PHILOSOPHICAL PREMISES FOR AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: SEN’S CAPABILITY APPROACH

By Symphorien NTIBAGIRIRWA

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the PhD in Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities,

University of Pretoria

SUPERVISOR: Professor G J ROSSOUW

Pretoria 2012

© University of Pretoria
ABSTRACT

The focus of this research is the cultural assumptions underpinning Africa’s strategies of economic development, taking the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as case studies. It considers the issue whether the neglect of Africa’s cultural beliefs and values in African plans and policies of economic development may not lead to a development impasse. Accordingly, three major objectives are pursued.

The first objective is to attempt a critical assessment of the two strategies of economic development, LPA and NEPAD, against the background of theories of economic development that informed them respectively and their cultural assumptions. Using both a theoretical reflection and an empirical approach, I argue that LPA and NEPAD relied on theories of economic development whose cultural foundations are not African. Consequently, although they were designed in Africa, their respective philosophical bases are not African.

The second objective is to investigate the relationship between African cultural values and economic development and the extent to which the neglect of the African value system in African policymaking and planning could lead to a development impasse. Based on a theoretical reflection as well as empirical research, I argue that in both LPA and NEPAD, the beliefs and values that structure the African value system have been neglected to the extent of being ignored. The major implication of this neglect is that there is insufficient room for people’s participation in the process of their economic development. Participation makes possible the democratisation and the inculturation of economic development, and thus translates the universal conception of economic development to its local, cultural feasibility.

The third objective is to propose certain philosophical premises that could guide development planning in Africa. I revisit the African value system and retrieve the Bantu concept of the human person as umuntu-w’-ubuntu / umuntu-mu-bantu in order to ground the future economic development of Africa on the African foundation. Using Sen’s capability approach which defines development in terms of the ability of people to lead the life they value and have reason to value, human agency and the expansion of capabilities (or real freedoms people enjoy), I suggest four philosophical premises which link African economic development to what Africans believe and value.
The first premise consists of the shift from extroversion to the freedom of people to lead the lives they value and have reason to value. This premise deals with the spirit of extroversion which prevents Africans from appreciating their beliefs and values in the process of economic development. It emphasises the fact that development is not a project, but rather a process by which people create and recreate themselves and the conditions by which they can flourish fully.

The second premise is the human agency. It deals with the shift from the conception of development as an autonomous process to the conception of development as an agency-based process. It emphasises that the development conceived of as an agency-based process, has as its starting-point and end-point the people.

The third premise deals with the shift from the conception of development as an end product to development as an expansion of capability or the real freedoms people enjoy. This premise emphasises three major things. The first is that the expansion of people’s capability is both the end and the means of development. People’s capabilities are not only the primary end of development, they are also its principal means. The second is that development conceived of as the expansion of people’s capability is the concern of both the people and their structural institutions. The third is that the interaction between people and their structural institutions makes it possible to transcend the various dualities often observed in certain development approaches such as the bottom-up and top-down development.

The fourth and last premise is the principle of baking the cake together. This premise follows from the fact that the capability approach leads to development as a participatory and inclusive process. It expresses the traditional practice of collaboration in the African community. It emphasises that the three major actors in the development process, namely, the state, the people and the market which tend to exclude each other, are all agents and must work together inclusively to achieve a sustainable economic development.

These are the premises suggested to lead future economic development in Africa. Each of these assumptions has implications which are unpacked in the conclusion.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research has benefited from the support of many people and institutions:

- The Dominican Order of the Vicariate of Rwanda and Burundi as well as the General Vicariate of Southern Africa. Thanks for having created the conditions and the support which allowed this project to come to fruition.
- Extraordinary Professor Deon Rossouw who supervised this research. Thanks for your the tireless guidance, leadership, insight and support.
- Professor Georges Enderle from the Notre Dame University. Thanks for your leadership and guidance. In particular, thanks for introducing me to Amartya Sen and the capability approach which gave a providential orientation to this dissertation.
- The generous grant of Robert S. McNamara, World Bank is highly appreciated. Thanks for opening me to new horizons and new knowledge.
- The generous grant of Porticus in Holland through the mediation of Kees Keijsper is highly appreciated. Thanks for supporting my research.
- The generous grant of the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) through the Centre for Responsible Leadership (Faculty of Economics and Management), University of Pretoria. Thanks for giving a value to this research.
- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). Thanks for making available the needed resources and information.
- Mendoza Business School of Notre Dame University, USA. Thanks for hosting my World Bank Fellowship.
- The participants in the empirical research. Thanks for the availability and for the information without which this research would have been simply theoretical.

Many other people have supported me in various ways: Freddy Mnyongani, Ms Yendry Delgado, Jorge Chaves, Jean Ndenzako, Wim Overbeek, Roger Gakira, the Franciscan fathers (Pretoria), Tom Broderick (MSCs), the Seminary of Saint John Vianney (Pretoria), Brigadier General Emmanuel Miburo, the Dominicans of Aquinas Community (Mondeor), and Jean Bosco Kazirukanyo and his family.

May God who provides, bless you all.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ..............................................................................................................................................II

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................................... iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................................... v

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................... ix

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................................. ix

LIST OF MAPS........................................................................................................................................ ix

ACCRONYMS .......................................................................................................................................... x

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY ..............- 1 -

1.1 Background: The issue at stake and the purpose of the study ..................................................- 1 -

1.2 Cultural values in relation to economic development ..............................................................- 2 -

1.3 To what extent have cultural values been neglected in development plans: LPA and NEPAD? .................................................................................................................................- 4 -

1.3.1 The Lagos Plan of Action (1980) .........................................................................................- 4 -

1.3.2 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (2001) ......................................................- 5 -

1.4 An overview of theories of economic development that informed Africa’s economic development .................................................................................................................................- 7 -

1.4.1 Dependency theory ..............................................................................................................- 7 -

1.4.2 Neoclassical economic theory: Economic counter-revolution...............................................- 10 -

1.5 Development theories in relation to African development plans .............................................- 11 -

1.6 The problem ..................................................................................................................................- 12 -

1.7 Research objectives .......................................................................................................................- 13 -

1.8 Methodological assumptions .........................................................................................................- 13 -

1.9 Data gathering ...............................................................................................................................- 16 -

1.10 Structure of chapters ......................................................................................................................- 18 -

1.11 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................- 20 -
CHAPTER TWO: LPA AND NEPAD IN RELATION TO THEIR RESPECTIVE THEORIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Introduction

2.2 The context of theories of economic development

2.3 The Dependency Theory in relation to the Lagos Plan of Action

2.3.1 The concept of dependency

2.3.2 The Dependency Theory and the Latin American cultural identity

2.3.3 The dependency theory as a product of the Latin American value system

2.3.4 The Lagos Plan of Action in relation to the dependency theory

2.4 The Neo-liberal Theory of economic development in relation to NEPAD

2.4.1 Defining economic neo-liberalism

2.4.2 The characteristics of the culture that gave birth to Liberalism

2.4.3 The birth of economic neo-liberalism

2.4.4 NEPAD and the Neo-liberal Theory of economic development

2.5 Conclusion

CHAPTER THREE: THE AFRICAN VALUE SYSTEM AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION

3.1 Introduction

3.2 The unity and/or the diversity of the African value system

3.3 Cosmological and anthropological dimensions of the African community

3.3.1 The muntu in the universe of ntu

3.3.2 The muntu in the universe of Bantu

3.4 Attempts to validate the African sense of community: African socialism

3.4.1 Leopold Sedar Senghor

3.4.2 Kwame Nkrumah

3.4.3 Julius Nyerere

3.4.4 Kenneth Kaunda

3.4.5 Assessing African socialism and its link with communalism

3.5 Conclusion

CHAPTER FOUR: THE UNIVERSALITY OF THEORIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN RELATION TO THE PARTICULARITY OF AFRICAN VALUE SYSTEM

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Development economics versus orthodox economics

4.3 The LPA and NEPAD in relation to their respective policy frameworks
7.3.4 Baking the cake together: from capability to an inclusive process of economic development ................................................................. - 228 -

7.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ - 239 -

8 CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... - 241 -

8.1 Summary of the macro-argument .................................................................................... - 241 -

8.2 Implications of the research findings .............................................................................. - 246 -

8.3 Contributions and new areas for further research ........................................................ - 253 -

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES ...................................................................................... - 259 -

ANNEXES ............................................................................................................................. - 294 -

ANNEXE 1: CONSENT FORM .......................................................................................... - 294 -

ANNEXE 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE (FOR LPA) ................................................... - 297 -

ANNEXE 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE (FOR NEPAD) ............................................. - 298 -
LIST OF TABLES

Table 2-1: NEPAD's application of the Washington Consensus principles .................................................. - 63 -
Table 3-1: Table of Bantu categories ............................................................................................................ - 78 -
Table 4-1: Theories of development economics.......................................................................................... - 124 -
Table 4-2: The promotion of NEPAD by the ruling elite ............................................................................ - 141 -
Table 5-1: The structure of the research sample .......................................................................................... - 156 -
Table 5-2: Measures that will be taken to ensure validity at different stages of the interview .......... - 166 -
Table 5-3: Measures to ensure reliability .................................................................................................... - 168 -
Table 5-4: Ethical implications of the research and measures taken to face them .............................. - 170 -
Table 6-1: Views on the link between culture and economic development ............................................. - 186 -
Table 6-2: Views on whether the LPA/NEPAD is a true expression of African beliefs and values ....... - 190 -
Table 7-1: Comparison between Sen and Nussbaum on Capability ......................................................... - 209 -
Table 7-2: Interaction between capabilities and the structural institutions ............................................. - 227 -

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3-1: The schematic structure of the Bantu categories ....................................................................... - 79 -
Figure 3-2: The structure of the Bantu human community ........................................................................... - 86 -
Figure 5-1: Structure of the questionnaire ................................................................................................... - 152 -
Figure 7-1: The structure of economic development based on the African value system ...................... - 229 -
Figure 7-2: The three actors according to what they become in the process of development ............... - 238 -

LIST OF MAPS

Map 3-1: Map showing the approximate distribution of Bantu vs Niger-Kongo ........................................ - 76 -
Map 3-2: Guthrie’s classification of Bantu languages (1948) updated in 2006 ........................................... - 77 -
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACPPD:</td>
<td>The African Charter of Popular Participation for Development;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPER:</td>
<td>Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU:</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA:</td>
<td>Capability Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASS:</td>
<td>Centre for Advanced Social Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP:</td>
<td>Convention People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO:</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECLA:</td>
<td>Economic Commission of Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP:</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP:</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI:</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDG:</td>
<td>International Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF:</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI:</td>
<td>Import Substitution Industrialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDC:</td>
<td>Less Developed Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPA:</td>
<td>Lagos Plan of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP:</td>
<td>Millennium African Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC:</td>
<td>More Development Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEDLAC:</td>
<td>National Economic Development and Labour Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD:</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU:</td>
<td>Organisation for African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP:</td>
<td>Omega Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-ECA:</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP:</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-NADAF:</td>
<td>The United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION:
BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 Background: The issue at stake and the purpose of the study

The issue of Africa’s economic development\(^1\) has always attracted the attention of scholars and policymakers. Many explanations have been given and continue to be given as to what constitutes the root-cause of the Africa’s development impasse. These include: geographical isolation and weather shocks (Smith, 1965, pp. 20-21; Landes, 1998; Bloom & Sachs, 1998; Sachs, 2005); the colonial experience which has robbed Africans of their self-confidence (Mudimbe, 1988; NEPAD, 2001: §§ 21-22); the African cultural mentalities which are not conducive to development (Chabal & Deloz, 1999; Nyang, 1994; Kabou, 1991; Manguellé, 1990); high ethnic and linguistic fragmentation (Easterly & Levine, 1998), the lack of sufficient financial aid to kick-start the development process (UNCTD, 2006; Sachs, 2005; Cassen, 1986); the international environment which is not always conducive to the development of poor countries (Adebayo, 1985; Amin, 1974, 1985; Eyoh, 1996; Rodney, 1972); ill-informed development policies (World Bank, 1981; Edozie, 2004); and bad governments and socio-political instability (Ake, 1996; Bayart, 1993; Van de Walle, 2001; Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997; Sandbrook, 1986; Ayittey, 2005). A question is even asked whether the issue of Africa’s development has ever been taken seriously (Ake, 1996; Keita, 2004, p.156).

The purpose of this research is not to discuss these explanations. Rather I should like to appraise the cultural foundations of African strategies of economic development and see whether the neglect of the African value system may not have led to Africa’s development impasse. In an attempt to answer this question I will investigate what has been the case with the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

\(^{1}\)Although I talk of Africa in general, I am concerned with Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa consists of countries presenting almost the same cultural, social, political, and economic characteristics different from those of Northern Africa, and those in South Africa with its multicultural wealth.
1.2 Cultural values in relation to economic development

The interest in cultural beliefs and values as a catalyst accelerating or hampering development goes back to Max Weber (1971) who argued that Western capitalism was tied to a particular institutional matrix and certain cultural values (spirit). On the other hand, the modernisation theorists, in the 1960s, used Emil Durkheim’s thought to claim that some forms of cultural practices are rather obstacles to economic development in so far as they represent non-rational, collective, traditional ways of life which are not suitable to capitalist development. By the same token, Etounga Manguellé, in his celebrated *L’Afrique a-t-elle besoin d’un programme d’ajustement culturel?* (1990), argues that Africa needs a programme of cultural adjustment that would transform African mentalities to one which is consistent with values in the rest of the world. However, it is not clear what those universal values he is referring to, are. In her *Et si l’Afrique refusait le développement?* Axelle Kabou (1991) is also convinced that, although they never appear on the long list of the official causes of underdevelopment, African cultures and mentalities are the main obstacles to development.

A considerable number of scholars are reconsidering culture as an important variable for economic development (Harrison & Huntington, 2000; Porter, 2000; Huntington, 1998; Inglehart, 1997; Landes, 1998; Swank, 1996; Granato, et al., 1996, Franke, et al. 1991). In particular, the debate is continuing, and centres on whether the economic miracle of Asia may not be predicated on the Asian cultural values, especially the Confucian values (Cf. Morishima, 1982; Sen, 1987; Ling & Shih, 1998).

Nevertheless, there is also a moderate argument that culture may not be a sufficient condition to explain economic development (see Sen, 2004; Chang, 2008; Ryh-Song Yeh & Lawrence, 1995). This reservation may equally be explained by the fact that economists, particularly those with a positivistic spirit, do not often take into consideration cultural endowments in their analyses (Ruttan, 1988), because they believe that the society of the market and economic development is nothing but the product of individual choices and preferences. More precisely, neoclassical economics, which has been the dominant economic paradigm since the 1980s, is done in a way that would make one believe that people live in a culture-free context.
The link between cultural values and economic development in Africa needs to be explored and investigated for two major reasons. The first reason is that the theories of economic development which have fuelled plans of development in Africa and which apparently have been successful in some parts of the world have failed in Africa. One may hypothesise that African cultural beliefs and values have been the missing link in this economic development process since not enough attention has been paid to the cultural component in the African development policymaking and planning. Instead, what has attracted the attention of African economists and development policymakers is the advice that appropriate policies of economic development effectively implemented achieve the same results, irrespective of the culture in which they are applied. The experience of development plans based on theories of economic development generally acknowledged as universally applicable seems to prove that this axiomatic affirmation cannot be taken as a universal law in economic development (cf. Katie, 2005; Mehmet, 1995).

The second reason that motivates the investigation of the link between cultural values and economic development as far as Africa is concerned is the fact that economic development seems to have been successful where it has been a validation or a substantiation of people’s beliefs and values. According to Messay Kabede,

> The depiction of development in terms of mere satisfaction of needs rather than validation of beliefs largely explains the underdevelopment of Africa. By not being a program of corroboration of beliefs, development fails to be animated by a competitive, insatiable, and creative spirit (Kabede, 1999).

In connection with economic development as the substantiation of a people’s beliefs and values, Michael McPherson (cited by Samuels, 1990, see also Throsby, 2001) argues that economics itself is part of a cultural milieu. The cultural milieu, in large measure, endows economic goods and activities with meaning and presents people with the matrix of constraints and opportunities within which they develop themselves.
1.3 To what extent have cultural values been neglected in development plans: LPA and NEPAD?

If I propose to consider LPA and NEPAD, it is not because there have not been other development plans in the history of Africa’s development. It is rather because these two are historically pivotal in Africa’s search for sustained economic development.

1.3.1 The Lagos Plan of Action (1980)

The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) was the first landmark and expression of African economic self-consciousness. Viewed from epistemological and historical perspectives, the deeper meaning of this economic Magna Charta of Africa is that economic dependency is a consequence of mental dependency (cf. Kebede, 2004, p. 123; Mudimbe, 1988). Thus in order to gain access to mental independence leading to economic independence, the LPA policymakers undertook to face three major tasks, namely: to challenge the conventional wisdom of inherited theories of development and economic growth; to analyse the impact of imitative life-styles and borrowed foreign concepts and ideologies on Africa’s social and economic transformation; and to make African authorities accept the need for a fundamental change (Adedeji, 1985, p.14).

Historically, LPA is a culmination of an effort of four years initiated by the Economic Commission of Africa (ECA). This effort consisted in reviewing the achievements of economic development paradigms that Africa has followed since the period of independence in the 1960s. The period reviewed covered 1960 to 1975. According to Adedeji (2002), it was noticed that the economic performance was obviously in decline. Thus, in 1976, ECA proposed a Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Order in Africa. This framework contained four fundamental principles which it was believed would lead to an auto-centric economic development in Africa, namely: self-reliance, self-sustainment, democratisation of the development process, and a just distribution of the fruits of

---

development. The uniqueness of LPA was its emphasis on collective self-reliance, self-sustaining development, and economic growth (OAU, 1980, p.4). The reason for this emphasis was for Africans to move away from external dependence (Adedeji, 1985, p.13).

As it will be shown later (Chapter 2), LPA was based on the dependency theory which originated in Latin America. Latin America has its own cultural and historical context. Although the dependency theory was an excellent tool for showing how Africans are victims of economic imperialism, one may wonder whether it gave any adequate advice on how to extricate themselves from such conditions (Apter & Rosberg, 1994, p.39). The dependency theory in Africa seems to have been like a seedling transplanted in a new environment without considering its pedological and the climatic conditions.

1.3.2 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (2001)

NEPAD seems to be a response to the “crisis of initiative” resulting from the failure of LPA (Diagne, 2004). It is defined as a pledge by African leaders to eradicate poverty and place their countries on a path of sustainable (economic) growth and development (NEPAD, 2001, §1).

NEPAD seems to respond to two major issues relating to the economic development of poor countries, namely: the effectiveness of development aid and the market economy as a solution to Africa’s underdevelopment. Concerning the effectiveness of development aid, the World Bank published a report Assessing Aid (1998) which provided a new impetus to the macroeconomic effectiveness of aid. This report argues that aid effectiveness depends on specific circumstances in recipient countries, particularly, sound economic policies and good governance. NEPAD promised to meet this conditionality, and in return, achieve a massive aid inflow for Africa to escape from economic stagnation and poverty.

However, the problem is that a country may receive development aid and become aid dependent. And this dependency may have negative effects on economic growth in return. Furthermore, large aid flows may not be used productively due to limited absorptive capacity of the beneficiary (Lensik & White, 2001). Thus, the point is that Africa’s economic development might require more than financial means.
Secondly, NEPAD is an expression of the present market-economy based on the assumption that the freedom to pursue one’s own interest promotes collective welfare. This economic perspective has its long history in western historical and philosophical developments, especially David Hume and Adam Smith (Rostow, 1990; cf. Khalil, 2001, p. 422). The question is whether its success in some places implies its success in Africa.

With regard to the first response, NEPAD is accused of being dependent on aid. But the problem is not only material dependence, but also philosophic dependence. Between 1970 and 1993, Africa shifted from trade dependence to aid dependence (World Bank, 2000, p.19). This shift is even deeper: it is the Africans’ continual shift from being to having in their value system (Ntibagirirwa, 2003). Instead of digging deeper to see what their own beliefs and values can offer, Africans seem to satisfy themselves with whatever is available to them.

With regard to the second response, the problem is that economic neo-liberalism has not been successful in Africa. The Structural Adjustment Programme, which was one of the ways through which neo-liberalism came into Africa, had negative effects. Its focus on macroeconomic stability had damaging impact on local manufacturing (Carnody, 2001; Satamar, 1993). It undermined those institutions (the state for instance, see World Bank, 1993) that provide the socio-economic environment for the free market to prosper (Stein & Nafziger, 1991; Ntibagirirwa, 2004). These negative effects are often used to critique neo-liberalism for its failure in underdeveloped countries, as well as any development that may be based on it.

The concern of this research is more than these economic aspects. Economic development must have its deep roots in the beliefs and values that structure the ontological make-up of a given people.

---

3 Other ways include political restructuring (political reforms), economic stabilisation, and social reform through the empowerment of the civil society.
1.4 An overview of theories of economic development that informed Africa’s economic development

The two development plans just reviewed were informed by the prevailing theories of economic development. Basically, two theories of development can be identified. The first is the dependency theory which flourished in the late 1960s/1970s and inspired the Lagos Plan of Action in the 1980s. The second is the neoclassical theory which experienced a resurgence in the 1980s, and which is also referred to as an “economic counter-revolution”, maybe vis-à-vis the influence of structuralism and the dependency theory which were developed in Latin America.

1.4.1 Dependency theory

The dependency theory was already implied in the Economic Commission of Latin America (ECLA) under the supervision of Raúl Prebisch in the 1950s, but André Gunder Frank is said to have played a leading role in its formulation in 1962. As will be seen later, the proponents of the dependency theory reacted against two major theories of economic development which prevailed in Latin America, namely the structuralism represented by Arthur Lewis (1954, 1955) and the linear process proposed by Walter Rostow (1960).

1.4.1.1 Dependency theory as a response to structuralism

The basic argument of the structuralist theory was that structural aspects of the domestic and international economy threaten the economic growth of developing countries, and that economic growth in developing countries can be achieved through an internal expansion of the local economy thanks to the state’s promotion of import-substitution-industrialisation (ISI). In effect, the structural problem that was pointed out was that the terms of trade worked against the producers of primary products. Whatever income they earned from these primary goods was used to import the consumer goods from the industrialised countries. Since consumer goods are higher in value than primary goods, it followed that the income increased for the industrialised countries while it decreased in the non-industrialised countries. This resulted in asymmetric trade relationships. Thus, the import-substitution-industrialisation was thought to
be a solution to the problem of asymmetric trade, and at the same time, a means of countering the negative effects of unemployment especially in the agricultural sector.

The champion of this theory was Arthur Lewis (1955). Lewis argued that the traditional overpopulated rural sector is characterised by marginal labour productivity and can, thus, be withdrawn from the agricultural sector without any loss of output. On the contrary, the modern, urban setting is characterised by a high productivity. Thus, for Lewis, the best path to economic growth is to utilise the surplus rural labour in the industrialised sector, which would be, in turn, the recipient of capital input from the developed countries. This would mean that the export of primary goods would continue and the earnings would be re-invested in the national industrialisation to produce the consumer goods which were hitherto imported.

This economic outlook was successful for a while and even gained much respectability, especially among the nationalist leaders of the Third World countries. Most of the newly African independent countries in the late 1950s and the early 1960s adopted it in their economic policies (e.g. Ghana, Libya). However, the brief economic expansion structuralism yielded turned into economic stagnation. As a result, many countries of Latin America were plagued by economic problems (such as currency devaluation, inflation, unemployment, declining terms of trade, heavy indebtedness to lending countries and institutions), and socio-political instability as the popular regimes collapsed and were replaced by repressive military and authoritarian regimes. The Latin American economists and policymakers who had hoped that structuralism would yield economic growth and social welfare were disappointed (see So, 1990).

The dependency proponents blamed the Economic Commission of Latin America (ECLA) for having been too timid in pushing forward radical measures such as land reforms and other structural changes such as social transformation (see Blomström & Hettne, 1984). In implementing structuralism in a “softer” way, the ECLA had assumed that various aspects of underdevelopment would automatically disappear in the process of industrialisation. Thus, the dependency theory emerged as a more radical economic perspective. Using the same economic assumptions as those of structuralism, its proponents suggested national and collective economic self-reliance.
1.4.1.2 Dependency theory as a response to Rostow’s linear process

The dependency theory was also a response to the linear process of economic development proposed by Walter Rostow (1960), as well as the modernisation theory he represented. Rostow argued that the transition from underdevelopment to development is a linear process which consists of five stages: the traditional society; the preconditions of take-off; the take-off; the stage of maturity; and finally the stage of higher consumption. He argued that some developing countries were still in the traditional stage, some others in the stage of preconditions. For them to achieve a self-sustained economic growth that could lead to the stage of take-off; they had to follow the historical trajectory of developed countries.

Rostow’s argument was an echo of the works of Emil Durkheim and Max Weber (see Taylor, 2001/2002, p. 3). According to Durkheim, the world is divided into modern and traditional societies. Traditional societies are backward-looking and do not have the dynamism required for economic success. Their socio-political organisations are based on religious authority, metaphysical cosmology and a form of social structures based on inheritance (Durkheim cited in Taylor, 2001/2002, p.4). Thus, Rostow argued that traditional societies are economically characterised by rural life and agricultural production. In contrast to this, modern societies emerged from traditional formations through a development process which includes the decline of the magic, the rise of reason, the secularisation of the society, and a system of reward based on merit. All these gave rise to science and technology, innovation and efficiency, as well as a capitalist work ethic which stimulated economic progress (cf. Weber, 1971).

Rostow’s point is that underdevelopment is explained by the persistence of traditional beliefs and institutions. Thus, for economic development to occur, traditional values and institutions have to be substituted by imported structures and beliefs consistent with economic growth. Furthermore, like other modernists, Rostow argued that the linkages (through cultural exchange, technology transfer, and foreign aid) between the economically underdeveloped countries and the developed countries would be beneficial.

The proponents of the dependency theory rejected Rostow’s theory on the ground that developed countries and underdeveloped ones are economically different because they have different contexts and histories (Frank, 1975; Cardoso & Faleto, 1979). The developed countries did not experience colonial rule and never had to integrate themselves into an
economy dominated by competitors (Taylor, 2001/2002, p. 6). Thus, it was believed that economic underdevelopment is externally induced and that economic development is impossible given the existing structural relationship between developed countries and their ex-colonies. The relationship pointed to is the fact that economically developed countries obtain raw materials from developing countries at a low price, and sell back the finished products to developing countries at a high price.\textsuperscript{4} This generates permanent poverty in developing countries. Thus, economic sovereignty needed to be promoted; and the suggested path to achieve it was self-reliance.

The assumptions of national and collective self-reliance that underlie the dependency theory seem to have inspired the Lagos Plan of Action especially in the sense that African policymakers seemed to have realised that there is a kind of preferable economic development of which the developing countries are capable, but which their dependence prevents them from achieving (cf. Leys, 1996, pp.112 & 113). The issue is what should ultimately underlie an economic development that is self-reliant in Africa.

\subsection*{1.4.2 Neoclassical economic theory: Economic counter-revolution}

The neoclassical theory goes back to Adam Smith’s philosophical reflection on how the wealth of a nation could be created and increased. Smith argued that human behaviour is guided by self-interest and that the freedom to pursue it leads to collective interest (see Smith, 1965, p.14).\textsuperscript{5}

Accordingly, the neo-liberal development economists and policymakers argued that the route to a successful economic development is the market economy. They dismissed the structuralists’ appeal to state intervention to deal with structural obstructions in the economic development of developing countries, and the dependency theory as unrealistic. They went as far as claiming that the dependency theorists had little knowledge of neoclassical economic theory, and argued that economic underdevelopment was rather a consequence of both poor

\textsuperscript{4} The export of primary goods continued under the economic policies of structuralism.

\textsuperscript{5} I am aware that Adam Smith wrote first \textit{The Theory of Moral Sentiments} in which he developed the concept of sympathy. For Smith, the motive to satisfy self-interest and the interests of others stems from the same human tendency to sympathise with self and with the beneficiary (see Khalil, 2001). However, in the economic discourse of neo-liberalism, it seems that the emphasis is laid on self-interest.
economic policies and also the excessive state intervention in the economy. Thus the solution to economic underdevelopment was thought to be an efficient market economy achieved by eliminating market restrictions and by the limitation of state intervention. This was concretised by the promotion of free trade and the elimination of state regulations which affect the market.

With this overview of these theories, one cannot but ask what makes them what they are? Can they claim any universal applicability?

1.5 Development theories in relation to African development plans

As already noted, the LPA seems to have relied on the dependency theory and its assumptions of national and collective self-reliance after realising that the previous development theories did not help. NEPAD seems to have relied on the neo-classical economic theory and its underlying concept of self-interest. It must be realised that none of the theories of economic development used to lead development plans in Africa came from Africa. The dependency theory is the outcome of the philosophical and cultural background of Latin America. It is true that Latin America shared with Africa certain historical features such as the colonial experience, and certain economic features such as economic underdevelopment and asymmetric economic relationships with the developed countries. Nevertheless, Latin America and Africa differ in two major connected respects and these are: their respective philosophical and cultural backgrounds. Thus, the question is to what extent an African plan of economic development premised on a philosophical basis that is not African can yield the economic development which Africans desire to achieve.

The same question obtains in the case of NEPAD which is based on the neo-classical theory of economic development. The neo-classical theory is a by-product of the philosophical and the cultural experience of the Western world. Unlike Latin America, the Western world has fewer features to share with Africa. Even if one were to grant that the neo-classical theory of economic development uses mathematical methods believed to be universal (Rosenberg, 1992; Yonay, 1998; Hogdson, 2001), one could still wonder whether this gives it the credentials to be universally applicable, irrespective of the cultural beliefs and values of a particular society.
1.6 The problem

The general path to get Africa out of the underdevelopment trap has been through development plans, but practically none of them has succeeded. If one considers the two major development plans, LPA and NEPAD that were supposed to propel Africa’s economic development, it is obvious that the former has ceased to be the reference framework for Africa’s economic development, while the latter, after ten years of experience, leaves one with certain reservations. One common feature of the two development plans is that they have used borrowed theories of economic development without sufficiently being sensitive to the African cultural dimension. Thus, the problem at the centre of this research is whether the neglect of the cultural beliefs and values that structure the ontological make-up of Africans might not be the reason why Africa is in a development impasse.

Accordingly, two main theses will be developed. The first thesis is that African plans of development seem to be based on theories of economic development that, in essence, are incompatible with the African value system. In effect, as it has already been said, both LPA and NEPAD used borrow theories of economic development. These theories grew out of their respective contexts with their particular value systems, and therefore specific philosophical bases. The question of whether and/or how they can take root in the African value system has hardly been taken into account. It was taken for granted that, since these theories are being used elsewhere, they could also be used in Africa.

The second thesis is that the architects of African plans of development seem to have relied on the belief that, because modern economics is based on methods (such as mathematical methods) that are universal, therefore theories of economic development resulting from them could be universally applied irrespective of the cultural and historical context. However, such belief ignores the fact that theories of economic development all have their own philosophical, historico-cultural backgrounds. In effect, economics and economic development are not only

---

6 I deliberately use African value system in the singular because Sub-Saharan Africans seem to share a common metaphysical backbone. This metaphysical backbone can be perceived in various aspects such the holistic concept of reality, the communal concept of human life and the tendency to explain natural phenomena in terms metaphysico-religious causality. The Bantu people who occupy a major region of Sub-Saharan Africa (mostly around the equator and south of the equator) share also the metaphysical concept of being which is referred to as “ntu”: mu-ntu (human being), ki-ntu (non rational being), ku-ntu (modal being), and ha-ntu (spatial and temporal being) (see chapter 3, section 3.3.1 below).
part of a cultural milieu, but they are also a substantiation of beliefs and values of a given people at a particular time.

1.7 Research objectives

This research has three main objectives. The first objective is to critically assess the LPA and NEPAD against the backdrop of the theories of economic development and their cultural assumptions on which the two development plans are respectively based.

The second objective is to investigate the relationship between African cultural values and economic development and the extent to which the neglect of this aspect in Africa’s economic policymaking and development planning could jeopardise development plans.

The third objective is to propose philosophical premises that could guide future development theory in Africa. In this connection, the question of African philosophy has not yet been taken seriously in facing the impasse of Africa’s economic development. Thus, I intend to revisit the African value system and its ontology and retrieve the Bantu people’s double concept of the human person as umuntu-w’-ubuntu / umuntu-mu-Bantu in order to ground the future of Africa’s economic development on an African foundation.

1.8 Methodological assumptions

I will approach the issue of the role of cultural values in Africa’s development from a philosophical perspective. Accordingly, the quantitative methods which development economists often use will not be central to my research process. Yet this does not mean that, where necessary, a reference to quantitative data such as development indicators and the like will not be referred to in the reflection process.

Philosophy is a human science classified among the social sciences (Grynpas, 1990, pp. 112-114). One may grant that, effectively, philosophy is a social science like anthropology, psychology, sociology, and political sciences. However, it cannot be confused with them. According to Demeterio (1996), both philosophy and the social sciences focus not only on the human beings, but also on their internal world (ideas, thoughts, and emotions) as well as their
social world of inter-subjectivity. Nevertheless, although the object of enquiry is the same, the methods of enquiry of the social sciences are different from those of philosophy. The methods of the social sciences are observation-experimentation, empirical processing, quantification of data and subsequent conclusion. The approach tends to be predominantly descriptive. The methods of philosophy are examination, analysis, and classification of ideas, reflection and insight. The philosophical approach tends to be predominantly interpretive, qualitative and prescriptive.

However, Demeterio’s distinction between philosophy and the social sciences in terms of methods does not seem to be clear since interpretative, qualitative and prescriptive approaches can be found in the social sciences to a large extent. What makes the distinction between philosophy and the social sciences clear is the search for the answer to the question “why”. The question “why”, leading to the first causes, as Plato puts it, makes philosophy a science whose major characteristic is to critique. Grynpas (1990) argues that philosophy is a science whose vocation is creativity based on the response to the question of the why of things. The depth of the question “why” makes philosophy the mother or queen of sciences not because it engenders them, but because it is a second order science. It ranks higher as a judge of other sciences and studies the principles on which they are based. Thus one talks of the philosophy of social sciences, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of economics. This research will deal with the philosophy of economic development. Since it is a philosophical consideration of the issue of Africa’s economic development, the research method will be a critique.

The two development plans (Lagos Plan of Action and the New Partnership for Africa’s development) which will be the focus of this research did not emerge from a vacuum. They are based on the development theories which were available in the history of development economics. Thus, I excavate these development theories and retrieve their cultural foundations and then subject them to a critical assessment in order to understand why the African plans of development which they inspired have not achieved Africa’s economic development.

Furthermore, the two plans of development themselves will be investigated and critically assessed. In this critical assessment, besides the cultural context and the eventual influences that were at stake, two levels of questioning will be considered, namely, their coherence and compatibility with their respective development theories on the one hand, their coherence and compatibility with the African value system on the other. I will consider the question of how
these plans are articulated with their respective development theories and how they cohere with their respective development theories. How were they articulated within the African context? In their use of the development theories, did the two plans engage with or ignore the African value system?

The philosophical premises that are proposed to guide the future economic development of Africa will be informed by the capability approach to economic development elaborated by Armatya Sen. Sen (1999, 2003) defines (economic) development as expansion of people’s freedoms or the ability of people to lead the lives they value and have reason to value.

Why use Sen’s capability approach? As will be seen later, Sen’s capability approach is increasingly used to assess economic development and the policies and methods devised to achieve it. Hitherto, economic development was assessed in terms of economic growth reflected in variables such as income, particularly the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and/or Gross National Product (GNP), wealth, or simply utility. However, economic growth is not necessarily synonymous with economic development. Certain societies may achieve a high GDP or GNP, or even be wealthy without being economically developed. For Sen (1995, p.6), economic development cannot simply be assessed in terms of economic achievements or quantitative terms. By concentrating on achievements, such an assessment would ignore freedoms, and other aspects of development that are not reflected in quantitative terms.

Following Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness (1971), certain economists and policymakers retained the idea of economic growth but suggested the idea of equitable distribution of primary goods. This gave rise to the idea of satisfying the “basic needs” of people and the assessment of economic development in terms of social indicators (see Adelman & Morris, 1973; Grant, 1978; Wells, 1983 among others). However, for Sen (1987, p.24), one cannot assess economic development simply in terms of commodity possession. Thus Sen points out that the distribution of primary goods or basic needs does not deal with the fundamental issue of the type of life that people value and are able to lead.

Against the above critique, Sen revisits Aristotle’s examination of the functions of a human being and the understanding of human life in terms of activity, as well Marx’s understanding of the success of human life in terms of fulfilling the needs of human activity (Sen, 2003, p.4;
Thus Sen’s starting point is the ability to function (hence, capability) and agency or ability to act.

The advantage of the capability approach is that its ultimate foundation is not culture, and therefore it could serve as a guide on how development could be achieved in any cultural context. In other words, Sen’s starting point is not social anthropology but philosophical anthropology as the capability approach emphasises essentially human agency, the ability of people to lead the life they value, and the expansion of the real freedoms people enjoy as a basis for genuine participation that leads to sustainable development. Participation makes development inclusive of all actors, and nobody can be made a patient of development. Furthermore, participation makes possible what I will be referring to as the democratisation and inculturation of economic development thanks to the public debate and reflection, or simply public reasoning (Sen, 1999, p. 201).

1.9 Data gathering

This research is mainly non-empirical, but with an empirical component. From the non-empirical perspective, the method of data gathering and study will be a literature review. According to Mouton (2001, p.180), a literature review provides the researcher with a good understanding of issues and debates in the area one is working in, and also the current theoretical thinking and definitions, as well as previous studies and their results. There are many publications on theories of economic development that informed development in Africa, LPA, NEPAD, and on African development in general. Both African and non-African policymakers, economists, social and political scientists, and recently African philosophers have taken an interest in the problem of development in Africa. Thus, in this research the literature review will help to make sure that I am not repeating or duplicating reflections already expressed; to identify and to retrieve the theorising on Africa’s economic development; interpret and evaluate explanations given as causes of Africa’s underdevelopment and solutions proposed; and provide me with clues and suggestions about which avenue requires particular attention (cf. Mouton, 2001, pp. 86-7; Welman et al., 2005, p.39).

Furthermore, with the literature review as a method of collecting and mining data, this “study will be valued as part of the cumulative knowledge-building effort” (Rubin & Babbie, 2001, p.121) regarding the problem of economic development in Africa to which I intend to provide
a contribution. The issue of why Africa is not developed and how it can develop has yielded various explanatory hypotheses. Thus, the literature review could be structured according to those explanatory hypotheses.

Another important approach to my study of data which goes with the literature review will be the conceptual clarification. One cannot do a literature review without paying attention to conceptual questions that are tied up with the problem being studied. In fact, the archaeology of development theories itself as well as the assessment of development plans to which they give rise cannot be done without careful attention to, and clarification of, a host of concepts and conceptual questions which surround them. This research involves many concepts such as dependency, (neo) liberalism, capability, and agency. These are all technical terms which need sufficient clarification.

However, one may ask whether one can engage in the conceptual clarification without at the same time engaging in a conceptual analysis. As Mouton suggests, the conceptual analysis brings conceptual clarity; and a well-structured conceptual analysis makes conceptual categories clear and explicates theoretical linkages (Mouton, 2001, p.175). Nevertheless, conceptual analysis and conceptual clarification are two different things. According to John Wilson (1963), the conceptual analysis is a whole method on its own by which one is brought to “think with concepts”. Conceptual analysis is concerned with the “the actual and possible uses of words” and “the criteria or principles by which those uses are determined” (Wilson, 1963, pp. 10-11; Du Toit, 2003, pp.23ss). Instead, in the clarification of the concepts of this research, I shall engage myself in a task with which the conceptual analysis is not concerned, namely that of defining concepts in their link with facts and values, in as much as this is required by the objectives of this research.

Besides the literature study of official or formal documents, published works and reflections, I will to engage with some economists and policymakers who have played a role in the design of the two plans. This will be done through semi-structured interviews. The necessity of this link with policymakers and economists lies in the fact that ideas and even concepts in publications tend to be static, while ideas in people’s minds tend to be dynamic. The shift from LPA to NEPAD and many other plans between them is an obvious case. Since the circumstances of

---

7See footnote (2).
development planning are complex, there seems to be more than what is often stated in official documents and publications.

Furthermore, one needs to know how African economists and policymakers respond to the concern that African cultural values could have been the missing link between development plans and the economic development they purported to achieve. More precisely, it will be important to discuss with them whether adapting development policies to the African value system or adapting the African value system to development policies could advance the cause of economic development in Africa. In fact the objective being contemplated here is to bring African economists and policymakers into the enterprise of formulating a philosophy of economic development. My belief is that economists and policymakers, particularly the mainstream ones, may persist in viewing values as an alien issue in development economics (cf. Ben-Ner & Putternam, 1998), while a philosophical perspective on economic development which would not consider the practical issues reflected by economists and policymakers may risk ending up in a pure abstraction with little or no bearing on the economic reality.

The method of empirical data gathering, analysis and interpretation of the empirical component is described in Chapter Five.

1.10 Structure of chapters

The first chapter of this research consists of the background and various methodological aspects. These are the aim of the research, problem, objectives and research method.

The second chapter will deal with the Lagos Plan of Action and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development in relation to their respective theories of economic development. In this articulation there is a double task to be done. The first task is to unearth the theories of economic development and the cultural assumptions underpinning them. The second task is to assess the two development plans against the backdrop of their respective theories of economic development and the cultural assumptions of these theories.
The third chapter will consider the African value system and its ontological foundation in order to appreciate its particularity which could lead to specific economic development in Africa. At this juncture I will revisit and discuss the Bantu conceptual framework, namely the double concept of the human person as *umuntu-w’-ubuntu* and *umuntu-mu-bantu*, in order to clear the ground for certain philosophical premises that will lead future development policymaking and planning in Africa.

The fourth chapter will focus on the universality of development theories in relation to the particularity of the African value system. African economists and policymakers imported available theories in development planning because these were being used elsewhere. But also, development theories were imposed on Africa’s development planning from outside presumably because these were considered to be successful elsewhere. In this chapter therefore, two major issues will be addressed. The first is the question of whether the African value system was ignored or avoided in the economic development planning. Secondly, the specificity of the African context of development will be addressed by considering the concept of participation which makes possible the inculturation and democratisation of the development process.

The fifth chapter will consist of the methodological procedures of the empirical component: the criteria for choosing the interviewees, the interviewees chosen, the nature of questions asked, and the method of analysis of the interviews, the method used to test the reliability and the validity of the findings, and the ethical considerations that that will guide the research.

The sixth chapter will consist of the findings of the empirical research, that is, the outcome of interviews with economists and policymakers who played a role in the design of LPA and NEPAD. These findings will be compared with the earlier theoretical conclusions of the two preceding chapters.

The seventh chapter will consider how the African value system can be taken seriously in development theorising and planning. It will first outline Sen’s capability approach to development, and secondly, based on this approach, some philosophical premises that could inspire the future development in Africa will be elaborated.
Finally, Chapter eight is the general conclusion. It will consist of the summary of the macro-argument, the implications of the findings, as well as the shortcomings of the research and the new areas it opens for further investigation.

1.11 Conclusion

So far this introductory chapter has provided a background of the research and the methodological aspects that give the broad orientation of the study. It discussed the research problem, the objectives, the methodological assumptions, as well as the empirical data gathering. It outlined the structure of the overall research, and presented briefly the purpose of each chapter.

The next chapter (Chapter Two) will consider the two strategies of Africa’s development in relation to the respective theories of economic development that informed them. It argues that although the two plans of economic development were produced in Africa, their philosophical basis is not African.
2 CHAPTER TWO

LPA AND NEPAD IN RELATION TO THEIR RESPECTIVE THEORIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Introduction

The essential theme of this chapter is that, although the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were crafted in Africa, their philosophical roots do not originate from Africa. To get across this point, I will excavate the dependency and neo-liberal theories of economic development, and retrieve the cultural assumptions upon which they are premised. I will then assess LPA and NEPAD against the benchmark of these development theories that underpin them respectively.

LPA is said to be a classic dependency interpretation of Africa’s economic development. Various scholars (Benachenhou, 1982; Shaw, 1984; Browne & Cummings, 1985; Owusu, 2006; Ikome, 2007) argue that, at the time when Africans were trying to redefine their identity as a part of the reaction to the legacy of the colonial and neo-colonial experience, the dependency theory was perceived as a persuasive tool that could help Africans to launch a collective self-reliant and self-sustaining economic development. Despite conflicting interpretations (see Pretorious & Patel, 2002; Fourie & Vickers, 2003; Matthews, 2004; Venter & Neuland, 2005), NEPAD relied on the neo-liberal theory of economic development. The architects of NEPAD believed that the integration into the global economy on the basis of the liberalisation of markets would lead to Africa’s economic development.

The point to be investigated is whether LPA and NEPAD might not have used their respective theories of economic development without being aware of the underlying belief and value systems. In effect, the theories of economic development themselves could sometimes be catalysed by the historical and political circumstances to the extent that people do not easily appreciate the relevance of their own beliefs and values in economic development. Even if it were shown that the architects of these plans were indeed aware of the “cultural value” factor
in economic development, the question is still to what extent this factor has been taken seriously. There are two things that are at stake here. The first is that theories of economic development are deeply rooted in specific belief and value systems. To each value system is attached a particular ontological make-up which individuals acquire in such a system and which yields a kind of economic development that fits with it. The second is the issue of how what people believe and value can be validated in terms of their policies of economic development, that is, how a given perspective of economic development could be a reflection of what people believe and value.

