SLAVERY IN JOHN CHRYSSOSTOM’S HOMILIES ON THE PAULINE EPISTLES AND HEBREWS:
A CULTURAL-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

by

CHRIS LEN DE WET

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR LITTERARUM (GREEK)
in the Department of Ancient Languages at the University of Pretoria
Faculty of Humanities

Supervisor: Prof. Hendrik F. Stander

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This study is dedicated to my mother, Sarie.

I thank...

- My supervisor, Prof. Hennie Stander, for his valuable comments and support, who also introduced me to the study of Chrysostom and Late Antiquity; a field I have now made my home;

- My colleagues at the Department of Biblical and Ancient Studies at UNISA, in particular Proff. Pieter J. J. Botha, Gerhard A. van den Heever, Pieter F. Craffert, and Johannes N. Vorster, who have not only shown me the richest collegiality, but also warm friendship;

- Prof. Jennifer A. Glancy, for her encouragement and wise counsel, and for reading and listening to crucial sections of this dissertation;

- Most importantly, my mother, who has always believed in me and supported me at all times, whom I will always love dearly.

(John Chrysostom, Homilia de Capto Eutropio 1)
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SUMMARY

SLAVERY IN JOHN CHRYSOSTOM’S HOMILIES ON THE PAULINE
EPISTLES AND HEBREWS:
A CULTURAL-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

by

CHRIS LEN DE WET

SUPERVISOR: Prof. Hendrik F. Stander
DEPARTMENT: Ancient Languages, Faculty of Humanities
DEGREE: Doctor Litterarum (Greek)

The aim of this study is to examine John Chrysostom’s views on slavery, specifically from his homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews. The study therefore asks: how does John Chrysostom negotiate and re-imagine the habitus of Roman slavery in his homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews? The cultural-historical theories employed are those of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu.

The habitus of Roman slavery is constructed as an intersection of four corporeal discursivities, namely the domesticity, heteronomy, carcerality and commodification of the slave-body. Chrysostom’s comments on slavery are then also evaluated in the light of these four discursivities.

Chrysostom negotiates and reimagines the domesticity of the slave-body in three ways. Firstly, Chrysostom promotes a shift from strategic to tactical slaveholding. Secondly, he also builds conceptual links between domestic slave-management and theological formulations. Finally, as
is evident from his exegesis on the Pauline *haustafeln*, slaves are to be taught virtue and practical trades whereby they could (possibly) be accepted into society. The household then becomes both an observatory, providing surveillance of slave-bodies, as well as reformatory, reforming and rehabilitating slave-bodies into models of Christian virtue.

The heteronomy of the slave-body is fully accepted by Chrysostom. This is especially seen in his exegesis of 1 Corinthians 7:21, in which he mimics typical Stoic-Philonic views of slaveholding and uses slave-metaphors extensively at the cost of neglecting the problem of institutional slavery. People, whether slave or free, should not be concerned about their social status, but rather their status in relation to God as the heavenly slaveholder.

Chrysostom’s views on the carcerality of slave-bodies are conventional. Since each slave-body is in a physical and/or symbolic state of incarceration, this carceral state should be maintained and not resisted. Basing his views on Paul’s Epistle to Philemon, Chrysostom argues that the ideal Christian slave is one who should remain with his or her owner, but also that owners should treat their slaves justly.

Finally, the slave-body as objectified and commodified body is also functional in Chrysostom’s thinking. The slave-body is seen as being both economic and symbolic capital. In the sense of economic capital, Chrysostom treats slaves as part of the wealth and property of his audience, and the management and manumission of slaves becomes related to the management and renunciation of wealth. As symbolic capital, the public displaying of slaves has the capacity to ascribe honour to the slaveholder. Slave-bodies also function as adornment. The danger pointed out here by Chrysostom is that this often leads to pride and vainglory, and that people should rather adopt a different scopic economy of necessity and simplicity rather than luxury.

Chrysostom is uncomfortable with the body enslaved, but rather than abolishing it, he reimagines slavery and thereby perpetuates the oppressive practice that would take several centuries to be rejected by the Christian church.
Keywords:

- John Chrysostom
- Slavery
- Cultural History
- Late Antiquity
- Ancient Household
- Habitus
- Patristics
- Pauline Slavery
- Rhetoric of the Body
- Carcerality
- Heteronomy
- Commodification
- Tactical Slaveholding
- Strategic Slaveholding
OPSOMMING

SLAWERNY IN JOHANNES CHRYSTOMOS SE HOMILIEË OP DIE PAULINIESE BRIEWE EN HEBREËRS: ’N KULTUUR-HISTORIESE ANALISE
deur
CHRIS LEN DE WET

STUDIELEIER: Prof. Hendrik F. Stander
DEPARTEMENT: Antieke Tale, Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe
GRAAD: Doctor Litterarum (Grieks)

Die oogmerk van hierdie studie is om Johannes Chrysostomos se sienswyses rakende slawerny te ondersoek, soos dit spesifiek na vore kom in sy homilieë op die Pauliniese Briewe en Hebreërs. Die ondersoek vra dus: hoe hanteer en beskou Johannes Chrysostomos die habitus van Romeinse slawerny in sy homilieë op die Pauliniese Briewe en Hebreërs? Die kultuur-historiese teorieë van Michel Foucault en Pierre Bourdieu word hier toegepas.

Die habitus van Romeinse slawerny word gekonstrueer as ’n interseksie van vier liggaamlike diskursiwiteite, naamlik huishoudelikheid, heteronomie, gevangenskap, en die kommodifikasie van die slaaf-liggaam. Chrysostomos se opmerkings oor slawerny word in die lig van hierdie vier diskursiwiteite bestudeer.

Die huishoudelikheid van die slaaf-liggaam word op drie wyses deur Chrysostomos hanteer en gerekonstrueer. Eerstens word daar aangetoon dat Chrysostomos ’n skuif van strategiese slawerny na taktiese slawerny aanmoedig. Tweedens word daar ook uitgewys hoe
Chrysostomos huishoudelike slawebestuur koppel met teologiese konsepte. Laastens, soos dit blyk uit sy eksegese van die Pauliniese *haustafeln*, moet slawe deugsaamheid sowel as ’n praktiese ambag aangeleer word waardeur hulle (moontlik) in die samelewing aanvaar kan word. Die huishouding word dan beide ’n observatorium, wat die slaaf-liggaam monitor, en ’n reformatatorium, wat die slaaf-liggaam verbeter en rehabiliteer tot Christelike gestaltes van deugsaamheid.

Die heteronome van die slaaf-liggaam word ten volle aanvaar deur Chrysostomos. Dit kan veral gesien word in sy eksegese van 1 Korintiërs 7:21, waar hy Stoïes-Filoniese sienswyses oor slawerny naboots en die metafoor van slawerny uiteenlopend gebruik, maar die werklige probleem van institusionele slawerny ignoreer. Slawe sowel as vrye mense moet nie so besorg wees oor hul sosiale status nie, maar eerder fokus op hul status in verhouding met God as die hemelse slawe-eienaar.

Chrysostomos se sienswyses oor die gevangenskap van die slaaf-liggaam is konvensioneel. Aangesien elke slaaf-liggaam eerder in ’n fisiese of simboliese toestand van gevangenskap is, moet hierdie toestand van gevangenskap in stand gehou word en nie weerstaan word nie. Met sy sienswyses wat op Paulus se brief aan Filemon gegrond is, redeneer Chrysostomos dat die ideale Christelike slaaf een is wat by sy of haar eienaar moet bly, maar dat eienaars ook hul slawe regverdig moet behandel.

Laastens is die slaaf-liggaam as ’n objek en handelsitem ook aanwesig in Chrysostomos se denke. Die slaaf-liggaam word gesien as beide ekonomiese en simboliese kapitaal. Betreffende ekonomiese kapitaal hanteer Chrysostomos slawe as deel van sy gehoor se rykdom en eiendom, en die bestuur en vrylating van slawe word in verband gebring met die bestuur en verloëning van rykdom. As simboliese kapitaal het die openbare vertoning van slawe die eer van die slawe-eienaar vermeerder. Die slaaf-liggaam funksioneer hier dan ook as versiering of optooiing. Die gevaar wat Chrysostomos hier uitwys, is dat hierdie gedrag dikwels tot hoogmoed en verwaandheid lei, en dat mense eerder ’n alternatiewe ekonomiese beeld van nodigheid en eenvoud aanneem in plaas van luuksheid.
Chrysostomos is ongemaklik met die liggaam wat in slawerny vasgevang is, maar in plaas daarvan om dit af te skaf, herbesin hy oor slawerny, en daardeur laat hy ook hierdie onderdrukkende praktys voortbestaan; ’n praktys wat eers eeue later deur die kerk verwerp sou word.

Sleutelbegrippe:

• Johannes Chrysostomos
• Slawerny
• Kulturele Geskiedenis
• Laat Antieke Wêreld
• Antieke Huishouding
• Habitus
• Patristiek
• Pauliniese Slawerny
• Retoriek van die Liggaam
• Gevangenskap
• Heteronomie
• Kommodifikasie
• Taktiese Slawerny
• Strategiese Slawerny
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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<td>ASNEL</td>
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FMLS  -  Forum for Modern Language Studies
Gymnasion  -  Gymnasium
Helios  -  Helios
Hermeneia  -  Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible
Historia  -  Historia
HTR  -  Harvard Theological Review
HUTH  -  Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie
Index  -  Index
JAAR  -  Journal of the American Academy of Religion
JBL  -  Journal of Biblical Literature
JECH  -  Journal of Early Christian History
JECS  -  Journal of Early Christian Studies
JEH  -  Journal of Economic History
JHPh  -  Journal of the History of Philosophy
JLH  -  Journal of Legal History
JPC  -  Journal of Popular Culture
JPh  -  Journal of Philosophy
JRA  -  Journal of Roman Archaeology
JRS  -  Journal of Roman Studies
JSAS  -  Journal of Southern African Studies
JSNT  -  Journal for the Study of the New Testament
JSocHist  -  Journal of Social History
JTS  -  Journal of Theological Studies
Ktima  -  Ktima
LCL  -  Loeb Classical Library
Miranda  -  Miranda
NICNT  -  New International Commentary on the New Testament
NIGTC  -  New International Greek Testament Commentary
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- C. Ar. Orationes contra Arianos Orations against the Arians

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- C. Jul. Contra Julianum Against Julian

Aulus Gellius
- Noct. att. Noctes atticae Attic Nights

Aurelius Victor
- Caes. De caesaribus Imperial History

Basil of Caesarea
- Attend. Homilia in illud: Attende tibi Give Heed to Yourself ipsi
- Dest. horr. Homilia in illud: Destrueam I Will Destroy My Storehouses horrea mea
- Ep. Epistulae Letters
- Hom. div. Homiliae super Psalmos Sermon to the Rich divites
- Psalm. Regulae morales The Morals super
- Reg. mor. Regulæ morales The Morals
- Spir. De spiritu sancto On the Holy Spirit

Cato
- Agr. De agricultura On Agriculture

Cicero
- Leg. De legibus On the Laws

Clement of Alexandria
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Galatas commentarius

- Eutrop. In Eutropium On Eutropius
- Exp. Ps. Expositiones in Psalmos Expositions on the Psalms
- Hab. eun. spir. In illud: Habentes eundem spiritum (II Cor. iv:xiii) We Have the Same Spirit (2 Cor. 4:13)
- Hom. Col. Homiliae in epistulam ad Colossenses Homilies on Colossians
- Hom. Eph. Homiliae in epistulam ad Ephesios Homilies on Ephesians
- Hom. Genes. Homiliae in Genesim Homilies on Genesis
- Hom. Heb. Homiliae in epistulam ad Hebraeos Homilies on Hebrews
- Hom. I Cor. Homiliae in epistulam I ad Corinthios Homilies on 1 Corinthians
- Hom. II Cor. Homiliae in epistulam II ad Corinthios Homilies on 2 Corinthians
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- Hom. Jo. Homiliae in Joannem Homilies on John
- Hom. Matt. Homiliae in Matthaueum Homilies on Matthew
- Hom. Phil. Homiliae in epistulam ad Philippenses Homilies on Philippians
- Hom. Phlm. Homiliae in epistulam ad Philemonem Homilies on Philemon
- Hom. Rom. Homiliae in epistulam ad Romanos Homilies on Romans
- Hom. Tit. Homiliae in epistulam ad Titus Homilies on Titus
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- Qidd.  Qiddušin  Qiddushin
- Šabb.  Šabbat  Shabbat
- Yebam.  Yebamot  Yevamot

Origen
- Comm. Eph.  Commentarii in epistulam ad Ephesios  Commentary on Ephesians

Palladius
- Op. agr.  Opus agriculturae  On Agriculture

Peter of Alexandria
- Ep. can.  Epistula canonica  Canonical Letter

Petronius
- Saty.  Satyricon  Satyricon

Philo
- Cher.  De cherubim  On the Cherubim
- Prob.  Quod omnis probus liber sit  That Every Good Person is Free

Philodemus
- Oec.  De oeconomia  On Household Management

Plato
- Crit.  Critias  Critias
- Leg.  Leges  Laws
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- Pol. Politicus Statesman
- Resp. Respublica Republic
Theodoret
- Prov. De providentia On Providence
- Int. Eph. Interpretatio in Ephesios Interpretation of Ephesians

Ulpian
- Dig. Digesta Digest

Varro
- Rust. Rerum rusticarum On Agriculture

Xenophon
- Mem. Memorabilia Socrati Memoirs of Socrates
- Oec. Oeconomicus Householder

All references to the books of the Bible follow the SBL Handbook of Style abbreviations
CHAPTER 1

APPROACHING AND PROBLEMATISING SLAVERY IN CHRYSOSTOMIC LITERATURE

1 INTRODUCTION TO AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

One of the greatest moral and social problems one encounters in the study of early Christian literature and history is slavery. What is even more troubling is that while slavery, to the modern eye, is one of the greatest human rights violations imaginable, very few early Christian authors exhibit this same disposition. In almost all instances when reading the New Testament, it simply seems as if slavery was quietly accepted and managed as any other social institution. In most instances, the famous baptismal formula used by Paul in Galatians 3:28, that in Christ ‘there is neither...slave nor free,’ had lost its original impetus, if it ever had it, and was reduced to a dead, spiritual metaphor in its use among later Christian authors. 1 Furthermore, slavery had become such an embedded and well-maintained social-institution that it would be impossible to simply avoid it, especially since the ancient Roman economy was a slave-dependent economy. 2 In fact, slavery may be described as the one social phenomenon from antiquity that discerns it from our world today. While there are still many forms of modern-day slavery, such as human trafficking, Roman slavery had its own, unique character, one that even shows much difference from the Atlantic slave enterprise. Slavery is therefore, to use more blunt language, a tricky and messy problem for cultural historians of late antiquity.

My own interest in the topic of slavery, however, did not result directly from reading scholarly works on slavery as such; rather, my curiosity began via a different route, namely cultural historical studies on embodiment, as well as from gender studies, philosophy and critical theory. My reading on this topic led me to a book that in fact first made me consider slavery in

late antiquity as a topic for my dissertation. The book I read was Jennifer Glancy’s, *Slavery in Early Christianity* (2006). In this book slavery is approached from the perspective of the rhetoric of the body, and I saw an opportunity for a novel research project, especially since this book did not venture into the late ancient context in much detail. At that point I had just finished an M.Th. dissertation on John Chrysostom’s homilies on the spiritual gifts in 1 Corinthians 12, and I decided that approaching slavery, from the perspective of embodiment as cultural historical enterprise in the homilies of John Chrysostom would suffice as an intriguing topic. It was also very convenient since slavery would fit in perfectly with the project my supervisor, Prof. Hennie Stander, was involved in, namely ‘Early Christianity and the Ancient Economy,’ (headed by Proff. Fika van Rensburg and John Fitzgerald), active as a program unit within the Society of Biblical Literature (SBL) and also as a sub-group with the New Testament Society of South Africa (NTSSA). Before embarking on this study, I had published some preliminary findings in an article entitled, ‘John Chrysostom on Slavery.’ But after finishing the article, there were many questions left unanswered and this supported the idea of writing a dissertation on the topic. As the study developed, I was very fortunate to present and test many of the ideas here as papers at academic conferences. A rough outline and summary of the most important points of the dissertation was presented in August 2011 at the Sixteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies at the University of Oxford. I was also very fortunate to have had the opportunity to present some of the main points of chapter 3, on the domesticity of the slave-body, at a departmental research seminar in that same month hosted by the Department of New Testament and Early Christian Studies at the University of South Africa (UNISA). In November 2011, a large part of chapter 4, on the heteronomous body, was presented at the Annual Meeting of the SBL in San Francisco and a very abridged version of chapter 5, on the carcerality of the slave-

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body, was read in May 2012 at the Annual Meeting of the North American Patristics Society (NAPS) in Chicago. Much of the information found in the final chapter on the commodification of the body, as well some comments on carcerality were presented as a main paper at the NTSSA conference in June 2012 in Pietermaritzburg.

Most importantly, also in June 2012, I had arranged a research workshop at UNISA entitled, ‘Redescribing Ancient Slavery and Its Modern Legacies: Problems, Approaches and Possibilities.’ The purpose of this project was to revisit and also to redescribe the corporeal discourse of ancient slavery. The critical enterprise of redescribing implies that ancient slavery as it is understood today is a scholarly construction, one that should always be subject to scrutiny, revision and further theoretical and systematic exploration. It therefore implies the re-problematisation of core issues addressed in scholarship on ancient slavery, along with endeavours to expand on its foundational discursivities. Redescription, moreover, nuances to dissatisfaction with some conceptualisations and enunciative modalities which have surfaced in the scholarly discourse of ancient slavery. In redescribing ancient slavery, along with its modern legacies, the need not only for new, interdisciplinary approaches is recognised, but the necessity for developing a new way of conceptualising about ancient slavery – that is, a new, critical language – is stressed. Manners in which ancient slavery as a discourse ‘speaks itself’ through the bodies of men, women and children are at the center here. Behind this pervasive and degrading practice, several discourses operate which are still very prevalent in modern society.

The project aimed to account for these discourses and conceptualise and problematise their functioning in both ancient and modern society (with a focus on the African context). The project was interdisciplinary, incorporating scholarship from the fields of Biblical and Ancient Historical Studies, but also from Roman Law, Linguistics, Critical Theory, Philosophy, Gender Studies, Cultural Anthropology and Sociology. It was a very productive day with papers read by scholars from the fields of Jurisprudence, African Culture and Linguistics as well as Sociology. Many of these issues also surface in this dissertation. This was also the instance in which I invited Jennifer Glancy to contribute, the scholar whose work inspired this very project. I am also very fortunate to have had her read large selections from chapters 2, 3 and 5, and even more fortunate for the gracious comments she provided.

This is then the history and development of this research project and dissertation. The completion of the dissertation does not imply the completion of the project itself, which will still
continue for at least 3 years. The point of this dissertation was to critically investigate how slavery functions in John Chrysostom’s homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews. I will now provide some preliminary remarks on this excursus, a *status quaestionis*, problem statement and methodological remarks, as well as an outline of the study.

## 2 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, SLAVERY AND LATE ANCIENT STUDIES

In his prodigious study on slavery in the late Roman world, Kyle Harper lists John Chrysostom as ‘an unparalleled source for the realities of Roman slavery’. This is no trifling matter, since the evidence for slavery in the late Roman world, both literary and archaeological, is sparse. Harper’s work is one of a number of recent studies on slavery in the first four centuries CE. Along with Harper, another compelling book also appeared in 2011, namely volume 1 of the *Cambridge World History of Slavery*, which examines slavery in the ancient Mediterranean world. In the nascent decade of this new millennium, nearly every year boasted a new title on slavery in the ancient world. The revival of interest in slavery in the ancient world is part of a larger project of writing a new cultural history of antiquity. This was especially signalled by scholars such as Paul Veyne, Peter Brown and Averil Cameron. Paul Veyne’s ground-breaking study entitled, *Le pain et le cirque: sociologie historique d’un pluralisme politique* (1976) set the scene for scholars who began utilizing methods and trajectories from New Cultural Theory to understand the history and historiography of late antiquity. Along with Veyne, there is also Peter Brown, who wrote several works of extreme importance for advancing the field of late antiquity. Another example is Averil Cameron, who especially helped scholars to understand

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how rhetoric and discourse function in the culture of late antiquity. This scholarly coup d’état would only grow stronger in the years after these foundational studies. The multi-authored book, *The Cultural Turn in Late Ancient Studies* (2005) is an example of the development of the study of late antiquity. Studies on the body and sexuality such as those by Brown, Clark, Glancy, and Burrus, among others, stand out in this array of scholarship. Finally, the new *Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies* (2008) and the Blackwell *Companion to Late Antiquity* (2009) have taken the lead in presenting this scholarship into mainstream teaching.

Having said this, neither of these two titles have a chapter devoted to slavery. The Blackwell Companion does not refer to slavery at all, while the Oxford Handbook has two pages (out of

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11 Brown, *Body and Society*.


nearly 1000) devoted to slavery. Yet ancient slavery has played a key role in the formation of many concepts central to this historiography, such as gender, honour/shame and the economy.

We have then two important points to stress; on the one hand, as Harper as stated, John Chrysostom is one of our most important sources for slavery (and most other subjects) in late antiquity; and on the other, slavery is a keystone in the project of writing a cultural history of late antiquity. Yet there is no decisive cultural historical study of slavery focussed on the writings of John Chrysostom. The two studies on slavery and Chrysostom, Kontoulis and Jaeger, are both socio-historical and theological studies, which follow a conventional approach to the topic. These two writings will be discussed below, but it is also worth mentioning that they are difficult to obtain, both written in German, and somewhat dated. Moreover, there have been astronomical leaps in research on slavery since the publication of these two works that need to serve as background to reading slavery in the writings of John Chrysostom. Notwithstanding the latter, Jennifer Glancy said it best in the introduction to her seminal study, Slavery in Early Christianity (2006):

[W]e have to remember that the picture of slavery we derive from these sources is pieced together rather than given. Any description of slavery in antiquity is the product of multiple scholarly decisions...

The reason for this ambiguity lies in the fact that our sources for slavery in antiquity, especially late antiquity, are limited, complex and problematic. Due the scarcity of literary and archaeological evidence for understanding late ancient slavery, the historian is constantly under threat of writing a history that is lacunaec and biased. The single greatest obstruction to this is that we do not possess one source from the first four centuries depicting slavery from the slave’s

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20 Glancy, Slavery in Early Christianity, 3.
All writings are composed by slaveholders rather than slaves, and only one side of the story is therefore present. Harrill has argued that the majority of references to slaves in the literary sources of early Christianity are more often based on literary stereotypes than reality - so even the opinions of ancient authors are ideological constructs. These scholarly constructions act like tainted glass windows, through which the curious observer must look. Each tint may highlight certain scenes, and darken others. And so our observer would move to another window to see the picture differently. The scenes highlighted by the cultural historical tint of this study are by no means all embracing or kaleidoscopic. It aims to highlight some milieux that may have been neglected and darkened by others. There is then a very urgent need for a new cultural historical analysis of slavery exclusively in the writings of John Chrysostom. This study aims to fill this gap and provide new insights based on recent research, in English, and therefore accessible to a wider scholarly public. It aims to address the lack of a cultural historical analysis of slavery in John Chrysostom’s writings, and, as it will be demonstrated at the end of this chapter, how Chrysostom specifically views slavery in the context of Pauline ethics found in the New Testament, since the main sources used will be Chrysostom’s homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews (which Chrysostom assumes was written by Paul). The dissertation is therefore both a cultural historical analysis of Chrysostom’s views on slavery, but also an investigation into the Wirkungsgeschichte of slavery in the Pauline Epistles.

3  STATUS QUAESTIONIS: SLAVERY AND JOHN CHRYSOSTOM

This section will now examine the history of research on slavery in the writings of John Chrysostom. There are only two studies that directly and extensively treat the issue of slavery in Chrysostom, Jaeger and Kontoulis, and these studies merit discussion. In addition, Harper’s study will also be discussed here since his use of Chrysostom is so extensive, more than any other source not solely devoted to Chrysostom. Although there are numerous other studies that

21 Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 16–23.
23 Jaeger, “Sklaverei.”
24 Kontoulis, Problem der Sklaverei.
25 Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World.
mention Chrysostom, none provide a detailed discussion of slavery in Chrysostom’s writings, which excludes them from the present discussion.


One of the earliest studies discussing John Chrysostom’s approach to slavery is that of Johann A. Möhler, ‘Bruchstücke aus der Geschichte der Aufhebung der Sklaverei;’ 26 the dating of the particular article is obscure, possibly 1840, as only secondary references are available on this work that is out of print. The discussion remains basic, touching on all aspects from manumission to the treatment of slaves. The article provides a good overview of relevant passages in the homilies. The problem is that it remains a discussion within a larger, general discussion of slavery, so Möhler’s discussion remains cursory and mostly descriptive.

The first study fully devoted to slavery in the writings of Chrysostom is Wulf Jaeger’s unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, ‘Die Sklaverei bei Johannes Chrysostomus’ (1974). 27 Jaeger’s study has done some important groundwork for the study of slavery in the writings of Chrysostom. It provides a rather thorough lexicographical survey, and an interesting section on the social aspects of slavery in Chrysostom’s writings. 28 But the focus of the study is the metaphor of slavery and its theological implications.

After the lexicographical examination, Jaeger looks at slavery as a social institution in late antiquity. 29 The section is rather conventional, and touches on most basic aspects of slavery in the later Roman world. The character and nature of slavery is discussed very briefly, followed by a section on the conditions of impoverished freed persons. 30 This point is interesting, since Jaeger argues that many freed persons, after they were manumitted, led very impoverished lives. Hence Chrysostom’s advice to teach slaves a trade before manumitting them. Jaeger’s point here is convincing and very important for the social context of freed persons in late antiquity. It is then followed by a section on the numismatics of slavery. He is concerned with the very high

27 Jaeger, “Sklaverei.”
28 Ibid., 3–24.
29 Ibid., 24–42.
30 Ibid., 27–33.
number of slaves and slaveholders, but the section is unfortunately very terse.\textsuperscript{31} Harper’s assessment of slave numismatics is much better and more sophisticated than Jaeger’s, who could have given more thought to the subject.\textsuperscript{32} The trading of slaves is also discussed.\textsuperscript{33}

After Jaeger’s cursory discussion of the institution of slavery (a mere 18 pages), the discussion on the character and morality of slaves follows.\textsuperscript{34} This is especially examined in the light of Chrysostom’s statements on the vice and bad character of slaves.\textsuperscript{35} He even lists some possible reasons why slaves were unsavoury characters and how Chrysostom seeks to improve their behaviour.\textsuperscript{36} He also looks at some characteristics that may have remained after the slave was manumitted.\textsuperscript{37} This section is contrasted by the image of the good and faithful slave. The focus here is on domestic slaves, and their duties.\textsuperscript{38} This section on the domestic slave is more detailed; it is mostly descriptive - based on the Chrysostomic sources. Attention is given to slaves’ duties in the house, including medical, sexual and administrative duties.\textsuperscript{39} The relationship between slaves and children is also discussed.\textsuperscript{40} Jaeger also provides a discussion of manumission, including its forms, representation and the issue of slaves with priests and monks.\textsuperscript{41}

The majority of the study is reserved for the theological aspect of slavery.\textsuperscript{42} The metaphor of slavery and its comparisons with sin affords much discussion. Jaeger also focuses a lot on the role of the church in the salvation of people from the ‘slavery of sin’. This section is basically a thorough discussion of the metaphor of slavery in the theology of Chrysostom.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 34–36.
\textsuperscript{32} Harper, \textit{Slavery in the Late Roman World}, 33–66.
\textsuperscript{33} Jaeger, “Sklaverei,” 36–42.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 43–58.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 43–48.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 49–55.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 58–141.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 62–82.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 132–40.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 141–50.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 155 ff.
This dissertation is the first and almost the only thorough discussion of slavery in Chrysostom’s writings. The main problem with Jaeger is that his hypothesis assumes that Chrysostom’s teachings on slavery were ameliorative to the issue. In other words, Chrysostom’s advice improved conditions for slaves. I would argue the opposite in this study. On the surface it may seem true, but the cultural historical dynamics need to be examined more closely. Furthermore, Jaeger assumes that Chrysostom’s descriptions of slaves, and in particular, their character, is based on real life. Although Chrysostom’s descriptions are not entirely fictive, a more sophisticated approach is needed than merely contrasting ‘good’ and ‘bad’ slaves. Chrysostom often uses hyperbole and other rhetorical techniques of persuasion and dramatisation to get his point across - often an exaggerated point. In the context of the New Testament and early Christianity, both Glancy⁴³ and especially Harrill⁴⁴ have convincingly shown that slaves in ancient literary sources are often popular slave stereotypes that are not always based on reality. Chrysostom is no exception to this, and Jaeger perhaps takes Chrysostom too seriously in this regard. Chrysostom speaks to slaveholders and therefore speaks the language of the slaveholders.

The most important point Jaeger stresses is that Chrysostom aims to provide corrective measures for improving the morality of slaves. But unfortunately he does not explore the dynamics behind this concept. Sadly, only 12 pages are reserved for this crucial aspect of understanding slavery with Chrysostom. But Jaeger is clear in his point. He aims to focus on the theology of Chrysostom and how slavery fits in that theology, especially the metaphor of slavery in terms of sin and salvation. Jaeger’s study is valuable in this area, the Chrysostomic theology - but in terms of understanding slavery as a social, cultural and historical phenomenon in late antiquity, it has little to offer.

### 3.2 Georg Kontoulis: *Zum Problem der Sklaverei (ΔΟΥΛΕΙΑ) bei den kappadokischen Kirchenvatern und Johannes Chrysostomus* (1993)

As with Jaeger, this study is also based on the author’s doctoral thesis. Slavery is discussed in the writings of the Cappadocian fathers and Chrysostom, and also like Jaeger, is an investigation into the theological-ethical aspects of slavery. The metaphor of slavery and its relationship to sin

dominates most of the discussion.\textsuperscript{45} It is especially focussed on how the four ancient writers view slavery in relation to the human passions, and how the human being is also a slave to her/his passions. The origin of slavery is discussed in its theological-ethical guise. Both Kontoulis and Jaeger stress that Chrysostom never calls for the abolition of slavery, which is an easy observation to make, but both have an nuance that these authors made life a bit easier for slaves, and thus supports the amelioration thesis. There is a strong ecclesiological focus in the section discussing Chrysostom, which discusses aspects of theological anthropology, equality, poverty and the role of the church in the protection of runaway slaves and asylum-seekers.\textsuperscript{46}

The wide scope of the study does not allow Kontoulis the luxury of very detailed investigations into the Chrysostomic literature, which is the greatest weakness of the study. It does pose some interesting questions, especially on how Chrysostom views equality.\textsuperscript{47} The discussion of the origins of slavery is certainly more sophisticated than that of Jaeger.\textsuperscript{48}

The strength and value of the study is that it contextualises Chrysostom’s views in the light of the Cappadocians, and trends are easy to spot between the ancient authors. It shows how the East was influenced by Stoic teachings on slavery and their important emphasis on ethics and virtue. It illustrates general tendencies related to slavery in the East, especially due to the influence of asceticism, and this explanation of the inter-ideology of slavery among the four famous eastern fathers is a valuable contribution.

3.3 Kyle Harper: \textit{Slavery in the Late Roman World AD 275-425} (2011)

Kyle Harper’s work can be described as the single most important and comprehensive work on late Roman slavery to date. Although this book does not have a direct focus on Chrysostom, he is still one of the primary sources used in the book, and Harper provides important discussions on many of Chrysostom’s views. Its only weakness is that it does not have a systematized discussion of Chrysostom’s views on slavery, but then, that is not the purpose of the book. The most important hypothesis in the book is that late Roman slavery was alive and well during the time of Chrysostom, and in accordance with Wickham’s monumental study of the early medieval

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 317–24.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 320–22.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 325–54.
period, there was no slow transition of late Roman slavery into early medieval serfdom. Harper rather argues that slavery almost disappeared due to a complete systemic collapse of supply and demand due to the gradual disintegration of the Roman Empire.

The book examines the economic, social and legal aspects of late Roman slavery in the minutest of detail, and provides an impressive array of sources, models and hypotheses for scholarship on the issue. Harper’s views will be examined and critiqued throughout this study.

Despite the importance of this book, it is still not a focussed discussion of John Chrysostom’s views on slavery. Chrysostomic texts are cited and discussed, but mostly to illustrate a greater trend in Roman society. Often Harper only skims over crucial passages, for instance Chrysostom’s *Homiliae in epistulam I ad Corinthios* 40, probably the single most important reference, which merits only the briefest of comment. In all fairness, this is not what Harper’s book sets out to do, nor can it be described as a cultural history of slavery in the late Roman world. Much hard work has gone into this book (also revised from a dissertation), and Harper has done most of the groundwork for scholars working with slavery in the late Roman world. He has addressed some issues that are of crucial importance (especially his refutation of the ‘transition’ and ‘amelioration’ hypotheses), and has now enabled us to go further and ask other questions in order to understand slavery better. With his extensive dependence on Chrysostom as a source, Harper, in fact, prompts the need for a focussed study of slavery in Chrysostom’s works.

### 3.4 Other Studies of Importance

In this discussion of the *status quaestionis* I have attempted to remain close to sources that are specifically focussed on Chrysostom (Jaeger and Kontoulis), or rely heavily upon him as a source (Harper). I did not wish to list other general works on slavery, which would lead to an almost endless discussion, since there are so many. I do wish to highlight some important works on slavery in the late Roman world that are relevant for this study, even though they do not have direct focus on John Chrysostom.

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51 Ibid., 3–66.
3.4.1 Richard Klein

A number of articles have been published by Klein on slavery in the writings of late ancient Christian authors, and these studies are also important in viewing the milieu of Chrysostom and his discussions on slavery. Especially important for this discussion, in supplementing the work of Kontoulis, is Klein’s, *Die Haltung der kappadokischen Bischöfe Basilius von Caesarea, Gregor von Nazianz, und Gregor von Nyssa zur Sklaverei* (2000), in which the stance of the Cappadocians on slavery is critically discussed and evaluated, following his 1988 study of the same topic focussed on the writings of Ambrose and Augustine. Although still very theologically oriented, it is a helpful source, along with most of Klein’s other publications. The importance of Klein’s work is highlighted in his demonstration that Christianity was not ameliorative, and shows continuity of mass-scale slavery into the fifth century. In his article entitled, ‘Zum Verhältnis von Herren und Sklaven in der Spätantike’ (1999), Klein focuses on the western Empire during the fifth century, especially Italy and Gaul. He argues that Christian and non-Christian authors differed sharply on the nature of slavery, and that Aristotle’s notion of natural slavery was still very prevalent among non-Christian authors (an issue that is questioned in this dissertation). It was not ameliorative though, since the number of slaves did not really decrease, and conditions were still set against slaves. Klein has also published an article on Jerome and slavery, ‘Der Kirchenvater Hieronymus und die Sklaverei: Ein Einblick’ (2001), which is without the typical theological and metaphorical emphases. There are interesting

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discussions of slavery in monasticism, and most importantly for this study, there is a focus on the role of Pauline literature in Jerome’s views on slavery, especially the household codes and the letter to Philemon.

3.4.2 Jennifer Glancy
Glancy has done extensive research on slavery in early Christianity, with a unique focus on the concept of slaves as ‘bodies’. Glancy argues that slaves should be understood as surrogate bodies for their owners, and especially focuses on the sexuality of these surrogate bodies, the issue of gender and the issue of slaves’ participation in the nascent early church.

For this current study, Glancy’s views have proven to be the most influential. Her proposition of understanding slaveholding as the management and regulation of bodies serve as the basic axiom for this study. Furthermore, Glancy’s application of Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus is also applied here, and serves as a very helpful and creative way of approaching ancient slavery. Much more will be said on Glancy’s views of slaveholding through the course of this dissertation.

3.4.3 Youval Rotman
Rotman’s study on slavery in the Byzantine world has shed light on some of the most important aspects of the institution during the Byzantine period. It is especially welcome since the only definitive study of the topic was that of Hadjinicolaou-Marava, a monograph entitled, *Recherches sur la vie des esclaves dans le monde Byzantin* (1950). Despite its emphasis on


58 Glancy, “Christian Slavery in Late Antiquity.”


medieval slavery, this study remains of direct importance for working on slavery in Chrysostom’s writings; it also offers a compelling view of the nature of slavery, which is very much the same as in this current study. Rotman especially argues for an emphasis on the socio-cultural nature of slavery. Interestingly enough, he is one of the few authors who critiques the oft-supposed dichotomy between slaves and masters, which is problematic for autocratic societies like Byzantium. Rotman convincingly illustrates various continuities between slavery from late antiquity and that of Byzantium, making it an interesting reading-partner for the seminal and crucial study of Wickham.⁶¹

There is unfortunately not that much reference to Chrysostom himself - mostly only in passing. The study is conventional in that it prefers to rely on several loci classici from late antiquity, namely Jerome's *Vita Malchi*, Pseudo-Nilus’ *Narrationes*, and Gregory of Nyssa’s *Homiliae in Ecclesiasten 4*. It is nevertheless a crucial study for understanding the context and continuity of slavery in Chrysostom’s writings and their possible impact in the centuries following.

There are many other studies that focus on slavery in the late Roman world or in early Christianity that are of utmost importance. These will be utilized in the body of the study. What is evident from this discussion is that a genuine need for a new, in-depth and focussed discussion of slavery in John Chrysostom’s writings. This brings me to the next and most important point of this chapter, namely the problem statement and methodology.

4 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND METHODOLOGY

The problem that this study addresses has already been articulated in a very general sense. It aims to provide a systematic account of Chrysostom’s treatment of slavery in his homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews. This, however, needs more delimitation and methodological refinement. I therefore present a more sophisticated problem statement: how does John Chrysostom negotiate and reimagine the habitus of Roman slaveholding in his homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews? I will now delineate the most crucial aspects of such an investigation.

The terms negotiate and reimagine have been carefully selected in order to capture the essence of Chrysostom’s ideas on slaveholding. The term negotiate implies, firstly, resistance;
this asks in which ways Chrysostom rejects certain discursivities of Roman slaveholding. While many scholars have shown that early Christian views on slaveholding were not ameliorative as such, it does not imply that their writings were totally devoid of resistance. The notion of resistance has been expanded in the classic work of Keith Bradley.\textsuperscript{62} It implies that with certain authors, one finds on the one hand a discomfort with slavery, and also, on the other, that ancient society exhibited both overt and covert measures of resistance, from slaves themselves, as in the cases of slave-revolts, fleeing and counter-surveillance, or from the free(d), especially from literary accounts like those of Seneca’s \textit{Epistula} \textit{47} and Gregory of Nyssa’s \textit{Homiliae in Ecclesiasten} \textit{4}. The problem statement will therefore also ask if Chrysostom resists certain aspects of Roman slaveholding, and how he does it.

Secondly, the term \textit{negotiate} implies that while the promotion of slavery is not always present, there is still a quiet acceptance of the institution. This I have already explained in a previous article.\textsuperscript{63} Glancy has shown that despite the resistance found in some late ancient Christian authors on slavery, the corporal habituation that has taken place over the centuries would not be overcome so easily.\textsuperscript{64} Negotiation, in this study, therefore implies the relation between resistance and acceptance - what does Chrysostom accept regarding slavery in the light of his points of resistance.

The term \textit{reimagine} implies that Chrysostom had a new social vision for slaveholding and slave-management. It asks how Chrysostom envisions the ideal slave/slaveholder relationship in the light of his theological and ethical understanding of scripture. Since he does not at all abolish slavery, what does he recommend and how does this fit in with his wider social vision?

The most important aspect of these terms, and the problem statement in general, is that they assume the habitus of Roman slaveholding. What is meant by habitus? The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu uses the concept of the habitus in his practice-centered social theory.


\textsuperscript{63} De Wet, “John Chrysostom on Slavery.”

\textsuperscript{64} Glancy, “Christian Slavery in Late Antiquity,” 73–74.
It is by means of practice that a society defines, shapes and regulates itself, and also promotes its social and ethical dispositions. This is most explicitly manifested in embodiment. Bourdieu refers to the notion of habitus as a ‘system of structured, structuring dispositions...’\textsuperscript{65} The habitus is also a strategy for socialisation, and it is directly translated or superscribed onto the body. Bourdieu further states:

As a system of practice-generating schemes which expresses systematically the necessity and freedom inherent in its class condition and the difference constituting that position, the habitus apprehends differences between conditions, which it grasps in the forms of differences between classified, classifying practices (products of other habitus), in accordance with principles of differentiation which, being themselves the product of these differences, are objectively attuned to them and therefore tend to perceive them as natural.\textsuperscript{66}

Chrysostom therefore finds himself in this symbolic social space and functions within its ‘naturalness’ or rather, its banality. But Chrysostom is also produced by another habitus, namely Christianity, and the negotiation and reimagination represent what Bourdieu above calls the apprehension of differences and their perception. Thus this study finds itself, in fact, at the conjunction of two systems of ‘practice-generating schemes,’ namely Roman slaveholding and late ancient Christian doctrine and ethics, and it aims to take account of the interaction inherent in such a conjunction. This is then the understanding of the habitus in the context of the problem statement above.

Furthermore, I propose here that the Roman habitus of slaveholding and slave-management occurs or is practiced (pratiquer, in the French theoretical sense, ‘to practise’ [itself]), at the intersection of four discursive lines. The first discursivity is that of the domesticity of the slave-body. Slave-bodies, especially in the context of Chrysostom, function as domestic bodies that need to be managed. This is in fact the defining trait of ancient slaveholding,

\textsuperscript{65} Pierre Bourdieu, \textit{The Logic of Practice} (Richard Nice (trans.); Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 52.

\textsuperscript{66} Pierre Bourdieu, \textit{Distinction} (Richard Nice (trans); London: Routledge, 1984), 167.
and is foundational to the other three discursivities. Slave-management falls within the ancient discourse of *oikonomia*, or household management. The second discursivity is that of heteronomy. It will be shown that, in antiquity, the view that all bodies are made to be ruled was quite common. This discursivity then provides an essential element for perpetuating a system of slaveholding. It also provides an important insight into how slave-metaphors functioned. The metaphor of slavery and its institutional equivalent cannot be separated; they are discursively linked. It also shows how concepts of domination, manumission and freedom functioned in this world. Notions of how subjects are formed and regulated, thus ancient subjectivities, as well as the concept of agency gain precedence in this instance. The third discursivity, namely the slave-body as a carceral body, will be examined. The concept of carcerality, that is, being in a symbolic or physical sense of imprisonment, is also crucial to understanding ancient slavery, since the management of slave-bodies is more specifically the management of their carcerality and mobility. This is related to how slave-bodies are contained, confined and regulated in all aspects. Finally, the notion of the slave-body as a commodified body will be discussed. The Roman habitus of slaveholding assumes that slaves are both persons and objects or commodities, thus, property. Slaveholding is then directly related to the management of wealth and property, as well as social honour and shame. The discussion of these four discursivities will therefore represent the outline of this dissertation, and the process of negotiation and reimagination will be located within these discursivities.

Finally, the scope of investigation must be delimited and validated. The choice of Chrysostom’s homilies has already been discussed above, especially in the light of their potential for understanding late ancient cultural history. But any scholar working on Chrysostom knows how important it is to limit the literary evidence to be discussed, simply because Chrysostom has written so much. The choice for the corpus of homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews (as stated, he believed Paul wrote Hebrews) is based on the assumption that such a selection would in essence not only then provide an investigation into Chrysostom’s thought on slaveholding, but also as we mentioned, provide a *Wirkungsgeschichte* on Paul’s views on slavery. The texts used for the homilies will be taken from Migne’s *Patrologia Graeca* and translations of Chrysostom’s works are my own unless otherwise indicated in the footnotes. In most instances I have tried to

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67 In this instance I must acknowledge an awareness of the fact that Migne’s text is not the preference for Chrysostom’s homilies on the Pauline Epistles, and that the corpus of texts by Frederick Field, while not perfect, is
strike a middle ground between a literal and functional equivalent translation, and in a few instances I have chosen to simply use an existing literal translation of Chrysostom’s work.

The subtitle of the dissertation, ‘A Cultural-Historical Analysis,’ indicates the methodology followed in the study. Much of the cultural-historical method has already been discussed above. But how exactly does this study understand and utilise cultural historiography? Cultural historiography is peculiar in that it utilises insights from the fields of Anthropology and History in order to understand cultural phenomena. It also exhibits moments of interaction with critical philosophical theories, such as Marxism and structuralism, and also postcolonialism and feminism. Cultural history is often divided into two periods, namely the classic period of cultural history, and the period of the new paradigm. In the classical period of cultural history, the most notable scholars would be Burckhardt and Huizinga, but it also exhibits much interaction with Marxism and also Hegelian philosophy. While this study takes cognisance of this period and its scholarship, the theorists of the new paradigm serve as trajectories for this dissertation. More specifically, I will primarily use the hypotheses of two French theorists of cultural history. In the first instance, the work of Michel Foucault will be predominantly used in the study. This is especially due to Foucault’s emphasis on embodiment. Foucault’s work stands out in the sense that it represents a highly critical reaction against established fields and disciplines, especially History, Sociology, Literature Studies and Psychology. Foucault’s recognition and problematization of power-dynamics in relation to knowledge-matrices and social systems are especially valuable. He has argued that social systems are in essence certainly a preference here. Unfortunately these texts in their various volumes were not at my disposal due to their limited availability and very old date of publication. Since the impetus of this study is not text critical or based on translation, I am convinced that Migne’s texts will suffice. Migne’s texts as well as many other ancient authors’ texts were accessed from the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG), and when page numbers were not available, the bibliographic reference will be given with an indication that it comes from the TLG. I would also like to thank Mr. Erastus Jonker for his assistance in obtaining the Hebrew texts in the dissertation, and Prof. Phil J. Botha for his assistance with the Syriac.

discursive, and that history is in itself a product of various power-discourses. Burke states: ‘Where [Norbert] Elias stressed self-control, Foucault emphasized control over the self, especially control over bodies exercised by the authorities.’ The formation, regulation and control of subjectivities by means of power-discourses are crucial for Foucault, and these concepts would be especially useful in a study of slavery. For the purposes of this study, the following Foucaultian theories will be used.

Firstly, Foucault’s works on the nature of knowledge and systems of classification are crucial for this dissertation. This is mostly covered in two of his works, and one of his main premises here is based on the dynamic between power, knowledge and identity formation. In another article, I state the following:

Power and identity formation are inseparable. Foucault demonstrated that the subject, or the self, is not free but a production of power-discourses and scripted by various social forces. People craft and/or negotiate their identities as ‘subjects’ in the context of institutions, experiences and doctrines that inexorably exert influence on the process of subject-formation and subject-embodiment. Furthermore, this process is inevitably discursive, and there exists a cyclical flow between discursive formations (i.e. objects of knowledge) and the formation of the subject within their embodied temporal and spatial positions. Discursive formations therefore produce individuals/figures, who in turn, construct their reality by means of interpretation of the very objects of knowledge that shaped them.

When this dissertation utilizes terms like discursivities and discourses, this is the context. A discursive formation is a combination of discourses that form the objects they speak of; slavery is in itself a discursive formation, shaped by various discourses as will be illustrated in the study. The second important concept of Foucault utilized in this study is that of governmentality. Governmentality is used to describe the changes in the technologies of, and dispositions towards, governance.\(^{76}\) While Foucault especially spoke about governmentality in eighteenth-century Europe, the implications of governmentality during the Christian Empire is crucial for understanding discourses related to the management of slave-bodies. The Christian state, with its shepherd-flock model, still had to manage its resources in an economic way, and with the development of the episcopate as a technology of state governance, there is a direct intervention from the state into the lives of the citizens. The consequences of this is that the Christian state, via the episcopate and its sub-structures as government institutions and discourses, aimed, in Foucault’s terms, to regulate the bodies of the citizens. Bodies are then in turn educated to monitor and regulate their own subsequent behaviour, and this is nowhere more clear than in the case of slave-management. In the third instance, stemming from his history of the modern prison-system, Foucault’s concept of discipline will be used quite extensively in this study since they are directly related to slave-management.\(^{77}\) This is especially related to the punishment and reformation of delinquent bodies in the institutions governed by the state and, in a more informal manner, by the household. Foucault uses the French term *surveiller* in his work on this topic, which does exhibit a nuance of surveillance, also crucial to understanding slave-management. It is also from this concept that Foucault’s notion of carcerality is deduced - the notion that bodies are incarcerated and confined for very specific purposes related to control, surveillance and regulation, mostly for the security of society or, in the case of slaveholding, for its labour-modes. Finally, the study will also use Foucault’s notions of normalcy and abnormalcy in the regulation of bodies and the formation of subjects.\(^{78}\) It will be argued that

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\(^{78}\) Michel Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–1975* (Valerio Marchetti and Antonella
slave-bodies were considered to be delinquent and abnormal bodies that were often subjected to processes of normalization, on the one hand, and on the other, that the slave-body as abnormal body was also essential to maintaining and forming the notion of the normal, free, Roman/Christian male. These issues tie in with the discourse of sexuality, and Foucault’s link between sexuality and society will often be stressed. These concepts then represent the main Foucaultian methodological apparatus that will be utilized in this study. The concepts will be discussed in more detail within the chapters themselves. Foucault’s concepts will especially feature in chapters 2 to 5 of this dissertation.

The second important theorist contributing to the cultural historical analysis of this dissertation is Pierre Bourdieu. We have already seen that Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus is central to the problem statement of this study, and the concept of the habitus has already been discussed. But the concept of the habitus is not the only Bourdieuan notion used in this investigation. Bourdieu’s notions of economic and symbolic capital will serve as the primary point of departure in chapter 6 of the study, the chapter that focuses on the objectification and commodification of the slave-body. This theory is extensively discussed at the beginning of this chapter, although some preliminary remarks may be made. Bourdieu discerns between symbolic and economic capital and, although they are inextricably related and influential to each other, they have different manifestations in society. While economic capital primarily serves economic needs, symbolic capital function as markers of what Bourdieu calls distinction or social worth and honour. Since honour and shame were core values of the Roman world, also to Chrysostom, the notion of slaves as both economic and symbolic capital, as logical inferences of their objectification and commodification, are crucial to any discussion of ancient slavery. Since slave-bodies were also objects and commodities, they are subjected to the same dynamics as goods in the ancient world.


80 Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, 112–21.
Further elaborations on the critical theory used in the methodology of this dissertation may be found at the commencement of the various chapters, since most function well when used with examples directly from the primary sources.

In summary then, to outline the cultural historical method used in this study, the following issues are relevant. The fact that the problem statement entails the investigation of a habitus is central. Since slaveholding is approached as a habitus (Bourdieu), its various discursivities (Foucault) need to be delineated. Since slaves are understood in the cultural-historical sense as bodies, these bodies are discursively formed and regulated by means of four discourses, namely domesticity, heteronomy, carcerality and commodification.

The dissertation therefore boasts, in addition to a novel analysis of Chrysostom’s views on slaveholding and a *Wirkungsgeschichte* of Pauline notions of slaveholding, also a new methodological framework for studying slavery, both ancient and early modern, from a cultural historical perspective.

In the light of this problem statement and methodological framework, the structure of the study may be outlined. The first chapter of the investigation, chapter 2, entitled ‘Revisiting and Reconstructing the Roman Habitus of Slaveholding: The Management of Slave-Bodies in Hellenistic, Roman, Judaistic and Christian Antiquity,’ serves as a preliminary point of departure for the rest of the study. In this chapter, the habitus of Roman slaveholding is discussed, and attention is given to its cultural-historical formation from the ancient Hellenistic, Roman, Judaistic and Christian contexts. I have chosen the terms *revisiting* and *reconstructing* to highlight the fact that, in the light of the methodological trajectory of this study, namely cultural historiography, the most important sources for understanding the Roman habitus of slaveholding, the point of negotiation and reimagination for Chrysostom, need to be revisited and re-read from the perspective of cultural history. This chapter therefore sets the scene for the others in that it provides a point of reference when reading the Chrysostomic sources. The Hellenistic and Roman contexts are important since they were still very active in the society of which Chrysostom is part, while the early Christian and Judaistic sources provide the background for Chrysostom’s disposition as a late ancient Christian homilist shaped by three centuries of Judeo-Christian discourse. This chapter will also conclude with a synthesis of some prominent Christian and non-Christian authors from late antiquity for the sake of highlighting continuities and discontinuities between Chrysostom and his close contemporaries.
The rest of the dissertation is devoted to the reading of the most important Chrysostomic sources for domestic slavery. I stress the term *domestic slavery* here, since Chrysostom’s homilies are in most instances concerned with the management of domestic slaves in the urban context. Chapter 3, entitled, ‘Managing the Domestic Body: John Chrysostom, Slaves and the Ancient Discourse of *Oikonomia*,’ examines how Chrysostom approaches the domesticity of slave-bodies. The emphasis will especially be on his homilies on the Pauline *haustafeln*. In chapter 4, Chrysostom’s understanding of the slave-body as a heteronomous body will be delineated from the basis of his exegesis of the ambiguous text in 1 Corinthians 7:21. This chapter problematizes the link between the metaphor and reality of slaveholding, and situates Chrysostom within the development of this discourse. Chapter 5, conceptually the most challenging chapter of the thesis, approaches the slave-body as a carceral body, specifically from the wealth of information provided by Chrysostom in his *Homiliae in epistulam ad Philemonem*. Finally, in chapter 6, the objectification and commodification of the slave-body is discussed with reference to two of the *loci classici* from Chrysostom’s homilies, namely his *Homiliae in epistulam I ad Corinthios* 40 and his *Homiliae in epistulam ad Hebraeos* 28. Chapter 7 will present the conclusion of the dissertation.

5 CONCLUSION

While this dissertation is part of a much larger project on ancient slavery, its findings aim to provide a definitive cultural-historical analysis of slaveholding in the homilies of Chrysostom. While this remains the main focus of the dissertation, it also exhibits a new framework for approaching ancient slavery, one that may be applied to any other author of antiquity. Finally, it also represents a study in the *Wirkungsgeschichte* of Pauline thinking on slaveholding. While the sources from Chrysostom that will be focussed on are his homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews, other writings of Chrysostom will also be brought into light for the sake of clarification, elaboration and comparison. Numerous other authors from antiquity will also appear in the course of the study, from Hellenistic philosophical literature to Roman agricultural writers, from texts in the Mishnah to those in the Pauline Epistles themselves - all voices and witnesses that shaped the world of the fourth century preacher that dominates the scene in this dissertation and in many instances, directly influenced him.

81 De Wet, “John Chrysostom on Slavery.”
CHAPTER 2

REVISITING AND RECONSTRUCTING THE HABITUS OF ROMAN SLAVEHOLDING:
THE MANAGEMENT OF SLAVE-BODIES IN HELLENISTIC, ROMAN,
JUDAISTIC AND CHRISTIAN ANTIQUITY

1 INTRODUCTION
The first and most important context of slave-bodies is the context of domesticity; that is, slave-bodies are essentially active within a household. There may be exceptions to this, but in the context of John Chrysostom, and his advice to slaves and slaveholders, most of the advice is directed at how Christian slaves and slaveholders should behave within the household. The household could be urban or agricultural, but in Chrysostom’s case, most of the households would be urban households.

The role of the slave within the household was shaped through centuries of discourse. This discourse was effectively known as oikonomia. In this chapter we will examine how the Roman habitus of slaveholding as a discourse of ancient oikonomia was shaped by giving attention to authors writing on the topic of oikonomia and slave-management. We will look at how this habitus was constructed and negotiated throughout antiquity. This chapter will therefore provide the basis of the social and cultural background of slavery in the ancient Mediterranean that will also be utilized in the following chapters. In the next chapter, Chrysostom’s own comments in the light of this complex habitus will be examined. This chapter not only provides the larger social and cultural background of the discourse of domestic slavery, but also lays some important methodological and theoretical foundations. As mentioned in the introduction of this
study, the secondary aim of the dissertation is to redescribe ancient slavery. In order to accomplish this, the old evidence needs to be re-evaluated in the light of the new, redemptive approach followed in this dissertation.

2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY OF THE ROMAN HOUSEHOLD

In antiquity household management, also known as oikonomia, was a discourse - a complex knowledge- and practice-matrix with very clear sets of behavioural boundaries and socio-cultural role-expectations that are especially dependent on gender and status. By approaching oikonomia as a discourse, the discursivity of managing domestic bodies becomes apparent, and the various power-concerns and regulatory strategies can be laid bare. Moreover, this chapter approaches oikonomia as a complex, strategic discourse. Its complexity is the result of the ambiguity of the household in the period this dissertation examines. Several studies on ancient oikonomia have grappled with the issue of the Christianization of the late ancient Roman household. More importantly, since the late 1970’s scholarship has become more aware of the

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82 This study will use the word oikonomia in the sense of household management. It is transliterated from the Greek word ‘οἰκονοµία’; Latin adopted the same term as oeconomia, although Meyer and Sessa also include the Latin words ordo, ordinatio, dispensatio, cura, procuratio, and administratio; cf. Ulrich Meyer, Soziales Handeln im Zeichen des ‘Hauses’: Zur Öikonomik in der Spätantike und im Früheren Mittelalter (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte 140; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 54–59; Kristina Sessa, The Formation of Papal Authority in Late Antique Italy: Roman Bishops and the Domestic Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1–34; cf. also: Friedrich Ohly, “Haus III (Metapher),” RAC 13 (1986): 905–1063.

83 Sessa, Formation of Papal Authority, 2.

importance of writing a cultural history of the late ancient household and its dynamics. One of
the groundbreaking studies in this regard is that of Paul Veyne published in 1978.85 When one
reads Veyne’s article it becomes clear that it was in fact Michel Foucault’s first volume of the
History of Sexuality that ignited scholarly interest in the late ancient family and household, since
Foucault masterfully demonstrated that sexuality cannot be approached without examining its
occurrence in antiquity, as well as the discursive links between sexuality, household and
society.86 Thus, from the inception of scholarly interest in the ancient household, there has been
an accompanying emphasis on issues of power, knowledge and the body. Another important
advance in the study of the Roman household was pointed out by Brent Shaw nearly a decade
later in a 1987 publication, which points out that the Roman family or household seemed to
assume a rather wide range of persons and relations, and not simply a nucleus based on
biological kinship, and that the interpersonal networking between kin and non-kin is still
obviated as household matters.87 This observation is very important for the study of slaves as
participants in the household. Since all dynamics in the household are not based on biological
kinship, especially not as understood in the modern sense, issues of gender and status were
immensely important in the functioning of the household. The problem with this is that gender
and status were equally ambiguous. For instance, Richard Saller has illustrated that a pater
familias did not necessarily have to be the biological father of the household.88

86 Cf. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction (Robert Hurley (trans.); New York:
Random House, 1978). For an excellent discussion of the influence of Foucault on the study of patristics and
of Peter Brown is also relevant in this regard; cf. Peter R. L. Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women & Sexual
familias was, on the one hand, the person who wielded the highest authority (auctoritas) in the family, and on the other, the person who has primary ownership of the property of the family (patrimonium), including the slaves. Thus strictly speaking, a woman could also be a pater familias. Since the dominion of the pater familias was primarily based on economic grounds, the household was also the central unit in the Roman economy.89

As mentioned earlier, Christianization did not simplify the issue of the late ancient household either. Although many studies have concluded that the ancient Roman household did not change much after the advent of Christianity, others have pointed out that there were, nevertheless, crucial yet subtle social and rhetorical shifts present during this period. Kate Cooper’s The Fall of the Roman Household (2007) is an important contribution on this very issue.90 Although her study is more concerned with the role of women (rather than slaves) in the Roman household during the period of Christianization, it is nevertheless valuable in that it addresses Edward Gibbon’s long-held view that Christian asceticism and pacifist values led to the erosion of traditional Roman civic values, and thus greatly contributed to the fall of the Roman Empire.91 Gibbon was especially critical of Christian asceticism regarding views on marriage, and asserted that Christian asceticism led to citizens abandoning two very important Roman institutions, namely marriage and military service.92 In her study, Cooper convincingly shows that despite anti-conjugal views present in Christian asceticism, the Christianization of the household also led to a strengthening of the household in its strong prohibition of divorce.

90 Kate Cooper, The Fall of the Roman Household (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
Cooper goes so far as to show that many Christian authors of the time included marriage and family life in the ascetic life. Where Cooper’s study becomes important for the current investigation is when she examines how the woman’s position in the household in terms of auctoritas was transformed. After referring to the very influential study of Martha C. Howell, concerning the decline of the household in the late medieval period, Cooper would conclude that ‘women played a central role [in the household] and that their share of ownership was surprisingly high’. If we take into consideration the view of Saller noted above regarding the identity of the pater familias, we can see that the interplay between gender, auctoritas and property ownership (slaves were considered property) is more complex than one would imagine. A question raised by Judith Butler now becomes apparent also here: ‘Can gender complexity and dissonance be accounted for by the multiplication and convergence of a variety of culturally dissonant identifications?’ Although Butler’s immensely relevant question was directed primarily at the gender-premises of Lacan, Riviere and Freud, this study recognizes its importance for a critical approach to scholarly constructions of gender, and by implication, auctoritas, in late antiquity. Both Saller and Cooper’s observations are directly relevant to the study of slavery in the late ancient household since the issue of gender/auctoritas interplays will continue to surface in the investigation.

The other study that is of equal importance is that of Kristina Sessa entitled, The Formation of Papal Authority in Late Antique Italy: Roman Bishops and the Domestic Sphere (2012). Both Cooper and Sessa approach the household and domesticity as a discourse, but the study of Sessa differs from Cooper’s in that it specifically examines how Roman bishops exercised their own authority within the household. This chapter and the one following would follow the proposition of Sessa that late ancient bishops in general can be viewed as domestic advisors or managers. In essence, Sessa is concerned with the same issues as Cooper; that is, how emergent Christian values and traditional Roman civic values influenced each other. But Sessa is unique in that she also investigates how the church, as a symbolic household, was shaped by this discourse.

The problem with both Cooper and Sessa, in light of the current study, is that both focus on the elite Roman households of the Western Empire, especially Italy, which is not the concern

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93 Cooper, Fall of the Roman Household, 97.
94 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London: Routledge, 1990), 89.
of this dissertation. A study on the same level as Cooper or Sessa on the nature of the Roman household in the Eastern Empire, not including Egypt, is somewhat lacking.\textsuperscript{95} Although this dissertation and this chapter in particular will attempt to elucidate some issues of the Eastern Roman household, the limited scope of this study will not be able to address the issue completely. It is also very problematic to apply the conclusions of Cooper and Sessa, based on analyses of the West, since the East differed from the West in one very significant aspect: the majority of illustrious (\textit{illustres}) and elite (\textit{spectabiles/clarissimi}) households, during the time of Chrysostom, were located in the West, with very few illustrious households in the East, and ‘western elites far outclassed their eastern peers in terms of wealth’.\textsuperscript{96} This is directly relevant to the discussion of slavery in the Chrysostomic context. It is further problematized from the view of studies on late ancient Roman aristocracies by the expansive area of properties often owned by illustrious and elite citizens. The East was growing stronger but it is only in the fifth and sixth centuries that we see the extreme economic, social and military fortification of the East due to the growing conflict with barbarian armies outside on the fringes of the Empire.\textsuperscript{97} Illustrious, elite and bourgeois households experienced different problems with regard to \textit{oikonomia} and slaveholding, which


\textsuperscript{97} The study of Haldon has shown how the Roman senatorial elite had to change and adapt during the crisis-period of the Empire; cf. John Haldon, “The Fate of the Late Roman Senatorial Elite: Extinction or Transformation?” in \textit{The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East Volume 6: Elites Old and New in the Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East}. (John Haldon and Lawrence I. Conrad (eds.); Aldershot: Darwin, 2004), 179–234.
means that certain issues in the East may have merited more attention than in the West and vice versa.

But the shape of the Roman household in late antiquity, whether in the Western or Eastern parts of the Empire, is a product of a formative process from the early Hellenistic and nascent Roman periods. In the course of this chapter, the most important oeconomic discourses from the early Hellenistic and Roman periods will be re-read from a cultural-historical perspective, since the households in the time of Chrysostom were products of this formative process, and the views on slaves in the households, or the habitus of slaveholding, was produced from these earlier discourses. The development of *oikonomia* as discourse, along with slaveholding, will provide the necessary basis from which various continuities and discontinuities may be delineated when approaching the Chrysostomic sources. The first section, as a diachronic investigation, will therefore discuss these sources since they shaped the households of those people in Chrysostom’s audience. After discussing the most important Hellenistic and Roman sources, the early Judaistic and Christian views, particularly from the New Testament, on *oikonomia* and slaveholding will be examined, since these discourses represent the point of departure that Chrysostom uses in his homilies. Finally, the evidence from late ancient authors will also be evaluate as to provide a synchronic context for the reading of Chrysostom’s sources. From this diachronic and synchronic analysis the main attributes of the habitus of Roman slaveholding would become clear.

3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF *OIKONOMIA* AND SLAVE-MANAGEMENT IN HELLENISTIC AND EARLY ROMAN ANTIQUITY

This section will examine the historical development of the discourse of *oikonomia* in Hellenistic and early Roman antiquity. Attention will especially be given to writings of this early period focusing on household- and slave-management, namely Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, pseudo-Aristotle/Theophrastus, Philodemus, Columella, Cato and Varro. Although these are not the only sources, they serve as a popular and representative sample to indicate the continuities and discontinuities in the historical development of *oikonomia*. We will also examine Stoic formulations of *oikonomia* since they were very influential in the early Christian movement. These sources are also selected because they specifically wrote on the topic of *oikonomia* and slave-management. Furthermore, although it is difficult to assess whether Chrysostom read the
following writings or not, having studied under Libanius, we can speculate at the very least that he was very aware of the concepts from the writings. It must also be noted that Hellenistic and Roman oikonomia and slave-management differed from each other. We will now commence by viewing the Hellenistic sources.

3.1 Xenophon’s Oeconomicus

One of the earliest treatises on oikonomia is Xenophon’s Oeconomicus; but some advice is also provided in his Memorabilia. The Oeconomicus comes in the form and style of a dialogue with various participants, including Socrates, and was probably written after 362 BCE. The fact that the source is presented as a dialogue is curious. Although most philosophical treatises of this period came as dialogues, it makes it a bit more difficult to deduce what Xenophon thought about the topic. Xenophon obviously shapes and controls the development of the dialogue to fit into his own views; the document is also presented as being highly pedagogical.98 But this exactly demonstrates the point this chapter wants to make - oikonomia was a discourse, and one that was constantly negotiated and debated.99 In this dialogue, Xenophon is arguing with himself and his peers. Both the Oeconomicus and Memorabilia are laced with discursivities regarding the topic. Dialogical and argumentative tensions exhibit the nature of negotiation typical of discourse and discursive formations. It also exhibits the pedagogical nature of the document. The dialogue aims to display the process of reasoning and on a passive level the reader or hearer is also involved in the dialogue. What are the characteristics of Xenophon’s rhetoric of domesticity (or perhaps, oeconomical rhetoric) specifically regarding the management of slaves?


To begin, it is evident from these writings that Xenophon, as with many classical authors, regards *oikonomia* as the cornerstone of civic leadership; what we could call a holistic view of *oikonomia.* It is not simply about managing a household. McKeown correctly emphasizes: ‘Xenophon’s aim, however, is neither reportage nor even managerial advice; nor is his primary focus slavery. He wants his audience to become better leaders of people. Both the *Memorabilia* and the *Oeconomicus* equate managing a household (an *oikos*) and other forms of power, notably military and political (*Mem.* 3.4.6; *Oec.* 5.14–17, 21.2, 21.12).’ Xenophon, like most ancient authors, considers *oikonomia* as a microcosm representing the dynamics of a larger socio-symbolic reality. He sees a considerable resemblance between slave-management in particular, and warfare. From this very early date in classical antiquity, there is a close relationship, almost symbiotic, between slavery and polemology. Rule and mastery have a military basis since both slavery and warfare require the same principles of governmentality. This has especially been illustrated by Hunt, who links Xenophon’s thoughts on slaveholding with his thoughts on the relationship between generals and their soldiers. Xenophon, of course, did not believe that slaves belonged in the army, which was a hot topic at the time in Athenian and Spartan debates, especially regarding the role of helots. Rulers, like slaveholders, needed to properly assert their authority. We therefore see, as early as Xenophon (and the same could be said of Thucydides), that slavery, as a social system, was interwoven and dependent on a larger social subset that was,

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102 This reality is structured within a strict hierarchical system, with very specific rules of engagement between subjects and rulers; cf. Hans Klees, *Herren und Sklaven: Die Sklaverei im oikonomischen und politischen Schrifttum der griechen in klassischer Zeit* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1975), 56–93.


within its structure, holistic. Social systems and institutions in the ancient context were all related and mutually influenced each other, unlike a more independent and fragmented modern system. Military philosophy shaped ideas of slaveholding, but the notion of oikonomia is equally important, since it also influences political and military institutions. This is why authors like Xenophon and Thucydides could so easily relate these subjects. The result of this phenomenon, on a socio-linguistic and psychosocial level, is that the language of violence permeated all slave discourse. According to Xenophon, slaves should not be included in the army not only because he accepted the common ancient stereotype that all slaves are distrustful, cowardly and weak, but also, on a somatic level, slave-bodies are more akin to those of women, slaves and barbarians (Oec. 5.14-17). And in Xenophon’s high-aristocratic view of the army, with a strong bias in favour of hoplites and other infantry (instead of naval forces), weak slave-bodies just did not belong. This inferiority, however, is not based on the natural order as seen with Aristotle. It seems to be based on their interests and social positioning with regard to the household. Pomeroy provides a convincing view on this: ‘At first all three [wife, housekeeper and farm foremen] are outsiders, who must be transformed into insiders so that they will be concerned as he is about the success of the oikos.’ This, among other things, leads Pomeroy to conclude that Xenophon is liberal in his views on slavery. Although one would certainly agree that in some instances, Xenophon’s views are moderate, it should also be noted that these views are given in order to laud the slaveholder Ischomachus probably as a type of neo-aristocratic ideal against the Athenian conservatives. The rhetoric becomes patronizing, and slaves are still treated very much like human animals.

We now move from Xenophon’s potent polemological rhetoric to his somatological rhetoric, that is, his discourse on the management of slaves as bodies. The advice that is consistent with Xenophon is that the householder must view slaves with suspicion, and that very

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105 The relationship between the construction of the barbarian image and the image of the slave in ancient Greek thought was quite close, as demonstrated by Geoffrey E. M. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), 133–79.


107 Pomeroy, Oeconomicus, 65. This view has also been accepted by Vivienne J. Gray, Xenophon (Oxford Readings in Classical Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 19–20.
strict bodily control and regulation is necessary (Oec. 5.14-17, 21.2, 21.12). The control and regulation of the slave-body is done via the passions, on a reward/punishment basis. Thus, the discourse of mastery is present. An important aspect of oikonomia for Xenophon is knowing how to regulate the bodily passions of the slave. For instance, in Oeconomicus 9.5, sexual intercourse, or perhaps temporary co-habital affection may be used as a reward, or its deprivation as punishment. Ischomachus is describing the layout of his house, and describes the slaves’ quarters (Oec. 9.5):

Then I pointed out to her the [slave-] women’s apartments, separated from the men’s by a bolted door, so that nothing may be taken out that shouldn’t be and so that the slaves may not produce offspring without our knowledge. For the useful ones, for the most part, feel even better once they have had children, but when wicked ones are paired together, they become only more resourceful in their bad behaviour.\(^{108}\)

Ischomachus is also described as a good oikonomos in that he allows slaves to have families and does not ever utter a word of manumission and splitting up the families.\(^ {109}\) Xenophon does praise Ischomachus for not forcing the slaves to have sex with him, but rather nurturing his relationship with his wife (Oec. 10.12).\(^ {110}\) To Ischomachus, both praise and verbal and physical punishments serve as tactics for successful mastery. Good mastery thus means the ability to read and utilize the passions of the slave to the greatest profit of the slaveholder, and


\(^{110}\) Sexual intercourse was a common duty for slaves toward their masters; cf. Marilyn B. Skinner, Sexuality in Greek and Roman Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 144–45.
not simply about cracking a whip. Reasonable control of the slave-body occurs when the slaveholder controls the passions of the slave. Having an aristocratic heritage, Xenophon would be accustomed to dealing with large numbers slaves. The reward for the slaveholder is that the slaves will be able to work without chains and the temptation of fleeing (Oec. 3.3). If properly ‘trained’, they will also not steal (Mem. 2.1.9), but the greatest obstacle to overcome is laziness (Oec. 21.10-11). The polarization of slave-bodies into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ slaves makes this type of rhetoric sustainable. It is evident from both the Oeconomicus and the Memorabilia that the management of slave-bodies is a frustrating task.

The instance where Xenophon is probably the most ‘liberal’, if that term would be valid (Pomeroy calls him ‘radical’111), is in his views on labour. It is true that Ischomachus treats his slaves generously and even with honour, while his wife is responsible for their health. But behind this, along with the allowance of slave-families on Ischomachus’ estate, lies the principles of productivity. A slave may be treated well since this boosts productivity and profits - this leads to the growth of the estate and inheritance, the main aim of any pater familias.

Two very important aspects of Xenophon’s rhetoric of domesticity have been delineated. In the first instance, oikonomia, especially slave-management, is a polemological discourse. This is the result of a holistic view of ancient social systems and their interdependence. Good slaveholders are inevitably good citizens, good soldiers and good rulers. In the same way barbarians need to be subjugated by Greek male soldiers, slaves must be mastered by their owners.112 Xenophon’s Oeconomicus is permeated with the discourse of masculinity and power.113 This could also be a reason for the seemingly liberal nature of the writing at first glance, but in fact, Xenophon raises the bar for women and slaves by subverting them to the

111 Pomeroy, Oeconomicus, 65.

112 This type of thinking would also find its place in Roman formulations on oikonomia, where the notion of penetration and subjugation would go hand in hand; cf. Jonathan Walters, “Invading the Roman Body: Manliness and Impenetrability in Roman Thought,” in Roman Sexualities (Judith P. Hallett and Marilyn B. Skinner (eds); Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 29–46.

113 Baragwanath has argued that Xenophon has a view that some women, specifically foreign wives, should not be viewed as being incapable and inferior, since they mediate friendships between men, and exhibit some qualities of leadership. Although this is true, the problem is that these women become the embodiment of masculine virtues, and it is still Hellenistic masculine virtues that are proliferated via this view of ‘special and capable wives;’ Emily Baragwanath, “Xenophon’s Foreign Wives,” Prudentia 34 (2002): 125–58.
same standards of ancient Greek masculinity rather than gender and status equality or promotion. Women need to become more ‘manly’ in the dialogue.\textsuperscript{114} The language of violence permeates the discourse - good men are men of violence and mastery. \textit{Oikonomia} is also a somatic discourse - one that involves the control and regulation of bodies to the greatest profit of the slaveholder. This implies that the master should have a sound knowledge of the passions, how to control, negotiate and manipulate them to exert some type of action from the slave that is optimal to productivity and slave/slaveholder relationships. Finally, Xenophon’s writings exhibit the dialogical and discursive nature of \textit{oikonomia}. \textit{Oikonomia} is a conversation - one that influences all other spheres of human life. The problem we have with Xenophon’s version of \textit{oikonomia} is that it is very idealistic and probably not normal practice. It is true that if Xenophon implies that an \textit{oikonomos} ‘should’ do these things, he indeed ‘could’ - but to which extent this was applied is quite difficult to determine. The other problem is that this document was written for a very select and limited audience - pro-Xenophonian aristocracy. Whether the bourgeois, and other classes below, actually followed the advice is again quite difficult to determine.

3.2 Plato, Aristotle, and Pseudo-Aristotle’s \textit{Oeconomica}

The pseudonymous work \textit{Oeconomica}, bearing the name of Aristotle (although Philodemus attributes the work to the Aristotelian philosopher Theophrastus), provides advice on \textit{oikonomia} in the form of a synthesis between Xenophon’s work above, but also from Plato and Aristotle’s authentic works, most notably Aristotle’s \textit{Politica}. It must be noted however that although this document connects many themes from Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle, these three authors were not univocal in their comments on \textit{oikonomia} and slave-management. A short summary of Plato and Aristotle’s views on slaves in the context of \textit{oikonomia} will be provided in order to frame the pseudo-Aristotelian work.

Plato’s discussions on slavery must be understood in the light of his comments on the ideal government; the issue features prominently in his *Leges*, but also in the *Respublica*.\textsuperscript{115} In both these documents one finds a holistic approach to social systems - they in fact mirror each other in terms of mastery and governmentality. As with Xenophon, the principles followed by the householder and the statesman are not very different. But what does Plato say about slave-management?

The discussions on slave-management particularly in the *Respublica* also come in the genre of a dialogue, and it is equally ambiguous at times as with Xenophon’s philosophical dialogues. But the statements in Plato’s *Leges* are clearer, and this genre exhibits a different dimension of slave-management present in antiquity. Statements of law have two important dimensions to them: they are socio-somatic discourses, but also politico-ethical at the same time.\textsuperscript{116} In the first instance, juridical statements, according to De Certeau, are inevitably written on the social body, but also on individual bodies within society at large (that is, the social body).\textsuperscript{117} This was also the basis of Michel Foucault’s work *Discipline and Punish* (1977), which examined the production, control and regulation of docile bodies.\textsuperscript{118} This same discourse is also illusively present in Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*; less explicit than with Plato, and with different aims. Plato probably exhibits a more negative view of slaves than Xenophon, but Plato’s context is also different. The *Leges* are especially concerned with the criminality of slaves. Interestingly enough, many of the laws assume the context of *oikonomia*. Punishments are harsh for slaves

\textsuperscript{115} Early in the previous century, Vlastos has made some important observations about Plato’s view of slaves. Most importantly, Plato understands that slaves do not have the ability to reason (λόγος). While they may possess empirical belief (δόξα), they cannot know the truth behind this belief (Vlastos uses Plato’s comments on the difference between free physicians and slave-physicians; cf. Gregory Vlastos, “Slavery in Plato’s Republic,” *PhR* 50 (1941): 289; Gregory Vlastos, “Does Slavery Exist in Plato’s Republic?” *CP* 63, no. 4 (1968): 291–95; cf. also: Page DuBois, *Slaves and Other Objects* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 153–69).


\textsuperscript{117} Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Steven Rendall (trans.); Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 139.

killing their masters in cold-blood; the punishments are very public, made to be a spectacle. But what manner of somatography (that is, the writing of law on a body in the Certeauian sense) lies behind this? This question is very important, and will serve as a backdrop for further discussion in this chapter. In the above-mentioned work of Foucault, the disappearance of torture as a public spectacle is examined. Foucault starts by examining, in vivid detail, an instance of public execution in France 1757; that of Damiens the regicide. His execution is brutal, and Foucault concludes that one reason for the disappearance of public punishment is that the shame attributed to the perpetrator now also spreads to the executioner, and with the rise of the popularity of disciplines like psychology and psychiatry, punishment became corrective rather than punitive in itself - it became hidden and

...marks a slackening of the hold on the body...the body now serves as an instrument or intermediary...From being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has become an economy of suspended rights...Recourse to psycho-pharmacology and to various physiological ‘disconnectors’, even if it is temporary, is a logical consequence of this ‘non-corporal’ penalty.

For Plato, the purpose of punishing slaves who committed the greatest crime of oikonomia, murdering the pater familias, is to serve as an exemplum and a deterrent, dissuading other slaves from doing the same. It is also interesting that Plato wants such a slave to be whipped in view of the victim’s tomb (Leg. 872b), adding an element of violent memory to the process. If the slave survives the whipping, a public execution must then take place. Whipping in itself is a discourse of mastery, domination and violation. Glancy states: ‘Flogging was the most common form of corporal punishment. The ability to order a whipping signalled a person’s dominance over another, the inability to resist a whipping, the dishonour of the person whipped.’ The master is still ‘present’ for the punishment of the slave. Harrill attributes such

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120 Foucault, Birth of the Prison, 11.
occurrences of ‘mastercide’ to the popular literary type of the slave as ‘domestic enemy’. Should a free citizen commit the same crime, however, the punishment in less severe (Leg. 869d-e, 880b-c) due to their position in the larger social body. Plato’s comments may perhaps shed some light on aspects mentioned earlier in Xenophon. The reason for the severe and public punishment of the slave is related to the Xenophonian proposal that slaves are not worthy to serve as soldiers (this excludes helotage, which is a more complex issue not directly relevant for the current discussion). Slaves are not only social zombies, taken from Orlando Patterson’s notion of slavery as social death, but more so, slaves are social outsiders. This statement seems to capture the continuity between Xenophon and Plato regarding slave-management and oikonomia. Their punishment is educational, reminding the slaves and the free who are insiders and who are outsiders; Plato also believed in natural slavery, which reinforces this discrimination. Punishment, in this instance, ramifies group-boundaries and social status-markers. Plato, thus, also assumes that slaves are corrupt in their nature, and forces upon all slaves the same dichotomy found in Xenophon: there are good slaves and bad slaves, but the majority are bad (Leg. 914a, 936b), and thus their regulation is important, and strategies for ensuring docility, a reward/punishment scheme similar to Xenophon, are of crucial importance for the art of oikonomia.

While Plato’s views discussed above are based mostly on socio-political foundations, Aristotle proposes a different framework for understanding slavery and oikonomia. Aristotle mostly relies on an argument of naturalization when it comes to oikonomia and slaveholding.

