CHAPTER 5

THE CARCERAL BODY: SLAVE-CARCERALITY AND JOHN CHRYSOSTOM’S HOMILIES ON PHILEMON

1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we will look more closely at the phenomenon of slave-carcerality in antiquity, and especially focus on this discourse in John Chrysostom’s homilies on Paul’s Epistle to Philemon. The concept of slave-carcerality has already come up in the previous chapters, and here we will aim to delineate the key discursivities in the discourse. The first part of the chapter will therefore explain the discourse of slave-carcerality, and thereafter, in the second part, we will read Chrysostom’s homilies on Philemon with this discourse as a conceptual lens. This chapter is probably the most theoretical of all in the current study, relying heavily on critical theory. The reason for this is because slavery and carcerality have not yet been linked to each other in scholarship, and therefore it is necessary to carefully delineate a theory of slave-carcerality before we proceed to Chrysostom’s writings. After this, we will examine Chrysostom’s homilies on Philemon and aim to delineate the key carceral mechanisms he utilizes to redefine the status of the slave as a carceral body.

The concept of carcerality is novel in the study of slavery. Carcerality originates from Michel Foucault’s understanding of modern society as a carceral society, that is, a society that

---

imprisons and confines individuals. It was especially developed in his work on the birth of the prison system, as well as other institutions like the asylum\textsuperscript{671} and the clinic.\textsuperscript{672} Foucault’s argument, however, centres on the rise of a carceral society in Europe after the sixteenth century. This point was also raised briefly in chapter 2 when the discipline and punishment of slaves were discussed, but we will now examine it more closely. Foucault argues that before the rise of the modern carceral system, the body of the criminal was not detained as such, but it was tortured and dismembered in a horrific public spectacle. The aim of this type of violent, public punishment was to illustrate that criminals found guilty were to suffer very badly, and it was to be displayed to the rest of society, acting not only as a deterrent but also establishing a social discourse of public punishment as a ceremony. After this, Foucault continues, society shifted from the public spectacle of punishment to one based on imprisonment, detention and, essentially, rehabilitation - a carceral society.\textsuperscript{673} This society had a new ‘policy’ if you will, that punishment now occurs in secrecy, behind the veil as it were, in order to protect the government or institution that applies the punishment from the shame of the punishment itself. These concepts we have already discussed, and they will serve once again as a point of departure for this chapter.

Foucault’s emphasis was mostly on the modern prison. At the end of his study, he concludes the following about the prison: ‘That in the central position that it [the prison] occupies, it is not alone, but linked to a whole series of “carceral” mechanisms which seem distinct enough - since they are intended to alleviate pain, to cure, to comfort - but which all tend, like the prison, to exercise a power of normalization.’\textsuperscript{674} This statement is very important for the study at hand. Carcerality is more than imprisonment or penal dynamics in a society. It is manifest in what Foucault would call the carceral-continuum. At the very core of carcerality lies a discourse of detention and confinement with the purpose of normalizing. It is made up of a


\textsuperscript{672} Michel Foucault, \textit{The Birth of the Clinic} (Alan M. Sheridan (trans.); London: Routledge, 1989).

\textsuperscript{673} Foucault, \textit{Birth of the Prison}, 3–24.

\textsuperscript{674} Ibid., 308.
series of carceral mechanisms which function interdependently, making up a larger system in which the power of normalization and surveillance flow.\textsuperscript{675}

While Foucault was focusing on the late sixteenth century onwards, I would like to examine the impact of this thinking in the context of late antiquity. There is one major distinction between ancient and modern societies, namely slaveholding. That the discourses behind slaveholding are still very prevalent today, and the fact that modern slavery is a reality I do not dispute; however, in antiquity slavery was promoted as a common, banal habitus of everyday life,\textsuperscript{676} the result of this process of normalization. This is not the case in the modern period where ancient manifestations of slavery are absent. Thus, here I want to argue that in the context of antiquity, and I will be focusing on the later Roman Empire and John Chrysostom specifically, a different type of carcerality was at work, namely the carcerality of slavery or, as I will use it here, ‘slave-carcerality’. The slave-body in society is unique in that it constantly finds itself in a state of imprisonment. It is not a prison made from bricks and mortar, but rather a symbolic prison constructed by the boundaries and stipulations of the habitus of Roman slaveholding (physical imprisonment, of course, was also a large part of the carceral life of the slave). In order to understand this concept more clearly, I will focus on two aspects of ancient slave-carcerality. Firstly, the discursivities that make up or inform the discourse of slave-carcerality will be delineated. The first discursivity that will be explained is the discursivity of normalization. Slaves are slaves because they are in essence ‘not part’ of free society. Here we will specifically look at what makes the slave abnormal and hence worthy of detention and confinement. The second discursivity that informs slave-carcerality is that of surveillance and mobility. Since slaves are in a carceral state, their movement should be closely regulated and monitored.

\textsuperscript{675} The French title of Foucault’s work on the birth of the prison is \textit{Surveiller et punir}. The term \textit{surveiller} is somewhat complex, and is noted by the translator in an introductory note. It is related to Jeremy Bentham’s concept of ‘inspection’ in the context of panopticism. Alan Sheridan, the translator, states (n.p. translator’s note): “‘Supervise’ is perhaps closest of all, but again the word has different associations. “Observe” is rather too neutral, though Foucault is aware of the aggression involved in any one-sided observation. In the end Foucault himself suggested \textit{Discipline and Punish}, which relates closely to the book’s structure.’

\textsuperscript{676} Jennifer A. Glancy, “Christian Slavery in Late Antiquity,” in \textit{Human Bondage in the Cultural Contact Zone: Transdisciplinary Perspectives on Slavery and Its Discourses} (Raphael Hörmann and Gesa Mackenthun (eds); Münster: Waxmann, 2010), 63–65.
But how do we unpack this very complex concept of carcerality related to late ancient slavery? I will start by delineating two principles that maintain and enforce the carceral continuum of slavery. These two principles are the power of normalization and the power of surveillance (that is, *surveiller*). Behind this lies the assumption that there was a constant slave-supply in antiquity. The issue of the supply of slaves is complex in itself, and as a result of various social and political circumstances, supply levels were not always stable, which would also have an impact on the price of a slave. Despite supply and demand levels, we know that during the late ancient period we are examining slaves were still a common commodity, and the oft-proposed theory that late ancient slavery declined into medieval serfdom does not hold much footing. Slaves were available and still very present in society up to the time of Chrysostom. A question that immediately arises, then, is why the slaveholding system was so successful. It is in essence a question of maintenance. The slaveholding system was maintained in such a way that it flourished. The two carceral principles I propose, namely normalization and surveillance, aim to explain conceptually at least, why it was so successful.

After discussing these two principles, we will move on to the carceral mechanisms that construct and manage slave-carcerality. While discourses of normalization and surveillance function in all forms and occurrences of slavery, each period, geographical delimitation or social group utilizes their own carceral mechanisms that in practice enforce and maintain slavery. The carceral mechanisms may overlap with other periods, places and groups. In this study we will specifically focus on the carceral mechanisms present in Chrysostom’s elaborations on slavery, and as a source, we will examine his homilies on Philemon. The reason for this selection is the fact that these homilies contain the highest frequency and most detailed descriptions of slavery references of all Chrysostom’s homilies, and they will therefore serve as a sufficient sample for a test case. Other homilies will also be discussed, but the Philemon homilies will serve as a basis.


Each homily will be examined and the Chrysostomic carceral mechanisms delineated at the conclusion.

2 SLAVE-CARCERALITY AND THE POWER OF NORMALIZATION IN LATE ANCIENT CHRISTIANITY

Since slavery was both a legal and habitual state of carceral subjectivity, what are the politics of perception that are active behind this subjectivity? It is obviously not possible to determine how ancient slaves ‘saw themselves’ as subjects, since we are today so separated from the context and very life of the subjects in question, and such a venture will always remain speculative and in the realm of generalization. What is possible however is to investigate the phenomenology of (slave) perception to understand something about the dynamics of social fashioning and social reproduction at work in the wider discourse of slave-carcerality. In this section I will be especially dependent on the work of Merleau-Ponty, especially his *Phenomenology of Perception*. After delineating the most important premises from Merleau-Ponty’s theory, I will read the results in the light of Michel Foucault’s formulations of how abnormalities and powers of normalization function. Thus, the first section building on Merleau-Ponty’s work will be on subjectivity, freedom and perception; that is, how we perceive ourselves as human beings and how we are perceived, and what implications this may have for ancient slave-carcerality. Finally, based on Foucault’s work, we will ask how these reproduced yet conscious subjects, carceral-bodies, are regulated and managed also as abnormal bodies. The carceral body, I will argue, is also understood by the ancients as the abnormal, delinquent and degenerate body.

In Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s final chapter in his phenomenology of perception, he deals with the notion of freedom. Questions of carcerality inevitably involve issues of freedom. What Merleau-Ponty asks is whether the subject can truly be ‘free,’ an argument that has received much attention, also from Foucault and several others. We have touched on this issue briefly in the previous chapter. Merleau-Ponty’s contribution is valuable because he approaches

---

it from perception-theory. I will repeat the important opening statement, already accessed in chapter 4: ‘Again, it is clear that no casual relationship is conceivable between the subject and his body, his world or his society. Only at the cost of losing the basis of all my certainties can I question what is conveyed to me by my presence to myself.’\textsuperscript{682} This statement illustrates the problem of the free subject; that is, the subject that is not shaped in some way by his or her surroundings and influenced by contemporaneous power-structures and institutions.\textsuperscript{683} Merleau-Ponty goes on to state that the only way human beings make sense of who they are as subjects is in their relation to others. It therefore stands to reason that subjects are shaped by their respective others. The perception of slave-bodies is based on and influenced by perceptions of free bodies. This is also why most of the statements in early Christian literature on the status and character of the slaves is accompanied by the status and characteristics of the \textit{pater familias} as well as the wife and children. What we have in antiquity, however, is an androcentric society. This feature has always been interpreted in a way that understands free men to be the subjects with authority and power, those who would dominate relationships with other subjects. Notwithstanding this notion, there is still something more about an androcentric society. Not only are free (Roman/Christian) men those who wield power and authority in such a society, but they also become the central point of comparison and highest factor of social measurement in the society. Slaves are exactly that because they are not institutionally free men. This was demonstrated quite clearly in the discussions on the \textit{haustafeln}, where every relationship was articulated with respect to the subject’s position in relation to the \textit{pater familias}. The status of the slave also directly shaped perceptions of masculinity in antiquity. We have also said this earlier in chapter 2, that mastery remained the key factor in the formation of ancient masculinities.

If Merleau-Ponty is correct in that our perceptions of others and ourselves are shaped by these same interrelationships, we can now understand that in the context of ancient society the free male-body was seen as the norm and highest standard of social standing. Free masculinity becomes the measuring tool that shaped all other subjects outside of it. These manifestations of social subjectivities therefore produce and reproduce each other in a constant and complex relationship. Free masculinity in antiquity is understood more clearly when the nature of the enslaved is understood and \textit{vice versa}. I now want to take one step further by elaborating on a

\textsuperscript{682} Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, 504.