Thus this chapter consists of five parts. The first part is this introduction. In the second part I outline the general context in which theories of economic development emerged and point out that, although the historical and political circumstances play a certain important role, it is what people believe and value that ultimately inform economic development. The third part deals with LPA in relation to the dependency theory. After clarifying the concept of “dependency”, I outline the cultural foundations of the dependency theory and assess LPA against this background. The fourth part deals with the neo-liberal theory in relation to NEPAD. I outline the features of the cultural system upon which neo-liberalism is based and assess NEPAD against this backdrop. The last part is the conclusion of the main arguments and a transition to Chapter Three.

2.2 The context of theories of economic development

Before launching into the analysis of the two theories of economic development, it is important to provide the general context in which the question of development and theories of economic development arose in Africa in particular, and in the Third World in general. According to Alvin So (1990), the issue of theories of economic development arose out of three major historical events.

The first event was the rise of the United States as a superpower after the Second World War. In the 1950s, the United States took over the responsibility of managing the affairs of the world as a whole and tended to impose their way of life, including their politico-economic ideology, which is mainly capitalist. In fact, this renders the reflection on certain theories of economic
development uneasy insofar as it becomes difficult to distinguish between objective American academic ideas and US foreign policy (see Manzo, 1991, p.11).

The second event was the spread of the communist movement under the Marxist ideology which tended to influence the political and economic ordering of most Third World countries. As a result, the economic thoughts that developed in most Third World countries tended to be associated with Marxism even when this was not really the case. Nevertheless, it can hardly be denied that the historical, structural and dialectical approaches peculiar to Marxism were widely used to identify the causes and provide cures for (under)development. Yet the issue is much more epistemological than ideological, since what is at stake is rather what tools may better serve an understanding of social phenomena.

Finally, there was the collapse of the colonial enterprise in the 1960s which gave birth to new nation-states in the South. These new nation-states were in search of perspectives of economic development that could help them to promote their economic development. They had a choice between forging their own perspectives and using the perspectives made available by their colonial metro-poles.

These three historical events catalysed development economics as an academic field and praxis. There was a strong tendency to promote the mainstream economic perspectives of the West as universally valid irrespective of the context where they are applied (Seers, 1980, p.6). The problem is (was) that, once one poses the principle of universality, one also has to be ready to confront the principle of particularity (which will be discussed in Chapter Four).

What one can infer from this dynamics is that historical and political circumstances play a certain role in approaches to economic development. As it will be argued, this role could be expressed in terms of catalyst in so far as it is the people’s mindset and the deep seated beliefs and values which ultimately inform economic development. By mindset, I mean how people understand and define themselves. People impart to the world what they know themselves to be and tend to shape it accordingly. The economic development of a society is part of this ontological and epistemological interplay (cf. Malinda, 2006, p.7; Adesina, 2004). With this in mind, I will now discuss the dependency theory in relation to the Lagos Plan of Action.
2.3 The Dependency Theory in relation to the Lagos Plan of Action

2.3.1 The concept of dependency

The concept of “dependency” is very complex and has been understood differently even among the dependency theorists themselves. It is often pointed out that the concept of dependency is surrounded by a lack of precision and conceptual clarity (Lall, 1975; O’Brien, 1973). According to Duvall (1978, p.55), dependency theorists tend to avoid and even to reject any conceptual precision and measurement in so far as they are more concerned with describing social, political and economic processes in historical, structural and dialectical perspectives. As a consequence, the same conceptual ambiguity is found in arguments used to defend the dependency theory (Bath & James, 1976; Chilcote, 1974; Duvall, 1978). In fact, the dependency theorists themselves are surrounded with a cloud of confusion as they ask themselves whether dependency should be seen as a theory of economic development or simply as an approach. For instance, Samuel Valenzuela and Arthuro Valenzuela (1978, p.546) argue that the dependency theory is primarily a historical model with no claim to “universal validity”. It pays less attention to the formulation of theoretical constructs and concentrates more on the historical phases which are an integral part of the framework.

Duvall (1978) tried to rescue the concept of dependency from its conceptual ambiguity and to clarify whether it is a theory of economic development or simply an approach. After attempting a conceptual clarification, Duvall suggests that dependency would qualify as a theory of economic development if a dialogue were established between dependencia theorists and rigorous empiricists (Duvall, 1978, pp. 68ff). The need for such a dialogue is perceivable in what Duvall sees as the meaning of dependency theory which requires not only an assessment of a social scientist (most dependency theorists are social scientists) but also that of economists.

Duvall understands dependency to mean three things. Firstly, the concept of dependency is used by a group of scholars who are concerned with a holistic descriptive analysis of historical processes or socio-structural transformation. Secondly, from the empirical view point, dependency refers to a property of countries. The trade dependency of a country is the extent to which that country is externally controlled in its trade by other countries. This may be the case when a country has no control on the pricing of the commodities it exports or imports. Finally,
dependency is a characteristic of the relationships between systems pursuing their separate goals. Here, dependency is equivalent to powerlessness as opposed to power (in Duvall 1978, pp. 60-61) as in the case of the people being exploited and those who exploit them.

What these three ways of understanding dependency share is the “conditioning” relationship between two or more countries in social, political, cultural or economic context. Since this research is concerned with economic development, dependency refers to the conditioning of one economy by another such that the former is a reflection of the latter (Duvall, 1978, p.62).

Dos Santos defines dependency in clearer terms:

…a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relationship of interdependence between two or more economies assumes the form of dependence when some countries, the dominant ones, can expand and can be self-starting\(^8\) while other countries, the dependent ones, can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development (Dos Santos, 1970, p. 231; see also Faletto & Cardoso, 1979, p.15).

This definition leads us to three major assumptions underpinning dependency. The first assumption is that dependency is an economic situation characteristic of less developed countries insofar as their development is a reflection of the expansion of the self-starting economy of the developed countries. The nature of this subordination is established by the second assumption. Dependency is an external economic condition imposed from outside as the surplus from the less developed countries flows to developed ones. This flow of the surplus leads to underdevelopment (Blomstrom & Hettne, 1984, pp.71ff). The third assumption is that the domestic cultural and institutional features are not the key variables accounting for the economic backwardness of developing countries, although these domestic structures are critical intervening factors.

\(^8\)The italics are my own emphasis.
With this understanding of the concept of dependency, I will now review the nature of the dependency theory of economic development and its cultural assumptions. I will argue that, although Latin America is geographically and demographically heterogeneous, it has a certain cultural value system that characterises and distinguishes it from the rest of the world. It is this value system that underlies the dependency theory of economic development.

2.3.2 The Dependency Theory and the Latin American cultural identity

The point to be made is that the dependency theory is a product of the Latin American cultural value system. The dependency theory is a substantiation of this cultural value system.

2.3.2.1 The features of Latin American culture

The issue of cultural identity of Latin America has been at the centre of discussion among Latin American thinkers. It is central to the reflection of the works of major thinkers such the Mexican philosophers, Samuel Ramos (1943, 1962, 1984), Leopoldo Zea (1952, 1953, 1957, 1963, 1969, 1974, 1978, 1988), and the Peruvian thinker, Salazar Bondy (1965, 1968, 1972, 1986). The first two discuss Latin American cultural identity in relation to self-knowledge and nationalism, while Salazar Bondy discusses it in relation to the liberation from the condition of economic underdevelopment. The issue of Latin American cultural identity is still topical as can be seen in the reflections of thinkers such as Ofelia Schute (1993), Alfredo Mirande (1997), Mario Saenz (1999) and Jorge Garcia (1986, 2000) among others.

According to Ofelia Schutte (1993, pp.74-75), the issue of Latin American cultural identity arose from the need to give political meaning and unity to the newly constituted Latin American countries and to define the difference between North and South America, and between the United States of America (Anglo-saxon America) and Latin America. The affirmation of this difference often took an antagonistic character. In Empire and Dissent, Fred Rosen (2008) argued that what unifies Latin America is the culture of “resistance”. “Resistance” seems to be a powerful indication of self-characterisation of Latin America as it has been observed in the search of its own philosophy (the philosophy of liberation), theology (the theology of liberation), political governance, as well as its own economic models. In the words of Wood and Roberts (2005, p. 20), these are “regularities to be identified” across Latin America.
One may wonder how these thinkers deal with heterogeneity, as Latin America is not only a melting pot of races, but also a melting pot of cultures. Demographically, Latin America consists of three major groups which are totally different: Amerindians (indigenous people), Iberians (Portuguese mainly in Brazil, Spaniards in the rest of Latin America), and Africans who are the majority, particularly in the Caribbean countries. The intensive race mixture between Iberians and Amerindians produced the Mestizos who are the majority of the population in Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras; the mixture between Africans and Iberians produced the Mulattos who are the majority in Cuba and a good percentage in Brazil and Colombia; the mixture of the Blacks and Amerindians produced the Zambos.

According to Gillin (1947), there is a multiplicity of cultures in Latin America; but these are but subcultures of a general culture, as can be found everywhere in the world. The cultures of Latin America are similar to trees that collectively constitute a forest. A forest has some general features that characterise or permeate all, or almost all, the trees. According to Schutte,

… the question of cultural identity [of Latin America] cannot be set apart from the question of difference. Difference is a fundamental factor making possible the conditions for identity. “One” is always an abstraction and departure from the rich manifold experience (Schutte, 1993, pp.14-15).

Various thinkers and social scientists (Zea, 1953, 1978; Saenz 1999; Nascimento, 2003, p.135) picture the cultural identity in Latin America in terms of *conciencia de mestizaje* or *mestizo* consciousness. *Mestizo* refers to the racial and cultural syncretism or synthesis as a result of racial miscegenation between Amerindians, Europeans, and Africans. According to Gillin (1947), the appellation “Latin American” culture is better suited to apply to the new culture that is neither that of the pure Whites (Portuguese and Spaniards), nor pure Amerindians (native Americans), nor Mestizos (mixed bloods). All of them have participated in the development and performance of the Latin American culture which is growing toward an

---

9 Although I will not discuss it in this dissertation, it is important to distinguish between two kinds of *mestizaje*, namely, *mestizaje* from below and *mestizaje* from above. According to Saenz (1999), *mestizaje* from above is a *mestizaje* that was imposed during the conquest and colonisation through “a forced physical miscegenation, imposition of ideas, …” and which is promoted by Latin American intellectuals ( pp. 94; 134). *Mestizaje* from below refers to the “appropriation of our reality and past”; it is a *mestizaje* “in which the living encounter between cultures becomes a questioning of the social and economic relations that have solidified, in many cases, ossified into an elitist Latin American identity” (Saenz, 1999, pp. 309-310).
integrated configuration. Garcia (1952) speaks of the (modern) culture of Latin America as the constructive and creative synthesis of Europe and America, of Spaniards and Indians, a spiritual symbiosis which is still in full evolution. For Zea (1953), the *conciencia* of *mestizaje* represents the national and the cultural consciousness of the Latin American peoples. For Schutte, Latin American cultural identity “is not derived from a fixed origin, but is a result of multiple configurations always in the process of reorganising and redefining themselves” (Schutte, 1993, p.15). Nascimento (2003, p.135) quotes Silvio Romero as saying: “All Brazilians are *mestizos*, if not in their blood, then surely in their ideas.”

What could be the characteristics of this racial/cultural syncretism that is central to the Latin American cultural identity? Gillin (1947, p.244, see also Gillin, 1955) outlines four major characteristics of the cultural identity of Latin America. Each of these characteristics is also emphasised by various Latin American scholars, yet without holding them together as Gillin did.

The first is *Iberian Catholicism*. Latin America is dominated by Roman Catholicism and many of its characteristics are those of the Iberian Catholicism. Thus José Brunner (1993) talks of the catholic substratum of Latin American culture and contrasts it to “puritanism” which plays a central role in individual motivation and performance. According to Brunner,

> [this] Catholic substratum renews the exhausted deposits of symbols and desires capable of mobilizing radical (revolutionary) behaviours on the social and political plan (Brunner, 1993, p. 44).

Freyre is quoted in Nascimento (2003, p.139) as saying: “Catholicism is really the cement of our unity”. Such power of unity and mobilisation for socio-political action produced a kind of quasi-socialist Catholicism and its own theology, namely, liberation theology, which, has often been charged with being at odds with the orthodox (Vatican) theology.

The second feature is *humanism*. The Latin American culture is humanistic. Such a humanistic character can be seen from the fact that most Latin American thinkers focus much more on self-knowledge, self-consciousness, Latin American identity and authenticity, the cultural experience, as well as the human concrete experience in daily struggle and quest of freedom rather than on moral principles. This can be seen in such works as Zea’s *América como*
Consciencia (1953), Latin American Mind (1963), Filosofia de la historia Americana (1978), Ramos’ Profile of man and culture in Mexico (1962), Salazar Bondy’s Existe una filosofia de nuestra America (1968), Roig’s The actual function of Philosophy in Latin America (1986), and Identity: A Latin American Problem (1988/9). Zea (1952) talks of the humanistic consciencia de mestizaje; while Schutte (1993, p.242) talks of “the development of a theory of a Latin American cultural identity that assumes a positive relationship with the whole cultural legacy of humanity”. Latin American humanism is also central to Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed as well as Gutiérrez’s Theology of Liberation. For Freire, the process of self-knowledge and self-consciousness (conscientização) is also a process of self-liberation and goes with the action (praxis) of naming and changing the world:

Human existence cannot be silent, nor can it be nourished by false words, but only true words, with which men transform the world. To exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it (Freire, 1970, p.76).

Thirdly, from the intellectual point of view, the Latin American culture is characterised by logic and dialectics rather than empiricism and pragmatics. The word is valued more highly that the thing; the manipulation of symbols is more cultivated than the manipulation of natural forces and objects (see Schutte, 1993, ch 4). This may be the reason why most of Latin American thinkers lean towards Hegel and Marxism in their philosophical approaches. For instance, the ideas of the search and actualisation of freedom as well as the cultural and racial mixture or mestizaje which Zea develops in his philosophy of American history carry with them a profound Hegelian influence. Moreover, Marxism is said to be a tool of social analysis which is also often used in economic and socio-political analyses.

The fourth characteristic which Gillin treats separately from the above three is the concept of the individual. In the Latin American culture, the concept of the individual is said to be radically different from that of the Western culture, particularly, North America. According to Gillin (1955, p.491), while in North America the individuals are respected because they have right to be considered “just as good as others”, in Latin America, individuals are valued because of the unique “inner quality” of worth they each possess. The individual is valued

While the first three characteristics are treated in his paper of 1947, the concept of the individual is treated in his paper of 1955. It is not clear why this concept is treated separately. Maybe one may take the view of William Davidson (1947, p.249) who says that the documentation used (by Gillin) was preliminary, because modern Latin American communities have not been subjected to anthropological study on a large scale.
precisely because one is not exactly “like” anyone else, that is, each individual is special and unique. This “inner quality” is said to be the “soul”.

As far as the origin of this concept is concerned, it is possible that the Christian view of the soul contributed to the conception of this “inner quality” at the time of conquest and after. But it is equally possible that indigenous concepts of the soul as manifested in Latin American beliefs and values are involved in the modern concept. Whatever maybe the origin, the Latin American concept of the soul has lost the purely religious connotation to embrace a largely secular meaning. One of its expressions is la dignidad de la persona which, according to Gillin, should not be confused with “the dignity of the person”. The “dignidad de la persona refers to the inner integrity or worth which every person has originally, and which that person is supposed to guard jealously” (Gillin, 1955, p.492). The following are the cultural characteristics of the dignidad de la persona as the inner integrity of every individual:

- Individuals are supposed to defend their respective inner integrity to the utmost of their ability, to the extent that a person who submits abjectly and without emotion to slurs upon her/him is regarded as far lower than one who merely breaks the laws established by the society;

- The concept of macho\footnote{The concept of “macho” has some connotation of gender discrimination (macho is a strong male). Machismo is nowadays associated with, and denounced, as a form of authoritarianism and even violence against women.} is valued as a high ideal in Latin American culture: This concept corresponds in some way to an ideal male or social personality, but it transcends social position. According to Gillin, “the real macho” refers to people who are sure of themselves, cognisant of their own inner worth, and willing to bet everything on such self-confidence (see also Schutte, 1993, pp. 81- 8; Mirandé, 1997). However, Ramos criticised this concept as often leading people to live enclosed in themselves, indifferent to the collective interests of the society (Ramos, 1962, p. 65), and negating anything at all with no reason (1962, p.39). When the machos fail to hide their weaknesses and lack of self-esteem, they show off their bravery and power by, sometimes, resorting to violence (Ramos, 1962, p.61).
- Social relationships: those people with whom one is in personal, intimate relationships can be expected to have with that person a reciprocal appreciation of the soul. People who appreciate one another’s soul can trust one another.

- Positive acceptance of social inequality: the Latin American premise of individual worth is involved in a cultural configuration that recognizes and accepts the social inequality. Each person realises that from the point of view of social structures, one is not equal with everyone else in terms of position or opportunity. Yet Latin Americans are conscious of the possibilities of mobility: people are aware that they are born into a certain social position which is one of the facts of life, but at the same time people are aware that they can improve their positions if they have the soul to do so.

Thus Davidson (1947, p. 250) argued that, in the Latin American culture, almost everyone is conscious of one’s own status and does everything possible to keep others from underestimating it. In the same vein, the Chilean scholar, Schwartzmann (1950) argues that the fundamental characteristic of Latin Americans is the sentiment of inner value.

These are the features of the Latin American belief and value system. They underlie the Latin American search for a political, social and economic uniqueness. I shall now consider how the dependency theory is premised on this belief and value system.

2.3.3 The dependency theory as a product of the Latin American value system

In which way do the characteristics just outlined inform the dependency theory? Does the dependency theory reflect the four characteristics of the Latin American value system? It is not easy to ascertain how these characteristics of the Latin American belief and value system taken together or individually underlie the dependency theory; especially since most literature available explains dependency theory more in terms of structural and historical foundations than in cultural terms (Velenzuela & Velenzuela, 1978). Kapoor (2002, p.654) observed that, the dependency theorists have not really examined the whole politics of (and within) culture and are even unaware of the way in which culture frames their own analysis. According to Grosfoguel (2000, p.367), “most dependentistas analysis privileged the economic and political
aspects of social process at the expense of cultural and ideological determinations”. Yet Eschazabal (1998, p.33) talks of the dependentistas as

[the] many intellectuals and politicians who felt a need to rehabilitate Latin America by reaffirming and re-establishing once and for all its distinctive identity, and to create forms of [...] expression capable of articulating the uniqueness of its culture.

These forms of expression include those which are artistic, political and economic as “the basis on which many politicians and intellectuals founded their optimism about the future of Latin America” (Beane, 1978/1979, p. 200)

But how exactly do the four characteristics of the Latin American value system inform the dependency theory? This question cannot be answered adequately unless one refers to the very definition of the dependency theory. Earlier, I underlined Duvall’s and Dos Santos’ understanding of dependency as the conditioning of one economy by another to such an extent that the dominant one can expand and be self-starting, while the dependent one is only a reflection of that expansion.

First of all the dependency theory could be seen as the affirmation of the Latin American uniqueness. This affirmation of uniqueness consists of a refusal of the Latin American economy to be a simple reflection of the expansion of some self-starting economy. The Iberian Catholicism seems to have communicated its own dynamism in this process. Its capacity to produce a particular type of Catholicism (quasi-socialist Catholicism) and a particular theology (liberation theology) seems to have an impact on the dependency theory as a perspective of economic development that would fit with the Latin American uniqueness (see Healy, 2001, pp. 94-95, 112-114). The concepts such “option for the poor” and “the marginalised” central to Latin American catholic theology became “topics of investigation for the dependentists like Fernando Cardozo” (Portes, 2005, pp. 30-31). Portes (2005, p.31) further argues that the concerns for such issues as marginality, structural and social injustices of the Latin American Catholic church were taken over by the dependentists in advocating models of development that would reduce them.
The humanistic characteristic of the Latin American value system is best perceived in the interest attached to social sciences by the dependency theory. The major dependency theorists such as Cardoso, Dos Santos, Faletto, and even Gunder Frank to name but a few were social scientists, particularly sociologists. The implication of this interest was the focus on such phenomena as social groups and movement, the link between culture and political economy, power, poverty and inequality. This focus produced a host of concepts such as (socio-economic) marginalisation, option for the poor, internal colonialism, centre-periphery among others. The concept of dependency in the global economy originated from this focus. More precisely, Dos Santos (1970, p.180) argues that “the narrative that dominates the Latin American sociology [is] the dependency theory”. The common feature of all these concepts is the human condition in Latin America and how Latin Americans could be liberated from social, political or economic structures that undermine their freedom, self-esteem and culture (Portes, 2005, p.38).

The logical and dialectic characteristic of the Latin American value system is perceived in the explanation of social change. Social change is explained in a conflictual and dialectical way. The reality of “centre-periphery” in the global economy and how it should be responded to could be seen from this perspective. The conflictual and dialectical explanation is said to have led to the elaboration of the dependency theory as an alternative to the modernisation paradigm of development (Ward, 2005, p.275). This shift is observable in the reflections of the dependency theorists such as Sunkel (1964) and Cardoso and Faletto (1969).

According to Portes (2005, p.33), the shift from modernisation to conflictual and dialectical explanation of social change is not accidental. Latin Americans believe social life to be dialectical. Portes argues that, while the dominant theories of economics and political science (developed in the Western tradition) assert the primacy of the individual, sociology (in Latin America) asserts the primacy of the social context and social relations from which the individual emerges. This bears on the ways economic policies are envisaged in the dependency theory. Dependency theorists had to consider the social dimensions of wealth and its distribution mechanism (Ferraro, 1996).

Linked with the dialectical characteristic of the Latin American value system is the interest in Marxism as a tool of social analysis. Brunner (1988, pp.238-39) expresses it thus:
Beginning in 1970, the sociologist becomes an ideologist through the use of a new paradigm (Marxism) that allows him to break with “academic” sociology without abandoning the pretention of truth [...]. Thus, the interpretation and application of Marxist theory become the central object of sociological work [...]

According to Joseph Love (1990, p.143), “Marxism is usually viewed, implicitly or explicitly, as the primary tradition from which the dependency theory arose”. In responding to critics, Frank (1977) and Cardoso (1977) pledge their allegiance to Marxism and the dialectic analysis as a point of departure. Some orthodox Marxists have disputed the idea that dependency theory is Marxist (see Chilcote, 1982). Instead, they argue that the dependency theory has structuralist roots. This point will be considered later. One may note that this dispute leads to the point that dependentists were in search of ways of development that are peculiar to Latin American value system.

Finally, I consider the dependency theory in relation to the concept of the individual in the Latin American belief and value system. The way the dependency theory has been defended during its heyday seems to conform to the characteristics of the *dignidad de la persona*. When the dependency theorists advocated the de-linking from the world capitalist economy, they seemed to be expressing the fact that, in Latin America, “the individuals are valued because of the unique inner quality of worth they possess”. The rigour in social analysis as well as in the defence of the dependency theory itself echoes “the defence of one’s inner integrity to the utmost of one’s ability”, as well as the concept of the *macho* characteristic of people who are sure of themselves, cognisant of their inner worth (Schutte, 1993, p.81). As a result, the de-linking from the global economy was thought to give birth to an independent national and regional capitalism rather than the world capitalism advocated by the developed countries (Grosfoguel, 2000, p.355).

Taken collectively, the four features that underlie Latin American self-characterisation seem to have fuelled the dynamics of “resistance” of the dependency theorists against modernisation, structuralism and classical or orthodox Marxism respectively.
2.3.3.1 Dependency theory in relation to modernisation

Modernists argued that the less developed countries are economically underdeveloped because their traditional beliefs and values are not conducive to economic development (Rostow, 1960; Weber, 1956). For these countries to develop economically, they have to embrace the attitudes and beliefs of modernity. In other words, modernisation assumes that its own attitudes and beliefs are the necessary prerequisites for economic development of any society. But what are those attitudes and beliefs that are claimed to be universally valid for economic development of any society?

Central to the modernist discourse is the human reason and its power to overthrow all that is considered as traditional, that is, what is not achieved through the process of reasoning and scientific rationality. According to Ashley (1989), modernisation is based on the figure of the reasoning individual who alone can achieve total knowledge of oneself and the world. This knowledge, in turn, gives the human being access to total autonomy, total power, and makes one the source of meaning of the world and maker of history. The ultimate dividend of this weltanschauung is a social system with the following characteristics: a degree of self-sustaining economy, a good measure of public participation in the polity, a diffusion of secular-rational norms in the culture, an increase in physical and social mobility, a system of reward based on merit, and finally, a corresponding transformation in personality to equip the individuals to function more efficiently (Lerner, 1964 quoted in Manzo, 1991, p.13).

Since the societies which happen to have the values and beliefs of modernity are mostly capitalist, it follows that integrating less developed countries into the capitalist network will result in the progressive modernisation of these countries and will develop them economically.

The argument that the beliefs and values that underlie modernity lead to economic development is based on a double precedence, namely, functionalism and social Darwinism.

---

12 This recalls August Comte’s idea that the human mind develops through three stages: the religious stage in which the human being holds a religious view of the world and interprets all events and reality from a religious point of view; the metaphysical stage which is a stage in which human being tends to give an abstract and metaphysical explanation of reality; and finally the positive stage, the stage of positive science in which the scientific world view replaces religious and metaphysical explanation. The third stage is the stage of what is empirically observable in which knowledge relies on the empirical experience.

13 I am aware that there are many types of capitalism (market capitalism, state-led capitalism, corporate capitalism, social-democratic capitalism). The capitalism that is considered here is the market-led capitalism mostly represented by the United States of America and the United Kingdom.
Functionalists substantiate the claim that the individual is the ground for the potential social and economic progress through personal effort. They argue that the human society is like a biological organism. In the same way as the different parts of the biological organism perform different specific functions for the good of the whole body, so also each individual or each institution performs certain functions for the good of the whole society.

From the Darwinist point of view, it was believed that there is a natural order which everything follows. Evolutionary theory assumes that social change is unidirectional; that is, human society invariably moves along one same direction from a primitive to an advanced state. It imposes a value judgement insofar as the movement towards the final phase is good because it represents progress of humanity and civilization. Finally, it assumes that the rate of social change is slow, gradual and piecemeal: it is evolutionary and not revolutionary (So, 1990, p.19).

As far as the economic expression of modernisation, Rostow (1960) seems to be the economist who better translated it in economic terms. He argues that there are five stages that economic progress follows: the traditional stage, the stage of preconditions, and the stage of take off, the drive to maturity, and high mass consumption. Among the preconditions for take off, are the productive investments which can come from banks, capital markets, government bonds, stock-markets, foreign trade (foreign earnings from exports) and the direct foreign capital investment. In case the productive investment is deficient, the solution would be public aid to development in the form of capital, technology, and expertise.

The dependency theorists’ response to modernisation can be better understood by distinguishing between two perspectives of dependency. The first perspective is that of the reformists whose objective is to reform the international economic system. The second perspective is that of the neo-marxists who argue that the only way to overcome dependence is through socialist revolution. For the time being, the first perspective will be considered, reserving the neo-Marxism for later analysis.

The reformists include Jaguaribe (1969), Sunkel (1969), Furtado (1971), Pinto (1972, 1973), Ferrer (1975), Fernando, Cardoso and Faletto (1979). Their common view is that nationalism is a way to increase the degree of national autonomy, and that reforming the capitalist system is the best way of resolving the problem of dependence. One can understand this argument as a
reaction to modernisation from two angles, namely the reaction to the modernisation as such on
the one hand, and a reaction to Rostow’s economic interpretation of the modernisation theory
on the other hand.

The reformists argue that the modernisation theory is deficient because it offers an internal
explanation of underdevelopment, and thus assumes that there is something wrong with
traditional cultural beliefs and values. For dependency theorists, such an argument is a result of
Western ethnocentrism that is self-congratulatory and self-uncritical (Brohman, 1995). Such an
ethnocentrism places the “modern” world in a hierarchical opposition to other societies of the
world which are thought to be traditional, that is, less cosmopolitan, less scientific, less secular,
less rational, less individualist, and less democratic. They are defined solely in relation to the
West as the foundational source of development (in Manzo, 1991, pp.9-10; cf. Schutte, 1993;
Saenz, 1999).

The dependency theorists view modernisation theory as a continuation of the 19th Century
Western attitude of looking at other societies as uncivilised, therefore to be conquered or
assimilated. The societies which, hitherto, were seen as uncivilized become traditional, and
therefore to be conquered if they are communist, or assimilated if they are not communist
(Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). For the dependency theorists, by imposing its patterns of
development, the West undermines the uniqueness as well as the potentialities of the so-called
traditional societies or the less developed countries to the extent that they cannot develop
unless they free themselves from these “wrong” perceptions. For the dependency theorists,
economic development becomes synonymous with re-affirming the cultural identity, potential
strengths and the local factors of development.

The reformists reacted also to Rostow’s economic interpretation of modernisation. For Cardoso
(1970), to assume that development is a linear trajectory is to ignore the nature of social
change. At times, change can be a linear trajectory, while at other times it can be cyclical or
even regressive. Change and development are not necessarily synonymous.

The point the reformists are making is important since it cannot simply be assumed that by
filling in the presumed “missing” components as the modernists believed, the development will
follow. There is no guarantee that the same beliefs and values that produced economic
development in capitalist societies would produce economic development in less developed
Earlier, Arthur Lewis who was one of the masterminds of the old-dependency theory had argued that people cannot assume deductively that things which are associated in a society they know must be relevant in all societies (Lewis, 1955, p.13). That the beliefs and values an individual incarnates in a society A yield its economic development does not mean that if these were transferred to society B they would necessarily produce the same outcome in society B (cf. Tetreault & Abel, 1986, p.45).

If one considers the reaction of the reformists, it seems that they were not disputing the fact that modernisation achieved economic development for capitalist societies. What they contended is that it cannot be deduced that following the same route will necessarily achieve economic development in Latin America or elsewhere in the world. This can be understood in the sense that modernisation was a product of the internal dynamics of a people. For a reformist, the dependency theory is a way of exploring how the local potential strengths and uniqueness can lead to a self-starting and self-reliant economic development.

I now turn to the dependency response to economic structuralism.

### 2.3.3.2 Dependency theory in relation to structuralism

In addition reformist group of dependency theorists reacted to the structuralism which is also referred to as the old-dependency theory (Love, 1990, p.144). Structuralists contended that the economic dependency is generated primarily by the expansionist tendency of capitalism and the structural characteristics of both the domestic and the international economy. They argued that the terms of the world trade worked against the producers of the primary commodities. This resulted in the income elasticity for import between the developed countries and the less developed ones. As Tétreault and Abel (1986, p.13) pointed out, the increasing income in the developed countries was followed by the demand for imports of primary commodities from the less developed countries, while the income in the less developed countries was followed by a high number of import manufactured commodities from developed countries. Since manufactured goods are higher in value than the primary goods, the income increased for the industrialised countries while it decreased in the non-industrialised countries. This resulted in asymmetric trade relationships. The consequence is that it was impossible for the developing
counties to save for productive investment, and trade was no longer perceived as the engine of economic growth and development.

The structuralists suggested as a remedy some kind of state capitalism and advocated planning as a means of rationally allocating scarce resources. This resulted in the state’s promotion of import-substitution industrialisation (ISI). Nevertheless the problem was how to respond to the issue of the labour shortage posed by the neoclassical economics. The response to this problem was given by Lewis (1954, 1955). For Lewis, the neoclassical economics does not give a clear picture of the condition of the developing countries and assumes that labour is short in supply everywhere. According to Lewis, the traditional overpopulated rural sector is characterised by marginal labour productivity and can, thus, be withdrawn from the agricultural sector without any loss of output. In contrast, the modern, urban setting is characterised by a high productivity. Thus, Lewis argues that the best path to economic growth and development is to utilise the surplus rural labour in the industrialised sector. Thus, it was argued that the process of industrialisation, far from suffering from labour supply, would absorb the mass of the rural population.

However, the reformists accused structuralism for having been too “soft” and wanted a more radical economic programme. According to Sunkel (1967, p.55), external dependence increased for various reasons. The vulnerability to fluctuation in foreign exchange led to the foreign exchange earnings becoming increasingly insufficient to sustain the development process. As a result, foreign debt kept increasing. Moreover, a large proportion of the industrial sector was owned by foreign corporations, and the profits of foreign exchange were repatriated instead of being reinvested. Dos Santos complained about this when he talked about the form of dependence which emerged after World War II (Dos Santos, 1970, p. 232). Some dependency theorists such as Cardoso, Fernando and Faletto saw this as part of the modernisation “ideology” which they aimed to do away with.

By accusing structuralism of being soft and not fully doing away with modernisation, the reformists wanted a totally independent path of economic development that responds to the identity and uniqueness of Latin Americans. I now turn to the dependency reaction to classical Marxism.
2.3.3.3 Dependency theory in relation to classical Marxism.

The dependency theorists also reacted to classical Marxism. This perspective includes dependentists such as Marini (1965, 1972), Torres-Rivas (1969, 1970), Dos Santos (1970, 1972), Frank (1970, 1975), Quijano (1971), Garcia (1972), Bambirra (1972), Aguilar (1973, 1974), and Braum (1973, 1984). These can be referred to as neo-Marxists. Like the reformist dependentists who reacted against the modernisation theory and structuralism, the view of those neo-Marxist dependentists who reacted against classical Marxism was geared to substantiating the dependency theory as an economic expression of Latin American cultural identity. The common point of the neo-Marxist dependentists is that reforming the national and international economy will not succeed in dealing with economic dependence. They argued that only a socialist revolution can overcome dependence. They rejected the idea of both structuralists and reformists that the national “bourgeoisie” have objective conditions for offering a nationalist or autonomous way out of underdevelopment (Frank, 1975, p. 15, Vasconi, 1971, pp.16-17).

In their reaction against orthodox Marxism, neo-Marxist dependentists argued that solidarity with the Soviet Union would lead them to further dependence. Instead of relying upon foreign aid of whatever kind and whatever provenance, developing countries should adopt a self-reliance model, that is, relying upon their own resources and planning their own paths of development so as to achieve independence and autonomous national development. Nevertheless, self-reliance does not mean a complete isolation from other countries. Rather, while avoiding the domination of developed countries, trade with other less developed countries on equally mutually beneficial terms should be encouraged.

Contrary to the reformists, the Latin American “neo-Marxist dependentists” used a dialectical method of analysis rather than social analysis. It is not clear whether they used this method as part of the intellectual heritage of the Latin American culture, or whether they used it as part of some Marxist background. Whatever the case may be, the use of the dialectical method neither undermined the humanistic characteristic of the Latin American culture nor betrayed its intellectual particularity which values logic and dialectics.
By rejecting orthodox Marxism and solidarity with the Soviet Union, the dependentists assumed that the impetus to economic development of the now developed countries is the result of their endogenous cultural and institutional transformation. Thus they rejected the idea that the economic change in the less developed countries depended primarily from exogenous stimuli (Valenzuela & Velenzuela, 1978, pp.538-9). Instead, they wanted to strengthen the fact that sustainable economic development is that which is based on the knowledge of local histories and experiences and not on any outside assumptions (Manzo, 1991).

So far, the argument is that the dependency theory is built on the value system characteristic of Latin American cultural identity. The question is to what extent a theory of economic development thus conceived can be replicated in another system of cultural values. If the dependency theory is an economic expression of the cultural identity whose characteristics I have outlined, to what extent can it be useful in a cultural value system other than that which generated it? It is with this question in mind that I will now consider how the dependency theory inspired the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA).

2.3.4 The Lagos Plan of Action in relation to the dependency theory

This section will establish that the LPA relied on the dependency theory of economic development, and therefore, that its philosophical basis does not originate from Africa. I have just established that the dependency theory grew out of the Latin American value system. I argued that the dependency theory makes a double claim. The first is that economic underdevelopment in less developed countries is explainable in terms of their dependence on the developed countries. The second claim is that the domestic cultural and institutional features are not the key variables accounting for the economic backwardness of developing countries. The solution suggested to this economic situation is to de-link from the world economy in order to build up an economic development that is self-reliant and self-sustaining.

As is obvious in the LPA document\textsuperscript{14}, the reliance of LPA on the dependency theory can be perceived from two points of view. The first is the reading of Africa’s historical experience in the world dynamics:

\textsuperscript{14} In the following, for the sake of precision, I will refer to different articles or paragraphs of the LPA document rather than the year of publication and page used in normal referencing.
[...]Africa was directly exploited during the colonial period and for the past two decades; this exploitation has been carried out through neo-colonialist external forces which seek to influence the economic policies and directions of African States (art. 6).

The second is the reading of Africa’s situation in the global economy as thus expressed:

We view, with disquiet, the over-dependence of the economy of our continent on the export of basic raw materials and minerals. This phenomenon had made African economies highly susceptible to external developments and with detrimental effects on the interests of the continent (art.9).

The proposed way out was collective self-reliance and self-sustainment as is expressed in the LPA document:

Faced with this situation, and determined to undertake measures for the basic restructuring of the economic base of our continent, we resolve to adopt a far-reaching regional approach based primarily on collective self-reliance (art.1).

The LPA’s reliance on the dependency theory has been acknowledged by its own architects, Adebayo Adedeji and other scholars. For Adedeji, LPA is a development strategy “combining contemporary dependencia, environmentalism, and human needs with indigenous and long standing values and priorities” (Adedeji, 1983, p.3). According to Timothy Shaw, although LPA is an African version of internationalist social democracy à la Keynes, its mix of nationalist, populist and continentalist strands embodies dependencia values (Shaw, 1983, 1984). Browne and Cummings (1987) compared the LPA and the Berg report of the World Bank on Africa¹⁵, and argued that LPA was a reaction to the excessive dependence of the African economies on the economic health of the West that was being exposed with starkness and which it was no longer possible to ignore. For Osei Prempeh,

¹⁵While the LPA was produced by United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA) on the demand of African ministers of planning, the Berg report was produced by the World Bank on the request of African ministers of finance. While the LPA is economically inward oriented, the Berg report is economically outward oriented. It is difficult to understand the dynamics of international relations that went on in this difference of vision among the ministers of the same continent and the World Bank. However, since the global economy was at stake, it is possible that the World Bank invited or rather influenced the African ministers of finance to embrace the kind of economic philosophy that was being developed within it (see Ajei, 2007).
[LPA] was framed around the need to question the neo-colonial nature of the economy by de-emphasizing its export orientation and to get Africa to start producing for its own internal needs… and to ensure a development process that was internally guaranteed and sustained (Prempeh, 2001, p. 573).

Taylor (2002, 2005) understands the rationale of LPA to be that of tackling the legacy of underdevelopment left by Africa’s insertion into the global capitalist economic system. Owusu (2006) talks of the LPA being a classic dependency interpretation of African crisis as it exonerated African leaders and blamed the historical injustices suffered by the continent and the continued dependence on external forces for the crisis. Ikome (2007) argues that insofar as the dependency theory was the most popular interpretation of the Third World situation among less developed countries, it strongly influenced the formulation of the LPA as a collective self-reliance strategy. Ikome’s point is strengthened by the fact that “much of the academic work on Africa in 1970s was rooted in dependency approaches which were the dominant paradigm in African studies” (Ravenhill, 1988, p.181).

For the architects of the LPA, the dependency theory served a double purpose. First it served as a method of social analysis that helped the less developed countries to locate their disadvantageous economic position in the global economy. Secondly it served as an approach on how they could extricate themselves from the economic situation they were facing.

As a method of social analysis, the dependency theory became a tool that helped the architects of the LPA to perceive that the cause of Africa’s poor economic performance lay in the process by which Africa had been integrated into the world economy (Taylor, 2001/2002, p.6). Like most of other less developed countries, Africa was integrated in the world economy as a supplier of primary commodities and as a consumer of processed goods. According to Carderisi (2006, pp.156ff), such a disadvantageous economic situation of less developed (African) countries was not conjectural but structural. After World War II, the purpose of the World Bank was to help the war-battered economies and help poor countries particularly the formerly colonised to climb the economic ladder and ensure global economic prosperity. Everyone was expected to benefit from this process. Developed countries would have ready markets for what they already produced, while less developed countries would supply raw materials and eventually move into light industries as richer countries moved into more
sophisticated products. This is what is referred to as Ricardo’s “principle of comparative advantage.”

This principle of comparative advantage has two aspects that, in the end, justify the consideration of the dependency theory in the African political economy. Firstly the volume and patterns of demand of exports were determined by the market of developed countries. According to Asante (1992, p.40), the implication was that the economic strategies of less developed countries were based on foreign markets, whereas the developed countries based their strategies and plans on domestic markets and available resources (Asante, 1992, p.40). Secondly the purchasing of processed goods, of which the price was higher than the price of primary commodities, meant the continual run of foreign exchange reserves (Taylor, 2001/2002, p.6; Kay, 1975; Amin, 1976; Frank 1975; Wallestein, 1974, 1979; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). Since foreign exchange was no longer sufficient, African countries depended on aid and/or borrowing of which the consequence was the debt burden.

Thus the dependency theory as a method of socio-economic analysis helped the architects of LPA to draw the conclusion that the international economic system is inherently skewed towards entrenching the interests of the developed countries while dooming the less developed countries through an inequitable commodity exchange, thus perpetuating dependency (Ikome, 2007; Fine & Yeo, 1997, p.432). It is from this perspective that much of the African poor economic performance was attributed to the economic dependence of African countries and their external orientation.

That the architects of LPA used the dependency theory as a method of social analysis to see what was wrong in international trade might not have been a problem in itself. The problem is that they might not have been clear about how a value system ultimately leads people to produce a kind of economic ordering that responds to who they are and what they value. It may be true that the architects of LPA were not interested in the question of how the dependency theory was arrived at, but rather how it could lead Africa to economic development irrespective of the underlying value system. Thus, Amin (1990), a leading African dependency champion sees LPA as an expression of the dependency theory, but laments that its failure lies in its lack of an alternative methodology consistent with the option of auto-centric development that is proper to Africa. He argues that LPA is defined solely in quantitative terms and remains at the level of the economists’ argument (Amin, 1990, p.59).
Besides being a method of social analysis geared to understanding why the African economy performs poorly, the dependency theory was also used as an approach to inform how Africa could extricate itself from its situation of economic underdevelopment. According to Osei (1991), there were two competing options of development from which African policymakers had to choose. The first one was the capitalist development which promised some measure of economic growth, but at the cost of economic dependence. The second option was the socialist development which promised some measure of autonomy, but at the cost of economic poverty.

Thus, two approaches to economic development emerged. The first was the revolutionary approach to development with as proponents Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah (in his post-coup era), Jerry Rawlings, Franz Fanon, and certain African scholars who called themselves scientific socialists. Drawing on the experience and the reflections on the economic development in Latin America, its proponents argued that Africa’s poverty and underdevelopment could not be understood without reference to the exploitation of the continent by the forces of colonialism and neo-colonialism or imperialism. They believed that Western political and economic expansionism was responsible for the present condition of economic depravity and poor performance. They argued that the key to Africa’s development would be total decolonisation. For African countries to achieve authentic economic growth, they had to detach themselves totally from the powers of colonialism.

The second is the pragmatist approach to development defended by Leopold Senghor, Awolowo, Houphouet Boigny, Milton Obote and Jomo Kenyatta. The proponents of this approach argued that total decolonisation was neither possible nor a prudent move because of its potential socio-economic and political consequences. They suggested that African countries should cooperate with Western capitalist countries as well as Marxist countries in order to accelerate national development efforts by reforming their economies and political structures.

The architects of the LPA preferred the revolutionary path which advocated economic decolonisation with its values of autonomy, self-reliance, and self-sustaining, and were thus compelled to rely on the already established dependency theory (Osei, 1991, pp.84-88; Gyekye 1998; Ajei, 2007). The LPA document expressed it as follows:
The same determination that has virtually rid our continent of political domination is required for our economic liberation. Our success in exploiting our political unity should encourage us to exploit the strength inherent in our economic unity (...). To this end, certain basic guidelines must be borne in mind: (...) (iii) Africa must cultivate the virtue of self-reliance (...); (iv) as a consequence of the need for increased self-reliance, Africa must mobilise her entire human and material resources for her development (arts. 13&14).

However, there are two arguments that reject the LPA’s reliance on the dependency theory. The first is that of Robert Cummings who questions the African authenticity of the plan. Cummings argument is as follows:

The LPA was constructed by Africans primarily with strong Western economic backgrounds and experiences. Their economic worldview and perspective regarding Africa and its attendant problems were not very different, in fact, from those of other Western-trained economists, financiers, and planners. As a result, the subsequent LPA did not receive the benefits of Africa’s own local economic, socio-cultural histories and inputs. (Cummings, 1992, p. 33)

Cummings is right to question the African authenticity of LPA by pointing out the lack of an African basis for the plan. However, he seems to undermine its dependency interpretation by arguing that the architects of the LPA had a Western economic background and experiences. Nevertheless, what deprives the plan of “the benefits of Africa’s economic, socio-cultural histories and inputs” is not the background Cummings points out, but rather the kind of analysis that led to the perception of Africa’s unfair position in the global economy as well as the approach adopted towards extricating the continent from such position. Such analysis and approach gave the plan a dependency interpretation which, as already pointed out, was the dominant paradigm in African studies in the 1970s.

The second view is that of Ajei (2007) who argues that the LPA is a blend of ideas of the dependency theory and neo-liberalism. For instance, Ajei (2007) argued that the call for convergences of African economies indicates key tenets of neo-liberal perspective which was emerging at the time the plan was being drafted. Indeed the LPA was issued at the time when the neo-liberal wind started to be strongly felt. However LPA contained ideas which are totally
the opposite of what the neo-liberal theory of development preached: the sovereignty of the market and the withdrawal of the state in economic affairs. Furthermore, the convergence of African economies was geared to mutual support of African states so as to achieve national, regional and continental self-reliance rather than the free market defended by neo-liberalism. Finally, neo-liberalism meant free international trade at the time when African countries were suspicious of the over-dependence of the continent’s economy, as is made clear in the article 9 of the document already mentioned.