123 McKeown, “Resistance Among Chattel Slaves,” 168–70.
125 Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (London: Harvard University Press, 1982).
127 Moses I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1998), 120.
In fact, Aristotle’s whole politicology is based on observations from nature. His view of social institutions is, like that of most ancient authors including Xenophon and Plato, holistic in nature. But Aristotle’s holism differs from that of Xenophon and Plato in that Aristotle approaches the interdependence of social institutions by means of taxonomical classification rather than microcosmic representation, that is, the notion that one institution is simply a micro-duplication of the other. The state is made up of households, and within households there are various classes; but these are not necessarily the same because governance is complex. Plato, for instance, would view the oikonomos as a type for the ruler of the state, but for Aristotle, oeconomical governance differs from civic governance. The same was seen with Thucydides and Xenophon when discussing the similarities between military commanders and householders. Aristotle’s views in fact critique this conventional holism. He states (Pol. 1252a.7-1252b.5):

Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state...But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to anyone who considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them. He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the

clearest view of them. In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Now nature has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses.131

131 Translation: Benjamin Jowett, *Politics by Aristotle* (Digireads.com: Stilwell, 2005), 3; Greek text: Ross: 67: ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἰονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικόν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὑτὸν οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν (πλῆθει γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομίζουσι διαφέρειν ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰδε τούτων ἐκαστον, οἷον ἀν μὲν ὀλίγων, δεσπότην, ἀν δὲ πλειονῶν, οἰκονόμον, ἀν δ’ ἐτι πλειόνων, πολιτικὸν ἢ βασιλικὸν, ὡς οὕδεν διαφέρουσαν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ μικρὰν πόλιν…ταῦτα δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ); δῆλον δ’ ἐσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ψφηγημένην μέθοδον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαφείρει (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἢ ἄν σύγκειται σκοποῦντες ψφόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων καὶ εἰ τὶ τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἐκαστον τῶν ὀψίαντων. Εἰ δὴ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πρᾶγματα φυσικα βλέψειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ’ ἀν οὕτω θεωρήσει. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γεννήσεως ένεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι, οἷον αὐτὸ, τοιούτων καταλιπεῖν ἔτερον), ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διαινοίᾳ προοράν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον [ταῦτα] ὑπὸ σώματι ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δούλον· διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλῳ ταὐτό συμφέρει. φύσει μὲν οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δούλον (οὕθεν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιούτον οἶνον οἰ
The opening arguments of his *Politica* show a strong reliance on the rhetoric of naturalization. This aids in placing Aristotle’s views on natural slavery into perspective; slaves are naturally and biologically inferior according to Aristotle.\(^{132}\) Women are designed for childbearing and slaves for service. Schofield queries and critiques Aristotle’s views on natural slavery as ‘an anomaly within his philosophical system; certainly inconsistent with his general theory of human psychology, and perhaps even internally inconsistent.’\(^{133}\) Schofield then attributes this to a type of false consciousness, probably influenced by the views of Athenian aristocracy. The problem is that one cannot attempt to understand Aristotle’s views on ‘natural slavery’ outside of his wider understanding of the nature of the state.\(^{134}\) Natural slavery with Aristotle is merely consequential. Rather, mastery in itself is explained by means of naturalization, and in the first book of *Politica* one finds, unlike Plato, a naturalistic governmentality. Natural slavery is simply one of the parts of a larger whole, a simple element in a more complex politicological taxonomy.\(^{135}\) When one comprehends the characteristics of the holism, natural slavery no longer appears to be an anomaly. In Aristotle’s eyes, nature exhibits its own *oikonomia*. As seen above, he starts by disagreeing with the conventional Platonic view of *oikonomia*, in that social systems mirror each other and share mutual principles of mastery and governance.\(^{136}\) Aristotle appreciates the complexity of political systems, and thus such a simplistic proposition found in Plato would not be adequate. The foundation of Aristotle’s argument lies in the necessity of natural reproduction. Plants and animals need to reproduce for the survival of the species and this, according to Aristotle, is based on the dynamics between pairs. Thus, nature exhibits a binarism at its core. Males need to mate with females to reproduce. He then continues to highlight other pairs, namely husband and wife (or at least, man and


\(^{136}\) McKeown, “Resistance Among Chattel Slaves,” 172.
woman), slave and master, and Greek and barbarian. All pairs within nature, however, work according to a dynamic of domination and subjugation.\textsuperscript{137} When breeding, the male dominates the female, and the female must submit to the male’s domination if reproduction is to occur. Thus, all the pairs need to work according to the domination-subjugation dynamic as seen in the natural household. This is perhaps the weakness in Aristotle’s argument - his presupposition that no pair can work outside of the domination-subjugation dynamic. The state works in the same way; there are rulers and subjects. Aristotle’s authorizes his version of proper oikonomia on the principles of nature. One could again here critique Aristotle in noting that a phenomenon called ‘nature’ does not actually exist. There are ‘natures,’ and their inter-relational dynamics are complex. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s argument of simplistic naturalization regarding oikonomia is a very powerful rhetorical strategy. Aristotle’s simplistic conjecture of nature shows consistency and stability, and therefore to maintain order, the principle of domination-subjugation should be maintained in the science of oikonomia. Thus, if the householder wants to effectively manage slaves, he needs to inspect nature, and he will see a dynamic of domination-subjugation. Thus, as Aristotle states, ‘For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule’ (\textit{Pol.} 1254a.21-24).\textsuperscript{138} One could replace ‘hour of birth’ with ‘according to nature’, since birth is a biological and natural event. Aristotle provides a taxonomy of the household: master and slave, husband and wife, and father and children. It is also this Aristotelian taxonomy of the household that is used in the so-called haustafeln found in the New Testament (cf. especially Col. 3:18-4:1; Eph. 5:21-6:9; 1 Tim. 5:1-6:2; Tit. 2:1-10; 1 Pet. 2:18-3:7), which would serve as a basis for Chrysostom’s discussions of oikonomia. The slave-slaveholder dynamic should then be modelled according to nature. What lies behind this elaborate classificatory logic of domestic arrangement? For the following section I rely heavily on the insights of Bruce Lincoln on how


\textsuperscript{138} Translation: Jowett, \textit{Politics}, 6; Greek Text: Ross: 54: τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἔστι, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τὰ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν.
general domestic taxonomies, as discourses themselves, shaped and influenced society. The Aristotelian domestic taxonomy exhibits a patricentric bisection based on gender, age and social status; a social map that marks cultural and social boundaries, all based on observations from nature. Aristotle’s taxonomic tree in fact encodes the rules of engagement for interpersonal relations in the *oikos*. Lincoln remarks: ‘...age and gender [and here, one could include free or enslaved status] function as taxonomizers, that is, each one establishes the basis for an act of discrimination through which all members of a given class are assigned to one of two subclasses: those who possess the trait or property in question, and those who do not.’ By authorizing these taxonomizers on the basis of naturalization, the argument is further strengthened.

Where and how does the enslaved person fit into Aristotle’s domestic taxonomy? Aristotle affirms that *oikonomia* and slave-management in his time was a multivocal discourse. He states: ‘For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the outset, are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust’ (*Pol.* 1253b.18-23). He then continues to argue for natural slavery, as it is commonly known. In the longer section quoted above, we see that Aristotle sees natural slavery as a bodily discourse: ‘For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest’ (*Pol.* 1252a.32-34). The slave-body is then described by

140 Ibid., 133.
141 Translation: Jowett, *Politics*, 5; Greek text: Ross: 61: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τέ τις εἶναι ἡ δεσποτεία, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ βασιλικὴ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀρχόμενον αὐτὴς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν (νόμῳ γὰρ τὸν μὲν δούλου εἶναι τὸν δ’ ἐλεύθερον, φύσει δ’ οὐθὲν διαφέρειν)· διότερον οὐδὲ δίκαιον.
Aristotle as an animate tool, a common description of slave-bodies in antiquity. Just as the female body is, according to Aristotle, inferior to the male body, the body of the slave is inferior to the slaveholder. It logically implies that one could be a slave, according to Aristotle, by nature and by law. Not all slaves by nature are slaves by law; such persons seem to exhibit a naturally slavish disposition, but they have not been legally declared slaves. But the slave-body, to Aristotle, is not simply an animate tool or naturally inferior body; it is also part of the slaveholder’s body, referred to by Glancy as a surrogate body. This becomes relevant when understanding the discipline and punishment of a slave. Although the slaveholder has a natural authority over the slave, Aristotle states: ‘The abuse of this authority is injurious to both; for the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his bodily frame’ (Pol. 1255b.9-12). A slaveholder who punishes and harms his or her slave unjustly, in essence, injures him- or herself, since, as in nature, there is a symbiotic relationship between the binary opposites. Like Xenophon, Aristotle then also believes that the good householder should treat a slave justly, although it is for selfish purposes. Thus, even the just treatment of slaves is seen in the symbiotic relationships in nature.

The pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* shares some of the rhetoric of naturalization found in Aristotle’s *Politica*, especially in the discussions of the relationship between husband and wife. It was a very popular handbook for oeconomics. The elaborations on slavery, however, are limited. The *Oeconomica* does not say anything about natural slavery, but especially approaches slaves as human, animate tools. The author wants the *oikonomos* to purchase slaves with care, and especially encourages the acquisition of young slaves, since they can be trained to be placed in positions of trust and responsibility. Regarding the treatment of slaves, the *Oeconomica* also advises the slaveholder to treat the slave with strictness, not allowing insolence (ὕβρις), but also not to be cruel to slaves. He also advises against rewarding slaves with wine. Slave-management

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144 Translation: Jowett, *Politics*, 8; Greek text: Ross: 71: τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἀσυµµφόρως ἔστιν ἀµφοῖν (τὸ γὰρ αὐτό συµµέρει τῷ µέρει καὶ τῷ ὄλῳ, καὶ σώµατι καὶ ψυχῇ, ὃ δὲ δουλὸς µέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, ὁν ἐµψυχον τι τού σώµατος κεχωρισμένον δὲ µέρος.
is a delicate art according to this account. The *Oeconomica* states that a good slaveholder should know how to balance a slave’s work, punishment and food. It reads (*Oec.* 1344a.35):\(^{146}\)

> We may apportion to our slaves (1) work, (2) chastisement, and (3) food. If men are given food, but no chastisement nor any work, they become insolent. If they are made to work, and are chastised, but stinted of their food, such treatment is oppressive, and saps their strength. The remaining alternative, therefore, is to give them work, and a sufficiency of food. Unless we pay men, we cannot control them; and food is a slave’s pay.\(^{147}\)

The effective control of slave-bodies is crucial to pseudo-Aristotle. As with Xenophon, pseudo-Aristotle acknowledges that the ability to control slave-bodies lies in controlling their passions, most importantly, their hunger. Food is used to control and manipulate the slave-body to be optimally productive. Punishment is not always an ideal. Pseudo-Aristotle uses a medical metaphor by likening the *oikonomos* with a physician, who dispenses food and other necessities with good judgement as a physician dispenses medicine. A diligent *oikonomos* is someone who keeps the slaves under surveillance in order to determine their needs (*Oec.* 1344b.1):

> ‘Accordingly we must keep watch over our workers, suiting our dispensations and indulgences to their desert; whether it be food or clothing, leisure or chastisement that we are apportioning.’

The *Oeconomica* differs somewhat with Xenophon’s account in that pseudo-Aristotle makes mention of manumission as a reward for slaves. Allowing slaves to have families is also a strategy in the *Oeconomica* - slaves are allowed to have children and families for the sake of their own personal

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\(^{146}\) For an interesting discussion on how texts like these were used in modern slavery, cf. Rafael de Bivar Marquese and Fábio Duarte Joly, “*Panis, Disciplina, et Opus Servo*: The Jesuit Ideology in Portuguese America and Greco-Roman Ideas of Slavery,” in *Slave Systems: Ancient and Modern* (Enrico Dal Lago and Constantina Katsari (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 214–30.

\(^{147}\) Translation & Greek text: LCL: 336-37: ὶντων δὲ τριῶν, ἔργου καὶ κολάσεως καὶ τροφῆς, τὸ μὲν μήτε κολάζεσθαι, μήτ’ ἐργάζεσθαι, τροφῆν δ’ ἔχειν ὑβρίν ἐμποιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ἔργα μὲν ἔχειν καὶ κολάσεις, τροφῆν δὲ μή, βίαιον καὶ ἀδυναμίαν ποιεῖ. Λείπεται δὴ ἔργα παρέχειν καὶ τροφῆν ἱκανήν· ἀμίσθων γὰρ σῶ μίσθως τροφῆ.
fulfillment, but also for the oikonomos to have hostages (the children) by which to threaten slaves. Like Xenophon, pseudo-Aristotle is well aware of the usefulness of threatening the breaking up of a slave family. It reads (Oec. 1344b.15-19):

To set the prize of freedom before him is both just and expedient; since having a prize to work for, and a time defined for its attainment, he will put his heart into his labours. We should, moreover, take hostages [for our slaves’ fidelity] by allowing them to beget children; and avoid the practice of purchasing many slaves of the same nationality, as men avoid doing in towns.\(^{148}\)

The proper control of slave-bodies, in this instance, aids in maximising productivity with few incidents of disobedience and punishment. Not much is mentioned about the natural state of slavery, although in other respects the Oeconomica exhibits similarities with the Politica. The Oeconomica also exhibits a strategic domestic taxonomy, as with the Politica. The domestic taxonomy is an important facet of Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian oikonomia, since it now provides a logical classification for the use of authority and domination. It is crucial in understanding the New Testament haustafeln as well as late ancient Christian expositions on oikonomia. The taxonomy serves as a discourse in itself that shapes society and civil governmentality. This is especially the case in late ancient ecclesiarchal dynamics. The next discussion will centre on the work of Philodemus, which represents a reaction against the works discussed thus far.

### 3.3 Philodemus’ *De Oeconomia*

The fact that oikonomia was a complex, multifaceted discourse becomes very clear when reading the Epicurean philosopher from Herculaneum, Philodemus’ *De oeconomia*.\(^{149}\) In this unique

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\(^{148}\) Translation & Greek text: LCL: 338-39: Χρὴ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὡφίσθαι πᾶσιν δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κεῖσθαι ἄθλον. Βούλονται γὰρ πονεῖν, ὅταν ἢ ἁθλον καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὡφισμένος. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐξομηρεύειν ταῖς τεκνοποιίαις καὶ μὴ κτᾶσθαι ὁμοεθνεῖς πολλοὺς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς πόλεισιν.

\(^{149}\) One of the most important biographical studies on Philodemus remains that of Marcello Gigante, *Philodemus in Italy: The Books from Herculaneum* (The Body, In Theory: Histories of Cultural Materialism; Dirk Obbink (trans.);
treatise, Philodemus especially highlights the ethical aspects of *oikonomia*, and provides a scolding critique on the works of Xenophon and pseudo-Aristotle/Theophrastus (according to Philodemus, the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Oeconomica* was written by Theophrastus, so for this section, we will refer to Theophrastus when discussing the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Oeconomica*). Philodemus’ book forms part of a larger work on nature of vice, and it is interesting to see how Philodemus incorporates a discussion on *oikonomia* in an expansive virtue-discourse. Representing the ninth book of a larger ethical treatise on vices and virtues, probably written after 50 BCE, *De oeconomia* is especially marketed by the author as the ethical guide for *oikonomia*.

Philodemus prides himself by stating that his handbook on the topic represents the way a philosopher, a person of virtue, would conduct *oikonomia*. Tsouna remarks: ‘The authors dealing with *oikonomia* assume that the activities involved in the administration of property make manifest one’s qualities and virtues or, alternatively, reveal one’s shortcomings and vices. Philodemus shares that assumption, and also the idea that unless *oikonomia* becomes subordinated to ethics, it must be perceived as its competitor on the same ground.'\(^{150}\) This is a very important observation, and it makes Philodemus’ viewpoint unique in that he does not assume the sole purpose of an *oikonomos* is to assure maximum productivity and profitability.\(^{151}\) This implies several consequences for how slave-management is viewed within the scope of *oikonomia*, and it is interesting to see that Philodemus does not hesitate to critique Xenophon and Theophrastus’ views on slave-management.

One of Philodemus’ major criticisms of Xenophon and Theophrastus is their apparent assumption that there is no limit on the amount of wealth necessary to lead a virtuous life.\(^{152}\) One of Philodemus’ attacks on Xenophon’s Socratic discourse involves Socrates’ use of a slave-metaphor when describing the inadequate *oikonomos* (Philodemus, *Oec.* 1.19-23). By calling masters slaves, Socrates causes confusion. Xenophon’s purpose was most likely irony, but

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\(^{150}\) Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 164.


\(^{152}\) Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 165.
Philodemus does not accept this literary device. In general, Philodemus is bothered by Socrates’ claim to teach the ignorant Critoboulos everything about *oikonomia* in one lesson - Philodemus appreciates the complexity of *oikonomia* and does very well to highlight other possibilities for understanding this important art. But what does Philodemus have to say about real-life slave-management?

Philodemus is especially concerned with the governmentality of the *oikonomos*, rather than his or her productivity (*Oec.* 1.6). We also find that Philodemus denies the relation between politics and *oikonomia*, especially present in Theophrastus - Philodemus does not subscribe to a holistic view of *oikonomia* found in the previous authors (*Oec.* 7.45-8.24). The point here is that the most important aim should not be profit but happiness.\(^{153}\) Philodemus, in turn, is then irritated by banal discussions on slave-management present in Xenophon and Theophrastus’ writings. Regarding Theophrastus, Philodemus states (*Oec.* 9.44-10.7):

> The instructions concerning their [tasks], nourishment, and punishment are commonplace, observed even by rather ordinary persons, and they are not within the province of the philosopher. As to the precept that one should not use brutal methods of punishment, this does equally concern both theory and practice, but it should not have been taken up here in connection with the treatment of servants. Otherwise, why should only this point be raised?\(^{154}\)

In his criticism of Xenophon, Philodemus is equally bothered by the fact that Xenophon does not dwell on how an *oikonomos* could teach his or her slaves virtue. This is a very important discursive shift in ancient teachings on slave-management. With Philodemus, the notion of the *oikonomos* as teacher of virtue, and the slave as being capable of virtue is extensively hypothesized. He is also troubled by foreign methods of slave-management, Spartan, Spartan,


\(^{154}\) Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 172.
Persian and Libyan, promoted by the said authors.\textsuperscript{155} Tsouna makes the following important observation on one of Philodemus’ statements (\textit{Oec.} 7.16-26):

Ischomachus does not make clear how one can teach servants ‘to keep their hands off the master’s property and not to steal, even if he exaggerates in a manner befitting tragedy when he speaks on deriving these principles from the laws of both Dracon and Solon and from royal decrees. But if, further, he thought it possible to teach the property manager the capacity to make people just, then I consider him to be saying things similar to the visions we have in our dreams.’\textsuperscript{156}

The importance of this shift found with Philodemus cannot be underemphasized. We find with Philodemus a different impetus regarding slave-management. Although he still shares in the common stereotype that most slaves are unjust, it is his view of the \textit{oikonomos} as virtuoso that deserves attention, since this motif becomes more prevalent especially in early Christianity and late antiquity. Whether Philodemus is correct in stating that his opponents’ discourses are not ethical is another matter. In the following section when discussing Cato, I would in fact argue that treatises like those Philodemus despises were actually quite ethical, and only veiled in the garb of economic discourse. Since Philodemus proposes an alternative governmentality when it comes to slave-management, the technologies for surveillance and treatment of slaves also change. In fact, Philodemus considers the views of Xenophon and Theophrastus quite harsh (\textit{Oec.} 9.26-44):

The claims [sc. of Theophrastus] that one should not allow the slaves to run riot and one should not press them and should give responsibility to the more trustworthy among them, but more food to the industrious is more or less correct. However, it is a hard thing to maintain that a drink of wine in general, not just in larger

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 173.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
quantities, makes even free men insolent (and that this is why many nations abstain from it), and that for these very reasons it is obvious to propose that one should distribute wine to the slaves either not at all or very seldom, whereas the obvious thing is rather that a certain quantity of wine gives strength by making one cheerful and is to be allowed to those who work most.157

For the Epicurean Philodemus, the minimal happiness of the slaves also adds to the happiness of the slaveholder. Rather than focussing specifically on profit and in essence, greed, the philosopher-oikonomos must focus on virtuous governmentality.158 The vices of traditional householding include greed, inhumanity, harshness and stupidity.159 Greed drives people to treat slaves badly, like having them work under harsh circumstances in the mines (Oec. 23.1-22). Rather than using slaves in such inhumane ways, the good oikonomos could profit and exercise virtue by focusing on the honourable and decent skills of slaves, and to develop them (Oec. 23.18-22).

But does Philodemus represent a typical Epicurean stance on slave-management? The problem faced here is that Epicureanism, as with all philosophical and socio-religious movements of antiquity, including early Christianity, was not monolithic in itself. For the part of Epicureanism, there are many views with subtle nuanced differences, often related to the social and geographical location of the author, the time period, or simply just the literary context of the source material. A cautioned approach is therefore necessary. Philodemus admits that he relies on the views of Epicurus and Metrodorus as a basis for his own work. In the traditional literature of Epicureanism, from Epicurus specifically, the view of ‘natural wealth’ becomes very important. Natural wealth refers to the amount of material possessions necessary to live naturally and pleasantly.160 For Epicurus, there was a limit on natural wealth. It is not part of the Epicurean way to collect wealth ad infinitum. Epicurus states (in Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 10.144-146 (KD 15)): ‘Natural wealth is both limited and easy to obtain. But the wealth (that is the object) of

157 Ibid., 175.
158 Balch, “Naturally Wealthy Epicureans.”
159 Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 186.

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empty opinions goes on to infinity.\textsuperscript{161} Unnatural and unnecessary wealth is thus difficult to obtain, and this desire can never be satisfied. Sufficiency here means enough to live naturally without any bodily or mental pain. This view is important for Epicurus’ understanding of freedom. Excessive wealth is, according to Epicurus, always accompanied by various political obligations to one’s patrons and friends - this wealth truly enslaves the one who has it.\textsuperscript{162} On the other hand, however, Epicurus is not content with leading a mendicant life resembling that of the Cynics. He also attacks Cynic views on wealth by emphasizing that a certain amount of wealth and possessions are very necessary for living a natural and happy life.\textsuperscript{163} Epicurus also stresses the importance of sharing these possessions among friends.

Philodemus, however, has his own strategy when interpreting the works of Epicurus. Living in Herculaneum among the Roman aristocrats, Philodemus had to reimagine an Epicureanism suited to the Roman high-life. During the final years of the Roman Republic we see the rise of large villa-estates with large numbers of slaves maintaining the production of the estates.\textsuperscript{164} The main purpose of such estates, it was believed, was to generate profits for the owners.\textsuperscript{165} Philodemus may have these aristocrats, who owned medium and large landholdings, in mind when writing his treatise on \textit{oikonomia}. In the light of this, Philodemus incorporates some very tricky and complicated reasoning when expounding his version of Epicurean property-management. Wealth is not wicked in itself. According to Philodemus, it is all dependent on the person that manages the wealth. If seeking wealth causes pain, it is not beneficial for a happy life. But if the acquisition of wealth comes ‘naturally’ and does not cause

\textsuperscript{161}Translation & Greek text: Asmis, “Epicurean Economics,” 145: Ὅ τῆς φύσεως πλούτος καὶ ἠφίσται καὶ εὐπόριστος ἔστιν· ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει.

\textsuperscript{162}Ibid., 133–38.

\textsuperscript{163}Balch, “Naturally Wealthy Epicureans,” 186–89.


\textsuperscript{165}Marazano, \textit{Roman Villas in Central Italy}, 224.
pain, it is not anathema for the Epicurean. Even if the acquisition and management of this wealth causes some toil it is still acceptable, since the natural way of life also requires some labour. It must not, however, cause great anxiety and effort, since this would be unnatural.\textsuperscript{166} The Epicurean virtuoso is not a moneymaker \textit{per se}; rather than rushing to collect as much wealth as possible as fast as possible, the Epicurean virtuoso acquires wealth at a natural pace, and, very importantly, shares it.\textsuperscript{167}

We therefore find with Philodemus an alternative type of \textit{oikonomos}, and with this, an alternative type of slave-management. It is someone who places the ethical impetus of household-management first, and is not someone who is a profit-hungry moneymaker. The house of the Epicurean \textit{oikonomos} should be a happy house with sufficient funds derived from admirable practices,\textsuperscript{168} but not necessarily a profit-driven entity. But it is a type of \textit{oikonomia} that should be acceptable to those wealthy Roman aristocratic landowners with whom Philodemus associates. The greatest vice here is the love of money (\textit{φιλοχρηµατία}). It almost transforms the manager into an automaton only focussed on acquiring more. Such a manager ‘is indifferent to the calls of society and to the sufferings of other human beings. He resists paying visits to people and does not mind making money from “his slaves’ forced labour in mines.”’\textsuperscript{169}

In terms of slave-management, the happiness of slaves is important so long as it does not interfere with the happiness of the manager. Harsh treatment of slaves is frowned upon and using slaves for indecent purposes attracts the wrong type of social attention (\textit{Oec.} 23.1-22):

\begin{quote}
Earning an income ‘from the art of mining with slaves doing the labour’ is unfortunate, and as to securing income ‘from both these sources by means of one’s own labour’, is a mad thing to do. ‘Cultivating the land oneself in a manner involving work with one’s own hands’ is also hard, while (cultivating it) ‘using other workers if one is a landowner’ is appropriate for the good man. For
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{167} Asmis, “Epicurean Economics,” 133.
\textsuperscript{169} Tsouna, \textit{The Ethics of Philodemus}, 17.
\end{flushright}
it brings the least possible involvement with men from whom many disagreeable things follow, and a pleasant life, a leisurely retreat with one’s friends, and a most dignified income to the (wise). Nor is it disgraceful to earn an income both from accepting tenants into one’s house and from slaves who have knacks or even arts which are in no way indecent.  

This section from Philodemus shows that the wealthy aristocratic landowner is not excluded from the virtuous life. Wealth in itself is not evil, but the administration of this wealth is what makes the difference. Owning slaves is an important part of leading the good life, since they will do tasks that the manager or landowner need not do. But the management of the slaves should be ethical. If the manager is simply set on making profits, the nature of the tasks performed by the slaves would not matter as long as profit-making is optimal. But for Philodemus, the type of work the slaves do is also important. It seems that having slaves do extremely difficult and inhumane work, like labouring in the mines, is not acceptable. Allowing slaves to do ‘indecent’ work, possibly referring to prostitution, is also prohibited, since this would possibly place the manager in a situation where he or she has to deal with unsavoury characters of society.

Thus, Philodemus challenges the traditional views of Xenophon and Theophrastus/pseudo-Aristotle regarding oikonomia and slave-management. The governmentality Philodemus aspires to is not holistic, in other words, not of such a nature that it is applicable to all spheres of life including politics and the military. Philodemus’ advice aims to be specifically tailored for householding. He is also irritated by some ‘obvious’ observations from Xenophon and Theophrastus, and rather wants his exposition to be specific and specialised. Most importantly, oikonomia is supposed to be an ethical art, and not simply an economic enterprise. Wealth should be acquired naturally and it should be in the service of leading a pleasant and natural lifestyle. Treating slaves justly and leniently is acceptable, and one should manage slaves in an ethical way by not having them perform harsh inhumane tasks like mining, nor indecent and shameful work. In order to achieve this, he has to strategically reinterpret the works of Epicurus and Metrodorus for an affluent audience in the Italian countryside, so that his

\footnote{170 Ibid., 189.}
alternative form of *oikonomia* and slave-management would be acceptable, one his audience could relate to. We can now proceed to the Roman sources for *oikonomia* and slave-management.

### 3.4 Cato’s De Agricultura

The Roman Republic’s period of expansion, especially after the Hannibalic War, had a massive effect on the composition of slaves on landholdings,\(^\text{171}\) with direct consequences on the ethos of slave-management throughout the whole Mediterranean area. The second century of the Republic, with its accompanying crises, saw numerous changes in terms of demography. This period exhibits the rise of the so-called ‘villa system’ of householding.\(^\text{172}\) This system primarily refers to very large agricultural landholdings, specifically on the Italian mainland, which relied on the production of cash crops like olives and grapes to survive and thrive. The illustrious Roman citizens mostly owned such estates.\(^\text{173}\) It was also prevalent because this period of warfare required from owners of small landholdings to join the Roman army in order to strengthen the programme of expansion, on the one hand, and on the other, rapid urbanization, especially in and around Rome, also saw many peasants leave their lands to seek a better life in the city. Bradley has shown, however, that this was not a sudden and rapid consolidation of small landholdings into large villa-estates, with the sudden appearance of a large slave-based labour-force model.\(^\text{174}\) It was more likely a gradual process. In whichever form we consider this phenomenon, whether sudden and rapid or gradual, the use of slave labour for production became popular both on small landholdings as well as on the larger villa-estates. What is quite evident, then, is that the appearance of huge landholdings, mostly with absentee owners, was on the rise in final years of the Republic, and large contingents of slave labourers slowly became the

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norm on these estates; the rise of the so-called slave-mode of production. The development of agricultural slavery, as we will see, had direct consequences for urban slaveholding. Furthermore, these estates were meant to be profitable to the owners. If we again take account of the previous discussion related to Philodemus, a Greek writer within Italy (Herculaneum), we see that Philodemus reacts harshly to the conventional wisdom that these large villa-estates simply had to be profitable. The slaves were not only for farming. Since many of these landowners were part of the illustrious of the Roman Republic, many had escorts of slaves and freedmen for security and show.175

This context serves as the backdrop for the Roman statesman Cato the Elder’s work De agricultura. Unlike Philodemus, Cato’s advice on slave-management had in mind the generation of maximum profit with a minimum cost to the owner of the estate. Slaves were considered along with the tools and animals on the farm, as he states (Agr. 2.7): ‘Sell worn-out oxen, blemished cattle, blemished sheep, wool, hides, a wagon, old tools, and old slave, a sickly slave, and whatever else is superfluous.’176 Sick and old slaves are liabilities. When Cato gives guidelines for agricultural building projects, the slave quarters are mentioned along with the ox-sheds and pigsties.177 Moreover, Plutarch gives an account of Cato loaning money to his slaves to purchase their own slaves, which they would train and sell at a profit.178 Accordingly, care and punishment of slaves should always be in the service of ensuring an environment that will provide maximum profit.179 We see here some very potent discourses of the objectification and commodification of the slave-body, an issue we will return to in chapter 6 of the dissertation.

175 Ibid., 252–53.
177 The archaeological data from sites like Settefinestre shows that slave-quarters had very particular specifications; cf. Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 147. This was also seen with Xenophon in which the slave-cells were separated according to gender.
179 Joshel, Slavery in the Roman World, 56.
Most importantly for this study and understanding slavery in the early Christian period, we see the rise and development of the persona of the *vilicus*. The rules of conduct for the *vilicus* are spelled out clearly (*Agr.* 5.1-3):

The following are the duties of the overseer: He must show good management. The feast days must be observed. He must withhold his hands from another’s goods and diligently preserve his own. He must settle disputes among the slaves; and if anyone commits an offence he must punish him properly in proportion to the fault. He must see that the servants are well provided for, and that they do not suffer from cold or hunger. Let him keep them busy with their work - he will more easily keep them from wrongdoing and meddling. If the overseer sets his face against wrongdoing, they will not do it; if he allows it, the master must not let him go unpunished. He must express his appreciation of good work, so that others may take pleasure in well-doing. The overseer must not be a gadabout, he must always be sober, and must not go out to dine. He must keep servants busy, and see that the master’s orders are carried out. He must not assume that he knows more than the master.180

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The *vilicus* plays a very important role when it comes to slave-management. Since most of the estate-owners were absent from the supervision of daily activities, the *vilicus* became an increasingly important office, and the model *vilicus* may be considered as a key construct in Roman *oikonomia*. It was often possible that the *vilicus* was a slave. The Latin word *actor* may be used as a substitute, with the Greeks words ἐπίτροπος, πραγματευτής and πιστικός as possible equivalents. Most importantly, the *vilicus* is represented as a surrogate body for the owner. The construction of the Roman *vilicus* was, in the first instance, one related to economy. The sole purpose of the *vilicus* was to ensure profit for the estate, but there were also several very important additional duties. As seen above, his conduct in relation to slaves should be productive. Cato even explains the punishment of the slaves by the *vilicus* in terms of scales and measures - the punishment should be equal to the fault. It is not so much a matter of fairness than it is one of balancing the socio-economic books. All relations with slaves should be directed at optimum productivity. But the *vilicus* was also a very important ethical construct. Despite the criticisms of Philodemus against authors like Cato (he does not attack Cato directly, but the ideologies of Xenophon and Theophrastus, which are also shared by Cato), stating that their type of *oikonomia* was simply economical and not ethical, the arguments of Cato (and those of Xenophon and Theophrastus/Pseudo-Aristotle), in my opinion, are quite ethical, but in a very subtle manner. Perhaps the problem lies with Philodemus’ conjecture that there exists some kind of dichotomy (even a contrast) between economy and ethics. In reality, especially in antiquity, they are very much interwoven. It is true that the treatises and handbooks Philodemus rejects as

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183 The office is a complex one; often they were slaves, but it also happened that *vilici* were free-born or manumitted slaves; cf. Walter Scheidel, “Free-Born and Manumitted Bailiffs in the Graeco-Roman World,” *CQ* 40, no. 2 (1990): 591–93. There were also *subvilici* present on estates; cf. Jesper Carlsen, “Subvilicus: Subagent or Assistant Bailiff?” *ZPE* 132 (2000): 312–16.
unethical are not always written in the conventional style of virtue-discourse (Xenophon’s account is especially an exception here), but this hardly makes them unethical. It simply implies a different focus and emphasis. Philodemus’ ploy to ‘sell’ his own views as those tailored for the philosopher and Epicurean virtuoso, ironically enough, seems to be nothing more than a marketing strategy, an advertisement that would appeal to a different aspect of the human psyche - old oikonomia in a new package, with a new focus. To illustrate this point further, I will dwell on the second characteristic of Cato’s construction of the vilicus, namely that of the vilicus as the ethical body double of the owner, or the duplication of the body of the owner. It is seen in the end of the section in that the knowledge of the vilicus should equal (and especially not supersede) that of the master, which would be equal to arrogance. In the section after the above quoted pericope, Cato states that the friends of the master should be the friends of the vilicus, and he provides an elongated list of guidelines for the vilicus, which most evidently presses the point that the vilicus should never act on his own accord, whether it is a question of lending money, making purchases or even consulting agents of divination (Agr. 5.3-5). Nothing may be done without the approval of the dominus. As mentioned earlier, this socio-symbolic duplication of the owner was the result of necessity, since most owners were absent from the estates. Thus an ethic of mirroring is necessary in the context of this discourse. The vilicus as model for ethical behaviour still has an economic end, since Cato assumes disciplined behaviour would lead to high productivity. The vilicus becomes a model for the slaves - they are expected to mirror his behaviour. The danger of an immoral vilicus is that bad behaviour would be contagious. It also implies very strict regulation of the body of the vilicus. If productivity is inadequate, Cato warns, the vilicus may come up with a myriad excuses, like ill slaves, or slaves who have run away, etc. He then provides the owner with several responses to the excuses of the vilicus. Sick slaves, for instance, should not receive large rations (Agr. 2.1-4). The early date of Cato’s work also exhibits a sentimental value on tradition and Roman religion, and the vilicus, as the surrogate for the master, had to ensure that the Roman feast days were observed (Agr. 5.1), even though slaves had to work on these days (Agr. 2.4).

One therefore sees the dynamic of such elaborate slave hierarchies found on agricultural estates. Cato has several categories of slaves in his handbook. Harper rightly states: ‘There was

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188 Reay, “Cato’s Aristocratic Self-Fashioning,” 335.
probably a whole universe of lower-level overseers who are hard to detect in our sources...\footnote{Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 123.}

Without a doubt, these intricate hierarchies function both with an economic and ethical impetus. The essential element in a hierarchy is authority, and power, which is inevitably linked to ethics. The taxonomy of the arrangement of slaves on an agricultural estate acts in the interest of discrimination, which not only creates sub-categories (which may only appear functional), but also sub-classes (which is based more on social status than function). Most importantly, the taxonomy also serves the catalytic purpose of reflecting and norming the values that the owner wants to instill. With Cato, for instance, one gets the *vilicus*, roughly translated as the ‘overseer’, but there are also, for instance, *custodes* (guards/keepers/overseers) and *salictarii* (osier managers); not to mention the very subtle difference between the *vilicus* (an overseer of one estate) and the *actor* (who oversees multiple estates). The highly specialized nature of slaves’ tasks on an agricultural estate assumes a very complex and specialized hierarchy to manage it.

The other problem is that this phenomenon is distinctly Roman, and finding Greek or especially English equivalents proves to be very difficult. Along with the development and proliferation of villa-estates in the Italian rustic, one also finds a very particular set of language parameters being created which most effectively ‘speaks itself’ in the language of the Republic, namely Latin. Many of the words Cato and other Latin authors like Varro may list for slaves, should not only be seen as labour-signifiers, but there may be subtle nuances present in the words that would be common knowledge to ancient readers, yet not so common to the modern eye. Hierarchic and taxonomic categories and terms inevitably have connotations and denotations related to power and authority, and especially to social status. These complexities are best demonstrated when attempting to ‘translate’ some of these terms and categories into Greek, as Harper demonstrates:\footnote{Ibid.} ‘The hazy boundaries between these managerial categories, and the discordant semantic range of the Greek and Latin terminology, are reflected in an artful letter of Ausonius, whose pretentious *vilicus* preferred to be called *epitropos*.’\footnote{It leads one to speculate as to why Philodemus prefers to direct his critique against Greek authors and not authors like Cato. Perhaps Philodemus realizes that his audience had favourable views, perhaps even social and biological ties, to someone like Cato or Varro, which would make for targeting Xenophon and Theophrastus more convenient and ‘safe’. On the other hand, was it this complexity of the language of Roman villa-based landholding, aggressively Latin, along with its cultural nuances, that led Philodemus to take the easier path and remain within the Greek}
spelled out by Cato regarding participation in religious feats and rituals. While the vilicus needs to ensure the observance of the feast days, while balancing productivity by having slaves work on these days, some religious activities are taboo for the vilicus;\(^{192}\) for instance, he may not consult a practitioner of divination nor is he allowed to perform any religious rites except the Compitalia honouring the Lares Compitales (Agr. 5.3), while any person, slave or free (except a woman) is allowed to bring the offering dedicated to Mars and Silvanus for the health of the oxen (Agr. 83).\(^{193}\) Even superstitions are catered for, such as stinting the seed for sowing, which Cato considers bad luck (Agr. 5.4). Finally, the taxonomic and hierarchic nuances are clearly and most obviously stated in Cato’s precise guidelines regarding the distribution of rations (Agr. 56-59).

Cato’s model vilicus therefore is only the tip of a very complex authority-based ethical framework, highly specialized and highly contextual. The same would be true for the authors in the following discussions, namely Varro and Columella. The focus, however, remains economical and profit-driven. Cato’s remarks on the treatment of slaves deserve some attention. The treatment of slaves, whether punishment or reward, should serve in the interest of context? To speculate even further, perhaps Philodemus merely had a preferential, even biased, ethnocultural grammar for Greek rather than Latin. This issue, however, requires more study than the scope of the present study allows.

\(^{192}\) For a discussion of the religious duties of the vilicus; cf. Carlsen, Vilici and Roman Estate Managers, 80–84.

\(^{193}\) In a rather curious passage written centuries later in the anonymous Origo gentis Romanae, a short treatise which aims to explain the origins of the Roman people, the following instance is narrated: ‘In truth, afterwards, Appius Claudius enticed the Potitii with money they received to instruct public slaves in the management of the rites of Hercules and furthermore to admit women as well. They say that within thirty days from this being done the whole family of the Potitii, which had earlier been responsible for the rites, died out, and that the rites therefore came into the hands of the Pinarii, and that they, instructed by their reverence as much as their feelings of duty, faithfully preserved the mysteries of this sort.’ (Orig. gent. Rom. 8.5-6; Translation Roger Pearse, The Origin of the Roman People (Cited 12 April 2012. Online: http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/origo_00_intro.htm, 2004), n.p.; Latin text: Teubner: 10: Verum postea Appius Claudius accepta pecunia Potitios illexit, ut administrationem sacrorum Herculis servos publicos edocerent nes non etiam mulieres admitterent. Quo facto aiunt intra dies triginta omnem familiam Potitiorum, quae prior in sacrificis habebatur, extinctam atque ita sacra penes Pinarios resedisse eosque tam religione quam etiam pietate edoctos mysteria eiusmodi fideliter custodisse.) We see here that the family of the Potitii were punished not only with death, but the erasure of their historical legacy, for permitting slaves and women to perform certain religious rites only to be performed by free men. The importance of status in religious activities and ceremonies was therefore something that endured from Republican to late Imperial times.
productivity. On the one hand, Cato’s advice on mastery and the treatment of slaves does not differ much from that found in Xenophon. He also believes in manipulating the bodily desires and passions to make slaves productive. Sick slaves should have their rations limited (Agr. 2.4), and if it rained slaves could have done numerous other tasks, even if it is simply mending their own apparel (Agr. 2.3). As mentioned above, when discussing rationing, Cato is again painfully specific and detailed regarding their diet, which is a high-carbohydrate diet with little protein, fruits and vegetables (Agr. 56-59). For instance, the chained gangs of slaves working in the fields receive specific rations which are dependent on the season and types of field-work they perform: ‘The chain-gang should have a ration of four pounds of bread through the winter, increasing to five when they begin to work the vines, and dropping back to four when the figs ripen’ (Agr. 56). Similar specifics are given regarding wine, even regarding feasts such as the Saturnalia and Compitalia (Agr. 57). Clothing and blankets are also strictly regulated (Agr. 59). These precise guidelines for rationing not only shows the importance and intricacy of accounting on these estates, but the exact regulations regarding the provision for bodily needs also ramify the authority-based hierarchical taxonomy, and illustrate its complexity. According to his biographer Plutarch, Cato was also a bit eccentric by having his wife, Licinia, breastfeed not only their own children, but also the slaves’ children in order to strengthen their bond of faith to their owner and his offspring: ‘For the mother nursed it (Cato’s son) herself, and often gave suck also to the infants of her slaves, that they might come to cherish a brotherly affection for her son (Cat. mai. 20.3).’ Some scholars suggest, quite plausibly in my opinion, that mastery began during early infancy, when the freeborn and slaves played together. Edmondson hypothesizes: ‘It is difficult to reconstruct the precise nature of their play, but it is quite likely that it was through


196 Translation & Latin text: LCL: 70-71: ...conpeditis per hiemem panis P.III, ubi vineam fodere coeperint, panis P. V, usque adeo dum ficos esse coeperint, deinde ad P. IIII redivo; cf. Bober, Art, Culture, and Cuisine, 183–84.

197 Translation & Greek text: LCL: 360-61: αὐτὴ γάρ ἔτρεφεν ἰδίω γάλακτι πολλάκις ἐκ τῶν δούλων παιδάρια τῷ μαστῷ προσπειμένη, κατεσκεύαζεν εὔνοιαν ἐκ τῆς συντροφίας πρὸς τὸν υἱόν.
play that children began to learn how to give orders to their slave playmates.198 This shows how extremely pervasive the practice of slavery was, that even during infancy and the development of early childhood behaviour, master/slave discourses were active and shaping individuals to rule or be ruled. Plutarch also points to a second eccentricity of Cato (Cat. mai. 20.3-4):

As soon as the boy [Cato’s son] showed signs of understanding, his father took him under his own charge and taught him to read, although he had an accomplished slave, Chilo by name, who was a school-teacher and taught many boys. Still, Cato thought it not right, as he tells us himself, that his son should be scolded by a slave, or have his ears tweaked when he was slow to learn, still less that he should be indebted to his slave for such a priceless thing as education...199

This was unusual indeed, since it was commonplace for slaves, called *educatores* or *paedagogi*, to serve as teachers.200 In Cato we therefore find a voice from the second century Republic. He is highly traditional and sentimental, going even to eccentric lengths to ensure successful mastery. He writes to a new class of Romans who were extremely wealthy and powerful, but also absent from their estates. In order to bridge the challenges posed by such a scenario, Cato produces a highly complex and precise guide to *oikonomia*, including slave-management, on such estates. Most notable for this study is his construction of the typical Roman *vilicus*, a construction that is permeated by a subtle interweaving of economic and ethical


199 Translation & Greek Text: LCL: 360-361: ἐπεὶ δ’ ἤρξατο συνιέέναι, παραλαβὼν αὐτός ἐδίδασκε γράάµµατα. καίτι ξαρίεντα δούλων εἶχε γραµµατιστήν ὠνοµα Χίλωνα, παλλοὺς διδάσκοντα παιδας· οὐκ ἠξίου δὲ τον υἱόν, ὡς φησιν αὐτὸς, ὑπὸ δούλου κακῶς ἀκούειν ἢ τοῦ ὠτὸς ἀνατείνεσθαι μανθάνοντα βράάδιον, οὐδέ γε μαθήµατος τηλικούτου [τῷ] δούλῳ χάριν ὀφείλειν,...

discusivities, one that becomes a mirror and surrogate for the owner. He also presents the reader with a very precise and complex taxonomy that reiterates and ramifies all levels of authority, whether it concerns rationing or punishment. Behind this lies a subtle and nuanced hierarchy, almost ineffable and difficult to translate into any language other than Latin. While his context prodded him to devise these unique features, there is also much continuity between Cato and someone like Xenophon and even Pseudo-Aristotle. He also advocates the regulation and manipulation via the bodily passions. To the discomfort of someone like Philodemus, Cato’s main emphasis and focus is to maximize profit and productivity, with ethical behaviour always directed at promoting this primary economic impetus of acquiring wealth and expanding the estate. We now turn to the works of Varro.

3.5 Varro’s Rerum Rusticarum

Varro’s handbook on farming and agriculture was written more than a century after Cato’s handbook, and by this time, despite the political instability in Rome at the time, the villa-estate system of landholding was more common and established. In very much the same manner as Cato and the Hellenistic authors discussed above, slaves are discussed within an economic context. He also refers to Cato on several occasions in his opus. A century of large-scale slave labour has passed, and Varro provides many guidelines for using large numbers of slaves on the estates. It is interesting to see how Varro regards slaves in the agricultural estate (Rust. 1.17.1-2):

Now I turn to the means by which the land is tilled. Some divide these into two parts: men, and those aids to men without which they cannot cultivate; others into three: the class of instruments which is articulate, the inarticulate, and the mute; the articulate comprising the slaves, the inarticulate comprising the cattle, and the mute comprising the vehicles. All agriculture is carried on by men - slaves, or freemen, or both...

201 Translation & Latin text: LCL: 224-25: Nunc dicam, agri quibus rebus colantur. Quas res alii dividunt in duas partes, in homines et adminicula hominum, sine quibus rebus colere non possunt; alii in tres partes, instrumenti genus vocale ett semivocale et mutum, vocale, in quo sunt servi, semivocale, in quo sunt boves, mutum, in quo sunt plaustra. Omnes agricoluntur hominibus servis aut liberis aut utrisque...
Varro uses the distinction of speech to classify and discern slaves (and free labourers). The term ‘articulate tools’ (*instrumentum vocale*) is another difficult Latinism to interpret. Carlsen states that it may have had a legal sense to it, but also notes its ambiguity. The term seems general and although it may seem derogatory to speak of human beings as tools, this term may not have had much of a shameful connotation to it, since it is used for both slaves and the free. It simply distinguishes humans from animals and non-living farm equipment. Joshel explores the ‘literary culture’ of this term thus:

The conjunction of ‘tool’ and ‘speaking’, object and subject, raises the question of the agency attributed by slaves in literature...I shall argue that this practice was founded on the very definition of the chattel slave as fungible. I refer to the term in the modern sense, though the notion applies to the condition of the slave in Rome: as a fungible thing, the slave was exchangeable, replaceable, substitutable.

Although Joshel is correct in her general premise that a slave is fungible, using this phrase from Varro to support it seems, in my opinion, implausible. The passage from Varro should be carefully examined. It should be noted that Varro’s taxonomy here seems to be more classificatory than hierarchical (unlike most of Cato’s taxonomies). The classification is material or biological (or the lack of biology), simply to discern between humans, animals and basic tools. It does not appear to be based on social status at all, since he includes all human beings under the classification. It is possible that the term may have been somewhat condescending, especially when one examines his elaborations on which type of free persons are included here: the poor (*pauperculi*), hirelings (*mercenarii*), and debt-labourers (*obaerarii*). It is obviously clear that these people are not part of the upper echelons of the social classes, but they are not exactly

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equal to slaves in the Roman sense. Although it can be quite tempting, one should not read too much into this term used by Varro.\textsuperscript{204} Furthermore, Varro lists this as simply one of many views on how to classify those ‘things’ that till the land - it is not even mentioned first by Varro. This does not mean that he considers slaves in a positive and humane manner. The contrary is true - Varro is no different from any of the other authors discussed thus far regarding the social status of slaves. Taking cognisance of the caveats mentioned above in the discussion on Cato pertaining to substituting Latin phrases with Greek ones, it does seem to me, in this instance, that it would be safe to say that \textit{instrumentum vocale} cannot possibly be as derogatory as the Greek \textit{ἀνδράάποδον}, which may better support an argument for the fungible character of the slave. Rather than being a word that particularly describes the state of slavery, the term \textit{instrumentum vocale} appears to form part of the specialised agricultural terminology, which has developed alongside Roman farming practices, a stereotype showing the contempt of the Roman upper classes for the servile classes. A term found in Varro’s work that could better support Joshel’s argument is that of \textit{venalium greges}, normally translated as ‘slave-gangs’ (\textit{Rust.} 1.2.20-21). The term \textit{venalium} here may act as a synonym for \textit{servus}, while \textit{grex} refers to a crowd or herd. \textit{Venalium} speaks of something that is liable to be sold. But even this phrase is ambiguous. Roth has provided sound argumentation for translating the term \textit{venalium greges} in this pericope from Varro not as ‘slave-gangs’, but simply as herds of animals; it further illustrates the complexity of the language we find in these Roman treatises on agricultural management.\textsuperscript{205}

But what does Varro have to say about slaves and slave-management? Like most ancient authors, Varro believes in careful and strategic regulation and manipulation of slaves to extract optimal productivity. He also believes that the selection of quality overseers for slaves is of crucial importance (\textit{Rust.} 1.17.4-5). The overseer (Varro uses the word \textit{praefectus} in this instance, and not \textit{vilicus}, most likely indicating a lower rank than that of the \textit{vilicus}; the \textit{praefectus} would possibly also be a slave, it could also simply be a synonym for \textit{vilicus}) needs to be an older, literate person, with experience in farming. The \textit{vilicus} should be able to apply

\textsuperscript{204} Carlsen issues this same warning; Carlsen, “Varro”.

punitive discipline.\textsuperscript{206} Although he is not necessarily referring to a \textit{vilicus}, many of the same qualities are present, and the \textit{praefectus} should serve as an example to the slaves under him (\textit{Rust.} 1.17.4-5):

\begin{quote}
For the foreman must not only give orders but also take part in the work, so that his subordinates may follow his example, and also understand that there is a reason for his being over them - the fact that he is superior to them in knowledge. They are not to be allowed to control their men with whips rather than with words, if only you can achieve the same result.\textsuperscript{207}
\end{quote}

As with Cato, we see here that the highly hierarchical Roman social systems exhibit a subtle ethical undertone. The \textit{praefectus} must lead by example, and the status marker here is knowledge (probably the fact that he is literate) and his past experience in farming. The \textit{praefectus} is also constructed as someone who is temperate, and not violent. Varro certainly appears to be less harsh than Cato regarding the status and treatment of slaves (\textit{Rust.} 1.17.6-7):

\begin{quote}
The goodwill of the foremen should be won by treating them with some degree of consideration; and those of the hands who excel the others should also be consulted as to the work to be done. When this is done they are less inclined to think that they are looked down upon, or rather think that they are held in some esteem by the master. They are made to take more interest in their work by being treated more liberally in respect either of food, or of more clothing, or of exemption from work, or permission to graze
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{206} Enrico Dal Lago and Constantina Katsari, “Ideal Models of Slave-Management in the Roman World and in the Ante-Bellum American South,” in \textit{Slave Systems: Ancient and Modern} (Enrico Dal Lago and Constantina Katsari (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 196. In this same article the authors demonstrate how widely principles from Cato, Varro and Columella were used in American slavery.

\textsuperscript{207} Translation & Latin text: \textit{LCL: 226-27: Non solum enim debere imperare, sed etiam facere, ut facientem imitetur et ut animadvertat eum cum causa sibi praesesse, quod scientia praestet. Neque illis concedendum ita imperare, ut verberibus coercerent potius quam verbis, si modo idem efficere possis.}
some cattle of their own on the farm, or other things of this kind; so that, if some unusually heavy task is imposed, or punishment inflicted on them in some way, their loyalty and kindly feeling to the master may be restored by the consolation derived from such measures.\textsuperscript{208}

Here again it is clear that Varro prefers consultation and cooperation in winning the loyalty of the \textit{praefectus} and the slave. Whereas Cato would not even allow a slave to teach his son, Varro places a high value on reasoning with slaves and overseers. He understands that the owner should employ subtle psychological manipulation to ensure relationships remain favourable even when there is punishment or very hard tasks required.\textsuperscript{209} Once again, the importance of manipulating the slaves’ bodily passions is emphasized. Varro is more liberal than Cato though when it comes to rationing. Whereas Cato provided very precise guidelines for rationing, Varro recognizes the value of rationing in winning the favour of slaves. Varro also displays a stereotypical cultural discrimination in his elaborations - he advises against having too many slaves of the same nationality, since ‘this is a fertile source of domestic quarrels’ (\textit{Rust.} 1.17.5).\textsuperscript{210} Like Xenophon, Varro also comprehends the value of allowing slaves to own property and to have sex and offspring, since it will cause them to be more attached to the estate and they become more stable. Incidentally, Varro seems to whisper, this also pushes up their value (\textit{Rust.} 1.17.5-6).

\textsuperscript{208}Translation & Latin text: LCL: 226-29: \textit{Inliciendam voluntatem praefectorum honore aliquo habendo, et de operariis qui praestabant alios, communicandum quoque cum his, quae facienda sint opera, quod, ita cum fit, minus se putant despici atque aliquo numero haberi a domino. Studiosiores ad opus fieri liberalius tractando aut cibariis aut vestiti largiore aut remissione operis concessioneve, ut peculiare aliquo in fundo pascere liceat, huiusce modi rerum aliis, ut quibus quid gravius sit imperatum aut animadversum qui, consolando eorum restituat voluntatem ac benevolentiam in dominum.}

\textsuperscript{209}Bodel, “Slave Labour and Roman Society,” 324.

\textsuperscript{210}It should be remembered that Varro’s comments on the nationality of slaves were made to avoid possible insurrection, especially in the light of the Sicilian slave-revolts about 70 years earlier. Bradley states: ‘His prescriptions were not idle words prompted by generic convention, but practical directions from a public figure with experience of farming that reflected the real difficulty of how to control a servile population and prevent insurrection among its members’; Bradley, “Slavery in the Roman Republic,” 247.
In terms of the amount of slaves necessary for an estate, Varro notes that none of his predecessors, including Cato, left clear guidelines. Varro’s best advice here to the owner is to look at the surrounding estates, and the type of fields and farming being conducted, and on this basis, determine the best number of slaves (Rust. 1.18.6-8).

Although Varro often refers to Cato’s work, he can be described as having an opinion more liberal and moderate when it comes to slave-management. Since the villa-system of landholding and large-scale slave-labour models have matured in the century between Cato and Varro, Varro often advises his readers to follow the examples of established villa-estates regarding the numbers of slaves and their management. Varro shares the same views of most ancient authors in that the bodily passions of slaves need to be regulated and manipulated in order to ensure optimal productivity. He also understands the importance of having firm hierarchies in place in order to govern the behaviour of slaves, and also to mirror the values of the absentee owner. Overseers need to embody the values of the owner, and lead by example. The owner is expected to be a good communicator, and someone who can strategically reason with slaves, gain their favour and loyalty, and use various technologies to psychologically manipulate their behaviour and opinions. Varro also places much value on employing educated praefecti to closely supervise and manage slave labour. It is becoming more and more evident that mastery is a highly complex issue. Most of the authors discussed thus far are not in favour of violent compulsion as a first resort. Even Cato, most likely the strictest advisor thus far, prefers psychological manipulation of bodily passions over and above physical violence. Punitive violence is mostly seen as a last resort. As mentioned early in this chapter, the regulation and manipulation of the bodily passions complicate the phenomenon of slave-management, since issues like slave-families, manumission and freed-status become ethically and socially ambiguous. Some advise against mention of manumission while others consider it advantageous. The issue of rationing is also complex when it comes to mastery, since rationing mostly serves as technologies for forcing submission and obedience, yet, as Cato seems to hint, it is also an economic issue. If one has an estate with a few thousand slaves, rationing becomes a real problem. In order to overcome these complexities, the Roman system of slave-management has become highly hierarchical and based on the designation of the owner’s authority and its duplication in the form of the vilicus. The channels of mastery become complex and the specialized and highly nuanced Latinisms do not help the modern historian either. The ethical
basis of this type of mastery requires that the values and dispositions of the owner be mirrored on every level of authority, whether it is an important figure like the *vilicus* or the more hands-on *praefectus*. The extent of influence of these principles of mastery from the agricultural treatises in the urban areas is not clear, but they would have most certainly had some effect on the opinions of slaveholders in the city. We will now examine Columella, the final author we have of an agricultural treatise in the early Roman period.

### 3.6 Columella’s *De Re Rustica*

Columella’s treatise on the management of an agricultural estate is the most comprehensive we have on the subject. He is also unique in that he writes firmly during the Roman Imperial period. His work illustrates the diversity of farming on these estates, with each book treating an aspect of farming, whether it is crops and vineyards (books 3 to five), poultry and fish (book 8), and even bees (book 9). He also has a whole discourse on veterinary medicine in book 6. Books 10 to 12 mostly deal with labour issues.\(^{211}\) The reason for this encyclopedic treatise is given in its very first lines. He believes that the state of farming in the Empire is dire.\(^{212}\) But the reason for the poor quality of farming, according to Columella, is not divine, but due to human error and ignorance, and he states (*Rust.* 1. Preface, 3):

> I do not believe that such misfortunes (bad crops, the decline in fertile soil, and the general state of farming) come upon us as a result of the fury of the elements, but rather because of our own fault; for the matter of husbandry, which all the best of our

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ancestors had treated with the best of care, we have delivered over
to all the worst of our slaves, as if to a hangman for punishment.\textsuperscript{213}

The reason for the poor state of farming is, according to Columella, the absenteeism of
the landowners, who have left farming for slaves to do - and by implication, Columella believes
that they have ruined it. Later he also mentions that there are no teachers in the ‘art’ of
husbandry as there is in rhetoric or masonry. Thus, his exhaustive work on how to farm is written
for a generation of landowners not accustomed to farming and, to the benefit of the modern
scholar, Columella almost assumes that his reader knows nothing of the art. By restoring the
primacy of the presence of the \textit{pater familias} on the estates, Columella hopes to revive the olden
ways of husbandry.\textsuperscript{214}

With Columella we therefore have an abundance of evidence regarding slave-
management on villa-estates during the Imperial period. Columella’s influence on slave-
management in the later Roman Empire is often understated. Columella’s work is most important
for this study in that it shows us something of Roman attitudes on mastery and slave-
management in the Imperial period, which would be influential during the later centuries,
particularly the time of Chrysostom.

Columella exhibits many similarities with the work of Varro, but he is possibly not as
harsh as Cato. Yet he still understands that very strict and strategic manipulation of slave-bodies
is needed for the optimal functioning of a large agricultural estate.\textsuperscript{215} More than any of the
previous writers (with the exception of Xenophon), Columella promulgates a culture of intense
surveillance when it comes to slave-management. Two very important and lengthy pericopes
merit thorough examination and read thus (\textit{Rust.} 1.1.20 - 2.1):

For men who purchase lands at a distance, not to mention estates
across the seas, are making over their inheritances to their slaves,
as to their heirs and, worse yet, while they themselves are still

\textsuperscript{213}Translation & Latin text: LCL: 4-5: \textit{Nec post haec reor violentia caeli nobis ista, sed nostro potius accidere vitio,
qui rem rusticam pessimo cuique servorum velut carnifici noxae dedimus, quam maiorum nostrorum optimus
quisque optime tractaverat.}

\textsuperscript{214}For the background on the issue of the absentee \textit{pater familias}, cf. Reay, “Cato’s Aristocratic Self-Fashioning”.

alive; for it is certain that slaves are corrupted by reason of the
great remoteness of their masters and, being once corrupted and in
expectation of others to take their places after the shameful acts
which they have committed, they are intent more on pillage than
on farming. I am of the opinion, therefore, that land should be
purchased nearby, so that the owner may visit it often and
announce that his visits will be more frequent than he really
intends them to be; for this apprehension both overseer and
labourers will be at their duties.216

And (Rust. 1.8.16-19):  

Again, it is established custom of all men of caution to inspect the
inmates of the workhouse, to find out whether they are carefully
chained, whether the places of confinement are quite safe and
properly guarded, whether the overseer has put anyone in fetters or
removed his shackles without the master’s knowledge. For the
overseer should be most observant of both points - not to release
from shackles anyone whom the head of the house has subjected to
that kind of punishment, except by his leave, and not to free one
whom he himself has chained on his own initiative until the master
knows the circumstances; and the investigation of the householder
should be more painstaking in the interest of slaves of this sort,
that they may not be treated unjustly in the matter of clothing or
other allowances, inasmuch as, being liable to a greater number of
people, such as overseers, taskmasters, and jailers, they are more

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216 Translation & Latin text: LCL: 38-39: Nam qui longinqua, ne dicam transmarina rura mercantur, velut heredibus
patrimonio suo et, quod gravius est, vivi cedunt servis suis, quoniam quidem et illi tam longa dominorum distantia
corrumpuntur et corrupti post flagitia, quae commiserunt, sub expectatione successorum rapinis magnis quam
culturae student. Censeo igitur in propinquo agrum mercari, quo et frequenter dominus veniat et frequentius
venturum se, quam sit venturus, denuntiet. Sub hoc enim metu cum familia vilicus erit in officio.
liable to unjust punishment, and again, when smarting under cruelty and greed, they are more to be feared. Accordingly, a careful master inquires not only of them, but also of those who are not in bonds, as being more worthy of belief, whether they are receiving what is due to them under his instructions; he also tests the quality of their food and drink by tasting it himself, and examines their clothing, their mittens, and their foot-covering. In addition, he should give them frequent opportunities for making complaint against those persons who treat them cruelly or dishonestly. In fact, I now and then avenge those who incite the slaves to revolt, or who slander their taskmasters; and, on the other hand, I reward those who conduct themselves with energy and diligence. To women, too, who are unusually prolific, and who ought to be rewarded for the bearing of a certain number of offspring, I have granted exemption from work and sometimes even freedom after they had reared many children. For to a mother of three sons exemption from work was granted; to a mother of more her freedom as well. Such justice and consideration on the part of the master contributes greatly to the increase of his estate.\textsuperscript{217}

\textsuperscript{217} Translation & Latin text: LCL: 92-95: \textit{Nam illa sollemnia sunt omnibus circumspectis, ut ergastuli mancipia recognoscant, ut explorent an diligenter vincti sint, an ipsae sedes custodiae satis tuta e munitaeque sint, num vilicus aut alligaverit quempiam domino nesciente aut revinxerit. Nam utramque maxime servare debet, ut et quem pater familiae tali poena multaverit, vilicus nisi eiusdem permisset compedibus non eximit et quem ipse sua sponte vinxerit, antequam sciat dominus, non resolvat; tantoque curiosior inquisitio patris famulorum debet esse pro tali genere servorum, ne aut in vestiariis aut in ceteris praebitis injuriose tractentur, quanto et pluribus subjecti, ut vilicus, ut operum magistris, ut ergastulariis, magis obnoxii perpeti endis injuriis, et rursus saevitia atque avaritia laesi magis timendi sunt. Itaque diligens dominus cum et ab ipsis tum et ab solutis, quibus maior est fides, quaerit, an essua constitutione iusta percipient, atque ipse panis potionisque probitatem gustu suo explorat, vestem manicas pedumque tegumina recognoscit. Saepe etiam querendi potestatem faciat de iis, qui aut crudeler eos aut fraudulenter infestent. Nos quidem aliquando iuste dolentes tam vindicamus, quam animadvertimus in eos, qui seditionibus familiam concitant, qui calumniatur magistros suos; ac rursus praemio prosequimur eos, qui strenue atque industrie se gerunt. Feminis quoque fecundioribus, quarum in subole certus numerus honorari debet, otium,
In this exposition, Columella creatively incorporates old views on slave-management with new discourses common to the Roman Imperial period. Like Xenophon, slaves are rewarded for ‘breeding’, and motherhood is considered synonymous with manumission in the thinking of Columella. But let us commence from the beginning of this pericope. As mentioned above, Columella’s new culture of surveillance is something that truly stands out as unique in his treatise. Although this is obviously present in the treatises of Cato and Varro, Columella’s version is much more striking. It must be understood that Columella is writing during a period when the villa-system was not only quite established, but also more open to critique. Columella seems uncomfortable with the absenteeism of the landowner or pater familias. While Cato and Varro established and reinforced the complex hierarchical systems of slave-management in the villa-estates, Columella subtly informs the reader of the fissures in the hierarchies. Although we saw the ethic of mirroring and modelling of the pater familias by the vilicus and other subordinates promoted by Cato and Varro, Columella is all too aware of the unrealistic idealism accompanying these constructions of subordinates in the hierarchy. Cato and Varro described the ideal, but the reality was all too clear for Columella - if a landowner truly desires high productivity on the estate, he should be present and involved in its workings. This pericope in Columella’s treatise therefore represents a critique on the construction of the vilicus and other subordinates provided by authors like Cato and Varro; it is done in almost juridical terms. There is therefore something that could be called a rigid panopticism present in Columella’s guidelines to slave-management. It is also possible that he is attempting to rescue the role of the pater familias of the villa-estate in the Roman social imagination. He wants to replace the stereotype of the absentee pater familias with that of one who is concerned about the welfare of slaves and most importantly, he must be the personification of justice and fairness. On a rather low level of abstraction, we can trace the evolution of the Roman landowner or pater


familias of the villa-estate from Cato, who provides us with the strict conservative, to Varro, showcasing the liberal master of social relations, to Columella, introducing the active and involved pater familias. These constructions are very likely based on the very personalities of the authors who construct them, but they nevertheless aim to appeal to the audience of the time and their needs and preferences. During the time of Columella, there has also been time to reflect on the causes and possible preventive measures of the three great Roman servile wars or slave-revolts, which plagued the later Roman Republic. Like Varro, Columella also promotes a friendliness and frankness in the relationship between the pater familias and the slaves (Rust. 1.8.12), but Columella goes much further in emphasizing that the pater familias should truly be concerned about the living conditions and justice of slaves in his care. By making the pater familias someone who is present at the estate and involved in its dynamics, the pater familias is restored to a favourable position in the eyes of peers and subordinates. What are the characteristics of the Columellan pater familias?

He remains a master of psychological manipulation. The favour of slaves is still a very important aspect in successful mastery. But the technologies to do this are different and a bit more complex. The regulation and manipulation of bodily needs remain a central strategy here, but an element of care is added with a culture of involvement and surveillance. The gaze of the pater familias should be one that guarantees justice, a concept repeated several times in the pericope quoted above. Justice does not imply leniency, it implies an attitude set against double standards. Columella gives much detail on this aspect when speaking about punishment. Although authors like Cato and Varro presented the ideal vilicus, for instance, as the mirror image of the landowner, and someone who is fair, civilized and educated, it seems that during the time of Columella in the high Empire, a different stereotype of the vilicus was more popular, one denoting ideas of favouritism, greed, cruelty and injustice, one that Columella distinctly mentions (Rust. 1.8.17). The management of punishment receives a central place in the treatise, and is a common topos in Columella’s discussions on slave-management. The question is not so much the type of punishment anymore, as with Cato and Varro, but the fair and correct administration thereof. It calls the master to be informed about the conditions of slaves in the

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workhouse, and to ensure consistency in the implementation of punishment. Columella seems to anticipate the response of some of his readers that this type of involvement bears a high price on the landowner. He often switches to the first person and recounts his own behaviour as a *pater familias*. He professes to ‘walk the talk’ as it were.223

Most importantly, the Columellan *pater familias* is someone who is aware of the living conditions of the slaves. Columella goes so far as to advise the landowner to even taste the food of the slaves, and closely inspect the quality of their clothing.224 In a different instance he states that slaves should have an array of clothing that would enable them to labour in any type of weather (*Rust.* 1.8.9). He must even be open to receive complaints against superiors, and to punish them accordingly - an effective measure for preventing revolts. Neither does he forget to praise fertile slave-mothers, who by means of childbearing are either absolved from their duties or even set free. This same reasoning was seen with Xenophon.225 Columella finally admits that if the *pater familias* assumes this role, the estate (*patrimonium*) will increase.

Columella also provides his own version of what the *vilicus* should represent. (*Rust.* 8.1-15). He gives some very interesting guidelines (*Rust.* 1.8.1-16; 11.1.1-32).226 In Columella’s first book he describes the duties of the *vilicus*, and then repeats it again later in his eleventh book, when he discusses the duties of the *vilicus* in relation to the husbandman (*rusticus*). Regarding the age and appearance, as well as physiognomy, of the *vilicus*, he is in accordance with Cato and Varro in that the man should be middle-aged and physically strong and fit for hard farm labour, with no physical disabilities; someone who is willing to teach those slaves under his care (*Rust.* 1.8.1-2; 11.1.3-5). It is curious that Columella, unlike Cato and Varro, does not consider literacy a prerequisite for the *vilicus*. The only prerequisite is practical experience and the ability to lead and show underlings how the work should be done (*Rust.* 1.8.3-4):

223 Columella did receive some critique on his proposition that the estate should be closely monitored by the *vilicus* since it was not practical for the *pater familias* to always be on the estate. While Columella also wants the *pater familias* present, he needs to address the reality of the situation accordingly, and give practical advice despite the absence of the *pater familias*. Pliny is especially known to have criticized Columella in this instance (*Hist. Nat.* 18.38); cf. Carlsen, *Vilici and Roman Estate Managers*, 20.


226 Carlsen, *Vilici and Roman Estate Managers*, 58, 103–4.
For it is not in keeping with this business of ours for one man to give orders and another to give instructions, nor can a man properly exact work when he is being tutored by an underling as to what is to be done and in what way. Even an illiterate person, if only he has a retentive mind, can manage affairs well enough.\textsuperscript{227}

Columella understands the works of authority and like the other Roman authors he acknowledges that authority is only effective when it is based on knowledge - but this need not be literacy, but rather experience. Literacy, according to a friend of Columella, can even be a stumbling block (\textit{Rust. 1.8.4}):

Cornelius Celsus says that an overseer of this sort [illiterate] brings money to his master oftener than he does his book, because, not knowing his letters, he is either less able to falsify accounts or is afraid to do so through a second party because that would make another aware of the deception.\textsuperscript{228}

With Columella we do not see the idealistic descriptions of the \textit{vilicus} present with Cato. Columella assumes the worst from the \textit{vilicus}, and therefore we have this type of advice. The danger of literacy is that it opens the channels for corruption. This feature is unique to Columella, and shows some development of the genre since the late Republican days. Columella is also very aware of the fact that age and experience play an important part in the hierarchical dynamics so crucial to the labour system present on the large agricultural estates. He admits that it is very difficult to balance the necessary skills of a \textit{vilicus}. He must be adept at farming, but also at commanding and the use of authority.

\textsuperscript{227} Translation & Latin text: LCL: 84-85: \textit{Nam non est nostri negotii alterum imperare et alterum docere; neque enim recte opus exigere valet, qui quid aut qualiter faciendum sit ab subiecto discit. Potest etiam inliteratus, dum modo tenacissimae memoriae, rem satis commode administrare.}

\textsuperscript{228} Translation & Latin text: LCL: 84-87: \textit{Eius modi vilicum Cornelius Celsus ait, saepius nummos domino quam librum adferre, quia nescius litterarum vel ipse minus possit rationes confingere vel per alium propter conscientiam fraudis timeat.}
Another unexpected guideline Columella gives is that the *vilicus* should not be physically attractive, and especially not from the class of urban slaves. Columella then provides a scolding critique of urban slaves. Such slaves have been made soft and lazy due to the pleasures of the city such as the Circus, the Campus, theatres and gambling dens. Employing such a person, according to Columella, could cause a serious loss to the estate, not to mention the waste of buying a slave. This polarization between the city and the countryside shows that Columella understands agricultural slaves to be more disciplined and hard working than urban slaves. In fact, the best slaves for the agricultural estate are those who were born and raised by the hard labour of farm work (*Rust.* 1.8.2).

Columella leaves nothing open to the imagination of the reader. He even provides advice on the types of relationships the *vilicus* may have and those that are forbidden (*Rust.* 1.8.5). He should have a female companion, and refrain from any relationships with workers in the household. He should also be weary of outsiders and not show any special favours to other slaves. His mobility is also limited in that he is not allowed to stray away from the farm, or even create new pathways on the land (*Rust.* 1.8.7). This same view was present with Cato, who is quoted here, in saying that the *vilicus* should not be a ‘gadabout’ or wanderer (*ambulator*). This is related to the special carceral conditions of the *vilicus*, which will be discussed in chapter 5 on carcerality. The *vilicus* also needs to restrict and control the mobility of the slaves in his care (*Rust.* 1.8.12-13). His own personal business dealings are also restricted in this regard.

In terms of religious observances and superstitions, we find Columella once again in agreement with Cato in that the *vilicus* should not perform any rituals without the approval of the master, and not consult any practitioners of divination (*Rust.* 1.8.6).

As with the *pater familias*, the *vilicus* is also expected to maintain strict technologies of surveillance, and also administer care to those slaves under his supervision (*Rust.* 1.8.9-11; 11.1.18). In terms of clothing, he needs to ensure and inspect that all attire is fitting for work in diverse weather conditions, and clothing should be practical and not cosmetic and decorative. In terms of punishment and regulation of subordinate slave bodies, Columella remains conventional. The *vilicus* should not be neither too lax nor too cruel, but fair, as with the case of the *pater familias*. There is thus still a trend of ethical mirroring present with Columella despite his suspicious attitude regarding *vilici*. The surveillance-mentality promoted by Columella is supported again by the issue of being present and keeping watch. Idle slaves are prone to cause
trouble, and therefore the *vilicus* should always ensure that slaves are kept busy with work. In his eleventh book, Columella makes it very clear that the best *vilicus* is the one trained by the *pater familias* himself (*Rust*. 11.1.4-6). He bases this argument on both Cato and, interestingly enough, Xenophon’s advice. Columella does concede that both Cato and Xenophon’s advice are idealistic, mainly because during those earlier years, most people knew how to farm. He is therefore hinting at a problem faced in Roman agriculture during the Imperial age that many a *pater familias* did not even know how to farm, and is therefore incapable of teaching the *vilicus*. The problem now is that the *vilicus* may know more about farming than the *pater familias*. This could be one of the reasons Columella’s advice is so encyclopedic in nature - it is could almost be considered an ‘idiot’s guide’ to farming in the Imperial age, suited for those landowners not accustomed to the *vita rustica*. Columella accepts that this is a wider social crisis. Since many people are no longer taught by their fathers how to farm, Columella believes that there should be teachers in the ‘rustic arts’, perhaps something to which he aspires. This is one of his greatest frustrations when discussing the role of the *vilicus*. He states (*Rust*. 11.1.9-10):

Therefore I wish to say what I said before, namely, that the future bailiff must be taught his job just like the future potter or mechanic. I could not readily state whether these trades are more quickly learnt because they have a narrower scope; but certainly the subject-matter of agriculture is extensive and widespread and, if we wished to reckon up its various parts, we should have difficulty in enumerating them. I cannot, therefore, sufficiently express my surprise as I justly complained at the beginning of my treatise, at the fact that, while instructors can be found in the other arts which are less necessary for life, for agriculture neither pupils nor teachers have been discovered.\(^{229}\)

\(^{229}\) Translation & Latin text: LCL: 54-55: *Libenter igitur eadem loquor tam docendus est futurus vilicus, quam futurus figulus aut faber. Et haud facile dixerim, num illa tanto expeditiora sint discentibus artificia, quanto minus ampla sunt. Rusticationis autem magna et diffusa materia est, partesque si velimus eius percensere, vix numero comprehendamus. Quare satis admirari nequeo, quod primo scriptorum neorum exordio iure conquestus sum,*
Columella exhibits uneasiness at the effects of the massive urbanization during the Imperial period. The rapid expansion of the Roman Empire, and the ensuing *pax Romana*, led to people leaving the country for better opportunities in the cities, even more so than in the late Republican period, when the villa-system was emerging. There was also much nationalization occurring in terms farming. And despite these events, Columella complains, there are no teachers in the arts of farming and agriculture. This is what makes it so difficult to find a good *vilicus*, because there are so few of them left.

He also gives guidelines regarding the diet and dining customs of the *vilicus*. Here Columella attempts to give authority to his argument by stating that it is based on old precepts, which are no longer in use during his time, which he is now reinstating. The *vilicus* must only dine with the rest of the household, and not on his own, nor may he consume food other than that prepared for the rest, since this will guarantee the good quality of the food. As with Xenophon, Columella’s *vilicus* is someone who should abstain from wine. This is yet again a measure of limitation regarding the mobility and carcerality of the *vilicus* (*Rust. 1.8.12*). The sexuality of the *vilicus* is also regulated, as Columella states (*Rust. 11.1.14*):

> Further, he should also have an aversion to sexual indulgence; for, if he gives himself up to it, he will not be able to think of anything else than the object of his affection; for his mind being effused by vices of this kind thinks that there is no reward more agreeable than the gratification of his lust and no punishment more heavy than the frustration of his desire.\(^{230}\)

\(^{230}\) Translation & Latin text: LCL: 56-57: *Tum etiam sit a venereis amoribus aversus: quibus si se dediderit, non alius quidquam possit cogitare quam illud quod diligit. Nam vitiis eiusmodi pellectus animus nec praeedium lucundius quam fructum libidinis nec supplicium gravius quam frustrationem cupiditatis existimat.*
This point was mentioned in most of the ancient authors discussed. The regulation of sexuality becomes a powerful strategy in controlling human behaviour. For the menial slaves, it was used as a reward, but here, with the *vilicus*, the issue is different. Abstinence is Columella’s advice, since it draws the attention of the *vilicus* away from work. It seems to be somewhat contradictory to the advice Columella gave earlier. Although he stated that the *vilicus* should avoid domestic relationships, he was still allowed to have a female companion. The advice is conflicting - the *vilicus* may have a female companion (*contubernalis mulier*), a term that does have some sexual connotations to it (*Rust*. 1.8.5). Perhaps the advice is to have the *vilicus* direct his sexual desire to this companion, rather than other domestics, implying that sexual abstinence is not general, but specific to others working in the household. This concept is repeated just before the pericope quoted above, and seems to be the sense Columella implies. Perhaps the female companion allowed by Columella is simply a necessary evil - he does seem to hint that the best *vilicus* is one who is not concerned about sex. This is again conflicting since the *vilicus*, according to Columella must be strong and masculine (at least not attractive). At least it could be said that Columella’s *vilicus* is someone who can control his bodily desires, as he would control his subordinates, a notion especially popular during the Augustan period.

Another effective means of social control of slave-bodies is the use of fear. This was a very common motif in discussions of mastery. This fear is especially articulated by Columella when he states that estate-owners should make it clear that they intend to visit their estates frequently (*Rust*. 1.2.1). The presence and possible surprise visit of the *pater familias* serve as a deterrent against any ill doings.

Along with the dietary and sexual regulations of the *vilicus*, Columella also provides guidelines on when the *vilicus* should wake up. Each second should be spent productively, and the *vilicus* must not be lazy or loiter, since other slaves are liable to follow this example. He should be the first in line for work and the last one to close off the working day. Columella

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231 Sexuality was a very important discourse in farming treatises, especially since fertility was so directly linked to farming. Columella had some interesting views on this, for instance, he states that one of the best ways to rid the garden of pests like caterpillars and such is to let a menstruating virgin walk around in the garden (*Rust*. 10.357-368, 11.3.64); cf. Amy Richlin, “Pliny’s Brassiere,” in *Roman Sexualities* (Judith P. Hallett and Marilyn B. Skinner (eds); Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 202–3.

uses the metaphor of a shepherd - the *vilicus* should be like a shepherd to the flock of slaves under him, and never leave anyone behind.

Columella’s construction of the *vilicus* is based on suspicion. He seems to want to popularize his arguments by referring to his advice as being ‘authentically’ agricultural, and not urban. He also intimates on several occasions that his model is one that reaches back to older traditions, especially those of Cato, even though he is often on the opposite side of Cato’s advice. The carcerality and mobility of the *vilicus* is strictly controlled, and the type of lifestyle he is supposed to lead is described in the minutest of details; hence his advice that the estate should be easy to visit by the *pater familias* (Rust. 1.2.20-2.2). Columella’s language also exhibits the contempt the Roman Imperial aristocrats had for the servile classes. This is exhibited in his suspicion of the *vilicus*, as well as his belief that farming in the Roman Empire was in a bad state due to it being entrusted to slaves. In the light of this, Columella also states (Rust. 1.7.6):

> On far distant estates, however, which is not easy for the owner to visit, it is better for every kind of land to be under free farmers than under slave overseers, but this is particularly true of grain land. To such land a tenant farmer can do no great harm, as he can to plantations of vines and trees, while slaves do it tremendous damage...  

Columella’s preference for tenant farmers (*coloni*) to work on estates where it is likely that the *pater familias* will not frequent further demonstrates his contempt for slaves. He commonly subscribes to the Roman stereotype of slaves being lazy, greedy and prone to trickery; hence the strict surveillance and regulation of slave-bodies on the estate.

An important feature in Columella’s work is the problematisation of the teaching of *oikonomia* (in his case, it includes basic farming techniques). Columella writes his extensive work as an attempt to transform the art of agricultural *oikonomia* into something that can be

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233 Champion, “Columella.”

234 Translation & Latin text: LCL: 82-83: *In longinquis tamen fundis, in quos non est facilis excursus patris familiae, cum omne genus agri tolerabilius sit sub liberis colonis quas sub vilicus servis habere, tum praecipue frumentarium, quem et minime, sicut vineas aut arbustum, colonus evertere potest et maxime vexant servi...*
taught. The problem he recognizes is that, due to the absenteeism of the *pater familias*, farming and estate management has become the work of slaves. This he believes is why it is in such a bad state. His typical aristocratic tone shows much contempt for the servile classes, especially slaves. His view of slaves, especially slaves in important managerial positions like the *vilicus*, is one of suspicion. He conforms to the view that slaves should be controlled via the regulation of their bodily passions, and he gives detailed expositions of how this should be done, again with special emphasis on the identity and behaviour of the *vilicus*. The most effective strategy, according to Columella, is to have the *pater familias* present on the estate, and to exhibit a strict culture of surveillance. Something that is also very evident in Columella’s work is his special distaste of urban slaves. The dichotomy between urban slaves (*familia urbana*) and rural slaves (*familia rustica*) is common in Roman literature on slaveholding.\(^{235}\) Columella advises the *pater familias* to avoid placing urban slaves on agricultural estates. Most estate-owners in the Imperial period would also have had properties in the city, where they would have had their own selection of urban slaves. He seems to intimate that urban slaves have more needs and are stereotypically more prone to laziness and participation in the vices of the city. Behind all this lies a greater dichotomy between urban life and life in the country. Not only does he scold urban slaves but, in a more respectful way, admonishes the new generation *pater familias* to become very knowledgeable in the science of agriculture, so that it is the owner who can teach the slaves how to farm and not *vice versa*. Columella adopts and adapts many principles from Xenophon and Cato, but also gives many of his own, unique advice. The complexity of slave-management between the city and the rural estate is very clear here. Although the phenomena of rural *oikonomia* and urban *oikonomia* differed, the lines are often blurred in that these constructions of *oikonomia* influenced each other. Columella is quite important for the understanding of slavery in the later Roman Empire, as we will see when discussing the work of Palladius.