Foucaultian concept already encountered in chapter two, namely the production and reproduction of normalcies and abnormalcies. Not only is free masculinity seen as the ideal and highest standard of social subjectivity, it is also presented as the normal subjectivity. The ideal free, male Roman/Christian body in itself becomes a technology for measuring the abnormal. While the body of the free man in Roman society seems free in the sense of its subjectivity, it is also not a free subject since its own reproduction is dependent on the subjectivity of slaves, women, children and outsiders or barbarians. Slave-bodies and the bodies of free men therefore stand in an autocatalytic identity-forming relationship to one another and their respective subjectivities are all but free - through their very subjectivity they reproduce one another.

The question is: how did free, Roman-Christian masculinity shape the subjectivity of slave-bodies? I will focus the discussion on Roman-Christian men since the bulk of the study concerns this very specific type of subjectivity. The main strategy of reproduction would be to impose a carceral subjectivity on slave bodies. Slave-carcerality is then in essence an imposed social subjectivity. Why carcerality as such? Because that which is abnormal needs to be confined and also regulated - it serves as both an economic measure and a social precaution. Slaveholding and slave-carcerality as an economic measure will be discussed in the next chapter on the commodification of the slave-body. The most important aspect of slave-carcerality in late ancient Christian thinking is that the symbolic confinement associated with the carceral state had to lead to reform. It is not simply an issue of controlling the mobility of the slave. With the rise of late ancient Christian pastoral governmentality, we saw that its defining characteristic was its tendency to duplicate nodes of power within its structure. Christ is seen as the ultimate prototype.

---

685 Both Heather and Mathisen have convincingly shown how this dynamic was present in the construction of the image of the barbarian in late antiquity; Peter Heather, “The Barbarian in Late Antiquity: Image, Reality, and Transformation,” in *Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity* (Richard Miles (ed.); London: Routledge, 1999), 234–58; Ralph W. Mathisen, “Violent Behaviour and the Construction of Barbarian Identity in Late Antiquity,” in *Violence in Late Antiquity: Perceptions and Practices* (Harold A. Drake (ed.); Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 27–36. Carcerality is not the only complexity here. The ethical dynamics and dilemmas of identity formation, especially regarding the issue of agency, individuality and freedom, are highlighted by Appiah, but for the purpose of this chapter, we will only focus on carcerality; Kwame A. Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 1–35. The problems of agency, subjectivity and freedom were already discussed in the previous chapter.
The bishop or priest then became Christic duplicates, representing Christ’s authority of earth. These nodes of power then duplicated themselves in the *pater familias*. It was especially evident in the thinking of John Chrysostom. The *pater familias* of the household now also had to become the shepherd of the household. The process of reforming the slave would imply a duplication of the role of the *pater familias*. Reform is also a process of normalizing, which is in essence the *pater familias* reduplicating himself in the slave. The reduplication remains Christocentric; having assumed the subjectivity of Christ normalizes the abnormal individual. We must not forget that the representation of Christic subjectivity and Christomorphism is determined by the church, and we clearly see then how an institution of power directly influences subjectivity.

The first discursivity that slave-carcerality is built upon is therefore the assumption that all slaves are part of a group of abnormals; individuals who do not measure up to the standards of free Christian masculinity; hence their bodies need to be symbolically confined and regulated. The carceral state here is not simply detentive, but it also aims at a type of reformation in which the subjectivity of the *pater familias* is duplicated onto the slave and hence the slave is ‘normalized.’

### 3 SLAVE-CARCERALITY, MOBILITY AND SURVEILLANCE

The carceral state implies a limitation to the mobility of the slave. Slave-mobility is a very complex issue. When a slave flees his or her master it is considered a socio-symbolic prison-break; hence the title for such a slave: *servus fugitivus*. The mobility of the slave is determined to a large extent on the character of the enslaved individual. On the one extreme one has the chain-gangs of slaves working on agricultural estates, whose mobility was very much limited, and then on the other, one has for instance the *actor*, who often had to oversee several estates and had to travel between such estates. Moreover, many of the Roman agricultural authors strictly advised that the *vilicus* should not be a gad-about (*ambulator*), and Columella limited the movement of the *vilicus* to the boundaries within the estate itself (cf. Cato, *Agr.* 5.2-5; Varro, *Rust.* 1.17.4-5; Columella, *Rust.* 1.7.5, 2.1.7-8).

---


687 Cf. also: Jesper Carlsen, *Vilici and Roman Estate Managers Until AD 284* (Analecta Romana Instituti Danici Supplementum; Bretschneider, 1995), 57–87; John Bodel, “Slave Labour and Roman Society,” in *The Cambridge*
For the purpose of this study we shall focus on the mobility of domestic slaves, since this is the majority of slaves owned by the slaveholders whom Chrysostom would address. The household therefore functions as the primary carceral space of urban slaves. Restrictions on mobility do not imply that slaves were not allowed outside of the house. Slaves often had to leave the physical space of the house, or the ‘place’ that is the household. The carcerality of the domestic ‘space’ however is still functional outside of its ‘place’. This implies that the household was the place and space where slaves were disciplined and also, as argued above, reformed or rehabilitated. The opposite is also true: the household was the place and space where slaves were violated and dominated. One of the main problems here relates to slave-sexuality. While Christian authors of late antiquity strictly regulated the sexual matters of their flocks, the realities of the sexual abuse of slaves in households did not disappear. Since slaves were confined to the house, one of the most common acts of infidelity was to have sexual relations with a slave, since slaves were traditionally considered to be morally neutral subjects. Brown has argued that the Christian authors emphasis on marital fidelity led to an increase in the sexual abuse of slaves since husbands were not permitted to visit brothels or bring other women into the house. Quoting from Musonius Rufus, Brown states: ‘The husband was not encouraged to live in the brothels, to set up a separate ménage, or to introduce new women into the house. But infidelity with servants was “a thing which some people consider quite without blame, since every master is held to have it in his power to use his slave as he wishes.”’

The carceral space of the household did not protect slaves from sexual abuse, but may have inadvertently promoted it.

In urban areas, slaves were also expected to move with the master. This especially seemed to be the case with aristocratic women who would visit significant social spaces like the theatre and baths with an entourage of slaves, something that would serve as a status-indicator social capital, which is a main point in the next chapter. Monasteries could also serve as carceral spaces, especially after the fifth century (see chapter 3).

---


Several mechanisms were also put in place to limit the instances of slaves fleeing their owners. A common mechanism, especially during the Christian period, was the introduction of slave-collars. This became very popular after Constantine’s ban on facial tattoos that marked the slave-body.\footnote{Jennifer A. Glancy, \textit{Slavery in Early Christianity} (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 9.}

The issue that is directly related to slave-mobility is that of surveillance. The greatest strategy to limit unauthorized mobility is to monitor slaves. We have seen that Christian authors would introduce a new scopic economy of surveillance, namely Christic panopticism. The slave should know that Christ, the ultimate slaveholder was always watching, and Christian slaves had to order their conduct accordingly. The act of surveillance was not only to limit the mobility of slaves, but also to monitor the progress of normalization, and to control disciplinary measures. We have already said much on the surveillance of slaves in chapters 2 and 3. It is interesting however that there was also a measure of counter-surveillance present in the domestic space. It should be remembered that the slaves in the ancient household mostly lived within the physical confines of its walls. It is an exception, mostly limited to large agricultural estates, for slaves to live in large slave barracks. This is a significant point, especially stressed by Veyne in his work on private life in antiquity. He states: ‘Remember that these people had slaves constantly at their beck and call and were never alone. They were not allowed to dress themselves or put on their own shoes…The omnipresence of slaves was tantamount to constant surveillance.’\footnote{Veyne, “Roman Empire,” 72-73.} Even bedroom privacy was rare – slaves often slept very close to the bed of the mistress, and always at the door of the bedchamber as guards. Martial naughtily tells of the slaves masturbating at the door when Hector and Andromache had sex (\textit{Epig}. 11.104).\footnote{Stephen Hinds, \textit{Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 133-34.} Slaves often slept all over the house. When household members, especially women and young men went out, as we often hear from Chrysostom, they always had slaves with them. We have also seen that slaves monitored other slaves, especially the \textit{vilicus}. The constant voyeurism of household slaves was a main source of gossip to the outside world. Slave-eyes were the eyes of the outside world, contributing
to the intense surveillance within ancient households.\textsuperscript{692} It was not only slaves who were under surveillance, but all the other household members.

Finally, civic authorities and bodies also manage the mobility and surveillance of slaves as carceral bodies. The introduction of \textit{manumissio in ecclesia} is an excellent example of this, where the church directly managed the status of slaves.\textsuperscript{693} The church never instituted regulations outlawing slavery. In some instances slaves were even more limited by ecclesiastical policies. The banning of slave ordination at the fourth-century Council of Gangra is a good example of this problem, where the activities of slaves within official church structures were highly contested. The main tribulation of freed slaves was exactly that they were never sure of their place in society. Being manumitted usually had some type of financial arrangement along with paying the homage or \textit{obsequium}. Thus many freed slaves made a living from this, but many, after being manumitted, remained in the service and household of the master.\textsuperscript{694} This is yet another complication of manumission and slave-carcerality. Even after manumission, there were still potent elements of carcerality present in the life of the freed slave.

In the light of these comments on slave-carcerality, we will examine John Chrysostom’s homilies on Philemon to see how he negotiates and manages the problems related with slave-carcerality and to delineate the carceral mechanisms at work in this series of homilies.

4 CARCERAL MECHANISMS IN JOHN CHRYSOSTOM’S \textit{HOMILIAE IN EPISTULAM AD PHILEMONEM}

The provenance of Chrysostom’s homilies on Philemon is very difficult to determine. Authors like Bonsdorff and Baur place the homilies in Chrysostom’s Constantinopolitan episcopate, perhaps in the year 402, but it remains very speculative.\textsuperscript{695} The homilies do seem to have been preached in succession, but I will not make a definitive claim on their provenance.


\textsuperscript{693} Harper, \textit{Slavery in the Late Roman World}, 463–94.

\textsuperscript{694} Veyne, “Roman Empire,” 81-87.

\textsuperscript{695} Wendy Mayer, \textit{The Homilies of St. John Chrysostom. Provenance: Reshaping the Foundations} (OrChrAn 273; Rome: Institutum Patristicum Orientalium Studiorum, 2005), 197.
Chrysostom’s homilies on Philemon have received some attention in scholarly circles, especially among some New Testament scholars. In the scholarly dialogue between Margaret Mitchell⁶⁹⁶ and Allen Callahan⁶⁹⁷ we find a discussion on Chrysostom’s exegesis of Philemon and the origin of the view that Onesimus, Philemon’s slave, was in fact a runaway slave or fugitivus. Callahan has argued that Onesimus was not a slave at all, but Philemon’s estranged brother. Callahan continues to state that Chrysostom is the first instance in the history of interpretation of the letter where the fugitivus-reading occurs. I do not want to resume this debate. I am in agreement with Mitchell here that Chrysostom has no reservations with regard to the status of Onesimus. He believes Onesimus to be a runaway slave (fugitivus), and openly utilizes this interpretation in his homilies.

4.1 The Preface to the Homilies
In the preface to the homilies on Philemon, Chrysostom provides a synthesis of his interpretation of Philemon. The Epistle to Philemon and Chrysostom’s interpretation thereof serve as a very convenient case study for slave-carcerality. The reason for this is that the image of Onesimus found in both these literary sources typically conforms to ancient stereotypes of degenerate slaves. Chrysostom accepts Onesimus as a ‘(stereo-)typical’ slave - that is, one who is a thief and, more importantly, one who has run away, implying that this slave has broken the bonds of his carcerality. Ironically, Paul is the one who is in jail and not Onesimus. Onesimus was serving Paul while he was in jail.⁶⁹⁸ In the preface, the typical discursivities of slave-carcerality are highlighted by Chrysostom.