Even if it were true that LPA made some concession to “free” international trade, such a concession is done in a way that does not betray its dependency interpretation. In the international trade, maximum priority is given first to that which fosters the intra-African cooperation (arts.70, 250), cooperation with other developing countries, and cooperation with developed countries having centrally planned economies:

Measures should be taken to diversify, both geographically and structurally, Africa’s trade patterns. These include: (a) Systematic exploitation and exploration of trade and economic cooperation potentials with other developing regions and countries (...); (b) Promotion and expansion of trade and economic cooperation with the developed countries having centrally planned economies, taking into account Member States’ due right to determine their own individual policies in this respect; (c) Measures to ensure control of foreign trade by national structures, whether this is effected by way of state intervention or private indigenous corporations, or a combination of both (art. 251).

So far, I have argued that the LPA is premised on the dependency theory which has its ultimate foundations in the Latin American cultural identity. Besides the fact that the LPA was prepared in Africa by Africans, its philosophical foundation is not African. This might have weakened its chance of success.

It is true that Latin America shares with Africa certain features such as the historical experience of colonialism, a disadvantaged position in the global economy, poverty, and even part of its population is African as a result of slavery. However, the unique and special individual of Latin America is not the African individual conceived of as ontologically part of the community as it will be seen later. Humanism could be seen as a common ground for Latin
America and Africa insofar as it contrasts with Western Puritanism, utilitarianism, pragmatism and easily accommodates, though differently, some version of socialism for both. However, as will be seen in Chapter Three, the Latin American humanism differs from the African type insofar as the latter is defined in terms of the human being’s relation to nature and the structure of African society. Finally, Latin America has a nuanced anthropological heterogeneity which, as seen earlier, unfolded in conciencia of mestizaje or mestizo consciousness. Africa is, to a greater extent, anthropologically homogeneous.

I am quite aware of the economic, political, and the structural aspects explaining the failure of the LPA. In effect, many reasons have been given as to why the economic situation continued to worsen in spite of the adoption of the strategy of the LPA. These include the international economic environment (Rasheed & Sarr (1991), lack of support to the plan itself (Owusu, 2003; Browne & Cummings, 1985), conflict between the LPA and the interests of the global economy, natural disasters, and Afro-pessimism (Browne & Cummings, 1985; Bujra, 2005). All these explanations are real and understandable. However, the question is: Could the challenges of life be met if people did not refer to their roots beyond what a borrowed theory of development alone could offer?

Having dealt with the Lagos Plan of Action in relation to the dependency theory, I shall now turn to NEPAD in relation to the neo-classical theory of economic development. I will argue that, as is the case for the LPA, the philosophical basis of NEPAD is not African. To achieve this, I will first consider the characteristics of the culture that gave birth to economic liberalism. I will then outline how this liberalism was perceived as a counter revolution which is currently called economic neo-liberalism, upon which NEPAD is seemingly premised.

2.4 The Neo-liberal Theory of economic development in relation to NEPAD

2.4.1 Defining economic neo-liberalism.

Economic neo-liberalism, which is also referred to as the “neoclassical counter-revolution”, is very complex and difficult to grasp. In simple terms, neo-liberalism refers to the perspective of economic development which suggested a return to a minimal state interference in the economy after Keynesianism had advocated greater involvement of the state (Todaro, 1989).
For Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw (1998, p.16), neo-liberalism is a “reassertion of traditional liberalism” which “represents a rebirth, indeed a reconnection with its heyday in the 19th century”. This “traditional” or rather classical liberalism had been disrupted by the economic depression of the 1930s which led to a large scale intervention of the state to correct the market failures in the development process. This was done through government planning for the promotion of target industries and other labour-intensive projects during the economic slump to counteract unemployment (Hayami, 2003, p.3). The state involvement in the economy continued almost three decades after World War II. However, in the 1970s, the failures of the state led Import Substitution Industrialisation in Latin America and in certain African countries, as well as the failure of centrally planned economies of socialist countries, prompted economists of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to suggest that the market mechanisms be given the driver’s seat in development policies.

According to Lee Mudge (2008) neo-liberalism has three dimensions. The first is the intellectual dimension which conceptualised the market as the source and arbiter of human freedoms. Among the representatives of this intellectual group there are von Hayek (1944, 1949), Milton Friedman (1962), the Chicago - trained economists, the intellectuals of the Mont Pelerin Society and the Institute of Economic Affairs in London. These neo-liberal intellectuals provided the political elites with explanations for the failures of Keynesianism and development policies and made recommendations for economic recovery. The second dimension of neo-liberalism is bureaucratic and refers to the set of economic policies of which the aim is to expel “the state out of the business of ownership and getting the politicians out of the business of dirigiste - style management” (Mudge, 2008, p. 704), or at most, keep the state’s role in the economy as minimal as possible. This dimension is represented by John Williamson with his repertoire of ten neo-liberal macro-economic prescriptions that constitute the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990, 1993). Finally, there is the political dimension which seeks to redefine the responsibility of the state as well as the locus of its authority within the market-centric politics. Nowadays, in the context of the post-Washington consensus, this responsibility and locus of the state is limited to providing institutions of good governance and sound economic policies that accommodate the markets.

Accordingly, the proponents of neo - liberalism critiqued the excessive role of the state, the Import Substitution Industrialisation, and dependency theory. They dismissed the structuralists’
appeal to state intervention and dependency theory as unrealistic. They claimed that dependency theorists had little knowledge of neoclassical economic theory, and that economic underdevelopment was rather a consequence of poor economic policies in conjunction with the excessive state intervention in the economy.

The idea of minimal intervention of the state and the freedom of the market in the economic development is traceable to the modern era, which was characterised by major cultural and intellectual mutations in Europe. The aim here is not to review the historical development that gave birth to this cultural and intellectual shift, but rather to underline the fact that this new cultural worldview underlies the kind of economic development, namely (classical) liberalism which cannot be easily transferred to any culture other than that which generated it. I will do this by outlining the major characteristics of this cultural value system. The point is to show that this culture confers upon the individual a particular ontological status upon which liberal economics is built.

2.4.2 The characteristics of the culture that gave birth to Liberalism

There are nine features that characterise classical liberalism. The first characteristic of this culture is human sovereignty over the natural world. This aspect is better described by Klaus Nürnberger, in his book, Beyond Marx and Market (1998, p.31):

No part of reality is forbidden ground for human investigation and utilisation. There are no uncanny forces, magical powers, divine beings or eternal principles which human beings must fear, respect, or obey. Human beings are masters over the world.

This human sovereignty developed as a result of the intellectual developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Francis Bacon refers to this by saying that science has given humanity the means to create a new world. Indeed, reality was henceforth discovered by means of investigation (the empirical philosophy of John Locke and David Hume), penetrated by logical thought (the rationalist philosophy of René Descartes) and manipulated for the desired result (technological advances thanks to the development of natural sciences such as physics, mathematics, and chemistry). The implication of this was a kind of culture which gave
the human being a new way of looking at the world and affirming oneself. The human being becomes “the origin of language, the maker of history, the source of meaning in the world” (Ashley, 1989; Cf. Connolly, 1988).

The second characteristic of the new culture which is, in fact, the implication of the first, is the individual sovereignty. That the individual is sovereign means that the society plays a secondary role. As Connolly argues, the liberal variant of modernist thought has privileged the individual as the site of sovereignty; but also, the state, the community, the class, or the people have been invoked as providing that site (Connolly, 1988, p.3). Jeremy Bentham (1789) views community as a fiction and a collection of individuals and asserts that no objective social interest exists but only individual interest independently of the fictitious society. This aspect has been emphasised by a great number of thinkers. Their lowest common denominator is that they all speak of the autonomous subject and the subsequent personal responsibility that flows from it (See Harris, 2006, p.9).

The first philosopher who featured the autonomy of the individual was René Descartes with his famous principle: “I think therefore I am”. The implication of this principle was that people were now the creators of their own selves, their world and owed allegiance to no one other than their individual selves. John Locke was another defender of the individual self. He argued that people are equal and that every individual had a right to self-preservation. This self-preservation went with personal property. Every individual had a property in his own person. Locke shared his thought on the sovereignty of the individual with Thomas Hobbes, although the latter viewed the individual from a negative perspective as can be seen in his principle: “man is a wolf against man”. Yet this did not prevent him from sharing with Locke the view of the individual as an atomic unit sufficient unto self, interacting with others primarily in the pursuit of their self-interest (Ingersoll & Matthew, 1991, pp.37-38). Another important figure in the defence of the individual sovereignty was Kant. The idea that lurks behind his categorical imperatives is that the individual is the starting point of universality.

The third feature of modern culture is freedom. Freedom is the characteristic mark of the sovereign individual. Modern culture insists on freedom of individuals to organise their own lives and defines their ends, alone or in cooperation with others. According to Nürnberger (1998, p.30), freedom goes with the virtues of taking bold initiatives and using one’s gifts and talents for self-determination, self-realisation and self-responsibility. Freedom is associated
with individual choices (Sen, 1999, 2002), self-fulfilment and individual initiatives (Rose, 1992, pp.158-159). The British thinkers such as Locke, Hume, and Hobbes argued that all people possess the freedom necessary to secure their natural rights, that is, the rights that are not subjected to any authority other than that of human beings themselves.

The fourth feature of the culture that fuelled the classical liberal economy is the emphasis on private property. Private property is viewed as an expression of human potential and an indication of human creativity (Ingersoll & Matthew, 1991, p.39). According to Jean Jacques Rousseau, there is a link between freedom and private property. Private property is an important instrument to secure one’s freedom. In fact, human sovereignty, individual sovereignty, freedom and the emphasis on private property are interlinked. Individual sovereignty without freedom can hardly be conceived of.

The fifth feature which is linked with private property is the notion of self-interest. This feature was emphasized by Hutchison, David Hume, Josiah Tucker, Furgeson, and Bernard Mandeville and, in a particular way, Adam Smith (see Haney, 1921). It is argued that the idea of self-interest might have originated from Bernard Mandeville who, in his Fable of the Bees (1729) argued that all mutual services which individual members of a society pay to each other depend on the multiplicity of wants. Josiah Tucker (1749) claimed that free trade policy is based on the harmony of interests, and that self-interest is the chief motive and corresponds in most cases to public interest.

The sixth feature of the culture that gave rise to liberalism is materialism. It is often argued that the basis of this materialism was the experimental science. Francis Bacon argued that natural philosophy is the only true philosophy; and that physics based upon the experience of the senses was the chief part of this natural philosophy. All science is based on experience and consists in subjecting the data furnished by the senses to a rational method of investigation. Furthermore, materialism was also obvious in Bacon’s dichotomy between facts and values, matter and mind, emotional and rational, man and nature, secular and spiritual. Locke and Hume who are said to be the fathers of empiricism gave a philosophical ground to materialism. Locke, for instance, argued that knowledge is based on experience as derived from the senses. For Hume, the world consisted of atomic sensible events. The order and combination of such events could be studied experimentally and scientific laws could be formulated. For Hume, there was no causal connection between events. One’s knowledge was limited to the present
events in one’s own experience. August Comte’s rejection of religious and metaphysical explanation of the world in favour of the positivist explanation can be understood against this backdrop.

The seventh feature is rather an aspect of the materialist outlook: a new sense of value. It could be referred to as the *quantification of value*. According to Bentham, the human being is governed solely by the hedonistic principle of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, and utility maximisation is the only standard of evaluation. He further argued that money was the most accurate measure of the quantity of pain or pleasure a human being could be made to receive (see Heney, 1993, p.93). Thus, the valuation of what was good or bad, profitable or not, pleasure or pain, rested solely on the subjective judgement of the individual with money as the measure of welfare (Bentham, 1954, pp. 437-438). Such notion of value is also connected with individual freedom and self-interest. Bentham argued that the best judge of value or interest was the individual. Yet if what is good or bad, pleasure or pain can only be evaluated in terms of quantity and not in terms of quality (exchange value), the human beings are only evaluated in terms of what they can do and not what they are, and thus are themselves material things.

The eighth feature which is also an aspect of materialism is the *instrumentalisation of labour*. Bentham argued that the love of labour is a contradiction in terms. From the utilitarian point of view, labour is not undertaken for the benefit of those performing the labour but for those hiring labour power to generate exchange value. Workers must be bribed to expend effort through payment of wages. Even Adam Smith tended to limit productivity to a vendible commodity to the extent that people themselves tend to be viewed as commodities. Hume argued that everything is purchased by labour; and that our passions are the only cause of labour.

The last or ninth feature of the culture that gave rise to liberal economy is the emphasis on *reason* as the regulator of everything. Reason is first of all the ground of the individual sovereignty and freedom. For Ashley (1989) “the reasoning man achieves total knowledge, total autonomy and total power whose use of reason enables him to see himself as the source of meaning in the world.”

The traditional understanding of reason as the essential characteristics of human nature is seemingly discarded as reason was considered mostly from an instrumental perspective rather
than comprehensively. According to Hume, reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any office other than to serve and obey them. Hume’s conception of reason coincides well with the feature of materialism already discussed. The “empiricist” understanding of human reason has implication for economic processes. In a culture where people are motivated by their desire to acquire things, reason serves the function of instructing them on how to secure these desires most efficiently (Ingersoll & Matthews, 1991, p. 38). From the contractual point of view, reason is thought of as an important instrument to deal with conflicts which arise because self-interest leads people to desire the same object. Reason is thus used to discover ways in which their self-interests may be served better. It is said that when individuals use their reason and industry in the pursuit of personal gain, everyone in society gains. From a scientific point of view, one may highlight this critical observation of Alasdair Macintyre:

Reason is just calculative; it can assess truths of fact and mathematical relations but nothing more. In the realm of practice therefore it can speak only of means. About ends it must silent (Macintyre, 1984, p.54)

The above characteristics underlie a cultural value system which gives the individual a particular ontological make-up. People in turn arrange all the aspects of life in a way that responds to this ontological make-up. Thus classical economic liberalism can be understood against this background. Benedict Spinoza is thought to have said that he was: “a free man who lives according to the dictates of reason alone” (Spinoza cited by Rutherford, 2008, p.500). Freedom was not only freedom of the mind but also freedom of action in economic field. According to Hayek (1974), the mind chooses the ends of human action and their realisation depends on the availability of the required means, and any economic control which gives power over the means, also gives power over the ends. The appeal to a minimal involvement of the state in economy was the outcome of such a culture and the ontological status it produced. Adam Smith whose economic thinking has been revived as a ground of universal economic development inherited from this culture and the ontological make-up thus produced. His assumptions of self-interest and laissez-faire economic policy developed within this cultural environment. That economics is concerned with wealth of the nations; that economic activity

16 Macintyre complained about the kind of individual that issues from this value system when he talks of the failure of the enlightenment project in terms of the loss of the ontological density of the individual life and of the society. For Macintyre, if any individual could now speak unconstrained by externalities of divine law, natural teleology, or hierarchical authority, why should anyone else now listen to him? (Macintyre, 1984, p.68)
lies in the pursuit of wealth, and that the mainspring of economic activity is self-interest, can only be understood against this cultural and individualistic ontological background.

I shall now consider the birth of economic neo-liberalism.

### 2.4.3 The birth of economic neo-liberalism

The culture whose features I have just outlined gave rise to classical economic liberalism. The salient characteristic of classical economic liberalism is the belief in free trade based on private enterprise, profit maximisation, perfect competition and consumer sovereignty (Todaro, 1985, p.610). Such free trade is thought to be the source of economic growth and the expansion of the possibilities of economic consumption (Gilpin, 1987, p.171). Free trade meant that government intervention was less likely to benefit the nation than government restraint in the economy (Harlen, 1999, p.736). The catalysis of free trade was believed to be the individual freedom to pursue self-interest as can be seen in Smith’s explanation as to why bakers, brewers, butchers and consumers prefer trade rather than humanity. Similarly Mill advocated economic “laissez-faire” as a general trade practice.

However, even with this idea of laissez-faire, the classical economic liberals were not hostile to the state. They even defended its role which consists in providing public services, dealing with the inequality and poverty which survive in the market economy, and protecting citizens from what Adam Smith called “prodigals and projectors” who, through over-speculation, can “grip human beings in their breathless search for profits” (Sen, 2009a).

This liberalism resurfaced in the 1980s as a call to the traditional values that gave birth to classical economic liberalism. Hence came forth the concept of neo-liberalism. But one may ask what is really new in neo-liberalism. As far as the economy is concerned, what is new is the hostility to the state. According to Deepak Lal (2006, pp.49-50), the classical liberals were not hostile to the state, nor did they believe that government had only a minor role in economic life. They believed that the state was crucial in recommending economic policies and should even protect the national economy (Reinert, 2007). Adam Smith, for instance, saw three important functions of the state: the protection of the society from foreign invaders; protection of every member from oppression and injustice by other members of the society; and providing
and maintaining various public works and institutions which provided public goods. According to Deepak Lal (2006, p.51), Smith’s view of the state is similar to Maynard Keynes’ view that “the important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are doing already, but to do those things which at present are not done at all” (Keynes, 1926, pp. 46-47).

However, as neo-liberalism becomes more and more an international common-sense understanding of economic development (Berger, 1999, p.460), more voices from economists and policymakers are raised to request that the state be kept minimal and neutral so as to let the invisible hand of the market regulate the economic dynamism. For instance, Martin Ferdstein (1974) argued that the social services and insurance in particular, fuelled consumption to the extent that harmed the nations’ capacity to save; and this deprived industry and trade of the needed capital for future economic development. Roger Bacon and Walter Eltis (1976) asserted that the British high inflation and stagnating economy were caused by excessive government involvement and spending which placed a huge burden on the productive economy. For Charles Murray (1984), the social programmes of the state in the United States of America created serious work disincentives. Since the country’s welfare system was excessively generous, people had no incentives to seek employment; and by being idle and dependent on government aid, they drained the productive economy. In his book State, Anarchy and Utopia, the political philosopher, Robert Nozick (1974) advocated a minimal state limited to the narrow functions of protections against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, arguing that going beyond these functions, the state would violate individual rights.

What could be considered as a common point of these neo-liberals is that the involvement of the state in the economy betrays the cultural value system and the individual’s ontological make-up that gave birth to liberalism. Thus the rebirth of neo-liberalism lies in the liberal individuals claiming back their essential nature and the value system that underlies it.

I would like to consider two key figures whose thought have been central to the revival of classical economic liberalism, namely, Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. The common point of Hayek and Friedman is that individuals should be allowed to conduct their life without state intervention, and that the role of the state should be limited to establishing optimal conditions for production such as supplying infrastructure, social order, and peace.
2.4.3.1 Friedrick Hayek

Hayek begins his economic thought by a reflection on individualism. He distinguishes two kinds of individualism. The Cartesian individualism is developed by thinkers inspired by Cartesian rationalism (Rousseau, the physiocrats, the encyclopedists). He argues that, in the Cartesian individualism, social processes can be made to serve human ends only if they are subjected to the control of individual reason. For Hayek, this kind of individualism gives rise to socialism and collectivism. Hayek does not explain how Cartesian individualism is linked with socialism and collectivism. One would rather understand the Cartesian “I think therefore I am” as leading to individual self-consciousness to the extent that the individual could be considered as unaided master of oneself and the world around.\(^{17}\) The second kind of individualism is the one developed by British thinkers (Locke, Hume, Tucker and Smith). For Hayek, this is the true individualism which he re-articulates as follows:

If left free, men will often achieve more than what human reason could achieve or foresee. In other words, the only way towards an understanding of social phenomenon is through the understanding of individual actions directed towards other people and guided by their own inspired behaviour (Hayek, 1949, p.6).

Hayek claims that this kind of individualism allows him to find a set of institutions by which people could be induced, by their own choices and motives which determine people’s ordinary conduct, to contribute as much as possible to the need of all others (Hayek, 1949, pp.12-13). For Hayek (1949, p.13) self-love or self-interest is the universal mover, a moral attitude thought to be widely prevalent. Hayek supports his view of self-interest with the Christian idea of individual conscience. People, he argues, must be made to follow their conscience in moral matters. Translated into the economic language, this means that people should be free to make full use of their knowledge and skills. They must be guided by their concern for particular things which they know and for which they care, if they are to make a contribution to the

\(^{17}\) It is true that, as Hayek himself points out, Rousseau starts from the rationalistic individualism and ends in some kind of collectivism as his idea of the general will suggests. The general will is thought to be a collective will in which the individual will and egoistic interests dissolve. Rousseau starts from extreme individualism and ends with extreme collectivism understood as the republic, state, body politic; but the value of these seems to be in their being able to protect the individuals and their interests in turn (see Osborn, 1940, p.23). In the same vein, the physiocrats start from rationalist individualism and end in a kind of socialism as can be seen in Le Code de la Nature of Morelly (1755) as well as in Bodeau’s idea that “the state makes of men all what it wants”. However, I believe that there is a problem of interpretation of Descartes’ thought here. Descartes intended that his “thinking thing” be the kind of individual who is conscious of oneself, defines oneself, and defines the world. It is not clear how such individuals could allow themselves to be dissolved in collectivism and socialism.
common purposes of society. The market is an effective way of making people take part in a process more complex and extended than they could comprehend, and it was through the market that they were made to contribute to their ends.

What Hayek is saying is that “people are and ought to be guided in their actions by their interests and desires”. However, this does not mean that people are or ought to be exclusively guided by their personal needs or self-interests, but rather that they ought to be allowed to strive for whatever they think is best for them. Nobody can know who knows best; and the only way by which one can find out is through a social process in which everybody is allowed to try and see what one can do. However, Hayek’s individualism does not mean anarchy. Hayek sees the necessity of coercive power which, nevertheless, needs to be limited.

2.4.3.2 Milton Friedman

The second key figure in the revival of liberal economic philosophy is Milton Friedman. Friedman had first been a proponent of Keynesianism advocating high taxes. He progressively evolved to be a defender of liberal economy when he became a friend of George Stigler who, for him, was “classically libertarian” and a “consequentialist libertarian”.

Friedman (1962) recalls first that in 18/19th century, liberalism consists in the fact that freedom is the ultimate goal, and that the individual is the ultimate entity of the society. He discusses the role of competitive capitalism as a system of economic freedom and a necessary condition for political freedom. Linked with competitive capitalism is the role that the government should play in a society dedicated to freedom and relying on the market to organise economic activity. Friedman defends the laissez-faire economy as a means of reducing the role of state in economic affairs and enlarging the role of the individual in society. He also defends the free trade as a means of linking the nations of the world together peacefully and democratically.

Friedman argues that economic freedom is a means to achieve political freedom. In effect, economic arrangements are important because of their effect on the concentration and dispersion of power. From this he comes to the conclusion that competitive capitalism promotes freedom because it separates economic power from political power (Friedman, 1962, pp.8-9). Political freedom, he argues, comes with the free market and the development of
capitalist institutions. The market is a direct component of freedom in that it protects one’s freedom impersonally without centralising authority (Friedman, 1962, p.12). On this very ground, Friedman argues that, if economic freedom were to be introduced into the countries governed by totalitarian regimes, it would result in political freedom. One can understand from this suggestion the tendency to link economic liberalism to political liberalism as is currently the case.

However, the neoclassical economics which both Hayek and Friedman strongly defend is organised around perfectly working markets; in which case the state could be kept minimal. But what guarantees that the market will work perfectly everywhere to justify the exclusion of the state from the economic procedures? Nevertheless, the liberal economic thought developed by Hayek and Friedman made a lasting impact on economists, consultants and policymakers working in international financial institutions or advising the donors’ milieu. Following their argument, it is now suggested that market forces typically unleash growth, innovation and economic efficiency, whereas governmental regulations and expenditures upend economic growth, stifle entrepreneurship and generate inefficiencies in both the private and the public sectors (Head, 1988, p.466). Although this may be true in some cases, it does not follow that this can be made a universal law of nature. In effect, the experience of the East Asian economic miracles as well as the ongoing economic ascendancy of China and India proves that economic growth and development does not necessarily require the state to be kept minimal. Furthermore, as will be seen later, the shift from the Washington Consensus\(^{18}\) which was market friendly to the Post-Washington Consensus which is rather state friendly shows that, while the market may foster the value of economic success, it could equally undermine the value of equity.

To conclude this section, from what has been developed so far, it is obvious that the culture that gave rise to neo-liberalism flourished mostly in Western Europe and the United States. It is in these parts of the world that this culture got its intellectual anchoring (Mudge, 2008, p.708).

\(^{18}\) As I will explain later, the term “Washington Consensus” refers to a set of ten macroeconomic principles arrived at by the economic consultants of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United States Treasury department. These principles were supposed to catalyse the market economy in the developing countries after the involvement of the state in the economy of these countries presumably failed. But in the 1990s, the Washington Consensus was not successful and proved itself unpopular, particularly in most developing countries. Hence came a kind of second edition of the Washington Consensus commonly known as the Post-Washington Consensus. While it recognizes the importance of the market, the Post-Washington Consensus rehabilitates the state beyond the minimal role which the Washington Consensus hitherto assigned to it.

In the following section, I will endeavour to establish and assess the fact that NEPAD is built on the above theory of economic development.

2.4.4 NEPAD and the Neo-liberal Theory of economic development

The objective of this section is to establish that NEPAD relied on the neo-liberal theory of economic development of which the cultural characteristics have been outlined, and therefore, that its philosophical foundation is not African. I consider and refute arguments that deny the neo-liberal basis of NEPAD. The first is the view that NEPAD is also an economic expression of the African renaissance developed in post-apartheid South Africa. Although this is indeed the case, the neo-liberal basis of the plan is not ruined, since the success of the African Renaissance project itself is premised on neo-liberalism. The second argument that will be considered and refuted is the idea that the use of concepts of “backwardness” and “catch up” gives NEPAD a modernist basis. I will argue that the use of these concepts is aimed at understanding Africa’s development as such and not to give NEPAD modernist prescriptions. Nor does the use of the concept of “underdevelopment” give NEPAD any dependency content.

The reliance of NEPAD on neo-liberalism can be directly read from the document itself as is obvious in the following:

- The African Renaissance project [...] depends on the building of a strong and competitive economy as the world moves towards greater liberalisation and competition (art.50);
- Promotion of policies and legislative frameworks that encourage competition and facilitate cross-border interaction and market enlargement (art.103. par.1; cf. arts.150 &151, pars.1&2);
- Promotion of the private sector (arts. 150,151, 163-164, 192);
- The government should remove the constraints to business activity (art.153);
- Allowance of the capital flow (foreign direct investment) by enforcing the security of property rights, regulatory framework and markets (art.151);
- Integration of the rural poor into the market economy (art.154, par.4; 155, par.8); and
- Trade liberalisation (particularly the three last paragraphs of art.159; arts.165-170).

These points are at the heart of the neo-liberal language. They constitute the backbone of the plan of action to integrate Africa into the global economy on the basis of greater liberalisation of the market as the source and arbiter of individual freedom and sovereignty. That NEPAD is rooted in the neo-liberal theory of economic development is underlined by various commentators of the document. Both optimists (Kanbur, 2001; Hope, 2002; Akinrinade, 2002; De Waal, 2002; Richard, 2002; and Edozie, 2004) and pessimists (Taylor & Nel, 2001; Adedeji, 2002; Turok, 2002a; Turok, 2002b; Nabudere, 2002; Bond, 2002; Adesina, 2002a; Adesina, 2002b; Ukiwo, 2003; Adesina, 2004; Taylor, 2005; Lesufi, 2004; Lesufi, 2006; and Ajei, 2007) concur on the idea that NEPAD is premised on “neo-liberalism which has become a code word for the contemporary development theory” (Tendon, 2002).

Jimi Adesina (2002a, 2002b) and Randriano (2002) argue that NEPAD is driven by the neo-liberal logic of the Washington Consensus in so far as it takes the positive aspects of it and attempts to promote global integration of Africa into the international economy from which it has been marginalised (Kahn, 2004, p.221). It is important to understand first what “Washington consensus” is and see how NEPAD links with it. The concept of the “Washington consensus” was used the first time in 1989 by John Williamson (see 1993, 2000) to describe a series of neo-liberal macro-economic policies that were presumably aimed at helping the developing countries to recover from the development crisis. The Washington Consensus consisted of the following ten (macroeconomic) principles:

1. Fiscal discipline;
2. Concentration of public expenditure on public goods including education, health and infrastructure;
3. Tax reform toward broadening the tax base with moderate marginal tax rates;
4. Interest rates to be market determined and positive;
5. Competitive exchange rates;
6. Trade liberalisation;
7. Openness to foreign direct investment;
8. Privatisation of state enterprises;
9. Deregulation: abolishment of regulations that impede entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental, and consumer protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions; and

10. Legal security for property rights.

These prescriptions were a lowest common denominator of the economists of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and also the United States Treasury Department. The word “consensus” was used to mean the convergence of these financial institutions. What lies behind these ten principles is the claim that the free market system and the freedom of the individuals to pursue their own interests are the prerequisites for economic growth and economic development to take place in any society. Thus the main argument of the Washington Consensus was that,

[I]f a developing country were to implement liberal macroeconomic policies to expand the role of the private market at the expense of the state in resource allocation, then it would achieve sustained high growth rates on its own” [and therefore, economic development] (Woo, 2004, p. 11).

The architects of NEPAD seem to have applied this economic advice. The table below (Table 1) shows how NEPAD could be seen as a response to the principles of the Washington Consensus. In table 1, each of the ten principles of the Washington Consensus is shown to find an expression in the NEPAD document.
Table 2-1: NEPAD’s application of the Washington Consensus principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles of Washington Consensus</th>
<th>NEPAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal discipline.</td>
<td>Developing appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies (art.49, par.3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration of public expenditure on public goods including education, health and infrastructure.</td>
<td>See sectoral priorities (arts. 96-114).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax reform toward broadening the tax base with moderate marginal tax rates.</td>
<td>Improvements in the public revenue collection systems (art.144) More effective tax collection to increase public resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest rates to be market determined and positive.</td>
<td>Promotion of financial markets (art.151, par.3, 7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive exchange rates.</td>
<td>Sustained economic growth based on competitiveness (arts.64; 69, par.3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade liberalisation.</td>
<td>The African Renaissance project [...] depends on the building of a strong and competitive economy as the world moves towards greater liberalisation and competition (art.50); promotion of policies and legislative frameworks that encourage competition and facilitate cross-border interaction and market enlargement (art.103. par.1, cf. arts.150 &amp;151, pars.1&amp;2, 167); reduce export taxes (art.166); removal of non-tariff barriers (art.170).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness to foreign direct investment.</td>
<td>Allowance of the capital flow by enforcing the security of property rights, regulatory framework and markets (arts. 144, 151, 166).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatisation of state enterprises.</td>
<td>Promoting the private sector (arts. 163-164, 192; See also arts. 86, 150,151).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deregulation.</td>
<td>The government should remove the constraints to business activity (art.153).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal security for property rights.</td>
<td>Enforcing the security of property rights, regulatory framework and markets (art.151).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Besides the fact that it is problematic to claim that “one economic policy fits all” which would fall into an economic universalism which ignores the particularities of each society, there was the fact that these economic policies of the Washington Consensus had negative consequences on the poor in less developed countries. In certain developing countries that adopted these economic policies the economy sank deeper than the initial level. In countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, the poor economic performances were accompanied with the collapse of the state as well as the deterioration of social conditions (World Bank, 1993; cf. Hayami & Akiyama, 2003, p.20, Sawamura, 2004). Maybe it is here that NEPAD does not conform with the sole logic of the Washington Consensus but also embrace that of the Post-Washington Consensus (Adesina, 2002; Randriamaro, 2006). Yet, this does not give NEPAD an ultimate African basis either.

While the Washington Consensus is confined to market competition for resource allocation, the Post-Washington Consensus broadened the scope to include non-market factors such as social norms and power balances. Thus, contrary to the Washington Consensus, the Post-Washington
Consensus allows for more than just a minimal state involvement in economic procedures, and makes poverty reduction the immediate objective of economic development. In developing countries, the role of the state is to work out sound economic policies and good governance that lead to economic development and poverty reduction, yet remain within the confines of the freedom of the market (World Bank, 1998, 2000; Burnside & Dollar, 1998, 2000).

The rehabilitation of the state and its role in poverty reduction and development as suggested by the Post-Washington Consensus is obvious in the NEPAD document, as can be seen in its very definition:

This *New Partnership for Africa’s Development*\(^\text{19}\) is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively on the path of sustainable growth and development (art.1).

In terms of the programme of action of NEPAD, the state plays a double role. The first is the political role and consists of making good governance its priority. This good governance has two aspects. The first aspect is political governance which consists of peace, security, democracy and sociopolitical stability (arts. 71-85). These are the social and political conditions which constitute the context which could allow economic development to flourish. The second aspect is economic governance (economic and corporate governance) (arts. 86-95). This consists in providing policy and regulatory frameworks that would facilitate the flourishing of the private economic activities, on the one hand, and the elaboration of sectoral priorities, particularly in the area of socio-economic infrastructures and human resources, on the other hand (arts. 96-143).

The “state intervention” could lead people to believe that, NEPAD is not neo-liberal in its basic orientation. This would be ignoring the fact that the Post-Washington Consensus (like the Washington Consensus) is informed by neo-liberal thought. Neo-liberalism is conceived in such a way that the kind of state intervention observed in NEPAD is not that which could be hostile to the market, resulting in the dichotomy state-market. It is the state intervention that is

\(^{19}\) Italics in the original
economically defined. The market defines what role the state should play and not the other way round. Tawfik is right to point out that:

The post-Washington consensus indicates the demise of the state –market dichotomy and the rise of a debate that is not concerned with state intervention \textit{per se} but with the form and extent of that intervention (Tawfik, 2005, p.8).

Certain commentators of NEPAD reflecting on the concepts of ownership and partnership have adopted a softer position on the fact that the plan is rooted in neo-liberal grounds. They argue that NEPAD is equally based on the idea of the African Renaissance championed by the former South African president Thabo Mbeki (Ajulu, 2001; Adesina, 2002b; Mzamane, 2003; Edozie, 2004; Venter & Neuland, 2005; Owusu, 2006). Effectively, NEPAD is a combination of the Millenium Partnership for African Recovery Programme (MAP) of South Africa and the Omega Plan (OP) of Senegal. MAP was produced by an economic unit of the South African presidency in Pretoria, and was conceived of as an economic expression of the African Renaissance. Moreso, the idea of African Renaissance is expressed in the NEPAD document:

The African Renaissance project should allow our continent, which has been plundered for centuries, to take its rightful place in the world. It depends on the building of a strong, competitive economy as the world moves towards greater liberalisation and competition (art.50).

As is obvious in the said article, far from softening the reliance of NEPAD on neo-liberalism, it strongly consolidates it instead. The article suggests that, for the African Renaissance project to succeed, Africa must open itself fully to “greater liberalisation”. This “greater liberalisation” could be understood to refer to unreserved implementation of the ten macroeconomic principles of Washington Consensus. Their explicit or implicit implementation by certain countries throughout the world partly explains the fact of the global economy into which the architects of NEPAD would like to integrate the African continent. The “greater liberalisation” could also refer to market-oriented economies which are said to be on the increase (art.7). In this way, the architects of NEPAD invite those African countries which have not yet joined the neoliberal economy to do so.
According to Leon Tikly (2003, see also Brown, 1988; Woodward, 1996; Hale, 2000), the idea of the African Renaissance recalls two major things. The first is the historical idea of European renaissance which referred to the retrieval of humanism built on a set of values about human nature based on a belief in morality, the priority of the individual over the collective, and the development of the whole person and the active citizen. The second is the antithesis to the European Renaissance which derives from the criticism that European humanism is tainted with the violent negativity of colonialism and neo-colonialism (Young quoted by Tikly, 2003, p.544).

In Africa this criticism led to the affirmation of African humanism championed by Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, the idea of negritude championed by Leopold Senghor in Senegal, the black consciousness of Steve Biko in South Africa, and authenticity preached by Mobutu Sese Seko in the former Zaïre (DRC). All these African ideologico-philosophical currents stressed the collective, people-centred and the spiritual nature of the African as contrasted with Western individualism and excessive rationality. For, Tikly, the idea of the African Renaissance of Mbeki is overwhelmed by a neo-liberal element that betrays the previous African perspectives. Mbeki’s African renaissance is understood in terms of charting a path of economic growth and political development characteristic of the neo-liberal society. In other words, its economic content is an espousal of the neo-liberal, market solution to African problems.

There are certain alternative interpretations that tend to contradict the neo-liberal basis of NEPAD. Sally Matthews (2004) considers the concepts of “backwardness” and “underdevelopment” used in the NEPAD document. She points out that the concept of backwardness calls to mind the modernisation theory which understands development as a linear process through which all societies progress, discarding backwardness and the traditional beliefs and values that underpin it as modernity is embraced (Matthews, 2004, p.498). Matthews is not the only one who makes this observation of the modernist ground of NEPAD. The G 6 Billion People’s Summit held the view that NEPAD is neck deep in modernisation with its “catch up” mentality (cited in Ukiwo, 2003). However, “catch up” is not necessarily synonymous with modernisation. To engage in the process of “catching up” as far as economic
development is concerned does not necessarily mean that one must follow the prescriptions of the modernisation theory.  

The modernisation theory, as referred to earlier, requires developing countries to give up their traditional beliefs, values and attitudes so as to embrace those of modernity. The architects of NEPAD acknowledge Africa’s rich cultural legacy (NEPAD, 2001: arts.10, par.4; 179) and even suggest as a way of bridging the digital divide, the development of “local-content software, based especially on Africa’s cultural legacy” (NEPAD, 2001: art.107). Furthermore, they suggest that indigenous knowledge should be protected and utilised in so far as it represents a major dimension of the African continent’s culture (art.140). This is contrary to the claims of modernisation theory. However, I am not saying that the fact that architects of NEPAD acknowledge Africa’s rich cultural legacy means that the economic policies of NEPAD are a validation of that African cultural legacy.

Matthews points out that the concept of “underdevelopment” is reminiscent of the dependency theory which understands the Third World to be in a state of underdevelopment as a consequence of exploitation by the developed countries. This seems to be the case since the architects of NEPAD use the concept of underdevelopment repetitively (it is used six times: arts.1, 6, 14, 25, and 46) and refer to colonialism and the workings of the international economic system that impoverished the African continent (art. 18), as well as the fact that “Africa has been integrated into the world economy as a supplier of cheap labour and raw materials” (art. 19). This was indeed the accusation which the dependency theorists directed against the architecture of the global economy.

NEPAD might meet the analysis made in the dependency theory concerning the economic realities of Africa. However, it cannot be concluded on this ground that NEPAD relied on the dependency theory. In fact, the main suggestion in NEPAD is the integration of Africa into the global economy on the basis of liberalisation of African markets and allowing the free flowing

---

20 There is certainly a point where neo-liberalism meets the modernisation theory. This point is most likely to be found in their Western cultural assumptions of economic development. However, neo-liberalism and modernisation differ in the way they approach the same issue of economic development in developing countries. While the modernists insist that the developing countries should do away with the traditional beliefs and attitudes in order to engage in the process of economic development, neo-liberalism limits itself to how the state is a hindrance to the same process of economic development. One would believe that, for the modernists, in the developing countries, even the state could achieve economic development provided it embraces the beliefs and values of modernity.
of financial capital, while the dependency theorists suggest de-linking or withdrawing from the global economy so as to achieve self-reliance.

In the same way the reference to the concept of “self-reliance” in article 27 differs greatly from its use in dependency theory. The concept of self-reliance in the NEPAD document refers to the creation, by Africans themselves, of the conditions such as good governance and the working out of “right” economic policies that could allow the integration of the continent into the market economy. In other words, the concept of self-reliance refers to “ownership” which is central to the NEPAD document.

Pretorius and Patel (2002) argued that NEPAD borrowed heavily from both modernisation and dependency theories, and thus uses an eclectic combination of modernisation and dependency as its framework. Effectively the concepts of “underdevelopment”, “backwardness”, and “catch up” used in the NEPAD document could lead one to believe that its architects refer to the modernisation and dependency theories. However, in using the concepts of “backwardness”, “catch up”, and “underdevelopment”, the architects of NEPAD are by no means interested in the modernisation and dependency theories per se. Rather these concepts are used to understand better the concept of development as such and the problems of development that puzzle African political economy when compared to the rest of the world. They are not used to give a modernist or dependency content to NEPAD.

Matthews argues that the acceptance of the assumptions of these theories is geared to underlining the fact that there is one desirable future for all humanity as far as economic development is concerned. She still wonders whether this “desirable development” (whatever it may be) may not lead African economy back to the modernisation perspective. However it is possible that there could be one desirable economic development, but different perspectives to

---

21 One should be aware of the problem of defining economic development. For instance, economic development was often equated with “economic growth”, that is, the measurable opulence of a given society. The measurement of economic growth considers aspects such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, that the GDP has increased in a given country does necessarily mean that it is economically developed. For instance, Gabon has one of the highest GDP in the world as a result its oil exports, but it is not economically developed. Economic development has also been defined in reference to such things as wealth, happiness, individual income, as well as individual well-being. Economic development cannot be limited to the utility achieved. As Sen would say, welfarist or utilitarian definitions of economic development do not pay attention to the freedom to pursue well-being. Economic development can also be defined by considering the access to what John Rawls (1971, 1996) referred to as the primary goods (income, wealth, opportunities, and social bases of self-respect). This definition also does not give a complete picture of economic development. The Blacks and other ethnic minorities in the United States of America are said to have access to these primary goods compared to some people in certain parts of the world, but they are not economically developed.
achieve it. In fact, one of these perspectives is the point to be defended in this research, that is, that economic development has to be the validation of the beliefs and values that structure a people’s identity.

At this juncture the question could arise why NEPAD opted for the neoliberal theory of economic development despite the availability of other alternatives such as the “social market economy”\(^\text{22}\) (which allows the government to be close to the people and in which economics and politics are not quite as divorced as is the case in neo-liberalism) (see Friedrich, 1955, p. 511), and the East Asian type of corporate capitalism or even state capitalism. I would like to outline three main reasons here.

The first reason is the fact of economic globalisation. Economic globalisation marks a new era in which people everywhere are increasingly subjected to the discipline of the global market (Ohmae, 1990, 1995; Guehenno, 1995; Strange, 1996). The indicators of human progress today are said to be the emergence of a single global market with its principle of global competition. The characteristic of the global market is the denationalisation of economies through the establishment of transnational networks of production, trade and finance.

In the opening article, the NEPAD document makes it clear that its aim is to extricate Africans from their exclusion from a globalising world, and considers economic globalisation as providing “the context and a means for African rejuvenation” (art. 28). In fact the whole section (arts. 28-41) makes the point that participation in the global economy through free trade will attract investments and aid to make economic growth and development possible.

The second reason why the architects of NEPAD might have embraced the neo-liberal theory of development is to boost aid and its effectiveness as expressed below:

The United Nations Millennium Goals adopted in September 2000, confirm the global community’s readiness to support Africa’s effort to address the continent’s underdevelopment and marginalisation. [...]The Declaration further

---

\(^\text{22}\) Social market economy is technically called ordo-liberalism. Contrary to neo-liberalism, ordo-liberals believe that economic dynamics are embedded in politics and so reject the view that the market is a self-dependent. Among the proponents of this economic thought, one could mention among others, Wilhelm Röpke (1948), Friedrich (1955). Hayek was once counted among the ordo-liberals. But afterwards, he broke from this school of thought, particularly because of the question of whether capitalism was self-destructive and a polarizing force which could be blamed for both World Wars.
points to the global community’s commitment to enhance resource flows to Africa, by improving aid (art.46).

To meet the International Development Goals (IDGs) Africa needed 64 billion US dollars annually. The major part of the amount was expected to come in the form of aid (art.144). Although Japan and China are increasingly counted among the major donors for Africa, the required aid to finance NEPAD was expected to come mostly from the traditional Western donors and International Financial Institutions (IFI). These Western donors and financial institutions happen to be the major champions of the neo-liberal economic credo. They are credited to have pushed the neo-liberal economy to such level of international common-sense understanding of economic development that any other alternative could be hardly thought of. Furthermore the same donors and financial institutions happen to be the most politically influential in Africa and in the international power relations (Berger, 1999, p.454, Williamson cited by Kahn, 2004, p.215).

The third reason why the architects of NEPAD embraced the neo-liberal theory seems to be the principle that: “if you cannot defeat them, join them”. In the years following independence, most African countries rejected certain economic policies simply because these were pursued by the former colonial countries, and thus associated with colonialism (Mudimbe, 1988; Sachs & Warner, 1995; Collier & Gunning, 1999). The LPA preference for the dependency theory against the neo-liberalism of which the thought and the practice were already available could be seen against this background. The demand made to African countries to liberalize their economy was seen as neo-colonialism. The World Bank’s agenda of Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (1981) which conflicted with LPA’s agenda was also perceived in this way. Accordingly, in the 1980s and 1990s, neo-liberalism was unpopular and met a lot of resistance in most African countries. Williamson (in Kahn, 2004, p.215) argues that sub-Saharan Africa moved “spottily and grudgingly, too often under foreign pressure rather than out of conviction”. Such pressure made it difficult for the architects of NEPAD to envisage any other alternative.

Thus NEPAD talks of “new circumstances” (art.42), “the new phase of globalisation” which reshapes international relations (art. 43), and uses the language of “ownership” and “partnership”. One may understand “ownership” to mean the neo-liberal economy should not be resisted but owned so as to make it work in Africa. The developed countries hitherto seen as neo-colonial powers should now be seen as partners in development.
The point being made so far is that NEPAD is informed by the neo-liberal theory of economic development. On this note, I shall now conclude this chapter.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I excavated the dependency and neoclassical theories of economic development as well as the cultural assumptions upon which they are premised. I then assessed LPA and NEPAD against the benchmark of these development theories that underpin them respectively, and argued that although the two plans of Africa’s economic development were devised in Africa, their philosophical foundations are not African.

The point that lies beneath the argument so far is the fact that theories of economic development are deeply rooted in belief and value systems. To each value system is attached a particular ontological status which people acquire and which yields a kind of economic development that fits with it.

