CHAPTER 6

THE COMMODIFIED BODY: SLAVES AS ECONOMIC AND SYMBOLIC CAPITAL IN CHRYSOSTOM’S HOMILIES

1 INTRODUCTION

The social identity of the slave-body is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, slaves were considered persons or rather subjects in their own right who, despite embodying a subjectivity that is more aggressively and directly heteronomous than free subjects, had limited social mobility and means to secure their own freedom. We saw in chapter 4 that the humanity of the slave was a technology for subjugating and oppressing the slave-body, and in the previous chapter, that some of the carceral mechanisms were directly founded upon this technology. On the other hand, however, there was also a dimension of objectification and commodification with regards to the identity of the slave-body. Slave-bodies were also considered commodified ‘objects’ that had both economic and symbolic, that is, status-based, value. In this final chapter of the dissertation, I consider the slave-body in Chrysostom’s writings from the perspective that such bodies constitute economic and symbolic capital. These terms, however, have very specific theoretical underpinnings and I will therefore commence this chapter by delineating these theoretical issues and contextualising them specifically for the matter of late ancient slavery. Thereafter, I will select model pericopes from Chrysostom’s homilies that will serve as case studies to elucidate the matter of the commodification of the slave-body in the context of Chrysostom’s views on wealth and poverty, which are inextricably tied to the notions of economic and symbolic capital. Under this discussion, his Homilia in epistulam I ad Corinthios 40 will be examined, with specific reference to the dynamics of commodified slave-bodies in the

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light of Christian asceticism. This discussion will specifically centre on the slave-body as economic capital. Thereafter, Chrysostom’s *Homilia in epistulam ad Hebraeos* 28 will be viewed from the perspective of slaves as symbolic capital, especially as honour-indicators and adornment that enhance the status of the slaveholder. We will now start by delineating the theoretical precepts that underlie this chapter, namely commodification, and economic and symbolic capital.

2 THE SLAVE-BODY AS PROPERTY: COMMODIFICATION AND ECONOMIC/SYMBOLIC CAPITAL IN THE CONTEXT OF ANCIENT SLAVERY

It is no surprise that the notion of commodification has come to light in the present study, since many of the issues previously dealt with are related to the concept of commodification. It is especially the notions of heteronomy, autonomy and subjectivity that feature in the theoretical foundations of commodification. But where should the discussion towards understanding commodification begin? The precursor and logical presupposition of commodification is reification or objectification. The problem with using terms like objectification and commodification in a study on ancient cultural history is that these terms originated from modern contexts, especially the context of capitalism and Marxism. According to Emig and Lindner reification/objectification was especially defined by the Hungarian socialist Georg Lukács who regarded it as ‘an inevitable consequence of capitalism.’ Emig and Lindner continue to quote Lukács:

Reification requires that a society should learn to satisfy all its needs in terms of commodity exchange. The separation of the

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746 The terms reification and objectification are often used interchangeably by certain scholars, sometimes with very subtle nuances of difference in the terms. Other terms like ‘thingification’ or ‘chosification’ have also been used. While acknowledging the subtle differences purported by various scholars for these terms, for the purpose of this study I will only use the term objectification as preference.

747 Rainer Emig and Oliver Lindner, “Introduction,” in *Commodifying (Post)Colonialism: Othering, Reification, Commodification and the New Literatures and Cultures in English* (Rainer Emig and Oliver Lindner (eds); Cross/Cultures 127 – ASNEL Papers 16; Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), viii.

producer from his means of production, the dissolution and destruction of all ‘natural’ production units, etc., and all the social and economic conditions necessary for the emergence of modern capitalism tend to replace ‘natural’ relations which exhibit human relations more plainly by rationally reified relations.

The close relational development between objectification/commodification and capitalism and in essence colonialism cannot be understated. The role of colonialism in this development is seen in the inherent othering or alterity found in the statement above. The immense influence of colonialism as operations of alterity is inevitably foundational to objectification/commodification, which is in itself, according to Lukács’ statement above, an operation of alterity or othering. In chapter 4 the issue of heterography was delineated, and is directly related to this. While reification/objectification operates to create ‘objects’ (as opposed to subjects, perhaps), commodification takes the next step in commercialising objects that are in their very nature not commercial. The buying and selling of human bodies are a case in point. But how can objectification and commodification be approached in a pre-modern context where capitalism is absent? While the modern social and economic contexts of capitalism and colonialism are absent from late antiquity, I will argue here, against the basic premise of Lukács, that they do not constitute the most important presuppositions for objectification and commodification. Notwithstanding the centrality of capitalism and colonialism to the concepts under discussion, a more plausible starting point for understanding objectification (and consequently, commodification) has been proposed by Pierre Bourdieu - namely language. I do not want to extrapolate all the complexities of sociological linguistics in this instance. Bourdieu presents this issue as a critical dialogue with, among others, Ferdinand de Saussure, and especially highlights the dynamics of language and practice with the notion of objectification. The most important point to note here is that language plays an active, practical role in the discursive production of objects, and while capitalism and colonialism as

751 Ibid., 30–33.
modern concepts are absent from late antiquity, the language of objectification is palpable in late ancient rhetoric concerning slavery. I will present three examples here.

Firstly, in the context of Roman law, slaves were grouped within the category of *res mancipi*. Within Roman private law, this category represents the acquired property of a person. The Latin term *res* implies an object or a thing, and specifically in this context, private property or objects. Thus it seems that in terms of the legal management of slavery, it was easiest to treat slaves as property or things. This does not imply that the average free person considered all slaves simply as property or objects but in terms of the administration of human bondage, property rights rather than human rights applied. Such a social disposition implies that slaves were provided with value measures, and damage to a slave would be considered damage to property. The term therefore functions within a very specific set of legal parameters, and Schumacher rightly notes the tension in Roman law between the slave as *res mancipi* and the slave as *ius naturale*, that is, a human being. It becomes difficult, if not impossible, to separate these two dimensions in the practical sense, as Buckland in his classical study on Roman laws on slavery noted. The second instance, which was already discussed in depth at the beginning of the study, is Varro’s grouping of the slave as *instrumentum vocale*. While it was shown that this term alone was not enough to simply designate all slaves merely as articulate tools, it was still convenient for Varro to group slaves among other objects of property. A more plausible example would be the use of *venalium greges*. Joshel emphasizes the fungible nature of slavery based on this type of language. It is possible that the objectification and commodification of the slave-body intensified with the rise of the Roman villa-system and slave-mode of production. We have seen that this particular agricultural language of slaveholding developed and functioned within the treatises of Cato, Varro and Columella. The language would however become commonplace,


even with authors like Porphyry, Ammianus, and Chrysostom’s numerous references to ‘herds’ of slaves. Philodemus’ discomfort with what could almost be called an ‘ancient capitalism’ of his time also demonstrates this point. Texts in the Mishnah exhibited potent discourses of commodification of the slave-body. In several of the texts cited from the Mishnah, we have seen that the violation of someone else’s slave was, in the first instance, dealt with as damage to property, even if the violation was of a sexual nature, like rape. Gender played a large role in the value of the slave\(^7\) in the Mishnah (Ma’as. Š. 1.7[A]), as well as ethnicity (Qidd. 1.2). Imperfect slaves, i.e. those with disabilities, eunuchs or people of ‘doubtful sex,’ were less valuable and could not be used for certain religious procedures according to the Mishnahic context (Hag. 1.1; Yebam. 8.2). This same principle is seen in the prescriptions of offerings. Furthermore, rape, as we have seen, was viewed as property damage. An enslaved rape victim was re-valued after the incident, and most of the guidelines concern the size of the fine given to the rapist (Ketub. 3.7). A female slave or an old slave had less value, and people were advised to sell them and rather buy land with the proceeds (Ketub. 8.5). Cato makes the same recommendation (Agr. 2.7). Female slaves also had reproductive capital. It was seen in the treatises of Xenophon (Oec. 9.5) and Columella (Rust. 1.8.16-19). The ‘breeding’ of slaves was strictly monitored and controlled, very much like the breeding of animals, and slave-mothers were rewarded or even manumitted if they had many children.\(^7\)

The final example, central to this very dissertation, is the notion that the slave is considered as a body. The context here is juridical-economic, since most of the instances occur in testaments and other works pertaining especially to inheritance, in basic invoices of sale. The metaphor, according to Glancy, eventually became a synonym for ‘slave’.\(^7\) Even here with this term there is much ambiguity, since calling someone or something a mere body is not exactly equal to res. What is evident here is that the language of objectification of slaves is as a whole ambiguous as much as it was commonplace in antiquity. Each of the terms functions within very

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\(^7\) This was a common feature of slavery in general; cf. Kirsten E. Wood, “Gender and Slavery,” in The Oxford Handbook of Slavery in the Americas (Robert L. Paquette and Mark M. Smith (eds); Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 513-34.


\(^7\) Jennifer A. Glancy, Slavery in Early Christianity (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 10–11.
specific semantic domains, whether juridical language, the language of Roman agricultural writers, or the economic language of the Mishnah. Often the terms have very specific, context-bound connotations and denotations. Thus, a constant tension between the slave as a human being and the slave as an object is present. But it is exactly this tension that makes objectification possible, since these opposites justify each other’s existence. From the results of chapter 4 we have also found that the notion of the heteronomous implies that each body is not only meant to be ruled, but all bodies also belong to someone or something as property. Paul himself states in 1 Corinthians 6:20 that all Christian bodies have been bought by Christ. Chrysostom himself builds on this statement by stating that, as with the purchase of a slave there is a contract, so too there was a contract when Christ purchased his earthly slaves, not a financial contract, but a contract of blood (Eutrop. 2.12).

