CHAPTER FOUR

THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE

Having so far examined the history of the liberation struggle led by the ANC in its alliance with the SACP, from the beginning of the Second World War to the decision in 1961 to adopt a campaign of revolutionary armed resistance against the State, we must now turn our attention to the history and development of the armed struggle inside South Africa from December 1961 to December 1988, when it was severely compromised by the signing of the New York Peace Accord.

To facilitate our discussion of this important period in the history of the liberation struggle, the period under discussion has been divided into four basic development phases: phase one deals with the period from December 1961 to about 1965 when, as a result of the government's counter-insurgency action, the combined underground movement comprising of the ANC, the SACP and Umkhonto had been virtually completely destroyed and forced outside the country. Phase two starts with the beginning of the latter development and the numerous problems it brought for the ANC and SACP's Mission in Exile. With the collapse of the internal underground structures of Umkhonto, the ANC and the SACP the responsibility for the revival of this structure and the continuation of the armed offensive became the direct responsibility of the Mission in Exile - a development for which it was wholly unprepared. As a result of the Mission's inability to rebuild and restart the armed struggle inside South Africa after 1965, the years up to the end of the 1960's as well as the first half of the 1970's, until the independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975 and the Soweto Riots of 1976, remained largely a period of ANC and Umkhonto inactivity. Attempts made by the ANC to launch combined incursions with the Zimbabwe African People's Union
(ZAPU) between 1967 and 1969 came to nothing, as most of the guerrillas who crossed into Rhodesia from Zambia were either caught or killed by the Rhodesian security forces. The lull in the sabotage campaign, however, gave the South African government a chance to clean-up what was left of the underground, sharpen its security legislation and update its counter insurgency measures - part of which was to send units of the South African police to assist the Rhodesian security forces in their operations against ZAPU and Umkhonto.

The third phase deals with the period from the outbreak of the Soweto Riots in June 1976, and covers the development of the armed struggle up to the signing of the Nkomati Accord in 1984 and the unrest of the 1984 - 1985 period. This latter period, which is perhaps the most significant in the armed struggle, has seen some important developments taking place. Among them were the influx of large numbers of new and highly motivated recruits from the township into the ranks of the ANC and Umkhonto; the banning of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in 1977 which helped to pave the way for the resurgence of the ANC; the escalation of the armed struggle into a war of armed propaganda between 1981 and 1983; South Africa's bombing of ANC and Umkhonto bases in the frontline states and the signing of a bilateral agreement with Swaziland in 1982 and Mozambique in 1984 to limit ANC-Umkhonto operations from these areas. The period to 1985 also witnessed the unrest of 1984 which, due to its sporadic nature, helped to alter the ANC and SACP's longterm approach to what constitutes a revolutionary situation and the role of Umkhonto in it. More important, however, the third phase also witnessed the growing inability of the ANC and the SACP to rebuild their underground structures inside South Africa to a level where it could serve as a springboard for a people's war.

The fourth and last phase to be examined in this chapter represents the period from 1985 to the end of 1988 when, with the signing of the New York Accord, a question mark was placed over the future ability of the ANC, the SACP and Umkhonto to bring about a transfer of power in South Africa through armed struggle. This period also witnessed
the development of the sanctions campaign against South Africa, the imposition of a major state of emergency, and the beginning of a series of meetings between groups from South Africa and members of the ANC and the SACP in Lusaka, and elsewhere in Africa and the world. By the end of 1988 more than seventy of these contacts had taken place. Although the period witnessed a steady increase in the armed attacks committed by Umkhonto’s cadres, it was becoming increasingly clear that the ANC and Umkhonto were unable to turn the struggle into a revolutionary people’s war and that questions were being raised in the innermost circles of the liberation movement as to the future of the armed struggle and whether a political settlement was perhaps not the answer. An important influence on this latter development was the changes brought about in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by the reform policies of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Since the expulsion of the ANC and Umkhonto from Angola at the beginning of 1989, the acts of sabotage committed by Umkhonto have markedly declined. At the same time, the South African government has gone out of its way to sell its reform policies and its willingness to accept a negotiated settlement for South Africa to the Western world but more important to the ANC-SACP alliance.

1. **PHASE ONE. THE PERIOD 1961 - 1965**

The first phase of Umkhonto’s armed campaign opened in Durban on 15 December 1961, a day earlier than planned. The Regional Command in the city, after a crash course in the manufacturing of explosives and explosive devices under the guidance of Harold Strachan, who was specially sent down from Johannesburg to instruct them in the act of sabotage, exploded a home-made bomb in Ordnance Road. The target of the attack was a wooden back door at the Durban Corporation’s Bantu Administration office building. A vivid description of this first attack and the preparation work for it has been left to us by Bruno Mtolo, who served on the Regional Command of Umkhonto in Durban. (1)

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According to Mtolo, Harold Strachan was sent down by the NHC of Umkhonto in Johannesburg to Durban either at the end of November or the beginning of December 1961, to inform the newly established Regional Command structure in that city that the sabotage campaign would start on 16 December. Strachan was specially sent down to help them prepare for this "historical and momentous event". Consequently under his guiding eye, the Durban Regional Command experimented with a number of explosive devices and time fuses. Among the bombs they were taught to make were petrol bombs or "Molotov Cocktails", as they were commonly known. They apparently also experimented with some crude electric detonators, and numerous tests were conducted in the early days of December to ensure that the fuses worked and that the methods of bomb construction were correct before Strachan left the city for the Eastern Cape. All this preparation was necessary to ensure that the Regional Command's Technical Committee would be in a position to manufacture its own explosive devices without the help of the NHC in Johannesburg. Once the preparation work was done the first targets were selected for attack. Initially three targets were selected: the Bantu Affairs building in Stanger Street, the Coloured Affairs Department in Masonic Grove and the Durban Corporation's Bantu Administration Offices in Ordnance Road. According to Mtolo it was suggested that when the time came for the attack, they would place the bomb near a place where papers and files were kept, thus facilitating a fire. Having assured themselves - after a careful inspection of the three premises - that they would be able to reach or enter the three targets without any great difficulty on the night of the attack, the saboteurs returned home to get everything ready for the 16th.

In the morning I went to work, wrote Mtolo. This was the 14th of December, 1961. For some reason or other we had decided that the attack must be made on the 15th. Ronnie [Kasrills], whom Billy [Nair] thought would fit into our technical committee, and I formed the group who were to attack the Bantu Administration Department.

Billy and two others were to attack the Coloured Affairs Department and the Native Affairs Department. They would drop us and go to these other places. Each man in our group had to find his own way back after the attack. (*)

During the course of the afternoon of 15 December, Mtolo and the rest of the technical committee prepared the four bombs and detonators that they would use during the attacks later on that evening. "Just after seven the others came by car. I got everything out of my room and we drove off," wrote Mtolo.

Near the municipal market they picked up the young Indian and from there they proceeded to the first target in Ordnance Road.

When we neared the main gate, where we thought we would sneak in, more than five security guards were sitting just in front of it. We decided to go to a small back door which Ronnie and I had seen the previous night. We placed the bomb against the door, packed it up with sand bags and waited for 9 p.m. to strike. Though we had changed the date from the 16th to the 15th, the time remained unchanged. After this we took a walk to kill time. At 8.55 we went back, I took the detonator, examined the sand, placed it in the can, and set it for time and screwed on the lid. Then we left, each one in his own direction. (*)

On his way to the bus stop in Soldier's Way, Mtolo could hear the bomb going off.

The next day Mtolo discovered to his dismay that the other two targets were not attacked the previous night, the reason for this being that the other bombs had no detonators.

The press report that morning described our attempt as a clumsy and amateurish effort, and a lot more. I felt like crying, Mtolo wrote. After all the trouble we had taken. This went on for a

5. Mtolo, Umkonto we Sizwe, pp. 21 - 22.
whole week in the press. It was made worse by reports that a death had occurred in Johannesburg, where one of the bombs killed the man who was carrying it, and the other man lost his arm. Arrests were made in some places ... We were not happy at all. With sabotage it does not matter how many times you have succeeded. Once there is an arrest, the whole thing becomes a failure. (6)

The total cost of the damage caused by the Ordnance Road attack was less than R100. A week later Harold Strachan was arrested by the security police in Port Elizabeth.

The day following the abortive attempt to set fire to the Durban Corporation’s Bantu Affairs Department Offices, sabotage attacks were carried out in at least ten different places throughout the country to mark the beginning of Umkhonto’s sabotage campaign. Two electric sub-stations, one at Framesley and the other at Brickmakerskloof were attacked by Umkhonto saboteurs in Port Elizabeth. Simultaneously, bombs were also exploded at the Bantu Labour Offices, the Bantu Administration Offices and the Bantu School Board Offices in the New Brighton Township of Port Elizabeth. The total damage caused by these attacks was estimated to be in the region of R375. (7)

In Johannesburg, several attacks were made on government or semi-government buildings during the night of 16th December. The first attack was made on the Municipal Bantu Control Offices in Dube Township. This attack was followed by four others: one on the Central Road Post Office at Fordsburg; one on the offices of the Portuguese Curator in Market Street; one on the Phirima Post Office in Orlando West and one on the Peri-Urban District Office in Kloptown. In the case of the latter attack dynamite was used, which caused an estimated damage of R16. In the rest of the attacks, a mixture of chemical and incendiary bombs were used causing a total

7. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Annexure A to the Indictment, pp. 2 - 3.
To judge by the nature of these early attacks and the targets involved, the campaign was strictly in keeping with the ANC and Umkhonto’s declared policy in 1961 to attack government installations but to avoid at all cost injury or death to people in the planning and execution of their attacks. The few deaths that did occur during the early stages of the sabotage campaign was largely due to negligence and ignorance.

A further six acts of sabotage were committed during the remainder of December 1961. All these attacks were committed in the Johannesburg region and before Christmas. Dynamite was used on two occasions. The total damage caused by these attacks are not known, but they must have been substantially higher than that of the previous attacks. The damage caused to the Bantu Affairs Offices in Carr Street in Fordsburg and to the Bantu Administration Offices in Market Street in Johannesburg alone for instance came to R898.

For the next two to three weeks no attacks took place; but then on 8 January 1962, Umkhonto launched the first of its New Year attacks. (See Diagram B of acts of sabotage committed during 1962.) During the course of 1962 up to 23 December, 105 acts of sabotage were committed in various parts of the country. Of these at least 16 were committed in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) area; 19 in the Durban-Pietermaritzburg area; 22 in the Cape Town-Paarl region and a total of 48 in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage-East London region. These attacks which were set out in "Annexure A" to the Rivonia Indictment were not, however, all committed by Umkhonto. There were other organisations that were also committed to sabotage in the early 1960's. A predominantly Whites only organisation, known as the National Committee for Liberation (NCFL), for instance, committed numerous acts of sabotage before Umkhonto launched its campaign in December 1961.

8. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Annexure A, pp. 3 - 4.
9. Mtolo, Umkhonto we Sizwe, p. 22.
10. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Annexure A, pp. 5 - 22.
### DISTRIBUTION OF ACTS OF SABOTAGE COMMITTED ACCORDING TO REGION OR AREA DURING THE COURSE OF 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region or Area</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town - Paarl Region</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth - East London Region</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban - Pietermaritzburg Region</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Free State</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal (PNV) Region</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Although Umkhonto we Sizwe was not the only organisation committed to a campaign of sabotage against the State in the early 1960's, it was however responsible for the majority of attacks that took place during 1962.)

11. Statistical information obtained from Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Annexure A to the Indictment.)
The stated aims and objectives of the NCFL were very similar to that of Umkhonto, namely to use sabotage to bring about a change of heart among the White electorate in South Africa with regard to the country's racial policies. Like Umkhonto, the NCFL did not direct its attacks against people but against political and economic objectives such as government buildings and powerlines, with the latter being a more favourite object of attack. In fact, the sabotage activities of the two organisations were so similar that Umkhonto felt it necessary to make it clear in a 'flyer' released on the day of its first attack on 16 December, that it was a new and independent organisation and that it was in no way connected with the 'so-called Committee for National Liberation'.

While it may be incorrect to assume that all attacks on power pylons were the work of the NCFL, they certainly were responsible for several of the attacks before as well as after December 1961. One of the "trade marks" of the NCFL was the use of dynamite and sophisticated electrical timing devices. Large quantities of dynamite were found by the police when they raided the premises of members of the organisation in July 1964. In May 1964, the NCFL changed its name to the African Resistance Movement (ARM), which is the name it became commonly known under.

A breakdown of the various acts of sabotage set out in Annexure A of the Rivonia Indictment indicates that, while Umkhonto saboteurs in the Transvaal and the Cape Province remained relatively active throughout 1962, the Regional Command of Umkhonto in Durban committed no acts of sabotage for nine months. The first act of sabotage they

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13. Some Stood Up, (New Republic 152, January 1965, p. 7). See also K. van der Merwe, Die Slag om Suid-Afrika, Deel 5 (Die Huisgenoot, 1971.10.22, pp. 67, 69). The article is based on a series of interviews between Koos van der Merwe and members of the Security Police who were involved in the investigation of the NCFL as well as the activities of the underground between 1961 and 1965.
committed in 1962 was on 14 October, when they cut the railway signals cables near Georgerdale and unsuccessfully attempted to explode a home-made incendiary bomb at the Security Police offices at Madeline Building in Durban.\(^{14}\)

Exactly what caused this lack of sabotage activity in Natal is not entirely clear, although it appears that it was the result of the hostility that had developed between the leaders of the local ANC and Umkhonto in Natal following Umkhonto's first attack on the 15th December. According to Mtolo, the leaders of the ANC in Durban not only wanted to know who the leaders of Umkhonto in the city were, but they also insisted on being consulted on all Umkhonto's operations in Natal. Mtolo wrote:

We of the Regional Command were scared of exposing ourselves to the ANC leaders, for many reasons. Firstly, we could not trust the people who made up the ANC leadership in Durban. Secondly, all our men were handpicked for their political feelings and understanding, whereas some of these ANC leaders only knew they were fighting for freedom. What kind of freedom they did not know.\(^{15}\)

According to Mtolo, Curnick Ndlovu, the "Captain" of the Regional Command in Durban, was sent to Johannesburg in early 1962 in an attempt to seek a settlement in the differences between the ANC and Umkhonto in Durban. This attempt was unsuccessful. As a result the first half of 1962 was spent in attempts to bridge the rift between the two organisations in Durban.

The NHC in Johannesburg, in the meantime, was becoming increasingly impatient with the ANC's attitude towards Umkhonto in Durban and the latter organisation's inactivity. Mtolo wrote:

We are far behind the other provinces. We only did one attack on 15 December, 1961, and we did not keep it up. The High Command was very hot about this, as they knew we had everything, including an allowance of R100 per month.\(^{16}\)

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14. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Annexure A, p. 12.
Despite increasing pressure from the NHC in Johannesburg, the Regional Command in Durban remained inactive until Mandela, recently returned from an extensive tour of Africa and Europe, visited Durban in August 1962. Mtolo recalled that the Regional Command in Durban was somewhat nervous about Mandela's visit due to the fact that they had done virtually nothing since their first attack in December. Mtolo wrote:

> We met Mandela in the dining room. He was very impressed that we were so young, the eldest among us being thirty-five. He congratulated us on having had no casualties up to then. I thought he was mocking us because we had done nothing since our first attack. (17)

It was not however Mandela's visit, nor his input that provided the necessary impetus for a resurgence of sabotage activities in Durban, but the fact that he was arrested shortly afterwards near Howick while he was on his way back to Johannesburg disguised as a chauffeur for Cyril Williams. This act, if nothing else, according to Mtolo, shocked the Regional Command back into action. Several emergency meetings were held to decide how to best revenge Mandela's arrest. Mtolo wrote:

> When Mandela was convicted in November, the Regional Command decided to show the Government that they had touched the wrong button. We decided that all the groups (presumably in Durban only) should select suitable targets to be attacked on the Friday. Later the date was changed to Sunday because of police activities. (18)

If Mtolo's evidence is correct and these attacks were the first to be committed by Umkhonto in Natal in 1962, then it means that those attacks committed before 7 November were not the work of Umkhonto. The question then is, who committed the nine acts of sabotage in the Durban-Pinetown region between 14 October and 19 November 1962? It appears that Mtolo could have made a mistake with the occasion on which the first attacks were committed in Natal in 1962, the number

of attacks (five altogether) committed on the nights of 14 and 15 October,\(^{19}\) and their proximity to the date of the arrest of Mandela in August, and not after his conviction on 7 November.

A rough estimate of the total damage caused by the various acts of sabotage committed between 1961 and June 1963 came to an estimated amount of about R93 837. Although a great deal of money to the ordinary man in 1963, it was hardly the sort of economic damage that in the long run would place a heavy burden on the State's financial position or compel white voters in the country to reconsider their political position. Edward Felt in his detailed study of Umkhonto and its activities between 1961 and 1964, wrote that while the aim of Umkhonto, namely to bring about maximum disorder, was fully understood by its leaders, they overlooked the fact that the need of the South African government was not so much to prevent all disorder, but to prevent "serious" disorder, something it was quite capable of doing.\(^{20}\)

On 12 May 1962, for instance, the government introduced the General Law Amendment Bill into Parliament. It was passed into law on 27 June. In terms of section 21 (1) of the new Act anyone will be guilty of the offence of sabotage if he commits any wrongful and wilful act whereby he obstructs, injures, tampers with or destroys:

a. the health or safety of the public and the maintenance of law and order;
b. the supply of water, light, power or food stuffs, sanitary, medical or fire extinguishing services, postal, telephone, telegraph or radio services, or of the free movement of traffic, and
c. any property.\(^{21}\)

In addition to the passing of the new Act, which popularly became known as the "Sabotage Act", the government also placed numerous people under banning orders during 1962. Among those served with

19. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Annexure A, pp. 12 - 18. See also Mandela's statement from the dock, pp. 32 - 34.  
five year banning orders were H.W. Shope of SACTU, Vera Poomen of the Federation of South African Women, as well as three lecturers - Miss G.E. Jewell of the University of Cape Town, and Messrs E.L. Maurice and R.O. Dudley of the Cape Technical College. Others were confined to specific areas. Among these were Joe Slovo and his wife Ruth of the South African Congress of Democrats, Mrs F. Mntombela and Mrs L. Ngoyi. By the end of October 1962 some 105 persons had been prohibited by one means or another from attending gatherings. Among those arrested were Whites, Coloureds, Indians and Blacks. The pro-communist and Whites-only COID was also banned by the government in September. In addition to these developments, numerous people suspected of furthering the aims of one of the banned organisations in the country, were arrested and held under the General Law Amendment Act of the previous year, which provided for periods of detention of up to twelve days. The authorities also introduced strict security on sensitive installations such as power stations, fuel storage depots and dams, which made it very difficult for Umkhonto to attack these places. Furthermore, anyone caught on or near these protected installations could face sentences of up to fifteen years.

Steps such as these, combined with the difficulty in obtaining proper and sophisticated explosive devices and the general inexperience of Umkhonto's saboteurs, seriously limited the effectiveness of the sabotage campaign. Not only were they unable to make the government seem incapable of maintaining order argued Feit, but they actually proved the opposite, namely that the government was in full control of the situation and that it had the power and authority to maintain control in the country. Consequently, the campaign never had the anticipated effect. The campaign was never fully reported in the press. This was partially due to censorship, often self-imposed, and partly because the attacks themselves were often not important enough to be newsworthy.