In Chapter Three, I attempt to put across the belief and value system that structures the ontological density of Africans. The underlying point to be made is that, for plans of economic development to succeed in Africa, they have to grow from this ontological foundation.
3 CHAPTER THREE
THE AFRICAN VALUE SYSTEM AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION

3.1 Introduction

In Chapter Two I argued that, although the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were designed in Africa, their respective philosophical foundations are not African. I outlined how the dependency theory of economic development, which inspired LPA, was based on the value and belief system which structures the ontological make-up of the Latin American people. In the same way I argued that the neo-liberal theory of economic development, which inspired NEPAD, is based on the Western belief and value system.

Chapter Three focuses on the belief and value system that structures the ontological status of Africans. I will argue that, in this system, the individual is conceived of as ontologically part of the community. This community has two aspects, namely, the cosmological and human dimensions. The human being is part of the cosmological community of beings (ntu), as well as part of the community of human beings (Bantu).

This chapter will consist of three parts. In the first part, I will argue that, despite the apparent cultural diversity which is empirically obvious, there is a metaphysical backbone that unifies almost all Africans. The second part is an outline of the cosmological and anthropological dimensions of the African community. The third part is an overview of the political attempts to validate the African sense of community and its values. I will consider the views of the fathers of Africa’s independence, namely, Leopold Senghor, Nkwameh Krumah, Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, who tried to give the African belief and value system a socio-political expression, namely African socialism. Such consideration should lead to the issue of whether the African belief and value system could be given an economic expression. The conclusion will follow.
3.2 The unity and/or the diversity of the African value system

To talk of the African value system and not African value systems presupposes the unity of African culture. The unity of African culture is certainly a debatable issue. That Africa is culturally homogeneous is not empirically obvious neither to the outside observer nor to those inside. In fact, empirically speaking, Africa is culturally diverse. A Zulu is not a Burundian, a Burundian is culturally different from a Yoruba of Nigeria, a Yoruba is not a Muluba of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and a Nuer of Sudan is not a Khoisan of Southern Africa. According to Mudimbe (1988, p.79), African scholars who are in search of their pride and identity cannot deny Africa’s diversity. Even Hountondji (1996, p.148) criticised the vast majority of anthropologists who neglected the plurality of pre-colonial African culture, forcing an artificial unity upon what is really irreducibly diverse.

The issue of the unity and plurality of African culture is even more contentious when it comes to the question of African philosophy. The much debated issue of whether there is an African philosophy is not only discussed with a view of affirming the universality of philosophy as self-critical thought (Crahay, 1965; Houtondji, 1977, 1982, 1983, 1989; Wiredu 1980; Oladipo 1992), but also in terms of the thought system which may be particular to African cultural groups, or simply African culture as a whole (Kagame 1956, 1971,1976; Mulago, 1955, 1969, 1973, etc).

Diversity is a reality which cannot be denied in Africa. Yet Hountondji’s idea that the vast majority of anthropologists are simply forcing an artificial unity upon what is irreducibly diverse is hardly acceptable. To remain at the level of Hountondji’s affirmation is to undermine the whole endeavour of philosophy which consists in the search of the unity behind the observed diversity, the One behind the many. The point is that the empirical observation is not a sufficient basis from which to appreciate the diversity or unity of Africans. The fact that there are different personalities in a given family does not negate the reality of a family. To affirm the reality of parts is not to deny the reality of the whole; nor is to affirm the reality of communion (common-union) necessarily to negate the existence of individualities.

Thus, although the diversity of cultures in Africa is a reality, such diversity of cultures could be seen as parts of the whole, or more accurately subcultures of a general African culture. This general African culture is underpinned by a common metaphysical backbone, a common root
that unifies almost all Africans (Oladipo, 1992; Ramose, 2002). The idea of a metaphysical backbone that underlies the cultural unity of Africans is present in African discourses of otherness such as negritude, black personality, African philosophy, and the struggle for identity and authenticity (Mudimbe, 1988, p. xi; Sindima, 1995, p.ch.3).

Olumide (1948) studied the Yoruba religion (in Nigeria) with a view to demonstrating that the Yoruba tradition has an Egyptian origin. Similarly, the Egyptologist Cheikh Anta Diop (1954, 1967a, 1967b) stressed the religious, linguistic and cultural unity of Africa. Diop’s cultural unity of Africa has been revisited by Nkemnkia (1999) who centres his reflection on the idea of “African vitalogy”, meaning that “for the African everything is life” (Nkemnkia, 1999, p.11).

Beside his nationalist programme, Abraham underlines African unity in his book The Mind of Africa (1966) and talks of the “family resemblance” in Africa. For Ramose (see also Shuttle, 2001) what underlies this “family resemblance” is the notion of “ubuntu” “which is simultaneously the foundation and the edifice of African philosophy, a philosophy which “‘goes from the Nubian desert to the Cape of Good Hope, and from Senegal to Zanzibar’” (Ramose, 2002, p.41). The concept of “negritude” which Senghor (1964, 1967a, 1967b) developed was aimed at substantiating the claim that Africa is one. Nkrumah always sought to build African unity politically on the premise that Africa has a cultural unity. Mbiti (1968) affirms the cultural unity of Africans and regards it as the foundation for the coherence of African religions and philosophy. In his La Religion Traditionnelle des Bantu et leur vision du monde (1973), Mulago asserts that the Bantu religious vision is homogeneous; and this homogeneity brought African scholars to talk of U-ntu, Négritude, Africanity, three terms that are used interchangeably. Mulago himself developed the concept of Africanity and took it to be the common factor of African cultures and religious beliefs. Sindima (1995) tries to redeem the African identity and the values that underlie it from the crisis caused by the impact of liberalism and the legacy of colonialism.

After having done research on the Bemba and the Baluba of Congo (and partly in Zambia), Tempels (1959) talked of the notion of being and the universe which is special not only to Baluba, but also to all Bantu and even to all Africans. Alan Ogot (1967) used this same Bantu ontology as a framework for the analysis of the concept of “jok” among the nilotic people. In his Muntu, Jahaneiz Jahn (1961) argued that the Bantu ontology applies to all Africans. For Jahn, this is substantiated by those Africans who have their own opinion and who are ready to determine the future of Africa: those, in other words, of whom it is said they are trying to
revive the African tradition (Jahn, 1962, p.16). Jahn had in mind the distinction between the “real” Africans and the westernised ones. Thus when he talks of the Africans who are trying to revive the future of Africa and its tradition, he was talking of the so-called “real” Africans. Jahn’s distinction seems to be too radical and simplistic, yet crucial insofar as it points to the issue of how to account for the Western influence on Africans, that is, the issue of whether Africans are still the same. Are the so-called “real” Africans not just those, who, despite the Western influence, “struggle for authenticity and identity” (Sindima, 1995, p.60)? Are they not those who “struggle […] to undo what colonialism did to the African mind and society” so as “to create a new mentality and a new social order in which African values […] can exist?” (Sindima, 1995, p.61) Are the so-called westernised Africans those “Black skin, (in) White Mask” of which Franz Fanon (1967) talks? Or those Africans who try to appropriate the fruits of science and technology (having) without appropriating to themselves the spirit or rather the cultural beliefs and values that ultimately produced them (being)? Or again those who “suffer from the pathological interiorisation of self-hatred” (Bidima, 1995, p.28)?

Central to the metaphysical backbone that unifies African cultures is the belief that the individual is ontologically part of the community and that the community is ontologically prior to the individual. It is true that this belief could be found elsewhere in other cultures in the West as can be seen in the reflections on the centrality of the community in the life of the individual (see Walzer, 1982; Taylor, 1989; Sandel, 1982, 1996). The sense of loyalty to the community found in certain oriental cultures, particularly in India, China and Japan, is one of the indications of the importance attributed to the community (see Morishima, 1982).

However, the specificity of African sense of community lies in the way the Africans conceive of the universe around them in general and the human universe in particular. As far as this research is concerned, it might be overly ambitious and unrealistic to consider the whole of Africa. As already mentioned in Chapter One and, as can be seen on Map 3-1, the northern part of Africa is populated by Afro-asiatic people, and therefore may have their distinctive cultural characteristics. In the same way, Madagascar will not be considered in this study since it is populated by Austronesian people who have their own cultural features. I will concentrate on the Bantu people whose ontology applies to the negro-Africans of Sub-Saharan Africa.
The Bantu people are part of a larger group called the Niger-Kongo (see Map 3-1) and occupy almost the whole region South of the Equator and its surroundings. They make up more than 60% of the African population in Sub-Saharan Africa, and occupy geographically a third of the whole African continent (Kagame, 1976; Guthrie, 1948). This may justify why most African thinkers tend to refer to Bantu philosophical principles to make the point about what unifies Africans (Jahn, 1961; Ebousi-Boulaga, 1972). Although this is debatable, anthropologists and ethnologists argue that Western Africans (Niger-Kongo A) and the Bantu people were the same people before they took different migratory itineraries. This may be the reason why certain metaphysical concepts found in West Africa are almost the same as those of Bantu people, although they are linguistically different (Gyekye, 1997; Kaphagawani, 2006; Odei, 2007).
Linguistically, Bantu languages seem to be variations of one common ancestral language (see Map 3-2). In particular, despite certain phonological variations they share the fact that the human being is referred as *Muntu* (in singular) and *Bantu* (in plural).

**Map 3-2 Guthrie’s classification of Bantu languages (1948) updated in 2006.**
*(NB. The original map did not have Group J which, on the updated map, combines D and E. See A Survey Report of Bantu Languages by Derek Nurse, SIL International, 2001)*

---

Group A: South Cameroon & North Gabon  
Group B: South Gabon & West Congo-B  
Group C: North-West, North & Central Congo  
Group D: North-East, East Congo-K & Rwanda-Burundi  
Group E: South Uganda, South-West Kenya & North-West Tanzania  
Group F: North & West Tanzania  
Group G: Central, East Tanzania & Swahili coast  
Group H: South-West Congo-B & North Angola  
Group K: East Angola & West Zambia  
Group L: South Congo-K & West, Central Zambia  
Group M: East, Central Zambia, South-West Tanzania & South-East Congo-K  
Group N: Malawi, Central Mozambique & South-East Zambia  
Group P: South Tanzania & North Mozambique  
Group R: South-West Angola & North-West Namibia  
Group S: Zimbabwe, South Mozambique & East of South Africa
In Bantu philosophy, the notion of being is known as -ntu\(^2\) while the concept of human being is \textit{muntu}. I will henceforth talk of \textit{muntu} to designate human being and \textit{ntu} to refer to being.

### 3.3 Cosmological and anthropological dimensions of the African community

In this section, the aim is to show that the \textit{muntu} is part of the cosmological community of \textit{ntu} (beings) in general and part of the human community in particular.

#### 3.3.1 The \textit{muntu} in the universe of \textit{ntu}

According to Alexis Kagame (1956), the structure and grammatical rules of a people’s language are modelled in agreement with the cosmological ordering of the universe. On this premise, Kagame analysed his own language, Kinyarwanda, and came to the conclusion that the philosophical elements in the linguistic structure of Kinyarwanda reveal the way in which the Bantu of Rwanda conceive of the categories of being in their philosophy. For Kagame, since the linguistic structure of Kinyarwanda is the same as that of Bantu in general, one can talk of an ontology that is common to all the Bantu people (1976)\(^\text{24}\). Kagame outlined four categories that constitute reality and the Bantu universe. He argues that these categories are amenable to Aristotelian metaphysical categories (see Table 3-1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Plural</th>
<th>Analytically</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Aristotelian categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muntu</td>
<td>Bantu</td>
<td>Mu/ba-ntu</td>
<td>\textit{Being with intelligence}: Human beings actually living, human beings who are dead, and human beings who are not-yet born.</td>
<td>Substance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kintu</td>
<td>Bintu</td>
<td>Ki/bi-ntu</td>
<td>\textit{Being without intelligence}: minerals, plants, animals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hantu</td>
<td>Hantu</td>
<td>Ha-ntu</td>
<td>\textit{Being of space and time}</td>
<td>Time, space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuntu</td>
<td>Kuntu</td>
<td>Ku-ntu</td>
<td>\textit{Modal being}</td>
<td>Quantity, quality, relation, position, possession, action, passion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) There may be some phonological variations where the root –ntu becomes nhu (some parts of Group S), -tu without “n” (Group G), or even –du (the western part of Group A). These variations do not alter anything as far as the Bantu notion of being is concerned.

\(^\text{24}\) Alexis Kagame collected data on 180 languages for the Bantu zone, read more than 300 books on all the various languages, and interviewed 60 informants (see Kagabo, 2006, p.232).
All these four categories (mu, ki, ha, ku) are built on the same root, *ntu* (being)\(^{25}\). The following figure (Figure 3-1) gives a schematic picture of the four categories.

**Figure 3-1: The schematic structure of the Bantu categories**

Contrary to what Mkhize (2008, p.41) believes, it is obvious from the above table that *ntu* is not only reserved for human beings. Mkhize (2008, p.38) talks of the cosmic unity but fails to discover that *ntu* underlies it as if the four categories were unknown to him.

There has been a question of why Kagame did not consider the “bu” of *(u)bu-ntu*\(^{26}\) as a fifth category. For Kagame, with the concept of *u-bu-ntu*, one is already in the realm of formal logic as a condition for philosophising. In other words, *bu* is not another class of beings, but rather an *abstracted being*\(^{27}\) which has a mental existence. It belongs to the order of what is signified. *Bu* could be compared to what Peter Abelard called *sermo*, that is, a word in its relationship with a logical content, that is, what is predicated. It has a universal existence in the mind, yet refers to concrete, particular beings in the real world.

The Bantu distinguish between the concrete and the abstract. They distinguish between the abstract of accidentality and the abstract of substantiality. The abstract of accidentality expresses entities which do not exist independently in nature. In other words, entities expressed

---

\(^{25}\)Kagame claimed that these four categories correspond to the ten Aristotelian categories (one substance and nine accidents). However, his biographer, Kagabo (2006, p.236), questioned this claim arguing that Aristotelian categories are classes of predicates, while Kagame’s categories are classes of beings. Nevertheless, this is not to say that Kagame is wrong since as far as the Bantu languages are concerned, Kagame is right to stress that any conceivable entity comes down to one of those four and there is no entity outside those four categories (Kagame cited by Kagabo, ibid.).

\(^{26}\)According to Ramose (2002, p.41, see also Mkhize, 2008, p.41) ubuntu has particles, the prefix *ubu* and the stem *ntu*. But actually there are three particles: *u* which is an article, *bu* which denotes the abstract. For instance the Bantu would refer to the dog-ness of a dog as *u-bu-bwa*, the animality of an animal as *u-bu-koko*. When *bu* is combined with the stem --*ntu*, it means the humanness”.

\(^{27}\)My emphasis
by the abstract of accidentality have no existence except in reference to some being. I will give
two examples here, namely *u-bu-gabo* and *u-bu-shangantahe*. *U-bu-gabo* (courage, force, and
virility) derives from *umugabo* (man) and is predicated to people or anything that shows signs
of courage or strength. *U-bu-shingantahe* (integrity, equity) derives from *umushingantahe*
(judge) and is predicated to any person who leads a life of integrity, justice, and truthfulness.
Instead, the abstract of substantiality expresses entities existing independently in nature. It
expresses a particular being in specific categories or a mode of being. For instance, the Bantu
would talk of *u-bu-bwa* to mean the dog-ness of a dog; *u-bu-khosi* to mean the kingship of a
king; *u-bu-shuhe* (heat-ness of the heat); *u-bu-kali* (sharpness of a thing or a tool). As can be
seen in these examples, it is the substantiality of a given being that is expressed.

Both the abstract of accidentality and the abstract of substantiality are connoted by the
classifier *-bu*. *Ubuntu* (humanity or humanness) enters in the category of the abstract of
substantiality. *-Bu* is not an entitative being. Ramose is right to point out that *(u)bu* evokes
the idea of be-ing in general (universal in the mind). It is enfolded being before it manifests
itself in the concrete form or mode of ex-istence of a particular entity (Ramose, 2002, p.41).

Looking at these categories of beings, one could say that the human being, the *mu-ntu*, the
being of intelligence, is part of the universal community which includes beings other than the
human being. However, there has been a debate as to whether it is adequate to translate *ntu* by
being on the one hand, and on the other hand, whether God is part of *ntu*.

Tempels (1959) translated *ntu* as force and equated the Bantu notion of being with force. The
aim of Tempels was to distinguish the classical Greek, Western notion of being (the reality
common to all beings, being as such, the reality that is) and the Bantu notion of being. But
Tempels’ distinction between the Western notion of being and the Bantu one is not only
conceptual, but also ontological. He argued that while the Western notion of being is static, the
Bantu notion of being is dynamic, hence his concept of “force”:

> We can conceive the transcendental notion of “being” by separating it from its
attribute, “force,” but Bantu cannot. “Force” in his thought is a necessary

---

28 See the above footnote 26.
29 Ramose’s spelling
30 Ramose’s spelling
element in “being”, and the concept of force is inseparable from the definition of “being”. Without the element of “force”, “being” cannot be conceived. We hold a static conception of “being”, theirs is dynamic (Tempels, 1959, p.34).

When one looks at the different Bantu categories, it would appear as if Tempels is right. Indeed, the Bantu idea of being seems to be dynamic when compared to the classical Greek/Western one. The classifier -Mu refers to being that acts with intelligence. –Ki refers to being that acts without intelligence (animals, the plants, and inanimate beings). –Ha is the being of time and space; and -Ku refers to the being of modalities, the different aspects a being can take. A number of African philosophers seem to have developed the Bantu philosophy along these lines.

In the same way, Vincent Mulago (1965, pp. 152-153; see also Mulago, 1955) argues that ntu cannot be simply translated by being. Ntu and being are not coextensive in so far as the ntu categories subsume created beings and not the original source of ntu, God. For Mulago ntu is a fundamental and referential basic being-force which dynamically manifests itself in all existing beings, differentiating them, but also linking them in an ontological hierarchy. Apparently, Mulago wants to vindicate Tempels’ equation that being is force and force is being in Bantu ontology. However, the fact that ntu includes only created beings does not undermine the translation of the Bantu concept of “ntu” as “being”, nor does it allow to claim that being is force. That the Bantu idea of being is dynamic does not give Tempels grounds to claim that, in Bantu ontology, “being is force”.

According to Kagame, the essential characteristic of ntu is to act and be acted upon. And this constitutes its mode of being. However, Kagame does not equate being with force. Force does not have an ontological status like ntu. Rather, it could be a characteristic of ntu but not ntu.

---

31 The concept of being-force is certainly taken from Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy (1959). Tempels talks of vital force as an invisible reality of everything that exists, a certain property that underlies all things. As far as he understands the Bantu ontology, force is being, the very essence of being. It is possible that Tempels was drawing on Bergson’s evolutionary philosophy (1946). In effect, Bergson talks of a vital principle (élan vital) which he contrasts to inert matter. Using the same contrast, Tempels compares the vital force in Bantu ontology with the static being in Western metaphysics (see Masolo, 1994, pp.48-49). Tempels believes that in Bantu philosophy, all beings have and are force and that there is a constant interaction between them. This interaction is a passive existential property which unites all beings. Although Tempels’ reflection on Africa philosophy has influenced many African philosophers, both his proponents as well as his opponents, I believe that his equation being = force in Bantu philosophy is merely an interpretation geared to underlining the fact that the Bantu people have a philosophical system of their own. As far as I know, in Bantu languages, nowhere do they use the word force to mean ntu.
itself. For Kagame, the central notion of the Bantu philosophy is being in the general sense rather than just force. According to Kagame, it is in this general sense that Bantu philosophy is a philosophy of being (See Kagabo, 2006, p.235).

In line with Kagame, Masolo (1994) disputes the accuracy of Tempels’ interpretation of *ntu* as force. He argues that Tempels is mistaken to consider being as force in Bantu philosophy. He demonstrates Tempels’ mistake by referring to the following analogy:

I have often held a piece of chalk out in class and asked different students to say “something” about “this thing” in my hand. Almost invariably, I have had students giving answers like this: it is white; it is cone-shaped; it is long; it is chalk (in the sense of its chemical composition), etc. Assuming that at the back of my own mind I believe that there is only one fundamental focus or problem to which every person’s attention would be invariably drawn in regard to “this thing,” I will definitely make a very stupid mistake in likening those different answers of students as equitable synonyms for the same referent, as synonyms which can be equated in the following way: white = cone-shaped = long= chalk. This equation may make sense in terms of what goes on in ordinary language and human experience (Masolo, 1994, p.58)

Masolo’s analogy is clear enough to demonstrate that *ntu* cannot be equated with force as Tempels claims. According to Tshamalenga (1981), Tempels’ error lies in the fact that he wanted to construct a philosophy instead of reconstructing the Bantu philosophy as he had intended. In so doing he betrayed the Bantu ontology. In fact, before Tshamalenga, Eboussi-Boulaga (1968) had argued that the confusion of force with being lies in the problem of method which Tempels did not confront. Tempels, having been schooled in the Aristotelian Thomistic philosophy, failed to face the question of how anthropology can be a source of, or a basis for philosophy. Thus Tempels limited himself to using the Aristotelian Thomistic grid, as a technique for transcribing and expressing what is fundamentally unutterable (Eboussi-Boulaga, 1968, pp. 9-10).

Furthermore, Eboussi-Boulaga suspected that, in the ontological hypothesis on which the distinction between the notion of being peculiar to Western metaphysics and the notion of force peculiar to Bantu metaphysics is established, Tempels reduced the *muntu* to the
primitiveness of an amoral and absolutely determining order of forces (Eboussi-Boulaga, 1968, pp.19-20). I would certainly not subscribe to Eboussi-Boulaga’s hermeneutics of suspicion.

That Tempels used the notion of force having in mind the intention to reduce the Bantu people to the order of forces is unthinkable, and would betray his mission of evangelisation which was the primary aim of his intellectual endeavour. In fact, as Sindima (1995, p.139) pointed out, “one of Tempels’s main reasons for writing Bantu ontology was the desire to show the closeness between the Bantu and the Christian worlds”. It may be true that Tempels opted for the notion of force because it was currently used by the Baluba, as he affirms. But as already pointed out earlier in a footnote, it may equally be possible that Tempels was referring to Bergson’s notion of “élan vital”, that is, “the within” of things underlying the process of evolution.

I would like to conclude the debate on *ntu*, being and force by noting the following three points which Tshamelenga makes.

1. One cannot conclude that, because the Baluba, whom Tempels studied pay a great deal of attention to the reality of force, that force is being.
2. Ontology cannot be constituted on the basis of its external signs. The identification of the Bantu notion of force with the Western notion of being does not make sense. In effect, in the Bantu tradition the concept of force should be understood and defined in its relationships with other concepts, while in the West, being is a notion transcending all determinations and opposing nothingness.
3. The equivalence established between force and being should be considered as a simulacrum since it is unthinkable without the Western conceptual instruments Tempels used (Tshamelenga, 1981, p.179).

As far as the notion of God is concerned, Kagame argues that, although God is an existent, God exists in a mode different from that of *ntu*. For Kagame, as I have already noted, the essential characteristic of *ntu* is to act and be acted on. This constitutes their mode of being. God does not have this characteristic. God transcends everything as the absolute and is the habitual source of all activity in *ntu* (see Masolo, 1994, p.92).
Kagame shares his idea with Mulago who argues that being is fundamentally one and all beings are ontologically attached together. Above the hierarchy, is the transcendent being, God: Nyamuzinda, the beginning and end of all life; and Imana, the spiritual being that is source of all life. Between God and humans are intermediaries, all ascendants, the ancestors, the dead, and the disincarnated souls. Below human beings are other beings which, basically, are only means placed at the disposition of humans to develop their being and life (Mulago, 1965, p. 155). In other words, the *ntu* is a sign of universal similitude; its presence in beings brings them to life, and attests to both their individual value and the measure of their integration in the dialectics of vital energy. *Ntu* is both a unifying and differentiating vital norm which explains the powers of vital inequality. Mulago’s worry about whether the four categories are comprehensive is important. It is a worry which consists in making sure that, in the universal community, nothing is excluded or forgotten, especially the necessary being (God) which gives meaning to the contingent ones.

According to Mujyinya (1972), God is the origin and meaning of *ntu*, but is beyond *ntu*. God is not a *ntu* but a causal and eternal being. That is why the Bantu people call God, Iyakare (initial one), Iyambere (pre-existing one), Rugira (efficient one), and Rurema (the creator).

It is not clear why most of these African philosophers who were schooled in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy did not refer to God as a necessary being who causes contingent beings. The reference to the necessary being in the Aristotelian-Thomistic way could have led them to consider God as a *ntu*. The only African philosopher who conceived God as a *ntu* is Tshiamalenga. Tshiamalenga (1973) argued that God is a *ntu* and even a *muntu*. His point is understandable since, in certain Bantu languages, God is conceived of as a *mu-ntu*. In the Zulu language, for instance, God is Nkurunkuru which means elder, lord, and authority. In most languages in Central African region such as Kirundi, Mashi, Kinyarwanda, and Kihaya *umukuru* means elder or authority.

It is not easy to take a clear position in this debate about God. It is an ongoing debate in so far as the issue of God is one of the philosophical problems without a final answer. That God is a *ntu*, it might not be denied. It is a *ntu* par excellence since other beings cannot have their being or any activity without it. If God is not included in the four Bantu categories, it is because the Bantu people seem to be aware that God is the being which transcends and causes the four other categories of being. From this point of view I concur with Kagame and Mulago who
argue that God is above the hierarchy of *ntu* and transcends everything. They both express differently Mujjinya’s claim that God is the origin and meaning of *ntu*. God communicates to *ntu* what God has, namely being. As the disciples of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas would argue, all other beings, apart from God, are beings by participation, that is, caused to be. Tshiamalenga’s view that God is a *muntu* seems to be borrowed from the biblical idea that God created human beings in God’s image and likeness. In turn, human beings in their quest for the foundation of their being tend to conceive God in their own image and likeness so that God has a place in their universe. Tshiamalenga’s view of God could be rightly understood against this background. The point being made is that, although God is not included in the four Bantu categories, God has a place in the Bantu universe as the origin, the foundation, and the ultimate explanation of everything that exists.

So with the idea of God included, one can now talk of the universal community or cosmic unity as Mkhize calls it. A holistic conception of life, cosmic unity entails a connection between God, ancestors, animals, plants and inanimate objects, and everything that is created (Mkhize, 2008, p.38). Masolo reflects Senghor’s view of the universal unity in the following words:

> It is the way he feels and thinks in union not only with other people around him but ‘indeed with all other beings in the universe: God, animal, tree, pebble’. […] negritude is the naturalness with which Africans embrace and participates in nature rather than relating it cognitively from distance. In Africa, the communitarian habits are not acquired but they are part of the African way of experiencing being (Masolo, 2006, p.489-90).

What one can conclude from the above discussion so far is that things exist together and manifest aspects of relationship beyond their individuality. This leads to the conclusion that, in the African value system, the world is a communion and not a collection of individual essences (Masolo 1994:59). So much for the *muntu* in the universal community of *ntu!* The next section considers the *muntu* in the universe of *bantu* (the plural of *muntu*).
3.3.2 The muntu in the universe of Bantu

Apart from being a member of the universal community of beings, the *muntu* is also a member of the human community. In Africa, the *muntu* is conceived of as part of the social web which incorporates other *Bantu*. These *Bantu* include human beings actually living (the present generation), human beings who are dead (the past generation), and human beings who are not yet born (the future generation).

![Figure 3-2: The structure of the Bantu human community](image)

This sense of community which is not limited to those living is peculiar to the African way of life. In Kwesi Dickson’s words, this all-inclusive human community is a characteristic mark that defines African-ness (Kwesi, 1977).

In his *Bantu Philosophy*, Tempels (1959) affirmed that the Bantu psychology cannot conceive of a human being as an entity existing by itself apart from its ontological relationship with other living beings. Jommo Kenyatta (1965) argued that nobody is an isolated individual (as contrasted with the liberal belief and value system) and that the uniqueness is a secondary fact about the individual (as contrasted with the Latin America belief and value system). This is derived from the fact that the individual is a relative of several people and contemporaries. Mbiti (1968) adds another aspect and argues that whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. From this, Mbiti derived his principle: “I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am”.

- 86 -
Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) argues that the community defines the person as a person, such that the notion of personhood is acquired and not merely granted as a consequence of birth. Tshamalenga (1985, see also Bidima, 1995, p.59) emphasises that the “we” (biso in lingala) is not a mere inter-subjectivity of the “I”. That is to say, the community in Africa does not result from a contract between people, but is ontologically derived.

This academic language of African scholars also builds upon what is already expressed in popular language. In South Africa, the sense of the community is expressed in the following popular Zulu and Xhosa saying: “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu”\(^{32}\) (a person depends on other people to be a person). In the Burundian culture, it is often said that the child does not belong to one family, emphasising that a child belongs to the village (umwana si uwumwe = a child does not belong to one family), or again, that people depend on one another (abantu ni magiriranire = people depend on one another).

The ontological primacy of the community in the African belief and value system, may lead one to believe that the individual is swallowed up by the community to the extent that individuals cannot have a responsibility of their own, a freedom of their own. Gyekye (1997) felt uncomfortable with the seeming radicality of the African sense of community and asked himself whether a moderate perspective of the African community could be envisaged. In fact, his book, Tradition and Modernity is an effort to substantiate such a moderate position with the aim of finding a ground upon which political and economic liberalism could be based in Africa.

The African belief and value system naturally accommodates both the individual as well as the community as ontologically interdependent yet without reducing the ontological density and the primacy of the community. To make clear this point I shall distinguish between the human being as a being-with/in-self (umuntu-w’-ubuntu) and a being-with/in-others (umuntu-mu-bantu).

---

\(^{32}\) This saying is also found in other languages such as Sesotho (Motho ke motho ka batho), in Kirundi and Kinyarwanda (Umuntu ni umuntu mu Bantu).
3.3.2.1 The African conception of the human being as *umuntu-w’ubuntu*

I have just shown the African conception of the human being as part of the universal community of *ntu* (beings). As it has been made clear, the characteristic feature of the human being is intelligence (*mu-ntu*). Ramose is right to define *umuntu* as the specific entity which continues to conduct an inquiry into being, experience, knowledge and truth (Ramose, 2002, p.41).

Intelligence is the faculty by which the *muntu* acts and interacts with other *ntu* in the universe. It is the faculty by which the *muntu* judges, appreciates, relates to and harmonises with, other beings in the world. The failure to act intelligently, or rather in a way that safeguards harmony in nature disqualifies the ontological identity of the *muntu*. The Burundians say of the *bantu* who have lost their ontological identity: *Barabaye ibikoko ntibakiri abantu* (these people have become animals and are no longer human beings).

According to Kagame there are two essential principles that underlie the ethical behaviour in the Bantu belief and value system. The first principle is based on the internal finality of the human act of the *muntu*, that is, the ultimate purpose that gives meaning to the moral acts of the *muntu* in the community. This principle brings two dimensions of the human being together: the dimension of knowing (intelligence) and the dimension of loving (will). The classical philosophy lays emphasis on knowing:

> [...] to know beings surrounding us in order to discern what is good and what is not good for us... we have to know and love the Pre-existing One who made possible these things so [that] we can know and love them” (Kagame cited by Mudimbe, 1988, p.150).

Bantu philosophy emphasises the dimension of loving to the extent that love commands knowing. It is an obligation or a duty for the Bantu to know their relatives. The reason for this emphasis is that love serves as the cement that ties and strengthens the relationships between the members of the family, the tribe, the clan and the community in general. Thus, for the Bantu, it is important to protect and perpetuate the lineage or the tribe in particular and the human community in general. Thus *ubuntu* of the *umuntu* (*ubuntu bw’umuntu*), that is, the

---

33 I could also refer to Heiddeger who argues that the best place to start the study of Being is the human being (dasein) because, the human being is the only being that asks the question of being. “The entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its being we shall denote by the term ‘Dasein’ (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 32ff).
humanity of the human being, is assessed in terms of what a person can do and be for other people to enhance their life.

The second principle is that the Bantu, in fact the African community defines itself mostly through blood filiations. The community is upheld and stands as a natural and social body. It defines how individuals in the nuclear or extended family, clan or tribe should behave in relation to one another, as well as the rights and obligations of each in the community. It infers from the authority of its being and its history the laws that regulate people’s lives. However, *ubuntu* of the *muntu* is not actually based on juridical laws for two reasons. First, the juridical laws do not bind the individual in conscience. Secondly, whoever can escape these laws could be regarded as intelligent. Nevertheless, that people could avoid legal responsibilities does not mean that they are regarded as moral; just as abiding by the juridical law does not make people necessarily moral. The *ubuntu* of the *muntu* is rooted in the taboo-laws which have a religious nature. These laws contain in themselves an immanent power of sanction. God and the ancestors are the sole judge. Thus, if a taboo-law is transgressed, its resolution lies between the transgressor and God on the one hand, and between his existing family on earth and the departed ancestors (Mudimbe, 1988, p.150).

The ultimate meaning of all this is that *umuntu-w’ubuntu* cannot be satisfied solely with the practical matters of the present through tricks and calculations. The primary role of intelligence is to connect people to their true selves as human beings to the extent that they can now feel obligated to be in harmonious relations in the community of both the visible world and the invisible one.

When I talk of the *umuntu-w’ubuntu*, I refer to the human person as one is in oneself, that is, one’s (moral) constancy in relation to one’s (ontological) identity. I may compare this with Paul Ricoeur’s concepts of *idem* (the same) and *ipse* (the self, of the self, or by the self) which are unified in that of self-constancy:

Self-constancy is for each person that manner of conducting himself or herself so that others can count on that person. Because someone is counting on me, I am accountable for my actions before another. The term responsibility unites both meaning; counting on and being accountable for. It unites them, adding to them the idea of a response to the question ‘Where are you?’ asked by another
who needs me. This response is the following: ‘Here I am!’ [...] (Ricoeur, 1992, p.165).

There is a great deal of moral baggage that goes with this outlook. This baggage revolves around the value of human-ty or human-ness (ubuntu), hence umuntu-w’-ubuntu. Literally, Umuntu-w’-ubuntu refers to a person of humanity, a person of harmony, integrity, equity and one who is respectful of the world of the humans and of things. It is a human person as one realises oneself as an individual person in one’s universe which includes one’s guiding principles, cherished values, innovating and constructive choices, self-determination, self-realisation in harmony with others. Senghor says it differently:

The member of the community society [...] claims his autonomy to affirm himself as a being. But he feels, he thinks that he can develop his potential, his originality, only in and by the society, in union with all other men – indeed, with all other beings in the universe: God, animal, tree, or pebble (Senghor, 1964, p.94).

The worry that the African sense of the community could be an impediment to the individual’s rights and responsibility, and that individuals could shift their responsibility to the community finds its response at this level. The aim of the community is to safeguard humanity in the individual and, on the other hand, the permanent concern of the individual is how humanity can be safeguarded in the community. Ramose (2002, p.42) rightly interprets umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu as follows: “to be a human being is to affirm one’s humanity by recognising the humanity of others”. Umuntu-w’-ubuntu affirms her/his own humanity by recognising the humanity of others. This leads me to the second aspect of the human being which is considered below.

3.3.2.2 The African conception of the human being as umuntu-mu-bantu

While umuntu-w’ubuntu refers to the human being as one conceives of oneself as an individual, umuntu-mu-bantu (being-with/in-community) refers to a human being as an community being, the human being as socially constituted. In the conception of the African,
the plenitude of humanness cannot fully be achieved outside the community. This belief has a deeper root in the whole of the communal conception of the human being. An individual is born into an existing human society, into the human culture. The fact that the individual is born into an existing community suggests that a human being is a communal being by nature. The human being does not choose voluntarily to enter a human community; the community life is not optional for the individual. The individual cannot make optional the community without, at the same time, doing injustice to the ubuntu characteristic of one’s individuality. Hence the concept of umuntu-mu-bantu.

Umuntu-mu-bantu, is a human person who recognises her/his situation among others as a moral necessity. In the Burundian culture, people say of a person who has no moral engagement towards the community: “Yarafpuye agenda” (= That person is dead alive). The meaning of this is that such person is dead although s/he is apparently alive, such person has lost what makes her umuntu. In other words, people’s disconnection from the community deprives them from their humanness (ubuntu). The Bavenda have another way of expressing this: muthu u bebelwa munwe, which Mkhize interprets as “To be is to belong and to participate, it is to be bone for the other” (Mkhize, 2008, p.40). Karenga translates communal relationality as follows:

[… ] a person is her character; or more definitively she is her practice-in-relationship as a result of her character. The motivation here, then, is not to enhance individualism or define and project individual rights, but to define relational obligations, the honouring of which gives one both her identity and sense of worth (Karenga, 2004, p.254).

Thus umuntu-mu-bantu refers to people as they realise themselves in the universe of other people, including their guiding principles, the values they cherish, their view of the world, and their dynamics in their universe. Bénézet Bujo puts it as follows:

34 For the following, I am indebted to Kwame Gyekye whose book Tradition and Modernity is very insightful. However, this does not mean that I share his view of African communitarianism. In the end, Gyekye seems to develop a passive view of the African community, and does not face the issue of whether the African belief and value system has something to offer.
Without a communitarian relationship there is no identity for the African person. Only together with others can one become a human person and achieve individual freedom, which again should be exercised in a communitarian manner (Bujo, 1998, p.148).

It is, therefore, only in relation with the community that the identity of the individual is substantiated. This dynamic interaction between the individual and the community is best seen in the whole process of initiation observed in most of the African cultures. One of the major objectives of initiation is to teach those who are being initiated how to interact with the natural environment and the human community (cf. Ogunbgemi, 1997; Tangwa, 2006). But above all, initiation is geared to help those being initiated to learn self-organisation and mutual challenge which involves, first of all, locating the talents and the potential abilities of each one outside the authorities of the village, of parents, etc. It is on the ground of these talents and potential abilities displayed by the individual that each one is given a role or responsibility in the group, and later on in the society as a whole. Manu Ampim (2008) points out that the rite of passage to adulthood is to ensure the shaping of productive, community-orientated and responsible adults. This observation is supported by Masila Mutisya (1996) who argues that in the initiation to adulthood, one learns the rules of the society, the responsibility of obeying these rules, of self-respect, and the respect for others. According to Ezekwona:

The availability of others in the community gives the individual the opportunity to use his reason and to allow his reason to be challenged. Therefore, the community should not be seen as swallowing the individual, instead it helps the individual and gives the individual a forum within which to manifest himself. It is when one is with others that he can think and then in the process his thinking can have a meaning (Ezekwonna, 2005, p.67).

Perhaps the best platform where Ezekwonna’s observation can be perceived in practice is the search of consensus in the process of decision-making on certain matters. On this platform, people can speak their mind and can challenge one another at length until a common ground is reached. When the consensus is reached, the decision of others is mine, and my decision is theirs insofar as it is the outcome of my reason and our reasoning (Wiredu, 1996, p.186; Deng, 1998, p. 159; Nürnberger, 2007, p. 194).
Some scholars such as Shutte (1993) and even Menkiti (1984) interpret this interaction between the individual and the community as if they want to safeguard the ontological primacy of the community to the detriment of the individual. Shutte interprets *umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu* to mean that the African personhood is an “outside thing” which the community empowers and inculcates (Shutte, 1993, 2001):

> European culture has taught us to see the self as something private, hidden within\(^{35}\) our bodies. (...) The African image is different: the self is outside\(^{36}\), present and open to all. This is because the self is the result and expression of all the forces acting upon us. (...) So we must learn to see ourselves as outside, in our appearance, our acts and our relationships, and in the environment that surrounds us. If we can see ourselves in this way we will have grasped the key insight in the African idea of persons: persons exist only in relation to other persons. The human self is not something that first exists on its own and then enters into relation with its surroundings. It only exists in relationship with its surroundings; these relationships are what it is. And the most important of these are relationships we have with other persons. This is why, in all African languages, there is the local variant of the Zulu saying *umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu* – a person is a person through other persons (Shutte, 2001, pp. 22-23).

In this quotation, Shutte is making two claims. The first claim is that, contrary to European personhood which is “within” and self-given, African personhood is an outside thing. This claim safeguards the individuals, their freedom and sovereignty in Western culture on the one hand, and the priority of the community on the individual in the African context on the other hand. The problem does not lay in this distinction between the individual in the Western culture and the individual in the African culture. The problem is the second claim in which Shutte articulates the genetic link between the community and the individual in the African culture. Shutte claims that, in African culture, personhood is “outside” and is given to the individual the same way one can give a colour to an object. Such a claim dilutes the ontological dynamic relation between the individual and the community; and so undermines

---

\(^{35}\) Italics in the original  
\(^{36}\) Italics in the original
the idea of *umuntu-w’ubuntu*, people as they are in themselves, their ontological identity, and moral constancy.

Shutte’s interpretation of the link between the individual and the community is similar to that of Menkiti (1984, 2006). Menkiti’s conception of the individual in the community is built on the following statements:

1. […] it is the community which defines the person as a person, not some isolated state quality of rationality, will or memory.
2. […] personhood is something which has to be achieved, and is not given simply because one is born of human seed,
3. […] the notion of personhood is acquired (Menkiti, 1984, pp. 172&174).

The three statements emphasise practically the same thing: the ontological primacy of the community. The importance of the community is emphasised to the point that, without the community, the individual is simply a “thing”; in Menkiti’s own words, an “it” which, through “an ontological progression” that the community imparts unfolds into a person (Menkiti, 1984, pp.173-174; 2006, p.325). This view is erroneous and misleading. In effect, Menkiti does not account for the fact that, first of all, the ontological identity of the *mu-ntu* in the universe of beings (ntu) is based on intelligence. The *mu-ntu* is a being which acts with intelligence. It is intelligence that allows the *ba-ntu* to live in mutual relationships and harmony with other *ba-ntu* in the community and in the universe. The community has to safeguard this ontological order. In the same way Wiredu and Gyekye have dismissed Menkiti’s point as unacceptable:

A human person is a person whatever his age or social status. Personhood may reach its full realization in community, but it is not acquired or yet to be achieved as one goes along in society. What a person acquires are status, habits, and personality or character traits: he, *qua* person, thus becomes the *subject* of the acquisition, and being thus prior to the acquisition process, he cannot be defined by what he acquires. One is a person because of what he is, not because of what he has acquired (Wiredu & Gyekye, 1992, p.108)
Umuntu-mu-bantu is ontologically derived from the community. A person is recognized as a person by others through the way one enhances them by one’s creativity, initiative, and innovation, dynamics in one’s universe, one’s self-determination and realisation, as well as one’s care and respect for oneself and for others (cf. Nyerere, 1968, p.107).

Such belief and value system is present not only among the Bantu people as a linguistic group, but also throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. In the next section, I shall try to give an overview of the attempts made by the African fathers of independence to use this African belief and value system to argue for an African socialism. What lies beneath this overview is the following question: If the African belief and value system has been used to justify and mobilise Africans behind the choice of socialism in Africa, to what extent can it serve as a foundation for strategies of economic development? I will first consider the concept of African socialism in order to see where it differs from classical socialism. In the second point, I will consider four representatives of African socialism, namely, Senghor and Nkrumah in West Africa, Nyerere in East-central Africa and Kaunda in Southern Africa. Thirdly I will assess African socialism and its link with African communalism, and then conclude.

3.4 Attempts to validate the African sense of community: African socialism

The African idea of the community has particularly attracted the attention of the leaders and thinkers of Africa’s independence era. For them the ideology of socialism resonated with the African belief and the value of the community. In other words, the fathers of Africa’s independence endorsed socialism as the favourite ideology that resonates with African realities and that would guide the social, political and economic policies of Africa. According to Bahru Zewde,

[…] the socialist objective of ending exploitation of man by man fitted in with the strategic objective of ending colonial rule […]. Capitalism had represented the springboard which propelled the colonialist powers towards the partition of colonisation of Africa at the end of nineteenth century. […] Socialist thinking permeated the ideology of liberation […] (Zewde, 2003, p.2).
The major champions of socialism in Africa include Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Sedar Senghor in Senegal, Kenneth Kaunda, and Sekou Touré in Guinea. For these political leaders and thinkers, socialism was central and a key concept in their thought as well as their socio-political practice.

However, these African leaders and thinkers argued that the kind of socialism which would lead policies in Africa was not the Western socialism underlined by the Marxian philosophy. Thus they talked of “African socialism”. The “African-ness” of African socialism was differently expressed. Nyerere talked of *ujamaa* (African brotherhood or familyhood), Senghor talked of negritude (emphasising African cultural identity), Kaunda talked of humanism, implying the centrality of human beings in African thought and practice, Nkrumah talked of African personality, while Sekou Touré talked of communocracy. What all of them tried to put across is that African socialism is foreshadowed in the traditional socio-economic thought and practice, and that the African traditional system is entirely communal. Thus, for them, to adopt the ideology of socialism was to claim back the African identity (Gyekye, 1997, p.144).

The concept of “African socialism” created confusion among socialist thinkers. In effect, originally, socialism was not associated with any communal society. In Marxist thought, socialism is associated with such concept as “class” and “proletariat”. Secondly, so far, in Marxist thought, there were no “socialisms”, but rather, one and only one “socialism”, namely, scientific socialism which was thought to be universally valid and applicable. Even among African socialists themselves, this confusion was apparent. For instance, Nkrumah (cited in the *Ghanaian Times*, December 1965) who hitherto had defended African socialism, affirmed that “there is only one Socialism – scientific Socialism” and “our Socialist ideology is the application of the principles of scientific Socialism to our African social milieu” (Nkrumah cited in *The Worker*, May 1965).

Thus “African socialism” needed to be defined. In Kenya’s government occasional papers in 1965, one of the presenters defined African socialism as follows:

In “African socialism”, the word “African” is meant to convey the African roots of a system that is itself African in its characteristics. African socialism is a term describing an African political and economic system that is positively
African, not being imported from any country or being a blue print of any foreign ideology (Kenya’s Ministry of Information, 1965, p.2).