This objectification ushers in the next point in the hypothesis. As objects, slaves function as capital. I understand the term ‘capital’ here strictly in the way Bourdieu uses it. One can distinguish between several types of capital. For the purposes of this study, two forms of capital will suffice. Firstly, there is simple economic capital - or wealth. This includes one’s material wealth, or in Roman legal terms, *res mancipi* – property possessed, especially by the *paterfamilias* as part of the larger *patrimonium*. Since slaves are considered property, they form part of an individual’s wealth or economic capital. But Bourdieu also highlights another type of capital, namely symbolic capital. In essence, symbolic and economic capital cannot possibly be separated, and often one is converted into another. Slaves, as economic capital, are often also converted into symbolic capital. Symbolic capital, as Bourdieu intimates, is based on a law of social recognition:

In an economy which is defined by the refusal to recognize the ‘objective’ truth of ‘economic’ practices, that is, the law of ‘naked self-interest’ and egoistic calculation, even ‘economic’ capital cannot act unless it succeeds in being recognized through a conversion that can render unrecognizable the true principle of its

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760 Ibid., 112–17.
761 Ibid., 120.
efficacy. Symbolic capital is this denied capital, recognized as legitimate, that is, misrecognized as capital (recognition, acknowledgement, in the sense of gratitude aroused by benefits can be one of the foundations of this recognition) which, along with religious capital, is perhaps the only possible form of accumulation when economic capital is not recognized.

Symbolic capital therefore serves to enhance the prestige of an individual; its dynamic is status-driven. Material goods therefore function in a symbolic sense, but always have retroactive economic implications. The social recognition of these types of capital functions by means of language, and we have seen above the affirmative language of commodification in antiquity. Often the exhibition of symbolic capital is very expensive in material terms. Bourdieu continues to state: ‘The interest at stake in the conducts of honour is one for which economism has no name and which has to be called symbolic, although it is such as to inspire actions that are very directly material.’762 A further notion introduced by Bourdieu that is directly related to symbolic capital is that of ‘distinction’. Distinction is in itself a kind of habitus, or set of tastes, that is mostly associated with upper class individuals that has an ennobling effect.763 In the sections that follow, I will evaluate how Chrysostom responds and negotiates slaves as both economic and symbolic capital.

3 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM ON SLAVES AS ECONOMIC CAPITAL: THE CASE OF HOMILIA IN EPISTULAM I AD CORINTHIOS 40

Among the many elaborations of slavery in his homilies on the Pauline epistles, one of Chrysostom’s most famous declarations about slavery occur in his Homilia ad epistulam I ad Corinthios 40.6. We have encountered this passage several times in the course of this study and have evaluated it from the perspective of the domesticity and heteronomy of the slave-body. The passage will serve as a case study in Chrysostom’s view of slaves as economic capital, and its relevance in Chrysostom’s ethics on wealth and poverty, especially regarding the renunciation of wealth and the dangers of greed.

762 Ibid., 120–21.
The series of homilies on I Corinthians seems to have been preached in Antioch (according to Chrysostom himself in *Hom. I Cor. 21*) possibly between 392 and 393 CE.\(^{764}\) The discussion on slaveholding occurs at the end of the homily, and represents its conclusion. Interestingly enough, the homily itself concerns I Corinthians 15:29-34 and thus the theme of the resurrection. As with many of Chrysostom’s homilies, the conclusion of the homily comes in the form of a virtue-discourse, especially highlighting the dangers of envy and greed in this case. As in the case of many late ancient homilists, Chrysostom uses images related to wealth and poverty for the pedagogical function of shaming his wealthier audience members.\(^{765}\) More on this aspect will be said in the following discussion on slaves as symbolic capital. What is more important for this section is that Chrysostom’s statements on tactical slavery function within the wider framework of his teaching on the renunciation of wealth. The concept of tactical slavery was especially present in the homily under discussion (*Hom. I Cor. 40.6*):

...[O]ne master only needs to employ one slave; or rather two or three masters one slave...We will allow you to keep a second slave. But if you collect many, you no longer do it for the sake of philanthropy, but to indulge yourself...when you have purchased them [slaves] and have taught them trades whereby to support themselves, let them go free.\(^{766}\)

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\(^{766}\) Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.353-354: Καὶ γὰρ ἕν τὸν ἑνὰ χρῆσθαι δεσπότην οἰκήτη μόνον ἐχοῦν· μάλλον δὲ καὶ δύο καὶ τρεῖς δεσπότας ἕν οἰκήτη...εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαίον, ἕνα ποιοῦ μόνον, ἢ τὸ πολὺ δεύτερον...εἰ δὲ πολλοὺς συνάγεις, οὐ φιλανθρωπίας ἐνεκεν τούτο ποιεῖς, ἀλλὰ θρυπτόμενος.
Chrysostom had a radical vision for the Christian inhabitants of Antioch. He wanted to popularise a type of domestic asceticism that would transform the Christian households of the city. This would also influence their roles as slaveholders. We have already seen how Chrysostom envisioned the *pater familias* as a shepherd of the household, and he realised that the Christianization of urban households would eventually transform the city. This vision would encompass every dimension of the role of the *pater familias* – husband, wife, and of course, slaveholder.

Many of Chrysostom’s audience members may have been wealthy individuals. This hypothesis has especially been proposed by Ramsey MacMullen, who argues that Chrysostom’s audience comprised of people mostly coming from the upper echelons of the social ladder. MacMullen intimates that most of the audience members may have received an expensive education, since they were able to enjoy rhetorically sophisticated sermons. Furthermore, MacMullen points to the numerous references to the rich made by Chrysostom himself in the sermons. Mayer has critiqued MacMullen’s hypothesis:

> The question that MacMullen fails to ask is whether this preoccupation simply reflects the importance of such people in society and within the church and can therefore be attributed to a natural focus upon them, or whether it is indicative of a genuine numerical dominance on their part.

This is a very relevant question, and Mayer has successfully shown that the question of Chrysostom’s audience is somewhat more complex. During Chrysostom’s activity in Antioch where the homilies under examination were preached, it is possible that Chrysostom preached in

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different churches to different congregations\textsuperscript{771} instead of having one audience following him around.\textsuperscript{772} The numerous references to the wealthy in the homilies do however call for some attention. Moreover, the semantic domains of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ were quite complex.\textsuperscript{773} Notwithstanding Mayer’s critique, MacMullen’s emphasis on the presence of the rich does have merit since it is the one constant indicator of the audience in most of the homilies. In MacMullen’s more recent book, \textit{The Second Church} (2009), he demonstrates that the churches in which a homilist like Chrysostom preached in could often only contain about 1 or 2 percent of the population.\textsuperscript{774} On particular days, especially Wednesdays and Fridays, when gatherings took place in Antioch, the working class was mostly absent due to labour commitments.\textsuperscript{775} I have stated in a previous study: ‘...the lower- and middle-class citizens’ liturgical space was more centered on the household than the official churches (except on feast days and other important gatherings).’\textsuperscript{776} Hence Chrysostom’s references to the household as a microcosm of the church. In my opinion, the strong numerical and social presence of the wealthy in Chrysostom’s audience composition cannot be ignored.

But another question remains: why does Chrysostom construct the wealthy in such a particular way as he does in the homilies? Many of Chrysostom’s homilies polarize rich and poor. While Chrysostom may have had the voluntary poor in mind as ideal managers of wealth,\textsuperscript{777} he rather uses the structurally poor within an \textit{argumentum ad sensum}. An excellent example is found in his eleventh homily on 1 Corinthians, where this polarization between rich and poor is present (\textit{Hom. I Cor.} 11.10):

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{774} Ramsay MacMullen, \textit{The Second Church: Popular Christianity A.D. 200–400} (Atlanta: SBL, 2009), 1–32.
\textsuperscript{775} Mayer, “Who Came to Hear John Chrysostom Preach?” 78.
\textsuperscript{777} Mayer, “Poverty and Generosity,” 142–49.
\end{quote}
For how is he [the pauper] able to sleep, with the pains of an empty stomach, restless hunger occupying him and that often while it is freezing, and the rain coming down on him? And while you, after washing, return home from the bath glowing in your soft garments, cheerful at heart and rejoicing, and hurrying to an expensive feast that has been prepared: he, compelled all over the marketplace by cold and hunger, makes his rounds, bending low and stretching out his hands; he does not even have the even spirit to beg for his necessary food without trembling, asking someone so satisfied with food and so used to the easy life; no, often he has to leave with insults. Therefore, when you have returned home, when you recline on your couch, when the lights around your house shine bright, when the table is prepared and abundant, at that time be reminded of that poor miserable man wandering about, like the dogs in the back streets, in darkness and in mire; except when, as is often the case, he has to leave this place, not to a house, nor wife, nor bed, but to a pile of straw, even as we see the dogs barking all through the night. And you, if you only see a little drop falling from the roof, throw the whole house into disarray, calling your slaves and disturbing everything; while he, lying in rags, and straw, and dirt, has to bear all the cold.  