As we have said, something that has emerged in this reading of Columella is to what extent *oikonomia* was taught in antiquity. It seems to be assumed that it was taught to people via their kin and the example of their parents, but how this was done is ambiguous. Although there probably existed some type of ‘conventional wisdom’ gained mostly by observation and the experience of everyday life, Columella is adamant in stating that there are no experts in the art of *oikonomia*. His concern is directly addressed to agricultural *oikonomia*, but this is not less true

for urban areas. What is apparent is that one aspect of oikonomia, that is master and masculinity, was taught indirectly via the other arts. Gleason has convincingly illustrated how masculinity was shaped via the art of rhetoric.\textsuperscript{236} This is what makes the study of oikonomia and slave-management so complex. Although several ancient theorists call it an art, it is learned via other arts and, as it were, the school of life experience. It is likely that technologies of mastery were taught as early as infancy, as we saw with Cato. Furthermore, discourses of masculinity were very apparent in all these ancient writings. The indirect pedagogy of oikonomia was therefore, in particular, a topic for the philosophers. This was already seen especially with the Hellenistic authors, especially pseudo-Aristotle and Philodemus; it will also be very evident in the examination of Stoicism. We will now discuss the final author from the Roman Empire who wrote a treatise on agricultural management, namely Palladius.

3.7 Palladius’ Opus agriculturae

Palladius (Rutilius Taurus Aemilianus) is one of the very few sources from the later Roman Empire who wrote on household management in an agricultural context. The problem we find here with Palladius, especially for the present study, is that he dates rather late; probably mid- to late fifth century.\textsuperscript{237} His relevance is therefore limited for understanding slave-management and oikonomia in the time of Chrysostom. What is important is that Palladius gives us a glimpse into estate-management during a period much later than, for instance, that of Columella. Another problem with Palladius’ treatise is that is gives surprisingly little information about slave-management itself. Palladius states that the lack of information about labour is due to the diversity in the types of landholdings (Op. agr. 1.6.3).\textsuperscript{238} Harper’s cautious approach to Palladius is quite justified, not only taking into account the limits mentioned above, but, more importantly, that Palladius’ ‘primary objective was to describe an efficient use of time, not of land or labour.’\textsuperscript{239} Hence we find the entire structure of the Opus being organized on the basis of the calendar. Palladius also approaches estate-management with the opinion that it should be as
productive as possible, and that it requires strict and direct control. As with Columella, Palladius provides a very detailed account of agricultural practices, from the breeding of pigs, to the keeping of bees, to the growing of roses; thus, a glimpse into rural life during the later Empire. The treatise exhibits a very strict philosophy of control and supervision and again, as with Columella, functions best if the owner of the estate is actively involved. Unfortunately there is not much said about this issue, or about the management of slaves. This does not necessarily point to a decline of slave labour in favour of tenancy on agricultural estates - Palladius also refers very little to tenants on the estate. The aim of his writing is a detailed explanation of agricultural issues related to botany, horticulture and animal husbandry. What is very evident in Palladius’ treatise, despite whether he is writing to slaves or coloni, he still promulgates a strong culture of surveillance over labourers, and even ‘uses the term praetorium rather than villa with its implicit military (structural) connotations.’

What does Palladius say about slave-management? We see especially an attitude of ensuring maximum productivity with the personnel on the estate. He states that both women and children are able to work on the farm, especially referring to chicken breeding. Both women and


241 Bodel believes that Palladius writes mostly about coloni, while Harper is more cautious about accepting such an approach; cf. Bodel, “Slave Labour and Roman Society,” 320; Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 189. Contrary to this, Giardina, Vera, as well as Wickham, believe that if the slave mode of production was still important in Palladius’ day, he would have most certainly discussed it; cf. Andrea Giardina, “Le Due Italie nella Forma Tarda dell’impero,” in Società Romana e Impero Tardoantico 1: Istituzioni, Ceti, Economie (Andrea Giardina (ed.); Rome: Laterza, 1986), 30–36; Domenico Vera, “Dalla ‘Villa Perfecta’ Alla Villa Di Palladio,” Athenaeum 83 (1995): 342–50; Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages, 269.

242 Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages, 269.

child slaves were often started out by looking after animals like chickens \((\textit{Op. agr.} 1.27.1)\).\textsuperscript{244} He does let something slip about the interaction between slaves and masters, but not in the form of agricultural advice, but when referring to himself and the completion of his work. In book 14 of the \textit{Opus}, addressed to a certain Pasipheus, at its very beginning, he apologetically explains why it has taken him some time to complete this book. He compares himself to a slave, and states that he prefers a slave to work diligently yet with quality, rather than pressing them for quick work, which is of inferior quality. Thus he states his own work, like that of a slave, may have taken longer than expected, but it is of a high standard. This, however, is simply a comment mentioned in passing, and its relevance is also limited due to its personal and general nature. He does seem to hint that slaves should be treated with respect. Another late ancient author, yet much earlier than Palladius, Porphyry gives the following advice to his wife Marcella, advice almost identical to that of Varro and Columella (\textit{Ep. Mar.} 35):

\begin{quote}
Strive neither to wrong your slaves nor to correct them when you are angry. And before correcting them, prove to them that you do this for their good, and give them an opportunity for excuse. When purchasing slaves, avoid the stubborn ones. Accustom yourself to do many things yourself, for our own labour is simple and easy. And men should use each limb for the purpose for which nature intended it to be used. Nature needs no more. They who do not use their own bodies, but make excessive use of others, commit a twofold wrong, and are ungrateful to nature that has given them these parts. Never use your bodily parts merely for the sake of pleasure, for it is far better to die than to obscure your soul by intemperance...correct the vice of your nature....If you give
\end{quote}

something to your slaves, distinguish the better ones by a share of honour...\textsuperscript{245}

The preference of moderate treatment of slaves in late ancient sources seems to mimic those earlier ones, exhibiting some continuity in the sources from Columella to Palladius. Porphyry also seems to believe that if one wants a job done right, one should do it oneself (this thinking is also very common with Chrysostom). Not that harsh punishment was less prevalent. Ammianus Marcellinus, for instance, states that a slave who was lazy and slow to perform his duties was given three hundred lashes (\textit{Res. gest.} 28.4.16). In an almost Christian fashion, Ammianus also criticized the Roman elite of late antiquity who ‘each take fifty slave attendants into the bath - and still yell menacingly, “where, where is my help”’ (\textit{Res. gest.} 28.4.8-9).\textsuperscript{246}

Regarding the appointment of the \textit{vilicus}, there is also very little said by Palladius, only: ‘Do not appoint the head of the farm from among the beloved slaves, since trusting in previous affection, he will think he is unpunishable for his present faults’ (\textit{Op. agr.} 1.6.18).\textsuperscript{247}

As mentioned above, the lack of reference to slave-management in this treatise should be approached with caution. It seems to simply indicate that the author did not regard this as very important in his \textit{Opus}, and that he was more concerned with the details of agricultural labours themselves, rather than those performing the labour. It does tell us that estates in the fifth century

\textsuperscript{245} Translation: Alice Zimmerm, \textit{Porphyry’s Letter to His Wife, Marcella: Concerning the Life of Philosophy and Ascent to the Gods} (Grand Rapids: Phanes, 1994), 59; Greek text: Pötscher: 38: οἰκέτας πειρῶ μη ἄδικεῖν μηδὲ ὀργίζομένη κολάζειν. κολάζειν δὲ μέλλουσα πείθε πρότερον, ὅτι ἐπὶ συμφέροντι κολάζεις, διδοῦσα αὐτοῖς καφών ἀπολογίας, παραιτοῦ εἰς τὴν κτήσιν τοὺς αὐθάδεις. τὰ πολλὰ ἀσκεῖ αὐτοφυγεῖν. λιτὸν γὰρ καὶ εὐπόρον τὸ τῆς αὐτουργίας, καὶ δεὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν μερῶν πρὸς ὁ ἡ φύσις κατεσκεύασε χρήσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. τῆς φύσεως ἀλλοῦ μὴ δεομένης· τοῖς γάρ μὴ χρωμένοις τοῖς ἁδίοις, καταχωμένοις δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις διστοῦν τὸ φορτιόν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐδωκυῖαν τὰ μέρη φύσιν ἀχάριστον. ψυλῆς δὲ ἐνεκα ἣδυνῆς μηδέποτε χρῆσθαι τοῖς μέἐσῳ· πολλῷ γὰρ κρεῖττον τεθνάναι ἢ δ’ ἀκρασίαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀμαυρώσαι ...κακίαν ἐνδοιρθουμένη τῆς φύσεως...οἶα δὲ οἰκέταις κοινονοῦσα τιμῆς μεταδίδου τοῖς βελτίσσειν. οὐκ ἐστ’ ὅπως γὰρ οὐν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικοῦντα σέβειν θεόν.


\textsuperscript{247} Translation: Harper, \textit{Slavery in the Late Roman World}, 190; Latin text: Martin: 13: Agri praesulem non ex dilectis tenere servulis ponas, quia fiducia praeteriti amoris ad inpunitatem culpae praesentis spectat.
still placed an important emphasis on productivity and profit, and the direct involvement and supervision of the estate-owner. Perhaps Palladius builds on the work of Columella but amends it with an emphasis on temporal issues. The treatise is designed to be read during certain periods of the year, and resembles a typical ‘how-to’ manual in terms of horticulture and husbandry. The silence of issues regarding slave-management therefore does not imply their absence on the estate, but simply, in my opinion, shows that the author had other concerns in mind.

To proceed, the one philosophical school with much influence on ancient Christianity, including Chrysostom, was the Stoics. We will now examine some Stoic formulations (in the context of some other Greek philosophical schools) of oikonomia with specific reference to its implications on views regarding slave-management.

3.8 Stoic Formulations of Divine Oikonomia and the Implications for Slave-Management: The Case of Seneca’s Epistula 47

Late ancient Christian authors were very much influenced not only by the mainstream Roman habitus of slaveholding, but also by Greek philosophical formulations of divine oikonomia. The following section will elaborate on Greek philosophical formulations of divine oikonomia, which is mostly represented in Stoic thought, although displaying influence from several precursors of Stoicism. Stoicism will also feature prominently in chapter 4 of the present study when the heteronomy of the body is discussed, but the following remarks will serve as a basis for Stoic thought on slavery and slave-management.

We have already seen that several of the writers discussed above understood oikonomia in a very wide sense. An author like Xenophon or Plato would bring household management in relation to politics and the military, while Aristotle pointed to an oikonomia present in nature. Others, like Philodemus, rejected this holistic view of oikonomia. The Stoics would apply the concept of oikonomia to an even larger entity - namely the universe and theology.

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Stoic physics, as is evident from the earliest authors, centred on two interrelated concepts, namely nature (φύσις) and reason (λόγος). The nature of the kosmos or universe is rational; i.e. guided by the divine logos, which orders everything. Nature in itself is therefore rational and logical. These two conceptualisations would serve as very effective strategies in Stoic reasoning, especially regarding oikonomia.249

Since the concept of nature plays such an important role in Stoic thinking regarding divine administration, it stands to reason that their notion of oikonomia is based on natural principles. We have already seen that Aristotelian philosophy was very dependent on arguments of naturalization when it comes to slave-management and oikonomia. In several of Aristotle’s writings, he not only refers to natural slavery, but also speaks of nature as an administrator or housekeeper (Gen. an. 744b). There was much agreement among philosophers of the Hellenistic period that there was some type of order or arrangement (διοίκησις) in nature.250 A popular exception to this was the Epicureans, who exhibited more of a chaotic atomism when discussing nature; they believed that nature was not ordered or prearranged. They also did not believe that any deity could rule over a human being. This may also account for Philodemus’ aversion for holistic oikonomia.

Naturalization immediately gives authority and structure to a concept. If one bases a concept on nature, it implies that there already exists a predetermined order, which is sufficient, even good, for copying. Aristotle would base his theory of natural slavery on this principle. The Stoics, however, used arguments from nature and the problem of slavery in a very different way.251 In fact, nowhere does any Stoic author agree with the notion of natural slavery, although we also have no evidence of any Stoic directly opposing Aristotle’s views on natural slavery.252 The best word to describe Stoic views on slavery is indifference, and it will especially be shown in the chapter on the heteronomous body that the Stoics were very much responsible for the

metaphorization of slavery, at the cost of giving attention to the social problem of institutional slavery. They rather promoted a view of moral slavery, and did not say much about institutional slavery. Since slavery is not a natural phenomenon, but rather a legal phenomenon, it makes no difference to one’s ability to live a good and virtuous life - it is merely a title. But the Stoics did own slaves, and there is no sign of them advancing an abolitionist view. How did the Stoics then treat and manage slaves within the naturalistic view of oikonomia?

Although we have no treatise from the Greek Stoic authors on slavery per se (not that the Greek Stoic authors did not speak about slavery sporadically in their treatises), the Roman Stoics did seem to have much to say on the topic. One of the most important sources for Stoic thinking on slave-management is Seneca’s Epistula 47, and I will use this source as a framework for discussing Stoic natural oikonomia and slave-management. In this letter, Seneca generally calls for the humane treatment of slaves. But the recognition of the humanity of slaves and their humane treatment is also highly problematic. This will be discussed in chapter 4 on the heteronomy of the body.

The reason for the humane treatment of slaves is based on his Stoic understanding on the naturalization of divine oikonomia (Ep. 47.10-12):

Kindly remember that he whom you call your slave sprang from the same stock, is smiled upon by the same skies, and on equal terms with yourself breathes, lives, and dies. It is just as possible for you to see in him a free-born man as for him to see in you a slave...I do not wish to involve myself in too large a question, and to discuss the treatment of slaves, towards whom we Romans are excessively haughty, cruel, and insulting. But this is the kernel of

255 Seneca’s discussion on slavery in De beneficiis 3.18-28 will also be taken into account.
my advice: Treat your inferiors as you would be treated by your betters. And as often as you reflect how much power you have over a slave, remember that your master has just as much power over you. ‘But I have no master,’ you say. You are still young; perhaps you will have one.257

Seneca’s advice on slave-management is that masters should treat their slaves humanely since they are mutually part of nature, that is, part of the same divine source.258 Seneca specifically states that slaves come from the same stock or seed (semen) as the master. The Greek sense here is that of the λόγος σπερματίκος, the universal principle from which all things come forth, and to which all things return; there are also universal principles present in all human beings. This imagery can be traced back to the very founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium. The notion of ‘seed’ is in fact not the only metaphor found in Stoic theology and ethics. Even before the use of the seed metaphor, it was said that all human beings spring from the same fountain.259 Other metaphors used are those of the vine and of olive trees - all taken as examples from nature. Seneca’s use of the seed here is typical, however, of a later, more developed notion of the spermafunction of the universal reason of λόγος.260 Most importantly, the same seed is

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257 Translation & Latin text: LCL: 306-8: Vis tu cogitare istum quem servum tuum vocas ex isdem seminibus ortum eodem frui caelo, aequo spirare, aequo vivere, aequo mori! tam tu illum videre ingenuum potes quam ille te servum... Nolo in ingenti locum immittere et de usu servorum disputare, in quos superbissimi, crudelissimi, contumeliosissimi sumus. Haec tamen praecepti mei summa est: sic cum inferiore vivas quamadmodum tecum superiorem velis vivere. Quotiens in mentem venerit quantum tibi in servum tuum licet, veniat in mentem tantundem in te domino tuo licere. 'At ego' inquis 'nullum habeo dominum.' Bona aetas est: forsit an habeabis.
260 Ibid., 7–8.
present in both slave and master. This type of thinking would become very influential in the household codes of the New Testament, which are the primary sources for Chrysostom’s advice on oikonomia. Seneca’s second admonition is based on the Stoic notion of the cyclical character of nature. Since divine oikonomia functions logically, there is also a cyclical character to it. Seneca’s reference to life cycles in the beginning of his statement makes this apparent - both masters and slaves are born, live and die. But nature also exhibits another feature that in one breath, the master could become the slave. The same reasoning is present with Epictetus, who calls all human beings kin (Diss. 1.13.3-4)\textsuperscript{261} and Cicero, referring to all human beings and the offspring of the gods (Leg. 1.24).\textsuperscript{262} The language and metaphors of kinship are also part of the nature of the divine oikonomia, which binds people with ties greater than that of social status or even biology.

Seneca’s statement regarding the power of the master over the slave also bears significance. He is not here simply referring to the power of the master over a slave, which is conferred upon him by society. In Stoic thinking, the notion of power has a central role, and is again related to the divine oikonomia. It was believed that the universal logos had a hegemonikon (ἡγεµονικόόν), ‘a soul center from which the powers go into the body’.\textsuperscript{263} They also understood the divine logos to have a great, individual hegemonikon, which governs power in the cosmos. In Seneca’s reasoning, the proud and cruel master of a slave, hungry with power, forgets that while he may have the power that governs a slave, there is also the hegemonikon of the logos that governs him. The early Christians, including Chrysostom, would provide nearly identical substitutes for these in their Christology.

We see here then that a very different understanding of what ‘nature’ is can directly influence daily relationships between slaves and slaveholders. Aristotle’s understanding of what ‘nature’ was led him to different conclusions. It illustrates that there is no objective reality that can be called nature - nature is complex, and always used in rhetoric and argumentation as a strategy to regulate and understand authoritative relationships and hierarchies. The Stoic concept of divine oikonomia is highly hierarchical, but here it is a metaphysical hierarchy. This hegemony/heteronomy of bodies, as mentioned, will be discussed in a next chapter. The basic

\textsuperscript{262} Fitzgerald, “Treatment of Slaves,” 156.
\textsuperscript{263} Meijer, Stoic Theology, 5.
premise, however, is that all bodies are made to be ruled, and hence masters ought to control their power over slaves.

Seneca then provides some advice, which was, as we have seen in the authors above, quite conventional. Masters should treat their slaves in a friendly manner so as to ensure their loyalty. But he goes even further, in a masterful diatribe, and professes that his advice would shock the average person (Ep. 47.13-14):

Associate with your slave on kindly, even on affable, terms; let him talk with you, plan with you, live with you. I know that at this point all the exquisites will cry out against me in a body; they will say: ‘There is nothing more debasing, more disgraceful, than this.’ But these are the very persons whom I sometimes surprise kissing the hands of other men’s slaves. Do you not see even this, how our ancestors removed from masters everything invidious, and from slaves everything insulting? They called the master ‘father of the household,’ and the slaves ‘members of the household,’ a custom which still holds in the main. They established a holiday on which masters and slaves should eat together, - not as the only day for this custom, but as obligatory on that day in any case. They allowed the slaves to attain honours in the household and to pronounce judgment; they held that a household was a miniature commonwealth.264

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In this instance, Seneca takes the conventional wisdom of being kind to slaves to a different level. Slaves were to be included in the household. The common term used for the household in which slaves would be included is the Latin term *familia*. Although the English derivative of this word today refers to the biological or nuclear family unit, it had a broader sense in the Roman world. Slaves would have many duties in the household, but there was always a social grammar of separation and subordination present. Seneca inverts this grammar to the utmost by opening the possibility for slaves to dine with masters. This he traces back to older traditions, specifically the Saturnalia. The late ancient author Macrobius, famous for his accounts on the Saturnalia, writes (*Sat. 1.24.22–23*):

> Meanwhile the head of the slave household, whose responsibility it was to offer sacrifice to the Penates, to manage the provisions and to direct the activities of the domestic servants, came to tell his master that the household had feasted according to the annual ritual custom. For at this festival, in houses that keep to proper religious usage, they first of all honor the slaves with a dinner prepared as if for the master; and only afterwards is the table set again for the head of the household. So, then, the chief slave came in to announce the time of dinner and to summon the masters to the table.\(^{265}\)

Another late ancient writer, Porphyry, also remarks (*Nym. 23.7-13*):

> For the Romans celebrate their Saturnalia when the Sun is in Capricorn, and during this festivity, slaves wear the shoes of those

that are free, and all things are distributed among them in common; the legislator obscurely signifying by this ceremony that through this gate of the heavens, those who are now born slaves will be liberated through the Saturnian festival, and the house attributed to Saturn, i.e., Capricorn, when they live again and return to the fountain of life.266

Porphyry, like Seneca, also seems to hint that the Saturnalia celebrates the common origin and destination of all human beings.267 Although the Saturnalia was celebrated well into the fourth century CE, it seems that Seneca feels it has lost its past radicalness. He refers to a social reality where slaves call their owner *pater*, and were treated with dignity. Seneca aims to apply these principles even outside the Saturnalia, by stating that slaves should be treated with dignity and respect because of the mutual links in the divine *oikonomia*. This should even be done regardless of the rank of the slave (*Ep. 47.12-16*). The social status of the slave should not matter. This was especially evident in the writings of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, who places little relevance on the status of a slave, since this slave, if he or she is wise, can still be free.268 Seneca refers to the social status of the slave as being like the saddle of a horse, or simply imaginary garments. One does not judge a horse by the quality of its saddle, and therefore a person should not be devalued simply because of their status as enslaved (*Ep. 47.16*).

The final important section on how a slave should be treated, according to Seneca, reads thus (*Ep. 47.17-18*):

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‘He is a slave.’ His soul, however, may be that of a freeman. ‘He is a slave.’ But shall that stand in his way? Show me a man who is not a slave; one is a slave to lust, another to greed, another to ambition, and all men are slaves to fear...You should therefore not be deterred by these finicky persons from showing yourself to your slaves as an affable person and not proudly superior to them; they ought to respect you rather than fear you. Some may maintain that I am now offering the liberty-cap to slaves in general and toppling down lords from their high estate, because I bid slaves respect their masters instead of fearing them. They say: ‘This is what he plainly means: slaves are to pay respect as if they were clients or early-morning callers!’ Anyone who holds this opinion forgets that what is enough for a god cannot be too little for a master. Respect means love, and love and fear cannot be mingled.  

Here again we see Seneca incorporating a type of language regarding slaves, which was very uncommon in the Roman social hierarchy. We have seen that most ancient authors advised that successful mastery is based on fear. Seneca uses terms like respect and not fear (‘colant potius te quam timeant’). This is one of the few instances in antiquity where fear is not recommended in terms of slave-management. Behind these statements lies a larger conceptual


271 It should also be remembered that there was also fear from the side of slaveholders toward slaves; cf. Page DuBois, “The Coarsest Demand: Utopia and the Fear of Slaves,” in Fear of Slaves - Fear of Enslavement in the Ancient Mediterranean (Actes du XXIXe colloque international du groupe international de recherches sur
reality to Seneca. Since all bodies are subject to rule by the \textit{hegemonikon} of the universal \textit{logos}, social status is merely coincidental. The body, to Seneca, may be enslaved, but the soul (\textit{animus}) of the slave could be free; slavery is a corporeal condition and nothing more.\textsuperscript{272} When is the \textit{animus} free? When the person is not enslaved to bodily desires. Whereas the previous authors regulated slave-bodies by means of the control and manipulation of the bodily passions, Seneca states that the slave should not be controlled by these passions. Since the two main technologies of corporeal control are now denied, new technologies must be put in place. These technologies, however, are based on love and mutual respect. Rule and domination should not be present in the virtuous life of the Stoic (cf. Stobaeus, \textit{Ecl.} 2.99).\textsuperscript{273} A new symbolic economy is present with all these Stoic authors, who elevate moral slavery over and above social status. In \textit{De beneficiis}, Seneca even goes so far as to imply that a slave is capable of performing a \textit{beneficium}, a kindness or favour, toward the master and not simply a \textit{ministerium}, referring to a service (\textit{Ben.} 3.18.1).\textsuperscript{274} This type of virtue reasoning would certainly be considered radical and liberal by Roman standards. Thus, slavery now becomes a metaphor, and the coincidental institution of slavery is downplayed, save for admonishments to treat slaves fairly and with love. Dio Chrysostom, for instance, speculates that moral slavery may have even existed before institutional slavery (2 \textit{Serv. lib.} 15.29.1-8):

\begin{itemize}
  \item Seneca states: ‘Yet men do bestow benefits upon their kings and their generals; therefore slaves can bestow benefits upon their masters. A slave can be just, brave, magnanimous; he can therefore bestow a benefit, for this is also the part of a virtuous man. So true is it that slaves can bestow benefits upon their masters, that the masters have often owed their lives to them.’ (\textit{Ben.} 3.18.1; Latin text: Basore [online: 4 April 2012]: \textit{Atqui dant regibus suis, dant imperatoribus beneficia: ergo et dominis. Potest servus iustus esse, potest fortis, potest magni animi: ergo et beneficium dare potest; nam et hoc virtutis est. Adeo quidem dominis servi beneficia possunt dare, ut ipsos saepe beneficii sui fecerint.}); and also: ‘As long as we only receive what is generally demanded from a slave, that is mere service; when more is given than a slave need afford us, it is a benefit; as soon as what he does begins to partake of the affection of a friend, it can no longer be called service’ (\textit{Ben.} 3.21.1; Latin text: Basore [online: 4 April 2012]: \textit{Quam diu praestatur, quod a servo exigi solet, ministerium est; ubi plus, quam quod servo necesse est, beneficium est; ubi in affectum amici transit, desinit vocari ministerium.}); cf. Keith R. Bradley, “Seneca and Slavery,” 336.
\end{itemize}
But perhaps it was not in this way [institutional slavery] that the term ‘slave’ was originally applied - that is, to a person for whose body someone paid money, or as the majority think, to one who was sprung from persons who were called slaves, but rather to the man who lacked a free man’s spirit and was of a servile nature. For of those who are called slaves we will, I presume, admit that many have the spirit of free men, and that among free men there are many who are altogether servile. The case is the same with those known as ‘noble’ and ‘well-born’.

These statements from the Stoics against slavery are certainly admirable. It would have an increasing influence on the thinking of Christian authors. By emphasizing a higher, divine oikonomia, a new utilization of the strategy of naturalization is seen. It is quite remarkable that two authors, Aristotle and Seneca for instance, can use the same concept, namely that of nature, and arrive at such different conclusions. What is important to realize is that these formulations were not simply theoretical. They had very real social effects. Seneca and the Stoics in general scold slaveholders who cannot control their passions, stating that such people are truly slaves. Zeno, according to Diogenes Laertius, is famous for criticizing the lack of anger-control among certain slaveholders. The irony is displayed in the fact that although they are able to control and manipulate their slaves and their bodily passions, they are unable to control their own lusts and therefore live shameful lives. In the beginning of his letter, Seneca graphically depicts the typical Roman dinner parties or symposia where some slaveholders would engorge themselves with food, basting in their gluttony to such an extent that they have to vomit up the food since they have overeaten (Ep. 47.1-3). All of this takes place while the slaves are not even allowed to

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275 Translation: Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 66; Greek text: Von Arnim: 61: ἀλλὰ μὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἢ λεγόμενος εἴ ῥήχης ὁ δοῦλος, ὑπὲρ ὅτου ἄργυριν τις τοῦ σῶματος κατέβαλεν ἢ ὃς ἢ κέ δούλων λεγομένων ἢ γεγονός, ὡστερ οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὅσπερ ἀνελεύθερος καὶ δουλοπρεπῆς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ λεγομένων δούλων πολλούς ὁμολογήσομεν δήποτε εἶναι ἐλευθερούς, τῶν δὲ γε ἐλευθέρων πολλοὺς πάνω δουλοπρεπείς, ἐστὶ δὲ ὃς περὶ τοὺς γενναίους καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς.

talk or partake in a morsel of food. Seneca mocks this false oikonomia and use of power. It is the divine oikonomia of nature and the universal logos that binds all living things together, and Seneca prefers to seek discourses of unity and mutuality rather than discrimination. In doing this, he negates traditional technologies of slave-management via the control of their bodily passions, and states that true mastery starts with the control of one’s own passions and showing respect to all other human beings who share in the divine oikonomia since they have the same origin, contain the same seed that is, and is governed by the same master of the universe, the hegemonikon of the universal logos. Yet, slavery to Seneca is not an evil in itself, and he still accepts institutional slavery as a basic social phenomenon.277

While it is justified to praise authors like Seneca and other Stoic authors, the chapter on the heteronomy of the body will show that although the Stoics promoted respect and love toward slaves, their general view of indifference toward institutional slavery becomes quite problematic. It leads to the popularization of the slavery metaphor in antiquity and the proliferation of moral slavery. The cost of this is that attention is drawn away from the actual problem of institutional slavery. These views would inevitably influence the early Christian concepts of slave-management, and especially promote the use of slave-metaphors with late ancient Christian authors, who also seem to show some indifference towards slavery. We will now analyze ancient Judaistic and early Christian conceptualisations of oikonomia.

4 OIKONOMIA AND SLAVE-MANAGEMENT IN EARLY JUDAISM

When looking at the division of discussion points in this chapter, from Hellenistic, Roman and now Judaistic-Christian sources, it may seem as if one can neatly divide these ‘groups’ into separate, socio-cultural and religious divisions. This however is not the case for the world of the ancient Mediterranean. The cultures of this world, be it Roman, Greek, Egyptian, Judaistic278 etc, were not exempt from inter-cultural influence. Thus, I want to make it clear that I do not consider these movements or cultures as being separate entities - they are intermeshed in a very complex manner. Early Christianity has been redescribed, correctly in my opinion, also as a

278 In this section I prefer to use the term ‘Judaistic’ and not ‘Jewish’ in order to promote some kind of discernment between ancient and modern Jewish practice notwithstanding the obvious continuities.
Graeco-Roman religion despite its undeniable links with early Judaism. Boyarin has argued that early Christianity and Judaism were in fact ‘twins’, with much trans-cultural and trans-religious influence from both sides. He argues that one can only really speak of a Christianity separated remotely from Judaism from the fourth century onwards, with the appearance of Constantinian Christianity. Moreover, Judaistic authors like Philo and Josephus, writing and often ‘thinking’ in Greek within the Roman Empire are difficult to categorize. Even the conventional and oft-utilized term ‘Hellenism’ has recently come under scrutiny. Ehrensperger highlights the complexities of someone like Paul, who speaks Greek, under the Roman Empire, even using a Roman name. She convincingly demonstrates, in line with the work of Wallace-Hadrill, that many of the terms and models for understanding the ancient world, since the work of Hengel up to contemporary cultural and postcolonial criticism of biblical literature, leave many questions unanswered and more importantly have been responsible for creating several misconceptions regarding ancient Mediterranean culture. It is with these caveats in mind that this study now moves to the discussion of early Judaism and Christianity. It also assumes that these movements were not monolithic within themselves, and that it is much more appropriate to speak of early Judaisms and Christianities. So how do these movements conceive and profess to practise slave-management?

The Judaistic household (בית) was no different from any of the households of the ancient Mediterranean in terms of the possession of slaves. These households also owned slaves and were confronted with the same challenges of managing them. It is especially true for the larger, wealthy ‘houses’ of the rabbis, who were, according to Hezser, more concerned with mundane, servile tasks like ‘the baking of bread, the washing of clothes, the soaking of lentils, and the

setting up of candlesticks’. 284 Sometimes such houses were organized like a kibbutz, which combined the study of the Torah with physical labour like working in the fields. 285 As with the previous Roman authors who wrote on issues of slave-management on agricultural estates, the first order of the Mishah, called Zeraim or ‘Seeds’, also concerns issues of agriculture, with slave-management receiving ample attention. Slaves were considered part of these households, as is evident from several discussions in the Mishnah, where they are often grouped with women and children: ‘Women, slaves or minors [who ate together with adult Israelite males] - they may not invite others [to bless] on their account.’ (Ber. 7.2[a]). 286 Hezser also points to the following section in the Mishnah (Šabb. 23.2):

[When passover coincides with the Sabbath] one may count the number of one’s guests and the savoury portions [of the Passover lamb] orally, but not in writing. And one casts lots with one’s children and the members of one’s house [עם בני ועמת בני] at the table [to decide who gets which portion of the lamb]. 

The term used in these instances for slaves, namely ביתו בן עמי, discern slaves from free labourers and guests, and is often used with other members of the house like the women and children. The technologies for corporeal control and regulation are very clear and strict for slaves, as with all other members of the household. The management of slaves is included in the larger religious management of bodies in the household. 288 This was also true for the Roman authors Cato, Varro and Columella, who set out very clearly to which extent slaves may participate in the domestic religious activities and festivals. It must also be noted in this instance that the texts from the Mishnah, like the Socratic dialogues of Xenophon, are written in the form of statement

284 Catherine Hezser, Jewish Slavery in Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 126.

287 Translation: Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 127; Hebrew text: Blackman:

288 Ibid., 127–29.
and responses. Like most other facets of Judaistic life, slave-management is also here presented as a discourse, a dialogue, somewhat fluid and open to scrutiny. For instance (*Ber. 2.7*[a-c]):

> And when Tabi, his servant, died, [Gamaliel] received condolences on his account. Said to him [his students]: ‘Did not [our master] teach us that one does not receive condolences for [the loss of] slaves.’ He said to them, ‘Tabi, my slave, was not like other slaves. He was exacting.’

In the Palestinian Talmud, as Hezser shows, contrasting advice is given:

> It has been taught: A story according to which a female slave of R. Eliezer died. And his students entered to console him, but he did not accept [their condolences]...[He said:] And have they not said: One does not accept condolences on behalf of slaves because slaves are like cattle?...To one whose slave or animal had died one says: May God restore your loss (y. *Ber.* 2: 8, 5b).

In the typical style of the verses of the Mishnah, a context or event is provided, with a challenge-riposte scheme following. We also see here above, when comparing the two texts, how the issue of the humanity of the slave and the notion of the slave as property (which is lost in this instance) do not exhibit clear, distinguishing lines. I am inclined to believe that slave-management on the agricultural estates of wealthier Judaistic families were not much different, practically, from those of their Roman counterparts. The contents of the discursivities may differ, but in terms of its conceptual discourses operating in the background, there appears to be much continuity. It is however problematic to determine to which extent these texts found in the Mishnah represent an actual account of slave-management in early Judaism. What can be said

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289 Translation: Neusner, *The Mishnah*, 6; Hebrew text: Blackman:

כשמתhabi עבדה כל עבדה נוחמות ארeuillez ולא חלמים להمدיהם וראין שאר פיקולין וסוחרים על העבדים אר흘 יאיהם

טבר עבדי כאэр כל העבדים כשר היא:  

with much certainty is that slavery was very present in the ancient Judaistic family, and that issues of slave-management from Rabbinic sources mirror Roman sources to a great extent.

The point to which this is true for urban Judaistic families is a more complex matter. Both Peskowitz and Hezser agree that the character of the living conditions of families housed in the typical insulae in Roman Palestine and beyond, result in such families rather resembling ‘working groups’ with the boundaries between slave and free, in terms of tasks and daily engagement, also blurred. There would no doubt still be the social stigma of being a slave, but within these families, slaves lived ‘closer’ in what we could call the ‘private’ sphere of the household.

One of the main issues in the status quaestionis of research on ancient Judaistic slavery has not so much been the difference between agricultural and domestic slaves in Judaistic families as the difference between slaves in terms of ethnicity - so called Hebrew slaves and slaves from other nationalities. Were different technologies of control and management in place for Hebrew slaves as opposed to non-Hebrew slaves in the Graeco-Roman period? The loci classici for this problem are Exodus 21:2-11 and Leviticus 25:44-45, in which the technologies for managing Hebrew and non-Hebrew slaves are quite different. Flesher interprets this distinction: ‘Hebrew servants are Israelites who have become indentured servants. They are not permanent slaves.’ Non-Hebrew slaves, on the other hand, are considered human chattel. While such a distinction may have been present at some point in Israel’s history, it seems that during the Hellenistic and early Roman period, according to both Flesher and Martin, such a distinction was not really present. The Mishnah rarely makes the common distinction between

296 Cf. Paul V. M. Flesher, “Slaves, Israelites and the System of the Mishnah,” in The Literature of Early Rabbinic Judaism: Issues in Talmudic Redaction and Interpretation (New Perspectives on Ancient Judaism 4; Alan J. Avery-
Hebrew and ‘Canaanite’ slaves. Ethnic discrimination, however, was present in Greek, Roman and Judaistic texts regarding slave-management. Philodemus criticized Xenophon for his acceptance of foreign, non-Athenian, managerial practices for slaves, and Columella advises the pater familias not to group too many slaves of the same nationality, since it causes domestic quarrels. An interesting account found in the Mishnah that does seem to point at some fundamental suspicion of outsiders possibly relating to slavery. It is found in the sixth order of the Mishnah, called Teshorot or ‘Purities’, where ethnic separation holds a prominent place (Makš. 2.7):

[If] one found in it an abandoned child, if the majority is deemed gentile, it is deemed a gentile. And if the majority is Israelite, it is deemed an Israelite. Half and half - it is deemed an Israelite. R. Judah says, ‘They follow the status of the majority of those who abandon babies.’

Here the issue of finding abandoned children, which in almost all cases lead to slavery, is discussed in ethnic matters. The ethnic identity of the child is important in determining its fate. Hezser notes that some other Rabbi’s, like R. Yehudah, considered all exposed infants as gentiles, which would make it easier to legitimize their status as slaves. Does it then imply that an Israeliite foundling (אסופי or sometimes מושלד חינוק) would not be considered a slave, but rather a foster child or θερπόος/alumnus? The text above may or may not assume that if such a child is a gentile, it should be treated and raised as human chattel. It rather seems that the text is concerned with the management of such a body within the Judaistic purity/defilement maps, with its status being a secondary issue. Although there are instances of Judaistic families adopting children and raising them, the instance of raising a foundling as an adopted child appears to be the exception rather than the rule, and as Hezser concludes, Judaistic families were probably not.

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297 Translation: Neusner, The Mishnah, 1098; Hebrew text: Blackman:

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much different from their Graeco-Roman counterparts in raising exposed and abandoned children as slaves. But this ethnic discernment should also not be understood in the modern sense to refer to race. This has become quite a problem in the study of ancient slavery, since race was a key factor in the Atlantic slave trade. These two phenomena, however, were quite different. As Gruen illustrates, there is no evidence from the Roman world that associates slavery, for instance, with blackness. The majority of slaves in the Roman world were white.

But if Judaistic households of the Roman period did not manage slaves according to their ethnicity as seen in some Old Testament passages, which discursivities were in particular present in their understandings of slave-management? As in the Greek and Roman sources, almost all sources from ancient Judaism assume that mastery is a necessary enforcement in slave-management. Negative stereotyping of slaves is present in several Old Testament passages, especially in the Wisdom literature and sources from Second Temple Judaism. Proverbs 29:19 infamously declares: ‘Slaves cannot be corrected by mere words; though they understand, they will not respond.’ The passage affirms the common thought in the ancient Near East that slaves were, on the one hand, intellectually inferior to the free, and on the other, that physical violence is the primary language understood by slaves. Several other proverbs also promote an attitude of suspicion when it comes to slaves (cf. Prov. 17:2, 19:10, 30:21-23). The author of the apocryphal Wisdom of Sirach states that although the wise man needs to exhibit an attitude of humility, which brings respect in the eyes of his peers, there are also instances when an attitude of strictness is quite necessary, and that the opposite is considered a sin (cf. Sir. 42:1-5). The advice comes in the garb of an economic discourse in which the author states that the wise man should deal fairly and diligently, in equal weights and measures, when doing business, but also when disciplining one’s children and ‘whipping wicked household slaves until they bleed.’ (Sir. 42:5).

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299 Ibid., 139.
301 Translation: NIV; Hebrew text: BHS:

302 Translation: CEB; Greek text: Rahlfs-Hanhart: καὶ οἰκετὴ πονηρῶν πλευράν αἰμαξαν.
the stereotypically immoral slave. As Hezser illustrates, Mishnahic sources also exhibit a strong attitude of suspicion regarding slaves.303

On the other hand, again resembling the Greek and Roman authors already discussed, some of these Judaistic sources promote non-violent treatment of slaves to ensure loyalty and quality of labour. In the same Wisdom of Sirach quoted above, the following advice is given: ‘Do not mistreat slaves who do their work well, or hirelings who do their best for you. Show the same love to wise slaves that you would show to yourself, and let them have their freedom’ (Sir. 7:20).304 There are no such equivalents in the Mishnah, but this does not imply that Judaistic slaveholders of antiquity did not practice it. Hezser points to common Rabbinic interpretations of the narrative of Abraham, Sarah and Hagar which often advise readers to treat slaves moderately.305 This advice conforms to the advice of the Graeco-Roman sources that mastery is psychological manipulation *par excellence*, and that physical violence is not always the best resort when it comes to slave-management.

In Mishnahic literature, the management of female slave bodies receives ample attention. The very common grouping of women, slaves, children and outsiders over and against the free, Judaistic male is extremely prevalent in the Mishnah, and exhibits an aggressive androcentrism and patriarchalism from the outset.306 It was also true for the Hellenistic and Roman sources, but this former genre provides an additional discourse, namely that of purity and defilement, to the discussion. In a section of the Mishnah that elaborates on agricultural practice, a division is made between the purchase of male and female slaves (*Ma‘aś. Š.* 1.7[A]). When it comes to the offering of the firstfruits, slaves are grouped with women, persons of doubtful sex, and androgynous persons who are not allowed to recite Deuteronomy 26:10 during the offering of the first fruits. This not only illustrates the importance of discriminating against gender, but also promotes an androcentric view of religious participation and almost criminalizes (at least,

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303 Hezser, *Jewish Slavery*, 151.

304 Translation: CEB; Greek text: Rahlfs-Hanhart: μὴ κακώσης οἰκέτην ἑργαζόμενον ἐν ἀληθεία μηδὲ μίσθον διδόντα τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ. οἰκέτην συνετὸν ἀγάπω σου ἢ ψυψή μὴ στερήσῃς αὐτὸν ἐλευθερίας.

305 Ibid., 154–55.

abnormalizes) all those outside the sphere of the dominant, free Judaistic male. The mapping of purity/defilement lines is also very evident in this instance. These groups mentioned above are also mentioned alongside executors and agents, people of ill social repute. Similar divisions were seen with Cato and Varro when it came to gender and religious participation. In another section, where participation of slaves, women and people of uncertain gender is prohibited from religious practice, they are also grouped with children and people with physical disabilities (Ḥag. 1.1). The offspring of slaves are also excluded from participation in or benefit from levirate marriages (Yebam. 2.5, 2.8, 7.5), and regulations regarding virginity are specific and strict (Ketub. 1.2, 4). Similar jurisdiction is present in Roman laws on inheritance.  

This manner of discourse serves to protect the inheritance of the free, Roman/Judaistic male population from those outside that grouping, especially slaves. The complexity of the regulations regarding gender and sex in the Mishnah cannot be understated. In general, sexual intercourse with slave women is prohibited, except for those whose penis is cut off or who have maimed testicles (Yebam. 8.2). This again shows the centrality of offspring and inheritance in conceptualizations of slave sexuality in the Mishnah. Not only are such men, who are types of eunuchs, allowed to have sexual intercourse with slaves, but they are also allowed to have sex with female converts. The issue of ethnicity arises again here, along with complex classifications of male normativity and normality linked with purity and defilement. Such males, with maimed genitalia, are not considered men in the dominant, androcentric sense due to their inability to produce legitimate, Judaistic offspring. Uncircumcised men are also grouped in this category. Conversion of women, slave or free, does not serve as a pass into participating in levirate marriages (Yebam. 11.2). Sexual misconduct is often treated in economic terms. Converts and slave women who were seduced by men are exempt from receiving a fine (Ketub. 3.2). In the case of rape, one sees that the social grammar of honour and shame is also translated and transformed into an economic dialect. A rape victim


308 In the sections of the Mishnah where the distinction between Hebrew and ‘Canaanite’ slaves are made, female Hebrew slaves are considered to have a higher worth and more benefits than male non-Hebrew slaves (Qidd. 1.2). Offspring of slave women and gentile women often receive the same treatment (Qidd. 3.13-4.1). Damaging slave-bodies, as property, however, receives more or less the same punishment despite their nationality (injuring a Hebrew slave does not require compensation for lost time) (B. Qamm. 8.3).


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is re-valued after the incident, and most attention is given regarding the nature of the fine by the perpetrator (Ketub. 3.7). Being a female slave or an old male slave also reduces value, and women who possess such people are advised to sell them and rather buy land with the proceeds (Ketub. 8.5). This advice has almost exact parallels in Cato (Agr. 2.7). Furthermore, the Mishnah often affirms the connotations between slave girls and prostitutes (ʾAbot 2.7). There is a very strong discourse of commodification of the slave-body in the Mishnah, and we will return to this issue in chapter 6.

The management of slave-sexuality is therefore a very prominent yet complex matter in the Mishnah, and something all freeborn, Judaistic males need to take account of and administer with great care.\(^{310}\) Several discursivities from the sources mentioned above come to the fore, which become useful when comparing slave-management in early Judaism with that in Hellenistic and Roman sources. There are many similarities and continuities. The Mishnah affirms the androcentrism and patriarchalism foundational to slave-management. The management and mastery of slaves shaped male Judaistic masculinity in both the social and the legal sense. In social terms, those outside the norm of the free, Judaistic male receive a measure of value, inextricably tied to monetary terms, which can be protected or damaged by means of sexual behaviour. The regulation and control of slave-sexuality (and especially female sexuality) become important since these determine also the status of the free male. In the center of this discourse lies the issue of the protection of patrimony and production of legitimate offspring.\(^{311}\) Besides being a highly gendered discourse, modalities of ethnicity run rampant, with both sex and ethnicity being markers for social and economic value. What stands out is that all bodies outside that of the sphere of the dominant, free Judaistic male body is commodified. More on this will be said in chapter 6 discussing the commodification of the body. It is also evident that slave-management here must be done in view of protecting the household and especially the patrimony of the pater familias. Although the statements supporting these discursivities are quite different between the Judaistic and Roman contexts, their aims are identical. The patrimony should be protected from outsiders by marginalising and commodifying those bodies falling outside the sphere of honour held by the free, male body of the corresponding ethnicity. Discourses of


normalising and abnormalising the discursive ‘other’ by means of gender and ethnicity serve in protecting the dominant hegemony, but also promote the construction of sub-categories of deviants, such as the eunuch, the ‘Canaanite slave’, and the prostitute/slave-girl.

Judaistic elaborations on slavery and slave-management also show much variety, and sources were certainly not univocal. Discourses of *oikonomia* and slave-management in ancient Judaism bear distinct continuity and similarity with its Graeco-Roman counterpart. But as in the Greek and Roman sources discussed above, there is also much diversity when it comes to the sources of ancient Judaism. While Rabbinic sources aid greatly in establishing some type of picture of slave-management in early Judaism, it is also evident that other sources exhibit somewhat varied and different opinions, and introduce new or amended discursivities to the practice of slave-management in Judaism. One such source is Philo, whose writings were quite influential in early Judaism. Philo was not opposed to slavery, although, in a fashion similar to the Stoics, Philo preferred to approach slavery from the perspective of moral, metaphorical slavery. His tractate *Quod omnis probus liber sit* is one of the key Philonic texts elaborating on moral slavery versus institutional slavery. Philo views the human body as being heteronomous, that is, prone to being ruled by forces outside of it, and especially developed the notion of people as being slaves to God. Moreover, Philo’s remarks on slave-management almost mirror those of Stoic proponents. He also opposes natural slavery like the Stoics, and prefers to focus on moral slavery at the cost of being indifferent to institutional slavery. There are some sections where Philo does contradict himself when referring to ϕύσις, as Garnsey has shown. Philo, however, will be discussed at length in chapter 4 that concerns the heteronomy of the body.

It is important at this stage, in the light of this discussion, as well as those preceding it, to take stock of an important phenomenon being exhibited in these discourses on slave-management. Many scholars have been focussing on how discourses similar to slavery, and indeed slavery itself, have contributed to the understanding of otherness in antiquity. The key study in this instance is Erich S. Gruen’s *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity* (2011). Although the formation of this conceptual category deserves much scholarly attention, it is another, different yet related conceptual category that I have an interest in, namely that of abnormality and constructions of degeneration. Michel Foucault, in a series of lectures from 1974 to 1975, later

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published as a collection, has examined this issue and its development with much finesse. The back matter of the collection of essays displays a striking quote from Foucault regarding the category of the abnormal:

The large, ill-defined, and confused family of ‘abnormal individuals,’ the fear of which haunts the end of the nineteenth century, does not merely mark a phase of uncertainty or a somewhat unfortunate episode in the history of psychopathology. It was formed in correlation with a set of institutions of control and a series of mechanisms of surveillance and distribution, and, when it is almost entirely taken over by the category of ‘degeneration,’ it gives rise to laughable theoretical constructions that nonetheless have harshly real effects.313

We have stated from the discussions above that slavery and the accompanying mastery and domination were important in the formation of masculinity in antiquity, and especially affirmed androcentric and patriarchal modes of social organization in these ancient Mediterranean societies, whether Greek, Roman or Judaistic. But at the same time another, even more illusive yet pervasive contra-category was being formed - namely that of the ‘abnormals’. Although antiquity certainly predates the common psychopathological elaborations of the concept, and does not really have equivalents for the words ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’, the same phenomena are present only with different appellations and descriptions. One could add to Foucault’s statement above that the category of abnormalcy is one produced over centuries of abnormalising discourses. The Mishnah, for instance, groups all those not belonging to the dominant, freeborn male stereotype into their own ‘family of abnormals,’ as Foucault calls it. Foucault’s focus was especially centred on the rise of psychiatry as a discipline in the Western world, but it should be remembered, as he also points out, that antiquity already provided social

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blueprints of such obscure *familiae*. I will argue here that slavery played a leading role in the definition of the category of abnormality in antiquity, which would have a very potent influence even in modern discourses on the topic. An example from a more modern context could be that of the infamous Saartjie Baartman (died 29 December 1815), the so-called ‘Hottentot Venus,’ who was a slave, social outcast and ‘freak’ attraction due to what was considered by Western standards, abnormal physical characteristics. The focus of this offensive and inhumane exhibition was especially her steatopygia (enlarged buttocks) and elongated vaginal labia. Although she was never ‘exhibited’ in the nude to reveal these traits, she was made to wear very tight clothing that would accentuate these features. When she was sold to a man in France, she became an ‘object’ of study by many French naturalists, most notably Georges Cuvier of the Muséum national d'histoire naturelle. After her death in 1815, her remains, specifically her skeleton, genitals and brain were displayed in Paris in the Musée de l'homme until 1974, when they were removed from public view. After a formal request from the previous president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, that her remains should be returned to South Africa, she was finally laid to rest in August 2002. Although the tragic story of Saartjie Baartman is a modern one, the discursivities that form its foundation are quite ancient. The grouping of slaves, along with women, and other social invalids and sexual ‘deviants,’ appear to have created an ever-lingerling category of abnormals which bears influence on modern conceptualizations of criminality, psychological illness, medical nosography, social perversity, and especially,
Christian formulations of hamartiology.\footnote{An excellent study illustrating this phenomenon is that of Jennifer W. Knust, \textit{Abandoned to Lust: Sexual Slander \& Ancient Christianity} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).} With this in mind, let us continue with the cultural-historical survey at hand. We will now move on to early Christian elaborations on slave-management.

5 THE PAULINE \textit{HAUSTAFELN}: EARLY CHRISTIAN \textit{OIKONOMIA}, PASTORAL GOVERNMENTALITY AND SLAVE-MANAGEMENT

As mentioned earlier, in its nascent years Christianity was seen as nothing more than a sect of Judaism. The earliest witnesses we have from Christian sources are the letters of Paul, the corpus whose interpretation by Chrysostom in his homilies is the main concern of this entire study. The key scriptures that have been identified for discussion are 1 Corinthians 7:21, the topic of chapter 4, the entire Epistle to Philemon, the topic of chapter 5 on the carceral body, and finally, the early Christian household codes from Ephesians, Colossians, 1 Timothy and Titus, the topic of the next chapter on the domesticity of the slave-body. Although we acknowledge that all the texts just mentioned concern issues of \textit{oikonomia} and slave-management, in this chapter we will now focus in the remainder of this chapter primarily on the household codes or \textit{haustafeln}, and their interpretation by late ancient Christian authors other than John Chrysostom. Reference will also be made to non-Christian historians of late antiquity.

towards the Christian *pater familias* in relation to those falling within his sphere of domination. The different manifestations of the *pater familias* are discussed, namely as a husband, father and slaveholder. The instructions to slaveholders read in the documents above read thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greek (UBS⁴)</th>
<th>Translation (NIV)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eph. 6:5-9</td>
<td>Slaves, obey your earthly masters with respect and fear, and with sincerity of heart, just as you would obey Christ. Obey them not only to win their favor when their eye is on you, but as slaves of Christ, doing the will of God from your heart. Serve wholeheartedly, as if you were serving the Lord, not people, because you know that the Lord will reward each one for whatever good they do, whether they are slave or free. And masters, treat your slaves in the same way. Do not threaten them, since you know that he who is both their Master and yours is in heaven, and there is no favoritism with him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Οἱ δοῦλοι, ὑπακούετε τοῖς κατὰ σάρκα κυρίοις μετὰ φόβου καὶ τρόμου ἐν ἀπλότητι τῆς καρδίας ὑμῶν, ὡς τῷ Χριστῷ, μή κατ' ὀφθαλµοδουλίαν ὡς ἀνθρωπάρεσκοι ἀλλ' ὡς δούλοι Χριστοῦ ποιοῦντες τὸ θέληµα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκ ψυχῆς, μετ' εὐνοίας δουλεύοντες, ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ καὶ όυκ ἀνθρώποις, εἰδότες ὅτι ἕκαστος, ἐάν τι ποιήσῃ ἁγαθόν, τοῦτο κοµµίσεται παρὰ κυρίου, εἰτε δοῦλος εἰτε ἐλεύθερος. Καὶ οἱ κύριοι, τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖτε πρὸς αὐτούς, ἀνιέντες τὴν ἀπειλήν, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ όυκ ἐστίν ὁ κύριος ἑστιν ἐν οὐρανοῖς, καὶ προσωποληµµψία όυκ ἑστίν παρ' αὐτῷ.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. 3:22-4:1</td>
<td>Οἱ δοῦλοι, ὑπακούετε κατὰ πάντα τοῖς κατὰ σάρκα κυρίοις, μὴ ἐν ὄφθαλμοδουλίᾳ ὡς ἀνθρωπάρεσκοι, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἀπλότητι καρδίας, φοβοῦμενοι τὸν κύριον. ὃ ἐὰν ποιῆτε, ἔκ ψυχῆς ἐργάζεσθε, ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπως, εἰδότες ὅτι ἀπὸ κυρίου ἀπολήμψεσθε τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν τῆς κληρονομίας. τῷ κυρίῳ Ἀνθρωπίνῳ δουλεύετε· ὁ γὰρ ἀδικῶν κομίσεται ὃ ἠδίκησεν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν προσωπολημψία. Οἱ κύριοι, τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὴν ἱσότητα τοῖς δούλοις παρέχεσθε, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ οὐκ ἔχετε κύριον ἐν οὐρανῷ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tim. 6:1-2</td>
<td>Ὅσοι εἰσὶν ὑπὸ ζυγὸν δοῦλοι, τοὺς ἰδίους δεσπότας πάσης τιμῆς ἀξίους ἡγεῖσθωσαν, ἵνα μὴ τὸ ὅνομα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία βλασφημῆται. οἱ δὲ πιστοὶ ἔχοντες δεσπότας μὴ καταφρονεῖτωσαν, ὅτι ἀδελφοὶ ἐισιν· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δουλεύετοσαν, ὅτι πιστοὶ εἰσιν καὶ ἀγαπητοὶ οἱ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Text</td>
<td>English Translation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tit. 2:9-10</td>
<td>Teach slaves to be subject to their masters in everything, to try to please them, not to talk back to them, and not to steal from them, but to show that they can be fully trusted, so that in every way they will make the teaching about God our Savior attractive.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1 Pet. 2:18-25 | Slaves, in reverent fear of God submit yourselves to your masters, not only to those who are good and considerate, but also to those who are harsh. For it is commendable if someone bears up under the pain of unjust suffering because they are conscious of God. But how is it to your credit if you receive a beating for doing wrong and endure it? But if you suffer for doing good and you endure it, this is commendable before God. To this you were called, because Christ suffered for you, leaving you an example, that you should follow in his steps. “He committed no sin, and no deceit was found in his mouth.”When they hurled their insults at him, he did not retaliate; when he suffered, he made no threats. Instead, he entrusted himself to him who judges justly. “He himself bore our sins” in his body on the cross, so that we might die to sins and live for righteousness; “by his wounds you have been healed.” For “you were like sheep
These passages from the New Testament bear remarkable resemblance, and it gives a glimpse into early Christian understandings of oikonomia.\textsuperscript{323} They are not at all as elaborative as some of the other sources examined here. I will start by examining the sections in Ephesians and Colossians. Harrill has made an important observation regarding these two passages. They are compared to the classical agricultural handbooks, and Harrill claims that the Christian master resembles the vilicus figure from these classical writings, with God as the absent pater familias.\textsuperscript{324} Harrill is correct in this observation since the sections regarding slaves and master indicate a type of delegated authority. Just as the slave is ruled by the earthly master, so too the earthly master is ruled by God by being a slave of God. As mentioned several times, the discourse functioning in the background of these statements is that of the body being heteronomous. But what do these sections say about early Christian oikonomia and slave-management? We will look at the passages both synchronically and diachronically, examining their interpretation in the early church up to the end of the fourth century.


The pericope in Ephesians is a very descriptive account of slave-management in the context of the *haustafeln*, and it is important to view the advice given to slaves and slaveholders in the context of not only the other statements, but also in the wider context of the letter. Harrill is again right in noting that the section in Ephesians 5:15-20, just before the *haustafeln* are encountered and even after (the section on the armour of God in Eph. 6:10-20), other ‘codes’ are given that are meant to bind the Christians together in one collective family. The section in Ephesians 5:15-20 is therefore a virtue-discourse. In these verses, the author promotes the lifestyle of a wise person, and specifically refers to the abuse of wine. Thereafter it is stated that believers need to participate in the singing of songs and hymns. Behind all this is the basic assumption that after baptism, the believers are unified into one family, assuming a fictive kinship structure (Eph. 4:22-24). Then follows the statement that serves as a basis for the *haustafeln* (Eph 5:21): ‘Submit to one another out of reverence for Christ’. This statement implies that a hierarchy is about to follow, one that is only functional if there is submission from the relevant participants. I have already mentioned that the statements in the *haustafeln* are highly patriarchal and androcentric. God is represented as the absent *pater familias*, who occupies the top level of the hierarchy. Power is then designated to other participants, or rather duplicated as seen in the case of the *vilicus* and *pater familias* in the Roman agricultural handbooks. As a moral and metaphorical *vilicus* of God, the earthly *pater familias* becomes the duplicate of Christ and his authority. This Christic duplication then serves as the major marker of authority and status, and is the basis for submission from all other participants. I do not wish to raise general issues here, issues easily discussed, often quite satisfactorily, in commentaries and specialist New Testament studies. Since our discussion of the *haustafeln* here would eventually lead to exploring how John Chrysostom would understand and apply its principles, particularly with regard to slave-management in the late fourth century, I would like to focus on the underlying governmentality of the passage, since this, I believe, lies at the core of our investigation. Governmentality is a common notion in the political philosophy of Michel

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325 Ibid., 113–14.
Foucault.\textsuperscript{326} The term specifically relates to the idea of being governed and the mechanisms or technologies of that governance. In the Ephesian \textit{haustafeln}, we see a typical early Christian attempt at implementing ideas and practices of governmentality, as well as a negotiation of this form of governance within the wider context of ancient Mediterranean society and culture.

While acknowledging and agreeing with Harrill that the \textit{haustafeln} in both Ephesians and Colossians (and even to greater degree, the entire epistles themselves), resemble and represent a primitive Christian ‘handbook’ of \textit{oikonomia}, I want to take a step further and argue that the \textit{haustafeln} exhibit the typical features of a social contract. The use of the social contract model,\textsuperscript{327} common to Foucault’s method, implies that a system or hierarchy of governance comes into being when participants in this system ‘agree’ to give up certain freedoms for the sake of group cohesion and identity. Social contracts are rarely novel; they are in most instances based on existing models of power relations with slight amendments or simply a new language to garb old concepts.\textsuperscript{328} One social contract can be quite contrary to another in order to signify that the characteristics of the group are determined by its opposing values against other groups. Social theorists of the New Testament highlight the fact that societies from the New Testament


\textsuperscript{327} Social contract theory developed early in the seventeenth century with the influence of critical thinkers like Grotius, Hobbes and Locke. It was further developed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and in the twentieth century most notably by Rawls, Gauthier and Pettit. Foucault uses the social contract model to demonstrate how macro- and micro-systems of government come into existence. The alternative to the social contract model is the social warfare model in which groups seize power without negotiation as such. Although Foucault agrees that governments often exploit people and violently seize power, he prefers to characterize the power of governance as a network that is complex and circulatory in terms of power dynamics; cf. Celeste Friend, “Social Contract Theory,” \textit{Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy} (2004): n.p. Cited 29 April 2012. Online: http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/; Geoff Danaher, Tony Schirato, and Jen Webb, \textit{Understanding Foucault} (London: Sage, 2000), 82–89.

times are quite collectivistic. Group-oriented personalities, according to Bruce Malina, are one of the defining characters of the historical anthropology of the New Testament.329

What are the characteristics of these microcosmic social contracts called the *haustafeln*? In the first instance, the notion of sovereignty is based on the concept of God as ruler of all human bodies.330 Since these bodies are heteronomous, that is, always prone to be ruled and governed by a higher participant in the hierarchy, the first level of submission implies submission to God, better translated as submission to the early Christian pastoral governance, which is highly patriarchal.331 This will especially become evident in the interpretation of the *haustafeln* in later centuries. What these contracts indicate is that this form of *oikonomia* is the ‘Christian’ way. In the Ephesian *haustafeln* this is especially evident in the very first statements, where the submission of the wife to the husband is compared to the submission of the church to Christ. The discourse of ecclesiastical submission to Christ serves the purpose of authorizing the social contract being proposed. As mentioned, this is done by duplicating Christ in the earthly *pater familias* just as the *vilicus* was duplicated in the early Roman agricultural handbooks. The author of Ephesians implies that the social contract the *haustafeln* represent is based on a larger, authoritative contract - namely that between Christ and the church. There is little practical sense in the Christ/church contract except its use as model for duplication and asserting authority. Ephesians depicts the authority and submission discourses in somatographic terms - the church is seen as the body of Christ, and Christ the soul or the reason, conforming to the Stoic concept that the body, and its desires are to be disciplined and ruled over. But the relationship of power is not simply top-down, but in a complex interchanging flux. The stipulation of the social contract of the wife to submit to her husband is complemented by the concept that the husband ought to love his wife as he does his own body.332 The concept of ‘love’ here should be understood in the

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curative sense. The husband should care for the wife as he does for his own body. This is supported by the statement in Ephesians 5:25b-33. The language of nurturing, purification and preservation is present here. The religious and political lines in this early Christian view of marriage are very much blurred. The care of the husband toward his wife is also a key feature in Xenophon’s work discussed above.  

In the honour-based culture of the ancient Mediterranean, purity was an important virtue for a woman and as Christ has kept the church, his wife, pure, so too the main curative role of the husband is to keep his wife pure. It must be remembered in this instance that early Christianity was a sect of Judaism, and that purity maps played a key role in the identity of the group. This was already seen in the discussions of the texts from the Mishnah. 

Foucault’s notion of the care of the self now transcends the body of the husband, which he must also keep pure, and the responsibility is extended to the body of the wife. In this manner, the wife’s body becomes an extension of that of the husband, a symbolic appendage or body-part. The believers are then also called members of Christ’s body. This premise and the premise from Genesis 2:24, that husband and wife will become one flesh, serve as points of argumentation. 

In this social contract, then, the wife submits to the authority of the husband, and by doing this, she becomes an extension of his body - she is not autonomous. The stipulation for the husband is that he needs to care for his wife since she is part of his own body and flesh. This discussion has shown how complex the power-relations of the social contracts of the haustafeln can be, and we can now see the trend and shape of the hierarchy. It is not linear - in the sense that God is at the top, then the husband, wife, children and slaves. It may appear so from the literary structure, but the hierarchy is cyclical – it all revolves around the pater familias as the Christ-duplicate.

But how does this social contract play out for the slaves, and how does it shape early Christian discourses of slave-management? The dynamics of the contractuality between slaves and masters function in a somewhat different manner to the contractuality between husband and wife. The advice is not based on love (as in the case of Seneca in Epistula 47) but on benign

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334 Knust, Abandoned to Lust, 94–96.

335 Sampley, Traditions in Ephesians 5:21–33, 51–60.
treatment. For the author of the Ephesian *haustafeln*, the most important facet of the slave/slaveholder relationship is that of appearance and representation. In the case of slaves and slaveholders, the social contract is almost identical, as Harrill has suggested, to those found in Roman agricultural and Greek oeconomical handbooks. Christ is symbolized as the absent *pater familias*, and the Christian slaveholder as the duplicated steward or *vilicus* of Christ. The notion of stewardship would become very important in late ancient Christian discourses of *oikonomia*. The slave is reminded that the true master of all is Christ. They are advised not to become ‘slaves to the eyes of people’ (ὀφθαλµμοδουλεία), since they are not out to please people but to please Christ, whose eyes are constantly directed at the heart of the slave. An interesting dynamic of surveillance is present here. Being slaves to human eyes seems to indicate that the slave’s behaviour should not be determined by ‘human’ technologies of surveillance, but rather by Christ’s surveillance, which is, ironically, a cryptic and veiled form of human surveillance in itself. The author clearly understands the limited usefulness of the surveillance of slaves by the *vilicus*, and thus introduces the omnipotent panopticism of Christ, that not only surveys the deeds and actions, the quality of the work of the slave but also the attitude and heart of the slave. This powerful strategy of manipulation aims to ameliorate the problem of slaves doing mischief in secrecy, a problem that is especially highlighted by Cato, Varro and Columella. The main aim of the slave is to acquire the approval and satisfaction of the slaveholder, in this case, Christ, the ‘absentee’ *pater familias*, but also indirectly, the earthly Christian slaveholder. The author also knows of the importance of reward and punishment in terms of slaveholding. Now Christ is seen as the one who will ultimately reward or punish the slave (and, in fact, all slaves of God). This is a typical Stoic-Philonic notion, where the focus is on the moral slavery. The verse, in fact, says very little about the practicalities of slave-management. Emphasis is placed on the notion of institutional slaves considering their enslavement to God as a higher priority than their enslavement to human beings. The result is that early Christian slaveholding resembles a type of creolization between Stoic, Philonic and Roman principles of slave-management. As in all of the oeconomical and agricultural handbooks, Christian slaveholders receive the conventional wisdom that they should treat their slaves kindly and not with threats.

since the slaveholders too are ruled by a heavenly slaveholder. Christ is portrayed as the typical just and fair *pater familias*. There is no favouritism with him, and all are treated fairly. Furthermore, the advice on the treatment of children and slaves bear remarkable resemblance. Fear is still a common strategy in the disciplining of slaves (Eph. 6:5). Slaves need to fear their masters in the same way as they fear God. This same advice is repeated by the authors of the *Didache* 4.11 and the *Epistle of Barnabas* 19:7, showing its continuity in the didactics of the early Christians.

What are the characteristics of the Colossian *haustafeln*? As in Ephesians, the Colossian *haustafeln* are also preceded by a detailed virtue-discourse. Most notably, it contains an amended duplication of the baptismal formula in Galatians 3:28, which reads (Col. 3:10): ‘Here there is no Gentile or Jew, circumcised or uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave or free, but Christ is all, and is in all.’ The thrust of this statement, as well as Galatians 3:28, is again the Stoic notion that one’s earthly status or ethnicity is not the determinative factor when seeking virtue. Like the arguments of Seneca, who reasoned that the same *logoi spermatikoi* or *semen* exists in both slave and free, the author of Colossians substitutes this metaphysical seed with the presence of Christ. This statement is framed in a chiastic argument for virtuosity - it is preceded by a vice list (Col. 3:8-10) and followed by a list of virtues (Col. 3:12-14). It also indicates, as in Ephesians, that Christian *oikonomia* is discussed in the context of virtue discourse - the same ‘selling point’ used by Philodemus.

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339 Galatians 3:28 (NIV): ‘There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.’ Greek text (UBS4): οὐκ ἐνὶ ᾿Ιουδαῖος οὐδὲ ᾿Ελλην, οὐκ ἐνὶ δοῦλος οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος, οὐκ ἐνὶ ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ- πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἰς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.


342 Some scholars assert that the *haustafeln* Christianize the subordination of women, children and slaves (for example, Mary R. D’Angelo, “Colossians,” in *Searching the Scriptures Volume 2: A Feminist Commentary* [Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza; New York: Crossroad, 1994], 313–24), while others, rightly in my opinion, assert that these codes are very much derived from similar social and cultural codes from the ancient Mediterranean and not exactly a form of Christianization (for example, Carolyn Osiek and David L. Balch, *Families in the New*
We now find simpler *haustafeln* in Colossians than in Ephesians when it comes to the relationship between husband and wife, but an equally elaborative code or contract when it comes to slaves. It should also be noted that these household codes are somewhat exceptional in that they address slaves directly, unlike the previous documents discussed. They also seem to assume that slaves need more motivation than slaveholders, since the codes for the behaviour of slaves are much longer than those directed at the masters in both Ephesians and Colossians. What are the social contractualities of slaves and slaveholders in Colossians then, and what can they tell us about early Christian slave-management? The exact same Christic panopticism is also present in the Colossian *haustafeln*. Slaves are again reminded that Christ, their heavenly slaveholder, is watching them. At this point I want to emphasize again that the purpose of panoptic surveillance is to ensure discipline and pacification. Since the *haustafeln* are located within the context of virtue-discourse, the virtuous slave is the disciplined slave. Foucault’s understanding of Bentham’s Panopticon is neatly summarized: ‘Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.’ This statement is also applicable to the Christic panopticon introduced to Christian slaves. It is to a certain extent more effective than any technologies of surveillance in the Greek and Roman handbooks of *oikonomia* due to its key feature - its permanence and thoroughness. The cyclical hierarchy that is the *haustafeln* now exhibits one of its most potent features of authority - it serves not only as a practical system of manipulation, domination and submission, but also serves as a symbolic apparatus that can alter behaviour and train or correct abnormal individuals. Since slaves are mostly viewed with suspicion in the ancient Mediterranean, the ever-present Christic gaze becomes corrective - it shapes the bodies of slaves into docile bodies that are loyal to their superiors, especially Christ, whose representative/vilicus on earth is the slaveholder. The Christic panopticism, despite its inherent

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346 Foucault, *Birth of the Prison*, 201.

347 For an excellent discussion of slaveholding and supervision/surveillance, cf. Fenoaltea, “Slavery and Supervision”.

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metaphysical and Stoic-Philonic nature, is quite practical. The Stoic effect of de-institutionalizing physical slavery means that not only is the behaviour of the slaves regulated, but of all those taking part in the social contract. Hence we find the social contractuality directed at the Christian slaveholder (Col. 4:1): ‘Masters, provide your slaves with what is right and fair, because you know that you also have a master in heaven.’ The slaveholder is reminded, almost tongue-in-cheek, that he also has a master, i.e. he is also under the gaze of the Christic panopticon. Whereas the slaves are here also reminded of their rewards and possible punishments, the slaveholders are reminded that they should provide fairness and justice to slaves. Both the Ephesian and Colossian contractuality directed at the slaveholder exhibit a secondary nuance of care. It is not like that displayed in Ephesians regarding the relationship between husband and wife. Here, the curative measure accorded to slaves should be fairness and justice.

5.2 Power and the Pastoral: The Development of Christian Pastoral Governmentality and Psychagogy related to Slave-Management

The Christic panopticism and curativity embedded in the *haustafeln* are also in line with the rise of pastoralism, and pastoral power in the Christian communities, which would have a profound effect on Western conceptualizations of governmentality. The Epistles to Timothy and Titus, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs, are known as the ‘pastoral epistles’. In this regard, Foucault makes a crucial observation in his elaboration of the *pasteur*:

\[\text{[T]he form it [pastoral power] takes is not first of all the striking display of strength and superiority... The shepherd is someone who keeps watch. He ‘keeps watch’ in the sense, of course, of keeping}\]

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350 The following section is especially based upon Foucault’s discussion on the development of Christian pastoral power as a form of governance, cf. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 115–90.
an eye out for possible evils, but above all in the sense of vigilance with regard to any possible misfortune.

It is evident that this type of governmentality, already present in the earliest Christian discourses, promotes a pastoral power whose main mechanism for exercising power is by keeping watch, or surveillance (Foucult uses the French word *surveiller*, while Bentam used ‘inspect’). In the following discussion from the Epistle to Titus, it will be shown that this type of surveillance always has the correction and regulation of bodies in mind, whether they were free or enslaved.

Moreover, by placing the free, Christian male in the centre of all these social contracts, the proliferation of androcentrism in early Christian household practice becomes quite evident. As with the elaborations in the Mishnah, the free Christian male body is responsible for issues of purity, obedience and quality service. The everyday life of the wife, children and slaves are all determined by their relations with the Christian *pater familias*, the *vilicus* of Christ on earth. This androcentrism is a crucial element in ancient slave-management.

The guidelines given to slaves in the Pastoral Epistles will now be discussed. We find discussions on slave-management in 1 Timothy 6:1-2 and Titus 2:9-10. These discourses, like all the others, are very much interwoven within the virtue-teaching of the entire letter. Both confirm the view that Christian slaves should work harder, and that proper submissive slave-behaviour is necessary for social acceptance. We also find no guidelines to slaveholders; only slaves are addressed. Slaves ought to show their owners respect despite their status of being Christian or not, and the author also emphasizes the mutual fictive kinship between slave and slaveholder. Whereas Colossians and Ephesians exhibit remarkable resemblance and similarities in terms of their *haustafeln*, Titus 2 stands out as being quite unique. As with Ephesians and Colossians, the entire Epistle to Titus can be described as an oeconomical exhortation. The language used in Titus has different emphases in contrast to Ephesians and Colossians. It also differs from the account in 1 Timothy. One of the reasons for this is because the letter, allegedly written by Paul to a younger co-worker named Titus, who is to manage a congregation of Christians in Crete, comes in the form of individual exhortations and duties. It gives us a glimpse from a different angle into the early Christian oeconomical *imaginaire*. Titus, as shepherd or pastor, is guided in

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pastoral governance. Chapter 2 of Titus, which forms the far equivalent of the Ephesian and Colossian *haustafeln*, is also framed by moral exhortation and virtue discourse (Tit. 1:10-16). But the nature of this is more specific in Titus - Titus is advised to present the Cretans with sound, or morally pure teaching. The motifs of teaching and discipline, related to submission and obedience regarding slaves, are rife in the letter. Sound doctrine is equivalent to good *oikonomia*. Again, I do not want to raise introductory issues relative to commentaries in this discussion. Rather, I am curious as to how Titus is presented as a teacher of *oikonomia*. This letter, quite appropriately grouped with the epistles called the ‘pastorals,’ represents some of the earliest direct instances of the rise of pastoral governmentality. As we mentioned earlier, the *pasteur* is someone who ‘keeps watch’. But in Titus the pastoral surveillance assumes teaching and correcting delinquent (often called heretical) behaviour. This would be central to Chrysostom’s thoughts on slave-management. In this epistle, the church itself becomes the *domus* where correction takes place. This correction should also be duplicated in the real households, and hence guidelines for household management are given. The *pasteur* therefore also becomes the domestic advisor. This will become even more prevalent in the later centuries with the rise of the episcopacy and papacy. In this sense, the *ecclesia-oikos* becomes both an observatory and reformatory (this will be discussed in more detail when examining Chrysostom’s views). Discipline occupies a key role here. We have already spoken about the importance of surveillance here, but the *pasteur* or domestic advisor should not merely ‘keep watch,’ but also correct delinquent behaviour. The ability to apply corrective measure for the production of docile bodies assumes that the surveillance and correction is hierarchized. It assumes an authoritative power-knowledge (in this case, the healthy doctrine) that serves as measuring stick to determine proper behaviour - it therefore has the function of normalizing bodies within the group. Although Titus is said to have the sound doctrine, when it comes to slave-management, the power-knowledge matrix is quite conventional, and one almost suspects the author is cribbing lines from Cato. Slaves are to be taught not be submissive in everything, aim to please their masters, not to talk back at them, nor to steal from them (Tit. 2:9-10).

Austerity is a fitting description of the teacher and the institution, church or household, in this regard. There is a rhetoric of strictness in the pericope.\textsuperscript{355} Titus 1:7-9 is very reminiscent of this:

> Since an overseer manages God’s household, he must be blameless - not overbearing, not quick tempered, not given to drunkenness, not violent, not pursuing dishonest gain. Rather, he must be hospitable, one who loves what is good, who is self-controlled, upright, holy and disciplined.\textsuperscript{356}

These guidelines for the overseer again resemble the qualities of the *vilicus* promoted by authors like Xenophon, Cato and Columella.\textsuperscript{357} The overseer here must be a worthy example, a mirror image, a duplication of the absent, but ever-watchful heavenly *pater familias*. The overseer must be a Christian virtuoso. From the wider context of the epistle, specifically its emphasis of viruosity, this teaching is presented in what could be called psychagogy, that is, the instruction of ‘souls’. The discourse of psychagogy is a very potent and strategic discourse. The soul, here, is more than a mere ideology. The soul should be understood as a technology of power of the body.\textsuperscript{358} In this manner, psychagogy is also somatography, since the soul as a somatic technology writes itself on bodies in a very real manner, and its presence is well attested in early Christianity.\textsuperscript{359} Here, the correction of the ‘soul’ is in fact the correction of the body via

\textsuperscript{355} Philip H. Towner, *The Letters to Timothy and Titus* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 733–34.

\textsuperscript{356} Greek text (UBS\textsuperscript{4}): δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἐπίσκοπον ἀνέέγκλητον εἶναι ως θεοῦ οἰκονόμον, μὴ αὐθάδη, μὴ ὀργίλον, μὴ πάροινον, μὴ πλῆκτην, μὴ αἰσχροκερδῆ, ἀλλὰ φιλόξενον, φιλάγαθον, σώφρονα, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, ἐγκρατῆ...

\textsuperscript{357} Ibid., 737.

\textsuperscript{358} Foucault, *Birth of the Prison*, 29.

\textsuperscript{359} A very interesting discussion on this topic is found in Lactantius. In his discussion of people who worship false gods, he refers to these people as being slaves to their passions, but he does this in a very unique manner. In typical invective rhetoric, he states that such people have made their soul a slave to the body, while the inverse is the more desirable condition. He states: ‘And since they have turned away once for all from the contemplation of the heaven, and have made that heavenly faculty the slave of the body, they give the reins to their lusts, as though they were about to bear away pleasure with themselves, which they hasten to enjoy at every moment; whereas the soul ought to employ the service of the body, and not the body to make use of the service of the soul’ (*Inst.* 6.1.2); Translation:
the technology of ‘soul’ - probably the closest ancient equivalent to what we call psychology today. Foucault has argued that the excess power exercised on the body has led to somatic duplication - the soul is a duplication of the dominated body; he states: ‘Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body.’\(^{360}\) The corrected slave-body in Titus 2 is the body that is docile and obedient to the earthly master. The idea of Christ as heavenly master may be assumed, but is not explicitly mentioned. Here contrary advice is given from that of the Ephesian and Colossian haustafeln. Slaves here should act in a pleasing manner to their masters. They may be ‘slaves to the eyes’ here, that is, exhibit behaviour corresponding to what is expected from slaves in the conventional sense. Typical slave stereotypes are present - the thief, the untrustworthy slave, and the slave with the loose tongue.\(^{361}\) Thus, the psychagogy directed at the slave-bodies should be directed at correcting the delinquencies displayed in the stereotypes. The soul, and accompanying notion of psychagogy, with its roots in Stoic and Philonic thinking, influenced Christian approaches to slave-management to a great extent. The concept of ‘soul’ as a corollary to virtue, served as a somatographic technology for producing and regulating docile slave-bodies, and functions quite well in the Christian pastoral governmentality of surveillance and correction.

5.3 Pastoral Technologies and the Petrine Haustafeln: Slavery, Suffering and Early Christian Discourses of Normalization

The Petrine haustafeln (1 Pet. 2:13-3:7), which probably comes from a very different context compared to Titus,\(^{362}\) nevertheless also display several overlapping discourses. The pastoral governmentality is much more pronounced in this document. At the end of the exhortation to the

\(^{360}\) Foucault, *Discipline & Punish*, 29.


\(^{362}\) Peter H. Davids, *The First Epistle of Peter* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 1–44.
slaves Christ is directly referred to as both shepherd and overseer (1 Pet. 2:25): ‘For “you were like sheep going astray,” but now you have returned to the shepherd and overseer of your souls.’ So what does the author of 1 Peter have to say about slave-management? The author only gives advice to slaves, and nothing is said to the owners. One can consider his advice to be quite radical and even shocking. Slaves are advised to not only submit to those slaveholders that are fair and just, but also to harsh slaveholders. The discourse here is even more laden with Philonic notions of being slaves of God, as the author explicitly states (1 Pet. 2:16): ‘Live as free people, but do not use your freedom as a cover-up for evil; live as God’s slaves.’

The centrality of suffering is what makes the Petrine advice to slaves unique. It should not necessarily be assumed here that the suffering slaves are Christian and the slaveholders are non-Christian. We have already seen that Christian principles and techniques of slave-management were not much different from Greek, Roman and Judaistic equivalents. The construction of the suffering slave as the innocent victim is important in this instance. Suffering, Judith Perkins has shown, was central to the development of early Christian identity, and it seems in this instance that symbolic links are drawn between the suffering death of Christ, the suffering loyal slave and the martyr. Perkins states:

The production of this subjectivity, the recognition and acceptance of a self-definition of sufferer, was essential for the growth of Christianity as an institution. Christianity offered itself as a community of sufferers and could not have developed had it lacked

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363 Greek text (UBS4): ἦτε γὰρ ὡς πρόβατα πλανώμενοι, ἀλλὰ ἐπεστράφητε νῦν ἐπὶ τὸν ποιμένα καὶ ἐπίσκοπον τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν.


365 Greek text (UBS4): ὡς ἔλευθεροι, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐπικάλυμμα ἔχοντες τῆς κακίας τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἀλλ’ ὡς θεοῦ δούλοι.

366 Suffering is one of the central motifs in the entire letter, and is here inextricably connected to formulations of community and also the author’s Christology. The intersection of these three motifs will also be seen in this discussion on slaves; cf. Steven R. Bechtler, *Following in His Steps: Suffering, Community and Christology in 1 Peter* (SBLDS; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998).

subjects present to respond to its call...Christianity did not produce its suffering subject alone...this subjectivity was under construction and emanated from a number of different locations in the Graeco-Roman world.