Bede Onuoha talks of African socialism as follows:

It is beyond doubt that traditional African society was based on a profound socialist attitude of mind and governed by indigenous socialist rules, customs and institutions. But these were not the product of Marxist thinking. This is the justification of the attribute ‘African’ standing before the word ‘socialism’. It points to the originality of African socialism. African socialism is an expression of the desire of all Africans to find themselves, be themselves, and assert themselves (Onuoha, 1965, p.30).

According to Jidendra Mohan (1966, p.228), the definitions of African socialism make three affirmations: Africa’s originality, its distinctiveness, and its personality. Thus, African socialism was thought to differ from scientific socialism thought to be universal and a new stage in society. The proponents of the scientific socialism, including Nkrumah (at later stage), rejected the idea of African socialism on the grounds that scientific socialism has a universal validity and applicability. They argued that in the same way that there cannot be African mathematics, chemistry or biology, there cannot be African socialism. Thus, the African political leaders and thinkers should simply apply “orthodox” or doctrinaire socialism, instead of constructing their new kind of socialism. For instance, Popov (cited in Onuoha, 1965, p.109) complained in the following terms:

These imperialist circles hiding behind talk of “real African socialism” are attempting to castrate the class content of the proletarian struggle and to force the African working class to betray the principles of proletarian internationalism as well as to drag into the African working-class movement the narrow nationalist slogan that “all African are brothers”. However, this false bourgeois thesis will become less and less popular on the African continent.

According to Gyekye (1997, pp. 145-146), the argument of scientific socialists is plagued by two major flaws: Firstly, the analogy between natural sciences and socialism is false. Natural sciences are exact sciences and have a universal validity. Socialism as a social theory may not
necessarily have a universal validity and applicability. Scientific truth *qua* scientific truth transcends cultural and social frontiers. On the contrary, a social theory is constructed out of a particular social and historical milieu and may therefore not have an immediate universal appeal or validity.

Secondly, for Gyekye, the argument of scientific socialists implies a rejection of a basic Marxist premise. By “materialism”, Marx meant that, the construct of a socialist theory must start with the real people and the real conditions of their life, that is, the material existence of people. The scientific socialists’ rejection of the idea of African socialism assumes wrongly that the real existential conditions of people in the mid-nineteenth century Europe and those of Africans in the mid-twentieth century Africa are the same. This argument was also put forward by Senghor (1964, p. 69ff) and Nyerere (1968).

According to Gyekye, by stressing African conditions and historical experiences, and thus starting off with what, according to Marx, one should start off with (the real conditions of the real man), African political thinkers were clearly taking their clue from Marx. Perhaps it is here that the idea of “African socialism” could make sense. Marx’s grid of analysis of society could be used at a different time (mid-twentieth century) and in a different social milieu (Africa). This would lead not to the scientific socialism which is thought to be universal, but to a contextual socialism; hence African socialism.

The problem, though, lies with those who seem to talk of African socialism as if there can be African socialism without Marxism, the same way one can talk of Marx without Marxism. Certain African scholars maintained that African socialism is but an attempt to recapture and modernise the communal way of life practised by Africans before the encounter with Europeans. The point is that the matrix of African socialism is the communitarian nature of the African society. There are many figures of African socialism of which I already mentioned five. All of them will not be treated in this dissertation. I shall consider four of them who are particularly highlighted in African philosophy, namely, Senghor and Nkrumah in Western Africa, Nyerere and Kaunda in East-central and Southern Africa respectively.
3.4.1 Leopold Sedar Senghor

Senghor was born in Senegal in 1906 and is well known as a poet, a cultural theorist and a politician who led his country as a president from 1960 to 1980. His knowledge and skills in poetry and nourished interest in literature won him a seat in the French Academy from 1983 to 2001. Senghor is well known for the idea of negritude which he drew on to substantiate his thought of African Socialism as an African alternative to Marxism.

For Senghor, African socialism is part of African humanism, and African humanism is a function of Africa’s negritude. The foundation of both African humanism and negritude is the nature of African society. The negro-African society is communal because it is more a communion of souls than an aggregate of individuals. Senghor (1964, pp.69-72) rejects scientific socialism for three reasons which are interconnected.

The first reason is that the knowledge of Marx and Engels, who are the fathers of scientific socialism, was conditioned by their era, “by the rather limited progress of science and philosophy. Marx and Engels could not foresee wave mechanics, quantum theory, or relativity.” (Senghor, 1964, p.69)

The second reason is the new theory of knowledge. Senghor argues that those scientific revolutions (relativity, wave mechanics, quantum theory, and para-Euclidian geometry) as well as new philosophical revolutions such as phenomenology, existentialism, and Teilhardism led to a new theory of knowledge in the first half of the twentieth century. The dialectic method which Marx and Engels used dates back to Heraclitus, and therefore is not new. Although they tried to rationalise it and to apply it to concrete facts, the European dialectics remains abstract and deterministic. In the new method of knowledge, reality which, hitherto, appeared to be continuous and determined appears now to be discontinuous and undetermined. To gain access to the undetermined and discontinuous requires one’s contact, participation and communion with the object being known. This could hardly be achieved by the traditional method of knowing in which the knower distances himself from the known. For Senghor the new method

---

37 Senghor is referring to Gaëtan Picon’s Panorama des idées contemporaines (1946). The point he wants to make is that the African way of life which consists in the communion of souls applies also in the African epistemology. To know reality is not to separate oneself from it and keep it at a distance but rather to participate in it, “to touch it”, “to penetrate it from inside”, “to finger it”. Drawing on Picon’s idea that “To grasp the meaning of a human fact is to grasp it in itself and in oneself”, Senghor argues that “To know a human fact, psychological or social, no longer means to investigate it with the aid of statistics and graphs, but to live it” (Senghor, 1964, p.71).
of knowledge is similar to the African approach to know reality. And this leads him to his third reason for rejecting scientific socialism.

The third reason is that the Negro-African’s method of knowing is by confrontation and intuition. Senghor describes it thus:

In contrast to the classic European, the Negro African does not draw a line between himself and the object; he does not hold it at distance, nor does he merely look at it and analyse it. After holding it at a distance, after scanning it without analysing it, he takes it vibrant in his hands, careful not to kill it or fix it. He touches it, feels it, and smells it (Senghor, 1964, p.72).

According to Senghor, this method of knowing by touch reveals the communitarian nature of the African society where everything holds together:

The Negro-African sympathizes (sym-pathises: feels with), abandons his personality to become identified with the Other\(^{38}\), dies to be reborn in the Other. He does not assimilate; he is assimilated. He lives a common life with the Other; he lives in symbiosis (Senghor, 1964, p.72-3).

For Senghor, even reason has a communitarian character. In his response to those who criticised him for reducing Negro-African knowledge to pure emotion, and denying that there is an African reason, Senghor argues that the Negro-African reason is not the reasoning-eye of Europe, rather it is the reason of the touch, the reasoning-embrace, the sympathetic reason, more closely related to the Greek logos than the Latin ratio\(^{39}\).

In the development of his version of African socialism, Senghor relied on Teilhard de Chardin. He regards De Chardin’s *Phenomenon of Man* as a continuation as well as an improvement of Engels’ *Dialectics of Nature*. He argues that, in the De Chardin’s process of socialisation, African socialism becomes the technical and spiritual organisation of human society by the intelligence and the heart. In its materialistic approach, scientific socialism relies on the intelligence without the heart. He writes:

\(^{38}\) The upper case is in the original text of Senghor.

\(^{39}\) Italics as in the original text.
[...] from scientific socialism we have rejected atheism and violence, which are fundamentally contrary to our genius, but we have accepted research and technology, which we have been without because we have neglected them. We have especially developed co-operation, not collectivist but communal. For co-operation, in family, village, tribe has always been held in honour in Africa, not in its collectivist form as an aggregate of individuals, but in its communal form as con-spiracy from centre to centre, of hearts. You will recognize this as Teilhard de Chardin’s union, which makes one mind and one soul (Senghor, 1964, p.146).

It is obvious that Senghor develops his African version of socialism, or better, African socialism by drawing on the communitarian nature of the African society as well as the values that flow from it: cooperation, communion, family, and solidarity which constitute the ontological density of the muntu. Yet it would be difficult to know whether, for Senghor or any other African socialist, it would have been possible to think of African socialism without Marx and/or Marxism. The genius of Senghor seems to lie in his discovery of the fact what is important is not Marxism but Marx’s methodological contributions. Senghor used these contributions to validate what Africans believe and value in terms of a political ideology, much less in terms of economic development. As Wiredu would argue, for Senghor as for the other fathers of Africa’s independence, the question that seemed to be urgent was rather:

What form of government or social organisation is best suited to the requirement of [...] the restoration of the cultural identity which colonialism has eroded (Wiredu, 1996, p.145).

Whatever case may be, Senghor’s argument follows the definitive framework in which the muntu is ontologically part of the universe of ntu as well as ontologically part of the human community.

I shall now consider another political thinker who tried to ground his political ideology in the communitarian nature of the muntu, namely, Kwame Nkrumah.
3.4.2 Kwame Nkrumah

Nkrumah was born in 1905 in Ghana, a country which he led to independence in 1957 and where he served as president till 1966 following a military coup. Nkrumah was also one of fathers of Pan-African movement and played an influential role in the foundation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Although, he did his graduate studies in the United States, Nkrumah was interested by the literature of socialism, especially Marx and Lenin. He believed that (African) socialism is respectful of African beliefs and values and leads to cooperative and egalitarian society.

Nkrumah distinguished between two kinds of socialism. The first kind of socialism is that which develops out of a non-communalistic society. He argued that “the passage from a non-communalistic society to socialism is a revolution which is guided by the principles underlying Communism” (Nkrumah, 1972, p. 258). As he indicates in his autobiography, Nkrumah arrived at this kind of socialism thanks to his extensive and interested reading of Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mazzini, but in particular, his reading of Marx and Lenin. For Nkrumah, the philosophy of these two impressed him to the extent that he thought that it could help him to solve the whole colonial question and the problem of imperialism.

The second kind of socialism is that which develops out of communalistic societies as is the case in Africa. For Nkrumah, because of the continuity of communalism with socialism, in communalistic societies, socialism is not a revolutionary creed, but a restatement in contemporary idiom of the principles underlying communalism (Nkrumah, 1972, p.258). Nkrumah arrived at this kind of socialism thanks to his background in African culture which is communalistic. He argues that there is a natural continuity between communalism and socialism:

If one seeks the socio-political ancestor of socialism, one must go to communalism…. In socialism, the principles underlying communalism are given expression in modern circumstances (Nkrumah, 1972, p.257).

Obviously, Nkrumah was in favour of the second kind of socialism, which is linked with communalism. For Nkrumah, this is the only natural and viable option as far as Africa is concerned. Nkrumah believed that “capitalism might prove too complicated a system for the
newly independent country” (Nkrumah, 1972, p.256). He argued that “the presuppositions and purposes of capitalism are contrary to those of African society” to such an extent that “Capitalism would be a betrayal of the personality and conscience of Africa” (Nkrumah, 1972, p.258). Thus, with his belief in the continuity between communalism and socialism, as well as the communitarian conscience and personality of Africans, Nkrumah built his case for African socialism.

However, later Nkrumah rejected African socialism to embrace scientific socialism both in theory and practice as can be noted in the following:

Concepts like African socialism, pragmatic socialism, traditional African socialism, Arab socialism, etc., will have to be analyzed and carefully explained so as not to confuse African people as to the real meaning of socialism and the correct way to set about achieving it. Here we have had to wage an unflinching battle for the general acceptance of the principles of scientific socialism. Socialism, in its principles, is a science (Nkrumah, 1964 [November]).

It is not clear when Nkrumah distanced himself from African socialism in favour of scientific socialism. It is not the purpose of this discussion to consider the history of Nkrumah’s socialist thought. Suffice it to note that prior to his publication of Consciencism in 1964, he was reported to have stated that he was behind the organisation of the left wing of the Convention People’s Party (CPP) and its ideological struggle to propagate scientific socialism (Nkrumah, 1962a, 1962b). Furthermore, according to John McClendon (2003), in his address at the First Seminar at the Winneba Ideological School in 1962, Nkrumah pronounced the Marxist character of his conception of socialism. Finally, in 1961, Nkrumah founded the journal The Spark which propagated scientific socialism in Ghana. If such were the case, the defence of African socialism in Consciencism might have served only as a philosophical or a theoretical guide for his ideological campaign (McClendon, 2003).

Although it is quite striking, McClendon’s interpretation seems to be limited and de façade. According to Hountondji (1996, p.145), before writing Consciencism, Nkrumah claimed to be committed to socialism. This is obvious in article 8 of the 1949-draft of the political programme of CPP which was adopted in 1951. This article states that the aim of the party is the founding of a socialist state in which all men and women have equal opportunity, and
where there would be no capitalist exploitation. For Hountondji, *Consciencism* is an attempt to justify this long-standing commitment. Furthermore, Hountondji made clear an aspect that is not often perceived by the readers of African political leaders and thinkers. He sees Nkrumah’s 1964 essay as an answer to a classic objection in which it is argued that by adopting socialism, Africa would be delivering herself to an imported ideology and betraying her original civilisation. In *Consciencism*, Nkrumah’s objective was:

[...] to link socialism with the purest African tradition by showing that socialism, far from being a betrayal of this tradition would actually be its best possible translation into modern idiom (Hountondji, 1996, p.146).

This fits with Nkrumah’s argument of the continuity between socialism and communalism. However, in moving away from African socialism in favour of scientific socialism, and hence embracing what was supposed to be avoided – submitting to an imported ideology and betraying Africa’s original civilisation, Nkrumah seems to have been prompted by new developments or realities in African politics. As Nkrumah described it in the fifth revised edition of *Consciencism* (1970), the period of independence and post-independence (in the 1960s) was characterised by armed struggles which were recurrent in Africa, military coups of which Nkrumah himself was a victim, the links between the interests of neo-colonialism and African indigenous bourgeoisie, and also the open conflict between pro-capitalists and the pro-socialists at national and international level. Thus while, in the first edition of *Consciencism*, he talks of the continuity between communalism and socialism in terms of reform, in the later edition, he refers to revolution as can be observed in the following quote:

[...] because the spirit of communalism still exists to some extent in societies with a communalist past, socialism and communism are not, in a strict sense of the word, ‘revolutionary’ creeds (Nkrumah, 1970, p. 74).

As can be observed in the above quote, Nkrumah sees the necessity of a “revolution” as a passage to socialism. However, Nkrumah is moderate in his suggestion of revolution: Revolution should not be taken in “a strict sense”, but in broad sense. Nkrumah saw socialism and communism as revolutionary creeds in the broad sense. His moderate perspective is premised on the belief that “the spirit of communalism still exists in Africa to some extent”. The phrase “to some extent” suggests that Nkrumah believes that in today’s African society,
communalism belongs to the past, and now survives only as a memory (Hountondji, 1996, p.145). It is this belief that might have led Nkrumah to his choice of scientific socialism in Africa.

To conclude, one has an impression that Nkrumah evolved from a thick to a thin perception of what African believe and value. He sought to validate African beliefs and values in terms of a political ideology of socialism, but failed to genuinely translate them in terms of economic development. Like in the case of Senghor, the attention was more on a form of government or social organisation that would help in the restoration of African cultural identity eroded by colonialism.

I will now consider two other figures of African socialism in eastern-central and Southern Africa, namely Nyerere in Tanzania and Kaunda in Zambia respectively.

3.4.3 Julius Nyerere

Nyerere was born in 1922 in Tanzania, a country he ruled, first as a Prime Minister from 1960 to 1961, and as a president from 1962 to 1985. During his studies of history and economics at the University of Edinburgh, he was influenced by the Fabian thinking of the British Intellectual Socialist Movement (Fabian Society) which aimed to promote the principles of social democracy gradually without using revolutionary means. Nyerere tried to link socialism to the African communal way of life. However, what is specific to him is his claim that socialism is an attitude of the mind as well as his notion of *ujamaa* (familyhood) as the basis for African socialism. He believed that the Africa’s sense of mutual responsibility could be extended to the nation and even to the whole world:

The foundation, and the objective, of African socialism is the extended family. The true African socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethren and another as his natural enemies. He does not form an alliance with brethren for the extermination of the non-brethren. He rather regards all men as his brethren – as members of his extended family [...] ‘Ujamaa’, then, or ‘Familyhood’, describes our socialism (Nyerere, 1968, pp.11-12).
For Nyerere, the characteristics of family relationships are care and compassion. Since the society is an extension of the basic family, the care and compassion perceived among the members of the family find similar expression in the sensitive attitudes members of the wider society have towards the needs of other members. It is on this ground that one can understand the interaction between the individual and the community:

In our traditional African society, we were individuals within the community. We took care of the community, and the community took care of us (Nyerere, 1968, pp.6-7).

Thus, Nyerere defines traditional “African socialism”:

Both the rich and poor individuals were completely secure in African society. Natural catastrophe brought famine, but it brought famine- ‘poor’ or ‘rich’. Nobody starved, either of food or human dignity, because he lacked personal wealth; he could depend on the wealth possessed by the community of which he was a member. That was socialism. This is socialism (Nyerere, 1968, pp. 3-4).

Sharing is another characteristic of *ujamaa* as a basis of African socialism. Sharing is the cement in the family, and the community at large. For Nyerere, to be a socialist is to put oneself in relation to one’s neighbour. This involves sharing out the goods in one’s possession. Commenting on Nyerere’s definition of socialism, Nkafu says:

African socialism, whose true realisation implies sharing and distribution of goods among all, consists in trust of belonging to a community and this total responsibility of the community towards its members (Nkafu, 1999, p. 52).

For Nyerere, because African Socialism developed out of the communitarian nature of the *muntu*, it differs from Western socialism. He puts it thus:

European socialism was born of the Agrarian Revolution and the Industrial Revolution which followed it. The former created the ‘landed’ and the ‘landless’ classes in society; the latter produced the modern capitalist and the industrial proletariat. These two revolutions planted the seeds of conflict within
the society, and not only was European socialism born of that conflict, but its apostles sanctified the conflict into a philosophy [...]. The European socialist cannot think of his socialism without its father- capitalism! [...] African socialism, on the other hand, did not have to ‘benefit’ of the Agrarian Revolution or the Industrial Revolution. It did not start from the existence of conflicting ‘classes’ in society [...]. The foundation of African socialism is the extended family (Nyerere, 1964, p.11).

Nyerere’s socialism has been praised as being the most pragmatic of all African socialisms insofar as its basic assumptions are spelt out in simple terms (Daggan & Civile, 1976; Mudimbe, 1988, 94-5). What I can infer so far, is that Nyerere built African socialism on the most concrete aspect of African communalism, brotherhood or familyhood. Although Nyerere did not gain any economic dividends from his thought, he nevertheless achieved national cohesion of Tanzanians and extended his political solidarity to most of the countries which were not yet independent. More precisely, like Senghor and Nkrumah in West Africa, Nyerere succeeded in using politically what Africans believe and value to justify and mobilise the Tanzanian people behind the choice of socialism in Africa. However, economic development has not followed with equal strength.

I shall now consider a fourth political thinker and leader, Kenneth Kaunda, in Zambia.

3.4.4 Kenneth Kaunda

Kaunda was born in 1924 in Zambia which he ruled as the first president right from the time of independence in 1964 to 1991. According to his biographer Collin Morris, he followed Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence which he enjoined upon his followers as well (Morris in Kaunda, 1966, p. 11). While Senghor, Nkrumah and Nyerere could easily take the label of “socialist”, Kaunda preferred to be called a humanist:

I suppose I could be called a humanist, though I have never had the leisure to read the standard works on the subject. I have a passionate belief in the worth and possibilities of man and I expect him some day to achieve perfection (Kaunda, 1966, p.19).
Kaunda’s humanism has a double foundation, namely, an African and a Christian foundation. For Kaunda, African humanism lies in its emphasis on “Human Relationships”\textsuperscript{40}, and this makes Africa “the last place where Man can still be Man” (Kaunda, 1966, p.22). Kaunda argues that in African humanism, relationships have two aspects. The first is the human relationship with Nature which he expresses thus:

I believe that the Universe is basically good and that throughout it great forces are at work striving to bring about a greater unity of all the living things. It is through co-operation with these forces that Man will achieve all of which he is capable. Those people who are dependent upon and live in closest relationship with Nature are most conscious of the operation of these forces: the pulse of their lives beat in harmony with the pulse of the Universe (Kaunda, 1966, pp. 22-3).

Although this idea of the human relationship with nature recalls the relational dynamics of the \textit{muntu} in the universal community of “\textit{ntu}”, it seems also to be based on Teilhard de Chardin’s book: \textit{The Future of Man} sent to Kaunda by a friend of his. The point De Chardin makes in this book is that the human species is evolving spiritually, progressing from a simple to higher forms of consciousness until it culminates in the ultimate understanding of humankind’s place and purpose in the universe. Thus, Kaunda could say: “[...] what he [De Chardin] has discovered as a philosopher I can testify to as a politician” (Kaunda, 1966, p. 20, see also p.42).

The second aspect is the human relationships in the society. Such relationships stem from the structure of traditional society. Kaunda draws attention to three factors which reinforce his humanistic outlook. The first is the fact that the African community is a mutual society, organised to satisfy the basic human needs of all its members to the extent that individualism is discouraged:

Most resources such as land and cattle might be communally owned and administered by chiefs and village headmen for the benefit of everyone. If, for example, a villager required a new hut, all the men would turn to and cut the trees to erect the frame and bring grass for thatching […] (Kanda, 1966, p. 25).

\textsuperscript{40} Upper case as in the original
The point Kaunda is making is that human needs, in African humanism, are the supreme criterion of behaviour.

The second factor to which Kaunda draws attention is the fact that the African community is an accepting community:

It did not take account of failure in an absolute sense. The slow, the inept and incapable were accepted as a valid element in community life provided they were socially amenable. Social qualities weighed much heavier in the balance than individual achievement (Kaunda, 1966, pp. 25-26).

The third factor Kaunda underlines is the fact that African community is an inclusive society. The web of relationships which involved some degree of mutual responsibility was widely spread. In this kind of society, the father or mother is not only the father of his/her own children, but also the children in the extended family. The title of ‘father’ or ‘mother’ goes with the responsibility of parenthood to the extent that all one’s ‘fathers’ receive one’s filial devotion (Kaunda, 1966, p.27). The implication is that “no child in the traditional society is likely to be orphaned”. In the same way,

No old person is likely to end his days outside the family circle. If his own offspring cannot care for him then other ‘children’ will accept the duty and privilege (Kaunda, 1966, p.27).

The second foundation of Kauda’s humanism is the Christian one:

I must be a Christian humanist! By Christian humanism, I mean that we discover all that is worth knowing about God through our fellow men and unconditional service of our fellow men is the purest form of service to God. I believe that Man must be the servant of a vision which is bigger than himself, that his path is illumined by God’s revelation and that when he shows love towards his fellow men, he is sharing the very life of God, who is love (Kaunda, 1966, p.39).
Kaunda relates the Christian foundation of his humanism to his responsibility as a political leader in these words:

When man learns, by better experience if in no other way, that the only hope for the peace and happiness of the world is to give political and economic expression to love for others, we shall have entered not the Kingdom of Man but the Kingdom of God (Kaunda, 1966, p. 39)

Thus Kaunda talks more of “humanism” rather than socialism. However, as is clear in his writing, by the term humanism, Kaunda is not bringing in a new socio-political thought; he simply meant that African socialism is a humanism as traditionally practised, and thus justifies the existence of African socialism as opposed to scientific socialism:

Just to recap, our ancestors worked collectively and cooperatively from start to finish. One might say this was a communist way of doing things, and yet these gardens remained strongly the property of individuals. One might say here that this was capitalism. Collectively and cooperatively they harvested and when it came to storing and selling their produce they became strongly individualistic. Indeed, one is compelled to say a strange mixture of nineteenth century capitalism with communism […] a strange mixture which gives the present generation the right to claim that our socialism is humanism (Kaunda, 1968, p. 20).

Kaunda may seem to have betrayed African socialism in his description. Nevertheless, he actually brought in an aspect which was not considered by Senghor, Nkrumah and Nyerere. Although the approach to production was clearly socialist, in certain cases, the land was private, and the produce was not put together. This gives the impression that the ontological link between the individual and the community as traditionally thought of in the African value system is rather loose. African thinkers have never denied that individuals have things on their own. However, the ontological status of the African is such that it is possible to say: “mine is ours, ours is mine”. The collectivist and cooperative spirit which Kaunda talked about is better understood in those terms.
Nevertheless, the question is still whether Kaunda managed to validate what Africans believe and value in terms of economic development. Like Nyerere, Kaunda might be given credit for having succeeded to unify Zambia socio-politically thanks to his intellectual articulation of what Africans believe and value. This credit cannot be given in the case of economic development. Like other fathers of African’s independence, Kaunda was more concerned with the issue of the form of government or social organisation that would redeem African cultural identity which had been tarnished by colonialism.

To conclude on the four figures treated, as Wiredu (1996, pp.145-146) argues, one can see that African statesmen of post-independence were under pressure of historical leadership to produce theoretical and normative underpinnings for their programmes of political reconstruction after years of colonisation. These statesmen often did so in reference to African value system and achieved certain political gains but less or no economic development.

3.4.5 Assessing African socialism and its link with communalism

The African political thinkers, whose thought I have put across so far, believed that it was possible to build their version of socialism on the African belief in the community and its values. The kind of socialism was thus called African socialism. Thus they rejected capitalism because they believed it was underpinned by individualistic and materialistic tendencies which betrayed African communalism and its humanistic sensibility (Ayittey, p.1990, p.2). In the same way, except for Nkrumah at the later stage, they opposed scientific socialism as unacceptable because its basic tenets conflicted with the historical and African contextual realities.

There are two issues that need to be confronted here. The first is the extent to which African socialism captured the imagination of Africans and mobilised them to action, that is: What did African socialism achieve? The second issue is why African socialism failed despite the strong belief that it is natural to Africa.

The first major achievement of African socialism is the point made that the African is different, and that this difference has its foundation in the structure of African society and its beliefs and values which had been undermined by colonisation. As a result, African socialism strengthened
in Africans the awareness of their own identity, and the struggle for their authenticity. It is awareness of Africans’ identity and the struggle for authenticity that partly served to achieve Africa’s socio-political liberation from colonialism and independence. Sindima puts it differently:

To be authentic is to be able to assert one’s values and to reach selfhood. Selfhood does not appear until people have asserted themselves as subjects of history (Sindima, 1995, p.117).

Another important aspect where African socialism captured and mobilised Africans is the creation of a new socio-economic and political order. Within African socialism as the framework of reference, Africans understood the fact that neither Marxist socialism nor capitalism responds to the ontological structure of Africans. In the imagination of Africans, not only these two systems were associated with colonial powers, but they were an end-product of the Western beliefs and values in which the African individual felt alienated. Leo Apostel expressed it thus:

Western capitalism and European socialism [...] could both reproduce a society in which the individual is alienated from others. Not the will of the majority but the will of the community should be realised; and even in a classless society African tradition is still afraid of solitude and closed individuality (Apostel, 1981, pp. 380–81).

The intellectual reflections of the scholars who theorised African socialism boldly emphasised humanism that underlies the human relations in the human community and in nature. Senghor, Nkrumah, Nyerere and Kaunda, all emphasised humanism, opposed to western materialism, as an important dimension which is displayed by the community, cooperation, togetherness, and care in the African society. Africans could understand African socialism as meaning that they would work together and cooperate so that no one would go hungry when others would have what they need, and that the wealth of the post-colonial Africa could be the welfare of all.

41 Emphasis as in the original
Thus African socialism captured the imagination of and mobilised Africans to the extent that it helped them to recover their identity, to build a new socio-political order, and to appreciate their humanism based on the African belief and value system.

Although certain African leaders such as Nyerere tried to be consistent in making African socialism the basis of all aspects of life in Africa, the idea that African socialism would also inform Africa’s self-reliant economic development remained, to a greater extent, at the level of thought. What explains the low level of its translation into practice? This question leads to the second aspect of the assessment of African socialism, that is, why African socialism failed despite the strong belief that it is natural to Africa.

According to Van Der Walt (1988, p.18), the failure of African socialism is in the very effort to tie it with an ideologised version of traditional communalism. The roots of socialism in the traditional society were weakly anchored, and the ideological plant would not grow. Communalism and socialism are different visions of life and ways of life. Van Der Walt’s point is quite striking. African leaders and thinkers seem to have embraced socialism not necessarily because it was readily present in the African communalism, but because it was readily available at the international stage as an alternative to capitalism. Against this background, African communalism was used as a moral justification to legitimate socialism and to oppose capitalism as an economic and political ideology of the colonial powers. This argument was also developed by Sachs and Warner who used it to explain the causes of slow growth in African economies:

The decision to pursue state-led development [...] in newly-independent developing countries in the 1960 was part of a reaction against the economies associated with colonialism. To be sure, many observers, not only in Africa, thought that market-led economic development and free trade has been discredited by the example of the Great Depression and (what appeared to be) the economic success of the Soviet bloc. But among African leaders seeking to lead their countries sharply away from their colonial past, free trade and market-led development had an additional stigma as being the policies of the colonial rulers (Sachs & Warner, 1997, p.19-20; see also 1995a).
In his *Black Orpheus* (1976), a text which served as a preface to Senghor’s book, *Antologie de la poésie nègre et margache d’expression française* (1948), Jean Paul Sartre drew an analogy between the proletariat under capitalistic structures in Europe and Africans under colonisation. From this analogy, Sartre drew this conclusion:

The Negro, like the white worker, is victim of the capitalistic structure of our society, and he discovers solidarity of interests beyond the nuances of skin colour with certain classes of Europeans oppressed as he (Sartre, 1976, p.14)

However, even if it were granted that the choice of socialism in Africa was informed by its availability on the international stage, one would expect this availability to be a strengthening factor for African socialism rather than a weakening one. In other words, the reasons that gave rise to socialism elsewhere would be complementary to the fact that African socialism is rooted in the ontological structure of the African, and not simply a consequence of a socio-historical development à la Marx.

According to Gyekye (1997, p.148), not everything that can be asserted about communalism can be asserted also of socialism. Communalism is essentially a socio-ethical way of life concerned with social relations as well as moral attitudes, about what sorts of relationships should hold between individuals in society and about the need to take into account the interests of the wider society. Instead, socialism is fundamentally economic, concerned with the relations or modes of production. The basic premises of socialism are economic. The concern of socialism with such moral values as justice and equality can be acknowledged, but this concern is certainly not idiosyncratic to it.

Gyekye’s point was also made by Ayittey, who points out that:

Socialism as understood and practiced, entails government ownership of the means of production; the operation of state enterprises to the exclusion of privately-owned businesses, price fixing by the state and a plethora of state regulations and controls […]. Africa’s indigenous economic system may be “backward” and “primitive”, but it is not characterised by these absences and is therefore not “socialism” (Ayittey, 1990, p.12).
Gyekye and Ayittey are right to point out that the specificity of communalism is a socio-ethical way of life, while the specificity of socialism is the modes of production. However, while they note the concern of moral values in socialism, they do not take note of the economic concern of communalism. Yet, they are aware of the notion of mutual aid in production which Nyerere and Kaunda held in esteem, as well as the fact that, in Africa the production of wealth is inseparable from social relations. In other words, the issue, in African socialism, is always “how to bake the cake together and share it together?” This is the case in most African societies. The issue is whether the African socio-ethical way of life can be given an economic expression or whether traditional African communalism could have economic implications.

Furthermore, Gyekye (1997, p.149) argues that there is no necessary connection between communalism and socialism, nor is communalism a necessary condition for socialism. As matter of fact, the European societies that gave birth to Marxist socialism were not markedly communitarian societies. They were societies marked by the ethos of individualism. Gyekye’s point is seemingly superficial here. It is effectively the ethos of individualism which allows the exploitation of the human being by another and abandons the human being to oneself that prompted Marxist socialism.

If Marx and Marxists in the West thought that socialism would solve the problem of the ethos of individualism, the fathers of Africa’s independence believed it to be present in Africa already in the form of communalism but that it lacked a political (and an ideological) expression. Thus they endeavoured to work out this political expression. This political expression grew stronger to the extent of being disconnected from what was seen as its root. One can see it in the ideological shifts that occurred in Nkrumah, Kaunda and Senghor. Nkrumah shifted from African socialism to scientific socialism, from communalism to communism; Kaunda shifted from African socialism to a vague use of humanism, as if humanism is not rather the spirit of African communalism. In his introduction to the translation of Senghor’s *On African Socialism*, Cook (1963, p.vii) accused Senghor of being too eclectic:

> Retaining such traditional African values as religion and the community spirit, Senegal, he believes, must develop its “open,” “democratic,” “humanistic” socialism, selecting and applying the most useful contributions available. From the French Utopian socialists it will borrow trade unions and the cooperative.
From Marxism-Leninism it will accept dialectics but reject atheistic materialism.

From Cook’s observation, one can see that in Senghor’s version of African socialism, African communalism is no longer at the centre as major factor to be given a political expression. It is now at the periphery as an aspect among others. Co-operation, which characterises the “communion of souls” which Senghor treasured in African communalism, is even borrowed from the French Utopian socialism. That is what I have called A wrong way: From being to having in African value system (Ntibagirirwa, 2003).

According to Masolo (2006), the proponents of African socialism confused culture and politics. There is a difference between culture and politics. For Masolo, Senghor, Nkrumah, Nyerere and Kaunda were led by nationalist ambitions to create out of Africa something that was radically different from the political system of the colonisers. They opted for a political programme that would combine values from Africa’s living indigenous histories and social structures with an anti-capitalist ideology. This left African socialism on shaky ground.

Masolo’s observation seems to be simplistic, though. Although culture and politics are two different things, they are necessarily, if not genetically linked. If politics is the art of managing the city, the best politics is that which takes into consideration people’s beliefs and values. In fact, politics is part of culture. The proponents of African socialism have not consistently followed up the link to its logical conclusion.

According to James Ferguson (2006, p.76), “African socialism was from the start an ideology of rule and state moralising”. Ferguson’s observation might be true, but African socialism might not be limited to that. If the language of socialism captured the ear of the ordinary African, it is because it could resonate with the reality of the ordinary life of Africans. Where this resonance was not betrayed but strengthened by the leaders, African socialism may not have yielded economic dividends, maybe because the focus was much more political liberation than economic, but it safeguarded unity and solidarity as it can be observed in Tanzania, Ghana and Zambia.
However, Ferguson’s idea could identify a more complex reason as to why African socialism went wrong. In fact I could put the issue as follow: Was the problem of African socialism at the level of ideology and state moralising? Or was it rather at the level of the political approach of the leadership? In effect, according to Bruce Baker,

The approaches of the ruling classes, both under colonial rule and since independence, have largely centred around statism. This has three pillars of belief. First, state power represents the will of the people (in singular) and rules in their interest. It is, therefore, entitled to rule by diktat. Secondly, state power promotes unity and therefore entitled to expect consent, or at least acquiescence. [...] Thirdly, state power promotes economic well-being (‘development’) and is therefore entitled to extract resources from the populace and distribute the resources as it sees fit (Baker, 2000, p.109).

One important aspect of this statism was too much bureaucracy of which the consequence is poor public service delivery. In the words of Collier and Cumming,

African governments have typically been less democratic and more bureaucratic than their Asian and Latin America counterparts (Collier & Gumming, 1999b, p.6 see also 1999a).

The views of Collier and Cumming raise a question with which I would like to conclude: Have the different structures and institutions of the modern African society worked in a way that effectively reflects the African socialist characteristic of the African belief and value system? The answer is that they have not. The structures and institutions of the modern African society were divorced from the African value system. African socialism itself became a forgotten idea. In most cases, once the independence was acquired, the question of whether African beliefs and values should inform political evolution received less and less attention. To be clear, Africans shifted from being to having as I said earlier (Ntibagirirwa, 2003). As a consequence, “in Africa, progress stagnated with the attainment of political liberation” and “the leadership failed to develop an inspiring, shared agenda of economic liberation and development” (Mbigi, 2005, pp. 148-149).
Although African socialism might not be retrieved, the philosophical guidelines that will be elaborated in Chapter Seven will highlight how different structures and institutions of the modern society in Africa could work in a way that reflects the African belief and value system.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that despite the cultural diversity observable in Africa, there is a common metaphysical backbone that unifies almost all Africans. Central to this metaphysical backbone is the belief that the individual is ontologically part of the community. I argued that the particularity of the African sense of community lies in the way the Africans conceive of the universe around them in general, and the human universe in particular. I made this point by dwelling on the four ontological categories of the Bantu people. I showed how Senghor, Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Kaunda developed and defended an African version of socialism or African socialism based on such an African belief and value system. I outlined the extent to which this African socialism captured the imagination of Africans, mobilised them to action, and also discussed the arguments used to explain the failure of this political vision in Africa.

In next chapter I will focus on the universality of development theories in relation to the particularity of the African belief and value system. I will address two major issues. First of all I shall consider the issue of whether the African value system was ignored or avoided in the economic development planning. Secondly, I will consider the issue of whether the “universalistic” aspect of theories of economic development could be accounted for in Africa’s economic development planning by using the concepts of inculturation and democratisation of economic development.
4 CHAPTER FOUR

THE UNIVERSALITY OF THEORIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN RELATION TO THE PARTICULARITY OF AFRICAN VALUE SYSTEM

4.1 Introduction

In Chapter Two, I argued that the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) used theories of economic development underpinned by belief and value systems that are not African, and therefore, that the philosophical assumptions of the two plans are not African. In Chapter Three, I reviewed the African value system and its ontological foundation that should constitute the ground of any African plan of development. In the present chapter, I will deal with the issue of how this African value system was neglected in the two strategies of Africa’s economic development. I shall argue that the African value system has been neglected for two reasons.

The first reason lies in the distinction between development economics that presumably pertains to Third World countries and orthodox economics that pertains to developed countries (Hirschman, 1981, p.3; Todaro, 1994, pp. 7-9; Lal, 2002, pp. 36ff; Shin, 2005; Lawson, 2006; Perraton, 2007). The development economics gave rise to the policy framework, that of the state, within which the LPA was conceived. Instead, orthodox economics gave rise to the policy framework of the market within which NEPAD was conceived. Although both policy frameworks could be articulated so as to take into consideration the value systems in which they are used, African economists and policymakers seemingly did not take into account what people believe and value as a foundation of the economic development (cf. Todaro, 1994, p.7; Shin, 2005; Lawson 2006)42.

---

42 Both Todaro and Shin argue that, although earlier development economists tried to build a special economics that would be applicable to developing countries based on their common characteristics such as rural underemployment, late industrialisation, and poverty, there must be certain sensitivity to the uniqueness and diversity of underdeveloped societies. Lawson suggests taking seriously matters of ontology, and referring to social reality. Consequently, Lawson, Shin and Todaro suggest that (development) economics must be applied eclectically taking into consideration different social realities.
The second reason is that in both policy frameworks, the African policymakers and planners operated against the background of what economics does and not what economics is (see Heilbroner, 1988, p.7). A strategy of economic development drawn against the background of what economics does and not what economics is tends not to give sufficient room to people’s participation in the process of their economic development. Yet it is this participation that mediates between plans of economic development and what people believe and value, and thus translates the universal conception of economic development into its local feasibility.

Accordingly, this chapter consists of four major sections. The first section will deal with the distinction between development economics and orthodox economics. The second section will explore the extent to which the African value system has been neglected in the two development plans. The third section will compare and contrast the state and the market as development frameworks of the LPA and NEPAD respectively in order to underline the fact that the African beliefs and values have been left out of the equation of economic development. The fourth section will consider the consequence of designing the two plans of development against the background of what economics does and not against what economics is, namely the lack of participation of people in the processes of their economic development. A conclusion will follow.

4.2 Development economics versus orthodox economics

With the division of the world in colonial and colonised countries, industrialised and non-industrialised countries, and developed and underdeveloped countries, there has been (and still is) the tendency to split economics into two: orthodox economics and development economics. Orthodox economics is built on the claim that “economics consists of a number of theorems of universal validity. One of these theorems is that, in the market economy, benefits flow to all participants be they individuals or countries” provided they are rational economic agents (Bauer, 1983; Gerrard, 1992; Haussman, 1992; Cudd, 1993). These ‘benefits’ are even qualified in terms of efficient results, and optimal outcomes (Kanth, 1999, pp. 91-92; Lawson, 2006, pp.486). Certain economists such as Rosenberg (1992, see also Kirman 1989, Robinstein 1995) even argued that economics is a branch of applied mathematics. However, this is hardly acceptable, since as Keita (see also Leamer, 1978; Hahn, 1985) argues,
The subject to which the mathematics of economics is applied is nothing other than evaluative norms of agent decision-making. Although we may formulate any system of ethics in mathematical terms, such a formulation would not grant it the licence of anything than a formalized system of ethics (Keita, 1999, pp.349).

The purpose of the claim “that economics is a branch of mathematics” is to establish economics as a positive, empirical science which would be concerned with the scientific side of economics. If such were the case, the conclusion could be that economic processes are universal and/or universalisable irrespective of the cultural context in which they are operated. In the process of economic development, this positive and orthodox economics purportedly yields facts upon which policies that apply universally could be made. That is what John Williamson (1993, p.1330) has expressed in his anecdotal words: “the world is flat”. Some of these facts include macro-economic stability, trade liberalisation, economic growth, and the idea of the relationship between trade and economic growth as the ground of economic development. On this basis, it is argued that orthodox economics is applicable to developed countries as much as to developing countries.

For Todaro (1994) orthodox economics is concerned with efficient, least-cost allocation of scarce productive resources with optimal growth. It deals with an advanced world of perfect markets, consumers’ sovereignty, automatic price adjustments, decisions made on the basis of marginal, private-profit, and utility calculations, equilibrium outcomes in all products and resource markets. It assumes economic rationality, a purely materialistic, individualistic, and self-interested orientation towards economic decision-making.

On the basis of these various aspects, Todaro observes that, indeed, orthodox or modern economics is characterised by certain formal precisions such as theoretical abstractions, mathematical analytics and the reliance on disinterested scientific methods of testing hypotheses about how economic systems behave. For the positivists, that is what gives economics its universal character.

However, for Todaro, although certain economists may claim it to be universal and universalisable, orthodox economics is the economics of advanced capitalist nations. By the same token, Shin (2005, p.1122) contends that the seemingly broader applicability and stronger
predictive power of orthodox economics is groundless because it is largely based on ignoring locational and temporal characteristics.

On the other side of the coin is development economics. Development economics is a reaction and even a rejection of or a revolt against orthodox economics. It is built on the claim that certain features of the economic structures of the underdeveloped countries make certain aspects of the orthodox economic analysis inapplicable. Various economists (Parraton, 2007; Lal, 2002; Lofchie, 1994; Bardhan, 1986, 1988; Hirschman, 1981) argue that development economics has its roots in Keynesian economics and is closer to the neo-Marxist theories than to orthodox economics. According to Lal (2002, pp. 42-43; see also Lofchie, 1994), certain modes of thought were relevant to the problems of development of Third World countries. These include the determinants of the level of economic activity (rather than the relative prices of commodities and factors of production), and national income-expenditure analysis. These modes of thought are adopted by development economics. This implies that, development economics goes beyond the concern about the perfect markets, automatic price adjustment, efficient allocation of resources, and economic rationality. According to Todaro and Smith (2009, p.8),

> It [development economics] must also deal with the economic, social, political, and institutional mechanisms, both public and private, necessary to bring about rapid […] and large-scale improvements in levels of living for the people of Africa, Asia, Latin America […].

Against this background, Todaro and Smith tell us that development economics is not the economics of the advanced capitalist nations, nor is it similar to the economics of centralised socialists, Marxist or command economics. It is rather more or less the economics of contemporary poor, underdeveloped, Third World nations with varying ideological orientations, diverse cultural backgrounds, very complex yet similar economic problems which usually require new ideas and novel approaches.

---

43 Emphasis in the original.
Unlike the more developed countries (MDCs), in the less developed countries (LDCs), most commodity and resource markets are highly imperfect, consumers and producers have limited information [...]. In many cases, economic calculations are dominated by political and social priorities such unifying the nation [...] or preserving religious and cultural traditions. At the individual level, family, clan, religious, or tribal considerations may take precedence over private, self-interest utility or profit-maximizing calculations (Todaro & Smith, 2009, p.8).

This distinction seems to suggest that the universality of economics (or trends of economics) is socio-geographical. Thus there would be two kinds of universality. Orthodox economics would be universal for advanced, developed countries, while development economics would be universal for the Third World, underdeveloped ones. Even the fact of orthodox economics being universal to advanced, developed countries can only be affirmed with reservation. Quoting Brauer et al., (1999), Ntibagirirwa (2009, p. 301) shows certain variations across these countries. He argues that the market-led capitalism of the United States of America and United Kindgom is not the social-democratic capitalism of Scandinavian countries; nor is the Austrian capitalism similar to the state-led capitalism of France. By the same token, Brohman (1995, p.127) argues that the neoclassical theory is tinged with ethnocentrism while the methods that are commonly employed yield inaccurate results and are inappropriate to most Third World settings.

According to Todaro, there are few, if any, truly universal principles or laws of economics governing economic relations that are immutable at all times and in all places. There can only be tendencies. This applies to development economics as well. Because of the heterogeneity of the Third World, there can also be no single development economics, no universal Third World economics applicable to any or all underdeveloped countries.

There have been some attempts to reconcile the two perspectives of looking at economics. Hirschman (1981, pp. 3ff) outlines two of these attempts, namely: the mono-economics’ claim and the mutual-benefit claim. The mono-economics’ claim asserts that orthodox economics is applicable to underdeveloped countries in the same way as it is applied to developed ones. According to this claim, there is no need of a separate development economics; “there is only one economics, just as there is only one physics that is applied equally to developed and
developing countries” (Shin, 2005, p.114). In consequence, the universality of orthodox economics is affirmed. However, this position can be accepted or rejected. It is indeed accepted by the proponents of orthodox economics, but rejected by the proponents of development economics.