The absence of media coverage, combined with the government's obvious

Horrell, Action, Reaction and Counter Action, pp. 49 - 50.
control, meant that most Whites in South Africa were scarcely aware that a sabotage campaign was being waged against White rule in the country. Even if allowance is made for the more spectacular of their actions, concluded Feit, in no sense can Umkhonto be described as an unparalleled success. Its actions did little to hearten Blacks, to dishearten Whites, or to sway the government from its course.

Although the sabotage campaign was in full swing by 1962 and the police were no nearer to destroying the underground, plans were already in the making to take the armed struggle from the plain of sabotage to fullscale guerrilla warfare as soon as conditions allowed for it. When the police raided the underground’s headquarters at Rivonia in July 1963 they found a document called "Operation Mayibuye". This document, if freely translated into the Zulu language means "Operation for the return of South Africa to the Black man", consisted of six pages in which plans were set out for guerrilla warfare and the invasion of South Africa by communist or pro-communist forces during the second half of 1963. Allegedly drafted by Joe Slovo and Arthur Goldreich (the latter had visited Communist China in 1962) the latter document contained detailed plans for guerrilla warfare in South Africa. Based on the guerrilla strategies of Mao-Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party, the aim of the operation was to destroy White rule in South Africa and replace it with a Black revolutionary system of government that would be fully Marxist-socialist in nature.

According to Edward Feit, "Operation Mayibuye" had its origins before the formation of Umkhonto in 1961 and Umkhonto was a part of it. He writes:

24. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Exhibit R71, Operation Mayibuye, pp. 1 - 6.
Operation Mayibuye was intended to have three stages: first of all the building up of the underground; then a sabotage campaign to be carried out concurrently with the sending of men abroad for guerrilla training; and finally, full-scale guerrilla war, of the sort envisaged by Che Guevara.\(^{26}\)

Feit went on to explain that given these facts, the ANC leaders of course hoped that it would not be necessary to resort to guerrilla warfare. Only if the sabotage campaign failed to achieve its aims, was the guerrilla phase of Operation Mayibuye to be launched and unlimited violence to be introduced. In such a case, outside aid, in the form of both arms and funds, was to be actively solicited. Once Operation Mayibuye was fully launched, an invasion of foreign troops procured from sympathetic countries, particularly the Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries, would be launched against South Africa.\(^{27}\)

Although there is little evidence to either substantiate or refute Feit's point of view it does fit in with some of the facts, such as Mandela's tour of Africa in January 1962 and what he said at the Rivonia trial in 1964.

As far as the contents of Operation Mayibuye is concerned, the document consists of six major divisions. Part One explained why it had become necessary for the ANC (and the SACP) to begin an armed struggle against the State in South Africa. It read:

It can now be truly said that very little, if any, scope exists for the smashing of White supremacy other than by means of mass revolutionary action, the main content of which is armed resistance leading to victory by military means.\(^{28}\)

It went on to point out that the two ingredients necessary for an

28. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Exhibit R71, Operation Mayibuye, p. 1.
armed struggle were present in South Africa - namely disillusionment with constitutional and semi-constitutional forms of struggle and a conviction that the road to victory was through force and a military readiness to respond to a leadership that holds out the best possibility or successful struggle. It further pointed out that the objective military conditions in which the movement found itself made the possibility of a general uprising, leading to direct military struggle, an unlikely one. Rather, as was the case in Cuba, the general uprising had to be sparked off by organised and well-prepared guerrilla operations during the course of which the masses of the people would be drawn into the struggle, and be armed. Part 1 concludes:

We are convinced that this plan is capable of fulfillment. But only if the whole apparatus of the movement, both here and abroad, is mobilised for its implementation and if every member now prepares to make unlimited sacrifices for the achievement of our goal. The time for small thinking is over because history leaves us with no choice.

Part 2 set out four geographical areas (presumably) to be used as bases for guerrilla warfare namely, the area Port Elizabeth to Mzimkulu, Port Shepstone to Swaziland, North Western Transvaal bordering on Bechuanaland and the Limpopo River; and the North Western Cape to South West Africa (Namibia). The coastal areas from Port Elizabeth to Mzimkulu and from Port Shepstone to Swaziland were probably specially selected for the landing of guerrilla troops by submarine once the military phases of the struggle had started.

Part 3 detailed the "Plan" for landing four groups of 30 guerrilla fighters either by sea or by air who where to be "armed and properly equipped in such a way as to be self-sufficient in every respect for at least a month". At the initial stages of the attack, the plan

29. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Exhibit R71, Operation Mayibuye, pp. 1 - 2.
30. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Exhibit R71, Operation Mayibuye, pp. 2 - 3.
proposed that the four groups should split up into platoons of ten men each, and that they link up with pre-arranged, locally trained groups of guerrilla fighters. The plan also made provision for the setting up of a political authority "in a friendly territory" to supervise the struggle both internally and externally. It was envisaged that, in due course, the political authority would develop into a sort of Provisional Revolutionary government. (31)

Part 4 dealt with the internal organisation of Operation Mayibuye. It stated that:

Our target is that on arrival, the external force should find at least 7 000 men in the four main areas ready to join the guerrilla army in the initial onslaught. These will be allocated as follows: Eastern Cape to Transkei 2 000; Natal to Zululand 2 000; North Western Transvaal 2 000; and North Western Cape 1 000. (32)

Preparation work for equipping the initial forces was to take place in three stages, namely, 1) The importation of military supplies and the landing of additional supplies simultaneously with the arrival of the external forces. 2) The acquisition and accumulation internally of firearms, ammunition and explosives at all levels of organisation. And 3) the collection and accumulation of other military supplies such as food, medicines and communication equipment. Part 4 suggested that "auxiliary guerrilla/sabotage units" in the four main areas had to be set up "before and after the commencement of operations". In the areas falling outside the four main guerrilla areas, MK (Umkhonto) units would be set up to support the activities in the guerrilla areas, as well as to harass the enemy. Finally, to draw in the masses of the population, the political wing (presumably the ANC) should arouse the people to participate in the struggle that was designed "to create an upheaval throughout the country". (33)

32. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Exhibit R71, Operation Mayibuye, p. 3.
33. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Exhibit R71, Operation Mayibuye, p. 4.
Part 5 was headed: "Detailed Plan of Implementation". It set out the work of the various departments and committees, such as the Intelligence Department, the External Planning Committee, the Political Authority, the Transport Committee and the Logistics Department, with the Technical and Supply Committee falling under the latter department.

The document concludes with Part 6, which is entitled "Miscellaneous". As the heading indicates, this section dealt with miscellaneous matters such as the immediate duties of the NHC in relation to the guerrilla areas, personnel, special directives to heads of departments, the organisation of areas and the setting up of proper MK machinery. Of particular interest are the duties of the NHC in relation to the guerrilla areas and the special directives to the heads of departments. In the case of the first, the duties of the NHC were set out: to map out regions in each area with a view to organising Regional and District Commands and MK units; to employ ten full time organisers in each guerrilla area; to place these organisers under the direct control of the NHC, and to direct, recruit and arrange for the external training of at least 300 men.

In the case of the second, the heads of departments were required to submit, not later than 30 May 1963, plans detailing the structural organisation of their departments, the type and number of personnel, as well as the funds required, a schedule of the time necessary to enable each department to fulfill its target and other matters relating to the efficient execution of the department's plans.

But master plans very seldom consist of a single document and Operation Mayibuye was no exception to the rule. A large section of the documents discovered by the South African police at Rivonia in July 1963 were either directly or indirectly related to Operation Mayibuye and the revolutionary struggle for freedom in South Africa.

34. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Exhibit R71, Operation Mayibuye, pp. 4 - 5.
35. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Exhibit R71, Operation Mayibuye, p. 5 - 6.
These documents are far too numerous and varied to be fully discussed here. Consequently, only some of the more important ones have been selected for brief discussion here. The first is a three-paged stencilled document entitled "Outlines of a Syllabus for a Brief Course on the Training of Organisers". This document, which was drawn up by Govan Mbeki and Arthur Goldreich in 1963, dealt with the historical background to the Black man's struggle for freedom in South Africa, the causes leading up to the formation of Umkhonto and the sabotage campaign. Section B of the document dealt with the actual birth of Umkhonto, the move to guerrilla warfare, and a study on the feasibility of an armed struggle. It also recommended that all available literature on the subject of guerrilla warfare, with special reference to China, Cuba, Algeria and Vietnam, be examined and used in the training of organisers. The last part of the document, Section C, dealt with the organisational machinery for guerrilla warfare.

A second important document relating to Operation Mayibuye was "The Speakers Notes. A Brief Course in the Training of Organisers". This document, which closely resembled the first, conveyed the following information on the armed struggle.

... the Organisation MK is born to wage a revolutionary armed struggle to overthrow White supremacy. Sabotage on a national scale should be used principally in disrupting communications, transport, railroads, railroad installations, etc. It is the civil branch and should be carried out only outside the areas dominated by the guerrillas. ... Guerrilla warfare becomes a way of harassing and wearing down the enemy while developing one's own strength. The guerrillas must eventually shift from guerrilla operations to regular warfare in order to achieve victory.

36. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Exhibit R230, Outlines of a Syllabus for a Brief Course on the training of Organisers, pp. 1 - 3.
37. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Exhibit R54, The Speaker's Notes. A Brief Course on the Training of Organisers, pp. 1 - 16.
In addition to the above documents, numerous others dealing with sabotage, guerrilla warfare and the problems relating to it were also found by the police at Rivonia. Some of these were in the handwriting of Arthur Goldreich and Harold Wolpe while others, such as the "Introduction to Demolition and Theory of Explosives" and "Strategic Problems of Guerrilla Warfare", were apparently the work of Goldreich alone. As pointed out, Goldreich visited Red China during the course of 1963 to discuss various aspects of guerrilla warfare with the Chinese. On his return to South Africa in early 1963, Goldreich prepared a 43-page document entitled "First Discussions - C. Lee [on] Defence of China" in which he set out the information obtained from the Chinese on the communist revolution in China.\(^\text{38}\) In addition to these documents there were also a number of pamphlets and papers, some prepared by Goldreich and some by Dennis Goldberg, dealing with the manufacturing and acquisition of explosives, landmines and hand grenades. Among the latter documents were some correspondence between Dennis Goldberg and timber merchants in Johannesburg regarding the purchase of wooden boxes for the manufacturing of landmines. Goldberg also obtained a diagram for a capula-type furnace that would be suitable for melting metals and making castings for the manufacturing of hand grenades.\(^\text{39}\)

Even more revealing and indicative of the extent to which the NHC of Umkhonto and the communist underground in South Africa had intended taking the liberation struggle, was the document entitled "Production Requirements". According to this document, facilities and materials were sought for the production of 15 tons of black powder; 21 tons of aluminium powder; 144 tons of ammonium nitrate; 1 500 timing devices for bombs; 48 000 anti-personnel mines and 210 000 hand grenades. In the opinion of an explosives expert, the quantity of explosives and exploding devices set out above would have been enough to blow up an entire city the size of Johannesburg.\(^\text{40}\)

38. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Judgement, pp. 25 - 28.
39. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Judgement, pp. 30, 41.
40. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Exhibit T.1, See also Dr. Yutar's Opening address to the Court in 1963, p. 8.
On the basis of these and other facts, the State, in its case against the NHC of Umkhonto in 1963, contended that there could be no doubt that the plans set out in Operation Mayibuye had been adopted by the leaders of Umkhonto and that they were in the process of implementing it when the police raided Rivonia in July. This was, however, denied by Walter Sisulu, Dennis Goldberg, and Govan Mbeki, who told the Court that the plan was impracticable and as result it was never adopted.\(^1\) The latter point of view was accepted by the Court who argued that it had not been sufficiently proven by the State that Operation Mayibuye had progressed beyond the preparation stage.\(^2\) Considering that preparation normally precedes adoption and implementation, it could be conceded that while extensive preparations were being made for a guerrilla struggle, the plans as contained in Operation Mayibuye were never adopted by Umkhonto's NHC prior to the raid on Rivonia on 11 July 1963. Yet, two years later in 1966, Batholomew Hlapane told the court during the trial of Abraham Fischer, that Operation Mayibuye had been accepted by the Central Committee of the SACP prior to July 1963.\(^3\) Joe Slovo later confirmed that while Operation Mayibuye had been adopted in principle at a meeting of the ANC and the SACP in early 1963 he, together with J.B. Marks, took the plan to London in May/June of the same year for discussion with Oliver Tambo and the rest of the Mission in Exile.\(^4\)

At his trial in 1964, Mandela told the Court that the leaders of the ANC had hoped that the sabotage campaign would never lead to open warfare between Whites and Blacks in South Africa, since Blacks would have been at a distinct disadvantage, due to their lack of military training. Unlike Whites, Blacks were not called up for compulsory

\(^{1.}\) Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Evidence of W. Sisulu and G. Mbeki with regards to the feasibility of Operation Mayibuye (See complete evidence).

\(^{2.}\) Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Judgement, p. 36.

\(^{3.}\) Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 375/66, The State against A. Fischer and 13 others, Evidence and Cross Examination of B.M. Hlapane, pp. 1 - 100.

military training in South Africa. To overcome this weakness it was decided in 1961 to build up "a nucleus of trained men" who would be able to provide the leadership which would be required if guerrilla warfare started. We," he said "had to be prepared for such a situation before it became too late to make proper preparations." Once this stand was taken, it was decided that Mandela should slip out of the country to attend the conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMCSA) in Addis Ababa in early 1962 to solicit support for the ANC in its struggle for freedom and at the same time, to seek training facilities for young Black guerrilla fighters from South Africa.

According to Howard Barrell, whatever the hope expressed by Umkhonto in its manifesto, the organisation's leadership apparently did not seriously expect the State to retreat from [its] apartheid policy in the face of the first few bangs - although [there] might well have been some others who did. It anticipated that the State's response would leave MK no choice but to move towards developing a sustained armed struggle. This had a bearing on MK's choice of sabotage for its initial ventures. Sabotage would show doubters in the Congress Alliance the need for, and benefit of, armed activity. It could also demonstrate to the populace at large that there had been a break with a half century of non-violent politics.

With Mandela's departure from South Africa in early 1962 the leadership of Umkhonto temporarily fell to Joe Slovo of the SACP. However, the fact that Mandela was sent out of South Africa a mere month after Umkhonto was launched to seek financial and presumably material aid for the armed struggle in South Africa also suggests

46. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Statement from the dock, pp. 24 - 26.
that the leaders of the underground, particularly those of Umkhonto, did not really seriously believed that sabotage alone could bring revolutionary change in South Africa. The most it could do was to serve as a "bridge" to carry people politically from the old to the new phase of resistance. Plans to transform the sabotage campaign into a revolutionary guerrilla struggle was therefore vitally important and well underway by the end of 1962, beginning 1963. A circular entitled "Umkonto we Sizwe Greets the People of South Africa: A Message from the High Command" sent to the offices of the Black press at the end of 1962 to mark the first anniversary of the sabotage campaign strongly reflected the revolutionary mood of the underground by the end of 1962. It stated clearly that Umkhonto will not rest until White supremacy had been "wiped of the face of the country).

A second document released by the underground in May 1963 carried an even stronger message to Whites in South Africa. Under the heading "The ANC Spearheads Revolution, Leballo No", the document made it clear that the Black people in South Africa were at war with the government. It wrote:

Twelve million people will be slaves no longer. For three hundred years the Whites have refused to hear our voice. The ways of peace have failed. Now we fight to be free. The Verwoerd Government had made it impossible for us to win our birthright any other way. The ANC tells the people straight: the struggle that will free us is a long hard job... The White supremacy state is powerful and had tried to prepare itself for revolution. It has money, it is well organised, well armed. ... TO DESTROY VERWOERD WE MUST DESTROY THE INSTRUMENTS OF WHITE POWER. We will not win until we destroy the forces that make the White state powerful. ... WHAT ARE THE INSTRUMENTS OF WHITE POWER? They are the army, the railways, the docks, the factories, the farms, the police and the whole administration. HOW ARE (WE) TO SMASH THEM? With planned, strategic violence. Already scared, the Whites are on the look-out.

49. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Judgement, pp. 20 - 21.
We must outwit them. We must hit them when they are not looking. ... ORGANISED VIOLENCE WILL SMASH APARTHEID. (**0)

The document also made it clear that Umkhonto was the army of the National Liberation Movement; that it was for activists; that it was training the youth as an army of liberation and that it had the necessary leadership to fight a war of liberation. (**1)

A few months earlier, in January 1963, the London based magazine Assegai, which closely concerned itself with the ANC's struggle for freedom in South Africa, and which from time to time propagated the advice of revolutionaries such as Mao Tse Tung and Fidel Castro on guerrilla warfare, carried the following lines on the liberation struggle in South Africa:

As true Marxist-Leninists, we believe in the inevitable clash between capitalists and workers and the ultimate and decisive destruction of capitalism. We know that the grounds for this clash must be prepared in a scientific and revolutionary way. We therefore welcome and have closely associated ourselves with the small beginnings that have already been made in our country. We salute UMKONTO WE SIZWE (Spear of the Nation) as a step in the right direction. By their acts of sabotage the necessary spark (for revolution) has been given. (**2)

1.1 The Raid on Rivonia July 1963

If there was still any doubt by the beginning of 1963 that the underground in South Africa was making plans for an intensification of the armed struggle, this doubt was finally removed by the discoveries.

51. Regional Court, Pietermaritzburg, Case R/C 508, 1966 - 1967, The State against A. Dhlomo and M.G. Mxenge, Exhibit "P".
52. Assegai, 1963.01.01, p. 1. See also Soref, The Puppeteers, p. 91.
that the police made when they raided the combined internal underground headquarters of the banned ANC, SACP and Umkhonto on 11 July 1963. Ever since the first attacks of December 1961 the police had been searching for the underground headquarters of the ANC and the SACP, without any success. The process of uncovering the headquarters of the underground turned out to be a long and arduous one with many frustrations for the security police and the government. One of the reasons why the police were unable to find the headquarters was probably the fact that they concentrated their search on the Black townships around the country while, in the meantime, it was situated in one of Johannesburg's wealthy White suburbs.

Although the police were fully aware of the decisions that was taken in mid-1961 to move to sabotage, they were nevertheless caught off-guard by the intensity and scale of the campaign. To complicate matters, Umkhonto was not the only organisation actively involved in acts of terrorism and sabotage in 1961. Two other organisations, namely the PAC's Pogo movement and the previously mentioned National Committee for Liberation (NCFL) which later changed its name to the African Resistance Movement (ARM), were also making attacks on government installations. Consequently some of the acts of sabotage committed before 15 December (some twelve incidents of sabotage were listed in Annexure A to the Rivonia Indictment prior to this date) were probably committed by either or both these two organisations. Pogo was established early in 1961.

53. Van der Merwe, Die Slag om Suid-Afrika, Deel 5 (Die Huisgenoot, 1971.09.24, p. 18). The contents of the article which is based on a series of interviews between Van der Merwe and Major General P.J. Venter corresponds very closely with an account of the events given by L. Strydom in his book, Rivonia Masker Af, which was published in September 1964 shortly after the end of the Rivonia Trial.

54. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Annexure A to the Indictment, pp. 1 - 2.