778 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.94.48-95.8: Πῶς γὰρ ἂν καθευδήσειε λοιπόν, ὑπὸ τῆς γαστρὸς δακνόμενος, ἀγρυπνῶν, λιμῷ πολιορκούμενος, πάγου πολλάκις ὄντος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ καταφερομένου; Καὶ σὺ μὲν ἐκ βαλανείου λελουμένος ἐπανέρχῃ, μαλακοῖς θαλπόμενος ἱματίας, γεγηθὼς καὶ χαίρων, καὶ ἐπὶ δείπνων ἐποιοῦν τρέχον πολυτελές· ἐκείνος δὲ πανταχοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀγοράν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρυµοῦ καὶ τοῦ λιµοῦ συνεχῶς ἐλαινόμενος, περιέρχεται συγκεκυφῶς καὶ χεῖρας προτείνων· καὶ οὐδὲ θαρύτων ἀδεῶς τῷ ἐμπεπλησµένῳ καὶ ἀναπεπαυµμένῳ ὁµίτως προσενεκεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὑβρισθεῖς ἀνεχώρησεν. Ὄταν οὖν ἀνέλθης οἰκάδε, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῆς εὐνῆς ἀνακληθῆς, ὅταν φῶς ἦ περὶ τὸν οἶκον λαµµτρόν, ὅταν ἐτοίµη καὶ δαµιλῆς ἦ τράπεζα, τότε ἀναμνήσθητι τοῦ ταλαιπώρου καὶ ἀθλίου ἐκείνου, τοῦ περιόντος κατὰ τοὺς κόνις ἐν τοῖς στενωποῖς καὶ τῷ σκότῳ καὶ τῷ πιηλῷ, καίτοι πολλάκις ἐκείθεν ἀπιόντος οὔκ εἰς οἰκίαν οὐδὲ πρὸς
We find here a typical rhetorical strategy. Brown is probably correct in stating that these polarities are hyperbolic, and probably not all that realistic.\footnote{Brown, Poverty and Leadership, 46.} Himmelfarb states: ‘[It] had the conceptual effect of pauperizing the poor by first creating the most distinctive, dramatic image of the lowest class, and then imposing that image upon the lower classes as a whole.’\footnote{Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age (New York: Vintage, 1973), 726.} Chrysostom is therefore constructing both an image of the poor and an image of the wealthy. The purpose of this type of social imagination is to shame the wealthy to become, in Brown’s words, ‘lovers of the poor’.\footnote{Brown, Poverty and Leadership, 5.} This is symptomatic of the shift from civic euergetism to becoming a ‘lover of the poor’. This shift will be discussed in more detail in the next section. What is also important for this section, however, is that behind all Chrysostom’s statements related to rich and poor, and thus, economic capital, we find the notion of the limited good.

The notion of the limited good is one that has been highlighted by cultural anthropological studies of antiquity. The concept basically entails that all commodities exist in limited amounts and can only be increased for one person at the cost of decreasing the goods of another.\footnote{Bruce Malina, The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 89.} Chrysostom also subscribes to this concept (Hom. I Cor. 40.5):

For there is a good type of robbery, the robbery of heaven, which does not disadvantage anyone. And although in respect of money it is impossible for one to become rich, unless another first becomes poor, yet this is not so in spiritual things, but exactly the opposite. It is impossible that anyone should become rich without making someone else’s store increase. For if you help no one, you will not...
be able to become rich. Thus, while in temporal things the act of giving results in a decrease: in spiritual things, on the contrary, the act of giving creates an increase, and the act of not giving – this causes great poverty and brings on extreme punishment.\(^{783}\)

Here we see how Chrysostom suggests a way of understanding economic capital different to that of the typical individual of antiquity. He accepts the basic premises of the limited good. A wealthy person is exactly that since others are poor, the rich therefore have more than their fair share. This is why we find so many negative depictions of wealthy persons in antique literature.\(^{784}\) But here Chrysostom shows the wealthy that accumulating spiritual riches/capital, what he calls the ‘robbery of heaven’ (ἡ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἁρπαγή), is more advantageous than collecting economic capital. According to Chrysostom there is a more important law than the common principle of limited commodities. Spiritual capital, in fact, increases with diminution – in other words, dispensing wealth leads to its increase in the spiritual sense.\(^{785}\) The rule seems illogical, but Chrysostom then affirms it with reference to the parable of the slaves and talents (cf. Matt. 25:14-30; Luk. 19:12-28). The slave who buried his talent, the equivalent to collecting excessive economic capital, lost everything. In so doing, Chrysostom delineates a spiritual economy with almsgiving at its core. Almsgiving now becomes an investment in spiritual capital. Since the rich are part of the reason for the poverty in the city, their redemption is via almsgiving. Their damnation, however, is exemplified especially in the vice of greed. Greed, however, is

\(^{783}\) Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 61.352.20-31: Ἐστι γὰρ ἁρπαγή καλή ἢ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἁρπαγή, ἢ μηδέν βλάπτουσα. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς χρήμασιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐτέρων γενέσθαι πλούσιον, μὴ ἐτέρων πρότερον γενομένου πένητος· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πνευματικῶν οὐκ ἔνι τούτο, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον ἀπαύ, οὐκ ἔστι τινὰ γενέσθαι πλούσιον, μὴ ἐτέρων ποιόμαντα εὔπορον· ἀν γὰρ μηδένα ὡφελήσῃς, οὐ δυνήσῃ γενέσθαι εὔπορος. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς σωματικοῖς ἢ μετάδοσις μείωσιν ποιεῖ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς πνευματικοῖς ἢ μετάδοσις πλεονεκρομένον ἐργάζεται, καὶ τὸ μὴ μεταδούναι, τοῦτο πολλὴν πενίαν κατασκευάζει, καὶ κόλασιν ἐσχάτην ἐπάγει. This same thinking is also found in Hom. Act. 32.1.


then also strategically linked to other vices, most notably gluttony and inebriation. This is common in Chrysostom’s thinking, as Newhauser confirms:786

Chrysostom, unlike Cassian, is generally not systematic in relating avarice to other sins...The authoritative foundation for finding similarities between gluttony or drunkenness and avarice was established in the related statements of Matthew 6:24...and Philippians 3:10...The glutton or drunkard is the slave of his belly, avaricious person of his idolized gold; both suffer from a type of intoxication. Yet the philarguros [his italics] is worse than the glutton, for whereas the latter may recover after a night’s sleep, greed always stays with the avaricious sinner, if he can sleep at all.

The common link in these vices is that those who embody them have insatiable appetites for all forms of economic capital, and these in essence ruin the soul (cf. Hom. Matt. 15.12; Hom. Jo. 80.3). They are enslaved to these passions, especially wealth (cf. Hom. Jo. 76.3; Hom I Cor. 37.5; Hom II Cor. 9.3; Hom. I Tim. 18.2; Hom. Heb. 20.3; Stat. 2.14; Eutrop. 2.12; alternatively, they are also called slaves of Mammon; cf. Hom. I Cor. 39.13). Another interesting metaphor common in Chrysostom’s thinking is the notion of wealth as a runaway slave or fugitivus. People need to hold on to wealth as they would hold on to a slave prone to fleeing, since wealth has the same tendency (cf. Hom. I Cor. 11.10, 30.8; ironically also in: Eutrop. 1.1, 2.3). As we have shown previously, he presents the ascetic notion of necessity as a guiding principle here, in both food and slaves. In the same way that a person has only one stomach, so too a person has two hands to serve their own needs. Chrysostom then refers to Acts 20:34, where Paul states: ‘These hands ministered unto my necessities, and to them that were with me.’787 People should rather pride themselves, ironically, in serving others than being served by ‘herds of slaves.’ We have already shown that having only one or two slaves, as Chrysostom suggests, would resemble a life of extreme poverty. While he does promote the humane treatment of slaves, their manumission is

787 Translation: NIV; UBS⁴: ... ὅτι ταῖς χρείαις μου καὶ τοῖς οὖσιν μετ' ἐμοῦ ὑπηρέτησαν αἱ χεῖρες αὐταί.
based on the renunciation of wealth rather than the virtue of manumission itself. The manumission of slaves is equal to a type of almsgiving. Slave-bodies therefore function here as commodities that can influence the social standing of a slaveholder. Most importantly, it has implications for the status of the individual in question. This brings us to the second point of discussion, namely slaves as symbolic capital.

4 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM ON SLAVES AS SYMBOLIC CAPITAL: THE CASE OF HOMILIA IN EPISTULAM AD HEBRAEOS 28

While slaves functioned as commodities or economic capital, the problem of slaves as symbolic capital receives the most attention in Chrysostom’s statements on slavery. The previous discussion of slaves as economic capital serves as a foundation for this examination. As we have said, symbolic capital and economic capital are in fact inseparable, and they are consequential to each other. For this section Chrysostom’s twenty-eighth homily on Hebrews will serve as a case in point, but it will also be compared to statements in the previous homily on 1 Corinthians.

