Afrikaner student identity in post apartheid South Africa: A case study

by

Charlotte Sutherland

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SUPERVISOR: Prof Janis Grobbelaar

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Abstract

The legal end of apartheid in South Africa brought about innumerable radical changes, not least so in its implications for the identity dynamics of all citizens. Due to their parents’ and grandparents’ undeniable involvement in and benefitting from the apartheid system, white Afrikaner youth are experiencing particular challenges as they battle to renegotiate their identity as Afrikaners. Three interrelated research aims guided this case study, namely a) to explore respondents’ attitudes toward a variety of identity labels and cultural elements; b) to detect possible manifestations of a present day ‘new’ Afrikaner nationalism amongst them and c) to probe the relationship between respondents’ identification and the South African ‘brain drain’. Literature and focus group data informed the content of a comprehensive survey, which was filled out by 151 respondents from the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Pretoria.

Results illustrate that conventional Afrikaner churches and the institution of the family continue to act as a 'hub of socialisation' that transfers traditional values to the youth, in so doing providing continuity between the past and present. The two-thirds of respondents who are members of conventional Afrikaner churches are more likely to identify with exclusivist, conservative ethno-cultural values. The stark juxtaposition between a radically changed national context and these respondents’ values manifests in a particular strategy to present themselves as ‘politically correct’ citizens. This strategy involves utilisation of the notion of 'culture' to downplay the centrality of racial difference in their experiences and identification. They subscribe to several discourses that are typical of ‘whiteness’, which cast whites as victims of change and discredit post-1994 redress policies. It is argued that respondents’ strong ethno-cultural identification disproves the notion of an identity crisis amongst them and underpins the finding that few respondents plan to emigrate on a permanent basis. Their active consumption of key elements of white Afrikaner culture arguably constitutes a form of twenty-first century cultural nationalism.
Acknowledgements

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Last but not least, thank you to my family for their encouragement. Thank you to my mom and sister for always being there for me. A special thank you to my late father, who not only taught me to value education, but also worked hard so that I could obtain one. I would like to dedicate this work to his memory. I hope you are proud, Daddy.
Key terms

Afrikaners, youth, identity, ethnicity, culture, race, racism, language, Afrikaans, whiteness, nation, nationalism, redress policies, emigration

Abbreviations

ANC    African National Congress
APO    African Political Organisation
ATKV   Afrikaanse Taal en Kultuur Vereniging
AWB    Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
CP     Conservative Party of South Africa
DA     Democratic Alliance
DRC    Dutch Reformed Church
FAK    Federasie vir Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings (Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organisations)
FF+    Freedom Front Plus
GNP    Gesuiwerde National Party
GR     Gereformeerde Kerk
GWU    Garment Workers Union
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IFP    Inkatha Freedom Party
KKNK   Klein Karoo Nasionale Kunstfees
NHC    Nederduitsch Hervormde Church
NP     National Party
OFS    Republic of Orange Free State
PAC    Pan Africanist Congress
SAAAS  South African Association for the Advancement for Science
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Preface

As a key element of white Afrikaner identity, the Afrikaans language is one of the undeniable contextual specificities that underpin this Sociological study. As respondents’ mother tongue, the Afrikaans language underscores the results of this study. All quotations of respondents’ own words are therefore presented in Afrikaans, and translated to English in footnotes, in order to maintain and convey their meaning as embedded in their particular context.
Declaration of Authenticity

I, Charlotte Sutherland declare that this dissertation is my original work. Where secondary material has been used (either from a printed source or from the internet), this has been carefully acknowledged and referenced in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Humanities, University of Pretoria.

Signature ........ ...........

Date ..............4 March 2013.....................
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Context and research objectives

The onset of democratic governance in South Africa in 1994 brought changes to every imaginable sphere of life for its citizens. The scales tipped and being a South African took on new meanings in the process. Citizens inevitably needed to re-conceptualise their identities (Moodley and Adam, 2000:51). The majority of South African citizens revelled in their expectations of freedom, while others, including so-called Coloureds and Indians, reported anxiety at the prospect of being categorically lumped together with black people (Soudien, 2001).

The ousted white oppressors were doomed to continue life as the instigators of apartheid and to witness its long-lasting impact on the lives of all South Africans. For them, democratisation meant certain loss of political power and privilege. Afrikaans-speaking whites, or ‘Afrikaners’,\(^1\) have been othered against the history of the immoral apartheid system, argues Steyn (2004:150, emphasis in original). A wide variety of reactions to post apartheid dynamics among Afrikaners, such as disappointment, embarrassment, guilt, anxiety and frustration, have been documented. However, the dynamics of being members of the post apartheid South Africa ‘other’ occur simultaneously with various other processes, including that of re-conceptualising their identities as Afrikaners. The complex nature of these processes is underscored by intergenerational tensions between those who institutionalised apartheid, on one hand, and their children, on the other, who experienced its dismantling as young adults.

Intergenerational tensions manifested in the public domain after the brother of former President FW de Klerk, Willem de Klerk, published a book in 2000\(^2\) in which he laments the losses and assaults Afrikaners had to endure after 1994 and criticised young Afrikaners for devaluing their

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\(^1\) White South Africans whose mother tongue is the Afrikaans language are considered ‘Afrikaners’ in this study. Debates regarding this definition of ‘Afrikaners’ are considered in Chapter 2.

Afrikaner identities (Freedberg 2006:340). De Klerk’s views enraged many Afrikaners, such as journalist Chris Louw, who in turn openly accused de Klerk and his peers of traumatising their children to defend apartheid, then years later meekly handed over power to the black majority. Louw’s letter voiced the feelings of many Afrikaners of his generation. His peer and musician Koos Kombuis went as far as to publically resign from Afrikanership in 2006, yet concurrently admitted to a deep-seated bond with this collective identity (Huigen and Grundlingh, 2009:1). Freedberg suggests that these personal and intergenerational conflicts represented a broader phenomenon of “soul-searching” among Afrikaners (2006:341), also conceptualised as a process of identity re-definition by authors like Bornman (2005) and Krog (2011).

Academic concern with the notion of identification and identity, encased in a context characterised by dramatic socio-political and economic change, reflects an international trend. Numerous scholars associate the current popularity of the notion of ‘identity’ with political change around the world. The legacies of processes and phenomena such as colonialism, migration, globalisation, and growing social movements have spurred new forms of identity politics, and pushed ‘identity’ to the frontline of various academic enquiries (Weedon, 2004:1). Richard Jenkins posits that ‘identity’ has been a unifying theme in social science for the last twenty years, one that “everybody has something to say about” (2004:28, emphasis in original). In his view, identification has become something of a ‘right’ that is beyond criticism or opposition, “reified into a sacred and holy apotheosis” that is rooted in national politics (Jenkins, 2004:29).

Some conceptualise the relationship between identification and change as indicative of an identity crisis. For example, Mercer holds that “identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable, is replaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty” (Mercer, 1990:43). Puttergill notes that whites experienced a sense of crisis when white privilege and power was challenged in South Africa (2008:74), and the 2007 ‘De La Rey

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3 Countless numbers of young Afrikaner men were sent to war to fight the enemies of the apartheid regime, including the majority of South Africans who are black, and hundreds reportedly lost their lives in battle. Many feel the conflicts were a waste of resources and lives.

phenomenon\(^5\) produced numerous outright suggestions of “a crisis in identity politics in which the Afrikaner has sought to redefine him/herself in post apartheid South Africa” (Baines, 2009:9). These authors argue that the ‘crisis’ is fuelled by insecurity about a future that is simultaneously free from prescribed identification and bound by the legacy of the past (Baines, 2009:9 and Russell, 2009:142).

However, Brubaker and Cooper caution against the notion of an ‘identity crisis’. They perceive changes in identification as inevitable, complex processes, not once-off crises (2000:2-3). The notion of a process of redefinition may be applied to white Afrikaner youth, who are actively engaging the question of their identity, as exemplified by a recent award-winning art work called ‘\textit{OranjeBlanjeBlou; Wie is ons dan nou?}’ (OrangeWhiteBlue; who are we now, then?), by a Durban fine arts student.\(^6\) “I was investigating South Africa’s past, such as the Great Trek, the British concentration camps and the Boer War. As an Afrikaner, I wanted to know who I am and where I come from,” she commented. At present, one of the major products of the redefinition process seems to be a form of pride. “\textit{Ons hou van ‘De La Rey’, want dis Afrikaans en dit maak ons trots om Afrikaans te wees},”\(^7\) one white Afrikaner youth told journalist Marida Fitzpatrick in 2007.

Exclusivist ethnic pride has been noted by authors like Baines (2009:5), Freedberg (2006:341, 361), Kriel (2006:63) and Jansen (2009). Baines accordingly suggests that a post apartheid-era Afrikaner Nationalism among youth is possible (2009:7), but this matter has not been scientifically investigated.

Are these youth free from the shackles of apartheid by virtue of having played no direct part in it? Or could a new or resurgent Afrikaner nationalism emerge from this generation, many of whom

\(^5\) The song called on an historical Anglo-Boer war General to come and lead the ‘Boere’, a term that unmistakably refers to white Afrikaners and which is commonly associated with ‘traditional’ Afrikanerdom and refers to staunch white Afrikaner farmers and/or the characteristics and values with which they are associated. The artist insisted that the song was simply about General De La Rey, but white Afrikaner youth seemed to extract more meaning than simply historical affiliation from it. They sang it out loud in hundreds of pubs and clubs, often with their right hands on their hearts. Sometimes the apartheid or even the old Transvaal flag (the ZAR or \textit{Vierkleur}) would be displayed.

\(^6\) ‘Oranje Blanje Blou’ is a term that refers to the apartheid-era South African flag and arguably invokes feelings of patriotic pride (especially in older) white Afrikaners. See \url{http://www.iol.co.za/mercury/art-student-s-dolls-win-award-1.1227060?showComments=true}.

\(^7\) We like ‘De La Rey’, because it’s Afrikaans and it makes us feel proud to be Afrikaans.
witnessed their parents become political eunuchs and complainants of victimisation? Will young white Afrikaners continue to emigrate in large numbers, seemingly apathetic to their roots, to join privileged whites in countries where whiteness is secure, such as Australia, England and Canada, as Steyn and Foster suggest (2008:44-45)?

Against this background, the present study explores the identity construction of a sample of white Afrikaner university students at the University of Pretoria. Three interrelated research aims guided the investigation, namely:

a) to explore the identification of a sample of 19-25-year-old white Afrikaner students by measuring their attitudes toward a variety of identity labels and cultural elements;

b) to probe the respondents’ identification with traditional white Afrikaner interests and concerns in the post apartheid context with the aim of considering possible manifestations of a present day Afrikaner nationalism;

c) to probe the relationship between respondents’ experiences, their identification and the South African ‘brain drain’.

The motivations behind these questions are further discussed below.

1.2 New generation, new Afrikaners?

This section presents the motivation and reasoning behind the study, ranging from the topic’s national relevance to the researcher’s personal affiliation with it.

Abebe Zegeye notes that youth identification has, and will continue to play a central role in the well-being of the South African nation (2008:17-39). Young white Afrikaners are part and parcel of South Africa’s future. Given the relatively privileged position of the majority of white Afrikaners, we may assume white Afrikaner youth will have significant resources, or access to resources such as education and skills, to enable them to contribute to future South Africa – if they choose to do so. Their identification of themselves as white Afrikaners, framed by the national context, arguably
influences the choices they make with regard to their country and their own contribution to its well-being.

Nevertheless, formal enquiry into their identification is scant. Two recent doctoral studies focus on white Afrikaners (Puttergill, 2008 and Van Der Merwe, 2009), but not specifically on youth or youth identification. Where white Afrikaans-speaking university students are included in other studies, they are usually compared with other population and ethnic groups, and only with regard to their attitudes toward race and language (for example the studies of Goldschmidt, 2003 and Walker, 2005). These findings reveal important but limited detail about white Afrikaans-speaking youths’ identification. Studies that focus specifically on this group offer little nuance in findings and discussion, and/or focus on a single dimension of their identity only. For example, the respondents in Kamper & Steyn’s study (2007) are high school students and Pieterse (2003) focuses only on the religious dimension of identification. The university students in Delport & Olivier’s study (2003) are all females and the findings are simply presented in terms of three broad categories. Anthropological and Psychological studies, such as those of Barnard (2010) and Heaven, Stones, Simbayi and Le Roux (2000) offer some useful findings, but arguably lack the depth and context characteristic of a Sociological perspective.

Pasting together available findings furthermore suggests that Afrikaner youth identification is dynamic, but these dynamics remain un-chronicled. Piecemeal findings from essentially incomparable studies are furthermore inconsistent. For example, Hendriks argued in 2000 that white Afrikaner youth were withdrawing from cultural maintenance initiatives into an ‘identity vacuum’ due to loss of political power and ideological disillusionment (2000:292-294). Thomas Blaser held that young white Afrikaners had dissociated from ethnic mobilisation and ‘traditional’ white Afrikaner concerns in 2004 (p.184). However, Schoeman & Puttergill found in 2007 that white Afrikaans speaking students at the University of Pretoria’s (UP) Faculty of Humanities displayed high levels of involvement in politics, identified with white politicians and parties and were more conservative than their English-speaking counterparts (p.166-167). Kamper and Steyn also found that their Grade 11 white Afrikaner respondents held generally positive views of their
future in South Africa, despite their acute awareness of the social problems the country faces (2007). As has been noted, these findings and arguments are suggestive, but substantial investigation is needed to gain a fuller understanding of the topic.

Questions of nationalism and the role of generational transfer of attitudes and memories in identification are of particular importance to the topic of white Afrikaner youth identity. Some of these youths have displayed behaviour that raises questions about their attitudes and the origin of thereof. Blaser argues that identity formation among young Afrikaners must be investigated, not only in order to explore the possibility and nature of Afrikaner nationalism in post apartheid South Africa, but perhaps more importantly to become knowledgeable of its possible implications for the future (Blaser, 2004:184). The shockingly racist nature of the infamous Reitz incident of 2008 in Bloemfontein illustrates that apartheid’s legacy reproduces racialised thinking and “speaks to the deep-seated resistance and anger from white students at the process of racial integration...” (Naidoo, 2010:121). Willem de Klerk criticises Afrikaner youth for denying the existence of an Afrikaner volk (De Klerk, 2000:52), but incidents like the Reitz video have re-focused attention on the possibility of a post apartheid Afrikaner nationalism among the youth, especially those raised in conservative, closed environments. The notion of a ‘new’ Afrikaner nationalism amongst the youth will also enhance our understanding of how post apartheid ‘whiteness’ works. Anthony Smith (1995) and Sheila Croucher (2003) argue that nationalist sentiments can exist in post-modern democratic dispensations and Mariana Kriel makes the case specifically for white Afrikaners’ ‘language struggle’ as a form of Afrikaner nationalism (2006).

However, the inter-connectedness and social processes between recent Afrikaner generations remain largely unchartered academic territory, except for brief social references to the idea, such as those offered by Anthropologist Kees Van Der Waal in his mention of an “intergenerational tension” in the “experiential disjuncture between older and younger Afrikaans speakers”

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8 The incident involves a video made by four white Afrikaner male students at the University of the Free State in 2008. It depicts some of the elderly black workers at the students’ residence partaking in humiliating activities, including drinking some of the students’ urine.

9 A volk is a nation.
The complex, intersectional nature of generational transfer of attitudes, experiences of national transformation and youth identification have not been explored as a whole. The notion of a ‘new’ Afrikaner nationalism amongst the youth has therefore been raised, but neither sufficiently formally confirmed, nor disproved.

Crain Soudien emphasises that youth identification and the role of educational institutions in such processes are of crucial importance to the new South Africa (2001:311). South African universities are sites of post apartheid transformational struggle, particularly struggles over power, language, money, class and status; hence they offer captivating sites for research. Previously racially and linguistically exclusive, universities have responded to post apartheid education policies with inclusive official discourses and internal restructuring (Walker, 1995:47). Institutionalised Afrikaner culture resisted change at the historically Afrikaans North-West University (Walker, 1995:49), and remains resilient at the University of Pretoria (UP) and the University of Stellenbosch (US), as documented by Jonathan Jansen (2009) and Jana Barnard (2010) respectively. At the University of the Free State (UFS), racial integration in residences only began to take place in 2007 and was met with defensive, frustrated incidences of racist acts by white students (Prishani, 2010). Scandals like the Reitz incident became “the signifier of all that was wrong in overcoming apartheid-era relations of difference at universities” (Lewins, 2010:127). A Ministerial committee, led by Professor Crain Soudien, investigated South African universities’ campus residences, as well as students’ learning and working life after the Reitz incident. The resulting Soudien Report argues that the pace of transformation is slow and that ‘whiteness’ and patriarchy remains resistant and pervasive in many spheres of South African universities (Lewins, 2010:130).

UP has been experiencing a specific set of transformational challenges, including struggles around the Afrikaans language as instruction medium. The history and dynamics of UP are discussed in Chapter 5. By way of introduction, note that most respondents in this study came to UP’s Faculty of Humanities from ‘safe’ white middle class environments. Some however lived in campus residences, where they experienced transformational politics, racialised arguments and discourses
about affirmative action, majority rule and so on. Non-residence students were exposed to similar
dynamics, at least in UP classrooms. Respondents’ university experience had therefore offered
them much food for thought by the time they participated in this study.\textsuperscript{10} Their experiences made
them question their belief systems, illustrated structural transformational dynamics and exposed
them to a discourse that de-prioritised everything that was white and Afrikaner. Jansen’s work
makes a particularly good case for the formal study of white Afrikaner student identity at UP. He
argues that “…the Afrikaner youths see everything collapsing around them. They see a future that
is dark. ... The slightest change in the social climate spells impending doom…” (Jansen, 2009:69).

My personal interest in this subject is largely motivated by my position and experience as ‘insider’
to the white Afrikaner population. I was an on-campus student at UP from 2003 to 2008. I am only
three to four years older than most of the respondents used in this study; we belong to roughly
the same generation. I share a cultural background with the population (young white Afrikaners
living in Pretoria). That is, I too am from a middle-class white Afrikaner family and attended the
same kind of high school they did: a Model C, Afrikaans-medium, whites-only school.\textsuperscript{11} Although
members of this generation were relatively young when apartheid officially ended (I myself turned
ten in 1994), we have experienced the transition and its upshots through our families, schools,
communities and Afrikaans-medium media, as carefully set out by Jonathan Jansen in his book on
white Afrikaner first-year students at the University of Pretoria (2009). Like my respondents, I had
to consider carefully the differences and similarities between inherited social ‘knowledge’, my
family’s views and national discourse and policy. We are the first generation who are ‘free’ to
make up our own minds about what to believe in a democratic context, yet our schools, parents
and experiences of the post apartheid context significantly influence our attitudes and
identification.

\textsuperscript{10} The data was collected in the fourth quarter of 2008.
\textsuperscript{11} The South African Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR) defines Model C schools as “those schools that were reserved for white
pupils under apartheid. The term is not officially used by the Department of Basic Education, but is widely used to refer to
former whites-only schools.” See Roodt, M., ‘Research and policy brief: ‘Model C’ is the model to emulate’, 1 February 2011,

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In summary, researching white Afrikaner identification as a context-specific phenomenon is an approach advanced by respected scholars Irma du Plessis (2004), Charles Puttergill (2008) and Jonathan Hyslop (1996), all three of whom conducted localised studies dealing with Afrikaner identity. The present case study aims to explore the identity construction of white Afrikaner youth at UP, with the view to understanding the relationship between their self-identification, the possibility of them gaining a new nationalist identification and the desire to emigrate from South Africa.

1.3 The tools of the study
This section briefly introduces the social constructionist paradigm and methodological approach followed in the study.

1.3.1 Social constructionism
Identity is conceptualised within a social constructionist framework and identification is considered a process that is shifting and dynamic, and shaped by contemporary context, history and human agency. This approach is in line with the broader trend in identity studies which focuses on how identities are chosen, claimed, and determined by social forces (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000:1; Jenkins, 2004:20). Accordingly, Rob Pattman suggests that social change, power dynamics, structural influences and contingent, individual and fluid factors all be considered when studying South African university student identification (2007:475).12

Social constructionism appeals to a balanced consideration of agency and structure, to history and the present. Referring specifically to the study of white Afrikaner identity, Van Der Waal notes that “there is a stronger emphasis on the need to see individual agency and instrumentalism on the one hand, together with structure (including hegemonic cultural systems) on the other...” and suggests that ‘culture’ be used as a verb rather than a noun: the notion of ‘culturing’ encourages

12 For example, Rob Pattman’s study of student identities at the University of KwaZulu-Natal focuses on the effects of structural powers of the apartheid legacy, as well as respondents’ agency and choices, on their identity. Pattman, R. 2007. “Student identities, and researching these, in a newly ‘racially’ merged university in South Africa.” in Race Ethnicity and Education, 10(4):473-492.
the consideration of the historically specific process of culture formation (2008:60). Such an approach considers agency and structural forces, as well as the fluid, dynamic nature of concepts like ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’.

In sum, social constructionism guides the study toward considering the effects of power relations and received ‘truths’ on identity, in so doing analysing its multi-dimensional nature (Burr, 1995:21,31,37). This paradigm and related concepts are further discussed in Chapter 2.

1.3.2 A note on methodology

This is a conveniently sampled case study of 151 white Afrikaans-speaking first year students in the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Pretoria (2008), South Africa’s largest residential university and one of the key institutions for higher learning during apartheid, according to Jansen (2009:3). Respondents’ attitudes toward and identification with a variety of Afrikaner cultural elements and contemporary issues constitute the study’s focus.

A case study’s goal is not to generalise findings to the population as a whole, but to explore the identification of a specific case of white Afrikaner youth. These findings can provide both substance and direction to larger future studies. Verschuren describes the case study as a research strategy that provides avenues of access to valuable knowledge about the population as a whole (2003:123). Given geographical variances in white Afrikaner youth identification, the results of this case study are limited to the sample of UP respondents.

Data was collected in the fourth quarter of the 2008 academic year – fourteen years after the official transition from apartheid in 1994. Qualitative data was collected first via four focus group sessions, and used to shape the questions and statements in the survey, as well as to

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13 Evidenced, for example, by Jansen’s description of Afrikaner youth in Pretoria (2009), Barnard’s exploration of a similar population in Stellenbosch (2010) and Prishani’s description of the population at the University of the Free State (2010). From the literature, it seems that white Afrikaner youth identify with race covertly in some geographical areas, and rather crudely in others.

14 Volunteer respondents from the Psychology, Sociology and Criminology first year groups at the university participated in the focus groups. They discussed themes such as their culture, how they felt about the Afrikaans language and its future in South
contextualise the discussion and analysis. The survey (Appendix A) collected information on respondents’ attitudes and viewpoints toward the key issues mentioned above. It was completed by one-hundred-and-fifty respondents. Both the focus groups and the survey specifically covered issues related to the research aims. They required respondents to consider and rank their attitudes toward relevant cultural elements, parents’ impact on respondent identification, as well as major issues that affect white Afrikaners’ identification, such as the end of apartheid, the role of traditional Afrikaner churches (the *susterskerke*), the Afrikaans language, race in South Africa, affirmative action policies and the prominent trend of white emigration.

Although case studies tend to vary in their methodological approach and focus, the Sociological character of this case study follows Verschuren’s notion of an ‘holistic’ case study, both in terms of the object of the study and its methodological approach (2003:125-135). In other words, the object of this study – the sample of respondents – represents a single point in temporal space, yet the historical and current contexts that underpin the findings are integral to all aspects of the study. The following paragraph explains the different methods used to generate and understand the data.

**1.3.2.1 Triangulation**

The methodology was designed to investigate the nature of a range of variables that may impact the research questions and findings. Heeding Puttergill’s warning that attitudinal research “tends to freeze people into cast positions” (2008:4), a triangulation or a ‘mixed methods’ approach was chosen, so that results could be obtained and explored from various angles. Qualitative and quantitative methods are conceived as complementary approaches, since each addresses some of the other’s shortcomings (Jick, 1979:602). Although this methodological approach may be challenging, it is based on the notion that “... multiple viewpoints allow for greater accuracy”, so, when three different kinds of data – literature, quantitative and qualitative data – confirm research results, these results are more likely to be valid (Jick, 1979:602). Commenting on the

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Africa, the importance of religion and church attendance in their lives, and their own and their families’ experiences of affirmative action and matters of race.
study of youth identities, Rattansi and Phoenix note that identity studies should include not only quantitative data, but also ethnographic data, or a “thick’ description of the myriad ways in which actual identities are constructed and reworked in different social contexts” (1997:107). Quotes from the focus group sessions are therefore used to contextualise the discussion and analysis, whilst reference to relevant literature further aids the production of a well-rounded, contextualised Sociological approach.

1.4 Study outline

This is not an exhaustive study of South African or Afrikaner history. As Charles Puttergill points out, presenting a coherent and detailed discussion of South African and white Afrikaner history is a challenging undertaking (2008:86) and certainly one beyond the scope of this study. The following chapters therefore include information and arguments most relevant to this study. Chapters two, three and four do not claim to present a complete historical overview of South Africa, or all of the complexities that underpin the formation of Afrikaner Nationalism. I draw extensively on the work of Hermann Giliomee’s *The Afrikaners: Biography of a people* (2003), Charles Puttergill and others.

Chapter Two is entitled *Theorising Afrikaner identification* and presents the social constructionist theoretical approach to this study. The origins and definition of the term ‘Afrikaner’ are discussed, and white Afrikaner identity is furthermore argued to be underpinned by ‘whiteness’, race and the Afrikaans language.

Chapter three, *Identity and nationalism: Theoretical approaches*, considers two major theories of nationalism - those of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson – and their applicability to this study. Richard Jenkins’ conceptualisation of ‘social identity’ is presented as a foundation for exploring respondents’ identity construction. Anthony D. Smith’s work on ethno-symbolism and national identity is discussed. Finally, an argument for cultural nationalism is offered.
Chapter four, entitled *Afrikaner Nationalism and apartheid* presents a synopsis of white Afrikaners’ and Afrikaner Nationalist history. The rise and the demise of the apartheid system are discussed with a view to exploring the impact of this history on the identification of respondents and their parents.

Chapter five is entitled *Transformation and Afrikaner generations*. The University of Pretoria is described as a site of post apartheid transformation and Afrikaner youth identity struggle. The notion of intergenerational knowledge transfer is explored and an ideal of a typical schematic of three Afrikaner generations is offered. The interrelationships between history, context, parents, institutions and white Afrikaner youth agency are argued to be central to this study’s findings.

Chapter six, *Methodology*, argues for the case study as a research strategy and discusses the value of triangulation in data collection and analysis. The researcher’s ‘insider’ status is unpacked and the data collection methods, ethical concerns and limitations of the study are set out.

Chapter seven provides a brief demographic profile of the focus group and survey respondents, and then unpacks the survey results.

Chapter eight discusses and analyses the results with the research questions in mind.

Chapter nine offers some final thoughts on the findings and deliberates on their implications for South Africa’s future.
Chapter 2
Theorising Afrikaner identification

This chapter discusses the conceptual tools used to approach respondents’ identification. First, the social constructionist approach and essential concepts such as ‘social imaginary’ are set out (2.1). Second, conceptual debates over arguably fundamental elements of white Afrikaner identification, including race, whiteness and language are presented (2.2). In conclusion, the implications of the social constructionist paradigm and the key elements of Afrikaner identity are considered.

2.1 Society, theory and identity
Puttergill notes that growing general and academic interest in the notion of ‘identity’ is marked by a plethora of ontological and epistemological questions which beg focused theoretical enquiry (2008:9-10). First, this section sets out the social constructionist approach as containing the major theoretical assumptions about society, social reality, knowledge and meaning that underpin the study’s approach to identification. Second, the key concepts ‘social imaginary’, language and discourse are discussed as central to social constructionist exploration of identity in South Africa.

2.1.1 Social constructionism and identity
This section illustrates the suitability of the social constructionist paradigm to the study and sets out its ontological and epistemological implications for the study of Afrikaner youth identity.

Debates over the prevalence of agency and structure, as well as objectivity and subjectivity, permeate the field of identity studies. Social constructionism offers particularly useful views on these dichotomies and their relevance to questions of experience, reality, morality and the nature of knowledge. As a thought paradigm, it construes reality as constitutive of both subjective experience and objective reality, in so doing acknowledging the powerful reciprocal relationship between human agency and structure.
According to Puttergill, social constructionism represents “a critical reflexive shift toward studying identity as socially mediated and historically situated” (2008:26). Its conceptualisation of society and social problems as “a process of definition” recognises subjective experience as an extremely powerful agent in the construction of ‘reality’ and in the invocation of the term ‘reality’ to justify claims about ‘truth’ (Miller and Holstein, 2007:7). The social constructionist approach therefore views identification as immersed in socio-historic specific experiences, which renders identity a process; neither inherent nor essential (Puttergill, 2008:26). Underpinning this view of identity is an approach to reality as constructed from meaning, and knowledge as provisional and incomplete (Burr, 1995:2-7; Puttergill, 2008:26-28). These dimensions of reality – identity, knowledge and meaning – are acknowledged to be consistently engaged in interconnected, reciprocal relationships.

However, social constructionism does not conceive reality as being simplistically subjective. Although the social constructionist focus emphasises subjective experience, discourse and representation and consequently views identity as reflexive and shifting, this approach is grounded by its acknowledgement of an objective reality (Puttergill, 2008:23). A reality that exists independently of human experience functions as social structure by virtue of the effects of socio-historic facts on one’s material position and available options (Hazelrigg, 2007:496; Puttergill, 2008:47). Social reality consists of multiple layers, the fix and flux of which are strongly influenced by politics of power (Puttergill, 2008:18). In sum, where reality exists independently of human thought it may have structural effects, but this is not to discount the agency involved in subjective experiences of reality.

Agency features foremost when social constructionist ontological and epistemological standpoints combine. By emphasising that researchers should use their agency to produce morally responsible research, social constructionism strikes a balanced approach to the subjectivity versus objectivity dichotomy. Social theory enables social scientists to reflect on reality (Puttergill, 2008:11), yet they are also impacted by reality. In order to be “…scaffolding for scientific progress, it [theory] must be understood in terms of its relationship to and value in research enterprise,” cautions Powers
(2010:36). To uphold Max Weber’s principle of ‘value-free sociology’, sociological inquiry must be subjected to honest examination of personal values, as well as the nature and power of social theories we use to reflect on reality (Powers, 2010:36-37).15

Social research must be conducted and presented responsibly, whether physically, morally, socially or otherwise. Therefore, this study approaches its research objectives and participants as valued, respectable, dynamic parts of the local and national social context. Given that shirking social responsibility for the past is one of the foremost themes of post apartheid Afrikaner identification and whiteness studies (see for example Puttergill, 2008:82,132,134,138 and Steyn and Foster, 2008:27,31), the researcher acknowledges that the research results and interpretation thereof cannot be separated from social origins. Results and analysis therefore both expose and contain effects of existing power relations.

With the aim of producing responsible research, that is, research “conducted by framing findings in a comprehensive and thoughtful way, providing the necessary contextualisation, in order to prevent accidental and/or deliberate misinterpretation and abuse of the findings” (Puttergill, 2008:168), the following social constructionist views of knowledge are adopted as points of departure. First, knowledge is recognised as a product of subjectivity, yet in the form of cultural discourses about gender, race, sexuality, age and so on, have structural effects when combined with the passage of time (Pattman, 2007:475). Second, knowledge is inherently contextual and contingent. In the presence of interpretation and experience, there are no absolute truths, but cultural and historical relativism aids academic enquiry and understanding. However, relativism must not be allowed to negate the moral purpose of social research. Respondents are moral actors who live in moral spheres, and the human desire to claim or avoid responsibility is clear in the strategies that respondents use to negotiate a credible moral position for themselves (Burr, 1995:83). The researcher must therefore remain aware and cautious of personal and other biases

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15 Anthropological theories and theorists (notably proponents of the ‘theory of culture contact’) were arguably not ‘value free’: they sustained racial segregation during the heyday of the apartheid era by justifying it, (Norval, 1996:146-7) a fact that illustrates both the power and effects of misused theory.
that may be present in the study, whilst maintaining a moral standpoint on the research topic in question. Relativism should be rooted by a moral compass.

Puttergill warns that overemphasising the ‘constructionist’ element of social constructionism may lead to objectification of the social dimension of identification, an unbalanced approach which neglects to critically assess the processes and reasons behind, for example, the continued existence of essentialist identification (Puttergill, 2008:33). The material context that envelops inter-subjective processes such as discourse must be carefully regarded so as to avoid reductionist accounts of identification and to acknowledge the role of power differentials in identification (Puttergill, 2008:34-5). Regarding Afrikaner identity politics, the social constructionist approach lays the foundation for understanding of respondents’ identification as situated within a specific socio-historic context wherein constructed ideas about being – race, class and gender – continue to impact subjective and objective reality. Finally, social constructionism encourages awareness of the subjective nature of research and knowledge claims and the need to direct and moderate relativism with a moral compass.

2.1.2 Social imaginary, language and discourse

This section discusses three concepts that are central to an understanding of society and identification as socially constructed. The concepts ‘social imaginary’, ‘language’ and ‘discourse’ arguably capture key processes that constitute human experience and identification. This section discusses the notion of social imaginaries, language and discourse.

The notion of ‘social imaginary’ is comparable to Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined nation’, in that it is...

... the way ordinary people “imagine” their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories, and legends. ... The social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy (Taylor, 2004:23).
Social imaginaries operate on notions of the way things ought to go – a ‘background’ of norms and values that inform our behaviour, choices and identification (Taylor, 2004:24). For example, the apartheid system imposed a social imaginary on South Africans which structured all social relations through legal and coercive force, but competing imaginaries always existed, imaginaries of the way things should be (Norval, 1996:27). As apartheid was increasingly challenged, competing imaginaries gained more ground. The apartheid imaginary entered into crisis and could no longer “fulfil its function of interpolating subjects into stable, ‘normalized’ forms of identification” (Norval, 1996:27).

Certain norms inform our ideas of ‘the ideal way things should be’, beyond which is some notion of a moral order that helps us make sense of ideals (Taylor, 2004:25). But imaginaries extend beyond these norms – they constitute implicit understanding of “how we stand to each other, how we got to where we are, [and] how we relate to other groups” (Taylor, 2004:25). Self-identification occurs within these imaginaries, and language plays a crucial role in the process of embedding a person’s identification in his or her social context, including the dominant imaginary (Taylor, 2004:65).

From a social constructionist viewpoint, language is central to experiences of social reality and consequently also to the structures that shape society. Language is not merely a tool for expression, but a central part of social reality. Burr warns that language is not a “clear, pure medium through which our thoughts and feelings can be made available to others”: it is powerful by making available to us ways in which to know and describe our worlds and ourselves (1995:23). Language and thought are inseparable phenomena: language provides us with systems of categories that help us to understand and give meaning to everything, “so that our very selves become the product of language” and language in turn, is to be understood as “a site of struggle, conflict and potential personal and social change” (Burr, 1995:30). These dynamics of language are
better understood through the notion of ‘discourse’,\(^\text{16}\) or language put into practice, according to Puttergill (2008:29).

Discourses are integral parts of social imaginaries. They actively constitute social reality and they render it epistemologically knowable (Puttergill and Leildè, 2006:14). Aletta Norval specifically explores the discourses through which apartheid was constituted (1996). Discourses are simultaneously chosen, rejected, articulated, supported and contested in the private and public realms by individuals, groups, social movements, the media, government, churches and other institutions and organisations, such as labour unions. A structure-agency dichotomy characterises the notion of discourse: a discourse can be ‘determining’ when it is part of the socio-cultural sphere that structures everyday discourse, or ‘constructing’ when it is part of the interactional level at which meanings are negotiated in everyday communication (Puttergill and Leildè, 2006:14). The power of discourse is furthermore acknowledged by Vivien Burr, who suggests that insofar as discourses form our identities, they are “intimately tied to the structures of practices that are lived out in society from day to day, and it is in the interest of relatively powerful groups that some discourses and not others receive the stamp of ‘truth’” (1995:37). Researchers must be aware of the power of discourses to shape realities, but also of the dynamics that drive, promote and discount discourses. In other words, ‘constructing’ and ‘determining’ discourses both reveal an array of social processes at work.

With reference to the study of identification, Puttergill and Leildè argue that equal acknowledgment of agency and structure in discourse prevents the researcher from characterising people either as a product of social structure or overemphasising variability (2006:14). They suggest that discourses are ultimately self-representations that aim to project a positive image and caution that qualitative researchers must consider the human concern to appear as ‘good’ as a reflection of structure and meaning in their contexts, not as distortion of ‘true’ identity (2006:16). When researching identification, respondents’ narratives and responses to

\[^{16}\] A discourse is a set of viewpoints and ideas that represent a particular standpoint, its formation and shape determined by the human agency and structural forces alike (Burr, 1995:32).
questionnaires must be considered as reflections of the realities they know through discourse (Puttergill and Leildè, 2006:15), yet they are not to be treated as “simple repositories from whom information can be extracted” (Puttergill and Leildè, 2006:15), but as agents who negotiate challenges and use available discourses to make sense of their experiences.

The fluid nature of ‘discourse’ implies the existence of various discourses in any given context and on every topic. Some discourses are hegemonic, while others are advanced by those who seek social power. The replacement of hegemonic discourses with competing ones invariably affects social imaginaries significantly (Norval, 1996:5,275). The transition from one hegemonic imaginary to another is termed ‘dislocation’. It refers first to the replacement of one imaginary by another, and second, to the experienced adaptation process necessitated by the change in social imaginary. Dislocation often includes shifts in social class, associated with confusion and frustration (Steyn, 2004:147). The anxiety and frustration experienced by white Afrikaners in South Africa about the transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994 is an example of such dislocation. Not only did accepted ways of thinking and speaking change dramatically, but the social order of the country was reversed, at least in terms of political power, a process that shocked many white Afrikaners as it stripped them of the supremacy they had become so accustomed to assuming.

In summary, the notions of social imaginary, discourse and language are integral to this study’s theoretical approach. They paint the abstract background upon which to position the following section’s exploration of concepts which are closely related to identification.

2.2 Race, whiteness and Afrikaner identity

This section outlines an approach to Afrikaner identification in which race and ‘whiteness’ occupy prime positions. First, debates about the origin of and membership to ‘the Afrikaners’ as a people are discussed. Although the study focuses specifically on white Afrikaner students, it is acknowledged that ‘the Afrikaners’ is a problematic concept insofar as membership is concerned. Second, the history of notions of race and racism is briefly set out with a view to provide an initial foundation for the study’s exploration of respondents’ identification. Third, the notion of
whiteness is presented as imperative to this study’s approach and findings. Fourth, the centrality of the Afrikaans language to white Afrikaner identification is considered and finally, the concepts ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’ are discussed.

2.2.1 Belonging to the Afrikaner nation
The origin and constitution of ‘the Afrikaners’ are contested matters. The following two sections argue for the adoption of a working definition of ‘Afrikaners’ as ‘white Afrikaans speaking South Africans’, with reference to debates around their origin as a collective and issues related to group membership.

2.2.1.1 The Afrikaners: Identifying as a people
The term ‘Afrikaners’ denotes a complex history that spans a little more than a century, punctuated by socio-economic issues, religious dogma, racial and linguistic exclusivism and underscored by internal conflicts. However, the exact origin of the white Afrikaners as a people is a contested matter, characterised by two camps: the first arguably influenced by the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology and the second by a somewhat more objective view of history.

In Giliomee’s opinion, consciousness of the identity ‘Afrikaner’ dates back to 1707, when a young man named Hendrik Biebouw proclaimed that he was an “Afrikaander” – an African (2003:22-23). However, Biebouw was a poor and illiterate son of a German doctor and certainly no ethnic nationalist. Giliomee admits that Biebouw’s claim to Afrikaner identity evades precise historical interpretation, but maintains that it is especially significant because Biebouw rejected existing identifications in favour of the notion of an ‘Afrikaander’ (Giliomee, 2003:22-23). Can we speak of ‘the Afrikaners’ as existing in a time when these pioneers had not yet produced the ideological glue and politically coherent thought and ideas that were required to hold white Afrikaans speakers together as a people?

In Du Toit’s opinion, Giliomee’s argument is characteristic of his generation and accordingly reflects his ideological inclination toward the Afrikaner Nationalist discursive appropriation of the
1707 incident as meaningful (2008:573). Du Toit and others place the birth of ‘the Afrikaners’ around the 1880 discovery of minerals in South Africa, which led to the country’s industrialisation (Grobbelaar, 1998:389). For example, Moodie adopts a structural approach according to which this industrial revolution gave rise to the conditions that encouraged collective identification among white Afrikaans speakers (1975) who suffered from poverty under British colonialists and lived primarily in urban slums. In addition to strong anti-British sentiments, racial and class struggles erupted over ownership of the forces of production (Grobbelaar, 1998:389). The mobilisation of socio-economic support for these poor whites by white Afrikaans-speaking intellectuals coincided with other key developments, namely rising employment competition with black workers, a strong Afrikaans language movement and acknowledgement of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) as the volkskerk,17 all of which resulted in a rising consciousness of themselves as a people by the turn of the century (Moodie, 1980:69).

Giliomee’s carefully documented post-eighteenth century uses of ‘Afrikaander’ and ‘Afrikaner’ does not prove the birth of a collective Afrikaner identity, argues Du Toit, but rather that Giliomee remains “the unconscious captive of a particular historical discourse” (2009:572-573). Giliomee’s view is also the standard version of Afrikaner origin that was propagated in Afrikaner Nationalist literature after the 1920s. The fact that this view remains popular “says a great deal about the hegemonic effect of emergent Afrikaner nationalism at the time,” suggests Du Toit (2008:573). In light of these arguments, the present study views the origin of collective identification as ‘Afrikaners’ as submerged in the dynamics of industrialisation after the 1880s. This is further discussed in Chapter 4.

2.2.1.2 The Afrikaners: Who are they?
This section presents a brief introduction to the history behind the exclusion of English-speaking whites, and the debated inclusion of Afrikaans-speaking brown, or so-called Coloured people from Afrikanership.

17 The ‘people’s church’ or ‘nation’s church’.
2.2.1.2a The Afrikaans language in opposition to English imperialists

White Afrikaners began collectively identifying as such partly due to their contempt for British imperialism and its role in the industrialisation of South Africa. Colonial management of the mines pre-1900 caused much interracial tension and urban poverty. According to Moodie, industry was based on the principle of high pay for white skilled labour and low wages for unskilled black labour (1980). In this systematised ‘racial capitalism’, racialism, racial domination and capitalism were inseparable (Wolpe, 1990:32) and affected white Afrikaners significantly for two reasons pre-1900. First, unlike their British counterparts, it was not the custom of white Afrikaner artisans to form trade unions to protect their interests, so they soon found themselves cast aside by mine owners, who favoured cheap and increasingly better skilled black labour. Second, the number of unskilled whites was a numerical minority compared to the droves of black Africans who flocked to the mines (Moodie, 1980:89).

White Afrikaners consequently experienced a lack of political and economic power coupled with rising white poverty. Their contempt towards British colonial ownership of the booming gold fields lay at the heart of the Anglo Boer War that destroyed much of South Africa during 1899-1902 (Van Onselen, 1979:290). After the War, more unskilled, poverty-stricken white Afrikaners migrated to urban areas, where the racial character of employment politics was magnified as mine management attempted to promote black people to skilled positions over whites, whose labour was that much more expensive (Moodie, 1980:89-91). Anti-British sentiment remained strong, and until the problem of white poverty was addressed, white labour politics were largely anti-capitalist and racialised (Van Onselen, 1979:302).

Unionisation in 1910 marked the shift from British colonisation to ‘internal colonialism’ – the imposition of white governance on black citizens (Wolpe, 1990:29). Wolpe notes that although Afrikaans-and English-speaking whites held internally diverse and conflicting interests, each group was united in its opinions of the terms upon which white domination should be implemented (1990:84). For white Afrikaner politicians, capitalist relations had to remain racialised, with whites
in control and black people as objects of administration in the labour force (Wolpe 1990:31;84). By 1921, the political and cultural identities available to white South Africans were marked by a particular division between exclusively English-speaking, pro-Empire parties like the Unionist Party, and Afrikaans-language Afrikaner parties like the National Party (NP), according to Giliomee (1995:206). The Afrikaans and English languages remained markers of intra-white conflict as Afrikaners developed their own capitalist class, despite the overbearing presence of powerful foreign capital and of an “indigenous capitalist class which was, in the main, drawn from the English-speaking community” in the 1930s (Wolpe, 1990:87).

Although this linguistic cleavage between Afrikaans and English-speaking whites was not a product of homogenous attitudes, Afrikaner Nationalists had hijacked the Afrikaans language as a prime historical binder of the white Afrikaners as a people by 1948, so that the sum of “historical baggage and a collective memory of cultural rivalry against the English” was prominent in Nationalist politics (Prah, 2007:167). By 1948 a history had been constructed in which struggles for power with English-speaking colonial authorities stood out as a major historical ‘fact’ of identity that had been propagated as a main point of identification for most white Afrikaners.

2.2.1.2b The question of so-called Coloureds as Afrikaners

This section acknowledges the debates around Afrikaner identity, specifically with regard to group membership. It is argued that these debates discourage a narrow definition of the Afrikaners as white Afrikaans speakers only.

So-called Coloureds, or brown people, and white Afrikaners share the Cape Dutch history during which white Burghers created families with Khoikhois and free blacks (Giliomee, 2003:28;40;85). However, their racially hybrid physical appearance led some to describe them as “creolized products of a colonial history” who are neither black nor white (Frankental and Sichone, 2005:223). Most of these so-called Coloured South Africans share the Afrikaans language as mother tongue with white Afrikaans speakers, and this situation has raised numerous debates over whether Coloureds are ‘Afrikaners’ or not.
Controversial anti-establishment Afrikaner writer Breyten Breytenbach frequently commented that the nationalist obsession with white Afrikaner purity was a false concept (Kennelly, 2005:4-5). Nevertheless, while white politics frequently rejected Coloureds on the grounds of their ‘impurity’, black Africans rejected Coloureds for their “relatively privileged status… by asserting that racial purity trumps genetic proximity to whiteness or assimilation to Western culture” (Adhikari, 2005:21). Despite historical fact, a consistent theme throughout South African and Coloured history has been that these people have occupied a social status ‘in between’ pure and impure, advantaged and disadvantaged, powerful and powerless, hence Mohamed Adhikari’s book about the Coloured race identity dilemma titled Not white enough, not black enough (2005).18

British Lord Selborne warned in 1908 to “give Coloured people the benefit of their white blood” and the South African Party attempted to incorporate Coloured people into the white political system between 1910 and 1924. During this time, industrialisation affected many unskilled Coloured workers as it did unskilled whites: many lost their jobs to lower-paid black workers. In the system of racial capitalism, Coloureds were therefore ‘not black enough’ to qualify for the low levels of pay allocated to black African workers. The main Coloured political party, the African Political Organisation (APO), reacted by propagating a distinctive Coloured identity and encouraging Coloured workers to form trade unions (Giliomee, 1995:206). In 1910, APO advocated disaffiliation with white Afrikaners when it shunned the Afrikaans language as lower-class “barbarous Dutch” and encouraged Coloureds to embrace the English language instead (Giliomee, 1995:206). However, following the social constructionist approach, Adhikari emphasises that Coloureds and the APO exhibited complex reactions to white supremacy, including resistance and collaboration, and protest as well as accommodation (2005:36).

In turn, Afrikaner nationalists attempted to manipulate Coloured identification for political benefit by emphasising similarity between white Afrikaners and Coloureds, but overall nationalist ideology

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prevailed and justified social segregation of races, including Coloureds. For example, although Hertzog insisted in 1919 that Coloureds and Afrikaners shared similar interests and that Coloureds and whites should politically band together against black Africans, social integration of whites and Coloureds was rejected on the grounds that Coloureds and whites belonged to fundamentally different peoples (Giliomee, 1995:208). Afrikaner nationalists were scolded by Coloured politicians for exploiting Coloured labour and using them as “voting fodder” (Giliomee, 1995:207).

Once Afrikaner nationalism established a clear, yet restricted Afrikaner identity, the Cape Coloured people were subjected to racist policies, just like black and Indian South Africans were. As the group “closest to Afrikaners in culture, language and church affiliation,” Coloured South Africans received ‘special treatment’ from the apartheid government, yet remained classified as black, residually segregated and generally discriminated against throughout the apartheid era. (Giliomee, 2003:558;465;501;510). Black South Africans, specifically isiXhosa speakers, feel that the Coloured population has always had, and in fact still do have an advantage over black ethnic groups in the Cape region of South Africa, where the majority of the population lives, because Coloureds received better education during the apartheid years (Mongwe, 2006:178) and were even represented on the voting roll from the ‘60s (Giliomee, 2003:550).

Adhikari argues that the relative privilege Coloured people enjoyed under apartheid played a critical role in the maintenance of a stable Coloured identity because it “rewarded Coloured exclusivism and conformity with white racist expectations while discouraging alternative strategies, particularly association with a broader black identity” (2005: xiii,176). Their ‘privileged’ position resulted in the general exclusion of Coloureds from the ranks of ‘oppressed blacks’, but did not negate the Afrikaner dogma of racial purity. Coloureds’ “multiple belongings” continue to set them apart from ‘pure’ white Afrikaners (Wicomb, 1998:105). Their ‘impurity’ – not being white enough – pushed many Coloureds to reject any and all affiliation with Afrikaner politics, especially after the Soweto uprisings of 1976 emphasised Afrikaans as the language of the oppressor. Coloureds renamed their dialect of the language Kaaps, in so doing creating an
“oppositional colouredness that aligned itself with the black liberation struggle” (Wicomb, 1998:97).

Adhikari emphasises that Coloured identity has been actively created and negotiated by Coloured people. Their identification is an intricate subject with a distinctive history, not to be defined simplistically in terms of its relationship to white and black African identities (2005:25). Nevertheless, the Afrikaans language remains a point of particular contempt for many Coloureds and white Afrikaners. Activists like theologian-politician Allan Boesak, a so-called Coloured himself, work to de-racialise the Afrikaans language, unite Afrikaans-speaking communities and advocate for a non-racial Afrikaans-medium university. However, Boesak asserted in 2007 that white Afrikaners were possessive of the Afrikaans language and acted like they had the right to exclude Afrikaans-speakers of other races from decision-making about the language in the national context (Terreblanche, 200719). Social power and struggles over it therefore remain an inextricable attribute of the dynamics around the Afrikaans language.

There is also the question of black Afrikaners, as raised in white Afrikaans author Elsa Joubert’s controversial and award-winning book, *Poppie Nongena*,20 in the 70s. However, the matter of ‘black Afrikaners’ presents a set of questions at least equally, if not more challenging than the complex, politicised nature of the debates around the close genetic proximity of Coloureds and white Afrikaners. More importantly, the questions around the implications of mother tongue for identification, and the intricacies of race-language combinations in South Africa, which result in the question of who qualifies as ‘Afrikaner’ and in whose books, have numerous theoretical and research implications beyond the scope and resources available to the present study.