In the first instance, he discusses the former carceral space of Onesimus, namely Philemon’s household. According to Chrysostom, Philemon’s household was a lodging for Christians. Philemon is illustrated by Chrysostom as the ‘most excellent man’. It is interesting to see how Chrysostom describes the Christian slaveholder in this preface. Philemon’s house is more than a house, but it is in fact called a ‘church’. We see again the duplication of pastoral power and institutions on the micro-societal level of the household. We also see here how the

carceral space of the household even follows a slave that is far away from the physical place that is the house. This is Chrysostom’s ideal household, a household that is also a church. If Philemon’s house is a church, it stands to reason that Chrysostom would consider Philemon as a type of shepherd for this household. Chrysostom thus strategically reconstructs the background of the epistle to mirror his view of the ideal Christian household and the ideal Christian pater familias and slaveholder within the context of pastoral governmentality. It also seems that Chrysostom’s reading of Philemon 7, that ‘the hearts/bowels of the saints are refreshed in him,’⁶⁹⁹ implies that Philemon also typically occupied the curative role of the shepherd-pater familias. Philemon, the ideal Christian slaveholder according to Chrysostom, is now placed parallel to Onesimus, the typical bad slave. The same detail used to show the honour of Philemon Chrysostom now uses to highlight shame and baseness of Onesimus. He was a thief and a runaway. None of these aspects is mentioned explicitly in the text, and the status of Onesimus, as mentioned above, has been a point of contention among scholars for decades. More on this will be said below. We have already seen the extreme view of Allen Callahan above, who believed that Onesimus was not even a slave. But the more moderate opinions tend to be divided rather on what type of slave Onesimus was, legally speaking, that is. Chrysostom’s view has been described as the ‘traditional view,’ that Onesimus was a fugitivus, a criminal and runaway slave. But there are several others, like John Knox’s view that Onesimus was in fact the slave of Archippus, mentioned in Philemon 2, and that Paul wanted to use his influence on Philemon to act indirectly on Archippus.⁷⁰⁰ Peter Lampe has challenged the traditional view that Onesimus was a fugitivus since a fugitivus could not return to his master’s house.⁷⁰¹ Both Lampe and, more

⁶⁹⁹ UBS⁴: …ὅτι τὰ σπλάάγχνα τῶν ἁγίίων ἀναπέέπαυται διὰ σοῦ…
⁷⁰⁰ John Knox, Philemon Among the Letters of Paul: A New View of Its Place and Importance (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1935). Knox’s theory was somewhat revived by Sara Winter, who also added that Philemon was no runaway, but rather sent by the Colossian church to serve Paul; Sara C. Winter, “Paul’s Letter to Philemon,” NTS 33 (1987): 1–15.
⁷⁰¹ The complexity and ambiguity of the terms fugitivus and erro has been a matter of scholarly debate for years. Peter Lampe originally used these terms, found in Roman jurists, to interpret Philemon; Peter Lampe, “Keine ‘Sklavenflucht’ Des Onesimus,” ZNW 76 (1985): 133–37. Later, Rapske expanded Lampe’s thesis that Onesimus was an erro, and also gave much attention to the notion of friendship in the letter; Brian M. Rapske, “The Prisoner Paul in the Eyes of Onesimus,” NTS 37 (1991): 187–203. Lampe and subsequently Rapske’s theory became quite popular in scholarly circles. It was however challenged more than a decade later by J. Albert Harrill, quite
recently Arzt-Grabner,702 rather understand Onesimus’ legal status to be that of an erro, or an ‘absconder,’ someone who has left but still has the option to return. My own view is in line with that of Harrill703 - the problem is that these terms, fugitivus and erro, are based on ancient Roman juridical categories, which are often based on fictive cases with conflicting definitions. It will be shown that not even Chrysostom seems to discern between these categories. The carceral complexities of detention and mobility are immense in this instance. Yet another more recent opinion from Elliot has argued that Onesimus was sent to Paul by his owner Philemon as a gift that is in turn refused by Paul.704 Tolmie is certainly correct in stating: ‘What has become clear, in general, is that, to outsiders - like us - who read Paul’s correspondence to Philemon, the letter yields an incomplete picture [his italics] regarding Onesimus’ status.’705

The opening paragraph of the preface to the homilies on Philemon reads thus (Hom. Phlm. Preface):

First, it is necessary to explain the argument of the epistle, then also the issues that are sought from it. What then is the argument? Philemon was a man of honourable and noble character. That he was an honourable man is evident from the fact that his entire household consisted of believers, and of so many believers that it is even called a church: therefore he says in this epistle, ‘And to the

convincingly in my opinion, who affirmed that the social and juridical boundaries between a fugitivus and an erro were not clear, and that using Roman jurists for this interpretation is highly problematic, since many of their definitions were contradictory and often hypothetical rather than actual cases; J. Albert Harrill, “Using Roman Jurists to Interpret Philemon,” ZNW 90 (1999): 135–38; cf. also: John Byron, Recent Research on Paul and Slavery (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2008), 128–29; Tobias Nicklas, “The Letter to Philemon: A Discussion with J. Albert Harrill,” in Paul’s World (PAST 4) (Stanley E. Porter (ed.); Leiden: Brill, 2008), 201–20; cf. also the interesting study by Norman R. Petersen, Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the Sociology of Paul’s Narrative World (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985).

703 Harrill, “Using Roman Jurists.”
church that is in your house.’ He also testifies to his great obedience, and that the bowels of the saints are refreshed in him. And he himself in this epistle asked him to prepare a lodging for him. It seems to me therefore that his house was in general a residence for the saints. This excellent man, then, had a certain slave named Onesimus. This Onesimus, having stolen something from his master, had run away. For we know that he had stolen something, hear what he says, ‘If he has wronged you, or owes you anything, I will repay you’. Going then to Paul in Rome, and having found him in prison, and having enjoyed the benefit of his teaching, he also received baptism there. For that he received the gift of baptism there is clear from his saying, ‘Whom I have begotten in my bonds’. Paul therefore writes, recommending him to his master, that on every account he should forgive him, and receive him as someone now reborn.\footnote{Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.702.1-18: Πρῶτον ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ὑπόθεσιν εἰπεῖν τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, εἴτε καὶ τὰ ἐπούμενα. Τίς οὖν ἡ ὑπόθεσις; Φιλήμων ἀνήρ τις τῶν θαυμαστῶν καὶ γενναίων (ὅτι γὰρ θαυμαστός ἦν, δήλον ἀπὸ τοῦ καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ πάσαν εἶναι πιστὴν, καὶ οὕτω πιστὴν, ὡς καὶ Ἐκκλησίαν αὐτὴν ὄνομαζεσθαι. Διὰ τούτου καὶ γράφων ἐλεγε· Καὶ τῇ κατ’ οἶκόν σου Ἐκκλησία. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ πολλὴν ὑπακοὴν, καὶ ὅτι σπλάγχνα τῶν ἁγίων ἀνεπέπαυτο εἰς αὐτόν. Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ γράφων ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστολῇ παρῆγγελλεν αὐτῷ ἐτοιμάσαι ξενίαν. Οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ καταγώγισαι εἰναι ἁγίων ἡ οἰκία ῧ ἐκείνου πάντων ἐνεκεν. Οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ καταγώγισαι εἰναι ἁγίων ἡ οἰκία ῧ ἐκείνου πάντων ἐνεκεν). Οὕτω δὴ οὖν ὁ θαυμαστός ἀνήρ παῖδα τινα εἶχεν Ὁνήσιμον. Ὁ τοίνυν Ὁνήσιμος οὕτος κλέψας τι παρὰ τοῦ δεσποτοῦ, ἐδραπέτευσεν· ὅτι γὰρ ἐκλεψεν, ἀκουσών τι φησίν· Εἰ δὲ τι ἥδικησέ σε, ἥ ὀφείλεις, ἐγὼ ἀποτίσω. Ἐλθὼν τοίνυν πρὸς τὸν Παύλον εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, καὶ εὑρὼν αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, καὶ ἀπολαύσας τῆς παρῆς αὐτοῦ διδασκαλίας, καὶ του βαπτίσματος ἐτυχεν ἐκεί. Ὅτι γὰρ ἐκεὶ ἐτυχε τῆς τοῦ βαπτίσματος δωρεάς, δήλον ἐκ τοῦ εἰπεῖν· Ὁν ἐγέννησα ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς μου. Ὁ τοίνυν Παύλος γράφει συνιστῶν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν δεσμότην, ὅστε πάντων ἐνεκεν ἐγένεσθαι, καὶ προσέσθαι αὐτῶν ὡς ἀναγεννηθέντα νῦν.}
The important question that I would like to ask here is why Chrysostom’s first inclination would be to consider Onesimus a *fugitivus*. The picture regarding the status of Onesimus was not clearer in Chrysostom’s time than for scholars today. There are more than three centuries of difference between Chrysostom and Paul, hardly something one could call close hermeneutical proximity. Chrysostom’s choice for a *fugitivus* is not necessarily based on good exegesis of the text either. He bases his argument solely on the fact that in Philemon 18-19 Paul states: ‘If he has done you wrong or owes you anything, charge it to me...I will pay it back...’ On this basis Chrysostom argues for the *fugitivus* status of Onesimus. This is certainly not a definite premise to settle for the *fugitivus*-stance. His negative stereotyping of slaves inexplicitly influences Chrysostom’s choice. It also shows that the seemingly neat legal and social lines of difference between an *erro* and a *fugitivus* were not clear, even to someone like Chrysostom. He, like most other ancients, expected the worst from slaves - namely that they would break the bonds of their carceral state; in this case, Onesimus (allegedly) ran away after committing a crime. There is in fact a double measure of shame on Onesimus. Not only is he simply a slave who exhibits an implied state of degeneracy, but he has committed a crime and fled. Chrysostom therefore polarizes the situation to suit the general view of free, androcentric society - to put it bluntly, Philemon is the ‘good guy,’ and Onesimus the ‘bad guy.’ They represent two very extreme poles - the best kind of *pater familias* and the worst like of slave, the *fugitivus*. Polarization is an effective rhetorical strategy, in that it serves to highlight the point of the argument by the interplay of extreme opposites - the Epistle to Philemon lends itself quite conveniently to this rhetorical polarization.

The next phase of the homily sees the restoration of Onesimus’ carcerality, as well as his normalization. Onesimus, according to Chrysostom, received Christian teaching and baptism from Paul, implying that since Onesimus has been normalized and his carcerality restored, Philemon should accept him back into the carceral space. The premise that carceral bodies should be confined to the corresponding carceral spaces is never denied by Chrysostom. In fact, Chrysostom commends the Christian faith precisely for not disturbing this equilibrium (*Hom. Phlm.* Preface): ‘But now many are reduced to the necessity of blasphemy, and to say that Christianity has come into the world for the subversion of everything, masters having their slaves

---

707 *UBS*: εἰ δὲ τι ἡδύκησέν σε ἡ ὀφείλει, τούτο ἐμοὶ ἐλλόγα.
taken from them, and it is a deed of violence." Chrysostom relates questioning the traditional slave-slaveholder social roles to subversiveness and even blasphemy, probably due to developments from the Council of Ganga held earlier, in which the Eustathians were accused of illegally setting slaves free. What stands out here is that there is also no mention of manumission after normalization. While we have seen that Chrysostom prefers that slaves be taught Christian virtues and practical trades and then be manumitted, normalization does not assume manumission. Normalization, namely subscribing to free, Christian masculine virtues, does not automatically negate the carcerality of the body. In fact, it serves to establish and strengthen the carceral state. This is related to the Stoic-Philonic notion of the heteronomy of the body discussed in the previous chapter. All people are in any case in a carceral state, so the nature and character of the carcerality is not important. It also shows how the recognition of the humanness of the slave enforces the carceral state of the slave-body.