The ANC and Umkhonto were quick to capitalise on the confusion that was created by the various campaigns of violence in the country. Shortly after the Bashee River murders the ANC released a pamphlet in which it warned Whites in South Africa that within a year or two the country would be caught in a war which would be more bloody and furious than that which took place in Algeria between 1954 and 1961, and which led to France’s withdrawal from that country. The pamphlet begins:

Listen, White Man! Five Whites were murdered in the Transkei, another hacked to death at Langa ... Sabotage erupts every other week throughout the country, now here now there. The Whites are turning vicious and panicky ... At this rate, within a year or two South Africans will be embroiled in a bloody, more furious, Algerian (type of) war.

Sabotage and murder multiplied last year. Sabotage and murder will not cease. You now face an indefinitely long future of terrorism, uncertainty and a steadily eroding power. You will keep a gun at your side, not knowing whom to trust. Perhaps the street cleaner is a saboteur, perhaps the man who makes your tea at the office has a gun... You will never be safe and you will never be sure. You will have launched a war you cannot win. (••)

No wonder then that the police struggled to find the source of the spate of armed attacks that hit the country since 1961. Even the arrest of Nelson Mandela in August 1962 did not bring them any nearer to stopping the acts of sabotage that were taking place all over the country. Although numerous arrests were made during 1962, none of these led the police any nearer to the underground headquarters of either the ANC or Umkhonto.

The first important breakthrough that would eventually lead the police to the headquarters of the underground came in early June 1963 when they arrested a convoy of Umkhonto recruits at Zeerust in the

Western Transvaal. These recruits were being taken out of the country for military training. That same night the police also arrested the owner of the taxi business that was used to transport the recruits to the Bechuanaland border. This person was Essop Sullman. Although Sullman was only responsible for the transporting of ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe recruits to the border, his arrest allowed the police to gain further access to the underground and its activities in early 1963.

The second important breakthrough came on 26 June when a broadcast by a clandestine radio called "Radio Liberation" was picked up by the regular radio service. A transcript of the broadcast was handed to the security police. The speaker, to the great surprise of the police, was no other than Walter Sisulu. Ever since he jumped his bail of R6 000 while awaiting an appeal against a prison sentence of six years, the police had been searching for him, but without success. They had come to believe that Sisulu had left the country. The broadcast, however, proved them wrong. Sisulu was not only in the country but right under their noses in Johannesburg, which made them believe that the underground's headquarters had to be nearby.

The third and final breakthrough in the search for the underground headquarters of the ANC came a short while after Sisulu made his broadcast from Rivonia in Johannesburg. On Wednesday afternoon 2 July 1963, Lieutenant Willem van Wyk of the security police received a phone call in his office on the sixth floor of "The Grays" in Von Wieligh Street, Johannesburg. The call was from a contact in Johannesburg's northern suburbs informing him that he had someone with him that could lead them to Walter Sisulu and the underground headquarters of the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe. Lieutenant van Wyk, in an interview with Koos van der Merwe, a journalist, in 1971, recalled that he could hardly believe his ears when he received the

57. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Evidence of Essop Sullman, pp. C 5 - 6.
call. (**) For someone who had struggled for almost eighteen months to find the one link that would lead him to the leaders of the sabotage campaign, the news of the whereabouts of Sisulu and the ANC's underground headquarters was an overwhelming experience. (**)

Exactly who the informant was, was never revealed. The reason for the person's identity not being revealed is not difficult to understand, since the person would almost certainly have been executed by the underground. According to research that was done recently into the history of the communist movement in South Africa, an amount of R6 000 was offered to the informant by the security police to reveal the headquarters of the underground. (**)

Considering that the average salary of a White worker in 1963 was probably not more than R400.00 per month, the amount of R6 000 was staggering and hard to resist. From here onwards it was merely a matter of time before the police discovered the ANC, SACP and Umkhonto's underground headquarters at Rivonia and raided the place on 11 July 1963.

When the police stormed into the neat, thatch-roofed homestead on Liliesleaf Farm, Rivonia on the afternoon of 11 July, they made a discovery that went beyond their wildest expectations. On entering the building they found not only most of the members of the NHC of Umkhonto on the premises, but also large quantities of highly incriminating documents and other pieces of evidence that made it possible for them to eventually destroy the entire underground operations of the ANC, the SACP and with it the sabotage campaign of Umkhonto by the end of 1965. Among the people arrested at Rivonia were well-known ANC and SACP members such as Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, Lionel Bernstein, Bob Heppe, Raymond Mhabla, Walter Sisulu and Dennis Goldberg. They later also arrested Arthur Goldreich and

60. Van der Merwe, Die Slag om Suid-Afrika, Deel 6, (DIE Huisgenoot, 1971.10.29, p. 30).
Dr. Hillard Festensteln, as well as the eight Black labourers who worked on the small-holding.\(^{62}\)

In addition to the arrests they made, the police discovered large quantities of documents and other incriminating evidence. Over two hundred of these documents were taken away for examination. Among the documents found by the police was "Operation Mayibuye". This particular document - the content of which has already been discussed - was the subject of discussion by some of the members of the NHC of Umkhonto when the police entered the Lilliesleaf house.

1.2 The Rivonia Trial 1963 - 1964

(a) Events preceeding the Trial

As a result of the discoveries made at Rivonia and the underground's other properties at Travellyn in the Krugersdorp district, and at Terras Avenue in Mountain View, Johannesburg, the police systematically unravelled the structure and activities of the underground. In addition to the twelve people they were holding for 90-days in terms of the General Law Amendment Act of 1963, following the raid on Rivonia (they were Dennis Goldberg, Arthur Goldreich, James Kantor, Lionel (Rusty) Bernstein, Harold Wolpe, Bob Hepple, Raymond Mhlaba, Elias Motsoaledi, Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, Andrew Mlangeni and Ahmed Kathrada) the police also held numerous other persons, including Nelson Mandela, who was already a sentenced prisoner. In reference to the subversive activities of the underground, the Minister of Justice, Mr. B.J. Vorster, told Parliament in April 1963 that it had become necessary for the State to table the General Law Amendment Bill in order to deal with the sabotage campaign and to put an end to the subversive activities of the ANC and the SACP.\(^{63}\)

Although the new act was unpopular with the opposition, both in and outside Parliament, the State, with the aid of the act and the discoveries made at Rivonia, managed to cripple the sabotage campaign. In sharp contrast to the more than 182 acts of sabotage that were committed in the period preceding the approval of the act in April 1963 and the discovery of Rivonia some three months later, the period following July 1963 witnessed only 21 incidents of terror (see Diagram C). Abraham (Bram) Fischer, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the SACP and the leader of the defence in the Rivonia trial later admitted that the act was to a large degree responsible for the destruction of the underground. "We," he wrote in 1963, "failed completely to understand the power of the 90-day detention weapon when it was applied by cruel, ruthless and often clever men".\(^{64}\)

Although the events of July 1963 did not put an immediate end to the activities of the underground and the sabotage campaign, it placed growing pressure on Wilton Mkwayi and others, including Bram Fischer and the remaining members of the underground communist movement, to curtail their actions and review their position. Many, who feared that it was only a matter of time before the police arrested them, left the country in a great hurry. On 11 August 1963, some two months before the Rivonia Trail was to begin, two key witnesses in the trial namely Arthur Goldreich and Harold Wolpe, together with two Indian conspirators, escaped from police custody after they had managed to bribe a young and naive prison warden with a promise of R1 000,\(^{65}\) R2 000 less than the sum the police paid their informant for information on the headquarters of the underground in June. Johan Arnold Greef, the young prison warden who allowed himself to be bribed, was brought to trial in September 1963 and subsequently sentenced to six years imprisonment.\(^{66}\)

64. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 375/66, The State against A. Fisher and 13 others, Document entitled Time for Re-Assessment, pp. 3 - 4. See also Dawn Souvenir Issue, pp. 24 - 25.
65. The Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 1963.08.12. See also Strydom, Rivonia. Masker Af, pp. 36 - 40, 43.
Although not all the acts of sabotage recorded below were committed by Umkhonto we Sizwe most of them can be attributed to the latter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 August 1961 - 14 December 1961</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 December 1961 - 30 June 1963</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1963 - 10 March 1964</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 March 1964 - 12 June 1974 (date of Rivonia verdict)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 June 1964 - December 1964 (most of the acts of sabotage committed during this period was done by the ARM)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The above information has been obtained from the following sources:
Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Annexure A to the Indictment, pp. 1 - 32;
Horrell, Survey of Race Relations, 1964, pp. 30 - 33; L. le Grange, Die Suid-Afrikaanse Staatsveiligheids situasie (Instituut vir Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, Aktualiteitsreeks, No. 11, University of Potchefstroom, July 1977, p. 8).
Following their escape from the police cells at Marshall Square, Goldreich and Wolpe used the underground or rather what was still left of it, to make their way to Swaziland. Here they stayed for a while with the Reverend Charles Hooper, the same clergyman who was accused by the government of being partially responsible for the unrest in the Zeerust area in 1957 - 58. In order to escape across the border Goldreich and Wolpe disguised themselves as two priests. Goldreich went under the alias of the Reverend Shippon while Wolpe was disguised as the Reverend Mitchel. After a short stay in Swaziland, during which time the necessary arrangements were being made for their escape to Dar-es-Salaam, they were transported by light aircraft to Lobatsi in Betchuanaland where they arrived on 28 August.

From Lobatsi they were taken by Landrover to Francistown where they met Ismail Bhana, their contact man in Bechuanaland. Bhana was the ANC and SACP’s chief organiser of escape routes out of South Africa and Bechuanaland. Like Goldreich and Wolpe, Bhana was also a communist. With the active support of Bhana and the ANC’s Escape Committee, Moola and Jassat, the two Indians who escaped with Goldreich and Wolpe, were also airlifted from Swaziland to Bechuanaland. From there they were later separately accompanied by Bhana to Dar-es-Salaam where they were given a hero’s welcome by members of the ANC and the banned SACP.

On the same day that Goldreich and Wolpe arrived in Francistown, a Dakota of the East African Airways (EAA) landed at the Welena airport not far outside the town to airlift the two men to Dar-es-Salaam. Their flight to Dar-es-Salaam was scheduled for the 29th, but during the early hours of the morning the plane was completely destroyed by an explosion. Exactly who was responsible for this explosion is not clear but it was reported in September 1964, that on 1 September a man telephoned the offices of the Rand Daily Mail in Johannesburg.

67. See Chapter three.
claiming to be the leader of the group that had destroyed the Dakota at Welena Airport. The group was apparently 30 men strong, multi-racial in composition and utterly opposed to communism. According to the anonymous caller, the group (its name is not known) was dedicated to "fair-play" and "the punishment of saboteurs who had injured innocent women and children". (70) Fearing an attack on their person, Goldreich and Wolpe asked for police protection until new arrangements could be made for their safe departure from Francistown. An appeal was made to the East African Airways to send another aircraft, but this they were reluctant to do. However, the EAA later announced that it would be prepared to send a light plane providing the British government could give the necessary assurances that the plane would be placed under strict security at Francistown. This offer was however subsequently withdrawn by the EAA after another plane reportedly chartered by the ANC in Dar-es-Salaam, crashed at Mbeya in Southern Tanganyika (now Tanzania). From London it was reported that two Labour members of Parliament had requested the British government to send a Royal Air Force plane to Francistown to take the two fugitives to safety. The British government was however not prepared to do this. On 5 September the ANC in Dar-es-Salaam managed to arrange for a light plane from Tanganyika to fly the two men from Bechuanaland to the safety of Dar-es-Salaam. (72) Four days later, on 9 September, Goldreich and Wolpe were taken in great secrecy to Palapye some 165 kilometers south of Francistown. From here they were taken by a single-engined aircraft of the Arusha Air Charters (AAC) from Tanganyika to Elizabethville in Katanga. The next day they were flown from Katanga to Dar-es-Salaam, where they were given a hero's welcome by the ANC. (72)

During their thirteen-day stay in Dar-es-Salaam, Goldreich and Wolpe held discussions with a number of exiles from South Africa such as

70. The Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 1964.09.11 - 12. See also Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations, 1964, p. 82.
Jack Hodgson and Vivian Ezra (he was the director of the non-existing company that bought Lilliesleaf Farm in 1961), as well as with some African leaders such as the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere. Tanzania had achieved its independence in December 1961.

From Dar-es-Salaam Goldreich and Wolpe were flown to London where they again arrived to a hero’s welcome on 23 September. The next day they attended a press conference that was arranged for them in the House of Commons by Barbara Castle(73), a Labour M.P. and senior member of the anti-apartheid movement in the U.K. Among those who attended the press conference were Joe Slovo, who had left South Africa in May 1963 to seek financial and military support for Umkhonto, and Oliver Tambo, the leader and acting President-General of the ANC’s Mission in Exile (see Chapter 5). Goldreich eventually settled in Israel while Wolpe went to the Soviet Union.(74)

The position occupied by Goldreich in the underground in South Africa was later pieced together by the police from the evidence found at Rivonia. More than fifteen of the documents found at Lilliesleaf were in the handwriting of Goldreich while numerous others dealing with guerrilla warfare, the manufacturing and use of explosives were found in Goldreich’s car.(75)

Wolpe occupied an equally important position in the underground’s chain of command. He was co-author with Goldreich of at least one document entitled “Carrying out orders”. His real value in the underground, however, lay in the fact that as a partner in a firm of lawyers, he was able to use his position to receive and disburse monies received from abroad to finance the underground activities of the ANC, Umkhonto, and the Communist Party.(76)

73. The Evening Post (Johannesburg), 1963.09.24; The Daily Dispatch (East London), 1963.09.25.
75. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, List of Exhibits found at Rivonia and in the car of A. Goldreich, pp. 1 - 10.
76. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, List of Exhibits found at Rivonia and at the offices of James Kantor and Partners, pp. 1 - 4.
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76. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, List of Exhibits found at Rivonia and at the offices of James Kantor and Partners, pp. 1 - 4.
(b) The Rivonia Trial

The trial of Nelson Mandela and his fellow accused, which became popularly known as the Rivonia Trial, started on 9 October 1963 when eleven of the original thirteen accused appeared in the Pretoria Supreme Court on charges of sabotage; of being members of the NHC of Umkhonto; of soliciting and receiving funds from local and overseas sources for sabotage and of furthering the aims and objectives of communism in South Africa. (77)

The State was represented by the Deputy Attorney-General for the Transvaal, Dr. Percy Yutar (Senior Council) who was assisted by Advocate A.J. Krog and two senior public prosecutors, Messrs T.B. Vorster and E. Klusman. The accused were represented by Advocate Abram Fischer (Senior Council) who was assisted by Advocates V.C. Berrange, A.C. Chaskalson, G. Bizos and J.F. Coaker. The last person appeared on behalf of James Kantor only. Both Advocates Fischer and Berrange were listed by the government as communists. (78)

After an adjournment of 19 days to study the charges against their clients, the defence applied to the Court to have the indictment rejected on the grounds that it was vague and not properly worded. After studying the indictment the presiding Judge, Mr. Justice O. de Wet agreed with the defence that the document was not acceptable to the Court and ordered the release of the accused. (79)

Before the accused could leave the court building however, they were all rearrested. One of the accused, Bob Hepple, was released on the morning of 29 October after he had agreed to turn state witness. Of the thirteen originally accused only ten thus remained. These were listed in the second indictment as: Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Dennis Goldberg, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Mohammed Kathrada, Lionel Bernstein, Raymond Mahlaba (also spelled Mhlaba), James Kantor, Elias Motsoaledi and Andrew Mlangeni.

77. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, First Indictment, pp. 1 - 4.
79. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Application by the Defence, and Judgement, pp. 1 - 6.
The second indictment was presented to the Court on 25 November and was almost twice the length of the first. In terms of the new indictment the accused were charged with having deliberately and maliciously plotted and engineered the commission of acts of violence and destruction throughout the country. The planned purpose was to bring about chaos, disorder and turmoil in South Africa that would be aggravated, according to their plan, by the deployment of thousands of guerrillas throughout the country at various vantage points as set out in Operation Mayibuye.\(^{80}\) In addition to the charges of sabotage and the manufacturing of explosives and the provision of other materials to bring about a revolution in South Africa, the accused were also charged with furthering the aims of communism.\(^{81}\)

A conviction under the main counts of sabotage and guerrilla warfare to overthrow the State could carry the death penalty, while a conviction under the Suppression of Communism Act carried heavy prison sentences.

In the weeks and months that followed the beginning of the trial, the prosecution presented the court with a mass of documentary and other evidence derived from the uncovering of the underground’s headquarters at Rivonia. The witnesses called by the State alone numbered 173 people. Perhaps the most important witness was Mr. X - he was later identified as Bruno Mtololo, who served on the Regional Command of Umkhonto in Natal.

Arrested in August 1963, Mtololo became the State’s chief witness after realising that the police knew all about him and the underground. Since the beginning of 1963 he had become increasingly disillusioned with the way in which some of the leaders of the ANC and the SACP were running Umkhonto. He became convinced that these leaders were running the organisation not for the benefit of the Black masses in South Africa but rather to further the aims of communism, something

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80. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Exhibit R71, Operation Mayibuye, pp. 1 - 6.
81. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Second Indictment, pp. 7 - 9; De Villiers, Rivonia. Operation Mayibuye, p. 26.
the majority of the members of the ANC were not aware of, he told the Court in 1964. In his book, Umkonto we Sizwe. The Road to the Left, he later alleged that by the time the sabotage campaign had started in 1961, the top leadership in the ANC was fully in the hands of the SACP.

The evidence and cross-examination of Mtolo concluded the case for the State on 4 March 1964. On 20 April the defence began their argument. In his opening address, Advocate Fischer informed the court that the Defence would present evidence to prove that of the seven accused alleged to be members of the NNC of Umkhonto, namely Mandela, Sisulu, Goldberg, Mbeki, Kathrada, Bernstein and Mhlabat least three (Goldberg, Bernstein and Mhlab) were not members of Umkhonto. Fischer further pointed out that the Defence would seek to show that the leaders of both Umkhonto and the ANC, as far as possible, endeavoured to keep the two organisations apart and that they were not one and the same organisation as was claimed by the State. The Defence would further seek to show that although the ANC welcomed the support of the SACP and other anti-government organisations, the two organisations were never controlled nor were they a tool of the SACP. The Court was also informed that in the last instance the Defence would bring evidence to show that while preparations for guerrilla warfare were being made from as early as 1962, no plan for its implementation was ever adopted. In this way the Defence acknowledged the existence of Operation Mayibuye but denied that it was accepted or implemented.