The pride and pomp associated with slave processions is highly problematic for Chrysostom, and the complexities of this issue are numerous. For instance, in the previous section above it was mentioned that manumission was often considered as the renunciation of wealth. But the line between earnest wealth renunciation and the display of riches is often quite opaque. Mass-manumissions of slaves could also, on the contrary, function as a display of wealth and honour of an individual. This is quite visible in the processions of freed persons at the funerals of Roman slaveholders. Again the social complexities of slave-manumission become evident. It is not simple to consider all manumissions of slaves in late Christian antiquity as instances of wealth-renunciation. Slaves served as symbolic capital even at the death of the slaveholder. But why is Chrysostom so uncomfortable with the display of, as he calls it, ‘herds of slaves’?

The importance of repraesentatio in Roman society cannot be understated. Possessing many slaves served to increase the honour and status of an individual - thus an act of self-fashioning. This point has been well deliberated in the previous chapters. Moreover, the capacity

for symbolic capital of an individual also signalled his or her ability to serve as a benefactor. In most instances, the display of wealth in Roman society served in depicting a citizen as being a benefactor to the city and its inhabitants. It has been suggested by several prominent scholars that the Christian emphasis on the care of the poor, *caritas*, replaced classical notions of civic euergetism or *liberalitas*. These studies point out that in late antiquity the social elites were part of a transition from a classical civic model of euergetism to an economic model polarizing the rich and the poor and highlighting the care of the poor as the ultimate civic virtue. Evelyne Patlagean’s work entitled *Pauvreté économique et pauvreté sociale à Byzance: 4e-7e siècles* (1977) is one of the most complete accounts of this issue.\(^\text{789}\) This theory of transition from euergetism to the care for the poor has not gone without critique. Van Nuffelen has shown that the problem is somewhat more complex and that some authors of late antiquity often exemplify both virtues simultaneously.\(^\text{790}\) My focus will obviously be on Chrysostom and I will not be so bold as to suggest that all authors of late antiquity were representative of such a transition. When it comes to these issues, Chrysostom is somewhat more subtle in his rhetoric. He often still prefers to use the rhetoric of civic euergetism, but I am of opinion that his social ideology does in fact represent a shift away from it. For Chrysostom, the pitfall of civic euergetism is the quasi-philanthropy that results from it, which may lead to the sin of vainglory (κενοδοξία).\(^\text{791}\)

For Chrysostom, there is a direct link between vainglory and the utilization and treatment of slaves. In a homily that directly addresses the issue of vainglory, Chrysostom gives parents some interesting guidelines on raising their children, and the treatment of slaves features extensively in the guidelines. One of the first guidelines he gives is that children should be raised not to rely on slaves, but to be self-sufficient (*Inan. glor.* 13). This has also been evident in other instances, most notably the homily on 1 Corinthians discussed above. Furthermore, children should be taught to treat slaves humanely. He states (*Inan. glor.* 31): “Teach him to be fair and

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courteous. If you see a slave being abused by him, do not overlook it, but punish him who is free; for if he knows that he may not abuse even a slave, he will abstain all the more from insulting or slandering one who is free and of his class\textsuperscript{792} (cf. also Inan. glor. 53). In this homily, slaves actually become a training ground for virtue (Inan. glor. 67): ‘[Children attain virtue]...if they practice themselves among their own slaves and are patient when slighted and refrain from anger when they are disobeyed, but narrowly examine the faults that they themselves have committed against others,’\textsuperscript{793} and (Inan. glor. 68): ‘So, too, let the slaves provoke him often rightly or wrongly, so that he may learn on every occasion to control his passion.’\textsuperscript{794} On the other hand, Chrysostom still allows for the use of slaves for certain tasks like cooking, but stresses that a virtuous person should wash his own feet and not rely on a slave to do this (Inan. glor. 70):

Let him not demand from the servants such services as a free man demands, but for the most part let him minister to his own needs. Let the slaves only render such services as he cannot do for himself. A free man, for example, cannot do his own cooking; for he must not devote himself to such pursuits at the cost of neglecting the labours befitting a free man. If, however, the boy washes his feet, never let a slave do this, but let him do it for himself. Thus you will render the free man considerate toward his slaves and greatly beloved by them. Do not let a slave hand him his cloak, and do not

\textsuperscript{792} Translation: Max L. W. Laistner, Christianity and Pagan Culture in the Later Roman Empire: Together with an English Translation of John Chrysostom’s Address on Vainglory and the Right Way for Parents to Bring up Their Children (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951), 96 (I have chosen to remain with Laistner’s literal translation); Greek text: SC 188.426-430: Δίδαξον αὐτὸν ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. Κἂν ἀκόλουθον ἰδής ύβριζόμενον, μὴ περιίδῃς, ἀλλὰ κόλασον τὸν ἐλεύθερον. Ὅ γὰρ εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν οἰκέτην ἐξέσται ύβριζει τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, πολλῷ µᾶλλον τὸν ἐλεύθερον καὶ ὀμότιµον οὐ βλασφηµήσει οὐδὲ λοιδορήσεται.

\textsuperscript{793} Translation: Laistner, On Vainglory, 115; Greek text: SC 188.803-806: ἐάν ἐν τοῖς οἰκέτασι τοῖς αὐτῶν ἐγγυµαζόνται καὶ φέρωσι καταφρονούµενοι καὶ µὴ χαλεπαίνωσι παρακοουµένοι, ἐξετάζωσι δὲ ἀκριβῶς τὰ εἰς ἔτέρου πληµµελούµενα.

\textsuperscript{794} Translation: Laistner, On Vainglory, 115; Greek text: SC 188.822-824: Ὅτω δὴ καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτῶν παραξυνόµενοι συνεχῶς καὶ δικαίως καὶ ἀδίκως, ὥστε μανθάνειν πανταχοῦ κρατεῖν τοῦ πάθους.
let him expect another to serve him in the bath, but let him do all these things for himself. This will make him strong and simple and courteous.\^795

Chrysostom therefore views slavery as a necessary evil, and he lays down certain limits to the use of slaves. Self-sufficiency lies at the core of this virtue. These statements are very important to consider, since they serve as a basis for his views on slaves as symbolic capital. In a very subtle manner, he simply redefines and redistributes the social distinctions associated with slaveholding. In Chrysostom’s reasoning, slaves still function as symbolic capital, but not in the conventional sense. It is no longer the number of slaves possessed by someone, or the duties they are given (strategic slaveholding); rather, the new ascetic distinction proposed by Chrysostom is what one does not have slaves do; washing one’s own feet now becomes a mark of distinction and social honour, since it represents the individual as someone who is self-sufficient. We can now examine more closely the statements in the homily on Hebrews (Hom. Heb. 28.9-10):

But there is no one who lays down his or her abundance. For as long as you have many slaves, and garments of silk, these things are all abundancies. Nothing is indispensable or necessary, without which we are able to live; these things are superfluous, and are simply add-ons. Let us then see, if you allow me, what we cannot live without. If we have only two slaves, we can live. For some live without slaves, what excuse do we have, if we are not satisfied with two? We can also have a house built of brick of three rooms;

\^795 Translation: Laistner, On Vainglory, 116; Greek text: SC 188.852-863: Ὅστε διδασκέεσθω καταφρονείσθαι, διαπτύυεσθαι. Μηδένα ἀπαιτεῖτω παρὰ οἰκετῶν οἷα ἑλευθερος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα ἐαυτῷ διακονείτω. Ἐκεῖνα δὲ μόνον οἱ παιδεὶς ύπηρετήτωσαν, ὅσα οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ διακονήσασθαι· οίον μαγειρεύειν οὐ δυνατόν ἑλευθερον· οὐ γὰρ χρὴ τῶν πόνων ἀφέμενον τῶν ἑλευθέρῳ προσηκόντων τούτως ἐαυτὸν διδόναι. Ἀν μέντοι δὲ τοὺς πόδας τοὺς ἑαυτῷ περιπλύνειν, μηδέποτε τοῦτο ποιεῖτω δούλος, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ· καὶ προσηνῆ τοῖς οἰκέταις ἐργάσῃ τὸν ἑλευθερον καὶ πολὺ ποθεινόν. Μηδὲ ἰμάτιον τις ἐπιδιδότω· μηδὲ ἐν βαλανείῳ περιμενέτω τὴν παρ’ ἐτέρου θεραπείαν, ἀλλὰ παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ πάντα ποιεῖτω· τούτο καὶ εὑρωστὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄτυφον καὶ προσηνῆ ἐργάσεται.
and this is sufficient for us. For are there not some with children and wife who have only one room? Let there also be, if you will, two serving boys. And how is it not shameful, you say, that a woman of nobility should walk out with only two slaves? It is no shame, that a noble woman should walk around with two slaves, but it is a shame if she should go around with many. Perhaps you laugh when you hear this. Believe me it is a shame. Do you think it is an important matter to go out with many slaves, like dealers in sheep, or dealers in slaves? This is pride and vainglory, the other is philosophy and respectability. For a noble woman should not to be known from the scores of slaves who attend to her. For what virtue is there in having many slaves? This does not belong to the soul, and whatever is not of the soul does not exhibit freedom. When she is satisfied with little, then is she a noble woman indeed; but when she needs many things, she is a slave and inferior to real slaves. Tell me, do the angels not go to and fro around the world alone, and do not need anyone to follow them? Are they then because of this inferior to us? They who need no servants, to us who need them? If then not needing a slave at all, is angelic, who resembles the angelic life more, she who needs many slaves, or she who needs a few? Is this not a shame? For a shame it is to do anything that is not fitting. Tell me who draws the attention of those who are in the public places, she who brings many in her procession, or she who brings only a few? And is she who is alone not less conspicuous than she who is accompanied by a few? Do you see that this former behaviour is a shame? Who draws the attention of those in the public places, she who wears beautiful clothes, or she who is dressed simply and modestly? Again who draws those in the public places, she who is borne on mules, and with mantlets decorated with gold, or she who walks out plainly, and as it may be, with propriety? Or we do not even look at this last one, even if we
see her; but the crowds not only force their way through to see the other, but also ask, ‘Who is she, and where is she from?’ And I cannot tell you how much envy is caused by this. What then, tell me, is it shameful to be looked at or not to be looked at? When is the shame greater, when all stare at her, or when no one does? When they learn [perhaps ‘gossip’] about her, or when they do not even care? Do you see that we do all these things, not for modesty’s sake but for vainglory?”