Chrysostom utilizes Philemon in this instance to promote Christian slaveholding, as he did in the case of 1 Corinthians 7:21, which is also quoted in the preface. More specifically, since Paul acted as teacher and reformer of Onesimus, so too the late ancient Christian pater familias should act in the same manner. He states explicitly (Hom. Phlm. Preface): ‘We ought not to give up on the race of slaves, even if they have progressed to extreme wickedness.’ He understands that his audience identifies and relates with the character of Philemon. If we return to the issue of perception, the audience, and Chrysostom himself, perceive themselves to be like Philemon. Chrysostom therefore presents Philemon as the Gestalt of the ideal Christian slaveholder, and Onesimus, now, becomes representative of something greater than the evil, runaway slave - Onesimus becomes the ideal Christian slave. Onesimus here is even more than a typos for the Christian slave - he also becomes the representation of the ancient carceral cycle of Christian slaveholding. The cycle Onesimus becomes representative of in Chrysostom’s argumentation is that of the typical, evil slave, who broke the bonds of his carcerality, physically fled, received teaching and baptism, was ‘normalized,’ and now is returned to the ideal carceral state of the

---

708 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.704.19-23: ἐπεὶ εἰς ἀνάγκην καθίστανται πολλοὶ τοῦ βλασφημεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ἐπὶ ἀνατροπή τῶν πάντων ὁ Χριστιανισμὸς εἰς τὸν βίον εἰσενήκτει, τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀφαιρουμένων τοὺς σκλάβους, καὶ βίας τὸ πράγμα ἐστιν.

709 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.703.19-20: τὸ δουλικὸν γένος οὐ δεῖ ἀπογινώσκειν, κἀν εἰς ἐσχάτην ἐλάσση κακίαν.
Christian slave. The Onesimus-event serves as the model for slave-rehabilitation in the Christian household. Manumission is not even mentioned; the most important part is that Onesimus was normalized and restored to the state of carcerality. Chrysostom also makes an interesting statement towards the end of the preface, that it would be ideal for those slaves who live outside of the city to come into the city for the sake of rehabilitation. Chrysostom states (Hom. Phlm. Preface):

I wish it were possible to bring those [slaves] who are outside into the cities. What, you would say, if he also should become wicked? And why should he, I ask you? Because he has come into the city? But consider that being on the outside he will be much more wicked. For he who is wicked being within the city, will be much more so being outside. For here he will be exempted from necessary care, his master taking that care upon himself; but there the worry about those things will distract him perhaps even from things more necessary and more spiritual.\(^710\)

The diatribe we find in this argument is identical to the stereotypes found in Columella’s agricultural treatise. Columella was highly negative of urban slaves, stating that they were even more delinquent than rural slaves. In this section Chrysostom turns this argument around, and probably with a shock effect - hence the diatribe. The status quo seems to accept Columella’s view that urban slaves are more degenerate or corrupt (φαῦλος) than rural slaves, but Chrysostom now utilizes a second carceral space to counter this argument; quite surprisingly, this other carceral space is the city. While Chrysostom mostly exhibits a negative disposition toward the city, here it becomes a positive carceral space. What are the dynamics of this move?

\(^710\) Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.703.35 – 704.9: Εἴθε τοὺς ἐξωθεῖν εἰς τὰς πόλεις εἰσωθεῖν ἐνήν. Τί οὖν, φησίν, ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς φαῦλος γένηται; Διὰ τί, εἰπέ μοι, παρακαλῶ; ὅτι πρὸς πόλιν εἰσῆλθεν; Ἀλλ’ ἐννόει, ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ὧν φαῦλότερος ἔσται· ὁ γὰρ ἐνδόν φαῦλος γενόμενος, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐξω ὧν· ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ καὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας φροντίδος ἀπῆλλακτα, τοῦ δεσπότου μεριμνώντος· ἐκεῖ δὲ ἡ περὶ τούτων φροντίς ἰσως ἀπάξει αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτέρων καὶ πνευματικοτέρων.

298
Behind this issue, in my opinion, is the problem of the absentee *pater familias*. But unlike Columella, who wants to remove the *pater familias* from the city to the countryside, Chrysostom removes the slave from the countryside and brings him or her into the carceral sphere of the *pater familias*. It is not the city as such which is the carceral space, but the presence of the *pater familias* within the city. The implication is that the slave is now within the pastoral programme of reform and normalization of the Christian slaveholder. He emphasizes the curative role again of the *pater familias* in basic matters of care as well as in spiritual matters (‘...τῶν ἀναγκαιοτέρων καὶ πνευματικωτέρων.’). Slaves are no longer tools used to generate profits of villa estates and farms, but subjects of normalization, abnormals who require a strict carceral sphere. In this carceral sphere, the dynamics of confinement, surveillance, discipline and reform can work more effectively, and the carcerality of the slave-body is thus more stable due to the increased surveillance and limited mobility.

This normalization and carceral restoration would complexify matters very much in the household, as we will see in the homilies that follow, since Onesimus is now considered a ‘brother’ and not only a slave, i.e. fictive kinship.

Another discourse that is very prevalent in Chrysostom’s preface to the homilies is his use of honour and shame in describing the relationship between Onesimus, Philemon and Paul. It must be remembered that both Paul and Chrysostom’s historical settings were very much honour-based. Honour and shame defined social roles and social status. The natural reaction to the degenerate behaviour of Onesimus was that the owner would be ashamed. We have also seen the prevalence of this issue in chapters 2 and 3. Honour and shame are reflective, the shame of Onesimus would reflect back on Philemon. The reward to the *pater familias* for educating the slave in virtue is that he does not have to be ashamed, as Chrysostom states (*Hom. Phlm.* Preface): ‘He teaches us not to be ashamed of our slaves, if they are virtuous.’\(^{711}\) The honour of the virtuous slave is reflected back onto the slaveholder. Thus, the virtue-teaching that the *pater familias* provides to the slave secures his own social position - in other words, his own state of normalcy, or free masculinity, is strengthened by the process of normalizing the slave. Thus slave-normalization affirms the normativity and normalcy of free Christian masculinities.

\(^{711}\) Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.704.24-25: Διδάσκει ἡµᾶς µὴ ἐπαισχύνεσθαι τοὺς οἰκέτας, εἰ ἐνάρετοι εἶν.
Christian masculinity is, in the context of Chrysostom at least, now fashioned when the *pater familias* takes up the curative role of shepherd and reformatio.

To conclude then, the value of Philemon for Chrysostom, and late ancient slaveholding in general, becomes very apparent. Due to its authoritative nature as scriptural apparatus, the Onesimus-event provides a model for Chrysostom to base his ideal cycle of slave-reformation and carceral restoration on, thereby utilizing, and in essence strategically re-narrating the fragmentary event from the epistle to suit the ideal cycle representative of Christian slaveholding. Philemon and Onesimus are constructed as extreme opposites and useful stereotypes - Philemon the good slaveholder and Onesimus the evil *fugitivus*. But Onesimus is also representative of the invention of the good Christian slave as a new literary type. The same is true for Philemon as the literary type of the ideal Christian slaveholder. The ideal Christian slave is therefore a slave who remains in the carceral state of slavery and who works better and harder. Chrysostom also wants to restore slaves to the sphere of carcerality of the *pater familias*, and it is clear that his proposition for the reformation of slaves works better in an urban setting than in the agricultural context where the *pater familias* is absent. There is also an honour-incentive given to the slaveholder in that the process of normalization and reformation also secures and fashions honourable and respectable free Christian masculinity.

### 4.2 *Homilia in Epistulam ad Philemonem* 1

In this homily Chrysostom provides the exposition of the first few verses in Philemon, and the theme of carcerality is common in the homily. At the very beginning, Chrysostom draws a comparison between Paul, who is himself in a carceral state - he was physically in prison - and Onesimus in the symbolic state of slave-carcerality (*Hom. Phlm.* 1.1): ‘For if a chain for Christ's sake is not shameful but something to be proud of, so much more is slavery not to be seen as a disgrace.’

Paul’s position as a prisoner, in fact, a criminal in the eyes of the Roman authorities of his day, is now used as a strategy to promote institutional slavery. Philemon is conventionally labelled as one of the so-called ‘prison-epistles’ of Paul, since it is written during the time of the apostle’s incarceration. Themes of carcerality run through this letter as well as through Chrysostom’s homilies on the letter. The first dilemma we are being faced with is Paul’s status

---

712 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.703.47-50: Εἰ γὰρ δεσµὸς οὐκ αἰσχύνη διὰ τὸν Χριστὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καύχηµα, πολλῷ µᾶλλον δουλεία οὐκ ἔπονείδιστον.
as being a ‘prisoner’. Like the state of slavery, Chrysostom does not see being imprisoned for being a Christian as a disgrace (ἐπονείδιστος). It is important at this stage to acknowledge the subtle changes that human understandings of criminality have experienced. According to Foucault, modern crinmo-anthropology and criminological psychoanalytics are especially concerned with gathering knowledge of the criminal. This is especially seen in the development of the understanding of ‘insanity’ in criminal law, especially originating from article 64 of the 1810 Code, in which it is said that ‘there is neither crime nor offence if the offender was of unsound mind at the time of the act.’713 Today, experts, judges of normality like psychologists and psychiatrists regulate pleas of insanity. This is, however, a very late modern development, and when we read Chrysostom’s homilies on Philemon a very different picture emerges. First though, during the first century, it should be understood that Paul was seen as a criminal. His status as criminal was determined by religio-political stipulations, in which Jesus-followers were seen as criminals in that they rejected and opposed the imperial and religious authority of Rome as embodied in the emperor. In the eyes of the law of first century Rome, Paul was by all accounts a criminal, a danger to society and thus someone who had to be imprisoned and confined. It is also clear that when Paul was released, he would continue to break the law that resulted in most of his incarcerations. In the eyes of the outsiders, non-Christians, this was seen as being quite shameful. The same and even worse could have been said of Jesus, who died a shameful death of a criminal. But in Chrysostom’s reading, and most Christian theological readings in general, Paul is obviously not seen as a criminal - much less a danger to society. From the Chrysostomic perspective, Paul is no longer a criminal, or rather, he never was one in the first place, because the guidelines for determining criminality had changed. The definition of crime, the level of seriousness and margins of indulgence had considerably changed up to the fourth century. We see here retrospective decriminalisation. This is especially the case when a certain religious authority exercised its influence over judicial systems. For us today, for instance, blasphemy has lost its status as being a punishable crime. Paul is by no means portrayed in the homilies as being deviant in any way. As a prisoner, Paul is in fact seen as someone with much honour and influence.