At the end of his address Fischer handed the court a list of admissions by the accused. In this the Defence informed the court

82. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Evidence and Cross Examination of Bruno Mtolo, pp. 4 - 5; Mtolo, Umkonto we Sizwe, pp. 132 - 133.
83. Mtolo, Umkonto we Sizwe, pp. 182 - 183.
84. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Opening Address of Mr. A. Fischer, pp. 1 - 4.
85. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Opening Address of Mr. A. Fischer, pp. 1 - 4.
that Mandela, Motsoaledi and Mlangeni would not take the oath but
would give their evidence in the form of an unsworn statement to the
court. Their evidence could therefore not be cross-examined by the
State. The remaining accused were, however, prepared to present
their evidence under oath and could therefore be cross-examined.
Some of the latter accused such as Sisulu and Goldberg, although
prepared to give evidence under oath, refused to answer many of the
questions put to them by the prosecution. Kantor, who was accused
number eight, was discharged by the court at the closing of the
State's case due to a lack of sufficient evidence against him.**(86)**

(c) **Judgement**

The hearing was concluded on 3 June 1964 after both the State and the
Defence had concluded their representation. Mr. Justice de Wet
handed down his judgement on 11 June, while sentence was passed the
following day. In his judgement of some 72 typed pages the judge
found Mandela, Sisulu, Goldberg, Mbeki, Mhlaba, Motsoaledi and
Mlangeni guilty on all four counts as set out in the indictment
against them. Kathrada was found guilty on count one but not on
counts two, three and four. Bernstein was found not guilty on all
four counts and discharged. He was, however, immediately re-arrested
under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 before he could leave
the court building. He was later granted bail of R2 000; an opportu-
nity which he subsequently used to escape from the country.(87)

The remaining eight accused were all sentenced to life imprisonment.
In passing sentence on 12 June, Mr. Justice de Wet made it clear that
the function of the Court in South Africa, as in any country, was to
enforce law and order, and to enforce the laws of the State within
which it functions. He further pointed out that:

> the crime of which the accused have been con-

-victed, that is the main crime, the crime of

conspiracy, is in essence one of high treason. The

86. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State
against N. Mandela and others, Judgement, pp. 5 - 7.
87. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State
against N. Mandela and others, Judgement, pp. 1 - 72. See also
Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1964,
p. 89.
State has decided not to charge the crime in this form. Bearing this in mind, and given the matter very serious consideration, I have decided not to impose the supreme penalty which in a case like this would usually be the proper penalty for the crime (of high treason). (\*)

Indemnity was granted to all state witnesses.

1.3 Reaction to the Trial and the Sentence

(a) International Reaction

The international reaction to the trial and the sentence can generally be described as one of outrage and severe criticism. The emotional reaction of the overseas press is perhaps best reflected in the fact that the day after the Court handed down its sentences, the World Peace Council, one of the organisations belonging to the international anti-apartheid movement, announced that it had decided to award the "Juliot Curie Peace Gold Medal" to the Rivonia accused "in recognition of their courageous efforts for peace, democracy, and human equality in South Africa". (\*)

Some of the most severe criticism came from the Anglican Church in the United Kingdom. The Reverend Joost de Blank, canon at Westminster Abbey and former Archbishop of the Anglican Church in Cape Town, spent a considerable deal of time in organising a world-wide campaign for the release of the Rivonia accused. He even travelled as far as the United States to present a petition to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organisation in New York, urging him to use his position and that of his office to secure the release of the accused. (\*) Strong criticism of the South African government and support for the Rivonia accused also came from the Reverend John Collins, a well known and influential Anglican priest, devoted

88. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Sentence, 12 June 1962, pp. 1 - 2.
89. The Daily News (Durban), 1964.06.13.
90. The Sunday Tribune (Durban), 1964.06.14; The Daily News (Durban), 1964.06.13; The Transvaler (Johannesburg), 1964.06.13.
communist and president of the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) - which also had a branch in South Africa. The IDAF was established shortly after the Second World War in 1946 at Oxford University. The name of the organisation then was the Christian Action Group. The South African chapter of the IDAF was administered by Doreen Tucker, a listed communist. ("1)

The stated aims and objectives of the IDAF was

to assist in the development of a non-racial society in Southern Africa based on a democratic way of life, with the object to aid, defend and rehabilitate the victims of unjust legislation and oppressive and arbitrary procedures; to support their families and dependants and to keep the conscience of the world alive to the issues at stake. ("2)

A considerable part of the funds that was sent to the ANC, Umkhonto and the SACP during the 1960 and 1961 was channeled through the offices of the IDAF in Johannesburg. ("3)

In addition to the reaction that was received from the Church and opposition parties in the United Kingdom, criticism also came from other countries such as France and the USA as well as organisations such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU). From Norway, for instance, a sum of about R2 000 was sent to Mrs. Winnie Mandela by the Norwegian Crisis Fund for South Africa via Christian Action in London to aid

91. The above account of the history of the International Defence and Aid Fund has been compiled from the following sources: Pike, A History of Communism in South Africa, pp. 244, 326 - 337; Vermaak, The Red Trap, p. 67; Soref, The Puppeteers, pp. 31 - 32.
93. Horrell, Action, Reaction and Counter-Reaction, p. 32; See also Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 375/66, The State against A. Fischer and 13 others, Evidence of B.M. Hlapane in general; and Vermaak, The Red Trap, pp. 67 - 69.
the families of the accused.

(b) Local Reaction

In South Africa the outcome of the trial was less emotionally reflected in the daily press. Both the Afrikaans and English language newspapers, which generally reflect the position or point of view of the government on the one hand and that of the opposition parties on the other hand, gave the trial and sentences passed by the Court a fair hearing and generally agreed that the outcome was fair and that there was nothing wrong with the South African judiciary.

As far as the Black press was concerned, the Johannesburg based World simply stated in an editorial on 15 June that justice had been done in that seven of the accused were found guilty of having plotted to overthrow the State through the use of violence. It did, however, point out that a lesson was to be learnt from the Rivonia Trial in that it would mark the beginning of a new era in which the government should make every possible attempt to eliminate the factors and circumstances that gave rise to the need for violence.

But perhaps more significant was the reaction of ex-Chief Albert Luthuli to the Rivonia sentences. In a statement read to the Security Council of the United Nations on his behalf, Luthuli remarked that:

> the African National Congress never abandoned its methods of militant non-violent struggle, and of creating in the process a spirit of militancy in

94. Die Volksblad (Bloemfontein), 1964.06.15; The Daily News (Durban), 1964.06.13; The Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 1964.06.13; See also The Rivonia Trial Ten Years Later, (United Nations Unit on Apartheid, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, Notes and Documents, 8/1974, p. 8).

95. The Daily News (Durban), 1964.06.16; Die Volksblad (Bloemfontein), 1964.06.12 (Editorial); House of Assembly Debates, vol. 12, 1964.06.15, col. 8149.

96. The World (Johannesburg), 1964.06.15 (Editorial).
the people. However, in the face of the uncompro-
mising white refusal to abandon a policy which
denies the Africans and other oppressed South
Africans their rightful heritage - freedom - no
one can blame brave, just men, for seeking justice
by the use of violent methods; nor could they be
blamed if they tried to create an organised force
in order to ultimately establish peace and racial
harmony. *(97)*

Thus by 1964 even Luthuli, despite his opposition to violence, had
come to accept the position and activities of Umkhonto and the
guidance it received from the SACP, both locally and abroad.

The government's reaction to the outcome of the Rivonia Trial and the
overseas criticism of its racial policies was reflected in an
official statement released by the Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd on
16 June. In this Verwoerd stated that the Rivonia Trial and the
judgement passed by the Court was entirely a South African matter.
He informed Parliament:

... but in spite of that, we find governments of
other nations taking an interest in them, (but)
these reactions are not spontaneous reactions.
They have been organised for a long time and this
emitted from two circles: the one is the group
of bodies which are continually opposing South
Africa and which have made it their task to attack
South Africa, like the Anti-Apartheid League and
other groups in Britain; but behind them there is
a much (wider organisation), viz, world
communism. *(98)*

He went on to say that the world must take note of the fact, that
South Africa was dealing with a communist inspired attempt to create
chaos and disorder in the Republic and that for the first, and
perhaps the only time, the communist states and governments have
openly expressed their support for the insurgents in South Africa.
In reference to the Rivonia accused themselves, he made it abundantly
clear that the South African government viewed them as

97. The Rivonia Trial Ten Years Later, *(United Nations Unit on
Apartheid, Department of Political and Security Council
Affairs, Notes and Documents, 8/1974, pp. 6 - 7).*
98. *House of Assembly Debates,* vol. 12, 1964.06.16, cols.
8281 - 8283.
communist criminals on the same basis as any spy who had been caught and sentenced to death in the USA ... in Britain or any other Western country. When there is a revolt in Cuba and people are caught and immediately shot or when there is a revolt in Zanzibar, death follows; or when a Government is overthrown and succeeded by another, the rebels shoot the members of the previous Government without trying them in (open) courts. In spite of that the Western powers continue to have diplomatic relations with them.**

1.4 Umkhonto and the ANC-SACP Alliance in the Post Rivonia period, 1964 - 1966

The raid on Rivonia and the arrest of most of the members of Umkhonto's NBC did not immediately bring an end to the underground and its subversive activities in the country. Two important leaders managed to elude the police dragnet. They were Wilton Mkwayi (also known by his nom-de-guerre "Bribi or Bri-Bri") and Abram Fischer.\(^{100}\) Almost immediately after the Rivonia raid these two men, but more specifically Fischer, took control of the underground struggle and set in motion plans to rebuild the NBC of Umkhonto, and to resume and intensify the sabotage campaign as soon as the trial was over. In fact, from this point onwards, the activities of the SACP and Umkhonto became so closely intertwined that the one cannot be discussed without referring to the other. The police raid on Rivonia and the widespread arrests that followed made Umkhonto even more dependent on the leadership, support and guidance of the SACP and its Central Committee of which Fischer was a leading member after the departure of Joe Slovo in May 1963.\(^{101}\)

Within weeks of the Rivonia raids and arrests, Fischer called a number of secret meetings of the Central Committee of the SACP to

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100. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Exhibit R71, Operation Mayibuye, p. 6.
discuss the critical situation that faced them. A large number of the organisation's membership through its association with the ANC and Umkhonto, had been arrested after Rivonia and there was therefore a growing need to reassess the situation and to make changes where necessary. The first meeting was held in August 1963. At this meeting, which was attended by six cell members - Piet Beyleveeld, Hilda Bernstein, Ivan Schermbrucker, Eli Weinberg, Ruth First Slovo and Gerhard Ludi (the latter was a police agent) - Fischer informed them that the membership of the Central Committee had been reduced to two members namely himself and Ruth First Slovo and that she was on the point to leave for London to join her husband. Numerous other aspects were discussed at this first meeting such as security and resistance to police interrogation. Although Umkhonto and the underground struggle as such was not discussed at this stage a new Central Committee was elected to provide the basis for the continuation of the liberation struggle. Fischer was re-elected Chairman of the Central Committee while Hilda Bernstein and Ivan Schermbrucker were elected to the Secretariat. The meeting in August was followed by a number of further meetings in 1963 and the first half of 1964. At one meeting held in May 1964, it was announced that in future individual members of SACP cells would be allowed to commit acts of sabotage at will.

1.5 The Revival of the National High Command of Umkhonto we Sizwe

Like the Central Committee of the SACP, the NHC of Umkhonto was almost entirely destroyed by the raids of July and 1963. With Joe Slovo in London to seek financial and other support for the struggle back home a new commander had to be found and the person best suited for this position was Wilton Mkwayi. In the early 1950's he became a union organiser for the African Textile Workers in Port Elizabeth and later served as Treasurer of the South African Congress of Trade Unions. He was one of the leaders of the Defiance Campaign in the

Eastern Cape during 1952 and was among the 156 people arrested for treason in 1956, following the Congress of the People held at Kliptown in June 1955.\footnote{104} Mkwai was, however, never brought to trial. Released on bail in 1958 he used his temporary freedom to escape to Basutoland before the trial began. He remained in Basutoland until 1961, when he returned to South Africa to join the newly formed Umkhonto. Shortly after he had become a member of Umkhonto, Mkwai left South Africa to undergo military training and to enlist foreign support for the liberation struggle in the country. Unlike most recruits who were sent to training camps in North Africa, Mkwai was sent to communist China for instruction.\footnote{105} On completion of his training in China, he returned to Dar-es-Salaam. After a brief stay, he was sent to Czechoslovakia where he was given extensive training in trade union work. During this period Mkwai visited several of the Eastern Block countries before he returned to South Africa via Dar-es-Salaam in early 1963. From this point onwards, he used the code-name "Bri-Bri". Undoubtedly one of the best trained guerrilla fighters and military commanders that Umkhonto had at that time, Mkwai was returned to South Africa with the sole aim and purpose to take command of the military operations of Umkhonto. The position of military commander had been left vacant by the departure of Joe Slovo from the country in May 1963.\footnote{106} The date on which Mkwai took control of Umkhonto is not clear. At his trial in December 1964 some of the sabotage attacks committed by Umkhonto in January 1963 were attributed to him and his associates.\footnote{107}

Mkwai, like most other members of Umkhonto, was also a senior member of the SACP. Unlike many recruits before and after him Mkwai had taken his training as a saboteur and guerrilla fighter seriously. He had learned to understand the value of rigid self-discipline and

\begin{enumerate}
\item Karis and Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge, vol. 4, p. 90.
\item The Star (Johannesburg), 1964.12.17.
\item Van der Merwe, Die Slag om Suid-Afrika, Deel 7, (Die Huisgenoot, 1971.11.5, pp. 14 - 15); Ludl and Grobbelaar, The Amazing Mr. Fischer, p. 44.
\end{enumerate}
secrecy. Unlike some of the members of the WHC of Umkhonto and the Communist Party who lived at Rivonia, Mkwayi preferred to stay at Travellyn. The reason for this was that Travellyn appeared to have been a safer hideout than Rivonia (an assumption that was later proven correct when the police discovered the smallholding a full month after they found Rivonia). \(^{108}\)

As commander of Umkhonto, Mkwayi had close contact with Fischer and the Central Committee of the SACP, which provided the financial and other material aid Umkhonto needed to continue its sabotage activities. Mkwayi took his instructions directly from Fischer and the Central Committee. On one occasion shortly after Fischer took control of the Central Committee, and indirectly, the planning of Umkhonto's sabotage campaign in 1964, Mkwayi complained to Fischer that he was running short of explosives. Fischer then told him that until such time that explosives could be obtained he should resort to alternative forms of sabotage such as pulling down telephone lines, loosing railway lines, damaging railway control boxes, and burning down sugar cane and maize fields. \(^{109}\)

Mkwayi apparently was at Lilliesleaf Farm the day the police raided the smallholding. While everyone else was arrested he managed, by sheer luck, to escape. After having had lunch on that day, Mkwayi decided to have a talk with some of the Black labourers who were working some distance away from the main house. It was while he was conversing with them that the police raided the house. When he saw what was happening, he quickly turned around and quietly walked away. His finger prints were later discovered on a broken window pane at Travellyn. \(^{110}\)

109. Ludi and Grobbelaar, The Amazing Mr. Fischer, p. 44.
110. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and others, Evidence of R. Mhlaba, and Judgement, pp. 55 - 56. See also Van der Merwe, Die Slag om Suid-Afrika, Deel 7, (Die Huisgenoot, 1971.11.5, p. 15).
Shortly after the Rivonia arrests Mkwayi and other Umkhonto members such as Ian David Kitson, Laloo Chiba, John Edward Matthews and "Mac" Maharaj with the help of Fischer, as chairman of the Central Committee formed a new NHC to continue with the armed struggle. Mkwayi, as a result of his extensive training in guerrilla warfare and political work was placed in charge of Umkhonto. Although well qualified, Mkwayi was apparently never made a member of the SACP's Central Committee. The reason for this is not clear but it was probably done for security reasons. Instead Kitson, who like Mkwayi was a long standing member of the SACP was co-opted onto the Central Committee to serve as official contact person between Umkhonto's new NHC and the SACP's Central Committee. In this role Kitson was also charged with the raising of funds for Umkhonto and the armed struggle. Chiba on the other hand was the official link between Umkhonto and the Indian community while Maharaj acted as messenger for the organisation. Maharaj allegedly also made his house available to the organisation for meetings and had assisted in the printing and distribution of subversive literature in accordance with Operation Mayibuye. A Technical Committee was set up and Matthews and Kitson, together with Mkwayi formed its members.

The function of the committee was to select targets for sabotage, to obtain explosives and to manufacture explosive devices.

Mkwayi, Kitson, Chiba and the others of the new NHC of Umkhonto were all members of the banned SACP. This, together with the fact that Mkwayi received his instructions directly from the Central Committee of the Party, confirms that Umkhonto, if not the entire ANC within South Africa, was by the middle of 1963 under the control of the SACP.

111. The Natal Mercury (Durban), 1964.12.19; See also The Star (Johannesburg), 1964.12.18; Vermaak, Braam Fischer, pp. 145 - 154.
Under guidance from the Central Committee of the SACP, Mkwayi convened a number of elandertive meetings with communists at the campus of the University of the Witwatersrand. He apparently also attended underground meetings at the Johannesburg Technical College. The new "junior" NHC under Mkwayi was also responsible for the construction of a new radio transmitter with which a Freedom Radio broadcast was made on 26 June 1964 from the Shangrila Indian Club in Johannesburg.  

With the NHC of Umkhonto and the Central Committee of the CPSA being reformed by the end of 1963, the stage was set for the resumption and possible intensification of the sabotage campaign. Under the personal guidance of Mkwayi, combined with the covert financial and advisory assistance of Fischer and the Central Committee, an immediate start was made with the recruitment of new members into Umkhonto. Individuals were recruited into the organisation mainly to commit acts of sabotage and to be sent out of the country for guerrilla training. Several new Umkhonto cells were set up in the Black townships of Moroka, Pinville, Orlando and others on the Reef. As for the rest of the country, it was hoped that once the organisation and the underground was again fully operative in the Transvaal, it could be gradually extended to the other provinces.

As a result of the serious nature of the charges brought against the Rivonia accused (which carried the death penalty) it was decided by the Central Committee to temporarily suspend all sabotage activities until the end of the trial. With Fischer being the leader of the Defence team as well as the Chairman of the Central Committee there can be little doubt that the directive came from him personally. As a result of this decision only four acts of sabotage were reported during the seven months that the trial was in progress. Two of the attacks were on electrical installations in Durban and Germiston, one on a railway powerline near Johannesburg and one on a telephone exchange in Pretoria.