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20 The book, a black Xhosa woman’s biography, raised questions about Afrikaans-speaking Xhosas, who referred to themselves as Afrikaners and were described by Afrikaner Professor Ampie Coetzee as “black Afrikaners” (McClintock, 1990:199).
Although the term ‘Afrikaners’ denotes a complex set of debates, the present study’s focus is limited to white Afrikaans speakers only. The next section elaborates on the historical developments that informed white Afrikaners’ collective identity.

2.2.2 Race, ethnicity, culture, whiteness and identity

The previous section illustrates the fact that the question of an Afrikaner identity is contested, contemptuous to some and historically shaped by racial, ethnic and class issues. This section considers the notions of race, racism, ethnicity, culture and whiteness as key conceptual and theoretical tools in the study. It concludes that the present study’s Sociological focus on white Afrikaners is informed by their unique collective experiences and social position.

2.2.2.1 From scientific to ideological racism

The salience of race and racism for South African identities is immersed in a complex history of ideas, some deemed scientific, that took on ideological formations and had a particular impact on all citizens, including white Afrikaans speakers. Dubow suggests that racism, through notions of superiority, exclusivity and hierarchy, exists in the collective mentalities of white South Africans as “more or less conscious ‘habits of mind’” (1995:5). The undemanding definition of ‘race’ is “a classification based on traits which are hereditary” (Benedict, 2000:113), but Dubow’s distinction between ‘race’ and ‘racism’ is more relevant to South Africa. ‘Race’ refers to “the systematic expression and rationalisation of the idea of superiority and innate biological difference among distinct groups of human beings” while ‘racism’ is the practice of “discrimination and prejudice in the context of the exercise or institutionalisation of power” (Dubow, 1995:5).

Today, the empirical implications of ‘race’ are studied as sociological phenomena, yet ‘race’ was originally “in crucial respects a product of the scientific imagination” (Dubow, 1995:3). The following brief history of the evolution of the notion of ‘race’ underpins the relationship between recent South African history and white Afrikaner identity.
2.2.2.1a Scientific racism

‘Scientific’ ideas of race, racial superiority and inferiority proliferated after the publication of Charles Darwin’s *The Origin of Species* in 1859. The twentieth century soon became characterised by Herbert Spencer’s idea that evolution was a struggle between races, rather than between individuals (Jackson and Weidman, 2005:66). Whilst new scientific thought explained how traits could stably be transferred from one generation to the next, notions of north European races’ superiority strengthened. Where these two strands of thought merged, the field of eugenics and its ideological counterpart, scientific racism, were born (Jackson and Weidman, 2005:66). Eugenics was principally concerned with preserving ‘genius’ and decreasing the number of people believed to be of lesser intelligence: those with dark skins and certain cranial measurements. Inductivist ‘scientists’ like Francis Galton and Karl Pearson produced works, based on biometrics (a focus on physical biological traits), that ‘proved’ that “Negroes were at least two grades below Anglo-Saxons in ability and intelligence” (Jackson and Weidman, 2005:68).

Amidst an expanding field of research and publications on race, one group of writers, the Nordicists, advanced three related views on race: first that Nordic Europeans were racially superior to all other races; second, that race, not nation or political alliance, was the foundation of social order and third, that heredity was immune from environmental influences (Jackson and Weidman, 2005:70-71). Race gained increasing salience and a white western identity emerged that marginalised and stereotyped racial others and presented white colonial domination as inevitable (Puttergill, 2008:56). Puttergill notes that race remains a key sociological concern in contemporary societies, especially in “racially saturated” societies like South Africa, where race is often considered primordial and consequently a determining part of institutions and discourses (Puttergill, 2008:51).

In *Scientific racism in modern South Africa*, Saul Dubow illustrates the ‘scientific’ roots of ‘race’ and how it was ideologically appropriated in South Africa (1995). Whilst the Boere were involved in two wars against British colonialists (1880-1881 and 1899-1902), the eugenics movement spread through Western societies, while industrialisation transformed human life (Jackson and Weidman,
However, racial categories were generally used without any definition (or with vague definition at best) before 1910 (Posel, 2001:90). The founding of the South African Association for the Advancement for Science (SAAAS) in 1903 marked the first South African attempt to systematise ethnological and anthropological knowledge of the country’s indigenous peoples (Dubow, 1995:11-12). As South African society approached colonial self-governance (the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910), SAAAS and specifically the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1903-1905 turned the knowledge of ‘experts’ into a ‘solution’ for the ‘native question’ that concerned them so much (Dubow, 1995:12). However, lawfully producing three racial categories (‘pure’, ‘native’ and ‘mixed’) posed significant conceptual challenges to legislators and racial classifications remained dependent on the “discretionary judgments” of the authority in question (Posel, 2001:91). By the 1920s, the race paradigm still contained logical contradictions, for example, some viewed miscegenation as the “ultimate dysgenic practice”, whilst others believed it promoted ‘hybrid vigour’ (Dubow, 1995:17). Nonetheless the race ideology of early twentieth century South Africa needed only a “semblance of overall consistency” to remain powerful (Dubow, 1995:17).

2.2.2.1b The emergence of ideological racism

By 1929, production of knowledge had become more institutionalised and physical anthropologists, focusing on race and evolutionary difference, were playing a central role in the formation of South African science of race (Dubow, 1995:12). Racial segregation had been part of the South African political landscape for almost two centuries by the 1930s (Giliomee, 2003:1-87). By this time, the international community perceived racial segregation as a scientific ‘project’. Following the lead of United States scientists’ ‘social engineering’ (Giliomee, 2003:345), South African scientists used the metaphor of South Africa as a ‘social laboratory’ that offered unique opportunities for positivist research, which characterised local and international science in the 1930s (Dubow, 1995:14). Until the 1950s, social engineering was underpinned by the secular values of rational progress and spearheaded by ‘experts’ (Dubow, 1995:14).
Social engineering was soon appropriated by Afrikaner Nationalists, who argued that inherent racial differences justified identification with one’s own ethnic community (Giliomee, 2003b:381). Assumptions about a natural relationship between biological differences, socio-economic status and culture meant the biological encoding of ‘otherness’ became supplemented by notions of cultural differences between ethnic groups (Posel, 2001:94; Puttergill, 2008:52). In addition, whiteness was increasingly associated with civilisation, education, skill and affluence (Posel, 2001:94). Leading Afrikaner Nationalists like Hendrik Verwoerd became “captivated by the new ‘scientific’ approach to curing social ills”, namely the rigid social segregation practiced in the American south (Giliomee, 2003b:377-379).

After the Second World War in 1939, concerns over urbanisation, unemployment, ill health and an alarming increase in crime levels during the War, as well as a dramatic increase in black migrant workers in cities, rose among unskilled and semi-skilled Afrikaner labourers (Posel, 2001:99). A rise in black political consciousness was perceived as a particularly troubling threat to their survival as a people, as (in)famously expressed by N.P. van Wyk Louw (Giliomee, 2003b:387; Dubow, 1995:249). The National Party (NP) was consequently determined to ‘modernise’ the state through centralisation and reinforcing white supremacy when it took power in 1948 (Posel, 2001:99). The centrality of race to Afrikaner thinking by 1948 is evident in the remark of Rev. Z.R. Mahabane, President of the Interdenominational African Ministers Federation, who accurately commented that apartheid sprang from twin forces – “a fear complex and a superiority complex” – both based on race (Giliomee, 2003:471).

The post-1948 race paradigm was a compelling ideology because its fundamentally ambiguous nature enhanced its ideological appeal, argues Dubow (1995:17). Afrikaner Nationalism was “flexible and eclectic” in its mobilisation of race and racist ideas (Dubow, 1995:17). A legally instituted, effective system of racial classification was the first step in the NP’s large-scale control mission. The 1950 Population Registration Act would preserve racial ‘purity’ through designating rigid, life-long racial identities to South Africans, drawing on the notion of white paternalism and explicitly aimed at maintaining white governance (Posel, 2001:98-99). Ongoing debates about the
A definition of race led to a consensus that precise definitions of race, based on biological descent, are time-consuming, expensive and ultimately “practically impossible” (Posel, 2001:101). Consequently, the 1949 Mixed Marriages Act (prohibiting interracial marriage), the 1950 Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act of 1950 all emphasised the fact that social status was the deciding factor in racial categorising (Posel, 2001:102). Physical appearance, including “habits, education and speech and deportment and demeanour in general” was the main indicator of social status (Posel, 2001:103).

Deborah Posel illustrates this multi-dimensional understanding of ‘race’: for most South Africans, the “idea of an objective biological basis for racial difference had popular currency as a self-evident truth, part of the “common sense” that permeated white South African society” after 1948 (2001:89). In the absence of a scientifically measurable ‘racial essence’, the close association of race with socio-economic power and class had come to constitute a form of racial ‘common sense’ that continued to inform and justify racial classification of citizens (Posel, 2001:88). A person’s race was “obvious” and the causes and effects of white racial superiority were both mythologised and legitimised through circular reasoning about race (Posel, 2001:95). This approach to social status buttressed white superiority, since it effectively prevented all non-white persons from ever advancing socially upward to ‘white’ status (Posel, 2001:103). Race was socially defined according to existing class boundaries, ‘culture’ and patterns of prejudice. Whites anxiously policed social boundaries to maintain white (social) ‘purity’ and standing (Posel, 2001:108).

Today, ‘race’ remains a tricky concept, to Spencer so problematic that he considers it a candidate for academic ‘erasure’ – appearing in written form with a line through it – but it is so ingrained in world history that it is unlikely to be ‘erased’ soon. Its official use persists (2006:33). Part of the ‘race’ dilemma lies in its simultaneously pervasive and evasive nature, underscored in post-modernity by its entanglement with the notion of ‘ethnicity’. The following section discusses ethnicity and culture as concepts that are central to recent South African history and the present study population.
2.2.2.2 Ethnicity and culture

The terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘culture’ are often used interchangeably, and in the South African context each has come to denote the other, both implicitly and explicitly. This section discusses culture and ethnicity as interrelated, key concepts with regard to identification.

Approaches to what culture is and what it does vary across disciplines. The present study conceptualises ‘culture’ as comprising various attributes which function as a dynamic system. Smith describes some of these attributes as a build-up of images, customs, rites, artefacts, certain events, heroes, landscapes, values, symbols of dress, emblems and language, and myths of migration and liberation (Smith, 2009:48). Haarmann categorises cultural elements as artefacts and ‘mentifacts’, thereby implicating the centrality of processes of knowledge-construction, hence of language, to culture (2007:117). Culture may be understood as a complex system of shared knowledge and beliefs that sustain the notion of a community (Haarmann, 2007:118). Culture as a system has permeable boundaries and is susceptible to change over time (Haarmann, 2007:186). Fox and Miller-Idriss emphasise the role of individual agency in the process of culture construction and change. They argue that culture is the product of not only heritage and custom, but also of choice. Cultural choices constitute active identification with one’s cultural in-group (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008). However, Haarmann points out the structural influence of cultural norms on identification. Cultural systems are embedded in normative frameworks, where ‘must-norms’, ‘should-norms’ and ‘can-norms’ “transform the rules prescribed by the system into actual behaviour” (2007:186).

Culture informs the countless collective ethnic identifications that exist within broad racial categorisations. In modern society, ethnicity refers to collective cultural identity (Spencer, 2006:45). It implies a bond between people based on a shared way of life, values, cultural practices, language, history and common destiny. More specifically, Spencer agrees with Van den Berghe’s (1967) influential definition, which holds that while ‘race’ is “socially defined... on the basis of physical criteria” and generally used to categorise others from outside, ethnicity is “socially defined... but on the basis of cultural criteria” and is generally considered to be less
objectifying than ‘race’ (Spencer, 2006:45). This emphasis on the in-group often mirrors, however, a stark exclusivism, since ethnic boundaries necessarily identify and exclude non-members, notes Puttergill (2008:61). Ethnicity is therefore understood in the study as exclusive and informed by cultural identification. The interrelationship between ethnic and cultural identification is referred to ethno-cultural identity. White Afrikaners may accordingly be considered an ethno-cultural group based on their cultural distinctiveness from other South African ethnic groups.

Ethnicity is essential to individual and collective identification in South Africa. In Spencer’s opinion, encounters with people of a different ethnic background count for some of the most significant experiences in the formation of our identities, for these experiences reveal to us what and who we are not (2006:45). Knight et al. conceptualise ethnic identity as “a set of self-ideas about one’s own ethnic group membership. …ethnic identity refers to knowledge of personal ownership or membership in the ethnic group, and its correlated knowledge, understanding, values, and feelings that are direct implications of that ownership” (1993:106). Ethnicity is intimately tied up with the dynamics of exclusivism in South Africa.

Moreover, ethnicity in South Africa is associated with forms and mechanisms of oppression that are arguably more pervasive and flexible than those of ‘racial’ oppression (Brown, 1986:177) evident in how ethnicity is regularly used as a euphemism for ‘race’ (Dubow, 1994:356; Spencer, 2006:45). Ethnicity may be a euphemism for ‘race’, but ‘culture’ is most often used as a euphemism for difference. Nagel argues that the production of culture serves specific purposes, most notably the creation of symbolic bases for ethnic mobilisation (1994:152). Dubow accordingly describes how the collective ethno-cultural groups of present day South Africa were constructed by the apartheid government and used to secure political division and exploitation (1994:356). The introduction of ideological racism represented increasing reliance on terms like culture and ethnicity, since “culture represented a means of insisting on difference… without the need to define precisely on what grounds that difference was predicated…” (1994:358).
Ethnicity is consequently a ‘loaded word’ in South Africa, because it is inextricably bound up with history and notions of culture, difference and above all, political power (Dubow, 1994:356). Ethnicity – and culture by implication – are at once historical, politicised and shifting, interlaced products of what Spencer calls “the politics of naming” and related issues of linguistic identification (Spencer, 2006:31). The naming and categorising of groups and individuals are highly politicised processes that involve varying levels of agency, enforcement and reinforcement, all of which are related to webs of ethno-cultural politics (Spencer, 2006:32). In addition to ‘naming’, Dubow adds the notion of ‘claiming’. Similar to Fox and Miller-Idriss’ approach to culture, Dubow holds that ethnicity has also been understood as a form of social identity that acquires content and meaning through conscious assertion in South Africa (1994:368).

In sum, ethnicity, underscored by notions of culture and difference and immersed in the socio-political context, has been central to South Africans’ identification since the 1940s (Dubow, 1994:356). Kriel emphasises the centrality of the Afrikaans language and white Afrikaner history in their ethno-cultural identification as a people (2006:49). However, ‘race’, or ‘being white’ also has important implications for their identification in the post apartheid context, as argued in the next section.

2.2.2.3 Whiteness

Whiteness studies represent a shift in race studies from the focus on victims of racism to its beneficiaries and the contingent social and historical relationships (Solomos and Back, 1996:23, 58). Being white amounts to more than ‘race’ – it is an argument from which whites view themselves, others and society (Frankenberg, 2003:113). Whites had the power to examine racial others and used their constructions of race to exempt themselves from examination. American whiteness, for example, is argued to be a “location of structural advantage, of race privilege” and a product of history loaded with constructed meaning (Frankenberg, 2003:113). Woody Doane concurs that race is more than ‘socially constructed’ – it is an ideology with specific, tangible implications of power (2003:9). From this point of view, ‘whiteness’ is an “historically contingent social identity”, characterised by both overt and hidden forms of racial dominance, submerged in
socio-economic and political power (Doane, 2003:9:11). ‘Responsible research’ should therefore examine not only how white Afrikaners view(ed) racial others, but also how they construct, understand and utilise their own racial identity as whites.

Its invisibility has rendered whiteness powerful throughout most of the history of racism. However, whites are often ignorant of, or reluctant to acknowledge the social meaning of whiteness. Seen as natural and involuntary, to them whiteness is not something to be questioned or analysed (Phoenix, 1997:195, Andersen, 2003). The comfortable, privileged position whites have enjoyed within racial identity politics has obscured the benefits of power, privilege and cultural dominance associated with their whiteness (Puttergill, 2008:68), but ignorance or plain denial of this position is a characteristic trademark of resistant whiteness, as documented by inter alia Steyn and Foster (2008).

‘Race’ has been applied mostly to people who are not white, thereby casting whites as non-racial and normal. This ex-nomination – the power to remain unnamed – has enabled white privilege (Puttergill, 2008:70) and manifests in a peculiar inability amongst whites to describe the content of their own cultures, assumptions and prejudices. Whilst questioning whiteness and its privileges illuminates this social position, mere understanding of how white privilege functions will not necessarily pinpoint white racism in practice (Andersen, 2003:26). Just as race should be understood historically and comparatively, so should whiteness, argues Puttergill (2008:68). Steyn similarly advocates for particularised studies of whiteness, so that “the specific politics of location” of whiteness can be explored, for example, the roles of class, gender, ideology, politics and context differentiate the construction of one whiteness from another (Steyn, 2004:145).

Steyn contextualises South African whiteness in an historical milieu where the “Western center” – Eurocentric hegemony – has been dislodged. This approach is underpinned by a theoretical comparison of critical postmodernism with the postcolonial character of the ending of apartheid: both have been considered (and still are in some circles) crises of Western European cultural authority (Steyn, 2001:150). Exposing whiteness contributes to the decolonisation of the
imagininations of the oppressed as well the oppressors, but increased visibility of whiteness does not necessarily result in less white racism – some contexts have seen whiteness become more defensive (Steyn, 2004:146). This study contributes to a growing body of literature on a new generation of Afrikaner whiteness.

2.2.2.3a Whiteness in recent South African history

Afrikaner nationalism was spawned by the industrial revolution of the 1880s (Grobbelaar, 1998:389), but race has been a determining factor of South African history since the colonisation of the Cape in the 1600s. European descent was strongly associated with Christian faith, and to be Christian “was to be civilised rather than barbarous, English rather than African, white rather than black” (Giliomee, 2003:41). By 1807, the term ‘Non-European’ was already in use by genealogists to imply ‘non-white’, or slave descent (Giliomee, 2003:51). Biological reference to race only occurred in South Africa late in the nineteenth century, but blacks, Jews and more others had already been judged as the opposite of beautiful, intelligent and normal by seventeenth-century Dutchmen (Giliomee, 2003:14). Afrikaner nationalist appropriation of whiteness therefore followed at least a century of institutionalised colonialist belief in white superiority.

Afrikaner whiteness was historically defined by the struggle between British colonialists and the Boere for control of the southern tip of Africa. Steyn contends that “…Afrikaner nationhood was forged within a mythology that celebrated the courage of a people who refused to be subordinated to the British empire on more than one occasion in their history” (2004:147). She links historical Afrikaner experiences of victimisation at British hands to the “fiercely reactionary” Afrikaner mindset that enacted the brutalities of apartheid (2004:148). Historical and present-day Afrikaner resistance to the English language and passion for the Afrikaans language represents this historical quest for freedom and has become a symbol of Afrikaner self-preservation and Nationalism – “the very symbol of their roots in Africa” (Giliomee, 2004:30;42).

Afrikaner whiteness is furthermore historically informed by a ‘master narrative’, based on Manichean anti-black colonialist sentiment and the ‘scientific’ establishment of whites as a
superior race, as discussed (Steyn, 2001:150). The early nineteenth century notion of ‘masters’ to slaves and the paternalism that informed the ‘masters’’ attitudes was also present in the baasskap (mastership) that characterised much of apartheid Afrikaner whiteness (Giliomee, 2003:49;191;300).21 The obvious positions of economic privilege that whites occupied as a minority in the post-colonial and apartheid eras represent an extreme version of the master narrative, since both whites and others were acutely aware of the link between their position of privilege and their life chances.

Afrikaner whiteness was driven by a nationalist quest for a volkseie,22 essentialist ethnic identity, constructed ironically out of the “thoroughly in-essentializable reality of their positioning and history” (Steyn, 2004:149). The fact that white Afrikaners had ‘impure’ non-white ancestry in their blood was at complete odds with true, pure Afrikanerdom. This situation led to increased focus on social status and appearance as racial markers and decreased emphasis on biological purity (Posel, 2001:101): Afrikaner whiteness was not its others: it was not English, not black, not Asian, not brown, not Jewish, not imperialist, not traitorous and not alien. The exclusive nature of volkseie Afrikaner whiteness was bolstered and justified by attributing a similar volkseie character to black South Africans (Norval, 1996:301). Norval observes that the transposition of the logic of volkseie to other ‘groups’ in society fostered racialised thinking in South Africa (1996:7-8).23

Afrikaners were not simply whites amongst non-whites. The notion of a ‘true’ Afrikanerdom, paternalistic, pure and God-ordained, was founded on the social dimensions of race that associated whiteness with intellectual and material superiority. Nationalism institutionalised the social superiority of white Afrikaners through education systems, political discourses, Afrikaner churches and Afrikaner cultural organisations. Despite consistent divides and contestation

21 The DRC was central to the construction of the notion of white Afrikaners as a ‘chosen people’ whose responsibility it was to herd and govern separate development initiatives to become “useful citizens” (Giliomee, 2003:459;460;462).
22 Melissa Steyn defines volkseie as “Literally: that which is the “nation’-s” own, which cannot be alienated” (2004:163).
23 The idea that black people needed to know and preserve their volkseie cultures was advocated by anthropologists like P. J. Schoeman. The implementation of “radical and total apartheid” (separate development and government control of “black education”) in the early 1940s was deemed necessary because “The Afrikaners were called not only to ensure the development of an eie volk but also to help backward and less developed people to help themselves and rehabilitate themselves,” stressed Schoeman in 1941 (Giliomee, 2003:467;508).
amongst Afrikaners, their own social superiority had been inextricably woven into whiteness, normalised and as a ‘fact of life’ hardly questioned by whites until the 1980s. As apartheid became increasingly unacceptable locally and internationally post Second World War, changing social relations inevitably started affecting the meaning of South African whiteness as its associated privileges were reconsidered, judged and challenged (Puttergill, 2008:74).

2.2.2.3b Transitional whiteness: dislocation and uncertainty

In the years before the 1994 election, anticipating change in their social imaginary, white Afrikaners were once again divided. On one hand, conservatives politicised others through an interpretive scheme focused on racial purity and the in-group. On the other, some moderate whites valued the idea of a non-racial future, while yet others were unsure whether they could in fact cross racial barriers (Schutte, 1995:330). White South Africans faced an uncertain future, as well as diverse political attitudes amongst themselves.

Aletta Norval uses the Laclauan concept of ‘dislocation’ to analyse the impact of dramatic social change on Afrikaner identification before and during apartheid (1996). For Norval, dislocation denotes an “experience which makes visible the ultimate contingency of all forms of identification” and leads to the “dislocation of previous modes of identification” (1996:13;52). In Steyn’s view, conservative post-1990 Afrikaners experienced dislocation when prior social changes denied facts forcibly visible, the forces that shaped their identities could be recognised and new boundaries had to be imagined for their social imaginary (2004:150).

If dislocation is so traumatic, why did most whites vote ‘yes’ to support the NP government’s negotiation process to give the black majority political rights in 1992? Puttergill argues that whiteness becomes salient when its position of privilege is threatened, especially when it seems racial others have the power to determine whites’ opportunities (2008:74). Schutte holds that most whites supported political change, not because this would get them the futures they desired – there were no guarantees – but because whites were aiming to collectively minimise their losses (1995:334). The uncertainty and fear that Afrikaans- and English-speaking whites experienced
about impending social change fostered a kind of white solidarity, based on the premise that whites in South Africa “have largely shared ... a world of similar experiences” (Schutte, 1995:334).

This temporary semblance of white political solidarity in response to threat marked a shared whiteness that transcended numerous historical, cultural and linguistic boundaries (Schutte, 1995:329). At the prospect of being judged by the national and international community, this ‘united’ whiteness constructed a governmental approach to the transition based on ‘responsibility’ and underpinned by a discourse of reason and rationality, void of ‘irrational ideology’ (Schutte, 1995:331). This ‘scientific’ approach labelled right-wing traditionalism, socialism, the ANC’s non-racialism and opposition to privatisation and decentralisation as irrational and counterproductive – arguably an attempt to re-establish white superiority in new, more acceptable terms (Schutte, 1995:331). This official government discourse used the language of facts, scientific reasoning and international legal principles to create an instrumentally rational way to accommodate a diverse set of white expectations in a value-rational way (Schutte, 1995:332). South African whiteness supported the creation of a democratic government that was “premised on the demise of everything Afrikaner Nationalism has always stood for” (Coombes, 2000:174), yet by no means indicated a general desire for a non-racialist future amongst them. Racial categories remained drenched with assumed connections between social status and white superiority (Posel, 2001; Schutte, 1995:330).

As the boundaries of the new social imaginary shifted, ethnicity and culture took on more prominent roles in everyday discourse. Conservative Afrikaner whiteness protected its interests by emphasising ethnic differences between black people when they felt threatened by the black political majority (Schutte, 1995:332-333), in so doing conceptually depreciating ‘black’ unity and power. The anxious apprehension of social change by this conservative whiteness belonged at least partly to poor, lower-class whites, who were most dependent on the financial advantage their ‘prestige identity’ as whites depended on (Schutte, 1995:335). Moderate whiteness, on the other hand, often drew on the idea of ‘civilised blacks’. Moderate whites believed that blacks who adhered to ‘civilised’ (read: white) standards of behaviour and lifestyle were socially acceptable,
and that ‘less civilised’ blacks would automatically clump around the poor strata of society, which, they believed, would be ethnically differentiated (Schutte, 1995:334).

Class concerns were an essential component of pre-transitional whiteness according to Hyslop (2000). Jonathan Hyslop argues that white identification had changed from strong, non-reflexive identification with the modernist, statist apartheid project in the 1950s-1960s, to individualised and consumerist identification in the 1990s (2000:36-37). Due to increased wealth and political differentials after the 1960s, middle- and upper-class Afrikaners and English speakers were especially exposed to globalising influences: “they were open to the impact of the socio-cultural changes of recent decades which are specifically linked to the era of ‘late modernity’” (Hyslop, 2000:38). Despite increasing political and cultural censorship during the 60s, whites were exposed to American consumerism through television, as well as new, more liberal ideas about race that contradicted the cultural values they grew up with (Hyslop, 2000:38). A strong, white, right-wing rejectionist political option was available, but most whites subscribed to other new, powerful types of subjectivity by 1992 (Hyslop, 2000:39). As global exposure and consumerism increased, South African whiteness became increasingly individualised. Hyslop convincingly argues that the white middle class was willing to abandon or revise their racial ideologies specifically because internal opposition to apartheid and external pressure to end it threatened white peoples’access to their consumer lifestyles (Hyslop, 2000:38).

As Afrikaner whiteness was more exposed to globalised media and individualism increased among them, gender identification also changed, marked by the emergence of white feminism among Afrikaner women writers (Hyslop, 2000:39). Whites were furthermore exposed to gay liberation causes and white middle-class men became much less agreeable to apartheid-style militarised masculinity due to its invasion of personal autonomy (Hyslop, 2000:39). While anti-conscription Afrikaans music expressed this change in white masculinity, sports like rugby seemed to become more consumer oriented and less an expression of apartheid racial order and traditional Afrikaner masculinity (Hyslop, 2000:40).
The individualisation of middle-class whiteness played an important role in the democratisation of South Africa: its diversification disabled totalitarian governance, yet this whiteness remains resistant in its attempts to establish and re-establish white superiority in democratic South Africa (Ramphele, 2008:130). Transitional whiteness, characterised by individualism, had outgrown the totalitarian Afrikaner Nationalist ideal, yet remained saturated with race and poised to protect white interests after 1994.

2.2.2.3c Post apartheid Afrikaner whiteness and new racism

The end of apartheid freed white Afrikaners from fixed ideological and religious identification options. They seemed free to embark on a journey of social redefinition (Steyn, 2001:151), but Gerhard Schutte predicted in 1995 that a sense of alienation would characterise white loss of racial prestige (1995:335). Nine years later, Steyn argued that the end of apartheid represented a crisis to Afrikaner identity, similar to the crisis that originally prompted the formation of Afrikaner Nationalism (2004:150). The growing body of literature on Afrikaner identification ten years after the official end of apartheid confirms that the dislocation of the apartheid social imaginary necessarily has a long-term impact on Afrikaner whiteness. Foster and Steyn’s detailed analysis of resistant whiteness in post apartheid South Africa confirms that dealing with dislocation is indeed a long-term process (2007).

The transformation of the South African context is marked by a dramatic shift in social power. Ansell emphasises ‘the power to govern’ as the object of racialised conflict in the country:

Despite celebration of the ten-year anniversary of the first democratic election, tremendous conflict persists in all sorts of smaller, more local and institutional contexts over who shall call the shots with concern to the nature, extent and pace of societal transformation (Ansell, 2004:19).

White Afrikaners have to face the fact that apartheid is the other of the new South Africa is almost every sense (Norval, 1996:299). They “cannot escape the fact that the system was put in place in
their name” (Steyn, 2004:150, emphasis in original). Not only are they deemed responsible for the immorality of the apartheid system (Steyn, 2004:150), they also have to live in a new social imaginary where this system – and Afrikaners, by implication – are generally held responsible for present-day social evils like persistent inequality, poverty and racism. White Afrikaners’ social positioning is therefore underpinned by elements of shame, guilt and disgrace, as well as feelings of loss related of apartheid privileges (Steyn, 2004:150).

Alongside this shame and guilt, the whiteness fostered by years of institutionalised privilege and ‘social’ superiority remain characteristic of whites’ post apartheid identification, only it appears in altered form. Steyn has documented what she terms “Afrikaner White talk”, a discursive option that re-defines the Afrikaner as deserving of a special place in the political, economic and social spheres of South Africa (Steyn, 2004:150). It operates as a “symbolic currency that has the power to keep the white Afrikaner (hierarchical) worldview intact and to sustain high levels of material, psychological and emotional comfort in the community” (Steyn, 2004:151). White talk utilises questions of ‘groupness’, language, religion, history, arts and sports (Steyn, 2004:150) in attempts to re-establish the Afrikaner as a ‘separate’ people with a distinct identity. Ansell describes it as a strategy of “… a particular kind of denial; denial of the cumulative benefits of being white” (Ansell, 2004:9-10). White talk therefore indicates identification with a particular form of post apartheid Afrikaner whiteness. Five expressions of White talk are outlined below.

**c.i Privileged victims**

Steyn argues that White talk serves not only to preserve privilege, but is part of a “fight for sustaining a sense of selfhood” (2004:153). It fosters self-examination and ultimately the construction of a post apartheid Afrikaner identity; reinvented, recontextualised, yet maintaining elements of Afrikaner idealism and righteousness (Steyn, 2004:154). In some Afrikaners, this process manifests as a crisis of alienation from the new social imaginary, a discourse marked by hostility, insensitivity toward racial others and a general backlash against social change, justified by a “distinct trend... to try to compete with the black African for the powerful position of victim” (Steyn, 2004:155-158).
Nevertheless, economic power remains a bastion of Afrikaner whiteness. A large number of white South Africans reported feelings of powerlessness in Huschka and Mau’s study (2006:492), but high levels of education and financially advantaged positions contained white tendencies toward anomie, their main concern being the maintenance of their material quality of life. Although lower-class whites have been affected by employment equity policies and are therefore more likely to experience anomie (Huschka and Mau, 2006:492-3) whites retain overall social advantage in South Africa. Bucaille notes that the need to maintain their socio-economic status has facilitated many citizens’ adherence to the new political system (2008:444).

c.ii Racial and ethno-cultural identification

Although some white South Africans acknowledge the impact of apartheid on black South Africans and advocate for white humility (Ansell, 2004:10), in-group identification remains highly prevalent amongst certain pockets of white Afrikaners, as evidenced by some of Puttergill’s respondents, who explicitly stated that they are not racists, just more comfortable with “what they are accustomed to” (Puttergill, 2008:316). An Afrikaner woman in Steyn’s study furthermore expressed strong in-group identification when she equated national diversity with stormy weather from which Afrikaners need shelter, in the form of “…familiarity and togetherness of a native language, culture, and a religious community…” (2004:153).

Several commentators have identified an ‘Afrikaner revival’ to the white middle class (Kriel, 2007:49; Puttergill, 2008:145; Steyn, 2004:155). Bornman suggests that Afrikaners’ sense of ethnicity has become their refuge in the post-1994 dispensation (Bornman, 2010:251). She found that white Afrikaners’ identification with ‘white’ and ‘Afrikaans’ increased from 1994-2001, whilst

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25 Only about five per cent of white South Africans were unemployed in 2009, compared to 27.9% of black citizens. White poverty halved to 3.6% between 1994 and 2008, yet an average of 49% of black South Africans remain classified as poor (SAIRR, 2010).
their identification with ‘rainbow nation’ and ‘South African’ decreased during this period (2010:251).

Barnard found that such ethno-cultural identification also features among Afrikaner youth at the University of Stellenbosch (2010). Conversely, Van Der Merwe claims that “tradition... typical Afrikaner values, markers, culture and identity” is rejected by adult respondents in his southern Free State study (2009:153). In his view, Afrikaners feel their history is “contaminated”, do not feel free to express “strong ethnic feelings”, are trying to behave in a “politically correct” fashion at all times and have become passive (2009:153). However, the Reitz incident at the University of the Free State in 2008 arguably represents a strong expression of ‘traditional’ Afrikaner whiteness that “invoked racism, ethnic and cultural supremacy, classism and sexism”, says Lewin (2010:127). White Afrikaner students have also been politically active at UP. Schoeman and Puttergill conclude that race impacts their identification with particular political parties (2007:168). Jansen agrees that white Afrikaner youths’ identification as white Afrikaners trumps other more inclusive identity options (2009). These findings suggest that white Afrikaner youth are sensitive to social change and challenges to whiteness and that their experiences encourage exclusivist ethno-cultural identification. Their whiteness arguably remains resilient in spite of the post apartheid milieu they occupy.

c.iii White isolation

In addition to strong, in-group ethnic identification, the resilience of Afrikaner whiteness is bolstered by persistent class inequalities which isolate middle and upper class whites from interracial contact. The informal racial segregation that persists in South Africa helps white South Africans to avoid facing ‘race’ (Puttergill, 2008:76). Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux found that prejudiced South Africans avoided interracial contact (2007:870;868), which could explain the persistent informal racial segregation in university spaces observed by *inter alia* Alexander (2007) and Alexander and Tredoux (2010). Gibson and Claassen found a significant increase in reconciliatory attitudes and actions amongst whites between 2001 and 2004, but compared to
English-speaking whites, who recorded an average ‘reconciliation score’ of 2.78, Afrikaans-speaking whites scored only 0.23 (2010:264).

These authors conclude that considerable intergroup animosity continues in South Africa particularly because contact between socially unequal groups does not reduce prejudice significantly (Gibson and Claassen, 2010:271). White isolation breeds indifference, a narrow self-interest, and maintains loyalty to the white in-group (Puttergill, 2008:77). These findings suggest that post apartheid Afrikaner whiteness remains buttressed by socio-economic inequality and hence resistant to social change. Gibson and Claassen further argue that interracial contact may reduce prejudice, as suggested by Allport’s classic theory,26 but will not necessarily change the deep ideological orientations that foster racial animosity and discrimination (2010:258).

c.iv Whitelash

White talk’s reactionary ‘whitelash’ complains that racialised redress policies constitute ‘reverse discrimination’ that ‘forces’ them to seek employment abroad (Puttergill, 2008:75). Scores of whites27 have emigrated to countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia for reasons related to violence and crime and the fear that “South Africa will follow the same downhill road as other African countries” (Bornman, 2005:387; translated from Afrikaans). White interests are central to this White talk strategy, which cleverly blames the new social imaginary and its politics for white emigration and the accompanying loss of skills. It fails to acknowledge that emigration is an expensive option, hardly available to all South Africans, and emphasises personal experiences of racialisation so that institutionalised perpetuation of privilege becomes a trivial, unrelated matter (Steyn and Foster, 2008:31). For example, Charl-Pierre Naudé openly blames the ANC for the ‘tragedy’ of white emigration which thwarts “the practical realisation of post-1994 liberation the way the constitution promises it to all citizens. The skilled people who are necessary to

26 This social-psychological theory suggests that frequent and intimate contact between members of different groups can reduce intergroup prejudice, specifically if contact occurs under optimal conditions (Allport, 1945).
27 According to Statistics South Africa (SSA) this number stands at 60,000.
manage that realisation have been leaving the country in droves…” (2011). Naudé presents his argument as non-racial, but the underlying tone of white victimisation and superiority is barely disguised.

**c.v New racism**

It is clear that prejudice has not vanished. Ansell explains that ‘new racism’ lies in conceptions of race, performance of racial identity and notions of racism that have been re-articulated around new “axes”, such as the local post-transitional moment and increasingly global racial politics (Ansell, 2004:6). ‘New racism’ flourishes in the “contemporary racial ideological constructions that tend to be sanitised, ostensibly non-racial, and couched within liberal democratic discourses of human/individual rights, but nevertheless work to shore up white privilege under challenge” (Ansell, 2004:6). More specifically, “...the newness of new racism involves hiding, disguising, or coding white anti-black racism in ways that are more culturally and politically palatable” (Ansell, 2004:14). *White talk* selectively employs “facts” to re-establish boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Steyn, 2004:155), thereby uncritically casting all criminals as black, civil servants as incompetent and corrupt, and so on. Its function is to conceal deep-seated racist attitudes which are not detectable through simple attitudinal research that focuses on prejudice alone, since direct expression of prejudice is no longer socially acceptable (Ansell, 2004:6). Respondents’ identification must therefore be conceptualised as possibly containing new racism.

In conclusion, Steyn and Foster’s work illustrates that Afrikaner whiteness is informed by a particular history of racial domination and paternalism, as well the experience of loss (2008). It is evasive and pervasive in its skilful adaptation to post apartheid standards of political correctness, marked by discourses of white victimisation, ‘new’ racism, physical white isolation and strong in-group identification.

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2.2.3 Afrikaner identification and the Afrikaans language

In addition to race and ethnicity, language has been central to the construction and experiences of South Africans’ social reality. For example, Bornman argues that “language might be the most important level of sub-national identification in South Africa” (Bornman 2010:247).

The Afrikaans language played an integral role in the development of apartheid. Afrikaner Nationalism claimed the Afrikaans language as its own but, by enforcing its official use rendered it a language of oppression (Giliomee, 2003:509). The apartheid government invested heavily in the development of the Afrikaans language (Giliomee, 2003:379,490-491) and simultaneously created and insisted on ethno-linguistic cleavages amongst black South Africans, “where they had never previously existed” (Orman, 2008:87). The numerous ‘black’ languages were reified purely for political and administrative purposes and deliberately underdeveloped to prevent black opposition to apartheid (Giliomee, 2003:509-510; Orman, 2008:87). These languages consequently came to represent apartheid era division and oppression.

The relationship between ethnicity and language in South Africa is therefore intimate, divisive and socio-economically differentiated. The eleven official languages recognised by the post apartheid constitution29 are “embedded in the politics of the country” (Webb, 2002:67) and represented by a range of complex language rights discourses. ‘Language equity’ is enshrined by the new Constitution, but actual language practice follows quite “…a clear language hierarchy...with English at the top...Afrikaans somewhere in the middle...” and black citizens’ mother tongues at the bottom (Orman, 2008:94). The demotion of the Afrikaans language and, by implication Afrikaner whiteness by post apartheid politics, has led to fierce, emotional outcries by Afrikaners and even the formation of a so-called ‘New Afrikaans Movement’ (Kriel, 2006:45). White Afrikaners cling to the notion of group and language rights to prevent the Afrikaans language from further demotion, since this process directly represents their decreased social status. The fight to maintain the status

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29 These are: Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, Pedi (Northern Sotho), Sotho (Sesotho or Southern Sotho), Swazi, Tsonga/Shangaan, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa and Zulu. An estimated 70 other languages are also used in South Africa, including the Khoi and San languages and various others, not all indigenous (Webb, 2002:67).
of the Afrikaans language is evidenced, for example, by the large amount of Afrikaans language newspaper articles that dealt with the topic in 2007 alone (Kriel, 2007:44).

Nevertheless, the Afrikaans and English languages both enjoy considerable status compared to ‘black’ languages in newspapers, television and official and business documents (Orman, 2008:95). The Afrikaans language remains one of the main instruction languages in some Faculties of the Universities of Pretoria, Stellenbosch, Potchefstroom and the Free State. However, television and advertising have been extensively Anglicised, a development that may encourage Afrikaner hostility toward advertisers and associated publications (Orman, 2008:132-133). Anglicisation of the public sphere pits Afrikaner whiteness against English-speaking whiteness once more, arguably bolstering the historical ethnic divisions of imperialism between them.

Claiming responsibility for defending the Afrikaans language’s status further emphasises the ethno-cultural dimension of white Afrikaners’ opposition to the majority black ANC government. Afrikaners have been battling the ANC government over name changes by claiming that these changes represent white victimisation by Government (Orman, 2008:126; Kriel, 2007:46). Orman suggests that an “identity conflict” is occurring between white Afrikaners and the ANC government, characterised by mutual mistrust (2008:124). “For the Afrikaners, the current threat posed to their language reinforces the traditional nationalist interpretation of Afrikaner history which emphasises the recurring theme of a struggle for cultural survival in the face of out-group persecution, the core element of which is the taalstryd or ‘language struggle’” (Orman, 2008:124). Kriel concurs with Orman that the Afrikaans language is key to white Afrikaners’ identification, to the extent that “the contemporary social movement for the promotion of Afrikaans in South Africa is essentially an Afrikaner nationalist movement” (2006:45). The notion of a post-modern language-based nationalism is further discussed in Chapter 3.

2.3 Conclusion
This chapter set out the social constructionist approach to identity, as well as the concepts of social imaginary, language and discourse. It outlined key elements constitutive of white Afrikaner
identity, namely culture, ethnicity, race, whiteness and the Afrikaans language. It is argued that the evolution of race and racism from ‘scientifically biological’ to an ideology of separate ethnic development, served white maintenance of distinctive group identities and informed the historical foundation of Afrikaner whiteness. Afrikaner identification is construed as an ethno-cultural, often exclusivist product of history, with its main axes being race, ethnicity and language.
Chapter 3

Identity and nationalism: Theoretical approaches

In Tamir’s opinion, nationalism “...provide[s] the most compelling identity myth in the modern world...” (1995:420). Cultural and racial identities are chosen based on the inequalities that continue to characterise most societies (Wieviorka, 2004:283-287), hence the consequences and possibilities of nationalism remain real.

This chapter summarises the work of four social theorists whose conceptual and theoretical perspectives contribute unique ideas and tools that facilitate the exploration of this study’s research questions. In the first half of the chapter, the tenets of Ernest Gellner’s classic theory of nationalism and Benedict Anderson’s powerful notion of ‘imagined communities’ are presented and their relevance to the present study evaluated. In the second half, the work of Richard Jenkins on ‘social identity’ is presented as a basic framework for the Sociological analysis of identification. The main ideas of the ethno-symbolist paradigm are presented through a synopsis of some of Anthony D. Smith’s renowned work on ‘national identity’ and nationalism. Finally, the notion of cultural nationalism is discussed with reference to white Afrikaners’ in the present day context.

While the first half of this chapter is concerned only with nationalism as a theoretical concept, the second half is concerned with the intersection of identification with nationalism and the processes that underpin this relationship. It sets out a) identification as a dynamic, active ongoing process; b) the overlap between individual and collective dimensions of identity; c) the idea that ethnicity and culture are integral to identification with a nation, and more specifically d) the possibility of re-defining nationalism and a consequent (theoretically) ‘new’ white Afrikaner nationalism in the twenty-first century post apartheid context.
3.1. Ernest Gellner

Ernest Gellner’s work on nationalism has been widely criticised, yet remains the key to academic understanding of the phenomenon and has provided successive theorists with the basic building blocks they needed to develop theories of nationalism. This section provides first, an overview of Gellner’s conceptualisation of nationalism, second, criticisms of his theory and third, its suitability for understanding and identifying nationalism (or strands of it) both in the historical origins and research findings of this study.

3.1.1. The Gellnerian approach to nationalism

Gellner offers a macro-perspective on the origins of nationalism as rooted in the structural dynamics of the 1800s industrialisation, when culture (shared systems of meaning and communication) replaced the rigid, demarcated social roles of pre-modern societies (Gellner, 1964:155). Gellner conceptualises nationalism as a cultural-political response to industrialisation’s demand for homogeneity. Belonging to a culturally homogenous group – a ‘nation’ – in a modernising society afforded one political power and access to resources such as education and employment.

Gellner defines nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (1983:1). While nationalism is therefore a “theory of political legitimacy”, its aim – political power – arose primarily from the haphazard amalgamation of cultures induced by industrialisation (Gellner, 1983:1). He proposes a direct relationship between culture and the nation, on one hand, and group membership and political power, on the other. People are concerned with the question of which culture offers full cultural citizenship, education and employment opportunities via the political power it has the potential to acquire. They may moreover oscillate between these cultural ‘options’ before choosing one. The cultural ‘pools’, driven by the intelligentsia and the print industry, offer power through cultural homogeneity (Gellner, 1983:39), in other words, they encourage cultural assimilation in favour of gaining collective social power.
Gellner maintains that the dominant cultural mode of communication, or ‘high culture’ of modern society, reproduces group members via centralised cultural and educational systems. This ‘high culture’ unites people by reaching them all, yet also differentiates a society in which tight structures no longer regulate social interaction. Those who are excluded from the ‘high culture’ by default of race, class or ethnicity belong to ‘low cultures’ and inevitably forego some opportunities and benefits to which members of the ‘high culture’ have better collective access. Groups of people may associate their (lack of) access to political power and wealth with genetic, religious and linguistic characteristics and then mobilise for their interests via nationalism (O’Leary, 1997:198).

The Gellnerian approach therefore operates in terms of three kinds of boundaries between citizens, or three roughly distinguished kinds of social stratification, namely:

- educated vs. uneducated: knowledge is power and those who do not have access to education know that they have less power;
- boundaries between ‘cultures’: insiders of a particular culture have access to the knowledge and ideas constructed and shared in that culture, whilst others do not;
- the rough boundaries between power-holders and the ‘rest’ (Gellner, 1981:770).

These boundaries are jagged and porous, but set the scene for Gellner’s premise that the stratified, centralised nature of industrial society is key to the birth of nationalism. It follows that states precede nationalism, that nationalism precedes nations and that its roots are time- and context-bound (Gellner, 1983:4,151). Nations are therefore not natural God-given entities, but informed by constructed nationalist goals.

In Gellner’s view, nationalism embodies a kind of ‘continuity’ or stability as it offers the image of a nation with a history and culture. Since skills are not transferable in industrial society, as they were in agrarian society, humans turn the focus of their identification from occupation to culture. Nationalism “misleadingly” makes a fuss of the loss of hereditary continuity when humans need it
most and offers culture as its substitute. However, culture and the constant need for labour specialisation depend on the educational system, which only select members of society have access to (Gellner, 1981:757). These members also have access to print media, an essential medium in the creation of a nation (Gellner, 1983:127). Literacy, communication and culture therefore create a normative order through which large industrial societies can be controlled and reproduced.

Gellner proposes a particular balance between agency and structure. Nationalism involves the intentions and agency of human actors and their interests in the industrial societal context (Gellner, 1983:49). Nationalist support is therefore actively and rationally associated with the pursuit of certain interests, whether perceived as benefits or rights. Modern people “…do not in general become nationalists from sentiment or sentimentality…they become nationalists through genuine, objective, practical necessity, however obscurely recognised” (O’Leary, 1997:194). However, the power of nationalism amounts to more than the sum of its parts – it “…creates nations, not the other way around” (Gellner, 1983:56). In industrial societies, differences between citizens have become the usual and acceptable basis for mobilising interests, to the extent that “having a nation” has come to appear to be an “inherent attribute of humanity” (Gellner, 1983:6), but Gellner insists nations are created by nationalists. He presents a conceptual dichotomy between the agency of creators and the life their creation takes on; between the whole and the sum of its parts. Hall notes that for Gellner “…identities are constructed and chosen, on the one hand and on the other, that nationalism explains the nation, nations do not account for nationalism” (Hall, 1998:2).

This dichotomy is further evident in the Gellnerian notion that the creation of nations involves crystallisation of new cultures, the invention of a culture, a history and a people by the intelligentsia. Gellner defines nationalism in terms of the ‘awakened seeking their own state’ (Hall, 1998:4). Intelligentsias may believe they are restoring the nation with nationalist ideas (through a mythmaking process), when in fact they are creating a new, modern political unit (O’Leary, 1997:195). Although agency undeniably underpins the creation and crystallisation of new nations
and new cultures, Gellner undermines the notion of this controlled power over nationalism and its components by noting that the intelligentsia and the created nation are ignorant of the complex character of the process they are enabling. Once the crafted beast – nationalism – is mature, internalised and institutionalised, the intelligentsia have little control over it, argues Gellner. His argument holds true for Afrikaner Nationalism. Afrikaner elite worked hard to socially construct Afrikaner Nationalism and did so purposefully: to uplift and empower the Afrikaner. However, the power of the sum of its parts ultimately affected millions of South African lives severely and its consequences continue to do so today.

In summary, Gellner’s approach emphasises nationalism as a function of structural and cultural necessity brought on by the industrialisation process and consequent urbanisation. New forms of collective identification became the necessary road to political and economic power and the intelligentsia created the foundations for such identification.

Gellner’s focus on industrialisation is particularly suited to the emergence of Afrikaner Nationalism, yet several shortcomings (briefly detailed in the following section) necessitate exploration of other theories on nationalism.

3.1.2 Critiques of Gellner’s theory

Gellner’s theory has been criticised for being too modernist and for relying excessively on functionalist argumentation (Hall, 1998:3). It is argued that his argument is teleological: it explains nationalism in terms of the needs it satisfies. Gellner’s arguments seem “unashamedly functionalist” because he positions the centralised state and modern culture as the creators of needs which spawn nationalism (O’Leary, 1997:203).

Functionalist arguments are characterised by their use of “holistic entities” such as ‘culture’ and ‘modernisation’ to explain phenomena, but “...Gellner’s principal thesis is that nationalism results from the actions of a social group placed at a disadvantage by newly unified cultural space...” (Hall, 1998:10, own emphasis). Nevertheless, Gellner also argues that a) the creators of nationalisms
were not aware of the power of the force they were creating and b) could not foresee that the force could/would become greater than the simple sum of its parts.

Perennialists, ethno-symbolists and post-modernists argue that the relationship between nationalism, modernisation and industrialisation may have been less direct than Gellner suggests (O’Leary, 1997:205). For example, identification as nations may have existed long before modernisation occurred. Gellner’s emphasis on modernisation may moreover be problematic when we need to explain the emergence of post-modern era nationalisms. O’Leary (1997:208) points out, however, that Gellner postulates a positive correlation between the maturity of societies’ modernisation processes on the one hand, and the potency of nationalisms such societies may give rise to, on the other (Gellner, 1983:74-75). It is not clear, however, if ‘less virulent’ also means less powerful nationalisms.