713 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, 35–79.
Since Paul remained in his carceral state (despite his ascribed innocence), never escaping or breaking out from prison, so too should the bonds of slave-carcerality be maintained. Furthermore, while it may seem initially shameful for someone to be in prison, Paul had much honour, thus, the carceral slave-body, traditionally considered shameful and inferior, should also be considered as having the potential to bear great honour. Honour now receives a very specific meaning for slaves.\textsuperscript{714} The honourable conduct for a slave is to remain in the carceral state. Chrysostom then strategically plays upon the links between Paul’s carceral state and the slave-carcerality of Onesimus.

After this initial word play, Chrysostom returns to explaining the carceral space, which is the church-household, and states (\textit{Hom. Phlm. 1.1}):

Here he has not even left out the slaves. For he knew that the words of slaves often have the power to overturn their master, and more so when his request was on behalf of a slave. And perhaps it was them in particular who upset him. He does not allow them therefore to fall into envy, having honoured them by including them in a greeting with their masters. And neither does he allow the master to be offended. For if he had mentioned them by name, perhaps he would have been angry. And if he had not mentioned them at all, he might have been disturbed. Look therefore how wisely he has found a way by his manner of mentioning them, both to honour them by his mention of them, and not to wound him. For the name of the church does not want masters to be angry, even though they are counted among their slaves. For the church does not know the distinction of master and slave. By good actions and by sins it defines the one and the other. If it is then a church, do not

be disturbed that your slave is greeted with you. For in Christ Jesus there is neither slave nor free.\(^{715}\)

The fact that slaves are also greeted, according to Chrysostom, is commendable. The problem is that in the actual epistle slaves are not directly mentioned, although Chrysostom is probably correct in that they would be included in the grouping of the ‘church’.\(^{716}\) Chrysostom explains this by alluding to the typical slave/slaveholder distinctions found in antiquity - they are not mentioned by name since this would be a sign of disrespect to Philemon, a common *faux pas* in antiquity. In these ancient literary artifacts, slaves are both voiceless and more often than not nameless. This form of media manipulation also affirmed elite free masculinities in antiquity. Although they are nameless, they should still see themselves as being part of the church and therefore also included. Slaves should therefore not be envious if they are not mentioned by name. After stating this Chrysostom quotes Galatians 3:28 saying that in the church there is no distinction between slave and free. He makes this claim despite the obvious distinction that was raised just in the previous sentences. We find here the typical dynamics of ‘policy’. Here Galatians 3:28 functions as a type of policy-statement, something that speaks more of the public values an institution wants to display, despite the more complex practical implementation.

From this point on the homily diverges into a discussion of the dynamics of honour and shame in the new Christian dispensation. Honour and shame were very important values in

\(^{715}\) Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.705.14-32: Οὐδὲ δούλους παρήχεν ἐνταῦθα· οἴδε γὰρ πολλάκις καὶ ἰδίωτα δούλων ἀνατρέψαι δυνάμενα τὸν δεσπότην, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ὑπὲρ δούλου ἡ ἀξίωσις ἃ· οἱ δὲ μάλιστα παροξύνοντες, ἵσως ἑκείνοι ἤσαν. Οὐ τοῖνυν ἄφησιν αὐτοὺς εἰς φθόνον ἐμπεσεῖν, τῇ προσηγορία τιμῆσαι μετὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸν δεσπότην ἀγανακτῆσαι συγχωρεῖ. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὀνομαστὶ εἶπεν, ἵσως ἂν ἠγανακτήσην· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐμνήσθη, κἂν ἐδυσχέρανεν. Ὅρα οὖν, πῶς συνετῶς εὑρεῖ διὰ τοῦ μνησθῆναι καὶ τούτους τῇ μνήμῃ τιμῆσαι, κάκεινον μὴ πλῆξαι. Τὸ γὰρ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ὄνομα οὐκ ἀφίησι τοὺς δεσπότας ἁγανακτεῖν, εἰ γε συναφθημοῦντο τοῖς οἰκέταις. Καὶ γὰρ ή Ἐκκλησία οὐκ οἴδε δεσπότων, οὐκ οἴδεν οἰκέτου διαφοράν, ἀπὸ κατορθωμάτων καὶ ἀμαρτημάτων τούτων κάκεινον ὀρίζει. Εἰ τοῖνυν Ἐκκλησία έστι, μὴ ἁγανακτεῖ, ὅτι μετὰ σοῦ προσηγορεύθη ὁ δούλος· ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ οὐ δούλος, οὐκ ἐλεύθερος.

antiquity and it was the means by which personhood was connected to group values.  

Honour-discourse would also continue to play a pivotal role in Chrysostom’s exposition of the Epistle to Philemon. In antiquity one’s social status, parentage, ethnicity and gender all formed an intersection where an individual’s honour would be constructed. Most importantly, honour is only effective when there exists a social hierarchy. In the previous chapter on domestic slavery we have seen that with the rise of Christianity in late antiquity and the rise of pastoral governmentality, a very strict hierarchic model of shepherding took precedence. At the top of the hierarchy was God, the ever-present, all-seeing slaveholder. The hierarchy then worked by duplicating its top level onto the bishop or priest and then also the pater familias. The highest ethical principle in this hierarchy was to honour God in the same way a slave should honour his or her owner. This was especially seen in the instructions found in the haustafeln; slaves had to govern their conduct in such a manner that it was pleasing to God, since God is the ruler of all bodies.

The values of honour and shame, I will argue, provide a code of conduct for all who participate in the hierarchy. There are two ways to receive honour. Honour may be achieved or ascribed to an individual. Ascribed honour is gained by means of one’s birth, parentage, ethnicity and heritage. These aspects are more or less out of the control of the individual. Achieved honour is gained in several ways, for instance by means of challenge-riposte scenarios, upward social mobility, etc. More importantly, honour is something that an individual would be ‘trained’ in; in other words, honourable conduct and the rules for honourable social engagement are taught to an individual. It becomes a form of discipline in itself and honourable conduct represents a transformed economy of visibility into the exercise of power. Slaves were expected to act in

certain socially acceptable ways because their masters and superiors were more honourable; in turn, since slave-bodies were violable bodies, being a slave was a shameful disposition. This disposition of shame also reinforced slave-carcerality since shameful persons had to be regulated, controlled and often either disciplined or confined. Being prone to shame is one of the consequences of ascribing humanity to slaves. Moreover, in ancient Christian pastoralism, this economy of honourable conduct was reimagined and became theocentric. Now, the primary recipient of honour should be God, and any instance where human beings receive more honour than God it is considered a crime or a sin.723

Honour-discourse in Chrysostom’s exposition of Philemon then also functions as a carceral mechanism. Specifically for the issue of slave-carcerality, this carceral mechanism is based on the codes in the *haustafeln* stating that for slaves to exhibit some form of honour, they should work as if working for God. It also has guidelines for slaveholders, in that they need to manage their slaves with the knowledge that they are also slaves of God. Both slave and slaveholder therefore need to honour God first and foremost in their conduct. Chrysostom would now state that when a slaveholder forces a slave to behave in a way that insults God, both the slaveholder and the slave are held accountable (*Hom. Phlm.* 1.2):

> But not only do you honour people more than God, but you force others to do so as well. In this way many have forced their domestics and slaves. Some have drawn them into marriage against their will, and others have forced them to perform disgraceful services, perverse sexual deeds, acts of theft, and financial fraud, and violence: so that the crime is twofold, and they cannot be pardoned on the basis that they were forced. For if you yourself do wrong things against your will, and because of the command of the ruler, not even in such a case is it by a sufficient excuse; but the crime becomes worse, when you also force them to fall into the

---

same sins. For what pardon can there possibly be for such a person?724

We see here above that slaves are not simply seen as automatons, and simply doing the will of the master under duress is no excuse. Slaves are still held accountable here for not resisting this type of domination.

The training of honour now becomes equal in the training of virtue, something we have seen in the chapter on domestic slavery and also earlier in this chapter. The virtuous slave is honourable, and the honour reflects on the master. But now, if the slave is compelled to dishonour God, the shame reflects back onto the slave and the slaveholder. They are both guilty of sinning against God and become criminals/sinners. Dishonourable conduct against God leads to sin, which is also a state of degeneracy and one worthy of punishment according to Chrysostom. Christian hamartiology exhibits an explicit language of carcerality and criminality. As with Peter of Alexandria, Chrysostom also argues that the punishment for the slaveholder is greater than the punishment for the slave, but both are still guilty. The interplay between honour, sin and punishment and the relational dynamics between the slave, slaveholder and God become apparent in Chrysostom’s thinking. These aspects are very closely related and form what we may call a symbolic carceral-continuum. The symbolic carceral-continuum represents the visible flow of power in the pastoral hierarchy. Honour and shame become related to normalcy and abnormalcy in a dynamic, conduct-based sense.

4.3 Homilia in Epistulam ad Philemonem 2

The exposition on Philemon continues from the fourth verse of the letter and Chrysostom starts by explaining to his audience the strategy of Paul’s rhetoric in the epistle. Chrysostom notes the

724 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.706.35-47: Οὐ μόνον δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀνθρώπους προτιµᾶτε τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρους ἀναγκάζετε. Πολλοὶ πολλοὺς οἰκέτας ἤναγκασαν, καὶ παιδᾶς· οἱ μὲν εἰς γάμμους εἰλικρινὰς μὴ βουλομένους, οἱ δὲ ὑπηρετήσασθαι διακονίαις ἀτόπους, καὶ ἐρωταὶ μισθοὺς καὶ ἁρπαγαῖς καὶ πλεονεξίαις καὶ βίαις ἥτο διπλῶν εἶναι τὸ ἐγκλῆμα, καὶ μηδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης δύνασθαι συγγνώμην αὐτοῖς εὑρέσθαι. Εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἄκων πράττεις τὰ πονηρὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐπίταγμα τοῦ ἄρχοντος, μάλιστα μὲν οὐδὲ σβήνως ἰκανή ἡ ἀπολογία, πλὴν χαλεπωτέρα γίνεται ἡ ἁµµαρτία, ὅταν καὶ ἑκείνους ἀναγκάζῃ τοῦ αὐτοῖς περιπίπτειν. Ποία γὰρ ἂν εἶ ὅ τῷ τοιούτῳ συγγνώμη λοιπὸν;
complex interplays in the patron-client dynamics of the epistle.725 While Philemon appears to occupy the role of Paul’s patron, since Paul is asking the favour, Paul’s authoritative status as apostle in Chrysostom’s view would make him almost automatically eligible to receive any favour. Chrysostom is also aware of Paul’s appeals to emotion in the letter and continues to explain how Paul strategically starts to persuade Philemon (Hom. Phlm. 2.1):

He does not immediately at the start ask the favour, but having first admired the man, and having lauded him for his good deeds, and having shown no small sign of his love, that he always made mention of him in his prayers, and having said that many are supported by him, and that he is obedient and complying in all things; then he asks it last of all, by this especially making him blush. For if others receive the things that they ask, much more should Paul. If coming before others, he was worthy to receive, much more when he comes after others, and asks something not related to himself, but on behalf of another. Then, that he may not seem to have written for this reason only, and that no one may say, ‘If it were not for Onesimus you would not have written,’ behold how he also appends other causes of his epistle. In the first place showing his love, then also desiring that a room may be prepared for him... Nothing so shames us into giving, as to present the kindnesses given to others, and particularly when a man is more entitled to respect than them. And he has not said, ‘If you do it to others, much more to me’; but he has insinuated the same thing, though he has managed to do it in another and a more gracious way.726