115. Vermaak, Braam Fischer, p. 146.
Considering Fischer's instructions to the Central Committee and to the NHC of Umkhonto to cease all sabotage activities, and the fact that Umkhonto was not the only organisation that was conducting a campaign of sabotage in 1963, it is likely that the four acts of sabotage were probably not the work of Umkhonto. These acts can probably be attributed to the African Resistance Movement (ARM) who concentrated their sabotage attempts primarily upon electrical installations and power pylons.\(^{118}\)

During the period following the revival of the NHC, Fischer and Mkwayi held numerous secret meetings to discuss and to co-ordinate the activities of the underground and to discuss the revival and intensification of the sabotage campaign after the trial. The two men formed a formidable combination. Fischer, with his legal background, was responsible for the planning, co-ordination and financing of all Umkhonto's activities, while Mkwayi, with his extensive guerrilla training, was responsible for the recruitment of new members and for directing the sabotage campaign. Secrecy was of the utmost importance especially after 11 July 1963. Thus, to avoid the attention of the police, Mkwayi went under the disguise of the Reverend Fundiizi, and it was in this guise that he regularly met with Fischer.\(^{119}\)

Towards the end of July 1964, after the Rivonia accused were sentenced, a small group of trained guerrilla fighters under the leadership of Siegfried Benghu, a former prison warden from Bethal, was added to the ranks of Umkhonto. These guerrillas were apparently recalled from outside the country by the new NHC to swell the ranks of the organisation and to take over the leadership should Mkwayi be arrested. The arrival of Benghu and his team apparently served as a great morale booster to the underground and gave Mkwayi a chance to

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119. Van der Merwe, Die Slag om Suid-Afrika, Deel 7, (Die Huisgenoot, 1971.11.5, pp. 16 - 17). See also Vermaak, Braam Fischer, pp. 147 - 154.
concentrate his efforts on the re-organisation and running of Umkhonto.\textsuperscript{(120)}

While the necessary arrangements were being made by Mkwayi and Fischer for the resumption of the sabotage campaign, the members of the SACP were doing their part to aid these developments. On 18 March 1964 a slogan containing the word "Umkhonto" was painted on the wall of a prison warden's house in Johannesburg. A few days later a further slogan containing the word "ANC" accompanied by an arrow pointing upwards was painted on a bridge in Industria, Johannesburg. On 10 June a further slogan "Free ANC" was painted on a wall of the Johannesburg prison. With the aid of police agents such as Gerhard Ludi (Agent Q-018) and Klaus Schröder (Agent Q-043) who had managed to infiltrate the underground, the police soon discovered it was done by members of the banned SACP who had assumed all propaganda work for the ANC and Umkhonto after the raid on Rivonia.\textsuperscript{(121)}

By May 1963, Ludi had successfully infiltrated the SACP and was invited by one of its members, Jean Strachan (née Middleton), a 26 year old teacher and party cell leader, to join the organisation. With the help of Strachan, Ludi not only came into contact with a broad spectrum of what was left of the underground in South Africa, but he also met Abram Fischer, who acted as Chairman of some of the meetings. As a result of Ludi's infiltration of the underground the police managed to learn a great deal about the organisation and activities of Umkhonto. It was through these observations that they learned that the slogans referred to above were painted by White members of the Communist Party.\textsuperscript{(122)}

\textsuperscript{120.} Van der Merwe, Die Slag om Suid-Afrika, Deel 7, (Die Huisgenoot, 1971.11.5, pp. 16 - 17).
\textsuperscript{121.} Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 375/66, The State against A. Fischer and 13 others, Annexure H, Schedule of Slogans Painted. See also Ludi and Grobbelaar, The Amazing Mr. Fischer, pp. 30 - 31, 47, 68.
\textsuperscript{122.} Ludi and Grobbelaar, The Amazing Mr. Fischer, pp. 30 - 31, 47, 68; Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 375/66, The State against A. Fischer and 13 others, Annexure H, Schedule of Slogans Painted.
1.6 The Arrest and Trial of Wilton Mkwayi

Within days of the accused in the Rivonia trial being sentenced, a series of sabotage attacks shook the country. Most of these attacks were committed in the Transvaal. Although Umkhonto claimed responsibility for most of it, some of the attacks were also committed by the ARM. Exactly who committed what acts of sabotage is however difficult to say.\(^\text{123}\) The revival of the NHC of Umkhonto and the resumption of the sabotage campaign after 12 June 1964 was shortlived. Early in August, the police, after numerous unsuccessful attempts, arrested Mkwayi, who until then had always appeared to be one step ahead of them. After Mkwayi's arrest the command structure of Umkhonto was briefly taken over by Siegfried Benghu, but his leadership too was shortlived. Benghu was arrested shortly after Mkwayi, while disguised as a blind man.\(^\text{124}\)

Overall, 1964 was a poor year for the underground movement in South Africa. Besides the arrest of Mkwayi and the remaining members of the second NHC of Umkhonto, numerous other members of the underground were also in police custody or in hiding, hoping that the police dragnet will miss them. Mkwayi and the rest of the second NHC were brought to trial on 30 October 1964. They were charged with more than 50 acts of sabotage which they allegedly committed during the course of 1963 and 1964, in various parts of the country. Sentence was passed on 18 December. Mkwayi was sentenced to life imprisonment while the others were given long prison sentences ranging from twelve to eighteen years.\(^\text{125}\)

As a result of the numerous arrests that followed the Rivonia Raid and trials such as that of Mkwayi and the rest of the NHC, the State

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123. For a description of some of the attacks after 12 June 1964, see Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations*, 1964; *The World* (Johannesburg), 1964.06.15; *Contact* 7(8), 1964.07.3; and Van der Merwe, *Die Slag om Suid-Afrika*, Deel 7, (Die Huigenoot, 1971.11.5, p. 32). See also Diagram C, p. 165.


was systematically destroying the underground movement. By the end of 1964 some 303 persons alone were under banning orders.\(^{(126)}\)

1.7 The Johannesburg Station Bomb

Perhaps the most infamous act of sabotage committed in 1964 following the conclusion of the Rivonia Trial was the Johannesburg station bomb explosion. The act of sabotage which was committed on 24 July 1964 and which left one person dead and fifteen others, among them a young child seriously injured, was first thought to be the work of Umkhonto because of its close proximity to the verdict and sentence of the trial. Police investigations however soon revealed that the explosion was the work of the left-wing ARM which had nothing to do with Umkhonto or the ANC.\(^{(127)}\)

1.8 The Arrest and Trial of Abram Fischer

Abram Fischer was first arrested on 9 July 1964 during the country-wide raids on the members of the ARM. The police initially thought that he had something to do with the movement, but no connection could be found between Fischer and the ARM and he was released a few days later. He was however re-arrested on 23 September 1964 under the 90-day detention Act.\(^{(128)}\) By this time the police had already in detention at least thirteen other key leaders of the SACP. These people together with Fischer were formally brought to trial on 16 November 1964 in the Pretoria Magistrate's Court in preparatory examination.

Fischer and his fourteen co-accused were charged on three counts: on the first count they were charged with the offence of having contravened Section 11(c) of the Suppression of Communism Act of


\(^{128}\) The Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 1964.09.24 - 25 and The Star (Johannesburg), 1964.09.24 - 25.
1950. In terms of this charge it was alleged that during the period 12 May 1963 to 2 July 1964, at or near Johannesburg, the accused did wrongfully and unlawfully become or continued to be office-bearers or members of the SACP. On the second count, the accused were charged with acting in concert and having taken part with others in the activities of the SACP during the period 12 May to 2 July 1964. On the third count the accused were charged with furthering the aims and objectives of communism or performing acts which were calculated to further the achievement of the objectives of communism. (129)

Fischer was released on R10 000 bail shortly after he was arrested in September, to appear before the Privy Council in London on behalf of a South African subsidiary of American Sterling Drug Incorporated, against the German concern of Farben Fabriken. Instead of skipping bail, like many thought he would do, Fischer, convinced that he could easily prove his innocence, returned to South Africa after the hearing in London to stand trial with the rest of the accused on 16 September 1964. Fischer thought that the State had little or no case against him. But he was soon disillusioned when the prosecutor called Peter Beyleveld, a key member of the SACP’s Central Committee, to the witness stand. During the course of his evidence, which came as a shock to Fischer, Beyleveld revealed to the Court that he had been a member of the Communist Party since 1956; that he and Fischer had been members of the same Party group since 1962; that Fischer had been a member of the Party’s Central Committee since August 1963, and that several of the accused had also been members of the Party’s Central and area committees. Beyleveld also told the Court that he had received a sum of R16 000 from the London committee of the SACP to further the cause of communism in South Africa. He further told the Court that every member in the underground in South Africa had a special code name. Fischer’s code name for instance was “Jan”, Schermbrucker’s was “Peter”, Ester Barsel’s was “Sandy”, Norman Levy’s was “Bently” and Lewis Baker’s was “Smithy” to name but a few. (130)

129. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 375/66, The State against A. Fischer and 13 others, Charge Sheet, pp. 1 - 3.
A second important witness called by the State to give evidence against Fischer and his co-accused was Detective Warrant Officer Ludi. During the course of his evidence he not only substantiated much of what Beyleveld had told the Court, but he also related how he had been gathering information for the security police as an undercover agent since 1960. He described how he had attended multi-racial parties where he was introduced to leading members of the ANC, the COD (the latter organisation was replaced by an organisation called "Club 77"\(^{131}\) after it was banned in 1964), the SACP and Umkhonto, which he said was the military wing of the ANC-SACP alliance.\(^{132}\)

Ludi told the court that he had belonged to an organisation called "The Volunteers" which was a section of the underground SACP responsible primarily for the painting of ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe and communist slogans in public areas.\(^{133}\) He then related that at a meeting held in Strachan's flat on 14 June 1963, they were informed by Fischer that a large scale recruiting campaign was in progress for Umkhonto and that the main attack in South Africa was being planned from outside the country. Fischer emphasised that while this attack would come from across South Africa's border, it was essential that a large "liberation movement" should remain in the country to direct the activities of the main attack once it had started.\(^{134}\) This information provided by Ludi closely corresponds with the information on guerrilla warfare contained in Operation Mayibuye.

132. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 375/66, The State against A. Fischer and others, Evidence of G. Ludi, pp. 197, 202. (In the case of the Fischer trial the Court records are numbered consecutively with the result that Ludi's evidence begins on page 197.)
133. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 375/66, The State against A. Fischer and 13 others, Evidence of G. Ludi, pp. 245 - 270.
Ludi also told the court that during the meeting on 14 June Strachan reported that there were several clandestine communist groups who were active in political organisational work and that one of them had been given the task of locating prospective sites for sabotage by Umkhonto.\(^{135}\)

The body of evidence against Fischer, which included a document entitled "Time for Re-assessment\(^{136}\) in which an evaluation was made of the successes and failures of the Congress Movement and the communist underground in the country, was thus overwhelming. Faced with this, Fischer, probably on instructions from the London branch of the SACP and the ANC’s Mission in Exile, with whom he had been in close contact ever since he went to London to appear before the Privy Council in September 1964, decided to estreat his bail conditions and to disappear underground to proceed with the restructuring of the underground and the struggle.\(^{137}\) On 25 January 1965 Fischer’s lawyer, Advocate H.J. Hanson, handed a letter to the court in which Fischer had set out his reasons for recusing himself from his trial. The letter was dated 22 January 1965.\(^{138}\)

A warrant for Fischer’s arrest was immediately issued by the police but it took them almost eleven months to recapture him. He was finally rearrested on 11 November 1965 in Johannesburg. The story of his disappearance and the intricacies of his eleven months of underground existence make for very interesting reading but are of little significance here.\(^{139}\) More significant is the fact that

137. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 375/66, The State against A. Fischer and 13 others, Record of evidence by the State Prosecutor, p. 1.
139. For a more detailed discussion of Fischer’s underground activities prior to his rearrest on 11 November 1965 see Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 375/66, The State against A. Fischer and 13 others, Record of Evidence presented to the Court by the State Prosecutor, pp. 1 - 8; and Pike, A History of Communism in South Africa, pp. 424, 429 - 444.
with the sentencing of Fischer's co-accused on 13 April 1965, the government not only destroyed what was left of the communist underground movement inside South Africa but with the rearrest of Fischer in November the organised underground movement, had for all practical purposes collapsed. Without the leadership and financial support of the Central Committee of the SACP and with most of its active leaders and members either in jail of having fled the country to avoid arrest, Umkhonto also ceased to function as an organisation inside South Africa.

Brought to trial on 23 March 1966, Fischer was charged on a total of fifteen counts ranging from conspiring to commit sabotage, of being a member of the banned SACP, of having planned to bring about violent revolution, of having distributed subversive literature, to charges of fraud and forgery relating to the false names and documents he used while hiding underground.\(^{140}\)

The trial of Abram Fischer lasted until 4 May 1966, when he was found guilty of all the charges brought against him by the State. In his verdict the presiding Judge, Mr Justice Wessel Boshoff, made it clear that the State had established beyond any doubt that Fischer, both by his own accord and as an office-bearer of the banned SACP, had conspired with the banned ANC and its military wing, Umkhonto, to commit sabotage and bring about the violent overthrow of the state in South Africa through a communist inspired revolution. He rejected Fischer's contentions that the SACP was not connected with Umkhonto or that it was not the Party's intention to establish a despotic state under communist domination in South Africa. Fischer was sentenced to life imprisonment on 9 May 1966.

1.9 An Evaluation of Phase One

Although the South African government was caught by surprise by the

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140. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 375/66, The State against A. Fischer and 13 others, Evidence presented to the Court by the State Prosecutor, p. 5. See also the Evidence of Mrs. D. Tucker, pp. 171 - 192.
Intensity of the spate of acts of sabotage that hit the country from 1961, and initially, had some difficulty in making progress with their investigation into the matter, their determination to find the source of the violence finally paid off in July 1963 when they uncovered the underground headquarters of the ANC-SACP alliance and Umkhonto at Rivonia in Johannesburg. From here onwards and with the aid of specially designed legislation to deal with insurrectionary activities, it was only a matter of time before they destroyed the underground movement. By the end of 1966 there was little left of the underground structure that was set up in the early 1960’s to challenge the State. Of a total of some 238 acts of sabotage committed between 9 August 1961 and the end of 1965 (see Diagram C, p. 165) the majority namely 182 were committed between 15 December 1961 and the raid on Rivonia in July 1963. Most of the acts of sabotage committed during this period were directed either against government or semi-government buildings such as post offices and police stations, or against economic installations such as powerlines, railway installations and signal boxes. Although attacks on people as such were explicitly forbade by the NHC of Umkhonto in the early 1960’s, of the 182 attacks committed between 1961 and the middle of 1963, at least 23 were directed at homes, six of which were the homes of African members of the South African police. If these attacks were successful and the explosions were large enough they could have caused the death of people. Fortunately the type of explosive devices used in the 1960’s were primitive and the attacks amateurish with the result that no one was killed in the attacks. (141)

A breakdown of the attacks committed between August 1961 and the end of 1965 (See Diagram D p. 192) reveals that the most popular object of attack by Umkhonto guerrillas were telephone lines or similar installations (55 attacks), followed by attacks on African dwellings (16 attacks) and Post Office boxes or buildings (16 attacks). The fourth most popular object of attack by saboteurs during the above

141. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State Against N. Mandela and 13 others, Annexure B to the Indictment, pp. 1 - 31.
### BREAKDOWN OF TYPES OF TARGETS ATTACKED BY GUERRILLAS BETWEEN AUGUST 1961 AND 30 JUNE 1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF TARGET</th>
<th>APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF ATTACKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone lines or cables</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African dwellings (non South African police)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post boxes and Post Office buildings</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power lines (pylons)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on African dwellings (members of the South African police)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway lines</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway installations (general)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway signal boxes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway rolling stock</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on local government buildings and properties such as:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Bantu Administration offices</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Bantu Affairs and Labour offices</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) African schools</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Municipal buildings</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) African beer halls</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric sub-stations / transformer stations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private institutions (firms providing services to the State)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government buildings such as prisons, etc.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government / Police vehicles</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack on petrol storage depot</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital buildings</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church buildings</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Police offices</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African shop</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City hall Cape Town</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private store room</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous attacks directed at targets such as the offices of the Portuguese curator in Market Street, Johannesburg, a private storeroom at New Brighton, Port Elizabeth, a dynamite storage depot used by a stone crushers company at Bethelsdorp, Port Elizabeth, etc.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**                                                                 | **196**

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142. Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/64, The State against N. Mandela and 13 others, Annexure B to the Indictment, pp. 1 - 13.
period was power pylons, both mainline and secondary. At least 15 attacks were launched against such objects. It should however be stressed, as was done earlier in this study, that not all the attacks referred to above and in Diagram D were committed by Umkhonto guerrillas. It can however be assumed that since Umkhonto was by far the most active of the various underground organisations committed to sabotage in the early 1960's most of the attacks committed between 1961 and 1965 were done by its cadres.

As far as the period 30 June 1963 to the end of 1965 is concerned, of the 43 attacks committed during this time, most were directed at targets similar to those listed above. For instance of the 17 attacks committed between 13 June 1964 to the end of that year following the verdict of the Rivonia Trial, six were directed at Post Office buildings, five at power pylons (probably all the work of the ARM), three at railway lines, one at the Johannesburg prison and one at the Hospital Hill police station. The 17th attack was the Johannesburg station bomb explosion which was the work of the ARM.\(^\text{143}\)

Only one attack was recorded in 1965. In this case the target was a Cape Town telephone booth and the explosive devise was a bottle-bomb. No one was injured and damage was minimal.\(^\text{144}\)

The cost of the damage caused by the acts of sabotage committed between August 1961 and 30 June 1963 was estimated to be in the region of R93 837,00. This figure is however a very conservative estimate since it does not reflect all the damage caused during the above period. But even if the figure of R93 837 was doubled to make up for those acts of sabotage not evaluated between 1961 and the middle of 1963, as well as those acts of sabotage committed to the end of 1965 for which no estimation of costs is available, it is still a small amount if one takes into account that South Africa's Defence budget alone for the period 1966 - 1967 came to R255,85 million.\(^\text{145}\)

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The period following the arrest of Fischer and other key members of the underground movement inside South Africa was marked by a sharp decline in the activities of the ANC, the SACP and Umkhonto, until the middle of the 1970's, when the Soweto riots and the circumstances surrounding it introduced an entirely new era in the history of South Africa. Consequently the years between 1965 and 1975 largely saw the arrest of hundreds of people in connection with the activities of the abovementioned organisations and their activities. In addition, the destruction of the combined underground and its leadership between these years, effectively paved the way for the rise of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and its Black power ideology which presented a major challenge to the position and leadership of the ANC inside South Africa during these years. This remained the case until the Soweto riots of the mid-1970's when, as a result of the influx of large numbers of Black youths into the ranks of the ANC-SACP alliance and Umkhonto, the latter began to challenge the position of the BCM.

The destruction of the underground movement by the mid-1960's left the ANC and particularly Umkhonto without the much needed financial and organisational support of the SACP and its leaders, many of whom were either in prison or had fled the country to avoid arrest. This, together with the setbacks suffered at Rivonia and the ongoing police investigations into the remnants of the underground, made it virtually impossible for the leaders of the underground still inside the country to revive Umkhonto or proceed with the sabotage campaign. Any attempt to rebuild the underground and to recruit new members into it thus seemed an impossible task by the mid-1960's. Consequently, it was decided to shift the centre of command from South Africa to the Mission in Exile which had its headquarters in London at the time (see Chapter 5). The implication of this was that from the mid-1960's onwards the ANC-SACP alliance would conduct their attacks on South Africa from outside the country. To set up the necessary infrastructure to bring this about, however, took time with the result that the period between 1965 and the outbreak of the Soweto riots in 1976 was relatively free from armed attacks by
Umkhonto or insurrectionary activities by the ANC-SACP alliance. The few attempts that were made during the period to infiltrate trained guerrillas into the country were largely unsuccessful. As a result the period 1966 to 1976 remained relatively free of Umkhonto guerrilla activities.