This is a very important observation made by Perkins. Here I want to argue that one such influential subjectivity to the notion of Christian self-definition as sufferers was the notion of the suffering but loyal slave. This literary topos of the slave who suffered unjustly is especially prevalent in the Roman agricultural handbooks, and especially with Columella. The author of 1 Peter, however, does not advise the slaves who are suffering unjustly to rebel or resist. They are to remain docile, passive bodies, both slaves and women.\textsuperscript{368} Two important essays on Roman sexualities, those of Jonathan Walters\textsuperscript{369} and Holt Parker,\textsuperscript{370} both suggest that the concepts of penetrability and impenetrability were crucial in constructing manliness and normality. Parker provides a teratogenic grid in which the sexual roles of men and women are placed into perspective and relation to each other.\textsuperscript{371} The male \textit{vir} is normal when he occupies an active, penetrating role, as Parker elaborates: ‘There is the \textit{vir}, the normal/active/male, who has open to him three possible sexual activities: to fuck someone in the vagina, the anus, or the mouth.’\textsuperscript{372} Unlike modern conceptions of sexuality, which often centres on gender (hetero-/homo-/bisexuality, etc.), Roman concepts of sexuality were about penetration and passivity.\textsuperscript{373} Furthermore, regarding the role of the woman, Parker states:\textsuperscript{374}

The opposite of the \textit{vir} is the \textit{femina}. However, the Roman writers reserve a special term for a woman in her sexual role, and this is

\textsuperscript{369} Walters, “Invading the Roman Body.”
\textsuperscript{371} Ibid., 48–49.
\textsuperscript{372} Ibid., 49.
\textsuperscript{373} Walters, “Invading the Roman Body,” 39–42.
\textsuperscript{374} Parker, “Teratogenic Grid,” 49.
*puella*, which denotes not merely youth of beauty, but the specific status of ‘sexual object.’ As the opposite of *vir*, the *puella* or *femina* (i.e., the normal/passive/female) has open to her exactly three possible sexual passivities: to be fucked in the vagina, the anus, or the mouth. She can be a *futata* (vaginal insertee), a *pathica/pedicata* (anal insertee), or a *fellatrix/irrumata* (oral insertee). The fact that there is no separate noun corresponding to *futata* is in itself significant: the word for a woman who is fucked vaginally is simply *femina/puella*. A woman is defined as ‘one who is fucked in the vagina.’

Why this elaboration on Roman sexuality at this point of the study? It was mentioned earlier that by creating an androcentric system as found in the *haustafeln*, not only is the category of the normal, free male constructed; a category of ‘abnormals’ and subordinates is also constructed, an their part in the social contract is always related to their behaviour toward the free male. Furthermore, this society has been termed not only androcentric, but also phallogocentric.\(^{375}\) The male slave is not a norm since, as Glancy has illustrated, he was not considered as having a phallus, that is, no legal right to *patrimonium*. A penis is not equal to a phallus; a male slave has the former, but not the latter.\(^ {376}\) Mastery does not only define masculinity, but it also defines its opposite; not exactly femininity, but rather, as Parker has stated, passivity. Kartzow correctly states: ‘In a phallogocentric system, the male has the power to define what the world consists of, what is right and what is wrong, and the female is naturally subsumed under the male.’\(^ {377}\) Moreover, penetration then serves as a strategy of normalization. It must be understood that the suffering the author of 1 Peter refers to, in most instances, is not only unfair punishment, but also sexual abuse. Jennifer Glancy has problematized this issue in the context of 1 Corinthians 5-7, but the same issues are found in this section, and for that matter, in


\(^{377}\) Kartzow, *Gossip and Gender*, 25.
the other sections of the *haustafeln*. Strong Christian reactions against *porneia* do indicate that the use of slaves for sexual purposes would be taboo for Christian slaveholders; but this does not mean that it did not happen. The unjust suffering the slave experiences relating to penetration in the form of punishment perhaps or sexual abuse is here accepted by the author of 1 Peter, a notion that we find well represented in the Christian authors. Suffering and being penetrated unjustly become a virtue. Brent Shaw has shown this in his study of early Christian martyrdom. A tension in the virtuosity of the early Christians therefore becomes clear - on the one hand, we see a strong promotion of masculine values, androcentrality and andronormativity, yet there is also the proliferation of feminine values, notions of suffering and also, as Shaw has indicated, endurance (*ὑπομονή*). The verb ‘endure’ (*ὑπομένει*ο) is found in 1 Peter 2:20: ‘But how is it to your credit if you receive a beating for doing wrong and endure (*ὑπομένει*ετε) it? But if you suffer for doing good and you endure (*ὑπομένει*ετε) it, this is commendable before God.’ A value we have not yet seen before now becomes prominent - the passive suffering and endurance of wronged slaves is a ‘gift’ (*χάρις*). As seen in Columella, the unjust *vilicus*, who punishes and ill-treats slaves, must be strictly regulated, and punished if necessary, if he is unfair and disobedient. But here, slaves should rejoice when this occurs. This advice is justified with a very potent rhetorical strategy - namely Christomorphism. When slaves suffer, it is a gift and a virtue because Christ has also suffered, and by suffering, they become more like their master.

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379 Clark, “Foucault, the Fathers, and Sex,” 630–35.

380 While Walters and Parker focus on the Roman world, the same was also true for the ancient Greek world, where these passive, feminine ‘virtues’ would never be understood as being acceptable for a free, male citizen to embody; cf. Winkler, *Constraints of Desire*, 1–129; David M. Halperin, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality: And Other Essays on Greek Love* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 41–74, 88–112.


383 Greek text (UBS4): ποίον γάρ κλέος εἰ ἁμαρτάνοντες καὶ κολαφιζόμενοι ὑπομενεῖτε; ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀγαθοποιοῦντες καὶ πάσχοντες ὑπομενεῖτε, τοῦτο χάρις παρὰ θεῷ.
Here, Christ is not the absentee *pater familias*, but inexplicitly, Christ becomes a suffering slave. It is supported in 1 Peter 2:22, 25, where the author quotes sections from Isaiah 53 from the Septuagint. Isaiah 53 speaks of the suffering servant of God, and suits the context of this section, which is addressed to suffering slaves of Christ. The third century church historian Eusebius of Caesarea would also not hesitate to make this same connection (*Comm. Isa.* 1.76).

Slave-behaviour is still strictly controlled. Suffering is only just when the punishment is unjust. It stands to reason that by suffering for disobedience, the slave is not special. Punishment and control of delinquent slave-bodies are still very much promulgated. First Peter does not give any advice to Christian slaveholders, simply to slaves, husbands and wives. We therefore see how the image of the slave suffering unjustly was used to promote passive values in the early church. It should also be noted that by promoting values of passivity, masculinity is also complemented. Encouraging those in the social hierarchy for whom it is normal to be penetrated to endure suffering, makes strategies for producing and affirming masculinities more efficient and facile. The normal slave-body is one that should be penetrated. Punishment could also be sexual. Furthermore, it should again be stressed the close links between slavery (of males or females) and prostitution. Aulus Gellius (*Noct. att.* 9.12.7) refers to Cato’s view that the bodies of male prostitutes, like slaves, can be violated. This is also what defined the status of the free male, according to Walters, namely bodily inviolability and impenetrability.384 This is why Roman citizens were not supposed to be beaten or raped (Parker has pointed out that rape was a common yet feared punishment for adultery; cf. Martial, *Epig.* 2.47, 3.73, 3.83).385 The problem of the heteronomy of the slave-body also contributes to this issue. The ease with which the slave-body could be penetrated and violated is exactly what defined the status of the slave-body. Walters rightly states: ‘To allow oneself to be beaten, or sexually penetrated, was to put oneself in the position of the slave, that archetypal passive body.’386 Many early Christian authors identified with the archetype of the suffering slave-body - Paul, in fact, uses the same archetype to make sense of Christ’s suffering in the Christological hymn of Philippians 2:5. According to this pericope, by taking on the nature of a slave, Christ embodied the values of obedience and suffering. The idea that Christ is restored to his former glory also supports the notion that slaves

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386 Walters, “Invading the Roman Body,” 40.
who were suffering unjustly would be rewarded. Paul constantly refers to himself, in the opening formulae of his epistles, as a ‘slave of Christ.’ We will now move to our discussion of the late ancient authors.

6 OIKONOMIA AND SLAVE-MANAGEMENT IN LATE ANTIQUITY

How were these texts read and understood by the Christian authors of late antiquity? Due to the scope of this study, the focus will now specifically be on the deuto-Pauline haustafeln, and not the Petrine haustafeln, although the concepts developed from its reading will apply. Authors commenting on these passages will be discussed, and it will also be examined how these discussions fit into the authors’ wider understanding of slavery. Many of the concepts highlighted in the discussions above are developed and reimagined by many of these authors. We will now briefly look at some interpretations in late antiquity. This analysis will highlight how these Christian authors understood slave-management.

Before looking at each author, including Chrysostom, an important observation made by Jennifer Glancy should be noted. In her study of Christian slavery in late antiquity, Glancy argues that slavery in everyday life was not so much experienced in the juridical sense, but rather as habitus. This is also the main impetus of this dissertation. Many of the Christian authors we will examine below were directly influenced by and ‘in-habit-ed’ this habitus of Roman slaveholding. They did, however, corporeally negotiate and sometimes even resist this habitus, as Glancy states:

...[S]ome Christians used their bodies symbolically to challenge, or at least outrage, the habitus of slavery, thus attempting to disrupt, albeit fleetingly, the practice of Christian slaveholding. In these few exceptional moments, ancient Christians evinced some awareness of moral problems intrinsic to the institution of slavery, moments where they brought to consciousness moral discomfort with the habitus that shaped them. These moments of resistance

387 Jennifer A. Glancy, “Christian Slavery in Late Antiquity,” in Human Bondage in the Cultural Contact Zone: Transdisciplinary Perspectives on Slavery and Its Discourses (Raphael Hörmann and Gesa Mackenthun (eds); Münster: Waxmann, 2010), 70.
were, in fact, futile, church hierarchies being receptive neither to the efforts nor to the Christians who made them. Ultimately these examples of embodied and enacted resistance illustrate precisely the conservative social effects of corporal habituation to particular social locations. \(^{388}\)

This statement is exceedingly important. In some instances, we will notice no such embodied resistance, while in others it will become quite evident. Their resistance to this habituation, or lack of resistance sometimes, is also embodied in their interpretations and commentaries on the New Testament texts that already constructed a slightly different, Christian view of slaveholding, most notably via the *haustafeln*-texts.

Origen, for instance, finds the use of the word ‘fear’ problematic in the Ephesian *haustafeln*. He states that fear should not be something that is present in the life of the Christian, and that there seems to be a contradiction here (*Comm. Eph.* 32). He does not elaborate much on the problem of slave-management. He is more concerned with the metaphor of being a slave to Christ than with practical matters pertaining to slaveholding. \(^{389}\) He concludes that fear, however, is necessary for the slave to serve Christ and the earthly master effectively. The fear of slaves should be directed to Christ especially in the sense of reverence. He never rejects institutional slavery, and is simply more concerned with moral slavery. \(^{390}\) Heine has compared the commentaries of Origen and Jerome on Ephesians, and one notices much continuity in their comments. \(^{391}\) As with Origen and Jerome, Lactantius also builds on the concept of fear in his discussion of the metaphorical slavery between God and humanity (*Epit.* 59). He also believed that punitive violence against slaves was necessary at times. \(^{392}\)

Cyprian simply states that when both slaveholders and slaves become Christians, they need to be better at their respective roles; i.e. slaves should work harder and serve their masters

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388 Glancy, “Christian Slavery in Late Antiquity,” 73.
391 Ibid.
to the best of their ability, and masters, according to Cyprian, should be more gentle (Test. 3.72). This especially shows the pervasiveness of the Roman habitus of slaveholding. The inherent moral problem of slavery is not noticed - the problem that is noticed, according to Cyprian it seems, is that slaves who do not work hard enough and slaveholders tend to be too violent. The problem becomes one of labour-relations. He quotes Ephesians 6:5 in this instance as a proof. Since the authoritative, canonical text of Ephesians approves of slavery, there is no need to critique it. Being a Christian should therefore be an advantage when it comes to slave-management, since Christian slaves (ought to) work harder. Cyprian is however critical of slaveholders who abuse their slaves, slaves that share in the same humanity as the slaveholder (Demetr. 8). Glancy, however, rightly states: ‘Beyond an implicit critique of slaveholders who wielded excessive force against their slaves, Cyprian sketched no practical consequences from his strongly worded statement of equality...’

Ambrosiaster presents an interesting view on slavery and problematizes the notion of submission and domination in the light of Christian hamartiology (Comm. I Cor. 7.21-22; Comm. Col. 4.1). He provides a simple, classificatory system for domination and submission. He states that the submission of wife to husband is natural and pre-lapsarian. The submission of slave to master, however, as will be seen with many Christian authors including Chrysostom, is post-lapsarian and a result of sin. He specifically refers to the curse of Ham (Gen. 9:25-27), which is understood as the logical inference of original sin. Slavery is not natural for Ambrosiaster and it represents unnatural submission. In his interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7:21-23, Ambrosiaster accepts the institution of slavery in typical Stoic fashion. Slaves are to remain in submission to their masters, and rather focus on being morally free. As with Cyprian, Ambrosiaster also wants to see that Christian slaves behave better and work harder than their non-Christian counterparts (Comm. I Cor. 7: 21):

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What [Paul] is urging is that, by serving his earthly master in the fear of God, a person should make himself worthy of being free; in case perhaps, on hearing the words, ‘You were called while a slave: do not let this bother you’, he should become more negligent about the good works of his earthly master, and the teaching of Christ should get a bad name, and the person in question should not find favour with God, whereas, if he performs his service well in these earthly affairs, he deposits his merit with God as an investment for himself, for the Lord has said: ‘He who is faithful in a very little is faithful also in much.’

God is still seen as the great slaveholder, and he alludes to the haustafeln here to suggest that slaves should work so as to find favour under the surveillance of God. Ambrosiaster also subscribes to the heteronomy of the body. Ambrosiaster states that through his death, Christ purchased humanity from the slavery to sin, and made them slaves of Christ. The metaphor of slavery and institutional slavery does not show clear, distinctive lines of separation in this type of thought. Ambrosiaster fully subscribes to the Stoic concept that being a moral slave is more detrimental than being an institutional slave.

Basil of Caesarea gives much information on Christian attitudes toward slave-management in the late Roman world. Basil is highly critical of the wealth wrought by slavery on agricultural holdings. But he was not altogether against slaveholding, and he even used the principles from the Ephesian haustafeln in his virtue-discourse, believing that slaves were to be obedient and, like most of the authors above, believed that Christian slaves should be better labourers (Reg. mor. 75). His views on slaveholding were very much influenced by his ascetic

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396 Translation & Latin text: Lunn-Rockliffe, Ambrosiaster’s Political Theology, 103: hortatur, ut bene serviens de dei timore carnali domino dignum se faciat libertate, ne audiens forte “servus vocatus es? non sit tibi curae”, neglegentior esset circa bonos actus carnalis domini et doctrina Christi blasphemaretur et nec ille deum promeretur, qui in his terrenis bene serviens meritum sibi conlocat apud deum, quia dixit dominus: “qui in minimo fidelis est, et in magno [fidelis est]?”.

397 Lunn-Rockliffe, Ambrosiaster’s Political Theology, 100–102.

398 Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 176–78.
tendencies, and he constantly links slavery with sin and the fall.\textsuperscript{399} Although he does not condemn slaveholding, he states that there are slaves necessary for life, that is basic productive tasks, and then there are slaves who are a luxury. His criticism is directed to the lavishness of having hundreds of slaves for each and every minute task (cf. Hom. div. 2.2-6; Attend. 5) and he also condemns the harsh punishments of the wealthy on their slaves (Hom. div. 2.6).\textsuperscript{400} In another writing of his, Basil mourns the father who has to sell his children as slaves due to poverty (Dest. horr. 4).\textsuperscript{401} In chapter 6 we will see that Chrysostom has similar criticisms against the wealthy. Basil also denies the concept of natural slavery, and states: ‘...no one is a slave by nature? Men are brought under the yoke of slavery either because they are captured in battle or else they sell themselves into slavery owing to poverty...’ (Spir. 20.51).\textsuperscript{402} Basil also exhibits strong Stoic views on institutional slavery.\textsuperscript{403} His view on child-exposure, which is related to slavery, is quite interesting (Ep. 217.52). According to Basil, exposing a child is not an offence in itself, but depends on the motive of the mother. If it was because of neglect or due to promiscuity, the mother should be judged as a murderer. A mother forced to abandon her child out of poverty or need is pardoned.\textsuperscript{404} In the same manner, a slave-woman who is forced into prostitution is also pardoned (Psalm. 32.5).\textsuperscript{405} Basil found it quite necessary to give detailed regulations on issues related to slave-management and sexuality, showing the extent of the problem.\textsuperscript{406} The apparent conceptual links between slavery, sex and sin are very evident in the

\textsuperscript{399} Kontoulis, Problem der Sklaverei, 132–53, 186–91.


\textsuperscript{401} Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 410–11.

\textsuperscript{402} Translation: Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 45–47; Greek text: SC: 253: ...παρὰ µὲν ἀνθρώποις τῇ φύσει δοῦλος οὐδεὶς. Ὡ γὰρ καταδυναστευθέντες ὑπὸ ζυγόν δουλείας ἤχθησαν, ὡς ἐν αἰχµαλωσίαις· ἢ διὰ πενίάν κατεδουλώθησαν…


\textsuperscript{404} Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 419.

\textsuperscript{405} Ibid., 309.

\textsuperscript{406} For a general discussion of this issue in antiquity, cf. Osiek, “Limits of Obedience”.
works of Basil. He does not allow slaves to enter into secret marriages either, and thereby still affirms the authority of the slaveholder over the slave: ‘It is a grave fault even on the part of a slave to give herself away in secret wedlock and fill the house with impurity, and, by her wicked life, to wrong her owner...’ (Ep. 199.18.21-23). If the owner approves of the marriage, however, it is not a sin: ‘The woman who yields to a man against her master's will commits fornication; but if afterwards she accepts free marriage, she marries. The former case is fornication; the latter marriage. The covenants of persons who are not independent have no validity’ (Ep. 199.40.1-5).

The word of the slaveholder is therefore the determining factor in whether slaves commit fornication or not. These comments of Basil especially illustrate how Christian formulations and regulations on sexuality influenced slave-management. Clement of Alexandria, in his aptly titled Paedagogus, criticizes aristocratic women who are not embarrassed to appear naked before their slaves, and even letting them rub their bodies and enticing slaves to lust (Paed. 3.5). Ambrose would also utilize the metaphor of slavery and the haustafeln in his discussions on virginity (Ex. virg. 1.3). Virgins are here also interpreted as slaves of God, and the strict corporeal control of virgins is also compared with the strict corporeal control of slave-bodies. Furthermore, the sexual history of slaves, especially slave-women, was of great importance to the slaveholder. In a letter written to Synagrius, the bishop of Verona, Ambrose refers to an instance where a master was concerned about the virginity of his slave-girl, and called in an experienced midwife to examine her, with the question of her virginity still being uncertain after the examination (Ep. 56).

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408 Translation: NPNF; Greek text: Courtonne 162: Μέγα μὲν ἁµµάτηµα καὶ δοούλην λαθραίοις γάµµοις ἐαυτὴν ἐπιδιδοῦσαν φθορᾶς ἀναπλῆσαι τὸν οἶκον καὶ καθυβρίίζειν διὰ τοῦ πονηροῦ βίου τὸν κεκτηµέένον·
409 Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 273.
410 Nathan, Family in Late Antiquity, 173.
411 For a full discussion of Ambrose’s use of the metaphor of slavery, as well as the origins of institutional slavery, cf. Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 191–205.
marriage (from the perspective of the woman), to being auctioned and sold as a slave. He states (Virg. 1.10.56):

But how wretched a position, that she who is marriageable is in a species of sale put up as it were to auction to be bid for, so that he who offers the highest price purchases her. Slaves are sold on more tolerable conditions, for they often choose their masters; if a maiden chooses it is an offense, if not it is an insult. And she, though she be beautiful and comely, both fears and wishes to be seen; she wishes it that she may sell herself for a better price; she fears lest the fact of her being seen should itself be unbecoming.413

It is interesting that Ambrose states that slaves can choose their masters, but not the woman put up in marriage, demonstrating the micro-political complexities of marriage in the later Roman Empire. Ambrose also advises husbands to exhibit a strict culture of surveillance on their wives as on their slaves (Ios. 5.22).414 Using the example of Abraham and Hagar, he advises the free person against marrying someone of inferior social status, especially a slave, since it compromises the social status of the free person, and would also lead to the creation of illegitimate heirs (Abr. 1.4.22-25).415 As in the pre-Christian Roman Empire, the Christian Roman Empire was very much concerned with keeping the patrimonium in the hands of legitimate heirs. It illustrates that the control of social status was directly related to the control of property rights.

Such issues were not only related to sexual matters. Slave-management in religious ceremonial and ritual matters was also an important issue, which is evident in the work of Peter of Alexandria. The canons of Peter deal mainly with the issue of the lapsi, Christians who left


the faith. Fourteen (or in some manuscripts, fifteen) canons are preserved in his *Epistula Canonica*, with twelfth-century commentaries from Theodore Balsamon and John Zonaras. If Christian slaves, who were forced by their masters, participated in offering sacrifices to non-Christian deities, they had to perform penance for an entire year in order to ‘learn’ that they are slaves of Christ (quoting the Ephesian *haustafeln*), and should therefore keep the will of their heavenly master in mind rather than that of their earthly masters (*Ep. can. 6*):

In the case of those who have sent Christian slaves to offer sacrifice for them, the slaves indeed as being in their master's hands, and in a manner themselves also in the custody of their masters, and being threatened by them, and from their fear having come to this pass and having lapsed, shall during the year show forth the works of penitence, learning for the future, as the slaves of Christ, to do the will of Christ and to fear Him, listening to this especially, that whatsoever good thing any man does, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free.\(^{416}\)

Here we see how the *haustafeln* serve as authoritative scriptural apparatus in pastoral governmentality and polity. Slaves are punished for not defying their masters when being asked to offer sacrifices to other deities. Only a section of the *haustafeln* is quoted, and (conveniently), not the section that slaves should be submissive to their owners in everything. Balsamon refers to this punishment of a year’s penance as being ‘moderate.’ In the next canon, the punishment on the slaveholding *lapsi* is harsher, and they are especially admonished for compelling their slaves to partake in the sin of idolatry (*Ep. can. 7*):

But the freemen shall be tried by penance for three years, both for their dissimulation, and for having compelled their fellow-servants to offer sacrifice, inasmuch as they have not obeyed the apostle, who would have the masters do the same things unto the servant,

\(^{416}\) Translation: *ANF*; primary Latin text not available at the time of writing.
forbearing threatening; knowing, says he, that our and their Master is in heaven; and that there is no respect of persons with Him. Now, if we all have one Master, with whom is no respect of persons, since Christ is all and in all, in barbarian, Scythian, bond or free, they ought to consider what they have done, wishing to preserve their own lives. They have drawn their fellow-servants to idolatry who would have been able to escape, had they given to them that which is just and equal, as again says the apostle.417

We see in both these canons that the *haustafeln* function as policy and polity in the early church. The notion of God as the slaveholder, and the heteronomy of the body, serves as the main premise for the punishment. Both slaves and slaveholders need to structure their behaviour around this. Slavery was a lively issue in church polity.418 This is an instance in which the consequences of moral and metaphorical slavery have direct implications for slave-management and *oikonomia*.

The other Cappadocian father, Gregory of Nazianzus, is moved by the fact that Paul even speaks to slaves in the *haustafeln* (*Apol.* 2.54), and of all the early Christian authors, he is probably the most sober and realistic when confronted with the injustice of slavery, and the vices it leads to among slaves and slaveholders (*Carm.* 2.1.1):

To be a master over slaves is a fatal net! Harsh masters always become hateful, but slaves will trample a pious master without shame, the bad slaves cannot be made mild, the good ones cannot be made docile. They breathe sharp bile against both types of master beyond all reasoning.419

417 Translation: *ANF*; primary Latin text not available at the time of writing.
418 Nathan, *Family in Late Antiquity*, 174–75.
According to Gregory, the attitude of the master, and all the psychological strategies of manipulation we have examined from Xenophon to sources in the Roman Republic and Empire, is not really effective in slave-management. He is disillusioned by the fact that slavery, no matter how one manages it, is inevitably related to sin and vice. Like Basil, Gregory also critiques the lavish lifestyle of wealthy agricultural landlords (Carm. 1.2.8). The most famous description of slavery by Gregory is found, in fact, in his will. Regarding the will, Harper states:

Gregory’s testament is one of the most complete to survive from antiquity. It offers a still-shot of an ascetic, most of whose property was presumably already given to the church. It illustrates the complicated but precise apportionment of human property and human labour between multiple generations. It exemplifies the perils of manumission and testation.

Most importantly, the document indicates that despite his discomfort with slavery, Gregory himself owned slaves, and knew how important it was to also manage one’s slaves after death. It seems that after the bad experience of having to administer the estate of his late brother Caesarius, Gregory realized that one of the most important areas where slaves are to be managed is in one’s testament. Basil of Caesarea attests to the difficulties Gregory experienced after his brother’s death, when he had to deal with slaves whom his brother neglected to manage in his testament (Ep. 32.1): ‘The matter rather is that those who have so freely distributed all the effects of Caesarius that were worth anything, after really getting very little, because his property was in the hands of slaves, and of men of no better character than slaves, did not leave much for the executors.’ It is then also understandable why, as seen in Gregory’s will, he appointed slaves

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421 Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 482.
423 Translation: NPNF; Greek text: Courtonne: 37: ...ἐπηρεάζουσιν αὐτῷ ὡς χρήματα Καισαρίου παρ' αὐτῶν εἰληφότος. Καὶ οὐ τὸ τῆς ἐσμᾶς βαρύ· πάλαι γὰρ ἔμαθε χρημάτων ὑπερφοράν, ἀλλ' ὃτι, μικρὰ παντελῶς δεξάμενοι τῶν ἐκείνου, διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ οἰκέταις αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι τὸν βίον καὶ ἀνθρώποις οὐδὲν
who were also monks to administer his property after his death. These slaves were also close members of Gregory’s household. As according to ancient practice, after his death, Gregory manumitted most of his slaves, while others were returned to the ownership of the church (Diath. 32-35, 52-55). The case of Gregory’s will exhibits the characteristics of the relationship between a clerical slaveholder and his slaves. We still find potent discourses of control and careful slave-management.

Gregory of Nyssa, when writing on the life of Gregory Thaumaturgus, also compares him to the faithful Christian slave of God using the Ephesian haustafeln (Vit. Greg. Th. 27.19). He is described as a slave of God who did nothing without the order of his heavenly master. More importantly however, the one Christian author of late antiquity who probably made the most significant comments against the institution of slavery is Gregory of Nyssa. In Gregory’s fourth homily on the Old Testament book of Ecclesiastes, he gives a remarkable exposition of Ecclesiastes 2:7, which reads: ‘I bought male and female slaves and had other slaves who were born in my house.’ While he does not directly refer to the haustafeln here, the text is crucial since it represents, in my opinion, one of the most potent late Roman treatises against slavery. Like many late ancient Christian homilies, this homily is a virtue-discourse. For Gregory, the vice of pride stands out when it comes to slaveholding and slave-management. It is the main premise on which the former phenomena rest; it is only through pride that mastery is functional. Traces of this type of thinking were especially seen with Stoic philosophers like Seneca, but Gregory does not exhibit the same Stoic indifference to slaveholding. He vehemently opposes slaveholding in the homily. Gregory states (Hom. Eccl. 4.1-2):

οἰκετῶν αἰρετωτέροις τὸν τρόόπον, οἵ, κατὰ πολλὴν ἀδειαν τὰ πλείστου ἄξια διανειµµάαµµενοι, ἐλάάχιστα παντελῶς ἀπέέσωσαν…

426 Translation: NIV; Greek text (Gregory used the LXX): Rahlfs-Hanhart: ἐκτησάαµµην δούµους καὶ παιδίσκας, καὶ οἴκογενεῖς ἐγένοντό µοι…
427 Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 84.
So, when someone turns the property of God into his own property and arrogates dominion to his own kind, so as to think himself the owner of men and women, what is he doing but overstepping his own nature through pride, regarding himself as something different from his subordinates? ‘I got me slaves and slave-girls’. What do you mean? You condemn man to slavery, when his nature is free and he possesses free will, and you legislate in competition with God, overturning his law for the human species. The one made on the specific terms that he should be the owner of the earth, and appointed to government of the Creator - him you bring under the yoke of slavery, as though defying and fighting against the divine decree.  

We see the normal Stoic and Philonic reasoning here: Gregory agrees that God is the only valid owner, and that slavery is by no means natural. The pride he identifies here is that human beings have become so greedy, in their lust to own all things, they have even started to rob God of his property, namely human beings. He quotes several Old Testament verses that, according to Gregory, state the limits of human dominion; all these verses state that humans must rule over the plants and animals of creation, but never humans (he refers to Gen. 1:26; Ps. 8:7-8; 104/103:16). Slavery implies a reversal of divine order for Gregory. The true master (over the

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428 Translation: Robert J. Wright, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon (ACCS 9; Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2005), 210; Greek text: Alexander: 335: ἐξουσίας παρὰ τῆς ὁνὸν κτῆµα ἐαυτοῦ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κτήµα ποιοῦµνος ἐπιµµερίζων τε τῷ γένει τὴν δυναστείαν, ὡς ἄνδρων τε ἁµµα καὶ γυναικῶν ἐαυτόν κύριον οἴεσθαι, τί ἄλλο καὶ οὐχὶ διαβαίνει τῇ ὑπερηφανία τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλο τι ἡ αὐτόν παρὰ τοὺς ἄρχοµενος βλέπων; Ἐκτησάµμην δούλους καὶ παιδίσκας. τί λέγεις; δουλεία καταδικάζεις τὸν ἀνθρώπον, οὐ ἐλευθέρα ἡ φύσις καὶ αὐτεξουσίος, και ἀντινοµοθετεῖς τῷ θεῷ, ἀνατρέπων αὐτοῦ τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει νόµον. τὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ γενόµενον, ἐφ’ ὧτε κύριον εἶναι τῆς γῆς καὶ εἰς ἀρχὴν τεταγµένον παρὰ τοῦ πλάσαντος, τούτον ὑπάγεις τῷ τῆς δουλείας ζυγῷ, ὥσπερ ἀντιβαίνων τε καὶ μαχόµενος τῷ θείῳ προστάγµατι.

429 Cf. Maria M. Bergadá, “La condemnation de l’esclavage dans l’homélie IV,” in Gregory of Nyssa Homilies on Ecclesiastes: An English Version with Supporting Studies (Proceedings of the Seventh International Colloquium on,

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earth) now becomes enslaved. He also argues from the perspective that all human beings are created in the image of God. For Gregory, the fact that human beings are created in the image of God makes them priceless, hence the terrible and sinful character of slavery.430

Gregory uses the principle of the heteronomy of bodies in a different way. All bodies are heteronomous, but the ability to rule over a human body rests with God alone, and by being a slaveholder, the greatest hubris is found - human beings taking up the role of God. Like Seneca, Gregory also emphasizes the shared humanity that exists between slaveholders and slaves, and the futility of legal contracts binding people into slavery.431 He states (Hom. Eccl. 4.6):

Your origin is from the same ancestors, your life is of the same kind, sufferings of soul and body prevail alike over you who own him and the one who is the subject of your ownership - pains and pleasures, merriment and distress, sorrows and delights, rages and terrors, sickness and death. Is there any difference in these things between the slave and his owner?432


430 Hart has also argued that Gregory’s critique on slavery is reliant on his eschatology and concepts of eternal reward and punishment, in which all human beings are equal. This is a very valid point and the same type of thinking is also present with other Christian authors of late antiquity; cf. David B. Hart, “The ‘Whole Humanity’: Gregory of Nyssa’s Critique of Slavery in the Light of His Eschatology,” SJTh 54, no. 1 (2001): 51–69.


It is therefore those experiences that are inextricably human, those shared by both slave and master, which bring them together and transcend social status. The humanization of the slave-body should be viewed with suspicion however, since it often functions as a technology for subjugation and oppression (see chapter 4). Similarly, the fourth century Syriac-Christian author Aphrahat, while discussing the impartiality of death, states (Dem. 22.7): ‘He [Death] leads away to himself together slaves and their masters; and there the masters are not honoured more than their servants. Small and great are there, and they hear not the voice of the oppressor. The slave who is freed from his master there pays no regard to him who used to oppress him’ (cf. Job 3:18-19).433 Another Syriac author of the same period, Ephrem the Syrian, provides a remarkably similar retort to the inequalities of slaveholding and the reality of death (cf. Carm. nisib. 36.5).

Gregory’s main argument is, more specifically, against the arrogance and pride associated with mastery.434 There is no virtue in mastery according to Gregory. The ascetic virtues that Gregory promotes are incompatible with those traditional Roman conceptualizations of mastery. He is unique, too, in that he rejects any type of slaveholding, not only those people who have ‘herds’ of slaves, as the popular saying goes among the early Christians. In a later chapter, when we consider the notion of the commodified body, the notion that Christian authors considered slaves as wealth will be examined. But it should be noted in this instance that Gregory is possibly the only late ancient Christian author who totally rejects the notion that human bodies can be commodified. He rather argues that a human body is a priceless possession, and by implication, owning even one is an inconceivable act of greed and lavishness. Gregory still views slaves as wealth - but they are a wealth that is priceless, and cannot ever be included in the Christian’s life.

Gregory therefore rejects two very potent discourses in the habitus of Roman slaveholding - namely the hierarchical (and, according to Gregory, the proud) nature of

433 Translation: NPNF; Syriac text: Graffin: 1008:

434 Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 346.
slaveholding authority, and the notion that the human body can be commodified. He illustrates that one can maintain Stoic and Philonic views without becoming indifferent to institutional slavery. He is one of the few authors who links the very act of owning a slave to partaking in vice. Stoic (especially Senecan) arguments of the shared experience of life and death, and origin, are widely used in the homily. Its Stoic and Philonic elements may be its only limit - Gregory still creates a space for the concept of God being a slaveholder, something that is also problematic. In order to fully abolish, or at least, reject slavery, one would have to reject the Philonic and later Pauline notion that God, too, is a slaveholder. This Gregory unfortunately does not do, but at least he is not indifferent to institutional slavery. Moreover, not only does he oppose the notion of natural slavery, but also highlights the pride found in Ecclesiastes 2:7 by mentioning slaves and animals in the same verse. It has been seen that slaves were often equated with animals, and Gregory directly rejects this notion (Hom. Eccl. 4.7). Gregory of Nyssa’s homily here is one of the earliest accounts of the outright rejection of slavery. It is true, his arguments are especially directed against the concept of mastery, and the problem of pride that is associated with it, and it is certainly not an abolitionist manifesto, but it is still proof that ancient authors were able to think outside the ‘normality’ and ‘banality’ of slaveholding. The argument that ancient authors could not think outside this box, outside this ‘background’ or ‘social context’ that is the ancient Mediterranean slaveholding culture, becomes more difficult to maintain in the light of writings like this homily. The limits of Gregory’s homily still being acknowledged (the proliferation of the God-as-slaveholder metaphor and the heteronomy of the body), it must still be appreciated for its immense value as an ancient source that outright rejects slaveholding, the concept of mastery and the commodification of the body. Gregory does not give principles of slave-management - there are none for him, slave-management, and slaveholding, are in themselves vices and sins. Oikonomia and domination have their limits.

In Theodore’s interpretation of the haustafeln in Ephesians, he remarks on the prevalence of slaves in the early church, a very important observation (Int. Eph. 6.5). Like most


of the authors above, except Gregory of Nyssa, Theodoret does not address the problem of slavery per se, but also notes that Christian slaves ought to work better because they are not working for earthly masters, but for the heavenly master. In fact, Theodoret remarks that slaves have ‘better’ lives than masters, exactly due to the curative nature of mastery (Prov. 7.677b-680). Masters have more cares and worries than slaves, and slaves may sleep better than master because of this. The argument seems ridiculous, but the argument seems to have been popular in antiquity. Libanius, Chrysostom and Theodoret are quoted in using this argument:

Libanius (Or. 2.5.66-67): Menander, son of Diopeithes, was not lacking in shrewdness. He very often found himself in thrall to his own slaves, and thus felt able to say: ‘There is only one slave in the house: the master.’ And certainly, keeping a slave, in good seasons and in bad, is a real worry. All the slave has to do is cast his eyes towards his master’s hands, whereas the master is obliged to hold out his hands to the slave. He may well complain about the weather, the anger of Zeus, the failure of the winds to blow, and all that hinders the ripening of the crop. But none of these things release him from his performance of his duty to the slave. On the contrary, the land always provides the slave with something, even when it provides nothing. As for clothes and shoes, the cloth is woven and the leather stitched up while he sleeps. If the slave falls ill, he has nothing to be anxious about except his illness; to another falls the worry of seeing to remedies, doctors, incantations. And at the moment of death, there is no need for fear on the subject of burial; the burden of that will fall on the man who, for all that he appears to be a master, is in actual fact a slave.\footnote{Translation: Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 50; Greek text: Teubner: 170: νοῦν δὲ εἶχε Μένανδρος ὁ Διοπείθους καὶ πλείστα τῶν οἰκέταις ἄρα τῶν αὐτοῦ δεδουλευκῶς οὕτως ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν τό· εἷς ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνου χεῖρας ἰδεῖν, τῷ δὲ ὀρέγειν ἀνάγκη. καιρὸν δὲ αἰτιάσασθαι καὶ Διὸς όργην καὶ πνευμάτων ἀποστολὰν καὶ ὁσα καρποφορίαν ἴσχει, τούτων οὐδὲν.
Chrysostom (Hom. I Cor. 6): So, tell me, what use is it when, though not enslaved to a person, you bow in subjection to your passions? Since people often know how to spare; but those masters are never satisfied with your destruction. Are you enslaved to a person? Think about it: your master is also a slave to you, in providing you with food, in taking care of your health and in looking after your shoes and all the other things. And you do not fear so much less you should offend your master; but the master, in the same way, worries if you do not have any of those necessities. But the master sits down, while you stand. So what? Since this may be said of you as well as of the master. Often, at least, when you are lying down and sleeping peacefully, the master is not only standing, but experiencing countless problems in the marketplace; and the master tosses and turns more painfully than you.\footnote{Translation: NPNF; Greek text: PG 61.157.61-158.16: Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, εἰπέ μοι, ὅταν ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν μὴ δουλεύῃς, τοῖς δὲ πάθεσι σεαυτὸν ὑποκατακλίνῃς; Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώποι καὶ φείνανται ἐπίστανται πολλάκις, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ οἱ δεσπόται οὐδέποτε κορέννυνται σου τῆς ἀπωλείας. Δουλεύεις ἀνθρώπω; Ἄλλα καὶ ὁ Δεσπότης σοι δουλεύει, διουκούμενοι σοι τὰ τῆς τροφῆς, ἐπιμελοῦμενος σου τῆς υγείας καὶ ἐνδυμάτων καὶ ὑποδήματων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπαντών φροντιζόν. Καὶ οὐχ οὕτω σὺ δέδοικας, μὴ προσκερούσης τῷ Δεσπότῃ, ὡς ἐκεῖνος δέδοικε μὴ τί σου τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπιλίπη. Ἄλλ’ ἐκείνος κατάκειται, σὺ δὲ ἐστήκας. Καὶ τί τούτο; οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτο παρ’ αὐτῷ μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ παρὰ σοί. Πολλάκις γοῦν σοῦ κατακειμένου καὶ ὑπνοῦντος ἤδεως, ἐκείνος οὐχ ἐστήκε μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ μυρίας ὑπομένει βίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς, καὶ ἀγορυπεῖ σοῦ χαλεπώτερον.}
Theodoret (Prov. 7.677b-680): The master of the house, beset by many worries, considers how to provide for the needs of the slaves, how to pay the state taxes, how to sell his surplus produce and buy what he needs. If the land is unkind to farmers, imitating in this the ingratitude of men to the Creator, the master is distressed, looks around his creditors, pays his accounts, and goes into voluntary slavery...The slave, on the other hand, though a slave in body, enjoys freedom of soul and has none of these worries...He takes his food, rationed no doubt, but he has no anxieties. He lies down to sleep on the pavement, but worry does not banish sleep: on the contrary, its sweetness on his eyelids keeps him from feeling the hardness of the ground. Wisdom, speaking in accordance with nature, said: ‘Sleep is sweet to the slave.’ [Eccl. 5:12]...His master is constantly bothered by indigestion: he takes more than enough, bolts his food, and forces it down. The slave consumes only what he needs, takes what is given to him with moderation, enjoys what he receives, digests it slowly, and it fortifies him for his work. You consider only the slavery of this man; you do not consider his health. You see the work, but not the recompense involved; you complain of toil, but forget the happiness of a carefree life...⁴³⁹

⁴³⁹ Translation: Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 51; PG 83.665-685: Ο μὲν γὰρ τῆς οἰκίας δεσπότης, πολλαῖς πολυορκεῖται φρονίσι, σκοπούμενος ὅπως τοῖς οἰκείοις πορίσῃ τὰς χρείας, ὅπως βασιλεύσῃ τὴν τεταγμένην εἰσφορὰν εἰσενέγκῃ, ὅπως ἀποδῶται μὲν τῶν προσόδων τὰ περιττὰ, ἰνήσηται δὲ τὰ ἐνδέοντα. Ἀγνώσων ἢ γῇ περί τοὺς γητόνους ἐγένετο, τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων περί τὸν Ποιητὴν ἀγνωσώνην οὔτω πας μιμουμένη· ὁ δὲ ἀνιᾶται, καὶ δανειοτὰς περισκοπεῖ, καὶ γραμματεία διαγράφει, καὶ τὴν αὐθαίρετον ἐπισπᾶται δουλείαν... ‘Ο δὲ οἰκέτης τῷ σώματι δουλεύων, ἐλευθέραν ἔχει τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ἀπηλλαγμένην. Οὐ γὰρ ὁδύρεται γῆς ακαρπίαν, οὐδὲ ὄνων ἀπορεῖαν ὀλοφύρεται...μέτωρ λαμβάνει τὸ σιτηρέσιον, ἀλλὰ φροντίδος ἀπηλλαγμένον. Ἐπ’ ἐδάφους καθεύδει, ἀλλ’ οὐ μέριμνα τὸν ὄρνην ἔξελαύνει, ἀλλὰ γλυκὺς αὐτοῦ τὸις βλεφάροις ἐπιχεύομενος ὅποι ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἐδάφους ἀντιτυπίας αἰσθάνεσθαι. Καὶ τοῦτο φυσιολογῶν ὁ Σοφός ἔλεγε· ‘Γλυκὺς ὁ ὄρνην τῷ δούλῳ’...’ Ἀρτὸν ἐσθίει πιτυρίαν, οὐδὲ μικροῦ προσοψήματος ἀπολαύων...
Behind these statements functions the notion of the heteronomous body. What is important to see here, specifically from Chrysostom and Theodoret, is that earthly cares and administrations, *oikonomia* that is, is in themselves something that enslaves the *pater familias*. The argument functions well in Theodoret and Chrysostom’s ascetic moralisms. But we also see the influence from non-Christian Greek authors like Libanius, who taught Chrysostom. It is linked with the Stoic idea that one can be ruled by the passions, only in this instance one is ruled by the responsibilities and general causalities of life. Both Theodoret and Chrysostom’s strategy with this argument is to promote the ascetic life. Shenoute of Atripe, when discussing the hierarchical dynamics of the monastery, makes an almost identical observation, as Krawiec remarks:

[H]e [Shenoute] makes clear that monastic rank was not to mimic the economic rank that existed outside the monastery. ‘Therefore let us not say blasphemously, “Those who rule us are our masters and we are beneath them like servants.”’ Those who rule us are not over us, but we are over them and they are beneath us; indeed, they are our servants because they take care of us, with God’s help, in everything.’

Slave-management then becomes a strategy for promoting asceticism. Chrysostom and Theodoret imply here that the administration of material possessions, including slaves, is an act that enslaves. The point the argument wants to make is that it is not that terrible to occupy the

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position of an institutional slave - it is better to be a slave than a master, since the slave is in this way more ‘free’ than the slaveholder. The ascetic life, with its renunciation of wealth, should not be seen as an inferior life. The renunciation of wealth is what makes one free. Although this argument bears resemblance to Stoic moral slavery, the use of the metaphor in this manner is more problematic. While the Stoic use led to indifference regarding institutional slavery, this argument is not indifferent at all. Institutional slavery is favoured and promoted by such an argument. Institutional slavery, by implication, offers a type of socio-economic protection that seems more favourable than the risks and threats evident in the life of the free person.

Oikonomia, for Theodoret, as well as Libanius and Chrysostom, is therefore considered a life permeated with peril and anxiety, while the life of the slave, which resembles the life of the ascetic, is in fact a ‘better’ and more free life. Institutional slavery is therefore used here in more than a Stoic metaphorical manner. It is used in a shock-argument to promote the simple life of the slave of God, the ascetic. In this case, while the ascetic is morally free, his or her physical existence of simplicity, service and discipline does resemble the life of the institutional slave. In this typically Christian ascetic philosophy we find a conglomeration of elements from Stoicism, Epicureanism, and especially Cynicism. The Stoic elements have already been mentioned. It was also seen earlier in this chapter that Epicurus believed that the desire for unnatural wealth enslaves the person seeking it. The argumentation is very similar here. Epicurus, however, would never ascribe to denouncing all one’s possessions and wealth. He did believe that a measure of wealth is necessary to lead a naturally happy life. The preference in Christian asceticism to live a poor, simple life is more a representation of the Cynic life, one that Epicurus abhorred. The ideological lines of Christian asceticism and Cynicism are quite similar, especially in the notion that rulers are people who are supposed to serve others. Garnsey notes that metaphorical and moral slavery, before entering Stoicism, passed through a Cynic ‘filter.’ This is evident in Diogenes of Sinope’s self-description as a κοσµοπολίτης, a ‘citizen of the world, which implied a rejection of the conventional city and its institutions’ (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil.

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441 Grey, “Slavery in the Late Roman World,” 493.
443 Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 128–33.
6.2).\textsuperscript{444} Diogenes himself was a slave. Diogenes famously, while being displayed at a slave-auction, said to his auctioneers that they should sell him to a rich Corinthian who apparently needed a ‘master.’ With the rise of Christian asceticism, the close philosophical interplays between Stoicism and Cynicism were reimagined, and with the discourses of renouncing wealth and material possessions, also came the renunciation of slaveholding and slave-management. It may have started with early Christian ‘policy’ that there is no longer slave or free (cf. Gal. 3:28; Col. 3:11). As Downing notes, these statements were very much influenced by Cynic and Stoic precepts.\textsuperscript{445} The early Christians never abolished slavery, but rather, they implied that the labels ‘slave’ and ‘free’ have no more significance in ecclesiastical structures. I refer to this as ‘policy,’ since these statements were most likely early baptismal formulæ, and had ceremonial and liturgical function. In early Christian households slaves still had to be managed as the haustafeln imply. It implies that these Christian authors still considered slaves as property, commodified bodies that are part of one’s wealth. Unlike Gregory of Nyssa, who argues from quasi-humanitarian reasons for the rejection of slaveholding, these ascetic authors argue against the possession of slaves within the larger framework of greed and superfluous wealth.

In another commentary on Ecclesiastes, Didymus the Blind also emphasizes the futility of slaveholding, but not in the same way as Gregory (Comm. Eccl. 166.9, 223.3). Didymus, in typical ascetic fashion, groups slaves with wealth that should preferably be avoided. Didymus, however, does allow for the keeping of slaves and quotes the Ephesian haustafeln regarding slave-management. While Didymus is uncomfortable with the idea of having many slaves, it is also moral slavery that is the greatest obstacle to true freedom.\textsuperscript{446} He does admit that someone can be the lord of their wealth without having it rule them, but the contrary seems to be more common. He states (Comm. Eccl. 155.11-17):

\begin{quote}
Of what use is wealth that belongs to someone? He is obviously lord over his wealth. The wealth somebody owns is his amenity and he himself is lord over his wealth. As he himself can use wealth well by being lord over it and not its slave, so also wealth
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{444} Ibid., 132.


\textsuperscript{446} Kontoulis, \textit{Problem der Sklaverei}, 97–99.
can become lord over him who owns it. Woe to that person. That is the case if he is greedy and becomes a slave of mammon.\footnote{Translation: Wright, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon, 244; Greek text: Kramer: 155: πρὸς τί ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτός τινος; ἐστιν δηλον ὁ πλοῦτος τινος; οὗτος οὖν ὁ παρὰ τινι γλυκασµός αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, καὶ αὐτὸς [κύριος] ἐστιν τοῦ πλ[ούτου]: ὥσπερ αὐτὸς δύναται χρήσασθαι καλῶς τῷ πλούτῳ, ἐν κρατῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ μὴ δουλεύων αὐτῷ, τουτέστιν τῷ µαµωνᾷ, τούτω καὶ πλοῦτος δύναται [κ]ρατῆσαι τοῦ ἐχοντος: καὶ οὐαὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐστιν ὅταν φιλάργυρος γένηται, ὅταν δούλος µαµωνά.} 447

We see here, as with most of the late ancient Christian authors, that moral mastery is considered an important trait of the Christian, especially in the ascetic sense. Didymus’ statement above is somewhat unique in that it is not overly negative about wealth. Most of the Christian authors, especially Chrysostom, exhibit a much more suspicious attitude when it comes to riches. Clement of Alexandria, for instance, states (Paed. 3.6): ‘Take away, then, directly the ornaments from women, and domestics from masters, and you will find masters in no respect different from bought slaves in step, or look, or voice, so like are they to their slaves. But they differ in that they are feebler than their slaves, and have a more sickly upbringing.’\footnote{Translation: NPNF; Greek text: SC 3.177: Αὐτίκα γοῦν περίελε τὸν κόσµον τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας τῶν δεσποτῶν, οὓς διαφέροντας τῶν ἄργυρων ἐφησεις τοὺς δεσπότας, οὐκ ἐν βαδίσµατι, οὐκ ἐν βλέµµατι, οὐκ ἐν φθέγµατι οὕτως τοῖν τοῖς ἀνδραπόδοις ἐοίκασιν. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι τῶν οἰκετῶν διακρίνονται καὶ τῷ νοσηλότερον ἀνατεθράφθαι.} He hints here that it is not only power, but the possession of wealth that discerns slaveholders from slaves, but again in typical Stoic fashion, if all these elements of wealth are removed, there is no difference between the slaveholder and the slave.

In the discussion above, we have seen how many of the ancient Christian commentators on the haustafeln reimagined and transformed the principles found in these texts to suit the needs of a Christianity that has developed much since the New Testament haustafeln were written. It is important to note that despite the clear continuities among many of the late ancient Christian authors discussed above, each should also be read on his own if the more subtle discourses are to be understood. Some, like Gregory of Nyssa, differ quite dramatically from the views of others,
for instance, Theodoret. The continuities, however, for the purpose of this study is very important. Several discursive continuities have come to the fore in the above readings:

Firstly, all of the authors mentioned above utilized the Stoic/Philonic slave-master metaphor in their own virtue-discourse. The heteronomy of the body is assumed in all these metaphors, and priority was always placed on serving the heavenly master, especially if the commands of the earthly master were in conflict with Christian theological principles. This would have a very physical effect on the management and governing of slave-bodies in the early church. With the development of Christian tradition, various issues not addressed in biblical texts had to be articulated. One of the most important issues in this instance was the regulation regarding slaveholding and sexuality. While the New Testament is quite cryptic in most instances about this issue, many late ancient Christian authors directly addressed the issue. It was especially evident in the writings of Basil the Great. The control of slave-sexuality was not only an issue of household mastery, but was now directly addressed through church polity. The slaveholder, if a Christian, had to ensure chaste behaviour of slaves, and shameful actions of slaves would reflect onto the slaveholder; hence the importance of knowing the sexual history of one’s slaves. The regulation of slave-sexuality, as a subset of slave-management and oikonomia, not only concerns issues of Christian sexual ethics but were inextricably connected with socio-political matters. The preservation of the Roman patriminium was still of absolute importance to the Christian authors, and sexual relationships between slaves and owners were forbidden to ensure the patriminium remained in the hands of legitimate heirs. Even Christian regulations on child-exposure, similar to Midrashic texts, were based on the protection of Christian-Roman identity and inheritance. Marriages between slaves were also closely monitored, and any marriage outside the knowledge of the slaveholder was considered illegal. The slaveholder, therefore, still had absolute authority in slave familial matters. The governance of conjugality among slaves also represents a discourse of othering and abnormalizing. By creating the category of abnormality that includes slaves, by creating a type of sub-humanity, even half-human half-animal, the juridical discourses that govern and shape society are brought into disturbance.449

The matter above is not simply one of protecting the Roman patriminium nor ensuring the bounds of mastery stay intact; the laws are applied to slaves in a very different manner than to

free persons - this was evident from as early as the examinations of Xenophon and Plato. Once one subscribes to arguments based on nature and naturalization (even, as with the Christian authors above, the recognition that slavery is ‘unnatural’), the juridical effects of transgressions from people who deviate from ‘nature’ and the ‘natural’ are altered. Both slaves and women, as is evident from the works of Ambrose, are objectified in the realm of conjugal matters, and similar marriage laws were applicable between Romans and non-Romans or barbarians.450 These discursivities are also present in the non-Christian authors of late antiquity. The Syrian Neoplatonist Iamblichus states: ‘For by education merely men differ from wild beasts, the Greeks from the barbarians, those that are free from slaves, and the philosophers from the vulgar’ (Pyth. vit. 8).451 As objects, they receive a certain value and are measured by certain traits, they become commodified and by implication, especially in the case of slave, disposable. The juridical boundaries serve to enforce the carcerality of such bodies, and the special juridical circumstances and measures symbolically confine them to the category of unnaturals and abnormals. The juridical regulation of the abnormals has yet another function - it serves as a technology for the punishment of extreme crimes committed by those grouped among the normals. The punishment for the crimes of free, Greek/Roman men were harsh, but they seldomly received the punishments reserved for slaves. When they do receive such punishments, it serves as technology for prevention of similar, heinous crimes and the previously labelled ‘normal’ person now also becomes a human monster, since he or she is punished like other abnormals and monsters of society. It is a volatile resort by the governing authorities since it tends to also stain the reputation of those in power who apply the punishment. The fourth century Roman imperial biographer Aurelius Victor, for instance, after praising the emperor Constantine the Great as one who was merciful to his enemies and treated them with honour, leading to


Constantine’s divinization, he defames Constantine’s rival Licinius by stating: ‘Licinius performed tortures applicable to slaves in unlimited numbers even on innocent philosophers of nobility’ (Caes. 41). In the thinking of Aurelius Victor, the shame of the juridical procedure is now reflected back on Licinius, who becomes the human monster and outcast, while the opposite behaviour of Constantine made him divine. To continue, the bodies of slaves were also governed when it came to religious matters, and here the material effects of metaphorical and moral slavery become the most apparent. Slaves who served in non-Christian rituals in behalf of lapsi-slaveholders were punished with a year’s penance in some cases, and that is only if they were forced by their owners. The original policies found in the haustafeln now become more complex, and those original codes serve only the interest of authorizing, that is, granting authority to, more specialized and recent juridical sub-codes; they are no longer practical as such. The rise and popularisation of asceticism also complicated the matter. Issues like the management of virginity had to be specifically articulated within the context of slave-management. The inclusion of slaves in monasteries is even more complex. This issue will also be discussed in chapter 4, but what may be noted now is that even though monasteries claimed to nullify social hierarchical models, the extent to which this was practised remains ambiguous. Some sources, Chrysostom included, profess that monasteries know no difference between slave and master; others, like Shenoute of Atripe, even said that the monastic setting reversed the roles. No doubt then that proponents of asceticism consciously utilized the slave-metaphor to construct their view of the ascetic life. Often, the lifestyles of institutional slaves were lauded as a good life since it so closely represented the ascetic and monastic life. Moreover, since the use of the slave-metaphor was so effective in constructing otherness and abnormality, it was used extensively in Christian and non-Christian invective rhetoric. The abnormal other is not only constructed, but also shamed with the use of the slave-metaphor. This type of othering, or heterography, promotes the values embodied by the heterographer, and vilifies those of the opposing group of abnormals. Heterologies, or discourses on the other, are therefore crucial to the conceptualisation of the self. The notions of difference and discontinuity, even disorientation, allow for the existence of

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452 Translation: De Wet; Latin text: Teubner: 125; Licinio ne insontium quidem ac nobilium philosophorum servili more cruciatus adhibiti modum fecere.

their opposites. It is also true however, as Foucault has noted, that heterological dichotomies are in many instances merely illusions and fictions, but their manifestations in the spheres of history and society are still active and influential. Such heterological formations serve, in the context of late antiquity, as boundary markers that promote and enforce social group-cohesion. It should also be acknowledged that the temptation for the historian of heterologies explicitly lies in the dangers of parallelism. It would be quite easy to start examining the other by drawing parallels of its opposites, but conceptually it proves to be problematic and futile. Rather, many post-colonial studies have shown that there is an explicit conflation of identities when competing groups and cultures encounter one another, often resulting in operations of transculturation and in the translation of subtle underlying grammars of difference; thus identity is invented and negotiated. Rather than fishing for strict parallels or rigid opposites, the historian of heterologies would do better to make a case based on shared conceptual, rhetorical and behavioural patterns. This is very important for understanding the nature of the habitus, which is in essence a dynamic process of negotiation and reimagination in itself. The use of the slave-metaphor as a subset of the habitus of Roman slaveholding is one such shared pattern. While Christian authors were slandering their opponents by calling them slaves of the belly and, as Knust has illustrated, slaves of lust and sexual desire, opponents of Christianity often utilised the same rhetoric. Porphyry, for instance, states that the author of the Gospel according to

455 The works that have most influenced my own opinion on this matter are: Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage, 1994); Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism (The New Critical Idiom; Abingdon: Routledge, 1998); Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 2004).
456 Knust, Abandoned to Lust, 15–50.
457 Porphyry, being a Neoplatonist, also fully subscribed to notions of moral slavery. In writing on abstinence, he states (Abst. 3.27.74-81): ‘But those who are liberated from slavery obtain for themselves what they before procured for their masters. In like manner, also, do you, when liberated from the servitude of the body, and a slavish attention to the passions produced through the body, as, prior to this, you nourished them in an all-various manner with externals, so now nourish yourself all-variously with internal good, justly assuming things which are [properly] your own, and no longer by violence taking away things which are foreign [to your true nature and real good].’ Translation: Taylor, Porphyry, 130; Greek text: Teubner: 211: οἱ δὲ γε ἐλευθερωθέντες ἃ πάλαι τοῖς δεσπόταις ὑπηρετοῦντες ἐπόριζον, ταῦτα ἐαυτοῖς πορίζουσιν. οὐκ ἄλλως καὶ σὺ τοῖνυν ἄπαλλαγεις τῆς τοῦ σώματος [δουλείας] καὶ τῆς τοῖς πάθεσι τοῖς διὰ τὸ σώμα λατρείας, ὡς ἐκεῖνα ἐτρεφες
Matthew had the mind of a slave (Contr. Chr. 1(fr.).13; from Macarius, Apoc. 4.3) and when speaking of Paul the apostle’s comment that he mimicked those people he preached to in order to convert them, Porphyry states (Contr. Chr. 1(fr.).27.1-12; from Macarius, Apoc. 3.30):

Tell me how it was that Paul said: ‘Although I have made myself a slave for all that I could gain’ (1 Cor. 9:19), and how he called circumcision mutilation, and then circumcised a certain Timothy as taught in the Acts of the Apostles (Acts 16:3). The absolute stupidity of it all! Is it a means of provoking laughter that such a stage, such theatre scenes are portrayed. Indeed this is the show jugglers give. For how could he be free if he made himself a slave of all? And how can a man gain them all who is serving all? For he is without law for those who are without law, as he says. And he was a Jew to the Jews, and spoke with them all in similar fashion. He was truly the slave of manifold evil, and totally a stranger to freedom. Truly he is a servant and minister of other evil people, and an unseemingly zealot to unworthy causes if he offers diatribes against the wickedness of those without the law, nevertheless making their activities his own.\textsuperscript{458}

\textsuperscript{458} Translation: Robert M. Berchman, \textit{Porphyry Against the Christians} (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 206; Greek Text: Von Harnack: 59:

\begin{quote}
παντοίως τοῖς ἐξωθὲν, οὕτως αὐτὸν θρέψεις παντοίως τοῖς ἐνδοθέν, δικαίως ἄπολαμβάνων τὰ ἰδιὰ καὶ οὐκέτι τὰ ἀλλότρια βία ἀφαιρούμενος.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
πῶς ὁ Παῦλος, ᾿Ελεύθερος γὰρ ὄν, λέει, πᾶσιν ἐμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα, ἵνα πάντας κερδήσω; πῶς δὲ καὶ τὴν περιτομὴν λέγων κατατομὴν αὐτὸς ἐν Λύστροις περιτέεµμνει τινά, Τιµόθεον, ὡς αἱ Πράξεις τῶν ἀποστόλων διδάσκουσιν; εὐ̇ γε τῆς ὄντως ὃς ἀληθείας τῶν ῥηµάτων·∙ τοιούτων ὁκρίβαντα, γελοίου µηχανήµατα, αἱ τῶν θεάτρων σκηναὶ ζωγραφοῦσι·∙ τοιοῦτον θαυµµατοποιῶν ὄντως τὸ παραπάγνιον. πῶς γὰρ ἐλεύθερος ὃ [παρὰ] πάσι δουλούµενος; πῶς δὲ πάντας κερδάινει ὁ πάντας καθικετε ἅνως, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἁνόµιοις ἄνοµοις, ὡς αὐτὸς λέει, καὶ τοῖς Ὠουδαίοις Ὠουδαίος καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁµοίως συνήχετο, ὄντως πολυτρόπου κακίας ἀνδράποδον, καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ξένον καὶ
\end{quote}
Here, we see a criticism against Paul for being a slave to the opinions of other people. By mimicking other people, Paul, according to Porphyry, inadvertently became their slave. In a very revealing yet emotional passage, another late ancient opponent of Christianity, Eunapius vehemently tirades against the reverence of monks and the cult of the martyrs (	extit{Vit. Eust.}): 

They settled these monks at Canobus also, and thus they fettered the human race to the worship of slaves, and those not even honest slaves, instead of the true gods. For they collected the bones and skulls of criminals who had been put to death for numerous crimes, men whom the law courts of the city had condemned to punishment, made them out to be gods, haunted their sepulchres, and thought that they became better by defiling themselves at their graves. “Martyrs” the dead men were called, and “ministers” of a sort, and “ambassadors” from the gods to carry men's prayers, - these slaves in vilest servitude, who had been consumed by stripes and carried on their phantom forms the scars of their villainy.\footnote{Translation: Wilmer C. F. Wright, \textit{Philostratus and Eunapius: The Lives of the Sophists} (London: W. Heinemann, 1922), 425; Greek text: Giangrande: 38: τοὺς δὲ µοναχοὺς τούτους καὶ εἰς τὸν Κάνωβον καθίδρυσαν, ἀντὶ τῶν νοητῶν θεῶν εἰς ἀνδραπόδων θεραπείας, καὶ οὐδὲ χρηστῶν, καταδήσαντες τὸ ἀνθρώπινον. ὥστε αἷς καὶ κεφαλὰς τῶν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς ἀμαρτήμασιν ἐνοπλοῦτων συναλίζοντες, οὕς τὸ πολιτικὸν ἐκολαξεῖ δικαστήριον, θεοὺς τε ἀπεδείκνυσαν, καὶ προσεκαλινδοῦντο τοῖς ὄστοις καὶ κρείττους ὑπελάμβανον εἶναι µολυνόµενοι πρὸς τοῖς τάφοις. µάρτυρες γοῦν ἐκαλοῦντο καὶ διάκονοι τινες καὶ πρέσβεις τῶν αἰτήσεων παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, ἀνδραπόδα δεδουλευκότα κακῶς, καὶ µάστει καταδεδαπανηµένα, καὶ τὰς τῆς µοχθηρίας ὀπειρὰς ἐν τοῖς εἰδώλοις φέροντα.}

The Christian monks and the cult of the veneration of the Christian martyrs, which they promoted, are vilified by Eunapius as being slave-like. The martyrs are not true gods, but in fact
slaves and these base people worship them. The use of the slave-metaphor in Christian and non-Christian invective was quite prevalent in late ancient sources.

Secondly, many late ancient Christian authors also approach slavery as a labour-issue. Some stated that by becoming Christian, the slave should become a better slave. Christian slaves ought to work better and harder than non-Christian slaves. We have seen the negative slave-stereotypes present in the habitus of Roman slaveholding, and this argument seems to be a strategy that aims to invert the stereotypes in favour of promoting the Christian faith. This strategy comes at a high cost for the slaves, but these arguments aim to construct a new stereotype, or even a literary type, namely that of the faithful and hardworking Christian slave. To many, this is an ideal, one that is achievable, since ought implies can, but most of the late ancient Christian authors reserved their suspicious and stereotypical views of slaves.

Thirdly, the phenomenon of slavery was directly associated with the development of Christian hamartiology. Christian authors of late antiquity linked slavery and sin, noted by Davis: ‘...[A]s early Christians repeatedly conceived of sin and salvation in terms of slavery and freedom, the words acquired complex layers of meaning that necessarily affected men’s response to the institution of slavery.’ It tied in very closely with concepts of nature and naturalness, and thus also with notions of normality and abnormality. Christian and non-Christian myths of origins come into play here, and we have seen that some Christian authors like Ambrosiaster saw complex interrelational links between authority/mastery, and pre- or postlapsarian states of existence. The hierarchy between male and female was seen as being prelapsarian, but that between slave and owner postlapsarian. Slavery was so embedded in the ancient worldview that it would occupy an integral role in the cosmologies and theories of politics of Christian and non-Christian thinkers alike. Plato is an excellent example here. Davis states that Plato ‘saw the relation of slave to master as a kind of microcosm of the hierarchical pattern that pervaded society and the entire universe.’ We have already discussed Aristotle’s notion of natural slavery, which is also interwoven in natural constructions of the universe. The prevalence of slavery-discourses in cosmologies and other archetypical and foundation myths of the Graeco-Roman world also became quite prominent in Christian conceptualisations of the myth of origins. Even though most Christian authors did not consider slavery as a natural phenomenon (with the

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460 Davis, *Problem of Slavery*, 84.
461 Ibid., 67.
exception, interestingly enough, of Athanasius (C. Ar. 2.51.253c)), it was still active and functional in nature, despite its unnaturalness. The same was believed of sin. The function of myths of origins and cosmogonies is not to explain how things came into being as such, but rather to justify why and how things are the way they are in present times. It therefore provides an explanation for various social institutions. Most prominent here is the institution of the household and the relationships between husband and wife, parents and children and, of course, slaves and masters. The close relationship between the institution of the household and oikonomia are seen already in the haustafeln, with their numerous references to texts in Genesis, and in Gregory of Nyssa’s rejection of institutional slavery, he constantly refers to Christian myths of origins. The institution of slavery is therefore also explained in terms of the origins of existence. Davis remarks: ‘In the eyes of Christians the independent, natural man, idealized by primitivists in all ages, was a sinner who, lacking the essential capacity for virtue, bore a certain resemblance to Aristotle’s natural slave.’ While Christian authors denied the notion of the slave by nature, authors like Basil believed that slavery came into being as the result of wars, poverty and child-exposure. All these are important hamartiological formations. The other problem is that the concept of ‘nature’ in late ancient Christian thinking is quite complex. Clark states that nature can serve as a synonym for several other concepts like ‘God’ and ‘humanity’. The so-called ‘order of God’ (ordo dei) and the order of nature (ordo naturalis) are very much intertwined in ancient Christian thinking. Here we also see the complexities of the animalization of slaves so common in ancient authors. In ancient virtue-discourse, slaves are often grouped with animals. Moreover, Jacoby has argued that slavery is in fact the domestication of the human being, since many of the same technologies used to domesticate animals were also used on slaves. The move from the ‘naturalness’ of slavery to its psychotheological link with sin is certainly an interesting shift in thinking between the classical and late ancient period. As shown above in the first point of summary here, these

462 Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 14.
463 Davis, Problem of Slavery, 85.
464 Cf. Elizabeth A. Clark, “Ideology, History and the Construction of ‘Woman’ in Late Ancient Christianity,” in A Feminist Companion to Patristic Literature (Amy-Jill Levine and Maria M. Robbins (eds); London: T&T Clark, 2008), 111; Winkler, Constraints of Desire, 17–18; Knust, Abandoned to Lust, 94–98.
conceptualisations of difference, otherness, abnormality and sinfulness spill over into the juridical domain. Several of the legal codices of late antiquity state that slavery is the result of the *ius gentium* and not the *ius naturale*.\(^{466}\) Although the contents of the argument changed, the material manifestations of slaveholding in Christian and non-Christian times were not very different. The issue of domination is also important in this discussion. Although he writes in a slightly later period, Augustine has elaborated on the word *dominetur*, and believed that it dictated that human beings should have had control over creation, especially over non-human creatures (cf. *C. Jul.* 4.12.61).\(^{467}\) As Gregory of Nyssa has written, it was not supposed to be dominion over other human beings. Slavery therefore represents a reversal in the ‘original’ (or, myth of origins) motif of domination. Human beings are now dominated by sin, and so the concept of the heteronomous body becomes more evident. It will be shown in chapter 4 how central the issue of sin is when it comes to the notion of the heteronomy of the body. The text in Genesis 1:26 becomes the key to this hermeneutic. The unnatural now becomes the natural, and so all people accept unnatural institutions like slavery. Institutional slavery became a banal phenomenon,\(^{468}\) and the popularization of Stoic moral slavery in this period did not aid the situation. Conceptualizations of slavery and hamartiology also then defined ancient Christian views of freedom and agency, and here again Genesis 1:26 plays a pivotal role. In some of the earlier Christian authors, the prelapsarian picture of Adam and Eve before the fall was articulated in terms of infantility - they were seen as being innocent children before the fall. Irenaeus illustrates this concept (*Epid.* 14):

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\(^{467}\) In his exegesis on the same pericope, John Chrysostom shares this view later propagated by Augustine; cf. *Hom. Genes.* 8.

Thoughts were innocent and childlike, and they had no conception or imagination of the sort that is engendered in the soul by evil, through concupiscence, and by lust...They were in their integrity, preserving their natural state, for what had been breathed into their frame was the spirit of life.\textsuperscript{469}

The problem in Irenaeus’ eyes was that Adam did not have sound judgement, and therefore he was misled by the devil. Clement of Alexandria (\textit{Protrep.} 11) also calls the pre-lapsarian Adam ‘free as a child at play.’ He elaborates by saying that the ‘freedom’ offered by the devil resulted in the enslavement of all human beings.\textsuperscript{470} In early Christian art, the same motif is present, such as the case of a fourth-century Christian sarcophagus in the Musée de l’Arles Antique that depicts God creating two small, nude, childlike figures representing Adam and Eve.\textsuperscript{471} It is therefore becoming quite evident that the shape of Christian theology as we have it today, which was moulded through centuries of theologizing, is directly related to and even the result of various views on and utilizations of ancient institutional slavery. Slavery was one of the main elements that made Christian theology what it is today.

7 \hspace{1cm} \textbf{CONCLUSION}

To conclude, this chapter had the twofold aim of, firstly, revisiting and reconstructing key contexts related to the Roman habitus of slaveholding. These were especially the oeconomical writings of the Hellenistic and early Roman authors. Secondly, it also had the purpose of evaluating the most important texts and traditions that would serve as the basis of John Chrysostom’s homilies, namely the documents of early Judeo-Christianity. What results has this chapter displayed?

One of the key discourses in the habitus of Roman slaveholding is that of \textit{oikonomia}. Slave-management was seen as a subset of this highly masculine discourse. The early Hellenistic authors had much to say about \textit{oikonomia} and slave-management, and views were especially

\textsuperscript{469} Translation: Boniface Ramsey, \textit{Beginning to Read the Fathers} (New Jersey: Paulist, 1985), 56; original Armenian text not available to author at the time of writing.

\textsuperscript{470} Ramsey, \textit{Beginning to Read the Fathers}, 57.

divided between notions of slaves as outsiders, from Xenophon, and Aristotle’s natural slaves. From the early Roman sources, it seems as if Xenophon’s views were more influential than Aristotle’s, except for Philodemus who refers to the pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica*, although the concept of natural slavery is practically absent in this document. Notwithstanding Aristotle’s famous decree that slaves are inferior by nature, his influence on the formation of the Roman habitus of slaveholding may be limited, since the library of Theophrastus was lost and only recovered some years later while Xenophon’s work was being translated into Latin by Cicero and cited by Cato and Varro.\(^{472}\) Not that Aristotle had no influence, but when reading the writings of the Roman agricultural authors like Cato, Varro and Columella, it is clear that Xenophonian ideas were more dominant.\(^{473}\) While Aristotle focused on nature as a larger framework for understanding systems of domination, Xenophon was more concerned about the control of slaves as social outsiders. Furthermore, both Xenophon and Plato subscribed to holistic *oikonomia*, that is, that the management of the household represented a microcosm for state governance. Aristotle and Philodemus problematized this issue and did not accept it at face value. The notion that *oikonomia* is holistic, specifically deriving from Xenophon and Plato, would serve as the foundation for later formulations of domination, household governance and slaveholding. Most importantly for this study, it set the scene for the Stoic philosophers’ notions of divine *oikonomia*, the belief that the great divine householder governs the universe. It would result in an author like Seneca especially emphasising the mutual origins of and governing *hegemonikon* over both the institutional slave and his or her master. The Stoics, as well as Philo, represent a bridge between the Hellenistic authors and the early Christian authors of the *haustafeln* and Pastoral Epistles. It would provide the conceptual continuity necessary for the development of Christian pastoral governmentality.

Since *oikonomia* is holistic, and slaveholding simply another manifestation of a more universal dynamic of domination, some crucial measures of social control among slaves were present. Both the Hellenistic and early Roman authors emphasized the importance of controlling


\(^{473}\) Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus* was translated into Latin by Cicero around 85 BCE, and both Cato and Varro were very much influenced by Xenophon; cf. Jesper Carlsen, “Estate Managers in Ancient Greek Agriculture,” in *Ancient History Matters: Studies Presented to Jens Erik Skydsgaard on His Seventieth Birthday* (Karen Ascani (ed.); Rome: L’Erma di Bretschneider, 2002), 122.
the passions of the slave if he or she were to function optimally. This would imply regulations on food, sexual intercourse and religious participation. With the rise of the Roman Republic and the development of large villa-estates, the control of slaves would become more important yet more difficult, as is evident from the writings of Cato, Varro and Columella. From this crisis the *vilicus* figure was introduced, a slave that would control other slaves. The *vilicus* would ideally be a mirror of the absent *pater familias*. As the discourse of rural slave-management developed, so too would urban slaveholding be influenced. The *vilicus* concept, with its accompanying dynamic of mirroring or duplicating the absentee *pater familias*, would also be highly influential in the development of Christian slave-management in the context of a holistic and divine *oikonomia*. The notion of control, mastery and domination would, however, experience another transformation, again from the Stoic, who now introduced the concept of moral slavery, and the control of one’s own passions as the cornerstone of self-mastery. The slave, as a surrogate for the master, would now also have to master his or her own passions. Moral and metaphorical slavery would gain preference in both Stoic and Christian authors, at the cost of ignoring the problem of institutional slavery. It would however now become important for slaves to be loved by their masters and taught virtue.

With these important developments of the habitus of Roman slaveholding in mind, what were the main characteristics of those traditions and sources that would influence Chrysostom? The most important influences in this case would be that of Xenophon and the Stoics. Xenophon’s notions of slaves as outsiders rather than natural slaves would become widespread, and Xenophon and Plato’s notions of a holistic *oikonomia*, along with the Stoic divine *oikonomia*, would serve as the foundation for the Christian pastoral model of governance, which is also holistic and based on divine *oikonomia*. In its early stages, Christian *oikonomia* and slave-management could be understood as social contracts, and in the case of slaveholding, would give rise to a complex hierarchy based on both Christic panopticism and duplication. The same Hellenistic and Roman concepts of normalization via masculinization would take place, while at the same time, a culture of passivity and suffering would be promoted, and slaves encouraged to be morally free despite institutional repression. The Christic panopticism would utilize the *vilicus* and absentee *pater familias* concept in a theological-ethical sense, to show that all humans, slave and free, are like *vilici*, and Christ the all-seeing slaveholder. The Christic duplication is based on the notion that all slaves are degenerate and in need of normalization by
means of psychagogy. These concepts abound in ancient Judaism, as seen especially in the Mishnah, and hence the strict rules of governance of slaves by the Christian *pater familias* in the *haustafeln*. The notion of the church as a place of normalization is common in this instance, and is again a preset of early Christian pastoralism.

These discourses are also found frequently in late antiquity, among both Christian and non-Christian authors. The most important issues here are the development of pastoral governmentality as well as late ancient Christian theology and ethics. Resembling a clear influence from both the Graeco-Roman and early Judeo-Christian traditions, the late ancient Christian authors had to deal with the issue of slaveholding. The only author that shows clear resistance to slavery is Gregory of Nyssa, although he does accept moral slavery and the notion of God as a slaveholder. All the others accept slavery as a consequence of sin, and hence something to be managed and strictly controlled using various technologies of pastoral governance. These late ancient authors all advised the humane and fair treatment of slaves, also seen in the Hellenistic and Roman authors. The humanity of the slave, however, simply functions as another technology for oppressing the slave (see chapter 4). They were especially concerned with managing slave-sexuality and labour, and the figure of the ideal Christian slave was always expected to do better work, or be a better slave, than a non-Christian. Stoic-Philonic notions of moral slavery are common to all, and slave-metaphors were used to formulate doctrine and ethics and also served as invective to slander opponents. In this way, group-identity and cohesion was maintained, and the slave-metaphor within invective rhetoric occupied a central role in the formation of ‘others’ or heterographies. Slaves were also considered property in the early Judeo-Christian tradition, an issue that late ancient authors would constantly grapple with in their writings.

Up to this point, we have discussed the main authors writing on *oikonomia* and slave-management in antiquity. This chapter also served as a foundation to understanding how the Roman habitus of slaveholding came into being, how it worked and how it was transformed during the early period of Judeo-Christian tradition. The rest of this dissertation will now build on this and focus specifically on John Chrysostom. Both the diachronic and synchronic developments were evaluated. It is important to remember that this chapter was not primarily directed at showing how these ancient authors ‘influenced’ John Chrysostom’s writings. This is difficult to prove. While it is quite likely that Chrysostom read texts like those of Xenophon and
Aristotle, some may have never received his gaze. What is important is that these texts represent the complex Roman habitus of slaveholding, a habitus in which Chrysostom also found himself. The ideologically discursive tides programmed over the centuries by the authors mentioned above, wash over the words and arguments of Chrysostom, inevitably leaving their mark on his words and thoughts. We will now move on to examine how John Chrysostom understood oikonomia and slave-management, specifically by looking at his own commentaries on the deutero-Pauline haustafeln.
CHAPTER 3

THE DOMESTIC BODY:

JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, SLAVERY AND THE ANCIENT DISCOURSE OF

OIKONOMIA

1 INTRODUCTION

From this point on the study will specifically focus on John Chrysostom’s views on oikonomia and slave-management. It will use his homilies, which also serve as commentaries, on the New Testament haustafeln as the basis, but will also examine other relevant texts. We have seen that the New Testament haustafeln represented a very early and primitive move towards a pastoral form of governmentality in which slave-management was a key discourse both literally and metaphorically. There are two sides to this issue; in the first instance, the Christian bishops of the later Roman Empire would use these texts as scriptural apparatus in their role as domestic advisors and, secondly, their domestic advice would also be applied in a larger, more holistic sense - ecclesiastical governmentality. The first part of this section will therefore aim to understand this role of the bishop as domestic advisor and what the implications were for church governance. Thereafter we will focus on Chrysostom’s comments on the haustafeln in his homilies, specifically focussing on slave-management.

2 THE BISHOP AS DOMESTIC ADVISOR

The formation of the Christian household in late antiquity was directly related, as Sessa has shown, to the formation of episcopal authority. The family and household in this instance were

used as a strategy for implanting certain matrices of power-knowledge and forms of authority outside and within the church. Sessa states:

The household, however, also played a formative cultural role in the making of episcopal authority. The ancient household was not a marginal female space only obliquely relevant to the governing of the city and state. It was a highly masculine institution, the empire’s primary unit of production and wealth, and the most morally revealing realm with respect to the character and capacities of its leaders.\(^{475}\)

Sessa has convincingly linked the formation of the late Roman Christian household with the formation of ecclesiastical modes of authority. In this process, we find that bishops act as domestic advisors, instructing Christians how to govern their households, and at the same time, having to govern their own ‘household,’ namely the church. In the Christian period of the Roman Empire, we find that the form of governmentality was pastoralism, with pastoral discourses already permeating Christian formations of household codes, as we have seen. The holistic and duplicatory nature of this type of government was not novel in ancient times, and we have seen that the views of authors like Xenophon or Plato on holistic \textit{oikonomia} certainly paved the way for a holistic (not pastoral, though) type of governmentality. At this point, I want to reflect a bit more on Michel Foucault’s discussion of the development of the Christian pastorate in late antiquity as a form of government, and delineate its relevance for the study at hand.\(^{476}\)

Notwithstanding the conceptual linkage with Hellenistic politicoology, Foucault argues that the shepherd-flock model of government was something that has its roots especially in the ancient Near East, most notably from Egyptian, Assyrian and Israelite sources.\(^{477}\) The history of the Israelites is often seen as God’s flock’s ‘wanderings in search of its pasture.’\(^{478}\) He has also

\(^{475}\) Ibid., 1.


\(^{477}\) Ibid., 136.

\(^{478}\) Ibid., 151.
shown that pastoral governmentality was not a common theme in ancient Greek literature. The Christian adoption of this metaphor and model for directing governance was directly related to its Yahwehistic and Judaistic heritage. Although some Greek sources, like Homer’s *Ilias* and *Odyssea*, do use the term shepherd to refer to the king, its influence may have been from Assyrian sources.\(^\text{479}\) There are then also the Neo-Pythagorean references to Zeus as god-shepherd, but these are also limited and somewhat marginal. The metaphor is therefore quite rare.