726 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.707.47-708.44 & 62.709.14-18: Οὐκ εὐθέως ἐκ προοιμίων αἰτεὶ τὴν
Chrysostom understands that the situation Paul finds himself in, that is, harbouring a fugitive slave, is very volatile and that very careful rhetorical manoeuvring is necessary. Chrysostom is also quite aware of how love functions as a strategy here for striking a balance between tact and frankness, as well as one for negotiating power. Chrysostom continues to explain (Hom. Phlm. 2.1):

For you know what the attitudes of masters are towards slaves that have run away, and particularly when they have done this with theft, even if they have good masters, how their anger is increased. It has taken all these measures to relieve this anger, and having convinced him first to serve him diligently in whatever matter, and having prepared his soul to exhibit all obedience, then he puts his request forward, and says, ‘I beseech you,’ and with the addition of flattery, ‘for my son whom I have begotten in my bonds.’ Again the chains are mentioned to shame him into compliance, and then the name.\textsuperscript{727}

\begin{quote}
χάριν, ἀλλὰ πρότερον τὸν ἄνδρα θαυμάσας, καὶ ἐπαινέσας ἐπὶ τοῖς κατορθώμασι, καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀγάπης δείξας τεκμηρίου ὡς μικρόν τὸ διαπαύοντος αὐτοῦ μεμνησθαί ἐν ταῖς προσευχαῖς, καὶ εἰπὼν, ὅτι πολλοὶ ἀνασταὶ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ πάσιν ὑπακούει καὶ πείθεται· τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευταίαν τίθησι, μάλιστα αὐτοῦ δυσωπῶν τούτω. Εἰ γὰρ ἔτεροι ἐπιτυγχάνοντο οὐ δέονται, πολλῷ μᾶλλον Παῦλος· εἰ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλθὼν ἄξιος ἦν τυχεῖν, πολλῷ μᾶλλον μετὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ πράγμα αἰτῶν οὐκ εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνήκον, ἀλλ’ ὑπέρ ἔτερον. Εἶτα ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ τούτον ἐνεκεν γράφειν μόνον, μηδὲ εἰπή τις, ὡς Εἰ μὴ Ὄνησιμος ἦν, οὐκ ἃν ἔγραψή, ὥρα πῶς καὶ ἐτέρας αἰτίας τίθησι τῆς ἐπιστολῆς· πρῶτον μὲν τὴν ἀγάπην αὐτοῦ δηλών; ἕπειτα δὲ καὶ ξενίαν κελεύων ἐτοιμασθῆναι αὐτῷ...Οὐδὲν οὕτω δυσωπεῖ, ὡς τὸ τάς ἐτέραν εὐρυγείας προφέρειν, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἐκείνων αἰδεσιμώτερος ἦ. Καὶ οὐκ εἶπεν, Εἰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιεῖς, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐμοί. Ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ἡνίξατο, ἐτέρως δὲ αὐτὸ μεθώδευε προσηνέστερον.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{727} Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.710.5-14: Ἡστε γὰρ τοὺς θυμοὺς τῶν δεσποτῶν κατὰ τῶν ἀποδεδρακότων οἰκετῶν, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν μετὰ κλοπῆς τούτο ἑργάσσωται, κἀκεῖθεν ἔχωσι δεσπότας, πῶς αὐξανεῖ ἡ ὀργή. Ταύτην οὖν πᾶσι τούτοις προελέανε· καὶ πρότερον πείσας πᾶν...
The second strategy used by Paul, according to Chrysostom, is his own state of carcerality. Paul needs to use all the tools at his disposal since the matter is very sensitive. The fact that Paul calls Onesimus a son is because of his spiritual rebirth and baptism under the tutelage of Paul. Slaves were often referred to as sons. Fictive birth or genealogy functions here as an honour-status indicator. Whether Chrysostom is correct or not in considering Onesimus a fugitivus is not that important in this instance. What is important is that we see how Chrysostom considers such a scenario where a fugitivus asks for asylum. We have seen in the previous homilies that he strictly advises Christians not to take slaves away from their owners since it is a shameful act and equal to violence, blasphemy and robbery. It does seem that some Christians, slaves or free, on the basis of the letter to Philemon, may have either fled and sought asylum or harboured fugitive slaves. This is already attested to, officially, in the Council of Gangra, in its third canon, stating: ‘If any one shall teach a slave, under pretext of piety, to despise his master and to run away from his service, and not to serve his own master with good-will and all honour, let him be anathema.’ This could be the background for Chrysostom’s reference of the blasphemy of fugitive slaves. The Epistle to Philemon does provide an impetus for ecclesiastical asylum. The practice of ecclesiastical asylum is well attested in Chrysostom’s time,728 himself providing asylum for Eutropius.729 Yet it seems that Chrysostom prefers the status quo to be maintained, that slaves should not be detained from their owners. It becomes a legal matter and it must also be remembered that Chrysostom considers slaves also as property, and therefore harbouring fugitivi would simply be akin to robbery and fraud. In order to maintain the view of the status quo, that slaves should be sent back to the carceral sphere of their masters, Chrysostom adheres to Paul’s own example (he sent Onesimus back) but emphasizes the point Paul also stresses - that the slave should be considered kin. As Decock intimates, since all human beings

are indebted to God, this relationship to God serves as a point of mutuality between all human beings. Notwithstanding this human mutuality, it has been shown that arguments based on shared humanity should be read with suspicion. Thus, fictive kinship is one of the carceral mechanisms of oppression stemming from a technology of humanness. Furthermore, we know from chapter 2 that slaves were considered part of the household in antiquity, but here a further step is taken. Slaves become included in the fictive kinship circle of the church. This is especially based on Philemon 15-16 where Paul asks Philemon to accept Onesimus as a brother.

Next Chrysostom embarks on a virtue-discourse in which he stresses the importance of humility. He acknowledges that there are few acts as humbling as calling a slave a brother and even a friend. We again find the Stoic reasoning of Chrysostom here by reminding his readers that if Christ, the almighty slaveholder, humbles himself to call human beings brothers and friends, his audience should not hesitate to do the same. Honour and shame are very important in this instance - one of the ways honour was ascribed to an individual was by means of genealogy and parentage. By placing slaves in the realm of fictive kin, both Paul and Chrysostom provide them with a measure of honour. Chrysostom then immediately shifts the focus away from institutional slavery and emphasizes the virtue of humility. He explains the message of this homily thus (Hom. Phlm. 2.2):

These things are not aimlessly written, but that we masters may not give up on our slaves, nor press them too hard, but may learn to

---

forgive the errors of such slaves, so that we may not always be severe, that we may not, due to their enslavement, be ashamed to make them share in all things with us when they are good. For if Paul was not ashamed to call one his son, his own bowels, his brother, his beloved, surely we should not be ashamed. And why do I say Paul? The master of Paul is not ashamed to call our slaves his own brothers; and are we ashamed? See how he honours us; he calls our slaves his own brothers, friends, and co-heirs. See to what lengths he has descended! Therefore, considering what we have done, have we performed our whole duty? We will never in any way do it; but to whatever degree of humility we have come, the greater part of it is still left behind. For consider that, whatever you do, you do to a fellow-slave, but your master has done it to your slaves. Hear and tremble! Never be proud of your humility.732

Chrysostom translates Paul’s ethic of including slaves as fictive kin into an ethic of moderate treatment of slaves. It is not shameful for slaveholders to call their slaves brothers, yet they still remain slaves. Fictive kinship does not serve as something that ameliorates institutional slavery. Rather, it acts as another carceral mechanism that solidifies the social position of the

732 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.711.36-56: Ταῦτα οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀναγέγραπται, ἀλλ’ ἰνα μὴ ἀπογινώσκωμεν τῶν οἰκετῶν οἱ δεσπόται, μηδὲ σφόδρα αὐτοῖς ἐπιτιθώμεθα, ἀλλὰ μάθωμεν συγχωρεῖν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα τοῖς οἰκέταις τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἵνα μὴ ἀπὸ τῆς δουλείας ἐπαισχυνόμεθα καὶ κοινωνοῦμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν πᾶσι λαμβάνειν, ὅταν ὄσιν ἀγαθοὶ. Εἰ γὰρ Παύλος οὐκ ἐπῄεσκε καὶ τέκνον καλέσας, καὶ σπλάγχνος, καὶ ἀδελφόν, καὶ ἀγαπητόν, πῶς ἂν ἦμεις ἐπαισχυνθῶμεν; Καὶ τί λέγω, Παῦλος; ὁ Παύλου Δεσπότης οὐκ ἐπαισχύνεται τοὺς ἡμετέρους δούλους ἀδελφοὺς αὐτοῦ καλεῖν, καὶ ἦμεις ἐπαισχυνόμεθα; Ὅρα, πῶς ἦμας τιμᾶ· ἀδελφοὺς ἑαυτοῦ καλεῖ τοὺς ἡμετέρους δούλους, καὶ φίλους, καὶ συγκληρονόμους. Ἐδώ ποῦ κατέβη. Τί οὖν ποιήσαντες ἦμεις, τὸ πάν ἡμικότες ἐσόμεθα; Ὑδὲν ὅλως δυνησόμεθα, ἀλλ’ ὅπως δ’ ἂν ταπεινοφοροῦντες ἐλθὼμεν, τὸ πλέον αὐτῆς ψυχλέλιταί. Σκόπει γάρ ὅπερ ἂν ποιήσης σὺ, περὶ τὸν ὀμόδουλου ποιεῖς, ὁ δὲ σος δεσπότης περὶ τοὺς σους δούλους πεποίηκεν. Ἀκουσοῦν, καὶ φρίξον· Μηδέποτε ἐπαρθής ἐπὶ ταπεινοφοροῦνή.
slave. By promoting the fictive kinship of slaves, a concept inherently Stoic, focus is drawn away from the status of the slave as institutionally bonded. It is not very different from Seneca’s proposition in *De beneficiis* that slaves were also able to bestow favours on their owners. In his *Epistula 47* we saw that Seneca promoted a relationship of love and mutual respect to slaves, almost identical to Paul, and in *De beneficiis* he aims to make this relationship practical. In order to make his argument plausible, Seneca had to argue that slaves were capable of virtue. He provides several examples of brave and virtuous slaves (*Ben.* 3.22-27). It is the common origin of nature that allows slaves to be benefactors to their owners. Seneca and Chrysostom’s arguments bear striking resemblance. Seneca states (*Ben.* 3.28):

The universe is the one parent of all, whether they trace their descent from this primary source through a glorious or a mean line of ancestors. Be not deceived when people who are reckoning up their genealogy, wherever an illustrious name is wanting, foist in that of a god in its place. You need despise no one, even though he bears a commonplace name, and owes little to fortune. Whether your immediate ancestors were freedmen, or slaves, or foreigners, pluck up your spirits boldly, and leap over any intervening disgraces of your pedigree; at its source, a noble origin awaits you. Why should our pride inflate us to such a degree that we think it beneath us to receive benefits from slaves, and think only of their position, forgetting their good deeds? You, the slave of lust, of gluttony, of a harlot, no, who are owned as a joint chattel by harlots, can you call anyone else a slave? Call a person a slave?