Gellner does point out that multilingual societies are less stable than monolingual ones, but does not extend this idea to a consideration of multiculturalism. “Gellner treated nationalism as the doctrine of ‘one culture, one state’...”, but ethnic nationalisms often develop in contexts with multiple, intermixed, counter-entropic cultures that compete for resources (O’Leary, 1997:221), such as post apartheid South Africa, which is certainly witness to resource competition between ethnic groups (Steyn, 2004) but sans civil war. Except for a few isolated incidents, contemporary white Afrikaners have illustrated little in the way of traditional nationalist goals of self-determination.30 Post-1994 South Africa is a world leader in minority representation in the legislature and in parliament.31 However, multi-cultural societies remain fertile breeding grounds

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30 These cases include the small Orania community’s drive for self-determination (selfbeskikking) over their own territory, a few newsworthy actions by the Afrikaner Weerstands beweging (AWB) (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) and a sporadic uprising by the ultra-rightwing group the Boeremag. See the Orania community’s description of themselves at [http://www.orania.co.za/english](http://www.orania.co.za/english). The murder of infamous AWB leader Eugene Terre’Blanche in April 2010 resulted in a “call for calm” by president Zuma (see [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8602347.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8602347.stm), accessed on 22 March, 2011) and was interpreted by his fellow supremacists as “declaration of war”, but nothing came of their threats (see [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/05/eugene-terreblanche-killi_n_525214.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/05/eugene-terreblanche-killi_n_525214.html), accessed on 22 March 2011). The Boeremag attempted to set off bombs in Soweto in 2003. One person was killed and the Boeremag conspirators were arrested and put on trial for treason (Rusell, 2010:137).

for post-modern nationalisms. For example, Croucher holds that “the allure of nationhood persists... also among new or newly transitioned states” such as South Africa (2003:11-12).

Van den Bossche describes the Gellnerian approach as a world-historic, macro-sociological approach that is in his opinion culturally and materially reductionist. Taking account of nationalism as a political phenomenon “...invariably means more attention to ‘local’ circumstances and people, to history, ideology and psychology than Gellner allowed for” (Van Den Bossche, 2003:491-492). Societal complexities and specificities must be considered by any study of nationalism in this context. Societal specificities or “conditions of responsiveness” hold the key to understanding why a nation chooses to mobilise for nationalism at a particular point in time (Van Den Bossche, 2003:496). For example, political heterogeneity amongst white Afrikaners reveals that the large majority of them perceive the conservative Freedom Front Plus’ goals of territorial separatism and territorial self-determination as beyond practical reach, suggests Southern (2008:470).

Context-specific detail facilitates a different approach to the construction of a possible new Afrikaner nationalism, for example Kriel’s appeal to rationality, which emphasises that a nation cannot simply claim land and self governance in today’s world (2006:53). Both macro-and micro-perspectives are therefore essential to understanding Afrikaner Nationalist history and the present enquiry into a possible present day Afrikaner Nationalism. Van Den Bossche contends that we must explore the individual and collective search for meaning, the transformation of subjective feelings into objective policies and the relationship between political discourse and political agency (2003:495-497).

Gellner’s classic work offers an excellent paradigm for understanding historic Afrikaner Nationalism as a structural force of modernisation, a ‘high culture’ with the will to rule politically and economically. Two critiques of Gellner’s theory guide to this study’s analysis. First, the Gellnerian emphasis on modernisation illuminates the conditions that gave rise to historic Afrikaner Nationalism, but the present study requires an approach more suitable to the post-modern, post apartheid context. Second, in addition to macro-analyses, attention must be paid to
the local contingencies and dynamics at play: the how, who, where, when and why. Gellner’s focus on ‘culture’ is useful, but limited to macro dimensions such as education and language. The complex relationship between culture and identification must be considered.

3.2 Benedict Anderson: Imagined communities

Anderson’s much read and recognised argument provides theoretical tools to explore both the political and ‘real’ dimensions of nationalism. His work specifically addresses the ‘how’ question: how does the nation and nationalism come to exist? Anderson also draws attention to nationalism in Creole communities, making his approach suitable to the South African context (1991:50).

3.2.1 The basic tenets of Anderson’s theory

3.2.1.1 Imagining the nation

Anderson convincingly argues that the modern age dates back to the 16th century, not the 19th as Gellner would have it. To Anderson, nationalism is not explained by Marxism or liberal theory, but is rather intimately connected to mortality, religion, language and culture. His renowned definition of a nation describes it as...

...an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion (Anderson, 1991:6).

Anderson comments that “...Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’ rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation’” (Anderson, 1991:6). We should explore the way in which a community is imagined – how the ‘magic’ of the nation comes about – rather than its genuineness, argues Anderson (1991:6).
The nation is imagined in three ways. First, it is imagined as limited because, regardless of its size, its elastic boundaries always remain finite - they define and exclude other nations. ‘Othering’, inclusion and exclusion are natural parts of imagining one’s nation. In South Africa, the material implications of concepts like ethnicity, race, history, politics, culture and language facilitate the nation’s boundaries.

Second, the nation is imagined as sovereign. In Anderson’s view, a nation’s desire for political sovereignty is intimately related to a geographic indicator of independence: land. However, scholars such as Appadurai (1996) make convincing cases for the continued existence of nationalisms without territorial sovereignty, through so-called “moral geographies” (Appadurai, 1996:337). Nations can exercise nationalist sentiment through the control of lower-level cultural entities like schools and publishing houses (Kriel, 2006:53). In this understanding, white Afrikaners may therefore imagine themselves as part of a nation despite the general unavailability of sovereign territory in South Africa (Kriel, 2006) (see section 3.4.5).

Third, the nation is imagined as a community, a “deep, horizontal comradeship”, regardless of the inequalities and exploitation that may exist in it (Anderson, 1991:7). The very imagining of a nation induces communal identification with people that one does not know personally. In the post-modern South African context, the imagined nature of a nation may be the very structure that facilitates nationalism and ultimately renders territorial sovereignty a trivial goal.

**3.2.1.2 Imagining the nation through history**

Anderson theorises that nationalism draws extensively on the past as a means of creating new social structures and proposes three sequential causes that result in the rise of nationalism: print capitalism, the rise of new elites (as in the Americas) and the bureaucratic grafting of nations onto empires (as with Great Britain, Russia and France). These dynamic changes in cultural systems changed the way people thought about themselves, their peers and their belonging.
Anderson emphasises that nationalism came into being out of, and against, the large cultural systems that preceded it (Anderson, 1991:12). Three fundamental cultural systems concurrently lost their grip on human thinking (Anderson, 1991:36) and “…made it possible to ‘think’ the nation” (Anderson, 1991:36,22). He does not single out class or politics, but rather conceptualises both as part of the ‘large cultural systems’ that gave rise to historic nationalisms.

First, the nation could be imagined after ordinary citizens gained access to literature. Before the 1600s, only privileged Church servants were taught the sacred language Latin. However, with the emergence of print capitalism, publishing soon evolved from a centralised, international enterprise, to a national, more localised one. The logic of capitalism dictated that once the elite market of Latin literates had been saturated by 1640, the huge markets of “monoglot vernacular speakers” became print capitalism’s next target (Anderson, 1991:37).

The demise of simple, singular religio-linguistic systems was part of the broader fragmentation of societies, a process that created feelings of rootlessness and Durkheimian anomie – ideal circumstances for nationalist sentiment to bind people together (Anderson, 1991:19). Nations became furthermore imaginable after the beheading of Charles Stuart, King of England in 1649, which marked the beginning of the decline of monarchic legitimacy. The fall of dynastic realms opened up social space for imagining nations and facilitated long-term, large-scale re-groupings of people, as various monarchs started utilising the notion ‘national’ to maintain their power in the face of increasing defiance (Anderson, 1991:22).

Finally, nations became imaginable when understandings of the world changed from ideas about destiny, prefiguring and fulfilment, to notions of temporal coincidence, community and commonalities, and ‘simultaneity’, similar to what we know as ‘meanwhile’ (Anderson, 1991:24-25). This view of time and existence gave rise to the idea of a sociological organism, the nation: a solid community, moving steadily through history (Anderson, 1991:26). In other words, one who imagines a nation never meets all of its members, or knows all their names, yet “…has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity” (Anderson, 1991:26).
3.2.1.3 Imagining the nation through printed language

After ordinary people gained access to literature via print capitalism in the 1600s, the emergence of the novel and the newspaper in eighteenth century Europe provided the perfect media for “…‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation” (Anderson, 1991:25). The comparability of the characters and milieus with real life counterparts intimately connected individuals with their imagined nations. The dates on the newspapers produced an imagined connection between the stories and reinforced belief in calendrical coincidence (Anderson, 1991:27-33). Print capitalism enabled speakers of a large variety of “vernaculars, syntaxes and grammars” to comprehend each other through print on paper (Anderson, 1991:44).

Language in mass print laid the foundation for national consciousness in three ways: First, it enabled imagining the nation as inclusive and exclusive, with boundaries, flexible yet finite (Anderson, 1991:44). Second, language in mass print slowed down the pace of linguistic change. This provided the “image of antiquity” that Anderson’ argues is central to the idea of a nation (Anderson, 1991:44). Third, by preferring some languages over others, print capitalism differentiated between powerful and powerless languages, thereby encouraging collective identification (Anderson, 1991:45).

Anderson’s theory of the origin of nations emphasises the role of social change and cultural systems in nationalism. This approach enables the consideration of nationalism in ‘Creole societies’ such as South Africa, where history, print language and democracy differentiate and unite groups of citizens.

3.2.2 Critiquing the imagined nation

Tamir asks how we can distinguish between imagined communities of, for example, university students or a neighbourhood’s inhabitants, and nations and nationalisms (1995). Anderson may respond by saying that communities can be distinguished by the ‘style’ in which they are imagined, but Tamir holds that Anderson does not clarify the existence or the content of said ‘styles’ (Anderson, 1991:6, Tamir, 1995:422). Tamir rejects the argument that communities are
distinguished by characteristics such as culture, language and history (Tamir, 1995:422). Tamir and Du Plessis agree that the notion of a ‘style’ of imagining involves the effects of all aspects of the context, including the distribution of political and economic power and role that intelligentsias assume, as Anderson illustrates through detailed accounts of historical nation formation (Du Plessis, 2004:47). Tamir insists that we focus on the outcomes of the “feelings of belonging and fraternity” in order to distinguish the nation from other communities (1995:425).

One such outcome renders Anderson’s work relevant to post-modern settings, where ‘traditional’ nationalist goals of territorial and political sovereignty are unattainable. The outcome of imagining the nation may be that the nation desires legitimacy and power in other social spheres (Kriel, 2006:53). Appadurai agrees that in post-modern settings our imaginations have to carry us beyond the old-fashioned idea of the nation (1996:337). Kriel argues that nations’ post-modern desires for legitimate power in social spheres represent a new kind of ‘cultural nationalism’ (see section 3.4.5).

It may be argued that Anderson’s focus on culture undermines the centrality of race and ethnic politics in South African history. The political environment is intimately tied to lived material realities and cannot be reduced to cultural expression, specifically since ‘cultural’ elements like ethnicity and language have been irreversibly politicised throughout South African history (Du Plessis, 2004:48). Nevertheless, Anderson’s emphasis on print capitalism acknowledges the importance of Afrikaans language media in white Afrikaners’ identification. The nation is creatively imagined in Afrikaans via books and visual representations (Du Plessis, 2004:39). According to Anderson, “… [the] most important thing about language is its capacity for generating imagined communities, building in effect particular solidarities. ...Print-language is what invents nationalism, not a particular language per se” (1991:133-134). From Anderson’s perspective, the Afrikaans

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32 For example, the post-World War I context provided fertile ground for the imagining of numerous nations in Africa and Asia. These contexts were characterised by tensions between the newly imagined nations and their imperial rulers, as well as the fact that intelligentsia could experience the rulers’ capital cities, study there and use printed language to disseminate ideas about the nation (Du Plessis, 2004:47).
language would not only be a cultural element, but would also constitute a system that is a vehicle for imagining the nation.

In conclusion, Anderson’s notion of the ‘imagined nation’ offers consideration of the issues of nationalism in multi-cultural and post-modern societies, which Gellner’s approach does not. It also highlights the centrality of the Afrikaans language and media as vehicles for imagining the Afrikaner nation. However, given their prevalence in South African society, the notions of race and ethnicity should receive more theoretical attention than Gellner and Anderson afford them.

3.3 Jenkins’ ‘social identity’
This section summarises Richard Jenkins’ approach to social identity as a dynamic, ongoing process. His work illuminates the intricate relationship between individual and collective identity, in so doing providing a framework for the present study’s investigation of identification with elements of Afrikanership.

3.3.1 Identification, context and change
Jenkins’ approach to ‘identity’ as inherently and inevitably ‘social’ is particularly appealing because it considers both structure and agency, private and public spheres. Most notably, he conceives identity as shaped by contextual change. Revisionist interpretations of history reflect the effects of contextual change on human identification (Norval, 1998:250; 1999:500). The predominant presence of change in human life means that ‘identities’ are works in progress, or continuous processes (Puttergill & Leildè, 2006:13). The verb ‘identify’ signifies that identity is not ‘just there’, but is continuously being re-established. It is conceptualised as neither inherent nor essential, but as mediated and negotiated over time (Jenkins, 2008:13-14). One’s ‘identity’ is not an object, but an active, dynamic process of identification, underpinned by the reciprocal relationship between humans’ agency and their contexts. ‘Identification’ signifies the temporal, changing nature of attitudes. In addition to ‘identity’, the verb ‘identification’ is therefore used in this study to denote the dynamic nature of respondents’ identity construction.
Puttergill & Leildè point out that identities need to be situated historically and relationally. Despite all their mutability and post-modern rootlessness, they do not transcend space and time (2006:13). The radical shifts that marked the end of South African apartheid were both a product and a cause of citizens’ identification changes (Norval, 1999:500). Respondents in this study occupy a peculiar position in the post apartheid social imaginary: they are direct descendants of white apartheid supporters in a post- and anti-apartheid environment that continues to echo historical racial divides and tensions. They did not experience apartheid themselves as adults, but they carry indirect knowledge of it, transmitted by their schools and families (Jansen, 2009:53-54). Respondents’ identification is therefore interwoven with history and the many available memories thereof. Jenkins appeal to ‘lived realities’ emphasises the reciprocal relationships between participants’ identifications on the one hand, and their family members, communities, history and the national post apartheid context, on the other.

Humans hold a variety of overlapping identities over time, which may or may not be interchangeable or of equal value to us (Puttergill & Leildè, 2006:12). Jenkins agrees that identities are “generally contingent” and “somewhat tolerant of inconsistency or contradiction” (Jenkins, 2008:84). Nevertheless, identification is rooted in history and social institutions. Walker’s conceptualisation of identification as constituted over time from different experiences is useful. She ties the historical and individual influences on multi-dimensional identification together: “…the present and future self is always rooted in past selves” (Walker, 1998:338). This abstract combination of multiple, contingent identities with the central positioning of experiences, means that recent history is central to the present study.

3.3.2 Similarity and difference

Similarity and difference are at the heart of identification (Jenkins, 2008:16-27). Jenkins proposes that the process of individual identification depends on difference to a large extent, while collective identity emphasises similarity of the in-group and difference from out-groups (2006:145-157). Difference is paramount to individual identification because we are more aware of the complexity of individuals whom we have face-to-face contact with and hence have more
‘evidence’ of personal difference from them. Our collective ‘contemporaries’, however, are “shadowy and anonymous” and we rely on similarity, via ‘ideal types’ to perceive and identify similarities between collectives and ourselves. Collective identity therefore depends on both similarity and difference (Jenkins, 2006:157).

Difference continues to determine identification worldwide (Wieviorka, 2004:283-287) and in South Africa, distinctly racial ideal types continue to echo the apartheid era emphasis on difference. Ideal types, stereotypes and associated prejudice in the South African context are not only concerned with intra-group similarities, but also with the real consequences of the differences they imply. Stereotypes have such a vast effect on the national psychology that meta-stereotypes (the stereotypes I think you hold of me and my in-group) affect inter-racial contact and identification. Stereotypes may be used to simplify intra-group characteristics, but this does not negate or reduce prejudiced perceptions of intergroup differences that South African groups may hold toward each other.

Jenkins’ idea that collective identification operates on the basis of an “image of similarity” (Jenkins, 2006:157) closely resembles Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’, according to which we identify with groups based on perceived or ‘imagined’ similarity. However, Jenkins’ emphasis on ‘image’ is critical of the origins and dynamics of the ‘imagined community’. Respondents may imagine themselves as part of the white Afrikaner community, but they may draw on vastly different ‘images of similarity’ to facilitate such imagining. Indeed, “…in the shade of that image a range of diversity and heterogeneity exists…” (Jenkins, 2008:157). Similarity and difference therefore operate on various different levels to inform both individual and collective identification.

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33 He summarises Weber’s concept ‘ideal types’ as referring to “…a myriad more or less present and occasionally absent collective phenomena,” (Jenkins, 2006:144-145).
34 For example, in a study conducted by Grossberg, Struwig & Pillay, 22% of 1815 respondents indicated that their first choice of identification is with their race, topped only by family as a first choice for 29% of respondents (2006:66). Roefs found that 32% of her 273 white respondents identified strongly with race but not with the ‘South African’ national identity (2006:85).
35 For example, Finchilescu found that the meta-stereotypes held by white respondents at a South African university caused more anxiety in white respondents than in any others, yet these white respondents also happened to hold the lowest prejudice levels, a complex situation that caused white respondents to avoid contact with black respondents (2005:467-468).
3.3.3 Institutions of socialisation: School and family

The intersection between macro- and micro-perspectives is central to investigation of youth identification in South Africa. More specifically, the effect of institutions like the family and schools on youth identification is undeniable. Given that childhood and adulthood depend on each other for meaning (Jansen, 2009:53-54; Jenkins, 2006:81), it is likely that adult family members’ immediate and historical experiences of being white Afrikaners influence their children’s identification. In order to address this study’s research questions, it is imperative to understand how the “defining moments of one generation – its ‘lived history’ – becomes the available history to the next” (Wineburg, Mosborg, Porat & Duncan, 2007:40). The results of the EIA Civic Education Study36 illustrate the close relationship between parents’ political experiences and children’s attitudes. By age fourteen most adolescents were already members of their parents’ political culture and shared their parents’ views on the trustworthiness of government and opinions on governmental involvement in economic matters (Torney-Purta, 2004:472).

Parents’ role in the formation of respondents’ attitudes and identification is apparent to Jonathan D. Jansen, who was Dean of Education at the University of Pretoria (2009). According to Jansen, white Afrikaner students at UP have a powerful knowledge of the past, informed by their experiences of being the ‘children of perpetrators’ (of apartheid) (Jansen, 2009:49). Although Jansen’s argument is just that, his prioritisation of the powerful tensions that characterise these students’ family contexts and identification processes is useful:

…the familial relationships between the first and second generations are intense, emotionally charged, and often destructive. At the heart of these family ties is a complex relationship about how the same past is known by the first and second generations (Jansen, 2009:54).

In addition to family, school is a key socialising agent. It renders collective identity as the “way of being,” and (re-) legitimises it through “implicit and explicit specifications of the nature of the

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36 Completed in 29 countries with 140,000 adolescent students in around 2003.
world and the place of people ...in it” (Jenkins, 2008:160,163). Jansen agrees that the founding fathers of apartheid viewed schooling as crucial to intergenerational transmission of knowledge (Jansen, 2009:75).

Today, many Afrikaans-language schools remain all-white because large numbers of students of colour are unable to study in the Afrikaans language (Jansen, 2009:36). Jansen argues that these schools are ‘white spaces’ where a ‘null curriculum’ locks students away from exposure to models of democratic thinking, hence causing them uncertainty and confusion (Jansen, 2009:109). However, Jenkins’ and Jansen’s view of schools may underestimate youth’s critical capacity and awareness. Their uncertainty and confusion may indicate critical-mindedness and a desire to understand viewpoints different to their own. For example, Kamper and Steyn found that seventeen-year old white Afrikaner students were acutely aware of their parents’ racist attitudes and their influence on youths’ expectations of the future (2007:523).

Jansen perceives family and schools as unilaterally and freely transferring conservative values to youth, but youth question the world they live in (Kamper and Steyn, 2007). Schools and family cannot be assumed to transfer values to youth unproblematically or unilinearly. Respondents’ attitudes may therefore reflect conservative values and/or uncertainty and confusion about dealing with difference and change.

3.3.4 Gender and class

a. Gender

Gender is understood as a primary identity – it is part of every human’s identification – with local specificities and content (Jenkins, 2008:82). Gender is always “massively externally defined” (Jenkins, 2008:83) and hence amounts to much more than biological being. What does it mean to identify as a white Afrikaner male or female? Historic Afrikaner Nationalism prescribed strict patriarchal family relations, justified by the Dutch Reformed Church (Jansen, 2009:165). Through organisations like the Suid-Afrikaanse Vrouevereniging (SAVV, South African Women’s
Organisation), the family and Church played a key role in interpolating the *volk* during the 1940’s (Norval, 1996:74). Nationalism came to explain women’s identities, as the National Party drew upon them as “indispensable soldiers”, the *volksmoeders*\(^{37}\) and the primary socialisers of children (Norval, 1996:206). Control over women featured particularly in Nationalist concern with Afrikaner ‘purity’: the racist obsession with preventing miscegenation dictated that white women be ‘safeguarded’ from working alongside black males (Norval, 1996:23-24).

White Afrikaner males, on the other hand, had to live up to behavioural norms of toughness. In the family sphere, they were the alpha and omega, as portrayed strikingly in Afrikaans language teenage book series like *Saartjie*, *Trompie* and *Keurboslaan*, in which the father figure always stood at the head of the nuclear family and had the final say in every matter.\(^{38}\) They were responsible for maintaining the norms of racial purity and ‘protecting’ females in their families from men of colour (Jansen, 2009:91). Benedict Anderson’s approach explains how the print industry in South Africa, through its cultural products, was able to determine, inform and spread the nationalist doctrines that underpinned patriarchal institutional structures. The authors and publishers of these Afrikaans language book series set the boundaries of the apartheid social imaginary, not only with regard to family and gender roles, but also problems of racial etiquette (Du Plessis, 2008:125).

Afrikaner men were also politically and economically responsible for the rest of society. The Afrikaner Broederbond, a ‘secret’, elitist, white Afrikaner male service organisation founded in 1918, restricted its membership to white Afrikaans speaking Protestant males older than 25 (O’Meara, 1977:164), thereby defining who were worthy of taking responsibility for the *volk’s* future and who were not – no women, no blacks and no members of non-traditional religious denominations. For example, at UP, white males were lecturers, professors and deans, whilst white women were secretaries (Jansen, 2009:13). This system had pervasive long-term

\(^{37}\) Mothers of the nation.

\(^{38}\) For example, Irma du Plessis illustrates the complex patriarchal norms that underpinned South African society in the early decades of the twentieth century (2004:167).
institutionalised effects, so that women, black and white alike, struggled to perform dual roles of both powerful persons (academics) and powerless persons (women) (Walker, 1998:337).

White males have suffered psychologically in the post apartheid context. They can no longer identify as dominant. The post-1994 social imaginary actively negates their historically normative status through racial redress policies. Their social status has been reduced dramatically. Many young white Afrikaners were socialised to follow in superior-white-male-identification footsteps, yet now they are exposed to the changing South African context, characterised by diversity and debate. Jansen claims that no-one feels the sense of loss and emasculation associated with reduced status as much as young white Afrikaner males do (Jansen, 2009:69). Kamper and Steyn found that white Afrikaans-speaking young males viewed South Africa’s biggest problems to be affirmative action and mismanagement and that they were more negative than brown Afrikaans speaking and white female respondents about South Africa in general (2004:525;529). This finding indicates lingering gendered reactions to post apartheid dynamics, arguably facilitated by intergenerational transfer of attitudes.

b. Class

The impact of economic class on human lives is as significant and determining as race, gender and history (Jenkins, 2009:26). In industrialised first-world countries, the impact of ‘class’ is often subdued by euphemistic references to ‘cultural’ differences and education (Sharp, 1996:92). In South Africa, social, racial and economic inequalities are inextricably wound up with each other (Smith and Stones, 1999:23). The gap between rich and poor in South Africa is undeniable and growing: the Gini-coefficient was 0.63 in 2009 (Rule and Mncwango, 2006:267; World Bank, 2012). Socio-economic differences bear distinct racial and social dimensions which are observable in all citizens’ lives.

Economic class has played a key role in the construction of white Afrikaner Nationalism and identification. According to O’Meara, the low economic class and social status of white Afrikaners during the 1920’s were the main driving forces of Afrikaner Nationalism (O’Meara, 1977:158). The Afrikaner Broederbond was formed by and for petty bourgeoisie Afrikaners in 1918, but around 1927 decided to address the ballooning problem of ‘poor whiteism’ not merely through politics, but by challenging the structure of South African capitalism itself (O’Meara, 1977:164). Intra-group class divisions were central to white Afrikaner identification by 1938, when better-off white Afrikaners described the working class as weak and lacking backbone (Norval, 1996:21). Afrikaner Nationalism did not make classes or race issues disappear, but cut across Afrikaner class divisions with its ‘volkist’ mythology (Norval, 1996:256). Some, such as Jonathan Hyslop, argue that consumerism was at the heart of white capitulation (2000), but Giliomee and Norval emphasise that in the face of apartheid’s demise, there was simply no other ideology that could justify white supremacy (Giliomee, 1997:119).

Class-race distinctions remain important to white Afrikaner identification in post apartheid society. Whites’ relative wealth insulates them from the emotional post apartheid rollercoaster ride to some extent; the majority are educated and able to rise above affirmative action through self-employment or emigration. Nevertheless, 450,000 whites are estimated to live below the poverty line and about 100,000 lived in squatter camps in 2010. However, Hoogeveen and Özler argue that “poverty in 2000 was virtually zero among whites” (2006:66), but 24% of white respondents (compared to 77% of black respondents) indicated that they were very poor or just getting by in the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) (Roberts, 2006:105). These numbers compare feebly to the number of poor black South Africans.

In post apartheid society, intra-group class issues are important causes of white Afrikaner heterogeneity. For example, the white right wing is generally recognised as representative of
downwardly mobile whites: mine workers, farmers deprived by the state, and the lower strata of Afrikaners in civil service (Adam and Moodley, 1993:150). Wealthy whites fear class regression relative to ‘other’ South Africans, suggests Jansen (2009:234). Wale and Foster found that wealthy white South Africans mobilise discourses that function to maintain the race and class privileges continuously enjoyed by whites (2007:45). James Glaser proposes a link between American whites’ education level and class dynamics. He found that educated white people are more racially liberal than less educated whites, except in their attitudes to affirmative action. Less educated whites were open to the idea of sharing ‘the burden of affirmative action’ with elite educated whites, whilst the educated whites felt that they should have exemption from ‘lower class’ burdens like affirmative action (Glaser, 2001: 323-324) – an appeal to a wealthy sense of entitlement to privilege.

The 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey found that white South Africans are hardly concerned about material matters like income because they are already financially comfortable (Roberts, 2006:115). They do however take issue with protecting this privileged economic position, explains Richard Ballard, who shows how middle-class white South Africans use exclusivist discourses to protect their property-related assets from squatters, or informal settlements (Ballard, 2004:48). “Informal settlements ...impact on residents’ sense of place and therefore on their self-perception as western, modern, civilised people”, explains Ballard as he juxtaposes middle-class whites’ interests against their discourses of uncivilized, backward poor black squatters (2004:49).

‘The legacy of apartheid’ – pervasive-economic inequality – is actively maintained by white South Africans, who have a vested interest in maintaining their privileged position at all costs (Wale and Foster, 2007:46). It follows that this privileged position is a significant element of white Afrikaners’ social identification. Indeed, Smith and Stone found that white Afrikaans speaking respondents were more insistent that social separation between races continue after apartheid than English speakers (1999:29).
3.3.5 Conclusion: Social identity

The notion of social identity urges consideration of respondents’ identification as simultaneously racialised, gendered, class-based and immersed in familial and institutional environments. Whilst Hyslop links white class and consumption in urban South Africa with the notion of a middle-class Afrikaner consciousness and possible post apartheid Afrikaner nationalism (2000), others emphasise that youth are not passive recipients of parents’ traditional values (Kamper and Steyn, 2007).

Anthony Smith’s theoretical approach to identification addresses the shortcomings of Anderson’s approach, namely the role of race and ethnicity in nationalism, as well as the need to acknowledge the role of individual agency in identification.

3.4 Anthony D. Smith: Ethno-symbolism and national identity

Ethno-symbolism offers a valuable theoretical framework for the study of white Afrikaners in post apartheid South Africa, for several reasons. First, it supersedes the seeming chasm between identity and nationalism by conceptually fusing them into one theoretical framework. Second, an ethno-symbolic approach to Afrikaner nationalism is premised on the pivotal role of history and ethnicity in national identification, which urges consideration of the role of historical continuity across generations. Third, Smith’s clear distinction between the nation and nationalism allows for consideration of contemporary white Afrikaners as a nation without a state or as a nation without nationalism. Fourth, the ethno-symbolist view of the nation provides neat indicators of what said nation is. Last but not least, ethno-symbolism is suitable to South Africa because it acknowledges the central and very tangible role of ethnicity in politics, culture and social processes in general.

The main arguments of ethno-symbolism are in fact a major critique of modernism (Smith, 2010:23). While structural approaches like that of Gellner view nationalism as a natural expression of the history of modernism, ethno-symbolism conceptualises nationalism as contingent upon specific historical processes in which ethnicity and culture play paramount roles (Smith, 1994:18-19). Ethno-symbolism argues for a ‘sociological continuity’ that overarches centuries, during which
ethnicity remains central as it reappears in every generation, shapes its structures and cultures and ultimately its meaning-systems (1983:xxxii). Post-modernists describe ethno-symbolism as founded on essentialist assumptions while modernists accuse Smith of leaving the political aspects of nations and nationalism “practically untouched” (Guibernau, 2004:126). Smith often mentions politics and governments, but always casts ethnicity and cultural symbolism as the main actors in and vehicles of national identity and nationalism. Accordingly, ethno-symbolism claims that social reality is inconceivable outside of symbolism. It criticises modernism for narrowly emphasising structural conditions in its analyses of nations, often at the expense of detailed attention to the content of nationalist ideologies and culture (Smith, 2010:25).

The following paragraphs discuss the main tenets and criticisms of ethno-symbolism as according to Smith’s work. A conclusion is offered regarding the suitability of the ethno-symbolist paradigm to this study’s research objectives.

3.4.1 The origin of nations: Ethnicity and ethnies
Ethno-symbolic assumptions about the historicity of nations have important implications for its definition of the nation. Smith disagrees with perennialists that nationalism is pre-modern, and with modernists that nations are modern only. He offers a compromise between the extreme perennialist and modernist views on history, which accommodates his argument that the nation pre-dates nationalism. He traces nations back to pre-modern times via the notion of pre-modern ethnic groups (ethnies) and locates the first emergence of nationalism in the mid-eighteenth century context of modernisation (2009:45). Smith furthermore suggests that “The challenge for scholars as well as nations is to represent the relationship of ethnic past to modern nation more accurately and convincingly” (1994:19).

In the ethno-symbolic paradigm, ethnicity is an inextricable component of the histories that underpin nations and nationalism. This relationship between an ethnic past and a nationalist present is continually renewed. It is “the secret of the nation’s explosive energy” (1994:19). Smith’s view of ethnicity fits its conceptualisation in the present study (see section 2.2.2.2). He
views ethnicity as standing at the centre of the existential grounds on which politics rests, where meaning is embedded in myths, memories, symbols, values and traditions (2009:111). Ethnic identification is intertwined with a rich variety of cultural elements. As such, it underpins the ethno-symbolic social meaning and drives identification with nations and nationalism (Smith, 1994:111). This particular interconnection between ethnicity and culture informs the use of the adjective ‘ethno-cultural’ in this study. This choice represents the argument that ethnicity, and culture by implication, are phenomena so intertwined and ingrained in society that they have become naturalised.

It is also acknowledged however, that defining ethnicity as normal may have severe socio-political consequences. Post-modernists like Norval hold that the “very naturalness” of categories like ethnicity must be problematised as politically constructed through narrative and contingent upon a wide variety of social factors (1996a:60-64). Although Norval agrees that ethnic identification will certainly persist in the post apartheid context, she denounces it as discursively determined, essentialist and biased toward notions of purity (1996a:63,68). Norval and Smith agree that ethnic identification has (had) highly regrettable real manifestations, but unlike Norval, Smith is not concerned with what ought to be or how to combat ethnic identification. To him, ‘ethno-cultural’ identification is not only real, but a complex historical given that refers to more than just descent or presumed ancestry. It is experienced as cultural heritage, derived from shared origins of time, place and kinship (Smith, 2009:113). In the face of transformation the myth of common origin remains embedded in cultures as a part of “the symbolic ensemble” of myths, symbols, memories values and traditions that constitute ‘ethno-culture’ (Smith, 2009:113).

In addition to ethnicity, Smith proposes two concepts to facilitate his view of the nation. The birth of a nation is predicated on the formation of an ‘ethnic core’ and an ‘ethnie’. When people start identifying ethno-culturally, an ‘ethnic core’ may be formed through a process of ethno-genesis, which consists of various networks of ethnic ties (Smith, 2009:27). The passage of time, history and collective memory therefore underpin these ethnic ties that bind people together in ‘ethnies’, which precede and are central to the formation of nations and nationalism (Smith, 2009:28). The
ethnic core is a ‘myth-symbol complex’, which, in combination with a myth of ethnic commonality, generates the dynamics at the core of an ethnie. As time passes, ethnies claim a collective name, develop myths of common origin, identify collective others and construct a symbolic fund. The characteristic myth of common descent and common culture renders the ethnie durable, resilient and host to various social processes and pressures (Smith, 1986:15-16).

The notion of a ‘symbolic fund’, generated via processes of “repeated cultivation, adaptation, augmentation and reinterpretation” which takes on the form of a symbolic heritage is relevant to the present moment of the ethnie, but also acts as an ethnic ‘DNA’ that both preserves the ethnie and facilitates it adaptation to new and unexpected circumstances (Smith, 2009:49). It is a build-up of images, culture, customs, rites, artefacts and certain events, heroes, landscapes and values, symbols of dress, emblems and language, and myths of migration and liberation (Smith, 2009:48). Once codified and officially written, the symbolic fund can “gain canonical status” as a ‘repository’ of ethnic culture, drawn on by successive generations (Smith, 2009:48). Historical development of an ethnic community is therefore an integral part of its cultural contents and goals. The idea that an ‘ethnic core’ generated by ethno-genesis can be sustained by successive generations, in spite of contextual and related cultural changes is important to this study (Smith, 1991). Identifying as an ethnic community sets the tone for identifying as nation.

### 3.4.2 From ethnie to nation

All ethnies do not become nations. Smith readily admits that consistent “one-to-one correspondence of nations with anterior ethnies” (2009:111) is not always the case. For an ethnie to become a nation, long-term processes must take place that transform myths of common ancestry and shared memories to standardised national history and common national myths. The process of territorialisation furthermore must transform an ethnie’s link with a homeland into a naturalised, symbiotic relationship of the nation with the land (Smith, 2009:50). Ultimately these processes work to transform ethnic into national ties through mobilisation and by encouraging members of a nation-in-the-making to seek political autonomy (Smith, 2009:114). Ideal-typically, an ethnie is more generic and characterised by “looser organisation” than a nation, whilst a nation
is more specific, more complex, more inclusive and less tied to its original ethnic base due to the long-term operation of myths and memories of common origin (Smith, 2010:15).

Is the power of ethnies and nations rooted in emotion and culture, or in political issues and rational choice? ‘Subjective’ factors (like ethno-cultural identification) and ‘objective’ factors (measurable drivers of national identification, such as territory, institutions, religion and customs) are often academically polarised in approaches to the nation and nationalism (Smith, 2010:11). Smith labels the subjective-objective continuum “old” and as being of little explanatory value, since any account of nations and nationalism contains both subjective and objective elements (Smith, 2009:26). He advocates a more balanced approach in which both rationality and emotion are recognised as interdependent elements of the vigour of nations. Accordingly, Smith describes nations as “dynamic, purposive communities of action” that feel “strong devotion and passionate attachments,” yet rationally connect their own “interests, needs and welfare …with the welfare and destiny of ‘their’ nation” (Smith, 2009:13;14). Smith’s definition of the nation reflects the main tenets of ethno-symbolism and the processes that underpin the making-of-a-nation as outlined above. A nation is...:

...a named and self-defining human community whose members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic territories or “homelands”, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws (p. 29).

Smith acknowledges both subjective ‘passion’ and objective rationality in his attempts to capture the complexity of nations. He agrees with modernists that nations are dynamic and purposeful with real consequences (Smith, 2009:13). Nations offer resources to their members and serve as vehicles for their interests and visions. The social bonds and cultural solidarity associated with identifying as a nation are invaluable to its members (Smith, 2009:14;42). However, ethno-symbolism also provides the necessary tools to zoom in on and explore the local specificities of nations. Smith addresses the tangible aspects of nations. Based on the “the powerful emotion, will
and imagination that are the hallmarks of nations”, Smith ascribes to the nation its own ‘being’. He argues that the nation stands conceptually apart from nationalism, precedes it, and that it therefore deserves a definition independent from that of nationalism (Smith, 2009:42). Smith holds that: a) the nation stands conceptually apart from nationalism in that it is the “felt and lived community” that contains the behaviour and imagination that underpins nationalist ideology, and b) following the ethno-symbolist standpoint that the nation predates nationalism, it cannot be viewed as a category of nationalist practice (Smith, 2010:10-11). The following section discusses the concept of ‘national identity’.

3.4.3 National identity

Identification with the nation is the most important condition for its existence. This identification, or ‘national identity’ is a “collective cultural phenomenon” and central to the powerful political movement and ideology that is nationalism (Smith, 1991:vii). The notion of ‘national identity’ illuminates the meaning of the nation to its members, as well as the processes that may lead to nationalism.

Post-modernist Guibernau notes that national identity consists of beliefs in “a shared culture, history, traditions, symbols, kinship, language, religion, territory, founding moment, and destiny” (2004:134). Opposed to this constructivist use of the notion of ‘beliefs’, Smith appeals to the dynamic nature of individual and collective identification to reaffirm his insistence on the ‘real’ nature of nations. He defines national identity as:

the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identification of individuals with that heritage and its cultural elements (Smith, 2009:109).
Two relationships are equally crucial to national identity: first, the relationship between collective and individual levels of analysis, and second, the relationship between continuity and change of identity (Smith, 2010:20).

Smith justifies the legitimacy of national identity by arguing that collective identity, like nationalism, is more than the sum of its parts and must be considered as analytically distinct from individual identification (Smith, 2010:21). Arguing for the primacy of collective identification, Smith criticises theorists like Jenkins (2006) for exploring social identities only from the standpoint of the individual and argues that ethno-symbolism correctly prioritises collective identification as the core of national identification (Smith, 2010:21). He suggests that cultural collectivities based on ethnicity, religion and castes, do not dissolve as easily as those based on classes and regions because “the basic cultural elements from which they are constructed – memories, values, symbols, myths and traditions – tend to be more persistent and binding; they represent recurrent elements of collective continuity and difference” (Smith, 2010:21). Ethnic identities are necessarily collective, and they are crucial to the formation and functioning of nations (Smith, 2009:21). In Smith’s view, awareness of ethnic similarity through culture is the ‘seed’ that sprouts national identity and nationalism. He prioritises ethnicity and the ‘symbolic fund’ and positions political actors and institutions as facilitators who help to forge nations “based on an ethnic model and around a dominant ethnic core population” (Smith, 2009:28).

Smith proposes a compromise between ‘Western’ or ‘civic’ vs. ‘non-Western’ or ‘ethnic’ models of national identity. He argues that even the most politically-minded nations identify ethnically and linguistically, too, so he draws the fundamental features of national identity from both these models (Smith, 1998:126). The civic principle represents membership of a legal-political community (such as citizenship rights and obligations) that accepts modernity, is bound to (conceptions of) historic territory, and values legal-political equality of members and a common

41 Smith’s notion of national identity as primarily ethno-cultural, yet also political, translates clearly in his remark that nationalism (which depends on the salience of national identity) is a “political ideology with a cultural doctrine at its centre” (1991:74).
civic culture and ideology (Smith, 1991:11). Within the ‘Western’ model, political development and well-defined territory go hand in hand. Identifying with a nation necessarily implies a corresponding, demarcated social space that is the historic homeland or ‘cradle’ of a nation (Smith, 1991:9).\footnote{This historic homeland is not necessarily the place of ultimate origin. As in the case of the Turks, it is rather the territory where ‘the nation’ has exerted influence for generations (Smith, 1991:9).}

Accordingly, Smith holds that national identity involves...

... some sort of political community, however tenuous. A political community in turn implies at least some common institutions and a single code of rights and duties for all the members of the community. It also suggests a definite social space, a fairly well demarcated and bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they feel they belong (Smith, 1991:9).

However, national identification must also incorporate and assimilate the myths, symbols and memories of the ethnie it grew from, or invent them where they don’t exist. To this view a nation is above all a community of common ethnic descent, often expressed through the metaphor of a super-family that can be traced back in time with pedigrees and genealogies as empirical proof of the metaphor (Smith, 1991:12).

Smith also presents cases wherein nations were formed in the absence of a distinctive ethnie, at least via political mobilisation, but mainly through the efforts of Creole elites, who created distinctive cultures with specific characteristics (Smith, 1991:40).\footnote{Smith refers specifically to cases in Argentina, Australia and Latin America, where nation-formation occurred in the absence of pre-existing ethnies but with distinction of cultural characteristics of Mexican, Chilean, Bolivian and other national identities through elite emphasis on symbols, values and memories of each “would-be” nation (1991:40).} For a nation, simply being a “political community subject to common laws and institutions” – as in the civic model of national identity – cannot push a community into nationalism (Smith, 1991:12). Nations and nationalism can therefore be almost wholly culturally and barely politically constituted, but never barely culturally so. In Smith’s view then, nation-formation is always culture-driven. For him, leaders, including politicians, must appeal to the ‘people’s’ will and hence follow an inter-class approach, driven by popular mobilisation (Smith, 1991:12). This model relies on vernacular culture instead of
law, as the Western model does. Popular mobilisation, vernacular languages and culture and customs are therefore the key elements of the ‘ethnic model’ of national identity.

The following paragraphs hinge on Smith’s reference to the relationship between historical continuity and change in identity. The progression over time of an ethnie to a nation may lead to the highest tier of national identification, namely nationalism, under certain conditions.

3.4.4 Nationalism

Noting that “People do not lay down their lives for a discursive formation”, Smith’s definition of nationalism confirms his conviction that it is an ideological movement, a cultural doctrine adopted by the nation. He defines nationalism as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (Smith, 1991:14,73). He addresses the question of how national identification – ‘being’ a nation – turns into nationalist sentiment, ideology and mobilisation.

First, Smith emphasises nationalism as a cultural doctrine, constituted of cultural agency, when he specifically states that nationalism is an ideology of the nation, not the state. Its concerns and prescriptions centre on the nation. The state performs a functionalist role as ‘protector and nurturer’ of the cultures of free nations (Smith, 2009:61). That not every nationalist movement has pursued its own sovereign state he regards as evidence that nationalism is not primarily a political phenomenon, as some would have it, but rather a cultural doctrine accompanied by varying degrees of political pursuit (Smith, 1991:74). Although his view enables us to begin conceptualising nationalism as non-state oriented, the political context that envelops nationalist movements nevertheless remains of critical importance and cannot be discarded along with the ‘state’, argues Norval (1996) and others.

Second, nationalism as an ideological movement depends upon the development of a ‘core doctrine’ that amalgamates beliefs about humanity, politics and prescriptions for action (Smith,
2009:61). Once members of a nation believe and are mobilised to act upon this ‘core doctrine’ of nationalism, it comes alive as an ideology about and for the nation. It becomes a phenomenon with “rules, rhythms and memories, which shape the interests of its bearers even more than they shape its contours, endowing them with a recognisably ‘nationalist’ political shape and directing them to familiar national goals” (Smith, 2010:3).

The ‘core doctrine’ prescribes that a) humanity is divided into nations, each with its own character, history and destiny; b) the nation is the sole source of political power; c) loyalty to the nation takes precedence over other loyalties; d) to be free, human beings must belong to a nation; e) nations require maximum autonomy and self-expression and f) global peace and justice can only be built on the basis of a plurality of free nations (Smith, 2009:61). The ‘core doctrine’ represents a collective mental ‘jump’ from identification with the nation (‘we are a nation’) to identification with perceived needs and liberties of the nation (‘we are a nation that needs and deserves…’). These ‘needs’ and ‘liberties’ are the key themes of nationalism. Though the importance and prominence of these themes vary significantly over time and space, they re-occur consistently and constitute the key themes of nationalism (Smith, 2009:62). They are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>The nation aspires to live under its own laws, free from interference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>Members desire territorial unification, social solidarity, fraternity and sorority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Nations desire distinctive identity, visible in ritual and art forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authenticity</td>
<td>Awareness or rediscovery by some members of the nation’s unique origins, history and culture enhances sense of national community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>Members have a sense of belonging to and memories of territory historically ‘theirs’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignity</td>
<td>Members believe that their community deserves prestige and status according to its true ‘inner worth’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity</td>
<td>Members believe they are closely linked to ancestors and earlier cultures in a relatively unbroken line of succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destiny</td>
<td>Members believe the nation has a preordained (usually glorious) path to follow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Smith (2009:62), these themes are the basic, common motives for nationalist mobilisation. However, no two nations or nationalisms are the same. It follows then that nationalism is flexible. Smith traces this flexibility back to his argument that national identification is simultaneously broad and specific: national identity connects the individual to a multi-faceted
yet exact category of belonging within a definite context. It is this multidimensionality of national identity that enables nationalism to maintain its character in modern settings (Smith, 1991:15).

In Smith’s view, we should ask what nationalists do and how they achieve their goals (2009:65). Who transforms national identity into nationalism? Sometimes this transformation is not driven by a distinctive “‘bearer’ class”, but intellectuals and professionals usually play crucial roles in the dissemination and mobilisation of nationalist ideas and sentiment. Whilst modernists view the nation as ‘invented’ by intelligentsia, ethno-symbolism assigns them a more specific, limited role as political archaeologists “seeking to place the community in its appropriate temporal and spatial contexts” (Smith, 2009:65). The metaphor of archaeologists emphasises the socio-political purpose of nationalists. They ‘excavate’ and present ‘sound’ evidence of the nation’s ‘authentic’ foundations. To achieve this, nationalists need to fabricate a cognitive framework or ‘map’ to encourage identification with and support of the nation’s ideals. The intelligentsia are accordingly tasked with rediscovering, selecting and reinterpreting the past and weaving national identity and ideals from this selectively remembered past. They frequently draw on romanticised notions of past heroes, heroines, war battles, customs, values and a homeland where life was generally ‘better’ than the present. Ideally, the community is united by the ‘produced ideology’ and empowered to express itself and restore its autonomy (Smith, 2009:66). In this view, nationalists reshape the community by reinterpreting the past. They are not nation-builders or inventors of nations, as (post-) modernists would have it, but interpreters who manipulate social and symbolic processes to make a national form of community possible (Smith, 2009:66,69).

State institutions may support intelligentsia’s efforts to reinvent the community as a nation, but ‘popular’ nationalism usually fares better when nationalists have to “seek support from different sections of the wider populace” (Smith, 2009:71). State elites tend to ignore or hijack and appropriate nationalist ideas, which leads to tension and conflict, notes Smith. A more effective approach is to appeal to ‘the people’ via reinterpreted/created folk memories, myths, symbols, customs and traditions, myths of political history and territorial bonds, all invented for the ‘nation-to-be’, as cultural nationalists do (Smith, 2009:71). They use documentary evidence to support
their reinterpretation of history, as well ideas from ‘social science’ to function as a foundation for their political projects (Smith, 2009:71). As considered in Chapter 4, Afrikaner intelligentsia went to great lengths in around 1935 to invent a range of myths, war heroes, Afrikaans-language folk songs, a race and racial ideology based on ‘cultural difference’ and more, targeting different classes of Afrikaners, in order to mobilise white Afrikaners to vote for the National Party in 1948.

Smith feels that ethno-symbolism complements and expands the modernist framework via useful concepts such as political archaeology, authenticity, historic nationhood and secular religion. However, since the goal of nationalism is underscored by goals of autonomy and freedom, we need to explore present day (possible) nationalisms not only as ethno-cultural, but also as politically driven phenomena. Hence the question of what autonomy and freedom mean in the era of globalisation and more locally, in post-apartheid South Africa.

3.4.5 Cultural nationalism

Drawing on the work of John Hutchinson, Smith explains that historically, political and cultural nationalisms tended to alternate in character and strength from period to period. One may therefore expect to see a post-apartheid Afrikaner cultural nationalism as a retort to the dissolution of historic Afrikaner nationalism and Afrikaners’ consequent loss of political power. Although Smith clearly states that nationalism is a cultural doctrine accompanied by varying degrees of political pursuit (Smith, 1991:74), it is not clear if post-modern nationalism can exist in the absence of territorial and political sovereignty as its main goals. As a ‘cultural doctrine’, nationalist ideology mobilises for cultural power rather than territorial and political power. In an era where modernist nationalist goals of sovereignty are impractical and costly, the nation may simply have to be imagined without the conventional territorial boundaries. Against this background, cultural nationalism could emerge as the hypothetical and practically possible nationalism of the present era (Appadurai, 1996:337).

South African scholar Mariana Kriel suggests that the notion of ‘power’ stretches beyond ‘sovereign’ and ‘political’ and that it permeates culture, demands cultural representation and
independent cultural institutions. Since a nation’s vested interests are represented by its presence in institutions and organisations, such representation equals the status of a nation’s cultural elements, such as language, and is directly correlated to that nation’s social power in society. The power to protect and nurture one’s culture and associated interests is the subject of a nation’s “ideological movement for ...autonomy, unity and identity” (Smith, 1991:73). According to Kriel, Afrikaner privileges, power, ethnic identity and ultimately their survival as a people, are issues represented by their ‘struggle’ for Afrikaans (Kriel, 2006:49).

Concurring with Anderson’s emphasis on language as central to culture and power, Kriel challenges Smith’s view that language is but another element of a nation’s symbolic fund. She suggests that Afrikaners’ emphasis on the Afrikaans language constitutes cultural nationalism. Compared to emphasis on the “extreme expressions” of Afrikaner Nationalism, Kriel suggests a “less restricted” definition of nationalism as a framework for the analysis of the Afrikaans language movement (Kriel, 2006:50). She posits that language sentiments – “love for and loyalty towards Afrikaans” – could in fact be considered nationalist sentiments. In her discussion of the struggle for the Afrikaans language, which has been ongoing since the constitution changed in 1994, she argues that the philosophical, social and psychological features of this language struggle represent the dimensions of nationalism (Kriel, 2006:51).