A survey of some of South Africa’s major newspapers(146) and the annual survey reports of the South African Institute of Race Relations(147) reveals that in sharp contrast to the many acts of sabotage, political violence, and general subversion that marked the first phase of the armed struggle, the second phase was largely one of police action, fleeing radicals, detentions and political trials as the State set into motion its extensive machinery to destroy all radical opposition to its policies. The State was so successful in this that in December 1965 the Minister of Justice, B.J. Vorster, told the country that it could relax, the government had been successful in its campaign against the underground movement in South Africa and that since July of that year there had been no further acts of sabotage in the country.(148)

Part of the government’s success in destroying the underground and bringing relative peace to the country between 1965 and 1975 was due to a host of new security legislation that was introduced after 1965 to cover up loopholes in the existing security legislation. The first important section of legislation introduced in 1965 was the Suppression of Communism Act (no. 97) of 1965. In terms of this Act it became an offence to record, publish or disseminate the writings or speeches of persons who had been prohibited from attending gatherings without the special written consent of the Minister of Law and Order. The second important Act was the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act (no. 96) of 1965. This Act replaced the 90-day

146. See The Daily News (Durban); The Star (Johannesburg); The Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg); The Daily Dispatch (East London); Die Burger (Cape Town); Die Volksblad (Bloemfontein); The Natal Mercury (Durban) and The Natal Witness (Pietermaritzburg) for the period 1966 - 1976.
detention clause with the 180-day detention clause - the very "weapon" which as Fischer later admitted, destroyed the underground in South Africa. Two further laws passed in 1965 was the Police Amendment Act (no. 74) of 1965 and the Official Secrets Act (no. 65) of 1965. The first extended the power and authority of the police to deal with terrorist infiltration on the country's borders, while the second made it an offence to communicate any information, military or police matters that was officially deemed to be prejudicial to the safety of the State.\(^{149}\)

The year 1966 saw the introduction of the Civil Defence Act (no. 39) and the General Law Amendment Act (no. 62). In terms of the first Act the Minister of Justice was given increased powers to declare a state of emergency and to take the necessary action to protect the country from a state of emergency or during such an emergency. The second Act, which was introduced in November, extended all the main security laws of South Africa to South West Africa.\(^{150}\)

During the course of the following year the government passed the Terrorism Act (no. 83) of 1967. This Act, which in terms of the General Law Amendment Act (no. 62) of 1966 was also applicable to South West Africa, was made retrospective to June 1962 when the first Umkhonto recruits were beginning to leave South Africa for military training overseas.\(^{151}\)

The nature of the security legislation, such as the Terrorism Act and the speed with which the government introduced it, aroused strong criticism from both the official opposition and the press, which claimed that the government was putting an end to the rule of law and the right of the courts. The government was aware of the far-reaching nature of its security legislation but argued that it was extraordinary times demanding extraordinary measures, and that, if


all the legal niceties were observed, there would be nothing left of the rule of law if the underground was to continue its subversive activities. At the second reading of the Terrorism Act in June 1967, Vorster's successor as Minister of Justice, P.C. Pelser, acknowledged the far-reaching nature of the Bill but pointed out that the Bill was necessary in view of the fact that the struggle against subversion was far from over and that the country had only been in contact with the vanguard of the movement. There were still persons inside South Africa and the High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Basotoland and Swaziland who were plotting the destruction of South Africa.\textsuperscript{152}

During the course of the next seven years the government introduced a wide range of security laws dealing with the police, the Defence Force, the Civil Service, the Railways and Harbours. In 1970, for instance, the government introduced the National Supplies Procurement Act (no. 89) of 1970 which called, among other for the stockpiling of essentially strategic materials.\textsuperscript{153} In 1972 the government set up a State Security Council in terms of the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act (no. 64) of 1972. In addition the Suppression of Communism Act was again amended to cover loopholes in the existing legislation. This was followed by the Gathering and Demonstrations Act (no. 52) of 1973 which prohibited any gathering or demonstration in the open air within the near vicinity of Parliament.\textsuperscript{154} Further legislation was introduced during 1974 and 1975 to deal with either general or specific security matters.

With the help of these laws and those introduced before 1965, the State succeeded in arresting, and bringing a large number of people to trial between 1965 and 1975, on offences relating to the security of the country. In the wake of the Rivonia and Fischer trials, a total of 500 people were arrested or detained during 1965. Of these 478 were Africans and 11 were Whites. As far as convictions were concerned, a total of 1 267 people - of whom some 1 176 were

\textsuperscript{152} House of Assembly Debates, vol. 18, June 1967, cols. 7023 - 7026.
\textsuperscript{154} Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations, 1973, pp. 54 - 57.
Africans - had been convicted under the country's security laws since the beginning of the 1960's. In addition a number of those released from prison during 1964 and 1965 was rearrested and brought to trial in 1966. A total of 1,310 people were still serving prison sentences by the end of June 1966. Most of these sentences were served under four major security laws namely the Suppression of Communism Act, the Unlawful Organisations Act (of 1960), the Public Safety Act and Section 21 of the General Law Amendment Act of 1962, which dealt with the act of sabotage.\(^{155}\)

Questioned in the House of Assembly on 9 April 1968 on the number of people convicted under the security laws in 1968, the Minister of Justice stated that three Africans were convicted under the Sabotage Act (General Law Amendment Act of 1962); one White, four Asians and 24 Blacks under the Suppression of Communism Act (1950 as amended) and four Coloureds and 38 Africans under the Unlawful Organisations Act of 1960. A total of 74 people were thus convicted in 1967. The Minister also stated that at the end of 1967 a total of 1,335 people were in prison having been convicted under the security laws of the country. Of these, the majority (some 1,275) were Africans.\(^{156}\)

The figures for 1968 were as follows: The number of persons convicted under the various security laws as set out above were 66. The majority of these (61) were Africans. As far as those still serving sentences under these laws were concerned, the Minister of Prisons stated on 30 May 1969 that a total of 1,019 people were still in prison by the end of 1968. Of these the majority (966) were Africans.\(^{157}\) A total of 196 persons having served their sentences under the security laws of the country were released in 1968. Of these persons 189 were Africans.\(^{158}\)

As far as 1970 was concerned, the Minister of Justice stated in the House of Assembly on 18 May 1971 that during the previous year eight persons (of which five were Africans) were convicted under the security legislation. He also revealed that a total of 549 persons

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were still serving prison sentences under the security laws by the beginning of January 1971. Of these 514 were Africans.\(^{(159)}\)

From 1972 statistical information such as those above was no longer made available by the Minister of Police who considered it "not to be in the public interest" to disclose this type of information. The reason for such security is not entirely clear but it probably had to do with South Africa's deteriorating image abroad. However, to judge by reports it appears that most of the people detained during the period 1972 to 1975 were members of the BCM or its affiliated organisations such as SASO, the BPC, and the Black Allied Workers' Union (BAWU).\(^{(160)}\) Exactly how many people were detained or convicted under the security laws of the country between 1972 and the end of 1975 is thus not clear nor is there any indication what percentage of these people were members of the ANC-SACP alliance and Umkhonto. The general impression is that with the formation of the BCM in the late 1960's the emphasis in Black politics and the actions of the police and the State associated with it, temporarily shifted away from the ANC and Umkhonto to the BCM.\(^{(161)}\)

Several attempts were made by the ANC-SACP alliance in exile between 1967 and 1969 to return trained cadres of Umkhonto to South Africa via Rhodesia (presentday Zimbabwe) in an attempt to restart the armed struggle, but these efforts (which are dealt with in the next chapter) were unsuccessful.

No further attempts of any significance were made after 1968 and it was, in fact, not before the outbreak of the Soweto unrest of the mid-1970's that renewed attempts would be made to infiltrate guerrilla units into South Africa. By this stage the collapse of the Portuguese empires in Southern Africa, the escalation of the Rhodesian bush war and the wide-scale unrest situation in South Africa had created a more favourable climate for the return of Umkhonto guerrillas.

In the meantime, faced with the failure of the Wankie and subsequent campaigns, the ANC attempted to step up its propaganda campaign inside the country. Between 1968 and the early 1970’s an increasing number of ANC publications were distributed throughout South Africa. Even the organisation’s official mouthpiece, Sechaba, was distributed inside South Africa during these years. Distribution of publications was done in a number of ways. Some were delivered by hand. Others were posted while some were also publicly distributed by means of explosive devices.\(^{162}\)

Generally, the period from the end of the 1960’s to the outbreak of the Soweto riots in 1976 is poorly documented with the result that not a great deal is known about it. The little that is known about this period have been gathered from the evidence and information that became available through the trials of ANC and Umkhonto cadres who were caught while attempting to infiltrate South Africa during these years. During most of these trials attention was focused on details of movements and activities largely irrelevant for a study of this nature. Moreover, not all the trials that took place between 1966 and 1976 had a direct bearing on the activities of Umkhonto. Most of the cases that took place between 1966 and the beginning of the 1970’s had something to do with the demise of the underground communist movement before 1965. Examples here are the trials of Fred Carneson, Michael Dingaka, Isaac Heyman, Violet Weinberg, Leslie Schermbrucker, Roley Arenstein, Victor Finkelstein and David Ernst.\(^{163}\)

162. See the following sources: ANC, The Story of Simon and Jane, 1968. (This little booklet which is in the form of a picture book was distributed in 1968 and contained among others information and drawings on how to make petrol and black powder bombs); ANC Flyer entitled "June 1968", one page; Morris, Armed Conflict in Southern Africa, p. 284; Africa Diary, August - September 1970, p. 511; and Dawn, various issues between 1968 - 1971 (Private Collection Dr J. Grobler).

Two trials that however captured the attention of the local and international media and which formed part of the second phase of the armed struggle were that in 1971 of W.J. Hosey (an Irish national) and Alexander Moumbaris (an Australian national) and that in 1975 of the South African born but self-exiled poet and activist, Breyten Breytenbach.

In the case of the first two accused, Hosey and Moumbaris, they were charged with having conspired with one another and with members of the ANC-SACP alliance abroad to bring about a violent revolution inside South Africa and to help overthrow the government. According to the State, the conspiracy which belonged to the post 1966 period had its origins in the Soviet Union, Britain and Somaliland. It was also alleged that Moumbaris was the main contact between the ANC-SACP alliance in London and the underground in South Africa. He apparently undertook six clandestine trips to South Africa between the mid-1960's and 1971 during which he brought in both weapons and literature for distribution among certain members of the underground in the country. In addition to his task as a courier of the ANC and Umkhonto, Moumbaris reconnoitred the coast of Transkei for suitable guerrilla landing sites. The State alleged that Moumbaris also surveyed the borders of both Botswana and Swaziland and that he visited these countries to meet with ANC-SACP activists in order to facilitate their infiltration into South Africa to commit acts of sabotage. Hosey on the other hand, was accused of distributing or causing to be distributed pamphlets containing anti-White and anti-government propaganda. Because of its sensational nature the trial received a great deal of publicity in the press. It was also given much publicity in London by the Anglican Church and the anti-apartheid movement. Moumbaris was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment but he escaped with two other ANC members, S.B. Lee and Timothy Jenkins, in 1979, having served only half of his sentence. Hosey was sentenced to five years which he completed in 1977.\(^{164}\)

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As far as the case of Breyten Breytenbach is concerned, he entered South Africa at the beginning of August 1975 under the assumed name of Christian Galeska. His aim and purpose was to set up a White underground cell of the ANC known as "Okhela", which is the Zulu word for "Spark". The Russian word for this is "Iskra" which was the name of Lenin's famous revolutionary paper.\(^{(165)}\) Despite its apparent link with the communist movement, Okhela was set up in 1973 (some sources indicate 1972) with the knowledge and support of Oliver Tambo and 12 other members of the ANC's NEC, but apparently without the knowledge of the SACP to act as a counter-force against the growing influence of the SACP in the ANC and the armed struggle. Indications were that Okhela also had close ties with the African nationalist faction in the ANC and that the latter played a significant role in Okhela's establishment in 1973. Once it was established in South Africa, the aims and objectives of Okhela was to enter and control the trade union movement in the country; engage in urban terrorism; set up cells, and start an underground newspaper to promote these aims.\(^{(166)}\)

Unfortunately for Breytenbach, both Okhela and his proposed visit to South Africa was known to the security police, who allowed him to enter the country and then closely followed him before they arrested him on 19 August 1975, when he tried to leave the country. Breytenbach was brought to trial and sentenced to nine years imprisonment.

With the arrest of Breytenbach, Okhela collapsed in South Africa. The organisation, which by now had become an embarrassment to its creators in the ANC, managed to survive for a few more years outside the country but finally collapsed in 1979 with the departure of one of its leaders, Barend Schuitema to South Africa where it was later revealed that he was a police informer. With the collapse of Okhela in South Africa in 1975 and the banning of the Africanist faction in

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166. J. Smith, Breyten Breytenbach and the ANC, p. 33. See also The Star (Johannesburg), 1975.08.25; Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 1975.11.23; The Star (Johannesburg) 1975.11.22.
the ANC in the same year, the SACP and its communist supporters in
the ANC had managed to successfully forestall whatever plans there
were to set up an alternative ANC movement inside South Africa. The
SACP was probably also responsible for the assassination of Tennyson
Makiwane, who was one of the original eight members of the nationa-
list faction, also known as the "Gang of 8", who were expelled from
the ANC in 1975. Makiwane returned to the Transkei in 1979 to join
its Foreign Affairs Department but was killed by unknown assailants
in 1980.167


This phase began with the Soweto riots in June 1976 and ended more or
less with the renewed outbreak of the unrest at the end of 1984. It
is a significant period in that it witnessed a number of major
developments both inside and outside South Africa that enabled the
ANC-SACP alliance to begin rebuilding its shattered underground
structures inside South Africa and restart the armed struggle. The
first major factor that helped to facilitate this development was the
granting of independence to the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambi-
que and Angola in 1975. Although the history of this development
belongs largely to the exile-politics of the ANC, the implications
for the ANC and the armed struggle of two Marxist governments so
close to South Africa were of integral importance to the development
of the armed struggle in South Africa after 1975. With the support of
the pro-marxist FRELIMO government in Mozambique and the MPLA
government in Angola, the ANC was, for the first time since the
formation of Umkhonto in 1961, in a position to set up forward bases
just across the borders of South Africa. With the aid of these bases
the ANC was able to channel Blacks fleeing from South Africa after
1976 into the ranks of Umkhonto for guerrilla training and their
redeployment inside the country to commit acts of sabotage or to
facilitate the recruitment and training of new cadres.

March 1982, p. 8).
The second development that aided the revival of the armed struggle inside South Africa after 1975, was the Soweto riots which began on 16 June 1976 and continued spasmodically until the beginning of the 1980's. Unrest then briefly died down, only to return more violently and more widespread at the end of 1984.

Although the ANC and Umkhonto had little to do with the outbreak of the Soweto riots in June 1976, it was quick to capitalise on the rapidly developing unrest situation which followed the events of 16 June.\(^1\) Presented with a growing revolutionary situation inside the country it was in the interest of the ANC and the SACP to keep the unrest alive for as long as possible. Due to the fact that the Soweto riots were largely a student inspired revolt with only limited roots in either the Black urban community or the rapid developing workers class, the ANC could initially do very little to influence events. Again events developed to the ANC's advantage when the government banned the major BCM organisations in 1977. The ANC was quick to step into the void thus created and gradually regained its former position as primary actor in internal Black politics. A third positive development for the ANC in general, and specifically for Umkhonto, was the mass exodus of Blacks following the banning of the BCM. It immediately provided the ANC and Umkhonto with a fresh intake of new recruits. Although no accurate figures are available for the numbers of Blacks who had left South Africa after June 1976, it has been conservatively estimated that by the end of 1979, anything between 5,000 and 6,000 people could have fled the country.\(^2\)

Despite the ideological differences between the BCM and the ANC-SACP alliance, the bulk of the people who had fled South Africa after June 1976 appeared to have joined the ranks of Umkhonto rather than the PAC. If this was indeed the case then it places a serious question mark over the level of influence that the philosophy of Black

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168. Kane-Berman, Soweto, p. 228. See also Barrell, MK, pp. 32 -33; Mell, South Africa belongs to us, pp. 185 - 194; Dawn Souvenir Issue, p. 49, and Sechaba, January 1978, p. 6.
Consciousness had on Blacks, particularly African youths in the 1970's. By mid-1978 it was estimated by the South African Security Police that approximately 4,000 refugees from South Africa had joined the ranks of Umkhonto and were in the process of undergoing military training in ANC-SACP camps in Angola, Tanzania, Libya and elsewhere.\(^{170}\) Once these recruits had completed their training, which in most cases was very brief, they were returned to South Africa via one of the many underground infiltration routes that served the armed struggle by the end of the 1970's. With Angola being the home of Umkhonto's major training camps by 1977, the route through Botswana was one of the more popular and the most frequently used by the ANC-SACP alliance by the end of the 1970's. Routes from Angola, Tanzania and Zambia via Mozambique and Swaziland were also frequently used by the ANC and Umkhonto during this period.

Although the South African security forces were relatively successful in their counter-insurgency operation against the ANC and Umkhonto in the 1970's, they were however, as a result of the changed conditions in Southern Africa not able to put an entire stop to the subversive activities of the underground. As a result the period 1976 to the mid-1980's was seen by observers as perhaps one of the most sustained and violent phases in the history of the liberation struggle. At that time there was every indication that things could develop into a full-scale revolutionary war.\(^{171}\)

A breakdown of the armed struggle and acts of sabotage committed by Umkhonto between 1976 and the beginning of 1983, when the organisational structure of Umkhonto underwent some major changes, has revealed that between October 1976 and May 1981 some 112 acts of sabotage had been committed. In March 1978 for instance it was reported that one explosion a week had taken place since November


In an analysis conducted by Tom Lodge in 1983, it was found that between January 1977 (when only four acts of sabotage were committed by Umkhonto) and December 1982, more than 180 acts of sabotage had taken place inside South Africa that can be attributed to Umkhonto. A breakdown of these acts of sabotage and the targets involved revealed that nine different categories of targets were attacked by guerrillas (see Diagram E p. 207) and that the two types or categories of targets most frequently attacked during this period were individuals (37 incidents) and railway communication installations (35 incidents). Three further categories of targets that were frequently attacked by guerrillas during this period were industrial objects, which included power stations and oil refineries (27 incidents); shopping centres and places of public entertainment (15 incidents), and administrative buildings (15 incidents). In sharp contrast to the 1961 - 1965 phase of the armed struggle, police stations and military targets were more frequently attacked by Umkhonto's guerrillas. In the case of the first a total of 13 attacks were recorded while in the case of the latter, which included attacks on military personnel, 4 attacks were recorded. During the above period there were also 18 incidents where ANC documents were distributed via pamphlet-bombs as well as 21 incidents of shoot-outs between insurgents and members of the security forces.

An interesting aspect of the attacks between 1976 and the mid-1980's is that a distinction can be made between the type of attacks that took place before and after 1980. Before this date most of the attacks committed by Umkhonto were more or less similar to the type of attacks and targets singled out by the ANC during the first phase of the armed struggle. They mainly involved attacks on government buildings such as police stations, Bantu Administration Board buildings as well as on African policemen, former members of the ANC.