---

*Translation: Aubrey Steward, *Seneca: On Benefits* (Guildford: White Crow, 2010), 80-81; Latin text: Basore [online: 11 May 2012]: *Unus omnium parens mundus est, sive per splendidos sive per sordidos gradus ad hunc prima cuiusque origo perducitur. Non est, quod te isti decipiant, qui, cum maiores suos recensent, ubicunque nomen inlustre <de> fecit, illo deum <in> fulciunt. Neminem despexeris, etiam si circa illum obsoleta sunt nomina et parum indulgente adiuta fortuna. Sive libertini ante vos habentur sive servi sive exterarum gentium homines, erigite audacter animos et, quidquid in medio sordidi iacet, transilite; expectat vos in summo magna nobilitas. Quid superbia in tantam vanitatem adtolliur, ut beneficia a servis indignemur accipere et sortem eorum spectemus obli*
If we compare Seneca’s statement above with the previous citation from Chrysostom’s homily, the similarities become increasingly apparent. Both Seneca and Chrysostom present their arguments as virtue discourses. Seneca understands that the main obstacle to his reader’s acceptance of slaves as benefactors was their pride in their birthright. Chrysostom promotes humility in the homily. Both rely on the shared origin of slaveholder and slave - Seneca on the universe and Chrysostom on the heavenly slaveholder (think for instance of the spiritual birth of Onesimus). Furthermore, both prefer to focus on the virtuous deeds of slaves, but neither addresses the problems of institutional slavery.

Since Seneca, Paul and Chrysostom accept slaves as kin, friends and benefactors worthy of honour, they reinforce the carcerality of the slave since the discourse of fictive kinship promotes humane treatment of slaves, which is already problematic, but never questions their institutional status or calls for their manumission.

At the end of this homily Chrysostom provides a poetic finale (Hom. Phlm. 2.2):

For this also is the glory of a master, to have grateful slaves. And this is the glory of a master, that he should love His slaves. And this is the glory of a master, to claim for his own that which belongs to them. And this is the glory of a master, not to be ashamed to recognise them before all. Let us therefore be awe-struck at this great love of Christ. Let us be inflamed with this love-potion. Though a person is of low status and simple, yet if we hear that he loves us, we are above all things warmed with love towards him, and greatly honor him. And do we then love? And when our master loves us so much, are we not joyful? Let us not, I beseech you, be so indifferent regarding the salvation of our souls, but let us love him with all our strength, and let us dispense with

meritorum? Servum tu quemquam vocas, libidinis et gulae servus et adulterae, immo adulterarum commune mancipium? Servum vocas quemquam tu?

everything for the sake of his love, our life, our riches, our glory, everything, with delight, with joy, with cheerfulness, not as if we are giving anything to him, but to ourselves. For this is the nature of the law of those who love. They think that they are receiving favours, when they are suffering wrong for the sake of the one they love. Therefore let us be so enamoured towards our Lord, that we also may share in the good things to come in Christ Jesus our Lord…

Like Seneca, Chrysostom believes that slaves can bestow favours upon their masters. But he took the argument even further. Chrysostom states that as slaves of Christ, human beings are in a patron-client relationship with Christ. This then serves as the basis and model for relationships on earth. The relationship duplicates itself. Since Christ humbles himself to love human beings, so too must human beings humble themselves to love others despite inferior social status. Seneca also emphasized the relationship of love between slave and slaveholder. Furthermore, Chrysostom intimates that the suffering of Christ’s slaves is seen as a benefaction. Suffering, as mentioned earlier, is now seen as a gift the patron bestows on his slave-clients.

735 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.714.22-44: Καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο δόξα δεσπότου, τὸ οἰκέτας ἔχειν εὐγνώμονας· καὶ τοῦτο δόξα δεσπότου, τὸ οὕτω φιλεῖν αὐτὸν τοὺς δούλους· καὶ τοῦτο δόξα δεσπότου, τὸ οἰκειοῦσθαι τα ἐκείνων· καὶ τοῦτο δόξα δεσπότου, τὸ μὴ ἑπασχύνεσθαι ἐπὶ πάντων ὁμολογείν. Αἰδεσθῶμεν τοίνυν τὴν τοσαύτην ἀγάπην τοῦ Χριστοῦ, διαθερμανθῶμεν τῷ φίλτρῳ. Κἂν ταπεινός ἦ τις, κἂν εὐτελής, ἀκούσωμεν δὲ ὅτι φιλεῖ ἡμᾶς, μάλιστα πάντων διαθερμαινόμεθα πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ εἰς τιμήν αὐτῶν ἀγομένοις σφεδράν· καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ὁ δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φιλεῖ τοσοῦτον, καὶ οὐ διανιστάμεθα; Μή, παρακαλῶ, ἐὰν σφεδράν, καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ἐὰν δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φιλεῖ τοσοῦτον, καὶ οὐ διανιστάμεθα; Μή, παρακαλῶ, ἐὰν σφεδράν, καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ἐὰν δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φιλεῖ τοσοῦτον, καὶ οὐ διανιστάμεθα; Μή, παρακαλῶ, ἐὰν σφεδράν, καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ἐὰν δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φιλεῖ τοσοῦτον, καὶ οὐ διανιστάμεθα; Μή, παρακαλῶ, ἐὰν σφεδράν, καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ἐὰν δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φιλεῖ τοσοῦτον, καὶ οὐ διανιστάμεθα; Μή, παρακαλῶ, ἐὰν σφεδράν, καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ἐὰν δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φιλεῖ τοσοῦτον, καὶ οὐ διανιστάμεθα; Μή, παρακαλῶ, ἐὰν σφεδράν, καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ἐὰν δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φιλεῖ τοσοῦτον, καὶ οὐ διανιστάμεθα; Μή, παρακαλῶ, ἐὰν σφεδράν, καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ἐὰν δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φιλεῖ τοσοῦτον, καὶ οὐ διανιστάμεθα; Μή, παρακαλῶ, ἐὰν σφεδράν, καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ἐὰν δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φιλεῖ τοσοῦτον, καὶ οὐ διανιστάμεθα; Μή, παρακαλῶ, ἐὰν σφεδράν, καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ἐὰν δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φιλεῖ τοσοῦτον, καὶ οὐ διανιστάμεθα; Μή, παρακαλῶ, ἐὰν σφεδράν, καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ἐὰν δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φιλεῖ τοσοῦτον, καὶ οὐ διανιστάμεθα; Μή, παρακαλῶ, ἐὰν σφεδράν, καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ἐὰν δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φιλεῖ τοσοῦτον, καὶ οὐ διανιστάμεθα; Μή, παρακαλῶ, ἐὰν σφεδράν, καὶ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν, ἐὰν δὲ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν ἡμῶν περὶ τὸν Ἰησοῦν τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν...
In this homily then, where Paul admonished Philemon to accept Onesimus as a brother (Phlm. 15-16), Chrysostom provides his audience with an authentic Stoic argument not only for treating slaves moderately, but also understanding that slaves and slaveholders are able to be benefactors (based on their fictive kinship) to each other because Christ and human beings stand in a patron-client relationship. It bears precise resemblance with Seneca’s arguments on the same topic. The *leitmotiv* of the homily is the promotion of the value of humility, another passive value proliferated by late ancient Christian authors. Fictive kinship and mutual benefaction serve as carceral mechanisms since they enforce the social position of the slave and the slave only gains the capacity to receive a quasi-ascribed honour based on these carceral mechanisms. Notwithstanding the emphasis on humility, the virtue of passive suffering is also lauded as a favour or gift the heavenly slaveholder bestows on human beings, and hence, the unjust physical suffering of institutional slaves also becomes, like martyrdom, something commendable.

4.4 *Homilia in Epistulam ad Philemonem 3*

In this final homily in the series, Chrysostom retraces several of the arguments mentioned above. He again highlights Paul’s strategic balance between tact and frank speech, as well as the honour that slaves have as fictive kin and that they should be considered as friends of the slaveholder. The fact that Onesimus is called the very ‘bowels’ (σπλάάγχνα) by Paul is considered a term of much endearment.

The *leitmotiv* of this homily is forgiveness. Paul has admonished Philemon to accept Onesimus back and also to forgive him for the crime of robbery he supposedly committed. From this point, and building on the theme of forgiveness, Chrysostom goes into a detailed discussion of God’s need to forgive and also to punish. More specifically, he directly opposes the notion of the *apokatastasis* - the doctrine that all creation will be restored and reconciled with God. While the doctrine of the *apokatastasis* is quite complex, it has been traditionally attributed to Origen and Evagrius Ponticus but scholars have shown that Origen’s conceptualizations of the *apokatastasis* are often contradictory.736 Despite this problem early Christian heresiological language often refer to proponents of the doctrine as ‘Origenists’. This was not, however, what strictly defined Origenists; the belief in the incorporeality of God and a potent anti-

---

anthropomorphism. It is interesting for the discussion of Chrysostom since one of the accusations brought against him was that he showed favour to the Origenists with reference to the strange and curious affair with the Long Brothers. This accusation was probably based on association rather than doctrine as such.

Chrysostom vehemently defends the concept of hell in this homily and states, contrary to the Marcionite opinion he mentions in passing, that hell and punishment are signs of God’s goodness. Chrysostom then returns to the issue of slavery and supports his argument by referring to the necessity of punishing slaves (*Hom. Phlm.* 3.2):

"You who ask these questions and who have slaves – if I could make it clear to these people, that if they [slaves] should destroy the family of their masters, if they should insult them to their faces, if they should steal everything, if they should overturn everything, if they should treat them as enemies, and they would not threaten them, nor discipline them, nor punish them, nor even verbally admonish them, would this be any sign of goodness? I contend that this is the extreme form of cruelty, not only because the wife and children are betrayed by this unreasonable leniency, but because the slaves themselves are destroyed before them. For they will become drunkards, promiscuous, licentious, and more irrational than any animal. Is this, tell me, a sign of goodness, to trample on the noble nature of the soul, and to destroy both themselves and others with them? Do you see that to call people to account is a sign of great goodness? But why do I speak of slaves, who easily fall into these sins? But let a man have sons, and let him allow them to do everything they want, and let him not punish them; will they not be worse than anything? Tell me, in the case of men then, is it a sign of goodness to punish, and of cruelty not to punish, and
is it not so in the case of God? Since he is good, he has therefore prepared a hell.737

The stereotype of the vice-prone slave is rather useful in this instance to Chrysostom. Despite the status of slaves as being sons and fictive kin, they are still liable to punishment since sons are also liable to be punished by their fathers if they transgress. Forgiveness and the attribution of fictive kinship-status and friendship do not rule out punishment. This again supports the point I made above that fictive kinship and friendship discourses related to institutional slaves function as carceral mechanisms, especially since they are also based on the humanness of the slave. The crime of mastercide is used by Chrysostom as the most extreme example and the tension between Paul’s forgiveness of Onesimus and the punishment of slaves for these crimes become apparent. While slaves should be treated moderately and with forgiveness, as with Onesimus, society must still be protected from the degenerate abnormals who murder, pillage and rob. God’s punishment of human beings serves as a justification for the punishment of slaves, and the need for the punishment of slaves again supports the view that God should punish.