The one important exception from Greek literature that Foucault points out is that of Plato, specifically from his *Respublica*, *Leges* and *Politicus*.\(^\text{480}\) The importance of these writings has been discussed earlier in this study, and it is not surprising that their relevance resurfaces here. According to Foucault, the *Respublica* and *Leges* exhibit three important features for understanding the shepherd-flock model of governance. In the first instance, the metaphor has a theological origin. The gods are considered as the original shepherds of humanity. In his *Critias*, Plato states (Crit. 109-b-c):

...[T]hey [i.e., the gods] tended us, their nurselings and possessions, as shepherds tend their flocks, excepting only that they did not use blows or bodily force, as shepherds do, but governed us like pilots from the stern of the vessel, which is an easy way of guiding animals, holding our souls by the rudder of persuasion according to their own pleasure; thus did they guide all mortal creatures.\(^\text{481}\)

\(^{479}\) Ibid., 136. It was a metaphor that would also develop with the eschatology of Second Temple Judaism; cf. Zech. 11:4-17.

\(^{480}\) Ibid., 136–43.

\(^{481}\) Translation: Benjamin Jowett, *Dialogues of Plato: Translated Into English, With Analyses and Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 600; Greek text: Burnet [TLG]: ...δίως δὴ κλήροις τὸ φίλον λαγχάνοντες κατώκιζον τὰς χώρας, καὶ κατοικίσαντες, οίνον νομῆς ποίμνια, κτήματα καὶ θρέμματα ἑαυτῶν ἡμᾶς ἔτρεφον, πλὴν οὐ σώματι σώματα βιαζόμενοι, καθάπερ ποιμένες κτήνη πληγή νέμοντες, ἀλλ’ ἡ μάλιστα εὐστροφὸν ζῴου, έκ πρύμνης ἀπευθύνοντες, οίνον οίακι πειθοῦ ψυχῆς ἐφαπτόμενοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν, οὕτως ἄγοντες τὸ θνητὸν πάν ἐκυβέρνων.
We see here an understanding of theological pastoralism functioning as the mythical and archetypical model of governance, almost a prelapsarian, if we can use this term, or utopian form of governance. There is no violence, but rather gentle yet stern rulership. The second feature Foucault highlights is the instances in which the magistrates are seen as shepherds of the human flock. The magistrate does not function as the founder-figure of the city, but rather its overseer, as Foucault states: ‘The magistrate-shepherd - this is completely typical and entirely clear in The Laws - is in fact a subordinate magistrate. He is something between a watchdog strictly speaking, let’s say brutally, a policeman, and someone who is the real master or legislator of the city-state.'

The third feature, as found in book 1 of Republic is the notion that the shepherd is not egoistic, but devotes himself entirely to the well-being of the sheep (Resp. 1.343b-344c). This concept also became popular in the Gospel literature of the New Testament. Foucault then continues to note Plato’s Politicus as an anomaly. Plato’s politician is someone who governs the flock, who gives commands to a herd of people. Here the shepherd receives an emphasis of imperativity that defines his being and essentially, his function. This would have a significant impact on how we would understand mastery, since mastery is, after all, in its very basic form, the giving of commands. Along with the shepherd metaphor, Foucault also highlights Plato’s use of the metaphor of the weaver. The image of the weaver is more related to oikonomia than that of the shepherd. The weaver has several tasks that define his role: shearing, twisting the yarn etc. In the same manner, the politician has tasks of governmentality, or political tasks, that define his role. Foucault states: ‘In this way, with his specific art, very different from all the others, the political weaver forms the most magnificent fabric and “the entire population of the state, both slaves and free men,” Plato goes on to say, “are enveloped in the folds of this magnificent fabric”’ (cf. Plato, Pol. 311c).

But in terms of the history of the development of the pastorate, except for the Neo-Pythagoreans and Plato, there are few other sources that show its prevalence in Greek thought. Plato’s own concept also received much critique in Hellenistic literature. Despite its prevalence in Israelite sources, Foucault concludes by saying:

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482 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 139.
483 Ibid., 145–47.
484 Ibid., 146.
485 Ibid., 147.
The real history of the pastorate as the source of a specific type of power over men, as a model and matrix of procedures for the government of men, really only begins with Christianity... The Church is a religion that thus lays claim to the daily government of men in their real life on the grounds of their salvation and on the scale of humanity...  

The rise and function of pastoral power in early Christianity was considered in itself an art. Ambrose, in *De officiis ministrorum* and Chrysostom himself, in *De sacerdotio*, would write long, emotional treatises on the subject. The governance and organization of the church is therefore based on pastoral power. Although the church professes to remain separate and distinct from political power, it was inevitably intertwined with state politics especially after the Edict of Milan.  

It also had direct implications for the formation of Christian morality in late antiquity, and even earlier, as seen in the discussions on the *haustafeln* above. Most importantly, this new Christian morality based on pastoral domestic rulership would, on the one hand, accept and utilize Stoic and Epicurean notions of the mastery of the passions of the self, also called ἀπάθεια (literally, the absence of the passions), but would also transform them into, according to Foucault, ‘the renunciation of egoism, of my own singular will.’ This is a very important observation - mastery now becomes something more complex, it is not only the renunciation of the bodily passions, but it also transforms the notion of caring for the self into the caring for others. This mutual curativity was already seen in the analyses of the *haustafeln*, the forerunners of pastoralism, in that the husband should also take care of the wife as he does his own body. As this thought developed further, the notion of what defined a bishop or priest would also develop. Whereas Plato considered the magistrate as a shepherd, in late antiquity, the bishop would now become the shepherd par excellence. The bishops defined their role and function in terms of

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486 Ibid., 147–48.  
householding or *oikonomia*, somewhat similar to Plato’s notion of the weaver, but with subtle differences. They also saw it, like Xenophon, as a holistic enterprise. In this instance, Sessa points to a very important feature within the discourse of pastoral power, namely the notion of *oikonomia* as stewardship.\(^{489}\) We now find a shift, according to Sessa, from domination to dispensation and, as I will argue, reformation. It was more than simply the management of wealth and distribution of goods to the poor. As demonstrated by Brown\(^ {490}\) and several others,\(^ {491}\) wealth and poverty were especially important for the development of the pastorate in late antiquity. But Sessa is correct in noting that it was not only expressed in these terms of wealth and poverty, but in the management of subordinate bodies within the household.\(^ {492}\) It is here where the notion of *auctoritas*/*ἐξουσία* would be transformed by late ancient Christian pastoralism. The pastor now also became the heavenly steward. Sessa remarks in this instance that in late antiquity most *vilici* (or *actores*, managers who would oversee a number of estates) were not slaves but free.\(^ {493}\) The evidence, especially that examined above, does not seem to be adequate to support such a view for the fourth century. While Sessa’s statement, if applied to the later fifth and sixth centuries (a period which she does cover), may have more merit, the late fourth and early fifth century do not exactly reflect a preference for free persons for the steward or manager despite the negativity seen with authors like Columella.\(^ {494}\) The prevalence of the slave-metaphor in early Christian thinking, and the belief in the heteronomy of the body, at least


\(^{492}\) Sessa, *Formation of Papal Authority*, 1–2.

\(^{493}\) Ibid., 49–50.

\(^{494}\) This uncertainty is also noted by Kyle Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World AD 275-425* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 123.
suggest that the concept of the steward of God is also like a slave is not totally implausible. In Chrysostom’s thinking, the bishop as well as the *pater familias* seem to be considered as metaphorical slaves, as he states (*Hom. Heb.* 24.6): ‘And I will make it clear to you by means of an example; as in the case of [slaves] in large households, when any of those placed over the household are very highly respected, and manage everything themselves, and can use great freedom of speech toward their masters, the master is called after them, and anyone may find many being called in this way.’ In the very next section of this homily, he discusses issues of slaveholding, which we will return to at a later stage.

Whether most *vilici* and *actores* on late ancient estates were free or not does not really make a difference, since the notion of the Christian being a slave of God was still very prevalent. To continue, we have seen especially with the Roman agricultural treatises that the household manager had a curative role, something that was even more stressed in the early Christian writings. Sessa especially refers to the steward as a *dispensator.* How did this manifest in late ancient Christianity?

In the first instance, bishops had to disseminate knowledge to ordinary Christians on how to manage and run their own households. Preaching would have a profound effect on the process of knowledge-transfer in late antiquity, unlike anything encountered in the previous centuries. Even though the audiences that could physically fit into the late ancient basilicas were small, the effects still seemed to have been far-reaching. A bishop (or earlier in his life, a priest) like Chrysostom would have substantial influence, both religious and political, within his see. Bishops were highly political figures, even though their agenda was more social and religious. Chrysostom also had a very specific agenda in mind - he wanted to promote a type of popular,

495 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 63.169.26-33: Ἐπὶ δὲ ὑποδείγµματος ὑµῖν αὐτὸ ποιήσω φανερὸν. ὎ν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις οἰκίαις, ὅταν τινὲς εὐδοκιµῶσι τῶν προεστηκότων τῆς οἰκίας, καὶ σφόδρα εὐδοκιµῶσι, καὶ πάντα αὐτοὶ διέπωσιν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας πολλὴν τὴν παῤῥησίαν ἔχωσιν, ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὁ δεσπότης καλεῖται· καὶ πολλοὺς ἄν τις εὐφοροι οὕτω καλουµέόνους.

496 Sessa, *Formation of Papal Authority*, 49.


everyday asceticism that people in the cities could live by, and in this way avoid the evils that defined the city.499 Regarding Chrysostom’s comments on slave-management, we see that most of his comments are directed toward domestic slaveholding, rather than agricultural slaveholding.500 Christianization affected urban slaves much more directly than rural slaves. He had very specific views on Christian domesticity, with advice to everyone from the pater familias to the lowly slave. We will examine these views more closely in the next section. Thus, as shepherd or pastor, Chrysostom had to care for his flock by means of surveillance and developing their skills as householders.501 He gave very specific guidelines for the conduct between husbands and wives, parents and children, and of course, slaves and masters. By understanding Chrysostom as the typical domestic advisor within the pastoral system of governance, the next section will specifically examine his interpretation of the respective deutero-Pauline household codes and focus on his comments on how to manage slaves within this complex system.

3 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM ON EPHESIANS 6:5-9 (HOM. EPH. 22)

The entire Homilia in epistulam ad Ephesios 22 is dedicated to the statements directed to slaves in the Ephesian haustafeln. While the provenance of the homilies is mostly difficult to determine, it does seem that the homily may have been preached in Antioch at some point between 393-397.502 Quasten also confirms this on the grounds of the mention of Babylas in homily 9 and Julian in homily 21.503

500 He does comment quite critically about how some rich landowners employ thousands of slaves and on how some peasants have to pay a very high rent on these landholdings (Hom. Matt. 61.3); cf. John H. W. G. Liebeschuetz, Antioch: City and Imperial Administration in the Later Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), 64–65.
In the very beginning of the homily, Chrysostom acknowledges the common hierarchical relationships and status indicators in the text. Like many of the other late ancient authors discussed above, Chrysostom highlights the fact that simply addressing slaves directly in the text is unique. They are mentioned last because of their inferior status as slaves, but they receive lengthy instructions because, despite their social inferiority to children, they are still mentally more advanced. What is also important is the fact that Chrysostom emphasizes that slaves should be virtuous if they are to be useful in the organization of the house. These statements also show how little the nucleus of the ancient Mediterranean household has changed in terms of status and honour between the period of the New Testament and Chrysostom.504

Furthermore, Chrysostom understands the Ephesian haustafeln to be typically Stoic, and he interprets it in a very Stoic manner. In his exegesis of the phrase in Ephesians 6:5, namely ‘according to the flesh’, he provides a Stoic explanation. He states (Hom. Eph. 22.1): ‘Slavery is nothing but a name. The domination is according to the flesh, brief and temporary; for whatever is of the flesh, is not permanent.’505 Not in one instance in the homily does Chrysostom reject the institution of slavery, he exhibits the same type of Stoic indifference we saw, for example, with Seneca when it comes to institutional slavery. The metaphor of the slavery to the passions is also very common in Chrysostom’s thinking.506 Chrysostom seems to take up this Stoic stance since it is also implied in the text of Ephesians. The typical Stoic thinking of the deuto-Pauline author of Ephesians becomes highly contagious for the late ancient Christian authors, Chrysostom included. Mitchell has explained the immense popularity of Paul with Chrysostom;507 he also then accepts Paul’s statements on slave-management in the haustafeln without any questions.

The next phrase that Chrysostom chooses to focus on in Ephesians 6:5 is ‘with fear and trembling.’ It is very interesting that Chrysostom initiates here an almost identical discussion on

505 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.155.34-36: ὄνοµα δουλείας ἐστὶ µόνον· κατὰ σάρκα ἐστὶν ἡ δεσποτεία, πρόσκαιρος καὶ βραχεύει· ὅπερ γὰρ ἂν ἡ σαρκικῶν, ἐπίκηρον ἐστὶ.
507 Margaret M. Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet: John Chrysostom and the Art of Pauline Interpretation (HUTH 40; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000).
the topic found with both Origen and Jerome. His answers are also more or less the same. He contrasts the fear of the slave with the fear that the wife is supposed to show the husband. As Origen has remarked, the occurrence of the phrase ‘with trembling’ seems to point to a different type of fear. Chrysostom then enters into a diatribe in which the tension between the Stoic and early Christian considerations of slaves as kin and its imperative to fear the masters is discussed. Since a slave is considered ‘a brother, he enjoys the same benefits, he belongs to the same body. Even more, he is the brother, not of his own master only, but also of the son of God, he shares all the same benefits’ (Hom. Eph. 22.1). This statement is almost ideologically identical to Seneca’s arguments. The mutual kinship of slave and master, as well as their divine origin - for Seneca, it was the divine universal seed, for Chrysostom, it is being a brother of Christ. The diatribe in the homily seems to represent a response to or even an attack against Stoic indifference from an imaginary opponent; perhaps to question its integrity and consistency. How can there be equality along with fear and submission? Chrysostom retorts by stating that the equality between husband and wife is also, perhaps shockingly, applicable to the slave and the master, and then finishes: ‘It is no sign of common birth, rather it is real nobility, to understand how to humble ourselves, to be modest and unpretentious, and to be courteous to our neighbor. The free have also served the free with much fear and trembling’ (Hom. Eph. 22.1). What we have here is the redefinition and transformation of the concepts of submission and servitude. This was mentioned earlier in the section when referring to the curative impetus of pastoral leadership. Servitude is now positively grouped with the virtues of humility and modesty, and now, in a reversal of traditional Roman values of mastery and masculinity, ‘real nobility’ are marked by mutual submission and servitude. Freedom does not rule out the imperative to care for and serve one another. The Stoic notion of the care of the self, which Foucault has so masterfully

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509 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.155.43-46: ἀδελφός ἐστι, τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπέλαυσεν, εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα τελεί· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδελφός ἐγένετο οὗ τοῦ κυρίου τοῦ οὐαντοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπολαύει πάντων...

510 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.155.53-57: Οὐ γὰρ δυσγένεια τὸ πράγμα ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἡ πρώτη εὐγένεια, τὸ εἰδέναι ἐλαττούσθαι, καὶ μετριάζειν, καὶ εἰκεῖν τῷ πλησίον. Καὶ ἐλεύθεροι ἐλευθέροις μετὰ πολλοῦ φόβου καὶ τρόμου ἔδούλευον.
discussed,\textsuperscript{511} is now expanded and transformed to include the care of the other. This concept is
found in the authentic Pauline Epistle to the Galatians, in chapter 5 verse 13b: ‘...[S]erve one
another in love.’\textsuperscript{512} In Chrysostom’s discussion of this verse we find very much the same
reasoning and the same terminology as in his Homilia in epistulam ad Ephesios 22. The will to
dominate, Chrysostom states, leads to arguments and strife (cf. Comm. Gal. 5.13). Through the
democratization of care, humility and servitude, Chrysostom introduces in the homily the new
requirements of nobility and honour. These are all the characteristics of the slave of God. He also
emphasizes that slaves should behave properly out of their own volition, and not from the
compulsion of the master. He then provides the same argumentation found in the Petrine
haustafeln, which may be alluded to here in the homily. By becoming humble, the possibility for
suffering is immediately present - as Christ lowered himself and suffered, so too may the slave of
God suffer in this. And then, predictably, Chrysostom promotes the virtue of endurance. We
have discussed the development of the notions of suffering and endurance in early Christianity
and Chrysostom is no exception when it comes to the proliferation of the virtue of endurance. He
refers to Matthew 5:39, in which Christians are advised to turn the other cheek, thus, accept
suffering and corporeal violation. It should be remembered, as Walters has shown, that nobility
and free citizenship in the Roman world were exactly defined by the trait of corporal
inviolability.\textsuperscript{513} Chrysostom states (Hom. Eph. 22.1):

For the one who suffers wrong in abundance, claims an act for
himself which he did not initiate, by allowing himself to be beaten
on the other cheek as well, and not simply by enduring the first
blow. For this last act may perhaps resemble cowardice; but it is in
fact a mark of a high philosophy. In this way you will show that it
was for the sake of wisdom that you also endured the first blow.

\textsuperscript{511} Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 3: The Care of the Self (Robert Hurley (trans.); New York:
Vintage, 1986), 40-64.

\textsuperscript{512} Translation: NIV; Greek text (UBS\textsuperscript{4}): ...διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης δουλεύετε ἀλλήλοις.

\textsuperscript{513} Walters, “Invading the Roman Body.”
And so in the case at hand [slavery], show here too, that you bear slavery also willingly...\textsuperscript{514}

What we see here is that by means of making the passive virtues of suffering and endurance the norm, slavery becomes acceptable. Being able to bear slavery ‘willingly’, like receiving a second blow to the cheek, raises the issue of agency, and Chrysostom wants to illustrate in this point that having control of one’s (re-)actions and passions is a mark of true freedom and not a symbol of weakness or cowardice. Moreover, when we examined Theodoret’s remarks on slave-management, it was seen that he promotes institutional slavery subtly by pointing to its similarity in lifestyle to asceticism. Chrysostom follows the same strategy here. To be a noble Christian, according to Chrysostom, means to embody the passive virtues of suffering, violability and endurance - but these are all identical to the characteristics of slavery. Thus, by being a slave and accepting the state of slavery willingly, one partakes in the making of the virtuous Christian. The other strategy Chrysostom incorporates is that through just suffering one creates a type of rewards-account with God. This further promotes the passive virtues, especially for the slave, since the reward now becomes heavenly, a type of spiritual capital. Chrysostom acknowledges that Christian slaves may suffer under non-Christian masters, but this is in fact a blessing, since it grows their eschatological reward with God: ‘For as they who receive a benefit, when they make no return, make God a debtor to their benefactors; so too, I say, do masters, if, when served well by you, they fail to repay you, repay you even more, by making God your debtor’ (\textit{Hom. Eph.} 22.1).\textsuperscript{515} Concurrently with this imagery of euergetism, he states that when

\textsuperscript{514} Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.156.31-38: Ὅ γάρ ἐπιδαψιλευσάμενος τῷ παθεῖν κακῶς, καὶ ὁπερ οὐκ ἦν αὐτοῦ, ἐποίησεν ἑαυτῷ τῷ ῥαπισθῆναι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σιαγόνα, μὴ τῷ μόνον ἐνεγκεῖν. Τοῦτο μὲν γάρ ἴσως δόξει καὶ φόβου εἶναι· ἐκεῖνο δὲ φιλοσοφίας πολλῆς. Οὐκοῦν ἐδείξας, ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο διὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἦγεγκας· Ὡστε καὶ νῦν δείξων ἐνταῦθα, ὅτι καὶ ταύτῃ ἐκοπτε πέρες τὴν δουλείαν...

\textsuperscript{515} Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.157.13-18: Καθάπερ γάρ οἱ καλῶς πάσχοντες, ὅταν μὴ ἀμείβονται τοὺς εὐεργέτας, τὸν Θεόν αὐτοῖς ὀφειλέτην ποιούσιν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ οἱ δεσπόται, ἃν παθόντες εἴ παρά σοῦ μὴ ἀμείβονται σε, μάλλον ἡμείησαντο, τὸν Θεόν ὀφειλέτην σοι καταστήσαντες.
earthly masters do not reward slaves, they in fact reward them even more since it forces God to reward them. The socio-theological manipulative strategies become very clear. In the eschatological sense, God’s judgement also then implies a correction of social inequalities and the repaying of debts. The suffering slave is now the slave who will receive the most during the final judgement.

In his comments on the slave-directed *haustafeln*, Chrysostom is squarely in line with the early Christian tradition of the proliferation and promotion of passive virtues. Slavery, on the one hand, is described in Stoic fashion as only a name, and thus not important. The Philonic slave of God metaphor is then extensively utilized to approve and perhaps even promote the suffering of slaves. He does not make any calls to social justice for suffering slaves, since they will be rewarded in heaven. It does not imply that he encourages the persecution of slaves, but their fair and just treatment is not a priority. It should be remembered in this instance, at least, that the Roman agricultural authors Cato, Varro and especially Columella, promulgated quite intensely the just and fair treatment of slaves. Chrysostom does not do this here, but rather advises slaves to endure suffering with the hope of some heavenly reward. This is certainly one of the premises that supports the view that early Christianity was in fact not ameliorative to the institution of slavery; in fact, by the promotion of the passive virtues of suffering, endurance and servitude, core values in both martyrdom and asceticism, along with the prevalent Stoic indifference, the institution of slavery was perpetuated (perhaps even indirectly promoted) by Christian pastoral governmentality and virtuosity.

He then provides his view on the slaveholder-directed comments in the Ephesian *haustafeln* (Eph. 5:9). In this section of the homily, Chrysostom relies on the discourse of the heteronomy of the body of the slaveholder as a slave of God: ‘For the master also presents service like a slave. Not as people-pleasers, he means, and with fear and trembling; that is, toward God, fearing that He may one day accuse you for your negligence toward your slaves’ (*Hom. Eph.* 22.2). It is interesting that Chrysostom then builds on a theologico-juridical argument in the homily. We have seen that this type of argumentation was common among other late ancient Christian authors, for instance, with Peter of Alexandria or Basil the Great. The

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516 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.157.21-25: δουλεύει γὰρ καὶ ὁ δεσπότης. Μὴ ὣς ἀνθρωπάρεσσι, φησὶ, μετὰ φόβου καὶ τρόμου, τούτοις, τοῦ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, δεδοικότες μὴποτε ὑμῖν ἐγκαλέσῃ ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰς τοὺς δούλους ἀμελείας.
heteronomy of the body has eschatological implications. In terms of God’s judgement, offences committed against slaves will count as offences committed against human beings. Chrysostom is very aware and judgmental about those typical shameful duties slaves are compelled to perform (Hom. Phlm. 1.2): ‘In this way many have forced their domestics and slaves. Some have drawn them into marriage against their will, and others have forced them to perform disgraceful services, perverse sexual deeds, acts of theft, and financial fraud, and violence.’\(^{517}\) Since slaves are body-surrogates, the punishment of such deeds is primarily enforced on the owner, yet, as we have seen, the slave is not entirely acquitted. We also get a very important glimpse into the ‘underworld’ of slaveholding. Among the shameful acts, Chrysostom is fully aware of the sexual abuse of slaves, as well as acts of robbery and fraud. As with the previous discussion on suffering and punishment, social equality is only achieved in a later, eschatological dispensation. Chrysostom interestingly remarks (Hom. Eph. 22.1):

Do not assume, he would say, that what is done to a slave will simply be forgiven because it was done to a slave. For the laws of other nations, typically being human laws, does acknowledge a difference between these kinds of crimes. But the law of the common Slaveholder of all, who does good towards all in common, and conferring the same rights to all, does not acknowledge such a difference.\(^{518}\)

Chrysostom refers here to the typical Graeco-Roman laws of punishment based on social status, very much like those seen with Plato in the previous chapter. While according to these laws a slave may be ill treated and severely punished, God’s eschatological laws do not regard

\(^{517}\) Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.706.36-40: Πολλοὶ πολλοὺς οἰκέετας Ἰάγκασαν, καὶ παιδας· οἱ μὲν εἰς γάμους εἰλκυσαν μὴ βουλομένους, οἱ δὲ ὑπηρετήσασθαι διακονίας ἀτόπους, καὶ ἔρωτι μιαρῷ και ἀρταγαίς και πλεονεξίας και βίαις.

\(^{518}\) Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.157.32-37: Μὴ νομίσῃς, φησίν, ὅτι τὰ εἰς τὸν δοῦλον, ὡς εἰς δοῦλον γινόμενα, οὕτως ἀφήσει. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐξωθήνει νόμοι διαφοράν ἱσαὶ τούτων τῶν γενῶν, ἀτε ἀνθρώπων ὄντες νόμος ὁ δὲ νόμος ὁ τοῦ κοινοῦ Δεσπότου οὐδεμίαν οὐδε διαφοράν, ἀτε κοινῇ πάντας εὐ ποιῶν, και πᾶσι τῶν αὐτῶν μεταδίδους.
social status. Although such a statement is certainly admirable, it does not do much good for the
treatment of institutional slaves while they are on earth. Like Stoic notions of indifference, the
concept of eschatological punishment and rewards of all the slaves of God, regardless of earthly
social status, draws attention away from the pressing inequalities and injustices of institutional
slavery. As a logical inference to the theologico-juridical argument, the issue of hamartiology
obviously comes to the fore, since sin is understood as disobedience from the slaves of God, and
hence, the reason for the eschatological punishment. Chrysostom explains the origins of sin to
his audience (Hom. Eph. 22.1):

But if anyone should ask, ‘Where does slavery come from? And, ‘Why it has it come into humanity?’ (And I know that many are
asking these questions, and desire to have them answered.) I will
tell you. Slavery is the result of greed, of degradation, of brutality,
since Noah, we know, had no slave, nor Abel, nor Seth, nor those
who came after them. The institution was the fruit of sin, of
rebellion against parents. Let children listen carefully to this, that
whenever they are disobedient to their parents, they deserve to be
slaves. A child such as this discards his nobility of birth; for he
who rebels against his father is no longer a son; and if he who
rebels against his father is not a son, how will he be a son who
rebels against our true Father? He has turned his back on his
nobility of birth, he has gone against nature. It is also the result of
people taken as prisoners of wars, and battles. Fine, but Abraham,
you will say, had slaves. True, but he did not use them as slaves.

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519 Gregory of Nyssa utilized his eschatology in a slightly different manner, which led to his outspoken rejection of
institutional slavery. The same cannot be said of Chrysostom since he never rejects slavery as an institution itself; cf.
David B. Hart, “The ‘Whole Humanity’: Gregory of Nyssa’s Critique of Slavery in the Light of His Eschatology,”

520 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.157.38-54: Εἰ δέ τις ἐρωτήσει ἤδη δουλεία, καὶ διὰ τί ἐστιν ἡ
πλεονεξία τὴν δουλείαν ἔτεκεν, ἡ βαναυσία, ἡ ἀπληστία· ἐπεὶ

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Here we have a similar argument to that of Gregory of Nyssa in his homily on Ecclesiastes. The subordination between slave and slaveholder is not natural, or prelapsarian, in Chrysostom’s view. We have seen that most of the Christian authors of late antiquity held this view. Even shortly after the fall with reference to Noah, Abel and Seth, Chrysostom intimates that slaveholding was not present. In a different homily he would also state that Adam did not have slaves (Hom. I Cor. 40.6). Slavery is therefore not natural, that is, natural in the patristic sense of the word, as being part of God’s original order. Slavery is the result of greed, covetousness and savagery, as Chrysostom states, as well as a consequence of war. The conceptual linkages between slavery, eschatology and hamartiology are very important in this instance, and we see what important place slavery occupies also in Chrysostom’s development of Christian theology. The concept of slavery is, again, inseparable from Christian theology, and late ancient Christian theological formations had very real, direct consequences for slaves - it did not improve their situation at all.

Finally, one of the most important sections in the homily deserves to be cited and explained, since it represents Chrysostom’s clearest statements regarding oikonomia and slave-management (Hom. Eph. 22.2):

But if, before we examine the following verses, you have a mind to listen, I will make the same remarks concerning slaves as I have also made earlier concerning children. Teach them to be religious, and everything else will follow from necessity. But now, when any one is going to the theatre, or going off to the bath, he drags all his slaves behind him; but when he goes to church, not for a moment; nor does he admonish them to attend and listen. Now how will Νῶε δοῦλον οὐκ εἶχεν, οὐδὲ Ἀβελ, οὐδὲ Σήθ, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ οἱ μετὰ ταῦτα. Ἁμαρτία τούτο τὸ πράγμα ἐτεκεν, ἢ εἰς τοὺς πατέρας υβρίς. Ἀκουέτωσαν οἱ παιδες, ὅτι αξιοί εἰσι δούλου εἶναι, ὅταν εἰς τοὺς πατέρας ἀγνώμονες ὦσιν. Ἀφείλετο ἑαυτοῦ ὁ τοιοῦτος τὴν εὐγένειαν· ὁ γὰρ υβρίζων τὸν πατέρα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ νόσος. Εἰ δὲ ὁ πατέρα υβρίζων, οὐκ ἔστιν νόσος, ὅ τὸν ὄντος ἡµῶν Πατέρα υβρίζων, πῶς ἔσται νόσος; Ἐξῆλθεν ἀπὸ τῆς εὐγενείας, ἔξωθρισεν εἰς τὴν φύσιν. Εἶτα καὶ πόλεμοι καὶ μάχαι αἰχμαλώτους ἔλαβον. Ἀλλ’ ὁ Ἀβραὰµ εἶχεν οἰκέταις, φησίν. Ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὃς οἰκέταις ἐκέχρητο.
your slave listen, when you, his master, are busy with other things? You have purchased and acquired your slave? First of all make it clear what God wants him to do, to be kind towards his fellow-slaves, and to take virtue very seriously. Everyone's house is a city, and every man is a prince in his own house. It is clear that this is the character of the wealthy house, where there are both lands, and overseers, and rulers over rulers. I also say that the house of the poor is like a city. Since there are also offices of authority here; for instance, the husband has authority over the wife, the wife over the slaves, the slaves again over their own wives; again the wives and the husbands over the children. Does he not appear to you to be, as it were, a type of king, having so many authorities under his own authority? And that it is crucial that he should be more skilled both in domestic and civic government than all the rest? For the one who knows how to manage these in their various relations, will also know how to select the fittest people for offices, truly, and will choose excellent ones. And in this way the wife will be a second king in the house, lacking only the crown; and he who knows how to choose this king, will excellently regulate all the others.\footnote{Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.157.60-158.25: Εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε ἀκούσαι, τὰ αὐτὰ ἐρώτημεν περὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν, ἃ καὶ πρότερον περὶ τῶν παιδῶν· διδάσκετε αὐτούς εἶναι εὐλαβεῖς, καὶ πάντας πάντα ἔπεται. Νῦν δὲ εἰς μὲν θέατρον ἁπαντῶν, καὶ εἰς βαλανεῖον ἄπιων τις, πάντας ἐπισύρεται τοὺς παιδας· εἰς δὲ ἐκκλησίαν, οὐκέτι, οὐδὲ ἀναγκάζει παρεῖναι καὶ ἀκούειν. Πῶς δὲ ὁ οἰκέτης ἀκούσεται, σοῦ τοῦ δεσπότου ἐτέρους προσέχοντος; ὁ γὰρ ὁδόρασας, ἐπρίων τὸν δουλόν; ἐπίταττε πρότερον αὐτῷ τὰ κατὰ Θεόν, ὡστε πρὸς τοὺς συνδούλους εἶναι ἕπιον, ἀρετῆς πολὺν ποιεῖσθαι λόγον. Πόλις ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκάστου οἰκία, ἄρχων ἐστὶν ἐκαστος τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οἰκίας. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν τουατή ἡ τῶν πλουτούντων, εὺδηλος, ἔνθα καὶ ἄγχοι καὶ ἐπίτροποι καὶ ἄρχοντες ἐπὶ ἄρχοντες· ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν πενήτων οἰκίαν φημὶ πόλιν εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἰσίν ἄρχοντες· ἀρχαίς ὁ ἄνηγή, ἡ γυνὴ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οἱ οἰκείαι τῶν ἱδίων γυναικῶν· πόλιν αἱ γυναίκες καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες τῶν παιδῶν. Ἀρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, καθάπερ τις βασιλεὺς εἶναι, τοσοῦτος ἔχων ἀρχοντας ὑποτεταμένους ἑαυτῶ, καὶ}
From this section we see that Chrysostom, like Xenophon and Plato, subscribes to holistic *oikonomia*. The previous discussions on *oikonomia* and slave-management make it possible to understand the relevance of this statement in the ancient Mediterranean context. For Chrysostom, the household slave must now, like children, be educated in ‘religion’ and ‘virtue’. It is also interesting that when raising children virtuously, Chrysostom advises that the *pater familias* use the slaves as a type of training ground for the virtue of the child (*Inan. glor.* 67-68). This is a very subtle form of discipline directed toward slaves. Although Chrysostom reiterates by noting that this is also applicable to children, the form and impetus of adult education (assuming the slaves are adults) is reformation. The slaves are now not simply taught household or even agricultural tasks, but the householder or even the *vilicus* (he uses the example of overseers in the text) becomes directly responsible for the education of slaves in virtue. The example of Paul and Onesimus, the slave of Philemon, is important in this regard as it serves as a model and a justification for this practice. Since Paul took it upon himself to teach Onesimus, so too should the *pater familias* teach the slave virtue. A virtuous slave becomes a marker of honour according to Chrysostom (*Hom. Phlm.* Preface): ‘He [Paul] teaches us not to be ashamed of our slaves, if they are virtuous.’

Firstly, this move toward the Christian pedagogy of slaves is the logical inference of the development of the pastorate. Teaching, according to Chrysostom’s *De sacerdotio*, is a crucial duty of the office of the clergy. While the pastors are responsible for teaching the heads of households, the heads of households now need to teach the slaves who, Chrysostom admits, are not always brought to church by their masters. The education of slaves is also hierarchical. He later states that slave-husbands are the rulers of their wives, showing the prevalence of slave-families in late antiquity, and this would imply that the slave men need to teach their wives and

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πάντων προσήκειν αὐτὸν οἰκονομικώτερον εἶναι καὶ πολιτικώτερον; Ὅ γὰρ εἰδῶς διαφόρως κεχρῆσθαι τούτους, οἴδε τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους ἀρχοντας αἰρέεσθαι, καὶ αἰρήσεται γε λαμπρούς. Όυκοῦν ἔσται βασιλεύς ἐτερως ἢ γυνῆ ἐν οἰκίᾳ χωρίς τοῦ διαδήματος, καὶ ὁ εἰδῶς τὸν βασιλέα τοῦτον αἰρείσθαι, πάντα τὰ ἄλλα καλῶς διαθήσει.


523 De Wet, “Priestly Body.”
children. This type of dynamic is also seen in his entire homily De inani gloria, specifically on the proper way to raise children. The comments herein also function in this system. The haustafeln are now transformed into something more than codes of conduct or, as argued earlier, social contracts. There is now a shift in emphasis from governance to education and pedagogy. The eccentricity of Cato’s insistence on teaching his own children would not seem too strange to Chrysostom in this instance. The impetus on the formation and maintenance of masculinity is now amended, and the ‘man of the house’ should now also become a teacher of Christian religion and virtue; if I may, a doctor familias. The pater familias becomes responsible for the salvation of the slave and so becomes the pastor of his household. This is a very effective strategy from the side of the pastorate. Since its influence may have been limited due to physical space restrictions, the strategy of Christianizing the household would broaden their sphere of influence. Chrysostom, after all, considers the household a microcosm for the church, as he states in the same selection of homilies (Hom. Eph. 20.2): ‘If we manage our households in this way, we will be also qualified for the management of the church. For surely a house is a little church. So it is possible for us by becoming good husbands and wives, to surpass all others.’ The art of oikonomia is also teaching and preparation for the management of the church. The husband then becomes the medium and catalyst through which pastoral power is mediated, especially by means of education and psychagogy, as also seen in the discussions of the haustafeln. We mentioned earlier that the soul of an individual was also a strategy in Stoicism and Christianity to promote the care of the self and the mastery of oneself and others. The pastoral mastery of slaves now becomes curative - the husband should also care for the slaves by educating and disciplining them. It obviously assumes that slaves are in need of such discipline. The educational discipline of other souls becomes crucial to the formation of Christian masculinity. Again, in a different homily on Ephesians, while elaborating on the story of the jailor who had his whole family baptised (cf. Acts 16:29-31), Chrysostom complains (Hom. Eph. 8.2): ‘Yes, not like most men these days, who allow both slaves and wives and children to go unbaptized!’ He implies that

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524 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.143.6-10: Ἄν οὕτω τὰς οἰκίας διοικῶμεν τὰς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ πρὸς Ἐκκλησίας ἐπιστασίαν ἐσόμεθα ἐπιτίθειοι· καὶ ἡ οἰκία γὰρ Ἐκκλησία ἐστὶ μικρὰ. Ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐν ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας γενομένους ἀγαθούς, πάντας ὑπερβαλέσθαι. 525 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.62.19-21: ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς νῦν οἱ πλεῖοι περιορώσι καὶ δούλους καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας ἀμοιῆτους τυγχάνοντας.
the husband of the house is responsible for the governance of the souls of the house, including having them baptised and taking them to church. Slaves were present sometimes in the services along with their owners. The Christian redomestication of masculinities relied especially on transforming the husband not only into someone who could master his own bodily passions and dominate subordinates, but, perhaps more importantly, someone who could be a teacher of virtue and a teacher of religion. This notion of the care of others should be seen as being not only curative in nature, which would especially be the case for children, but, in the case of slaves, it may also be understood as corrective and thus a strategy, in Foucault’s terms, of creating docile bodies through discipline.

The assumption is that most slaves are delinquents and degenerates, as mentioned above - abnormals in the true sense of the word. Social status and the position within the household hierarchy becomes an indicator of where remedial action is necessary. On the one hand, it assumes that the pater familias, the pastor, maintains strict surveillance in order to identify degeneracy and treat it psychagogically. The pastoral model of government found with the rise of Christianity, along with the strong focus on the household as catalytic space for distributing pastoral power, had some radical effects on the very nature of the domus. The household, in the first instance, becomes something of an ‘observatory.’ Kate Cooper has convincingly argued for the nature of households as being ‘closely-watched.’ The household was not, strictly speaking, a private space for individuals. It was a point of observation, in the first instance, for the husband of the house over his subordinates. Of course, it does not necessarily have to be the husband. Women also played a role in the government of households, and as mentioned earlier, Saller has shown that, technically speaking, a female could also, ironically, be a pater familias. The point


is then that the head of the household, the *pater familias*, had to closely monitor the behaviour of the slaves, who are prone to degeneracy according to ancient stereotypes, to ensure they behave virtuously and, if they do not, administer the appropriate corrective and disciplinary action. But it also implies that the *pater familias* was strictly observed by the pastor, who, in turn, is highly scrutinized by his superiors as well as society. Education and discipline presuppose technologies of observation, since this makes the effects of power, pastoral power in this instance, visible and the means of discipline also becomes visible. Most importantly, as we have mentioned, this is hierarchized surveillance. This measure of controlled and hierarchized observation was also present in the church architecture in late antiquity, with the rise of a simple yet effective spatial technology: the βῆµα. The typical theatre-like spatiality, where it is the speaker who is under observation, now becomes inverted and reversed: in the basilicas it is the members who are under surveillance, and the gaze of the pastor is the gaze that determines normalcy and degeneracy. This word was also common in the juridical language of ancient courtrooms. The strong spatial politics within the basilicas, including the churches of Chrysostom, support the rise of a Christian culture of surveillance within its physical and socio-symbolic spaces and places.530 Not only is the gaze of the bishop, with the βῆµα-spatiality, almost a social microscope of conduct in terms of its function, it was also the point of representation - and becomes something of a panopticon. The bishop functions as someone who interprets the observation of everyday life. For instance, the way in which Chrysostom depicts the rich and the poor in the city is not simply descriptive; he especially emphasizes the two extremes poles of the rich and poor in the city, without focussing on the rest. This is of course a strategy for manipulating the thoughts and emotions of the audience, especially since it is done via preaching. The point is that observation also implies a control of the scopic politics of those being observed. They are told what to ‘see’ when looking. In terms of slavery, the strict mentality of observation was already present in the Roman agricultural writers, but for a different purpose - they needed to monitor work progress to ensure high profitability. In those writings especially, surveillance is an economic operator. Here,

the surveillance is based on and directed towards psychosocial reform. This strategy of observation was highly effective in maintaining the pastoral power of late ancient Christianity. The fact that the surveillance is strictly hierarchized and functional means that the flow of power and corrective discipline forms a large and complex network with very potent religious markers of authority. This is what the pastorate would become: a complex and hierarchized network of power-flows and knowledge-operations whose agents are duplicated in macro- and microcosmic contexts. What does this mean? Although the priest is pastor in a macrocosmic context, the larger church (which is in effect, a grouping of households); the husband becomes a duplicate or surrogate of the pastor within his own household; one could also consider both Christic duplications. The slave-husband, as Chrysostom states, then also becomes a duplication of the pastor and husband in that the slave-husband should teach his wife, children and slaves. Foucault’s remark on hierarchized surveillance becomes important in this instance:

The power in hierarchized surveillance of the disciplines is not possessed as a thing, or transferred as a property; it functions like a piece of machinery. And, although it is true that its pyramidal organization gives it a ‘head’, it is the apparatus as a whole that produces ‘power’ and distributes individuals in this permanent, continuous field...Discipline makes possible the operation of a relational power that sustains itself by its own mechanism and which, for the spectacle of public events, substitutes the uninterrupted play of calculated gazes. Thanks to techniques of surveillance, the ‘physics’ of power, the hold over the body, operate according to the laws of optics and mechanics, according to a whole play of spaces, lines, screens, beams, degrees and without recourse, in principle at least, to excess, force or violence. It is a power that seems all the less ‘corporal’ in that it is more subtly ‘physical’. 531

531 Foucault, Birth of the Prison, 177.
Chrysostom’s comments on the teaching of slaves are thus part of a much larger network or machinery of power we call pastoral governance. Like Plato’s weaver, this network directs numerous actions and distributes bodies accordingly. The teaching of the slave by the *pater familias*, and the teaching of slave-wives, slave-children and slaves of slaves by the slave-husband are simply distributions of this complex network of pastoral power. Foucault’s final remark above is important. We see that this form of observing and correcting behaviour, these ‘calculated gazes,’ in the curative and pastoral sense makes claims that it is not physically violent. In truth that may not have been the case, but Chrysostom himself, and as seen above, several other Christian and non-Christian authors of antiquity, state that slaves should not be beaten or threatened. One of the most important technologies in this machine of observance-based pastoral governance is fact that even when no one is looking, God, the eternal and *all-seeing* slaveholder is watching. This was already present in the *haustafeln*. Hence the agreement in the Ephesian and Colossian *haustafeln* that slaves (institutional and metaphorical, in my opinion) should not base their conduct simply on the surveillance of humans (the notion of ὀφϑαλµμοδουλεία - being enslaved to human eyes), but must remember that they are constantly observed by the divine slaveholder. The aim of all this is to normalize and correct the underlings in the hierarchized system of surveillance. Chrysostom remarks (*Hom. I Cor.* 34):

Furthermore, in order that the one may be subjected, and the other rule; (for equality often results in quarrels) he did not allow it to be a democracy, but a monarchy; and as in an army, this hierarchy one may see in every family. In the rank of king, for instance, there is the husband; and the wife in the rank of lieutenant and general; and the children too are given a third position in command. Then after these a fourth order, namely that of the slave. For slaves also rule over their inferiors, and some one of them is often set over the whole household, guarding the position of the master, but still as a slave. And along with this again another command, and among the children themselves again another, according to their age and gender, since among the children the girl does not possess equal influence. And God has made governments within a small area and
densely grouped together everywhere, that all might be in agreement and good order.  

Hierarchy and order become, in Chrysostom’s terms, natural, that is, by order of God. He is very aware of the complex and strict hierarchical codes in the household, even among children, and here too he applies it in a holistic sense. The notion of slaves governing other slaves, like the *vilicus*, is also affirmed here in the urban context. In Chrysostom’s eyes, *oikonomia* is not democratic but monarchical. This brings me to the second point on how the rise of Christian pastoral governmentality changed the household and, essentially, slave-management. Since the aim of surveillance and discipline is corrective and aimed at producing docile and obedient bodies, the household also becomes a reformatory. This is especially the point behind Chrysostom’s notion that they should be educated in *virtue*. In the earlier work of Philodemus, we also saw this new focus on virtue and ethics (even though it has been argued that the agricultural treatises are highly ethical documents laden with virtue-discourse). Philodemus wanted to provide a type of *oikonomia* that was centred on Epicurean wealth ethics, and this was also exhibited with the Stoics like Seneca and Dio Chrysostom. Unlike Philodemus, however, and more in the line of Xenophon and Plato, the notion of providing universal principles of governmentality is also implied by Chrysostom. By stating that ‘every man’s house is a city,’ the implication is that he also subscribes to a holistic view of oeconomical governmentality, earlier he stated that the household is a little church. The continuity and universality between civic/political and ecclesiastical and domestic governance becomes apparent. The purpose,

532 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.289.64-290.16: Εἶτα ἕνα τὸ μὲν υποτάαττηται, τὸ δὲ ἀρχὴ τὸ γὰρ ὀμότιμον οἴδε πολλάκις μάχχην εἰσάγειν· οὐκ ἄφηκε δηµοκρατίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ βασιλείαν, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν στρατοπέδῳ, ταύτῃν ἀν τις ἄρχει καθ’ ἑκάστην οἰκίαν. Ἐστι γοῦν ἐν τάξει μὲν βασιλέως ὁ ἀνήρ, ἐν τάξει δὲ υπάρχου ἡ γυνὴ καὶ στρατηγοῦ· καὶ οἱ παιδεῖς δὲ ἀρχὴν κεκλήρωνται τρίτην· εἶτα μετὰ ταύτα ἄρχη τετάρτη ἡ τῶν οἰκετῶν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ οὕτω κρατοῦσι τῶν ἔλαττῶν, καὶ εἰς τις πολλάκις τοῖς πᾶσιν εφέστηκε, τὴν τοῦ δεσπότου τάξιν διατηρῶν, πλὴν ὡς οἰκέτης. Καὶ μετὰ ταύτης ἑτέρα πάλιν ἄρχη καὶ ἐν αὐτοὶς ἡ τῶν γυναικῶν, ἡ τῶν παιδιῶν, καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς παισί πάλιν ἑτέρα κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παιδίοις ὁμοίως τὸ θὴλον κρατεῖ. Καὶ πανταχοῦ δι’ ὁλίγου καὶ πυκνὰς ἐποίησε τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁ Θεός, ἦν πάντα ἐν ὀμονοίᾳ μένη καὶ εὐταξία πολλή.
however, is developed to include the correction and reformation of delinquent bodies, whether in the
city, church or household. He also intertwines civic spaces, like the theatre and the baths, with the
space of the church and the household. Since there are universal governing principles, according to
Chrysostom, it makes the flow of power within the network of the pastoral model of government
more accessible and easy. As with the magistrate of the city (we think again of Plato’s comments on the
magistrate as the shepherd), who was in charge of order, discipline and punishment, so too the bishop
and the pater familias, perhaps in a more limited role, receive the same responsibilities. Close to the
conclusion of a homily on Romans, Chrysostom advises his audience to be shepherds over their families
(Hom. Rom. 29.2): ‘For the one who is ruled may be in the place of a shepherd to his family, to his
friends, to his slaves, to his wife, to his children’. The bishops were, by implication, also magistrates in
many respects; this new manifestation of power was especially evident in the phenomena of the episcopal
audientia and, more implicitly, evident in the procedures of manumissio in ecclesia. Bishops could also
grant asylum to fugitives in certain instances. The magistrate, bishop and pater familias were
responsible for corrective discipline. When Chrysostom refers to slaves who should be taught
virtue and religion by their owners, it implies discipline and also new modes of punishment.
Chrysostom intimates that both children and slaves should be educated, and the principle
provided in the haustafeln on disciplining children with the words ‘to bring them up in the
chastening and admonition of the Lord’ also becomes applicable to slaves. He states exactly this in
the homily that was cited above (Hom. Eph. 22.2): ‘I shall make the same recommendations concerning
slaves, as I have also made previously concerning children.’ Chrysostom assumes a measure of
chastisement and punishment with both slaves and children. We will discuss Chrysostom’s comments
on the punishment at the end of this section. What should be remembered, however, in this instance
is that teaching slaves to be virtuous and religious also implies that the pater familias makes it clear
what type of behaviour is expected from them. Here the aspect of the social contractuality of the
haustafeln becomes apparent again. By being slaves of a Christian pater familias, slaves are also ‘expected’
to become Christians and give up their

533 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 60.661.59-661.1: ἔξεστι γὰρ καὶ ἄρχοµένῳ ἐν µέρει εἶναι ποιµένος,
tῆς οἰκίας, τῶν φίλων, τῶν οἰκετῶν, τῆς γυναικός, τῶν παιδών.
534 Claudia Rapp, Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity: The Nature of Christian Leadership in an Age of Transition

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own freedom of social and religious identity. The slaves and children are therefore provided with an image of what a Christian should look like. Chrysostom seems to indicate that the pater familias should lead by example, and not only drag his or her slaves to civic spaces like the theatres and the baths, but also bring them to church. This statement in itself gives us an interesting bit of data, which should be read carefully, but still taken into consideration. Since slaves were status-markers, it seems that taking them to church was not very popular. The first level of education and correction, in fact, starts with the slaveholders, by having them bring their slaves to church and compel them to listen. These technologies then construct the levels of observances a slave should adhere to, and it also then provides a technology of measurement as to when a slave is not compliant. These were most certainly the issues raised, inter alios, by Peter of Alexandria and Basil the Great. Owners had to know something about the sexual history of their slaves, control and regulate their conjugal and sexual relationships, and also guide them in religious matters. Peter of Alexandria canonized the punishment for slaves who sacrificed to non-Christian deities on behalf of their owners. Thus, by means of psychagogy, the specifics of non-observances and transgressions (all labelled as ‘sin’) are also spelled out, and this creates a space and dynamic for disciplinary penalty. The previous outlines of transgression found in the Graeco-Roman household codes were both replaced in some instances, and/or supplemented in others, by the new Christianized guidelines for acceptable slave behaviour, which would be based on ethical principles interpreted from biblical texts. The biblical texts serve as scriptural apparatuses for authorizing the new codes of conduct, and also provide a rationale for punishment and reward, as we have seen above. If the slave therefore does not conform to the principles by which a slave should act according to Roman standards, as well as the new Christian domain of ethical behaviour for slaves (found in the haustafeln), it is equal to non-conformance and thus punishable. These could be minor infractions, but in most instances, in the context of slavery in antiquity, it would probably be related to the inability of the slave to carry out his or her task. When it comes to the punishment of slaves it seems that Chrysostom prefers disciplinary and corrective exercises rather than violent and corporeal signs. As with all the authors discussed above, both Christian and non-Christian, the pater familias, whether he is the manager of an agricultural estate or a Christian psychagogue, should preferably avoid violent punishment and rather use psychological manipulation to regulate the behaviour of the slave-bodies. In the case of the Christian psychagogue/pater familias, Chrysostom advises the
avoidance of harsh punishments in the homily, since the owners should remember that they too are slaves of God. This view is very common in disciplinary dynamics. Foucault cites the eighteenth-century author and teacher Charles Demia, saying:

The teacher must avoid as far as possible, the use of punishment; on the contrary, he must endeavour to make rewards more frequent than penalties, the lazy being more encouraged by the desire to be rewarded in the same way as the diligent than by the fear of punishment; that is why it will be very beneficial, when the teacher is obliged to use punishment, to win the heart of the child if he can before doing so.\textsuperscript{535}

This statement coming from the context of eighteenth-century French didactics, almost replicates the statements made by Xenophon, Cato, Varro and Columella on the punishment of slaves. Therefore, there cannot be punishment if there are no rewards - this is why Chrysostom especially focuses on eschatological punishments and rewards. Ranks, of course, can also serve as technologies of penality. As a reward, we have seen that slaves may be manumitted if they conform to Christian codes of virtuous behaviour; Chrysostom himself states (\textit{Hom. I Cor. 40.6}) ‘...[W]hen you have purchased them [slaves] and have taught them trades whereby to support themselves, let them go free. But when you whip them, when you put them in chains, it is no more an act of philanthropy.’\textsuperscript{536} If a slave therefore measures up to what is expected of him or her, they may be set free as a form of reward. In the same homily, in a wider sense, Chrysostom also reminds his audience that the institution of slavery itself is a punishment due to sin (\textit{Hom. I Cor. 40.6}): ‘Since the class of slaves did not at all originate out of necessity, otherwise a slave would have been formed along with Adam; but it is the penalty of sin and the punishment of

\textsuperscript{535} Foucault, \textit{Birth of the Prison}, 180.

\textsuperscript{536} Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.354.16-18: ἀγοράσας, καὶ τέχνας διδάξας ὡστε ἁρκεῖν ἑαυτοῖς, ἄφες ἑλευθέρους. Ὄσον δὲ μαστίζης, ὃσον δεσμεύης, σύκετι φιλανθρωπίας τὸ ἐργον.
disobedience.'\textsuperscript{537} The fact that institutional slavery exists is because God, the great slaveholder, is punishing his slaves for their sin or disobedience. Discipline therefore functions especially on the basis of its ability to give awards, or to reserve them. The scholar should be attentive to this development with Chrysostom, and in late ancient Christianity in general. The disciplining of slaves by means of psychagogy with punishment and reward serves again as new yet subtle differentiators of normality and abnormality. The very essence of this disciplinary process is that it forms a field of comparison. The ideal figure is postulated in the process of teaching, and the individual is then evaluated and compared on these grounds. In my opinion, the danger of this is that this ideal figure of Christian virtue is often, especially in late antiquity, still based on Roman standards of free masculinity, despite the proliferation of passive and feminine virtues. The bar is set high for slaves, women and children, since the standards that they are measured against are the standards of what made Roman men - namely the control and domination of the bodily passions. These women and slaves had to become ‘men’. In Chrysostom’s homilies on the Maccabean martyrs, when discussing the figure of the martyr-mother, who willingly sacrificed her children, he stated that she became the epitome of masculine virtue, leaving her weaker, maternal nature behind her. Normalizing judgement is now based on their level of the emulation of free masculinity. The martyr-mother of the Maccabees is judged positively because, according to Chrysostom, she surpassed her naturally weak feminine and maternal instincts, and became like a man.\textsuperscript{538} In Gillian Cloke’s convincing and aptly named study \textit{This Female Man of God} (1995), she has shown that the feminine had to be escaped via the masculine; this is how virtue for women was constructed.\textsuperscript{539} The slave would now have to escape the stereotypes of slavery by embodying the virtues of free, Christian/Roman masculinity. In this manner, the household functions as a reformatory - its aim is not simply to dominate and master, but to correct and to reshape.

\textsuperscript{537} Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.354.1-4: Οὐδὲ γὰρ χρείας ἐνεκεν τὸ τῶν δούλων ἔπεισήχθη γένος, ἐπεὶ μετὰ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ ἐπλάσθη ἃν καὶ δοῦλος· ἀλλ’ ἁµµαρτίας ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιτίµμιον, καὶ τῆς παρακοῆς ἢ κόλασις.


Furthermore, all of these technologies of the Christian pastoral household serve in providing the *pater familias*, and indirectly, the ecclesiastical authorities, with knowledge about individuals, in service of making it a docile body. As virtue and aptitude is increased, so too is domination increased. The somatosocial coagulation, defragmentation and refragmentation that occur when the act of discipline produces a docile body, is masterfully described by Foucault:

The historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, not at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A ‘political anatomy’, which was also a ‘mechanics of power’, was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, ‘docile’ bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes the same forces (in political terms of obedience)...If economic exploitation separates the force and the product of labour, let us say that disciplinary coercion establishes in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination.\footnote{Foucault, *Birth of the Prison*, 137–38.}

I have provided the entire citation, quite lengthy, yet so extremely important for the chapters of this dissertation that lie ahead, and for the rest of the current chapter. Foucault’s notion of the production of docile and ‘practised’ bodies could be well compared to Bourdieu’s
fields of cultural and social reproduction and the dynamics of the habitus. Foucault makes this statement in the light of the rise of disciplinary institutions during the eighteenth century, especially in France. Shortly before providing this discussion, Foucault also states that ascetic and monastic discipline differ from what is stated above since it is based on renunciation rather than the increase of utility. Here I tend to differ with Foucault. The discipline of monasticism was also based on utility, and renunciation itself becomes a utility or technology of monasticism. Although renunciation, as Elizabeth Clark and Peter Brown have both convincingly shown, was a crucial discourse in the making of late ancient Christianity, from what has been seen above with regards to slave-management and the oikonomia of the late ancient Christian household, I think Foucault’s remarks in the citation above are also applicable, since slave-bodies, more than any other, are also economic or, as I will argue in a later chapter, commodified bodies – economic and symbolic capital in the Bourdieuian sense. The mechanistic functioning of power in the pastoral model of governance I have already illustrated, along with its very distinct nature as a ‘political anatomy’, highly hierarchized and based on surveillance, with the curative and corrective impetus producing docile slave-bodies that need to measure up according to the standards of Roman-Christian masculinities in late antiquity. The hold of pastoral power over slave-bodies cannot be underestimated: on the one hand, these slaves are measured against the high standards of free Roman-Christian masculinity, while on the other hand, motivated to remain in their difficult state of institutional slavery via the strategy of proliferating passive, feminine virtues, especially those of suffering and endurance. Moreover, the close corporeal resemblance between the slave life and the ascetic life also increased the pastoral hold over slavery. Finally, as the pièce de résistance, the Stoic-Philonic metaphor of moral slavery and being slaves of God not only promoted attitudes of indifference to institutional slavery, but the very conceptual and symbolic dependence of Christian theology on the very concept of slavery ensured the survival and perpetuation of institutional slavery, and, even more importantly and dangerously, the discourses and discursivities that function behind slavery that are present even today.

543 Brown, *Body and Society*.  

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Chrysostom’s homilies on the *haustafeln*, in my opinion, fit squarely into this ‘political anatomy’ that function for the production of docile slave-bodies. We now proceed to his homiletic commentary on the Colossian *haustafeln*.

4 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM ON COLOSSIANS 3:22-41 (*HOM. COL. 10*)

Chrysostom’s series of homilies on Colossians was most certainly delivered in Constantinople. In the third homily Chrysostom refers to his position in the episcopate (*Hom. Col. 3.4*) with the allusions to the fall of Eutropius and the foolishness of earthly power supporting this point. He also mentions recent earthquakes that hit the capital in the second homily, which took place at the end of 398 and the Eutropius affair happening in August of the following year. It would then point to the possibility of the series being preached in the beginning of 399, possibly in the autumn season.\(^{544}\)

The comments in homily 22 regarding slave-management was certainly more detailed than those in this homily and in this homily Chrysostom refrains from elaborating on slave-management principles for Christians. The similarities between this homily and the previous one is that in both Chrysostom makes the regular Stoic references to metaphorical slavery, with the accompanying focus on not aiming to please people but to please God. The major difference between this homily and the previous is Chrysostom’s lack of comments directly related to the governance of slaves in the household; in fact, the homily seems to be quite rushed. The reasons for this will forever elude us. Surprisingly, the codes given to husbands and wives are very brief, unlike the previous series of homilies.

While the homilies on the Ephesian *haustafeln* were built around the theme of the household, this one short homily devoted to the entire Colossian *haustafeln* is not built around that theme. Here the central theme and structure of the homily are based on authority. This is perhaps fitting considering the Constantinopolitan context in which Chrysostom was quite active in civic politics. He does provide the same arguments as in the previous homily on the character of the authorities in the *haustafeln*. The authority functioning between husband and wife is natural, while that between slave and owner is not natural. The theme of love is perhaps more prevalent in this homily. Chrysostom makes a strong link between nature and love; this would be

the affection rising from biological kinship. The authority existing between slave and slaveholder is somewhat different from what Chrysostom envisages since he states (Hom. Col. 10.1):

Next he comes to the third kind of authority, saying that slaves must obey their masters according to the flesh. Here there is also a certain love, but no more resulting from nature, as in the one above, but from social custom, and from the authority itself, and the works done. Since the range of love is more limited here, obedience is increased, and he elaborates on this, desiring to give to these from their obedience, what the first have from nature. Thus, that which he discusses solely with the slaves is not for the sake of their masters, but also for their own sake, so that they may become desirable on their own for their masters. 545

Whereas the relationships between the pater familias and his wife and children put an emphasis on love, here the emphasis in on obedience and labour. The love/authority between husband and wife is natural, but that between slave and master is based on social custom (συννηθεία). The theme of loving slaves is also quite Stoic, as we have seen it in Seneca’s epistle. Unlike Seneca, however, Chrysostom does not use an argument of mutual origin to encourage love between slaves and masters. Rather, it is by means of good work that a slave should win the love of his or her master. Fear remains an important factor of manipulation here, and the obvious discrepancy between fear and love, surprisingly, does not feature here as it did in the previous homily and in the commentaries of Origen and Jerome. Along with the technology

545 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.367.11-23: Εἶτα ἐπὶ τρίτην ἤλθεν ἄρχην, Οἱ δούλοι, λέγων, ὑπακούετε τοῖς κατὰ σάρκα κυρίοις. Ἐνταύθα ἔστι μὲν τι καὶ φίλτρον, ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι φυσικον, καθάπερ ἁνω, ἀλλὰ συννηθείας, καὶ ἀπ' αυτῆς τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἑργῶν. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐνταύθα τὸ μὲν τοῦ φίλτρου ὑποτέτιμαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ὑπακοῆς ἐπιτεταται, τούτω ενδιατρίβει, βουλόμενος, ὅπερ οἱ πρῶτοι ἔχουσιν ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, τοῦτο δοῦναι τούτοις ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπακοῆς. Ὡστε οὖχ ὑπὲρ τῶν δεσποτῶν τοῖς οἰκέταις μόνοις διαλέγεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, ἵνα ποθεινοὺς έαυτοὺς ἐργάζονται τοῖς δεσπόταις.
of fear comes the usual emphasis on surveillance. Here, however, the ever-present panopticism of the divine slaveholder is more elaborately and explicitly stated. Slaves should fear Christ in the first instance despite the earthly socio-juridical regulations (Hom. Col. 10.1): ‘Make, he says, your service which is required by the law, to come from the fear of Christ. Since, when your master does not see you, and if you perform your duty and what is necessary for his honor, it is clear that you do it because of the sleepless Eye.’ \(^{546}\) God’s surveillance is called the ‘sleepless eye’ (ὁ ἀκοίμητος ὀφϑαλµμός). Fear of God means that one does not do evil when no one is looking. The love that owners ought to show to slaves, and the strong emphasis on teaching them virtue, points to the fact that slaves should no longer be considered merely as possessions and, more importantly, status indicators.

In this homily Chrysostom brings out a different emphasis on Stoic moral slavery. Although he does state that slavery is only temporal, ‘Your better part, the soul, is free, he says; your enslavement is temporary’ (Hom. Col. 10.1).\(^{547}\) Chrysostom stresses the freedom of the soul in this instance, and he now explains moral freedom (rather than moral slavery). The moral freedom metaphor, however, has some very practical implications for slaves according to Chrysostom (Hom. Col. 10.1): ‘He wants to have them freed not only from hypocrisy, but also from laziness. He has made them free instead of being slaves, when they do not need the dominion of their master; for the expression ‘from the heart’ means, with good intentions, not with a slavish necessity, but with freedom and choice.’\(^{548}\) Freedom from hypocrisy and laziness would certainly have direct advantages to the slaveholder regarding the labour of the slave. The dominion (ἐπιστασίας) of the master is now downplayed since a higher economy of

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\(^{546}\) Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.367.31-35: Ποίησον, φησὶ, τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου δουλείαν ἀπὸ τοῦ φόβου γίνεσθαι τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Κἂν γὰρ μὴ φρόντις ἔκεινου πράττῃς τὰ δέοντα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τιμὴν τοῦ δεσπότου, δηλονότι διὰ τὸν ἀκοίμητον ὀφϑαλµὸν ποιεῖς.

\(^{547}\) Translation: NPNF; Greek text: PG 62.367.28-29: Τὸ κρείττόν σου ἡ ψυχή ἐλευθέρωται, φησί· πρόσκαιρος ἢ δουλεῖα.

\(^{548}\) Translation: NPNF; Greek text: PG 62.367.50-56: Οὐ μόνον ύποκρίσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀργίας αὐτοῦς ἀπηλλάχθαι βούλεται. Ἐλευθερίας αὐτοὺς ἐποίησαν ἀντὶ δοῦλων, ὅταν μὴ δέονται τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν ἐπιστασίας· τὸ γὰρ, Ἐκ ψυχῆς, τοῦτο ἔστι, τὸ μετ’ εὐνοίας, μὴ μετὰ δουλικῆς ἀνάγκης, ἀλλὰ μετ’ ἐλευθερίας καὶ προαιρέσεως.
surveillance is at work and the slave is now a docile body. We have seen above that many late ancient Christian authors believed that Christian slaves were better workers than non-Christian slaves; or at least, they ought to be better. The argument here is related to this, and implies that a Christian slave, having renounced laziness and hypocrisy (two very stereotypical vices for slaves), is obviously a more productive slave. We see again here how Chrysostom utilizes the Pauline psychic expression ‘Εκ ψυχῆς as a strategy to produce a docile body. As mentioned, the soul is a corporeal strategy, used to manipulate corporeal behaviour.

He then discusses the rewards for good Christian slaves and, as expected, makes reference to eschatological reward and punishment. In the Colossian haustafeln however, Chrysostom seems to read a more ethnocentric argument from Paul than in the other (Hom. Col. 10.1):

Here he confirms his former guidelines. In order that his words may not seem to be flattery, he will receive, he says, the wrong he has done, that is, he will also be punished, for there is no partiality here. So what if you are a slave? It is not a shame. And truly he might have said this to the masters, as he did in the Epistle to the Ephesians. But here he appears to me to be hinting at the Greek masters. So what if he is a Greek and you are a Christian? The actions are scrutinized, not the persons, so that even in this case you ought to render service with good intentions and from the heart.549

Chrysostom addresses the problem of Christian slaves under non-Christian, specifically Greek, slaveholders. In this passage Chrysostom seems to understand that Greek (and thereby we

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549 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.368.2-13: ἔνταυθα βεβαιο ὑπὸ τὸν πρότερον λόγον. Ἡν γὰρ μὴ δόξῃ κολακεῖας εῖναι τὰ ὁμάτα, ἔπειτα, φήσεται, ὄσης· τοιτέτοιτα, καὶ τιμωρίαν διδωσιν· Ὡς γὰρ ἐστι προσωποληψία παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ. Τί γὰρ, εἰ δούλας εἰ; οὐκ αἰσχύνη. Καὶ μὴν τούτο πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας ἐδει εἰπεῖν, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς ᾿Εφεσίους. Ἀλλ’ ἐνταυθά μοι δοκεῖ τοὺς ᾿Ελλήνας αἰνίττεσθαι δεσπότας. Τί γὰρ, εἰ ἐκείνος μὲν ᾿Ελλην, σὺ δὲ ᾿Χριστιανός; Ὅτα πρόσωπα, ἀλλὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐξετάζεται. Ὡς τε καὶ σωτὶ μετ’ εὐνοίας, καὶ ᾑς ψυχῆς δεὶ δουλεύειν.
can add, I would say, Roman) principles of *oikonomía* and slave-management differ from Christian methods. I have said before that such a statement seems to be rather propagandistic and conjectural; although the contents of Christian slave-management principles differed from Greek and Roman principles and manifestations of slaveholding, their practical manifestations were more or less the same. We would find similar reasoning in his commentary on the *haftafeln* in Titus. Christian slaves, according to Chrysostom, should obey their owners despite their religion and socio-cultural practices. This is related to the notion of God not showing any favouritism of persons. Not much advice is given to slaveholders in this homily and, in fact, in the entire homily the most detail is devoted to slave behaviour, even more than to the behaviour between husband and wife.

The dynamics of authority in this homily become quite evident then, and it is also here based on the pastoral model of governance. Authority is effective because of surveillance, the divine shepherd and slaveholder is always watching, his eye is ‘sleepless.’ There is also love, that is, curativity, at work here, but the emphasis now is on the production of the practised, disciplined and docile body of the slave. It should also be noted here, with Chrysostom’s emphasis on the freedom of the soul, that the punishment and reward are also directed against the body as well as the soul; hence the strict disciplinary impetus between body and soul. Furthermore, the scopic economy proposed by Chrysostom here has two sides: since God shows no favouritism of persons, the slave and/or the master should do the same. Thus Christian slaves, who *ought* to work harder and better, should also show no favouritism in their behaviour if their owner is not a Christian. The control of the passion of hypocrisy, as stated in this homily, relates not only to correct behaviour before God, but also to proper behaviour before those who are not Christians. In his commentary on Titus Chrysostom would state that this type of behaviour has a kerygmatic function, and promotes Christianity. Good slave behaviour now becomes an informal policy of Christianity: ‘our slaves work better.’ This statement is of course built on the common and degrading stereotypes of slaves being hypocritical and lazy: two passions Chrysostom urges them to control in this homily. In the next homilies on the Timothean and Titan *haftafeln*, we will see this negative stereotype from Chrysostom more clearly.
The provenance of this series of homilies is a bit more problematic. The majority of homilies in the series seems to point to them being preached in Antioch, but the evidence is not entirely conclusive. The homily does provide much discussion on the topic of slaveholding. In this homily Chrysostom emphasizes the mutual fictive kinship between slaves and slaveholders. This is also a typically Stoic concept. These are the reasons for good relations between the slave and the slaveholder. It is a theme that is also very prevalent in Chrysostom’s series of homilies on the Epistle to Philemon. He re-articulates Paul’s words in Philemon 16 thus (Hom. Phlm. 2): ‘You have lost a slave for a short time, but you will find a brother for ever, not only your brother, but also mine. There is much virtue here. But if he is my brother, you also will not be ashamed of him.\(^5\)

Chrysostom especially focuses on the relations between slaves of God and God as slaveholder in the homily on the Timothean *haustafeln*. Chrysostom uses the image of the hard-working, busy slave as metaphor for what the attitude of Christians should be towards God. Like slaves, who spend most of their time doing the work of the slaveholder, so too the work of the divine slaveholder should take precedence (Hom. I Tim. 16.2):

But if he admonishes slaves to show such obedience, think of what ought to be our attitude towards our master, who brought us into existence out of nothing, and who feeds and clothes us. If in no other way then, let us at least serve him as our slaves serve us. Do they not structure their whole lives to ease the life of their masters, and is it not their duty and their life to take care of the masters’ concerns? Are they not busy with their masters’ work all day long, and only a small part of the evening busy with their own? But we, on the contrary, are always tending to our own affairs, in our master's hardly at all, and that too, although he does not need our services, as masters need those of their slaves, but those very...
services are to our own benefit. In their case the ministry of the slave benefits the master, but in our case the ministry of the slave shows no profit to the master, but is rather to the benefit of the slave.\footnote{Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.589.11-29: Εἰ δὲ τοῖς δούλοις οὕτως ἐπέτατε τοσαύτη κεχρῆσθαι τῇ ὑπακοῇ, ἐννοήσατε πώς ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὸν Δεσπότην διακεῖσθαι χρή, τὸν ἐκ τοῦ µὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡµᾶς παραγαγόντα, τὸν τρέφοντα, τὸν ἐνδιδύσκοντα. Εἰ καὶ µηδαµῶς οὖν ἔτερως, κἂν ὡς οἱ οἰκέται οἱ ἡµέτεροι, δουλεύσωµµεν αὐτῶι. Οὐχὶ πάσαν τὴν ζωὴν εἰς τὸν Καισαρίαν ἔργον· καὶ οὗτος τὰ ἐπεκτάσεις τοὺς δεσπότας αὐτῶι, καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον αὐτῶι ἐστι, καὶ οὗτος ὁ βίος τὰ δεσποτικὰ µεριµνᾶν; οὐχὶ τὰ τοῦ δεσπότου πάσαν τὴν ἡµέραν µεριµνᾶσι, τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν πολλὰκις µικρὸν ἐσπέρας µέρος; Ἡµεῖς δὲ τούναντιον, τὰ µὲν ἡµέτερα διαπαντῶς, τὰ δὲ τοῦ Δεσπότου οὐδὲ µικρὸν µέρος, καὶ ταῦτα οὐ δειµενὸν τῶν ἡµετέρων, καθάπερ οἱ δεσπόται τῶν δούλων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν πάλιν εἰς ἡµέτερον προχωροῦντων κέρδος. Ἐκεῖ µὲν γὰρ ἡ διακονία τοῦ οἰκέτου τὸν δεσπότην ὄφελει· ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἡ διακονία τοῦ δούλου τὸν µὲν Δεσπότην οὐδὲν, πάλιν δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν οἰκέτην ὄνινησι.}

Chrysostom’s teaching on the Christian lifestyle, here, is based on institutional slavery. It again demonstrates that if we were to totally remove the phenomenon of slavery from history, Christian theology and ethics would take on an entirely different shape. Here God becomes the epitome of the fair and virtuous slaveholder, who cares for slaves by supplying in their corporeal needs. Since God shows such providence, it is only fair that slaves of God serve him entirely. The difference between God and the earthly slaveholder is that unlike the earthly one, God is in no need of slaves. It is explained as a mutually beneficial relationship. God is also greater in that the rewards he gives to his slaves are far greater. A very interesting statement is here made by Chrysostom regarding manumission. The freedom of the soul, and salvation, is much greater than institutional manumission according to Chrysostom. He goes so far as to say (Hom. I Tim. 16.2): ‘Freedom here is often worse than enslavement since it is often embittered by famine beyond slavery itself.’\footnote{Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.589.46-49: ἀλλὰ τί; ἐλευθερίαι τὴν ἐνταῦθα, τὴν πολλὰκις τῆς δουλείας χαλεπωτέραν. Πολλὰκις γὰρ κατέλαβε λιµός, καὶ πικροτέρα δουλείας αὐτῇ ἡ ἐλευθερία γέγονε.} Here we see how complex manumission is, and as seen above with
many of the other authors, manumission was not necessarily something sought by all slaves. It also relates to the previous statements from Libanius, Chrysostom and Theodoret, stating that being institutionally free also implies great anxiety in providing for one’s everyday needs and the needs of slaves.

Finally, Chrysostom admonishes the audience to imitate slaves in the metaphorical sense, with the main focus on fear. As earthly slaves fear their masters, so too the heavenly slaves must fear God. It becomes a blueprint for proper, Christian behaviour. Here, Chrysostom shows how effective the technology of fear is for controlling slave-bodies. Fear teaches slaves patience and endurance, those important passive virtues promulgated by ancient Christian authors (Hom. I Tim. 16.2):

But I especially encourage you to imitate slaves; only in that they work out of fear of their masters, let us do the same out of the fear of God. For I do not find that you even do this! They receive many insults from fear of us, and silently endure them with the patience of philosophers. They are subjected to our violence justly or unjustly, and they do not resist, but entreat us, even though they have often done nothing wrong. They are satisfied to receive no more than they need and often less; with straw for their bed, and only bread for their food, they do not complain or murmur at their hard life, but because of their fear of us they are restrained from impatience. When they are entrusted with money, they return all of it. For I am not speaking of the bad [slaves], but of those that are moderately good. If we threaten them, they are immediately humbled.\footnote{Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.589.65-590.16: ‘Εγώ δὲ κἂν τοὺς οἰκέτας μιμήσασθαι παραινέων, ὅσα ἐκεῖνοι διὰ τὸν φόβον τὸν ἡμέτερον πράττουσι, κἂν τοσάτα διὰ τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ φόβον ἡμείς πράττομεν· οὐ γὰρ εὑρίσκομεν πράττοντας ύμᾶς. Ἐκεῖνοι διὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον φόβον ύβρίζονται μυρίακις, καὶ παντὸς φιλοσόφου μᾶλλον ἐστίκασι σιγῶντες· ύβρίζονται καὶ δικαίως καὶ ἀδίκως, καὶ οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ παρακαλοῦσιν, ἀδικοῦντες οὐδὲν πολλάκις. Οὐδὲν ἐκεῖνοι πλέον τῆς χρείας λαμβάνοντες, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἔλαττον στέγουσι· καὶ ἐπὶ στιβάδος καθεύδοντες, καὶ ἀρτον μόνον}
The fear of slaves towards their masters also defines the fear Christians should have of God. It is because of the fear of eternal judgement and punishment that Christians rightly fear God; again, we see the interplays of eschatology and slavery. The problem Chrysostom also addresses quite briefly in the homily is that slaveholders tend to keep score of slave offenses, and punish accordingly. Yet they forget about God and their offences against him. Christians should have the mentality of good slaves when it comes to their relationship with God.

6 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM ON TITUS 2:9-10 (HOM. TIT. 4)

Regarding the provenance of the series of homilies on Titus, Mayer remarks: ‘The provenance of the series on Titus (CPG 4438) has never been disputed. The references in In Titum hom. 3 to those who fast with the Jews and to Daphne, the cave of Matrona and a location dedicated to Kronos in Cilicia, all provide incontrovertible proof that it was delivered at Antioch.’\(^{554}\) It is then also the fourth homily in this series that serves as our source for Chrysostom’s comments on slave-management. This homily is very developed in terms of the discussion on slave-management, and it shows some important resemblances with *Homilia in epistulam ad Ephesios* 22.

As with the other two homilies discussed above, also in this homily Chrysostom starts immediately with the reference to Stoic moral slavery, and as in the homily on the Colossian *haustafeln*, he makes a distinction between the behaviour of Christian and non-Christian slaves and slaveholders. Again, Christian slaves, out of their fear for Christ, should not only be better workers, but exempla of virtue (*Hom. Tit. 4*):

> For if you serve your master with good intentions, yet the cause of this service commences from your fear, so the one who serves with such great fear, will receive the greater reward. For if he does not control his hand, or his undisciplined tongue, how will the gentile

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\(^{554}\) Mayer, *Homilies of St. John Chrysostom*, 186.
admire the doctrine that is among us? But if they see their slave, who has been taught the philosophy of Christ, showing more self-mastery than their own philosophers, and serving with all meekness and good intentions, he will admire the power of the gospel in every way. For the Greeks do not judge doctrines by the doctrine itself, but they make the practice and lifestyle the test of the doctrines.555

He again refers to Greek slaveholders in this section. He utilizes another stereotype that the Greeks place a high regard on practical philosophy. We have seen this issue also in the works of Philodemus on the issue of oikonomia. He therefore refers to Christian theology as the philosophy of Christ, which in this instance, aims to highlight Christian principles of self-mastery and virtuosity. Now the Christian slave is not merely someone who works better, but someone who lives a virtuous life. We have seen above in the discussion on the homily to the Ephesians that the disciplinary standards of virtue that slaves and women were measured with were in essence, standards of free masculinity. Here, this discourse becomes explicit. He states above that Christian slaves should exhibit more ‘self-mastery’ (ἐγκράτεια) than the philosophers, and just after saying this, he states (Hom. Tit. 4.1): ‘Therefore, let women and slaves be their teachers by [their] domestic lifestyle.’556 Chrysostom’s construction of the Christian slave becomes much more apparent. It is via this type of masculine domestic conduct (‘διὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀναστροφῆς’) that women and slaves can serve a pedagogical function in

555 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.685.11-23: Κἂν γὰρ τῷ δεσπότῃ διακονῆς μετ’ εὐνοίας, ἀλλ’ ἡ πρόφασις ἀπὸ τοῦ φόβου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει. Ὡστε ὃ μετὰ τοσοῦτον φόβου ἐκεῖνω διακονῶν, μεγίστων ἐπιτεύξεται τῶν μισθῶν. Εἰ γάρ χειρὸς μὴ κρατεῖ, μηδὲ γλώσσῃς ἀκολάστου, πόθεν θαυμᾶσεται ὁ Ἑλλην τὸ δόγμα τὸ παρ’ ἡμῖν; Εἰ δὲ τὸν δοῦλον θεάσοιντο τὸν ἐν Χριστῷ φιλοσοφοῦντα, τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς φιλοσοφήσαντων μείζονα τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἐπιδεικνύον, καὶ μετὰ πολλῆς τῆς ἐπιεικείας καὶ τῆς εὐνοίας διακονοῦμεν, παντὶ τρόπῳ θαυμᾶσεται τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ κηρύγματος. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δόγματος δόγματα, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ πραγμάτων καὶ βίου τὰ δόγματα κρίνουσιν Ἑλληνες.