796 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 63.197.44-198.36: ἀλλʼ οὐδείς ἐστιν οὐδὲ τὸ περίίσσευµα καταβάλλων· ἡς γὰρ ἀν ἐχῃς οἰκέτας πολλοὺς καὶ ιµµία σηµικα, πάντα ταύτα περιττεύµατα ἐστίν. Οὐδὲν ἀναγκαίον οὐδὲ τῆς χρείας, ἄν ἀνευ δυνάµθα ξην ταύτα περιττα καὶ ἀπλῶς ξω πρόσκειται. Τίνος οὖν ἀνευ οὐ δυνάµθα ξην ᾱδωµέν, ει δοκει. Κὰν δῦο μόνους ξχωµεν οἰκέτας, δυνάµθα ξην ὁπο γὰρ εἰσι τινες χωρὶς οἰκετῶν ξώντες, ποιαν ήµεις ξχωµεν ἀπολογίην, τοῖς δῦο οὐκ ἀρκούµενοι; Δυνάµθα καὶ έκ πλίνθων ἔχειν οἰκίαι τοῖς οἰκηµάτων· καὶ τοῦτο ἀρκεῖ Ἦµιν. Εἰπὲ γὰρ µοι, οὐκ εἰσὶ τινες µετὰ παίδων καὶ γυναικῶς ένα οἴκων ξχοντες; ἔστωσαν δὲ, ει βουλει, καὶ παίδες δῦο. Καὶ πῶς οὐκ αἰσχύνη, φησιν, έστι τὸ µετὰ δῦο οἰκετῶν τὴν ἐλευθέεραν βαδίζειν; Ἀπαγε, οὐκ έστι τοῦτο αἰσχύνη, µετὰ δῦο οἰκετῶν τὴν ἐλευθέεραν βαδίζειν, ἀλλα αἰσχύνη έστι τὸ µετὰ πολλῶν προίεναι. Τάχα γελάτε τούτων ακουόντες. Πιστεύσατε, τούτο έστιν αἰσχύνη, τὸ µετὰ πολλῶν προίεναι. ὶστορ οἱ προβατοπῶλαι, ἢ ὅστερ οὶ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων κάτηροι, οὕτω µέγα τί ἤγεισθε τὸ µετὰ πλειόνων οἰκετῶν προίεναι. Τύφος τοῦτο καὶ κενοδοξία· ἐκεῖνο φιλοσοφία καὶ σεµμνότης. Τὴν γὰρ ἐλευθέεραν οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν άκολουθων φαίνεσθαι δεῖ· ποια γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἀνδράπόδα ἔχει πολλὰ; Τοῦτο οὐκ έστι φυχής· ὅπερ δὲ οὐκ έστι φυχής, οὐ δείκνυσιν ἐλευθέεραν. Ὅταν ολίγων ἀρκῇς τὸν ἐστίν ἐλευθέεραν ὄντως· ὅταν δὲ πολλῶν δῆται, δουλὴ ἔστι καὶ ἀνδραπόδων χεῖρων. Εἰπέ µοι, οἱ ἀγγελοὶ οὐχὶ µόνοι περιπολοῦσι τὴν οἰκουµένην, καὶ οὐ δέονται οὐδενὸς τοῦ ἐψοµένου; ἂρ οὐν διὰ τοῦτο χεῖρους ἡµῶν εἰσι τῶν δεοµένων οἱ µὴ δεοµένοι· Εἰ τοῖς οὐκ ὁµὲν µεθε ἄρως δείκνυε ακολοθου, ἀγγελικὸν, τὶς τοῦ ἀγγελικοῦ βίου ἐγχῶς, η πολλῶν δεοµένη, η ο λίγων; Οὐκ έστι τοῦτο αἰσχύνη· αἰσχύνη γὰρ έστι τὸ ἀπόστοι το το πράξαν. Εἰπέ µοι, τὶς ἐπιστρέφει τοὺς ἐπ’ ἀγορᾶς, ἡ πολλοὺς ἐπαγοµένη, η ο λίγως; ταύτης δὲ τῆς ο λίγους ἐπαγοµένης, οὐχὶ η µόνη µάλλον ἀπρόοπτος φαινοµένη; Ὅρας ὅτι ἐκείνο έστιν αἰσχύνη; Τὶς ἐπιστρέφει τοὺς ἐπ’ ἀγορᾶς, ἡ τα καλά φοροῦσα ιµµία, ἡ ἡ ἀπλῶς περικειµένη καὶ ἀνεπιτηδεύτως; τὶς πάλιν ἐπιστρέφει τοὺς ἐπ’ ἀγορᾶς, ἡ ἔπι ἡµίωνον φεροµένη, καὶ χρυσοπάστων παραπεπεσµένων, ἡ ἡ ἀπλῶς καὶ ὡς ἐτυχε µετὰ κοσµιώτητος.
The homilies on Hebrews were most likely preached in Constantinople during Chrysostom’s episcopate, and sights like those described in the homily above would have been common in this great city. The tirade is in essence directed against the vice of superfluity or luxuria. We can see that Chrysostom lists slaves along with other luxurious commodities like silk garments and eunuchs (cf. also: Hom. Jo. 28.2). It is not surprising that these commodities are linked since both are for cosmetic purposes or ornamentation. Chrysostom's comments on slaveholding here thus function as critique of adornment and a warning of the dangers of ancient voyeurism and counter-surveillance. In the first instance, like silk garments, slaves are not required for necessity, but for appearance and the display of wealth. The issue was raised some decades earlier at the Council of Gangra where, according to its synodical letter, the Eustathians were accused of contravening regular dress codes and encouraging slaves to act with insolence toward their masters both in action and, as it interestingly seems, in apparel (they did not wear slaves’ attire). Chrysostom then continues to elaborate on slaveholding, stating as in the previous homily on 1 Corinthians that having only two slaves would be sufficient. He then provides a scathing criticism of how wealthy aristocratic women display their herds of slaves as symbolic capital. Chrysostom provides an inverse argument by stating that parading many slaves is in fact a mark of shame. If we interpret this in the light of Bourdieu's notion of social distinction, Chrysostom redraws the honour-map and redistributes social distinction based on ascetic adherence to principles of necessity and simplicity. There is a new symbolic economy at work, and social repraesentatio is reimagined. The critique of slaves as a type of adornment should not be underemphasized here. Dress and adornment are often discourses laden with

βαδίζουσα; ἢ ταύτην μέν οὐδὲ ὄρωμεν κἂν ἴδωμεν, ἐκείνην δὲ οὐ μόνον ἵδεῖν βιάζονται οἱ πολλοὶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐρωτώσι, τίς εἰπ, καὶ πόθεν; Καὶ παρίσημα λέγειν ὅσος ὁ φθόνος ἐντεῦθεν τίκτεται. Τι οὖν, εἰπέ μοι, ἀίσχρόν, ὁράσσεις ἡ μὴ ὁράσσας; πότε μείζων ἡ ἁίσχυνη, ὅταν πάντες εἰς αὐτὴν βλέπωσιν, ἢ ὅταν μὴ δέοις; ὅταν μανθάνωσι περὶ αὐτῆς, ἢ ὅταν μὴ δέοντος, ὃς ὅτι οὐ δὲ· αἰσχύνην, ἀλλὰ διὰ κενοδοξίαν πάντα πράττομεν;