Departing from the idea that language and nation represent each other to the point that they are inseparable, Kriel suggests that activism for language rights may be labelled cultural nationalism in cases where nations have had to abandon the possibilities of obtaining political self-determination, or even a significant degree of lower-level institutional power (Kriel, 2006:61). Kriel acknowledges that the nation and nationalism are most often associated with political symbolism and agendas, but feels that in the case of the contemporary non-separatist Afrikaners, “…language should act as a substitute for the lost, never-to-be-found-again state. Language can become the...
new land” (Kriel, 2006:56, own emphasis). As early as 1996, Breyten Breytenbach suggested that the Afrikaans language should replace the Afrikaner’s post apartheid ‘home’.

Cultural nationalist movements have become synonymous with language revival movements and its agents are not politicians, but intellectuals – philosophers, historians, linguists and artists (Kriel, 2006:61). The global shift toward official recognition of language rights buttresses Afrikaner mobilisation to uphold the status of the Afrikaans language (Kriel, 2006:66–67). This cultural nationalist ideology prioritises the ‘preservation of the cultural community’ and works for the moral regeneration of the nation, but is not void of political concern with Afrikaner prestige and power (Kriel, 2006:61). Hence spoken Afrikaans alone will not do. The struggle for Afrikaans revolves around its persistent, continuous use in the public domain (schools, universities, courts of law, churches etc.) (Kriel, 2006:57).

Beyond the ethnic nationalism which Webb claims underpins the Oranje people’s mobilisation for a Volkstaat (2002:162), Van der Waal observes that there is arguably a much broader ethnic cultural nationalism to be explored among Afrikaners:

A new ethnicity of Afrikaner, based on Afrikaans, that is more cultural, commodified and vulnerable, has emerged in recent times, especially centered around language struggles at school and universities (2012:12).

Kriel argues that Afrikaner intellectuals’ mobilisation to maintain the institutional use of Afrikaans contains the essential ingredients of political ideology, that is, a) the principle of inclusion/exclusion, and b) the principle of political order, which no longer holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent, but that the national (cultural) and the linguistic units are congruent (Kriel, 2006:57). In other words, following Kriel’s argument, we can conceptualise the struggle for Afrikaans as ethno-culturally exclusive and as a political ideology insofar as it “stipulates who ‘we’ are and how ‘we’ should be governed” (Kriel, 2006:57). Finally, reflecting Smith’s persistent reference to ‘passion’ for the nation, Kriel illustrates that Afrikaners’ fervour for
their mother tongue comprises intense love, loyalty and pride (Kriel, 2006:64). As active communities, nations are not only represented by their language, they also represent their language through their attitudes toward it. “Emotions about a language are nationalist attitudes when they are determined, on a cognitive level, by reactions to the symbol nation” (Kriel, 2006:66).

The point that I am trying to make is that contemporary ethno-linguistic based movements for democracy also deserve to be considered as nationalist movements even if they seek to secure for their nation lesser forms of power — or different kinds of power — than a government of co-nationals (Kriel, 2006:54).

In conclusion, Kriel posits that, considering the available options to minorities when they face a majority regime, ‘exiting’ (conflict) is not an option for Afrikaners, but ‘voice’ (activism) is. Territorial and political sovereignty are not preconditions of cultural nationalism. Kriel and Smith agree that nationalism is mainly driven by the efforts of the intelligentsia. However, cultural nationalism extends its view to ordinary citizens by acknowledging ‘everyday nationhood’ and attributing to it the same kind of magical quality that conventional nationalism own.

3.4.5.1 Everyday nationhood

In the conventional three approaches to nationalism discussed earlier, elites (intelligentsia) and ordinary people share a reciprocal relationship: one group needs the other in order to achieve nationalist goals. However, in these models, the intelligentsia hold most of the definitive power. Cultural nationalism, on the other hand, is located in nationalist practices and beliefs of ordinary citizens. These practices and beliefs all indicate favour toward and support of their collective ethno-cultural identity. This view represents ‘everyday nationhood’, conceptually part of a subfield of ‘micro-nationalist’ studies (Smith, 2009:73). Some cultural nationalists suggest that present day nationalisms may be observable simply in everyday thinking about ‘us’ and ‘them’, or ‘home’ and ‘abroad’, yet always firmly entrenched in our linguistic practices (Smith, 2009:73).
Fox and Miller-Idriss argue that ordinary people may be indifferent to nationalist claims made in their names (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008:554). For them, nationalism revolves not around the social power of the nation as much as it does around being a nation. “The nation... is not simply the product of macro-structural forces; it is simultaneously the practical accomplishment of ordinary people engaging in routine activities” (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008:537). Basing their approach on the work of Hobsbawm (1991), they suggest we study nationhood and nationalism ‘from below’. Michael Billig adds that sociological enquiry “routinely reduces nationalism to a surplus phenomenon and ...forgets to analyse how nations are reproduced on a daily basis” (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 1995:39). Nationalism, or enactment of nation-ness, appears so natural that it disappears into “the ‘natural’ environment of ‘societies’” (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 1995:39). Its everyday occurrence is furthermore overlooked because nationalism is regularly defined as a dangerous problem driven by irrationality – especially true for recent South African history (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 1995:39).

In other words, a distinction between intelligentsia as producers of cultural nationalist discourses on one hand, and respondents, who are ordinary middle-class cultural consumers, must be acknowledged. Second, we must identify indicators not only of what nationalism is (as ethno-symbolism and other theories generally do) but also of how it is. Cultural nationalism is expressed not simply via identification with the nation, but by actively talking, choosing, performing and consuming the nation (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008:537-5). According to Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008), everyday nationalism may be observed in four particular actions, namely:

**Talking the nation** This action involves to the discursive constitution and legitimation of the nation through routine talk and social interaction (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 1998:540).

**Choosing the nation** Fox and Miller-Idris emphasise that “nationhood ...is implicated in the decisions ordinary people make” (1998:542).
Performing the nation This action manifests in the nature of everyday meanings and invocations and the ritual enactment of national symbols (p.545). “National bonds ...are constituted through the collective act of performance” (p.546). For example, sport events and music festivals provide common focus to the imagined national community.

Consuming the nation This action involves the “constitution and expression of national difference through everyday consumption habits” (p.550). The consumption practices of everyday life construct and ‘concretise’ nationalist identification, while the commodification of the nation produces “a vague self-awareness of shared dispositions” (p.550) which encourages national identification. National products such as flags, music, costumes, literature and food represent national pride in everyday life. Ultimately, consumption represents the choice to define, demonstrate and affirm one’s national affinity (p.552), hence its part in cultural nationalism.

Smith warns that ‘everyday nationhood’ must also be ‘historic nationhood’. In other words, the temporal continuity between generations, national cultural heritage and institutions must be acknowledged as a key factor even in the phenomena of everyday nationhood (Smith, 2009:74). In both everyday nationalism and elite-driven cultural nationalism, exclusivism remains at the heart of cultural nationalism.

3.5 Conclusion: Nationalism in a global era

While some authors argue that the ‘globalising’ tendencies of our era render nationalism unlikely, empirical evidence of persistent nationalisms worldwide suggest otherwise. In one view, technology and mass public education are the forces of a future in which national identification will mean little. It is argued that technology may facilitate the development of a global form of ‘culture’, but this argument conceives of ‘culture’ only as communication. It overlooks the important function of identification with a nation and its culture, namely that a culture provides one with the cognitive framework to deal with the problems of life (Smith, 2010:145). In fact, technologically advanced communication may facilitate identification with one’s nation (Croucher, 2003). Eriksen illustrates that “nations thrive in cyberspace” (2007:1). He refers specifically to
white Afrikaners as a nation that has lost its territory, yet continues to exist through many Internet sites, ranging from online literature to ‘virtual community’ sites. In the case of the white Afrikaners, the Internet is used to strengthen national identification. Afrikaners regularly express their interests on many websites, ranging from language-related themes, to literature, politics and other topics. Afrikaans language newspapers such as Die Beeld are available online which serve the purpose of expressing Afrikaner concerns (2004).45

Rattansi and Phoenix note that it is important to use a variety of conceptual tools to study youths’ identification in order to adequately emphasise both their subjective accounts and the varied objective positions they occupy in their social worlds (1997:97). This study accordingly aims to incorporate different sociological theoretical perspectives with the aim of creating (albeit ambitious) theoretical ‘continuity’ in order to accommodate the broad span of history and sociological complexity that underscores this study’s enquiry. The approaches of Gellner, Jenkins, Anderson and Smith each contribute uniquely to this study’s conceptualisation of historic Afrikaner Nationalism and its present-day consequences.

A hypothetical post apartheid Afrikaner nationalism will likely be of a primarily cultural, non-separatist yet exclusive nature, concerned with maintaining Afrikaner socio-economic power, as proposed by Kriel (2006). Respondents are accordingly conceptualised as ‘ordinary’ middle-class citizens who embrace Afrikaner culture not only as a representation of Afrikaner status, but also in a broader sense, in which a strong presence of conscious pro-white-Afrikaner choices are equally as prevalent as their ‘everyday nationhood’ practices.

45 They cover topics like racialised policy, religion, Afrikaans language arts, sports, crime (particularly against white South Africans and white farmers), the national status of Afrikaans and national name changes.
Chapter 4
Afrikaner Nationalism and apartheid

The nature of the rise and fall of Afrikaner Nationalism and its principal political product, the apartheid system, is imperative to this study. As twin forces, they defined and determined recent national history and white Afrikaner identity. O’Meara emphasises that certain questions regarding the generation, development and acquisition of the cultural values of Afrikaner Nationalism must be explored in order to grasp it as a “historically specific, often surprisingly flexible, reaction of particular class forces to the pressures of capitalist development” (1977:157-158). This chapter unpacks Afrikaner Nationalism as a socio-historical, political and economic phenomenon, as the foundation of the present study’s enquiry into the possibility of a post-apartheid-era nationalism. It draws heavily on Charles Puttergill’s recent synopsis of this history (2008) and Hermann Giliomee’s The Afrikaners: Biography of a people (2003). First, the historical context that preceded Afrikaner Nationalism is summarised (4.1); second, the creation and main elements of Afrikaner Nationalist identification are set out (4.2); and finally, the end of apartheid and Afrikaner Nationalism is discussed as a context-specific structural and cultural development.

4.1 The colonial era

This section offers a brief synopsis of the historical milieu that hosted and facilitated the creation and birth of Afrikaner Nationalism and the rise of the apartheid system.

4.1.1 Burghers and Brits

Several important developments set the stage for Afrikaner Nationalism during the period 1652-1860. White settlers started identifying with their collective circumstances, detaching themselves from the Netherlands, Germany and France by focusing on their own material well-being. Five years after the first Europeans settled in the Cape Peninsula in 1652, the United East India Company (hereafter the Company) granted some of these settlers land in the Cape. These contractually ‘free’ settlers became known as free burghers (Puttergill, 2008:87, Giliomee,
There were about 150 Europeans in the Cape by 1662 (Giliomee, 2003:2). Slaves were imported to the Cape from 1658 (Giliomee, 2003:12). Although the Company still had some power over the burghers by the 1700s, the latter were focused on independence.

Some English churches arrived with settlers, but the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) was the dominant church in the then Cape colony (Davenport, 1997:51). It was first established in Africa north of the Orange River in 1853 (De Gruchy et al., 2005:20). Under religious influence, colonial society was stratified by race and class. Those who appeared ‘European’ or white were regarded as ‘born Christians’ and consistently occupied the top tier of the Colonial identity hierarchy (Giliomee, 2003:36). Racial purity and class were central to general white identity formation and whites guarded against forms of *gelykstelling* with slaves and servants (Giliomee, 2003:xiv). Racial prejudice was further institutionalised in the 1770s, when the number of free blacks increased and government introduced regulations to control them while the burghers made efforts to ostracise them (Giliomee, 2003:51).

The Afrikaans language developed informally through interaction between the European colonists, who spoke Dutch, local Malay, Khoi and the San languages (present in the Cape region at the time of Dutch occupation) and slaves imported from Africa and Asia (Giliomee, 2004:25). During its formative years, the Afrikaans language consisted of a diverse set of Dutch regional dialects, creolised by the Khoi and San peoples. This mix of languages had taken on several different forms by the nineteenth century and was used by slaves and workers (Hofmeyr, 1987). For example, a High Dutch variation of Afrikaans was spoken by middle and upper classes, whilst Afrikaans was generally regarded as an inferior *kombuistaal* or ‘kitchen language’ by upper classes, due to its association with slaves.

Some of the burghers, known as *trekboers*, who had turned to stock farming and moved east by 1770, (Giliomee, 2003:8,21,144), spoke Afrikaans, became more independent from the Cape.

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46 *Gelykstelling* implies the experience of social leveling.

47 *Kombuistaal* is a derogatory term that literally translates as “kitchen language”.

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government and engaged in large-scale cultural borrowing from the indigenous Khoisan people. They saw themselves as “a special kind of African” and the term ‘Afrikaner’ started replacing Dutch, French and German identification by the end of the 19th century. As the trekboers exhausted the natural resources around them, frontier expansion and increased contact with the Bantu-speaking people raised “pervasive anxiety about maintaining themselves culturally and materially” (Giliomee, 2003:31-51). Those concerned with maintaining racial purity believed rigid Calvinism was the solution to their concern, but endogamy was nonetheless practiced extensively by most trekboer groups (Giliomee, 2003:35-38). This lack of a hegemonic collective awareness amongst the trekboers on the importance of racial purity suggests that they were not yet a distinct ‘group’, comments Puttergill (2008:88). Afrikaner Nationalist sentiment would take another century to come into existence.

During the first decade of the 19th century, economic and political issues drove a phenomenon that became known as the Great Trek. Countless burghers moved away from the Cape colony. These so-called Voortrekkers of the Great Trek left the colony due to land, labour and security issues, coupled with a “pervasive sense of being marginalised” (Giliomee, 2003:144). Despite the Company’s official policy of preventing permanent expansion beyond the border, many trekboers were in fact living outside of the Colony’s borders by 1830 without having applied for the Colonial government’s permission (Giliomee, 2003:146). The first wave of the Great Trek ended in 1840, and by 1845 approximately 15,000 burghers and their families (and an estimated 5,000 servants) had left the Cape colony (Giliomee, 2003:161). The DRC in the south opposed the Great Trek. When Dirk van der Hoff, a ‘liberal’ Dutchman, established the DRC in the Transvaal, it was with support of the northern Voortrekkers. Although the pioneer burghers had set up two republics inland, neither these pioneer Voortrekkers, nor the Dutch and other European settlers in the Cape Colony identified themselves collectively as a volk yet (Puttergill, 2008:98).

Language became an especially prominent variable in religious and educational matters after English replaced Dutch as the official language of the colony in 1822 (Davenport, 1997:61). After the abolishment of slavery in 1834, black-white competition for employment intensified and white
Afrikaans speakers increasingly combined whiteness and the Afrikaans language in their identification (Giliomee, 2003:110; Puttergill, 2008:89). They found it perturbing that their mother tongue continued to officially occupy the second tier of the social hierarchy (Giliomee, 2003:202,359; Giliomee, 2004:25). Although the first Afrikaans book was printed around 1850 and newspapers employed the Afrikaans language by the 1860s, most English speakers still did not consider Afrikaans a public or respectable language (Giliomee, 2003:201, 216).

The DRC soon became known as the volkskerk and reflected Transvalers’ preference for political independence (De Gruchy et al., 2005:58-59; Hexam and Poewe, 1997:125). As religious matters began to play increasingly key roles in identification, so did ethnicity, ideas of race and language. In other words, these sources of identification arguably shaped knowledge claims and social organisation in the nineteenth century (Puttergill, 2008:13).

4.1.2 Minerals, miners and inventing Afrikaner history
The discovery of minerals in Africa in the 1870s led to the so-called European ‘scramble for Africa’. More specifically, the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley and gold on the Witwatersrand were the main catalysts that brought industrialisation and full-blown capitalism to southern Africa and ultimately spawned the structural forces that generated Afrikaner Nationalism. Mineral mining exploded across the region and attracted scores of British immigrants and settler families (Puttergill, 2008:93). Especially in the Witwatersrand, the complexity of the unfolding society demanded new forms of social organisation (Van Onselen, 2001:xvii). These newly urbanised communities were characterised by a combination of factors, summarised in diagram 4.1:
The two Boer or Voortrekker republics, namely the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR) and the Republic of Orange Free State (OFS) became the hosts of poverty and illiteracy amongst the growing population of urbanised whites around mining sites (Giliomee, 2003:211, 316). The Voortrekker republics’ transition from subsistence farming to commercial farming was required by the new market, which caught governments off-guard and left scores of white Afrikaans-speaking farmers impoverished (Giliomee, 2003:321). English-speaking white farmers tended to form their own associations, leaving Afrikaans-speakers to their boereverenigings. The tension between them was further amplified when English, which was the international trade language, trumped Dutch-medium education in 1880 (Giliomee, 2003:212). Meanwhile, the effects of industrialisation arguably produced more and more uneducated, unemployed white Afrikaans speakers in the growing cities (Giliomee, 2003:210).

Against the background described above, a political consciousness emerged amongst white Afrikaans-speakers, motivated by political and economic issues, notably the British annexation of the Basutoland diamond fields and later of the Transvaal (Giliomee, 2003:212-213). Afrikaner elites in the Cape started identifying with a “greater Afrikanership” and established the First

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48 Boer associations and organisations.
Afrikaans Language Movement in 1875. The latter produced accounts of history that created positive images of white Afrikaners and excluded racial others (Puttergill, 2008:99). Giliomee argues that the Afrikaans language movement combined religious faith and language to inspire a “strong cultural nationalism” (Giliomee, 2003:215,384; O’Meara, 1977:161). In response to turbulent, highly competitive circumstances, these white Afrikaner intelligentsias actively set out to invent a people’s history for white Afrikaners which contributed to essentialised notions of identity (Puttergill, 2008:98).49

Puttergill argues that a Kuyperian neo-Calvinism was central to the intelligentsia’s concern with creating a white Afrikaner history around the end of the nineteenth century (2008). They did so via a number of key themes, namely their subjugation by the British and the notion that white Afrikaners had a special relationship to God whose destiny was to ‘civilise’ Africa (Hexam, 1980; Moodie, 1983:xvii; Puttergill, 2008:98). The DRC also needed to uplift its congregations after it became independent from the Dutch Parliament in 1875 and dependent on its poor white Afrikaner members’ contributions (Giliomee, 2003:208). The DRC supported the notion of a ‘shared past’, including the ‘fact’ that the Voortrekkers considered themselves a chosen people, on a special mission for, and distinctly protected by God. In this regard, Puttergill notes that contemporary historians “have not found reliable evidence to support the notion that pioneers considered themselves a uniquely chosen people…” (Puttergill, 2008:99).50 The invented history and notion of a ‘unique Afrikaner destiny’ constituted a central part of the mythology that sprouted and scaffolded Afrikaner Nationalist ideology in the next century.

Intra-white power struggles intensified when the ZAR was annexed by British forces in 1877 (Giliomee, 2003:228). Against the background of labour and produce demands, interracial competition manifested itself in pass laws being promulgated in 1896. The latter permitted poor

49 For example via publications like Die geskiedenis van ons land in die taal van ons volk, which sketched a nationalist history of the Afrikaners as a people (Giliomee, 2003:210).

50 Du Toit furthermore illustrates that the notion of a Calvinist, special destiny and Divine national mission for the Afrikaners, which T. Dunbar Moodie argues for, is ambiguous, since the actual content of the mission varies (Moodie, 1980:3; Du Toit, 1983:926). Some Afrikaners and historians understood the divine mission to include the spreading of the gospel, whilst others focussed on a more secular mission, namely to spread civilisation and order amongst ‘heathens’ (Du Toit, 1983:927).
whites to stay in urban areas, but excluded unemployed blacks (Puttergill, 2008:93). Formal racialised spatial segregation became the norm.\textsuperscript{51} White miners in the area were still very poor, but British government had little sympathy with them. The mining commissioner of the Witwatersrand “attributed the state of the poor to idleness, and left it to private institutions to aid the most miserable among them” (Giliomee, 2003:316). When war erupted between British authorities and the Boers in 1899, the Boer Republics were largely destroyed and further impoverished (Van Onselen, 2001:334). Steyn amongst others argues that Afrikaner anti-imperialism was driven by strong intra-white ethnic competition (Steyn, 2004:147), whilst Giliomee emphasises a fear of “being wiped out as a people” amongst white Afrikaners (Giliomee, 2003:xviii). After the Boer-war people of all races, including Afrikaners, sought refuge in the Witwatersrand, creating extensive, grave slums (Giliomee, 2003:324). Since mechanisation had reduced manual labour demand, white poverty had ballooned by 1906 (Van Onselen, 2001:159).

The Rand economy hit a full-scale depression by 1905 (Van Onselen, 2001:336-337). White poverty persisted after the Transvaal and Orange River colonies were granted self-governance in 1907, but so did Afrikaner pride – Afrikaners’ daughters chose poorly paid factory work “to avoid the lonely and humiliating experience of having to enter domestic service in the homes of their English overlords” (Van Onselen, 2001:159).\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{4.1.3 Post-war: Afrikaner Nationalism constructed}

1910 marks the date when the Union of South Africa was constructed, following the passing of the reconciliatory Act of South Africa which was meant to minimise residual differences between British imperialists and white South Africans (Foster, 2008:27). However, disagreement persisted. The working class Cape Dutch identity began experiencing upward class mobility soon after 1910,

\textsuperscript{51} Van Onselen describes how this racialised policy of exclusion led to the formation of the ‘Ninevites’ or ‘Regiment of the Hills’ in present-day Johannesburg: large numbers of unemployed blacks and some hardened criminals “moved into the protective surroundings of the Klipriviersberg to the immediate south of Johannesburg where, under the remarkable leadership of a man names Jan Note, they were organised into a quasi-military body…” which was “…partially fired by a sense of social justice while at the same time being involved in a series of profoundly anti-social activities” (Van Onselen, 2001:26).

\textsuperscript{52} Black women were similarly driven to prostitution by poverty. The total number of prostitutes decreased when the First World War started in 1914 (Van Onselen, 2001:161).
when its Afrikaans speakers experienced increases in collective and individual pride as well as racialised thinking – the result of their concern with black competition. By 1912, the term ‘Afrikaner’ had arguably not acquired a distinctly racial character yet (Giliomee, 2003:390), but white Afrikaans speakers had begun demanding that they stop being agterryers, that they establish their own social institutions and consider South African interests the top priority, instead of Britain’s (Giliomee, 2003:356; Van Onselen, 2001:42; Verhoef, 2008:708). In this context, the Natives Land Act, promulgated in 1913, restricted blacks to ownership of only 7% of South African land (Steyn, 2001:35). The black population nevertheless continued to provide cheap labour to the mines and other new industries, so white Afrikaner anxiety about employment did not subside (Foster, 2008:34). Whites mobilised around their whiteness and de-emphasised the numerical advantage of the black population by casting non-white ethnicities as divisive, according to Melissa Steyn (2001:35).

In aid of post-war upliftment, the Second Afrikaans Movement, established in 1905, further promoted volksie themes like that of a predetermined visionary future, contributing to a stronger nationalism amongst white Afrikaans speakers (Puttergill, 2008:98). The language movement rose in the public sphere and in that of the DRC. It set the stage for further creation of social capital by Afrikaners, embedded in religion and the political and economic spheres (Verhoef, 2008:709). Two key events in 1913 contributed to this social capital.

1. First, the inauguration of a monument in Bloemfontein for the 26,000 women and children who perished in British war concentration camps;
2. Second, a speech by General Hertzog during the inauguration of the monument in Bloemfontein to 12,000 Afrikaners that inspired cultural activists to “build a nation from words.” Hertzog’s speech augmented the efforts of the Afrikaanse Taalgenootskap and the Zuid-Afrikaansche Akademie voor Taal, Letteren en Kunst (Foster, 2008:31).

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53 The First Language Movement received strong support, but had died out by the end of the nineteenth century given that Afrikaans speakers were not involved in 20th century South African commerce and politics, where Dutch and English were prevalent (Foster, 2008:31).
54 Unique to the peoplehood (Puttergill, 2008:98).
55 Populist Gustav Preller contributed ‘words’ via inter alia a series of Afrikaans-language magazines, which he used to engage the collective memory of Afrikaner people and unite them as a volk (Foster, 2008:32).
The Movement utilised Afrikaners’ sense of relative economic disadvantage and offered an alternative to the seemingly inevitable assimilation promoted by the state at the time (Foster, 2008:31).

The nationalist movement soon claimed the histories of other epochs as their own, as it embarked on the “inevitable and necessary ‘mythmaking’ process that is inherent in the construction of appropriate histories” for nationalist movements (Du Toit and Giliomee, 1983:xv; Grobbelaar, 1998:388). While the Afrikaans language was cast as a cornerstone of white Afrikaner identity (Giliomee, 2003:371), various historical incidents were combined and re-cast as a unifying story of heroism. For example, a long-forgotten Voortrekker covenant with God was cast as ‘proof’ that Voortrekkers were respectable Afrikaner Christian heroes, though the covenant’s origin is debated (Kloppers, 2002:186; Moodie, 1983:6). In addition, the church defined suffering as the path to God’s favour (Moodie, 1983:12). Therefore, British and black threats were understood as honours and “the seal of God’s election” (Moodie, 1983:13), a myth that was used to justify social action and domination (Puttergill, 2008:99).

Ethnic Afrikaner non-governmental organisations were set up and played a key role in the creation of social capital and Afrikaner materialism. After the successful Helpmekaar movement instilled a sense of pride and achievement in Afrikaners, nationalist mobilisation sprouted a number of foundational Afrikaner organisations. The Afrikaans publishing house Nasionale Pers was established specifically to produce non-British literature (Foster, 2008:32). The Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Lewensassuransie Maatskappy, or Sanlam, provided support to northern Afrikaners from 1918 onwards (Verhoef, 2008). Sanlam was a product of the “entrepreneurial spirit” of the Cape Colony Afrikaners’ close network of small business elites, whose strategy was to focus on enterprise and self-help, not welfare. Afrikaners wanted to own a notable share of the South African economy and the Sanlam men did so via the endogenous forces of nationalism (Verhoef, 2008:696). They cast the Protestant sense of social responsibility towards fellow Afrikaners,

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56 Afrikaner church leaders, teachers and other community leaders organised the Helpmekaar movement to raise more than £330,000 in funds from Afrikaner communities to help Afrikaner war rebels pay civil suit claims (Verhoef, 2008:699).
nationalism and cultural pride as being responses to British political domination and proof of the entrepreneurial ambition of Afrikaners (Verhoef, 2008:699).

Established in 1918 from a group called Jong Suid Afrika,\(^{57}\) the Afrikaner Broederbond\(^{58}\) (hereafter the Bond) sought solutions to Afrikaner poverty in the ownership structures of South African capitalism and started playing a “class vanguard” role around 1927 (O’Meara, 1977:159). The Bond is particularly infamous for advancing Afrikaner interests in a ‘secret’ or at least “thoroughly mystified” manner for many years, to the extent that it was described as “the bogeyman of South African politics” in 1977 by Dan O’Meara (O’Meara, 1977:156). The Bond’s goal was to conflate emergent Afrikaner capitalism, the pressing poor white problem and the Afrikaans language movement into one ‘peoples’’ mission (Moodie, 1983:15). It played a critical leading role in the manufacture of the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology and its politics, especially leading up to the 1948 NP electoral victory (O’Meara, 1977:158). Puttergill attributes the Bond’s successful mobilisation to its control over Afrikaner cultural organisations such as the Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organisations (FAK)\(^{59}\) and emphasis on *kultuurpolitiek* (2008:102). *Kultuurpolitiek* represented people’s politics, or *volkspolitiek* and the idea that church politics and state politics must remain separate. The pastor could not directly instruct his parishioners’ votes, but the church could express views about matters like the Afrikaner people’s unity (*volkseenheid*), the importance of Afrikaans-medium education and Afrikaner poverty (Moodie, 1983:72). This distinction enabled Afrikaner politicians and churchmen to “pursue the goal of Afrikaner *volkseenheid* and at the same time to eschew party-political squabbles” (Moodie, 1980:98).

Puttergill contends that several developments met Afrikaners’ existential and emotional needs after the pact government gained control in 1924 (2008:106). Afrikaans replaced Dutch as the Union’s second official language in 1925 (Foster, 2008:32). A second flag was introduced in 1926 and eventually also a second anthem in 1938. The pact government furthermore announced

\(^{57}\) Young South Africa

\(^{58}\) Literally the Afrikaner Brotherhood, according to O’Meara (1977:159).

\(^{59}\) Some argue that the Bond ‘ran’ South Africa for a period of time, but O’Meara (1977:167) and Giliomee (2003:421) disagree.
several legislative changes that protected white Afrikaners from English-speaking white and black employment competition (Puttergill, 2008:106). However, white poverty became a national issue once again when the 1929 world wide economic depression hit South Africa. More than 25% of Afrikaans-speaking whites were proletarianised and their living conditions in racially mixed slums elicited horrified responses from Afrikaner intellectuals (O’Meara, 1983:54). The Hertzog government increased relief measures for poor whites to 15.8% of the national budget in 1933. By 1936, 50% of Afrikaners were urbanised and by 1939 the white poverty and education crises had been largely resolved (Giliomee, 2003:345, 405). The decision to abandon the Gold Standard was believed to be in the interest of the poor white working class, but caused a split in the National Party (NP) based on disagreement over alignment with Britain. Conservatives formed the Gesuiwerde NP (GNP), which consisted largely of petty bourgeoisie Afrikaners, including the clergy of the DRC who were opposed to British ‘large capital’ (O’Meara, 1983:51). They were able to opt out of manual labour and to operate daily in Afrikaans-medium professional environments that excluded English-speakers, and enabled the petty bourgeoisie to affirm and assert the Afrikaans language and culture “to symbolise the struggle against all the discriminatory ‘imperialist’ structures” (O’Meara, 1983:55). O’Meara suggests that Afrikaner intellectuals drew on the effects of capitalism on all classes of Afrikaners to construct a “curriculum of ‘imperialism’” which was taught to Afrikaner children (O’Meara, 1983:55). This curriculum cast imperialism and its representatives as the source of all white Afrikaners’ problems (O’Meara, 1983:55).

Nearly seventeen thousand white women were employed in the textile and clothing industries on the Witwatersrand by the mid-1930s, scores of them represented by the Garment Workers Union (GWU), led by communist Solly Sachs and peers Anna Scheepers and the Cornelius sisters, Hester and Johanna (Giliomee, 2003:425). In response to the communist ‘threat’, nationalist organisations like the Bond spread their influence beyond the Transvaal, discursively ensconced in emphasis on the importance of the awakening and handhawing of Afrikaner culture (Moodie,

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60 For example, the Wage Act of 1925, which set the same minimum wages for whites and blacks, was based on the assumption that employers would prefer to employ whites (Giliomee, 2003:336).

61 Assertion.
Moodie posits that the Bond transformed the general meaning of the word ‘culture’ in its efforts, by shifting the latter’s emphasis on creative arts to a “more technical and ethnic sense that limited ‘culture’ to the civil-religious conception of traditional forms of Afrikaner life” (1983:107). It did so through organisations like its mouthpiece, the *Federasie vir Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings* (FAK), whose “major function was a symbolic one, ensuring that all the diverse activities … were done in the name of a consistent rhetoric” states Moodie, who describes this as a pattern of ideological justification and theory of national election known as Christian Nationalism (Moodie, 1980:109-110).

Christian Nationalism, based on Protestant Calvinism, was a set of values and morals that prescribed appropriate beliefs and behaviour to white Afrikaners and offered them a specific discourse to identify with. It aimed to preserve the separate ethnic characteristics of white Afrikaners. By 1948 it had a clear resonance in the daily consciousness of white Afrikaners of all classes (O’Meara, 1983, Moodie, 1980:110). The DRC, the Bond and the FAK ensured that this ideology of divine sanction, or “civil theology,” was widely accepted (Moodie, 1980:111). Religion served Afrikaner Nationalism by providing the Afrikaner with a divine sanction, namely to bring civilisation to Africa. The bureaucratic nature of nationalist churches also limited disagreement with nationalist decision-making (Seegers, 1993). Christian national ideology facilitated transfer of Afrikaner nationalist identity from one generation to the next and was therefore crucial to such identification from the 1930s to the 1960s. Amongst others, Kinghorn agrees that Afrikaner ethnic identity was embedded in religious discourse which positioned the Afrikaans speaker in a specific stance toward society (1994).

### 4.2 Afrikaner Nationalism and apartheid

This section presents a brief summary of post-1948 intensification of Afrikaner Nationalism and the birth of official apartheid. *Die Burger* newspaper used the term ‘apartheid’ to refer to “an accepted Afrikaner viewpoint” in the 1940s (Giliomee, 2003b:374). Rev. J. C. du Plessis of the DRC first proposed to a DRC conference in 1929 that apartheid fitted the “character, nature and nationality” of Africa and that it would be the Christian alternative to a mission’s policy that
“offered blacks no ‘independent national future’” (Giliomee, 2003b:374). However, academics disagree on the role that the notion of ‘apartheid’ played in the 1948 NP electoral victory. The notion was incomplete at the time, so some argue “voters voted against integration rather than for apartheid” (Puttergill, 2008:113). In this view, the 1948 nationalist victory was over British imperial interests and reinforced identification with the idea of a chosen people who had overcome a history of loss and disaster (Puttergill, 2008:113).

The NP achieved victory in the 1948 election by mobilising a diverse constituency. Puttergill notes that the issues of 1910 unionisation still demanded attention, namely the relationship with Britain, the relationship between whites and policies toward non-whites (Puttergill, 2008:111). However, the NP’s victory was slim and it needed to consolidate Afrikaners’ support though the “cross-cutting network” of associated nationalist organisations that permeated civil society (Puttergill, 2008:112). Although South Africa “certainly was the society most overtly organised around a legalised axis of “race”” in 1948, a rush of legislation was to follow in order to consolidate Nationalist power (Steyn, 2001:24). Giliomee argues that survival as a people was at the top of the Afrikaner political agenda and at the heart of the decision to introduce the apartheid system (Giliomee, 2003:xix). Arguably the racist and biologically determinist views of Geoff Cronjé and others informed the making of apartheid, yet Giliomee emphasises that that the notion of volkseie (a people should develop and maintain their own beliefs, customs, language and history) and Christian Nationalism were both core concepts in the making of apartheid (2003b:375). These factors, and the rising appeal of American ideas of ‘scientific’ social engineering, attracted Afrikaner social scientists to the idea of separate development based not only on race, but on the culturally unique attributes of ethnic groups and a belief in white paternalism and trusteeship (Giliomee, 2003b:388). From this perspective, apartheid was above all based on notions of culture and racism a by-product thereof.

Ethical concerns with regard to apartheid were raised by intellectuals like N. P. van Wyk Louw, who advanced the notion of voortbestaan in geregtigheid, or survival in justice. In Van Wyk Louw’s vision of apartheid, the system would only be justifiable should it be morally so. He died in 1970,
but a new generation of Afrikaner intellectuals, such as André du Toit, used Van Wyk Louw’s work to argue that apartheid had to be abandoned (Giliomee, 2003b:388). Despite its euphemistic focus on *volkseie* and the ‘good’ intentions of paternalism, the apartheid system stripped the majority of South Africans of their birth right as well as their human rights.

English-medium churches condemned apartheid plans and DRC leaders were divided about segregation. De Gruchy et al. emphasise that the DRC added its voice to the opposition of politicians, academics, newspaper editors and other community leaders to apartheid during the 1950s. DRC leader Professor Keet stated that apartheid’s supporters were “labouring under a delusion that belongs to a world of make-believe” (De Gruchy et al., 2005:52-58). Hermann Giliomee too accepts that the apartheid system was meant to protect white Afrikaners from arguably invented ‘perils’ such as the so-called *swart gevaar, the rooi gevaar, the geel gevaar* and English imperialism (Giliomee, 2003:354). The latter kind of political propaganda arguably solidified nationalist ideology by eliminating alternative identification options for white Afrikaners.

During the ‘50s and ‘60s, the NP gained increasing support as it created “cocooning but also isolating structures” that ostracised brave dissidents like Beyers Naudé (Puttergill, 2008:11). The NP institutionalised single-medium educational instruction, which made ideological indoctrination easy and secured Afrikaner identity and national pride (Puttergill, 2008:114). Christian National education normalised racial domination and perpetuated racial stereotypes whilst constantly emphasising loyalty and obedience to leaders (Puttergill, 2008:114-115). Overall, the complete and contained ‘Afrikanerness’ of socialising institutions cumulated in a “total approach orientated towards ensuring loyal Afrikanerdom” (Puttergill, 2008:115). Like Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008), McClintock emphasises that nations are “elaborate social practices” dependent on choice, consumption and performance (McClintock, 1991:104). The imagined nation and its physical enactment are therefore reciprocal dimensions of one process. By 1960 Afrikaner Nationalism was

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63 The black, red and yellow dangers, referring to threats associated with black South Africans, communists (red) and China (yellow) respectively.
thriving, its key themes being Divine sanction and manifest destiny, cultural brotherhood and racial distinction, patriarchal power, entitlement to the land in South Africa, and a single unifying language (McClintock, 1991:106; Steyn, 2001:39).

The notion of separate development served the nationalist aim of isolating Afrikaners. It was articulated and socially engineered through Dr. Verwoerd’s consistent emphasis on group identity and the cultural complexity of South Africa (Steyn, 2001:39). Verwoerd, the grand architect of apartheid, built the system on the foundation of four Acts which were promulgated after 1948. Two of the pillars legally enforced racial purity, another ascribed racial identity, and the fourth demarcated geographically separate residential areas. By 1960 they were functioning as the pillars of apartheid. A variety of laws further scaffolded the “master narrative of whiteness,” reminiscent of imperialist race attitudes and manifested in the notion of baasskap (mastership) (Steyn, 2001:3,25).

Relationships between the church and state became increasingly tense as foreign missionaries were deported and the promulgation of Clause 29(c) of the Native Laws Amendment Bill in 1957 made it very difficult for black people to attend churches in ‘white’ areas (De Gruchy et al., 2005:58-59). The DRC and other churches openly protested against the state’s violation of the church’s ability of fulfill its calling. Although Verwoerd agreed not to interfere in the freedom of the church, he rejected the controversial 1960 Cottesloe Consultation’s criticisms of apartheid and recommendation that so-called Coloureds be enfranchised (De Gruchy et al., 2005:65-66). Melissa Steyn suggests that the DRC perpetuated the myth that Afrikaners were a chosen people with a special destiny in Africa (Steyn, 2001:xi). Many of the ‘national’ psalms were particularly popular for the parallels they suggested between the Israelites of the Bible and the Afrikaner nation

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The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 and the Immorality Act, amended in 1950, criminalised interracial ‘mixing’. Racialised identity labels were legalised with the Population Registration Act of 1950 and illustrated the power whites had to define racial others. The black population was legally bound to geographical areas by the Group Areas Act of 1950, which buttressed the legal racial categories. More than two million Africans were forced to move from farming areas that were designated for whites. Complete social and spatial segregation ensued via the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 (Puttergill, 2008:116). Black citizenship was relegated to small, economically unviable “independent” ‘Homelands’ or ‘bantustans’ — a “chilling exercise in social engineering” (Steyn, 2001:39).
(Kloppers, 2002:183). The traditional Afrikaner Churches became the bearers of a nationalist ‘civil religion’ - the religious dimension of the state that is “invariably associated with the exercise of power and ... constant regeneration of a social order; it provides a transcendent referent for sovereignty within a given territory. The ultimate nature and destiny of political power is thus connoted in the symbols of the civil faith and re-enacted by civil ritual” (Moodie, 1980:296).

By 1960, 75% of Afrikaners were urbanised (Giliomee, 2003:405). They were the perfect audience for government-controlled broadcasting and a powerful pro-Nationalist print-media which created the illusion of a white country, where most whites enjoyed a suburban lifestyle and blacks provided labour (Puttergill, 2008:115-118). However, significant problems remained. Intra-white tensions concerned Afrikaners and criticism of the government increased. The 1960 Sharpeville killings and the 1978 ‘Information Scandal’ exposed government oppression and attempts to influence foreign and local criticism. By 1976, the NP Government had invented new, stricter measures to control opposition with harsh security measures which culminated in “totalitarian control” (Puttergill, 2008:119).

4.3 The end of apartheid and Afrikaner Nationalism

As the oppressed majority mobilised for change through growing political parties like the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the apartheid government was forced onto its hind legs. Being an international pariah reduced the political system’s legitimacy and increasing black unrest meant government was faced with a daunting contradiction: it had to find a way to share power whilst also retaining control (Ross, 2008:178). Following the failure of the Tri-Cameral Parliament, which left the black population with nothing more than Bantustan structures through which to exercise their rights (Ross, 2008:181), South Africa found itself “isolated at the tip of a continent, surrounded by liberated states, paralysed by internal resistance, and under growing demand for change from Western powers” (Jansen, 2009:26). Economically, international sanctions, the withdrawal of foreign investment and international credit hit the country hard. After 1985 South Africa faced a full-blown economic crisis (Ross, 2008:178). These crises not only put political pressure on whites locally, but threatened their financial status, too. The strong Afrikaner middle
class that emerged between 1985 and 1995 was politically divided, but exposure to globalised consumerism and a weakening national economy meant the lifestyles they desired were threatened (Hyslop, 2000:37-41). However, most white Afrikaners doubted that democratic-based majority rule could guarantee their future cultural and financial wellbeing. Adam and Moodley described the start of official reconciliation as “reluctant” in 1993 (Adam and Moodley, 1993:339). In 2001, 65% of white Afrikaners in a national study indicated they still believed that the values behind apartheid were basically good (Giliomee, 2003b:375).

Some political experts suggested that a power-sharing coalition government between the NP and ANC would be the best way to ensure political stability in a context characterised by ethnic tensions. The idea of power-sharing did not materialise. The ANC won the battle for democracy rule in South Africa. Whether this development was inevitable or not, whites were agitated by the lack of white representation and loss of white political power. A flurry of literature was published that condemned majority rule for its neglect of minorities. A majoritarian democracy like the one that has governed South Africa since 1994 has been deemed unsuitable for a country with deep racial and ethnic divisions by some analysts, including Hermann Giliomee (2003:639).

Secret negotiations with the main liberation movement, the ANC, started long before the public became aware of them (Jansen, 2009:25). A series of events preceded the final demise of apartheid, including the De Klerk government’s 1990 unbanning of opposition parties, the release of political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela and the removal of the Land, Population and Registration and Group Areas Acts from the country’s statute books. The National Party and the ANC negotiated the transition to democracy during the years leading up to 1993, when the Interim Constitution was established. During this time, white Afrikaners felt uncertain and anxious about the prospective and inevitable change. On the other end of the spectrum, an exceptionalist approach to the transition promulgated numerous discourses. Neville Alexander holds, however, that “we are dealing with a very ordinary country, one which has come very late to the comity of nations” (2003:1).
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) played an instrumental role in the transition from apartheid to democracy. Whilst leaders like FW de Klerk were willing to admit to and apologise for the hurt caused, P.W. Botha represented the stubborn who refused to acknowledge the Other(s) and treated the notion of the TRC as “a tool to discredit Afrikaner history and his ancestors’ contributions to South Africa” (Ramphele, 2008:57). Archbishop Tutu led the TRC process, but critics were concerned that Tutu was being too lenient with those who should have been held accountable for their apartheid-era actions. However, the “threat of a white right-wing revolt was significant given the fragility of the new democracy,” and major apartheid crimes, such as the Vlakplaas murders committed by ‘Prime Evil’ Eugène de Kock, were consequently revealed, mourned and not, as some would have it, met with tangible criminal imprisonment (Ramphele, 2008:58-61). Although the TRC brought healing for a number of individuals and communities, many white Afrikaners were “baffled by the turn of events” (Ramphele, 2008:50). Ramphele specifically refers to the youth. “Many were mere children at the close of apartheid and feel unfairly blamed for the errors of previous generations,” she says (2008:50). Dave Steward, former apartheid civil servant and now director of the F. W. de Klerk Foundation, summarised the particular issue well in a 2006 Sunday Independent newspaper article:

The TRC also stamped whites with an almost indelible mark of guilt and created the perception of moral inferiority. ... The assumption of blanket white guilt and the unwillingness of most whites to acknowledge it is the wedge that continues to create the chasm between us. It explains why Archbishop Tutu still feels so strongly that whites have not given proper recognition to the generosity of blacks for ‘not wanting to knock their blocks off’. 65

In conclusion, the ideological boundaries that propped up apartheid unravelled in the face of international and local pressures. The socio-economic development of the white Afrikaner middle class, coupled with their increased exposure to for example American culture through television

and consumerist ideals shifted political support from the Afrikaner nation to individual, materially-driven interests. Apartheid and its ending remains however part of successive generations’ identities. More specifically, intergenerational dynamics, collective memory and Afrikaner institutions continue to play defining roles in Afrikaner youths’ identification. The present study therefore explores and conceptualises their identification as based upon recent history and its effects.

4.4 Conclusion

The selected history included in this chapter illustrates that a historical, symbolic fund informed Afrikaner Nationalist identity. Although Afrikaners were divided on various issues throughout history, Afrikaner nationalism managed to create an overarching, exclusivist white supremacist identity based on myth, language, race and ethnicity. Notions of ‘culture’ and ‘difference’ remain integral to Afrikaner identification. Wieviorka explains the persistence of difference in terms of themes of social inequality, power and modern individualism (2004). Individuals choose to associate with a particular group or identity when they perceive such an identity as capable of collectively promoting their interests. Group identity and by implication ‘difference’ is not reproduced, but actively produced by subjective individuals in attempts to construct meaning in their lives (Wieviorka, 2004). Wieviorka’s argument emphasises that the nature of chosen and imposed differences may be ‘cultural’, but their effects are politicised. Respondent identification in this study is therefore conceptualised not only as ethno-cultural, but as immersed within a highly stratified, politicised historical context.
Chapter 5
Transformation and Afrikaner generations

This chapter argues first that the effects of transformation play out in the national, as well as institutional contexts. The University of Pretoria (UP) is arguably therefore a microcosm of the dynamics that characterise white Afrikaners’ post apartheid political and cultural identification. Second, the particular relationship between white Afrikaner generations is explored as a key variable in youth identification.

5.1 The University of Pretoria: Stage for transformational struggles
This section suggests that white Afrikaners’ reactions to national transformation are echoed in the UP context in general, as well as in Afrikaner students’ actions in particular. In both the national and UP contexts, discussed in 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 respectively below, white Afrikaners draw on the notion of group rights, defend the Afrikaans language, choose to play the ‘economic power’ card and focus on race issues in their reactions to transformation.

5.1.1 The South African context
Post apartheid South Africa is characterised by a consistent, stark juxtaposition between the needs for redress and equality on one hand, and notions of non-racialism on the other. Despite its intent to unify South Africans, the notion of a ‘rainbow nation’ and consequent nation-building attempts have been thwarted by the consistent presence of ‘difference’ in national discourses. Moodley and Adam, for example, argue that cultural divides remain at a subconscious level (2000) and Van der Waal adds that social categories are perceived as fixed, natural social entities (2012:2).

According to Melissa Steyn, the post apartheid “scramble for optimal location” (Steyn, 2004:144) is refereed by seemingly cemented ethnic categories that are so pervasive and historically engraved into South African society that they determined the structure of the post apartheid constitution. Yet the South African nation-building project is accordingly premised on the idea that
ethnic identities are malleable, so that leadership of respective ethnic groups could mould them into more accommodating, more open ethnic identities (Southern, 2008:467). Nation-building has, in the view of some, created a multi-cultural ‘nation’, exemplified by inclusive symbols such as a shared flag, a multi-lingual national anthem, multi-lingual media and multi-racial schools and national sports teams (Southern, 2008:466). An overarching South African national identity has been created, but arguably remains harshly punctuated by in-group chauvinism, out-group rejection, racism and intolerance (Mattes, 2002:30). Citizens may be ‘proudly South African’, but most cling to their historical racial and ethnic group identities, not simply emotively, but because these identities remain the vehicles through which citizens can mobilise for socio-political and economic power. The comprehensive South African Bill of Rights, officially adopted together with the current Constitution in 1997, offers ‘group rights’ to cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic communities. In the face of the globalisation process and increased interdependence between nations, local South African cultures have been bolstered by the notion and discourses of group-based rights (Oomen, 1999:76). South African indigenous minority groups, such as the Zulus and the white Afrikaners, are producing new collective identities based on culture and founded on the notion of ‘rights to roots’, instead of ‘rights to options’ (Oomen, 1999:77). The legal guarantee of group rights based on culture, combined with racialised policy and practice, and citizens’ everyday experiences, has resulted in collective ethnic identification underscored by political and economic competition. Ethnic minorities are propelled to maximise their political leverage by acting collectively.

The characteristic notions of superiority and privilege associated with ‘whiteness’ are also prominent in white Afrikaners’ group rights discourses. Various Afrikaner factions have reacted to post apartheid changes with outrage and discourses that allude to notions of victimisation, discrimination and general anxiety. They have taken issue with matters such as the institutional status of the Afrikaans language, official name changes, maintenance of historical monuments and statues, and affirmative action in the workplace. Many Afrikaners pride themselves in the post
apartheid era on being ‘liberal’ intellectuals who allegedly now lead once *verkrampte* cultural organisations, churches, Afrikaans media and labour unions (Malan, 2007). Nevertheless, a ‘laager mentality’ symptomatic of group rights-based thinking consistently emerges in response to perceived post apartheid onslaughts on white Afrikaners by state and society (Malan, 2007). Public reactions to crime, affirmative action and language issues reveal ethno-culturally defined in-group experiences, but of course this may be true for most or all ethnic groups in South Africa. Despite a healthy openness to democracy, difference and new ideas, many white Afrikaners continue to identify as an ethno-cultural community with clear boundaries. For these white Afrikaners, exclusivity and inclusivity therefore remain interconnected spheres of life, in which one often invokes the other.

### 5.1.2 The UP context

National affairs reverberate in national institutions. For example, the challenges of transformation in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) have been extensively documented. White Afrikaner concerns and power struggles also manifest themselves in university contexts (Jansen, 2009:15) such as UP. Its history is embedded in the South African national history of race and language power struggles. At the time of data collection, participants in this study found themselves completely immersed in the birth dynamics not only of a transforming institution, but a transforming national context. Jansen, who became the first black Dean of Education at UP in 2002, presents a brief history of UP (2009).

Originally an English-medium institution, UP became gradually appropriated by Afrikaner Nationalism, so that the characteristic ox wagon symbol came to occupy centre stage on the UP emblem (Jansen, 2009:3), where it remains to this day. The University embodied whiteness: whiteness was normal, leaders’ authority was paramount and there was no racial tension because

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66 *Verkrampte* is an adjective that was used during apartheid to refer to any Afrikaner Nationalist person, party, policy or organisation that was opposed to liberal trends and change in government policy, especially liberal changes toward relating to racial issues. In contrast, *verligte* individuals, parties, policies and organisations were open to liberal changes and trends.

everyone was white (Jansen, 2009:13). Everyone communicated in Afrikaans, had more or less the same cultural and religious backgrounds, all textbooks were Afrikaans-medium and normative patriarchy permeated every level of the institution (Jansen, 2009:13-14). Stability and peace reigned on campus, described by Jansen as “an occluded space” – it was defined by the absence of ‘difference’ (2009:14). Whites occupied all positions of power at UP, including that of privileged student. UP taught and reinforced a specific understanding of power, most notably to the generation who could be respondents’ parents today. Indeed, academic justification for apartheid was produced via UP graduates for decades.