556 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.685.23-25: Ἐστώσαν οὖν αὐτοῖς καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ δοῦλοι διδάσκαλοι διὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀναστροφῆς.
the eyes of outsiders. In order to facilitate this construction, Chrysostom has to also adopt the traditional, negative stereotype of the ancient slave-body (*Hom. Tit.* 4.1):

For both among themselves, and everywhere, it is admitted that the race of slaves is inordinate, not open to impression, stubborn, and does not show much aptitude for being taught virtue, not from their nature, it cannot be, but from their [bad] upbringing, and the neglect of their masters. For those who rule over them care about nothing but their own service, and if they do give attention to their morals, they do it only to avoid the distress that would be their part when they fornicate, rob, or become drunk; and since they are so neglected and having no one to care about about them, they obviously descend to the depths of wickedness. For if they were under the tutelage of a father and mother, a guardian, a master, and teacher, with suitable companions, with the honor of a free condition, and many other advantages, it is difficult to depart from doing evil things, what can we expect from those who are bereft of all these, and are mixed up with wicked people, and associate fearlessly with whomever they want to, with no one concerned about their friendships? What type of people do we expect them to be? Because of this it is difficult for any slave to be good, especially when they do not have the advantage of being taught either from those outside or from ourselves. They do not enage in conversation with free persons who behave appropriately, who have a great regard for their reputation. For all these reasons it is a difficult and surprising thing that there should ever be a good slave.557

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557 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.685.25-52: Καὶ γὰρ καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῖς, καὶ πανταχοῦ τούτο διωμολόγηται, ὅτι τὸ τῶν δουλῶν γένος ἵταμόν πώς ἐστι, δυσδιατύπωτον, δυστράπελον, οὐ σφόδρα ἐπιτίθειν πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς διδασκαλίαν, οὐ διὰ τὴν φύσιν, μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀνατροφὴν καὶ τὴν ἀμέλειαν τὴν παρὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πανταχοῦ οὐδενός ἐτέρου, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῶν
Chrysostom here concedes to the negative stereotypes of ancient slaves in much detail. What makes slaves prone to vice, not able to control their passions, according to Chrysostom? He states that it is certainly not due to nature (as Aristotle has it), but from bad upbringing (ἀνατροφή) and neglect (ἀμέλεια) on the part of their owners. This tends to point to a link in Chrysostom’s mind to bad behaviour and the way slaves are raised, not by nature he explicitly states; and also because of their masters who do not teach them virtue. We again see the emphasis on the curative and didactic role of the slaveholder. He then starts to criticize the slaveholders interestingly enough. The problem Chrysostom has, which bears resemblance to the problems forwarded by Philodemus, is that slaveholders are simply concerned about the labour of slaves and the quality of the work they do. The value of the slave-body, for Chrysostom then, does not simply lie in the quality of its service and labour, but in its conforming to the norms of virtuosity - this is now what defines good bodily practice. He continues to intimate that when slaveholders are concerned about the good behaviour of slaves, it is in order to spare them the embarrassment of bad slave behaviour. This is fully in line with Greek and Roman constructions of masculinity again. A man that cannot control and master his slave is a shameful sight. The only value of good slave behaviour in this instance is that it adds to the honour of the slaveholder. In another homily, Chrysostom states (Hom. Heb. 24.6): ‘For if we refuse to be called the masters of our bad slaves, and give up on them; and if any one comes to us and says, ‘so-and-so 

διακονίας οἱ κρατοῦντες αὐτῶν φροντίζουσιν· εἰ δὲ που καὶ τῶν τρόπων ἐπιμεληθείεν, καὶ τούτο πάλιν διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνάπαυσιν πράττοισι, ὡστε μὴ πράγματα αὐτοῖς παρέχειν ἢ πορνεύοντας, ἢ κλέπτοντας, ἢ μεθύοντας· εἰκότως ἠμμεληµένοι, καὶ οὐδένα τῶν πολυπραγµονονύτων ἔχοντες, εἰς αὐτά τῆς κακίας τὰ βάραθρα καταποντίζονται. Εἰ γὰρ, ἑνθα πατὴρ ἐφέστηκε καὶ µήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ τροφεὺς καὶ διδάάσκαλος καὶ ἕλικωται, καὶ αὐτῇ ἡ τῆς ἐλευθερίας δόξα περικειµμένη, καὶ πολλὰ ἔτερα, μόλις ἀν τῆς διαφύγοι τὰς τῶν πονηρῶν συνουσίας· τί οἴει τοὺς πάντων τούτων ἐρήµους ὄντας, καὶ µαριαὶς αναµµυγνυµένους, καὶ µετὰ ἀδείαις οἰς ἀν ἐθέλωσι συγγινοµένους, οὐδένος ὄντος τοῦ τὰς φιλίας αὐτῶν πολυπραγµονονύτων; τί οἴει τοὺς τοιούτους ἐσεθαί; Διὰ τοῦτο δύσκολον δούλον γενέσθαι ἄγαθόν. Ἄλλως δὲ οὐδὲ διδασκαλίας ἀπολαύουσιν, οὔτε τῶν ἔξωθεν οὔτε τῶν παρ’ ἡµῖν· οὐ συναναστρέφονται ἀνδράσιν ἐλευθέρους, κοσµίους, πολλὴν τῆς αὐτῶν δόξης ποιουµένοις φροντίδα. Διὰ ταύτα πάντα δύσκολον καὶ θαυμαστόν, χρήσιμον οἰκέτην γενέσθαι ποτέ.
does countless evils, he is your slave, is he not?’\footnote{Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 63.169.60-170.5: Εἰ γὰρ ἡµεῖς παραίτούµεθα καλείσθαι δεσπόται πονηρῶν ἡµῶν δοῦλων, καὶ ἀφίεµεν αὐτούς· κἂν εἴπῃ τις προσελθὼν, Ὡ δείνα µυρία ἐργάζεται κακὰ, ἀρα σὰς δοῦλός ἐστίν; εὐθέως φαµέν, ὅτι οὐδαµµῶς, ἀποτριβόµενοι τὸ ὀνείδος· σχέσις γὰρ ἐστὶ τῷ δούλῳ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, καὶ διαβαίνει ἡ ἀδοξία καὶ εἰς τούτον ἀπ’ ἄκεινου.} We immediately say, ‘certainly not!’ In order to spare us the shame, for a slave has a close relationship with his master, and the disgrace passes from the one to the other.’ Honour and shame become contagious and transferable in this instance. Chrysostom states that people in general are prone to generate bad behaviour and the enslaved all the more. He makes an important statement here. He admits that degenerate slave behaviour in antiquity is due to social inequalities and discrepancies; he identifies the root of the problem as being socio-psychological developmental issues. Upbringing, education and mentoring are not available to the slave, and even having these present, it is still difficult to live a virtuous life. These are the typical features used to classify abnormality and degeneracy in societies, even today. The slave as an abnormal is so because of several reasons then, according to Chrysostom, as well as many other ancient authors. The issue of bad upbringing is raised twice in the citation above. We have seen in the previous discussion on the homily on the Ephesian haustafeln, that in terms of discipline, in Chrysostom’s view, slaves are grouped in the same category as children. Puerile terms were often used to designate slaves, like \textit{puer}/\textit{παῖς}. In his \textit{Homily on Hebrews} 28.9, for instance, Chrysostom uses this same Greek term above and calls slaves ‘serving boys’.\footnote{Cf. PG 63.197.56.} This is not simply a term of offense and disrespect, but it exhibits something more pervasive when it comes to the identity of the slave. Using this type of language and applying the same rules of discipline on slaves as on children, we see the notion of puerility being transferred onto the image of the slave as an abnormal. The slave is not only regarded as a child in knowledge and experience (in fact, in the previous homily, Chrysostom used this as a distinction between slaves and children), but the slave is regarded as morally and socially underdeveloped in terms of behaviour. It also had sexual connotations; slave-traders are infamously known for using all kinds of techniques to make slaves look younger in order to boost their value.\footnote{Harrill, \textit{Slaves in the New Testament}, 129-133.}
For Chrysostom, discipline and virtue-teaching become technologies of normalization; we must remember that free Christian masculinity is seen as the norm here. This is well before the rise of psychiatry and psychopharmacology, where normalization was mechanized by means of medical and juridicial power - the hospital/asylum and the courtroom. The dynamics are slightly different in the model of pastoralism. The technologies here, especially with Chrysostom, are now psychotheological, with the juridicial dimension remaining. Normalization (equal to masculinization) is done by means of the teaching of virtue and also practical skills, as Chrysostom states (cf. Hom. Eph. 22.1-2; Hom. I Cor. 40.6). In this way, slaves are now ready to be ‘released’ into society - this is the ideal manumission in Chrysostom’s thinking. Not only should slaves be virtuous citizens, but they should also have a trade so that they would not be a burden on society. There is now a shift from domination to reformation and rehabilitation. When I say rehabilitation, I do not mean it in the strictly technical sense that it received with the rise of the prison system. For the slave it implies that, after being isolated in the realm of slave-carcerality and under constant surveillance and supervision, the Christian household and pater familias now rehabilitates the slave as a free, social individual, training the slave to act according to virtue (that is, against the stereotypical slave-vices) and also making the slave an economic contributor to society. Instead of the courtroom, the institution of manumissio in ecclesia now becomes the authorizing body confirming that normalization has taken place. In Christian pastoral governmentality, and in Chrysostom’s ideal society, the essential function of slave-carcerality is now the rehabilitation of the slave, and not merely to perform labour (which can and should still be done under the status of being freed). The limitations still applied to the status of freed persons make the supervision and prevention of non-rehabilitation easy to facilitate and maintain.

Another strategy Chrysostom applies to facilitate discipline and rehabilitation within slave-management and oikonomia is his radical reduction of the number of slaves a Christian slaveholder is supposed to have. These statements fit in squarely with Chrysostom’s ascetic views on the renunciation of wealth. Slaves are here seen as commodified and disposable bodies. This will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter. The important point here is that reducing the number of slaves also makes it easier for the pater familias to discipline, instruct and punish them. One of the most popular instances where Chrysostom speaks of slaves and slaveholding, one that will surface many more times in this dissertation, is found in his Homilia
in epistulam I ad Corinthios 40. Here, regarding the number of slaves, Chrysostom famously states (Hom. I Cor. 40.6):

...[O]ne master only needs to employ one slave; or rather two or three masters one slave...We will allow you to keep a second slave. But if you collect many, you no longer do it for the sake of philanthropy, but to indulge yourself...when you have purchased them [slaves] and have taught them trades whereby to support themselves, let them go free.\(^\text{561}\)

In another, very important source mentioned above, Chrysostom states (Hom. Heb. 28.10): ‘Let there also be, if you do not mind, two serving boys.’\(^\text{562}\) We will get back to this argument several times during the course of this study, since it bears so many important dimensions regarding slaveholding in the late Roman world. For our present discussion we need to ask: what relevance does this argument have for Chrysostom’s views on slave-management and slave-rehabilitation? We have seen above in the homily on the Ephesian haustafeln that even the poor households in Antioch would have had some slaves. The admonition to only have two slaves is not simply a rule based on the ascetic renunciation of property; by reducing the number of slaves, it becomes easier to educate and discipline slaves in the household. As we have mentioned above, Chrysostom’s remarks are almost always applied to smaller-scale, domestic slavery (even though the numbers of slaves in a wealthy, large domestic household would have been quite high). At this point I want to propose that the type of slaveholding Chrysostom wants his audience to adopt could be termed ‘tactical slaveholding.’ Michel de Certeau has utilized the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz\(^\text{563}\) to show how strategic power is transformed into tactical

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\(^{561}\) Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.353-354: Καὶ γὰρ ἐνὶ τὸν ἑνα χρῆσθαι δεσπότην οἰκέτη μόνον ἔχην· μάλλον δὲ καὶ δύο καὶ τρεῖς δεσπότας ἑνὶ οἰκέτη...εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἕνα που μόνον, ἢ τὸ πολὺ δεύτερον...εἰ δὲ πολλοὺς συνάγεις, οὐ φιλανθρωπίας ἐνεκεν τοῦτο ποιεῖς, ἀλλὰ θρυπτόμενος.

\(^{562}\) Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 63.197.56: Ἐστωσαν δὲ, εἰ βούλεις, καὶ παιδεῖς δύο.

power: ‘Power is bound by its very visibility,’ thus, its representation.\textsuperscript{564} The reduction of the number of slaves reduces and limits the channels of mastery and the exhibition of wealth and status; thus it reduces the visibility of power. In military terms, when one’s forces or resources are visibly reduced, the more strategy is transformed into tactics. De Certeau states: ‘[A] tactic is determined by the \textit{absence of power} [his italics] just as a strategy is organized by the postulation of power.’\textsuperscript{565} In antiquity, we can consider slaves as nodes of power; that is, modulations through which the slaveholder can make his or her power visible. Strategic power, in the thinking of De Certeau, is based on the utilization of space, since resources are abundant. Tactics, due to the lack of visible resources, must cleverly utilize time. Strategy is then the utilization of spatial requirements while tactics involve the utilization of temporal requirements. Once the numbers-based view of slaveholding is negated, that is, strategic slaveholding, tactical slaveholding is born. It must be remembered that Chrysostom still allows for a slaveholder to have ‘one or two’ slaves. Now, the small amount of slaves should be utilized to the most efficient extent, and according to Chrysostom’s ascetic thinking, only for necessity (\textit{ἀνάγκη}) and need (\textit{χρεία}). The terms here would imply those shameful servile duties specifically related to sewerage and other hygienic services, and according to another homily, cooking (\textit{Inan. glor. 70}). Chrysostom, for instance, believes that a priest is allowed to have at least one slave so that he does not have to perform ‘shameful’ duties. This is stated as a contra-argument to shame those wealthy individuals who employ slaves for every possible type of material and social spatiality, whether it is aiding the owner at the baths, at the market or at the theatre, even at the foot of the bed or in the kitchen. It is interesting that in the case of cohabitation, Chrysostom advises the man who is sharing the house to also acquire those ‘feminine’ skills needed for certain domestic chores despite having slaves to perform them.\textsuperscript{566} While he advises slaveholders to perform their own duties, slaves are still implied. This is a direct assault on strategic slaveholding. While it is easier to discipline and teach a small number of slaves, their duties would, by implication, become

\textsuperscript{564} Michel de Certeau, \textit{The Practice of Everyday Life} (Steven F. Rendall (trans.); Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 37.
\textsuperscript{565} Ibid., 38.
more intense since the practice of everyday life is now tactical, based on optimum utilization of
time rather than space. This creates the impression of weakness and poverty, one that is
preferential for asceticism. Owning only two slaves would be a representation of extreme
poverty.567 In the homily on Ephesians above Chrysostom stated that even poor households
sometimes owned entire slave families (cf. Hom. Eph. 22.2).568 It is in line with the strong
emphasis on the renunciation of material wealth, and more importantly, in line with the move to
promote passive, feminine (in this case, almost Cynic) values of weakness. Both Von Clausewitz
and De Certeau note tactics as an ‘art of the weak’; that is, as a tactical polemology of the
weak.569 What are the effects of this shift from strategic to tactical slaveholding? Initially, it
would seem to be ameliorative to institutional slaveholding, since fewer people are enslaved.
While it is true that fewer people would be slaves in this system, one should not regard tactical
slaveholding as being ameliorative. In fact, I would argue that it makes institutional slavery,
firstly, more pervasive than before and, secondly, that tactical slaveholding would dramatically
worsen the conditions of institutional slaves. Why does it make institutional slavery more
pervasive? Because it bears the deception of being ameliorative. Just in terms of numbers,
institutional slavery ‘appears’ to no longer be such a big problem, and the power-dynamics of
slaveholding become less visible. It removes the critical eye from slavery possibly to other issues.
Why would it worsen conditions for the slaves themselves? Because labour, surveillance and
discipline become much more intense. Fewer slaves now need to do the same amount of work.
Chrysostom, in this case, does advise slaveholders to tend to their tasks and duties themselves,
but this would not always be practically applicable.570 In his homily De inani gloria he advises
fathers to teach their children to take care of their own needs. Slaves should not hand them their
cloaks, wash their feet or serve them at the baths – cooking, however, should be done by the
slave since there are more important things to do with the time (Inan. glor. 70). The character of

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568 Cf. also: Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 49–50.
569 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, 37.
570 Chrysostom refers to the example of Sarah, who had hundreds of servants, but still ‘this woman kneaded the flour,
and did all the other slaves’ duties, and stood by them as they feasted also in the rank of a slave’ (Hom. Rom. 30.2).
Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 60.666.40-42: ἀυτὴ ἐφέρε τὰ άλευρα, καὶ τὰ άλλα πάντα διηκονεῖτο,
καὶ ἐστιμώμενος παρειστήκει πάλιν ἐν τάξει Θεραπανίδος.
slave-labour also becomes much worse, with more slaves doing the terrible tasks usually reserved for the lowliest of slaves. Tactical slaveholding makes slaves work harder, due to the emphasis on temporal utility (of both slave and slaveholder), and the work they do would be so much more unpleasant. Fewer slaves to monitor means that those who are present can also be more strictly monitored, in terms of labour, and observed, in terms of correct, non-degenerate behaviour. Discipline can also become more focused, and it creates a more intense, enclosed space where discipline happens. Discipline and punishment shift from the public spectacle to the domestic observatory/reformatory. Signs are replaced by exercises in this new mode of slaveholding; discipline is no longer enforced (i.e. punishment) by means of violent, external signs on the body (whippings or tattooing), but by means of exercises such as the study of scripture, the singing of hymns and, very importantly, service to the slaveholder. This is also one of the conclusions Chrysostom reaches in his *Homilia in epistulam ad Philemonem* 2. Since God also forgives his slaves, so too should earthly slaveholders practice forgiveness rather than resort to punitive violence (*Hom. Phlm.* 2): ‘...[So] that we masters may not give up on our slaves, nor press them too hard, but may learn to forgive the errors of such slaves, so that we may not always be severe, that we may not, due to their enslavement, be ashamed to make them share in all things with us when they are good.’

Chrysostom does not rule out punishment however. In the very next homily on the series on Philemon he states (*Hom. Phlm.* 3):

> But why do I speak of slaves, who easily fall into these sins? But let a man have sons, and let him allow them to do everything they want, and let him not punish them; will they not be worse than anything? Tell me, in the case of men then, it is a sign of goodness to punish, and of cruelty not to punish, and is it not so in the case of God? Since he is good, he has therefore prepared a hell.

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571 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.711.36-42: ...insula μὴ ἀπογινώσκομεν τῶν οἰκετῶν οἱ δεσπόται, μηδὲ σφόδρα αὐτοίς ἐπιτίθομεθα, ἀλλὰ μᾶθομεν συγχωρείν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα τοῖς οἰκέταις τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἵνα μὴ ἀεὶ τραχεῖς ὡμεν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπὸ τῆς δουλείας ἐπαισχυνώμεθα καὶ κοινωνοῦς αὐτοὺς ἐν πάσι λαμβάνειν, ὅταν ὡς τοις ἀγαθοῖς.

572 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.718.27-34: Καὶ τί λέγω οἰκέτας τοὺς προχειρότερον ἐπὶ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα ταῦτα ἐρχομένους; Ἦλλ’ ἐχέτω τις νίοις, καὶ πάντα ἐπιτησπέτω τολμὰν ἐκείνους, καὶ
The development of late ancient Christian pedagogy and eschatology went hand in hand. Punishment is still very necessary, and here hell is seen as the most extreme, and violent form of punishment. Not punishing is therefore in fact a cruelty, as Chrysostom states. We find here a divine justification of violence and punishment, which now serves as a technology that not only enforces the masculinity of the *pater familias*, but also appears to be an act of ‘kindness,’ since God also punishes his slaves (cf. *Hom. Eph.* 16). There is no shame in the punishment of slaves. This is an aspect Foucault notes very early in his *Discipline and Punish*, where he states that the punishment of criminals in the modern period has moved into a hidden sphere since the brutal, public spectacles of punishment also shamed those who dealt out the punishment.\(^{573}\) For Chrysostom, however, there is no shame in punishing a slave, since God also punishes. Chrysostom does opt for controlled domesticated violence against slaves. In a discussion of domestic violence in general, he refers to men losing their tempers, removing their slave-girl’s head covering, dragging her by the hair and beating her. Chrysostom is bothered equally by the concept of a slave-girl with her head uncovered and the inability of the owner to control his temper (cf. *Hom. Eph.* 15.4).\(^{574}\) Discipline, he affirms, should be gentle and fair, yet a physical beating with a rod is permissible, but at the same time, the slaveholder should be conscious of his own sins before God. He also gives guidance to the *mater familias* (*Hom. Eph.* 15.4): ‘If you will learn this lesson in your household in dealing with your slave-girl, and not be severe but gentle and patient, with this behaviour you will be in the goodwill of your husband.’\(^{575}\) Again, in another homily he states (*Hab. eun. spir.* 3.7): ‘To teach or punish foolish slaves is a great honour, and not a simple praise, when one is able to expel wickedness using private violence


\(^{574}\) Just prior to this discussion Chrysostom states that women are prone to losing their tempers, shouting and publicly harassing their slave-girls, which is very shameful conduct; cf. *Hom. Eph.* 15.3-4.

\(^{575}\) Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.110.41-43: Ἄλλων ἐν οἴκια ταῦτα παιδευθῆς ἐπὶ τῆς θεραπαινίδος, καὶ προστηνῆς ἢ καὶ μὴ χαλεπῇ, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐστὶ τοιαύτῃ.
against those who are the most evil.\textsuperscript{576} The point here is that slaveholders should not apply punitive violence hastily, such as putting their slaves in chains or beating them excessively; this is after all a loss of self-control and is considered shameful.\textsuperscript{577} The mastering of the passions of the slaveholder is just as important as the mastering of the slave. Punitive violence, therefore, should also contribute to the self-fashioning of the slaveholder, and always be directed to installing virtue to the slave. As then stated above, the preference of punitivity shifts from violent, public displays to domestic, spiritual exercises.

Hence, the move to tactical slaveholding is the logical step in favour of a better mechanism of rehabilitation. The process of rehabilitating the slave is, for Chrysostom, essentially a psychotheological process. The ‘soul’ of the slave is now manipulated by means of new strategies and new mechanisms of fear: doctrinal precepts. Chrysostom states (\textit{Hom. Tit.} 4.1):

\begin{quote}
When it is therefore seen that the power of religion, imposing a restraint upon a class naturally so self-willed, has rendered them singularly well behaved and gentle, their masters, however unreasonable they may be, will form a high opinion of our doctrines. For it is manifest, that having previously instilled in their souls a fear of the resurrection, of the judgment, and of all those things which we are taught by our philosophy to expect after death, they have been able to resist wickedness, having in their souls a settled principle to counterbalance the pleasures of sin. So that it is not by chance or without reason, that Paul shows so much consideration for this class of people: since the more wicked they are, the more admirable is the power of that preaching which
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{576}Translation: Harper, \textit{Slavery in the Late Roman World}, 331; Greek text: PG 51.287.4-8: ...καθάπερ ἰκέέτας ἀγνώώµµονας παιδε ύυειν καὶ σωφρονίζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγκώώµµιον µμέέ γιστον, καὶ οὐχ ὁ τυχὼν ἔπαινος, ὅτι τοὺς πρὸς τοσαύύτην κατενεχθέέντας κακίίαν ἠδυνήήθη διὰ τῆς οἰκείίας σφοδρόότητος ἀπαλλάάξαι τῆς πονηρίας...

\textsuperscript{577}Chrysostom states clearly that under no circumstances should a free man physically abuse or beat his wife or a slave-girl; cf. \textit{Hom. 1 Cor.} 26.8.
reforms them. For we then most admire a physician, when he restores to a healthy and sane state one who was despaired of, whom nothing benefited, who was unable to command his unreasonable desires, and wallowed in them. And observe what he most requires of them; the qualities which contribute most to their masters' ease.578

It is the indoctrinization of the slave-body as a form of discipline that makes it a docile body. The formation of late ancient Christian eschatology, in particular, has bonds with the institution of slavery, and I would argue, that ancient Christian eschatology was directly related to slavery. Eschatology, as a technology of fear, becomes a very powerful social and rhetorical strategy. Chrysostom now plays one of his most important cards, and compels us to make a crucial and critical observation. When speaking about this process of disciplining and rehabilitating a slave, he uses a medical discourse. I have mentioned above that unlike the modern psychiatrization of normal and abnormal conduct, the process in Chrysostom’s context is psychotheological and finally also juridical in terms of *manumissio in ecclesia*. But this does not rule out the discourse of medicality in this larger, discursive formation of the rehabilitated Christian slave. Despite their prepsychiatrical context, medical metaphors are very common in Chrysostom’s rhetoric. Slave-management, which now also becomes slave-rehabilitation, is like

578 Translation: *NPNF* (I prefer to keep the *NPNF* translation here due to its clarity); Greek text: PG 62.685.53-686.10: Ὅταν οὖν ἴδωσιν, ὅτι τὸ γέένος τὸ οὕτως αὔθαδες ἡ τοῦ κηρύγµµατος δύύναµµεν ἀλογώώτερον καὶ ἐπιεικέέστερον, κἀν σφόόδρα πάάντων ὄσιν ἀλογώτεροι οἱ δεσπόόται, λήψονται ἐννοιαν μεγάλην περὶ τῶν δογµµάτων τῶν παρ’ ἕµιν. Δῆλον γὰ ρ ὅτι καὶ τὸν περὶ τῆς ἀναστάάσεως φόόβον καὶ τὸν τῆς κρίίσεως καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπότελημα καὶ τὸν τὸν θάάνατον φιλοσοφουµµέένων παρ’ ἕµιν πρότερον ἐγκαταθέέντες αὐτῶν τῇ ψυχή, οὕτως ἰσχυσαν ἀποκρούύσασθαι τὴν κακίαν, ἀντίίῤῥοπόν τινα ἀπὸ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυµιῶν ἀλλ’ ἐναγάάγῃ πρὸς ἑαυτῶν ἐνιδρύύσαντες ψυχὴν. Ὅστε οὐκ εἰκὴ υἱόν ἀποµένον ἐπὶ τούτων πανταχοῦ ποιεῖται τὸν λόόγον· ὅσῳ γὰ ρ ὃς οὐδὲ ἀλλ’ ἐν τῶν κακῶν, τοσούτω μάλιστα θαυµάζεται τοῦ κηρύγµµατος ἡ ἰσχύς. Καὶ γὰ ρ ἵστον τότε θαυµάζεται, ὅταν τὸν ἀπεγνωσµέένον καὶ οὐδεµμιᾶς βοηθείας ἀπολαύύοντα υἱόν κρατήσει τῶν ἀκάφων ἐπιθυµιῶν δυνάµενον, ἀλλ’ ἐν ταύταις ἐγκαλινδούµενον, ἐναγάγῃ πρὸς υγείαν καὶ διορθώσηται. Καὶ ὅσον τίνα παρ’ αὐτῶν ἀπαίτει· τῷ μάλιστα πάάντων ἀναπαύει τὸν δεσπότην.
a medical practice. Of course, a morally healthy slave has many benefits for the slaveholder and the household, as he states (Hom. II Thess. 5.3): ‘And virtue is so exceptional, that even a slave often benefits a whole family together with the master.’

In concluding his discussions on slaves, Chrysostom summarizes the main point he has made again. Slave conduct should be directed to God and not the owner. Chrysostom uses the example of Joseph who served a non-Israelite king as a slave. It was the good and sound behaviour of Joseph, his accumulated knowledge of the king’s domestic affairs, and the trust he had won thereby, that saved him from being executed after Potiphar’s wife attempted to seduce him. He concludes again by referring to the holistic nature of oeconomical government, citing 1 Timothy 3:5, that a man who can govern his house can also govern the church.

Finally, it is also interesting to see that the discourse of domesticity was also related to life in the monastery. Chrysostom had a programme of social transformation in mind regarding his vision for the city in which he ministered. This transformation had at its core a type of popular asceticism that was viable in the households of urban Christians. The promulgation of popular asceticism was always explained in the light of its pinnacle, the monastery. The problem here is the fact that very little research has gone into the position, function and status of slaves in the late antique monastery. Furthermore, there is no literary or archaeological evidence from monasteries in the East from late antiquity that described their position on slavery. The only witnesses are the official church canons. Much of this issue is thus left open to speculation. How can the principles of monasticism, especially as understood by Chrysostom, inform scholars on this issue?

One of the important principles in monasticism is that of necessity (ἀνάγκη). Monks were meant to care for themselves and only use what is necessary. In an interesting passage, Chrysostom describes the very nature of the monastery (Hom. I Tim. 14.2):

579 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.498.54-58: καὶ τοσαύτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ ὑπερβολή, ὥστε καὶ δοῦλος πολλάκις ὀλόκληρον ὑφέλησεν ὀικίαν μετὰ τοῦ δεσπότου.
580 Cf. Hartney, Transformation of the City, 90–94; Maxwell, Christianization and Communication, 130–33; Liebeschuetz, Ambrose and John Chrysostom, 34–42.
To go to the monastery of a holy man is to pass, as it were, from earth to heaven. You do not see there what is seen in a private house. That company is free from all impurity...No one calls for his slave, for each person serves himself...

For Chrysostom, the monastery is a piece of heaven on earth. In this place there is no concept of private and personal property. These two principles, namely that of necessity and the lack of personal property, would seem to indicate that slave-status was not considered relevant in the monastery. There is also evidence that some poor monks were originally slaves, and it also seems that monasteries were used as asylum for runaway slaves. The legislation surviving from antiquity for the latter, however, is only evident from the Council of Chalcedon in 451 CE. There is also an important shift during the mid-fifth-century, after Chalcedon, when the monastery became legally independent of lay ownership. It is therefore problematic to apply fifth century developments to monasteries earlier than this period. Moreover, the issue of providing asylum to slaves all but negates their status. It is exactly their status as being fugitive slaves that causes asylum in monasteries and churches to be a problem. The councils and canons before Chalcedon are notoriously difficult to interpret regarding the issue of slave-status and asylum. There is, in the first instance, the mid-fourth century Council of Gangra that condemned the Eustathians that seemed to have either promoted slaves to leave their masters or act insolently toward them. The silence of some other councils and canons are deafening, such as

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582 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.575.30-33, 37-38: ὥσπερ ἀπὸ γῆς εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, οὕτως ἐστὶν εἰς μοναστήριον ἀνδρὸς ἁγίου καταφυγεῖν. Οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἐκεῖ ταῦτα ἀπερ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ· πάντων καθαρὸς ὁ χώρος ἑκείνος…. Καὶ οὐκ ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας, ἔγχουσιν οἱ οἰκεῖαι...


585 Glancy, Slavery in Early Christianity, 90.

586 Kate Cooper, The Fall of the Roman Household (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 236.

canon 7 of the Council of Sardica (346-347 CE) that gave the bishop power to intervene in cases of widows, orphans, and those that are subject to deportation who were treated violently or unjustly. Nothing of slaves who have suffered the same is present here.\textsuperscript{588} The Council of Carthage (401 CE) is equally ambiguous, and only refers to \textit{manumissio in ecclesia}. It must also be remembered that Chalcedon rejected the asylum offered to slaves, and stipulated that such slaves be returned to their masters. It is only in the late fifth century during the period of Justinian that a shift in policy becomes more or less evident. During this period, the church or monastery received permission to accept slaves who wanted to become clergymen or monks on the condition that they did not commit any crime prior to their flight. But masters still had a claim on these slaves. Their owners could still reclaim slaves who became clerics within a year of their service, and for slaves who became monks the owner had three years to reclaim the slave. What is more, the higoumenos of the monastery could not free slaves; this right was still reserved for the church and state authorities.\textsuperscript{589} Cases of slaves in monasteries and their manumission were therefore still rerouted to the channels of \textit{manumissio in ecclesia}, which still assumed status boundaries between slave and master.\textsuperscript{590} None of these instances above shows a tendency towards a negation of status in the monastery, even when the slave has become part of its community. Finally, Chrysostom himself, in his commentary on the Epistle to Philemon, admonishes runaway slaves, or any slave for that matter, to return or remain with their legal owners (\textit{Hom. Phlm.} Preface).\textsuperscript{591}

Furthermore, the passage quoted above from Chrysostom does not necessarily signify the absence of non-clerical slaves in the monastery; it simply means that the individual monks in the monastery did not use slaves for their own purposes. It is a fact that the churches and clergymen of late antiquity owned slaves, and there is no reason to doubt that the monastery, which was in itself a staunchly hierarchical entity, also collectively owned slaves. If one reads Chrysostom’s discussions of slavery and necessity, especially the section in \textit{Homilia in epistulam ad I Corinthios} 40.5, it is clear that the communal owning of a slave, that is, one slave for two or three masters, was not out of the question. Chrysostom also states that priests are allowed to own

\textsuperscript{588} Rotman, \textit{Byzantine Slavery}, 144.
\textsuperscript{589} Ibid., 145.
\textsuperscript{590} Harper, \textit{Slavery in the Late Roman World}, 465–85.
\textsuperscript{591} Cf. Glancy, \textit{Slavery in Early Christianity}, 91; De Wet, “Honour Discourse”.

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a slave in order to perform those shameful duties, especially related to sewerage-management, cooking, etc (Hom. Phil. 9.4; Inan. glor. 70). If a priest could own a slave, one slave to a monk or two would not oppose the monastic concept of necessity in Chrysostom’s eyes. The notion of the monastery as a household would also support rather than oppose the notion that slave-status was recognized in monasteries.592

The spatiality of the monastery is therefore not a socially neutral zone. The hierarchical dynamics of slave-domesticity were still present. The strong collectivism found in monastic communities allowed for slaves to be owned and used. The issue of slavery and monastic spatiality is not related to the principle of owning slaves, but rather the principle of self-sufficiency. An individual monk living in a monastery would have no need of a slave while he was at the monastery at least, but the community, like the church, would need slaves for their day-to-day operations.

There is then no reason, either from official ecclesiastical documents or from Chrysostom’s homilies, to understand the monastery as a socially neutral zone. The principle of Christ not recognizing slave or free as found in Galatians 3:28 was not realized in the most sacred of ecclesiastical spaces - the monastery.

In this section we have examined Chrysostom’s main arguments in terms of slave-management. We have used his homilies on the haustafeln as a framework, but evidence from other homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews were also considered. We will now summarize Chrysostom’s main points on slave-management in a more systematized way while concluding this chapter.

7 CONCLUSION
At the commencement of this chapter the question was asked as to how Chrysostom negotiates and reconstructs the Roman habitus of domestic slaveholding. We have viewed the development of the discourse in order to understand the complex habitus itself. After this, we have examined Chrysostom’s own guidelines on how slaves are to be managed as domestic bodies.

592 Else M. W. Pedersen, “The Monastery as a Household Within the Universal Household,” in Household, Women, and Christianities in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Anneke B. Mulder-Bakker and Jocelyn Wogan-Browne (eds); Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), 167–90.
To conclude, we have seen three very important features in Chrysostom’s discussions on slave-management. I will present these in this summary and conclusion of Chrysostom’s thinking on slave-management as discursive shifts in the traditional Roman understanding of slaveholding. To articulate it differently, with reference to Jennifer Glancy’s statement of habituation and slavery above, these discursivities would represent Chrysostom’s somatic negotiations with the Roman/Christian habitus of slaveholding. He provides a rather complex framework in which the habit of slaveholding is adjusted; the medium by which he does this is preaching. Preaching, as Maxwell has illustrated, was a powerful tool in the Christianization of daily life.

From strategic to tactical slaveholding: One of the most important discursive shifts we have seen with Chrysostom is that he promotes tactical rather than strategic slaveholding. The inference here is that by reducing the number of slaves Christians ought to have, as seen with several other late ancient Christian authors, slaveholding becomes reliant on the most clever and optimal utilization of time. Tactical slaveholding has temporality at its core; this was not good news for slaves, since it meant that their tasks would probably become both more intense and more shameful. The reason for this new prompt in Roman slaveholding was the notion that slaves could serve as adornment as well as representing high-status (symbolic capital) and thus, wealth (economic capital). In Chrysostom’s potent ascetic theology and ethics, there would be no room for strategic slaveholding, which implies high numbers of slaves for all sorts of tasks, occupying them in many spatial contexts. This shift would have a substantial effect on the role and relational dynamics of the slave within the late ancient Christian household.

From domination to reformation: While the concept of domination occupied a central place in the Roman habitus of slaveholding, especially in formations of masculinity and master, we now find with Chrysostom a shift to a more reformatory impetus. The slave is not simply someone that should be dominated, but the slave also needs to be educated and disciplined in virtue and Christian religious observance. Domination still played an important role in this process. The stereotype of the suffering Christian slave (normally suffering under a non-Christian slaveholder) strategically utilizes the discourse of domination to promote and proliferate passive, feminine virtues - virtues that should also be embodied by some Christians.

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593 Glancy, “Christian Slavery in Late Antiquity,” 70–75.
594 Maxwell, Christianization and Communication, 144–68.
despite a counter-discourse of Christian androcentrism being present. The emphasis, however, is on reformation, and the *pater familias* must now become a *doctor familias* in the psychopedagogical sense. The context of this process of education and discipline is the household. But for Chrysostom the household is also the duplication of the church. The discourse therefore also has an element of pastoral governance in it. The most prominent continuity of pastoral governance between the church and the household is that of surveillance and observance. The household, like the church, therefore becomes in the first instance an observatory. Since the number of slaves has been (ideally) reduced, observation is easier and also becomes more intense. Slaves now need to partake in Christian pedagogy and spiritual exercises. The discipline of the soul, as a corporeal strategy, lies at the center of this discourse. In the second instance, in the light of the previous statement, the household also serves as a reformatory - an institution of technologies of discipline and reform to produce docile, normalized bodies fit for society. Since slaves are considered degenerate, abnormal and prone to violence, they need to be reformed. This reformation carries with it an element of masculinization, since the standards slaves (and women for that matter) are measured by are masculine virtues and modes of behaviour. The common, age-old stereotype of the unruly, degenerate slave is therefore assumed in this discourse. Punishment also plays an important role here. Although Chrysostom recommends punitive violence against slave-bodies under certain circumstances, there is a preferential option for exercises rather than signs; that is, spiritual disciplining rather than corporal punishment. The end of this process is envisioned in *manumissio in ecclesia*. It serves not only as a means by which slaves receive a different social status, namely that of freed persons, but it also serves to judge what is normal. Manumission was of course not the fate of all slaves even if they had been ‘rehabilitated’.

*Slavery and the making of Christian theology and ethics*: We have also seen with Chrysostom, as well as all the other Christian authors of late antiquity, that slavery and its accompanying Stoic-Philonic metaphorical elaborations occupied a central role in the expression of Christian theology and ethics. It was also argued that if institutional slavery, by some miracle, might be removed from the history of late antiquity, Christianity would look dramatically different than it does today. Whether it is Christology or eschatology, the concept of slavery was used to express, explain and formulate these doctrines. Even the monastic developments and the rise of the monastery were not exempt from slaveholding discourses. From an ethical point of
view, slaveholding practices were interwoven with the ethics of marriage and parenting. With the development of the Christian tradition, new guidelines had to be formulated for old problems concerning slavery.
CHAPTER 4

THE HETERONOMOUS BODY: SLAVERY, HUMANNESS AND SUBJECTIVITY IN JOHN CHRYSOSTOM’S INTERPRETATION OF 1 CORINTHIANS 7:21-23

1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to problematize the concept of the heteronomy of the slave-body. The concept of heteronomy was already mentioned in the previous chapters, but here the focus will be more direct. The issue will be demonstrated by means of Chrysostom’s interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7:21-23. The heteronomy of the body is directly related to the metaphor of slavery, which has already been seen in the Stoic and Philonic sources. The chapter will therefore start by delineating the exegetical difficulties underlying 1 Corinthians 7:21-23, followed by a brief synthesis and elaboration on the nature of Stoic-Philonic metaphorical slavery, and then an analysis of Chrysostom’s interpretation thereof. Finally, the concept of heteronomy also concerns issues of agency and subjectivity, and this chapter will be concluded by reading the results in the light of recent debates on agency and subjectivity with regard to slavery.

2 THE PROBLEM OF 1 CORINTHIANS 7:21-23
There are almost no instances in the authentic Pauline letters where Paul addresses slaves directly. The pericope in 1 Corinthians 7:21-23 (and, one could possibly argue, Gal. 3:28) is

595 One of the purposes of this chapter is to provide and examine the sources, since the problem of sources in the study of late ancient slavery is notorious. Sources cannot be viewed in fragments and since this dissertation does not provide an appendix of translations of sources, the sources will be cited in the chapters that discuss Chrysostom’s commentary. It is therefore necessary to quote longer sections from ancient sources.
an exception to this, in which Paul directly tells slaves the following (1 Cor. 7:21; UBS⁴): δοῦλος ἐκλήθης, μή σοι μελέτω ἄλλ' εἰ καὶ δύνασαι ἐλεύθερος γενέσθαι, μᾶλλον χρῆσαι. The text is difficult to translate, but it could literally mean: ‘Were you a slave when you were called? Do not let it trouble you, but if you can become free, rather use it.’

One immediately notices the ambiguity in this verse. It is specifically found in Paul’s brachylogy⁵⁹⁶ in the phrase μᾶλλον χρῆσαι. This phrase could be translated quite literally as ‘rather use [it].’ But what is it that the Corinthian slaves should use? Do they need to use their status as enslaved, or freedom? Does he perhaps refer to the slaves’ ‘calling’ from God, that they need to use despite their social status? The pericope is littered with grammatical, syntactical and semantic ambiguities.⁵⁹⁷ The meaning of the verb χράοµαι in the aorist imperative raises several possibilities for its translation. Some state that the aorist could indicate a ‘definite opportunity,’ while others point out that it could also indicate ‘attitude of mind as well as behaviour.’⁵⁹⁸

There are convincing arguments for both possibilities. This chapter, however, is not concerned here with which reading is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ – the conclusion of the chapter does represent a decision on the matter though. It is concerned with Chrysostom’s understanding of the verse. His main discussion of this verse can be found in his commentary on 1 Corinthians. In Homilia in epistulam I ad Corinthios 19.5, Chrysostom states:

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⁵⁹⁶ Brachylogy is the term used for a grammatical or syntactical omission usually for the sake of brevity or if there is an assumption that the recipient already knows the contents of the omission.

⁵⁹⁷ For a detailed discussion of the grammatical difficulties of this pericope, cf. S. Scott Bartchy, ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΧΡΗΣΑΙ: First Century Slavery and 1 Corinthians 7:21 (SBLDS; Missoula: Society of Biblical Literature, 1973); Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 127 (this discussion, however, is not detailed, and Conzelmann seems to make an easy choice in favour of inserting enslavement as the omission); Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 315–20; J. Albert Harrill, The Manumission of Slaves in Early Christianity (HUTH; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 74–75; J. Dorcas Gordon, Sister or Wife? 1 Corinthians 7 and Cultural Anthropology (JSNTSupp; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 162–63; Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 553–59 (the most detailed discussion); John Byron, Recent Research on Paul and Slavery (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2008), 92–93.

⁵⁹⁸ Cf. Thiselton, First Corinthians, 153–54; Byron, Recent Research, 92–93.
Incredible! Where has he put slavery? In the same way that circumcision has no benefit, and not being circumcised has no disadvantage; neither does slavery nor freedom bear any advantage. And in order to demonstrate this with excellent clarity, he [Paul] says, ‘But even if you can become free, use it rather,’ this means: rather continue to be a slave. Now for what reason does he tell the person who might be set free to remain a slave? He wants to show that slavery is no hindrance but rather an advantage. And we are not unaware that some people say the words ‘use it rather’ are spoken with regard to freedom - interpreting it: if you can become free, become free. But the expression would be quite contrary to Paul's argumentation if he meant this. For he would not, while consoling the slave and pointing out that he was in no way disadvantaged, have told him to seek freedom. Since someone might say, ‘What then, if I am not able to become free? I am a wronged and inferior person.’ This then is not what he says, but as I said, he means to show that a person benefits nothing by being made free; he says, ‘Even though it is in your power to be made free, remain rather in slavery’.

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599 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.156.17-36: Βαβαί! ποῦ τὴν δουλείαν ἐθήκεν! Ὡσπερ οὐδὲν ωφελεὶ ἡ περιτοµὴ, οὐδὲ βλάπτει ἡ ἀκροβυστία, οὔτως οὐδὲ ἡ δουλεία οὐδὲ ἡ ἐλευθερία. Καὶ ίνα δείξῃ τοῦτο σαφέστερον ἐκ περιουσίας, φησίν· Ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ δύνασαι ἐλεύθερος γενέσθαι, μάλλον χρῆσαι· τουτέστι, μάλλον δούλευε. Καὶ τί δήποτε τὸν δυνάμενον ἐλευθερωθῆναι κελεύει μένειν δούλον; Θέλων δείξαι, ὅτι οὐδὲν βλάπτει ἡ δουλεία, ἀλλὰ καὶ ωφελεί. Καὶ οὐκ ἄγνωσυ μὲν ὅτι τινές το, Μάλλον χρῆσαι, περὶ ἐλευθερίας φασίν εἰρήσχαι, λέγοντες, ὅτι Εἰ δύνασαι ἐλεύθερωθῆναι, ἐλευθερώθητι· πολὺ δὲ ἀπεναντίας τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦ Παύλου τὸ ὄμη, εἰ τοῦτο αἰνίττοιτο. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν παραμυθούμενος τὸν δούλον, καὶ δεικνὺς οὐδὲν ἠδικηµένον, ἐκέλευσε γενέσθαι ἐλευθερον. Εἶπε γὰρ ἂν τὶς ἰσως· Τί συν; ἂν μὴ δύνωμαι, ἡδίκησαι καὶ ἢλάττωμαι; Οὐ τοῖνυν τοῦτο φησίν, ἀλλ’ όπερ ἐφην, Θέλων δείξαι ὅτι οὐδὲν πλέον γίνεται τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ γενοµένῳ, φησί· Κἂν κύριος ἢς τοῦ ἐλευθερωθῆναι, μένε δουλεύων μάλλον.

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Chrysostom opts for a reading that assumes enslavement as the substitution for Paul’s brachylogy; thus, slaves should rather remain slaves than seek freedom. It is clear however from the section above that even Chrysostom finds Paul’s omission troubling, and that as early as Chrysostom’s time there had been debate over the meaning of this verse.\footnote{Thiselton, \textit{First Corinthians}, 553–56.} Chrysostom understands Paul to mean that slaves should rather use their status as slaves, and not necessarily seek freedom. Chrysostom says that enslavement is no ‘hindrance’ (βλάπτω), probably meaning no hindrance to being Christian and following Christian (ascetic) values. He affirms this in his introduction to the Epistle to Philemon, stating (\textit{Hom. in Phlm.} Preface): ‘For this reason the blessed Paul, when giving them the best advice, said, “Are you called, being a slave? Do not be concerned about it, but even if you can be made free, rather use it;” that means: remain in slavery.’\footnote{Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.704.8-12: Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ μακάριος Παῦλος τὴν ἀρίστην αὐτοῖς εἰσάγων συμβουλὴν ἐλεγε∙ Δοῦλος ἐκλήθης; μὴ σοι μελέτω∙ ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ δύνασαι ἐλεύθερος γενέσθαι, μάλλον χρῆσαι· τοιότι, Τῇ δουλείᾳ παράμενε. Cf. also: Chris L. de Wet, “Honour Discourse in John Chrysostom’s Exegesis of the Letter to Philemon,” in \textit{Philemon in Perspective} (D. Francois Tolmie (ed.); BZNW 169. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 317–32.}

Slaves should rather use their status to exalt God. This same line of argumentation is used by Chrysostom when quoting this pericope in his discussion in \textit{De Virginitate} 41.59-66, that both virgins and slaves have their status in order to glorify God based on Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 7:25ff.\footnote{Cf. Sally R. Shore and Elizabeth A. Clark, \textit{John Chrysostom: On Virginity; Against Remarriage} (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1983), 38–39.} He understands that one’s social status has no bearing with God, since all are equal before God (probably an allusion to Gal. 3:28). In the section before the passage quoted above, Chrysostom explains that being a slave is similar to being circumcised (or uncircumcised), or being married to an unbelieving wife, and concludes that ‘they are no hindrances to piety.’ It is therefore quite clear how Chrysostom interprets 1 Corinthians 7:21, and he does the same in three instances in his homilies on Corinthians and Philemon, as well as in \textit{De virginitate}.

Several very important issues come to the fore when examining Chrysostom’s commentary on the verse. There have been many interesting scholarly interpretations that follow Chrysostom’s reading. Most notably, Bartchy has argued that it is not the social status that is the
question since the slave has no say in this, but rather the calling that is the main issue. 603 Dale Martin builds on Barchy’s observations and uses the verse to argue for the upward social mobility of slaves in the first century. 604 There are many other interpretations that will merit discussion in this chapter, but before these issues are discussed, one needs to ask what lies behind both Paul and Chrysostom’s comments to slaves. One of the very crucial issues, in my opinion, regarding the Pauline-Chrysostomic view of the body is its main characteristic as being heteronomous. The body always belongs to someone else; it is always a slave to something - either to Christ, or to the passions and to sin. This is a principle that Berger has traced back as far as Paul the apostle in early Christian literature. 605 Berger states: ‘The body is thus regarded as an object for possession, ownership of which can pass from one person to another.’ 606 We will now trace the development of this idea in the time of the New Testament and slightly before, since the New Testament serves as Chrysostom’s primary frame of reference for this issue. But before the New Testament writings are considered in this investigation, Stoic attitudes to slavery need to be delineated since they exercised a substantial influence on the New Testament. Philo’s modification of Stoic thought on the matter will also be discussed, and then our focus will turn to the New Testament and finally Chrysostom. The following is thus an examination of the historical development of the notion of the heteronomous body.

3 THE STOICS, PHILO AND MORAL SLAVERY

We have already devoted some attention to discussing Stoic views on slaveholding, particularly from Seneca’s works. This section will serve as a more general discussion of metaphorical slavery, and will provide both a short synthesis of previous results as well as a wider elaboration on the topic with special reference to corporeal heteronomy.

The thought of the body that should be controlled and ruled was common in antiquity. Probably the most popular example of this is found in Aristotle. He distinguishes between the

603 Barchy, ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΧΡΗΣΑΙ, 137–54.
606 Ibid.
bodies of men, women, slaves and animals. Interestingly enough, Aristotle considered non-Greeks, or barbarians, equal to slaves since they have no governance amongst themselves. These distinctions are based on some ‘biological’ observations of Aristotle. The slave is marked for submission and obsequiousness at the hour of his or her birth (Pol. 1.5.1). Their bodies are inferior to those of free men, and like animals, they need to be ruled. The free, male, Greek body was seen as superior and considered the norm. This was also seen in the works of Xenophon, although he reasons not from the basis of nature but from social inclusion. It was even true for ancient Greek medical science in the time of Xenophon and Aristotle. In the Hippocratic corpus, there are no diseases that are characteristic to men. Skinner states: ‘Thus men are regarded as the physiological norm, while women, with their peculiar bodily organs, constituted a special case.’ Slaves were objects that had to be dominated, and as we have seen they played an important role in the formation and maintenance of masculinity in antiquity. Being able to master one’s wife, children and slaves characterized what it meant to be a man, implying that those who had to be mastered were considered ‘unmen.’ These unmen were to be passive subjects upon which the active, freeborn male could exercise authority and, in essence,

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penetration. But we also noted that there was a shift during and after the Augustan epoch to the notion of self-mastery. Foucault states: ‘Whereas formerly ethics implied a close connection between power over oneself and power over others... [t]he formation of oneself as the ethical subject of one’s actions became more problematic.’ Foucault continues to trace this important development and centres on Stoic thought, although it was probably present in less popularized forms before Stoicism. Foucault quotes both Seneca and Epictetus in stating that being a slave, according to the Stoics, was merely a title, something that one could rise above.

Although the notion of being a slave to a god is absent from Stoic thought, the Stoics did make some important shifts in views on slavery in the Graeco-Roman world. Furthermore, although it is difficult and erroneous to assume that Stoicism was monolithic, there does seem to be some philosophical continuity regarding their views on slavery. Some of the shifts in foci that the Stoics contributed prepared the ground for Philo and early Christian thinking on slaves and the heteronomous body.

The Stoics promoted a shift in emphasis from Aristotelian natural slavery to Stoic moral slavery. There is no explicit rejection of natural slavery, but as Garnsey notes: ‘[T]here appears to be a common assumption that by the early imperial period in Roman history...it was considered common place that no man was a slave by nature...,’ and Garnsey attributes this to Stoic influence. Early Stoic thinking on moral slavery was especially the result of Cynic

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616 Capel Anderson and Moore, “Matthew and Masculinity,” 69.
618 Ibid., 84–86.
621 Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 128.
influence, most notably that of Diogenes the Cynic.  He was captured by pirates and sold as a slave. His behaviour, as a typical wise man of antiquity, does not seem to be influenced by his status as a slave. Legal slavery was therefore seen as an external of this life, something over which human beings have no control. This served as a trajectory for the development of the Stoic doctrine of ‘indifference’ (ἀδιάφορος). Slavery is neither good nor evil, and cannot contribute to happiness or unhappiness. Slavery, in the Stoic sense, is more a matter of the disposition of the soul rather than the material body. A slave in body or in the legal sense can still be free in his or her mind, as Diogenes has illustrated. It is all a matter of one’s attitude and behaviour toward external factors that determine freedom or captivity. Legal or institutional slavery is therefore outside of one’s control and thus something not worth caring about. The slavery of the soul to the passions, however, is within the control of the individual and is therefore a matter of concern.

We then find with the Stoics the first popularisation of a type of slavery that devaluates institutional and/or natural slavery for the sake of a moral trajectory. The body is therefore subject to forces outside of its control. The second-century Stoic, Epictetus, who was himself a former slave, makes this quite clear: ‘You ought to treat your body like a poor loaded-down donkey, as long as it is possible, as long as it is allowed; and if it be commandeered and a soldier lay hold of it, let it go, do not resist nor grumble.’ The institutionally enslaved can be ‘truly’ free in the Stoic sense if they chose not to be moral slaves.

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625 Epictetus, for instance, states: ‘When the tyrant threatens and summons me, I answer, “Whom are you threatening?” If he says, “I will put you in chains,” I reply, “He is threatening my hands and feet.” If he says, “I will behead you,” I answer, “He is threatening my neck.” If he says, “I will throw you into prison,” I say, “He is threatening my whole paltry body,” and if he threatens me with exile, I give the same answer. Does he, then, threaten you? Not at all. If I feel that this is nothing to me - not at all; but if I am afraid of any of these he threatens me.’ Arrian, Epict. diss. 1.29.6-8; cited in: Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 32.

But behind this lies another important advancement in Stoic thinking against that of Aristotle. The Stoics believed that slaves partake in the divine reason or *logos*, and thus have the ability to reason and rationalise.\(^{627}\) In the earliest thinking on slavery, slaves were likened to animals, with the Greek word ἄνδράποδον (‘man-footed animal’) being a clear indication of this.\(^{628}\) Aristotle did not consider slaves as animals, but he did view them as lacking in the abilities to reason.\(^{629}\) Slaves can understand but they do not possess reason, which is the defining mark of separation. The Stoics come in sharp distinction here, and this is also where the Stoic attitude against natural slavery becomes clearer.\(^{630}\) Epictetus states that all humans share the same kinship due to their descendancy from the gods.\(^{631}\) Slavery is something that is made by human laws, not divine and natural laws. Petronius links slavery to fate and dismisses the notion that people are slaves from birth.\(^{632}\) But the most important difference between Aristotle and the Stoics is seen with Cicero (and also Seneca), who states that all people are the offspring of the gods and therefore share the same ‘divine gift of mind.’\(^{633}\)

These advances popularised a type of slavery that was not institutional, and aided in devaluing institutional slavery. This was certainly problematic, since institutional slavery was then not regarded as a problem. There is then an interesting development in the thinking regarding slavery. From the point of considering slaves equal to animals, to the notion of the slave that is slightly higher than the animal, but still biologically inclined to servitude, to the slave that has the ability to reason, and thus to choose to be morally free. As Foucault has pointed out, this started with the concept of the care of the self, in which the self should be mastered in order to be morally free and achieve happiness. Masculinity was now the ability to still master one’s wife and slaves, but, perhaps more importantly, to master oneself. It needs to

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\(^{627}\) Fitzgerald, “Treatment of Slaves,” 156.

\(^{628}\) Bradley, “Animalizing the Slave.”

\(^{629}\) Garver, “Natural Slaves.”

\(^{630}\) Fitzgerald, “Treatment of Slaves,” 156.

\(^{631}\) Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.13.3-5; cf. also: Fitzgerald, “Treatment of Slaves,” 156.


be understood that these shifts were more than just symbolic or metaphorical. The rules of the game were changed, or as Foucault has it, a new political game was in play.\footnote{Foucault, \textit{Care of the Self}, 87.} Since all people are inclined to become slaves of their passions, care needs to be taken to master the body and to make the soul truly free.

Philo is an important bridge between Paul and the Stoics. Philo shares the characteristics of Stoicism regarding moral slavery. It is especially seen in his treatise \textit{Quod omnis probus liber}. Philo conceptualises two types of slavery.\footnote{Garnsey, \textit{Ideas of Slavery}, 157–72.} Firstly, there is the slavery of the body, or institutional slavery, while against this, there is slavery of the soul, or moral slavery. The Exodus account played an important role in Philo’s thinking on slavery. There is a type of hybridity in Philo’s thinking, exhibiting much reliance on the Stoic concept of moral slavery, but, most importantly now, the notion of the believer as a slave of God, is an influence from his monotheistic and Judaistic background.\footnote{Cf. John Byron, \textit{Slavery Metaphors in Early Judaism and Pauline Christianity: A Traditio-Historical and Exegetical Examination} (WUNT; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 106–28; Catherine Hezser, \textit{Jewish Slavery in Antiquity} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 55–61.} Slavery to God then becomes an acceptable form of slavery. Philo relates Abraham and Joseph as slaves of God. Philo explains (Philo, \textit{Cher.} 107):

\begin{quote}
For to be the slave of God is the highest boast of a man, a treasure more precious than freedom...\footnote{Translation: Garnsey, \textit{Ideas of Slavery}, 160–61; Greek text: Cohn [TLG]: τὸ γὰρ δουλεύειν θεῷ μέγιστον αὐχήμα καὶ οὐ μόνον ἔλευθερίας...}
\end{quote}

He is not as consistent as Paul would be, but the notion of the slave of God is present enough to command attention. This type of thinking is characteristically Judaistic rather than Greek in the Aristotelian or Stoic sense. It is especially in Paul that we find the concept of the heteronomous body (as a slave of God) in its most developed form.

Thus, in both Graeco-Roman philosophy and in Hellenistic Judaism, we find the concept of the body that is made to be ruled. Animal bodies are to be ruled by humans, barbarians are to be governed by Greeks, women are to be ruled by men, and slaves by their free masters. At the top of this hierarchy is the free Greek (or Roman) male body, which should also master itself, since it is also inclined to be ruled by its passions, something that is truly shameful and slavish. But this principle, in the Stoic sense, does not only apply to the free Greek/Roman male, but to...
all human beings who have received reason from the gods. Philo, takes the final step in typical Judaistic fashion, stating that people should also be slaves of God and not moral slaves to their passions.

4 PAUL, JOHN CHRYSOSTOM AND THE HETERONOMOUS BODY

In Paul’s introduction in the Epistle to the Romans, he refers to himself as a ‘slave of Christ Jesus’ (‘...Παῦλος δοῦλος Χριστοῦ Ιησοῦ...’), and in the opening of the Epistle to the Philippians, he calls himself and Timothy slaves of Christ Jesus. Paul’s self-conceptualisation as a slave of Jesus Christ is especially found in Romans 6:15-23:

What then? Shall we sin because we are not under the law but under grace? By no means! Don’t you know that when you offer yourselves to someone as obedient slaves, you are slaves of the one you obey —whether you are slaves to sin, which leads to death, or to obedience, which leads to righteousness? But thanks be to God that, though you used to be slaves to sin, you have come to obey from your heart the pattern of teaching that has now claimed your allegiance. You have been set free from sin and have become slaves to righteousness. I am using an example from everyday life because of your human limitations. Just as you used to offer yourselves as slaves to impurity and to ever-increasing wickedness, so now offer yourselves as slaves to righteousness leading to holiness. When you were slaves to sin, you were free from the control of righteousness. What benefit did you reap at that time from the things you are now ashamed of? Those things result in death! But now that you have been set free from sin and have become slaves of God, the benefit you reap leads to holiness, and the result is eternal life. For the wages of sin is death, but the gift
of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord.  

It is quite clear from Paul’s thinking here that one can either be a slave of sin or a slave of God in Christ. Slavery to sin is probably a development from the idea of moral slavery found in Stoic philosophy. Romans 6:6-7 elaborates on the body that belongs to sin: ‘For we know that our old self was crucified with him so that the body ruled by sin might be done away with, that we should no longer be slaves to sin— because anyone who has died has been set free from sin.’ Romans 7:4 as well as the discourse in 1 Corinthians 6:20 affirms the view that the body of the believer now belongs to Christ, and is thus a slave to Christ through righteousness. Thus, to get back to the passage under discussion, it would be plausible for Paul to recommend that slaves remain in their state of enslavement, since institutional slavery does not matter anymore. Although he does not explicitly mention it, it seems apparent that Chrysostom understood Paul’s phrase μᾶλλον χρῆσαι to imply the Stoic indifference of institutional slavery. We have seen

638 Translation: NIV; Greek text: UBS 4: Τί οὖν; ἁμαρτήσωμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσμεν ὑπὸ νόμου ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ χάριν; μὴ γένοιτο. οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι ὁ παρεστάνετε ἐαυτούς δούλους εἰς ὑπακοήν, δοῦλοι ἔστε ὑπακούετε, ἦτοι ἁμαρτίας εἰς θάνατον ἢ ὑπακοής εἰς δικαιοσύνην; χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ ὅτι ἔστε δοῦλοι τῆς ἁμαρτίας υπηκούσατε δὲ ἐκ καρδίας εἰς ὅν παρεδόθητε τύπον διδαχῆς, ἐλευθερωθέντες δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ: ἀνθρώπινον λέγω διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς υμῶν. ὡσπερ γὰρ παρεστήσατε τὰ μέλη υμῶν δούλα τῇ ἀκαθαρσίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἀνομίᾳ εἰς τὴν ἀνομίαν, οὕτως νῦν παραστήσατε τὰ μέλη υμῶν δούλα τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ εἰς ἁγιασμόν. ὅτε γὰρ δοῦλοι ἦτε τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ἐλευθεροὶ ἦτε τῇ δικαιοσύνη, τίνα οὖν καρπὸν εἴχετε τότε ἐφ’ οἷς νῦν ἐπαισχύνεσθε; τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἐκείνων θάνατος, νῦν δὲ, ἐλευθερωθέντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας δουλωθέντες δὲ τῷ θεῷ, ἔχετε τὸν καρπὸν υμῶν εἰς ἁγιασμόν, τὸ δὲ τέλος ζωῆν αἰώνιον. τὰ γὰρ ὑψώνια τῆς ἁμαρτίας θάνατος, τὸ δὲ χάρισμα τοῦ θεοῦ ζωῆς αἰώνιος ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν.

639 Berger, Identity and Experience, 64.

640 Translation: NIV; Greek text: UBS 4: τούτῳ γινώσκοντες, ὅτι ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπος συνεσταυρώθη, ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ· ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας.

this view exhibited in other homilies of Chrysostom. One’s socio-institutional status does not really matter; it rather matters whether one is a slave of Christ or a slave of sin. This is also evident in Chrysostom’s commentary on Romans 6:15-23 (Hom. Rom. 11.1). Let us turn to Chrysostom’s explanation of 1 Corinthians 7:21-23. Commenting on 1 Corinthians 7:22, he states (Hom. I Cor. 19.5):

For the one that was called in the Lord while being a slave, is the Lord's free person; in the same way, the one that was called, being free, is Christ's slave. For, he [Paul] says, regarding the things that relate to Christ, both are equal: and as you are the slave of Christ, so also is your master. How then is the slave a free person? Because Christ has freed you not only from sin, but also from outward slavery while continuing to be a slave. For he does not allow the slave to be a slave, not even though such a person is someone in slavery; and this is the great wonder. But how is the slave a free person while continuing to be a slave? When this person is freed from passions and the diseases of the mind, frowning upon riches and anger and all other similar passions.643

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642 Chrysostom also uses this verse in his commentary on Paul’s Epistle to Philemon; cf. Hom. Phlm. 3; other instances of the use of this verse are: Exp. Ps. 112, 143; Hom. Matt. 16, 38, 68; Hom. Jo. 79; Hom. Rom. 1, 12; Hom. I Cor. 24; Hom. Eph. 18; Hom. Phil. 13; Hom. I Tim. 5; Catech. illum. 2.11, 3.5.
643 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.156.36-49: Ὅ γὰρ ἐν Κυρίῳ κληθεὶς δοῦλος, ἀπελεύθερος Κυρίου ἐστὶν· ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ ἐλεύθερος κληθεὶς, δοῦλος ἐστι τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Ἐν γὰρ τοῖς κατὰ Χριστὸν, φησὶν, ἀμφότεροι ἰσοί· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ ὁ δεσπότης ὁ σὸς. Πῶς οὖν ὁ δοῦλος ἀπελεύθερος; Ὅτι ἠλευθέρωσεν σε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἐξωθέν δουλείας μένοντα δοῦλον. Οὐ γὰρ ἀφίησιν εἰναι δοῦλον τὸν δοῦλον, οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπον μένοντα ἐν δουλείᾳ τούτῳ γάρ ἐστι τὸ θαυμαστὸν. Καὶ πῶς ἐλεύθερος ἐστιν ὁ δοῦλος, μένων δοῦλος; Ὅταν παθῶν ἀπηλλαγμένος ἢ καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς νοσημάτων, ὅταν χρημάτων καταφρονή καὶ ὀργῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων παθῶν.
The concept that in Christ all are equal is based on the notion of the heteronomy of the body. Slaves and freepersons are equal in that they are both heteronomous despite their socio-institutional status. Universalizing the heteronomy of the body makes it possible for Chrysostom to interpret Paul’s words on a higher level, namely that of the Antiochene *theoria*. ⁶⁴⁴ Being slaves of sin or Christ is the more important motif in this text, and being a real, institutional slave is merely coincidental. The same reasoning of Philo and Paul is also present with Chrysostom - there is a good and a bad type of slavery. ⁶⁴⁵ Good slavery means to be a slave of Christ in righteousness and bad slavery means to be a slave of sin. Chrysostom does make an interesting statement, in that Christ not only freed the slave from the slavery of sin, but even from ‘outward slavery’ (‘...ἡ ἔξωθεν δουλεία ᾗ...’). This term does not seem to apply to institutional slavery, but rather to what we could term moral slavery. Chrysostom therefore formulates a three-tiered view of slavery: a) slaves of sin; b) slaves of the passions; c) socio-institutional slaves.

Chrysostom therefore refines the nature of slavery. Being a slave of sin seems to be related to the psychic life of the believer - a metaphysical state of captivity not based on the Stoic notion of being enslaved to the passions. This state of enslavement to sin is annullèd upon confession and especially baptism. This distinction is not yet clear in Pauline literature, but certainly clear in Chrysostom. Chrysostom provides the reader with a further elaboration of ‘outward slavery.’ This type of slavery means being a slave to the passions (‘...πάθος...’ and the ‘diseases of the mind’ (‘...τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς νοσημάτων...’), in which he especially highlights greed and wrath, but includes the other passions. In the next section of the homily he would also mention gluttony. Chrysostom does not give much attention to the notion of being slaves to sin, which seems to be a highly theological concept. In two other homilies, Chrysostom describes service to the Law as slavery (cf. *Hom. Rom.* 7.1; *Comm. Gal.* 5.1). The Pauline notion of the Law still remains central in Chrysostom’s thinking of enslavement to sin. Discussions of slavery to sin and slavery to the passions do however go hand in hand in Chrysostom’s thinking. In this same homily quoted above, Chrysostom defames the Greeks for idolising their passions

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by calling lust Venus, anger Mars and drunkenness Bacchus. But sin is also used to illuminate institutional slavery. In a homily on Genesis, Chrysostom explains that institutional slavery entered the world at the time of the fall and expulsion from the Garden of Eden (Hom. Genes. 4). This is Chrysostom’s explanation as to why something like institutional slavery exists - it is due to sin. There is then a strong line of continuity between slavery of sin, the passions and institutional slavery.

He does devote much of the explanation to this ‘outward slavery,’ which is equivalent to moral slavery, with some interesting points of advice to institutional slaves. Continuing his discussion of 1 Corinthians 7:21-23, Chrysostom intimates the following (Hom. I Cor. 19.6):

‘You were bought with a price - become not slaves of people.’

This saying is directed not only to slaves but also to free persons. For it is possible for one who is a slave not to be a slave, and for one who is free to be a slave. And how can one be a slave and not a slave? When this person does all for God, with no pretence, and does nothing out of eye-service towards people, that is how one that is a slave to people can be free. Or again, how does one that is free become a slave? When this person serves other people in any wicked duty, either for gluttony or desire of wealth or for power. For such a person, while being free, is more of a slave than any person.

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647 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.156.49-62: Τιµμῆς ἠγοράάσθητε, μή γίνεσθε δοῦλοι ἀνθρώωπων. Οὗτος ὁ λόόγος οὐ πρός οἰκέέτας µόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἑλευθέέρους εἰρήται. Ἐστι γὰρ καὶ δοῦλον ὅντα µή εἶναι δοῦλον, καὶ ἑλευθέρουν ὅντα δοῦλον εἶναι. Καὶ πῶς ὁ δοῦλος ὧν, οὐκ ἔστι δοῦλος; Ὅταν διὰ τὸν Θεόν πάντα ποιή, ὅταν μὴ ὑποκρίνηται µηδὲ κατ’ ὀφθαλµμοδουλείαν ἀνθρώωπων τι πράάττῃ; τούτεέστι, δουλε ύυοντα ἀνθρώόπων ἐλεύθερον εἶναι. Ἡ πῶς πάλιν ἑλευθέρος τις ὡν, γίνεται δοῦλος; Ὅταν διακονήται ἀνθρώπως πονηράν τινα διακονίαν ἢ διὰ γαστριµμαργίαν, ἢ διὰ χρηµµάτων ἐπιθυµίαν, ἢ διὰ δυναστείαν. ὘ γὰρ τοιοῦτος πάντων ἐστὶ δουλικώτερος, κἀν ἑλευθέρος ἦ.
In this section one can see the influence of the *haustafeln* on Chrysostom’s thinking, especially Colossians 3:22. Chrysostom universalizes Paul’s imperative in 1 Corinthians 7:23b to relate to both slave and free. This section is interpreted in the light of two opposites: one can be a slave to God, but also a slave to people, but not in a legal, socio-institutional sense. This refers to the ὀφθαλµµοδουλεία and ἀνθρωπάρεσκοι of Colossians 3:22, which is then grouped in the second tier of Chrysostom’s framework. Being a slave to the passions is inevitably linked to being slaves of people and, especially in Chrysostomic terms, being a slave of vainglory (κενοδοξία). References to this type of slavery are numerous in Chrysostom’s homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews. References to people as beings slaves of the belly (cf. *Hom. Rom.* 13.3, 32.1; *Hom. I Cor.* 17.1; 28.3; with reference to Esau, cf. *Hom. Heb.* 31.2), slaves to lust (cf. *Hom. Rom.* 11.1,13.3; *Hom. I Tim.* 18) and slaves to wealth (cf. *Hom. Heb.* 15.7, 18.4, 25.8) are very common in Chrysostom’s homilies. He uses the instance of Joseph and Potiphar’s wife as an example of a man who was institutionally a slave, but in terms of virtue, quite free. Moreover, Joseph’s conniving brothers are described as being the ‘true’ slaves (*Hom. I Cor.* 19.5). This type of thinking regarding slavery is by definition Stoic. The next section is especially illuminating (*Hom. I Cor.* 19.6):

This is the nature of Christianity; in slavery it bestows freedom.

And as that which is by nature an indestructible body then exhibits itself to be indestructable when being pierced with an arrow, it is

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648 Chrysostom is quite vocal on this matter (*Hom. Tit.* 2.2): ‘But it is impossible that the slave of glory should not be a slave to all, and more slave-like than slaves in reality. For we do not compel our slaves to perform such tasks, as glory demands from her captives. Base and disgraceful are the things she makes them say, and do, and endure, and when she sees them obedient, she is the more urgent in her commands. Let us flee then, I beg you, let us fly from this slavery.’ (Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.676.25-32: Οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν, ἀνθρωπόφνον δόξης δοῦλον, μὴ πάντων εἶναι δοῦλον, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνδραπόδων δουλικῶτερον. Οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτάττομεν τοιαῦτα τοῖς δούλοις τοῖς ἡμετέροις, σὰς ἐκείνη τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ἀλούσιν· αίσχρα καὶ αἰσχύνης γέμοντα πράγματα καὶ φθέγγεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχειν· καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἴδῃ ὑπακούοντας, ἐπιτείνει μᾶλλον τὰ ἐπιτάγματα. Φύγωμεν οὖν, φύγωμεν, παρακαλῶ, τὴν δουλείαν ταύτην;) cf. especially: John H. W. G. Liebeschuetz, *Ambrose and John Chrysostom: Clerics Between Desert and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 205–8.
not harmed; so too is the person that is free, when even under masters the person is not enslaved. For this reason Paul recommends remaining a slave. But if it is impossible for the one who is a slave to be a proper Christian, the Greeks will condemn the true religion of having a great weakness; but if they can be shown that slavery in no way hinders godliness, they will admire our doctrine. For if death does not hurt us, or torture, or chains, much less slavery. Fire and iron and many tyrannies and diseases and poverty and wild animals and many things more harmful than these have not been able to harm the faithful. No, in fact, they have made them even stronger. And how will slavery be able to harm us? It is not slavery itself, beloved, that hurts us, but the real slavery is that of sin. And if you are not a slave in this way, be bold and rejoice. No one will have power to harm you, having the heart which cannot be enslaved. But if you are a slave to sin, even though you are ten thousand times free you have no good of your freedom.\footnote{Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.157.41-61: Τοιοῦτον ὁ Χριστιανισµός· ἐν δουλείᾳ ἐλευθερίαν χαρίζεται. Καὶ καθάπερ τὸ φύει ἄτρωτον σῶµα, τότε δείκνυται ἄτρωτον, ὅταν δεξάµµενον βέλος μηδὲν πάθη δεινόν· οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄκριβως ἐλεύθερος τότε φαίνεται, ὅταν καὶ δεσπότας ἔχων µὴ δουλωθῇ. Διὰ τούτο κελεύει δοῦλον µένειν. Εἰ δ’ οὐ δυνατὸν δοῦλον ὅντα εἶναι Χριστιανὸν, οἶον χοῇ, πολλὴν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἀσθένειαν κατηγοροῦσιν Ἑλληνες· ὡσπερ, ἂν µάθωσιν, ὅτι τὴν εὐσέβειαν οὐδὲν βλάπτει δουλεία, θαυµάζουσιν τὸ κήρυγµα. Εἰ γὰρ θάνατος ἡµᾶς οὐ βλάπτει οὐδὲ µάστιγες οὐδὲ δεσµία, πολλῷ µᾶλλον δουλεία, πῦρ καὶ σίδηρος καὶ τυραννίδες µυρίαι καὶ νόσοι καὶ πενίαι καὶ θηρία, καὶ µυρία τούτων χαλεπώτερα, οὐκ ἐβλαψαν τοὺς πιστοὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δυνατωτέρους ἐποίησαν. Καὶ πῶς δουλεία βλάψαι δυνήσεται, φησίν; Οὐχ οὕτως βλάπτει ἢ δουλεία, ἀγαπητε, ἀλλ’ ἢ φύει δουλεία ἢ τῆς ἁµµαρτίας. Κάν ταύτην µὴ ἢ τὴν δουλείαν δοῦλος, θαρρεῖ καὶ εὐφραίνων· οὐδείς σε οὐδὲν ἀδικήσαι δυνήσεται, ἀδούλωτον ἔχοντα τὸ θος· ἂν δὲ ταύτης ἢς δοῦλος, κάν µυρίακις ἐλεύθερος ἢς, οὐδὲν ὀφελός σοι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.
This section shows Chrysostom’s discontentment, it seems, with Greek philosophy. Chrysostom generalizes much in this section, and it is not clear what he means by the ‘Greeks’. Rather, he seems to be at quarrel with social conceptions of status, which are typically Graeco-Roman, rather than a specific philosophy. If he is aiming it at a specifically Greek philosophy, he seems to be pointing to Aristotelian philosophy of natural slavery or perhaps the Xenophonian notion of social exclusivity. This could be intimated in the first sentence, pointing that at birth the body is invulnerable and thus not immediately destined to be a slave or not. It could also imply that the Christian body is invulnerable to death, torture and imprisonment, as also mentioned in the commentary. I am inclined to understand this section to refer to the latter probability. His generalizations are probably referring to the active, masculine virtues of Graeco-Roman society, still very much based on notions of mastery and domination (which are related to Aristotelian philosophy, but not exclusively reserved by it, as we have seen).650 The Pauline and thus Chrysostomic notion of the universally heteronomous body makes it possible to elevate passive values to the realm of virtue. The crux lies in Chrysostom’s statement that Christians need to demonstrate that slavery ‘in no way hinders godliness’ (‘...τὴν εὐσέβειαν οὐδὲν βλάπτει δουλεία ...’). As mentioned throughout this study, the Greek view of the body was based on the free male body as being the norm. The androcentrism of the ancient Greek medical writers was also pointed out. This view did change during the Roman Empire, when a ‘one-sex’ somatology was promoted. Men and women were in essence, physiologically, the same; the only difference, according to authors like Herophilus (cf. Soranus, *Gyn.* 3.3) and Galen (*Us. part. corp.* 14.6), was that the female genitals were inverted and the male genitals turned outward. The scrotum is the equivalent of the uterus, while the penis is like a vagina turned outward.651 This new understanding of the body and gender during Roman times however did not change the social values of passivity and activity. Roman views of sexuality still perpetuated the view that the free, Greek/Roman male or *vir* is still the penetrator and dominator, while the woman or *femina* takes up the role of the passive one who is penetrated. The same is applicable to the abnormal, passive male or *pathicus*, who inverts the values of the *vir*. In this grid, a male slave could never be a *vir*, he is always a *pathicus*, even if the relation is not sexual (although the term

mostly implies sexual connotations).\textsuperscript{652} The male slave may have a penis, but he does not have a phallus, hence the phenomenon of many male slaves becoming eunuchs.\textsuperscript{653} We have seen that this social system could be termed phallogocentric. Behind this, as also mentioned earlier, lies the relationship between masculinity and mastery/domination. The slave, whether male or female, is then the object of domination and mastery, a shameful social disposition. Masculinity and thus its cardinal virtue or \textit{ἀνδρεία} in the Greek are based on masculine virtues. Being active and able to dominate is honourable, but being a slave who is dominated and passive is shameful. Early Christianity does seem to represent a shift in this regard. Brent Shaw has shown how early Christianity promoted passive, feminine virtues rather than mainstream masculine virtues.\textsuperscript{654} The proliferation of feminine values in early Christianity is especially seen in the martyr narratives. Both Perkins\textsuperscript{655} and Shaw\textsuperscript{656} have illustrated how the notion of suffering, a typically feminine value, was idealized in early Christianity. Aristotle promotes the virtues of being able to resist and fight back as honourable, while early Christianity rather responded with passive suffering as a virtue.\textsuperscript{657} This is now also seen in Chrysostom’s statement above. He equates slavery with other passive virtues such as being martyred, tortured or imprisoned, and states that possessing these values does not hinder godliness. He rather states, in line with Perkins’ and Shaw’s observations, that these things strengthened the early Christians. It still contains a veiled Stoic discourse emphasizing moral slavery and the Pauline discourse of slavery to sin. Being slaves to sin and the passions now become a hindrance to godliness and virtue. Since the body is in any case heteronomous, with no exceptions, it is not the status of being heteronomous that hinders virtue, but rather the identity of the metaphorical master of the heteronomous body. If the body is ruled by sin or the passions, it is shameful, but if it is ruled by Christ, it is honourable and virtuous. In Chrysostom’s mind then, the heteronomous body serves as a social equalizer, at least in the eyes of Christ and the church.

\textsuperscript{652} Cf. Walters, “Invading the Roman Body”; Parker, “Teratogenic Grid.”
\textsuperscript{656} Shaw, “Passions of the Martyrs.”
\textsuperscript{657} Ibid., 285.
As was also mentioned, the problem with this view of the heteronomous body is that it devalues the importance of institutional freedom and sidesteps the moral problem of slavery. Chrysostom too is guilty of this, as seen in the next section of his commentary (Hom. I Cor. 19.6):

So, tell me, what use is it when, though not enslaved to a person, you bow in subjection to your passions? Since people often know how to be lenient, but those masters are never satisfied with your destruction. Are you enslaved to a person? Think about it: your master is also a slave to you, in providing you with food, in taking care of your health and in looking after your shoes and all the other things. And you do not fear so much less you should offend your master; but the master, in the same way, worries if you do not have any of those necessities. But the master sits down, while you stand. So what? Since this may be said of you as well as of the master. Often, at least, when you are lying down and sleeping peacefully, the master is not only standing, but experiencing countless problems in the marketplace; and the master tosses and turns more painfully than you.⁶⁵⁸

In the following section, the argument for the seriousness of moral and hamartiological slavery over-and-against institutional slavery receives another premise. The real slave is better

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⁶⁵⁸ Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.157.61-158.16: Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, εἰπέ μοι, ὅταν ἄνθρωπος μὲν μὴ δουλεύῃς, τοῖς δὲ πάθεσι σεαυτὸν ύποκατακλίνῃς; Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωποι καὶ φείίσασθαι ἐπίστανται πολλάκις, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ οἱ δεσπόται οὐδέποτε κορέέννυνταί σου τῆς ἀπωλείας. Δουλεύεις ἄνθρωπος; Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Δεσπότης σοι δουλεύει, διοικούμενός σοι τὰ τῆς τροφῆς, ἐπιµμελούμενός σου τῆς υγείας καὶ ἐνδυµάτων καὶ ὑποδηµάτων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων φροντίζων. Καὶ οὐχ οὕτω σὺ δέδοικας, μὴ προσκρούς τῷ Δεσπότῃ, ὡς ἐκεῖνος δέδοικε μὴ τί σοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπιλίπη. Ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνος κατάκειται, σὺ δὲ ἔστηκας. Καὶ τί τούτο; οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτο παρ’ αὐτῷ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ σοί. Πολλάκις γοῦν σοῦ κατακειµένου καὶ υπνοῦντος ἠδέως, ἐκεῖνος οὐχ ἔστηκε μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μνήμας υποµένει βίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς, καὶ ἀγριπτεῖ σοῦ χαλεπώτερον.
off than the moral slave because human masters can be kind and forebearing, while the passions
are all equally harsh masters, more than any human master could be to his or her slave. He also
elaborates on the notion that the master is in fact also a slave to his or her slave. This same type
of reasoning is found with Chrysostom’s teacher, Libanius. And as we have seen, it also has
parallels in Theodoret.

The oration of Libanius utilizes the rhetorical trope of *dialexis* in which opposites are
equated for the sake of irony. This type of rhetoric, found both with Chrysostom and Libanius,
aims to ameliorate the problem of institutional slavery, in that it states that all people are in any
case slaves. The master is a slave to the cares of the world, while the slave only needs to do what
he or she is commanded. It is this type of rhetoric that aided in the perpetual survival of
institutional slavery in the late ancient world.

What has been seen thus far is how intertwined the language of slavery is in the world-
view of the ancient authors quoted above, Chrysostom being no exception. Often this type of
language is simply labelled as slave-metaphors, which does not say much about institutional
slavery except validating its existence and necessity. From the discussion in this chapter,
however, it can be seen that the language of slavery, and slave-metaphors, are intricately linked
with dynamics of institutional slavery, and these two aspects cannot be treated separately. In
Chrysostom’s exposition of 1 Corinthians 7:21-23, institutional and metaphorical or symbolic
slavery are inseparable, and in fact two sides of the same coin. Sin is seen as the origin of
institutional slavery, while in the eyes of the Stoics, Philo, Paul and Chrysostom, moral slavery
did affect the status of an institutional slave, even if only on a metaphysical level. What has been
exhibited so far is the potency of the slave-metaphor in Chrysostom’s thinking. Being a slave to
Christ (or sin, for that matter) is not merely a comparison, but it is a metaphysical reality to
Chrysostom. There are three levels of enslavement - namely being a slave to sin, a slave to the
passions and an institutional slave. Both sin and the passions of the body should therefore be
brought into submission to Christ, the heavenly master. Like Paul, the holy person is a slave of
Christ.