797 Mayer, Homilies of St. John Chrysostom, 197–98.
799 Glancy, Slavery in Early Christianity, 90.
conflict. Karen Tranberg Hansen has described dress and adornment as a ‘set of competing discourses, linked to the operation of power, that construct the body and its presentation’ and that it ‘readily becomes a flash point of conflicting values, fuelling contests in historical encounters, in interactions across class, between genders and generations, and in recent global cultural and economic exchanges.’ Adornment, whether with ‘dress’ made from fabric or represented with slave-bodies, is therefore quite performative and, as Bourdieu has noted, a habitus in itself. While the authors referred to above mostly refer to adornment in the conventional sense, it should be understood here that the case of slave-bodies as adornment is quite curious. As it has been argued in this chapter, along with jewelry and clothes, slave-bodies are economic and symbolic capital, and the display of herds of slaves points to luxuria, and as Batten states: ‘...[E]lite males attack women for their elaborate adornment, they accuse them of greed and luxuria and attach moral and symbolic meanings to the women’s dress when what may be fuelling this invective, at least in part, are worries about the economic power of the women who owned and wore such items.’ The promotion of tactical slaveholding has implications for adornment. Adornment in Roman society was dictated by numerous unspoken principles and, in the case of women especially, it was directly related to honour concerns. Roman society was very much obsessed with public appearance since it was so directly related to honour concerns. The display of superfluous adornment in the form of dress or slaves was part of the expected public performance of Roman aristocratic women and, as Olson states: ‘[W]omen were not ignorant cultural dopes, coerced into beautification, or passive narcissists; but rather knowledgeable and adept cultural actors.’ This point also illustrates the wealth of some women during the late imperial period. Chrysostom’s statements in the homily cited above are perfect examples of an elite male criticism of female adornment. This criticism forms part of a long-standing early Christian tradition related to modest female dress-codes (cf. for instance: 1 Tim. 2:9-15; 1 Pet. 3:1-6; Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 3.11; Tertullian, Cult. fem.; Cyprian, 800Karen Tranberg Hansen, “The World in Dress: Anthropological Perspectives on Clothing, Fashion and Culture,” AnRevAnth 33 (2004): 370; cf. also: Alicia J. Batten, “Carthaginian Critiques of Adornment,” JECH 1, no. 1 (2011): 5. 801Tranberg Hansen, “World in Dress,” 372; cf. also: Batten, “Carthaginian Critiques of Adornment,” 5. 802Batten, “Carthaginian Critiques of Adornment,” 6. 803Kelly Olson, Dress and the Roman Woman: Self-Presentation and Society (London: Routledge, 2008), 111; cf. also: Batten, “Carthaginian Critiques of Adornment,” 10.
Christian women ought to adorn themselves with virtue and modesty rather than fine cosmetic commodities. Along with modesty, Chrysostom again emphasizes the virtue of self-sufficiency. It is in fact an angelic attribute to serve others, since this is the essential task of angels. Another problem that Chrysostom identifies is that of social visibility. The woman adorned with gold, silk and many slaves draw the wrong type of attention, attention that often leads to the vices of vainglory and envy. Ironically, people then become slaves of vainglory (cf. Hom. Tit. 2.2). The extravagant parade of the herds of slaves is actually disgraceful and a display of pride. In Homilia in epistulam ad I Corinthios 40.5-6 he states that it is shameful since slaveholders utilize these slaves, especially at the marketplace, to keep other people at a distance from the slaveholder. Chrysostom continues to state that such wealthy slaveholders would rather allow animals to walk close to them than human beings. Furthermore, he also points to the fact that the slaves themselves are often dressed in the best clothing. This further exemplified the elevated status of the slaveholder. The slave-bodies serve as surrogates here to bear the excess adornment of the slaveholder. In both homilies Chrysostom warns that the wealthy person who flaunts their symbolic capital is liable to be envied by others. In the ancient Mediterranean world, envy was considered a destructive vice. This is especially true in a society where economic capital was limited. Chrysostom often refers to the vice of envy in his sermons. He does not regard it in a superstitious way as is often the case among ancient authors, but points out that ‘envy in fact is like a venom against a virtuous lifestyle.’

Secondly, we also find a warning against the dangers of ancient visibility and voyeurism. Besides the comments on adornment, the symbolic capital here also functions as something to supposedly protect the honour of the noble woman. It was considered shameful for such a woman to go out into public alone, since it may imply that she does not want people to see what she is doing. We saw this in chapter 2 when discussing the counter-surveillance of slaves. The surveillance and voyeurism of the slaves became something of a mobile prison for such women, as Veyne remarks:

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804 Batten, “Carthaginian Critiques of Adornment.”
Decency and concern for station required that ladies of rank never go out without maids, companions (comites), and a mounted servant known as a custos, often mentioned by erotic poets. This mobile prison, which followed a woman everywhere, was the Roman equivalent of the gynecaeum, or monogamous harem, in which a Greek woman concerned for her reputation insisted that her husband lock her up during the night...In any case, old-fashioned women proved their modesty by going out as little as possible and never showing themselves in public without a partial veil. To be the mother of a family was an honourable prison...

This statement is crucial to understanding the radical nature of Chrysostom’s statement. By redefining the role of the symbolic capital that is the slave-procession of a noble woman, Chrysostom is in essence also redefining the boundaries of modesty and reputation. The honour of the slave-procession is not only in the display of wealth, but it also shows that the woman has nothing to hide. This is also why Chrysostom constantly refers to the visibility and voyeurism of such a spectacle. The inverse now becomes true. Going out alone or with a slave or two is honourable. The dynamics of the living symbolic capital of the Roman noble woman also highlights the dynamics of surveillance and carcerality she faced. The slaves now become a prison, a panopticon that guarded not only her physical body, but also her honour. This is also how gossip spreads. Chrysostom literally states that the crowd ‘learns’ (μανθάνω) about her, but this could be euphemistic for gossip. The woman of true nobility, for Chrysostom, guided by the new principles of inner virtue, simplicity and necessity, has her conduct based on conscience and not visibility. Ascribing to these new guidelines of Chrysostom may have been quite difficult, if not impossible, for the typical Constantinopolitan mistress. It would be an action with much risk, not only to her honour, but also to the honour of her husband and the household. This is probably why Chrysostom generally proposes that she goes out into public with a few slaves, thus still being under surveillance and with less risk of attracting the wrong reputation.

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807 Veyne, “Roman Empire,” 73.
While it seems that Chrysostom is opposing the social distinction wrought by symbolic capital, he is in fact simply introducing a new form of social distinction. Whereas the former habitus of the Roman aristocracy entailed displaying superfluous adornments, garments and slaves, Chrysostom's alternative, what we may term ascetic distinction, attributes honour and distinction to those embodying values of simplicity and necessity. These become new status indicators in Chrysostom's social vision. This new ascetic symbolic economy has several implications for gender roles. He especially targets women who employ adornment to achieve social distinction. His aesthetic distancing is therefore strategic and very much bound to gender issues. Tactical slaveholding, along with other aspects like modesty of dress, for women in particular (but also for men, as seen in his De inani gloria), now become the new mark of distinction, an ascetic aesthetics based on the values of simplicity and necessity. The countervoyeurism of the slaves on the mistress is decreased, but not totally absent, although this would be the ideal. This would still protect the modesty of the mistress from the wrong public opinion. The slave-body as an economic and symbolic commodity functions identically in relation to other commodities of luxuria and dangers related to vainglory and well as public reputation.

5 CONCLUSION
We have seen in this final chapter that the slave-body also functioned as an objectified commodity in late antiquity, most notably as economic and symbolic capital. Thus, many of Chrysostom’s remarks on slaveholding, especially the shift from strategic to tactical slaveholding, function within his paradigm for wealth management. To many wealthy individuals in Chrysostom’s audience the guidelines for slave-management would seem quite radical. His repeated advice that only one or two slaves would suffice would have been quite dramatic to the ears of some of his audience. Slave-bodies, like all other commodities in antiquity, function within the economic perspective of the limited good; a perspective that Chrysostom also accepts. Thus, manumission of slaves is seen as an act that is supposed to bring some economic balance on the one hand, but also to honour the slaveholder as someone who aspires to the ascetic ideal of renunciation of wealth and the care of the poor.

Slave-bodies, as commodified bodies, also functioned as symbolic capital. This implies that possessing slaves was seen as both an honour-incentive and something that guarded the one’s honour, especially in the case of women. Moreover, the public display of such bodies was
governed by the politics of adornment. Chrysostom, however, provides a thorough critique of such public displays and slave processions. Wealthy aristocrats would often move around in public with scores of slaves not only for practical tasks and security, but also to flaunt their wealth and honour. Even mass-manumissions of slaves served the purpose of giving honour to the slaveholder. The danger that Chrysostom highlights is that such displays almost always lead to vainglory and envy. He rather proposed that during the crucial developmental years of a child, he or she must be taught to treat slaves humanely and learn to be self-sufficient and modest. Slaves also functioned as a type of moral training ground for teaching children the principles of Christian virtue. As with many elite male authors of antiquity, his invective is especially directed towards aristocratic women who may use scores of slaves as adornment to negotiate power in public life. The mobile and panoptical prison made from slave-bodies incarcerated the Roman mistress in a harem-like fashion. She is hereby protected from gaining social ill-repute and gossip. The new Christian noble woman, for Chrysostom, is guided by the virtues of simplicity and necessity, her conduct based on conscience and not public visibility. It is therefore also a critique of the highly voyeuristic public life of the Roman world. Social invisibility is the ideal. These new guidelines of Chrysostom would have been quite challenging, especially to the traditional Roman gentlewoman. It could be a risk to her honour and reputation, as well as that of her husband, which is probably why Chrysostom advises that she moves about in public with a few slaves, to ensure she is still under surveillance and with less social risk. Chrysostom thus provides a new economy of adornment and *repraesentatio*, one that places the values of self-sufficiency, modesty and humility at the core.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