After democratisation, dramatic change in university settings was inevitable. Race and language issues were targeted by a discourse of ‘equity’ at UP. To achieve equity, the all-white staff population had to make room for people of colour, curricula had to change and new Government regulations had to be implemented. Jansen describes post apartheid UP as the “epicentre of white student resistance to change” and details 34 media reports of white students’ protests against change that occurred from 1990 up to 2007 (Jansen, 2009:117). Transformation meant that numerous Afrikaans-medium classes had to be offered as dual-medium in order to accommodate the more varied demography of students (Jansen, 2009:14). In the Faculty of Humanities, several once Afrikaans-medium courses came to be taught in English only due to supply-and-demand and resource dynamics. This reduction in the institutionalised use of Afrikaans as instruction medium was (and still is for many white Afrikaners) not simply a matter of demand or financial resources. Mariana Kriel argues for example that the official status of the Afrikaans language symbolises the official status of the Afrikaner people, and that protests concerned with Afrikaans were and still are really concerned with the status of its speakers (2006). Kriel’s argument is reflected in Giliomme’s labelling of double-medium instruction at universities as a kyllery, that was leading to the verdringing of Afrikaans in universities. He suggests that Afrikaans instruction has disappeared at the University of the Western Cape (UWC) and Port Elizabeth (UPE) and predicts

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68 Cheating.
69 Displacement
that the same situation was imminent at the University of Johannesburg (UJ). He advised Afrikaners to start mobilising and to insist on their consumer right to be educated in Afrikaans (Alet Rademeyer for Beeld, 20 October 2008).

In a similar vein, white Afrikaner students have argued that their financial power should equal political power, exemplified specifically by unconditional protection of the Afrikaans language. For example, the 2005 Student Representative Council (SRC) President at UP, Cornelius Jansen van Rensburg, also a representative of pro-Afrikaans political party Freedom Front Plus (FF+), was quoted as saying that Afrikaans students were tired of being second-class students. “Ons geld is goed genoeg, en ons ouers se belasting is goed genoeg,” he said, implying that Afrikaans speakers’ ‘right’ to Afrikaans-medium instruction is bolstered by the fact that they pay for education. In 2006, students held up a banner that asked “Rector, you have my money, where is my Afrikaans?” during the official annual opening ceremony. This idea reflects a popular general discourse among white Afrikaners, whereby they justify their group-based claims with reference to their financial ‘equality’ or superiority, a trend documented by *inter alia* Steyn and Foster (2008).

Race matters have also been openly disputed on the UP campus. In 2008, white FF+TAS-alligned students copied an ‘affirmative action cake sale’, acted out by Republicans at a few American universities, including the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) in 2002 and the University of New Mexico in 1999, at UP. Campus security confiscated their banner and pamphlets, which allegedly contained information meant to incite campus debate on affirmative action.

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74 Organised by the FF+ student organisation FF+TAS, a big poster advertised that the cake prices depended on the customer’s race. White students had to pay R5 for a piece of cake, coloured and Indian students R3, and black students only 50c. ANC members could have cake for free if they made a donation to a ‘corruption box’. See Sapa, ‘Affirmative action’ cake sale canned’, 14 April 2008, [iolnews.com](http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/affirmative-action-cake-sale-canned-1.396410).
Nevertheless, the FF+ has won the SRC election every year from the 1990s to 2008 due to low numbers of black voters and the legacy of a white middle class university (Jansen, 2009:124). Conservative white students relied on the victories of the FF+TAS student organisation to represent their interests, until UP management altered the election process of the student body in 2009 so that candidates were no longer allowed to reveal their political membership (Jansen, 2009:124). Ironically, the FF+ spoke out against racialised practice on several occasions, for example in 2003 when they submitted a memorandum to former President Thabo Mbeki, arguing that “exposing the youth to racial quotas after 10 years promotes polarisation and is plain racial discrimination”75 This juxtaposition of continuous resistance against racialised practice on one hand, with indirect support of such practice when it benefits whites on the other, is a key characteristic of whiteness in South Africa according to for example Steyn and Foster (2008:25).

Transformation has been difficult not only for adult Afrikaners, but also for the youth. The following section explores the connections between Afrikaner youth and their elders, specifically the idea of intergenerational transfer of knowledge. I argue that ‘inherited knowledge’ plays a key role in Afrikaner youth identification, indicating a clear relationship between Afrikaner generations.

5.2 “Knowledge in the blood”: History is alive

Knowledge runs along a crooked line from one generation to the next, never smooth, often interrupted, but always connecting generations that were there with those who were not (Jansen, 2009:53).

The ‘knowledge’ transferred from one generation to the next is integral to youth identification (Torney-Purta, 2004; Wineburg et. al, 2007). During apartheid, youth learned a mythologised Afrikaner history through cultural and educational institutions, but today, the institution of the

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Accessed on 27 September 2011. In addition, more students voted in a referendum about the applicability of affirmative action on today’s youth than in the SRC election of March 2007 (Esterhuizen and Du Toit, Kampus Beeld, 28 March 2007).  
family – parents and grandparents – is the influential repository of Afrikaners’ version(s) of recent history. Collective memory and intergenerational relationships are arguably central to youths’ identification options and choices.

5.2.1 Afrikaner generations: Perpetrators, rebels and ‘the innocent’

Several academics and journalists have published on the notion of Afrikaner generations, for example Baines (2009), Barnard (2010) and Van Der Waal (2008). Loammi Wolf informally classifies Afrikaner generations based on their identification with ideas, cultural norms and political ideology. She proposes that we recognise three generations, namely: 1) the one that institutionalised the system of oppression; 2) the following one that (usually) rebels against the system of oppression, but does not possess sufficient cultural and political resources to start building a new, transformed collective identity; and 3) the third generation, whose grandparents institutionalised said system of oppression, stabilises cultural identity, yet cannot escape the past as part and parcel of their identity.

In his study of Afrikaner youth, Jansen argues that the transmission of historical knowledge across generations allows new generations to incorporate the past into their identities. He suggests that youth have ‘indirect knowledge’ of the past events and contexts that shaped their parents’ and grandparents’ lives (2009:52). The knowledge that youth possess of the past is mediated by their parents and various historical events. Despite the second-hand, subjective nature of this ‘indirect knowledge’, it arguably impacts youth identification significantly (Jansen, 2009:53). Jansen conceptualises indirect knowledge as…:

- transmitted indirectly, yet so powerful in effect that it seems to stem from direct experience;
- transmitted from one generation to the next through various, somewhat mysterious mechanisms;
- influential in its effects on recipients, though said effects beg more intensive study;

o relational. Familial relationships between the first and second generations are necessary precursors to indirect knowledge and are “intense, emotionally charged, and often destructive” (p. 54);

o mediated by history and the passage of time;

o paradoxical. Despite questions of authenticity of ‘second-hand’ knowledge, indirect knowledge carries emotions and memories “which have real effects on the lives of the second generation” (p. 54).

These ‘real effects’ are directly related to the notion that Afrikaner youth are the offspring of shamed white Afrikaner perpetrators of apartheid. The following section briefly discusses each ideal typical generation with a view to establishing the contribution grandparents and parents may have made (or may still have to make) to respondents’ indirect knowledge of Afrikaner and South African history.

5.2.2 The perpetrators: Parents and grandparents

According to Jonathan Jansen, the perpetrators of apartheid is a category that includes all white citizens who “created, defended, and nurtured the system of racial rule from its inception, and returned the ...all-white National Party to government with every election since D. F. Malan first captured power in 1948...” (Jansen, 2009:59). Jansen refers most often to his students’ parents as the perpetrators of apartheid, but Andre du Toit and Loammi Wolf’s more sophisticated approach distinguishes between two generations of ‘perpetrators’: the grandparents, who institutionalised the oppressive system, and the parents, who first supported it as young adults, then experienced its demise and transformation to a new system. While Generation Grandparents could not imagine a non-apartheid future, Generation Parents saw both Afrikaner Nationalism and apartheid fail and rendered invalid by millions of South Africans, thereby emphasising the Afrikaners’ racial and political minority status (Du Toit, 2008:575). Du Toit uses the notion of ‘coming of age politically’ to explain that Grandparents experienced Afrikaner power as a fact of life, unlikely to change. The next generation of white Afrikaners, born during the heydays of apartheid, came of
age politically in the 70s, when boycotts and protests constantly spurred socio-political winds of change (Du Toit, 2008:575).

Using identification with ideas as a marker of generations requires the Weberian notion of ideal typical categories. Ideal types are exaggerated typological schemes used to a) exclusively categorise the major forms a particular phenomenon assumes, or b) to exclusively identify the distinguishing characteristics of the phenomenon. The following typology functions as an ideal type that facilitates an analytical bird’s eye view of various major experiences and values that grandparents and parents may have held and transmitted to their children, as each generation experienced a vastly different social imaginary. The generations are labelled Generation Grandparents, Generation Parents, and Generation Respondents.

**a. Generation Grandparents**

One’s generational position significantly impacts one’s perception of Afrikaner Nationalism, apartheid and general national history (Du Toit, 2008:575), not only via the specific social imaginaries of one’s time, but also through their lasting influence. The essence of social imaginaries is captured in and transmitted to succeeding generations via indirect knowledge.

As noted, Afrikaner Nationalism and the apartheid ideology represented survival and political and cultural power to Generation Grandparents.77 Although they had such power for a while, for them, apartheid ended in “political catastrophe” (Du Toit, 2008:575). Given this generation’s long-lived identification with Afrikaner Nationalist thought and politics, Wolf argues that they face most difficulty confronting the post apartheid context as white Afrikaners (2006). Arguably, their disillusionment with Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid is present in the indirect knowledge they transfer to their youthful children – respondents in this study – whether it be in the form of

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77 For example, according to Jonathan Jansen nationalist propaganda used the white Afrikaners’ minority status to incite anxiety in Generation Great-Grandparents and Grandparents about ‘gevaar’ (threats) that allegedly threatened the Afrikaners’ existence, including the ‘Rooi gevaar’ (the red or Communist threat), the ‘Swart gevaar’ (the black threat) and the ‘Roomse gevaar’ (the Roman or Catholic threat) (2009:223).
reminiscing about the ‘good old days’, complaining about political betrayal, expressing regret or shame, or reaffirming racist beliefs.

b. Generation Parents
As for Generation Grandparents, the existence of apartheid and its demise impacted the psyche of Generation Parents. As children, most members of Generation Parents were shielded from the harshness and immorality of South African reality. They were not exposed to dissent or alternatives (Jansen, 2009:85). Parents inherited a particular set of knowledge as children that pitted whites against blacks, justified and normalised white privilege and ingrained military-type authoritarian discipline in school and society (Jansen, 2009:85). Their indirect knowledge reinforced patriarchy, extreme ethnocentrism, white pride and racial exclusivity as given and normal. Their experiences of the transition to democracy therefore include a wide range of linkages and emotions associated with historical Afrikaner Nationalism, survival and pride, as well as political disappointment, fear, embarrassment and guilt (Jansen, 2009:29). Sestiger minds like those of Andrè Brink and Breyten Breytenbach were disillusioned and disappointed. Generation Parents were traumatised by the realisation that they were prisoners of the structural violence institutionalised to keep apartheid in place (Wolf, 2006). Parents are of the “first generation that could anticipate a future on the far side of Afrikaner power” (Du Toit, 2008:575). Some members of this generation challenged the oppressive system — Max du Preez and Antjie Krog’s resistance was followed by the Voëlvry movement. Chris Louw’s open letter to Willem de Klerk, prominent nationalist opinion maker and FW de Klerk’s brother, titled Boetman en die swanesang van die verligtes, is a perfect example of this generation’s distress at how to deal with the end of apartheid and a new beginning:

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78 According to the Mail & Guardian, the Voëlvry movement was the “‘Boere Beatlemania’ of the late 1980s, whose main proponents sported undeniably kitsch names like Koos Kombuis and Johannes Kerkorrel. But far from being incidental, this eccentric bunch of young Afrikaans artists became the voice of their generation when South Africa was pushed to the brink of collapse by apartheid. Under the Voëlvry banner, their goal was the emancipation of Afrikaner youth from the strictures of their authoritarian, patriarchal culture—to make it cool to be Afrikaans.” From ‘The Voëlvry movement was the "Boere Beatlemania" of the late 1980s, with proponents such as Koos Kombuis and Johannes Kerkorrel’, Mail & Guardian, 1 August 2011, http://mg.co.za/article/2011-08-01-volvry-the-movie. Accessed on 28 February 2013.

This bewilderment is characteristic of what Beeld newspaper journalist Johan de Jager describes as the *koepelgeslag*,80 which first supported apartheid, then fought it by voting ‘yes’ to end it and now dons ‘new dispensation identities’ (2007). The impact of apartheid’s end on this ‘bridging generation’ is most visible in parents’ general inclination to emphasise who they are *not*: supporters of apartheid and racism (Wolf, 2006). Yet the ‘bridging generation’ will always have one historical foot firmly planted in the ‘old’ South Africa. Generation Parents holds the key to mourning as well as repentance – they experienced the birth of the possibility of a new beginning for the Afrikaners (Du Toit, 2008:577).

c. Generation Respondents: Indirect knowledge in the present

Considering the significant experiences of their parents and grandparents, is it possible that Generation Respondents are able to produce a new, fresh Afrikaner culture and identity that is free of stigma and guilt? According to authors like Jansen (2009) and Wineburg et al. (2007), the answer is a certain ‘no’.

Jansen argues that youths’ inherited knowledge colours their own critical thinking and experience. He defines this ‘knowledge in the blood’ as “knowledge embedded in the emotional, psychic, spiritual, social, economic, political, and psychological lives of a community” (2009:171). He emphasises that sociological enquiry must cast its focus beyond the traumatic effects of indirect knowledge and explore instead “what is known, how it is known, and how such knowledge is expressed...” (Jansen, 2009:80). Wineburg et al. refer to the “cultural curriculum” – schooling and family – as the agents that form and transfer indirect knowledge from one generation to the next. Their approach is based on the work of French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, who emphasised

79 “Should I quit my job, should I continue being angry and hating, should I go overseas, should I invest all my money abroad, should I just give up?”
80 Bridging generation.
the role of shared social frameworks, such as families and ethnic groups, in transferring memory from one generation to the next (2007:43). There is a major difference between the contexts that underscore Wineburg et al. and the present study. In the USA, families and the educational system convey more-or-less similar historical messages to youth. In post-1994 South Africa, new educational curricula and the re-writing of history means that the new curriculum contradicts what respondents learned about Afrikaner history from their parents. Wineburg et al. conclude that the formal education system’s contribution to youths’ historical knowledge is minimal compared to that of the “cultural curriculum”, which includes media, monuments, music, literature, the infinite resources of the Internet and of course, the institution of family (2007:70).

Considering Wineburg et al.‘s conclusion that the education system contributes minimally to youths’ historical knowledge, we may conclude that inherited knowledge is imperative to youth identification. Afrikaner youth could therefore not create a brand new identity or be easily re-socialised. Despite critical agency and awareness of the present, these authors argue that the ‘cultural curriculum’ and inherited knowledge inevitably impact youth identification significantly. The following research findings regarding Afrikaner youth are therefore considered as emanating both from the specific historical experiences of parents and grandparents and from the youths’ own critical, yet subjective thinking and experiences.

This is evident in the findings of Delport and Olivier, who studied first-year white Afrikaner female students at the University of Port Elizabeth (UPE) in 2003.81 Although some respondents felt ambiguous about their Afrikaner identity, most “…reflected a strong identification with the traditional cultural goods” (Delport and Olivier, 2003: 88). These respondents were anxious to emphasise Afrikaner culture as precious, valuable and unique (Delport and Olivier, 2003:185). Heaven et al. similarly concluded that white students under threat eagerly emphasise their uniqueness, that is, difference from ethnic others (2000). Delport and Olivier conclude that the

81 Although all respondents were female, this study is very similar to the present one in its focus on white Afrikaner first-year university students. The authors chose an inductive approach and identified themes from qualitative findings obtained through six focus group interviews.
Afrikaans language is a central element of most of their respondents’ identity construction and that their anxiety about its future runs hand-in-hand with exclusivist group identification (2003). Goldschmidt attributes this exclusivist identification to her finding that Afrikaner youth identify most with the Afrikaans language and their ethnicity. Most of Goldschmidt’s respondents had exclusivist social preferences: the majority reported that they prefer friends of similar socio-economic status, race, language and ethnicity, in that order (Goldschmidt, 2003:210). She concludes that language and ethnicity form the two pillars of her respondents’ identification and that they remain as salient as they were before and during apartheid (Goldschmidt, 2003). In keeping with the trend of findings that suggest strong Afrikaner youth preference for ethno-linguistic in-group identification, Finchilescu et al. found that language and meta-stereotypes play a crucial role in continuous informal segregation on university campuses (2007). The majority of their black (72.1%) and white (79%) respondents endorsed language differences as a barrier to interracial mixing on campus. Of particular interest is their finding that subtle racism is increasing among all students, specifically whites, in response to the strongly anti-racist nature of national discourses (Finchilescu et al., 2007).

Kamper and Steyn argue that ‘unfavourable’ political circumstances and distrust in the government did not lead to negative attitudes amongst their respondents, nor to a disproportionately high desire to emigrate. Schoeman and Puttergill found that white Afrikaner students at UP were surprisingly politically active in 2006, unlike most youth, who tend to display

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82 She collected her data through a survey, completed by 145 students at the Rand Afrikaans University’s Nursing Faculty. The sample included students of all races and in every year of study, from first-years to post-graduate students. 44% were white English speakers and 8% were white Afrikaners.

83 Schrieff, Tredoux, Dixon & Finchilescu observed high levels of informal racial segregation in two university residence dining halls (2005). They found that white students, who constituted 31% and 32% of students in the two dining halls respectively, sat together at the same tables during every dining session (in both halls), and that these tables were on the left-hand side of the dining halls in both halls. The authors argue that this behaviour may reflect an “implicit or habitual expression of a racialised sense of how space should be organised” and that it’s highly likely that this racialised behaviour reflects students’ friendship patterns (2005:442).

84 Respondents in the present study were probably in Grade 11 or 12 when Kamper & Steyn (2007) collected their data. A total of 608 respondents from three schools (representing three different socio-economic strata in an urban area, a mining community and a semi-rural area) filled out their survey. It included items on church attendance, plans after school (local or abroad), main reasons for plans to leave South Africa (permanently or temporarily), their reasons for their attitudes towards their futures in South Africa, the character of discussions on the country in the home environment, the nature of school discussions of South Africa and how frequently they read newspapers.
political apathy (2007:166-167). White Afrikaner students reported feeling ‘least close’ to the ruling ANC and other ‘black’ parties and were found to be “more conservative than their white English-speaking counterparts, yet also more involved in politics” (Kamper and Steyn, 2007:167). Do these ethnic divisions manifest amongst Afrikaner youth due to generational transfer of knowledge, beliefs and attitudes? In a cross-culture comparative study of American and South African college students, Low, Akande & Hill found that white Afrikaans-speaking respondents tended to “personally explore ideological domains and rely on parental and societal views in the interpersonal domains” (Low et al., 2005: 10). Low et al.’s respondents were sensitive to the political particularities of the national milieu, but their interpersonal preferences are strongly influenced by their parents and society, arguably to the extent that Afrikaner youth find it difficult to talk about the country’s recent history and employ several strategies to negotiate racial difference, as Leibowitz, Rohleder, Bozalek, Carolissen & Swartz found (2007).

These strategies include a) denying the impact of the past on the present; b) ‘appreciating’ the strengths of the Other; c) acknowledging the past (but usually still wishing for a move away from it); d) responding with guilt and raised awareness and finally, e) taking responsibility for the impact of the past on the present and future (Leibowitz et al., 2007). Low et al. discussed their findings only from a psychological perspective, but these ‘negotiation strategies’ bear striking similarity to Steyn and Foster’s ‘White Talk’ discourses, which work not only to negotiate ‘difference’ but also to buttress and conceal white privilege in South Africa (2008).

5.3 Conclusion

The hypothesis emerges that most white Afrikaner youth probably believe, internalise and reproduce ethno-centric cultural anxiety and the conviction of white superiority and privilege their parents hold. If young Afrikaners at UP are concerned with the same issues as their parents, and

85 516 respondents successfully completed the survey in the Faculty of Humanities at UP. Of all respondents, white Afrikaners reported the highest voter turnout (32%) in the Local Government Elections the study was concerned with.

86 The authors conducted thematic analyses of university students’ online interactions to identify strategies they used to negotiate difference. 97 fourth-year psychology and social work students from two universities in the Western Cape Province participated in the online discussions.
enact typical ‘whiteness’ as Afrikaners at large are arguably doing, it may be the case that the youth of today are unable to leave the categorical shackles of apartheid behind, as Goldschmidt suggests (2003).
Chapter 6
Methodology

This chapter describes the rationale and detail of the chosen methodology, including sampling, data collection and ethical concerns. The ‘insider’ position of the researcher is furthermore discussed in terms of the advantages and limitations it presents to the study.

6.1 Research aims
Due to their parents’ and grandparents’ undeniable involvement in and their having benefited from the apartheid system, white Afrikaner youth are experiencing particular challenges as they search for and renegotiate their identity. In support of the main research aim, namely to explore the construction of white Afrikaner youths’ identity, three interrelated research aims guided the study, namely:

a) to explore respondents’ attitudes toward a variety of identity labels and cultural elements;
b) to consider possible manifestations of a present day Afrikaner nationalism and
c) to probe the relationship between respondents’ identification and the South African ‘brain drain’.

6.2 The case study
Various advantages and limitations characterise the case study as a research strategy, yet it proved most suitable to the circumstantial and resource limitations which applied to this study. As a research strategy that includes a customised, coherent set of methods for generating and analysing data (Verschuren, 2003:122), the case study enables the researcher to consider complex contextual conditions, especially when they are very pertinent to the topic of study. It involves an empirical investigation of a “contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 2003: 13). As has been suggested, the ‘real-life context’ is paramount to Afrikaner youth identification. However, since it is adaptable to innumerable ‘cases’, the case study remains one of the most challenging social science endeavours. Several requirements define the case:
First, the case study has to be defined. This is an exploratory case study of a relatively small sample of white Afrikaner youth from mainly middle-class backgrounds who studied in the Faculty of Humanities at UP in 2008. The broader South African political context is considered part and parcel of this educational context.

Second, relevant data must be collected. The research topic implies a complex combination of necessarily relevant sub-topics. Data collection addressed the attitudes of white Afrikaner youth toward numerous relevant issues such as race and language, and attitudes toward Afrikaner culture, older generations, the Church and emigration. A multi-method approach to data collection furthermore increased the validity of the results.

Third, the methodology should detail how the data will be used. Themes were identified from literature and qualitative data to inform a quantitative survey. Although the results are not statistically generalisable to the Faculty of Humanities, the University of Pretoria, or the white Afrikaner youth population at large, they can inform analytic generalisation. The results may illustrate, represent or be generalised to a theory (Yin, 2003:239). They furthermore represent a valuable stepping stone for future research on this topic and help to begin to fill the gap in academic literature on Afrikaner youth.

6.2.1 Sampling

Broadly speaking, approximately 6% of South African youth aged 16 to 35 are white. They are more likely to live in urban areas where there are universities that they can attend should they wish to – 65% are urban dwellers (Boyce, 2010:89). Respondents were sourced from the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Pretoria via convenience sampling. The focus group respondents were from the Psychology and Sociology Departments. Permission was obtained from the Research Proposal and Ethics Committee to approach first-year Afrikaans-speaking Sociology students, as well as the Afrikaans first-year classes of the Departments of Psychology and Social Work & Criminology. As is usually the case, fourth-quarter classes were not well attended in

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87 The Social Work and Criminology Disciplines constitute one Department at the University of Pretoria, but only first-year Criminology students were approached to participate in the survey. The Social Work class was not approached by the
2008. Upon returning to the classes every so often in an attempt to gain more respondents, it was observed that the attendees were usually the same students, hence the note that this is a case study of diligent Afrikaner students. The timing of this sampling approach therefore did not reach the less dedicated, less diligent white Afrikaner students in the first year group. The disciplines Psychology, Sociology, and Social Work & Criminology are part of a number of degree packages in Humanities and several respondents were planning on majoring in two of these disciplines. The sampling choices and method were therefore both very selective.

The sample of 151 respondents represent 20.5% of all white Afrikaans-speaking first-year students in Humanities and 9% of all white Afrikaans-speaking first-year Humanities students in 2008.88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Module</th>
<th>White Mother tongue is Afrikaans</th>
<th>Total students enrolled in Humanities in 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminology KRM 120</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology SLK 120</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology SOC 120</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolments: Faculty of Humanities</td>
<td>Study year 1</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other undergrads</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total undergrads</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey respondents’ sex demography represents the trend of one male to two females among white Afrikaans-speaking students in the Faculty of Humanities in 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents % of...</th>
<th>Sample (% of n=151)</th>
<th>Targeted modules/classes (n=830)</th>
<th>White Afrikaans-speaking first-year students in Humanities 2008 (n=736)</th>
<th>All white Afrikaans-speaking students in Humanities 2008 (n=1671)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

88 Thanks to the Bureau for Institutional Planning and Research at the University of Pretoria for providing this information.
Eighty-three per cent of respondents classified themselves as first-year students and 9.3% as second-years. Liela Groenewald, who conducted her study on experiences of racism with first-year Sociology and Mathematics students, argues the difference in Faculties would ensure variation in their responses. Humanities students’ responses may be “toned to perceived expectations” if they had read literature relevant to the topic of study (Groenewald, 2004:61), in this case material on issues surrounding the white Afrikaner. However, a ‘purely Humanities’ sample need not be tedious or standardised. First year students cannot be expected to have read a substantial amount of academic material on the topic. Since most Faculties do not offer classes in Afrikaans, the Faculty of Humanities is furthermore a convenient choice for a study such as this one because it offers access to groups of young white Afrikaner students who choose to attend classes presented in Afrikaans.

One regular critique of the case study method is that its results cannot be generalised to the entire population. Admittedly, the same study may produce different results when administered to a different group of white Afrikaner students. Regional variances furthermore differentiate the Afrikaner student population. For example, students in Potchefstroom and the Free State may be more conservative than UP students. The aim of this study is limited to providing a glimpse of the sampled respondents’ identification at one moment in time and to provide possible research questions for future studies concerned with white Afrikaner youth.

6.3 Mixed methods

Verschuren comments that the case study approach is invaluable because it is necessarily customised (Verschuren, 2003:121). It does not prescribe methodologically. Yin asserts that its unique strength is “its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations” (2003: 8). In this case, compiling a detailed picture of respondents’ identification required a multi-pronged approach to data collection. The chosen methodology accordingly draws on primary and secondary data, and includes both qualitative and quantitative primary data. Secondary data in the form of academic and media literature on white Afrikaners
and Afrikaner youth is drawn on as a general empirical and theoretical landscape against which to locate primary data results. This methodological approach is known as ‘mixed methods research’, or ‘triangulation’. It is based on the philosophically pragmatic goal of finding a middle-ground between traditional dualisms\(^{89}\) so as to offer moderate, common-sense workable solutions to solving problems (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004:18). With triangulation, qualitative and quantitative methods and data serve as “a vehicle for cross validation”, that is, via mixed methods methodology, social scientists can compare data with a view to validating results and conclusions (Jick, 1979:602).

In the present study, qualitative data served two purposes, namely to inspire the quantitative survey and to supplement its interpretation by contextualising the discussion and analysis of the findings. Secondary data in the form of the literature study presented in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 further served to augment qualitative and quantitative data collection, as well as its interpretation. It illuminated the research topic, influenced the choice of data collection methods and impacted on the result interpretation.

6.4 Attitudes as indicators of identification and nationalism

The opinions, perceptions and attitudes of respondents are interpreted as indicators of their identification with issues and concepts that represent white Afrikaner interests and culture. Bohner defines ‘attitude’ as representative of an evaluative response toward an object and as “a summary evaluation of an object of thought” (2002:5). ‘Attitude objects’ can include anything concrete, abstract, inanimate, people or groups (Bohner, 2002:5). Kriel utilises the widely accepted ABC model in her approach to Afrikaner attitudes, whereby attitudes consist of three components: A) cognitive components – forms of thought, such as ideas, beliefs, outlooks, values, and cognitive processes of interpretation and evaluation; B) affective components – the emotions, feelings and sentiments that the object of the attitude evokes; and C) conative components – behavioural dispositions, or ‘readiness for action’ (Kriel, 2006:52).

\(^{89}\) Traditional dualisms in academic debates include subjectivism vs. objectivism, rationalism vs. empiricism and qualitative vs. quantitative approaches.
Attitudes and identification are therefore intimately related. The expression of attitudes serves a symbolic function, since individuals affirm their core values through attitudes (Bohner, 2002:8). Attitudes furthermore serve to maintain social relationships and as such are integral to social identification (Bohner, 2002:8). Kriel illustrates that attitudes are valuable indicators of nationalist sentiment (Kriel, 2006:52). Nationalist attitudes involve thoughts, emotions and behaviour, since nationalism emanates from feelings of threat and insecurity, and exists as popular sentiment, through feelings of belonging, loyalty and pride, she argues (Kriel, 2006:63-64). Respondents’ attitudes therefore have to be explored in order to come to a conclusion regarding their identification and the possibility of feelings of nationalism amongst them.

6.5 The focus groups

The strength of qualitative research lies in its unstructured nature and the arguably comfortable opportunities it provides for respondents to express and explain their views (Struwig & Stead, 2001). Qualitative pilot work serves two important purposes: first, to explore the origins and natures of the attitudes in question, so as to clarify what exactly we wish to measure, and second, to obtain vivid narrated expressions of those attitudes that may be suitable for use in the survey (Oppenheim, 2002:57). Qualitative data grounds quantitative enquiries in context and revealed the themes that structured the survey in the present study. Following Oppenheim’s emphasis on careful pilot work before constructing a survey (2000:51,117), qualitative pilot work was conducted via focus groups. Several themes emerged from the focus groups sessions and these informed the content of the quantitative measure of identification – a survey.

Focus groups are especially suited for exploration of thoughts and feelings, since the group dynamics inherent in focus groups act as a catalytic factor in self-disclosure among respondents (Greeff, 2002:306). The friendly nature of focus group interviews encourages discussion, expression and comparison, which proves particularly useful when we need to ascertain the range of feelings and thinking amongst members of a specific population. Focus groups “allow the researcher to investigate a multitude of perceptions in a defined area of interest” (Greeff,
2002:306). The variety of responses obtained during qualitative enquiry inform and increase the accuracy (and hence reliability and validity) of the quantitative survey. In this case, the participants’ discussions delineated and substantiated the survey themes, as suggested earlier.

Volunteer participants for the focus group sessions were sought from the first-year (first semester) Psychology and Sociology Afrikaans language-speaking groups in the second quarter of 2008 with the permission of the Dean, respective Heads of Departments and the relevant lecturers. Participation in the focus groups was described as an opportunity to do two things. The researcher considered the approach to be honest and open. First, the study presented an opportunity to participate in a research project and second, participation in the focus groups was an opportunity for young white Afrikaners to voluntarily voice their concerns and opinions about certain matters. The study title and objectives were explained to the students, as well as the main themes to be raised in the focus groups. This detailed information arguably encouraged interested students to participate and a sufficient number of volunteers signed up to produce four focus groups ranging in size.

Four focus groups with between five and seven respondents each were conducted. All respondents identified themselves as first-year students. Male volunteers were few, however. Two of the groups included one male respondent each, the third included two male respondents and the fourth consisted of females only. Most respondents volunteered from the Sociology class and indicated Psychology and/or Criminology as their majors. Sociology students were more likely to volunteer for two reasons: they were familiar with the researcher and had participated in class lecture discussions on issues such as crime, affirmative action and language rights, which stimulated their interest in the topic of citizenship in post apartheid South Africa.

Greeff warns that group dynamics between respondents may influence data if respondents feel constrained, try to be polite and/or fit in with the norm (Greeff, 2000:305). However, respondents seemed eager to express their perceptions, experiences and frustrations. The following themes
emerged from the focus group sessions and are presented here as the questions that consequently informed the scaffolding of the survey:

- What does it mean to be an Afrikaner?
- How influential are the values and beliefs of parents and other family members?
- What elements constitute the white Afrikaner culture?
- How important is the Afrikaans language?
- What influence does globalisation have on Afrikaner youth?
- How important is religion and church attendance?
- What are respondents’ attitudes toward race matters and racialised redress policies?
- Is emigration (for a few years, or permanently) something respondents would consider and why?

The focus group sessions informed the construction of the survey. Consider for example the following. To answer the question ‘What does it mean to be an Afrikaner?’ focus group participants referred to a range of different things, such as their South African citizenship, their skin colour, the Afrikaans language, Afrikaner history, and their association with the African continent. Although these responses do not directly address the question of ‘what it means’ to be an Afrikaner, they illustrate that identification always takes place in relation to other identifications that either indicate what the Afrikaner is not or what he/she insists on being. The different identification options were captured in Question 37 of the survey, where respondents ranked their association with each one.

Since the themes that arose from the focus group discussions also emerged in the quantitative data, quotes from the focus groups are used in the analysis chapter to contextualise and augment the study’s conclusions.

6.6 The survey

Surveys can be impersonal and lack the nuanced information and detail produced by qualitative methods. However, surveys allow anonymity, consistent assessment, data analysis and interpretation. They can be administered to larger groups, and are usually reasonably affordable
The self-administered survey also helps to limit and perhaps even avoid interviewer bias and elicits high response rates from well-educated populations like university students (Groenewald, 2004:58). Struwig & Stead prescribe that the survey should provide clear instructions on how to answer questions; be divided into logical sections by subject; start with questions that are easy to answer; proceed from general to specific questions; ask personal or sensitive questions last; avoid jargon; employ the respondents’ vocabulary and minimise the number of questions to avoid respondent fatigue (2001:89-90).

The survey was scrutinised and reworked and the final version consisted of 21 pages (11 double-sided) excluding the front page ethical declaration which was signed by the respondents and the researcher. The survey was self-administered, since the researcher was present to address possible problems and questions.

Care was taken not to pose loaded questions or use loaded words, since “the problem of emotivity is a common problem in studies of attitude” (Groenewald, 2004:62) though the very nature of the enquiry may have rendered emotional responses inevitable. Open-ended and closed questions are suitable to different kinds of questions and each poses its own challenges, for example when it comes to the coding of surveys. Most of the survey items were closed questions, since these are easier and faster to fill out, hopefully avoid bias against less articulate respondents and generally offer greater accuracy and comparability (Groenewald, 2004:62-63). These closed-question items required respondents to indicate their agreement with the item statement. Even-numbered Likert scales did not offer the option for ‘neutral’ answers, so respondents were forced to indicate agreement or disagreement with each statement. Groenewald prefers Likert scales because they are more suitable to educated populations and are simple, flexible and relatively easy to compose (2004:65). Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with each statement. To avoid confusion, ‘1’ consistently represented no agreement, whilst the highest number on the scale (a

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‘4’ or ‘5’) represented very strong agreement. Every question included instructions about how to address the items included in it. Two of the more complicated questions also included example answers.

First, the reliability of the survey as a research instrument was determined. Given that the reliability of survey results is inversely related to the degree of variance in the sample (Groenewald, 2004:70), the reasonable reliability scores of the survey questions used in this study indicates a large degree of similarity in the present study’s sample. A stratified, strictly randomised sampling approach was not possible, therefore the high reliability scores of (most) of the survey questions does not render results generalisable to the white Afrikaner student population in general. In this case, ‘reliability’ refers to the internal consistency between the statements contained in each item. Items with high scores will probably elicit the same responses if the survey were administered to the same respondents.

The reliability of each item in the survey is expressed via the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, which is specifically suited to the Likert-scale items used in the present survey. On a continuum of 0 to 1, higher scores indicate more reliability. The reliability scores of the Likert-scale type questions are listed below (cases where slight alterations would improve scores are discussed in Chapter 7 with presented results.) Most of these reliability scores are good and indicate potential for scale development. Questions with lower scores are unlikely to produce the same results if re-administered to the respondents and must be re-worked before future use (See Table 6.3 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item number</th>
<th>Cronbach’s alpha</th>
<th>Item number</th>
<th>Cronbach’s alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>.420</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>.812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>.683</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>.736</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 (personal expression)</td>
<td>.867</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>.478</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

91 Thank you to the University of Pretoria’s Department of Statistics for entering and analysing the data using SPSS 15.0.
92 The conventional score that allows scale development is 0.7.
The following statistical calculations were run on the data:

**a. Effect size: Kendall’s Tau-b**

The concept ‘effect size’ expresses something similar to the better known ‘correlation’. Effect size expresses the practically significant relationship between two variables. Kendall’s Tau-b coefficient expresses effect sizes using nominal categorical data. It is specifically suitable for the calculation of nonparametric correlations (correlations between items with ordinal categorical scales), that is, the strength of associations between Likert-scale (ordinal) items such as those used in this study (Steyn, 2002). Negative associations are expressed as -1, and positive associations as 1. Zero indicates complete lack of association between the two variables. According to Steyn, a strong effect is usually expressed by a Tau-b of 0.5 or higher, while 0.3 represents a medium strength effect (2002:12).

**b. Cross tabulations**

Cross tabulations, or ‘crosstabs’ check for significant relationships between certain variables. The four demographic ‘group’ variables (unpacked in Chapter 7), were cross tabulated with the rest of the data to produce more insight regarding inter-sample variance. In order to facilitate statistical calculations, the category ‘non-traditional church respondents’ includes the 22 respondents who indicated they were not members of a church, as well as the other 23 who represent a wide variety of non-traditional churches. As discussed in Chapter 7, future research should aim for more refined statistical analysis in this regard. This point applies especially given that the cross tabulations revealed that sex, area of origin and living arrangement had little or no influence on respondents’ attitudes. In contrast, church (non-)membership consistently yielded statistically significant results.
6.7 Ethical concerns

It was emphasised to all respondents that their participation was highly valued, but voluntary. Respondents were not requested to reveal their student numbers at any stage and were reassured that their privacy would be respected. Each focus group respondent received a signed guarantee of confidentiality from the researcher. The researcher kept a copy of each respondent’s agreement to voluntary participation.

Respondents were fully informed of the nature of the study, in both the focus groups and the survey. No information was withheld. It was hoped that participant awareness of the study objectives, combined with the insider status of the researcher and somewhat familial relationship between researcher and respondents, would increase the honesty of their replies. Short debriefing sessions were conducted after the focus group sessions. Respondents seemed content with their contributions. The ethical declaration page attached to each survey contained clear statements on voluntary participation and anonymity and asked the respondent to indicate his/her voluntary participation. The statement guarantees that all information would be treated confidentially.

6.8 The researcher: Insider and outsider

This section deliberates on the implications of the researcher’s own status as ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ to the group of respondents and the white Afrikaner community. It may be argued that the researcher’s ethnic status as white Afrikaner poses the risk of bias. The political position of the researcher’s family, her educational history and religious upbringing may further influence interpretation of the study results. Jennifer Kenning argues it is impossible to completely remove the self-bias barrier between oneself and one’s intellectual work. In any good analytical evaluation, one should strive to maintain a fair balance of objectivity and subjectivity (Kenning, 2006:10). She advises analysts to acknowledge their own biases and prejudices, since “subjective thinking clouds the analytical process when it is denied” (Kenning, 2006:10). Honesty about one’s subjectivity facilitates openness to change, consideration of different perspectives and re-evaluation of priorities if necessary, all of which contribute to more objective analysis (Kenning,
2006:10). It has become customary to include information about how the researcher engaged the field and established rapport with respondents (Young, 2004:190). Such honesty about the implications of the research process and its components, including the researcher, contribute to the legitimacy of one’s work (Young, 2004:190).

Having a lot in common with respondents may grant a researcher ‘insider’ status, which may be more desirable than ‘outsider’ status. When respondents perceive a researcher as an outsider, this may have adverse effects on their participation and responses, as well as on the researcher’s interpretation of results. However, being an insider also implies certain emotional, subjective ties with one’s respondents and research topic, or at least a set of personal experiences and opinions that could steer the researcher’s methodology and result interpretation away from objectivity.

Young argues that the distinction between insider and outsider status should be understood as an analytical rather than an experiential divide (2004:192). Although insider status is crucial for research on issues like race and racism, such status is not easily attainable, never complete and hard to maintain (Young, 2004:192). In the present study, the researcher is an insider in some ways, and an outsider in others, for example, as one of the first-year students’ lecturers, the researcher was herself involved in first introducing contentious issues of post apartheid South Africa to the very students that participated in this study. Familiarity with the researcher may have therefore encouraged either honest responses, or responses that aimed to please the researcher in some way.

The researcher’s ethnic, linguistic and age similarity with respondents was especially obvious during the focus group interviews. At approximately four years older than most respondents and female, the researcher had gender in common with most respondents – 72.8% were females. The focus groups were all conducted in Afrikaans and participants seemed to experience the two principal features associated with insider status: intimacy and trustworthiness (Young, 2004:194). However, the researcher also felt frustration and confusion at times, when her presumed insider status did not produce the comfortable, valuable rapport expected, an experience documented by
Young (2004:194). Clearly, some respondents did not regard the researcher as an insider, perhaps due to her status as departmental staff member or of slightly older age, or perhaps ‘quiet’ participants were simply introverted students who prefer to listen rather than speak up.

Although Young refers to qualitative field work in his study dealing with the insider-outsider dichotomy, this dilemma also applies to quantitative research methods. Zaller and Feldman illustrate that, contrary to popular belief, surveys do not simply measure attitudes or opinion, they also shape and channel them (1992:582). The response effects on survey results commonly include factors like survey design and the order of survey items, but we must also consider the significant influence of the context in which the survey is filled out, as well as the contextual ‘knowledge’ that surrounds every survey item (Zaller and Feldman, 1992:582). Surveys elicit a question-answering process during which respondents 1) decide what the issue is; 2) canvas their minds for relevant thoughts; 3) combine ideas into a coherent attitude and 4) map the resulting attitude onto available response options (Zaller and Feldman, 1992:583). The context in which the survey was filled out included the researcher’s insider status, as she introduced the survey to all respondents personally in Afrikaans, within the university setting, as a project that is interested in researching their attitudes as white Afrikaner youth. However, the researcher’s outsider status may have been equally emphasised by the fact that the respondents’ lecturers openly supported her and the project. The researcher was therefore a young ethnic peer of the respondents, yet also aligned with the more commanding, professional dimension of the university.

6.9 Conclusion

The case study is not only suitable to the present study’s practical limitations, it also offers the flexibility to customise methodology to fit the case. In this case, multi-method triangulation was chosen in order to increase the validity of results, consisting of a comprehensive literature study, combined with qualitative and quantitative data. Finally, it is acknowledged that the researcher’s relative insider-status may have influenced the qualitative and quantitative results, as well as their subjective interpretation.
Chapter 7

Results and interpretation

Following the methodological reasoning set out in Chapter 6, this chapter first presents the focus group results in order to illustrate the themes that, in conjunction with those identified via the literature study, informed the quantitative data collection. Secondly, the quantitative results are presented and interpreted against the background of the relevant literature.

7.1 Focus group results

The focus groups were conducted for three interrelated reasons. First, the qualitative data from the focus group sessions confirm that the issues documented in existing literature are in fact relevant to the study population. For example, focus group participants confirmed that the Afrikaans language is central to their identity construction and that they hold protective attitudes toward their mother tongue, as suggested by inter alia Bornman (2010), Goldschmidt (2003) and Kriel (2006). Second, the focus group sessions also illuminated issues that have been less explored in existing literature, such as the role of church membership in white Afrikaner youth identity construction, as well as the notion of consumerism with regard to cultural elements like sport and Afrikaans language events. Third, the focus group data assisted with the identification of distinct themes which informed the content of the questionnaire and constitute the foundation of the quantitative findings.

The following themes emerged from the focus group discussions:

a. Church and Christianity Although respondents regularly referred to their religion and church membership, they also expressed awareness of the various debates associated with traditional churches. Very few, however, have dissociated from traditional churches and even fewer were willing to express their disillusionment in black-and-white terms. Overall, Christianity appeared to motivate a large number of their arguments on topical issues. For example, conservative focus-
group respondents ambiguously utilised notions of equality and choice to distance themselves from their religious view of homosexuality:

... ek dink dis dieselfde as om te rook, ne, soos die Bybel sê ook dis verkeerd maar as jy wil aanhou daarmee dan gaan jy aanhou daarmee. ...dit is jou keuse om dit te doen, ek stem nie saam met dit nie, maar dit is jou keuse. En ek dink nie sommer NG kerke gaan dit aanvaar nie, soos wat NG kerke nie selfmoord of rook, ok ek dink NG kerke het meer rook begin aanvaar, maar hulle aanvaar nie selfmoord nie want selfmoord is ook ‘n sonde wat jou keuse is. Verstaan, alles is dieselle, alles word oor dieselle kam geskeer. 93

b. Family Respondents expressed loyalty towards their families. Although they acknowledged differences between their parents and themselves, they were also keen to discuss similarities between themselves and older generations of Afrikaners. Many of the participants furthermore stated that they sympathised with their parents and attributed their parents’ views to their experiences of apartheid and its legal end. Overall the impression emerged that participants were close to their families and that they felt protective of them.

c. White Afrikaner history The topic of Afrikaner history elicited particularly strong responses from participants who were or had been members of the Voortrekker movement. These participants agreed that Afrikaner history was a key element of Afrikaner identity and that youth must be taught the Afrikaner version of this history. Afrikaner history was furthermore associated with ethno-cultural pride, a recurring theme in the quantitative findings.

d. Race and racism The topic of race and racism elicited enthusiastic conversation and lots of examples of related incidents from participants. Participants generally agreed that white Afrikaners are unfairly labelled as racists, when in fact hardly any of them are. Various avenues of blame for white racism were utilised, for example, blaming of the media, of government, of corruption and of other South Africans in general. The following quote reveals the particular combination of victimisation and blame that characterised participants’ narratives.

93 ... I think it is the same as to stop smoking, like the Bible also says it is wrong but if you want to continue with it you will. ... it is your choice to do it, I don't agree with it, but it is your choice. And I don't think NG churches are going to accept it easily, just as they don't accept suicide or smoking, ok I think NG churches have started accepting smoking more, but they don't accept suicide because suicide is also a sin that is your choice. Understand, everything is the same, everything is judged by the same standard.
Participant 1: As rassisme opkom, nee dis Afrikaners. Vat nou byvoorbeeld wat nou daar gebeur het by uhm, Bloemfontein, niemand het enigsins, wel ek bedoel miskien is daar nou rede daarvoor, maar dit word so baie meer uitgelig nou bo als anders, en dat almal anders se foute nou net eenkant toe geskuif word, maar rassisme word nou hierdie hoof ding, en dit word heeltemal –

Participant 2: Hand uit geruk….

Participant 3: Ja dit ruk heeltemal hand uit.

Participant 1: Voor dit was daar ook hoofblad nuus van mos wat by TUT gebeur het, waar die swartes rondgehardloop het en geskreeu het ‘Kill the Boers’ en... dit was niks, dit was een dag in die koerant, maar die Bloemfontein ding is nou uhm internasionaal, orals ...

Participant 2: Ja en vir elke, blanke situasie wat senoumar hand uitgeruk het, word daar dadelik iets soos gesoek waaraan rassisme gekoppel het, soos, o, hierdie het nou gebeur, maar o ok daar’s ‘n moontlikheid vir – en dan word dit daaraan gekoppel, en dit is baie baie onregverdig want dit skep hierdie stereotipe, en veral nou as mens nou kyk na daai studente, nou, net oordat dit maybe dalk ‘n paar studente was wat dalk rassisties iets bedoel het, nou is dit nie, alle wit, verstaan, studente is nou rassiste. En ek voel dit is uiers onregverdig. ...

Participant 1: Ja en jy kan ook nie verwag van mense om nie rassiste te wees as jy die heeltyd ook, verstaan negatief na hulle kyk nie, ek bedoel as jy nie mense ‘n kans wil gee om te wys, kyk ek is nie ‘n rassis nie, en die heeltyd daarmee aanhou, gaan jy nie ‘n positief in elkgeval kry nie.  

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94 Participant 1: When racism comes up, no it’s Afrikaners. Take for example what happened there at uhm Bloemfontein now, no-one had, well I mean maybe there is a reason for it now, but it is being emphasised so much more than everything else, and that everyone else’s mistakes are now just moved to the side, but racism is becoming the main thing now, and it is getting totally –

Participant 2: Out of hand...

Participant 3: Yes it is getting out of hand completely.

Participant 1: Before that there was also front page news of what happened at TUT, where the blacks ran around and shouted ‘Kill the Boers’ and... that was nothing it was in the papers for one day, but the Bloemfontein thing is now international, everywhere...

Participants 2: Yes and for every, for example white situation that got out of hand, it is immediately linked to racism in some way, like, oh, this has happened now, but there’s also a possibility for – and then it’s connected to that, and it is very, very unfair because it creates this stereotype, and especially now when one looks at those students, now, just because there were maybe a few students that meant something extremely racist, now it’s like, all white, you understand, students are now racist. And I feel that is extremely unfair.

Participant 1: Yes and you also can’t expect people not to be racist if you also, you understand, look at them negatively all the time. I mean, if you don’t want to give people a chance to show, look I am not a racist, and you keep doing that, you’re not going to get a positive [reaction] anyway.
e. Affirmative action  Affirmative action emerged as one of the main scapegoats for white racism. It was generally labelled as unfair and as reverse discrimination. Participants were particularly adamant that they had nothing to do with apartheid, but they did not mention how they are benefitting from the long-term effects of apartheid.

A male focus group participant elaborated on his resistance to affirmative action:

... ek is baie trots om te kan sê ek is Afrikaans en ek’s blank, en, jy weet, al my voorvaders en hulle geskiedenis, maar ek voel, asof, die land nie rérig meer spacie maak vir Afrikaanssprekendes nie. Uhm, ja, ek voel asof, ek meen, soos daai artikel ook sê, ons is, of ons is seker gebore in apartheid, maar van ons kan niks daarvan onthou nie, maar nou moet ons, regstellende aksie, nou moet ons daaronder ly. Dan kry ons nie werk nie, en dit is alles, ek meen, as ’n swart persoon slimmer is as ek, dan gee ek rérig nie om dat hy my plek kry nie, mar ek voel net nie dis regverdig dat hulle voordeel kry nie.95

The above excerpt illustrates several characteristics of resistant whiteness, such as the strategy of drawing on democratic values of fairness and non-discrimination to justify white privilege and to do so without reference to race (Steyn and Foster, 2008:29,33).

f. Emigration  Given participants’ strong feelings with regard to affirmative action, one would expect that they would use affirmative action as a reason to leave South Africa permanently. However, crime was the main reason underpinning threats to emigrate. Nevertheless, at the same time participants also emphasised that they do not want to emigrate. Although the participants’ answers below show that they agreed that they would emigrate if they had to in order to source a safer existence, a certain melancholy coloured their discussions on this topic, revealing a degree of affection for their country, whilst other participants stated they would never emigrate because they have ‘the right’ to live in South Africa.