The mutual-benefit claim suggests that economic relations between the developed and underdeveloped countries can be shaped in such a way as to produce gains for both. It is not clear whether both orthodox economics and development economics are acknowledged or whether development economics is still taken as superfluous as is in the first case. However, the mutual-benefit claim has been a hotly debated issue (see Lawson, 2006; Bardhan, 1988; Hirschman, 1988, 1981; Blaug, 1980). While it is accepted by the orthodox economics, it is rejected by, for instance, Marxian and neo-Marxian economists as it has been the case of certain dependency theory proponents. Thus Hirschman summarises all the different possibilities in the following table (Table 4-1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claims</th>
<th>Mono-economics claim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual-benefit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>claim</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Hirschman, there are only two nuanced, universalisable categories of economics that influence development policies, namely: orthodox economics in which both mono-economics’ claim and mutual-benefit claim are not questioned and neo-Marxian economics in which the two claims are rejected. In between, there are two hybrids. On the one hand, there is the Marxian economics which would accept the mono-economics claim as in orthodox economics but deny the possibility of mutual-benefit. On the other hand, there is the development economics which would accept the mutual-benefit claim but reject the mono-economics claim.
According to Lal (2002, p.42), development economics is closer to neo-Marxist than to orthodox economics in its view of the mutual-benefit claim. In development economics, it is at times believed that mutual gains are possible if the rules of the game of the capitalist, developed countries are changed to serve the interests of the underdeveloped countries. The condition for this to take place is that legitimate departures from the orthodox case of free trade are enforced by government action both nationally and internationally. This becomes a plea for a certain form of Keynesian economics which the Third World countries do not find hard to accept, given the need of the state as a regulator of economic development.

Thus, with the division of the world into developed and underdeveloped, the idea of orthodox economics pertaining to the former and development economics pertaining to the latter is safeguarded. This distinction is important insofar as it leads to a clear understanding of where the problem of development policing and planning lies, namely the temptation to remain at the level of what economics does, that is, the analytic task of economics, but not what economics is, that is, its constitutive nature (Heilbroner, 1988, p.7; see also Olsen, 2006).

In its analytic task, “what economics does” is to concern itself with how market systems work, the laws of supply and demand, and the allocation of resources (Heilbroner & Thurow, 1998). “What economics does” is linked to the idea of economic rationality which tends to strip away cultural and other social ties and thus leaves radically autonomous and internally self-sufficient individuals or political institutions (such as the state). These individuals or institutions are thought to be equipped with capacities of reflexivity and the ability to calculate in order to achieve the general social good or general welfare, or again utility (Williams, 2007, pp. 99-100).

For Heilbroner, economics tends to obscure or veil what economics is. What economics is, is linked with a specific social order and culture. Economics is a social science concerned with human beings and the social system by which they organise their activities to satisfy basic material needs and nonmaterial wants. Unlike physical sciences, the social science of economics can claim neither scientific laws nor universal truth. In economics, there can only be tendencies; and even these tendencies are subjected to great variations in different countries, cultures and times.
The distinction between orthodox economics and development economics on the one hand, and the distinction between what economics does and what economics is, on the other, helps to locate where and how the two plans of economic development in Africa, the LPA and NEPAD, neglected the African value system. I shall argue that the two plans neglected the African value system in their adoption of specific policy frameworks. The LPA adopted the policy framework characteristic of the development economics of Third World countries, namely the state, whereas NEPAD adopted the policy framework characteristic of orthodox economics, namely, the market. Furthermore, it needs to be shown that the state and the market as the policy frameworks of the LPA and NEPAD respectively means that the people as well as what they believe and value, were not taken seriously in the achievement of economic development.

### 4.3 The LPA and NEPAD in relation to their respective policy frameworks

In this section, I will consider the issue of the African value system in the policy frameworks of the LPA and NEPAD respectively. I will argue that, although the LPA and NEPAD evoke the issue of African culture to different extents, their reference to African cultural values does not mean that the policies of Africa’s economic development are a validation of these values.

#### 4.3.1 The African Value System in the LPA’s policy framework

The architects of the LPA were aware of the importance of the cultural component in Africa’s economic development and even explicitly refer to it to a great extent. However, as can be seen in the following passages of the LPA document, one wonders whether the African value system serves as means or an end for Africa’s development. In the preamble, the architects of the LPA underline the importance of the African culture in terms of commitment:

…”we commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of our government and peoples, to […] ensure that our development policies reflect adequately our socio-cultural values in order to reinforce our cultural identity (art.3, [iv].i).
Two observations can be made on this commitment. The development policies are posited first, and thereafter they are mirrored in African socio-cultural values with the purpose of reinforcing Africa’s cultural identity. The second observation is that socio-cultural values and development policies seem to stand as two different, independent things with no necessary fundamental relations or connections.

Linking the development of human resources and their utilisation in the process of economic development, a suggestion is made that the curriculum should be revised so as to make education and training more relevant to the development needs of the local African environment:

Member States should carefully define the objectives of such curriculum revision by highlighting the need to emphasize traditional cultural values and to understand the working of rural society. The curriculum revisers must aim, when their proposal are appropriately executed, at arriving at human end-products possessing skills and knowledge which would make them socially useful, either on their own or as employees, and capable of living and working in harmony with their environment (art.141).

Here again, the (traditional) cultural values are posited as something that is independent in the socio-economic processes. That they should be emphasised in the curricula revision does not make it clear that they should be referred to as premises of socio-economic development. They are not referred to as an important instrument that should catalyse or facilitate economic development.

The architects of the LPA linked African culture to the transfer and development of technology as expressed below:

Special attention should be paid to the socio-cultural milieu of the majority of the population and an attempt to satisfy their needs should be made by urging traditional technologies, where worthwhile, developing new ones and adapting imported technology (art.148).
This article contains interesting elements including: attention to the socio-cultural milieu, traditional technologies (which are often linked with indigenous knowledge) and their adaptation to imported technology. However, even here it cannot be said that the African value system is made the foundation of Africa’s economic development. In the suggestion of paying attention to socio-cultural milieu, no clear reason is given as to why this should be the case. It is possible that the architects of the LPA had in mind the preservation of the African cultural identity. This might be the case since, according to Wiredu (1996, p.145), the major question that faced the leaders of post-independence Africa was not only the social and economic development that had become stunted under colonialism, but also the restoration of the cultural identity that colonialism had eroded. There seems to have been the tendency to deal with these two aspects differently with the result that the issue of how the cultural identity should inform the process of providing the needs of the people was not much of a concern.

The focus on culture in the LPA document is also highlighted in relation to research on population and the improvement of the quality of life. The architects of the LPA encourage research on such topics as:

[S]ocio-economic and cultural factors infringing on, or influencing the growth and development of, concepts related to population and other socio-cultural issues;

[E]ffective values, beliefs, and taboos and traditions which control decision-making processes in the family in selected countries, and the ways in which levels of understanding of population issues effect these values and attitudes (art.354a and b).

As is obvious in these passages, the architects of the LPA were not unaware of the importance of African cultural value system in the process of economic development. The question that might be asked is whether the fact that African culture mentioned in the document of LPA means that African value system is being validated in terms of Africa’s economic development. The dominant pattern is that the architects of the LPA make African cultural value system more of an end than a means or the soul of development. This observation has been made by a number of African scholars such as Amin (1990), Asante (1991), and Ajei (2007).
Amin (1990, p.57) argues that the LPA makes culture its aim in the same way it does for development, whereas culture is supposed to be regarded as a means to development. This is clearly evident in the quotation from the preamble referred to earlier. That the aim is to ensure that Africa’s development policies reflect adequately Africa’s socio-cultural values does not necessarily mean that the development policies have been rooted in Africa’s socio-cultural values.

Amin’s remark has been echoed by Ajei (2007, p.61) who argues that, in the LPA document, African socio-cultural values are thought of much more as an end rather than a means of development. The failure to take into consideration the cultural assumptions for the LPA has also been identified by Asante. Asante (1991, p.76) argues that to ensure the success and sustainability of the development process, the political, social, economic, technological, administrative and cultural dimensions of development have to be integrated in a manner that can optimise development possibilities. His complaint is set out below:

Nowhere does the LPA as a development strategy espouse the socio-political and cultural dimensions of development. […] No consideration is given to the fact that African development should be rooted in the culture of the people; reflect their systematic values in order to free them from any form of economic, social, political and cultural dependence […] Self-reliance is based on cultural grounds. Local knowledge and values must be the starting point for people-centred alternative development (Asante 1991, pp.68 &74).

In another place, Asante says of Adedeji who was the key figure in the design of the LPA:

[Adedeji] has frequently warned against separation of economic development from its social, cultural, and political setting, but this has not been seriously articulated in the Economic Commission for Africa document (Asante 1991, p.74).

The question that needs to be considered at this point is why the planners and the policymakers of the LPA saw the importance of the African value system, yet failed to take it seriously as a source of Africa’s economic development. According to Lal:
Since part of the dependency thesis is that cultural and political effects of neo-colonialism have warped the minds and hence the attitudes of peoples in the South, de-linking is also expected to lead to resurgence of national cultures and self-respect (Lal, 2002, p. 91).

What Lal is pointing out is that de-linking from world capitalism does not only liberate the economy of the underdeveloped countries but it liberates people’s culture (cf. Wiredu 1996, p.146). This does not imply that the culture thus liberated is necessarily made the basis of economic development being sought in the process. It might be from this background that the policymakers and planners of the LPA saw African cultural beliefs and values as an end rather than a means. Certainly establishing culture as end was important insofar as people needed to recover and affirm their identity or who they were in the process.

The question about how people’s identity could serve what they become did not receive much attention in the LPA development planning and policing, since it was a context in which “Africa’s post-independence policy framework presupposed a highly activist and regulatory state” (Lofchie, 1994, p.164). That the state should play this central role came from a double pessimism which prevailed in most underdeveloped countries. The first was trade pessimism, the consequence of which was the rejection of the orthodox economists’ assumption that international trade could be structured so as to provide mutual benefits for both developed and underdeveloped countries. The second was the pessimism about entrepreneurs, especially in Africa. This consisted in a doubt as to whether Africa had an entrepreneurial class sufficiently strong to launch the process of economic development. On this point, what Barbara Ward said of Africa in 1962 was still valid at the time when the LPA was launched:

At this stage of development among the poorer communities, it is virtually certain that the state will play a major part in raising more capital for development. This is because in the early days of growth, a large confident business class is simply unavailable (Ward, 1962, p. 99).

This argument is echoed by Goldon and Goldon (1996, p.115) who gave two reasons for the African state’s involvement in economy, namely: the promotion of investment as it was believed that private savings were very low; and the belief that private investors were reluctant
to invest because of high risks, especially if the market is small or sources of supply are unreliable.

This doubt about trade and entrepreneurship seems also to have cast doubt about people at the grassroots. People at the grassroots were thought not to have sufficient maturity to deliberate about, and influence matters of economic development. To understand this, it might be interesting to refer to Heilbroner on the nature of economics. Heilbroner defines economics as the process by which the society marshals and coordinates the activities required for its provisioning (Heilbroner, 1988, p.14). This coordinating mechanism as the essential element of the economy may reveal three aspects, namely:

- tradition, in which the orchestrating function is accorded to roles and responsibilities of kinship or other communal relations;

- command, where the function is accorded to the will of some superior figure or institution, typically the state; and

- the market, where the process is carried out principally by the interaction of self-interested individuals competitively seeking access to the workplace or to the purchasing power of the public (Heilbroner, 1988, pp.15-6).

For Heilbroner, the forces that are at work in the first two categories or nonmarket societies are compared to “the psychic propensities and capacities that arise from the socialisation of the infant and child” (Heilbroner, 1988, p.18). Heilbroner tells us that the socialisation process has two aspects. The first is the development of the general capacity to “affect”. This affect permits, encourages or demands action or participation of individuals or members of the society. The second aspect is a response to the first. The orchestrating process requires the obedience or acquiescence required for the subordination of the individual or the members of the society to the will which may be embodied in custom or command. Heilbroner’s conclusion is that the experience of infantile helplessness and the development of infant affect play an important role in the orchestration of “economic” life.
Heilbroner’s analysis provides a clue as to where the neglect of the African value system in the LPA lies. It is in the relationship between the state and the people on the one hand, the architects of the development strategies (within the logic of the state) and the people on the other. The people did not participate in the process which was thought would lead them to their economic development except by acquiescence or obedience to the command of the state and its experts. I shall come back to this issue when I talk of the notion of participation later. For the time being I will consider the African value system in relation to the policy framework of NEPAD.

4.3.2 African value system and NEPAD’s policy framework

As in the LPA, the African value system is not ignored in the NEPAD document. First of all, the architects of NEPAD recognise African culture as one of the resources that could serve the purpose of economic development, but at the same time underline the fact that it is underutilised and underdeveloped (Art.11). They also complain about the fact that colonialism subverted African beliefs and values and made these compliant to the economic and political needs of colonial powers while simultaneously retarding African entrepreneurial and managerial capacity as expressed in the NEPAD document:

Colonialism subverted hitherto traditional structures, institutions and values or made them subservient to the economic and political needs of the imperial powers. It also retarded the development of an entrepreneurial class, as well as a middle class with skills and managerial capacity (art.16).

Although compared to the LPA document, the NEPAD document has fewer passages referring to the African value system, the architects of NEPAD rate culture as one of the sectoral priorities:

Culture is an integral part of development effort on the continent. Consequently, it is essential to protect and effectively utilise indigenous knowledge that represents a major dimension of the continent’s culture, and to share this knowledge for the benefit of humankind. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development will give special attention to the protection and nurturing of
indigenous knowledge, which includes tradition-based literacy, artistic and scientific works, inventions, scientific discoveries, designs, marks, names and symbols, undisclosed information and all other tradition-based innovations and creations resulting from intellectual activity […] (art.140).

Two observations can be made regarding this passage. The first observation is that, although it is presented as a priority among priorities, it is not clear what role culture has to play in economic development. That “culture is an integral part of development on the continent” does not make it clear whether it is an end that Africa’s development should achieve, or at the same time also a means of development that has to be considered as such.

In its final report of the Zonal Workshops and National Conference on Culture and NEPAD, the Ghana National Commission on Culture (2008) made this remark: “NEPAD needs to recognize and discover how culture can contribute to good governance, wealth creation, peace and justice”. The observation made here is that “how” culture could contribute to wealth creation (among other aspects) does not seem to be given sufficient consideration. One could react by saying that the answer “how” is the affirmation of African identity as the following passage of the NEPAD document seems to suggest:

Africa’s rich cultural legacy is reflected in its artefacts of the past, its literature, philosophies, art and music. These should serve both as a means of consolidating the pride of Africans in their own humanity and of confirming the common humanity of the peoples of the world (art.179).

However, it is not clear how the beliefs and values that constitute the content of such African identity and pride are made to serve the purpose of Africa’s economic development. In connection with this “African pride”, Ian Taylor (2005, p.96) questioned the fact that some Africans are not willing to invest in Africa as is shown by the high level of capital flight. This outward orientation could end up influencing the African people not only to have an outward mindset and extroversion, but also to pathologically interiorise their self-hatred as Bidima (1994) indicated. In the end, Africa’s economic development itself is jeopardised. As Taylor (2005, p.96) observes: If, in the name of African pride, African leaders themselves are not willing to invest in their own continent, how could non-Africans be expected to do so?
The second observation is that culture is presented in its accidental aspects rather than its essential aspects, in parts rather that in its totality. It is true that such a presentation is geared to underlining what constitutes African identity and the fact that such an identity should stand in partnership with that of other people. However, the implication is that African culture is presented in some aspects which may be of interest to tourism. These aspects are more clearly captured by the concept of “cultural capital” which Throsby refers to as:

Heritage buildings, cultural institutions, facilities such as theatres, halls, craft workshops and so on (which) can all be seen as capital assets, and the people who produce cultural goods and services in these facilities – actors, musicians, craft people, writers, technicians, designers, administrators and many others – (who) all contribute to the generation of economic and cultural value over time (Throsby, 2001, p.126).

In the NEPAD document, culture is thus presented as what Throsby (2001, pp.11-12) calls the economy of culture, rather than a system of beliefs and values that could be validated to give birth to a general strategy of economic development. This can be observed from this passage:

Africa has already made a significant contribution to the world culture through literature, music, visual arts and other cultural forms, but its potential remains untapped because of its limited integration into the global economy (art.16).

Once again, the Ghana National Commission on Culture (2008) made this remark which I find to be true:

While culture is defined as the totality of life of a particular group of people, in discussing the NEPAD framework, culture is seen as a capital that would enable Africa to affirm and preserve her cultural identity, values, institutions, tangible and intangible heritage.

Thus, although the issue of culture in the NEPAD document is not avoided, it is nevertheless neglected. The question is: What explains this neglect? In the case of the LPA, I argued that the neglect came from the fact that it was conceived within the policy framework of a highly activist and regulatory state characterised by doubts about the role of other actors in economic
development. In the case of NEPAD, the neglect came from the fact that its policy framework is the market which hardly recognises those other aspects that make economic development possible.

According to Heilbroner, the motives of economic “rationality” that underlie the framework of the market are the same as those that underlie the framework of the state. Heilbroner argues that the policy framework of the market is underpinned by the rationality of free exchange in which “the economy appears as an autonomous process, wholly independent of the society with which it operates” (Heilbroner, 1988, p.23). In other words, the market operates as a means of social orchestration just as it is the case in traditional kind of society and command economy. The market draws its orchestrating means to shape human behaviour from the self-interest and rational calculation displayed by individuals (Heilbroner, 1988, p.25). Heilbroner further adds:

The changes wrought by the market mechanism are so great, and their impact of consciousness so deep, that it becomes impossible to speak of this orchestration process without designating it as a special realm. […] This is all the more the case […] insofar as the logic of market interaction acquires a complexity and a self-regulating character that endow the market system with “a life of its own” (Heilbroner, 1988, p.33).

Thus one could say that the neglect of the African value system lies in the so-called “self-regulating character” of the market. In this self-regulating character even culture tends to be valued more in terms of a set of commodities to be sold and bought rather than a system that constitutes the foundation of economic activities and that can lead to a whole society’s economic development.

4.3.3 State versus Market: where do people stand?

The contrast between the state and the market arises out of the concern about how economic development should be achieved. The proponents of the state’s intervention in the economy argue that economic development cannot be achieved unless the state plays a clear role in the process. The state’s intervention can take three major forms depending on its degree of
intervention (Kambhampati, 2004, pp.140ff; cf. Evans, 1995). It is strong in centrally planned or command economies, moderate in mixed economies (as in developmental states), or minimal in a laissez-faire or free-market economy. In command economic development, the state directs the economy to the extent that the market has little or no role to play. Consequently, the state sets the prices and determines resource allocation. In short, the state undertakes all economic activities as is the case in communist countries, particularly. In the mixed economic development, the state regulates the economy and is the distributive force in it as is the case in certain developmental states of East Asian (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) (see Chang, 2003, p.47). The state regulation consists of shaping, pursuing and encouraging the achievement of development objectives (Leftwich, 1995, p.401, Evans, 1995, p.59). The state intervention is minimal in the laissez-faire or free-market economy. This minimal intervention consists of, *inter alia* large-scale socio-economic infrastructure, security, enforcing contracts, and securing property rights.

The proponents of the state intervention in economic development argue that even a well-functioning market economy necessitates a well-functioning state. The market, they argue, is a political construct (Chang, 2003, p.52; Toye, 2003). According to Polanyi (cited by Chang, 2003, p.50; see also Reinert, 2007; Chang, 2009), even in the case of Britain, where the free-market is believed by many to have emerged spontaneously, “the road to the free-market was opened and kept open by enormous increase in continuous, centrally organised and controlled [state] interventionism”. One cannot but asked this question which Lesser (1991) raised: “When government fails, will the market do better?”

It is this “state interventionism” and presumed failure that the proponents of the market, particularly the neo-liberal economists, react against. They contend that the state’s intervention creates allocative inefficiencies which undermine economic development. Their contention is based on the belief that the market is a natural institution whereas the state and other institutions are man-made substitutes. More precisely, “market-based economic arrangements are natural because they are the product of an economic rationality inherent in all persons” (as in Williams, 2007, p.95). In his *Markets and Hierarchies*, Williamson (1975, p.20) expresses the primacy of the market as follows: “…in the beginning, there were the markets”. Such belief is based on the (neo)-liberal assumption that the individuals are free to pursue their particular interests. The market harmonizes the interests of all the participants. From an economic development point of view, Bauer (1983, pp.30-31) draws on Smith’s invisible hand and
argues that the pursuit of individual gain by individual members in the society mediated by the market results in economic growth and development. Thus, the proponents of the market economy argue that the developing countries are not poor because they are poor; rather they are poor because of too much state interference.

The question that may be asked is whether the state and the market as frameworks of economic development are so divorced from each other to the point of being kept as parallel lines in Euclidian geometry. Do they really supplant each other more than they can supplement or complement each other? Is the state simply there to correct the market failures as the proponents of state intervention would claim? Is the market coming in to reshape the state failures in the economy as the orthodox economists have often made one believe? These are certainly not easy questions to deal with. However, it might be necessary to recall the point made earlier in the second chapter that the classical liberals (even Adam Smith referred to as the father of classical economic liberalism) were not that hostile to the state, nor did they believe that government had only a minimal role in economic life (Wyatt-Walter, 1996; Harlen, 1999). They believed that the state is crucial in recommending economic policies and should even protect the national economy. Thus, List (1885, p.175) argued that the state is necessary to accomplish the economic development of the nation and to prepare it for admission into the universal society. The market was recognised in its role.

However, the state and the market seem to be emphasised differently according to the structure of societies. The market seems to be much emphasised in certain developed nations of the West where the individuals are autonomous and free to pursue their interests. Accordingly, the seeming state intervention in the heyday of laissez-faire economy, as well as in the Keynesian era was often abhorred as a stumbling block to the individual autonomy, and freedom and to the free market they underlie. The suggestion here is that economic development is linked with how the human beings are conceived of in the society, i.e the beliefs and values that structure their ontological make-up. It is this underlying anthropo-ontological aspect that the architects of NEPAD seem to have neglected in their use of the orthodox economic framework for Africa’s economic development.

Instead, the state seems to be emphasised much more in the developing countries where the structure of the society (and the concept of the individual) is different from that of the West. Even this structure of the society varies from one region to the other according to the content of
what people believe and value. In using the state as a framework of development, the architects
of LPA do not seem to have been sufficiently sensible to this (anthropological) factor.

From what has been developed so far, it is clear that the state and the market tend to oppose
each other, playing on each other’s weaknesses and failures. Furthermore, the role of the state
and that of the market tend to gain emphasis according to the structure of the societies where
they are preeminent. Neither the LPA in its use of the state as policy framework nor the
NEPAD in its use of the market as its policy framework took seriously the structure of the
African society. This is the whole issue of the people and what they believe and value which is
not clearly defined in devising strategies of economic development in Africa. As it has already
been argued, one reason why the people are left on the margins of economic development is
that the two strategies of economic development worked within the logic of what economics
does. The consequence of this logic is that the people are deprived of participation in the
process of their own economic development. I consider this aspect in the next section.

4.4 The consequence of functional use of economics by the LPA and
NEPAD: Lack of people’s participation.

Although the issue of economic development is at stake in both policy frameworks, the
architects seem to have been trapped in the logic of what economics does for the people and
not what economy is for the people. The function of the economics of “doing” is mirrored and
reproduced in a certain way by both the state and the market in the process of achieving
economic development. In other words, the economic development becomes that which is
achieved by the policymakers as well as the leaders they advise (in the policy framework of the
state) or policymakers and the invisible hand of the market (in the policy framework of the
market).

One major problem of this logic is that the role of people tends to be omitted from the equation
of their own economic development. Consequently, the LPA and NEPAD have often been
criticised by scholars as well as the African population at the grassroots for being elite driven
or the result of top-down processes due to the lack of public participation and consultation in
the process. For instance, although Adebayo Adedeji was the mastermind behind the LPA, he
looks back on African strategies of economic development and criticises LPA and NEPAD in these terms:

[…] one great deficiency which they both share and which has to be put right is that they are top-down rather than bottom-up initiatives. While it is the responsibility of political leaders to take policy and political initiatives, their efforts will be in vain if they are unable to carry their people with them. Both were prepared without consultation with the stakeholders of Africa’s development. No public discourse or debate has been held on both in [the] majority of African countries. It is even doubtful if national parliaments have been fully engaged in both processes. Yet both claim that the promotion of democratic principles and instituting popular participation and good governance is one of their main objectives. The African ownership which is claimed for them is no more than the ownership of the heads of government and their immediate advisers (Adedeji, 2002, pp. 16-7).

In their assessment of the Lagos Plan of Action, Rasheed and Sarr (1991) underlined the fact that, the plan was, indeed, endogenous:

African countries committed themselves to base their individual and collective development on endogenous factor inputs, especially natural and human resources, and to ensure that the development process relies mainly on domestic factor endowment (Rasheed & Sarr, 1991, p. 15).

Such domestic factor inputs include some presumed indigenous expertise and management adaptable to serve Africa’s production requirements (arts.90, 106 & 111ii). However, in the conclusion of their assessment, Rasheed and Sarr underlined a number of aspects that made the objectives of the LPA endogenous in its slogans but less indigenous in practice:

With over 80 percent of the population marginalised; with an aid-dependent mentality, inadequate and sometimes counter-productive public services, management organisational systems, and an externally dependent economic structure, the objectives of self-reliance and self-sustainment naturally remained mere slogans (Rasheed & Sarr, 1991, p. 33).
Another scholar who complained about the lack of participation of the population in the elaboration and execution of the LPA is Benachenhou. He says:

The issue of the execution of the Lagos Plan lies in the central problem of the formation of the popular political will which, alone, could guarantee that the development is oriented towards the satisfaction of the needs of the majority of the people with the participation of this same people to the elaboration of plans (of development) and their execution (Benachenhou, 1982, p.21).

In his statements aimed at the preparation of Africa for the twenty-first century, Adedeji recognised the fact that LPA lacked a “new transformation ethic” which would have involved people through their full and active participation. He argues that what is needed, as far as Africa is concerned, is

[a] New African transformation ethic based on a human-centred development paradigm which puts the people at the centre of the development process, on the driving seat as it were and is predicated, above all, on the rational proposition that development has to be engineered and sustained by the people themselves through their full and active participation. In other words, the new African transformation ethic rests on the firm belief that development should not be undertaken on behalf of a people; rather, that it should be the organic outcome of a society’s value system, its perceptions, its concerns and its endeavours (Adedeji, 1991, p. 49).

The same lack of people’s participation of which the LPA has been accused is also found in the criticism about NEPAD (African Scholars’ Forum, 2002; Bond, 2002; Kotzé & Steyn, 2003; Matthews, 2004; Ayittey, 2005, pp. 320-23; and Hawi, 2005). The African scholars’ Forum has expressed its concern about the fact that there has been little or no public debate regarding the extent to which the NEPAD policy corresponds to the African reality, dream and vision:

NEPAD is unknown to the majority of African peoples, is barely understood by African development agents, including those in government, and has drawn little interest from African scholars (African Scholars’ Forum, 2002, p.2).
In the same way, church representatives complained that:

The process that gave rise to the current NEPAD document is seriously lacking because there has been no consultation with Africa’s citizenry, without whose active participation there can be no real partnership and no real development (Southern Africa’s Bishops’ Conference, 2002).

The declaration of the Civil Society Organisation (CSO) is even more categorical:

[…] we do not accept the NEPAD plan, as a process and in its content. We are committed to joint efforts for Africa’s development and emancipation, and we call upon all African peoples’ organisations and movements to continue their longstanding efforts to produce sustainable, just and viable alternatives that will benefit all the people of Africa (in Kotzé & Steyn, 2003, p.54).

Kotzé and Steyn (2003, p.55) carried out a survey across seven African countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe). The survey consisted in asking the elites to indicate on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) to what extent they concur with the statement: “it is only the ruling elite in the country that is actively involved in promoting NEPAD”. The following table (Table 4-2) features the results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Neutral (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kotzé and Steyn (2003, p.55) concluded that the majority of respondents in all countries except Zimbabwe agreed with the statement. The survey reflects the opinion that NEPAD is an elite-driven process. The case of Zimbabwe could be explained by the fact that “the Zimbabwean leadership interprets NEPAD as an endeavour of neo-colonialism” (Kotzé & Steyn, 2003, p.51).

Finally, a Kenyan scholar expressed himself on NEPAD in the following terms:

NEPAD is undemocratic. Popular forces in Africa – the farmers through their associations, the workers and their unions, the civil society and their organizations, the indigenous business community, women and their organizations and the professionals and intelligentsia – were not consulted, let alone involved in the development of the initiative. [...] “you cannot shave a person's head in his absence” (Oduor, 2002).

When people are not involved in the development process that concerns them, it is difficult to make what they are as well as what they believe and value a catalyst of such process. However, in the case of NEPAD, some people could oppose the argument here by saying, as implied earlier, that NEPAD is based on the idea of African Renaissance which is often perceived as a cultural project. This project refers to the appropriation of values that are genuinely African and rooted in the former ideological framework of Pan-Africanism, negritude and black consciousness (Edozie, 2004, p.152). Even if this were the case, the argument would still be groundless. The point does not cover the fact that both NEPAD and the LPA are top-down and do not take people along. The people turn out to be alienated and subordinated in the process of development (Ukiwo, 2003, p.128; Hawi, 2005). Taylor (2005, p. 45) made a similar point and observed, that besides being promoted by African leaders, NEPAD does not have any African spirit or African cultural value. He notes that NEPAD is built on the principle of give and take which is peculiar to the economic neo-liberalism to the extent that the plan becomes another commodity to be marketed.

What is being underlined is that the LPA was conceived in the policy framework of the state and NEPAD was conceived in the framework of the market. What is lacking in both is the participation of the people. Akiwo (2003) asks this question: Does popular participation matter? The question is answered in the affirmative. It is through the process of participation
that the issue of how and what people believe and value could be translated into policies that promote their economic development.

The concept of “participation” is itself ambiguous. Even if the people were actually participating in the execution of the plans like the LPA and NEPAD, the issue remains how much people can participate meaningfully in a system they have not conceived, and therefore which they may not understand. The full and active participation of the people is what makes plans of development find their foundation in what people believe and value. At the same time, it is participation that translates theories of development from their universal conception to local application.

The concept of participation is increasingly occupying the centre of development thinking to the extent that it is seen as catalysing what, nowadays, is referred to as alternative development or post-development (Escobar, 1992, 1995; Latouche, 1993; Pieterse, 1998, 2001; Sen, 1999; Matthews, 2004; Crocker 2007, 2008). The concept of development means that people take part in their own development, that is, they are agents and not patients in the processes of their development (Sen, 1999; Crocker, 2008). There are various aspects of participation. David Crocker (2007, pp. 432-3) has outlined seven types of participation which are listed below.

- **Nominal participation**: People participate in group decision-making only as a members of the group but, do not, for instance, attend meetings, maybe because of responsibilities, lack of will, or feeling that they are harassed and unwelcome.

- **Passive participation**: In this type of participation, one is a member of a group and attends decision-making meetings only to listen in order to report about decisions already made. As Drydyk (2005, p.259) puts it, passive participation is limited to being told what is going to happen or what is going on already.

---

44 Although the concept (and the practice) of participation has not attracted much attention in most perspectives of development, it is central in the social teachings of the Catholic Church. In fact, it was already much debated in late 1940s/early 1950s, under Pope Pius XII, in terms of what level of participation is appropriate to determine the policies, procedures, practices and directions in industries. In *Pacem in Terris* issued in 1963, Pope John XXIII referred to the common good as a reality in which all people should share through their participation (arts. 73ss, cf. art.56). In *Populorum Progressio* issued in 1967, Pope Paul VI uses the concept participation to reconcile the notion private property and the common good. He suggested that if the conflict between acquired private rights and primary community exigencies arises, the public authority, with the active participation of individuals and social groups, should provide a solution (art.23). Thus one might justifiably ask why it was not replicated in the perspectives of development as it has been, for instance, in the struggle for political independence.
- **Consultative participation:** This refers to non-elites participating by simply giving information or opinions to the elite. However, the non-elites neither deliberate among themselves nor make decisions.

- **Petitionary participation:** The non-elite participate by petitioning to authorities to make certain decisions or do certain things as a remedy for their grievances.

- **Participatory implementation:** Elites determine the goals and the main means, while the non-elite implement the goals and decide the tactics. Drydyk (2005, p.260) calls it functional participation.

- **Bargaining participation:** Here the non-elite individually or collectively bargain with the elite, but mostly as adversaries rather than partners; the motive of the bargaining being largely or exclusively self-interest.

- **Deliberative participation:** Both the elites and non-elites deliberate together, engage in reasoning and scrutinise the proposals, reflect in order to reach agreements or consensus on policies geared to the common good. According to Crocker (2007, p.433), the deliberative process includes the scrutiny and formation of values as well as the importance of various processes and opportunities. Drydyk (2005, p.260) calls this kind of participation interactive participation geared to a joint analysis and reflection in order to achieve solutions to issues.

The first five types of participation refer to what I call *accidental participation*. There is no public reflection and debate, or what Sen (1999, 2005, 2009) calls “public reasoning”, involved as far as people are concerned. The occurrence or non-occurrence of this kind of participation does not prevent “the course of things” (what has been planned at the level of leadership and expertise) from taking place. In this kind of participation, people’s involvement is practically limited to approval and execution as is the case (has been the case) in most of the “top-down” development strategies, in particular the LPA and NEPAD. Once policymakers and planners have finished the office work of designing a plan or a project of development, people are required to work with it without knowing its politics, its meaning, how it will shape their lives and where it will lead them.
Deliberative participation refers to what I call essential participation. In this kind of participation, people are the agents and not patients of their own development. In other words, their participation is essential to the process of development; in fact, it is already development in process. Development starts with them and not without them. And at the same time, development is essential to what they become. It transforms them as they give it a shape (cf. Adedeji, 1991, p. 49). To use Hodgett’s terms, by exercising their agency, people acquire the political and social awareness that helps them to leapfrog in their development (Hodgett, 2008). The idea of deliberative participation is also underlined in what Pieterse calls reflexive development. For Pieterse, the reflexive development takes on a programmatic meaning such that reflexive development becomes reflexive in a social and political sense. In participatory development, popular reflexivity takes the form of broad debates on development goals and methods that structure policies (Pieterse, 1998, p.369).

The major relevance of participation is that it makes possible the inculturation and democratisation of development. The concept of inculturation is borrowed from Third World Christian theologians, in particular African theologians, who use it to mean the process by which Christianity could take roots in, and the colour of local cultures. I believe inculturation, together with democratisation, could equally be applied to economic development to mean the process by which economic development could take root in what people believe and value.

Both the inculturation and democratisation of economic development are geared to translating what is universal in economic development to a local context. The need for development as the process of improving the quality of people’s lives is universal. In all societies, irrespective of which economic approach is adopted, economic development has the aims described below:

- It aims to raise people’s living levels, that is, to increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic life-sustaining goods such as food, housing, health services, and security through relevant economic growth processes. This has to do with sustenance or the ability to meet people’s basic needs.

- It is aimed at creating conditions conducive to the growth of people’s self-esteem: this should include not only better incomes, jobs, education, but also greater attention to cultural and human values that enhance both material well-being and collective and individual self-esteem. This is achieved through the establishment of
social, political, and economic systems and institutions that promote human dignity and respect. This has to do with the promotion of the value of “being a person”.

- It aims to expand people’s freedom by enlarging the range of economic and social choices: This means freeing people from servitude and dependence not only in relation to other people and states, but also from the forces of ignorance and human misery. This requires increasing varieties of consumer goods and services (Todaro, 1994, pp.19 & 670).

However, the way this process of development is effected is particular, since people are historically, socially, economically, and culturally different. Inculturation and democratisation of development imply two principles. The first is the principle of difference. People are different in their social, historical, political experience. The kind of economic system that may be suggested to such people requires policymakers to take this fact into account. The second principle is that of appropriation, economic systems that were produced elsewhere can be used by other people provided they are properly integrated so as to take into account the ontological make-up of these people. However, this is difficult as the experience of development in Africa shows.

The translation of the universality of development to a local context is mediated by local beliefs and values. Cooper and Vargas (2004; see also Throsby, 2001) talk of the cultural feasibility of economic development.

The question that puzzles is how to concretise the link between economic development and cultural values. Cardoso suggested that the participation of people in their development should be linked to political activity (in Goulet, 1989, p.168), that is, bringing what is economic and cultural in the political sphere. According to Sen (1999, 2005, 2009, see also Pellissery & Bergh, 2007, p.284; Crocker 2007, 2008), this can only be achieved through public reflection and debate or public reasoning (Sen 1999, 2005, 2009). That is what I call “democratisation of economic development”.

In LPA and NEPAD, this public reflection and debate never moved beyond government officials and the experts who advised them. In the absence of this public reflection and debate or public reasoning, the African value system could hardly be validated in terms of policies for economic development in Africa.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that the African value system has been neglected in both the LPA and NEPAD as strategies for Africa’s economic development. I outlined two reasons which explain this neglect. I argued that the first reason lies in the distinction between development economics that underlies the economic policies of developing countries and the orthodox economics that underpins the economic policies of developed countries. Development economics gave rise to the policy framework of the state, within which the LPA was conceived. By contrast, orthodox economics gave rise to the policy framework of the market within which NEPAD was conceived. Both policy frameworks failed to provide sufficient room to allow what people believe and value to be the foundation of Africa’s economic development.

As far as the second reason is concerned, I argued that in both policy frameworks, the architects of the two strategies for Africa’s economic development operated against the background of what economics does and not what economics is. This did not give sufficient room for people’s participation in the process of their economic development. Participation, I argued, makes possible the democratisation and inculturation of economic development, and thus translates the universal conception of economic development into its local, cultural feasibility.

The next two chapters will deal with the empirical component of this research. I will engage with certain architects who played a central role in the design of the LPA and NEPAD, in order to record their views on the cultural foundations of the two strategies of economic development.
Two objectives will be pursued. The first objective is to know how African policymakers and planners respond to the concern that the African belief and value system could have been the missing link between development plans and the economic development they intended to achieve. The second objective will consist in discussing with them whether adapting development policies to the African value system or adapting African value system to development policies could advance the cause of economic development in Africa.
5 CHAPTER FIVE

METHODOLOGY OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

5.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the empirical part of my research. The aim of this empirical research was to engage with policymakers who masterminded the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). I will consider the issue of how these architects of the African plans for economic development respond to the concern that African cultural values have not been taken seriously in these two African strategies of economic development, and thus could be the missing link between these African plans for development and the economic development they desire to achieve. I will discuss with them whether by adapting development policies to the African value system or, conversely, by adapting the African value system to development policies, this could achieve Africa’s economic development.

To achieve the above aim, this chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section is the method of data collection and its rationale. The second section will deal with how the research will be conducted as well as the validity and reliability of the collected data and findings. The third section will deal with the ethical issues of this empirical research component and how they will be handled.

5.2 Method of data gathering and its rationale

The method of data collection for this research is semi-structured interviews. The semi-structured interview is part of the qualitative research methods. According to Mason (2002, pp. 3-4), the qualitative approach has three features which justify its use for this research. Firstly, qualitative research is grounded in a philosophical position which is ‘interpretivist’. It is concerned with how the social world is interpreted, understood, experienced, produced or constituted. Secondly, qualitative research is based on methods of data generation which are both flexible and sensitive to the social context in which data are produced. Thirdly, qualitative research is based on methods of analysis, explanation and argument building which involve the
understanding of complexity, details and context. It aims to produce rounded and contextual understandings based on rich, nuanced and detailed data. It is more ‘holistic’ in its analysis and explanation. Thus, the qualitative method fits well with the philosophical approach to this research which tends to be interpretive, qualitative and prescriptive (see Chapter One, point 8).

Qualitative research has a wide range of approaches which social scientists tend to divide into two categories, namely non-survey and survey approaches (Bailey, 1982). Non-survey qualitative research approaches include the ethnographic approach which uses observation and participation, content analysis, and historical analysis. Survey qualitative approaches include sampling, mailed questionnaires, and interviews. The approach used in this research is the interview which is part of the survey category. The choice of the interview approach lies in the fact that it allows for an exchange of views on issues between the researcher and the interviewee. Kvale (1996) talks of “Inter Views”. It is against this background that I shall use semi-structured interviews.

May (1993, p.93) states that the semi-structured interview is thus called, because it lies between structured and focused types of interviews. A structured interview relies upon the use of an interview questionnaire as a data collection instrument. Interviewees are asked questions in the same way, to the extent that differences between answers are assumed to be real ones and not the result of the interview situation itself. By contrast, the focused interview is informal and unstructured. It is open-ended and provides the interviewees with the freedom to talk about the issue in any way they like to the extent that the preconceptions of the research could find themselves challenged (May, 1993, pp.93-4). The semi-structured interview stands between the structured and the focused interview and can borrow techniques from both. It borrows from the structured interview in that questions are normally specified; but it is also close to the focused interview as the interviewer is freer to probe beyond the answers:

Qualitative information about the topic can then be recorded by the interviewer who can seek both clarification and elaboration on the answers given. This enables the interviewer to have more latitude to probe beyond the answers (May, 1993, p.93)\textsuperscript{45}.

\textsuperscript{45} Italics are in the original text.
Mason calls the semi-structured interview “interactional exchange dialogue” or, in the words of Burgess (1984:102), a “conversation with purpose”. Epistemologically, the semi-structured interview assumes that knowledge is situated and contextual to the extent that its purpose is the “production” and “construction” of knowledge. The interactional exchange dialogue or conversation between the interviewee and the interviewer makes it possible to achieve this constructed knowledge. This is the reason behind the use of the semi-structured interview in this empirical research.

5.3 Design of the data collection and analysis

5.3.1 The structure of the interview

As the method of research will be a semi-structured interview, the interview questionnaire will be a combination of a structured and focused interview questionnaire. The concept “semi-structured” presupposes that there is a more or less structured list of questions to be discussed. Mason (2002, p.69) claims that, data cannot be collected in a wholly unstructured way since the decisions and judgements that the researcher makes give a certain structure and purpose to the data generation process.

The sequencing of questions will not be wholly structured. There will be the possibility of probing in order to achieve depth and clarity. Moreover, this research is taking place 30 years after the LPA was issued and 10 years after NEPAD. Certain participants could find it difficult to remember some aspects of the “story” of these plans. To deal with this challenge that might be caused by ageing, it could be necessary to give them the main interview questions in advance in order to refresh their memories.

The overall structure of the interview will be as follows: introduction, questions, and conclusion. The following figure (Fig 5-1) gives a schematic representation of the interview.
5.3.2 Interview questionnaire

The interview questionnaire will have three parts. The first part consists of introductory preliminaries, namely, the self-introduction of the interviewer, the explanation of the research being carried out, and also the terms and conditions that will apply to the interview (informed consent, confidentiality, the duration of the interview, and the recording of the interview data).
The second part will consist of five research questions. The first question inquires about the background of how each plan emerged. The aim of this question is to establish what prompted the respective plans as well as the fundamental assumptions made by the architects of these plans.

The second question inquires about whether the interviewees were aware of the theories that informed either of the respective plans being investigated and whether in the knowledge they had of these theories, they were aware of their cultural underpinnings.

The third question investigates the extent to which dependency and neoclassical liberal theories of economic development have been used to inform the LPA and NEPAD respectively. Up till now, in the theoretical section I have argued that the philosophical basis of the two plans is not African, by relying on my reading of the documented texts of these plans as well as the related literature. The aim of this question, therefore, is to establish whether architects of the two plans share this view. The question will also clarify the issue of what was appealing in the theories that prompted the architects to consider them as grounds for African strategies of economic development.

The fourth question concerns the link between culture and economic development. It seeks to establish whether the architects of the two plans were aware of this link and how they dealt with it. It will also solicit their views about the cultural foundations of economic development.

The fifth question is the application of the preceding question to the two respective plans for economic development. It is the question of whether the respective plans could be regarded as corroborations of the African value system. It fulfils a double objective. The first objective is to investigate the issue of how the architects of the two plans respectively respond to the concern that African cultural values might not have been taken seriously in the two strategies for Africa’s economic development. The second objective is to discuss with these architects whether adapting development policies to the African value system could advance the cause of Africa’s quest for economic development.

The third part is the conclusion of the interview. I will first give the interviewees the opportunity to make final comments or to ask questions if they have any. I will also express my appreciations to the interviewees for their involvement in the research. The interviewees will
also be informed that there will be a follow-up of the interview in which they can make observations and comments on the write-up of the data.

In the box is the skeleton of the interview to be conducted.

**Box 5. 1: Interview questionnaire**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LPA INTERVIEWEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. Introduction:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Self-introduction of the interviewee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Brief explanation of the research being carried out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Terms and conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. Research questions:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Could you give me some background about how the LPA emerged?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Was the dependency theory known to you at the time you worked on the LPA?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The LPA is perceived to be a classic interpretation of the dependency theory in the African development planning. To what extent is this the case?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Is culture (as a system of beliefs and values that structure the identity of a given people) related to economic development?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Did you consider the LPA to be a true expression of what Africans believe and value?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. Concluding the interview:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Final comments by the interviewee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Expression of appreciation by the researcher and explanation of how the interview will be followed up.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NEPAD INTERVIEWEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. Introduction:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Self-introduction of the interviewee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Brief explanation of the research being carried out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Terms and conditions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. Research questions:
1. Could you give me some background about how NEPAD emerged?
2. Was the neoliberal economic theory known to you at the time you worked on the NEPAD document?
3. NEPAD is perceived to be a classic interpretation of the neoliberal theory in African development planning. To what extent is this the case?
4. Is culture (as a system of beliefs and values that structure the identity of a given people) related to economic development?
5. Would you consider NEPAD to be a true expression of what Africans believe and value?