1 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

At the commencement of this study, the following problem statement was introduced: how does John Chrysostom negotiate and re-imagine the habitus of Roman slaveholding in his homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews? In order to address this problem statement, the study started by revisiting the historical development of the Roman habitus of slaveholding and re-evaluating the ancient sources and evidence from a cultural-historical perspective. One of the most important discourses for understanding the Roman habitus of slaveholding is *oikonomia*, or household management. One of the earliest and most influential authors writing on *oikonomia* was Xenophon, specifically in his *Oeconomicus*, which resembles a dialogue on the nature of optimal *oikonomia*. Xenophon, along with authors like Thucydides did not use arguments of naturalization to make sense of slavery, but rather saw the slave as a socially inferior outsider. This would become very important for the centuries to follow. While Aristotle famously decreed that slaves are inferior by nature, his influence on the formation of the Roman habitus of slaveholding may be limited, since the library of Theophrastus was lost and only recovered some years later. Not that Aristotle had no influence, but when reading the writings of the Roman agricultural authors like Cato, Varro and Columella, it is clear that Xenophonian ideas were more dominant. An author like Philodemus critiqued both Xenophon and Aristotle/Theophrastus when it came to ideas of householding and slave-management. What this demonstrates at least is that the formation of the Roman habitus of slaveholding was in no way simple and monolithic - different people had different ideas on the issue. It would especially be the rise of the Roman villa-system and slave-mode of production that would influence ideas on slaveholding, but even here, viewpoints evolved and changed as the Republic declined and the Empire rose. One of the
most important concepts for this study that came from the development of Roman agricultural practices is the notion of the \textit{vilicus}. I can only conclude in this regard that the development of the \textit{vilicus}-concept from the Roman agricultural treatises was not only crucial, but instrumental in the development not only of Christian views on slavery, but a keystone in Christian theology such as Christology, hamartiology and eschatology. By the time that Chrysostom writes on slaveholding and slave-metaphors, this concept was deeply embedded in Christian thinking.

Furthermore, alongside the Hellenistic and Roman authors mentioned above, special attention needs to be given to the influence of Stoic philosophy. Stoic teaching essentially redefined Hellenistic and Roman concepts of mastery, especially the mastery of the passions, which was the foundation of masculinity. Seneca’s writings on slaveholding would almost mirror Christian thought on slaveholding. Obviously, the most important writings for understanding Chrysostom’s views were the New Testament documents, especially the writings of Paul. These also serve as the scriptural apparatus in Chrysostom’s homilies. As early as Paul’s writings we find traces of the development of a pastoral form of governmentality, a concept that would be crucial to understanding Chrysostom’s views on slaveholding. Thus, what are the most important points to take note of from the study of pre-Chrysostomic sources regarding the complex habitus of Roman slaveholding:

a. \textit{Natural Slave or Social Outsider}: While concepts of natural slavery were common in the Hellenistic period, the thought was less popular during the Roman and Christian periods. Almost no Christian author would accept the notion of natural slavery, and this also included Chrysostom. With the concept of natural slavery being less popular, the Xenophonian idea of the slave as a social outsider and socially inferior gained prominence, especially during the development of the Roman villa style of \textit{oikonomia}. From this the concept of the \textit{vilicus} developed, which was influential in early Christian thought. Slave-bodies especially had to be controlled by the regulation and manipulation of the passions.

b. \textit{The Stoic Influence}: Ancient Christian thought on slaveholding, including that of Chrysostom, is almost identical to Stoic thought on the matter. While slavery is never abolished, an attitude of indifference to institutional slavery gave rise to the popularisation of the slave-metaphor. The use of slave-metaphors unfortunately removes the focus from institutional slavery. Nevertheless,
ancient Christian authors like Chrysostom would adopt this type of reasoning when it came to slaveholding.

c. From Holistic Oikonomia to Pastoral Governmentality: Another very important feature for understanding slavery in the homilies of Chrysostom is the pastoral model of governance, specifically based on the notion of the shepherd-flock dynamic. The concept of holistic oikonomia found in authors like Xenophon and Plato provided the foundation for this development. This implied a Christic duplication in the social hierarchy, and in late antiquity, this was active from the bishop or priest to the pater familias, and from the pater familias to the slave. The metaphor of all human beings being slaves to Christ, and God as the almighty heavenly slaveholder authorizes this system. It implied that although slaves are socially inferior, they should still be cared for and the image of Christ as embodied in Christian virtue should also be taught to slaves.

We therefore see that the habitus of Roman slaveholding was very complex and always in flux. This is the nature of the habitus, as seen in the theories of Bourdieu. But it was especially these three developments above that would have an immense influence of John Chrysostom’s teachings on slavery. We also mentioned that the Roman habitus of slaveholding practices itself at the intersection of four corporeal discourses, namely domesticity, heteronomy, carcerality and commodification. We will now summarize Chrysostom’s views on this and specifically highlight in which ways he negotiates and re-imagines these particular corporeal discourses. It is not so simple as to state that Chrysostom either accepts or rejects slavery - he does not abolish it, but he also has points of contention, and the schema of negotiation and re-imagination provides the necessary complexity to the issue without the danger of generalizing.

2 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM AND THE DOMESTICITY OF THE SLAVE-BODY
Domestic slavery is one of the most important discursivities in approaching slaveholding in the writings of John Chrysostom, since most of his comments are directed toward the control and regulation of the slave-body in the Christian household as the sources clearly attest. In which ways does Chrysostom negotiate and re-imagine these discourses?
a. **Negotiating Domesticity**: One of the clear points of negotiation when it comes to the domesticity of the slave-body is Chrysostom’s shift from strategic to tactical slaveholding. Chrysostom advises Christians to have little or even no slaves at all. The ideal number, as he states in numerous instances, is to have one or two slaves in the household. This is a very low number of slaves for a typical bourgeois household. Tactical slaveholding is based on the clever utilization of time rather than space, as in the case of strategic slaveholding. The implication is that fewer slaves would do more work, and also more shameful and unpleasant tasks. His ideal of having no slaves at all also supports the inclusion of this shift into the points of negotiation in Chrysostom’s works. One of the other points of negotiation and acceptance in this regard can be seen in Chrysostom’s extensive use of slave-metaphors in his teaching. While he is often uncomfortable with slavery, Chrysostom also acknowledges its inevitability, especially since, as seen above, he still allows for people to own some slaves. This would entail that the use of slave-metaphors would be effective in a community promoting the ownership of slaves, even if it is only one or two. The Stoic-Philonic metaphors of slavery are crucial to Chrysostom’s formulations of Christology, hamartiology and eschatology. The Christological influence is seen in two respects. Firstly, the view of Christ or God as the eternal slaveholder defines a basic dimension of human interaction with the divine. The second, and logical inference of this is that this thought as incorporated in early Christian pastoralism would become a means of governing, controlling and regulating bodies, especially slave-bodies in the Christian community. In terms of hamartiology, slavery is seen as the result of sin and hence part of imperfect creation. Sin also enslaves. These continuities between slavery and sin provide the background for the final formulation, namely eschatology. Chrysostom sees God as the eternal slaveholder, and human beings his slaves or *vilici*, waiting for the surprise visit of the absent *pater familias*. The good slaves will receive eschatological reward (heaven) and the bad slaves will receive eschatological punishment (hell). This was not simply theoretical theological formulations or crude manipulation - they had very real implications. Christian institutional slaves who suffered on earth should endure and embrace their suffering, and not revolt against their disposition, since their reward will even be greater in heaven. Eschatological reward and punishment also then justify the earthly reward and punishment of slaves. Here we see Christian theology and ethics maintaining a system of extreme cruelty and social injustice through negotiation with metaphors and acceptance of hierarchies of domination.
c. Re-Imagining Domesticity: Chrysostom presents a new social vision for domestic slaves in his homilies. This was based on the reformation of the slave-body. Again, the Xenophonian notion of the slave as social outsider and delinquent is assumed in this instance. Slaves, due to their disadvantaged upbringing and background, according to Chrysostom, have the capacity for virtue since they are not slave-like due to their nature. The slave-body is then reformed through the teaching of virtue as well as practical trades. The reward here could be manumission, but it was not guaranteed. This is then one of the essential tasks of the pater familias within the system of pastoralism: to teach slaves virtue. External signs of punishment are now replaced by spiritual and religious exercises. It implies the normalization of the delinquent slave-body, also equal to masculinization to a certain extent. The household now becomes both an observatory, to monitor deviant behaviour, as well as a reformatory, to reform slave-bodies into what Foucault calls docile bodies. Surveillance plays a major role and the Christic panopticism of pastoral governmentality functions as a strategy for regulating slave-bodies and making them docile.