Participant 1: Ek dink half, jy weet, wat gaan ek eendag doen vir my kinders? Ek gaan nie hulle buite in die tuin in die bome kan laat speel nie want, dit is nie veilig nie. Dit gaan net nie veilig wees nie, so dan gaan soek ’n mens die beste opsie, wat dalk nie hier gaan wees nie.

95 I’m very proud to be able to say that I am Afrikaans and I’m white, and, you know, all of my ancestors and their history. But I feel like, the country doesn’t really make space for Afrikaans speakers anymore. Uhm, yes, I feel like, I mean, like that article also says, we are, or we were all born in apartheid, but we can’t remember anything of it. But now we have to. Affirmative action, now we have to suffer under that. Then we don’t find jobs, and that is all. I mean, if a black person is smarter than I am, then I really don’t mind that he gets my spot, but I just don’t feel it’s fair that they get an advantage.
Participant 2: Ja ek dink as mens kon kies, sou jy hier wou bly, (almal stem saam), mens wil nie eintlik ‘n skuif maak nie. Jy wil hier bly want jy‘t hier grootgeword, jy ken die land, dis ‘n mooi land, uhm, (almal beaam dit), en jy hou van die mense, die “communities” is baie sterk, maar ek dink wanneer dit kom by, wat is die beste vir jou... (almal stem saam)

Researcher: En wat dink jy?

Participant 3: Ek dink, die meeste mense van ons ouderdom het al by hierdie punt gekom waar jy soos hierdie - wat noem ‘n mens dit? Kulturele identiteit prysgee vir ‘n meer makliker, veiliger bestaan.96

g. Afrikaner group membership The question of what it means to be an Afrikaner encouraged participants to think about what they identify with. In addition to the themes mentioned above, participants expressed views that reveal that they experience their identity as ethno-cultural, and exclusively so. Identification with their collective identity as white Afrikaans speakers was accompanied by statements that revealed a strong notion of ‘us v.s them’, thereby excluding all ethnic others from their in-group. This male focus group participant elicited strong agreement from other participants when he conceptually pitted ‘us’ against ‘them’ – those who induce white guilt, expecting remorse and redress – with dismay:

... nou, veral nou, is dit asof daar nogsteeds van ons verwag word om terug te staan... Hierdie eed, ‘ek is so jammer’, ...tot wanneer gaan ons jammer sê?97

Participants’ perception of the position of white Afrikaners in the post apartheid context clearly influences participants’ own identification.

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96 Participant 1: I think, you know, what am I going to do for my children one day? I’m not going to be able to let them play outside in the trees in the garden because it is not safe. It just won’t be safe. So then one looks for the safest option, which probably won’t be here.

Participant 2: Yes, I think that if one could choose, you would want to live here (everyone agrees) One doesn’t really want to make a move, you want to stay here because you grew up here, you know the country, it’s a beautiful country, (uhm) (everyone agrees), and you like the people, the communities are very strong, but I think that when it comes to, what is the best for you... (everyone agrees).

Researcher: And what do you think?

Participant 3: I think, most people our age have come to this point where you, like, what do you call it? Give up this cultural identity for an easier, safer existence.

97 Now, especially now, it is like it is still expected of us to stand back... This oath, ‘I am so sorry’, ... ‘till when are we going to keep apologising?
h. The Afrikaans language  Most participants expressed strong opinions about the status and maintenance of the Afrikaans language. Afrikaans-medium education emerged as an important link between Afrikaner culture and history. This female respondent explained that youth should learn appreciation for Afrikaner history and culture at school. She suggested that it is easier for youth to identify as Afrikaners if they are taught how to do so in school.

This particular quotation reveals the interconnected nature of Afrikaner history, culture and the Afrikaans language, and that participants felt a certain degree of concern over the meaning of the reduction in institutionalised Afrikaans for Afrikaners’ future, both as Afrikaans speakers and as a people.

i. Cultural consumption: Music, events, sport and food  Despite their concerns and frustrations, participants readily noted elements of Afrikaner culture that they regularly choose to consume. Most notable amongst these were Afrikaans music, rugby and foods which they claimed were ‘Afrikaner’ by nature, such as braaivleis. Focus group participants confirmed that cultural consumption of Afrikaans music and pride in Afrikaans music bolstered their identification as white Afrikaners:

... ok ek was ’n Voortrekker gewees, maar buite dit wou ek nie rêrig veel met Afrikanerskap te doen gehad het nie, want my ouer susters het my baie beïnvloed ... en toe ewe skielik toe gebeur dit net dat, daar Afrikaanse musiek uitgekom het wat, mense het net ewe skielik Afrikaanse musiek begin luister, en...99

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98 I think one already has an instinct inside of you that makes you want to belong. You want to belong to a culture, a generation. I don’t think Afrikaner history is still being taught in schools, so I think there most of the, at least, sections of Afrikaans speakers, or Afrikaners, feel that they don’t belong anywhere and sometimes that brings out a, what do you call it, rebellion, because they feel that there is an imbalance and they don’t know why. And I feel that it is because we are no longer taught, we no longer learn to appreciate our culture and history.

99 ...ok I was a Voortrekker, but besides that I didn’t really want much to do with Afrikanership because my older sister had influenced me a lot ... and then suddenly it just happened that, Afrikaans music emerged that, people just suddenly started
Afrikaans music expresses the attitudes of many Afrikaner youth. This male participant described the band *Fokofpolisiekar* as a “revelation” and another added associated them with the idea of an ‘Afrikaans truth’ – an Afrikaner truth:

> Hulle is die ultimate van Afrikaanse waarheid, hulle sê alles soos wat dit is en hulle gee nie om nie ... ek kan nie genoeg van hulle kry nie. \(^{100}\)

According to this male focus group participant, rugby represents Afrikaner passion:

> En ons is baie erg oor ons rugby. Jy weet, ander is nogal, maar hulle is soortvan.... Dis nie vir hulle so groot issue nie, maar die oomblik as ek vir jou sê ek’s ‘n Bloubul en jy’s ‘n Shark dan gaan jy my aanvat daaroor. Jy gaan my doodmaak! \(^{101}\)

Participants actively choose to support other expressions of Afrikaner culture as well, such as music festivals. In conclusion, the above themes raised numerous questions about the nature of issues that influence white Afrikaner youth identification in the post apartheid context. The focus group sessions also brought forth more nuanced issues that are yet to be explored in existing literature, such as the close relationship between youth, their parents and their respective church membership.

### 7.2 Survey results and interpretation

This section unpacks the demographic variables used in the statistical analysis of the quantitative data and proceeds to present the data under six sub-headings.

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\(^{100}\) They are the ultimate in Afrikaans truth, they say everything the way it is and they don’t care... I can’t get enough of them.

\(^{101}\) And we are very passionate about our rugby. You know... others are also ... but they’re sort of.... It’s not such a big deal to them, but the moment I tell you that I am a Blue Bull and you are a Shark you will take me on about that. You will kill me!
### 7.2.1 Introduction

The following demographic characteristics of the sample were converted into statistical variables and used to run cross tabulations: sex, living arrangement, church membership and area of origin. Table 7.2.1A below illustrates that most respondents were females. The majority were members of a traditional Afrikaner church and grew up in a city or urban area, whilst about half of respondents still lived with their parents at the time of data collection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic variable</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex (n=151)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living arrangement (n=150)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence/commune</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents/family</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own apartment</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church membership (n=148)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Afrikaner church</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional Afrikaner church</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a church member</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of origin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town/rural area</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of 85.1% of respondents are members of a church (n=148). When church membership was converted to a statistical variable, two categories were created within this variable based on respondents’ indicated church membership. These two categories are based on a distinction between traditional Afrikaner church members, labelled ‘Traditional church respondents’, and the rest, labelled ‘Non-traditional church and other respondents’. The latter group includes members of all non-traditional churches, as well as non-church members. It may be argued that the conservative nature of the Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk (APK) justifies its members’ inclusion in the ‘Traditional church respondents’ group. However, since only 5 respondents (3.4% in total)
indicated membership of the APK, it was decided to exclude it from the ‘Traditional church respondents’ category. However, given the significant role that church (non-)membership plays in this study’s findings, future researchers should consider refining their statistical approach to church membership by creating more nuanced categories within this variable. Those respondents who do not belong to one of the traditional Afrikaner churches were the minority and were therefore statistically lumped together as ‘Non-traditional and non-religious respondents’. Due to spatial limitations, this group is simply referred to as ‘Non-traditional respondents’ throughout the following chapters. Future research on the topic of Afrikaner youths’ religious orientation should refine statistical variables and analysis in such a way as to account for more nuanced differences between various religious orientations.

Church membership emerged as the most significant statistical variable in the results. While church membership consistently produced statistically significant results, the other three variables only produced significant results occasionally. Respondents’ sex, living arrangements and areas of origin played a minor role in their attitudes toward the issues raised in the survey. The prominence of Christianity is also reflected in the focus group data, which illustrates how participants regularly invoke religious rhetoric to justify their viewpoints.

The following sections unpack the results of the survey in the order in which the various themes are analysed in Chapter 8.

7.2.2 Traditional Afrikaner churches and the family

The majority of respondents and parents identify themselves as Christians. A marginal percentage is ‘religious.’ The Afrikaans term used in the survey, ‘gelowig,’ simply means ‘to believe’ and hence includes the option of subscribing to any other religion e.g. Muslim, or ‘spiritual.’ Admittedly, provision of both ‘Christian’ and ‘religious’ as options in this survey question may have created confusion amongst respondents, yet the fact that the majority clearly opted for the more specific option – Christianity – reinforces the finding that Christianity remains highly prevalent amongst the respondents. Presented in a bar chart, it is clear that alternative religions, different forms of
spirituality and other options are not an evident choice for respondents and their parents (see Graph 7.2.2A).

From the bar chart below, a direct positive relationship is observable between parents’ and respondents’ religious status. Almost all parents are Christian, as are their children. It is evident that atheist parents’ children have not chosen to explore religious avenues. More respondents than parents are reportedly agnostic, perhaps an indicator of a youthful, yet slight move away from traditional churches. Chart 7.2.2B reflects that two-thirds of all respondents (62.7%) belong to one of the traditional Afrikaner churches and 46.6% specifically to the DRC (n=148).

**Graph 7.2.2A Religious orientation of respondents and parents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Religious /gelowig</th>
<th>Atheist</th>
<th>Agnostic</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mothers (n=151)</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fathers (n=150)</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents (n=151)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.2.2C below illustrates that membership of a traditional Afrikaner church engenders a fond relationship with Afrikaner history and culture. This finding suggests that for traditional-church respondents specifically, knowledge and awareness of being a white Afrikaner is an important part of their identity construction.

**Table 7.2.2C Afrikaner history in personal cultural expression**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Agree that Afrikaner history is important part of personal cultural expression</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional-church respondents</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>p=0.013</td>
<td>n=145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional church respondents</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than 90% of respondents consider family fellowship and socialising to be a fundamental part of their personal and general cultural expression. Interestingly, most of these respondents attend the same church congregation’s services as their parents.\(^{102}\)

\(^{102}\)Table 8.1.2C shows that respondents interpreted the two questions in Item 51 in different ways – those who provided reason 1 referred to their living circumstances – they do not live with their parents in Pretoria and hence do not attend the same services as their parents. Respondents who provided reasons 3 and 5 also focused on the services – they find the services their parents attend boring and old fashioned. Those who provided reasons 2 and 4 interpreted the question as asking whether they attend the same church as their parents. While the poor and hence confusing formulation of this item produced a wide variety of reasons for why respondents do not attend the same church or church services as their parents, it does not clarify whether those who do not attend the same services as their parents actually do attend the same church’s services as their parents.
The majority of respondents value family, but traditional-church respondents are more likely to accept their parents’ religious preferences as their own (see Tables 7.2.2A, 7.2.2B and 7.2.2C). In addition, most respondents who attend a different church’s services do so for practical reasons. Few respondents disagree with the values of their parents’ church. In fact, 87% of all respondents describe Christianity as part of their cultural expression. Traditional-church respondents tend to drift toward the extreme by agreeing that Christianity and church attendance are fundamental parts of their personal cultural expression (Table 7.2.2D). Table 7.2.2E below shows that traditional-church respondents are more likely to attend the same church congregation’s service as do their parents. Table 7.2.2F illustrates that most respondents who attend a different congregation’s services do so for practical reasons, as opposed to religious or intellectual disagreement with their parents, suggesting that there is a relationship between respondents’ and their families’ religious orientation and preferences.

**Table 7.2.2D Family fellowship and socialising as part of personal and general cultural expression**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Cultural Expression (n=148)</th>
<th>General Cultural Expression (n=151)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.2.2E Do you attend the same church congregation’s service as your parents?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you attend the same church congregation’s services as your parents?</th>
<th>Traditional-church respondents</th>
<th>Non-traditional church respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes %</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No %</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>p=0.035 (n=122)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.2.2F Why respondents do not attend the same congregations’ services as their parents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you attend the same church congregation’s services as your parents? (n=126)</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>60.3%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If not, why don’t you attend the same church’s services as your parents? (n=43)</td>
<td>No 39.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because we live in different towns</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t agree with my parents’ church in every way</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I attend the youth service</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel I get a clearer message from another church</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The services my parents attend are boring</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My parents do not attend church because they feel it is being Anglicised</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table 7.2.2G and 7.2.2H illustrate, traditional-church respondents are more committed to the church than their non-traditional and non-religious counterparts. At first, this data may seem to suggest unwavering, uncritical acceptance of traditional Afrikaner churches and their views. However, two points emerge that question such an assumption. First, Rule and Mncwango note a documented trend among South Africans to over-report church attendance due to ‘social desirability factors’. They comment that in “an increasingly secularising and individualising society, it is interesting that so many apparently feel the need to say that they attend church when they do not” (2010:190). The centrality of traditional-church membership to respondents’ identification may therefore be a manifestation of a need amongst them to publicly report regular church attendance, especially considering that respondents strongly associate church-attendance with Christianity (Tau-b=0.641, p=0.000, n=149).
Second, Table 7.2.2H below illustrates that about half of traditional-church respondents have the desire to experience other churches, and that half disagree that Afrikaner churches are the foundation of Afrikanerdom. In contrast, non-traditional church respondents are likely to be happy with current religious orientation and to have clear, negative views on the role of Afrikaner churches in Afrikanerdom.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Traditional Afrikaans churches are the foundation of Afrikanerdom’</th>
<th>Traditional-church respondents</th>
<th>Non-traditional church respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree %</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree %</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>p=0.016 (n=123)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘I currently have a desire to experience a variety of churches’</th>
<th>Traditional-church respondents</th>
<th>Non-traditional church respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree %</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree %</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>p=0.006 (n=125)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings suggest that traditional-church respondents are aware, albeit to varying degrees, of their own and their church’s social position in post apartheid South Africa. Compared to 26% of non-traditional church respondents, only 9% of traditional-church respondents agreed that churches should accept homosexuality (p=.049, n=147). The hypothesis emerges that traditional-church respondents may use their church membership to justify politically unacceptable viewpoints. For example, they may argue that their church disapproves of multi-racial congregations, or of homosexuality, even though these religious prescriptions contradict liberal post apartheid legislation.

### 7.2.3 Acceptable exclusivism: The culture euphemism

The following results reveal strong ethno-cultural in-group identification amongst respondents, and that this identification is mediated by the use of ‘culture’ as a euphemism for exclusivist attitudes. The notion of culture elicits exclusivist attitudes more clearly than the notion of race does. Due to the post apartheid era fear of being labelled as racist, the use of racial labels in
questions elicited ambiguous responses. In conjunction with the finding that respondents identify more readily with labels that offer ethno-cultural boundaries such as language and race, the hypothesis emerges that respondents rely on culture to cope with and to negotiate difference in general and their exclusivist attitudes in particular.

Table 7.2.3A shows that strong identification as South African is first and foremost linguistically defined, and secondly via the ethnic term ‘Afrikaner’.

**Graph 7.2.3A Identification with identity labels**

*These percentages represent the combined scores of association with ‘strong’ and ‘very strong’ association with each label.

Note the gap in association between the top four labels and bottom/last five. More respondents identify with racial and linguistically exclusive labels than with broad inclusive labels. This trend is evidenced in Table 7.2.3B, which shows that respondents are likely to buttress their identification as ‘African’ and ‘Afrikaner’ with the racial signifier ‘white’.
Table 7.2.3B White Africans and Afrikaners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associated labels</th>
<th>Tau-b score (effect size)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. ‘African’ and ‘White African’ (n=146)</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>p=0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ‘Afrikaner’ and ‘White Afrikaner’ (n=146)</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>p=0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Traditional-church respondents, who may or may not be experiencing a trend toward secularisation, identify significantly more with exclusive labels than non-traditional church respondents (Table 7.2.3C below). Although few respondents associate with the label ‘Boer’, traditional-church respondents were a lot more likely to identify strongly with it, indicating once again their stronger ties with white Afrikaner history and notions that have become frowned upon in post apartheid South Africa.

Table 7.2.3C Church groups’ strong identification with exclusive labels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Traditional-church</th>
<th>Non-traditional church</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. I am a white Afrikaner (n=144)</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
<td>p=0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. I am an Afrikaner (n=144)</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
<td>p=0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. I am a Boer (n=143)</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>p=0.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of Question 39 (reliability score of .683) are displayed in Table 7.2.3D, which arguably illustrates that exclusivist identification also manifests in respondents’ attitudes toward the old and new South African flags. Only 51.7% of respondents identify strongly with the new flag, which represents democracy and transformation, while a third (33.8%) feel neutral (see Table 7.2.3D). This result may indicate a measure of detachment from post apartheid South Africa and its symbolic flag. Traditional-church respondents’ exclusivist identification reveals a distinctly historical character, with more sentimentality about the old flag despite the stigma attached to it. The Tau-b association between the two old flags is furthermore strong (0.606, p=0.000, n=151), but weak when the new flag is part of the equation, suggesting that the old flags represent an era that is tangible in some way for the majority of respondents. This finding is supported by the fact that, in Graph 7.2.3E non-traditional church respondents are more likely to have negative feelings toward the old flag (Graph 7.2.3E).
Table 7.2.3D Association with old and new South African flags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag Description</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oranje-Blanje-Blou / “Ou” vlag (n=151)</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vierkleur/Ou ZAR/Transvaal vlag (n=151)</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-1994 ‘nuwe’ Suid-Afrikaanse vlag (n=151)</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = Ek voel hierdie vlag behoort verban te word / I feel this flag should be banned
2 = Ek hou nie van hierdie vlag nie / I don’t like this flag
3 = Ek voel neutraal oor hierdie vlag / I feel neutral about this flag
4 = Ek voel aangetrokke tot hierdie vlag / I am attracted to this flag
5 = Ek voel baie sentimenteel oor hierdie vlag / I feel very sentimental about this flag

Graph 7.2.3E Identification with old South African flag*

![Graph showing identification with old South African flag]

* n=147, p=0.000

Although the above results hint at exclusivist attitudes and less-than pro-liberal attitudes amongst traditional-church respondents, direct inquisition on the topic of in-group membership, phrased in terms of inclusivity, failed to produce results that affirm these notions. Although 51% of respondents initially agreed that Afrikaners are ‘whites only’, ambiguity characterises their
responses, as Table 7.2.3F below illustrates. The question of in-group membership elicited indefinite opinions when phrased in racial terms.

**Table 7.2.3F Who is included in the “Afrikaners”?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Fully agree</th>
<th>Total agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. “Afrikaners” include only white Afrikaans speaking persons (n=151)</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. “Afrikaners” include brown (so-called Coloured) Afrikaans speaking persons (n=151)</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. “Afrikaners” include black Afrikaans speaking persons (n=151)</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following mathematical logic, a total of 49%, or less than half of the respondents should have agreed with (b) and (c) that ‘Afrikaners’ include brown and/or black Afrikaans speakers, but a number of respondents responded ambiguously. This ambiguity manifests as the fact that the negative associations of statement (a) with (b) and (c) respectively, are of medium-strength only, when logically speaking they should have been very strong, thereby indicating clear opinions.

**Table 7.2.3G Associations between “Who is included in the ‘Afrikaners’?” items**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associated statements: ‘Afrikaners’ include ….. Afrikaans speaking persons.</th>
<th>Tau-b score (effect size)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) … only white … + (b) brown (so-called Coloured) … (n=151)</td>
<td>-0.424</td>
<td>p=0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) … only white … + (c) black … (n=151)</td>
<td>-0.459</td>
<td>p=0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) … black + (b) … brown (so-called Coloured) … (n=151)</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>p=0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the reliability score for this item is a nonsensical -1.324, but would improve to a reasonable .616 if statement (c) (“Afrikaners” include black Afrikaans speaking persons) were removed. The removal of (b) (“Afrikaners” include brown (so-called Coloured) Afrikaans speaking persons) would make no difference to the reliability score. Although Table 7.2.3G above illustrates that respondents are likely to lump ‘black’ and ‘brown’ together, phrasing the question in inclusive terms and/or the explicitly racial terms confound the reliability of this particular question. Table 7.2.3H below shows that respondents could express their opinions more clearly when statements were worded in exclusivist and cultural terms, as opposed to inclusive, racial terms.
Table 7.2.3H Differences between the white Afrikaners and other South African cultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. The difference between the Afrikaner and English cultures in South</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa is very prominent (n=150)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The difference between the Afrikaner culture and other cultures in</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa is very prominent (n=150)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The difference between the Afrikaner culture and black peoples’</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultures will always be a key issue (n=150)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of respondents emphasise the distinctiveness of Afrikaners and their links to culture, a trend that alludes to exclusivity rather than inclusivity. Table 7.2.3I below further illustrates the salience of culture as a euphemism for difference. Although few respondents agree that different races should have and attend separate churches, traditional-church respondents are somewhat more likely to agree to such an arrangement when phrased in cultural terms. While disagreement with the racially-worded statement in Table 7.2.3I is generally strong and clear, both church groups are divided when the same statement is worded in terms of culture.

Table 7.2.3I Race, culture and separate churches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Different races should have and attend their own churches’ (n=151)</td>
<td>74.8%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Different cultural groups should have and attend their own churches’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional-church respondents</td>
<td>Traditional-church respondents</td>
<td>Non-traditional church respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree %</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree %</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>p=0.041 (n=123)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Importantly, these findings confirm the salience of culture as a euphemism for difference and exclusivism (see Table 7.2.3I). Traditional-church respondents are likely to agree that different cultural groups should have and attend their own churches, but the same question worded in racial terms evoked strong general disagreement. Exclusivism, even in church, is therefore easier to justify in cultural terms, especially for traditional-church respondents. The trend here therefore suggests that respondents shy away from racially labelling and excluding racial others, however this does not negate the presence of subtle, hidden racism. More specifically, statistically
significant results indicate that membership to a traditional Afrikaner church encourages respondents to rely on culture to euphemise their attitudes toward intra-group differences.

### 7.2.4 Race matters

Except for the data presented in Table 7.2.4D, the results on racism in the tables below are all derived from Question 62 of the survey, which scored a strong reliability coefficient of .735. Table 7.2.4A below summarises respondents’ beliefs with regard to racism in South Africa. The findings on race and racism illuminate the presence of subtle racism in respondents’ attitudes. Subtle racism is blamed on external, structural agents and characterised in this case by defensive attitudes.

#### Table 7.2.4A Respondents’ opinions on racism in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Black people often accuse others of racism, to their own advantage (n=148)</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Black people stereotype all white people as racists (n=147)</td>
<td>( \tau_b = 0.626, \ p=0.000 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Only some white people are racist (n=148)</td>
<td>93.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Black people are more racist than white people (n=148)</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The strong association between statements (b) and (c) arguably illustrates something of a backlash against respondents’ feelings of being stereotyped as racist. Racial divides slide out from behind ‘cultural’ identification with ease when accusatory tones present themselves to respondents via the notion of racism (see Table 7.2.4A). While the combination of inclusivity and race in Table 7.2.3F produced incoherent results, the exclusive nature of the racialised statements in Table 7.2.4A elicited easy agreement. Respondents who agree that black people stereotype all white people as racists are very likely to agree that only some white people are racist. Table 7.2.4B below illustrates that the majority of respondents are willing to admit that they feel racist ‘sometimes’, for which they tend to blame external objective structures and agents, rather than their own thinking or families.
Table 7.2.4B Motivators of racist attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal motivators for racism</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My family’s racism makes it hard for me not to think in a racist way (n=148)</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural motivators for racism</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action contributes to racism amongst white people (n=151)</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption in the government encourages racist thinking in me (n=147)</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The high crime rate in South Africa makes me feel racist sometimes (n=144)</td>
<td>81.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The presence of race everywhere in our society encourages racist thinking (n=148)</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2.4C below suggests that traditional church membership encourages respondents to rely on structural scapegoats such as the ‘high crime rate’ and ‘corruption in government’ to blame for their own racism.

Table 7.2.4C Church groups on crime, corruption and racism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘The high crime rate in South Africa makes me feel racist sometimes’</th>
<th>Traditional-church respondents</th>
<th>Non-traditional church respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree %</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree %</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>p=0.019 (n=144)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Corruption in the government encourages racist thinking in me’</td>
<td>Traditional-church respondents</td>
<td>Non-traditional church respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree %</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree %</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>p=0.002 (n=147)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Forty-four point seven percent of respondents report a large difference between their own and their parents’ attitudes toward race. One-hundred-and-thirteen respondents provided short explanations for the difference (or similarity) between their own and their parent’s attitudes toward race matters.

The relative lack of direct acceptance of being racist as presented in Table 7.2.4D suggests that a fair number of respondents claim that they and their parents are not racist, or at least that they themselves are not racist. In fact, most of the ‘Yes’ answers (45.2%) admit outright that parents are racist, and a minority (6.2%) hint at parental racism via reference to their parents’ experiences of the past.
Table 7.2.4D Respondents’ and parents’ attitudes toward race matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is there a difference between your own and your parents’ attitudes toward race matters? (n=113)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO – open to interpretation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, not a big difference because they raised me, so we think in the same way</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO – parents and I are not racist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, not a big difference – my parents and I are not racist</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, not a big difference, we think apartheid is over and that we should move on</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO – parents and I are racist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, no difference because we are all racist</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES – parents are more racist than I am</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, a big difference because my parents are racist and have difficulty understanding that I am not like them in that way.</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes a small difference, my parents are a little racist but I understand why and do not blame them</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, a small difference because they grew up in a different time and had different experiences of race matters</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES – I am more racist than parents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes a small difference, because I am more racist than my parents</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data in Table 7.2.4E below confirms this trend: 63.3% of respondents do not consider themselves to be racist at all. It follows that 36.7% of respondents therefore admit to being racist to some extent, a figure similar to the percentage of respondent families that are reportedly racist (40%). Non-traditional church respondents are significantly more likely to agree that they are not racist, thereby distancing themselves from the notion of racism.

Table 7.2.4E Personal and family racism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My family is racist (n=148)</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not racist at all (n=147)</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional-church respondents</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional church respondents</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although racial redress policies or ‘affirmative action’ is often cited as justification for racism, and Table 7.2.4F below illustrates that white males have been the primary target of racial redress policies, it also reflects that less than half of respondents’ family members have been affected by affirmative action policies between 1994 and 2008.
Table 7.2.4F Family members affected by affirmative action after 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have any of your family members been affected by affirmative action? (n=149)</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If yes, who has been affected? (May indicate more than one)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My father</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One/both of my grandparents</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My mother</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers and/or male cousins</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both parents</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father, uncles and grandfather(s)</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nevertheless, all respondents had strong opinions on affirmative action. Table 7.2.4G below reflects agreement with statements on affirmative action. Cronbach’s coefficient for this Question is 0.88, indicating reliable results.

Table 7.2.4G Affirmative action is unfair because...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affirmative action is unfair because...</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Fully agree</th>
<th>Total agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action is morally justifiable</td>
<td>88.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. ...it is based on racial distinctions</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ...it does not consider merit</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. ...it discriminates against people who were not involved in apartheid</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. ...it negatively affects the country’s progress and growth</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. ...services and public maintenance are negatively affected</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>70.7%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. ...it leads skilled people to leave the country</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As illustrated in Table 7.2.4H below, the strong associations between the above statements arguably indicate that collectively they constitute a cohesive discourse which discredits racialised redress through a focus on its purported negative consequences and ‘unfair’ biases. Although less than half of respondents’ family members have actually been affected by affirmative action, almost all respondents hold strong opinions on this practice and evidently perceive it as a kind of onslaught on whites, which they use to bolster the notion of white victimhood.
Table 7.2.4H Associations between affirmative action statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Kendall’s tau-b</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a &amp; b</td>
<td>0.602</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b &amp; c</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b &amp; d</td>
<td>0.612</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b &amp; e</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b &amp; f</td>
<td>0.588</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c &amp; d</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c &amp; e</td>
<td>0.577</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d &amp; e</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d &amp; f</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e &amp; f</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2.4I below illustrates that the majority of respondents agree that affirmative action is ‘reverse apartheid’ that victimises whites and that government should stop implementing it.

Table 7.2.4I Affirmative action, government and racism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affirmative action, government and racism</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action is ‘reverse apartheid’ (n=150)</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government should stop implementing affirmative action (n=151)</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action contributes to racism among whites (n=150)</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action contributes to racism among people of colour (n=151)</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results on redress policies convey unanimous agreement with the notion that whites are unfairly disadvantaged by such policies. In accordance with previously noted results in this regard, respondents blame racial redress for facilitating racism, not only among whites, but also among other South Africans. It is also often noted as a reason for emigration.

7.2.5 Emigration

Only 7.9% of respondents indicated that most of their close and other family members no longer reside in South Africa. With regard to close family members (defined in the questionnaire as mothers, fathers, sisters and brothers), 6% of respondents indicated that they had a close family member who was residing overseas permanently at the time and 6.7% of respondents had one close family member who was living abroad temporarily at the time. Although 60% of
respondents’ parents have encouraged them to emigrate if they could, 31.8% don’t plan to emigrate at all, and 37.1% will only stay abroad temporarily (Table 7.2.5B).

Table 7.2.5A Parents and emigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My parents think I should stay in SA and make a difference (n=149)</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My parents encourage me to emigrate when I get the chance (n=150)</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t think that we should emigrate, but that we should stay here to make a difference in South Africa (n=150)</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of respondents who are open to permanent emigration is substantially smaller than the number of parents who reportedly encourage their children to emigrate if they could. Although the term ‘emigration’ by definition implies permanent exodus from one’s country, it was presented in the questionnaire as either being ‘temporary’ or ‘permanent’, in order to distinguish between the youthful desire to gain a few years’ experience abroad, on one hand, and the desire to leave South Africa on a permanent basis, on the other. Table 7.2.5B below illustrates that only 29.8% of respondents plan to emigrate on a permanent basis.

Table 7.2.5B Respondents’ plans to emigrate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I plan to emigrate... (n=149)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes, permanently</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes, temporarily</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t plan on emigrating</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I emigrate, I will definitely return to South Africa permanently (n=148)</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents who answered ‘yes’ to the question of whether they plan to emigrate (including ‘yes, permanently’ and ‘yes, temporarily’) were asked to indicate which of the following reasons for emigration they identified with (they could select more than one reason).

Table 7.2.5C Reasons for respondents’ plans to emigrate*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I want to travel and see the world.</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I want to gain experience.</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The crime rate in South Africa is worrying.</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are more job opportunities overseas.</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One is not disadvantaged by affirmative action overseas.</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I want to live and work in a more Western environment. 19.9%
Costs of living are too high in South Africa. 11.3%

*n=101

Table 7.2.5C illustrates that individualist reasons, such as visiting other countries and gaining experience in the process, are the most popular motivations for emigration. ‘Structural’ issues with underlying connotations to race and power, such as crime and employment are also push factors. Respondents nonetheless also confirmed a variety of reasons not to emigrate (Table 7.2.5D), which suggests that they are attached to South Africa in ways that exercise a pull which is stronger than the combination of existing push factors.

### Table 7.2.5D Family and friends’ reasons to stay in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Want to stay’: Family and friends’ reasons to stay in South Africa</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t want to leave their family and support networks behind.</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They don’t want to leave ‘cultural elements’ like braaivleis, sunshine and rugby behind.</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are happy in South Africa.</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They want to keep their current jobs.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We fought for this country and it belongs to us just as much as to others.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belief that they are in South Africa ‘for a reason’.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Have to stay’: Family and friends’ reasons to stay in South Africa</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They cannot afford emigration.</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They doubt whether they will find a job abroad.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are too old to emigrate.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings suggest that although emigration may be a more affordable option to white youth than to less privileged youth of other races, few respondents are removed from their families and ethno-cultural community enough to consider emigrating permanently, despite their complaints over crime and other push factors. The prevalence of individualist pull factors over structural push factors also suggests that a degree of material individualism takes precedence over national level concerns like crime.
7.2.6 The Afrikaans language

The Afrikaans language is an integral part of respondents’ identities and has been the mother tongue of their families for at least three generations. It was indicated as the mother tongue of more than 90% of parents and 80% of all grandparents. Table 7.2.6A illustrates that the Afrikaans language was respondents’ main educational and social language during their primary and secondary school years.

Table 7.2.6A Prevalence of the Afrikaans language in respondents’ childhoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The following language was most used in my environment when I was 0-13 years old (n=151)</th>
<th>Afrikaans 84.1%</th>
<th>English 2.6%</th>
<th>Afrikaans and English equally 13.2%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The following language was most used in my environment when I was 14-18 years old (n=151)</td>
<td>Afrikaans 72.2%</td>
<td>English 8.6%</td>
<td>Afrikaans and English equally 19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My primary school used mainly the following language</td>
<td>Afrikaans 82.8%</td>
<td>English 5.3%</td>
<td>Afrikaans and English equally 11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My high school used mainly the following language</td>
<td>Afrikaans 78.8%</td>
<td>English 5.3%</td>
<td>Afrikaans and English equally 15.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The prevalence of Afrikaans decreased with only 4% in respondents’ school environments, but with 12% as they grew older. This could be attributed to the increasing availability of international television to South African households and respondents’ increasing ability to seek out preferred communication media as they grew up, including the Internet and a wide variety of music, books and magazines. Nevertheless, the primary prevalence of the Afrikaans language decreased only slightly over time.

The data in the tables below is derived from questionnaire Question 47, which obtained a high reliability score of .812. From Table 7.2.6B, we can infer that most respondents have knowledge of recent South African history and the role of the Afrikaans language in 20th century South African
history. They experience their mother tongue as associated with the apartheid era and the way in which citizens were defined under apartheid. Most of them feel guilty about this history, at least to some extent. Despite their awareness of the past, its impact on the present and the guilt they reportedly feel the majority of respondents insist that they are proud Afrikaans speakers. Whilst most agree that Afrikaans is often expected to take a back seat to English, a reasonable amount of tolerance is visible in the finding that all respondents do not insist on being served in Afrikaans in restaurants and shops, as illustrated in Table 7.2.6C below.

### Table 7.2.6B Afrikaans, guilt and pride

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>% Strongly disagree</th>
<th>% Disagree</th>
<th>% Agree</th>
<th>% Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I feel that Afrikaans is associated with apartheid in South Africa (n=151).</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes I feel guilty about apartheid and what it did to people (n=151).</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans speakers are stereotyped for speaking Afrikaans (n=151).</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>% Strongly disagree</th>
<th>% Disagree</th>
<th>% Agree</th>
<th>% Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes I feel ashamed to be an Afrikaans speaker (n=147).</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am openly and proudly Afrikaans-speaking (n=151).</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My parents are openly and proudly Afrikaans-speaking (n=151).</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>62.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7.2.6C Afrikaans vs. English consumers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>% Strongly disagree</th>
<th>% Disagree</th>
<th>% Agree</th>
<th>% Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans is often expected to take a back seat to English (n=151)</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes I am forced to speak English in order to be served (n=151)</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I insist on being served in Afrikaans (n=150)</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My parents insist on being served in Afrikaans (n=151)</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My friends insist on being served in Afrikaans (n=150)</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, traditional-church and town/rural-born respondents are significantly more likely to insist on being served in Afrikaans, suggesting that these respondents experience a closer relationship with their mother tongue, and/or less exposure to ethnic others.

Table 7.2.6D Insistence on being served in Afrikaans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I insist on being served in Afrikaans in restaurants and shops.</th>
<th>City-born respondents</th>
<th>Town/rural-born respondents</th>
<th>Traditional-church respondents</th>
<th>Non-traditional church respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I completely disagree</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t agree</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I fully agree</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>p=0.059 (n=148)</td>
<td></td>
<td>p=0.024 (n=147)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents and parents are concerned about the future of the Afrikaans language, and traditional-church respondents more so. This finding suggests that respondents probably follow their parents’ lead on this issue, as they do with several of the previously documented findings, especially traditional-church respondents, as illustrated in Table 7.2.6F below.

Table 7.2.6E Concern with the future of the Afrikaans language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Worried about the future of the Afrikaans language</th>
<th>Significant association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondents</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
<td>Tau-b = 0.760 p = 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>70.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2.6F Church groups’ concern with the future of the Afrikaans language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I am worried about the future of the Afrikaans language</th>
<th>% Disagree</th>
<th>% Agree</th>
<th>% Strongly agree</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional-church respondents</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional church respondents</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Institutionalised use of the Afrikaans language is a concern for more than half of respondents who indicated that they were against the changing of Afrikaans-medium schools to dual-medium schools (n=149).
117 respondents justified their responses to this item. The most popular justifications set out in Table 7.2.6H reveal a combination of focused insistence on their in-group’s rights and fear of threat to the language’s survival. Those who disagreed are in the minority. They reveal more open, liberal attitudes that acknowledge the globalised, multi-cultural world that white Afrikaners find themselves in.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.2.6H Reasons to agree/disagree with dual-medium education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree (60.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree (39.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.2.6I The role of the education system in future of Afrikaner culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The education system should play a key role in the maintenance of Afrikaner culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional-church respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional church respondents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents generally are not satisfied with the role the education system currently plays in maintaining and expanding Afrikaner culture - 49.4% disagreed that the education system lives up to their expectations in this regard. Table 7.2.6I illustrates that there is a strong, significant
relationship between traditional church membership and attitudes regarding the role of institutions in the maintenance of Afrikaner culture.

7.2.7 Consuming the nation

The act of consuming refers to respondents and their parents’ continued support of cultural Afrikaner events and other cultural products, such as music events, sport and food. As suggested by the findings below, traditional-church respondents are more likely to view the Afrikaans language and Afrikaans music as fundamental elements of their cultural expression. Cultural consumption is arguably a key driver and sustainer of their identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afrikaans language and music as parts of personal cultural expression</th>
<th>Traditional-church respondents</th>
<th>Non-traditional church respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans <em>language</em> is a fundamental part of personal cultural expression (p=0.004, n=145)</td>
<td>85.4%</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans <em>music</em> is a fundamental part of personal cultural expression (p=0.007, n=146)</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sixty-six percent of respondents agree that Afrikaans bands often reflect their own viewpoints and experiences. Findings illustrate a relationship between respondents’ and their parents’ attitudes toward Afrikaans music and cultural events (see Tables 7.2.7A-C). Traditional-church respondents and their parents express a significantly closer affinity with Afrikaans music than non-traditional church respondents. Assuming an overlap between the need to stay in a residence/commune and being of town/rural origin, the results in Table 7.2.7C may be interpreted as illustrating that respondents and parents who are not connected to a traditional Afrikaner church or are of a town/rural area are less attracted to the ‘eventification’ of their social identities. Table 7.2.7B confirms this trend. Traditional-church respondents and their parents value Afrikaans music more than non-traditional and non-believer respondents.
Table 7.2.7.B Church groups on three Afrikaans language statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Traditional-church group</th>
<th>Non-traditional church group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans bands often reflect my viewpoints and experiences (p=0.001, n=146)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I disagree</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I fully agree</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Afrikaans music is generally very important to me (p=0.000, n=146) |
| I disagree | 30.6% | 62.6% |
| I agree | 44.9% | 20.7% |
| I fully agree | 24.5% | 37.4% |

| Afrikaans bands reflect my parents' viewpoints and experiences (p=0.000, n=146) |
| I disagree | 54.1% | 70.8% |
| I agree | 45.9% | 29.2% |

The results in Table 7.2.7C echo the strong relationship between parental and respondent attitudes toward the Afrikaans language. Just as respondents with proudly Afrikaans-speaking parents are likely to be proud, so do these respondents reflect their parents’ favourable attitude toward Afrikaans arts festivals (Tau-b effect size=0.582, p=0.000, n=151).

Table 7.2.7.C Attending Afrikaans festivals like KKNK and Aardklop

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I like to attend Afrikaans festivals like KKNK and Aardklop</th>
<th>Staying in residence /commune</th>
<th>Staying with family</th>
<th>Traditional-church respondents</th>
<th>Non-traditional church respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I disagree</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>91.9%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I fully agree</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>p=0.029 (n=127)</td>
<td>p=0.026 (n=147)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>My family likes to attend Afrikaans festivals like KKNK and Aardklop</th>
<th>Town/rural-born respondents</th>
<th>City-born respondents</th>
<th>Traditional-church respondents</th>
<th>Non-traditional church respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I disagree</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I fully agree</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>p=0.064 (n=148)</td>
<td>p=0.020 (n=147)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite respondents’ awareness of the association of Afrikaans with apartheid oppression, and their admitted guilt over the past, they report that they and their parents are proudly and openly
Afrikaans-speaking. Respondents and parents furthermore choose and consume the Afrikaner nation by attending Afrikaans music festivals. They also choose and reflect the importance of their culture in other ways, for example, via their support of rugby. Most respondents consider rugby to be an essential element of general Afrikaner cultural expression, but only 31.5% feel it is fundamental to their personal cultural expression, as evidenced in table 7.2.7D below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Cultural Expression (n=149)</th>
<th>General Cultural Expression (n=150)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.8% 17.4% 26.2% 31.5%</td>
<td>0.7% 4.0% 24.0% 71.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is not a statistically significant difference between male and female respondents on this item, so the sex demographic of the sample is not responsible for the mediocre response to rugby in terms of personal cultural expression. It may be the case that the respondents are simply less interested in sport, since they were, as has been suggested, more academically dedicated than their peers, who did not attend class regularly in the fourth quarter of 2008 when the data was collected. The relationship between personal and general expression as variables is not statistically significant. However, traditional-church and rural/town-born respondents are significantly more likely to embrace rugby in their personal cultural expression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Agree that rugby is part of personal cultural expression</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional-church respondents</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>p=0.014</td>
<td>n=145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional church respondents</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural-town-born respondents</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>p=0.017</td>
<td>n=146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City-born respondents</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents furthermore consume the Afrikaner nation’s ‘traditional’ foods eagerly. Braaivleis, a social and physical gathering that often combines family time and rugby, is extremely popular and considered a fundamental element of Afrikaner culture.
Table 7.2.7F Braaivleis as part of personal and general cultural expression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Cultural Expression (n=149)</th>
<th>General Cultural Expression (n=151)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No significant group differences emerged for braaivleis. Respondents agree on the centrality of braai to Afrikaner culture regardless of where they were born, their gender or their church membership. ‘Boerekos’ is equally popular.

Table 7.2.7.1G ‘Boerekos’ as part of personal and general cultural expression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Cultural Expression (n=149)</th>
<th>General Cultural Expression (n=149)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.3 Conclusion

The focus group sessions effectively guided the construction and content of the survey to produce the above findings, which suggest that several trends characterise respondents’ identification. Respondents are more likely to identify with traditional white Afrikaner concerns, such as the future of the Afrikaans language, when they and their parents are members of a traditional Afrikaner church, such as the DRC. Interestingly, the demographic variables ‘living arrangement’ and ‘area of origin’ produced only single instances of statistically significant results, whilst sex produced none. These variables may prove significant in studies that approach identification differently and/or attempt to measure different values than the ones central to the present study.

The results illustrate that ethno-cultural exclusivism is prevalent in traditional-church respondents’ identification, but that an overarching affinity to South Africa exists in their attitudes, too. The majority of respondents are motivated by personal and/or national factors to remain South African citizens. Whilst respondents easily and comfortably utilise discourse that is typical of whiteness to justify their attitudes toward race, racism, affirmative action and language issues, these matters also elicit a certain defensiveness and insistence on their own opinions from them.
This particular combination of white guilt, frustration, and pride accompanies the subtle racism which characterises much of their ethno-culturally exclusivist identification. Finally, despite their concern with the institutionalised use of Afrikaans, crime, corruption and racialised national policies like affirmative action, membership of a traditional Afrikaner church encourages respondents and parents to continue to use and reproduce white Afrikaner culture in their everyday lives. Against this background of strong ethnic ties, few respondents plan to emigrate permanently.
Chapter 8
Discussion and analysis

The following sections argue that whiteness and Afrikaner ethnic heritage, particularly linguistic and religious history, are central to respondents’ identification in the post apartheid milieu. Traditional Afrikaner churches and the institution of the family emerge as primary agents of the socialisation of youth, whilst respondents’ agency transpires in their choices to yield discourse that is typical of whiteness and to consume cultural products that represent white Afrikaner culture.

8.1 Traditional Afrikaner churches and ethnic identification

The first section (8.1.1) argues that recent history and the notion of kultuurpolitiek are key elements of the continuity between the past and present. The second section (8.1.2) suggests that traditional Afrikaner churches and the respondents’ families are the vehicles for the transference of traditional exclusivist beliefs to respondents who are members of these churches. The third section (8.1.3) argues that indications suggesting individualisation amongst the respondents are in fact mediators of their concern to present their attitudes as politically acceptable. Finally (8.1.4) it is argued that traditional churches and the institution of the family operate in conjunction to protect, enhance and transfer the ethnic core of the Afrikaner nation to the youth, and in so doing offer comfortable historical continuity between the apartheid past and the radically different present.

8.1.1 History and kultuurpolitiek

The fact that most respondents and parents are members of traditional Afrikaner churches underscores the general trend toward identification that represents traditional Afrikaner Nationalist values (see Graph 7.2.2A and Chart 7.2.2B, p.147-148). The centrality of traditional Afrikaner churches to Afrikaner identification is illustrated by the paramount position that Afrikaner history itself occupies in their identification. Traditional-church respondents attribute particular value to Afrikaner history (see Table 7.2.2C, p.148).
Churches played a predominantly ‘caring’ role during apartheid and they remain the most trusted institution in South Africa (Daniel et al., 2006:32; Rule and Langa, 2010:24). South Africa’s recent history is accordingly characterised by particular moral conservatism (Rule and Mncwango, 2006:251). Membership of traditional Afrikaner churches, notably the DRC, is directly related to respondents’ ethnically exclusive identification. The DRC has been the most socially conservative and powerful church in the political and cultural history of the country, according to Moodie (1980:60) and Kinghorn (1997:136). The Afrikaner Nationalist ‘civil religion’ emphasised and normalised exclusivist values, such as “the immutable exclusiveness of ethnic nationalities, and that all spheres of national life were subsumed within God’s calling” (Moodie, 1980:99). Values central to historically conservative Afrikaner Nationalist identification furthermore include the institutionalisation of the Afrikaans language, patriarchy, a deep belief in the God-ordained calling of Afrikaners as a separate nation, Christian Afrikaans-medium education and the teaching of Afrikaner history in education (Moodie, 1980:57, 239, 282, 240). These values were ensconced in the notion of *kultuurpolitiek*, which conflated cultural matters and political ideals, rendering them within the *volkskerk*’s jurisdiction and allowing the intelligentsia to pursue unity despite political squabbles. For example, Afrikaans-medium education and poverty were matters of the Afrikaners’ political progress as a people, advanced within the church as cultural phenomena, which the intelligentsia used to overcome class and political chasms (Moodie, 1980:12,72,168). The status and well-being of the Afrikaner people was therefore effectively separated from party politics, or *partypolitiek*. This concern with the well-being of the Afrikaners is arguably still observable in Afrikaners’ ethno-cultural identification.

The past also features in the DRCs present day character. The DRC’s General Synod accepted a report on race relations that justified apartheid “as a legitimate policy that promoted a greater degree of social justice” in 1974 (Giliomee, 2003:559). Van der Merwe holds that the DRC “went about its business as if *nothing* had happened in the country” when democracy dawned in 1994 (Van der Merwe, 2009:124, emphasis in original). Instead of proceeding to unite the four racially separate Dutch

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103 Most South Africans identified themselves as Christian in the 2001 Census (Rule and Mncwango, 2010:186). Out of six broad groupings of churches, the African Independent Churches (AICs) claim as members about 32% of South African Christians, followed by the mainline Protestant churches – including Methodist, Dutch Reformed, Anglican, Lutheran and Baptist churches – with 24.98% (Rule and Mncwango, 2010:186).
Reformed Churches after 1994, “the DRC family is reluctant to bid farewell to its apartheid resolutions” (Van der Merwe, 2009:124). Catering specifically for Afrikaner needs during apartheid, the DRC now finds itself a ‘pariah church’ with limited contact with other more conservative churches (Van der Merwe, 2009:124). According to Nelson, the DRC has not totally “exorcised the spectre of apartheid”, which is the reason why one of few female DRC ministers resigned and revoked her affiliation with the DRC “over an article in which she called Afrikaner Nationalism the biggest divide in the church and claimed that the church was being abused as the last vestige of Afrikanerd” (Nelson, 2003:69).

Although historically traditional Afrikaner churches have adapted to post apartheid language codes and rhetoric, the results of this study illustrate that these churches, in conjunction with families, remain key agents in the socialisation of traditionally-minded Afrikaner youth, particularly via the pride associated with Afrikaner ethno-cultural heritage. The prominence of Afrikaner history as identity driver suggests the presence of an ethno-symbolic ‘ethnic core’ that provides continuity over generations and serves to culturally bind a nation, in this case via traditional Afrikaner churches (Smith, 2009). One male focus group participant explains that his perception of Afrikaner history represents awareness and ethnic pride:

...die geskiedenis wat ek vertel was deur my ouma en oupa, en hoe braaf die mense was in die Anglo-Boere oorlog, en hoe ons gefight het en hoe ons die minderheid was, en ons so saamgestaan het en... ek’s net, ja, net om al daai stories te hoor en om te weet dat daar, en om so baie Afrikaner mense te sien wat rêrig so baie integriteit het, maak my trots. 104

Jonathan Jansen explains this pride as “defensive falling back on... group knowledge and identity” (2009:79-80), but Blaser points out that Afrikaner youth are also critical of Afrikaners’ post apartheid social position, as well as the nationally discredited status of their inherited version of history (2008). Future studies should specifically investigate the role that perceptions of Afrikaner history play in the longevity of a post apartheid Afrikaner ‘ethnic core’.