5  HETERONOMY, SUBJECTIVITY AND THE PROBLEM OF HUMANNESS IN
CHRYSTOSOMATIC THOUGHT

In the light of the findings on the heteronomy of the slave-body, and the close symbolic links
between institutional and metaphorical slavery, issues of subjectivity and humanness inevitably rise. It has been mentioned in several instances that slaves were considered both as persons, that is, human beings, and as property. The latter will be the topic of chapter 6. This statement, however, that slaves are also human, is somewhat problematic, since it implies that the humanity of the slave should be ‘discovered’ by scholarship, rather than assumed. Heteronomy assumes that human/divine beings rule all other human bodies. Being ruled by the passions is a distinctly human experience. The slave-body is therefore seen as a human subject. But what does this link between heteronomy and humanness tell us about the power-dynamics in both the habitus of Roman slavery and in Chrysostom?

In the same line as Hartman, I would hypothesize that the concept of the humanity of the slave in antiquity (or modernity) is in itself a technology of repression and regulation, very much in the same way as the concept of ‘soul’ functioned. Hartman states: ‘I argue that the barbarism of slavery did not express itself singularly in the constitution of the slave as object but also in the forms of subjectivity and circumscribed humanity imputed to the enslaved.’ 659 Hartman continues to argue that notions of the humanity of slaves in fact intensified the suffering of slaves. Furthermore, Johnson rightly affirms that rather than seeking the humanity of slaves, or proving that slaves were in fact ‘human’ and had self-directed agency, the humanity of the slave should be assumed in the historical investigation. Moreover, it is exactly this recourse to the ‘humanity’ of slaves that led to highly oppressive forms of regulation and control. In Foucault’s terms, the docile body is made docile by various technologies of subjection - and humanness is one such technology. This is one of the major difficulties with most ancient writings promoting the humane treatment of slaves - this includes the Stoics, New Testament, even Gregory of Nyssa and of course, Chrysostom.

How does humanness function as a technology of subjection? The traits that are distinctly human, such as having a body that can experience pain, threats to family life via manumission, the rationing of food, sleep, regulating sexuality, etc, serve as strategies for controlling the slave. This was seen with Xenophon, Cato, Varro and Columella in their discussion on the management of slaves. These authors exhibit these strategies more directly, but it is certainly more subtle in

the Stoics and Chrysostom. The Stoics and most other early Christian authors promote the humane treatment of slaves - thus, humanity is something that should first be discovered. By emphasizing the humanity of the slave, however, one also intensifies the possibilities for recourse to disciplinary measures that are distinctly human.

Related to the concept of humanness is that of agency. This is the main topic of Johnson’s study, but is also a key to Hartman’s work. Johnson is correct in noting that concepts of agency related to slavery have been influenced by nineteenth-century debates on liberalism and subjectivity. Many scholars, erroneously in my opinion, ask whether slaves had personal free agency. In other words, did they have the freedom, despite their enslaved status, to make independent choices? The problem here is that it assumes slaveholders did have agency. Agency is in itself a very complex issue, and in the context of antiquity, where all bodies were considered to be heteronomous, it is even more problematic. Agency is directly related to the notion of subjectivity, and while debates on slavery and agency are often conducted in the background of nineteenth century liberalism, as Johnson rightly notes, the concept of the death of the subject, as Nietzsche had it, bears much relevance here. This was the starting-point for Foucault’s work on the subject. The idea that a subject is free to make his or her own decisions, based on agency, and thus form themselves as subjects, does not take into account that subjects are produced by discourses, institutions and relations of power. This demonstrates the potency of the habitus of Roman slavery - the lives of both slaves and slaveholders are rather scripted by the social forces and power-structures of the epoch. This is also Merleau-Ponty’s point: ‘Again, it is clear that no casual relationship is conceivable between the subject and his body, his world or his society. Only at the cost of losing the basis of all my certainties can I question what is conveyed to me by my presence to myself.’ Being part of society, culture and history, and in this context, a heteronomous body, implies that the subject, or the self, could not possibly be free or have something called free personal agency, despite claims (by Stoics and Christians alike) that certain forms of behaviour represent ‘true’ freedom. Humanness and the human being is an

661 This is especially highlighted in Friedrich Nietzsche’s work, The Gay Science (Walter Kaufmann (trans.); New York: Random House, 1974).
invention of the concurrent society, and as Foucault has famously remarked in his history of the human sciences:

As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility...were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did...then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.663

The rise of the human sciences, or humanities, with its accompanying disciplines of Psychology, Psychiatry, Sociology, Philosophy, Criminology, etc, were part of this search for subjectivity, or what it means to be a self. Heteronomy is an ancient manifestation of this social dynamic, and it inevitably produces and regulates the bodies of slaves and slaveholders. The fact that the sources from this epoch are not written by slaves also complicates the matter. For instance, in terms of resistance, are those stereotypical slave ‘vices’ like laziness and baseness due to the upbringing of slaves, as Chrysostom believes, or are they subtle forms of resistance as Bradley has noted?664

The point here is also a caveat. While reading ancient slavery in the context of the heteronomous body, questions of humanness and agency need to be carefully assessed. I prefer not asking whether slaves were acting out of agency or not, nor whether they were human or not. Rather, I would ask here how the concept of humanness in these ancient writings serves as a strategy for producing docile bodies and maintaining the system of slavery.

Chrysostom often falls back on the humane treatment of slaves. As we have seen before, the notion of reforming the slave-body is done by various technologies. I would argue that Chrysostom’s concept of humanness or philanthropy (φιλανθρωπία) is in fact a technology

similar to that of the ‘soul’. While much critique is given on the de-humanization of slaves, the humanization of slaves is equally problematic. By humanizing the slave, and having the slaveholder function on the premises of philanthropy, the opportunity for further oppression, often done by means of normalization in this case, becomes possible. It now implies that the slave has a soul, and thus the capacity for virtue. In other words, the heteronomous body of the slave now becomes viable for social reproduction. As a human, the slave still answers with his or her body. In Chrysostom’s case, not via violent corporal punishment, but via subtler forms of oppression, namely Christian normalization and masculinization. Having the slave remain in a state of slavery, as the scriptural apparatus of 1 Corinthians 7:21-23 does, yet promoting the humanness of the slave and philanthropy of the slaveholder, a perfect storm is formed, suitable for subtle oppression via spiritual exercises or exercises of the ‘soul’. What Johnson calls the ‘bare life existence’ of slaves, namely eating, sleeping and relieving oneself ‘were sedimented with their enslavement.’ With Chrysostom’s propositions noted in this chapter, as well as in the chapter before, the oppression of enslavement becomes much more pervasive, since it uses some of the most potent technologies of submission, namely humanness, philanthropy and the soul.

Rather than reading the statements of humanness and philanthropy of the Stoics, Paul or Chrysostom as positive forms of resistance from slaveholders, or as Vogt has notoriously argued, a type of civilizing process, humanness and philanthropy should be read with much suspicion. Since the heteronomy of the ancient body, as a social disposition, produced the bodies of both slaves and slaveholders, agency and resistance become ambiguous, even opaque, and humanness and philanthropy should be viewed not as ameliorative, but in fact, as some of the most subtle technologies for oppressing slaves and reproducing them as docile bodies. Hartman’s statement serves again - rather than seeking or promoting the humanity of slaves, the humanity should be a simple axiom in the historical investigative enterprise.

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666 Joseph Vogt, *Sklaverei und Humanität im klassischen Griechentum* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1953); this work was also very much the object of critique by Moses I. Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology* (Princeton: Markus Weiner, 1980), 122-128.
CONCLUSION

The interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7:21-23 by Chrysostom justified the slaveholding practice. In fact, with the exception of Origen and Jerome, patristic exegesis seems to favour a reading of verse 21 that slaves should remain enslaved. This view was undoubtedly influenced by the slave-texts of the Deutero-Pauline Epistles, especially the haustafeln. In terms of the meaning of verse 21, I am inclined to reason against Chrysostom and other patristic authors. I am of the opinion that the phrase μᾶλλον χρῆσαι should be understood as advice to slaves to obtain freedom. Both Harrill and Fitzgerald, rightly I believe, indicate that it would be highly unlikely, ludicrous rather, for Paul to allow a slave to refuse an owner’s grant of manumission. If the option of obtaining freedom is available, it should be utilized.

We are still faced with the bulk of patristic authors arguing the opposite. Chrysostom attempted to solve this problem by using both Stoic and typically Pauline notions of slavery. The actual problem of remaining a slave was side-shifted and slavery to sin and the passions were emphasized at the cost of ignoring the social problem of institutional slavery. This type of language was not simply metaphorical or symbolic. It would also be erroneous to separate the symbolic and metaphorical language of slavery from literal and practical advice and guidelines to slaves and masters. There exist some very real conceptual links. These two discourses are connected and inevitably influence each other. This is a very important point this chapter has demonstrated. There are no neat lines between institutional and metaphorical slavery. Metaphorical slavery distracted people from the actual problem of institutional slavery. Discourses of being enslaved to sin and the passions also provided a myth of origin for institutional slaveholding, and since the problem of sin and the passions could only be ‘solved’ at the point of the eschaton, so too will institutional slavery only come to an end when there is no more sin. This highly problematic reasoning perpetuated the existence of the habitus of Roman slaveholding. At the centre of this discourse and interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7:21-23 by Chrysostom functions the concept of the heteronomous body. Since all bodies are designed to be ruled, in the Philonic and Pauline sense, by either God or sin, the problem is not being a slave, which is inevitable, but rather to whom one chooses to be a slave. This is a development away from Stoic thinking that still had a strong valuation of liberty. But the Stoic notion of

\[668\] Harrill, Manumission of Slaves, 84–127.

\[669\] Fitzgerald, “Treatment of Slaves,” 152.
‘indifference’ did not help in ameliorating the problem of institutional slavery. The combination of Stoic concepts such as indifference and Hellenistic-Judaistic formulations of divine slavery supported the notion of the heteronomy of the body, a concept also clearly present in Chrysostom’s reasoning. The idea that there could be a slavery that was ‘good,’ and the proliferation of passive, feminine values in early Christianity added fuel to the fire. The problem reaches its climax in that notions of humanness and philanthropy serve as technologies for oppressing the slave-body. Humanness and philanthropy should not simply be accepted as being admirable virtues and principles. The heteronomy of the ancient body complexifies concepts agency and resistance, and so humanness and philanthropy should be understood as being part of the problem of slavery. Rather than seeking the humanity of slaves, the humanity of slaves should be assumed. Thus the notion of the heteronomous body was a pillar in the habitus of Roman slaveholding, still central to Christian and non-Christian thought in late antiquity.
CHAPTER 5

THE CARCERAL BODY: SLAVE-CARCERALITY AND JOHN CHRYSOSTOM’S HOMILIES ON PHILEMON

1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we will look more closely at the phenomenon of slave-carcerality in antiquity, and especially focus on this discourse in John Chrysostom’s homilies on Paul’s Epistle to Philemon. The concept of slave-carcerality has already come up in the previous chapters, and here we will aim to delineate the key discursivities in the discourse. The first part of the chapter will therefore explain the discourse of slave-carcerality, and thereafter, in the second part, we will read Chrysostom’s homilies on Philemon with this discourse as a conceptual lens. This chapter is probably the most theoretical of all in the current study, relying heavily on critical theory. The reason for this is because slavery and carcerality have not yet been linked to each other in scholarship, and therefore it is necessary to carefully delineate a theory of slave-carcerality before we proceed to Chrysostom’s writings. After this, we will examine Chrysostom’s homilies on Philemon and aim to delineate the key carceral mechanisms he utilizes to redefine the status of the slave as a carceral body.

The concept of carcerality is novel in the study of slavery. Carcerality originates from Michel Foucault’s understanding of modern society as a carceral society, that is, a society that

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imprisons and confines individuals. It was especially developed in his work on the birth of the prison system, as well as other institutions like the asylum and the clinic. Foucault’s argument, however, centres on the rise of a carceral society in Europe after the sixteenth century. This point was also raised briefly in chapter 2 when the discipline and punishment of slaves were discussed, but we will now examine it more closely. Foucault argues that before the rise of the modern carceral system, the body of the criminal was not detained as such, but it was tortured and dismembered in a horrific public spectacle. The aim of this type of violent, public punishment was to illustrate that criminals found guilty were to suffer very badly, and it was to be displayed to the rest of society, acting not only as a deterrent but also establishing a social discourse of public punishment as a ceremony. After this, Foucault continues, society shifted from the public spectacle of punishment to one based on imprisonment, detention and, essentially, rehabilitation - a carceral society. This society had a new ‘policy’ if you will, that punishment now occurs in secrecy, behind the veil as it were, in order to protect the government or institution that applies the punishment from the shame of the punishment itself. These concepts we have already discussed, and they will serve once again as a point of departure for this chapter.

Foucault’s emphasis was mostly on the modern prison. At the end of his study, he concludes the following about the prison: ‘That in the central position that it [the prison] occupies, it is not alone, but linked to a whole series of “carceral” mechanisms which seem distinct enough - since they are intended to alleviate pain, to cure, to comfort - but which all tend, like the prison, to exercise a power of normalization.’ This statement is very important for the study at hand. Carcerality is more than imprisonment or penal dynamics in a society. It is manifest in what Foucault would call the carceral-continuum. At the very core of carcerality lies a discourse of detention and confinement with the purpose of normalizing. It is made up of a

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674 Ibid., 308.
series of carceral mechanisms which function interdependently, making up a larger system in which the power of normalization and surveillance flow.\textsuperscript{675}

While Foucault was focusing on the late sixteenth century onwards, I would like to examine the impact of this thinking in the context of late antiquity. There is one major distinction between ancient and modern societies, namely slaveholding. That the discourses behind slaveholding are still very prevalent today, and the fact that modern slavery is a reality I do not dispute; however, in antiquity slavery was promoted as a common, banal habitus of everyday life,\textsuperscript{676} the result of this process of normalization. This is not the case in the modern period where ancient manifestations of slavery are absent. Thus, here I want to argue that in the context of antiquity, and I will be focusing on the later Roman Empire and John Chrysostom specifically, a different type of carcerality was at work, namely the carcerality of slavery or, as I will use it here, ‘slave-carcerality’. The slave-body in society is unique in that it constantly finds itself in a state of imprisonment. It is not a prison made from bricks and mortar, but rather a symbolic prison constructed by the boundaries and stipulations of the habitus of Roman slaveholding (physical imprisonment, of course, was also a large part of the carceral life of the slave). In order to understand this concept more clearly, I will focus on two aspects of ancient slave-carcerality. Firstly, the discursivities that make up or inform the discourse of slave-carcerality will be delineated. The first discursivity that will be explained is the discursivity of normalization. Slaves are slaves because they are in essence ‘not part’ of free society. Here we will specifically look at what makes the slave abnormal and hence worthy of detention and confinement. The second discursivity that informs slave-carcerality is that of surveillance and mobility. Since slaves are in a carceral state, their movement should be closely regulated and monitored.

\textsuperscript{675} The French title of Foucault’s work on the birth of the prison is \textit{Surveiller et punir}. The term \textit{surveiller} is somewhat complex, and is noted by the translator in an introductory note. It is related to Jeremy Bentham’s concept of ‘inspection’ in the context of panopticism. Alan Sheridan, the translator, states (n.p. translator’s note): “‘Supervise’ is perhaps closest of all, but again the word has different associations. “Observe” is rather too neutral, though Foucault is aware of the aggression involved in any one-sided observation. In the end Foucault himself suggested \textit{Discipline and Punish}, which relates closely to the book’s structure.’\textsuperscript{676} Jennifer A. Glancy, “Christian Slavery in Late Antiquity,” in \textit{Human Bondage in the Cultural Contact Zone: Transdisciplinary Perspectives on Slavery and Its Discourses} (Raphael Hörmann and Gesa Mackenthun (eds); Münster: Waxmann, 2010), 63–65.
But how do we unpack this very complex concept of carcerality related to late ancient slavery? I will start by delineating two principles that maintain and enforce the carceral continuum of slavery. These two principles are the power of normalization and the power of surveillance (that is, surveiller). Behind this lies the assumption that there was a constant slave-supply in antiquity. The issue of the supply of slaves is complex in itself, and as a result of various social and political circumstances, supply levels were not always stable, which would also have an impact on the price of a slave. Despite supply and demand levels, we know that during the late ancient period we are examining slaves were still a common commodity, and the oft-proposed theory that late ancient slavery declined into medieval serfdom does not hold much footing. Slaves were available and still very present in society up to the time of Chrysostom. A question that immediately arises, then, is why the slaveholding system was so successful. It is in essence a question of maintenance. The slaveholding system was maintained in such a way that it flourished. The two carceral principles I propose, namely normalization and surveillance, aim to explain conceptually at least, why it was so successful.

After discussing these two principles, we will move on to the carceral mechanisms that construct and manage slave-carcerality. While discourses of normalization and surveillance function in all forms and occurrences of slavery, each period, geographical delimitation or social group utilizes their own carceral mechanisms that in practice enforce and maintain slavery. The carceral mechanisms may overlap with other periods, places and groups. In this study we will specifically focus on the carceral mechanisms present in Chrysostom’s elaborations on slavery, and as a source, we will examine his homilies on Philemon. The reason for this selection is the fact that these homilies contain the highest frequency and most detailed descriptions of slavery references of all Chrysostom’s homilies, and they will therefore serve as a sufficient sample for a test case. Other homilies will also be discussed, but the Philemon homilies will serve as a basis.

Each homily will be examined and the Chrysostomic carceral mechanisms delineated at the conclusion.

2 SLAVE-CARCERALITY AND THE POWER OF NORMALIZATION IN LATE ANCIENT CHRISTIANITY

Since slavery was both a legal and habitual state of carceral subjectivity, what are the politics of perception that are active behind this subjectivity? It is obviously not possible to determine how ancient slaves ‘saw themselves’ as subjects, since we are today so separated from the context and very life of the subjects in question, and such a venture will always remain speculative and in the realm of generalization. What is possible however is to investigate the phenomenology of (slave) perception to understand something about the dynamics of social fashioning and social reproduction at work in the wider discourse of slave-carcerality. In this section I will be especially dependent on the work of Merleau-Ponty, especially his *Phenomenology of Perception*.679 After delineating the most important premises from Merleau-Ponty’s theory, I will read the results in the light of Michel Foucault’s formulations of how abnormalities and powers of normalization function.680 Thus, the first section building on Merleau-Ponty’s work will be on subjectivity, freedom and perception; that is, how we perceive ourselves as human beings and how we are perceived, and what implications this may have for ancient slave-carcerality. Finally, based on Foucault’s work, we will ask how these reproduced yet conscious subjects, carceral-bodies, are regulated and managed also as abnormal bodies. The carceral body, I will argue, is also understood by the ancients as the abnormal, delinquent and degenerate body.

In Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s final chapter in his phenomenology of perception, he deals with the notion of freedom.681 Questions of carcerality inevitably involve issues of freedom. What Merleau-Ponty asks is whether the subject can truly be ‘free,’ an argument that has received much attention, also from Foucault and several others. We have touched on this issue briefly in the previous chapter. Merleau-Ponty’s contribution is valuable because he approaches


it from perception-theory. I will repeat the important opening statement, already accessed in chapter 4: ‘Again, it is clear that no casual relationship is conceivable between the subject and his body, his world or his society. Only at the cost of losing the basis of all my certainties can I question what is conveyed to me by my presence to myself.’\textsuperscript{682} This statement illustrates the problem of the free subject; that is, the subject that is not shaped in some way by his or her surroundings and influenced by contemporaneous power-structures and institutions.\textsuperscript{683} Merleau-Ponty goes on to state that the only way human beings make sense of who they are as subjects is in their relation to others. It therefore stands to reason that subjects are shaped by their respective others. The perception of slave-bodies is based on and influenced by perceptions of free bodies. This is also why most of the statements in early Christian literature on the status and character of the slaves is accompanied by the status and characteristics of the \textit{pater familias} as well as the wife and children. What we have in antiquity, however, is an androcentric society. This feature has always been interpreted in a way that understands free men to be the subjects with authority and power, those who would dominate relationships with other subjects. Notwithstanding this notion, there is still something more about an androcentric society. Not only are free (Roman/Christian) men those who wield power and authority in such a society, but they also become the central point of comparison and highest factor of social measurement in the society. Slaves are exactly that because they are not institutionally free men. This was demonstrated quite clearly in the discussions on the \textit{haustafeln}, where every relationship was articulated with respect to the subject’s position in relation to the \textit{pater familias}. The status of the slave also directly shaped perceptions of masculinity in antiquity. We have also said this earlier in chapter 2, that mastery remained the key factor in the formation of ancient masculinities.

If Merleau-Ponty is correct in that our perceptions of others and ourselves are shaped by these same interrelationships, we can now understand that in the context of ancient society the free male-body was seen as the norm and highest standard of social standing. Free masculinity becomes the measuring tool that shaped all other subjects outside of it. These manifestations of social subjectivities therefore produce and reproduce each other in a constant and complex relationship. Free masculinity in antiquity is understood more clearly when the nature of the enslaved is understood and \textit{vice versa}. I now want to take one step further by elaborating on a

\textsuperscript{682} Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, 504.

Foucaultian concept already encountered in chapter two, namely the production and reproduction of normalcies and abnormalcies. Not only is free masculinity seen as the ideal and highest standard of social subjectivity, it is also presented as the normal subjectivity. The ideal free, male Roman/Christian body in itself becomes a technology for measuring the abnormal. While the body of the free man in Roman society seems free in the sense of its subjectivity, it is also not a free subject since its own reproduction is dependent on the subjectivity of slaves, women, children and outsiders or barbarians. Slave-bodies and the bodies of free men therefore stand in an autocatalytic identity-forming relationship to one another and their respective subjectivities are all but free - through their very subjectivity they reproduce one another.

The question is: how did free, Roman-Christian masculinity shape the subjectivity of slave-bodies? I will focus the discussion on Roman-Christian men since the bulk of the study concerns this very specific type of subjectivity. The main strategy of reproduction would be to impose a carceral subjectivity on slave bodies. Slave-carcerality is then in essence an imposed social subjectivity. Why carcerality as such? Because that which is abnormal needs to be confined and also regulated - it serves as both an economic measure and a social precaution. Slaveholding and slave-carcerality as an economic measure will be discussed in the next chapter on the commodification of the slave-body. The most important aspect of slave-carcerality in late ancient Christian thinking is that the symbolic confinement associated with the carceral state had to lead to reform. It is not simply an issue of controlling the mobility of the slave. With the rise of late ancient Christian pastoral governmentality, we saw that its defining characteristic was its tendency to duplicate nodes of power within its structure. Christ is seen as the ultimate prototype.

684 Foucault, Abnormal, 55–166.
685 Both Heather and Mathisen have convincingly shown how this dynamic was present in the construction of the image of the barbarian in late antiquity; Peter Heather, “The Barbarian in Late Antiquity: Image, Reality, and Transformation,” in Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity (Richard Miles (ed.); London: Routledge, 1999), 234–58; Ralph W. Mathisen, “Violent Behaviour and the Construction of Barbarian Identity in Late Antiquity,” in Violence in Late Antiquity: Perceptions and Practices (Harold A. Drake (ed.); Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 27–36. Carcerality is not the only complexity here. The ethical dynamics and dilemmas of identity formation, especially regarding the issue of agency, individuality and freedom, are highlighted by Appiah, but for the purpose of this chapter, we will only focus on carcerality; Kwame A. Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 1–35. The problems of agency, subjectivity and freedom were already discussed in the previous chapter.
The bishop or priest then became Christic duplicates, representing Christ’s authority of earth. These nodes of power then duplicated themselves in the *pater familias*. It was especially evident in the thinking of John Chrysostom. The *pater familias* of the household now also had to become the shepherd of the household. The process of reforming the slave would imply a duplication of the role of the *pater familias*. Reform is also a process of normalizing, which is in essence the *pater familias* reduplicating himself in the slave. The reduplication remains Christocentric; having assumed the subjectivity of Christ normalizes the abnormal individual. We must not forget that the representation of Christic subjectivity and Christomorphism is determined by the church, and we clearly see then how an institution of power directly influences subjectivity.

The first discursivity that slave-carcerality is built upon is therefore the assumption that all slaves are part of a group of abnormals; individuals who do not measure up to the standards of free Christian masculinity; hence their bodies need to be symbolically confined and regulated. The carceral state here is not simply detentive, but it also aims at a type of reformation in which the subjectivity of the *pater familias* is duplicated onto the slave and hence the slave is ‘normalized.’

3 SLAVE-CARCERALITY, MOBILITY AND SURVEILLANCE

The carceral state implies a limitation to the mobility of the slave. Slave-mobility is a very complex issue. When a slave flees his or her master it is considered a socio-symbolic prison-break; hence the title for such a slave: *servus fugitivus*. The mobility of the slave is determined to a large extent on the character of the enslaved individual. On the one extreme one has the chain-gangs of slaves working on agricultural estates, whose mobility was very much limited, and then on the other, one has for instance the *actor*, who often had to oversee several estates and had to travel between such estates. Moreover, many of the Roman agricultural authors strictly advised that the *vilicus* should not be a gad-about (*ambulator*), and Columella limited the movement of the *vilicus* to the boundaries within the estate itself (cf. Cato, *Agr.* 5.2-5; Varro, *Rust.* 1.17.4-5; Columella, *Rust.* 1.7.5, 2.1.7-8).

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687 Cf. also: Jesper Carlsen, *Viliki and Roman Estate Managers Until AD 284* (Analecta Romana Instituti Danici Supplementum; Bretschneider, 1995), 57–87; John Bodel, “Slave Labour and Roman Society,” in *The Cambridge*
For the purpose of this study we shall focus on the mobility of domestic slaves, since this is the majority of slaves owned by the slaveholders whom Chrysostom would address. The household therefore functions as the primary carceral space of urban slaves. Restrictions on mobility do not imply that slaves were not allowed outside of the house. Slaves often had to leave the physical space of the house, or the ‘place’ that is the household. The carcerality of the domestic ‘space’ however is still functional outside of its ‘place’. This implies that the household was the place and space where slaves were disciplined and also, as argued above, reformed or rehabilitated. The opposite is also true: the household was the place and space where slaves were violated and dominated. One of the main problems here relates to slave-sexuality. While Christian authors of late antiquity strictly regulated the sexual matters of their flocks, the realities of the sexual abuse of slaves in households did not disappear. Since slaves were confined to the house, one of the most common acts of infidelity was to have sexual relations with a slave, since slaves were traditionally considered to be morally neutral subjects. Brown has argued that the Christian authors emphasis on marital fidelity led to an increase in the sexual abuse of slaves since husbands were not permitted to visit brothels or bring other women into the house. Quoting from Musonius Rufus, Brown states: ‘The husband was not encouraged to live in the brothels, to set up a separate ménage, or to introduce new women into the house. But infidelity with servants was “a thing which some people consider quite without blame, since every master is held to have it in his power to use his slave as he wishes.”’

688 The carceral space of the household did not protect slaves from sexual abuse, but may have inadvertently promoted it.

In urban areas, slaves were also expected to move with the master. This especially seemed to be the case with aristocratic women who would visit significant social spaces like the theatre and baths with an entourage of slaves, something that would serve as a status-indicator social capital, which is a main point in the next chapter. Monasteries could also serve as carceral spaces, especially after the fifth century (see chapter 3).

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Several mechanisms were also put in place to limit the instances of slaves fleeing their owners. A common mechanism, especially during the Christian period, was the introduction of slave-collars. This became very popular after Constantine’s ban on facial tattoos that marked the slave-body.689

The issue that is directly related to slave-mobility is that of surveillance. The greatest strategy to limit unauthorized mobility is to monitor slaves. We have seen that Christian authors would introduce a new scopic economy of surveillance, namely Christic panopticism. The slave should know that Christ, the ultimate slaveholder was always watching, and Christian slaves had to order their conduct accordingly. The act of surveillance was not only to limit the mobility of slaves, but also to monitor the progress of normalization, and to control disciplinary measures. We have already said much on the surveillance of slaves in chapters 2 and 3. It is interesting however that there was also a measure of counter-surveillance present in the domestic space. It should be remembered that the slaves in the ancient household mostly lived within the physical confines of its walls. It is an exception, mostly limited to large agricultural estates, for slaves to live in large slave barracks. This is a significant point, especially stressed by Veyne in his work on private life in antiquity. He states: ‘Remember that these people had slaves constantly at their beck and call and were never alone. They were not allowed to dress themselves or put on their own shoes…The omnipresence of slaves was tantamount to constant surveillance.’690 Even bedroom privacy was rare – slaves often slept very close to the bed of the mistress, and always at the door of the bedchamber as guards. Martial naughtily tells of the slaves masturbating at the door when Hector and Andromache had sex (Epig. 11.104).691 Slaves often slept all over the house. When household members, especially women and young men went out, as we often hear from Chrysostom, they always had slaves with them. We have also seen that slaves monitored other slaves, especially the vilicus. The constant voyeurism of household slaves was a main source of gossip to the outside world. Slave-eyes were the eyes of the outside world, contributing

690 Veyne, “Roman Empire,” 72-73.
to the intense surveillance within ancient households.\textsuperscript{692} It was not only slaves who were under surveillance, but all the other household members.

Finally, civic authorities and bodies also manage the mobility and surveillance of slaves as carceral bodies. The introduction of \textit{manumissio in ecclesia} is an excellent example of this, where the church directly managed the status of slaves.\textsuperscript{693} The church never instituted regulations outlawing slavery. In some instances slaves were even more limited by ecclesiastical policies. The banning of slave ordination at the fourth-century Council of Gangra is a good example of this problem, where the activities of slaves within official church structures were highly contested. The main tribulation of freed slaves was exactly that they were never sure of their place in society. Being manumitted usually had some type of financial arrangement along with paying the homage or \textit{obsequium}. Thus many freed slaves made a living from this, but many, after being manumitted, remained in the service and household of the master.\textsuperscript{694} This is yet another complication of manumission and slave-carcerality. Even after manumission, there were still potent elements of carcerality present in the life of the freed slave.

In the light of these comments on slave-carcerality, we will examine John Chrysostom’s homilies on Philemon to see how he negotiates and manages the problems related with slave-carcerality and to delineate the carceral mechanisms at work in this series of homilies.

4 CARCERAL MECHANISMS IN JOHN CHRYSOSTOM’S \textit{HOMILIAE IN EPISTULAM AD PHILEMONEM}

The provenance of Chrysostom’s homilies on Philemon is very difficult to determine. Authors like Bonsdorff and Baur place the homilies in Chrysostom’s Constantinopolitan episcopate, perhaps in the year 402, but it remains very speculative.\textsuperscript{695} The homilies do seem to have been preached in succession, but I will not make a definitive claim on their provenance.

\textsuperscript{693} Harper, \textit{Slavery in the Late Roman World}, 463–94.
\textsuperscript{694} Veyne, “Roman Empire,” 81-87.
\textsuperscript{695} Wendy Mayer, \textit{The Homilies of St. John Chrysostom. Provenance: Reshaping the Foundations} (OrChrAn 273; Rome: Institutum Patristicum Orientalium Studiorum, 2005), 197.
Chrysostom’s homilies on Philemon have received some attention in scholarly circles, especially among some New Testament scholars. In the scholarly dialogue between Margaret Mitchell696 and Allen Callahan697 we find a discussion on Chrysostom’s exegesis of Philemon and the origin of the view that Onesimus, Philemon’s slave, was in fact a runaway slave or fugitivus. Callahan has argued that Onesimus was not a slave at all, but Philemon’s estranged brother. Callahan continues to state that Chrysostom is the first instance in the history of interpretation of the letter where the fugitivus-reading occurs. I do not want to resume this debate. I am in agreement with Mitchell here that Chrysostom has no reservations with regard to the status of Onesimus. He believes Onesimus to be a runaway slave (fugitivus), and openly utilizes this interpretation in his homilies.

4.1 The Preface to the Homilies

In the preface to the homilies on Philemon, Chrysostom provides a synthesis of his interpretation of Philemon. The Epistle to Philemon and Chrysostom’s interpretation thereof serve as a very convenient case study for slave-carcerality. The reason for this is that the image of Onesimus found in both these literary sources typically conforms to ancient stereotypes of degenerate slaves. Chrysostom accepts Onesimus as a ‘(stereo-)typical’ slave - that is, one who is a thief and, more importantly, one who has run away, implying that this slave has broken the bonds of his carcerality. Ironically, Paul is the one who is in jail and not Onesimus. Onesimus was serving Paul while he was in jail.698 In the preface, the typical discursivities of slave-carcerality are highlighted by Chrysostom.

In the first instance, he discusses the former carceral space of Onesimus, namely Philemon’s household. According to Chrysostom, Philemon’s household was a lodging for Christians. Philemon is illustrated by Chrysostom as the ‘most excellent man’. It is interesting to see how Chrysostom describes the Christian slaveholder in this preface. Philemon’s house is more than a house, but it is in fact called a ‘church’. We see again the duplication of pastoral power and institutions on the micro-societal level of the household. We also see here how the

carceral space of the household even follows a slave that is far away from the physical place that is the house. This is Chrysostom’s ideal household, a household that is also a church. If Philemon’s house is a church, it stands to reason that Chrysostom would consider Philemon as a type of shepherd for this household. Chrysostom thus strategically reconstructs the background of the epistle to mirror his view of the ideal Christian household and the ideal Christian *pater familias* and slaveholder within the context of pastoral governmentality. It also seems that Chrysostom’s reading of Philemon 7, that ‘the hearts/bowels of the saints are refreshed in him,’⁶⁹⁹ implies that Philemon also typically occupied the curative role of the shepherd-*pater familias*. Philemon, the ideal Christian slaveholder according to Chrysostom, is now placed parallel to Onesimus, the typical bad slave. The same detail used to show the honour of Philemon Chrysostom now uses to highlight shame and baseness of Onesimus. He was a thief and a runaway. None of these aspects is mentioned explicitly in the text, and the status of Onesimus, as mentioned above, has been a point of contention among scholars for decades. More on this will be said below. We have already seen the extreme view of Allen Callahan above, who believed that Onesimus was not even a slave. But the more moderate opinions tend to be divided rather on what type of slave Onesimus was, legally speaking, that is. Chrysostom’s view has been described as the ‘traditional view,’ that Onesimus was a *fugitivus*, a criminal and runaway slave. But there are several others, like John Knox’s view that Onesimus was in fact the slave of Archippus, mentioned in Philemon 2, and that Paul wanted to use his influence on Philemon to act indirectly on Archippus.⁷⁰⁰ Peter Lampe has challenged the traditional view that Onesimus was a *fugitivus* since a *fugitivus* could not return to his master’s house.⁷⁰¹ Both Lampe and, more

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⁶⁹⁹ UBS⁴: ...ὅτι τὰ σπλάάγχνα τῶν ἁγίων ἀναπέέπαυται διὰ σοῦ...


⁷⁰¹ The complexity and ambiguity of the terms *fugitivus* and *erro* has been a matter of scholarly debate for years. Peter Lampe originally used these terms, found in Roman jurists, to interpret Philemon; Peter Lampe, “Keine ‘Sklavenflucht’ Des Onesimus,” *ZNW* 76 (1985): 133–37. Later, Rapske expanded Lampe’s thesis that Onesimus was an *erro*, and also gave much attention to the notion of friendship in the letter; Brian M. Rapske, “The Prisoner Paul in the Eyes of Onesimus,” *NTS* 37 (1991): 187–203. Lampe and subsequently Rapske’s theory became quite popular in scholarly circles. It was however challenged more than a decade later by J. Albert Harrill, quite
recently Arzt-Grabner,\textsuperscript{702} rather understand Onesimus’ legal status to be that of an \textit{erro}, or an ‘absconder,’ someone who has left but still has the option to return. My own view is in line with that of Harrill\textsuperscript{703} - the problem is that these terms, \textit{fugitivus} and \textit{erro}, are based on ancient Roman juridical categories, which are often based on fictive cases with conflicting definitions. It will be shown that not even Chrysostom seems to discern between these categories. The carceral complexities of detention and mobility are immense in this instance. Yet another more recent opinion from Elliot has argued that Onesimus was sent to Paul by his owner Philemon as a gift that is in turn refused by Paul.\textsuperscript{704} Tolmie is certainly correct in stating: ‘What has become clear, in general, is that, to outsiders - like us - who read Paul’s correspondence to Philemon, the letter yields \textit{an incomplete picture} [his italics] regarding Onesimus’ status.’\textsuperscript{705}

The opening paragraph of the preface to the homilies on Philemon reads thus (\textit{Hom. Phlm. Preface}):

\begin{quote}
First, it is necessary to explain the argument of the epistle, then also the issues that are sought from it. What then is the argument? Philemon was a man of honourable and noble character. That he was an honourable man is evident from the fact that his entire household consisted of believers, and of so many believers that it is even called a church: therefore he says in this epistle, ‘And to the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{703} Harrill, “Using Roman Jurists.”
church that is in your house.’ He also testifies to his great obedience, and that the bowels of the saints are refreshed in him. And he himself in this epistle asked him to prepare a lodging for him. It seems to me therefore that his house was in general a residence for the saints. This excellent man, then, had a certain slave named Onesimus. This Onesimus, having stolen something from his master, had run away. For we know that he had stolen something, hear what he says, ‘If he has wronged you, or owes you anything, I will repay you’. Going then to Paul in Rome, and having found him in prison, and having enjoyed the benefit of his teaching, he also received baptism there. For that he received the gift of baptism there is clear from his saying, ‘Whom I have begotten in my bonds’. Paul therefore writes, recommending him to his master, that on every account he should forgive him, and receive him as someone now reborn.\[706]\n
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706 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.702.1-18: Πρῶτον ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ὑπόθεσιν εἰπεῖν τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, εἶτα καὶ τὰ ζητούμενα. Τίς οὖν ἡ ὑπόθεσις; Φιλήμων ἀνήρ τις τῶν θαυμαστῶν καὶ γενναίων (ὅτι γὰρ θαυμαστός ἦν, δήλον ἀπὸ τοῦ καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ πάσαν εἶναι πιστήν, καὶ οὕτω πιστῆν, ὡς καὶ Ἐκκλησίαν αὐτήν ὀνομάζεσθαι. Διὰ τούτου καὶ γράφων ἐλεγε· Καὶ τῇ κατ’ οἶκόν σου Ἐκκλησίᾳ. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ πολλὴν ὑπακοὴν, καὶ ὅτι σπλάγχνα τῶν ἁγίων ἀνεπέπαυτο εἰς αὐτόν. Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ γράφων ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστολῇ παρῆγγελλεν αὐτῷ ἐτοιμάσαι εξενίαν. Οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ καταγώγιον εἶναι ἁγίων ἡ οἰκία ἤ ἐκείνου πάντων ἐνεκεν. Οὕτως δὴ οὖν ὁ θαυμαστός ἀνήρ παῖδα τινα εἴχεν Ὄνησιμον. Ὁ τοιὸν Ὅνησιμος οὕτος κλέψας τι παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, ἐδραπέτευσεν· ὅτι γὰρ ἐκλεψεν, ἀκούσον τι φησιν· Εἰ δὲ τι ἡδύκησε σε, ἡ ὰφείλει, ἐγὼ ἀποτίσω. Ὅλης τοιὸν πρὸς τὸν Παύλον εἰς τὴν Ἡρώμην, καὶ εὑρὼν αὐτόν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, καὶ ἀπολαύσας τῆς παρ’ αὐτοῦ διάδασσας, καὶ τοῦ βαπτίσματος ἐτυχὲν ἐκεῖ. Ὡς τοῖος Παύλος γράφει συνιστῶν αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, ὡςτε πάντων ἐνεκεν λύσιν γενέσθαι, καὶ προσίεσθαι αὐτὸν ὡς ἀναγεννηθέντα νῦν.
The important question that I would like to ask here is why Chrysostom’s first inclination would be to consider Onesimus a *fugitivus*. The picture regarding the status of Onesimus was not clearer in Chrysostom’s time than for scholars today. There are more than three centuries of difference between Chrysostom and Paul, hardly something one could call close hermeneutical proximity. Chrysostom’s choice for a *fugitivus* is not necessarily based on good exegesis of the text either. He bases his argument solely on the fact that in Philemon 18-19 Paul states: ‘If he has done you wrong or owes you anything, charge it to me...I will pay it back...’\(^7\) On this basis Chrysostom argues for the *fugitivus* status of Onesimus. This is certainly not a definite premise to settle for the *fugitivus*-stance. His negative stereotyping of slaves inexplicitly influences Chrysostom’s choice. It also shows that the seemingly neat legal and social lines of difference between an *erro* and a *fugitivus* were not clear, even to someone like Chrysostom. He, like most other ancients, expected the worst from slaves - namely that they would break the bonds of their carceral state; in this case, Onesimus (allegedly) ran away after committing a crime. There is in fact a double measure of shame on Onesimus. Not only is he simply a slave who exhibits an implied state of degeneracy, but he has committed a crime and fled. Chrysostom therefore polarizes the situation to suit the general view of free, androcentric society - to put it bluntly, Philemon is the ‘good guy,’ and Onesimus the ‘bad guy.’ They represent two very extreme poles - the best kind of *pater familias* and the worst like of slave, the *fugitivus*. Polarization is an effective rhetorical strategy, in that it serves to highlight the point of the argument by the interplay of extreme opposites - the Epistle to Philemon lends itself quite conveniently to this rhetorical polarization.

The next phase of the homily sees the restoration of Onesimus’ carcerality, as well as his normalization. Onesimus, according to Chrysostom, received Christian teaching and baptism from Paul, implying that since Onesimus has been normalized and his carcerality restored, Philemon should accept him back into the carceral space. The premise that carceral bodies should be confined to the corresponding carceral spaces is never denied by Chrysostom. In fact, Chrysostom commends the Christian faith precisely for not disturbing this equilibrium (*Hom. Phlm. Preface*): ‘But now many are reduced to the necessity of blasphemy, and to say that Christianity has come into the world for the subversion of everything, masters having their slaves

\(^7\) UBS\(^4\): εἰ δὲ τι ἡδύκησέν σε ἡ ὁφείλει, τούτο ἐμοὶ ἐλλόγα.
taken from them, and it is a deed of violence.\textsuperscript{708} Chrysostom relates questioning the traditional slave-slaveholder social roles to subversiveness and even blasphemy, probably due to developments from the Council of Ganga held earlier, in which the Eustathians were accused of illegally setting slaves free. What stands out here is that there is also no mention of manumission after normalization. While we have seen that Chrysostom prefers that slaves be taught Christian virtues and practical trades and then be manumitted, normalization does not assume manumission. Normalization, namely subscribing to free, Christian masculine virtues, does not automatically negate the carcerality of the body. In fact, it serves to establish and strengthen the carceral state. This is related to the Stoic-Philonic notion of the heteronomy of the body discussed in the previous chapter. All people are in any case in a carceral state, so the nature and character of the carcerality is not important. It also shows how the recognition of the humanness of the slave enforces the carceral state of the slave-body.

Chrysostom utilizes Philemon in this instance to promote Christian slaveholding, as he did in the case of 1 Corinthians 7:21, which is also quoted in the preface. More specifically, since Paul acted as teacher and reformer of Onesimus, so too the late ancient Christian \textit{pater familias} should act in the same manner. He states explicitly (\textit{Hom. Phlm.} Preface): ‘We ought not to give up on the race of slaves, even if they have progressed to extreme wickedness.\textsuperscript{709}’ He understands that his audience identifies and relates with the character of Philemon. If we return to the issue of perception, the audience, and Chrysostom himself, perceive themselves to be like Philemon. Chrysostom therefore presents Philemon as the \textit{Gestalt} of the ideal Christian slaveholder, and Onesimus, now, becomes representative of something greater than the evil, runaway slave - Onesimus becomes the ideal Christian slave. Onesimus here is even more than a \textit{typos} for the Christian slave - he also becomes the representation of the ancient carceral cycle of Christian slaveholding. The cycle Onesimus becomes representative of in Chrysostom’s argumentation is that of the typical, evil slave, who broke the bonds of his carcerality, physically fled, received teaching and baptism, was ‘normalized,’ and now is returned to the ideal carceral state of the

\textsuperscript{708} Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.704.19-23: ἐπεὶ εἰς ἀνάγκην καθίστανται πολλοὶ τοῦ βλασφημεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ἐπὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῶν πάντων ὁ Χριστιανισμὸς εἰς τὸν βίον εἰσενήγεται, τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀφαιρουµένων τοὺς οἰκέτας, καὶ βίας τὸ πράγµα ἐστιν.

\textsuperscript{709} Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.703.19-20: τὸ δουλικὸν γένος οὐ δεί ἀπογινώσκειν, κἂν εἰς ἑσχάτην ἐλάση κακίαν.
Christian slave. The Onesimus-event serves as the model for slave-rehabilitation in the Christian household. Manumission is not even mentioned; the most important part is that Onesimus was normalized and restored to the state of carcerality. Chrysostom also makes an interesting statement towards the end of the preface, that it would be ideal for those slaves who live outside of the city to come into the city for the sake of rehabilitation. Chrysostom states (*Hom. Phlm. Preface*):

> I wish it were possible to bring those [slaves] who are outside into the cities. What, you would say, if he also should become wicked? And why should he, I ask you? Because he has come into the city? But consider that being on the outside he will be much more wicked. For he who is wicked being within the city, will be much more so being outside. For here he will be exempted from necessary care, his master taking that care upon himself; but there the worry about those things will distract him perhaps even from things more necessary and more spiritual.\(^{710}\)

The diatribe we find in this argument is identical to the stereotypes found in Columella’s agricultural treatise. Columella was highly negative of urban slaves, stating that they were even more delinquent than rural slaves. In this section Chrysostom turns this argument around, and probably with a shock effect - hence the diatribe. The *status quo* seems to accept Columella’s view that urban slaves are more degenerate or corrupt (*φαῦλος*) than rural slaves, but Chrysostom now utilizes a second carceral space to counter this argument; quite surprisingly, this other carceral space is the city. While Chrysostom mostly exhibits a negative disposition toward the city, here it becomes a positive carceral space. What are the dynamics of this move?

\(^{710}\) Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.703.35 – 704.9: Εἴθε τοὺς ἔξωθεν εἰς τὰς πόλεις εἰσώθησιν ἐνήν. Τί οὖν, φησίν, ἃν καὶ αὐτός φαῦλος γένηται; Διὰ τί, εἰπέ μοι, παρακαλῶ; ὅτι πρὸς πόλιν εἰσῆλθεν; Ἀλλ’ ἐννόει, ὅτι καὶ ἔξω ἃν φαυλότερος ἔσται· ὁ γὰρ ἔνδον φαῦλος γενόμενος, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἔξω ἃν· ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ καὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας φροντίδος ἀπῆλλακται, τοῦ δεσπότου μεριμνῶντος· ἐκεῖ δὲ ἡ περὶ τούτων φροντίς ἵσως ἀπάξει αὐτόν καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαιότερων καὶ πνευματικωτέρων.
Behind this issue, in my opinion, is the problem of the absentee *pater familias*. But unlike Columella, who wants to remove the *pater familias* from the city to the countryside, Chrysostom removes the slave from the countryside and brings him or her into the carceral sphere of the *pater familias*. It is not the city as such which is the carceral space, but the presence of the *pater familias* within the city. The implication is that the slave is now within the pastoral programme of reform and normalization of the Christian slaveholder. He emphasizes the curative role again of the *pater familias* in basic matters of care as well as in spiritual matters (‘...τῶν ἀναγκαιοτέρων καὶ πνευματικωτέρων.’). Slaves are no longer tools used to generate profits of villa estates and farms, but subjects of normalization, abnormals who require a strict carceral sphere. In this carceral sphere, the dynamics of confinement, surveillance, discipline and reform can work more effectively, and the carcerality of the slave-body is thus more stable due to the increased surveillance and limited mobility.

This normalization and carceral restoration would complexify matters very much in the household, as we will see in the homilies that follow, since Onesimus is now considered a ‘brother’ and not only a slave, i.e. fictive kinship.

Another discourse that is very prevalent in Chrysostom’s preface to the homilies is his use of honour and shame in describing the relationship between Onesimus, Philemon and Paul. It must be remembered that both Paul and Chrysostom’s historical settings were very much honour-based. Honour and shame defined social roles and social status. The natural reaction to the degenerate behaviour of Onesimus was that the owner would be ashamed. We have also seen the prevalence of this issue in chapters 2 and 3. Honour and shame are reflective, the shame of Onesimus would reflect back on Philemon. The reward to the *pater familias* for educating the slave in virtue is that he does not have to be ashamed, as Chrysostom states (*Hom. Phlm. Preface*): ‘He teaches us not to be ashamed of our slaves, if they are virtuous.’

The honour of the virtuous slave is reflected back onto the slaveholder. Thus, the virtue-teaching that the *pater familias* provides to the slave secures his own social position - in other words, his own state of normalcy, or free masculinity, is strengthened by the process of normalizing the slave. Thus slave-normalization affirms the normativity and normalcy of free Christian masculinities.

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711 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.704.24-25: Διδάσκει ἡµᾶς µὴ ἐπαισχύνεσθαι τοὺς οἰκέτας, εἰ ἐνάρετοι εἶν. 

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Christian masculinity is, in the context of Chrysostom at least, now fashioned when the pater familias takes up the curative role of shepherd and reformer. To conclude then, the value of Philemon for Chrysostom, and late ancient slaveholding in general, becomes very apparent. Due to its authoritative nature as scriptural apparatus, the Onesimus-event provides a model for Chrysostom to base his ideal cycle of slave-reformation and carceral restoration on, thereby utilizing, and in essence strategically re-narrating the fragmentary event from the epistle to suit the ideal cycle representative of Christian slaveholding. Philemon and Onesimus are constructed as extreme opposites and useful stereotypes - Philemon the good slaveholder and Onesimus the evil fugitivus. But Onesimus is also representative of the invention of the good Christian slave as a new literary type. The same is true for Philemon as the literary type of the ideal Christian slaveholder. The ideal Christian slave is therefore a slave who remains in the carceral state of slavery and who works better and harder. Chrysostom also wants to restore slaves to the sphere of carcerality of the pater familias, and it is clear that his proposition for the reformation of slaves works better in an urban setting than in the agricultural context where the pater familias is absent. There is also an honour-incentive given to the slaveholder in that the process of normalization and reformation also secures and fashions honourable and respectable free Christian masculinity.

4.2 *Homilia in Epistulam ad Philemonem* 1

In this homily Chrysostom provides the exposition of the first few verses in Philemon, and the theme of carcerality is common in the homily. At the very beginning, Chrysostom draws a comparison between Paul, who is himself in a carceral state - he was physically in prison - and Onesimus in the symbolic state of slave-carcerality (*Hom. Phlm.* 1.1): ‘For if a chain for Christ's sake is not shameful but something to be proud of, so much more is slavery not to be seen as a disgrace.’\(^\text{712}\) Paul’s position as a prisoner, in fact, a criminal in the eyes of the Roman authorities of his day, is now used as a strategy to promote institutional slavery. Philemon is conventionally labelled as one of the so-called ‘prison-epistles’ of Paul, since it is written during the time of the apostle’s incarceration. Themes of carcerality run through this letter as well as through Chrysostom’s homilies on the letter. The first dilemma we are being faced with is Paul’s status

\(^{712}\) Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.703.47-50: Εἰ γὰρ δεσµὸς οὐκ αἰσχύνη διὰ τὸν Χριστὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καύχημα, πολλῷ μᾶλλον δουλεία οὐκ ἐπονείδιστον.
as being a ‘prisoner’. Like the state of slavery, Chrysostom does not see being imprisoned for being a Christian as a disgrace (ἐπονείδιστος). It is important at this stage to acknowledge the subtle changes that human understandings of criminality have experienced. According to Foucault, modern crimino-anthropology and criminological psychoanalytics are especially concerned with gathering knowledge of the criminal. This is especially seen in the development of the understanding of ‘insanity’ in criminal law, especially originating from article 64 of the 1810 Code, in which it is said that ‘there is neither crime nor offence if the offender was of unsound mind at the time of the act.’ Today, experts, judges of normality like psychologists and psychiatrists regulate pleas of insanity. This is, however, a very late modern development, and when we read Chrysostom’s homilies on Philemon a very different picture emerges. First though, during the first century, it should be understood that Paul was seen as a criminal. His status as criminal was determined by religio-political stipulations, in which Jesus-followers were seen as criminals in that they rejected and opposed the imperial and religious authority of Rome as embodied in the emperor. In the eyes of the law of first century Rome, Paul was by all accounts a criminal, a danger to society and thus someone who had to be imprisoned and confined. It is also clear that when Paul was released, he would continue to break the law that resulted in most of his incarcerations. In the eyes of the outsiders, non-Christians, this was seen as being quite shameful. The same and even worse could have been said of Jesus, who died a shameful death of a criminal. But in Chrysostom’s reading, and most Christian theological readings in general, Paul is obviously not seen as a criminal - much less a danger to society. From the Chrysostomic perspective, Paul is no longer a criminal, or rather, he never was one in the first place, because the guidelines for determining criminality had changed. The definition of crime, the level of seriousness and margins of indulgence had considerably changed up to the fourth century. We see here retrospective decriminalisation. This is especially the case when a certain religious authority exercised its influence over judicial systems. For us today, for instance, blasphemy has lost its status as being a punishable crime. Paul is by no means portrayed in the homilies as being deviant in any way. As a prisoner, Paul is in fact seen as someone with much honour and influence.

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Since Paul remained in his carceral state (despite his ascribed innocence), never escaping or breaking out from prison, so too should the bonds of slave-carcerality be maintained. Furthermore, while it may seem initially shameful for someone to be in prison, Paul had much honour, thus, the carceral slave-body, traditionally considered shameful and inferior, should also be considered as having the potential to bear great honour. Honour now receives a very specific meaning for slaves. The honourable conduct for a slave is to remain in the carceral state. Chrysostom then strategically plays upon the links between Paul’s carceral state and the slave-carcerality of Onesimus.

After this initial word play, Chrysostom returns to explaining the carceral space, which is the church-household, and states (Hom. Phlm. 1.1):

Here he has not even left out the slaves. For he knew that the words of slaves often have the power to overturn their master, and more so when his request was on behalf of a slave. And perhaps it was them in particular who upset him. He does not allow them therefore to fall into envy, having honoured them by including them in a greeting with their masters. And neither does he allow the master to be offended. For if he had mentioned them by name, perhaps he would have been angry. And if he had not mentioned them at all, he might have been disturbed. Look therefore how wisely he has found a way by his manner of mentioning them, both to honour them by his mention of them, and not to wound him. For the name of the church does not want masters to be angry, even though they are counted among their slaves. For the church does not know the distinction of master and slave. By good actions and by sins it defines the one and the other. If it is then a church, do not

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be disturbed that your slave is greeted with you. For in Christ Jesus there is neither slave nor free.\textsuperscript{715}

The fact that slaves are also greeted, according to Chrysostom, is commendable. The problem is that in the actual epistle slaves are not directly mentioned, although Chrysostom is probably correct in that they would be included in the grouping of the ‘church’.\textsuperscript{716} Chrysostom explains this by alluding to the typical slave/slaveholder distinctions found in antiquity - they are not mentioned by name since this would be a sign of disrespect to Philemon, a common \textit{faux pas} in antiquity. In these ancient literary artifacts, slaves are both voiceless and more often than not nameless. This form of media manipulation also affirmed elite free masculinities in antiquity. Although they are nameless, they should still see themselves as being part of the church and therefore also included. Slaves should therefore not be envious if they are not mentioned by name. After stating this Chrysostom quotes Galatians 3:28 saying that in the church there is no distinction between slave and free. He makes this claim despite the obvious distinction that was raised just in the previous sentences. We find here the typical dynamics of ‘policy’. Here Galatians 3:28 functions as a type of policy-statement, something that speaks more of the public values an institution wants to display, despite the more complex practical implementation.

From this point on the homily diverges into a discussion of the dynamics of honour and shame in the new Christian dispensation. Honour and shame were very important values in

\textsuperscript{715} Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.705.14-32: Οὐδὲ δούλους παρήκεν ἐνταύθα· οἴδε γὰρ πολλάκις καὶ ὀνομαστὰ δούλων ἀνατρέψαι δυνάμενα τὸν δεσπότην, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ὑπὲρ δούλου ἡ ἀξίωσις ἢ· οἶδε μάλιστα παροξύνοντες, ἵσως ἐκεῖνοι ἤσαν. Οὐ τοινυν ἀφύησιν αὐτοὺς εἰς φθόνον ἐμπέσειν, τῇ προσηγορίᾳ τιμῆσαι μετὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν. Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸν δεσπότην ἀγανακτῆσαι συγχωρεῖ. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὄνομαστὶ εἶπεν, ἵσως ἂν ἠγανάκτησεν· εἰ δὲ ἐμμνήσθη, κἂν ἐδυσχέρανεν. Ὑπάρ ποτὲ καὶ τούτου τῇ μνήμῃ τιμῆσαι, κἀκεῖνον μὴ πλῆξαι. Τὸ γὰρ τῆς Ἑκκλησίας ὄνομα οὐκ ἀφύησι τοὺς δεσπότας ἀγανακτεῖν, εἰ γε συναριθμοῖν τοῖς οἰκέταις. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ Ἑκκλησία οὐκ οἶδε δεσπότας, οὐκ ὑπεύθυνον οἰκέτας. Εἰ τοινυν Ἑκκλησία ἐστι, μὴ ἀγανάκτει, ὅτι μετὰ σοῦ προσηγορεῖ ὁ δοῦλος· ἔν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ οὐ δοῦλος, οὐκ ἐλεύθερος.

\textsuperscript{716} James D. G. Dunn, \textit{The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon} (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Paternoster, 1996), 320–21.
antiquity and it was the means by which personhood was connected to group values. Honour-discourse would also continue to play a pivotal role in Chrysostom’s exposition of the Epistle to Philemon. In antiquity one’s social status, parentage, ethnicity and gender all formed an intersection where an individual’s honour would be constructed. Most importantly, honour is only effective when there exists a social hierarchy. In the previous chapter on domestic slavery we have seen that with the rise of Christianity in late antiquity and the rise of pastoral governmentality, a very strict hierarchic model of shepherding took precedence. At the top of the hierarchy was God, the ever-present, all-seeing slaveholder. The hierarchy then worked by duplicating its top level onto the bishop or priest and then also the pater familias. The highest ethical principle in this hierarchy was to honour God in the same way a slave should honour his or her owner. This was especially seen in the instructions found in the haustafeln; slaves had to govern their conduct in such a manner that it was pleasing to God, since God is the ruler of all bodies.

The values of honour and shame, I will argue, provide a code of conduct for all who participate in the hierarchy. There are two ways to receive honour. Honour may be achieved or ascribed to an individual. Ascribed honour is gained by means of one’s birth, parentage, ethnicity and heritage. These aspects are more or less out of the control of the individual. Achieved honour is gained in several ways, for instance by means of challenge-riposte scenarios, upward social mobility, etc. More importantly, honour is something that an individual would be ‘trained’ in; in other words, honourable conduct and the rules for honourable social engagement are taught to an individual. It becomes a form of discipline in itself and honourable conduct represents a transformed economy of visibility into the exercise of power. Slaves were expected to act in

certain socially acceptable ways because their masters and superiors were more honourable; in turn, since slave-bodies were violable bodies, being a slave was a shameful disposition. This disposition of shame also reinforced slave-carcerality since shameful persons had to be regulated, controlled and often either disciplined or confined. Being prone to shame is one of the consequences of ascribing humanity to slaves. Moreover, in ancient Christian pastoralism, this economy of honourable conduct was reimagined and became theocentric. Now, the primary recipient of honour should be God, and any instance where human beings receive more honour than God it is considered a crime or a sin.723

Honour-discourse in Chrysostom’s exposition of Philemon then also functions as a carceral mechanism. Specifically for the issue of slave-carcerality, this carceral mechanism is based on the codes in the haustafeln stating that for slaves to exhibit some form of honour, they should work as if working for God. It also has guidelines for slaveholders, in that they need to manage their slaves with the knowledge that they are also slaves of God. Both slave and slaveholder therefore need to honour God first and foremost in their conduct. Chrysostom would now state that when a slaveholder forces a slave to behave in a way that insults God, both the slaveholder and the slave are held accountable (Hom. Phlm. 1.2):

But not only do you honour people more than God, but you force others to do so as well. In this way many have forced their domestics and slaves. Some have drawn them into marriage against their will, and others have forced them to perform disgraceful services, perverse sexual deeds, acts of theft, and financial fraud, and violence: so that the crime is twofold, and they cannot be pardoned on the basis that they were forced. For if you yourself do wrong things against your will, and because of the command of the ruler, not even in such a case is it by a sufficient excuse; but the crime becomes worse, when you also force them to fall into the

same sins. For what pardon can there possibly be for such a person?\textsuperscript{724}

We see here above that slaves are not simply seen as automatons, and simply doing the will of the master under duress is no excuse. Slaves are still held accountable here for not resisting this type of domination.

The training of honour now becomes equal in the training of virtue, something we have seen in the chapter on domestic slavery and also earlier in this chapter. The virtuous slave is honourable, and the honour reflects on the master. But now, if the slave is compelled to dishonour God, the shame reflects back onto the slave and the slaveholder. They are both guilty of sinning against God and become criminals/sinners. Dishonourable conduct against God leads to sin, which is also a state of degeneracy and one worthy of punishment according to Chrysostom. Christian hamartiology exhibits an explicit language of carcerality and criminality. As with Peter of Alexandria, Chrysostom also argues that the punishment for the slaveholder is greater than the punishment for the slave, but both are still guilty. The interplay between honour, sin and punishment and the relational dynamics between the slave, slaveholder and God become apparent in Chrysostom’s thinking. These aspects are very closely related and form what we may call a symbolic carceral-continuum. The symbolic carceral-continuum represents the visible flow of power in the pastoral hierarchy. Honour and shame become related to normalcy and abnormalcy in a dynamic, conduct-based sense.

### 4.3 *Homilia in Epistulam ad Philemonem 2*

The exposition on Philemon continues from the fourth verse of the letter and Chrysostom starts by explaining to his audience the strategy of Paul’s rhetoric in the epistle. Chrysostom notes the

\textsuperscript{724} Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.706.35-47: Οὐ μόνον δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀνθρώπους προτιμάτε τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρους ἀναγκάζετε. Πολλοὶ πολλοὺς οἰκέτας ἠνάγκασαν, καὶ παῖδας· οἱ μὲν εἰς γάμμους εἰλικριναν ηὐ βουλομένους, οἱ δὲ ὑπηρετήσασθαι διακονιῶς ἀτόποις, καὶ ἐρωτὶ θαυμῶ καὶ ἀρταγαῖς καὶ πλεονεξίαις καὶ βίαις· ὥστε διπλῶν εἶναι τὸ ἐγκλῆμα, καὶ μηδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης δύνασθαι συγγενῶμην αὐτοὺς εὑρέσθαι. Εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἄκων πράττεις τὰ πονηρά καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐπίταγμα τοῦ ἄρχοντος, μᾶλιστα μὲν οὐδὲ οὕτως ἰκανή ἡ ἀπολογία, πλὴν χαλεπωτέρα γίνεται ἡ ἁμαρτία, ὅταν καὶ ἐκείνους ἀναγκάζῃς τοῖς αὐτοῖς περιπίπτειν. Ποιὰ γὰρ ἂν εἰ ὁ τοιοῦτος συγγνώμη λοιπῶν;
complex interplays in the patron-client dynamics of the epistle. While Philemon appears to occupy the role of Paul’s patron, since Paul is asking the favour, Paul’s authoritative status as apostle in Chrysostom’s view would make him almost automatically eligible to receive any favour. Chrysostom is also aware of Paul’s appeals to emotion in the letter and continues to explain how Paul strategically starts to persuade Philemon (*Hom. Phlm. 2.1*):

> He does not immediately at the start ask the favour, but having first admired the man, and having lauded him for his good deeds, and having shown no small sign of his love, that he always made mention of him in his prayers, and having said that many are supported by him, and that he is obedient and complying in all things; then he asks it last of all, by this especially making him blush. For if others receive the things that they ask, much more should Paul. If coming before others, he was worthy to receive, much more when he comes after others, and asks something not related to himself, but on behalf of another. Then, that he may not seem to have written for this reason only, and that no one may say, ‘If it were not for Onesimus you would not have written,’ behold how he also appends other causes of his epistle. In the first place showing his love, then also desiring that a room may be prepared for him... Nothing so shames us into giving, as to present the kindnesses given to others, and particularly when a man is more entitled to respect than them. And he has not said, ‘If you do it to others, much more to me’; but he has insinuated the same thing, though he has managed to do it in another and a more gracious way.


726 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.707.47-708.44 & 62.709.14-18: Οὐκ εὐθέως ἐκ προοιμίων αἰτεῖ τὴν
Chrysostom understands that the situation Paul finds himself in, that is, harbouring a fugitive slave, is very volatile and that very careful rhetorical manoeuvring is necessary. Chrysostom is also quite aware of how love functions as a strategy here for striking a balance between tact and frankness, as well as one for negotiating power. Chrysostom continues to explain (Hom. Phlm. 2.1):

For you know what the attitudes of masters are towards slaves that have run away, and particularly when they have done this with theft, even if they have good masters, how their anger is increased. It has taken all these measures to relieve this anger, and having convinced him first to serve him diligently in whatever matter, and having prepared his soul to exhibit all obedience, then he puts his request forward, and says, ‘I beseech you,’ and with the addition of flattery, ‘for my son whom I have begotten in my bonds.’ Again the chains are mentioned to shame him into compliance, and then the name.727

χάριν, ἀλλὰ πρότερον τὸν ἄνδρα θαυμάσας, καὶ ἐπαινέσας ἐπὶ τοῖς κατορθώμασι, καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀγάπης δείξας τεκμήριον ὡς μικρὸν τὸ διαπαντὸς αὐτοῦ μεμνήσθαι ἐν ταῖς προσευχαῖς, καὶ εἰπὼν, ὡς πολλοὶ ἀναπαυόμενται πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπακούων καὶ πείθεται· τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευταῖον τίθησι, μάλιστα αὐτοῦ δυσωπών τοῦτο. Εἰ γὰρ έτεροι ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν ἄν δέονται, πολλῷ μᾶλλον Παῦλος· εἰ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλθὼν ἄξιος ἦν τυχεῖν, πολλῷ μᾶλλον μετὰ τούς ἄλλους, καὶ πράγμα αἰτών οὐκ εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνήκον, ἀλλ’ ὑπέρ έτέρου. Εἰτα ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ τούτου ἕνεκεν γράφειν μόνον, μηδὲ εἰπῇ τις, ὡς Εἰ μὴ ὦν ἥσιμος ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ἐγραφαίς, ὥρα πῶς καὶ ἐτέρας αἰτίας τίθησί τῆς ἐπιστολῆς· πρῶτον μὲν τὴν ἀγάπην αὐτοῦ δηλόν; ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ ξενίαν κελεύων ἐπομασθήναι αὐτῷ…Οὐδὲν οὕτω δυσωπεῖ, ὡς τὸ τάς έτέρων εὐεργεσίας προφέρειν, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἐκείνων εὔδεσμωτέρος ἦ. Καὶ οὐκ εἶπεν, Εἰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιεῖς, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐμοί. Ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ἤνειατο, ἐτέρως δὲ αὐτὸ μεθώδευσε προσηνέστερον.

727 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.710.5-14: Ἰστε γὰρ τοίς θυμοῖς τῶν δεσποτῶν κατὰ τῶν ἀποδεδρακότων οἰκετῶν, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν μετὰ κλοπῆς τούτο ἐργάσωνται, κἀκεῖστοις ἔχουσι δεσπότας, πῶς αὐξεῖται ἡ ὀργή. Ταύτην οὖν πᾶσι τούτοις προελέαν· καὶ πρότερον πείσας πᾶν
The second strategy used by Paul, according to Chrysostom, is his own state of carcerality. Paul needs to use all the tools at his disposal since the matter is very sensitive. The fact that Paul calls Onesimus a son is because of his spiritual rebirth and baptism under the tutelage of Paul. Slaves were often referred to as sons. Fictive birth or genealogy functions here as an honour-status indicator. Whether Chrysostom is correct or not in considering Onesimus a *fugitivus* is not that important in this instance. What is important is that we see how Chrysostom considers such a scenario where a *fugitivus* asks for asylum. We have seen in the previous homilies that he strictly advises Christians not to take slaves away from their owners since it is a shameful act and equal to violence, blasphemy and robbery. It does seem that some Christians, slaves or free, on the basis of the letter to Philemon, may have either fled and sought asylum or harboured fugitive slaves. This is already attested to, officially, in the Council of Gangra, in its third canon, stating: ‘If any one shall teach a slave, under pretext of piety, to despise his master and to run away from his service, and not to serve his own master with good-will and all honour, let him be anathema.’ This could be the background for Chrysostom’s reference of the blasphemy of fugitive slaves. The Epistle to Philemon does provide an impetus for ecclesiastical asylum. The practice of ecclesiastical asylum is well attested in Chrysostom’s time, himself providing asylum for Eutropius. Yet it seems that Chrysostom prefers the *status quo* to be maintained, that slaves should not be detained from their owners. It becomes a legal matter and it must also be remembered that Chrysostom considers slaves also as property, and therefore harbouring *fugitivi* would simply be akin to robbery and fraud. In order to maintain the view of the *status quo*, that slaves should be sent back to the carceral sphere of their masters, Chrysostom adheres to Paul’s own example (he sent Onesimus back) but emphasizes the point Paul also stresses - that the slave should be considered kin. As Decock intimates, since all human beings

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are indebted to God, this relationship to God serves as a point of mutuality between all human beings.\textsuperscript{730} Notwithstanding this human mutuality, it has been shown that arguments based on shared humanity should be read with suspicion. Thus, fictive kinship is one of the carceral mechanisms of oppression stemming from a technology of humanness. Furthermore, we know from chapter 2 that slaves were considered part of the household in antiquity, but here a further step is taken. Slaves become included in the fictive kinship circle of the church.\textsuperscript{731} This is especially based on Philemon 15-16 where Paul asks Philemon to accept Onesimus as a brother.

Next Chrysostom embarks on a virtue-discourse in which he stresses the importance of humility. He acknowledges that there are few acts as humbling as calling a slave a brother and even a friend. We again find the Stoic reasoning of Chrysostom here by reminding his readers that if Christ, the almighty slaveholder, humbles himself to call human beings brothers and friends, his audience should not hesitate to do the same. Honour and shame are very important in this instance - one of the ways honour was ascribed to an individual was by means of genealogy and parentage. By placing slaves in the realm of fictive kin, both Paul and Chrysostom provide them with a measure of honour. Chrysostom then immediately shifts the focus away from institutional slavery and emphasizes the virtue of humility. He explains the message of this homily thus (\textit{Hom. Phlm.} 2.2):

\begin{quote}
These things are not aimlessly written, but that we masters may not give up on our slaves, nor press them too hard, but may learn to
\end{quote}


forgive the errors of such slaves, so that we may not always be severe, that we may not, due to their enslavement, be ashamed to make them share in all things with us when they are good. For if Paul was not ashamed to call one his son, his own bowels, his brother, his beloved, surely we should not be ashamed. And why do I say Paul? The master of Paul is not ashamed to call our slaves his own brothers; and are we ashamed? See how he honours us; he calls our slaves his own brothers, friends, and co-heirs. See to what lengths he has descended! Therefore, considering what we have done, have we performed our whole duty? We will never in any way do it; but to whatever degree of humility we have come, the greater part of it is still left behind. For consider that, whatever you do, you do to a fellow-slave, but your master has done it to your slaves. Hear and tremble! Never be proud of your humility.732

Chrysostom translates Paul’s ethic of including slaves as fictive kin into an ethic of moderate treatment of slaves. It is not shameful for slaveholders to call their slaves brothers, yet they still remain slaves. Fictive kinship does not serve as something that ameliorates institutional slavery. Rather, it acts as another carceral mechanism that solidifies the social position of the

732 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.711.36-56: Ταῦτα οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀναγέγραπται, ἀλλ’ ἵνα μὴ ἀπογινώσκωμεν τῶν οἰκετῶν οἱ δεσπόται, μηδὲ σφόδρα αὐτοῖς ἐπιτιθώμεθα, ἀλλὰ μάθωμεν συγχωρεῖν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα τοῖς οἰκέταις τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἵνα μὴ ἀεὶ τραχεῖς ὤμεν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπὸ τῆς δουλείας ἐπαισχυνώμεθα καὶ κοινωνοῦσι αὐτοῖς ἐν πάσι λαμβάνειν, ὅταν ὄσιν ἀγαθοί. Εἰ γὰρ Παύλος οὐκ ἐπηχύνθη καὶ τέκνον καλέσαι, καὶ σπλάγχνοι, καὶ ἀδελφῶν, καὶ ἀγαπητῶν, πῶς ἄν ἡμεῖς ἐπαισχυνθῶμεν; Καὶ τί λέγω, Παύλος; ὁ Παύλου Δεσπότης οὐκ ἐπαισχύνεται τοὺς ἡμετέρους δούλους ἀδελφοὺς αὐτοῦ καλεῖν, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπαισχυνώμεθα; Ὅρα, πῶς ἡμᾶς τιμᾶ· ἀδελφοὺς ἑαυτοῦ καλεῖ τοὺς ἡμετέρους δούλους, καὶ φίλους, καὶ συγκληρονόμους. Ἰδοὺ ποῦ κατέβη. Τι οὗν ποιήσαντες ἡμεῖς, τὸ πάν ἡμικότες ἐσόμεθα; Ὑδέν ὅλως δυνησόμεθα, ἀλλ’ ὅπου δ’ ἂν ταπεινοφοροῦσιν ἔλθωμεν, τὸ πλέον αὐτής ὑπολέείται. Ἐκοπεῖ γὰρ ὃπερ ἂν ποιήσης σὺ, περὶ τῶν ὅμοδουλῶν ποιεῖς, ὁ δὲ σὺς δεσπότης περὶ τούς σους δούλους πεποίηκεν. Ὅκουσον, καὶ φρίζον· Μηδέποτε ἐπαρθῆς ἐπὶ ταπεινοφοροῦν. 311
slave. By promoting the fictive kinship of slaves, a concept inherently Stoic, focus is drawn away from the status of the slave as institutionally bonded. It is not very different from Seneca’s proposition in *De beneficiis* that slaves were also able to bestow favours on their owners. In his *Epistula 47* we saw that Seneca promoted a relationship of love and mutual respect to slaves, almost identical to Paul, and in *De beneficiis* he aims to make this relationship practical. In order to make his argument plausible, Seneca had to argue that slaves were capable of virtue. He provides several examples of brave and virtuous slaves (*Ben. 3.22-27*). It is the common origin of nature that allows slaves to be benefactors to their owners. Seneca and Chrysostom’s arguments bear striking resemblance. Seneca states (*Ben. 3.28*):

> The universe is the one parent of all, whether they trace their descent from this primary source through a glorious or a mean line of ancestors. Be not deceived when people who are reckoning up their genealogy, wherever an illustrious name is wanting, foist in that of a god in its place. You need despise no one, even though he bears a commonplace name, and owes little to fortune. Whether your immediate ancestors were freedmen, or slaves, or foreigners, pluck up your spirits boldly, and leap over any intervening disgraces of your pedigree; at its source, a noble origin awaits you. Why should our pride inflate us to such a degree that we think it beneath us to receive benefits from slaves, and think only of their position, forgetting their good deeds? You, the slave of lust, of gluttony, of a harlot, no, who are owned as a joint chattel by harlots, can you call anyone else a slave? Call a person a slave?[^733]

[^733]: Translation: Aubrey Steward, *Seneca: On Benefits* (Guildford: White Crow, 2010), 80-81; Latin text: Basore [online: 11 May 2012]: *Unus omnium parens mundus est, sive per splendidos sive per sordidos gradus ad hunc prima cuiusque origo perducitur. Non est, quod te isti decipiunt, qui, cum maiores suos recensent, ubicumque nomen inlustre <de> fecit, illo deum <in> fulciunt. Neminem despexeris, etiam si circa illum obsoleta sunt nomina et parum indulgente adiuta fortuna. Sive libertini ante vos habentur sive servi sive exterarum gentium homines, erigite audacter animos et, quidquid in medio sordidi iacet, transilite; expectat vos in summo magna nobilitas. Quid superbia in tantam vanitatem adtollimur, ut beneficia a servis indignemur accipere et sortem eorum spectemus obli*
If we compare Seneca’s statement above with the previous citation from Chrysostom’s homily, the similarities become increasingly apparent. Both Seneca and Chrysostom present their arguments as virtue discourses. Seneca understands that the main obstacle to his reader’s acceptance of slaves as benefactors was their pride in their birthright. Chrysostom promotes humility in the homily. Both rely on the shared origin of slaveholder and slave - Seneca on the universe and Chrysostom on the heavenly slaveholder (think for instance of the spiritual birth of Onesimus). Furthermore, both prefer to focus on the virtuous deeds of slaves, but neither addresses the problems of institutional slavery.

Since Seneca, Paul and Chrysostom accept slaves as kin, friends and benefactors worthy of honour, they reinforce the carcerality of the slave since the discourse of fictive kinship promotes humane treatment of slaves, which is already problematic, but never questions their institutional status or calls for their manumission.

At the end of this homily Chrysostom provides a poetic finale (Hom. Phlm. 2.2):

For this also is the glory of a master, to have grateful slaves. And this is the glory of a master, that he should love His slaves. And this is the glory of a master, to claim for his own that which belongs to them. And this is the glory of a master, not to be ashamed to recognise them before all. Let us therefore be awe-struck at this great love of Christ. Let us be inflamed with this love-potion. Though a person is of low status and simple, yet if we hear that he loves us, we are above all things warmed with love towards him, and greatly honor him. And do we then love? And when our master loves us so much, are we not joyful? Let us not, I beseech you, be so indifferent regarding the salvation of our souls, but let us love him with all our strength, and let us dispense with meritorum? Servum tu quemquam vocas, libidinis et gulae servus et adulterae, immo adulterarum commune mancipium? Servum vocas quemquam tu?

everything for the sake of his love, our life, our riches, our glory, everything, with delight, with joy, with cheerfulness, not as if we are giving anything to him, but to ourselves. For this is the nature of the law of those who love. They think that they are receiving favours, when they are suffering wrong for the sake of the one they love. Therefore let us be so enamoured towards our Lord, that we also may share in the good things to come in Christ Jesus our Lord…

Like Seneca, Chrysostom believes that slaves can bestow favours upon their masters. But he took the argument even further. Chrysostom states that as slaves of Christ, human beings are in a patron-client relationship with Christ. This then serves as the basis and model for relationships on earth. The relationship duplicates itself. Since Christ humbles himself to love human beings, so too must human beings humble themselves to love others despite inferior social status. Seneca also emphasized the relationship of love between slave and slaveholder. Furthermore, Chrysostom intimates that the suffering of Christ’s slaves is seen as a benefaction. Suffering, as mentioned earlier, is now seen as a gift the patron bestows on his slave-clients.

735 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.714.22-44: Καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο δόξα δεσπότου, τὸ οἰκετεία ἔχειν εὐγνώμονας· καὶ τοῦτο δόξα δεσπότου, τὸ οὐτω φιλείν αὐτόν τοὺς δούλους· καὶ τοῦτο δόξα δεσπότου, τὸ οἰκειόπθοι τὰ ἑκέινων· καὶ τοῦτο δόξα δεσπότου, τὸ μὴ ἐπαισχύνεσθαι ἐπὶ πάντων ὁμολογεῖν. Αἰδεσθῶμεν τοῖνυν τὴν τοσαύτην ἀγάπην τοῦ Χριστοῦ, διαθερμανθῶμεν τῷ φίλτρῳ. Κἂν ταπεινὸς ἤ τις, κἂν εὐτελῆς, ἀκούωμεν δὲ ὅτι φιλεῖ ἡμᾶς, μάλιστα πάντων διαθερμανόμεθα πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ εἰς τιμήν αὐτῶν ἀγομέν σφοδράν· καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ὁ δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φιλεῖ τοσοῦτον, καὶ οὐ διανιστάμεθα; Μὴ, παρακαλῶ, μὴ ὡς ἐκείνῳ τι παρεέχοντες, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. Τοιοῦτος γὰρ τῶν ἡμετέρων φιλοῦμεν, ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ Κυρίῳ...
In this homily then, where Paul admonished Philemon to accept Onesimus as a brother (Phlm. 15-16), Chrysostom provides his audience with an authentic Stoic argument not only for treating slaves moderately, but also understanding that slaves and slaveholders are able to be benefactors (based on their fictive kinship) to each other because Christ and human beings stand in a patron-client relationship. It bears precise resemblance with Seneca’s arguments on the same topic. The *leitmotiv* of the homily is the promotion of the value of humility, another passive value proliferated by late ancient Christian authors. Fictive kinship and mutual benefaction serve as carceral mechanisms since they enforce the social position of the slave and the slave only gains the capacity to receive a quasi-ascribed honour based on these carceral mechanisms. Notwithstanding the emphasis on humility, the virtue of passive suffering is also lauded as a favour or gift the heavenly slaveholder bestows on human beings, and hence, the unjust physical suffering of institutional slaves also becomes, like martyrdom, something commendable.

### 4.4 *Homilia in Epistulam ad Philemonem 3*

In this final homily in the series, Chrysostom retraces several of the arguments mentioned above. He again highlights Paul’s strategic balance between tact and frank speech, as well as the honour that slaves have as fictive kin and that they should be considered as friends of the slaveholder. The fact that Onesimus is called the very ‘bowels’ (*σπλάάγχνα*) by Paul is considered a term of much endearment.

The *leitmotiv* of this homily is forgiveness. Paul has admonished Philemon to accept Onesimus back and also to forgive him for the crime of robbery he supposedly committed. From this point, and building on the theme of forgiveness, Chrysostom goes into a detailed discussion of God’s need to forgive and also to punish. More specifically, he directly opposes the notion of the *apokatastasis* - the doctrine that all creation will be restored and reconciled with God. While the doctrine of the *apokatastasis* is quite complex, it has been traditionally attributed to Origen and Evagrius Ponticus but scholars have shown that Origen’s conceptualizations of the *apokatastasis* are often contradictory.\(^\text{736}\) Despite this problem early Christian heresiological language often refer to proponents of the doctrine as ‘Origenists’. This was not, however, what strictly defined Origenists; the belief in the incorporeality of God and a potent anti-

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anthropomorphism. It is interesting for the discussion of Chrysostom since one of the accusations brought against him was that he showed favour to the Origenists with reference to the strange and curious affair with the Long Brothers. This accusation was probably based on association rather than doctrine as such.