### BREAKDOWN OF TYPES OF TARGETS ATTACKED BY GUERRILLAS BETWEEN JANUARY 1977 AND DECEMBER 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE (CATEGORY) OF ATTACKS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF ATTACKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Assassinations and attacks on individuals</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Railway communication installations</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Industrial targets including power stations and oil refineries</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Skirmishes and shoot-outs between guerrillas and members of the security forces inside the country</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The release of documents and pamphlets via pamphlet-bombs</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Public buildings and places of public entertainment</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Administrative buildings</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Police stations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Military targets</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>185</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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and the SACP who had turned against the organisations and railway installations. Although there were also increased incidents of contact between guerrillas and the security forces inside the country, this really only became a prominent feature of the armed struggle after 1980. Events such as the Goch Street shoot-out between Umkhonto guerrillas and members of the police in June 1977 was thus more the exception than the rule before 1980. According to Lodge the latter incident which left two people dead was largely the result of circumstances forced on the guerrillas rather than a change in policy or a pre-planned operation by the ANC and Umkhonto. From the nature and low frequency of attacks during the latter half of the 1970's as well as the type of targets selected by the guerrillas the impression is that the period 1976 to the beginning of the 1980's was largely one of armed propaganda and the attempted establishment of a sizable underground presence inside South Africa. An essential part of this phase was the establishment of arms caches and the rebuilding of the underground's internal structures destroyed in the early 1960's. According to Howard Barrell this was no easy task as the police were uncovering underground cells and arresting key underground members of the ANC-SACP alliance almost as fast as the ANC was able to establish them. As a result of the general unrest brought about by the Soweto unrest and the political activities of radical Black youths there was some potential to build an internal armed capacity around political structures. But the re-arrest of Joe Gqabi, Harry Gwala and Martin Ramokgadi who had been actively involved in the rebuilding of ANC underground command units in Natal and the Transvaal following their release from prison during the first half of the 1970's, seriously weakened Umkhonto's organisational base, especially when they needed it the most.

As a result of these circumstances Umkhonto guerrillas who entered the country during the latter part of the 1970's found it difficult

if not often impossible to link-up with an organised ANC political presence. This was made even more difficult by the fact that they were often instructed not to establish contact with any local groupings out of fear that they might betray them. Moreover, writes Barrell, MK combatants found themselves under continued pressure to mount 'potboiling' attacks - designed to maintain the political temperature or, later, to reinforce particular political campaigns - very often before they had sufficient time to situate themselves reasonably securely inside the country.

According to Barrell, such pressures were to harm Umkhonto's attempts to build an enduring presence both in the immediate post-1976 period as well as later. The result was that combatants' survival rates and tours of duty inside the country were short-lived. (177)

Initially, argued Barrell, returning combatants were sent both into urban and rural areas which suggest that the ANC was remaining with its old policy in which the rural areas were preferable because, among other reasons, guerrillas could be seen to be challenging the State for control over actual territory. But the Soweto unrest and the scale of it soon convinced the ANC-SACP alliance of the potential of armed combat and sabotage in the urban areas. From 1976 onwards the urban areas of South Africa, in particular its Black townships, provided suitable conditions for urban guerrilla warfare and insurrection. According to Barrell, urban combatants, Umkhonto believed, should aim to turn the Black townships into no-go areas for government security forces, especially because the government relied on these townships for industrial labour. (178)

As a result of the changing conditions inside South Africa favouring urban guerrilla warfare after 1976, Umkhonto's High Command gave increasing priority to the development of what it termed "auxiliary" units. These units would consist of recruits that were given quick military training in the forward areas before being returned to South

177. Barrell, MK, p. 35.
Africa. These guerrillas were instructed to direct attacks against the ruling class, its property and personnel. Instructions were also given that attacks should as far as possible avoid endangering the lives of civilians. However, attacks on military and semi-military installations and personnel such as the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the South African police were excluded from this. In addition, where possible, attacks should be linked to political issues and popular struggles, in other words, attacks should be planned to coincide with local unrest situations and mass demonstration. A good example of this policy was for instance the attack on the Soekmekaar police station in the north-eastern Transvaal in 1980. According to Lodge, the latter attack was designed to coincide and identified the armed struggle with the resistance of the local Batlokwa people in their fight against forced removals and enforced settlement. (179)

By the beginning of the 1980's conditions both inside and outside South Africa had become even more favourable for the ANC and Umkhonto to step up its armed activities. Although the unrest situation inside the country had markedly declined by the end of the 1970's as a result of increased police action and the various measures taken by the government, the banning of the BCM and its affiliated organisations, and the arrest and imprisonment of their leaders after 1977 had effectively helped the ANC and Umkhonto to establish a noticeable presence inside the country by the beginning of 1981. (180) Outside South Africa this development was also aided by the granting of independence to Zimbabwe in April 1980. The immediate implication of this was that while it provided Umkhonto with an additional theatre of operations it also added hundreds of kilometers of additional border for the South African security forces to control.

As a result of these more favourable conditions, Umkhonto was able to step up its armed campaign from the end of 1980. According to the

Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg, between July 1979 and June 1980 only 17 acts of sabotage were committed by Umkhonto guerrillas whereas between January and October 1981 something like 40 acts of sabotage had been committed.\(^{(181)}\) Unlike the earlier phase of the armed struggle, the phase after 1980 witnessed increasingly the use of sophisticated weapons and explosive devices as well as more daring attacks on a variety of major industrial targets such as oil refineries and nuclear power stations. The damage caused by these new waves of attacks was far more extensive than that caused during the 1961 - 1965 phase. For instance, in 1980 Umkhonto guerrillas launched an attack on the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation's (SASOL) synthetic petrol and diesel refinery at Sasolburg and Secunda. The total damage caused by this attack alone amounted to R58 million. In May 1981 several million rands worth of damage was also caused when two Eastern Transvaal power stations were damaged by Umkhonto guerrillas using limpet mines.\(^{(182)}\) Perhaps the most daring attack by Umkhonto guerrillas was that launched on the Voortrekkerhoogte military base near Pretoria in August 1981. Although no serious damage was caused by the latter, the attack, like those referred to above was marked by the use of sophisticated weapons such as the Soviet-made RPG-7 and DKZ-B 122 mm rocket attack systems. The attack on Voortrekkerhoogte was apparently done in retaliation for the assassination - allegedly by agents of the South African government - of the Umkhonto leader Joe Gqabi in Harare in July of that year.\(^{(183)}\)

These attacks in 1980 and 1981 were followed by equally daring and sometimes highly successful attacks between 1982 and 1984. Examples

of the latter were the attacks on an oil storage tank at Paulpietersburg causing damage of "hundreds of thousands of rands", and that on the Koeberg nuclear power station in December 1982. The latter attack which was more daring than economically damaging, was said to have been in retaliation to "salute" the raid by the South African Defence Force on Maseru earlier in the month, and to show that the ANC was operating inside South Africa rather than from neighbouring countries. According to figures quoted by the Institute of Race Relations in its annual survey for 1982, there were at least 26 Umkhonto attacks between December 1981 and November 1982. These excluded the attack on the Koeberg power station mentioned above and the assassination of B.M. Hlapane at his Soweto home in December 1982. Figures quoted by the above institute also revealed that in contrast to only five Umkhonto guerrillas being killed by security forces in 1981, at least 17 were killed in shoot-outs with police in 1982. It was also claimed that half of the sabotage attacks and shoot-outs with the police and other security personnel took place in the Eastern Transvaal and Natal which were two of the main routes used by guerrillas to enter and leave the country. Although no exact figures are available, total damage caused by Umkhonto's sabotage activities in 1982 was estimated to amount to "millions of rands".

The periods 1983 and 1984 (see DIAGRAM F p. 213) saw a slight increase in the number of acts of sabotage committed by insurgents. Although the ANC and Umkhonto accepted responsibility for most of these acts of sabotage not all were committed by the latter organisations. In 1983 between 55 and 56 acts of sabotage were committed. This was 17 more than for the period 1982. The period 1984 however saw a slight decline in the number of attacks committed with only 44 being recorded for that year. The next year, 1985, which represents the start of the fourth and last phase in the armed struggle saw a sharp increase in the number of armed attacks

TOTAL NUMBER OF ACTS OF SABOTAGE COMMITTED BETWEEN 1976 AND 1985 (Although Umkhonto was not responsible for all the attacks listed below it committed most of them.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF ATTACKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>12 - 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>55 - 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>417 - 419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

committed by insurgents, namely 136. The total number of armed attacks for the entire third phase of the armed struggle, i.e. 1976 to 1985 was estimated at 419 which was slightly more than the figure of 398 supplied by the Minister of Law and Order.

L. le Grange, in February 1986. According to the Minister, in the same period a total of 85 people had been killed by insurgents while 79 guerrillas had lost their lives and a further 201 had been captured.\(^{(189)}\)

Some of the more noticeable attacks launched by Umkhonto guerrillas during 1983 and 1984 were as follows: On 20 May 1983 a sophisticated car bomb reminiscent of similar acts of terror committed by terrorist groups in Europe and the Middle East, exploded in a busy street in Pretoria outside the South African Air Force (SAAF) headquarters and opposite a building which housed military intelligence personnel. The explosion, which stunned most South Africans left 19 people dead and some 217 injured. Eight of the dead were African while 11 were White of whom four were military personnel. Total damage was estimated at R4 million. At the time it was the largest act of sabotage committed by Umkhonto and one which caused the most casualties. After the attack the government warned that it would not hesitate to launch pre-emptive strikes against ANC and Umkhonto targets in neighbouring territories in retaliation.\(^{(190)}\)

The Pretoria car-bomb explosion was followed by two further car-bomb explosions in 1983. The first was at a factory in Bloemfontein and came only a few days after the Pretoria explosion. On 12 July of the same year five people were killed when a second car bomb exploded in the industrial area of Jacobs in Durban. Two truck-loads of soldiers narrowly escaped injury when the bomb exploded only seconds after they had passed and shortly before the rush hour traffic started. Prior to this attack seven people died in an Umkhonto attack in which rockets were used on a Durban oil refinery. Three of those killed were civilians who burned to death after a paint store ignited as a result of the attack.\(^{(191)}\)

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In December of the same year there were at least a further six acts of sabotage as well as two attempted attacks. In Bloemfontein for instance a locomotive and two trucks were derailed by a powerful explosion presumably caused by a limpet mine, while in Durban three limpet mines were exploded on the beachfront near the SADF's Natal command headquarters. In the latter attack little damage was caused, however.

The spate of attacks continued in 1984 with 32 of the approximately 44 acts of sabotage committed during that year having taken place after the signing of the Nkomati Accord on 16 March of that year. According to Lodge most of the guerrilla activity in 1984 took place between April and the end of August and was located primarily in Durban where 12 attacks were recorded, and in Johannesburg where 12 attacks were recorded. Between September and the close of 1984 however only nine acts of sabotage were recorded. These latter attacks were mostly of a minor nature and did not cause any serious damage.

According to the South African police, most of the attacks in 1984 were apparently the work of a group of 50 guerrillas that was sent into the country shortly after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, and that the decreasing acts of insurgency towards the end of that year was the direct result of the stipulations of the Nkomati Accord coming into operation.

Although the attacks committed between 1976 and 1984 were not all as daring as those directed for instance against Voortrekkerhoogte in 1981 or against Koeberg in 1982 or as devastating as the car-bomb explosion in Pretoria in May 1983, they nonetheless had enormous propaganda value for the ANC and the SACP. Africans were reported to be proud of these Umkhonto attacks. "People are jubilant", one Black told a reporter. Others too felt "It will make the boers realise

that these boys (Umkhonto guerrillas) mean business too and have the guts to fight". Oliver Tambo is reported to have said after the Pretoria bombing of May 1983, that "Never again, never again, are our people going to be doing all the bleeding, never again". According to Lodge Tambo also announced in August 1981, that the ANC would in future attack "officials of apartheid" and that "moreover there might arise combat situations in which civilians could lose their lives". The attack on the SAAF Headquarters in Pretoria in 1983 was a clear example of this change in policy.

In addition to the acts of sabotage and armed violence committed by Umkhonto since 1976, the ANC’s influence on popular political perceptions inside the country had also been consolidated and strengthened by the emergence of open political discussion within the African community.

A major contributing factor to this latter development had been the local press, which was instrumental in the promotion of the "Release Mandela Campaign" in 1980 and the popularisation of the Freedom Charter, which was adopted by a number of new organisations such as the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) formed in 1979, and the United Democratic Front (UDF) which was formed in August 1983. The creation of the UDF was a direct reaction to the government’s new constitutional proposals which called for a tri-cameral parliament of Whites, Coloureds and Indians, but which

198. Meli, South Africa Belongs to Us, p. 192. See also South Africa: The UDF, (Africa Confidential 28 (2) January-February 1987, pp. 4 - 6); Sechaba, October 1983, p. 1; Sechaba, October 1984, pp. 2 - 10.
excluded Africans. With the formation of the UDF the ANC's armed struggle and propaganda campaign entered an entirely new era inside South Africa. Composed of more than 700 affiliated organisations and associations opposed to apartheid, and with aims and objectives that only differed from that of the ANC and the SACP on the use of violence, the UDF became, for all intents and purposes, the internal wing of the ANC, despite repeated denials that this was the case. In short the UDF was doing inside South Africa what the ANC could not do, due to its insistence on the necessity for armed struggle. In fact, Thabo Mbeki, a senior member of the ANC's NEC made it clear in 1983, following the Pretoria car-bomb explosion, that while people working in student organisations and trade unions had not been trained for guerrilla warfare, they nevertheless actively promoted the cause of the ANC and the armed struggle inside South Africa by talking to fellow workers about it, and by organising for it. This, he pointed out, was more important than a bomb going off.\(^{(199)}\)

A further significant development in the armed struggle during these years was the increasingly important role played by women. According to an article that appeared in the *Natal Mercury* on 19 February 1981, "More and more Black women are being recruited and trained to back urban terrorists". They were used to ferry weapons, ammunition and propaganda material into the country - often concealed under their clothes to give the appearance of pregnancy. Like men, these women were increasingly being trained for combat situations and sabotage.\(^{(200)}\)

With the shift towards the mass politicisation of the Black masses following the formation of the UDF in 1983, recruitment for the ANC and Umkhonto was not only made substantially easier, but many recruits were increasingly being trained inside South Africa.


Although the formation of the UDF in 1983 provided the ANC and Umkhonto with an important propaganda and organisational base inside South Africa, Umkhonto had to wait for the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985 to gain broad access to the labour class.\(^\text{201}\)

The period following the Soweto riots also witnessed a substantial rise in Black support for the ANC and its armed struggle. A survey conducted in 1981 by the Johannesburg-based newspaper, The Star, found that to Blacks the ANC was the most popular organisation in the country, and that forty per cent of those taking part in the survey indicated that they would vote for the organisation in a democratic election. Nelson Mandela, who had been in prison since 1962, emerged in the same survey as the most popular Black leader with 76 per cent of those surveyed indicating that they would vote for him.\(^\text{202}\)

### 3.1 Government Reaction

Faced with hostile neighbours that were sympathetic to the ANC and Umkhonto and who were willing to provide them with bases, as well as a rapidly escalating unrest situation inside the country after 1976, the South African government devised a series of counter-measures to meet the new onslaught against it. These measures were collectively referred to as its “national” or “total strategy”. In terms of this new strategy the government under the leadership of Prime Minister P.W. Botha and the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, called for the complete integration of the military and the political sectors of the State to meet the ANC-SACP’s diplomatic, political, economic and military onslaught against it. In short, this meant that in future the defence of South Africa would no longer be the sole responsibility of the Department of Defence but the combined responsibility of the government and all its relevant departments. As such the role of the South African Defence Force was redefined to an ‘executive body’ which would be responsible for the achievement of certain national goals, as directed by the government.

\(^\text{201}\) South Africa: Trade Unions, (Africa Confidential 28 (5), 1987.03.4, pp. 5 - 6).

\(^\text{202}\) The Star (Johannesburg), 1981.09.23.
The outcome of this new approach was a systematic militarisation of government policies and some of its key departments. The main vehicle of the government’s total strategy was the State Security Council (SSC), set up in 1972, and the National Security Management System (NSMS). The latter organ consisted of a hierarchy of inter-connecting regional, sub- and mini-joint management centres staffed by both military and civilian personnel, but with the latter being to a large degree subject to the will of the former. The State Security Council, which was given a powerful position in the co-ordination of government policy from 1978 onwards, met fortnightly under the chairmanship of the head of the government and allowed for the representation of a whole range of important ministries, ranging from Defence and Foreign Affairs to Law and Order, and Trade and Industry. It also included representatives from the various security and intelligence agencies in the country such as the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) as well as the South African police’s special intelligence department.  

With the NSMS firmly in place by the end of 1979 and with the information it obtained from the various security agencies, the government between 1980 and 1985 launched a series of military and diplomatic initiatives against the ANC and Umkhonto in neighbouring territories. In view of the escalation in ANC-Umkonto attacks towards the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980, the South African government, having warned the ANC and neighbouring territories that it would not hesitate to take military action against them, sent the SADF on a pre-dawn commando raid against ANC and Umkhonto installa-

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tions and buildings in Matola, Mozambique on 30 January 1981.\(^\text{204}\) In December 1982, the SADF again launched a strike against ANC bases in a neighbouring territory, this time on the homes of ANC representatives in Lesotho. At the end of May 1983, shortly after the car-bomb blast in Pretoria, the SADF again attacked ANC-Umkhonto bases in Mozambique; this time in the heart of Maputo, the capital of Mozambique. These attacks were followed by further SADF strikes into neighbouring territories in 1985 and 1986. Buildings in Gaborone, alleged to have housed ANC and Umkhonto members and which were used for the planning of raids on South Africa, were attacked and destroyed in June 1985. This was followed by a commando-type raid on Maseru in Lesotho in December of the same year. On 14 May 1986, it launched a series of similar attacks on alleged ANC bases in the three neighbouring territories of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. This was the first time that the SADF had attacked ANC facilities in Zambia and Zimbabwe.\(^\text{205}\)

The attacks created some serious problems for the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe. Not only was the organisation losing valuable manpower (according to statistics compiled by Lodge in 1983 the liberation movement lost more than 100 people since 1977 as a result of police action inside South Africa, and SADF attacks on ANC bases and personnel outside the country,\(^\text{206}\)) but it was finding it increasingly difficult to maintain its operations from the "frontline" territories. As a result of these developments and the South African government's diplomatic initiatives which led to the signing of a bilateral agreement with Swaziland in 1982 and with Mozambique at Nkomati in March 1984, the ANC-SACP alliance was forced to seriously rethink its position in South Africa. Lodge, who at the end of 1979 had predicted that the armed struggle had all the potential of developing into a full-scale revolutionary guerrilla war now had to

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\(^{205}\) Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations, 1986, pp. 813 - 815. For the reaction of the ANC to the SADF raid on ANC (Umkhonto) facilities and offices in Maseru, Lesotho see Sechaba, February 1983, pp. 1 - 5, 20 - 23.

admit that as a result of the above developments the ANC and Umkhonto had suffered a severe setback with regard to the armed struggle. Consequently it had yet to advance the armed struggle in South Africa from a war of "armed propaganda" to a revolutionary people's war. (207)

The South African government's policy of total strategy was clearly having the desired effect. It left the ANC with two basic choices. It could either remain in the neighbouring states of Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Swaziland and run the risk of further SADF attacks and arrests by the local authorities, or it could withdraw from these regions and work out a new strategy to facilitate the rebuilding of its underground organisation inside South Africa. As it turned out, it chose the latter course. It began to withdraw its bases and personnel from Mozambique and Swaziland in 1983. At the same time it abolished the old 1969 Revolutionary Council and replaced it with a more sophisticated and more elaborate clandestine organisational structure, that could link the political functions of the ANC and the military activities of Umkhonto more effectively. The new structure, devised by Joe Slovo and others in the SACP, provided for a hierarchy of organs consisting of a Political Military Council (PMC) at the top of the structure, followed by clandestine Regional Political Military Councils (RPMC) in the neighbouring territories, and Provincial Political Military Councils (PPMC) inside South Africa based on the four provinces and their various regions. Below this the ANC and Umkhonto operated through area or alternative structures such as people's courts, student committees and boycott committees. These latter divisions of organisation were followed by zone or branch committees and street or shaft committees at the grass roots level. In addition to these committees, the structure also provided for Area Military Political Commands (AMPC). (See Diagrams "I" and "J" pp. 424 - 425.) This

latter division operated directly under the authority of the PPMC. (208)

4. **THE FOURTH PHASE. THE PERIOD 1984/5 - 1988**

This phase, which stretched from the escalation in unrest in 1984/85 to the signing of the New York Accord on 22 December 1988, witnessed the continuation of the government's political, diplomatic, and counter-insurgency operations against the ANC and Umkhonto and increasing attempts by the latter organisations to extend their underground structures inside South Africa. The period also witnessed the effects of the Angolan mutiny among Umkhonto cadres on the ANC and the armed struggle; increased contact between groups of people and individuals from South Africa and the ANC's exile leadership; as well as renewed attempts by the ANC and Umkhonto to accelerate the armed struggle amidst growing indications that it was unable to do so as a result of problems such as logistics, discipline, strategy and the imposition of the 1985/86 states of emergency. The period further saw a growing division between those in the ANC-SACP alliance who showed an increasing willingness to seek a political solution to apartheid in South Africa, and those who insisted on a transfer of power via military means. This latter development, although denied by the liberation movement, was closely associated with the political and strategic changes that had been taking place in the Soviet Union since Mikhail Gorbachev took power in 1985. Under the influence of Gorbachev's policies of "glasnost" and "perestroYka" which called for greater "openness" and the restructuring of the Soviet Union's socio-economic and political system, Moscow came to adopt a more moderate stance on regional conflict such as that waged by the ANC-SACP alliance in South Africa. In sharp contrast to the past, when military action appeared to have been the only means of settling a regional problem, the period after 1985 witnessed a gradual change in this attitude; a development that had a definite effect on ANC and SACP policy by the end of the decade.