VI. Conclusion of the interview:
1. Final comments by the interviewee
2. Expression of appreciation by the researcher and explanation of how the interview will be followed up.

5.3.3 Sampling

The choice of interviewees will follow a non-probability sampling method. According to Henry (1999, p.104), the characteristic of the non-probability sampling method is the subjective judgment of the researcher in the selection of the interviewees. Creswell calls it purposeful sampling in which the researcher selects individuals for the study because they can purposefully inform an understanding of the research problem being investigated. The decision has to be made about who should be sampled (Creswell, 2007, p.125). There are at least six types of non-probability sampling.

The first is the convenience sampling in which individuals are selected on the basis of their availability for the study.

The second is the most similar/dissimilar cases in which cases are selected based on whether they represent similar conditions or, alternatively, very different conditions. Miles and Huberman (1994, p.28) refer to this type of sampling as confirming or disconfirming cases. One of the objectives of this type of sampling is to elaborate on the initial analysis.
The third is the *typical cases* in which cases are selected according to whether they are known to be useful. This type of sampling is also known as criterion sampling, as the individuals included in the study meet some criterion, in particular the criterion of usefulness for quality assurance.

The fourth is *critical cases* in which cases are selected according to whether they are key or essential for overall acceptance or assessment.

The fifth is *snowball* in which initial group members identify additional members to be included in the sample.

Finally, the sixth is *quota* sampling which presupposes a stratified population. Each stratum is represented in the interview on a proportional basis. The researcher selects a sample that yields the same proportions on the ground of easily identified variables.

These types of sampling do not necessarily exclude one another. It is possible to have a sampling type that combines the advantages found in one or the other particular type. Thus the sampling used in this research will be structured as follows. It will be partly typical cases in so far as the interviewees will be chosen on the grounds of their usefulness and the fact that they meet the criterion of having worked on either of the plans of development being studied. It will be partly critical cases as the interviewees will be selected depending on the central role they played in either plan of development, the LPA or NEPAD. It will also be partly quota since the number of interviewees will have to be the same in both plans of development in order to give them equal chance in the process data collection. In each plan, interviewees will consist of economists and non-economists in equal proportion. The table below (Table 5-1) gives a picture of how the sample will be structured.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-1: The structure of the research sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This sample may seem very small for data collection. But two interviewees per category is the minimum that can be considered. Furthermore, the aim of the semi-structured interview is to arrive at a deeper understanding rather than breadth of information. To achieve this depth the selection criterion of interviewees will be the fact of having been part of the technical group that played a role in the reflection and deliberation that gave birth to either of the plans. More interviewees will be added where required in order to achieve data saturation.

5.3.4 Interviewing, recording and processing

5.3.4.1 The interview and its recording

The data collection will be done using face-to-face personal interviews. However, where this is not possible at all, the telephone or online interviewing will be used. An informed consent package will be sent to interviewees beforehand. The package will consist of the information about the nature of the study being carried out and its objectives, the procedure to be followed and the consent form itself.

The interview will be recorded by means of a digital recorder. During the interview, I will also take some field notes, noting particularly those aspects such as body language, which escapes the digital recording. The length of each interview will be approximately 60 minutes. However, it could be extended to more or less 90 minutes depending on the interaction between the interviewee and the researcher.

5.3.4.2 The underlying philosophy that will guide data analysis and interpretation

According to Rubin and Rubin (2005, p.19), there are two major philosophies that inform how research, data analysis, and interpretation have to be conducted, namely: positivism and interpretative constructivism. Positivism assumes that knowledge is objectively out there and can be accessed unambiguously and accurately. It imitates the ways of the natural sciences and suggests that social sciences should use the methods of the natural sciences.
Social scientists with a positivist bent tend to formulate rigorous hypotheses that can be tested and retested, and use quantitative techniques such as computer simulation, scaling and statistical analyses. In the process of the measurement, the positivist researchers are said to be neutral to such an extent that they can claim not to affect what is observed or measured.

However, this approach to data analysis and interpretation does not provide a clear account of the fact-value differentiation. It is true that the social scientists have to confront the issue of what “is”, that is, facts that substantiate their claims in their search for truth. Since they are dealing with human beings in society, factuality has to be transcended in view of what ought to be, that is, value (Bailey, 1982, p.7). In effect, the factuality of human acts does not give us an account of whether these acts are a result of human free will or whether they are simply a pure product of social laws.

Instead, interpretative constructionism assumes that knowledge does not exist outside the perceiver, as if it is waiting to be discovered as an objective truth (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p.25). This may sound as if one is conceding to certain epistemological scepticism and relativism, but this is not what is meant here. Rather it is the issue of the neutrality of the researcher. In effect, in interpretative constructionist philosophy, since the researchers are humans and not automatons, they affect research findings.

As far as the duality of fact-value is concerned, for the constructivist researchers, how people view objects or events and the meaning they attribute to them is very important. Thus, they try to elicit the interviewees’ views of the world, their work, events and life experience, economic and political interests, and shared meaning. Rubin and Rubin (2005, p.29) claim that researchers do not need to drop their cultural assumptions for them to comply with those of the interviewees. Nevertheless, the constructivist researchers have to be cautious that their cultural assumptions do not get in the way and prevent them from hearing the meaning of what the interviewees say. Gergen (1999, p.50) suggests that:

The ability to get into the world of someone who does not share one’s own lenses requires an ability to first recognise and then suspend one’s own cultural assumptions long enough to see and understand another’s.
Interpretative constructionism is appropriate for the qualitative research. Since this research is qualitative with semi-structured interviews as the instrument of data collection, it will be guided by interpretative constructivism which resonates with the philosophical perspective as the research design of the overall research.

5.3.4.3 Data processing and interpretation

The proper data processing and interpretation begin with transcription and organising of the collected data (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973; Welman et al., 2005, p. 211; Gibbs, 2007, p.11). In this research, the data collection and analysis of interviews will follow the scheme proposed by Kvale (1996, p.189) who argues that the analysis runs through from description to interpretation. This process is referred to as “interpreting as you go” (Kvale, 2007, p.102). Many social researchers praise Kvale’s approach as it entails “craftsmanship” in the research process (Henning et al., 2004, p.146ff; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006, ch.10). Moreover, Silverman (2010, p.221) and Merriam (2009, p.171) argue that data analysis should not only happen after data have been gathered. Data should be analysed as they are being gathered. My approach to data processing and interpretation will consist of the six steps suggested by Kvale (1996, p.189): bringing the interviewees to describe their lived world; bringing the interviewees to discover and see new meaning in their experience during the interview; condensing and interpreting during the interview; transcription and interpretation of the interview material; re-interview, and action. I shall briefly consider each step in turn.

1. Bringing the interviewees to describe their lived world during the interview will create the possibility of prompting them to interpret and explain.

2. Bring the interviewees to relate their experience of policymaking or planning to the issue of African cultural values, and how they respond to the concern that the impasse of economic development in Africa owes much to the fact that the cultural dimension has not been taken seriously in Africa’s plans of development.
3. Condensing and interpreting what the interviewees describe will enable me to send back the meaning, thus giving them the opportunity to freely reply as required by the nature of the in-depth interview. This interaction is geared to achieving a self-correcting interview so as to avoid any doubt that could arise later.

4. Data transcription and interpretation. First, the data transcription will consist in converting the recorded data into write-ups. According to Mason (2002:78) there are three ways of transcribing data, namely: literal, interpretative and reflexive transcriptions. The literal transcription is the exact or factual transcription of what took place. It has the advantage of attempting to give an overall picture of what took place in the interview. However, this is hardly possible since such transcription presupposes that there can be no missing data, or areas of vagueness and uncertainty. Moreover certain utterances or gestures cannot be translated into written language. The interpretative transcription consists in reproducing the interview from what the researcher thinks the interviewees mean. The problem is that the interpreter runs the risk of imposing some meaning which is different from that of the interviewees. Epistemologically, the interpretative transcription substantiates the fact that knowledge is constructed rather than discovered. In the reflexive transcription the researchers have to refer to their shaping role in the interview and its outcome.

This research will utilise all three types of transcription. Literal transcription will be used to some extent as the recorded data will be transcribed as accurately as possible in order to capture the interview data. However, since the guiding philosophy of the data analysis and interpretation will be an interpretative constructionism, the emphasis will be more on interpretative and reflexive transcription. This will involve paying attention to key words, concepts, and the message of the interviewees. Indeed, as Gibbs (2007, pp.10-11) argues, even transcription is itself an interpretative process, a creative activity, and not just a mechanical reproduction which represents the beginning of the analysis.

5. Control of data: After the transcription, the write-up will be sent to the interviewees for comments and further elaboration of their original statements. This is referred to as the re-interview.
6. **Action:** The interpretation will consist of themes identification, coding, and analysis. This process can be done manually or computer assisted. In this research, the analysis will be done manually rather than computer assisted. According to Gibbs (2007, p.2), the computer helps with the office processes, but does not do the thinking. Thinking involves a hermeneutical task which the computer cannot do.

The theme identification consists of identifying key words or statements referred to as themes which sum up segments of the transcript. Rubin and Rubin (2005, p.207) argue that themes explain in a summary style what is going on. For Welman et al. (2005, p.211), themes serve as “umbrella” constructs of the interview. These themes are later subjected to analysis and interpretation.

The theme identification will be followed by coding. According to Rubin and Rubin (2007, p.219), coding consists of allocating labels or codes to each data unit where the matching themes appear. These codes can be words, numbers or symbols placed in the margin of the transcript or after the text segment being coded (Merriam, 2009, p.173, Flick, 2009, p.309). They help to locate themes that have the same content so as to analyse and make sense of the collected data (Welman et al., 2005, p.214).

According to Gray (2009, pp.495-496), in qualitative analysis there are no hard or fast rules for how data should be coded. In fact, there are various ways of coding. The most influential approach to coding is suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998). It consists of open, axial and selective coding central to the grounded theory. However, I have chosen to use the coding process proposed by Welman et al., (2005, p.214) in so far as it is practical and will serve the purpose of this research. It consists of six types of coding, four of which will be used in my analysis: descriptive codes which involve attributing a theme category to a segment of the text with little or no interpretation; interpretative codes which relate to the explanations or motives behind certain information; pattern codes which connect various sections of the interview in order to create meaning; and reflective remarks which reflect certain aspects of the interviewee’s nonverbal behaviour and its interpretation by the interviewer.
The final step will be the analysis of coded data. This will consist in close examination, grouping and comparing themes in order to see their connections and eventual patterns which will lead towards an integrated analysis and interpretation.

The continuum of description and interpretation will be extended to include action which will include relating and harmonising the interview findings with the conclusions reached in the earlier theoretical reflection.

5.3.5 Validity and reliability of the methods and research findings

The crucial question is how to ensure that the data collected and its analysis are accurate and consistent. This question has to do with the validity and the reliability of the method of data collection, the data analysis and interpretation.

5.3.5.1 Validity and measures taken to ensure validity at different stages

According to Robson (1993, p.66; cf. Welman et al., 2005, p.142), validity is concerned with whether the findings are really about what they appear to be about. Singleton et al., (1993, p.115) talk of validity in terms of matching, congruence, or the goodness of fit between, for instance the operational definition and the concept it purports to measure. Thus, validity means truthfulness or accuracy. For Neuman (2000, p.171) and Silverman (2010, p.275), validity means truthful. This raises the question of what is truth. There are three classic accounts of truth, namely the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic accounts.

In the correspondence account, a proposition (p) is true if it states a fact. There is a correspondence or conformity between the proposition (p) and fact or reality in the world. In the coherence account, a proposition (p) is true if it coheres or fits within other propositions already accepted as true. In the pragmatic account, a proposition (p) is true if it is verified in its practical outcomes. The truthfulness of a proposition is in its efficiency or applicability.

Each of these accounts has its strengths and flaws, but a discussion of these would be outside the scope of this research. Instead, I will briefly justify the marginal use of the correspondence account leading to a preference for the coherence and pragmatic accounts. Although the
correspondence account may play a certain role for factual information, it will not be central in this research which relies on interpretative constructionism. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p.247) name three weaknesses of the correspondence account which lead to a preference for the coherence and pragmatic accounts in this research.

Firstly, the correspondence account of truth is weakened by Popper’s thought which shifts the emphasis from verification to falsification (see Popper, 1959). Valid knowledge is not that which corresponds to objective reality, but rather that which is defensible. True or valid knowledge becomes that which is defended against falsification attempts. For Kvale and Brinkmann (2009:249), such validity depends on the quality of craftsmanship during the investigation, as the researcher is continually checking, questioning, and interpreting the findings.

Secondly, the correspondence account of truth is weaker vis-à-vis the social construction of reality which lays emphasis on the discourse of the community. In the community discourse, truthful knowledge is constructed through dialogue which may involve conflicting interpretations. The harmonisation of these interpretations requires the coherence account for them to form a whole that is acceptable to the community.

Thirdly, the correspondence account plays a secondary role vis-à-vis the pragmatic account. In the correspondence account, knowledge relies on external justification for it to be valid. External justification of knowledge could be open to certain questions such as “And so what?” or “Why” which require answers beyond factuality. One of these answers is the applicability which is the ability to perform actions whereby even values can be accounted for. Applicability becomes the criterion of validity.

In this research, the quality of craftsmanship, the social construction of knowledge and applicability as a justification of valid knowledge require that validity be considered holistically. Thus, validity will be verified at different steps of the interview process. To achieve this objective, I will follow Kvale’s suggestion that the validity of interview research runs through from the thematising to the reporting. Mishler (1990), Maxwell (2005) and Flick (2009) agree with Kvale when they argue that validity is a process rather than a state, a goal and not a product. Henning et al., (2004), Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006) and Merriam (2009) have praised Kvale’s approach to validity arguing that, indeed, it reflects the quality
craftsmanship. However, I will concentrate on validity in four stages that are crucial in all empirical research, namely: interviewing, transcribing, analysis, and validation.

1. **Interviewing**

Validity pertains to the accuracy of the participant’s response and the quality of the interviewing itself. This entails two things: careful questioning and the quality of the information being gathered. As far as the questioning is concerned, questions will be concise and precise. Ambiguous, vague and undefined words, unclear phrasing in questions will be avoided as far as possible. The concepts such as culture and the nature of the link between culture and economic development will be clearly defined and clarified for the interviewees in order to ensure that the information being gathered is germane to these concepts, and thus achieves face validity. Face validity has to do with whether a given instrument of measurement is measuring what is meant to be measured (see Neuman, 2000, p.164); but also whether this is achieved adequately (Bailey, 1982, p.70). I am aware that face validity has the problem of assuming the content of a measure rather than proving it. Gray et al. (2007, p.67) rightly argues that one can never be sure of the obvious. Indeed what seems obvious could easily lead to illusions rather than the reality. Yet, the face validity seems to appeal to intuition which allows both the interviewer and the interviewee to make an “inference to the best explanation” since in the interview process there may be no documented sources at hand to rely on.

2. **Transcribing**

This has to do with the quality of conversion of the interview from oral to written language. There are many factors that may hamper this conversion, such as inaudible utterances, or unexpected defects of the recording instrument. Effort will be made to ensure an accurate transcription. This effort involves the use of reliable recording equipment to ensure a proper collection of interview data; transcribing the recorded data soon after the interview so as to retrieve through fresh memory unclear data in the digitally-recorded account; and finally, taking note of my own observations, interpretations and experiences of the interview so as to use them as supplements to both the digitally-recorded and memory data (cf. Mason, 2002, p.77).
3. Analysis

At this stage, validity concerns the mining of the data transcribed and the issue of whether the logic of the interpretation is sound. Concerning the data mining, to achieve the validity of data analysis, I will make sure that the processes of data analysis are carefully followed. These include theme identification, coding, categorising and interpretation of the data. As far as the interpretation is concerned, the validity will be assessed according to whether the findings shed light and clarity on the issue of the link between the African value system and the plans for economic development being investigated. This is what is referred to as pragmatic validity: the validity assessed in terms of the effectiveness or the applicability of the analysis.

4. Validation

This concerns the strategies to prove that the findings are valid. Merriam (2007) outlines four strategies used to ensure the validity before reporting, namely triangulation, member check, peer/colleagues examination, and the researcher’s experience. Triangulation is the use of multiple sources of data or methods to confirm the emerging findings. Member checks consists of taking the data collected and their interpretations back to the people from whom they were derived and asking them whether the interpretation is valid. Peer/colleagues examination consists of asking colleagues to examine one’s data or to comment on the plausibility of the emerging findings. The statement of the researcher’s experience concerns the recognition of the researcher’s assumptions, biases, and orientation.

In this research, only member checks will be used and will consist of the re-interview, or the participants’ validation (Reason & Rowan, 1981; Fielding & Fielding, 1986; Gibbs, 2007). Member checks can be understood as the communication of knowledge in the process of ensuring validity (Kvale, 1996, p.240, see also 2009; Merriam, 2009). The transcribed data will be sent to the participants for further elaboration of their earlier statements and comments. Their reactions will be used to refine the analysis and interpretation to increase validity (Fielding & Fielding, 1986, p.43; Gibbs, 2007, p.43).
The table below (Table 5-2) gives a summary of the measures taken to ensure validity at different stages of the interview.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Interviewing| Concise and precise questions  
Averting ambiguous, vague, undefined words, unclear phrasing in questions  
Defining and clarifying key concepts to achieve face validity |
| Transcription| Use of reliable recording equipment  
Note-taking during the interview  
Transcription of oral data soon after the interview |
| Analysis    | Following consistently the processes of data analysis: theme identification, coding, categorisation and interpretation  
Coherence with the overall research |
| Validation  | Member checking (re-interview) |

I shall now turn to the criterion of reliability.

### 5.3.5.2 Reliability and measures taken to ensure reliability at different steps

Reliability refers to consistency, stability, dependability and trustworthiness of the research findings (Singleton et al., 1993, p.114; Neuman, 2000, p.170, Merriam, 2009, p.221). Research findings are reliable, i.e consistent or dependable if they can “stand up to the closest scrutiny” (Raimond, 1993, p.55). One important aspect of this “close scrutiny” is replication, that is, whether “a research finding can be repeated” (Welman et al., 2005, p.145). If, for instance, in the case of the semi-structured interview, the interviewees were asked the same questions in different circumstances and time, and the same findings were obtained, these findings could be regarded as reliable.

To ensure reliable findings, the process itself that leads to the findings has to be reliable. According to Neuman (2000, p.368, cf. Gibbs, 2007, p. 3), reliability depends on a researcher’s insight, awareness, suspicion and questions. For Flick (2009, p.387), reliability in qualitative research comes down to the need for explication of the genesis of the data as well as the procedures followed. These aspects are particularly important in the three stages of research where reliability has to be accounted for, namely: interviewing, transcribing and analysis (Kvale, 1996, p. 235).
I. Interviewing

In interviewing, the first element that has to be reliable is the questionnaire (Bailey, 1982, p.73). Faulty or ambiguous questions lead to ambiguous and inconsistent answers. To avoid, or at least to minimise this source of inconsistency, I shall try to make the interview questions as clear and simple to understand as possible. Probes will be used to ensure that clear questions yield consistent answers (see Babbie, 1998, p.152).

Furthermore, the issue of culture in economic development as well as Africa’s economic development are contentious and may arouse emotions. I shall avoid sensitive and emotional questions that could lead to errors, non-responses to certain questions, and emotional answers that could undermine the objectivity of the research.

Other aspects undermining consistency in interviewing include the environment where the interview is being held, uncontrolled personal factors in the interviewee such as fatigue, the relationship between the interviewee and the interviewer, unexpected equipment failure and inaudible answers. Some of these aspects are not easy to deal with. For limitations pertaining to the interviewee, Bailey (1982, p.194) suggests that the interviewer be adaptable, friendly, and responsive. This involves encouraging the interviewees through feedback, support, and praise which could shape an atmosphere that is stimulating so as to gain detailed answers and consistent information. The limitations pertaining to the misunderstanding of answers of the interviewee will be minimised by the re-interview. To prevent unexpected equipment failure, recording equipments will be tested beforehand. I will also take some notes and pay sufficient attention during the interview.

2. Data transcription

The second area where reliability is crucial is in the data transcription from the tape recorder to the written text. Earlier, I indicated that the transcription will be a combination of literal, interpretative and reflective types of transcription. Bailey (1982, p.76) argues that inconsistent information may be recorded due to missing or illegible data. But the interpretative and reflexive aspects of transcription could mistake certain valuable information of interviewees. To limit the shortcomings due to recording, I will take notes of my own observations in the
interview process. The re-interview will help to limit certain inconsistencies which might have escaped the recording or the transcription.

3. Data analysis

The third area where reliability has to be considered is in the data analysis. Certain sources of inconsistency in data analysis include the misinterpretation of data, drawing incorrect conclusions from data, or saying that the data shows something it does not show due to the researcher’s bias. To minimise such inconsistencies, Merriam (2007) suggests triangulation, peer examination, keeping of an audit trail which, according to Guba and Lincoln (1989) and Richards (2005) consist of describing how the research has been conducted. This research does not require triangulation to prove the data accuracy. Instead of peer examination, member checking will be used which will include the interviewees’ comments and elaboration on their earlier statements made during the interview. This process will ensure that the data being analysed is reliable. For the audit trail, I will provide an account of how data has been collected and analysed.

The following table (Table 5-3) gives a summary of the measures taken to ensure reliability at different stages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviewing</td>
<td>Clear and simple questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Probing in search of clarity and depth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avoiding sensitive and emotional questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adaptability, friendliness, and responsiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Testing recording equipment prior to interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Note taking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcribing</td>
<td>Recording and note taking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combination of literal, interpretative and reflective transcription</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Re-interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data analysis</td>
<td>Audit trail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Re-interview (member checking)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3.6 Ethical issues in the research process

Merriam (2009, p.209) argues that ensuring validity and reliability in qualitative research involves conducting the investigation in an ethical manner. Similarly, Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p.62) see an interview inquiry as a moral enterprise. Both Mason (2007, pp.79ff), and Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) argue that moral issues arise at every stage of the research. I will focus on three stages in which common ethical issues such as voluntary participation, harm to the participants, anonymity/confidentiality, and scientific responsibility arise (cf. Babbie, 1995, pp.448ff), namely: interview situation, analysis and validation.

1. Interview situation

The interview could involve fatigue, stress, or fear of giving certain information that might compromise the interviewee’s relations. For the interviews to proceed, I will require the participants’ informed consent. The consent letter will be approved and obtained from the University of Pretoria. The interviewees will be informed about the nature of the research, and its objectives, as well as the objective of their participation. The interviewees will also be informed that they will be given a transcript of the interview data for their approval as well as the guarantee of confidentiality and anonymity.

Patton (1990, pp. 353-354; cf. Welman et al., 2005, p.201) states that interviews are interventions which may involve fatigue and stress. These will be dealt with through time management so as to minimise the interviewee’s fatigue, a quiet place for the interview to minimise discomfort, as well as conducting the interview in a way that could minimise tension and stress. This will involve inter alia friendliness and responsiveness (see Patton, 2002, p.375).

2. Analysis

Two major ethical issues arise in analysis, namely: the scientific quality of the analysis, and whether the interviewees should have a say as to how their statements are interpreted. The latter will be taken care of, at least partly, by the re-interview in which interviewees will be allowed to make further comments and elaboration on their earlier statements. However, the former is problematic because it involves many things such as the integrity of the researcher,
honesty, and achieving a balance between the ethical and the scientific. This is the scientific and moral responsibility of the researcher held together. It is not easy to respond to these ethical aspects. However, as a researcher, I commit myself to the scientific and ethical quality of the research being undertaken. This commitment involves avoiding interpretations that are inconsistent with the available data.  

3. Validation

This has to do with the responsibility of the researcher to report verified and consistent knowledge. This will require openness to the interviewees’ reactions in the re-interview process and a commitment not to accord a privileged status to these reactions when they should be treated as just another source of data.

The table below (Table 5-4) gives a summary of the ethical implications and measures taken to deal with them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages</th>
<th>Ethical implications</th>
<th>Measures to deal with them</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview situation</td>
<td>Possible harm (in case the information the interviewees give compromises their relations with institutions or certain people), stress, and fatigue;</td>
<td>Obtaining the participants’ informed consent; Quiet place for interviews; time management, friendliness and responsiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>The quality of the analysis, the honesty, fairness, and integrity of the researcher; balance between ethical and scientific responsibility, Interviewees should have a say as to how their statements are interpreted;</td>
<td>Commitment to scientific and ethical quality; Avoiding interpretation that are inconsistent with the data; Re-interview.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validation</td>
<td>Responsibility to report knowledge that is secure, verified, and unquestionable.</td>
<td>Openness to the interviewees’ reactions in the re-interview process; Judgment in the treatment of these reactions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the various aspects that constitute the methodology of this empirical research. To reiterate, this empirical research will consist of engaging with the policymakers who have masterminded the two strategies, the LPA and NEPAD in order to gather their views on the link between African cultural values and plans of economic development. The various aspects discussed include the method of data collection and its rationale, the validity and reliability of the collected data and findings, and also the ethical issues involved and how they will be dealt with.

The next chapter presents the data findings of the empirical research and their comparison with the previous theoretical reflection.
6 CHAPTER SIX

THE CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS REFLECTED BY THE ARCHITECTS OF THE LPA AND NEPAD

This chapter consists of four sections. The first section provides an overview of the interview with the architects of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD); the second section presents the findings; the third section compares these findings with the earlier theoretical conclusion; and finally, the fourth section is the conclusion.

6.1 The interview process

The interviews were conducted with a selection of the architects who played a role in the design of the LPA and NEPAD respectively. This was done in accordance with the methodological guidelines outlined in Chapter Five of this research. The sample which, earlier, consisted of four people for each of the two plans was extended to five in the case of NEPAD to ensure data saturation.

Recruiting participants for interviews was not easy in terms of time required to complete the interviews and gaining access to participants. It was hard to find people who had designed the LPA thirty years after it was issued. Some names were found thanks to the help of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Addis Ababa. Among those who were found, some had forgotten certain aspects of the LPA as a result of working on so many other strategies of development since - some of which tended to contradict the LPA. These people were reluctant to be interviewed. Others were weighed down by age and could not be interviewed either. Some of those who are still active had a very busy schedule, which made it impossible to interview them. Of 20 people contacted, seven responded and only four made themselves available for interviews. It took more or less eight months to interview 4 people and to obtain further comments on the transcripts of their interviews.
Concerning NEPAD, despite my proximity to its secretariat in Midrand (Johannesburg), it was not easy to identify and have access to the people who designed it either. None of the people contacted at the NEPAD office responded. Beside some bureaucratic problems, the busy schedules of people contacted were an obstacle. Of 18 people contacted, eleven responded, and five were interviewed. This process took nine months.

It was planned that the participants to the research would include both economists and non-economists to diversify the points of view on the link between culture and economic development. This categorisation was not followed systematically as most people contacted did not make themselves available for interviews as expected. In the case of LPA where this has been possible, it was a matter of pure chance rather than the result of prior design.

The interview protocol consisted of five open-ended questions:

1. background about how LPA/NEPAD emerged;

2. awareness of the dependency/neo-liberal economic theory at the time the LPA/NEPAD document was being designed;

3. whether LPA/NEPAD is a classic interpretation of the dependency/neo-liberal theory in African development planning;

4. whether culture (as a system of beliefs and values that structure the people’s identity) is related to economic development;

5. whether LPA/NEPAD could be considered as a true expression of what Africans believe and value.

Since the research concerned plans of economic development that date back to quite a long time ago, the interview questions were sent to participants beforehand (Greef, 2005, p. 295). This helped the interviewees to recall certain aspects of the debate which prevailed during the design of the plans on which they had worked and to link these with the research being conducted.
The interview process was flexible. Questions were adapted according to the responses given by the participants while obtaining the cooperation and achieving the rapport required by the research (Neuman, 2000, p.276; Welman, et al., 2005, p.200). Depending on answers given, the researcher could judge whether it was necessary to ask the next question in the list. In a number of cases, interviewees answered question 2 along with question 3 of the question list. This is in line with what Neuman (2000, p.371) says: “The questions and the order in which they are asked are tailored to specific people and situations.”

To ensure reliability, probes and follow-up questions were extensively used in accordance with the objectives of the research and the methodological guidelines outlined in Chapter Five. However, they varied from interviewee to interviewee. According to Greef (2005, p.293), probes are introduced when “responses lack sufficient detail, depth or clarity”. This leads the interviewer to follow up with a probe to complete or clarify the answer, or to request further examples or evidence. Requests for further explanation or clarification were put to the interviewee to elaborate on why and/or how a particular situation was the case.

Follow-up questions are aimed at pursuing the implications of answers to the main questions (Greef, 2005, p.294). In the process of interviewing, the common follow-up questions included, where appropriate, asking whether the architects of the LPA/NEPAD were aware of the cultural basis of the dependency theory/ the neoliberal theory of economic development, the extent to which the link between culture and economic development was considered in a particular plan of development.

More so, where appropriate, the question “whether adapting strategies of economic development to African value system would advance the cause of economic development” was asked. There was a situation whereby the follow-up question was not just linked with the answer given by the interviewee, but was also a follow-up of a perspective given by a previous interviewee. In the case of NEPAD, a view emerged that this plan is informed by the developmental state paradigm. According to Woo-Cummings (1999, p.1; see also Wade, 1990; Johnson, 1999; Handley, 2008, p. 15), the developmental state model of economic development is particularly prevalent in East Asia. Following the spectacular economic growth referred to as the East Asian Miracle (World Bank, 1993), certain African countries such as Rwanda and Ethiopia tried to emulate this Asian development model. Thus, one
The interviewee was asked whether NEPAD had not been influenced by the Asian experience of development.

The process of interviewing included face-to-face as well as telephonic (including Skype) interviews and was recorded by means of a digital voice recorder. There was one case in which the recording was not allowed by the institution where the participant works. In this case, extensive field notes were taken and the transcript was sent to the interviewee to make additions and clarifications where appropriate, as well as to allow for further comments.

There were two LPA cases where face-to-face or telephonic interviews were not possible because of the availability of the participants. A questionnaire was sent to these participants via email and the response collected by the same means. This way of collecting data had limitations as there was no opportunity for immediate probing or follow-up questions for greater depth and clarity. In this case, the solution opted for was to follow-up the participants’ answers through requesting further comments and elaboration by emails. This solution was successful in one case; however, the other participant did not give any feedback.

Although the questionnaire was in English, one LPA participant preferred to answer in French which is a language the interviewee was comfortable with. The answers were translated by the researcher and a copy of the transcript sent to the participant for approval and further comments.

The transcription of interviews used the three types of transcription discussed in Chapter Five, namely: literal, interpretative and reflective transcription. The literal transcription captured accurately the interview data as expressed by the interviewee. However, this literal transcription was not a mechanical reproduction of the recorded interview. The interpretative and reflective transcription helped to express creatively in complete sentences the message encapsulated in certain words, concepts, or ideas which the interviewees had expressed in incomplete sentences. Repeated words were expressed once in the transcript. In this case, attention was paid to certain words repeated as a result of typical verbal communication and those repeated to emphasise a point. The transcripts were sent to the respective interviewees for further comments and elaboration. This process served to ensure on their part that the interpretative and reflective transcription conveyed the message recorded by the voice recorder.
The validity was ensured in the spirit of knowledge as a social construction. To ensure the quality of information, questions were concise and precise. During the interview, certain participants requested clarification about the meaning of culture, neo-liberal theory of development as these are complex and could be confusing. These were clarified. One participant felt uncomfortable that the researcher talked of economic development rather than development which is more comprehensive. This participant was informed about the various dimensions of development, but that the focus of the research was on economic development.

After the transcription, the data of each interview was coded by attributing theme categories to segments of the text according to the information they provided to research questions. The theme categories from different interviews were then compared among themselves, first according to the meaning they made for each of the two plans of development, and then according to the meaning they gave to the overall research. This way of proceeding responds to two of the three objectives of the overall research, namely,

- a critical assessment of the major African strategies of economic development against the backdrop of theories which are alleged to have informed them and their cultural assumptions; and

- an investigation of the relationship between African cultural values and economic development and the extent to which the neglect of Africa’s value system in Africa’s economic policymaking and planning could jeopardise development plans.

I shall now outline the findings obtained. In the following sections, the LPA participants will be identified by the letter ‘L’ and those of NEPAD by the letter ‘N’.

6.2 Research findings

On the awareness and appreciation of the two theories of economic development

The research sought first to investigate the extent to which the architects of the LPA and NEPAD were aware of and appreciated the dependency and neoliberal theories respectively. As it will be demonstrated below, the extent differs from plan to plan, and from participant to participant.
On the awareness and appreciation of the dependency theory

With different emphasis, the LPA participants claimed that the architects of the LPA were aware of and appreciated dependency theory. They provided two reasons to support the claim.

The first reason was the prominence and popularity of the dependency theory. “The dependency theory was prominent among certain African scholars and leaders” (#2L). These leaders and scholars appreciated “the ideas of Raoul Prebisch, in particular the idea of centre-periphery” (#1L). The dependency theory “was a kind of populist approach that resonated very well among Africans” and “was very popular even within the media” (#4L).

The second reason was the relevance of the dependency theory. The dependency theory “gave a clear picture of how the world economy works and the place of Africa in it” (#1L). For #4L, “it [the dependency theory] reflects the concerns and needs of Africa within the context of the global economy”. #4L continues and argues that “It was premised on an African sentiment of injustice [and] exploitation”.

#3L gave a certain nuance which is not mentioned by other participants. While #3L, like the three others, affirms that the dependency theory was well-known, a point was made that “the notion of the dependency did not feature very much in theoretical terms. Instead, “it was very and clearly discussed in informal circles”. Probed to explain further why, #3L said: “Most people went as far as accusing openly the former colonisers of still having a hand on their former colonies”. Two other interviewees shed light on this matter. #4L talks of the context of the Cold War and the need of aid to implement development policies:

Maybe it is because it was a period of the Cold War. When they blamed the West, [they] could rely on Libya and the Soviet Union for support. Of course, they knew they needed aid in order to implement their policies. The West was not willing to provide them with aid as long as they were not accepting the diagnosis of the problems that came from the World Bank and IMF which can be seen as the mouthpiece of the West.
For #5N who gave a background to NEPAD by comparing it with LPA:

The LPA was developed at the height of the Cold War [...]. They wanted us to depend on them, to depend on their economy for us to continue to supply them with raw materials.

Thus, depending on the ideological trend which they followed and relied on for their aid, certain African countries could not make free critical comments in formal circles. This approach seems to have been part of a political pragmatism.

The main point is that the architects of the LPA were aware of the dependency theory and appreciated it as one which could help them to see clearly the position of Africa in the global economy and respond to it accordingly. I shall now consider the neoliberal theory.

On the awareness and appreciation of the neoliberal theory

As in the case of the dependency theory, the architects of NEPAD were aware of the neo-liberal theory. However, their appreciation of it differed from participant to participant to the extent that one feels that the people who designed NEPAD did not share one view of what could inform economic development in Africa. The participants gave three reasons to explain how the architects of NEPAD were aware of the neo-liberal theory and appreciated it.

The first reason is that,

we live in a global system with neo-liberalism as a dominant paradigm [...] reinforced by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), most world institutions, and certain world organisations (#3N).

Africa being “part of the global world [and] the global thinking” (#3N), “they [architects] needed to engage rather ignore some of these countries and institutions” (#2N).

The second reason is the need for a starting point. “[T]he neo-liberal economic understanding was important to kick-start NEPAD” (#4N). This way of proceeding is linked with the fact that “the leaders [...] were aware of what they were dealing with and the challenges they were going
to face vis-à-vis the neo-liberal approaches to development” (#2N). From this voice, one can hear voices other than neo-liberalism being expressed. According to #4N “we cannot just rely on neo-liberal economic approach to development in this part of the world” (referring to Africa). For #4N, beside the appreciation of the neo-liberal economic approach, the architects of NEPAD appreciated also the importance of “a political economic approach” as well as the importance of “a new economic approach which embraces the use of information technology (ICT)”.

While #4N talks of complementary alternatives to neo-liberal theory, #1N and #5N talk of alternatives to oppose it. This alternative consists of the notion of the developmental state. The perspective of the developmental state featured strongly in the responses of two interviewees. #1N puts it thus: “neo-liberalism is anathema to NEPAD”. For #5N, “The foundation of NEPAD was the state. The state has a political will”.

The third reason that led to the awareness and appreciation of the neo-liberal theory is the way the global economy and market work in practice. According to #3N,

> How you produce, the production as well as exports and imports are determined, if not by the World Bank, in any case by the international market.
> We are operating within a paradigm, [...] under the regime of neo-liberalism.

“[T]he leaders were not naive” about this reality (#2N).

The point that emerges from these quotes is that the architects of NEPAD were aware of the neo-liberal theory and appreciated its relevance. Unlike the dependency theory for LPA, there was a strong issue about whether the neo-liberal theory should lead the future strategy of development (NEPAD). Thus, beside the neo-liberal theory, there were alternatives suggested such as the developmental state, the political economic approach, and the economic approach centred on information technology (ICT). #5N also talked about a group of people in the debate who advocated for an agricultural economic approach, but was rather marginalised.

However, the neo-liberal voice seems to be dominant as it was expressed by #2N. There was “a lot of appreciation” to the extent that “At the end of the day, NEPAD […], was overwhelmed by the Washington Consensus” although, “in theory, that was not the intention.”
So far, I dealt with the issue of whether the architects of LPA and NEPAD were aware of the dependency and neo-liberal theories alleged to have fuelled the two plans respectively. I shall now consider whether the LPA and NEPAD can be regarded as manifestations of the dependency and neo-liberal theories respectively.

**LPA and NEPAD in relation to the two respective theories of economic development**

This theme deals with the issue of the extent to which LPA and NEPAD are expressions of the theories of economic development alleged to have informed them.

*On the extent to which LPA is an expression of the dependency theory*

The LPA interviewees affirm that LPA is an expression of the dependency theory. Two main reasons are given to explain why they regard LPA as a manifestation of the dependency theory. The two reasons flow from the awareness and appreciation which the architects of LPA had for the dependency theory.

The first reason is that the dependency theory was used as a tool of analysis for, and a response to, the way the world economy works: “[...] the dependency theory helps in the analysis and understanding of the economic situation of Africa and its position in the global economy” (#1L). For #4L, the dependency theory “was used essentially as a basis to identify the problem and offer a solution”. In the same way, interviewee #2L argues that LPA was aimed “at reducing the dependency of African economies on developed countries”.

The second reason is that the dependency theory was used to respond to Africa’s historical experience of colonisation and economic exploitation. For #2L, “LPA was essentially aimed at reducing dependency of the African economies on developed countries particularly the former colonial powers.” #3L expresses a similar view but differently: “[P]lan[s] of development [were] conceived in the West and executed according to the interests of the West rather than the interests of Africa”.

However, #2L and #3L expressed two points which give a moderate view of LPA being an interpretation of the dependency theory. As highlighted earlier, #3L pointed out that “the notion of the dependency [...] was much and clearly discussed in informal circles”. The second
point is expressed by #2L who said: “many African countries continued to rely on the two-gap model⁴⁷ that gives prominence to external capital and external aid to fill the gap for development financing”.

What can be inferred from these voices is that the dependency theory informed LPA. However, this cannot be taken in absolute terms. The fact that the dependency theory was discussed in informal circles could lead one to wonder whether there were some other alternatives that were discussed in the formal circles. None of the interviewees talked of such eventual alternatives. Nevertheless, one might presume that #2L’s two-gap model was an alternative. Yet none of the participants indicated the two-gap model as being discussed when LPA was being designed. Instead #2L’s comment has to do with the implementation of LPA. Furthermore #2L does not dispute the view that LPA is an expression of the dependency theory. In fact, #2L expresses discontent with the two-gap model that goes in the opposite direction of the dependency theory as it “gives prominence to external capital and external aid” viewed as tools used to enforce economic dependency.

I shall now turn to NEPAD and the neoliberal theory.

*On the extent to which NEPAD is an expression of the neo-liberalism*

The claim that NEPAD is an expression of the neo-liberal approach to development is not commonly shared among the interviewees. The views collected show that there was more than one paradigm proposed to the extent that it might have been difficult to reach a consensus about what exactly should inform an African policy of economic development.

The views on the impact of the neo-liberal theory on NEPAD can be classified into three sets of arguments. The first set argues that NEPAD is an interpretation of the neo-liberal approach to economic development in so far as it was the dominant paradigm that informed the global

---

⁴⁷The two-gap model is a theoretical model of foreign aid which compares savings and foreign-exchange gaps to determine which one represents a strong constraint on economic growth. The main argument of the two-gap model is that developing countries either do not have enough domestic savings for their investment or suffer from a shortage of foreign exchange to finance the imports of needed capital and other immediate goods. Both shortages have an impact on economic growth. Thus it is argued that this shortage could be resolved by aid. However, aid itself could have little or no impact on economic growth as it is determined by the recipient’s absorptive capacity, which is the ability to use that aid fund wisely and productively (Todaro & Smith, 2010, pp.732-734).
economy at the time NEPAD was initiated. Thus, for #3N, “we are operating within a paradigm, [...] under the regime of neo-liberalism”. By the same token, #4N argues that “the neo-liberal economic paradigm was useful to kick-start NEPAD”. #4N goes on to say: “We can use the neo-liberal model as long as we come to terms with it and make it work for our situations and the challenges we are faced with”.

The second set is premised on the argument that NEPAD is not an expression of the neo-liberal approach in Africa’s economic policymaking. For #5N, “NEPAD was actually premised on the paradigm of a strong state, a very active state”. #1N shared the same view, but added that this “developmental state” goes “with a private sector though”. Like the views expressed in the first set, #1N and #5N recognised the fact that “NEPAD was introduced when the neo-liberal model was dominant”. However, #5N emphasised the view of an “interventionist state” and pointed out the fact that even “developed countries everywhere are bailing out the private sector” as a result of “the financial crisis [that] shattered the whole notion of the market driving the economy”.

The third set consists of the middle way argument between the point that NEPAD expressed the neo-liberal theory and the point that NEPAD relied on the developmental state model. Yet when analysed closely, this middle way bends more in the direction of the first argument. In effect, #2N argues that “in theory, it was not the intention of the leaders to make NEPAD an interpretation of the neo-liberal model of development.” Instead, NEPAD “has fallen victim to the excesses of the international global processes”. #2N further argues that “there was a lot of appreciation” of the neo-liberal model which “at the end of the day” led NEPAD to being “overwhelmed by the Washington Consensus”.

In the case of the latter comment by #2N, one may wonder what the real intention of the architects of NEPAD was. #1N had stated that NEPAD was informed by a strong state which underlies the East Asian economies. In a probe which sought to inquire whether the architects of NEPAD were aware of the developmental state, #2N said: “I could not say whether there was influence or no influence, but the way the world works today is that every country tries to influence, manipulate or exploit the others.”
While it is clear that LPA was informed by the dependency theory, it cannot be stated categorically that NEPAD was informed by neo-liberal development model. The three arguments indicate that there were contending models of economic development of which the dominant were the neo-liberal and developmental state theories. Nevertheless, the arguments of #2N, #3N, and #4N seem to make a stronger case for the neo-liberal theory. The implication is that NEPAD is informed by the neo-liberal theory but not exclusively. The developmental state, the new political economy, the information technology approach, and the agricultural economic approach were considered, but not to the same extent as neo-liberal and developmental state models.

I shall now consider the issue of whether the architects of LPA and NEPAD were aware of the cultural assumptions of the dependency and neo-liberal theories.

On the cultural premises of the dependency and neoliberal theories

This theme concerns the issue whether the architects of LPA and NEPAD were aware of the cultural bases of the theories of economic development that informed these strategies of development respectively. The question was asked particularly to the interviewees who argued that LPA and NEPAD are interpretations of dependency and neo-liberal theories.

On the cultural basis of the dependency theory

The LPA interviewees argued that, even though certain architects were aware of the cultural premises of the dependency theory, this did not really matter. Instead, they identified two issues which were the central focus.

According to #1L, the LPA architects “were aware of the cultural basis of the dependency theory but not all though”. However, the issue was not whether the dependency theory had cultural underpinnings but rather its immediate relevance; that is, “how the use of the dependency theory helps in the analysis and understanding of the economic situation of Africa and its position in the global economy”. More so, #4L argued that the architects of the LPA “were much aware of the political and historical underpinnings of the theory rather than the cultural ones”. They drew inspiration from “the historical and political dimensions of the theory because that seemed to make more sense to a lot of them” (#4N).
Still for #4L, the fact that certain architects of the LPA were neo-Marxists contributed to not taking much interest in the cultural premises of the dependency theory: “As neo-Marxists, they put a lot of emphasis on Marxism instead of culture because of the realities of exploitation and colonialism” (#4L).

The above views indicate in implicit terms that certain architects of LPA were aware of the cultural premises of the dependency theory. The implicit terms in which this awareness is expressed indicate that the cultural basis of the dependency theory was not an issue to be concerned with. Instead the issue was the historical and political dimensions of the dependency theory and its relevance to the analysis and understanding of Africa’s situation in the global economy. Moreover, the realities of exploitation and colonialism which concerned neo-Marxists overshadowed the concern for culture and how it informs theories of development. This could explain why culture is given little space in the LPA document.

**On the cultural basis of neo-liberal theory**

The interviewees argued that the architects of NEPAD were aware of the cultural foundations of neo-liberal theory. This awareness is located in the two main areas. The first area is the education of the planners as is expressed by #3N:

> [W]here are these planners trained? What is the knowledge of these planners? Isn’t it from the same schools of those planners, I mean, those who dominate the market.

