a policy regime may fail (Mucciaroni in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:208). Both the policy and a programme can fail in substantive terms by not delivering the expected results, or in procedural terms as perceived in terms of being legitimate or illegitimate, fair or unfair, just or unjust (Bovens & Hart, Hood, McGraw and Weaver in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:208). Through the application of appreciative inquiry in evaluation, research information can be generated about the positive effects of a programme, which information can be used as a building block for future interventions (Cloete, 2006:689).

Policy evaluation research may be undertaken to assist in the improvement of an existing programme (Ross, Freeman & Lipsey in Cloete, 2006:683). This view is consistent with the understanding by Mucciaroni (in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:208) and Bovens and Hart, Hood, McGraw and Weaver (in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:208) as described above. There is also a danger that information generated during policy evaluation may not result in programme improvement as a result of it being used selectively by political office-bearers, especially if it is not in line with certain political priorities or ideologies (Kogan in Sanderson, 2002:5).
Policy evaluation research provides information in terms of which problems and needs of society require government intervention (Sanderson, 2002:4). It also enables insight to be gained into the effects of a programme or policy (Ross, Freeman & Lipsey in Cloete, 2006:683). This view is consistent with the definition provided above by Gerston (in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:207). Evidence generated in this regard would enable decision-makers to:

- test the cause and effect assumptions made in terms of the policy;
- determine how a policy achieves change under a different set of conditions within a social system; and
- make appropriate policy choices (Sanderson, 2002:5-6).

Information can also be generated on how a government programme can be structured and administered (Ross, Freeman & Lipsey in Cloete, 2006:683). Formative evaluation provides information in terms of whether the different components of a programme are designed in such a way as to facilitate the achievement of programme objectives (Cloete, 2006:685).

Policy evaluation research generates information that enables administrators and analysts to respond to political pressures (Ross, Freeman & Lipsey in Cloete, 2006:683). Political pressure could, for example, arise when political office-bearers demand evidence in terms of whether policies produce the desired results, or demand evidence of information to indicate which policies can work better in terms of bringing about change in a social system (Sanderson, 2002:4). The pressure to produce policy-linked results enhances political accountability. However, research cannot provide adequate information that foretells which policies would work best under different circumstances to bring about change (Sanderson, 2002:5).

Administrative evaluation can take place in a number of forms. *Effort evaluation* is a measure of the quantity of policy or programme inputs. The New Public Management approach has contributed to the diffusion of new measures for evaluating government programmes, such as the consideration of costs and the use of performance indicators (Mollas-Gallart & Davies, 2006:76).
Performance evaluation is a measure of the outputs of a policy or programme, whereas adequacy of performance evaluation, also known as effectiveness evaluation, is a measure of whether a policy is achieving what it set out to achieve. Efficiency evaluation is a measure of the costs of a policy or programme against the output produced.

Process evaluation examines the organisational methods and work procedures used to implement a policy (Suchman in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:211-212). This is similar to systemic evaluation which Arnold (in Mollas-Gallart & Davies, 2006:72-73) argues would resolve institutional conditions impacting on implementation of a programme, the extent to which there is networking and connectivity within and across systems and the extent to which a system is capable of performing in terms of knowledge formation and dissemination, enhancing economic benefits and technical aspects.

### 3.11 CONCLUSION

Public Administration has evolved into a multidisciplinary applied field with its analytical focus firmly entrenched in the administration of government policies. As an eclectic and multidisciplinary applied social science, Public Administration would continue to remain relevant in future in dealing with the complexity of societal problems, such as the administration of government programmes. In the statement of the problem, it has been argued that public administration is instrumental in the achievement of the goals and objectives of the LRAD programme.

In the discussion of the generic approach to the study of Public Administration, it has been highlighted that a number of factors as mentioned below can have an impact on the effectiveness with which the LRAD programme is administered. The content of the programme includes the psychological processes involved when public officials make sense of the rationale for the land redistribution programme. It also includes the rationale for the choice of policy instruments, and the decisions which public officials make with regard to policy administration, in relation to their interpretation of challenges of administering government policies.

The intergovernmental context through which the programme has to be administered, creates dependence relationships among institutions administering the programme. The
dependence relationships requires the creation of network structures for policy administration, including government institutions as well as stakeholders from the private sector, and requires integration of policies, systems and procedures among institutions co-administering the programme.

The administrative capacity of institutions administering the programme requires managers to think creatively to manage the potential risk of lack of flow of resources to their respective organisations. It also has the potential of rendering public institutions administering the programme incapable of performing their functional responsibilities, as well as those which they perform collectively with other institutions.

The commitment by political office-bearers and public officials towards the programme, in terms of integration of policies, systems and procedures, is critical. Commitment is also important in terms of provision of the required resources, policy-monitoring, evaluation and accountability, and solving problems that are encountered during administration of the programme. Participation by clients and other stakeholders, in the co-production of the programme outputs, is of importance also.

Political and administrative reforms aimed at redistributing agricultural land from land owners to the landless are not unique to South Africa, but have been implemented in a number of countries, the majority of which have gone through a process of colonisation and land dispossession. Chapter 4 presents an international perspective on the rationale for, and challenges of the land and agrarian reforms, with specific reference to the case studies of Brazil and the Philippines.