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104 ...the history I was told by my grandmother and grandfather, how brave the people in the Anglo-Boer war were and how we fought and how we were in the minority, and how we stood together and... I just, to hear all of those stories and to know that there...and to see so many Afrikaner people who really have so much integrity, makes me feel proud.
8.1.2 Church and family

Although some respondents and their families belong to other churches, two-thirds of respondents (62.7%) belong to one of the traditional Afrikaner churches and almost half (46.6%) specifically to the DRC (see Chart 7.2.2B, p.148). The family remains a key agent of socialisation. The intimate relationship between Afrikaner families, their church community, nationalist ideology and the education system formed a social network within which generations of white Afrikaners were raised. Many parents built their families’ identities around the church (Kinghorn, 2007:142). When the church is ethnic in character and central to the community, as was the DRC during apartheid, it served as a ‘hub of social organisation’ that effortlessly integrated youth into the community’s ‘system’ of ethnic relations. Sanders also suggests that such a strong religio-social network effectively maintains ethnic boundaries and identity (2003:344).

Following Brubaker’s conception of “groupness as event”, church attendance may produce “moments of intensely felt solidarity” (Brubaker, 2002:168), even for those who attend the same church as their parents, only in a different location and/or time. This solidarity stretches further than the family to include ethnic loyalty by virtue of the family’s share in the social networks of their ethnic community. Jansen posits that traditional Afrikaner churches complement the knowledge youth inherit from their parents. Their services relay “underlying themes of ethnic uniqueness, self-preservation, struggle against others, and lamentation of oppression continue to mark this theology” (2009:73).

The family is a key player in the development of one’s social identity. Sociologically speaking, Jansen argues that the “family transmits to children the continuity of justificatory knowledge from the past to the present” (2009:72). Respondents’ parents and grandparents grew up in contexts that prized the family as institution. The long-term effects of the secularisation of the state may nonetheless be noted in the finding that non-traditional church respondents are less likely than their traditional-church counterparts to agree that traditional churches are the foundation of Afrikanerdom.
Although historical continuity therefore seems well transmitted to youth via their families and traditional Afrikaner churches, traditional-church respondents’ attitudes suggest not only critical consciousness of the past as it stands in the present, but also considerable disagreement with the idea that the traditional churches represent the core of their cultural identification, as illustrated in Table 7.2.2H (p.151). Traditional-church respondents’ ambivalence regarding the role of the church in their identification may indicate secularisation amongst more traditional white Afrikaners. However, it may also be interpreted as an indicator that their reported identification with traditional church serves as a disguise for socially less acceptable attitudes.

8.1.3 Individualisation or presentation?

Traditional-church respondents’ ambivalence regarding the centrality of traditional Afrikaner churches could arguably be attributed either to individualisation, or to a strong desire to present themselves as politically correct.

Non-traditional church respondents actively dissociate Afrikaner culture from traditional Afrikaner religious institutions. Rule and Mncwango argue that this attitude toward traditional churches is the result of an ‘autonomous conscience’, characterised by an increase in the confinement of religion and moral choice to the private sphere (2010:185). This process of ‘individualisation’, “a process whereby individuals develop norms and values autonomously, as part of their own self-actualisation and achievement of ‘self-happiness,’” is marked by a shift away from traditional institutions such as church and family. Each individual becomes his or her own moral guide, and much more willing to accept contradictions and eclecticism (Rule and Mncwango, 2010:185-186). Traditional-church respondents’ ambivalence toward the traditional churches may arguably be understood as a consequence of a growing critical awareness amongst them of the nationally discredited status of traditional Afrikanerdom. It may be the start of an individualisation process amongst traditionally-minded youth. This male focus group participant comfortably separates his religiosity from traditional Afrikaner churches:

Participant – … wat ek glo is dat Jesus aan die kruis gesterf het vir my sones en weer opgestaan het, maar ek wil dit nie Christenskap noem nie, as gevolg van, die hele Afrikaner kultuur wat so
However, it is possible that traditional-church respondents are more concerned with self-presentation than with advancing their own ‘self-happiness’. A certain discomfort may result from their time-space location. On one hand, high education levels are correlated with higher tolerance of political others. On the other, religiosity and strongly-held group identity has been shown to correlate with political intolerance (Roberts, 2010:253). Given that traditional-church respondents have a reasonably high level of education, awareness of the past and its effects on the present, as well as a strong ethno-religious identity, they may experience conflict between tolerance and intolerance of ethnic others. Instead of embracing individualisation, they may ‘fall back’ on traditional inherited knowledge, as Jansen suggests, and utilise available discursive tools associated with whiteness to present their traditional attitudes as ‘politically correct’.

For example, the conflict between traditional-church respondents’ traditional beliefs, on one hand, and their desire to present themselves as socially acceptable within the post apartheid milieu, is well illustrated by their reluctance to condemn homosexuality. Politically unacceptable views are often justified with reference to religion or the church. This participant refused to accept responsibility for her judgment:

   Ek het min of meer dieselfde opinie as sy... Dis nie my plek om te judge nie. As ons almal bo in die hemel kom staan ons alleen voor God. Dis nie my, dis nie my verantwoordelikeheid om hom laat hy ‘n regte keuse maak nie. So, maar ek glo dis verkeerd, ek glo nie daaraan nie. Die Bybel sê dis verkeerd, so maar ek keur dit nie goed nie maar dit is nie my verantwoordelikeheid nie.  

   105 Participant - …what I believe is that Jesus died on the cross for my sins and rose again, but I don’t want to call it Christianity, because of (it’s) the whole Afrikaner culture that developed to where it is now in the church that I don’t like. It is hard for me to describe all the aspects of it but I don’t like it.
Researcher - Do you feel like it suppresses/limits you?
Participant - Yes, for sure.

   106 These findings pertain specifically to South African society. They are part of the South African Social Attitudes Survey data set (Roberts, 2010).

   107 I have more or less the same opinion as her... It’s not my place to judge. When we arrive up in heaven we all face God alone. It is not my, it is not my responsibility to make him make the right choice. So, but I believe it is wrong, I don’t believe in it [homosexuality]. The Bible says it’s wrong, so I don’t approve of it but it is not my responsibility.
The argument for individualisation is further discredited by the fact that traditional Afrikaner churches have evolved to accommodate the youth. At this female focus-group participant’s church, music and activities meet youths’ requirements of ‘hipness’, while also providing conservative religious substance to their everyday lives:

... daar’s ‘n orkes, en ‘n voorsang groep, en daar’s drama’s en mimieks en goeters, wat vir ons dit lekker maak, maar die onderwerpe van die preke word ook baie aangepas tot vandag se tyd. Hulle sal, baie preke dan sit ek daar en wonder nou hoe het die dominee hierdie stuk gebring tot in die moderne lewe, hoe’s dit op toepassing van jou lewe vandag, want dit voel, soos net geskiedenis, en hulle het ‘n punt daarvan gemaak om dit op jou lewe van toepassing te maak. En hulle het vir jou daai paadjie gewys van hoe om dit op jou lewe van toepassing te maak, en ek dink dit help ook dat die jeug weer kerk toe gaan. 108

The hypothesis therefore emerges that traditional-church respondents are aware of their historical and present day social position, and that their church membership, instead of being affected by trends toward secularisation, provides them with an acceptable way to negotiate social change.

8.1.4 Conclusion: The ethnic core and historical continuity

Religious background and orientation significantly impacts respondents’ cultural identification. There is a clear relationship between church membership and attitudes. This section illustrated the persistent influence of traditional Afrikaner churches via the institution of the family. Non-traditional church respondents consequently separate traditional Afrikaner churches from Afrikaner culture without hesitation, whilst traditional-church respondents are only starting to grapple with this question. Following ethno-symbolism, the historical bastion of Afrikaner Nationalism arguably provides comfortable continuity between past and present to its members, an expected finding within the ethno-symbolic framework. Traditional Afrikaner churches are able to provide refuge from rapid social changes, for in religion “changes in ritual and dogma tend to be

108 ...there’s a band, and a singing group, and there’s drama and mimics and things, which makes it fun for us, but the subjects of the sermons are also adapted to today’s time. They will, through many sermons I sit there and wonder how the pastor brought this piece into modern life, how it applies to your life today, because it feels, like it’s just history, and they have made a point of making it relevant to your life. And they have showed you that path of how to apply it to your own life, and I think that also helps to encourage the youth to go to church again.
slow and gradual and [which] continue[s] to exert a strong influence over various aspects of society and politics” (Smith, 2009:37).

How are the ethnic core and its historical continuity maintained? The post apartheid milieu requires that the comfort of ethnic continuity is mediated by politically correct rhetoric, as argued next.

8.2 Acceptable exclusivism: The culture euphemism

8.2.1 Ethno-historical exclusivism

The existence of a broader national identity cannot be denied. The 2005 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) results illustrate that national pride is uniformly high across age groups and youth of different race groups (Boyce, 2010:93). Most respondents identify strongly as South African, as is illustrated in Graph 7.2.3A (p.152). Confirming Heaven et al.’s finding (2000), strong identification as a ‘South African’ necessarily also invokes exclusivist ethnic identification from respondents. Inclusive labels like ‘world citizen’, ‘of European descent’ and ‘African’ are unpopular, while identification with ‘Afrikaner’ and ‘African’ are likely to be accompanied by the racial signifier ‘white’ (see Table 7.2.3B, p.153). Conversely, the unpopularity of the term ‘Boer’ is the result of a dynamic similar to that documented by Steyn and Foster (2008) and Wicomb (1998), whereby any connection to the apartheid era and explicit white exclusivity must be avoided.

Respondents’ attitudes hint at exclusivism, but the next section unpacks their apparent reluctance to admit to such attitudes.

8.2.2 Culture is difference

Statements regarding inclusivity and worded in racialised terms evoked inconsistent responses, as illustrated in Tables 7.2.3F and 7.2.3G (p.155). Whilst this may be a case of Humanities students ‘toning’ their responses to perceived expectations (Groenewald, 2004:61), it is possible that the inclusive phrasing of the statements contradicts the respondents’ usual way of thinking.
Whether inclusivity is an issue for respondents or not, admitting to racialised identification clearly is. Respondents displayed consistent, clear agreement with ‘culturally worded’ exclusivist statements (see Table 7.2.3H, p.156). Given that racial categories were normalised by the apartheid system (Van der Waal, 2012:2) and are officially used in post apartheid to designate privilege, it is to be expected that race features in South Africans’ thinking. However, for white South Africans the prominence of race is a problem – they do not want to be labelled racist. Steyn and Foster view this phenomenon as ‘New South Africa Speak’. Whites avoid mention of ‘race’ in order to prevent being accused of harbouring a lingering affinity with apartheid and racist ideas (2007:28). Wicomb also notes that in contexts of official ‘anti-racism’, whites display a “fastidious reluctance to speak of white or black” (1998:363) and Pattman’s student researchers expressed concern over being perceived as racist upon posing questions on race to their research subjects (2007:478). He argues that university students are uncomfortable with race, yet they can’t help but refer to it. Race is prominent in their frames of reference and they attach significance to it, but they feel socially awkward speaking in racial terms (Pattman, 2007:477).

As Tables 7.2.3H and I illustrate, exclusively worded statements phrased in terms of ‘difference’ and ‘culture’ therefore offer a comfortable avenue of identification for respondents. Culture as euphemism for exclusivist racial identification not only echoes apartheid policy, in so doing providing the present-past continuity, but in the post apartheid context it also provides a ‘politically correct’ communication. This focus group respondent readily used the notion of culture to other all non-white South Africans as uniformly ‘black’:

Ek dink die swart kultuur is heeltemal anders as die wit kultuur of ons nou Afrikaans of Engels is. Want hulle is heeltemal anders as ons.109

‘Culture’ is viewed and presented as the ultimate unbridgeable difference. In addition to unmediated use of ‘us’ and ‘them’, this respondent starts off with the notion of cultural similarity, but ends up judging other cultures for being different to that of Afrikaners:

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109 I think the black culture is completely different to the white culture whether we are Afrikaans or English. Because they are completely different than we are.
Contemplating the role of ‘whiteness’, Wicomb observes that “white is an empty signifier, both everything and nothing...” (1998:371). She further comments that “Commitment to the demise of apartheid does not mean an abandonment of ethnic tags, but it does at least according to the given texts require a disaffiliation from whiteness” (Wicomb, 1998:387). Ethno-cultural identification therefore simultaneously disguises and enables Afrikaner whiteness and the exclusivism it is arguably still based on. Blaser suggests that there is a ‘slippage’ between whiteness and culture in South Africa. He conceptualises whiteness as a situational, contextual phenomenon immersed in cultural practices. In this view, respondents’ identification as whites amounts to more complex claims than simple notions of ‘white supremacy’ (Blaser, 2008). Contingent upon time and space, their whiteness is an historical phenomenon and as such is closely related to axes of power (Blaser, 2008:90), though political power per se might not be its sole objective.

Bornman inter alia contends that cultural identification serves to affirm group membership in an age where globalisation processes have rendered boundaries prone to porousness (2003:26-7). Group characteristics, cultural practices, symbols and traditions change. Strong identification with one’s ethnic group thus arguably denotes identification with shared knowledge of a common history; an awareness of “‘what we are’ and ‘what we have become’” that is rooted in history and consequently “provides stable, continuous and unchanging frames of reference of meaning amidst social and political changes” (Bornman, 2003:26), much like the ethno-symbolic ethnic core (Smith, 2009).

\[110\text{You know, I feel like they were very attached to their culture and they had culture, but now they are so westernised, and now we can relate because our cultures are now more or less the same, like on campus, I can relate to them more, we all go through the same things, but I mean these people who just, Ndebele cultures and they have to do this at this time and they have to slaughter chickens and all... I don’t understand it and because I don’t understand it I can’t get along with them.}\]
8.2.3 Conclusion
The question remains why white Afrikaners – respondents – identify so exclusively when English-speaking whites have been found to be ambivalent toward their own ethnic group (Bornman, 1999:413; Steyn, 2001:80). Arguably, the peculiar position that white Afrikaners find themselves in – the others of apartheid (Steyn, 2004:150) – elicits a defensive response, observable in insistent, intensified ethnic identification among large numbers of white Afrikaners (Steyn, 2001:41). In addition, wide-spread membership of an ethnic community, such as a traditional Afrikaner church, provides access to interpersonal networks that increase the degree of closure of their cultural in-group boundaries and the degree to which ethnic identity is retained, suggests Sanders (2002:327). Identifying with a culture brings stability because it connects people with the past and the present simultaneously (Bornman, 2003:26).

However, utilising politically correct rhetoric, such as the culture euphemism for difference, does not mean that Van der Merwe is correct when he argues that Afrikaners have drastically re-prioritised their religious values in favour of an individualist consumer culture (2009:128). Respondents who most eagerly ‘consume’ the Afrikaner nation are also the most socially conservative, as illustrated in the next sections.

8.3 Race matters
The previous two sections concluded that respondents identify exclusively with their ethnic group and established that they are more comfortable using ‘culture’ than ‘race’ to define and maintain the boundaries between their own group and ethnic others. The following paragraphs argue that respondents’ ethnic identification is buttressed by attitudes that are typical of mainstream South African whiteness. Defensiveness and blame, underscored by the tendency to cast themselves as victims of everything ‘post apartheid’ characterise their whiteness, ultimately revealing extreme sensitivity about their social position in post apartheid South Africa.
8.3.1 Who’s to blame?

The 2002 SASA Survey found that 70% of white South Africans felt that race relations have improved since 1994 (Roberts et al., 2010:2), but the white population was the most distrusted in seven out of nine national provinces\footnote{Daniel et al., 2006:37}. Despite their sensitivity about being the others of the post apartheid era, these findings suggest a disjuncture between white perceptions of the status quo on the one hand, and their social status on the other (Steyn and Foster, 2008:30).

Strong agreement that black people often accuse others of racism, to their own advantage, exposes white frustration with the idea that blacks are victims, and by implication also white disagreement with (or ignorance of) the real and long-lasting effects of apartheid on all black, Indian and so-called Coloured South Africans. Respondents’ defensive reaction is to twist the issue to cast themselves as the innocent party: 68.2% agree that black people are more racist than white people. The South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) published similar results after a 2006 poll which revealed that 87% of Afrikaners felt racism against them was a serious problem (Herman, 2011:15). This trend illustrates how South African whiteness blames racial others for white racism. In a case study of the Afrikaans press reports on the infamous Reitz incident, Wasserman illustrates that the Afrikaans media employed several strategies to deny, individualise and trivialise white racism, instead of acknowledging it as a systemic and historically determined problem (2010:20). He notes that...

\begin{quote}
By positioning Afrikaans identity within a discourse of progress and consumption, however, the Afrikaans press is able to obscure such links between contemporary incidents of racism and the persistence of racist attitudes carried over from the apartheid past (in which it was complicit) (Wasserman, 2010:23).
\end{quote}

Wasserman describes the strategy of ‘dislocation’, which displaces unacceptable forms of racism outside the speaker’s sphere of responsibility; ‘deracialisation’, which disarms potentially racist statements by attributing the causes of the racism to something other than the speaker; and

\footnote{The Western and Northern Cape provinces were exceptions.}
‘relativising’ or ‘trivialising’ racism, whereby perpetrators of racism are cast as victims thereof (2010). Focus group respondents utilised these strategies in their discussion of the Reitz incident:

Participant 1: … dit was vir my verkeerd, nie op ‘n rassistiese vlak nie, maar op ‘n menslikheids vlak. Dit was vir my verkeerd op ‘n human being menslikheids vlak, maar nou’s hulle van nee dit was rassisties, en hulle konsentreer meer op die feit dat dit rassisties is, dat dit wit en swart was, as wat dit ‘n issue was van, hulle mense se menslikheid aangetas. En dis wat my kwaadgemaak het, as ‘n wit ou in ‘n township ingaan en ses mense doodskiet dan is dit rassisties, jy hoor tot in ewigheid daarvan, maar as dit anders om gebeur, dan’s dit van sjj…

Participant 2: Ons verstaan, hy’t nie onderwys gehad nie. Ag shame! [Sarcastically]

Participant 3: Jy weet, hy’t nie skool gehad nie daarom is dit ok as hy dit doen. Dis nie reg nie!112

The above excerpts trivialise the Reitz incident by casting whites as victims of black racism and condescending references to low education levels among blacks, a fact which is directly attributable to the apartheid era, but ignored in the above scenario. Respondents are likely to blame affirmative action for their own racism (96.7%), followed by corruption in government (81.8%), the high crime rate (81.4%) and the presence of race everywhere in our society (68.2%) (Table 7.2.4B, p.158). It may be posited that it is simply respondents’ relatively high level of education that determines their attitudes, since citizens with matric and post-matric qualifications are more likely to prioritise matters of crime and safety than issues of poverty, for example (Rule and Langa, 2010:24). However, Steyn and Foster argue that invariable emphasis on crime, instead of poverty, as South Africa’s biggest problem, is characteristic of resistant whiteness (2007:34). From their point of view, the results in Table 7.2.4C (p.158) therefore suggest that resistant whiteness is significantly more prominent among traditional-church respondents’ attitudes. Resistant whiteness, which refuses to admit to and give up its historical white privilege in the post-apartheid context, arguably finds solace in the sense of ethnic continuity that traditional Afrikaner churches offer between the past and present.

112 Participant 1: … I found it wrong, not on a racist level, but on the level of humanism. I found it wrong on the level of humanism, but now they are like no it was racist, and they focus more on the fact that it was racist, that it was black and white, than on the issue of, they affected people’s humanity. And that’s what made me angry. When a white guy goes into a township and kills six people it is racist, you hear about it forever, but when it happens the other way around, then it’s like shhh….

Participant 2: We understand, he didn’t have education. Oh shame! [Sarcastically]

Participant 3: You know, he didn’t have any schooling, that’s why it is ok if he does that. That’s not right!
Focus group participants comfortably blamed their racism on crime and affirmative action, while other participants concurred and validated their reasoning. Few survey respondents admitted that their families’ racism rubs off on them. Therefore the vague, ambivalent nature of White Talk is present in the ‘blame game’, too.

These participants justified their own and their families’ racism with reference to structural issues, which they invoke to stereotype black people as criminals, the black government as completely ineffective and to de-contextualise affirmative action and redefine it as reverse discrimination. The idea that they may have inherited and chosen to uphold their families’ racism was unpopular and elicited uncomfortable, unfinished sentences from focus group respondents. This male focus group participant reluctantly admitted that his grandfather’s racism rubbed off on him:

... hy was r é rig ongelooflik rassities, en hy’ t swart werkers gehad en hy’ t hulle baie goed behandel, maar hy’ t geglo hulle het nie ‘n keuse nie en hulle kan nie dink nie en ek weet nie, dit het soortvan a fgerub, want, en hoe dit a fgerub het maak sin vir my, as jy kyk na, hoe hulle redeneer, en hoe hulle kulture is, en jy neem dit alles in, dan sal jy sien dit is maar ‘n bietjie... barbaars. Ok... In vergelyking met hoe ons is, ja, dit het baie a fgerub, actually.116

This female participant was even more equivocal with regard to her father’s racism:

113 I mean with my parents, they are not racist at all, where I, I am very [racist] and they tell me so all the time, and that’s because I, I am a lot more racist than they are generally because of all the crime and everything that’s going on now.
114 No, we are not that different because my parents and everyone is racist. Yes, because we were like attacked so we are a bit...
115 No, my parents, and my dad especially, are very racist, because he had to go through that whole thing of, he has qualifications but he has to suffer.
116 ... he really was incredibly racist, and he had black workers and he treated them very well, but he believed that they didn’t have a choice and that they couldn’t think for themselves and I don’t know, it sort of rubbed off, because... And how it rubbed off doesn’t make sense to me because, if you look at, how they reason, and what their cultures are like, and you take all of that in, you will see that it’s a little bit... barbaric. Ok... In comparison with how we are, yes, it has rubbed off a lot, actually.
En hy’s nogal rassisties en aan die een kant voel ek van, ek wil nie, patent daarop lê, van, o hene ons gaan, ek probeer die silwer lyntjie sien, van ag dalk as ons effort aan... jy weet die hele... maar dit rub nogal off....

An open-ended question on similarity between respondents’ and their parents’ race attitudes, the results of which are summarised in Table 7.2.4D (p.159), reveal various degrees of similarity and difference between generations. Traditional-church respondents are much more likely to admit to racism (see Table 7.2.4E, p.159), confirming not only that traditional Afrikaner churches are associated with Afrikaner racism, but also that these respondents are aware of and admit to their attitudes, despite the ‘political incorrectness’ of these attitudes. The notion of resistant whiteness explains respondents’ denial of holding racist attitudes as the result of a strong desire to present themselves as politically correct (Steyn, 2001; Steyn and Foster, 2008:29). Traditional-church respondents are evidently less likely to utilise politically correct self-presentation as a strategy to deal with race than non-traditional church respondents. Hence the pertinent use of strategies like the ‘culture euphemism’, blaming of ethnic others, and as argued below, discursive victimisation of whites to maintain a politically correct ‘front’.

However, Krog and Jansen suggest that respondents are not simply harbouring resistant whiteness. As Table 7.2.4D (p.159) illustrates, some respondents empathise with the racist attitudes of their elders, but this empathy comes at a price, as youth are in a precarious position which demands that they ‘defend or deny’ their parents, argues Jansen (2009:66). To Krog, it is obvious that youth feel they can’t betray their ‘loved ones’, yet this loyalty to family is fundamentally undermined by youths’ desire to ‘move on’ (Krog, 2011; Jansen, 2009:228). Arguably and in reaction to this distressing position, respondents find it much easier to denounce national issues as ‘causing’ white racism than to recognise and address institutionalised racism.

317 And he’s quite racist and... on the one hand I feel like, I don’t want to lay claim to, like... oh dear we are going to... I try to see the silver lining. Or maybe if we put effort to... you know the whole... but it rubs off quite a lot...
8.3.2 White victims

A defensive attitude underscores respondents’ tendency to simultaneously experience, sustain and resist racial stereotyping, all from a distinctly white vantage point. As divisive as this cycle of white thought is, Wicomb suggests it is also a strategy to “forge a link through suffering and victim status between black and Afrikaner” (Wicomb, 1998:370). Such a forged link arguably embodies a strategy to cope with white guilt about the past as it negates the racialised nature of past and present white privilege. This male focus group participant managed to combine youths’ frustration with guilt, crime and ‘reverse discrimination’ to describe himself as a victim of post apartheid:

Wie’s rassisties? … want dit maak nie meer vir my sin om eers ‘n rassis te wees nie. Want ons is soos, ek, ons, ek het nie toe gelewe nie, dis heeltemal verby, ek wil net soos, to get along, you’ve got to go along, jy moet nou maar, dis give en take, ek wil nie oblige en jammer ... nie, ek wil net lewe, ek wil net my deel hê, ek wil net in die aande kan veilig stap deur die straat, deur my eie huis, ek wil nie toegesluit in diefewering die heeltjed en wonder, jis, gaan hulle my kar steel, wie’s volgende dood van wat ek ken nie. Ek verwag nie van iemand om voordele te baat uit dit uit nie, net gelykheid, dis al, maar... dis ek.118

This approach not only effectively casts the respondent as a victim of crime, but also blames crime on ‘post apartheid’ and manages to include the idea of inequality, not in order to explain the high crime rate, but to unpack why he is a victim of crime.119 White ‘victimhood’ remains closely related to white distrust in institutions: South African whites generally trust in institutions like police, government and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) less than other population groups (Daniel et al., 2006:32). However, to blame one’s racism on the national environment and government is a typical strategy of resistant whiteness to deflect possibilities for introspection and attitude changes, as illustrated by Steyn and Foster (2008). Blame and victimhood are discursive partners: many focus group respondents felt they were being stereotyped as racist for being Afrikaners, yet none raised the issue of institutionalised racism. Their defensive attitudes represent

118 Who’s racist? ... because it doesn’t even make sense to me to be racist anymore. Because we are, I, we, I was not alive then. It’s completely over now, and I just want to like, get along. You’ve got to go along, you just have to, it’s give and take. I don’t want to oblige and sorry ... I just want to live, I just want my own share, I just want to be able to walk down the street safely, through my own home, I don’t want to be locked up behind burglar bars all the time, wondering, jeez, are they going to steal my car, who’s going to die next that I know. I don’t expect anyone to gain advantage from it, just equality, that’s all, but... that’s me.
119 The fact that Genocide Watch released data that describes the murder rate of white farmers as four times that of the general South African population arguably confirms the white discourse of victimisation. Government’s impassive attitude toward farm murders, as well as popular ANC politician Julius Malema’s public singing of ‘kill the boer, kill the farmer’, legitimises the notion of white victims according to Herman (2011:14).
the strategies pinpointed by Wasserman (2010) and conceptualised by Steyn and Foster as ‘spreading the blame’. This strategy is meant to make racism seem insignificant by literally spreading the blame for it far and wide. It diverts attention away from the crux of the matter, which is that racism is a historicised, systematised and institutionalised problem (2008:32).

The notion of the victimisation of whites directs attention to Krog’s concern about the kind of Afrikaners the post apartheid milieu is creating. Respondents are stuck in their perceptions of being unfairly stereotyped that they arguably do not recognise or experience opportunities for reconciliation. They are consistently defensive of their attitudes. They fall back on discourses reminiscent of older generations’ bitterness, and rhetoric that typifies a stubborn whiteness. This trend is arguably related to respondents’ religiosity, since 85% of respondents agree that their religiosity helps them to cope with experiences of matters like racism and affirmative action. Traditional-church respondents are therefore likely to turn to the ethno-cultural assurance of traditional and conventional Afrikaner churches in response to typical post apartheid issues, a cycle that encourages exclusivist ethnic identification by justifying respondents’ experiences and attitudes.

8.3.3 Redress rage

Respondents are clearly opposed to racial redress, a set of policies commonly referred to as ‘affirmative action’ by South Africans and implemented by the post apartheid government to compensate victims of apartheid and to give them a ‘competitive edge’. Political parties such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) and FF+ argue that these policies espouse a form of ‘reverse discrimination’ against whites. Arguably they also contribute to the racialised nature of South African society (Durrheim, 2010:31).

Durrheim found that the group that had the most to lose – whites – rated redress policies most negatively (2010:32). Whites were most opposed to policies that affect business and employment,

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120 In addition to affirmative action in employment and education, other redress policies include programmes of reconstruction and development, restitution, quotas in sports and preferential trading and procurement.
since these are the areas where they are most likely to be affected (Durrheim, 2010:33). Although less than half of respondents have family members who have been affected by affirmative action since 1994 (see Table 7.2.4F, p.160), they strongly oppose this form of racial redress. As Tables 7.2.4G and 7.2.4H (p.160-161) show, white justification for the ‘immorality’ of affirmative action constitutes a solid discursive approach that includes notions of racism against whites, merit, progress, standards and skills. Following Smith and Stones, respondents’ attitudes may represent high levels of ethnocentrism, which the authors found to be correlated with negative attitudes toward change in South African university students (1999:26).

Such negative attitudes may emanate from a lack of knowledge of what poverty really entails, since whites have a radically different idea of which items are essential to maintain a ‘decent’ standard of living and full participation in society than do black South Africans (Wright, Noble and Magasela, 2010:153). Steyn and Foster describe this “characteristic lack of insight into their own privilege” as a trademark of resistant whiteness (2008:30). Opposition to the achievement of equality is furthermore an exclusive attitude whereby the poor are barred from full participation in society (Durrheim, 2010). Respondents’ opposition to redress is an attitude representative of a particular combination of race and class, one that seems effortlessly transferred from parents to respondents, notes Durrheim.

Among all population groups, young adults had similar attitudes to their older counterparts, who had lived the bulk of their lives under apartheid. However, there were class differences in redress attitudes: opposition to the policies was stronger among higher-income whites and higher-educated Africans. Perhaps these higher-class individuals are more ideologically conservative (Durrheim, 2010:40).

Statistics show that whites are not disproportionately affected by racial redress policies. Despite affirmative action, Black Africans still constitute the largest chunk of unemployed citizens (31.6%), followed by so-called Coloureds (19.8%), Indians (18.0%) and whites (5.1%) (Steyn, 2010:221). In fact, Brooks and Hinks found that “African, coloured and Indian labour force participants’ likelihood of being employed worsened relative to that of white labour force participants” between 1995 and 2002 (2004). Employment was furthermore generated for only about 28% of all new black African
entrants into the labour market between 1995 and 2002, but 55% of all new white entrants found employment (Steyn, 2010:222). In addition, black Africans experienced a greater drop in average real earnings than whites between 1995 and 2003 (Steyn, 2010:227).

Despite these statistics, the overwhelming majority of respondents feel that government should stop implementing affirmative action, since it contributes, in their opinion, to racism among whites and people of colour (Table 7.2.4I, p.161). In sum, respondents’ attitudes toward racial redress constitute an extension of their racial attitudes, as discussed in the previous section, and may be interpreted as an embodiment of Steyn and Foster’s resistant whiteness in its insistence on ‘merit’ as the only condition for employment (2008). Jansen argues that for Afrikaner youth, affirmative action represents an institutionalised attempt to “take everything of theirs away from them” (2009:128). This notwithstanding, to oppose redress is to argue that the poor black majority should be excluded from development and ultimately to deny the past in order to protect white privilege.

8.3.4 White flight

Emigration from South Africa is an expensive option, available to a select few South Africans, most notably whites, who ironically continue to benefit from the long-term effects of apartheid. Official statistics generally underreport the number of emigrated South Africans. Few people indicate their intention to emigrate in their travel documents, therefore data from receiving countries is more reliable, which indicate that at least 2.3 times more citizens had emigrated between 1996 and 2001 than was indicated by official statistics (Bornman, 2005:387). These emigration trends are of concern, not because the emigrants are white – though the white population profile has been adversely affected (Steyn and Foster, 2008:26) – but because most of them are highly skilled professionals. This trend impedes the growth of the South African economy (Bornman, 2005:387).

121 As a result, organisations with mainly white constituents, such as AfriForum, launched campaigns like the ‘Kom-huis-toe-veldtog’ (Come-home-campaign) to encourage the growing number of Afrikaner diaspora to return to South Africa (Bornman, 2005:388). See http://www.komhuistoe.co.za/. The English-medium counterpart of this Afrikaans initiative is called Homecoming Revolution, sponsored by FNB. See http://www.homecomingrevolution.co.za/.
In contrast to Daniel et al.’s finding that youth are generally optimistic about the future (2006:26), Boyce found that white youth reportedly have the worst expectations of the future (2010:96). Respondents’ expectations exceed those of their parents: 60% of parents think that respondents should emigrate if they can, but only 29.8% of respondents plan to do so permanently and 59.4% believe that they will return to South Africa, should they emigrate (see Table 7.2.5A-B, p.162). However, compared to Bornman’s study, wherein only 13.2% of white Afrikaners planned to emigrate (2005:393), 29.8% of respondents in this study indicated that emigration is an increasingly popular trend among youth. These young emigrants will have tertiary qualifications, but will not be using them to contribute to South Africa’s development (Bornman, 2005:397).

Crime is a common push factor and was cited by 41.1% of respondents who plan to emigrate, whether temporarily or permanently (see Table 7.2.5C, p.162). Most South Africans experienced increased concern over personal safety from 1994 – 1998, but after that their concern has seemingly gradually decreased. Whites reported the steepest drop in concern over personal safety during 2000-2005 (Roberts, 2010:263). However, Herman’s investigation revealed that most of the estimated one million white citizens who emigrated between 1994 and 2006 cited violent and racially motivated crime as their main reason for emigrating (2011:14). Although poor black Africans are statistically most likely to be victims of individual violent crimes, white citizens often feel that they are specifically being targeted by criminals (Roberts, 2010). Whites rely on a racialised discourse of crime that misrepresents themselves as the usual victims and black Africans as the usual perpetrators, which in turn “perpetuates suspicion and ‘stranger danger’”, which “disrupts social cohesion” (Roberts, 2010:261). Bornman agrees that references to crime and violence are the most ‘politically correct’ reasons for emigration, though race-related issues like affirmative action usually underpin decisions to emigrate (2005:389).

Individualist reasons for emigrating – travelling and gaining experience – were most popular among respondents (see Table 7.2.5D, p.163). Bornman obtained similar results and suggests that this trend indicates an extreme form of individualisation and social and political apathy among Afrikaners (2005:397). Academics note that individualisation may also occur due to social and
political withdrawal. It is argued that whites’ loss of political power after 1994 has encouraged ‘inward emigration’ among them, that is, social and political withdrawal and a singular focus on individual interests. This individualisation is marked by a materialist focus and consumerism. ‘Inward emigration’ may encourage physical emigration, since an upper-middle class socially withdrawn white family unit would probably be able to pursue their individualist consumerism in other countries, too (Bornman, 2005:390).

Mirroring Bornman’s results, 65.6% of respondents indicated that family and ethnic identification are a significant pull factor for their friends and families (Table 7.2.5C, p.162). While Bornman’s respondents indicated significant identification with ‘Western norms and standards’ as a pull factor (Bornman, 2005:398), ‘living and working in a more Western environment’ was a pull factor for only 19.9% of respondents in the present study. In light of her result, Bornman suggests that nation-building efforts have largely failed, at least with regard to Afrikaners who are white (2005:398), but the present study’s results indicate a considerable degree of identification as South Africans.122 For example, although only 21.9% of respondents indicated that their family and friends would stay because they are happy in South Africa, 60.4% of respondents agreed that ‘I don’t think we should emigrate, but that that we should stay here to make a difference in South Africa’ (Table 7.2.3J, p.151). We may therefore deduce that, despite its fractured nature, there are signs of an overarching South African identity among respondents and that this identification plays a role, however minor, in discouraging respondents from emigrating. Bornman suggests that a “safe cultural space” for Afrikaners could be imperative in the prevention of Afrikaner emigration (2005:397).

8.3.5 Conclusion

Respondents’ peculiar time-space location introduces unique elements of confusion, frustration and guilt to their whiteness, yet few would leave South Africa permanently. Their ethno-cultural communities – white schools, Afrikaner churches and families – arguably provide at least a

122 90.4% of respondents indicated strong identification with the identity label ‘South African’, and the new South African flag elicited a higher percentage of positive identification than the two ‘old’ South African flags (51.7%).
semblance of the ‘safe cultural space’ that Bornman feels would prevent white Afrikaner emigration (2005:397). In addition to exclusive ethno-cultural identification as Afrikaners, wherein respondents keenly avoid notions of race, their national identity as South Africans remains starkly racialised and mediated via discourses typical of whiteness. These findings confirm Jansen’s argument that Afrikaner youth tend to adopt their parents’ awkward post apartheid racial attitudes (2009:86). The next section illustrates a striking similarity between parents’ and respondents’ attitudes toward the status and future of the Afrikaans language.

8.4 The Afrikaans language and cultural nationalism

This section argues that the Afrikaans language embodies respondent identification and reflects a broad trend among Afrikaners, wherein the fusion of linguistic and ethnic identification remains underscored by various historical dynamics. As expected, the majority of respondents (77.7%) consider the Afrikaans language to be a fundamental element of their cultural expression.

8.4.1 White guilt, white pride

The findings of this study illustrate the complex relationship between past and present and how it manifests itself in respondents’ identification. If guilt about the past is part of Afrikaner ‘inherited knowledge’, as Jansen argues (2009), we may infer that parents have significantly contributed to the guilt that respondents admit to feeling about apartheid. In addition to being implicated in this ‘group knowledge’ of guilt, respondents are inescapably ‘the children of perpetrators’, as responsible for the past as their parents by default of benefitting from it.

In addition to guilt, many respondents also feel stereotyped as Afrikaans speakers. This combination of guilt and sense of victimisation can be juxtaposed with their desire to live free from the past and its implications (Wicomb 1998:370). Despite its post apartheid vilification, the Afrikaans language remains a key part of Afrikaner social identification (Heaven et al., 2000:70). In fact, it is so central that respondents offer a particularly strong reaction to the guilt associated with it. Though 86.8% of respondents feel they are stereotyped for speaking Afrikaans, a mere 10.6% sometimes feel ashamed to speak it. In fact, 84% of respondents and 94.8% of parents (reportedly)
are openly and proudly Afrikaans-speaking. In reaction to the post apartheid ‘vilification’ of Afrikaans and its white speakers, respondents defensively ‘fall back’ on pride in something they believe is truly theirs – Afrikaans. When asked what the most important component of their Afrikaner identity is, this female focus group participant said:

Ek sal dink aan Afrikaans, want jou taal is wie jy is, jy’s gebore Afrikaans, soos dit is, en jou geskiedenis is ook wie jy is, en dis belangrik dat jy dit moet voorhou anderste gaan dit uitsterf want dis soos ‘n stuk van jou wat jy rêrig moet uitleef...

Another confirmed:

Ja dis rêrig soos, as hulle Afrikaans wegvat is dit asof hulle ‘n stuk van jou identiteit wegvat. Want jy is Afrikaans.

In ethno-symbolism, a shared linguistic history is paramount to the existence of nations, as it apparently is to respondents’ identification. Beyond simply facilitating communication, language is part of the ‘symbolic fund’ of a nation. A nation’s language represents the nation in every way – its (mythological) origin, formation, struggles, heroes, values and traditions (Smith, 2009:48). In this light, it is not surprising that respondents and their parents are not only concerned about the future of the Afrikaans language, but that they actively take steps to support it by consuming Afrikaans language products.

8.4.2 Afrikaans consumers

The status of the Afrikaans language in the post apartheid context is an issue of grave importance for the Afrikaners. Like Delport and Olivier’s respondents (2003), respondents experience a decrease in public use of Afrikaans and a simultaneous increase in public English (Table 7.2.6C, p.165). On one hand, intra-racial historic animosity toward white English-speakers and the historic development of the Afrikaans language are developments that underscore just how integral the Afrikaans language is in shaping and instructing the nature of respondents’ social identities. On the other, the present day social imaginary is decreasing institutionalised use of Afrikaans in order to include more South Africans at this level, a process that elicits complaints that the status of the
Afrikaans language is being reduced by the ‘other’ South Africans who communicate in English or indigenous ‘black’ languages (Kriel, 2006).

Du Toit argues that Afrikaners were traditionally more bilingual than English-speaking whites (1970:543). Although they are probably able to speak English, close to half (45.8%) of respondents extend their pride in Afrikaans to insistence on being served in Afrikaans, as do (reportedly) the parents of 51.6% and the friends of 37.1% of respondents (Table 7.2.6D, p.166). They view the Afrikaans language as an integral part of their identity. Bornman found that the Afrikaans language is imperative to Afrikaans-speaking whites’ strong positive self-image (1999:411-413), while Pattman associates the English language with having no cultural identity (2007:483). The generally more conservative group of town/rural-born respondents hardly ever feels ashamed to speak Afrikaans and consequently is more likely to insist on being served in Afrikaans, as are traditional-church respondents (Table 7.2.4D, p.165-166). Due to increased contact with ethnic others in the cosmopolitan city environment, city-born respondents are significantly more likely to feel uncomfortable speaking their mother tongue. Being a town/rural-born and/or religiously conservative respondent therefore means one is less likely to accommodate others and more likely to express ethnocentric values than being city-born and religiously ‘liberated’ from traditional religious dogma.

According to Delport and Olivier, their respondents felt that Afrikaans was being threatened by the pervasive presence of English everywhere (2003:185). Considering that parental concern for the future of the Afrikaans language strongly correlates with respondent concern for the same language and that traditional-church respondents are also more likely to be worried about the future of Afrikaans (Table 7.2.6E-F, p.166), we may argue that traditional-church respondents’ language attitudes have been copied to a large extent from their parents.

8.4.3 Afrikaans in education

Traditional-church respondents are also more likely to favour linguistically exclusive educational settings. Over the period 2003-2005, almost half of white respondents in the annual SASA Surveys
indicated agreement with the idea that children of different religions must be educated separately (Wa Kivilu, 2010:135). This attitude echoes historical Christian Nationalist focus on mother-tongue education and centrality of Afrikaner history (Moodie, 1980:240). “Mother-tongue education was, above all, the guarantee of Afrikanerdom and Afrikaans schools held its future life in trust” (Moodie, 1980:240). Concern with the devaluing of Afrikaans and its future has therefore been a continuous theme in traditional Afrikaner identification and power struggles, one that evidently continues to transpire in exclusivist attitudes, especially in the traditional Afrikaner church sphere.

However, inclusivity underpins the post apartheid government’s policy to integrate children from all backgrounds in public and private schools. Authors argue that formal barriers to integration have been removed, but the discriminatory racial values and practices of white communities and schools remain (Wa Kivilu et al., 2010:128). Although all schools have the obligation to accept learners from any background, some white schools arguably limit access through admission policies and high fees (Wa Kivilu et al., 2010:130). “It is widely believed that not many white parents feel comfortable letting their children share the same school with children of other races, particularly African children” (Wa Kivilu et al., 2010:128). In the case of white Afrikaners, this attitude may be linked to the notion that schools play a key role in the maintenance of Afrikaner culture, which is particularly popular with traditional-church respondents. The most popular motivations behind insistence on Afrikaans-only schools revolve around group rights and the fear that Afrikaans will be marginalised in a dual-medium setting (see Table 7.2.6G, p.167).

Half of all respondents are dissatisfied with the support that the education system currently provides to the white Afrikaner culture (see Table 7.2.6I, p.167). However, attending a bilingual school might improve respondents’ ability to cope in multi-racial environments such as the university setting, reflecting the minority opinion (Table 7.2.6H, p.167), this focus group participant argued that dual-medium settings are important because they provide opportunities to learn about other cultures.

Ek dink, ek kom uit ‘n dubbelmedium skool, so ek is gewoond aan al die verskillende kulture, waar die Vrystaat is ‘n boere provinsie, nou hulle is gewoond aan Afrikaans skole, of Engelse skole, ek dink nie rërig daar is baie dubbel-medium skole nie, so die wit mense verstaan nie, of
Her opinion represents a more liberal, less popular approach among respondents. Traditional respondents tend to agree with the following line of thought expressed by an annoyed male focus group participant.

Participant 1: … ons cater vir hulle. Ek was by Vividus … maar daar was twee Engelse ouens in ’n groep van 400. Raai wat het hulle alles in gedoen? Engels. Alles. Dis, ek het nie omgegee nie ek meen ek kan Engels praat ek’s nie dom nie-

Participant 2: … maar hulle kan nie Afrikaans praat nie …

Participant 1: … maar dis soos twee mense en daar’s hoeveel, drie-honderd-agt-en-negentig, en dit was soos net, ok nou moet ons mar net verstaan, dit was net soos, why? Ek kon dit nie verstaan nie.124

The continued devaluing of public use of the Afrikaans language as respondents experience it is therefore a source of negative attitudes towards linguistic others, one which appears to elicit strong insistence on and pride in their mother tongue amongst respondents, especially those who are members of a traditional Afrikaner church.

8.4.5 Conclusion: Afrikaans and cultural nationalism

In conclusion, the evidence is clear: the Afrikaans language lies at the core of respondents’ identification, as it has for generations of Afrikaners. In spite of awareness and admittance of the historical character of Afrikaans, respondents offer strong pride in their mother tongue in reaction to the guilt and frustration they experience. This finding mirrors the general situation among Afrikaners, according to the literature. Although respondents have daily contact with
other languages, especially English, the general permeability of the Afrikaner language barrier has not decreased much among respondents, as Deumert suggests is possible via language contact (2005:124). Unlike so-called Coloured South Africans, who developed a mixed Afrikaans-English dialect in response to the apartheid government’s obsession with purity (Deumert, 2005:130), traditional-church respondents tend to insist on the Afrikaans language in the public sphere.

Following the arguments of Anthony Smith and Mariana Kriel, traditional-church respondents’ exclusivist attitudes toward the Afrikaans language may be conceived of as representative of a post apartheid Afrikaner cultural nationalism. The Afrikaans language was critical to the ethnogenesis of the Afrikaner nation (Moodie, 1980:48). Modernists like Benedict Anderson rely heavily on language as a catalyst and core of nationalism. Smith views language as a key facilitative element of ethno-cultural identification. He argues that language fosters easy and efficient communication with one’s own community, in so doing fostering “a sense of boundedness” by emphasising historical continuity and, most notably, difference from others (Smith, 2009:46). Heaven et al. suggest that white Afrikaners need to maintain exclusivist attitudes in order to maintain the security and distinctiveness of their in-group (2000:71). In this era of globalisation, it is practically impossible to prevent contact with others, but by maintaining exclusivist ethno-cultural identification, the in-group can maintain its social power (Bornman, 2003:30-31).

Therefore, exclusivist language attitudes represent the philosophical, social and psychological dimensions of nationalism, as Kriel argues (2006:51). She specifically identifies the struggle for the institutionalised use of Afrikaans as a movement that involves the activism and sentimental attitudes characteristic of cultural nationalism. Since white Afrikaners arguably have little political power compared to other groups in the post apartheid context, they strive to sustain a power, one that Afrikaans activists and politicians alike have to work hard to maintain. Language activism is considered nationalist when it is enacted in the interest of those they claim to represent. This
activism defends not merely a cultural national identity, but more importantly the structurally existing economic power of those who speak the language (Kriel, 2006:62). In a recent release by the FW de Klerk Foundation, De Klerk expresses the concerns of conservative Afrikaners. He argues that Afrikaans is a non-racial, inclusive language because it is spoken by large numbers of non-white South Africans. He draws on the Constitutional notion of group rights to argue for mother tongue education for all learners. He also takes care to emphasise that Afrikaans should now be treated as an ‘egalitarian’, valuable language spoken by many. His statement is ‘politically correct’ hence it does not acknowledge some white Afrikaners’ still exclusivist appropriation of the language as their own. Official instances of transformation in higher education, involving the use of Afrikaans as an institutionalised instruction and administrative medium, have evoked passionate responses from Afrikaners, many of whom continue to identify and mobilise in a culturally exclusive manner. Such ethnically exclusive mobilisation is based on the notion that as long as a nation’s language remains embedded in institutions, its ethnic identity can survive (Smith, 2009:112). Kriel similarly attributes this trend to the idea that the salience of Afrikaner ethnic identity rests on the Afrikaans language, and that language-based nationalist movements defend exclusive identities (Kriel, 2006:63). The Afrikaans language therefore does not represent egalitarianism. We may consequently argue that exclusivist ethnocultural mobilisation for and attitudes toward the Afrikaans language constitute a form of nationalism.

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125 Accordingly, the fear that the nation and their children will suffer humiliation when the language in question ‘dies’ illustrates the intimate connection between a nation’s interests and the national status of their language (Kriel, 2006:63).

126 De Klerk argues that in 1994, the University of Pretoria was 77% Afrikaans. This percentage has decreased to 39% in 2009. Of the 1,396 single-medium Afrikaans schools there were in South Africa in 1993, only 839 remained in 2003 (De Klerk, 2012). See also De Klerk, F.W. ‘FW de Klerk discusses the future of Afrikaans in South Africa and Namibia’, issued by the FW de Klerk Foundation on 4 July 2012. Published by Givengain. Accessed on 16 September 2012: http://www.givengain.com/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=print_article&news_id=115261&cause_id=2137.

By choosing, performing and consuming the Afrikaner nation in their everyday lives, (mostly traditional-church) respondents uphold the exclusivist cultural boundaries that bind them together as a collective.

8.5 Consuming the nation and everyday nationhood
White Afrikaner youth hold the key to future Afrikaner national identity and possible nationalism. Commenting on the influence of transformation on national identity, Anthony Smith notes that whilst older generations might cling to notions of a ‘golden past’, phenomena like military, political and cultural history of the nation “anathema” to the youth, “…suggesting a waning, or a refocusing, of a sense of national identity on the part of younger people” (Smith, 2009:101). If youths’ sense of national identification ‘wanes’ nationalism becomes less likely. However, should the youth ‘refocus’ their national identification, that would warrant investigation into the wealth of symbolic and cultural resources that inform white Afrikaner national identification, as well as the possibility of a ‘new’ youthful cultural Afrikaner nationalism. Consider the issue of economic class. How does cultural nationalism, as in Kriel’s view, take account of class issues among Afrikaners and b) considering respondents are middle-class, how can we reconcile their attitudes with Kriel’s argument?