4.1 The unrest of 1984/85, and the National State of Emergency

Perhaps the most important development in South Africa in the mid-1980's that had a significant effect on the position and future strategy of the ANC and Umkhonto, was the wave of political unrest that hit the country from September 1984 and which lasted intermittently until 1988. The unrest, which had its origins in the growing dissatisfaction that manifested itself in the country's Black townships over issues ranging from opposition to apartheid and government policies in general, to rent increases and education, rapidly came to a head after the introduction of the government's new tricameral parliamentary system in September 1984. On the day that P.W. Botha was sworn in as the country's first Executive President under the new constitution, violence broke out in the Transvaal Black townships of Sharpeville, Bophelong, Bopatong, Sebokeng and Evaton, as their inhabitants registered their opposition to a constitution that ignored their political aspirations yet lumped them with a system of unpopular local authorities and equally unpopular rent increases. (209)

From the Vaal Triangle the unrest and mood of dissatisfaction and defiance, fanned on by organisations such as the newly established UDF, quickly spread to the rest of the country. As the unrest developed and intensified the government was forced to announce a partial state of emergency (affecting 36 magisterial districts) in July 1985. This was followed by a national state of emergency a year later on 12 June 1986. Faced with what was generally described as a revolutionary situation, the government in terms of the two states of emergency moved against organisations and leaders throughout the country, arresting and detaining thousands. By June 1987, a year after the national emergency was introduced, an estimated 26 000 or more people of all races had been detained. (210) Some sources placed the figure closer to 30 000. (211)

209. F. Meer (ed), Resistance in the Townships, pp. 3 - 5.
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As was the case in 1976, the ANC and Umkhonto were caught by surprise by the 1984/85 unrest, particularly by its rapid development. Yet, as in the case of the Soweto uprising, the ANC was quick to capitalise on the unrest and present it to the world as an ANC-inspired event. More important, however, was the fact that the exodus of a new wave of young Africans from the country between 1984 and 1986, provided the ANC and Umkhonto in particular with a much needed influx of new recruits. Some recruits were, as was the case in the post-1976 period, sent to the ANC's education complex at Mazimbu in Tanzania. The bulk of them were however sent to Umkhonto's training camps in Angola. Although the influx of new recruits was a boon to the ANC and Umkhonto, it also brought a whole range of new problems for the organisation and its ageing leadership. Much younger and more radical than the youths of 1976, the new recruits soon came to criticise the ANC and Umkhonto for its slow progress with the armed struggle in South Africa. But the influx of new recruits also brought a second more serious problem with them, namely South African police agents. General Johan Coetzee, the Commissioner of the South African police, said in 1983 that one of the problems facing the ANC and Umkhonto was that they could not absorb large numbers of people from South Africa without including security agents, a situation that was highlighted by the discovery of a well-developed South African police spy-ring in the ANC and Umkhonto's training camps in Angola in 1981. As a result of these and other problems that had been steadily forced on the external leadership since the beginning of the 1980's, but which became particularly critical by the mid-1980's following the signing of the Nkomati Accord and the SADF's continued raids against ANC and Umkhonto facilities in neighbouring states, the Mission in Exile was eventually compelled to call a major National Consultative Conference in June 1985, the first since 1969.  

the spontaneous nature of the 1984/85 unrest, the ANC and SACP was forced to have a serious rethink on strategy and the future role of Umkhonto in the armed struggle in South Africa. In view of this the Conference adopted a number of resolutions which among others, called for an intensification of the armed struggle in South Africa; attacks on "soft" or civilian targets; increased political activities among the masses, particularly the workers; greater recognition of the labour movement and its role in the armed struggle; the recruitment of Umkhonto cadres from it; and the urgent need to build up the ANC and Umkhonto's underground political and military structure inside South Africa to serve as the basis for "a people's war".

The Conference also called for the consolidation and extension of the organisational changes introduced in 1983/4 to both urban and rural areas, including the homelands, as well as the election of a War Council to give more effective direction to the struggle.1

Although numerous other resolutions were also adopted by the Kabwe conference dealing with a broad spectrum of issues such as cadre policy, discipline and security in the organisation, the two most significant with regard to the development of the armed struggle in South Africa after 1985, were the decisions to allow attacks on soft or civilian targets, and for the ANC and Umkhonto to expand their social and political base inside the country. The latter decision was particularly significant since it was the direct result of the 1984/85 uprising. The spontaneous nature of the unrest caused the ANC and the SACP to realise that their 1969 notions of what

constituted a revolutionary situation and how it would eventually come about was out-dated. Up to the events of 1984/85, the ANC and the SACP firmly believed that revolution in South Africa would eventually come about through a protracted guerrilla war led by a vanguard party of committed partisans from outside the country. This party was to be the SACP in alliance with the ANC and Umkhonto, who was to lead the insurrection from outside the country. In terms of this thinking the ANC and the SACP rejected any form of popular uprising as a viable route to revolution and the transfer of power.\(^\text{214}\)

But this notion was, however, radically changed by the unrest of 1984/85 and the South African government's diplomatic initiatives and military successes by 1986. In an article that appeared in the ANC's official mouthpiece, Sechaba, in 1987, Mzala (a pseudonym), made it clear that while "In 1969, the realistic military perspective was to wage only a protracted guerrilla struggle, ... The person who now speaks only of protracted guerrilla war is behind the times."\(^\text{215}\)

Thus the emphasis after 1985 was on the political and military mobilisation of the masses inside South Africa and the intensification of the armed struggle, via the extension of the internal organisational structures of the ANC. In this Umkhonto was to play the key role. It was to lead the "mass combat units" that were being formed in the "mass insurrectionary zones" in the townships.\(^\text{216}\)

Unfortunately for the ANC it soon discovered that the formulation of new strategies and their successful implementation represented two different sides of the same coin and that the declaration of 1987 as the "Year of Advance to People's Power" did not necessarily correspond with the reality of its armed struggle inside South Africa. This


\(^{215}\) Mzala, Towards People's War and Insurrection, (Sechaba, April 1987, p. 5).

\(^{216}\) O. Tambo, Attack, Advance, Give the Enemy no Quarter, (Sechaba, March 1986, p. 6).
meant that while Umkhonto was able to dramatically step up its acts of sabotage and destruction inside South Africa after 1985 (see DIAGRAM G below) the ANC remained largely unable to rebuild its underground structure inside South Africa to the extent where it could seriously threaten the security of the State or galvanise the Black population in the country to the point where it could unite them in a full-scale people's war.  


218. The statistics in DIAGRAM G were compiled from the following sources:
   - The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 26 January - 1 February 1989;
   - Cooper, Race Relations Survey, 1987/1988, pp. xxxviii - xxxix;
the latter diagram exclude figure for 1990) acts of terrorism had been committed in South Africa. Of these attacks 433 were directed against the South African police, 60 against the SADF, 36 against legal institutions, 244 against State institutions, 315 against economic targets, 336 against civilian targets and eight against unspecified targets. During this same period there were 240 fatalities while 1,350 people had been injured in these attacks. According to Stadler, the ANC had accepted responsibility for most of these acts of sabotage. The total cost of these attacks is not known.

There were a number of reasons as to why the ANC-SACP alliance despite the successes and increased acts of sabotage committed by Umkhonto since 1976 could not advance the armed struggle in South Africa from a basic war of propaganda to a people’s war by the end of 1988. In the first instance the government, despite its deteriorating political and economic position internationally, had nevertheless managed to maintain its position of power and authority in the country while at the same time met every new phase of the ANC’s armed campaign and every new manoeuvre with sophisticated if not ruthless counter-measures. Among these measures were the already mentioned attacks launched by the SADF on ANC and Umkhonto targets in neighbouring countries between 1983 and 1986, the signing of anti-ANC pacts with neighbouring states such as Swaziland and Mozambique and the installation (albeit indirectly) of a pro-South African government in Lesotho in 1986. In addition to these measures the government was quick to ban any newly formed leftwing organisations or fronts and detain their leaders if it thought they contributed to the unrest situation in the country or might aid the ANC’s armed campaign. During the period 1985 to the end of 1988, the security forces were particularly successful in their counter-insurgency operations against the ANC and Umkhonto inside the

country. The number of guerrillas captured or killed during this period was almost five times higher than the figure for the period June 1976 to the end of 1984. According to figures released by the security police in 1988 a total of 489 guerrillas belonging mostly to the ANC-SACP alliance had been captured or killed between July 1985 and June 1986. A further 419 insurgents were arrested or killed between January 1987 and June 1988. (222) It was further reported in June 1989 that 487 guerrillas had been killed or captured between June 1987 and June 1989. The total number of guerrillas killed (excluding those captured) between 1984 and mid-1989 was estimated to be in the region of 163 as compared to the 64 killed and 185 captured during the entire period from October 1976 to December 1984. (223)

Although the above figures do not relate to attacks by Umkhonto guerrillas alone they nevertheless give a good indication of the level of success that the government had in its counter-insurgency operations in the 1980's. These successes led the authorities to claim in February 1988 that there were growing signs that Umkhonto was having difficulty in escalating the armed struggle and that the ANC was increasingly forced into the diplomatic field to show any progress in South Africa. (224) This latter development was reflected in a number of developments, the most important among them being the growing contact between the ANC and groups and individuals from South Africa after June 1985; visible pressure from within the ranks of the ANC's leadership to consider a possible political settlement for South Africa should the armed struggle fail; the release of a statement in Lusaka in August 1987 containing five minimum conditions to be met by the South African government to create a climate for talks; growing support from international agencies and governments for a peaceful settlement in South Africa, and the release of a set of constitutional guidelines by the ANC in early 1988 to clarify the organisation's stance on the principles contained in the 1955 Freedom Charter.

Although Umkhonto, under the direction of military hardliners such as Chris Hani, Ronnie Kasrils and others managed to increase the number of sabotage attacks inside South Africa during 1988, particularly during the latter part of the year to co-incide with the municipal elections held in October, the decision by the military hardliners in Umkhonto and the ANC to take the armed struggle to the White areas in the country and to begin concentrating their attacks on soft or civilian targets was seen as the act of a desperate organisation. It was argued by Africa Confidential in its March 1988 issue that while the decision to attack civilian, particularly White civilian targets, would no doubt be popular with angry Black youths inside South Africa (and presumably also inside the ranks of Umkhonto), it would certainly alienate international support for the ANC as well as lose the organisation some of its liberal White support inside South Africa.\(^{225}\)

With Sweden being the largest single financial supporter of the ANC the decision to attack White civilian targets undoubtedly came as an embarrassment to it. According to a later edition of the same publication,\(^{226}\) sources close to the ANC-SACP alliance - but not official spokesmen - believed that Hani's decision to attack soft targets in South Africa after 1987 was brought on by a power struggle in the ANC and that it was Hani's aim not only to challenge the leadership of both the ANC and the SACP to bring a change in policy but also to stake a claim for the eventual presidency of the ANC. According to statistics compiled by Michael Morris (of Terrorism and Research Associates in London) on acts of sabotage committed between 15 June 1985 and 17 November 1988 involving public places and civilian targets, 125 such incidents took place during this period.\(^{227}\) Statistics compiled by other sources such as the Institute of Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria revealed that 70 per cent of all armed attacks in 1987 were directed at soft or civilian targets. Similarly, the Interna-

\(^{225}\) South Africa: What next for the ANC, (Africa Confidential, 29 (5), 1988.03.4, p. 1).

\(^{226}\) South Africa: Hani's rise, (Africa Confidential, 29 (16), 1988.08.12, p. 1).

tional Freedom Foundation calculated that acts of indiscriminate insurgency - such as on civilians - had increased from 19 per cent in 1985 to 49 per cent in the first half of 1988. In June 1989 it was stated by the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, that while acts of insurgency by Umkhonto had decreased in 1989, attacks by the organisation on civilian targets had increased by some 200 per cent. (226)

Clearly, the government's counter-insurgency and diplomatic measures such as the signing of the New York Agreement (Accord) on 22 December 1988 were increasingly forcing the ANC-SACP alliance to take drastic measures to make its presence felt inside the country. In terms of the New York Accord the ANC-SACP alliance was forced to close down its bases and other facilities in Angola after 1988. These developments and those taking place in Central Europe, particularly in the Eastern Bloc countries were forcing changes on both the ANC-SACP alliance and the South African government by the middle of 1989 that no one could have foreseen. Both the ANC and the South African government found themselves increasingly being pushed towards a peaceful settlement and a political solution to South Africa's racial problems.

CONCLUSION

In the thirty odd years of armed struggle conducted by the ANC-SACP alliance and Umkhonto we Sizwe since 1961 two periods or phases stand out above the rest. The first is the period 1961 to 1965 and the second is the period 1976 to the mid-1980's. The first period reflects the profile of an organisation that had just embarked on a campaign of sabotage and was still struggling to find its feet. The acts of sabotage committed during this period were mainly crude and ineffective. Admittedly, the aim of these early attacks, as the ANC has stated, were not designed to bring the government to a fall but to show dissatisfaction and to generate both local and international support for the cause of the ANC which the latter hoped could be

brought to bear on the government to change its policies. The question, however, is whether the ANC and the SACP's sabotage campaign in the early 1960's was designed to bring about revolutionary or evolutionary change? While there can be little doubt that the shift towards armed violence and the formation of Umkhonto in 1961, especially the role that the SACP played, constituted a definite move towards a revolutionary strategy it is nevertheless doubtful whether the underground leadership of the ANC-SACP alliance were convinced in the early 1960's that their limited acts of sabotage - at least in the early stages - could bring the government to a fall. Indications are that they held out strong hopes that the White voters in the country might place sufficient pressure on the government to change its unpopular racial policies and grant greater political freedom to Blacks, particularly Africans in the country. They further hoped that should this take place and Blacks be granted full citizenship with Whites the ANC in association with the SACP would be in a position to set up a predominantly Black government based on a socialist democracy which in time could be replaced by a fully-fledged communist government. In this manner the aims of the ANC and the SACP were undoubtably revolutionary in the 1960's.

All this had become academic by 1965 as a result of the government's reaction to the sabotage campaign and the measures it took to destroy the underground. Having moved the centre of its operations outside South Africa after 1965, the ANC-SACP alliance began to campaign vigorously for international recognition and support for its armed struggle in South Africa. At the same time it also set into motion plans to rebuild its shattered underground structures inside South Africa to enable Umkhonto to resume the offensive and when necessary to develop the struggle into a full-scale people's war. Unfortunately for the ANC-SACP alliance conditions remained unfavourable for them to do so until the mid-1970's when with the granting of independence to Angola and Mozambique, and the growing unrest situation inside South Africa after 1976, Umkhonto was able to resume its activities inside the country. This latter development heralded the second major phase in the armed struggle. Being absent from the
country for more than ten years the first few years of the 1976-1985 period was spent setting up underground structures, bringing in arms, establishing underground routes and recruiting new members for Umkhonto. The few attacks that were conducted during the period 1976 to 1979 were largely done for political and propaganda reasons. Although the damage caused by these attacks was more substantial than that of the period 1961 to 1965, they were however limited in comparison to the damage caused by Umkhonto's guerrillas during the period 1980 to about 1985. By this stage the aims and objects of the armed struggle had become revolutionary, namely the violent destruction of white minority rule in South Africa through a guerrilla war and its immediate replacement with a multi-racial socialist (if not communist) democracy.

In pursuit of this aim the period 1976 to 1985 saw a steady increase in attacks by guerrillas of Umkhonto directed against a variety of targets similar to those attacked during the first phase of the armed struggle. One particular category of target that received more attention from guerrillas during the post 1976 period were members of the South African police and the Defence Force, and people who were suspected of being informers, or former ANC, SACP or Umkhonto members who had turned against the organisation. A good example of the latter was the assassination of Bartholomew Hlapane at his Soweto home in 1982. Hlapane was a key witness for the State in numerous trials involving ANC and SACP members during the 1960's.

Although the third period, 1985 - 1988 saw a dramatic increase in the acts of sabotage committed inside South Africa these attacks were not as spectacular as those committed by the organisation during the previous period nor were they as damaging. A particular feature of the armed struggle after 1985 was however the growing incidence of attacks directed against public places and civilian people. The reason for this new development, as we have indicated, may have been the result of a power struggle between "moderates" and "radicals" within the National Liberation Movement following the Kabwe Conference of June 1985. Whatever the case may have been there were forces at work by the mid-1980's that would eventually bring a change
in attitude both in the ANC-SACP alliance and the South African government by the latter part of the decade. These changes in attitude which were resisted by hardliners in the liberation movement as well as in the South African government had a momentum of their own that was hard to stop. Although the ANC continued with its sabotage campaign in the months immediately following the signing of the New York Accord, the expulsion of the ANC and Umkhonto from Angola and the policy changes that were taking place in Central and Eastern Europe were beginning to have their effect on the armed struggle. As a result, by the end of 1989 it was becoming increasingly clear that although the ANC was still able to mount acts of sabotage inside South Africa, it was unable to escalate its armed activities let alone bring about a people's war in South Africa that would involve mass insurrection. History had caught up with both the ANC and the South African government. Communism and its emphasis on the settlement of political disputes through revolutionary means was rapidly on the wane. In its place had came a new and growing desire for a peaceful (political) settlement of all regional and national disputes. With the ANC-SACP alliance being a major recipient of Soviet military and ideological aid Umkhonto and its leaders were forced by the beginning of the 1990's to take serious note of this new direction in Soviet political thinking.