3 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM AND THE HETERONOMY OF THE SLAVE-BODY

In antiquity, all bodies were considered heteronomous, and therefore made to be ruled and owned. This heteronomy would have very real implications for understanding ancient subjectivity and humanness. The following points of negotiation and reimagination serve as reference here:

a. Negotiating Heteronomy: At no point in the homilies under consideration does Chrysostom resist the notion of the heteronomy of the slave-body. All bodies are under some type of rulership. He also admonishes slaveholders that they too are under the rulership of the divine slaveholder. He also promotes the idea that slaveholders should treat slaves fairly and justly, a concept not uncommon in ancient thought on slave management. Based on his exegesis of 1 Corinthians 7:21, however, it is better for slaves to remain enslaved. He especially wants Christian slaves to be better at the work of slaves than non-Christian slaves. This is especially based on a new scopic economy at work in Chrysostom’s thought. Since God is the eternal slaveholder, slaves ought to work as if working for God and not for an earthly owner. The practical subjectivity of the slave is now based on his or her position in the divine economy in
which God rules over everything. The potent influence of Stoicism in this regard is also exhibited in the notion that slaves should be treated humanely or, as Chrysostom repeatedly states, with philanthropy. But the humanization of the slave-body does not function as amelioration, but rather a very pervasive technology for further oppressing the slave, since the typical ‘human’ characteristics like sex, food, sleep and family could be manipulated to regulate slave behaviour. Rather than seeking the humanity of slaves, it should be assumed.

b. Reimagining Heteronomy: Chrysostom does believe that being under Christ represents some type of freedom. Again the Stoic-Philonic metaphor serves as a point of reference. Being in a state of slavery in the institutional sense should not be the main concern of the slave or the free, but to which extent they are enslaved to sin and the passions. Chrysostom does not equate these two aspects, but rather sees enslavement to sin as the most dangerous form of enslavement. At the bottom of the scale lies institutional slavery. Thus, rather than focusing on one’s social status, one must focus on one’s theological status as being enslaved to sin and thereafter, enslaved to the passions. It is both a reaffirmation and re-imagination of typical Stoic-Philonic concepts of slavery and heteronomy.

4 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM AND THE CARCERALITY OF THE SLAVE-BODY

The slave-body was also described as a carceral body in this dissertation. It implies that the slave constantly finds him- or herself in a state of physical and/or symbolic imprisonment. The carceral state of the slave-body is maintained by various carceral mechanisms. Chrysostom negotiates and re-imagines slave carcerality in the following ways:

a. Negotiating Carcerality: Like most late ancient Christian authors, Chrysostom is in favour of slaves remaining in their carceral state. Slaves should obey the law and remain in their state of slavery and never seek illegal means of breaking this carcerality. He goes so far as to say that people who, under the pretence of religion, cause slaves to flee from their masters are not only criminals, but also blasphemers. In his homilies on Philemon, Chrysostom states that good slaves ought to remain with their masters and if they flee, they need to return. Masters however should also be fair and gracious toward such slaves. The examples of Paul, Onesimus and Philemon serve as role models for such behaviour.
b. Reimagining Carcerality: Since Chrysostom affirms that slaves should remain in their carceral state, he also uses various carceral mechanisms to ensure slaves remain incarcerated. The first mechanism is that of an authoritative scriptural apparatus. Paul’s Epistle to Philemon was especially influential in this instance. Philemon functions as the ideal Christian slaveholder and Onesimus, on the one hand, the bad slave who fled from his master, but on the other, the rehabilitated and reformed slave returning to the domination of his master. The second carceral mechanism is that of the fictive kinship of slaves. Slaves are included as fictive kin within the Christian community, but the extent to which this was truly practised is unclear, and even if it was practiced, like the Stoic-Philonic metaphorical slavery, fictive kinship draws the focus away from institutional slavery and hence reinforces the social status of the slave as someone in bondage. Finally, the notion that slaves are capable of benefaction also reinforces the carcerality of the slave, since the slave must first conform to the principles of passivity and submissiveness. Honour simply functions as a reward, but the micro-honour of benefaction does not negate the macro-shame of being enslaved. Both these latter mechanisms are examples of how the humanness of the slave-body is used as a technology for enforcing slave-carcerality.

5 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM AND THE COMMODIFICATION OF THE SLAVE-BODY

Slaves were considered to be both persons as well as objects in the ancient world. Chrysostom also speaks about slaves in terms of wealth. He views slaves as both economic and symbolic capital. The processes of negotiation and reimagination function thus:

a. Negotiating Commodification: Chrysostom negotiates with the objectification and commodification by including slaves into the categories of economic and symbolic capital. In terms of economic capital, both the possession and manumission of slaves becomes a very complex matter in this instance, since it can serve as both a marker of wealth renunciation, or honour. Chrysostom’s advice to slaveholders to own one or two slaves is in line with the popular asceticism he aims to promote among the urban inhabitants. People should become self-sufficient and only use slaves for tasks of necessity and not for luxury. This is then the other dimension of tactical slaveholding promoted by Chrysostom.
b. Reimagining Commodification: Chrysostom also considers slave-bodies as symbolic capital, that is, capital that serves to enhance the honour and social status of the slaveholder. The danger for Chrysostom here is that this often leads to pride and especially vainglory. This was often the case when slave-bodies served as adornment. Rather than parading processions of slaves to the theatre and marketplace, in other words, strategic slaveholding, slaveholders should not be governed by the politics of social visibility. Rather, slaveholders should be exemplary through the lack of slaves by their side and their practice of ascetic tactical slaveholding. This is truly honourable and not simply vainglory. It would have very real implications for the noble Roman women of Chrysostom’s time, since they were also constantly under the surveillance of slaves, in a type of a mobile prison. He critiques this ancient public voyeurism and rather wants women to move around in public with little or no slaves, which would pose a considerable social risk.

In concluding this study, it has been seen that Chrysostom’s views on slavery are very complex and function within other social and cultural systems of his day. It is not so simple as to state that Chrysostom, or any other ancient author for that matter, simply accepts or abolishes slavery. It is obvious that Chrysostom does not abolish it. Rather, we see Chrysostom in constant negotiation and reimagining the Roman habitus of slaveholding to serve his greater social vision of promoting a popular asceticism in the households of the city. While he may have had various problems with slavery, Chrysostom does not see it as a serious social problem. Chrysostom’s views on slaveholding are almost identical to Stoic-Philonic concepts of the institution. These views form part of a complex system of governance called pastoralism, in which the image of Christ is constantly duplicated and reduplicated onto the bishop, the *pater familias* and the slave. Christ is morphed into the divine slaveholder, constantly watching, preparing for a surprise visit, and ready to punish and reward. Chrysostom is uncomfortable with the body enslaved, but rather than abolishing it, he reimagines slavery and thereby perpetuates the oppressive practice that would take several centuries to be rejected by the Christian church.
POSTSCRIPT: ON CRITICAL THEORY/METHOD AND THE HEURISTICS OF SLAVERY STUDIES

The main question this dissertation aimed to address was how Chrysostom negotiates and reimagines slavery in his homilies on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews. But it was also mentioned that a second result of this undertaking was that a new framework for approaching slavery was developed. As a postscript, after the completion of the investigation, what could be said of this new framework, and what would be the way forward? While it provided a useful matrix for making sense of ancient slavery, it has also stirred up many questions, specifically relating to critical theory/method and the study of ancient slavery. The use of critical theory often leads the scholar to a point, not of investigation or discovery necessarily, but also to one of crisis. During the course of writing the dissertation and applying the critical theory, especially to a topic as moving and disturbing as slavery, it often ended at these points of frustration, points of discontent, points of ‘not knowing’. I will use one example of such an event.

When discussing the heteronomy of the body, the notion of the humanity and humanness of slaves were discussed, especially relating to the work of Hartman, Johnson and Foucault. It was stated that rather than ‘seeking’ the humanity of slaves in the texts, the humanity of slaves should be assumed. The problem was that when the humanity of the slave-body was ‘found,’ it was often used as a technology of oppression and regulation, worsening the life of the slave. The notion of recognizing, seeking and proving certain marginalized or oppressed subjectivities often leads, not to emancipation, but to an intensification of exclusion, regulation and, inevitably, pathologization (a word I deliberately ignored due to its connotations to psychiatry and psychology – abnormalization was preferred). But is this then not the very nature of critique? To seek, explore and question? This easily brings one to this point of frustration and discontent. It is in essence a question of heuristics. What would the heuristic dynamic of slavery studies entail? Or put more plainly: what are we searching for, if we are searching at all? Two issues arise, issues that will be further explored during the course of my research on late ancient slavery, Chrysostom and critical theory. In the first instance, this dissertation took a step in introducing a new way for talking about slavery – namely slavery as a complex corporeal discourse – a point of intersection between domesticity, heteronomy, carcerality and commodification. This was especially due to the influence of Jennifer Glancy’s work. The logical inference of reaching a point of discontent and ‘not knowing’ is that one is forced to invent and construct a new
language and rhetoric. New categories in which slavery ‘speaks itself” should be explored. For instance, this study was especially focused on the subjectivities (or lack of subjectivity) of slave-bodies. But this is not necessarily the only category. Rather than seeking subjectivities, one could also deny their existence, or at least the possibility that they are determinable, and focus on seeking practices. This is especially the points raised by Bourdieu and De Certeau. But, secondly, before this constructive process can take place, a point of deconstruction must also be reached. And this is where critique, in my opinion, receives its essence – not as enquiry and investigation only – but also in the notion of critique as crisis. Often deconstruction, or destruction, which is crisis, must precede construction. The great cathedrals of thought must be torn down to a level of abstraction that would expose their functioning, usefulness and fissures. And only thereafter should the process of re-constructing, often with the same materials, begin. This study represented the ‘dis-memberment’ of the notion of the slave-body, into corporeal units that lay bare both its practices and subjectivities – a point of crisis, where critical theorization also becomes a form of activism, something that should never be absent in the study of slavery.