In Kriel’s conceptualisation of cultural nationalism, elite Afrikaners ultimately strive to protect the power of those Afrikaners who already have power, whether it be economic and/or social. They defend not merely a cultural national identity, but more importantly the existing and potential economic power of those who speak the language (Kriel, 2006:62). What’s more, mobilising for language as the ‘new land’ may not require much support from or even consideration of working class Afrikaners. Elite mobilisation for the Afrikaans language does not exclude ordinary Afrikaners per se, but it is largely driven by intelligentsia. Kriel’s perspective overlooks a larger, more popular dimension of Afrikaner cultural life in which youth enjoy several niches. The national status of the Afrikaans language is therefore only one of various subjects of ethno-cultural passion. Unlike some of Delport and Olivier’s respondents (2003:184), respondents in this study had clear ideas of the things they considered to be part of Afrikaner culture.
8.5.1 Afrikaans as a product

Post apartheid Afrikaans language music is a cultural product that often carries political undertones. According to Ballantine, most popular Afrikaans music began to embrace Desmond Tutu’s ‘rainbow nation’ and Thabo Mbeki’s ‘I am an African’ concepts around 1994. For a few years, Afrikaans music reflected the possibility of facilitating social integration amongst South African citizens. The music expressed and summarised the desire that many whites had to transcend their constricted apartheid identities as upper-class whites (Ballantine, 2004). As the national landscape began to change, however, popular Afrikaans music began carrying a different message.

Ballantine suggests that disappointment centred on the re-racialisation of South African society became the main theme of Afrikaans music from around 1997. A fixation on race, reminiscent of the apartheid era, remained prominent. Resistant whiteness found expression in Afrikaans music for the youth. It expressed outrage at being cast as villains in the revision of national history. Disillusioned white South Africans consequently accused the propagators of exclusivist Africanist and ‘white-enemy’ discourses of ‘blanket insults’ and of stereotyping whites in a way that that came “dangerously close to racist hate speech” in Afrikaans music (Ballantine, 2004: 123).

However, Afrikaans music also serves to expresses young white South Africans’ creative search for a new ‘integrated’ kind of white identity (2004). Hauptfleisch (2006) conceptualises the emergence of Afrikaans arts festivals like the KKNK and Aardklop was a product of the transition from apartheid to post apartheid society. Indeed, theatrical, music and other fine arts events are popular consumer products, commonly mobilised to aid reinterpretation and understanding of the past, coping with the present and shaping the future (Hauptfleisch, 2006:186). Afrikaans music festivals offer the perfect opportunity to ‘consume’ the Afrikaner nation and invest in the future of Afrikaans. Afrikaans festivals like the KKNK, Aardklop, Afrikaanse Woordfees, the Gariep Fees, Kaktus Oppi Vlaktes and the Suidooster Fees ‘eventify’ the celebration, (re-)establishment and display of the cultural heritage of white Afrikaners. In other words, these events are official opportunities for Afrikaners to celebrate institutionalised ‘traditional’ Afrikaner identity, but also to transform their culture to include newer elements, such as the idea of multi-racial Afrikaners.
The inclusion of black Afrikaans artists could be interpreted as evidence of “an attempt to construct new identities that are more inclusive and are not bound by racial categories,” on the one hand, but may also serve as legitimacy of the continued prominence of Afrikaner culture on the South African cultural landscape, on the other (Haupt, 2006: 18). Haupt cites critics like Lauren Shantall and Zebulon Dread, who accuse the KKNK of being exclusively white, Afrikaans and a festival that has, over the years, “advanced little beyond the mundane middle-class mediocrity that personifies the Afrikaner and his viewpoint of the arts” (Dread, 2001, cited in Haupt, 2006: 20). Consequently, Haupt argues that the acceptance of black Afrikaans artists at festivals could simply be a strategy to purchase legitimacy “for the continued operation of Afrikaner nationalist hegemony” (Haupt, 2006: 16). From Jansen’s perspective, these festivals and events generally serve as “undiluted forms of knowledge transmission” (2009:77).

However, from Blaser’s (less dramatic) perspective, Afrikaner youth are not simply reacting to post-apartheid with uni-dimensional lament over the loss of institutionalised racial privilege – their whiteness is context- and generation-specific. Youth do not simply absorb and agree with their parents’ qualms and views. Despite parental influence, we must also ask ourselves how the youth of today are using available cultural avenues to construct their identities as youth. The age gap between parents and youth mediates and shapes the inter-generational transfer of knowledge. Music festivals provide space to youth to celebrate and encourage the political and cultural development of a post-apartheid Afrikaner identity, given the formally reconstituted South African structural context. Nevertheless, results illustrate a clear connection between church membership and investedness in Afrikaner culture. Respondents and parents who are not connected to a traditional Afrikaner church or a town/rural area seem less attracted to the ‘eventification’ of their social identities. Their identification is also less exclusive. We may therefore argue that traditional-church respondents and parents rely more on conservative elements of Afrikaner culture which emphasise their in-group and effectively exclude ethnic others.
In keeping with national discourses that emphasise cultural group identity, traditional-church respondents are especially likely to choose and consume the nation by supporting these events – in Afrikaans. Unlike high-level politics of representation, everyday nationhood provides an accessible avenue to asserting Afrikaner culture, arguably quite suitable to respondents’ tendency to avoid race and instead use ‘culture’ to express themselves.

The common denominator in Oudtshoorn is not culture ... It is something more pervasive. It is Die Taal (‘The Language’), the youngest language in the world – Afrikaans is spoken, krom en skeef, in all its varied forms, throughout the country... English and other languages are tolerated... But Afrikaans is alive – enthusiastically used, relished, and celebrated. For the time being, apparently, the new Southern African context is seen as a challenge to be confronted and even embraced (Hauptfleisch, 2006:190, Italics in original).

While Afrikaner intelligentsia patrol the political sphere to maintain the status of institutionalised Afrikaans, the cultural sphere is where ordinary citizens choose, consume and perform the Afrikaner nation, as respondents and their parents do.

8.5.2 Rugby culture

Rugby has long been associated with apartheid and Afrikaners (Grundlingh, 1998:68). Historically, rugby was the sport through which masculinity, power and nationalism were entrenched in Afrikanerdom, thus it remains politicised (Jansen, 2009:74). From an ethno-symbolic perspective, a cultural practice with as much symbolic value as rugby holds for Afrikaners, serves to bolster their in-group identity by tying them together in history and serving as a “heritage of ethnic memories” (Smith, 2009:101). Although post apartheid rugby has become part of a broad South African national identity (Grundlingh, 1998), Jansen argues that the sport is inextricably tied to Afrikaner identity (2009:74). Although it was developed in England, rugby represents Afrikaners’ historical struggle with the post-1902 ‘cultural chauvinism’ of the British (Allen, 2003). The Afrikaners’ particularly conservative attitudes pitted them against liberal British imperialists. It is argued that

128 Traditional-church respondents also hold significantly more favourable attitudes toward conservative, old-fashioned aspects of Afrikaner music and events, such as Volkspele and boeremusiek. Recognised by few respondents as part of their cultural expression, it is striking that traditional-church respondents identify with these two niche elements with their distinctly historical character a lot more than their non-traditional counterparts. This identification implies a strong connection between traditional-church membership and affiliation with historical cultural practices. Non-traditional church respondents have left Volkspele and boeremusiek far behind.
rugby had a symbolic significance for Afrikaners and soon became the game of the ‘Volk’. “Whereas rugby in Australia and New Zealand expressed some sense of ‘imperial kinship’, among Afrikaners Springbok rugby carried a thinly disguised anti-imperialist message. ... Whenever they played the Britons, it was the Anglo-Boer War in explicitly nationalistic and ethnic terms all over again” (Allen, 2003:52).

During apartheid, rugby was a bastion of Afrikaner whiteness, but Jansen points out that, unlike the family and the church, rugby as a public affair is subject to dramatic transformation and so it is the one sphere in which white racial dominance and exclusivity is directly threatened (Jansen, 2009:75). Although Afrikaners cannot maintain ethnic exclusivity in rugby, it is to this day “an event of tremendous social and cultural significance for the Afrikaner” (2009:73). Respondents definitely perceive rugby as part of general Afrikaner cultural expression, but as explained in Chapter 7, few of the more academically orientated respondents in the present study embrace it personally. Mirroring the historical popularity of rugby, traditional-church and town/rural-born respondents are significantly more likely than their counterparts to consider rugby a fundamental part of their personal cultural expression (see Tables 7.2.7.1D-E, p.170). Youth may be less connected to the historical feats that spurred the original Afrikaner identification with rugby, but this history remains central to their in-group identification.

### 8.5.3 Food culture

The preparation and consumption of both braaivleis and boerekos arguably constitute the backbone of various other typical activities that Afrikaners may claim to be unique to their in-group, such as watching rugby and/or socialising with friends/family. The popularity of braaivleis represents some other facts about middle-class white Afrikaners: most of them eat meat, they can afford to eat meat regularly and this meat-eating and -cooking is part of their cultural identity. It is part of their everyday nationhood and Jansen notes that food culture is an important, yet informal, means of knowledge transmission (2009:70). In this case, it may more be the opportunities for togetherness that braaivleis provides that facilitate cultural solidarity than the actual history of braaivleis, which is pretty vague and in actual fact not claimed by any one ethnic group. It is so
popular that South African Heritage Day (24 September) is now also official national ‘Braai Day’, also known as Braai4Heritage and endorsed by the National Heritage Council (NHC) in 2008. The appropriation of *braaivleis* as a unifying heritage may be successful as a general nation-building strategy, but it does not change the fact that the activity is likely to be performed by white Afrikaners when they socialise together.

*Boerekos* is also very popular with respondents as part of their personal and perceived general cultural expression. 129 From an ethno-symbolic perspective, *boerekos* offers white Afrikaners something more distinctive than braaivleis. While *braaivleis* has been appropriated by the South African heritage/nation-building project, the term ‘*boerekos*’ offers cultural continuity, however vague, between Afrikaner past and present. Despite its name, ‘*boerekos*’ is furthermore relatively unpolicised, yet symbolises a rich ethnic history and as such contributes to the boundaries between ‘Afrikaners’ and ethnic *others*, according to ethno-symbolism (Smith, 2009:25). As Bornman suggests, cultural identification with one’s in-group is a reaction to the blurred group boundaries caused by globalisation processes (2003) and continuity between past and present in cultural elements is essential to maintaining collective ethnic identification (Smith, 2009:38). Respondents and their families therefore actively choose and consume these elements of the Afrikaner culture. Traditional-church respondents and parents are most likely to choose the nation via consumption of Afrikaans music and practicing social events that include family togetherness, rugby, *braaivleis* and *boerekos*.

### 8.5.4 Afrikaner youth and everyday nationhood

Delport and Olivier assert that their findings support Hendriks’ (2000), namely that the deprivation of political power since 1994 has led Afrikaners to withdraw from formal efforts to maintain their culture (2003:185). However, the results of the present study illustrate that respondents and their

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129 In her DPhil dissertation, Claassens explores the origins and nature of what we know as ‘Boerekos’ today. She considers dishes like *bobotie, blatjang, atjar, bredies, frikkadelle, kaiings, sosaties, wors, koeksisters, konfyt, kerrie* and *pampoenkoekies* as *boerekos*. The Cape cookery that eventually became known as *Boerekos* was strongly influenced by Dutch, German and French speaking cultures, which in turn were influenced by Roman, Persian and Arabian cookery. Today, few people may be aware of the exact origins of *boerekos*, but it remains a popular home-made and restaurant dish.
families actively live their maintenance of the Afrikaner culture. They maintain cultural boundaries in various ways – through supporting rugby teams, attending family gatherings, consuming braaivleis and boerekos, Afrikaans music festivals and in some cases supporting cultural organisations like the Afrikaanse Taal en Kultuur Vereniging (ATKV). This boundary maintenance is underscored by a definite awareness of their own temporal and spatial positioning in South Africa: respondents acknowledge the past (to some extent at least) and they feel guilty about it, yet they do not timidly retreat into shame. Their proud reaction to their awareness of the present is underscored by a spirited, knowledge of their ethnic heritage. As older generations did, respondents identify with ethnically exclusive identity labels, yet their distinct awareness of the juncture between the apartheid and post apartheid periods indicates the dawn of a new generation.

Some of Delport and Olivier’s respondents may have found themselves in a cultural vacuum in 2003, but the identification pendulum seems to have swung back to the other side of the continuum, especially for traditional-church respondents, who identify strong and unashamedly with Afrikaner culture. Their ‘everyday nationhood’ transpires in each identity-related choice they make. Traditional Afrikaner churches clearly have a durable, resilient influence on their members’ cultural consumption, and this influence has been transferred effectively from church member parents to respondents.

The next chapter summarises the main findings of the study and contextualises them with regard to the role of white Afrikaner youth in South Africa’s future.
Chapter 9
Conclusion

9.1 Summary of findings
Against the background of the original research aims, the following paragraphs summarise the main findings of the study. The aims were:

a) to explore the identification of a sample of 19-25-year-old white Afrikaner students by measuring their attitudes toward a variety of identity labels and cultural elements;
b) to probe the respondents’ identification with traditional white Afrikaner interests and concerns in the post apartheid context with the aim of considering possible manifestations of a present day Afrikaner nationalism;
c) to probe the relationship between respondents’ experiences, their identification and the South African ‘brain drain’.

Given the relative absence of statistically significant results for all the variables except church membership, the main finding of the study is that membership of a traditional white Afrikaner church is associated with specific attitudes and actions and hence with a particular trend in identification amongst respondents. In contrast with non-traditional church and non-religious respondents, traditional-church respondents report closer relationships with their parents and their respective churches. Their parents are also likely to have close relationships with their respective churches. Therefore, traditional Afrikaner churches and the family unit combine to form a particularly effective system of knowledge transferral which respondents are at the receiving end of. This triangular relationship appears to underscore a number of traditional-church respondents’ attitudes.

Compared to the non-traditional church group, who tend to hold more liberal views, traditional-church respondents generally identify strongly with a number of cultural elements, such as the
Afrikaans language. They also tend to favour their ethnic in-group – white Afrikaners – in their attitudes toward race and racism, emigration, education and identity labels. An insistence on ethno-cultural pride accompanies their awareness of and guilt over the role that recent history plays in their social status as privileged whites. Culture is also used as a euphemism for racial difference and ethnic exclusivism, and often ambiguously so. These findings confirm the arguments of authors such as Bornman (2005), Delport and Olivier (2003), Heaven et al. (2000), Kamper and Steyn (2007) and Smith and Stones (1999). Although traditional-church respondents are divided over the role of the church in their identity construction, results suggest that the traditional churches’ influence is effectively extending to the youth and therefore hardly waning, at least with regard to respondents in this study. Despite their strong ethnic identification, the majority of respondents also identify strongly as South Africans and this, in conjunction with the hold and support of their strong relationships with their families and churches, renders permanent emigration a less appealing option than staying in South Africa. Respondents therefore do not seem likely to contribute to the South African ‘brain drain’.

9.2 White Afrikaner youth, cultural nationalism and the future of South Africa

The findings confirm Jansen’s argument that the ‘concentric’ circles of Afrikaner socialisation – the family, church, rugby, school and peers – still operate effectively as a system of knowledge transmission (2009). Following Uslaner, who argues that one’s ethnic heritage shapes one’s values more than experiences of living among other ethnic groups do (Uslaner, 2008:725), it may be argued that the ethno-symbolic ‘ethnic core’, characterised by cultural continuity between past and present, is tangible in the exclusivist nature of traditional-church respondents’ identification. However, the system of knowledge transmission is neither simplistic nor closed. Although respondents ‘inherited’ knowledge and guilt from their parents, they also exercise their agency by choosing the extent of their identification with Afrikanerdom. They draw on both their parents’ and their own experiences of the past and present to construct their identities from the old and the new. Respondents are therefore adapting what they inherited to fit into the new social imaginary – post apartheid South Africa. Whilst traditional-church respondents find innovative ways to recycle old, exclusivist attitudes, non-traditional church and non-religious respondents locate themselves
on the more open, liberal end of the identity spectrum, in so doing arguably re-negotiating the character and role of the white Afrikaner ethnic core as it manifests in their own identification.

Respondents are therefore not experiencing an identity crisis. They may experience discomfort with the blunt juxtaposing of past and present as the recent past manifests its effects consistently in the present, but they are not “individuals who have lost a sense of sameness or continuity” (Bornman, 2003:26). In fact, their ethno-cultural identification provides a continuity between past and present that helps them to cope with what Jansen conceptualises as the “disjunction between group (ethnic) knowledge and national (official) knowledge”. This, he argues, is what characterises Afrikaners’ experience of post apartheid (2009:79). This strong ethno-cultural identification serves not only to bolster traditional-church respondents’ identification as white Afrikaners, but also to substantiate white Afrikaners’ socio-political standing. Given that traditional-church respondents and their parents actively choose to perform and consume the Afrikaner nation in ‘everyday’ ways, it may be argued that their attitudes constitute a form of twenty-first century white Afrikaner cultural nationalism. This notion is supported by Kriel’s interpretation of strong identification with the Afrikaans language as a form of Afrikaner cultural nationalism, which is aimed at institutions (2006) and Fox and Miller-Idris’ argument that active consumption of the nation constitutes cultural nationalism at an everyday level (2008).

This cultural naturalism is different from conventional nationalisms in that it does not imply the desire to ‘fight’ for power, but rather the choice to ‘voice’ concerns and interests (Kriel, 2006). Whilst media and government commentators immediately concluded that the De la Rey phenomenon represented a conventional nationalist uprising amongst white Afrikaner youth, Antjie Krog’s interpretation of the phenomenon alludes to a cultural nationalism that represents complex negotiation amongst these youth for meaningful identification in the post apartheid context. Their cultural consumption is indeed accompanied by a degree of negotiation with their social imaginary, as there is an aching juxtaposition between their own familial love and pride in Afrikanership, on one hand, and the embarrassment, shame and rejection associated with what the
Afrikaners did to racial others via apartheid, on the other. This juxtaposition is a millstone around their necks (2011:33).

... how can they, the youth, live as fellow citizens without betraying those whom they love, but who have upheld apartheid? (Krog, 2011:33)

Following Krog’s perspective, defensive ethnic pride, such as that noted in respondents’ attitudes, is directly linked to shame, guilt, and embarrassment about their past, which excludes them from the ‘new South Africa’. The main sources of these respondents’ inherited knowledge arguably remain adversely affected by the end of apartheid. In Desmond Tutu’s view, many white South Africans hold less than positive attitudes toward their role in apartheid, which fuels the guilt and shame that colour their experiences and attitudes.

The denial by so many white South Africans even that they benefitted from apartheid is a crippling, self-inflicted blow to their capacity to enjoy and appropriate the fruits of change (Desmond Tutu, 2009).130

As with the kultuurpolitiek of the apartheid era, traditional churches appear to continue to provide their members with the appropriate political discourse to justify their exclusivist attitudes. Traditional-church respondents in this study utilise several discourses characteristic of resistant whiteness to deny the legacy of the past and cast whites as innocent victims of a new system. Although the traditional Afrikaner churches are no longer the hub of an Afrikaner ‘civil religion’, results suggest they are at the epicentre of the cultural nationalism that respondents practice. Traditional Afrikaner church membership mediates respondents’ post apartheid experiences by providing continuity between the past and present in the form of discursive justification for Afrikaner privilege and exclusivism. Most importantly, it nourishes conservative Afrikaner values and in-group identification.

The implications of this finding for the future of South Africa are located in the youths’ contributions to the country. Will they contribute to an open, healthy democratic country wherein citizens are empathetic toward each other and participate democratically, or will they turn inward to their ethnic own, close off ethnic *others* and contribute the bare minimum to the development of the country? In Krog’s view, the combination of naturalised ethnic categories and affirmative action policies in South Africa exclude Afrikaner youth from making a positive contribution to the country (2011). These youth may therefore not become a ‘transient’ generation, since they are driven by the national context to retreat into an in-group laager by national condemnation and have plenty of ethno-symbolic (and in many cases financial) resources to stay there comfortably, argues Krog. The national context is therefore a key variable in the (lack of) transformation of white Afrikaner identity. Krog emphasises that it is essential for Afrikaners to invest everything in redefining themselves – re-imagining the Afrikaner nation – in a positive and honourable way and that their attempts to do so must be encouraged and respected (2011). Krog’s argument therefore suggests that cultural nationalism amongst Afrikaner youth does not preclude their valuable participation in the country’s development, as long as they are able to sufficiently deal with the burden of the apartheid past and re-negotiate an identity that is open to meaningful contribution to the creation of a thriving South Africa.
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Afrikaner studente identiteit in post apartheid Suid-Afrika: ’n Gevallestudie

1. (Vir kantoor gebruik) Respondent Nommer

Vul asseblief net EEN KEER hierdie vraelys in! Indien u reeds hierdie vraelys ingevul het, moet asseblief nie nog een invul nie.

Afdeling A: Biografiese agtergrond

Die volgende stel vrae verlang biografiese inligting oor uself, u ouers en grootouers.

2. In watter jaar is u gebore? Vul asb. die jaartal in:
   1 9
3. Dui asb. u geslag aan met ´n ‘x’:
   Manlik 1
   Vroulik 2

4. Ek sal myself beskryf as (merk asb. een keuse met ´n ‘x’):
   Wit 1
   Kleurlig 2
   Indiëër 3
   Swart 4

5. Merk asb. met ´n ‘x’ die mees toepaslike keuse:
   a. Ek is ´n eerstejaar student. 1
   b. Ek is ´n tweedejaar student. 2
   c. Ek is ´n derdejaar student. 3
   d. Ek het reeds ´n graad. 4

6. Merk asb. met ´n ‘x’ die hoofvakke wat u tot op 3e jaar vlak wil neem (maksimum 3):
   a. Sielkunde 1
   b. Kriminologie 2
   c. Maatskaplike Werk 3
   d. Geskiedenis 4
   e. Sosiologie 5
   f. Filosofie 6
   g. Tale 7
   h. Politieke Wetenskappe 8
   i. Opvoedkunde 9
   j. Antropologie 10
   k. Ander (spesificeer asb.) 11
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Merk asb. met ‘n ‘x’ die kerk waaraan u tans behoort:

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Engels</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Ander (spesifiseer asb.)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indien u in ‘n koshuis woon, dui asseblief aan watter taal (tale) amptelik die meeste gebruik word in die koshuis? Merk een keuse met ‘n ‘x’:

9. 
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Ek is nie lidmaat van enige kerk nie</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Nederduits Hervorme Kerk</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Gereformeerde Kerk</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>Rooms Katolieke Kerk</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>Apostoliese Geloofsending Kerk</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>Ander Pinkster Kerke</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>Hatfield Christian Church</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j.</td>
<td>Anglikaanse / Metodiste Kerk</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k.</td>
<td>Ander (spesifiseer asb.)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Is u in Suid-Afrika gebore?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ja</th>
<th>Nee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Dui asblief u provinsie van geboorte aan met ’n ‘x’:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Gauteng</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mpumalanga</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Limpopo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Noord-Wes Provinsie</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Vrystaat</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Oos-Kaap</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Noord-Kaap</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Wes-Kaap</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Weet nie</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Hoe sal u die area beskryf waar u gebore is? Merk asblief een toepaslike keuse met ’n ‘x’:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Stedelik</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Dorp</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Plaasomgewing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Indien u nie in Suid-Afrika gebore is, noem asblief die stad en land waar u gebore is:

<p>| |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13a. Watter omstandighede het daartoe geleid dat u nou in Suid-Afrika is?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Die volgende stel vrae verlang inligting oor u ouers. Indien u ‘n aangenome kind is, u biologiese ouers geskei en een of albei weer getrou is, of een oorlede en die ander weer getrou is, vul asblief die details in vir die persone wat volgens u die meeste ouerlike invloed sover op u lewe gehad het.


<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Albei my ouers is hier gebore.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Slegs my ma is hier gebore.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Slegs my pa is hier gebore.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Dui asblief aan waar elkeen van u ouers gebore is met ’n ‘x’ langs die toepaslike opsies:

- In die geval van ’n moeder en/of vader wat in Suid-Afrika gebore is, antwoord asblief vraag 15.1 - 15.4 in die toepaslike kolomme.
- In die geval van ’n moeder en/of vader wat nie in Suid-Afrika gebore is nie, antwoord asblief vraag 15.5 en/of 15.6.
Dui aseblief u moeder en vader se geboorte provinsies aan met ’n ‘x’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15.1 Moeder</th>
<th>15.2 Vader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Gauteng</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mpumalanga</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Limpopo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Vrystaat</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Oos-Kaap</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Noord-Kaap</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Wes-Kaap</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Weet nie</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hoe sal u die areas beskryf waar hy/sy/hulle gebore is?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15.3 Moeder</th>
<th>15.4 Vader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Stedelik</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Dorp</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Plaasomgewing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indien u ouer(s) nie in Suid-Afrika gebore is nie, noem asseblief die stad en land waar u vader/moeder/albei gebore is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15.5 Moeder</th>
<th>15.6 Vader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

16. Wat is u ouers se moedertaal? Merk asb. een toepaslike keuse met ’n ‘x’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ma se moedertaal</th>
<th>Pa se moedertaal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Afrikaans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Engels</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Ander (spesifiseer asb.)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Die volgende stel vrae verlang inligting oor u grootouers.

17. Hoeveel van u grootouers is gebore in Suid-Afrika?
   **Vul asb. die getal in Kolom A in (vir grootouers aan moederskant) en in Kolom B in wat die getal aandui (vir grootouers aan vaderskant).**
   **Die getalle dui die aantal grootouers aan by elke vraag.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grootouers aan moederskant</td>
<td>Grootouers aan vaderskant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getal:</td>
<td>Getal:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Hoeveel van u grootouers is oorlede voordat u hoërskoolloopbaan begin het?
   **Vul asb. die getal in Kolom A in (vir grootouers aan moederskant) en in Kolom B in (vir grootouers aan vaderskant).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grootouers aan moederskant</td>
<td>Grootouers aan vaderskant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getal:</td>
<td>Getal:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Hoeveel van u grootouers is/was Afrikaanssprekend?
   **Vul asb. die getal in Kolom A in (vir grootouers aan moederskant) en in Kolom B in (vir grootouers aan vaderskant).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grootouers aan moederskant</td>
<td>Grootouers aan vaderskant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getal:</td>
<td>Getal:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. Met hoeveel van u grootouers het u gereelde kontak (gehad)?
   **Vul asb. die getal in Kolom A in (vir grootouers aan moederskant) en in Kolom B in (vir grootouers aan vaderskant).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grootouers aan moederskant</td>
<td>Grootouers aan vaderskant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getal:</td>
<td>Getal:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Hoeveel van u grootouers het volgens u ´n sterk invloed op u waardes en oogpunte uitgeoefen? **Vul asb. die getal in Kolom A in (vir grootouers aan moederskant) en in Kolom B in(vir grootouers aan vaderskant).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grootouers aan moederskant</td>
<td>Grootouers aan vaderskant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getal:</td>
<td>Getal:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Die volgende stel vrae verlang inligting oor die omgewing waar u grootgeword het.

Watter taal is die meeste gebruik in die omgewings waar u grootgeword het? Merk asseblief die mees toepaslike blokkie by elke stelling met ‘n ‘x’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>22. Toe ek 0-13 jaar oud was, is die volgende taal (tale) meeste gebruik in my omgewing:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
a. Afrikaans | 1 |
b. Engels | 2 |
c. Afrikaans en Engels ewe veel | 3 |
d. Ander (spesifiseer asseblief) | 4 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>23. Toe ek 14-18 jaar oud was, is die volgende taal (tale) meeste gebruik in my omgewing:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
a. Afrikaans | 1 |
b. Engels | 2 |
c. Afrikaans en Engels ewe veel | 3 |
d. Ander (spesifiseer asseblief) | 4 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24. My laerskool (-skole) het hoofsaaklik die volgende taal (tale) gebruik:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
a. Afrikaans | 1 |
b. Engels | 2 |
c. Afrikaans en Engels ewe veel | 3 |
d. Ander (spesifiseer asseblief) | 4 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>25. My hoërskool (-skole) het hoofsaaklik die volgende taal/tale gebruik:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
a. Afrikaans | 1 |
b. Engels | 2 |
c. Afrikaans en Engels ewe veel | 3 |
d. Ander (spesifiseer asseblief) | 4 |

Die volgende stel vrae verlang inligting oor hoeveel van u gesins- en familielede geëmigreer het of tydelik oorsee werk/reis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>26. Woon die meeste van u gesins- en familielede steeds in Suid-Afrika?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Ja | 1 |
Nee | 2 |
27. Hoeveel van u **nabye gesinslede** (ma, pa, broers, susters) woon tans **permanent** oorsee?

Dui asb. aantal persone aan

28. Hoeveel van u **nabye gesinslede** (ma, pa, broers, susters) woon tans **tydelik** oorsee?

Dui asb. aantal persone aan

29. Hoeveel van u **familielede** (tannies, ooms, niggies, nefies, grootouers) woon tans **permanent** oorsee?

Dui asb. aantal persone aan

30. Hoeveel van u **familielede** (tannies, ooms, niggies, nefies, grootouers) woon tans **tydelik** oorsee?

Dui asb. aantal persone aan

31. Hoeveel van u **vriende** woon tans **permanent** oorsee?

Dui asb. aantal persone aan

32. Hoeveel van u **vriende** woon tans **tydelik** oorsee?

Dui asb. aantal persone aan

33. Indien van u familielede geëmigreer het, wat was hul redes hiervoor? *U kan meer as een keuse met 'n 'x' merk:*

   a. Mens word nie benadeel deur regstellende aksie oorsee nie.  

   b. Die misdaadsyfer is Suid-Afrika is te hoog na hul sin.  

   c. Alledaagse lewensuitgawes hier is te hoog.  

   d. Suid-Afrika se infrastruktuur is kommerwekkend (bv. Elekrisiteitkrisis)  

   e. Daar is meer werksgeleenthede oorsee.  

   f. Hulle wou in 'n meer Westerse omgewing woon en werk.  

   g. Ander (spesifiseer asb.)
34. Indien u gesins-, familielede en/of vriende permanent oorsee woon, na watter lande het hulle verhuis? *U kan meer as een keuse merk met ’n ’x’*:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Australië</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Kanada</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Nieu-Zeeland</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Verenige Koninkryk</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Midde-Ooste</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Verre-Ooste</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Ander (spesifiseer asb.)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35. Waarom wil van u familielede en vriende nie emigreer nie? *U kan meer as een keuse merk met ’n ’x’*:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Wil nie hul familie/onheersingsnetwerk agterlaat nie.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Hulle is gelukkig in Suid-Afrika.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Hulle wil nie uit hul werk(e) bedank nie.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Wil nie ‘kultuur elemente’ soos braaivleis, sonskyn en rugby verlaat nie.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Hulle kan nie emigrasie bekostig nie.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Hulle twyfel of hulle werk sal kry oorsee.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Ander (Spesifiseer asb.)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36. Hoeveel van u familielede en vriende beplan om te emigreer in die toekoms?

*Dui asb. die aantal persone aan:*

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36.1 Wat is hul redes hiervoor? *U kan meer as een keuse merk met ’n ’x’* merk:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Oorsee word mens nie benadeel deur regstellende aksie nie.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Die misdaagsyfer is Suid-Afrika is kommerwekkend.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Allledaagse lewensuitgawes hier is te hoog.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Suid-Afrika se infrastruktuur is kommerwekkend (bv. elektrisiteitkrisis)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Daar is meer werkseleenthede oorsee.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Hulle wou in ’n meer Westerse omgewing woon en werk.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Ander (Spesifiseer asb.)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Afdeling B: U houdings en opinies

Die volgende vrae verlang u opinies en houdings teenoor sake soos geloof, kultuur en regstellende aksie.

37. Hoe sal u uself beskryf?

Dui asseblief aan tot watter mate u met elkeen van die volgende beskrywings saamstem deur `n syfer omkring langs elke stelling wat u assosiasie verteenwoordig. Omkring slegs EEN opsie by elke stelling.

1= "Ek assosieer glad nie hiermee nie" en 5= "Ek assosieer ten sterkste hiermee".

**BYVoorbeeld**: Indien u tot `n groot mate voel dat u bv. `n Duitser is, omkring nommer 4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38. Wie is die Afrikaners? Die volgende stel vrae gaan oor u opinies rondom wie ingesluit word in die term “Afrikaners”. Merk asseblief u opinie by elke stelling met ‘n ‘x’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V73 | 134
V74 | 135
V75 | 136
V76 | 137
V77 | 138
V78 | 139
V79 | 140
V80 | 141
V81 | 142
V82 | 143
V83 | 144
V84 | 145
39. Die volgende vraag gaan oor u houdings teenoor van die vlae in Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis. **Omkring asb. langs elke vlag EEN syfer wat u houding teenoor die vlag verteenwoordig:**

1=Ek voel hierdie vlag behoort verban te word.  
2=Ek hou nie van hierdie vlag nie.  
3=Ek voel neutraal oor hierdie vlag.  
4=Ek voel aangetrokke tot hierdie vlag  
5=Ek voel baie sentimenteel oor hierdie vlag.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vraag</th>
<th>Oranje-Blanje-Blou / “Ou” vlag</th>
<th>Vierkleur/Ou ZAR/Transvaal vlag</th>
<th>Post-1994 ‘nuwe’ Suid-Afrikaanse vlag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Oranje-Blanje-Blou" /></td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Vierkleur/Ou ZAR/Transvaal" /></td>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Post-1994 ‘nuwe’ Suid-Afrikaanse" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kultuur

40. Is daar na u mening groot verskille tussen Suid-Afrikaanse kultuurgroepe? **Dui assblief u opinie aan deur een toepaslike blokkie by elke stelling te merk met ‘n ’x’:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stelling</th>
<th>a. Ek verkies vrienete wat dieselfde kulturele agtergrond het as ek.</th>
<th>b. Die verskil tussen die Afrikaner en Engelse kulture in Suid-Afrika is baie prominent.</th>
<th>c. Die verskil tussen die Afrikaner kultuur en ander kulture in Suid-Afrika is baie prominent.</th>
<th>d. Die verskil tussen die Afrikaner kultuur en swart mense se kulture sal altyd ’n kernsak bly.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
41. Tot watter mate sal u die volgende aktiwiteite as deel beskou van A: u persoonlike uitlewing van Afrikaner kultuur   EN B: die uitlewing van die kultuur deur Afrikaners oor die algemeen?

Omkring asseblief TWEE syfers langs elke kultuur element in die tabel, een in Kolom A (persoonlike uitlewing) en een in Kolom B (algemene uitlewing).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kolom A Persoonlike uitlewing</th>
<th>Kolom B Algemene Afrikaner kultuur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c. Rugby</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BYVOORBEELD: Indien uself nie waarde heg aan rugby as kultuur element nie maar wel dink dat die aktiwiteit ’n belangrike deel van Afrikaner kultuur is, sal u so antwoord:

| a. Rugby                      | 1 2 3 4                            |
| b. Familie kuier/samesyn      | 1 2 3 4                            |
| c. Boerekos                   | 1 2 3 4                            |
| d. Die Afrikaanse taal        | 1 2 3 4                            |
| e. Afrikaanse musiek          | 1 2 3 4                            |
| f. Voortrekkerbeweging        | 1 2 3 4                            |
| g. Wild jag                   | 1 2 3 4                            |
| h. Boeremusiek                | 1 2 3 4                            |
| i. Christenskap               | 1 2 3 4                            |
| j. Kerkbywoning               | 1 2 3 4                            |
| k. Afrikaner geskiedenis      | 1 2 3 4                            |
| l. Sterk morele waardes       | 1 2 3 4                            |
| m. Respektabelheid            | 1 2 3 4                            |
| n. Volkspele                  | 1 2 3 4                            |
42. Voel u daar is ’n groot verskil tussen u eie en u ouers se uitleef van Afrikaner kultuur?  
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ja</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42.a Verduidelik asseblief kortliks waarom u so sê?

43. Hoe voel u oor die rol van die onderwysstelsel in die behoud van Afrikaner kultuur?  
Merk asseblief een blokkie wat u opinie weerspieël by elke stelling met ’n ‘x’:

a. Die laerskool (-skole) wat ek bygewoon het was toegewyd daaraan om die jeug trots te maak op hul Afrikaner identiteit.

|  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stem glad nie saam | Stem nie saam nie | Stem saam | Stem heeltemal saam |

b. Die hoërskool (-skole) wat ek bygewoon het was toegewyd daaraan om die jeug trots te maak op hul Afrikaner identiteit.

|  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stem glad nie saam | Stem nie saam nie | Stem saam | Stem heeltemal saam |

c. Afrikaanse skole fokus nie genoeg op Afrikaner kultuur nie.

|  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stem glad nie saam | Stem nie saam nie | Stem saam | Stem heeltemal saam |

d. Die onderwysstelsel speel op die oomblik ’n sleutelrol in die behoud en uitbou van Afrikaner kultuur.

|  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stem glad nie saam | Stem nie saam nie | Stem saam | Stem heeltemal saam |

ey. Die onderwysstelsel behoort ’n sleutelrol te speel in die behoud en uitbou van Afrikaner kultuur.

|  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stem glad nie saam | Stem nie saam nie | Stem saam | Stem heeltemal saam |

44. Die volgende vrae verlang inligting oor u en u ouers se betrokkenheid by die Voortrekkerbeweging. Merk asseblief die toepaslike antwoord met ’n ‘x’:

a. Ek was/is ’n toegewyde Voortrekker.

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ja</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. My ouers was/is toegewyde lede van die Voortrekkers.

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ja</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Die Voortrekker-beweging het ’n sterk invloed op my identiteit as Afrikaner gehad.

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ja</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
45. Hoe voel u en u ouers oor Afrikaanse musiek? Merk asseblief een blokkie by elke stelling wat u opinie weerspieël met ‘n ‘x’:

a. Afrikaanse bands reflekteer dikwels my oogpunte en ervarings.
   - Stem glad nie saam
   - Stem nie saam nie
   - Stem saam
   - Stem heeltemal saam

b. Afrikaanse musiek is oor die algemeen baie belangrik vir my.
   - Stem glad nie saam
   - Stem nie saam nie
   - Stem saam
   - Stem heeltemal saam

c. Afrikaanse bands reflekteer my ouers se oogpunte en ervarings.
   - Stem glad nie saam
   - Stem nie saam nie
   - Stem saam
   - Stem heeltemal saam

d. My ouers hou van ligte Afrikaanse musiek.
   - Stem glad nie saam
   - Stem nie saam nie
   - Stem saam
   - Stem heeltemal saam

e. Voel u dat Afrikaanse bands u oogpunte en/of ervarings reflekteer?  
   Ja  1  
   Nee  2
   Verskaf asseblief die redes vir u antwoord op vraag 45e. Indien u ja antwoord, verskaf asseblief ook die bands se name.

46. Hoe voel u oor die invloed van globalisering op Afrikaner jeug en kultuur?

a. Globalisering het ‘n positiwe invloed op jong Afrikaners.
   - Stem glad nie saam
   - Stem nie saam nie
   - Stem saam
   - Stem heeltemal saam

b. Jong Afrikaners is besig om die Afrikaner kultuur te verander.
   - Stem glad nie saam
   - Stem nie saam nie
   - Stem saam
   - Stem heeltemal saam

47. Die volgende stel vrae gaan oor u houdings teenoor die Afrikaanse taal. Merk asseblief een blokkie by elke sin met ‘n ‘x’ om te wys tot watter mate u daarmee saamstem.

a. Ek voel dat Afrikaans met apartheid geassosieer word in Suid-Afrika.
   - Stem glad nie saam
   - Stem nie saam nie
   - Stem saam
   - Stem heeltemal saam

b. Afrikaanssprekendes word gestereotipeer omdat hulle Afrikaans praat.
   - Stem glad nie saam
   - Stem nie saam nie
   - Stem saam
   - Stem heeltemal saam

c. Ek kry soms skaam om Afrikaans te praat.
   - Stem glad nie saam
   - Stem nie saam nie
   - Stem saam
   - Stem heeltemal saam
d. Daar word dikwels van Afrikaans verwag om terug te staan vir Engels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stem glad nie saam</th>
<th>Stem nie saam nie</th>
<th>Stem saam</th>
<th>Stem heeltemal saam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

e. Ek is openlik en trots Afrikaanssprekend.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stem glad nie saam</th>
<th>Stem nie saam nie</th>
<th>Stem saam</th>
<th>Stem heeltemal saam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

f. My ouers is openlik en trots Afrikaanssprekend.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stem glad nie saam</th>
<th>Stem nie saam nie</th>
<th>Stem saam</th>
<th>Stem heeltemal saam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

g. Ek woon graag Afrikaanse kultuur feeste soos die KKNK en Aardklop by.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stem glad nie saam</th>
<th>Stem nie saam nie</th>
<th>Stem saam</th>
<th>Stem heeltemal saam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

h. My gesin woon graag Afrikaanse feeste soos die KKNK en Aardklop by.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stem glad nie saam</th>
<th>Stem nie saam nie</th>
<th>Stem saam</th>
<th>Stem heeltemal saam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

i. Ek is bekommerd oor die toekoms van die Afrikaanse taal in Suid-Afrika.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stem glad nie saam</th>
<th>Stem nie saam nie</th>
<th>Stem saam</th>
<th>Stem heeltemal saam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

j. My ouers is bekommerd oor die toekoms van die Afrikaanse taal in Suid-Afrika.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stem glad nie saam</th>
<th>Stem nie saam nie</th>
<th>Stem saam</th>
<th>Stem heeltemal saam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

k. Ek is gesteld daarop om in Afrikaans bedien te word by restaurante en winkels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stem glad nie saam</th>
<th>Stem nie saam nie</th>
<th>Stem saam</th>
<th>Stem heeltemal saam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

l. My ouers is gesteld daarop dat hul in Afrikaans bedien word by restaurante en winkels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stem glad nie saam</th>
<th>Stem nie saam nie</th>
<th>Stem saam</th>
<th>Stem heeltemal saam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

m. My vriende is gesteld daarop om in Afrikaans bedien te word by restaurante en winkels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stem glad nie saam</th>
<th>Stem nie saam nie</th>
<th>Stem saam</th>
<th>Stem heeltemal saam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

n. Ek is teen die verandering van Afrikaanse skole in dubbel-medium skole.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stem glad nie saam</th>
<th>Stem nie saam nie</th>
<th>Stem saam</th>
<th>Stem heeltemal saam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Brei asseblief kortliks uit op u keuse vir stelling (n). Waarom voel u so?
48. Watter een van die volgende keuses sal u die beste beskryf? Merk asseblief een keuse met ’n ‘x’:

a. Ek is ’n Christen.  
   b. Ek is ’n gelowige persoon.  
   c. Ek is ’n ateïs.  
   d. Ek is agnosties.  

49. Hoe sou u u ouers beskryf? Merk asseblief een keuse in elke kolom met ’n ‘x’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>My ma is...</th>
<th>My pa is...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. ... ’n Christen.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ...Gelowig.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. ... ’n Ateïs.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. ...Agnosties.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Ander (spesifiseer asb.)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50. Is u lid van ’n gemeente? Merk asseblief een opsie met ’n ‘x’:

   b. Nee.

Indien ja, antwoord asseblief vraag 51-55. Indien nee, spring asseblief na vraag 52.

51. Woon u dieselfde gemeente se dienste by as u ouers?

   b. Nee.  
   c. Indien nee, waarom woon u (nie) dieselfde kerk se dienste by as u ouers nie?
52. Hoe gereeld woon u kerkdienste by? Merk asseblief een opsie met 'n 'x':

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Ek woon elke diens by.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Ek woon een diens per week by.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Ek woon twee keer per maand 'n diens by.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Ek woon 'n paar keer per jaar 'n diens by.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53. Hoe betrokke is u by gemeente aktiwiteite? Merk asseblief al die toepaslike keuses met 'n 'x':

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Ek is betrokke by jeugaktiwiteite.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Ek is in 'n leierskapposisie.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Ek is deel van 'n selgroep.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Ek help om aktiwiteite te organiseer.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Ander (spesifiseer asseblief).</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54. Wat was u ervaring van kerk en katkisasie (Sondagskool) as kind? Dui asseblief u antwoorde aan deur een toepaslike blokkie by elke stelling met 'n 'x' te merk:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. My ouers het my forseer om kerk toe te gaan as kind.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Ouers behoort hul kinders te forseer om kerk by te woon.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Ek was verveeld tydens meeste van die dienste en Sondagskool klasse.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Ek het op die oomblik 'n behoefte om verskillende kerke te ondervind.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55. Hoe voel u oor die volgende stelling? Merk asseblief een keuse met 'n 'x' en verskaf asseblief kortlikse 'n rede vir u antwoord:

“Tradisioneel Afrikaanse kerke vorm die grondslag van Afrikanerskap.”

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Dit is waar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Dit is onwaar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
56. Watter rol speel geloof in u lewe? *Merk asseblief een toepaslike blokkie by elke stelling met ‘’x’*:
   a. My gelowigheid bring stabiliteit in my lewe.
      | Stem glad nie saam | Stem nie saam nie | Stem saam | Stem heeltemal saam |
   b. My gelowigheid help my om te *cope* met my ervarings van goed soos regstellende aksie en rassisme.
      | Stem glad nie saam | Stem nie saam nie | Stem saam | Stem heeltemal saam |

57. Hoe voel u oor verskillende kulture in die kerk konteks? *Merk asseblief een toepaslike blokkie by elke stelling met ‘n ‘x’*:
   a. Verskillende rasse behoort hul eie kerke te hê en by te woon.
      | Stem glad nie saam | Stem nie saam nie | Stem saam | Stem heeltemal saam |
   b. Verskillende kultuurgroepe behoort hul eie kerke te hê en by te woon.
      | Stem glad nie saam | Stem nie saam nie | Stem saam | Stem heeltemal saam |
   c. My kerk aanvaar slegs wit lede.
      | Stem glad nie saam | Stem nie saam nie | Stem saam | Stem heeltemal saam |

58. Wat is u standpunt oor die volgende kontemporêre debatte binne die geloofsgemeenskap? *Merk asseblief een toepaslike blokkie by die volgende stellings met ‘n ‘x’*:
   a. Kerke behoort gay en lesbianisme te aanvaar.
      | Stem glad nie saam | Stem nie saam nie | Stem saam | Stem heeltemal saam |
   b. Godsdiensonderrig by skole behoort behou te word.
      | Stem glad nie saam | Stem nie saam nie | Stem saam | Stem heeltemal saam |
   c. Het u addisionele kommentaar om te lever oor hierdie debatte?
Regstellende Aksie en Rassesake

59. Is enige van u familie na 1994 direk deur regstellende aksi e geaffekteer?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ja</th>
<th>Nee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indien ja, wie in u familie is geaffekteer?

60. "Regstellende aksi is moreel regverdigbaar"

Dui asb. aan of u saamstem met hierdie stelling deur `n `x` aan te bring in die toepaslike blokkie:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Ek stem saam</th>
<th>b. Ek stem nie saam nie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61. Indien u nie saamstem met bogenoemde stelling nie (b) dui asseblief aan tot watter mate u met die volgende redes hiervoor saamstem deur by elke stelling u keuse met `n `x` aan te dui.

(Indien u saamstem (a), gaan asseblief na die volgende vraag, nr.62).

Regstellende aksi is onregverdig want...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. ...dit is op ras gebasseer.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ...dit neem nie meriete in ag nie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. ...dit diskrimineer teen mense wat nie by apartheid betrokke was nie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. ...dit strems die vooruitgang van die land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. ...dienste en instandhouding word benadeel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. ...dit lei daartoe dat kundige mense die land verlaat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 62. Merk asseblief een blokkie wat u opinie weerspieël by elke stelling met ‘n ‘x’:

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a.</strong> Swart mense gebruik gereeld die aantyging van ‘rassisme’ tot hulle voordeel.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b.</strong> Swart mense is meer rassities as wit mense.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>c.</strong> Swart mense stereotipeer alle wit mense as rassiste.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>d.</strong> Slegs sommige wit mense is rassities.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>e.</strong> My familie is rassities.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>f.</strong> Ek is geensins rassities nie.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>g.</strong> My familie se rassisme maak dit moeilik vir my om nie rassities te dink nie.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>h.</strong> Die teenwoordigheid van ras in ons samelewing moedig rassiste denke aan.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>i.</strong> Die hoë misdaadsyfer in Suid-Afrika laat my rassities voel.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>j.</strong> Die korrupsie in die regering laat my rassities voel.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 63. Merk asseblief een blokkie wat u opinie weerspieël by elke stelling met ‘n ‘x’:

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a.</strong> Regstellende aksie is omgekeerde apartheid.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b.</strong> Die regering behoort regstellende aksie te staak.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>c.</strong> Ek voel sons skuldig oor apartheid en wat dit aan mense gedoen het.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>d.</strong> Dit is onregverdig om van jong mense te verwag om skuldig te voel oor apartheid.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>e.</strong> Regstellende aksie dra by tot rassisme onder wit mense.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>f.</strong> Regstellende aksie dra by tot rassisme onder anderskleurige persone.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
64. Is daar 'n groot verskil tussen u eie en u ouers se houdings teenoor rassesake?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ja</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nee</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

64.a Verduidelik asseblief kortliks u antwoord op hierdie vraag.

---

**Emigrasie**

65. Dui asseblief aan of u saamstem met die volgende stelling deur een toepaslike keuse te merk met 'n 'x':

"Ek beplan om (permanent of tydelik) te emigreer in die toekoms."

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Ja</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Nee</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indien ja, omkring asseblief "permanent" of "tydelik" hierbo.

66. Indien ja, waarom? Merk asseblief elke toepaslike rede met 'n 'x'. Indien nee, spring na Vraag 67.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Oorsee word mens nie benadeel deur regstelende aksie nie.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Die misdaadsyfer is Suid-Afrika is kommerwekkend.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Alledaagse lewensuitgawes hier is te hoog.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Daar is meer werksgeleenthede oorsee.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Ek wil in 'n meer Westerse omgewing woon en werk.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Ek wil ondervinding opdoen.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Ek wil reis en die wêreld sien.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67. Dui asseblief aan of u saamstem met die volgende stelling deur een toepaslike keuse te merk met 'n 'x':

"Jy laat mense in die steek wanneer jy emigreer."

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Stem saam.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Stem nie saam nie.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
68. Indien u **saam stem met bogenoemde stelling** en 67a gemerk het, **merk asseblief met ‘n ‘x’ wie die mense is wat u in die steek sal laat indien u emigreer (u kan meer as een keuse merk):**

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. My familie.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. My vriende.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. My kultuurgroep.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Almal in Suid-Afrika.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69. Merk asseblief **een blokkie** by elke stelling wat u opinie weerspieël met ‘n ‘x’:

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. In hierdie era van globalisering is emigrasie ‘n vanselfsprekende neiging.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Ek dink ons moet nie emigreer nie, maar hier bly sodat ons ‘n verskil in Suid-Afrika kan maak.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. My ouers dink ek moet in Suid-Afrika bly en hier ‘n verskil maak.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. My ouers moedig my aan om te emigreer wanneer ek die kans kry.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. My ouers los my om my eie besluit te maak oor emigrasie sonder om in te meng.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Indien ek emigreer, sal ek definitief permanent terugkeer na Suid-Afrika.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Ek voel in twee geskeur tussen die geleenthede wat emigrasie bied en die idee dat ek ander in die steek laat deur te emigreer.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam nie</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Afrikaner wees sal ’n sentrale deel van my identiteit wees selfs al emigreer ek permanent.</td>
<td>Stem glad nie saam</td>
<td>Stem nie saam</td>
<td>Stem saam</td>
<td>Stem heeltemal saam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dankie vir u tyd en deelname!**

**Charlotte Sutherland**