Chrysostom vehemently defends the concept of hell in this homily and states, contrary to the Marcionite opinion he mentions in passing, that hell and punishment are signs of God’s goodness. Chrysostom then returns to the issue of slavery and supports his argument by referring to the necessity of punishing slaves (*Hom. Phlm. 3.2*):

> You who ask these questions and who have slaves – if I could make it clear to these people, that if they [slaves] should destroy the family of their masters, if they should insult them to their faces, if they should steal everything, if they should overturn everything, if they should treat them as enemies, and they would not threaten them, nor discipline them, nor punish them, nor even verbally admonish them, would this be any sign of goodness? I contend that this is the extreme form of cruelty, not only because the wife and children are betrayed by this unreasonable leniency, but because the slaves themselves are destroyed before them. For they will become drunkards, promiscuous, licentious, and more irrational than any animal. Is this, tell me, a sign of goodness, to trample on the noble nature of the soul, and to destroy both themselves and others with them? Do you see that to call people to account is a sign of great goodness? But why do I speak of slaves, who easily fall into these sins? But let a man have sons, and let him allow them to do everything they want, and let him not punish them; will they not be worse than anything? Tell me, in the case of men then, is it a sign of goodness to punish, and of cruelty not to punish, and
is it not so in the case of God? Since he is good, he has therefore prepared a hell.737

The stereotype of the vice-prone slave is rather useful in this instance to Chrysostom. Despite the status of slaves as being sons and fictive kin, they are still liable to punishment since sons are also liable to be punished by their fathers if they transgress. Forgiveness and the attribution of fictive kinship-status and friendship do not rule out punishment. This again supports the point I made above that fictive kinship and friendship discourses related to institutional slaves function as carceral mechanisms, especially since they are also based on the humanness of the slave. The crime of mastercide is used by Chrysostom as the most extreme example and the tension between Paul’s forgiveness of Onesimus and the punishment of slaves for these crimes become apparent. While slaves should be treated moderately and with forgiveness, as with Onesimus, society must still be protected from the degenerate abnormals who murder, pillage and rob. God’s punishment of human beings serves as a justification for the punishment of slaves, and the need for the punishment of slaves again supports the view that God should punish.

We have already discussed Chrysostom’s views on the punishment of slaves, but it is necessary to point out here the importance of punishment in the carceral-continuum of

737 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.718.11-34: ἕάν ύμων τῶν ταύτα ἐφωτώντων, καὶ οἰκέτας ἐχόντων, δήλον ποιήσω τούτοις, ὅτι, κἀν διαφθείρωσι τὴν δυσποτείαν, καὶ εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἐκείνων ἐνυψίσωσι, κἀν πάντα ἐκφέρωσι, κἀν τὰ ἄνω κάτω ἐργάσουσι, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν αὐτούς διαθὼσι, οὐκ ἀπειλοῦσιν, οὐ κολάζουσιν, οὐ τιμωρήσουσιν, οὐδὲ μέχρι ὰημάτων λυπήσουσιν· ἄρα δοκεῖ ταύτα ἀγαθότητος εἶναι; Ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ δείκνυμι, ὅτι ἄνθρωπος ἄγαθος, καὶ ἄλλη ἡ παράνομος; ᾿Αλλ’ ἐγὼ δείκνυμι, ὅτι ὄνομα ἐνυψίσωσι τὸν κολάζοντα· Καὶ γὰρ μέθυσοι καὶ ἀσελγεῖς καὶ ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ πάντων ὕβρις ἐσονται ἀλογώτεροι. Τοῦτο οὖν ἀγαθότητος, εἰπέ μοι, εὐγένειαν τῆς ψυχῆς καταπατήσαι, καὶ αὐτούς καὶ ἀλλήλους προσαπολέσαι; Ὁρᾶς, ὅτι τὸ εὐθύνας αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπον τὸν ἀγαθόντα, τὸ δὲ μὴ κολάζειν ἀγαθότητος, ἐπὶ δὲ Θεοῦ ὄσκετ; ᾿Ωστε ἐπειδή ἀγαθός ἦστι, διὰ τούτο γέννησαν προητοίμασε.
slaveholding. While Chrysostom prefers a type of punishment that is psychopedagogical, the need for violent punishment of the worst offenders is not ruled out. He still considers it as necessary, as hell is necessary for the wicked. Here the punishment serves as a spectacle and not a measure of reform and normalizing. The crimes that Chrysostom mentions above are the most serious crimes slaves could commit, and throughout the history of Mediterranean antiquity the punishment for the crimes Chrysostom mentions was death after being tortured. We have seen that Plato preferred to have such slaves whipped in front of their owner’s tomb and then executed, while Roman law would provide crucifixion as punishment; as this would serve as a deterrent for rebellious slaves, so too hell serves as a deterrent to keep virtuous people in such a state. We are reminded again of what defined the slave-body: its violability and penetrability and, quite importantly, the types of tortures and punishments reserved for the criminal slave-body.

Thus, as God, the heavenly slaveholder, forgives slaves, slaveholders are admonished to forgive; yet the existence of a hell and eternal punishment also validate the violent punishment and execution of the worst of slave criminals and ramify the carceral continuum that slave-bodies find themselves in despite their new status as fictive kin and friends.

5 CONCLUSION

To conclude this chapter we will now delineate the carceral mechanisms Chrysostom utilizes in his homilies on Philemon that regulate slave-bodies. Christianity in late antiquity was faced with the habitus of slaveholding, and as was said, Chrysostom’s homilies, especially those on Philemon, represent one of many negotiations with this potent habitus. Like the majority of Christian authors of late antiquity, Chrysostom is in favour of slaves remaining in their carceral state. In order to affirm this, Chrysostom utilizes three carceral mechanisms in his homilies on Philemon.

The first carceral mechanism is his use of an authoritative scriptural economy. In this instance, we should not make the mistake of underestimating the influence of Philemon on late ancient Christian views on slaveholding. From the homilies examined in this chapter, it becomes clear that the Epistle to Philemon functioned as a type of popular legal policy that reinforced slave-carcerality. From the information present from the Council of Gangra, it seems that the Eustathians may have forcibly manumitted slaves, and hence the stipulation in the third canon. It is very plausible that Philemon functioned as authoritative scriptural apparatus in this instance
to provide clergy with guidance regarding slave-management. Moreover, Philemon now provided homilists like Chrysostom with new literary types for not only making sense of slavery, but also regulating and maintaining slavery as a carceral system. In Chrysostom’s reconstruction of Philemon, he typically constructs an image that informs Christians of what the ideal Christian slaveholder should embody. It is notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to determine who Philemon ‘really was.’ Nor is it important - rather, in Chrysostom’s time, Philemon represented something far more important; he represented a holy man who owned and managed slaves without reproach from the apostle Paul. Onesimus is already presented in the epistle itself as the bad, criminal slave, very likely influenced by stereotypes of slaves in Paul’s own time. In my opinion, due to this carceral mechanism of scriptural economy and convenient literary types, Philemon was probably one of the chief obstacles that prevented the late ancient church from ever adopting an attitude of abolition.

The second and third carceral mechanisms both rely on the humanization of the slave, as seen with both Seneca and Chrysostom. These mechanisms serve as proof for how the notion of humanness enforces the carceral state of the slave-body. The second carceral mechanism reinforcing slave-carcerality is the idea of the fictive kinship of slaves. This is also already present in the epistle itself and Chrysostom extensively elaborates on the issue. The most important point here is that fictive kinship structures, although they provide a temporary alternative symbolic world for a slave, did not change kinship on a structural and biological level. Honour was in the first instance connected to one’s birthright, and slaves did not possess this - they were bodies that were out of place and socially alienated, and in many aspects they were corporeal ‘things’, as the legal term *res mancipi* implies.\(^{738}\) Fictive kinship is in fact very problematic for the experience of subjectivity and corporeality - it results in corporeal tension and confusion. The identity of the slave-body is now dichotomous since there is tension between structural and fictive kinship systems. Even if slaves were accepted as fictive brothers and sisters and both the epistle and Chrysostom hints at, this would certainly not change their legal and habitual status in Roman society and popular legality. Rather, it opens the possibility for further forms of domination, as seen in Chrysostom’s remarks on the punishment of slaves and sons. I have explored this issue in a different study, and concluded that with the social contradictions of

\(^{738}\) Sam Tsang, *From Slaves to Sons: A New Rhetorical Analysis on Paul’s Slave Metaphors in His Letter to the Galatians* (New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 166.
fictive kinship ‘the body was now “degenealised”, resulting in a constant “seesaw” effect in a person’s status. This degenealisation could be socially and culturally traumatic, especially in the close relationship between kinship and social reproduction, as recent studies on kinship have shown.\textsuperscript{739} Merely being part of a fictive kinship-community would thus not remove the harsh reality of still being regarded as a slave outside the community.’\textsuperscript{740} As with Stoic slave-metaphorics, fictive kinship structuring removes the focus from the problem of institutional slavery and thereby reinforces slave-carcerality. Fictive or metaphorical kinship presents most of the same problems of metaphorical slavery.\textsuperscript{741} It also implies that slaves are now measured by conflicting social standards, and the slaves are now expected to conform to the standards of free masculinity.

The third carceral mechanism present in the homilies is that of honourable service and benefaction. It was established when discussing the domesticity of slaves that with the new Christian rhetoric pertaining to slaveholding, a principle of labour intensification took precedence. It was believed that Christian slaves should work better than non-Christian slaves. This would be considered as being honourable. In the homilies discussed above, we have seen that Chrysostom allows for slaves to have a measure of honour (not always assumed by other authors of antiquity), but if they are virtuous and abide by the rules of conduct expected from the ideal Christian slave. By simply ascribing honour to slaves that conform to the principles of being passive and submissive bodies (again, the proliferation of passive virtues), the carceral


\textsuperscript{740} De Wet, “Honour Discourse,” 330.

\textsuperscript{741} The apparent distinction between metaphorical slavery/kinship and institutional slavery/biological kinship appears to be a conjecture. These aspects inevitably influence each other. One cannot understand Paul’s statements about metaphorical slavery and kinship without his views on the actual institutions, since these mutually influence each other. This is the major problem of the study of Tsang on this topic (in Galatians), in which he states: ‘...a study on Galatians should be more about how Paul used the metaphor of slavery instead of what Paul thought about slavery’; Tsang, \textit{From Slaves to Sons}, 17; see also p. 32, where this distinction is made by Tsang; after referring to the work of Petersen, he does admit that there is merit in understanding the link between the metaphorical and institutional, but does not proceed to utilize it in the study; cf. Petersen, \textit{Rediscovering Paul}. 320
state of the slave is enforced. Honour here becomes an incentive or reward, very much like allowing slaves to have sex, families or better occupations, and using these to further dominate and manipulate the slave since these are all inferences from the humanization of the slave-body. Once honour is ascribed to slaves, various benefits related to sociality apply, especially that of benefaction. It has been shown that the debate of slave’s being benefactors is already present with Seneca, and like Seneca, Chrysostom also believes that slaves could be friends and benefactors to slaveholders, something that may have been controversial to some of those in his audience. Like the mechanism of fictive kinship, ascribed honour in this instance is not universal, and once outside the Christian community, the honour may not be recognized. If this occurs, slaves are admonished to accept their suffering since it functions as a favour or benefaction toward God, again reinforcing the carceral state of the slave.

These are then the three carceral mechanisms found in the homilies on Philemon. They function more in a habitual sense than a legal sense. It is very true that being a slave was a legal status, and this legal disposition most certainly affirmed the carceral state of the slave. But as mentioned in chapter 2, I view slavery not as a juridical dispensation of a subject in the primary sense (without downplaying this dimension), but rather, as a habitus, that is, a habitualized dispensation. This was the argument of Jennifer Glancy that slaves, in the first instance, in everyday life did not see themselves as being in slaves in the legal sense; it was much more complex and pervasive - the legal status of the slave was simply one dimension of its carceral subjectivity.742 We have seen that many freed persons would remain within the carceral space of the household. The preference for approaching ancient slavery as a habitus implies that being a slave was not merely the result of one’s legal disposition. Glancy articulates this point thus: ‘[I]n another sense slaves were not born but made, corporally trained to be slaves, elite persons were corporally trained from infancy to embody a privileged status.’743 Glancy in this instance refers to an excellent study of Martin Bloomer in which he illustrates how infants and children in the elite echelons of Roman society learned from a very young to imitate and rehearse the role of the pater familias.744 This was also pointed out by Edmondson in his discussion of Cato’s eccentricity in having his children and slave-children play together, a type of play where the

742Glancy, “Christian Slavery in Late Antiquity.”
743Ibid., 70.
dynamics of slave and slaveholder may already be rehearsed. While Chrysostom opposes the
traditional slave-slaveholder pedagogy in his *De inani gloria*, he still assumes the presence and
service of slaves in the upbringing of children. It is possible that these habitual states often gave
rise to the formation of popular legalities pertaining to slavery. The canons related to slavery in
the Councils of Gangra or Elvira, or the principles derived from the Epistle to Philemon, are
excellent examples of such popular legalities. There is therefore both a legal process and a
process of habituation that essentially defines slave-carcerality, and slave-carcerality is enforced
and affirmed when the humanness of the slave is recognised.
CHAPTER 6

THE COMMODIFIED BODY: SLAVES AS ECONOMIC AND SYMBOLIC CAPITAL IN CHRYSOSTOM’S HOMILIES

1 INTRODUCTION

The social identity of the slave-body is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, slaves were considered persons or rather subjects in their own right who, despite embodying a subjectivity that is more aggressively and directly heteronomous than free subjects, had limited social mobility and means to secure their own freedom. We saw in chapter 4 that the humanity of the slave was a technology for subjugating and oppressing the slave-body, and in the previous chapter, that some of the carceral mechanisms were directly founded upon this technology. On the other hand, however, there was also a dimension of objectification and commodification with regards to the identity of the slave-body. Slave-bodies were also considered commodified ‘objects’ that had both economic and symbolic, that is, status-based, value. In this final chapter of the dissertation, I consider the slave-body in Chrysostom’s writings from the perspective that such bodies constitute economic and symbolic capital. These terms, however, have very specific theoretical underpinnings and I will therefore commence this chapter by delineating these theoretical issues and contextualising them specifically for the matter of late ancient slavery. Thereafter, I will select model pericopes from Chrysostom’s homilies that will serve as case studies to elucidate the matter of the commodification of the slave-body in the context of Chrysostom’s views on wealth and poverty, which are inextricably tied to the notions of economic and symbolic capital. Under this discussion, his Homilia in epistulam I ad Corinthios 40 will be examined, with specific reference to the dynamics of commodified slave-bodies in the

light of Christian asceticism. This discussion will specifically centre on the slave-body as economic capital. Thereafter, Chrysostom’s *Homilia in epistulam ad Hebraeos* 28 will be viewed from the perspective of slaves as symbolic capital, especially as honour-indicators and adornment that enhance the status of the slaveholder. We will now start by delineating the theoretical precepts that underlie this chapter, namely commodification, and economic and symbolic capital.

2 THE SLAVE-BODY AS PROPERTY: COMMODIFICATION AND ECONOMIC/SYMBOLIC CAPITAL IN THE CONTEXT OF ANCIENT SLAVERY

It is no surprise that the notion of commodification has come to light in the present study, since many of the issues previously dealt with are related to the concept of commodification. It is especially the notions of heteronomy, autonomy and subjectivity that feature in the theoretical foundations of commodification. But where should the discussion towards understanding commodification begin? The precursor and logical presupposition of commodification is reification or objectification.  

746 The problem with using terms like objectification and commodification in a study on ancient cultural history is that these terms originated from modern contexts, especially the context of capitalism and Marxism. According to Emig and Lindner reification/objectification was especially defined by the Hungarian socialist Georg Lukács who regarded it as ‘an inevitable consequence of capitalism.’ 747 Emig and Lindner continue to quote Lukács:

> Reification requires that a society should learn to satisfy all its needs in terms of commodity exchange. The separation of the

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746 The terms reification and objectification are often used interchangeably by certain scholars, sometimes with very subtle nuances of difference in the terms. Other terms like ‘thingification’ or ‘chosification’ have also been used. While acknowledging the subtle differences purported by various scholars for these terms, for the purpose of this study I will only use the term objectification as preference.

747 Rainer Emig and Oliver Lindner, “Introduction,” in *Commodifying (Post)Colonialism: Othering, Reification, Commodification and the New Literatures and Cultures in English* (Rainer Emig and Oliver Lindner (eds); Cross/Cultures 127 – ASNEL Papers 16; Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), viii.

producer from his means of production, the dissolution and
destruction of all ‘natural’ production units, etc., and all the social
and economic conditions necessary for the emergence of modern
capitalism tend to replace ‘natural’ relations which exhibit human
relations more plainly by rationally reified relations.

The close relational development between objectification/commodification and
capitalism and in essence colonialism cannot be understated. The role of colonialism in this
development is seen in the inherent othering or alterity found in the statement above. The
immense influence of colonialism as operations of alterity is inevitably foundational to
objectification/commodification, which is in itself, according to Lukács’ statement above, an
operation of alterity or othering. In chapter 4 the issue of heterography was delineated, and is
directly related to this. While reification/objectification operates to create ‘objects’ (as opposed
to subjects, perhaps), commodification takes the next step in commercialising objects that are in
their very nature not commercial.749 The buying and selling of human bodies are a case in point.
But how can objectification and commodification be approached in a pre-modern context where
capitalism is absent? While the modern social and economic contexts of capitalism and
colonialism are absent from late antiquity, I will argue here, against the basic premise of Lukács,
that they do not constitute the most important presuppositions for objectification and
commodification. Notwithstanding the centrality of capitalism and colonialism to the concepts
under discussion, a more plausible starting point for understanding objectification (and
consequently, commodification) has been proposed by Pierre Bourdieu - namely language.750 I
do not want to extrapolate all the complexities of sociological linguistics in this instance.
Bourdieu presents this issue as a critical dialogue with, among others, Ferdinand de Saussure,
and especially highlights the dynamics of language and practice with the notion of
objectification.751 The most important point to note here is that language plays an active,
practical role in the discursive production of objects, and while capitalism and colonialism as

751 Ibid., 30–33.
modern concepts are absent from late antiquity, the language of objectification is palpable in late ancient rhetoric concerning slavery. I will present three examples here.

Firstly, in the context of Roman law, slaves were grouped within the category of *res mancipi*.

752 Within Roman private law, this category represents the acquired property of a person. The Latin term *res* implies an object or a thing, and specifically in this context, private property or objects. Thus it seems that in terms of the legal management of slavery, it was easiest to treat slaves as property or things. This does not imply that the average free person considered all slaves simply as property or objects but in terms of the administration of human bondage, property rights rather than human rights applied. Such a social disposition implies that slaves were provided with value measures, and damage to a slave would be considered damage to property. The term therefore functions within a very specific set of legal parameters, and Schumacher rightly notes the tension in Roman law between the slave as *res mancipi* and the slave as *ius naturale*, that is, a human being.

753 It becomes difficult, if not impossible, to separate these two dimensions in the practical sense, as Buckland in his classical study on Roman laws on slavery noted. The second instance, which was already discussed in depth at the beginning of the study, is Varro’s grouping of the slave as *instrumentum vocale*. While it was shown that this term alone was not enough to simply designate all slaves merely as articulate tools, it was still convenient for Varro to group slaves among other objects of property. A more plausible example would be the use of *venalium greges*. Joshel emphasizes the fungible nature of slavery based on this type of language.

755 It is possible that the objectification and commodification of the slave-body intensified with the rise of the Roman villa-system and slave-mode of production. We have seen that this particular agricultural language of slaveholding developed and functioned within the treatises of Cato, Varro and Columella. The language would however become commonplace,


even with authors like Porphyry, Ammianus, and Chrysostom’s numerous references to ‘herds’ of slaves. Philodemus’ discomfort with what could almost be called an ‘ancient capitalism’ of his time also demonstrates this point. Texts in the Mishnah exhibited potent discourses of commodification of the slave-body. In several of the texts cited from the Mishnah, we have seen that the violation of someone else’s slave was, in the first instance, dealt with as damage to property, even if the violation was of a sexual nature, like rape. Gender played a large role in the value of the slave in the Mishnah (Ma’as. Š. 1.7[A]), as well as ethnicity (Qidd. 1.2). Imperfect slaves, i.e. those with disabilities, eunuchs or people of ‘doubtful sex,’ were less valuable and could not be used for certain religious procedures according to the Mishnahic context (Hag. 1.1; Yebam. 8.2). This same principle is seen in the prescriptions of offerings. Furthermore, rape, as we have seen, was viewed as property damage. An enslaved rape victim was re-valued after the incident, and most of the guidelines concern the size of the fine given to the rapist (Ketub. 3.7). A female slave or an old slave had less value, and people were advised to sell them and rather buy land with the proceeds (Ketub. 8.5). Cato makes the same recommendation (Agr. 2.7). Female slaves also had reproductive capital. It was seen in the treatises of Xenophon (Oec. 9.5) and Columella (Rust. 1.8.16-19). The ‘breeding’ of slaves was strictly monitored and controlled, very much like the breeding of animals, and slave-mothers were rewarded or even manumitted if they had many children.

The final example, central to this very dissertation, is the notion that the slave is considered as a body. The context here is juridical-economic, since most of the instances occur in testaments and other works pertaining especially to inheritance, in basic invoices of sale. The metaphor, according to Glancy, eventually became a synonym for ‘slave’. Even here with this term there is much ambiguity, since calling someone or something a mere body is not exactly equal to res. What is evident here is that the language of objectification of slaves is as a whole ambiguous as much as it was commonplace in antiquity. Each of the terms functions within very

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756 This was a common feature of slavery in general; cf. Kirsten E. Wood, “Gender and Slavery,” in The Oxford Handbook of Slavery in the Americas (Robert L. Paquette and Mark M. Smith (eds); Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 513-34.


specific semantic domains, whether juridical language, the language of Roman agricultural writers, or the economic language of the Mishnah. Often the terms have very specific, context-bound connotations and denotations. Thus, a constant tension between the slave as a human being and the slave as an object is present. But it is exactly this tension that makes objectification possible, since these opposites justify each other’s existence. From the results of chapter 4 we have also found that the notion of the heteronomous implies that each body is not only meant to be ruled, but all bodies also belong to someone or something as property. Paul himself states in 1 Corinthians 6:20 that all Christian bodies have been bought by Christ. Chrysostom himself builds on this statement by stating that, as with the purchase of a slave there is a contract, so too there was a contract when Christ purchased his earthly slaves, not a financial contract, but a contract of blood (Eutrop. 2.12).

This objectification ushers in the next point in the hypothesis. As objects, slaves function as capital. I understand the term ‘capital’ here strictly in the way Bourdieu uses it.759 One can distinguish between several types of capital. For the purposes of this study, two forms of capital will suffice. Firstly, there is simple economic capital - or wealth. This includes one’s material wealth, or in Roman legal terms, res mancipi – property possessed, especially by the paterfamilias as part of the larger patrimonium. Since slaves are considered property, they form part of an individual’s wealth or economic capital. But Bourdieu also highlights another type of capital, namely symbolic capital. In essence, symbolic and economic capital cannot possibly be separated, and often one is converted into another.760 Slaves, as economic capital, are often also converted into symbolic capital. Symbolic capital, as Bourdieu intimates, is based on a law of social recognition:761

In an economy which is defined by the refusal to recognize the ‘objective’ truth of ‘economic’ practices, that is, the law of ‘naked self-interest’ and egoistic calculation, even ‘economic’ capital cannot act unless it succeeds in being recognized through a conversion that can render unrecognizable the true principle of its

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759 Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, 112–21.
760 Ibid., 112–17.
761 Ibid., 120.
efficacy. Symbolic capital is this denied capital, recognized as legitimate, that is, misrecognized as capital (recognition, acknowledgement, in the sense of gratitude aroused by benefits can be one of the foundations of this recognition) which, along with religious capital, is perhaps the only possible form of accumulation when economic capital is not recognized.

Symbolic capital therefore serves to enhance the prestige of an individual; its dynamic is status-driven. Material goods therefore function in a symbolic sense, but always have retroactive economic implications. The social recognition of these types of capital functions by means of language, and we have seen above the affirmative language of commodification in antiquity. Often the exhibition of symbolic capital is very expensive in material terms. Bourdieu continues to state: ‘The interest at stake in the conducts of honour is one for which economism has no name and which has to be called symbolic, although it is such as to inspire actions that are very directly material.’ A further notion introduced by Bourdieu that is directly related to symbolic capital is that of ‘distinction’. Distinction is in itself a kind of habitus, or set of tastes, that is mostly associated with upper class individuals that has an ennobling effect. In the sections that follow, I will evaluate how Chrysostom responds and negotiates slaves as both economic and symbolic capital.

3 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM ON SLAVES AS ECONOMIC CAPITAL: THE CASE OF HOMILIA IN EPISTULAM I AD CORINTHIOS 40

Among the many elaborations of slavery in his homilies on the Pauline epistles, one of Chrysostom’s most famous declarations about slavery occur in his *Homilia ad epistulam I ad Corinthios* 40.6. We have encountered this passage several times in the course of this study and have evaluated it from the perspective of the domesticity and heteronomy of the slave-body. The passage will serve as a case study in Chrysostom’s view of slaves as economic capital, and its relevance in Chrysostom’s ethics on wealth and poverty, especially regarding the renunciation of wealth and the dangers of greed.

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762 Ibid., 120–21.

The series of homilies on I Corinthians seems to have been preached in Antioch (according to Chrysostom himself in *Hom. I Cor.* 21) possibly between 392 and 393 CE. The discussion on slaveholding occurs at the end of the homily, and represents its conclusion. Interestingly enough, the homily itself concerns 1 Corinthians 15:29-34 and thus the theme of the resurrection. As with many of Chrysostom’s homilies, the conclusion of the homily comes in the form of a virtue-discourse, especially highlighting the dangers of envy and greed in this case. As in the case of many late ancient homilists, Chrysostom uses images related to wealth and poverty for the pedagogical function of shaming his wealthier audience members. More on this aspect will be said in the following discussion on slaves as symbolic capital. What is more important for this section is that Chrysostom’s statements on tactical slavery function within the wider framework of his teaching on the renunciation of wealth. The concept of tactical slavery was especially present in the homily under discussion (*Hom. I Cor.* 40.6):

...[O]ne master only needs to employ one slave; or rather two or three masters one slave...We will allow you to keep a second slave. But if you collect many, you no longer do it for the sake of philanthropy, but to indulge yourself...when you have purchased them [slaves] and have taught them trades whereby to support themselves, let them go free.


766 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.353-354: Καὶ γὰρ ἕνι τὸν ἑνὰ χρῆσθαι δεσπότην οἰκέτη μόνον ἔχον· μάλλον δὲ καὶ δύο καὶ τρεῖς δεσπότας ἕνι οἰκέτη...εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἕνα που μόνον, ἢ τὸ πολὺ δεύτερον...εἰ δὲ πολλοὺς συνάγεις, οὐ φιλανθρωπίας ἐνεκεν τοῦτο ποιεῖς, ἀλλὰ θρυπτόμενος.
Chrysostom had a radical vision for the Christian inhabitants of Antioch.\textsuperscript{767} He wanted to popularise a type of domestic asceticism that would transform the Christian households of the city.\textsuperscript{768} This would also influence their roles as slaveholders. We have already seen how Chrysostom envisioned the \textit{pater familias} as a shepherd of the household, and he realised that the Christianization of urban households would eventually transform the city. This vision would encompass every dimension of the role of the \textit{pater familias} – husband, wife, and of course, slaveholder.

Many of Chrysostom’s audience members may have been wealthy individuals. This hypothesis has especially been proposed by Ramsey MacMullen, who argues that Chrysostom’s audience comprised of people mostly coming from the upper echelons of the social ladder.\textsuperscript{769} MacMullen intimates that most of the audience members may have received an expensive education, since they were able to enjoy rhetorically sophisticated sermons. Furthermore, MacMullen points to the numerous references to the rich made by Chrysostom himself in the sermons. Mayer has critiqued MacMullen’s hypothesis:

The question that MacMullen fails to ask is whether this preoccupation simply reflects the importance of such people in society and within the church and can therefore be attributed to a natural focus upon them, or whether it is indicative of a genuine numerical dominance on their part.\textsuperscript{770}

This is a very relevant question, and Mayer has successfully shown that the question of Chrysostom’s audience is somewhat more complex. During Chrysostom’s activity in Antioch where the homilies under examination were preached, it is possible that Chrysostom preached in


\textsuperscript{768}Aideen M. Hartney, \textit{John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City} (London: Duckworth, 2004), 133–82.


different churches to different congregations\footnote{Cf. Frans van de Paverd, Zur Geschichte der Messliturgie in Antiochien und Konstantinopol gegen Ende des Vierten Jahrhunderts: Analyse der Quellen bei Johannes Chrysostomos (OrChrAn 187; Rome: Institutum Pontificum Studiorum Orientalium, 1970), 61–79; Mayer, “Who Came to Hear John Chrysostom Preach?” 79.} instead of having one audience following him around.\footnote{Robert L. Wilken, John Chrysostom and the Jews: Rhetoric and Reality in the Late 4th Century (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 1983), 13.} The numerous references to the wealthy in the homilies do however call for some attention. Moreover, the semantic domains of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ were quite complex.\footnote{Cf. Mayer, “Poverty and Society,” 474–75; Wendy Mayer, “Poverty and Generosity Toward the Poor in the Time of John Chrysostom,” in Wealth and Poverty in Early Church and Society (Susan R. Holman (ed.); Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 147–48.} Notwithstanding Mayer’s critique, MacMullen’s emphasis on the presence of the rich does have merit since it is the one constant indicator of the audience in most of the homilies. In MacMullen’s more recent book, The Second Church (2009), he demonstrates that the churches in which a homilist like Chrysostom preached in could often only contain about 1 or 2 percent of the population.\footnote{Ramsay MacMullen, The Second Church: Popular Christianity A.D. 200–400 (Atlanta: SBL, 2009), 1–32.} On particular days, especially Wednesdays and Fridays, when gatherings took place in Antioch, the working class was mostly absent due to labour commitments.\footnote{Mayer, “Who Came to Hear John Chrysostom Preach?” 78.} I have stated in a previous study: ‘...the lower- and middle-class citizens’ liturgical space was more centered on the household than the official churches (except on feast days and other important gatherings).’\footnote{Chris L. de Wet, “Vilification of the Rich in John Chrysostom’s Homily 40 On First Corinthians,” APB 21, no. 1 (2010): 84.} Hence Chrysostom’s references to the household as a microcosm of the church. In my opinion, the strong numerical and social presence of the wealthy in Chrysostom’s audience composition cannot be ignored.

But another question remains: why does Chrysostom construct the wealthy in such a particular way as he does in the homilies? Many of Chrysostom’s homilies polarize rich and poor. While Chrysostom may have had the voluntary poor in mind as ideal managers of wealth,\footnote{Mayer, “Poverty and Generosity,” 142–49.} he rather uses the structurally poor within an \textit{argumentum ad sensum}. An excellent example is found in his eleventh homily on 1 Corinthians, where this polarization between rich and poor is present (\textit{Hom. I Cor.} 11.10):

\begin{quote}
777 Mayer, “Poverty and Generosity,” 142–49.
\end{quote}
For how is he [the pauper] able to sleep, with the pains of an empty stomach, restless hunger occupying him and that often while it is freezing, and the rain coming down on him? And while you, after washing, return home from the bath glowing in your soft garments, cheerful at heart and rejoicing, and hurrying to an expensive feast that has been prepared: he, compelled all over the marketplace by cold and hunger, makes his rounds, bending low and stretching out his hands; he does not even have the even spirit to beg for his necessary food without trembling, asking someone so satisfied with food and so used to the easy life; no, often he has to leave with insults. Therefore, when you have returned home, when you recline on your couch, when the lights around your house shine bright, when the table is prepared and abundant, at that time be reminded of that poor miserable man wandering about, like the dogs in the back streets, in darkness and in mire; except when, as is often the case, he has to leave this place, not to a house, nor wife, nor bed, but to a pile of straw, even as we see the dogs barking all through the night. And you, if you only see a little drop falling from the roof, throw the whole house into disarray, calling your slaves and disturbing everything; while he, lying in rags, and straw, and dirt, has to bear all the cold.  

778 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.94.48-95.8: Πῶς γὰρ ἂν καθευδήσειε λοιπόν, ὑπὸ τῆς γαστρὸς δακνόμενος, ἀγρυπνῶν, λιµῶν πολιορκούμενος, πάγου πολλάκις ὄντος καὶ ύετοῦ καταφεροµένου; Καὶ σὺ μὲν ἐκ βαλανείου λελουµμένος ἐπανέχῃ, µαλακοῖς θαλπόµενος ἱµµατίοις, γεγηθὼς καὶ χαίρων, καὶ ἐπὶ δείπνον ἔτοιµον τρέχων πολυτέλες· ἐκεῖνος δὲ πανταχοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἁγοράν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρυµµοῦ καὶ τοῦ λιµοῦ συνεχῶς ἐλαινόµενος, περιέρχεται συγκεκυφώς καὶ χεῖρας προτείνων· καὶ οὐδὲ θαῤῥῶν ἀδεῶς τῷ ἐµµπεπλησµμένῳ καὶ ἀναπεπαυµµένῳ ῥήµματα προσενέγκειν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὑβρισθεὶς ἀνεχώρησεν. Ὅταν οὖν ἀνέλθης οἰκαδε, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῆς εὐνῆς ἀνακληθῆς, ὅταν φῶς ἤ περι τὸν οἶκον λαµπρόν, ὅταν ἐτοίµη καὶ δαµηλής ἤ τράπεζα, τότε ἀναµνήσθητι τοῦ ταλαιπώρου καὶ ἀθλίου ἐκείνου, τοῦ περιόντος κατὰ τοὺς κόνις ἐν τοῖς στενωποῖς καὶ τῷ σκότῳ καὶ τῷ πηλῷ, καίτοι πολλάκις ἐκείθεν ἀπίόντος οὐκ εἰς οἰκίαν οὐδὲ πρὸς
We find here a typical rhetorical strategy. Brown is probably correct in stating that these polarities are hyperbolic, and probably not all that realistic. Himmelfarb states: ‘[It] had the conceptual effect of pauperizing the poor by first creating the most distinctive, dramatic image of the lowest class, and then imposing that image upon the lower classes as a whole.’ Chrysostom is therefore constructing both an image of the poor and an image of the wealthy. The purpose of this type of social imagination is to shame the wealthy to become, in Brown’s words, ‘lovers of the poor’. This is symptomatic of the shift from civic euergetism to becoming a ‘lover of the poor’. This shift will be discussed in more detail in the next section. What is also important for this section, however, is that behind all Chrysostom’s statements related to rich and poor, and thus, economic capital, we find the notion of the limited good.

The notion of the limited good is one that has been highlighted by cultural anthropological studies of antiquity. The concept basically entails that all commodities exist in limited amounts and can only be increased for one person at the cost of decreasing the goods of another. Chrysostom also subscribes to this concept (Hom. I Cor. 40.5):

For there is a good type of robbery, the robbery of heaven, which does not disadvantage anyone. And although in respect of money it is impossible for one to become rich, unless another first becomes poor, yet this is not so in spiritual things, but exactly the opposite. It is impossible that anyone should become rich without making someone else’s store increase. For if you help no one, you will not

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779 Brown, Poverty and Leadership, 46.
781 Brown, Poverty and Leadership, 5.
be able to become rich. Thus, while in temporal things the act of giving results in a decrease: in spiritual things, on the contrary, the act of giving creates an increase, and the act of not giving – this causes great poverty and brings on extreme punishment.\textsuperscript{783}

Here we see how Chrysostom suggests a way of understanding economic capital different to that of the typical individual of antiquity. He accepts the basic premises of the limited good. A wealthy person is exactly that since others are poor, the rich therefore have more than their fair share. This is why we find so many negative depictions of wealthy persons in antique literature.\textsuperscript{784} But here Chrysostom shows the wealthy that accumulating spiritual riches/capital, what he calls the ‘robbery of heaven’ (ἡ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἁρπαγή), is more advantageous than collecting economic capital. According to Chrysostom there is a more important law than the common principle of limited commodities. Spiritual capital, in fact, increases with diminution – in other words, dispensing wealth leads to its increase in the spiritual sense.\textsuperscript{785} The rule seems illogical, but Chrysostom then affirms it with reference to the parable of the slaves and talents (cf. Matt. 25:14-30; Luk. 19:12-28). The slave who buried his talent, the equivalent to collecting excessive economic capital, lost everything. In so doing, Chrysostom delineates a spiritual economy with almsgiving at its core. Almsgiving now becomes an investment in spiritual capital. Since the rich are part of the reason for the poverty in the city, their redemption is via almsgiving. Their damnation, however, is exemplified especially in the vice of greed. Greed, however, is

\textsuperscript{783} Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.352.20-31: Ἐστι γὰρ ἁρπαγή καλὴ ἡ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἁρπαγή, ἢ μηδὲν βλάπτουσα. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς χρήμασιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτερον γενέσθαι πλοῦσιον, μὴ ἔτερον πρότερον γενομένου πένητος· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πνευματικῶν οὐκ ἔνι τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον ἄπαν, οὐκ ἔστι τινὰ γενέσθαι πλοῦσιον, μὴ ἔτερον ποιώντας εὔπορον· ἂν γὰρ μηδένα ὕφελήσῃ, οὐ δυνήσῃ γενέσθαι εὔπορος. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς σωματικοῖς ἡ μετάδοσις μείωσιν ποιεῖ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς πνευματικοῖς ἡ μετάδοσις πλεονασμὸν ἐργάζεται, καὶ τὸ μὴ μεταδοῦνα, τοῦτο πολλὴν πενίαν κατασκευάζει, καὶ κόλασιν ἐσχάτην ἐπάγει. This same thinking is also found in Hom. Act. 32.1.

\textsuperscript{784} Malina, New Testament World, 97–98.

then also strategically linked to other vices, most notably gluttony and inebriation. This is common in Chrysostom’s thinking, as Newhauser confirms:786

Chrysostom, unlike Cassian, is generally not systematic in relating avarice to other sins…The authoritative foundation for finding similarities between gluttony or drunkenness and avarice was established in the related statements of Matthew 6:24…and Philippians 3:10…The glutton or drunkard is the slave of his belly, avaricious person of his idolized gold; both suffer from a type of intoxication. Yet the philarguros [his italics] is worse than the glutton, for whereas the latter may recover after a night’s sleep, greed always stays with the avaricious sinner, if he can sleep at all.

The common link in these vices is that those who embody them have insatiable appetites for all forms of economic capital, and these in essence ruin the soul (cf. Hom. Matt. 15.12; Hom. Jo. 80.3). They are enslaved to these passions, especially wealth (cf. Hom. Jo. 76.3; Hom I Cor. 37.5; Hom II Cor. 9.3; Hom. I Tim. 18.2; Hom. Heb. 20.3; Stat. 2.14; Eutrop. 2.12; alternatively, they are also called slaves of Mammon; cf. Hom. I Cor. 39.13). Another interesting metaphor common in Chrysostom’s thinking is the notion of wealth as a runaway slave or fugitivus. People need to hold on to wealth as they would hold on to a slave prone to fleeing, since wealth has the same tendency (cf. Hom. I Cor. 11.10, 30.8; ironically also in: Eutrop. 1.1, 2.3). As we have shown previously, he presents the ascetic notion of necessity as a guiding principle here, in both food and slaves. In the same way that a person has only one stomach, so too a person has two hands to serve their own needs. Chrysostom then refers to Acts 20:34, where Paul states: ‘These hands ministered unto my necessities, and to them that were with me.’787 People should rather pride themselves, ironically, in serving others than being served by ‘herds of slaves.’ We have already shown that having only one or two slaves, as Chrysostom suggests, would resemble a life of extreme poverty. While he does promote the humane treatment of slaves, their manumission is

787Translation: NIV; UBS⁴: ... ὥστε ταῖς χρείαις μου καὶ τοῖς οὖσιν μετ’ ἑμοῦ υπηρέτησαν αἱ χεῖρες αὕτη.
based on the renunciation of wealth rather than the virtue of manumission itself. The manumission of slaves is equal to a type of almsgiving. Slave-bodies therefore function here as commodities that can influence the social standing of a slaveholder. Most importantly, it has implications for the status of the individual in question. This brings us to the second point of discussion, namely slaves as symbolic capital.

4 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM ON SLAVES AS SYMBOLIC CAPITAL: THE CASE OF HOMILIA IN EPISTULAM AD HEBRAEOS 28

While slaves functioned as commodities or economic capital, the problem of slaves as symbolic capital receives the most attention in Chrysostom’s statements on slavery. The previous discussion of slaves as economic capital serves as a foundation for this examination. As we have said, symbolic capital and economic capital are in fact inseparable, and they are consequential to each other. For this section Chrysostom’s twenty-eighth homily on Hebrews will serve as a case in point, but it will also be compared to statements in the previous homily on 1 Corinthians.

The pride and pomp associated with slave processions is highly problematic for Chrysostom, and the complexities of this issue are numerous. For instance, in the previous section above it was mentioned that manumission was often considered as the renunciation of wealth. But the line between earnest wealth renunciation and the display of riches is often quite opaque. Mass-manumissions of slaves could also, on the contrary, function as a display of wealth and honour of an individual. This is quite visible in the processions of freed persons at the funerals of Roman slaveholders. Again the social complexities of slave-manumission become evident. It is not simple to consider all manumissions of slaves in late Christian antiquity as instances of wealth-renunciation. Slaves served as symbolic capital even at the death of the slaveholder. But why is Chrysostom so uncomfortable with the display of, as he calls it, ‘herds of slaves’?

The importance of repraesentatio in Roman society cannot be understated. Possessing many slaves served to increase the honour and status of an individual - thus an act of self-fashioning. This point has been well deliberated in the previous chapters. Moreover, the capacity

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for symbolic capital of an individual also signalled his or her ability to serve as a benefactor. In most instances, the display of wealth in Roman society served in depicting a citizen as being a benefactor to the city and its inhabitants. It has been suggested by several prominent scholars that the Christian emphasis on the care of the poor, *caritas*, replaced classical notions of civic euergetism or *liberalitas*. These studies point out that in late antiquity the social elites were part of a transition from a classical civic model of euergetism to an economic model polarizing the rich and the poor and highlighting the care of the poor as the ultimate civic virtue. Evelyne Patlagean’s work entitled *Pauvreté économique et pauvreté sociale à Byzance: 4-7e siècles* (1977) is one of the most complete accounts of this issue. This theory of transition from euergetism to the care for the poor has not gone without critique. Van Nuffelen has shown that the problem is somewhat more complex and that some authors of late antiquity often exemplify both virtues simultaneously.

My focus will obviously be on Chrysostom and I will not be so bold as to suggest that all authors of late antiquity were representative of such a transition. When it comes to these issues, Chrysostom is somewhat more subtle in his rhetoric. He often still prefers to use the rhetoric of civic euergetism, but I am of opinion that his social ideology does in fact represent a shift away from it. For Chrysostom, the pitfall of civic euergetism is the quasi-philanthropy that results from it, which may lead to the sin of vainglory (*κενοδοξία*).

For Chrysostom, there is a direct link between vainglory and the utilization and treatment of slaves. In a homily that directly addresses the issue of vainglory, Chrysostom gives parents some interesting guidelines on raising their children, and the treatment of slaves features extensively in the guidelines. One of the first guidelines he gives is that children should be raised not to rely on slaves, but to be self-sufficient (*Inan. glor.* 13). This has also been evident in other instances, most notably the homily on 1 Corinthians discussed above. Furthermore, children should be taught to treat slaves humanely. He states (*Inan. glor.* 31): “Teach him to be fair and

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courteous. If you see a slave being abused by him, do not overlook it, but punish him who is free; for if he knows that he may not abuse even a slave, he will abstain all the more from insulting or slandering one who is free and of his class. In this homily, slaves actually become a training ground for virtue (Inan. glor. 67): ‘[Children attain virtue]...if they practice themselves among their own slaves and are patient when slighted and refrain from anger when they are disobeyed, but narrowly examine the faults that they themselves have committed against others,’ and (Inan. glor. 68): ‘So, too, let the slaves provoke him often rightly or wrongly, so that he may learn on every occasion to control his passion.’ On the other hand, Chrysostom still allows for the use of slaves for certain tasks like cooking, but stresses that a virtuous person should wash his own feet and not rely on a slave to do this (Inan. glor. 70):

Let him not demand from the servants such services as a free man demands, but for the most part let him minister to his own needs. Let the slaves only render such services as he cannot do for himself. A free man, for example, cannot do his own cooking; for he must not devote himself to such pursuits at the cost of neglecting the labours befitting a free man. If, however, the boy washes his feet, never let a slave do this, but let him do it for himself. Thus you will render the free man considerate toward his slaves and greatly beloved by them. Do not let a slave hand him his cloak, and do not

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792 Translation: Max L. W. Laistner, Christianity and Pagan Culture in the Later Roman Empire: Together with an English Translation of John Chrysostom’s Address on Vainglory and the Right Way for Parents to Bring up Their Children (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951), 96 (I have chosen to remain with Laistner’s literal translation); Greek text: SC 188.426-430: Δίδαξον αὐτὸν ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. Κἂν ἀκόλουθον ἴδης ύβριζόμενον, μὴ περιίδῃς, ἀλλὰ κόλασον τὸν ἐλεύθερον. Ὅ γὰρ εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν οἰκέτην ἐξέσται ύβριζειν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, πολλῷ µᾶλλον τὸν ἐλεύθερον καὶ ὁµότιµον οὐ βλασφηµήσει οὐδὲ λοιδορήσεται.

793 Translation: Laistner, On Vainglory, 115; Greek text: SC 188.803-806: ἐὰν ἐν τοῖς οἰκέταις τοῖς αὐτῶν ἐγγυµαζοµένων καὶ φέροντο καταφφονούµενοι καὶ µὴ χαλεπαίνωσι παρακουόµενοι, ἐξετάζωσι δὲ ἀκριβῶς τὰ εἰς ἑτέρους πληµµελούµενα.

794 Translation: Laistner, On Vainglory, 115; Greek text: SC 188.822-824: Οὕτω δή καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτῶν παροξυνεύονται συνεχῶς καὶ δικαίως καὶ ἀδίκως, ὡστε µανθάνειν πανταχοῦ κρατείν τοῦ πάθους.
let him expect another to serve him in the bath, but let him do all these things for himself. This will make him strong and simple and courteous.\textsuperscript{795}

Chrysostom therefore views slavery as a necessary evil, and he lays down certain limits to the use of slaves. Self-sufficiency lies at the core of this virtue. These statements are very important to consider, since they serve as a basis for his views on slaves as symbolic capital. In a very subtle manner, he simply redefines and redistributes the social distinctions associated with slaveholding. In Chrysostom’s reasoning, slaves still function as symbolic capital, but not in the conventional sense. It is no longer the number of slaves possessed by someone, or the duties they are given (strategic slaveholding); rather, the new ascetic distinction proposed by Chrysostom is what one does not have slaves do; washing one’s own feet now becomes a mark of distinction and social honour, since it represents the individual as someone who is self-sufficient. We can now examine more closely the statements in the homily on Hebrews (\textit{Hom. Heb.} 28.9-10):

But there is no one who lays down his or her abundance. For as long as you have many slaves, and garments of silk, these things are all abundancies. Nothing is indispensable or necessary, without which we are able to live; these things are superfluous, and are simply add-ons. Let us then see, if you allow me, what we cannot live without. If we have only two slaves, we can live. For some live without slaves, what excuse do we have, if we are not satisfied with two? We can also have a house built of brick of three rooms;

\textsuperscript{795} Translation: Laistner, \textit{On Vainglory}, 116; Greek text: SC 188.852-863: Ὅστε διδασκέεσθω καταφρονείσθαι, διαπτύεσθαι. Μηδένα ἀπαίτειτω παρὰ οἰκετῶν οἷα ἐλευθέρος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖω ἑαυτῷ διακονεῖτω. Ἐκεῖνα δὲ μόνον ὁι παῖδες ύπηρετήτωσαν, ὡσα ύοί ὁι τε αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ διακονήσασθαι· οἰον μαγειρεύειν οὔ δυνατὸν ἐλευθέρον· οὐ γὰρ χρή τὸν πόονον ἀφέμενον τῶν ἐλευθέρων προσηκόντων τούτως ἑαυτὸν διδόοναι. Ἀν μέντοι δέ η τοὺς πόδας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ περιπλύνειν, μηδέποτε τούτο ποιεῖτω δούλος, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ· καὶ προσηνῆ τοῖς οἰκέταις ἐργάσῃ τὸν ἐλευθέρον καὶ πολύ ποθεινόν. Μηδὲ ἰμάτιον τις ἐπιδιδότω· μηδὲ ἐν βαλανεῖω περιμενέω τὴν παρ’ ἑτέρου θεραπείαν, ἀλλὰ παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ πάντα ποιεῖτω· τούτο καὶ εὔρωστον αὐτὸν καὶ ἀτυφὸν καὶ προσηνῆ ἐργάσεται.
and this is sufficient for us. For are there not some with children
and wife who have only one room? Let there also be, if you will,
two serving boys. And how is it not shameful, you say, that a
woman of nobility should walk out with only two slaves? It is no
shame, that a noble woman should walk around with two slaves,
but it is a shame if she should go around with many. Perhaps you
laugh when you hear this. Believe me it is a shame. Do you think it
is an important matter to go out with many slaves, like dealers in
sheep, or dealers in slaves? This is pride and vainglory, the other is
philosophy and respectability. For a noble woman should not to be
known from the scores of slaves who attend to her. For what virtue
is there in having many slaves? This does not belong to the soul,
and whatever is not of the soul does not exhibit freedom. When she
is satisfied with little, then is she a noble woman indeed; but when
she needs many things, she is a slave and inferior to real slaves.
Tell me, do the angels not go to and fro around the world alone,
and do not need anyone to follow them? Are they then because of
this inferior to us? They who need no servants, to us who need
them? If then not needing a slave at all, is angelic, who resembles
the angelic life more, she who needs many slaves, or she who
needs a few? Is this not a shame? For a shame it is to do anything
that is not fitting. Tell me who draws the attention of those who are
in the public places, she who brings many in her procession, or she
who brings only a few? And is she who is alone not less
conspicuous than she who is accompanied by a few? Do you see
that this former behaviour is a shame? Who draws the attention of
those in the public places, she who wears beautiful clothes, or she
who is dressed simply and modestly? Again who draws those in
the public places, she who is borne on mules, and with mantlets
decorated with gold, or she who walks out plainly, and as it may be,
with propriety? Or we do not even look at this last one, even if we
see her; but the crowds not only force their way through to see the other, but also ask, ‘Who is she, and where is she from?’ And I cannot tell you how much envy is caused by this. What then, tell me, is it shameful to be looked at or not to be looked at? When is the shame greater, when all stare at her, or when no one does? When they learn [perhaps ‘gossip’] about her, or when they do not even care? Do you see that we do all these things, not for modesty’s sake but for vainglory?796

796 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 63.197.44-198.36: ἂν ἐγὼ συνειληθήση αὐτῆς μὴ πλάσασθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ζωῆς τῆς σορίας, πάντα ταύτα περιτεύσματα ἐστίν. Οὐδὲν ἀναγκαῖον οὐδὲ τῆς χρείας, ὥσπερ γάρ εἰσὶν ἐκεῖναι, ἀπὸ τοῦτο ἄκροις καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦτο τελεσίματα ἐστίν. Τίνος οὖν ἄνευ οὐ δυνάμεθα ζῆν· ταύτα τερητά καὶ ἀπλώς ζῶντες ἐστίν. Εἴπετε γάρ μοι, οὔτε εἰσὶν τινὲς παῖδων καὶ γυναικὸς ζῶντες, ποιῶν ἡμείς ἔχομεν ἀπόλογον, τοῖς δύο οὐκ ἀρκοῦμενοι; Δυνάμεθα καὶ ἔκ πλήθος ἐχοῖς οἰκετῶν ζῶντες, ποιῶν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν ἀπόλογον, τοῖς δύο οὐκ ἀρκοῦμενοι; Άρ' οὖν διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκεῖνος ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη, τίνος τοῦ ἀγγελικοῦ βίου ἐστὶν οὐκ ἔστιν περικείμενη καὶ ἀνεπιτηδεύτως; Εἴπετε γάρ μοι, τίνος ἐπιστρέφει τοὺς ἐπ' ἀγορᾶς, η ἐπὶ ἀπλῶς περικείμενη καὶ ἀνεπιτηδεύτως; τίνος ἐπιστρέφει τοὺς ἐπ' ἀγορᾶς, ἡ ἐπὶ θαλάσσων ἐπαγομένη, καὶ χρυσοπάστων παραπετασμάτων, ἡ ἀπλώς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρυσοπάστων, ἡ ἀπλώς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρυσοπάστων.
The homilies on Hebrews were most likely preached in Constantinople during Chrysostom’s episcopate, and sights like those described in the homily above would have been common in this great city. The tirade is in essence directed against the vice of superfluity or *luxuria*. We can see that Chrysostom lists slaves along with other luxurious commodities like silk garments and eunuchs (cf. also: *Hom. Jo.* 28.2). It is not surprising that these commodities are linked since both are for cosmetic purposes or ornamentation. Chrysostom's comments on slaveholding here thus function as critique of adornment and a warning of the dangers of ancient voyeurism and counter-surveillance. In the first instance, like silk garments, slaves are not required for necessity, but for appearance and the display of wealth. The issue was raised some decades earlier at the Council of Gangra where, according to its synodical letter, the Eustathians were accused of contravening regular dress codes and encouraging slaves to act with insolence toward their masters both in action and, as it interestingly seems, in apparel (they did not wear slaves’ attire). Chrysostom then continues to elaborate on slaveholding, stating as in the previous homily on 1 Corinthians that having only two slaves would be sufficient. He then provides a scathing criticism of how wealthy aristocratic women display their herds of slaves as symbolic capital. Chrysostom provides an inverse argument by stating that parading many slaves is in fact a mark of shame. If we interpret this in the light of Bourdieu's notion of social distinction, Chrysostom redraws the honour-map and redistributes social distinction based on ascetic adherence to principles of necessity and simplicity. There is a new symbolic economy at work, and social *repraesentatio* is reimagined. The critique of slaves as a type of adornment should not be underemphasized here. Dress and adornment are often discourses laden with

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799 Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 90.
conflict. Karen Tranberg Hansen has described dress and adornment as a ‘set of competing discourses, linked to the operation of power, that construct the body and its presentation’ and that it ‘readily becomes a flash point of conflicting values, fuelling contests in historical encounters, in interactions across class, between genders and generations, and in recent global cultural and economic exchanges.’ Adornment, whether with ‘dress’ made from fabric or represented with slave-bodies, is therefore quite performative and, as Bourdieu has noted, a habitus in itself. While the authors referred to above mostly refer to adornment in the conventional sense, it should be understood here that the case of slave-bodies as adornment is quite curious. As it has been argued in this chapter, along with jewelry and clothes, slave-bodies are economic and symbolic capital, and the display of herds of slaves points to luxuria, and as Batten states: ‘...[E]lite males attack women for their elaborate adornment, they accuse them of greed and luxuria and attach moral and symbolic meanings to the women’s dress when what may be fuelling this invective, at least in part, are worries about the economic power of the women who owned and wore such items.’ The promotion of tactical slaveholding has implications for adornment. Adornment in Roman society was dictated by numerous unspoken principles and, in the case of women especially, it was directly related to honour concerns. Roman society was very much obsessed with public appearance since it was so directly related to honour concerns. The display of superfluous adornment in the form of dress or slaves was part of the expected public performance of Roman aristocratic women and, as Olson states: ‘[W]omen were not ignorant cultural dopes, coerced into beautification, or passive narcissists; but rather knowledgeable and adept cultural actors.’ This point also illustrates the wealth of some women during the late imperial period. Chrysostom’s statements in the homily cited above are perfect examples of an elite male criticism of female adornment. This criticism forms part of a long-standing early Christian tradition related to modest female dress-codes (cf. for instance: 1 Tim. 2:9-15; 1 Pet. 3:1-6; Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 3.11; Tertullian, Cult. fem.; Cyprian, 


Christian women ought to adorn themselves with virtue and modesty rather than fine cosmetic commodities. Along with modesty, Chrysostom again emphasizes the virtue of self-sufficiency. It is in fact an angelic attribute to serve others, since this is the essential task of angels. Another problem that Chrysostom identifies is that of social visibility. The woman adorned with gold, silk and many slaves draw the wrong type of attention, attention that often leads to the vices of vainglory and envy. Ironically, people then become slaves of vainglory (cf. Hom. Tit. 2.2). The extravagant parade of the herds of slaves is actually disgraceful and a display of pride. In Homilia in epistulam ad I Corinthios 40.5-6 he states that it is shameful since slaveholders utilize these slaves, especially at the marketplace, to keep other people at a distance from the slaveholder. Chrysostom continues to state that such wealthy slaveholders would rather allow animals to walk close to them than human beings. Furthermore, he also points to the fact that the slaves themselves are often dressed in the best clothing. This further exemplified the elevated status of the slaveholder. The slave-bodies serve as surrogates here to bear the excess adornment of the slaveholder. In both homilies Chrysostom warns that the wealthy person who flaunts their symbolic capital is liable to be envied by others. In the ancient Mediterranean world, envy was considered a destructive vice. This is especially true in a society where economic capital was limited. Chrysostom often refers to the vice of envy in his sermons. He does not regard it in a superstitious way as is often the case among ancient authors, but points out that ‘envy in fact is like a venom against a virtuous lifestyle.’

Secondly, we also find a warning against the dangers of ancient visibility and voyeurism. Besides the comments on adornment, the symbolic capital here also functions as something to supposedly protect the honour of the noble woman. It was considered shameful for such a woman to go out into public alone, since it may imply that she does not want people to see what she is doing. We saw this in chapter 2 when discussing the counter-surveillance of slaves. The surveillance and voyeurism of the slaves became something of a mobile prison for such women, as Veyne remarks:

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804 Batten, “Carthaginian Critiques of Adornment.”
Decency and concern for station required that ladies of rank never go out without maids, companions (*comites*), and a mounted servant known as a *custos*, often mentioned by erotic poets. This mobile prison, which followed a woman everywhere, was the Roman equivalent of the gynecaeum, or monogamous harem, in which a Greek woman concerned for her reputation insisted that her husband lock her up during the night... In any case, old-fashioned women proved their modesty by going out as little as possible and never showing themselves in public without a partial veil. To be the mother of a family was an honourable prison...

This statement is crucial to understanding the radical nature of Chrysostom’s statement. By redefining the role of the symbolic capital that is the slave-procession of a noble woman, Chrysostom is in essence also redefining the boundaries of modesty and reputation. The honour of the slave-procession is not only in the display of wealth, but it also shows that the woman has nothing to hide. This is also why Chrysostom constantly refers to the visibility and voyeurism of such a spectacle. The inverse now becomes true. Going out alone or with a slave or two is honourable. The dynamics of the living symbolic capital of the Roman noble woman also highlights the dynamics of surveillance and carcerality she faced. The slaves now become a prison, a panopticon that guarded not only her physical body, but also her honour. This is also how gossip spreads. Chrysostom literally states that the crowd ‘learns’ (μαθάνω) about her, but this could be euphemistic for gossip. The woman of true nobility, for Chrysostom, guided by the new principles of inner virtue, simplicity and necessity, has her conduct based on conscience and not visibility. Ascribing to these new guidelines of Chrysostom may have been quite difficult, if not impossible, for the typical Constantinopolitan mistress. It would be an action with much risk, not only to her honour, but also to the honour of her husband and the household. This is probably why Chrysostom generally proposes that she goes out into public with a few slaves, thus still being under surveillance and with less risk of attracting the wrong reputation.

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807 Veyne, “Roman Empire,” 73.
While it seems that Chrysostom is opposing the social distinction wrought by symbolic capital, he is in fact simply introducing a new form of social distinction. Whereas the former habitus of the Roman aristocracy entailed displaying superfluous adornments, garments and slaves, Chrysostom's alternative, what we may term ascetic distinction, attributes honour and distinction to those embodying values of simplicity and necessity. These become new status indicators in Chrysostom's social vision. This new ascetic symbolic economy has several implications for gender roles. He especially targets women who employ adornment to achieve social distinction. His aesthetic distancing is therefore strategic and very much bound to gender issues. Tactical slaveholding, along with other aspects like modesty of dress, for women in particular (but also for men, as seen in his De inani gloria), now become the new mark of distinction, an ascetic aesthetics based on the values of simplicity and necessity. The counter-voyeurism of the slaves on the mistress is decreased, but not totally absent, although this would be the ideal. This would still protect the modesty of the mistress from the wrong public opinion. The slave-body as an economic and symbolic commodity functions identically in relation to other commodities of luxuria and dangers related to vainglory and well as public reputation.

5 CONCLUSION
We have seen in this final chapter that the slave-body also functioned as an objectified commodity in late antiquity, most notably as economic and symbolic capital. Thus, many of Chrysostom’s remarks on slaveholding, especially the shift from strategic to tactical slaveholding, function within his paradigm for wealth management. To many wealthy individuals in Chrysostom’s audience the guidelines for slave-management would seem quite radical. His repeated advice that only one or two slaves would suffice would have been quite dramatic to the ears of some of his audience. Slave-bodies, like all other commodities in antiquity, function within the economic perspective of the limited good; a perspective that Chrysostom also accepts. Thus, manumission of slaves is seen as an act that is supposed to bring some economic balance on the one hand, but also to honour the slaveholder as someone who aspires to the ascetic ideal of renunciation of wealth and the care of the poor.

Slave-bodies, as commodified bodies, also functioned as symbolic capital. This implies that possessing slaves was seen as both an honour-incentive and something that guarded the one’s honour, especially in the case of women. Moreover, the public display of such bodies was
governed by the politics of adornment. Chrysostom, however, provides a thorough critique of such public displays and slave processions. Wealthy aristocrats would often move around in public with scores of slaves not only for practical tasks and security, but also to flaunt their wealth and honour. Even mass-manumissions of slaves served the purpose of giving honour to the slaveholder. The danger that Chrysostom highlights is that such displays almost always lead to vainglory and envy. He rather proposed that during the crucial developmental years of a child, he or she must be taught to treat slaves humanely and learn to be self-sufficient and modest. Slaves also functioned as a type of moral training ground for teaching children the principles of Christian virtue. As with many elite male authors of antiquity, his invective is especially directed towards aristocratic women who may use scores of slaves as adornment to negotiate power in public life. The mobile and panoptical prison made from slave-bodies incarcerated the Roman mistress in a harem-like fashion. She is hereby protected from gaining social ill-repute and gossip. The new Christian noble woman, for Chrysostom, is guided by the virtues of simplicity and necessity, her conduct based on conscience and not public visibility. It is therefore also a critique of the highly voyeuristic public life of the Roman world. Social invisibility is the ideal. These new guidelines of Chrysostom would have been quite challenging, especially to the traditional Roman gentlewoman. It could be a risk to her honour and reputation, as well as that of her husband, which is probably why Chrysostom advises that she moves about in public with a few slaves, to ensure she is still under surveillance and with less social risk. Chrysostom thus provides a new economy of adornment and repraesentatio, one that places the values of self-sufficiency, modesty and humility at the core.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

1 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
At the commencement of this study, the following problem statement was introduced: how does John Chrysostom negotiate and re-imagine the habitus of Roman slaveholding in his homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews? In order to address this problem statement, the study started by revisiting the historical development of the Roman habitus of slaveholding and re-evaluating the ancient sources and evidence from a cultural-historical perspective. One of the most important discourses for understanding the Roman habitus of slaveholding is oikonomia, or household management. One of the earliest and most influential authors writing on oikonomia was Xenophon, specifically in his Oeconomicus, which resembles a dialogue on the nature of optimal oikonomia. Xenophon, along with authors like Thucydides did not use arguments of naturalization to make sense of slavery, but rather saw the slave as a socially inferior outsider. This would become very important for the centuries to follow. While Aristotle famously decreed that slaves are inferior by nature, his influence on the formation of the Roman habitus of slaveholding may be limited, since the library of Theophrastus was lost and only recovered some years later. Not that Aristotle had no influence, but when reading the writings of the Roman agricultural authors like Cato, Varro and Columella, it is clear that Xenophonian ideas were more dominant. An author like Philodemus critiqued both Xenophon and Aristotle/Theophrastus when it came to ideas of householding and slave-management. What this demonstrates at least is that the formation of the Roman habitus of slaveholding was in no way simple and monolithic - different people had different ideas on the issue. It would especially be the rise of the Roman villa-system and slave-mode of production that would influence ideas on slaveholding, but even here, viewpoints evolved and changed as the Republic declined and the Empire rose. One of the
most important concepts for this study that came from the development of Roman agricultural practices is the notion of the *vilicus*. I can only conclude in this regard that the development of the *vilicus*-concept from the Roman agricultural treatises was not only crucial, but instrumental in the development not only of Christian views on slavery, but a keystone in Christian theology such as Christology, hamartiology and eschatology. By the time that Chrysostom writes on slaveholding and slave-metaphors, this concept was deeply embedded in Christian thinking.

Furthermore, alongside the Hellenistic and Roman authors mentioned above, special attention needs to be given to the influence of Stoic philosophy. Stoic teaching essentially redefined Hellenistic and Roman concepts of mastery, especially the mastery of the passions, which was the foundation of masculinity. Seneca’s writings on slaveholding would almost mirror Christian thought on slaveholding. Obviously, the most important writings for understanding Chrysostom’s views were the New Testament documents, especially the writings of Paul. These also serve as the scriptural apparatus in Chrysostom’s homilies. As early as Paul’s writings we find traces of the development of a pastoral form of governmentality, a concept that would be crucial to understanding Chrysostom’s views on slaveholding. Thus, what are the most important points to take note of from the study of pre-Chrysostomic sources regarding the complex habitus of Roman slaveholding:

a. *Natural Slave or Social Outsider*: While concepts of natural slavery were common in the Hellenistic period, the thought was less popular during the Roman and Christian periods. Almost no Christian author would accept the notion of natural slavery, and this also included Chrysostom. With the concept of natural slavery being less popular, the Xenophonian idea of the slave as a social outsider and socially inferior gained prominence, especially during the development of the Roman villa style of *oikonomia*. From this the concept of the *vilicus* developed, which was influential in early Christian thought. Slave-bodies especially had to be controlled by the regulation and manipulation of the passions.

b. *The Stoic Influence*: Ancient Christian thought on slaveholding, including that of Chrysostom, is almost identical to Stoic thought on the matter. While slavery is never abolished, an attitude of indifference to institutional slavery gave rise to the popularisation of the slave-metaphor. The use of slave-metaphors unfortunately removes the focus from institutional slavery. Nevertheless,
ancient Christian authors like Chrysostom would adopt this type of reasoning when it came to slaveholding.

c. From Holistic Oikonomia to Pastoral Governmentality: Another very important feature for understanding slavery in the homilies of Chrysostom is the pastoral model of governance, specifically based on the notion of the shepherd-flock dynamic. The concept of holistic oikonomia found in authors like Xenophon and Plato provided the foundation for this development. This implied a Christic duplication in the social hierarchy, and in late antiquity, this was active from the bishop or priest to the pater familias, and from the pater familias to the slave. The metaphor of all human beings being slaves to Christ, and God as the almighty heavenly slaveholder authorizes this system. It implied that although slaves are socially inferior, they should still be cared for and the image of Christ as embodied in Christian virtue should also be taught to slaves.

We therefore see that the habitus of Roman slaveholding was very complex and always in flux. This is the nature of the habitus, as seen in the theories of Bourdieu. But it was especially these three developments above that would have an immense influence of John Chrysostom’s teachings on slavery. We also mentioned that the Roman habitus of slaveholding practices itself at the intersection of four corporeal discourses, namely domesticity, heteronomy, carcerality and commodification. We will now summarize Chrysostom’s views on this and specifically highlight in which ways he negotiates and re-imagines these particular corporeal discourses. It is not so simple as to state that Chrysostom either accepts or rejects slavery - he does not abolish it, but he also has points of contention, and the schema of negotiation and re-imagination provides the necessary complexity to the issue without the danger of generalizing.

2 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM AND THE DOMESTICITY OF THE SLAVE-BODY
Domestic slavery is one of the most important discursivities in approaching slaveholding in the writings of John Chrysostom, since most of his comments are directed toward the control and regulation of the slave-body in the Christian household as the sources clearly attest. In which ways does Chrysostom negotiate and re-imagine these discourses?
a. Negotiating Domesticity: One of the clear points of negotiation when it comes to the domesticity of the slave-body is Chrysostom’s shift from strategic to tactical slaveholding. Chrysostom advises Christians to have little or even no slaves at all. The ideal number, as he states in numerous instances, is to have one or two slaves in the household. This is a very low number of slaves for a typical bourgeois household. Tactical slaveholding is based on the clever utilization of time rather than space, as in the case of strategic slaveholding. The implication is that fewer slaves would do more work, and also more shameful and unpleasant tasks. His ideal of having no slaves at all also supports the inclusion of this shift into the points of negotiation in Chrysostom’s works. One of the other points of negotiation and acceptance in this regard can be seen in Chrysostom’s extensive use of slave-metaphors in his teaching. While he is often uncomfortable with slavery, Chrysostom also acknowledges its inevitability, especially since, as seen above, he still allows for people to own some slaves. This would entail that the use of slave-metaphors would be effective in a community promoting the ownership of slaves, even if it is only one or two. The Stoic-Philonic metaphors of slavery are crucial to Chrysostom’s formulations of Christology, hamartiology and eschatology. The Christological influence is seen in two respects. Firstly, the view of Christ or God as the eternal slaveholder defines a basic dimension of human interaction with the divine. The second, and logical inference of this is that this thought as incorporated in early Christian pastoralism would become a means of governing, controlling and regulating bodies, especially slave-bodies in the Christian community. In terms of hamartiology, slavery is seen as the result of sin and hence part of imperfect creation. Sin also enslaves. These continuities between slavery and sin provide the background for the final formulation, namely eschatology. Chrysostom sees God as the eternal slaveholder, and human beings his slaves or vilici, waiting for the surprise visit of the absent pater familias. The good slaves will receive eschatological reward (heaven) and the bad slaves will receive eschatological punishment (hell). This was not simply theoretical theological formulations or crude manipulation - they had very real implications. Christian institutional slaves who suffered on earth should endure and embrace their suffering, and not revolt against their disposition, since their reward will even be greater in heaven. Eschatological reward and punishment also then justify the earthly reward and punishment of slaves. Here we see Christian theology and ethics maintaining a system of extreme cruelty and social injustice through negotiation with metaphors and acceptance of hierarchies of domination.
c. Re-Imagining Domesticity: Chrysostom presents a new social vision for domestic slaves in his homilies. This was based on the reformation of the slave-body. Again, the Xenophonian notion of the slave as social outsider and delinquent is assumed in this instance. Slaves, due to their disadvantaged upbringing and background, according to Chrysostom, have the capacity for virtue since they are not slave-like due to their nature. The slave-body is then reformed through the teaching of virtue as well as practical trades. The reward here could be manumission, but it was not guaranteed. This is then one of the essential tasks of the *pater familias* within the system of pastoralism: to teach slaves virtue. External signs of punishment are now replaced by spiritual and religious exercises. It implies the normalization of the delinquent slave-body, also equal to masculinization to a certain extent. The household now becomes both an observatory, to monitor deviant behaviour, as well as a reformatory, to reform slave-bodies into what Foucault calls docile bodies. Surveillance plays a major role and the Christic panopticism of pastoral governmentality functions as a strategy for regulating slave-bodies and making them docile.

3 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM AND THE HETERONOMY OF THE SLAVE-BODY

In antiquity, all bodies were considered heteronomous, and therefore made to be ruled and owned. This heteronomy would have very real implications for understanding ancient subjectivity and humanness. The following points of negotiation and reimagination serve as reference here:

a. Negotiating Heteronomy: At no point in the homilies under consideration does Chrysostom resist the notion of the heteronomy of the slave-body. All bodies are under some type of rulership. He also admonishes slaveholders that they too are under the rulership of the divine slaveholder. He also promotes the idea that slaveholders should treat slaves fairly and justly, a concept not uncommon in ancient thought on slave management. Based on his exegesis of 1 Corinthians 7:21, however, it is better for slaves to remain enslaved. He especially wants Christian slaves to be better at the work of slaves than non-Christian slaves. This is especially based on a new scopic economy at work in Chrysostom’s thought. Since God is the eternal slaveholder, slaves ought to work as if working for God and not for an earthly owner. The practical subjectivity of the slave is now based on his or her position in the divine economy in
which God rules over everything. The potent influence of Stoicism in this regard is also exhibited in the notion that slaves should be treated humanely or, as Chrysostom repeatedly states, with philanthropy. But the humanization of the slave-body does not function as amelioration, but rather a very pervasive technology for further oppressing the slave, since the typical ‘human’ characteristics like sex, food, sleep and family could be manipulated to regulate slave behaviour. Rather than seeking the humanity of slaves, it should be assumed.

b. Reimagining Heteronomy: Chrysostom does believe that being under Christ represents some type of freedom. Again the Stoic-Philonic metaphor serves as a point of reference. Being in a state of slavery in the institutional sense should not be the main concern of the slave or the free, but to which extent they are enslaved to sin and the passions. Chrysostom does not equate these two aspects, but rather sees enslavement to sin as the most dangerous form of enslavement. At the bottom of the scale lies institutional slavery. Thus, rather than focusing on one’s social status, one must focus on one’s theological status as being enslaved to sin and thereafter, enslaved to the passions. It is both a reaffirmation and re-imagination of typical Stoic-Philonic concepts of slavery and heteronomy.

4 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM AND THE CARCERALITY OF THE SLAVE-BODY

The slave-body was also described as a carceral body in this dissertation. It implies that the slave constantly finds him- or herself in a state of physical and/or symbolic imprisonment. The carceral state of the slave-body is maintained by various carceral mechanisms. Chrysostom negotiates and re-imagines slave carcerality in the following ways:

a. Negotiating Carcerality: Like most late ancient Christian authors, Chrysostom is in favour of slaves remaining in their carceral state. Slaves should obey the law and remain in their state of slavery and never seek illegal means of breaking this carcerality. He goes so far as to say that people who, under the pretence of religion, cause slaves to flee from their masters are not only criminals, but also blasphemers. In his homilies on Philemon, Chrysostom states that good slaves ought to remain with their masters and if they flee, they need to return. Masters however should also be fair and gracious toward such slaves. The examples of Paul, Onesimus and Philemon serve as role models for such behaviour.
b. **Reimagining Carcerality:** Since Chrysostom affirms that slaves should remain in their carceral state, he also uses various carceral mechanisms to ensure slaves remain incarcerated. The first mechanism is that of an authoritative scriptural apparatus. Paul’s Epistle to Philemon was especially influential in this instance. Philemon functions as the ideal Christian slaveholder and Onesimus, on the one hand, the bad slave who fled from his master, but on the other, the rehabilitated and reformed slave returning to the domination of his master. The second carceral mechanism is that of the fictive kinship of slaves. Slaves are included as fictive kin within the Christian community, but the extent to which this was truly practised is unclear, and even if it was practiced, like the Stoic-Philonic metaphorical slavery, fictive kinship draws the focus away from institutional slavery and hence reinforces the social status of the slave as someone in bondage. Finally, the notion that slaves are capable of benefaction also reinforces the carcerality of the slave, since the slave must first conform to the principles of passivity and submissiveness. Honour simply functions as a reward, but the micro-honour of benefaction does not negate the macro-shame of being enslaved. Both these latter mechanisms are examples of how the humanness of the slave-body is used as a technology for enforcing slave-carcerality.

5 **JOHN CHRYSTOM AND THE COMMODIFICATION OF THE SLAVE-BODY**

Slaves were considered to be both persons as well as objects in the ancient world. Chrysostom also speaks about slaves in terms of wealth. He views slaves as both economic and symbolic capital. The processes of negotiation and reimagination function thus:

a. **Negotiating Commodification:** Chrysostom negotiates with the objectification and commodification by including slaves into the categories of economic and symbolic capital. In terms of economic capital, both the possession and manumission of slaves becomes a very complex matter in this instance, since it can serve as both a marker of wealth renunciation, or honour. Chrysostom’s advice to slaveholders to own one or two slaves is in line with the popular asceticism he aims to promote among the urban inhabitants. People should become self-sufficient and only use slaves for tasks of necessity and not for luxury. This is then the other dimension of tactical slaveholding promoted by Chrysostom.
b. Reimagining Commodification: Chrysostom also considers slave-bodies as symbolic capital, that is, capital that serves to enhance the honour and social status of the slaveholder. The danger for Chrysostom here is that this often leads to pride and especially vainglory. This was often the case when slave-bodies served as adornment. Rather than parading processions of slaves to the theatre and marketplace, in other words, strategic slaveholding, slaveholders should not be governed by the politics of social visibility. Rather, slaveholders should be exemplary through the lack of slaves by their side and their practice of ascetic tactical slaveholding. This is truly honourable and not simply vainglory. It would have very real implications for the noble Roman women of Chrysostom’s time, since they were also constantly under the surveillance of slaves, in a type of a mobile prison. He critiques this ancient public voyeurism and rather wants women to move around in public with little or no slaves, which would pose a considerable social risk.

In concluding this study, it has been seen that Chrysostom’s views on slavery are very complex and function within other social and cultural systems of his day. It is not so simple as to state that Chrysostom, or any other ancient author for that matter, simply accepts or abolishes slavery. It is obvious that Chrysostom does not abolish it. Rather, we see Chrysostom in constant negotiation and reimagining the Roman habitus of slaveholding to serve his greater social vision of promoting a popular asceticism in the households of the city. While he may have had various problems with slavery, Chrysostom does not see it as a serious social problem. Chrysostom’s views on slaveholding are almost identical to Stoic-Philonic concepts of the institution. These views form part of a complex system of governance called pastoralism, in which the image of Christ is constantly duplicated and reduplicated onto the bishop, the pater familias and the slave. Christ is morphed into the divine slaveholder, constantly watching, preparing for a surprise visit, and ready to punish and reward. Chrysostom is uncomfortable with the body enslaved, but rather than abolishing it, he reimagines slavery and thereby perpetuates the oppressive practice that would take several centuries to be rejected by the Christian church.
The main question this dissertation aimed to address was how Chrysostom negotiates and reimagines slavery in his homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews. But it was also mentioned that a second result of this undertaking was that a new framework for approaching slavery was developed. As a postscript, after the completion of the investigation, what could be said of this new framework, and what would be the way forward? While it provided a useful matrix for making sense of ancient slavery, it has also stirred up many questions, specifically relating to critical theory/method and the study of ancient slavery. The use of critical theory often leads the scholar to a point, not of investigation or discovery necessarily, but also to one of crisis. During the course of writing the dissertation and applying the critical theory, especially to a topic as moving and disturbing as slavery, it often ended at these points of frustration, points of discontent, points of ‘not knowing’. I will use one example of such an event.

When discussing the heteronomy of the body, the notion of the humanity and humanness of slaves were discussed, especially relating to the work of Hartman, Johnson and Foucault. It was stated that rather than ‘seeking’ the humanity of slaves in the texts, the humanity of slaves should be assumed. The problem was that when the humanity of the slave-body was ‘found,’ it was often used as a technology of oppression and regulation, worsening the life of the slave. The notion of recognizing, seeking and proving certain marginalized or oppressed subjectivities often leads, not to emancipation, but to an intensification of exclusion, regulation and, inevitably, pathologization (a word I deliberately ignored due to its connotations to psychiatry and psychology – abnormalization was preferred). But is this then not the very nature of critique? To seek, explore and question? This easily brings one to this point of frustration and discontent. It is in essence a question of heuristics. What would the heuristic dynamic of slavery studies entail? Or put more plainly: what are we searching for, if we are searching at all? Two issues arise, issues that will be further explored during the course of my research on late ancient slavery, Chrysostom and critical theory. In the first instance, this dissertation took a step in introducing a new way for talking about slavery – namely slavery as a complex corporeal discourse – a point of intersection between domesticity, heteronomy, carcerality and commodification. This was especially due to the influence of Jennifer Glancy’s work. The logical inference of reaching a point of discontent and ‘not knowing’ is that one is forced to invent and construct a new
language and rhetoric. New categories in which slavery ‘speaks itself” should be explored. For instance, this study was especially focused on the subjectivities (or lack of subjectivity) of slave-bodies. But this is not necessarily the only category. Rather than seeking subjectivities, one could also deny their existence, or at least the possibility that they are determinable, and focus on seeking practices. This is especially the points raised by Bourdieu and De Certeau. But, secondly, before this constructive process can take place, a point of deconstruction must also be reached. And this is where critique, in my opinion, receives its essence – not as enquiry and investigation only – but also in the notion of critique as *crisis*. Often deconstruction, or destruction, which is crisis, must precede construction. The great cathedrals of thought must be torn down to a level of abstraction that would expose their functioning, usefulness and fissures. And only thereafter should the process of re-constructing, often with the same materials, begin. This study represented the ‘dis-memberment’ of the notion of the slave-body, into corporeal units that lay bare both its practices and subjectivities – a point of crisis, where critical theorization also becomes a form of activism, something that should never be absent in the study of slavery.
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## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS

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<td>CSEL</td>
<td><em>Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</em>. Vienna, 1866-_.</td>
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<td>LCL</td>
<td>Loeb Classical Library. Havard.</td>
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Slavery in John Chrysostom’s Homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews: A Cultural-Historical Analysis

By Chris Len de Wet

Abstract

The aim of this study is to examine John Chrysostom’s views on slavery, specifically in his homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews. Roman slaveholding is approached as a complex habitus, and Chrysostom’s negotiation with and reimagination of this habitus is examined. The method of enquiry used is a cultural-historical analysis, and the theories of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu are extensively utilized. Moreover, based on the work of Jennifer Glancy, slavery is approached as a corporeal discourse – one focused on the slave as a body. The discursive formation of the slave-body is further deconstructed into four related corporeal discourses – namely the domesticity, heteronomy, carcerality and commodification of the slave-body. The study commences by revisiting and re-reading Hellenistic, early Roman, Judaistic, and early Christian sources on slaveholding from a cultural-historical perspective in order to reconstruct the main discursivities of the habitus of Roman slaveholding. Then, the first question asked is how Chrysostom understands the domesticity of the slave-body. Based on his exegesis of the haustafeln, it is concluded that Chrysostom negotiates and reimagines the discourse in three ways: a) he proposes a shift from strategic to tactical slaveholding; b) he formulates his theology, especially hamartiology and eschatology, on the Stoic-Philonic metaphor of domestic slavery; and, c) he advises that domestic slaves be reformed by being taught Christian virtue and trades. Secondly, Chrysostom accepts the heteronomy of all bodies, and hence uses slavery as a basis for his ethics. The body is either ruled by God or sin/passions, and the problem of institutional slavery is downplayed. Thirdly, Chrysostom affirms that slaves should remain in their carceral state and stay obedient to their masters, while masters ought to treat slaves justly since they are also slaves of God. Finally, Chrysostom sees slaves as both economic and symbolic capital, and the shift to tactical slaveholding supports his more general vision of promoting a popular asceticism in the city. Chrysostom does not simply accept, ameliorate or reject slaveholding – we rather see sophisticated discourses of negotiation and reimagination of slaveholding to fit in with his wider programme of social and ascetic reform among Christian households.