We have already discussed Chrysostom’s views on the punishment of slaves, but it is necessary to point out here the importance of punishment in the carceral-continuum of

737 Translation: De Wet; Greek text: PG 62.718.11-34: Ἐὰν ύμων τῶν ταύτα ἐρωτῶντων, καὶ οἰκέτας ἐχόντων, δήλον ποιήσω τούτοις, ὅτι, κἂν διαφθείρωσι τὴν δεσποτείαν, καὶ εἰς τὸ σώμα ἐκείνων ἐνυβρίσωσι, κἂν πάντα ἐκφέρωσι, κἂν τὰ ἄνω κάτω ἐργάσωσιν, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν αὐτοὺς διαθῶσιν, οὐκ ἀπειλοῦσιν, οὐκ ἀνθρώπους ἐνυβρίζουσιν, οὐδὲ μέχρι ἡμίτοις λυπήσουσιν· ἀρα δοκεῖ ταύτα ἀγαθότητος εἶναι; Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ δείκνυμι, ὅτι ὁμότητος ἐστὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης, ὑπὸ τὴν γυναίκα καὶ τὰ παιδία προδίδοσθαι διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἀκαίρου χρηστότητος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν αὐτοὺς ἐκείνως πρὸ τούτων ἀπόλλυσθαι. Καὶ γὰρ μέθυσοι καὶ ἀσελγεῖς καὶ ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ πάντων θηρίων ἔσονται ἀλογώτεροι. Τούτῳ οὖν ἀγαθότητος, εἰπέ μοι, εὐγένειαν τῆς ψυχῆς καταπατῆσαι, καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀλλήλους προσαπολέσαι; Ὁρᾷς, ὅτι τὸ εὐθύνας ἀπαιτεῖν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πολλῆς χρηστότητος ὄν; Καὶ τί λέγω οἰκέτας τοὺς προσειρώτερον ἐπὶ τὰ ἀμαρτήματα ταύτα ἐρχομένους; Ἀλλ' ἐχέτω τις νίγις, καὶ πάντα ἐπιτρεπέτω τολμάν ἐκεῖνος, καὶ μὴ κολαζέτω, τίνος οὖν οὐκ ἔσονται χείρως, εἰπέ μοι; Εἶτα ἐπὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπων τὸ κολάζειν ἀγαθότητος, τὸ δὲ μὴ κολαζέιν ὑμότητος, ἐπὶ δὲ Θεοῦ οὐκέτι; Ὑστε ἐπειδή ἀγαθός ἐστι, διὰ τούτο γέννηνα προσηθοῖμαι.
slaveholding. While Chrysostom prefers a type of punishment that is psychopedagogical, the need for violent punishment of the worst offenders is not ruled out. He still considers it as necessary, as hell is necessary for the wicked. Here the punishment serves as a spectacle and not a measure of reform and normalizing. The crimes that Chrysostom mentions above are the most serious crimes slaves could commit, and throughout the history of Mediterranean antiquity the punishment for the crimes Chrysostom mentions was death after being tortured. We have seen that Plato preferred to have such slaves whipped in front of their owner’s tomb and then executed, while Roman law would provide crucifixion as punishment; as this would serve as a deterrent for rebellious slaves, so too hell serves as a deterrent to keep virtuous people in such a state. We are reminded again of what defined the slave-body: its violability and penetrability and, quite importantly, the types of tortures and punishments reserved for the criminal slave-body.

Thus, as God, the heavenly slaveholder, forgives slaves, slaveholders are admonished to forgive; yet the existence of a hell and eternal punishment also validate the violent punishment and execution of the worst of slave criminals and ramify the carceral continuum that slave-bodies find themselves in despite their new status as fictive kin and friends.

5 CONCLUSION

To conclude this chapter we will now delineate the carceral mechanisms Chrysostom utilizes in his homilies on Philemon that regulate slave-bodies. Christianity in late antiquity was faced with the habitus of slaveholding, and as was said, Chrysostom’s homilies, especially those on Philemon, represent one of many negotiations with this potent habitus. Like the majority of Christian authors of late antiquity, Chrysostom is in favour of slaves remaining in their carceral state. In order to affirm this, Chrysostom utilizes three carceral mechanisms in his homilies on Philemon.

The first carceral mechanism is his use of an authoritative scriptural economy. In this instance, we should not make the mistake of underestimating the influence of Philemon on late ancient Christian views on slaveholding. From the homilies examined in this chapter, it becomes clear that the Epistle to Philemon functioned as a type of popular legal policy that reinforced slave-carcerality. From the information present from the Council of Gangra, it seems that the Eustathians may have forcibly manumitted slaves, and hence the stipulation in the third canon. It is very plausible that Philemon functioned as authoritative scriptural apparatus in this instance.
to provide clergy with guidance regarding slave-management. Moreover, Philemon now provided homilists like Chrysostom with new literary types for not only making sense of slavery, but also regulating and maintaining slavery as a carceral system. In Chrysostom’s reconstruction of Philemon, he typically constructs an image that informs Christians of what the ideal Christian slaveholder should embody. It is notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to determine who Philemon ‘really was.’ Nor is it important - rather, in Chrysostom’s time, Philemon represented something far more important; he represented a holy man who owned and managed slaves without reproach from the apostle Paul. Onesimus is already presented in the epistle itself as the bad, criminal slave, very likely influenced by stereotypes of slaves in Paul’s own time. In my opinion, due to this carceral mechanism of scriptural economy and convenient literary types, Philemon was probably one of the chief obstacles that prevented the late ancient church from ever adopting an attitude of abolition.

The second and third carceral mechanisms both rely on the humanization of the slave, as seen with both Seneca and Chrysostom. These mechanisms serve as proof for how the notion of humanness enforces the carceral state of the slave-body. The second carceral mechanism reinforcing slave-carcerality is the idea of the fictive kinship of slaves. This is also already present in the epistle itself and Chrysostom extensively elaborates on the issue. The most important point here is that fictive kinship structures, although they provide a temporary alternative symbolic world for a slave, did not change kinship on a structural and biological level. Honour was in the first instance connected to one’s birthright, and slaves did not possess this - they were bodies that were out of place and socially alienated, and in many aspects they were corporeal ‘things’, as the legal term *res mancipi* implies.\(^ {738}\) Fictive kinship is in fact very problematic for the experience of subjectivity and corporeality - it results in corporeal tension and confusion. The identity of the slave-body is now dichotomous since there is tension between structural and fictive kinship systems. Even if slaves were accepted as fictive brothers and sisters and both the epistle and Chrysostom hints at, this would certainly not change their legal and habitual status in Roman society and popular legality. Rather, it opens the possibility for further forms of domination, as seen in Chrysostom’s remarks on the punishment of slaves and sons. I have explored this issue in a different study, and concluded that with the social contradictions of

---

\(^ {738}\) Sam Tsang, *From Slaves to Sons: A New Rhetorical Analysis on Paul’s Slave Metaphors in His Letter to the Galatians* (New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 166.
fictive kinship ‘the body was now “degenealised”, resulting in a constant “seesaw” effect in a person’s status. This degenealisation could be socially and culturally traumatic, especially in the close relationship between kinship and social reproduction, as recent studies on kinship have shown.\(^{739}\) Merely being part of a fictive kinship-community would thus not remove the harsh reality of still being regarded as a slave outside the community.'\(^{740}\) As with Stoic slave-metaphorics, fictive kinship structuring removes the focus from the problem of institutional slavery and thereby reinforces slave-carcerality. Fictive or metaphorical kinship presents most of the same problems of metaphorical slavery.\(^{741}\) It also implies that slaves are now measured by conflicting social standards, and the slaves are now expected to conform to the standards of free masculinity.

The third carceral mechanism present in the homilies is that of honourable service and benefaction. It was established when discussing the domesticity of slaves that with the new Christian rhetoric pertaining to slaveholding, a principle of labour intensification took precedence. It was believed that Christian slaves should work better than non-Christian slaves. This would be considered as being honourable. In the homilies discussed above, we have seen that Chrysostom allows for slaves to have a measure of honour (not always assumed by other authors of antiquity), but if they are virtuous and abide by the rules of conduct expected from the ideal Christian slave. By simply ascribing honour to slaves that conform to the principles of being passive and submissive bodies (again, the proliferation of passive virtues), the carceral


\(^{741}\) The apparent distinction between metaphorical slavery/kinship and institutional slavery/biological kinship appears to be a conjecture. These aspects inevitably influence each other. One cannot understand Paul’s statements about metaphorical slavery and kinship without his views on the actual institutions, since these mutually influence each other. This is the major problem of the study of Tsang on this topic (in Galatians), in which he states: ‘...a study on Galatians should be more about how Paul used the metaphor of slavery instead of what Paul thought about slavery’; Tsang, *From Slaves to Sons*, 17; see also p. 32, where this distinction is made by Tsang; after referring to the work of Petersen, he does admit that there is merit in understanding the link between the metaphorical and institutional, but does not proceed to utilize it in the study; cf. Petersen, *Rediscovering Paul*. 

320
state of the slave is enforced. Honour here becomes an incentive or reward, very much like allowing slaves to have sex, families or better occupations, and using these to further dominate and manipulate the slave since these are all inferences from the humanization of the slave-body. Once honour is ascribed to slaves, various benefits related to sociality apply, especially that of benefaction. It has been shown that the debate of slave’s being benefactors is already present with Seneca, and like Seneca, Chrysostom also believes that slaves could be friends and benefactors to slaveholders, something that may have been controversial to some of those in his audience. Like the mechanism of fictive kinship, ascribed honour in this instance is not universal, and once outside the Christian community, the honour may not be recognized. If this occurs, slaves are admonished to accept their suffering since it functions as a favour or benefaction toward God, again reinforcing the carceral state of the slave.

These are then the three carceral mechanisms found in the homilies on Philemon. They function more in a habitual sense than a legal sense. It is very true that being a slave was a legal status, and this legal disposition most certainly affirmed the carceral state of the slave. But as mentioned in chapter 2, I view slavery not as a juridical dispensation of a subject in the primary sense (without downplaying this dimension), but rather, as a habitus, that is, a habitualized dispensation. This was the argument of Jennifer Glancy that slaves, in the first instance, in everyday life did not see themselves as being in slaves in the legal sense; it was much more complex and pervasive - the legal status of the slave was simply one dimension of its carceral subjectivity.742 We have seen that many freed persons would remain within the carceral space of the household. The preference for approaching ancient slavery as a habitus implies that being a slave was not merely the result of one’s legal disposition. Glancy articulates this point thus: ‘[I]n another sense slaves were not born but made, corporally trained to be slaves, elite persons were corporally trained from infancy to embody a privileged status.’743 Glancy in this instance refers to an excellent study of Martin Bloomer in which he illustrates how infants and children in the elite echelons of Roman society learned from a very young to imitate and rehearse the role of the pater familias.744 This was also pointed out by Edmondson in his discussion of Cato’s eccentricity in having his children and slave-children play together, a type of play where the

742Glancy, “Christian Slavery in Late Antiquity.”
743Ibid., 70.
dynamics of slave and slaveholder may already be rehearsed. While Chrysostom opposes the traditional slave-slaveholder pedagogy in his *De inani gloria*, he still assumes the presence and service of slaves in the upbringing of children. It is possible that these habitual states often gave rise to the formation of popular legalities pertaining to slavery. The canons related to slavery in the Councils of Gangra or Elvira, or the principles derived from the Epistle to Philemon, are excellent examples of such popular legalities. There is therefore both a legal process and a process of habituation that essentially defines slave-carcerality, and slave-carcerality is enforced and affirmed when the humanness of the slave is recognised.