The second avenue is how Africa came to take position in the world economy. For #4N, Africa is part of the world through the colonial domination:

> They were very much aware of that [cultural basis of neo-liberalism]. The challenge with the African continent [...] which has gone through colonial domination is not to break ties completely. A country which has been part and parcel of the evolvement of another country which has colonised it, to break ties can be suicidal.
These two arguments show that the architects of NEPAD were aware of the cultural basis of the neo-liberal theory. This awareness is a result of the education of the planners and policymakers as well as Africa having been colonised by these countries where some of these planners had been trained.

The issue of the awareness of the cultural basis of the dependency and neo-liberal theories was a prelude to the issue of the extent to which the link between African culture and economic development is considered in the LPA and NEPAD. This is discussed in the next section.

**On the link between culture and economic development in LPA and NEPAD**

The views on the issue whether there is a link between culture and development do not coincide. However, most of the views support the point that culture is a basis for economic development. The table below sums up the views expressed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Link between culture and economic development as expressed by participants</th>
<th>Interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture is the basis for economic development.</td>
<td>#1L, #2L, #4L, #2N, #N3, #5N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture is the basis for economic development but differently in colonised countries.</td>
<td>#4N, #4L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural heterogeneity cannot serve as a basis for economic development.</td>
<td>#1N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture is an obstacle to economic development.</td>
<td>#3L</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the above table, there are two sets of claims. The first set consists of absolute claims opposed to each other, namely: culture is the basis of economic development, and culture is an obstacle to economic development. The second set consists of relative claims, namely: culture is the basis of economic development but differently in the colonised countries, and culture is related to economic development but not the same way everywhere (cultural heterogeneity in society). I will deal with these claims in the order in which they are presented in the table, as they range from the absolute affirmation of African culture as the basis of economic development to absolute affirmation of African culture as an obstacle to economic development.
development. It should be noted that only the participants who affirmed absolutely that culture is the basis of economic development were asked the question about the extent to which the link between culture and economic development was dealt with in the two plans. The three other groups were not asked this question as their claim that African culture cannot be the basis of economic development did not allow the researcher to do so. Furthermore, it was the link that was being pursued.

**On culture as the basis of economic development**

This is the affirmative claim that culture is the basis of economic development. In this affirmative claim, there are two different voices.

The first voice says that the architects of LPA and NEPAD recognised the value of culture for economic development, but did not employ it sufficiently or pursue it in terms of strong and concrete commitment. According to #1L, the architects of LPA “recognised the value of culture in terms of analysis, [but] the commitment was not strong”. For #2L, “culture was not dealt with explicitly and in detail in LPA” although the leaders committed themselves to ‘ensure that their development policies reflect adequately their socio-economic values in order to reinforce their cultural identity’.

The same response is evident among the NEPAD respondents:

I don’t think it [the link between culture and economic development] has been exploited that much. [...] The process is not revisited to say, let us have a thinking group around culture and development. [...] If NEPAD were further to be updated, we would have realised that, on the ground, things are culturally otherwise (#2N).

In the same way, #3N argues that, although “[it] expresses certain cultural values”, “NEPAD was not meant to articulate very clearly a cultural paradigm to development”.

The second voice claims that the link between culture and economic development is captured by certain key concepts central to the two plans respectively. According to #3L the link between culture and economic development in the LPA is reflected in “the idea of self-
sufficiency, self-reliance” as well as “regional integration [...] supposed to develop [...] what is common to Africa”. However, in responding to a probe on this issue, #3L said: “It is difficult to have an African identity to serve as a foundation of Africa’s development policy”.

#5N did not refer to key concepts of NEPAD, but instead listed some African lost ideals which should be recovered. Thus #5N claims that the link between culture and economic development in NEPAD is reflected in the affirmation that “Africa is the cradle of civilization, cradle of humankind, [...] Africa’s contribution to civilization, to culture”. However, the emphasis was shifted as #5N immediately stated that the focus of NEPAD is the sectors of development: “infrastructure, health, education, governance, and environment”, and not culture.

These views have one point in common, namely: the recognition that culture is the basis of economic development, whilst also recognising that this has not been the case in LPA and NEPAD. In other words the value of African culture for economic development was recognised in the two plans, but there was no follow through on this recognition. This lack of follow through is expressed in different ways. The first voice expresses this lack of follow through in terms of neglect. In the two plans, the African culture was neglected. The second voice expresses it in terms of “ignoring”. African culture tended to be ignored in the two plans. This conclusion can be expressed in the words of #3N: “The two plans were not made to articulate a cultural paradigm of economic development”. Thus, in the two plans, African culture tended to be ignored or neglected.

On culture as a basis of economic development but differently in colonised countries

This is the first relative claim about the link between culture and economic development. Culture is the basis for economic development but in a different way in colonised countries. According to #4L, “It is important to define the development agenda based on cultural aspirations of the people.” Accordingly, #4L was included in the group of the absolute affirmative claim. However, #4L goes on to argue that African culture cannot be made the basis of an African development agenda because “it has undergone so much transformation, influenced by the Western culture”. Most architects of African strategies of development “are alien to African culture [...]” #4N concurs:
To a certain extent there is [a link between culture and economic development]. But with countries which have been colonised, you find that the cultural behaviour of old times became very insignificant as people are educated in western universities.

In these views, the fact that culture is the basis of economic development is not disputed. Instead, what is disputed is the fact that there is no longer an African culture to serve as a basis for Africa’s economic development. In other words, the affirmation that culture is the basis of economic development is not true in Africa. Culture cannot be the basis of economic development in Africa. The reason is that colonisation and Western education have eroded African culture. One feels that these views express a discontent about what happened to African culture. African culture has been diluted. However, at the same time, one feels that such scepticism is pushed to the extreme. This kind of scepticism might have led certain architects to ignore African culture on the basis that it does not exist anymore and, henceforth they gave it little space in the plans.

Cultural heterogeneity cannot serve as basis for economic development

This is the second relative claim. Culture is related to economic development but not in the same way everywhere, within the same society. More clearly, culture is relative and cannot be made the basis of an agenda of economic development. According to #1N, “There is a division of the society into urban and rural, people who have studied and those who have not”.

In the above quote, the claim that culture is related to economic development but not in the same way everywhere, is based on the diversity or heterogeneity in the society. Seemingly, those who have moved to urban settings operate on a cultural basis other than that of the rural areas; those who have studied operate on a cultural basis other than that of those who have not. This is the same argument as that of the second claim made by #4L and #4N, in the subtheme just concluded, but applied to people within the same society. The implication of this claim is also suggestive of the little importance attached given to culture in the two plans being investigated.
On African culture as an obstacle to economic development

This sub-theme pertains to the absolute claim that African culture is an obstacle to economic development. According to #3L, “[I]n Africa, the culture of economic accumulation is not sufficiently integrated in the minds of people”

The point of the above quote is that African development cannot be premised on African culture, because Africa lacks a culture of economic accumulation. The culture of accumulation is the basis of economic development. This was also one of the arguments used in the modernisation theory to explain underdevelopment. The implication of this claim is the exclusion of African beliefs and values in the processes of economic development, even those upon which (African) production is premised. In effect, before people can think of accumulating, they have to produce more than they can consume. Production and consumption are not culture-free as it is being argued.

What can be concluded from the discussion so far is that, in the two plans, African culture has been neglected; and some architects tend to ignore it. I shall now consider the issue of whether the LPA and NEPAD are true expressions of what Africans believe and value.

On the LPA and NEPAD as corroboration of what Africans believe and value

The reactions to this issue for both the LPA and NEPAD can be captured under three main headings as indicated in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Views</th>
<th>Interviewee #</th>
<th>Group (G)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LPA and NEPAD are true expressions of what Africans believe and values insofar as they are strategies of economic development produced by African leaders/intellectuals.</td>
<td>#3L, #4L, #1N, #N5</td>
<td>G1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPA and NEPAD are true expressions of what Africans believe and value but it is not comprehensive.</td>
<td>#1L, #2L, #2N, #3N</td>
<td>G2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues dealt with in (LPA) NEPAD are universal economic issues.</td>
<td># 4N</td>
<td>G3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Group 1 in Table 2 above claims that LPA and NEPAD are not expressions of what Africans believe and value in an anthropological sense, but insofar as they are African strategies of development produced in Africa, by African leaders (and intellectuals).

Among the LPA respondents, this view was best expressed by #4L:

[... ] LPA was a true expression of African leaders. If you want to go to Africa to talk to Africans, this is only possible if they are educated and understand the dynamics and the philosophical foundations of development policies [...].

For #3L, “[T]he Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) [...] was adopted by [the then] OAU Heads of State and Government, after it had been studied and refined by experts of Ministers”.

Similar views are expressed in the case of NEPAD. According to #1N, “It [NEPAD] was elaborated by African intellectuals and born of African leaders who were elected, and therefore had the mandate of the people. It is an African document, [...] adopted in Africa”. For #5N, “NEPAD is an African document. It was produced by African leaders. It is being implemented in a number of countries”.

From these quotes, one can highlight three main arguments used to substantiate the claim that LPA and NEPAD are expressions of what Africans believe and value on the grounds that they are an outcome of the leaders and their experts. The first argument is that the rest of people do not understand the dynamics and the foundations of development policies as the quote from #4L suggests. It is an argument characteristic of an elitist conception of development or top-down approach to development. The fundamental assumption is that the minds of the African leaders express what the African people believe and value.

The second argument is that these leaders were elected, and therefore had the mandate of the people. In other words, the mandate conferred on the leaders by the people guarantees that whatever policy of development they formulated is an expression of what people believe and value. It does not matter whether the development agendas emanate from these leaders as such,
or whether they are imposed on them from elsewhere. What counts is that these leaders are elected and mandated by the people.

The third argument is the extent of geographical implementation and “meeting what people want”. In other words, the fact that a given policy of development is being implemented in a number of countries guarantees it being an expression of what people believe and value. The assumption is that “being implemented” means “it works”, and “it works” is synonymous with “being accepted by the people on the ground”.

The point made by Group 1 thus far is that a given plan of economic development is an expression of African beliefs and values on the grounds of being produced by African leaders (and intellectuals). Three major conditions are given for this claim to be the case: these leaders must be elected by the people, a given plan of development devised must be implemented, and this implementation must comply with what people want. What can be highlighted here is that African beliefs and values are not understood from a cultural viewpoint. It is from this perspective that they are neglected or ignored.

\textit{LPA/NEPAD is not a full expression of African beliefs and values.}

Group 2 argued that LPA and NEPAD are true expressions of what Africans believe and value, but not comprehensively. In other words, LPA and NEPAD are not full expressions of African beliefs and values.

According to #1L, “LPA includes some of the values which Africans had from outside.” #1L further suggested that “if today there was another LPA, the document […] would better reflect the impact of culture”. #2L expressed the same view in a comparative way:

[The fact of] Africa remaining the least developed, and its leadership are still under the influence of developed countries [...] could be seen as a departure from African cultural legacy. [...] the successful performance in other developing regions of Asia and Latin America, where plans and programmes (were) based on shared values and common interests, are indications that there is hope that Africa will succeed.
#3N gives three reasons why NEPAD (or any African strategy of economic development) is not fully a translation of what Africans believe and value. The first is linked with the training or education of African planners: “The problem is still where our planners are trained. The knowledge system they have which informs their thinking and planning”. Put differently, the fact that most planners and policymakers are educated in a value system other than the African one is the reason why African strategies of development are not full expressions of African beliefs and values.

The second reason is that NEPAD “was not meant to articulate very clearly an African paradigm to development”. “NEPAD expresses certain cultural aspects, but it is not about African cultural beliefs and values” (#3N).

The third reason #3N gave is the need to take “aspects of the global picture into account: issues of global trade, and issues of global investment [...] in a world dominated by the paradigm of neo-liberalism”. #3N is saying two things here. The first is that issues of global trade and investment are outside the realm of African culture, yet they are necessary for the flourishing of Africa’s economic development. The second thing is that the world in which Africa’s economic development is called to flourish is dominated by the paradigm of neo-liberalism which is not based on an African value system.

Another participant of Group 2 who holds a similar view is # 2N. For #2N, “NEPAD is a true expression of what Africans believe and value but is not all encompassing”,

[I]n the sense that certain things are said but without any further elaboration. [...] we didn’t progress any further than the fact of the announcement that ‘culture is important’. So many things are mentioned but we did not focus on strategies of how then, what cultural programme we should implement.

As it appears in these views, the idea that LPA and NEPAD are expressions of what Africans believe and value is not disputed. But the contention is that the two plans are not full expressions of African beliefs and values. The reasons given to make this point can be grouped into three sets.
The first set pertains to extroversion in African development planning. This set comprises the appeal to values from outside, the continual dependence on developed countries, especially the former colonial powers, and the education which does not take into account the African value system.

The second set of reasons pertains to shaping African plans of development according to the global economy. This set of reasons expresses the idea that African plans of development are not meant to articulate a paradigm of development specific to Africa; and therefore, that African policy makers and planners must take into account aspects of the global economy. It suggests that in the African planning of development, the African reality does not count much. The implication is that African agendas of development end up falling “victim to the excesses of international global processes” “without having developed enough strategies to ensure a way out” (#2N).

The third set consists of the fact that culture is mentioned in the two plans of development without elaborating further on how it should be translated into clear policies of development. This reason is a result of both extroversion and the reliance on realities other than the African one.

The implication of these three reasons is that, in the process, African beliefs and values are neglected. I shall now turn to the case of Group 3.

**LPA and NEPAD and the universality of economic issues**

Group 3 claims that issues dealt with in NEPAD (the same could be said in the case of LPA) are not cultural issues but universal economic issues. According to #4N, “Issues of health, issues of education, and issues of poverty, are issues which we can’t say are cultural. They are issues which have to do with economic system [...]”.

To substantiate this claim, #4N used two arguments which evolve around the concept of “institution / institutionalisation”. The first argument is that the way African [traditional] institutions used to transfer knowledge from elders to the young has evolved. These traditional institutions were like universities.
But now that we have created new universities, there is no reason why a way of learning should be different from how Americans learn or how other people learn. It should be more or less the same because the human brain is the same. Education is an instrument of institutionalisation.

This argument shares certain commonality with the one developed earlier by #3N. #3N argued that the problem is where African planners are trained and the kind of knowledge system they hold. However, #3N does not reject the idea of premising economic development on what Africans believe and value.

The second argument used to substantiate the claim that economic issues are universal issues is that, in planning: “We are all looking for the same objectives: to be creative, to be innovative, to be competitive, the mind. The spirit wants to succeed” (#4N).

With the idea of universal economic issues, institutionalisation, and common objectives, what is being put across is the case of the universality of economic development outlined in Chapter Four. This would lead one to believe that there is no need to refer to African beliefs and values, and therefore they can be ignored.

So far, what can be concluded on the issue of whether LPA and NEPAD are expressions of what Africans believe and value is that the African planners and policymakers have tended to ignore or to neglect African beliefs and values or even to deliberately exclude them.

These are the main findings that can be highlighted in the empirical research. In the next section, I shall attempt to compare these findings to the earlier theoretical conclusion. The conclusion of this chapter will then follow.
6.3 Interpretation of the empirical findings in relation to the theoretical findings

From what has been developed so far, two main sets of conclusions can be drawn in connection with the theoretical conclusion. The first set of conclusions pertains to the theories of economic development that inform the LPA and NEPAD and their respective cultural premises. The second set of conclusions pertains to the issue of whether LPA and NEPAD are a corroboration of what Africans believe and value. I shall consider these sets of conclusions in turn.

I begin with the first set of conclusions which pertains to the two theories of economic development alleged to have informed LPA and NEPAD respectively. As far as LPA is concerned, no participant disputes that the dependency theory served as a basis used to inform this strategy for Africa’s economic development. The fact that the dependency theory did not feature very much in theoretical terms, and henceforth was discussed informally does not invalidate or undermine the above conclusion. Furthermore, the complaint that it was not used consistently because of the reliance on the two-gap model seems rather to be an issue of political and economic pragmatism linked with the context of the Cold War on the one hand, and the financial means needed by the developing countries on the other hand.

The issue of whether the dependency theory has a cultural basis was not a matter to be debated. The architects who designed LPA were much more concerned with its political and historical underpinnings. In their understanding these underpinnings bore immediate effect on the analysis of the position of Africa in the global economy, and how Africans should respond to the economic dependence that issues from this situation.

As far as NEPAD is concerned, the situation is different. There were conflicting suggestions about what should inform a strategy of economic development in order to allow Africa to reclaim its place in the global economy. Among these various suggestions, two are particularly highlighted, namely, the neo-liberal and developmental state models. In the theoretical findings, I argued that NEPAD is informed by the neo-liberal theory of economic development. This argument is refuted by the voice which holds that NEPAD is informed by the developmental state. In other words, NEPAD is not wholly informed by the neo-liberal theory of economic development. How can this finding be interpreted?
The claim that NEPAD is also informed by the developmental state might not be rejected. Both claims (that “NEPAD is informed by the neo-liberal theory” and that “NEPAD is informed by the developmental state model”) seem to have been attempts to address the issue of how African economic development could be shaped for Africa to climb the ladder of development. They originate from the fact that the architects of NEPAD came from different backgrounds and found it difficult to reach a clear consensus as to what should inform an African strategy of economic development. Accordingly, the two claims could be considered together, and one has to try to understand what went on. The two groups of architects who held the two claims respectively seem to have diverged and entertained a tension in the first place, and then converged in a reconciliatory way in the second place.

First I consider the divergence and the tension trajectory. One could assume that the architects from both claims were inspired by the success story of each paradigm of development as well as the reality of the world economy. No one could deny that neo-liberalism has achieved development success in some countries to the extent of becoming a source of inspiration for certain architects of NEPAD. #4N argues that:

> Generally people who are arguing cannot tell us that the success of Japan, the success of Malaysia, the success of Singapore, or the Far East, South Korea has not used neo-liberalism.

For this group of architects, their “preference” for the neo-liberal approach to economic development was backed up by the reality of the global economy. They took into account the fact that “Africa is developing in a globalised world [...] and cannot pretend to be an island” (#2N). Furthermore they reviewed the forces that support the “global system dominated by neo-liberalism”, namely, “the World Bank, IMF, world institutions and world organisations” (#3N).

However, on the other side of the coin, certain other architects of NEPAD were aware of the negative effects of the neo-liberal approach on economic development in Africa. These negative effects included the disempowerment of the state to which the World Bank (1993) referred to in terms of The Crisis of the State at the time when the developmental state, strong and active had achieved an economic miracle in East Asia. Thus the idea of a strong and active state advocated by certain NEPAD architects might have been informed by the economic
successes in East Asia. It might have been suggested as an alternative to the neo-liberal approach which had negative effects on Africa’s economies and weakened the very state being brought back in order to lead the economy henceforth. One could say, therefore, that the idea of “a strong and active role of the state” advocated by a certain group of scholars and planners in the processes leading to the NEPAD document did not originate in a vacuum. Woo-Cumings argues that,

Developmental state is a shorthand for seamless web of political, bureaucratic, and moneyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist South-east Asia. This state form originated as the region’s idiosyncratic response to a world dominated by the West [...] (Woo-Cumings, 1999, p.1).

I will now consider the convergent, reconciliatory trajectory. The architects who suggested the neo-liberal approach to lead Africa’s economic development and those who preferred the developmental state paradigm do not seem to have maintained that level of divergence and tension. There seems to have been a tendency to converge and reconcile. First of all the two participants (#1N and #5N) who argued that NEPAD is premised on the paradigm of “a strong and active state” affirm at the same time that NEPAD was introduced at the time when neo-liberalism was dominant. One feels that these architects neglected the effects which this dominance of neo-liberalism had on the processes leading to NEPAD. Yet these effects are taken seriously in the NEPAD document itself. As highlighted earlier, #2N argues that “in theory, there was a lot of appreciation” of the neo-liberal approach to economic development, which, together with “the excesses of the international global processes” led to NEPAD being “overwhelmed by the Washington Consensus”.

However, the idea of “the Washington Consensus” was not followed to its logical conclusion. If this had been the case, the idea of “a strong and active state” advocated by certain architects would have fallen, since the neo-liberal approach to development requires the state to disengage from the economy. Obviously the NEPAD document does not suggest that the state should disengage from the economy. It is here that convergence and reconciliation begins to emerge. Against this background, #1N argues that “NEPAD assumes a strong state with the private sector”.

- 198 -
Thus, in reality, the architects of NEPAD seem to have understood that neo-liberalism does not mean that the state should be passive in the economy. “[I]t performs specific required functions for a self-regulating market society” to emerge (Radice, 2008, p.1160). In fact, Chalmers Johnson argues that:

The issue is not one of the state intervention in the economy. All states intervene in their economies for various reasons [...] The United States is a good example of a state in which the regulatory orientation predominates, whereas Japan is a good example of a state in which the developmental orientation predominates (Johnson, 1982, pp.17 & 19).

For Evans (1999, p.10),

Sterile debates about “how much” states intervene have to be replaced with arguments about different kinds of involvement and their effects. Contrasts between “dirigiste” and “liberal” or “interventionist” and noninterventionist states focus attention on the degrees of departure from ideal-typical competitive markets. They confuse the basic issue. In the contemporary world, withdrawal and involvement are not alternatives. State involvement is a given. The appropriate question is not “how much” but “what kind.”

#5N affirms that “the role of the state should be to create conditions” for the African economy to flourish. The leaders who initiated NEPAD promised to create these required conditions, namely, democracy, good governance, infrastructure, and also legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets, health and education (NEPAD, par. 49). That is what #4N called the political economic approach which balances the neo-liberal approach to economic development. The fulfilment of the above “required conditions” calls for an active and even a strong state, which certain architects referred to as “developmental”. It should be noted that the same conditions are increasingly prescribed to developing countries by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund which also championed the Washington Consensus.

Thus, the idea of a strong and active state peculiar to the East Asian developmental state model (Woo-Cummings, 1999, p.1) was not meant to be incompatible with the neo-liberal theory presumed to have informed NEPAD. Instead, it served as a complement that provided the
conditions required for the free market economy to flourish. In other words, the neo-liberal and developmental state approaches were made to be complementary in NEPAD as an African strategy of economic development although the neo-liberal voice remains predominant in the NEPAD document.

To reiterate this point, the empirical findings lead to a conclusion other than the one reached in the theoretical conclusion. NEPAD is not wholly premised on the neo-liberal theory. Rather, the architects seem to have been eclectic and considered both the neo-liberal and the developmental state models of economic development. Accordingly, NEPAD may be what Hugo Radice (2008) calls the Developmental State under Global Neoliberalism. In the Economic Report on Africa 2011: Governing development in Africa, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) reiterated the need to marry the two approaches in Africa’s economic transformation as thus expressed:

Since free market forces will not drive economic transformation on their own, the developmental state must play a central role in resource allocation and in efficient coordination of crucial economic activities. This is particularly relevant to developing infrastructure, human capital, and the financial market and setting up production facilities in the agricultural and industrial sectors (ECA, 2011, p.7)

Nevertheless, even if both the neoliberal and developmental state models might have informed NEPAD on an equal footing or otherwise, the central claim of this research that the philosophical basis of the LPA and NEPAD is not African would not be seriously damaged. In effect, neither the neo-liberal theory nor the developmental state model is premised on the African value system. This being the case, the issue is still that although NEPAD was produced in Africa, its philosophical basis is not African.

The second set of conclusions pertains to the issue of whether the LPA and NEPAD are expressions of African beliefs and values. This requires an interpretation of the following three findings outlined earlier, namely:

- LPA and NEPAD are true expressions of what Africans believe and values because they are development strategies produced by African leaders and intellectuals;
LPA/NEPAD are true expressions of what Africans believe and value, but not comprehensively; and

- issues dealt with in LPA and NEPAD are universal economic issues.

I shall consider these findings in the same sequence as listed above.

The first finding is that ‘the LPA and NEPAD are true expressions of what Africans believe and value because they were African documents produced by African leaders/intellectuals’. This finding needs to be taken seriously, not only because it opposes the central thesis of this research, but also because African planners and policymakers often proceed in that way in devising strategies for economic development. It corresponds with the first reason of the theoretical findings in which it is presumed that the state or the market can alone achieve the desired economic development independently of the cultural context (cf. Chapter four).

The role of the leadership in the search for the best ways in which African people can be economically developed cannot be disputed. That the leadership has the explicit or implicit mandate to do so cannot be disputed either. However, what is disputable is the claim that an agenda of development is an expression of what people believe and value simply because it is produced by their leaders and the intellectual elite. People have often compromised or rejected strategies for development because these do not meet their deep beliefs and values. Furthermore, the leaders have often sought to implement strategies for development which are not original to them but which are rather plans imposed from outside and asked people to accept them as their legitimate programs. And when these strategies fail because they are incompatible with the ontological make-up of the African people, the failure is justified on the ground that “African people are enemies of development” (Ake, 1996, p.15).

The flaw of the claim lies in the elitist, top-down approach to development which tends to regard the rest of the people as incapable of understanding the dynamics and the foundations of development policies; or to limit their role to political participation by which certain leaders ascend to power (where this is the case). It is a clientelist kind of development whereby African leaders and their advisors establish themselves as monopoly providers of development benefits to their people. As a result people are made patients rather than agents in their development. In the process, people’s beliefs and values are ignored or neglected. The point is
that people must participate in the development processes in the same way as they participate in the political process of electing and giving the mandate to those who lead them. It is this democratisation of the development process that could lead to the corroboration of what people believe and value in terms of policies of development.

The second finding is that LPA and NEPAD are true expressions of African beliefs and values, but not comprehensively. Three major reasons why this is the case were highlighted, namely, extroversion in African planning for development, shaping Africa’s development according to the global economy as if the African reality does not matter, and finally the reference to African culture without any follow through in terms of how implementation should be made. Although it is already evident in the problem of extroversion, one may underline strongly the fact that most African planners and policymakers are trained in value systems other than the African one to the extent that it is difficult for them to appreciate fully the importance of African beliefs and values in the process of African economic development. Thus to a certain extent, this claim confirms the thesis of this research that the African value system is neglected when devising Africa’s strategies.

The third finding is the claim that issues dealt with in the LPA and NEPAD are universal economic issues. This claim needs to be highlighted because that is exactly where African economic strategies often go wrong in most cases. It agrees with the second reason given in the theoretical findings, namely, the fact that the architects who designed LPA and NEPAD did so against the background of what economics does and not what it is (cf. Chapter Four). In the claim that “issues dealt with in LPA and NEPAD are universal issues”, African beliefs and values are not just neglected, but they are also ignored. African policymakers and planners presume that because certain economic issues such as poverty, health, education, and infrastructure are universal, therefore there is one universal way of dealing with them.

There must be a balance between the universality of development (global policy) and its particularity (local feasibility). It is true, indeed, that poverty is poverty everywhere, the need for health, education, and infrastructure is the same need everywhere. However, the ways of responding to them differ. It cannot be held that these issues can be dealt with without considering the beliefs and values that matter on the ground. That is what Cooper and Vargas (2004, p.343) refer to when they talk of “the cultural feasibility of sustainable development”. It is this aspect of feasibility that is ignored or neglected in the two plans of development.
Thus, the three conclusions put across the point that African beliefs and values were neglected and/or ignored in the two plans of development being investigated. They were ignored on two aspects. The first aspect is that strategies of economic development are the validation of African beliefs and values not in the anthropological sense but in so far as they are produced by African leaders and/or intellectuals. The second aspect is that certain issues are universal economic issues which can be dealt with without reference to cultural feasibility. Furthermore, African beliefs and values are neglected in so far as they are mentioned without any follow through on how they should be implemented in the development process. Such neglect is a consequence of the extroversion in African planning and the attempt to shape African plans according to the global economy.

6.4 Conclusion

So far, this chapter has dealt with the process and findings of the empirical research and their comparison with the earlier theoretical conclusion. The empirical research consisted in engaging with certain architects who designed LPA and NEPAD on the issue of whether these two strategies of economic development are premised on the beliefs and values that structure the ontological make-up of African people. This was done by first considering the theories of economic development which informed LPA and NEPAD.

The results obtained confirmed that LPA was informed by the dependency theory despite certain nuances. On the contrary, in the case of NEPAD, the results showed that there were at least two contending theories of economic development at work in the process of designing NEPAD. The theoretical findings showed that NEPAD was informed by the neo-liberal theory of economic development, while the empirical findings suggest that NEPAD was also informed by the developmental state approach. This seems to contradict the earlier conclusion that NEPAD is solely premised on the neo-liberal model of development. The reading of the NEPAD document shows indeed that NEPAD was informed by the neo-liberal theory of economic development. Nevertheless, the suggestion that the developmental state was also crucial in the design of NEPAD can be given the benefit of the doubt. NEPAD could be seen as a strategy of economic development of the “developmental state under global neo-liberalism” as noted earlier. Yet, even if both approaches were shown to have shaped NEPAD in the process of its design or the final document, the central claim of this research would not be
undermined. In other words, although NEPAD was produced in Africa, its philosophical basis is not African. This is because neither the neoliberal approach nor the developmental state model is premised on the African value system.

The use of these theories to inform African strategies of economic development has implications for the link between culture and economic development in Africa. The result of the empirical research led to the conclusion that African beliefs and values have been neglected even to the extent of being ignored.

The next chapter will consider certain philosophical guidelines that should lead the planning of economic development that takes seriously what Africans believe and value. These guidelines will be formulated within the framework of Sen’s capability approach which defines development in terms of “the ability of people to lead the life they value and have reason to value”, human agency, as well as the expansion of the real freedoms people enjoy.
7 CHAPTER SEVEN

PHILOSOPHICAL PREMISES FOR AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

7.1 Introduction

In Chapter Two, I argued that although LPA and NEPAD were designed in Africa, their philosophical basis is not African. This argument was defended by excavating the theories of economic development alleged to have informed them as well as the value systems in which they are rooted. In Chapter Three, I retrieved the ontological structure of the African value system that should constitute the ground of any African plan of development. Chapter Four dealt with how the architects who designed the two strategies neglected the African value system by failing to achieve a balance between the universality and particularity of economic development. I contended that participation is an important factor that should mediate between plans of economic development and what people believe and value, and thus translates the universal conception of economic development into local feasibility. Chapters Five and Six consisted of the empirical research. The findings confirmed that, despite some nuances, the LPA was premised on the dependency theory. In the case of NEPAD, the findings suggested that NEPAD was not only shaped by the neo-liberal approach as argued earlier in the theoretical part, but also by the developmental state model which, as I argued, originated in South-East Asia. The suggestion of NEPAD being also informed by the developmental state was given the benefit of the doubt. However, this conclusion does not undermine the central claim that although NEPAD was produced in Africa, its philosophical basis is not African. In effect, neither the neoliberal approach nor the developmental state model is based on the African value system. Furthermore I found that the use of these theories in African planning of economic development led to African beliefs and values being neglected to the extent of being ignored.

The present chapter will outline the philosophical assumptions that should inform strategies for economic development in order to ensure that they are grounded in what Africans believe and value. These philosophical guidelines will be developed against the background of Sen’s
capability approach. The relevance of the capability approach for Africa’s quest for economic development lies in the fact that its ultimate foundation is not culture, but rather the ability for people to be “all they can be and do” (Feldman, 2005, p.3). The capability approach serves as a guide to how development could be achieved in particular cultural contexts. Development itself is defined in a way that fits with different cultural contexts. Sen defines development in terms of “the ability of people to lead the life they value and have reason to value”, “agency”, as well as “the expansion of the real freedoms people enjoy” (Sen, 1999: pp. xii, 1 & 18). The ability of people to lead the life they value, agency and the expansion of the real freedoms people enjoy could be seen as the characteristics of umuntu-w’-ubuntu/umuntu-mu-bantu. This latter concept refers to the African community as a locus of essential participation. Thus these characteristics will help to link economic development with the African value system. The structure of economic development that results from this link is a “triangle of solidarity” of which the dimensions are the state, the people, and the market. I will suggest that the interaction between the three components is a participatory process which could be achieved thanks to what Sen calls public discussion or public reasoning.

Thus, this chapter will consist of three sections. The first section outlines Sen’s capability approach and its main aspects. The second section discusses the philosophical premises that should inform African economic development. The third section is the conclusion.

### 7.2 Sen’s capability approach

The capability approach is increasingly regarded as the cornerstone in the definition and the assessment of economic development as well as in the methods and policies that should lead to it (Nelson, 1996, p.35; Atkinson, 1999; Gasper, 1997, p.286; 2000, p.435; Feldman, 2005, p.2; Crocker, 2008). According to Clark (2009, p.21, see also 2000),

> Capability approach (CA) has emerged as a leading alternative to mainstream economic frameworks for conceptualising and assessing human well-being and development.

---

48 I borrowed this concept from the Government of Costa Rica (Central America) that used it to mean the type of governance involving the state, civil society and the link between them.
In the same vein, Smith and Seward (2009, p.213) argue that “capability approach (CA) has inspired much theorising and research that seeks to better understand and evaluate the status and process of human development”. For Robeyns (2006, p.352; see also 2000, p.2),

It [the capability approach] can also be used as an alternative to mainstream cost-benefit analysis, or as a framework to develop and evaluate policies, ranging from welfare state design in affluent societies, to development policies by government and non-governmental organisations in developing countries.

In particular, since 1990, the capability approach has inspired a new way in which the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assesses Human Development (Sen, 1999, p.318 note 41). Hitherto, the focus was on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the human capital, suggesting that “economic development was not human-centred and that, ‘development’, was in practice, inadequately conceived and operationalised as economic growth” (Gasper, 2002, p.442). In this practice, human beings were/are seen as the means rather than the end of production (Sen, 1999, p. 293).

The capability approach was first formulated by Amartya Sen in the late 1970s and further developed by Martha Nussbaum. In particular, Nussbaum (see 2000, p.13) argued that “Sen never attempted to ground the capabilities approach in the Marxian/Aristotelian idea of truly human functioning”. Subsequently both Nussbaum and Sen (1993) have linked the capability approach back to Aristotle’s reflection on the conditions for human flourishing. Sen argues that the capability approach is related to Aristotle’s analysis of the good of human beings, leading to an examination of the functions of a person as well as an exploration of life in terms of activity (Sen, 2003, p.4; 1992, p.5).

Sen also linked the capability approach to Adam Smith and Karl Marx (Sen, 2003, p.4). For Sen, both Smith and Marx discussed the importance of human activity and the capability to function as the determinants of well-being. Marx’s political economy conceived the success of human life in terms of fulfilling the needs of human activity (thus linking back to Aristotle). Sen shows that the focus on freedom that the capability approach reflects, featured in Marx’s claim that there is a need to replace the “domination of circumstances and chances over

---

49 Functioning is a technical concept in Sen’s reflections, meaning “being in activity”. It will be explained in detail below.
individuals by the domination of individuals over chance and circumstances” (Marx in Sen, 1997, p.497, see also Sen, 2003, p.4). Smith emphasised the need of appearing in the community without shame, an achievement which is valued in all societies (Sen, 1992, p.115).

However, Sen and Nussbaum differ substantially in their respective definitions of capability. In particular they differ on the issue of whether there is a fixed set of capabilities and how this set should be arrived at. For Nussbaum there is a fixed set of capabilities that should be arrived at through an overlapping consensus (Nussbaum, 2000, p.76). Accordingly, she outlined ten capabilities which she sees as the heart of this overlapping consensus. She argues that “any life that lacks any one of these capabilities, no matter what else it has, will fall short of being a good human life (Nussbaum & Glover, 1995, p.85). By contrast, for Sen, there is no such fixed set of capabilities. Sen argues that the determination of what capabilities should be considered is a matter of public debate. The following table (Table 7-1) provides an overview of the differences between Nussbaum and Sen on the issue of capabilities.

50The concept of overlapping consensus came from Rawls (1996, p.133ff) who used it while attempting to answer the question of the possibility of a stable and just society, given the conflicting and incommensurable religious, political and philosophical doctrines.
Table 7-1: Comparison between Sen and Nussbaum on Capability  
Adapted from Ortrud Lessmann 2007.  
(N.B. In the Nussbaum column, the capabilities in bold are as found in Lessmann’s table. Their elaboration is as found in Nussbaum and Glover, 1995, pp. 76-79, 83-85)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAPABILITIES</th>
<th>Nussbaum (Method by which they are arrived at: Overlapping consensus)</th>
<th>Sen (Method by which they arrived at: Public debate and reflection)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life: not dying prematurely</td>
<td>Avoiding escapable morbidity and premature mortality, longevity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodily health: having good health, having opportunities of sexual satisfaction, being able to move from place to place</td>
<td>Being adequately nourished, being in good health, being free from malaria, being well-sheltered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodily integrity: Ability to avoid unnecessary pain and non-beneficial pain, to have pleasurable experience</td>
<td>Move about, travelling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senses, imagination and thought: access to information, education, etc</td>
<td>Being literate, cultural and intellectual pursuits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotions: ability to have attachment to things and persons outside ourselves</td>
<td>Being happy, being close to people one would like to see</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical reason: being able to form a conception of the good and engage in critical reflection, being able to seek employment and participation in political life.</td>
<td>Taking part in the life of the community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliation: ability to live for and to others, concern for others, social interaction, capability for justice and friendship</td>
<td>Ability to entertain and visit friends, being close to people one cherishes, self-respect, appear in public without shame</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other species: concern for and in relation to animals, plants and world of nature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Play: being able to laugh, play, enjoy recreational activities</td>
<td>Vacationing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over one’s environment: ability to live one’s life and nobody else’s, freedom of association, integrity of personal property, being able to live one’s own life in one’s own surroundings and context</td>
<td>Ability to entertain and visit friends, vacationing, travelling, being employed, being decently clothed&lt;sup&gt;51&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the table (Table 7-1), Nussbaum has a fixed list of capabilities which, in her understanding constitute a “good human life”. She considers them to be “central human capabilities” or the moral entitlements of every human being (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 71; 2003, pp. 41-42). As highlighted earlier, Nussbaum claims that these central capabilities are a result of an *overlapping consensus*<sup>52</sup>: “The list represents the result of years of cross-cultural discussion and […] the input of other voices has shaped its content” (Nussbaum, 2000, p.76). She further argues that

---

<sup>51</sup> In Sen’s understanding, what Nussbaum sees as affiliation, play, and control over one’s environment could end up generating the same capabilities if suggested to public debate and reflection. It might be for this reason that Lessmann duplicates the two capabilities, namely, ability to entertain and visit friends and vacationing.

<sup>52</sup> Italics as in the original
part of the idea of the list is its *multiple realizability*: its members can be more concretely specified in accordance with local beliefs and circumstances. It is thus designed to leave room for a reasonable pluralism in specification (Nussbaum, 2000, p.71).

Nussbaum claims that the ten capabilities are universal and can be made concrete or specified when they are applied to local context. According to Lessmann (2007, p.13), Nussbaum follows a top-down (deductive) approach, starting by drawing up a comprehensive list, and she leaves the task of putting the elements in their concrete form to those who want to apply the approach. In other words, as Robeyns (2006, p.355) argues, the list is formulated at an abstract level, and the translation to implementation and policies should be done at a local level, taking into account local differences.

However, critics argued that Nussbaum has no authority to speak on behalf of the people to whom the list would apply, and that her list lacks legitimacy (Robeyns, 2006, p.355; Stewart, 2001). Menon (2001, pp. 152 & 153) calls it the universalism without foundation. In particular, Nussbaum’s critics worried - and I concur - about the lack of democratic legitimacy and agency in Nussbaum’s approach (Robeyns, 2003; Crocker, 2008). Even if the list were “open ended and humble” as Nussbaum (2000, p.77; 2003, p.42) responded to her critics, the problem is still that there is insufficient scope for democratic deliberation and public participation in her capabilities approach:

> The problem is not with listing important capabilities, but with insisting on one predetermined canonical list of capabilities, chosen by theorists without any general social discussion or public reasoning. To have such a fixed list, emanating entirely from pure theory, is to deny the possibility of fruitful public participation on what should be included and why (Sen, 2004, p.77).

Sen continues the same argument by saying:

> [...] pure theory cannot “freeze” a list of capabilities for all societies for all time to come, irrespective of what the citizens come to understand and value. That

---

53 Italics as in the original
would be not only a denial of the reach of democracy, but also a misunderstanding of what pure theory can do, completely divorced from particular social reality that any particular society faces (Sen, 2004, p.78)

Thus, contrary to Nussbaum’s approach, Sen proceeds inductively, in a bottom-up manner. For him, the various capabilities given are but illustrations of the kind of doings and beings a human being may achieve, and therefore are not exhaustive. The list of capabilities that can be drawn reflects only a view of what is valuable and what has no intrinsic values (Sen cited by Lessmann, 2007, p.13). Thus, rather than a fixed or complete list, Sen talks of “elementary capabilities” (for instance, being nourished), and very complex capabilities or personal states (for instance, taking part in the life of the community or appearing in public without shame).

As far as the process of arriving at various capabilities is concerned, Sen suggests Rawls’ idea of public reasoning or public discussion which is central to deliberative democracy (Rawls, 1996, pp. 1-1vii; 1999, pp. 131ff; see Crocker 2008:18). “Public discussion and reasoning can lead to a better understanding of the role, reach, and significance of particular capabilities” (Sen, 2004, p.80).

Thus, although Nussbaum’s central or basic capabilities have a “moral claim” in so far as they structure “the good human life”, the dogmatism that surrounds them and the approach itself does not seem to be compelling for the purpose of this research. Nussbaum’s approach lacks what really matters, namely, the good of public discussion which is inclusive and participatory. It is on this ground that I have supported Sen’s approach instead.

I shall now turn to the concept of capability more closely.

What does the concept “capability” mean? According to Sen, capability refers to the ability of people to lead the lives they value and have reason to value. The concept of capability has two aspects which are central to Sen’s philosophy of development, namely: functioning and agency.
I shall begin with “functioning”. The concept “functioning” comes from the ordinary verb “to function”. To function is to be involved in activity. For Aristotle, the well-being or the flourishing of people depends on their ability to function, that is, to be involved in activity either actually or potentially. According to Sen, “[A] functioning is an achievement of people, that is, what they manage or succeed to be or to do” (Sen, 1987, p.7). More precisely, functionings are physical or mental states (beings) and activities (doings) that allow people to participate in the life of their society.

Functionings range from the elementary physical ones such as being well-nourished, being in good health, being clothed, and sheltered, avoiding escapable morbidity and premature mortality, being literate, to the most complex social achievements such as being happy, taking part in the life of the community, having self-respect or being able to appear in the public without shame (Sen, 1992, pp.5, 39 &110).

In relation to functionings, capability

represents the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that a person can achieve. [...] a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another (Sen, 1992, p.40).

Put differently, capabilities are the functionings which a person has the potential to undertake (Jackson, 2005, p. 103). Capabilities indicate the extent of the freedom that people have in pursuing valuable activities or functionings (Drèze & Sen, 1989, p. 42). Capabilities may include such abilities as reading and writing, being well-informed, having realistic chances of participating freely in the life of the community- in short all those aspects of life that allow one to fully function as a human being individually and in community (Sen, 1999, p.233).

The second important aspect is the concept of agency. In fact, one cannot talk of functioning without agency. Agency is a person’s capability to act. Sen talks of seeing people as agents rather than as patients of development. He refers to an agent as “someone who acts and brings change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives” (Sen, 1999, p.19). Or again, agency consists of the realisation of the goals and values one has reason to pursue (Sen, 1992, p. 56).
Sen (1992, pp.57-58) distinguishes between “realised agency” which is more generic and “instrumental agency” which is more specific and participatory. In realised agency, one’s objectives may be achieved as a result of someone or something else being the cause or the source of action. The realised agency is peculiar to the top-down conception of development and the conception of development in terms of economic growth where the focus is on human capital. Thus, this kind of agency is not helpful as far as the validation of what people believe and value in terms of economic development is concerned. As I highlighted in Chapter Four, it is limited to accidental participation. In contrast, instrumental agency is participatory and requires that people themselves either bring things about by their own efforts or play an active part in some collective action (Crocker, 2008, p.153). That is the kind of agency that essential participation presupposes and, therefore serves the purpose of this research.

The concept of agency should not be understood as applying to single individuals or to a group of people collectively only. It could also be applied to the three major actors in the process of economic development, namely, the state, people and the market. The three actors must all be seen as agents in the process of development, each with a bundle of capabilities to be expanded (cf. Mbaku, 2004, p.3). In the history of economic of development, each of these components has worked in isolation to the neglect of others, claiming to have the means and the power to do so. Considering each of the three actors as an agent allows for the recognition of their respective strengths and for the overcoming of their limits.

Rather than taking the state as one of the agents in the process of economic development, certain economic thinkers who hold it in high esteem for various reasons (see Keynes, 1936; Polanyi, 1944; Gerschenkron, 1962, p.122; Evans, 1995; Innis cited by Boyer and Dracher, 1996, p.11; Chang & Grabel, 2004, p.13) tend to side-line the market and the people. In this state-dominated framework, the people are deprived of also being agents in development and are only expected to enjoy the fruit of the state-engineered economic development. In the same way, the market is deprived of being an agent in development because it neglects certain important aspects such as culture, nature, social justice and values; being concerned with the

---

54 According to the *Oxford Dictionary of Economics*, the market is “a place or institution in which buyers and sellers of a good or asset meet”. To refer to the market in terms of “place” would not serve the purpose being pursued in this research since the concern is on the market as an actor. An actor is personal whereas “place” is impersonal. Thus in what follows, I shall refer to the market as an “institution” which consists of economic operators or the business community. The concept of market will be developed later in more details.
accumulation of individual wealth rather than development as the higher goal; and being a source of economic crises.

In response to its marginalisation by the state, proponents of the market tend to elevate it to the level above politics to free it from political interventions of any kind (Mudge, 2008, p.715; Lal, 1985; Lal & Myint, 1996). They see the market as a repository of economic efficiency, while the state is the root of inefficiency. Hayek (1948) argues that the market is an effective means of making people take part in the economic order. Williamson (1993, p.1330) argues that “market is freedom” and further holds that “the Earth is flat” to mean that there are (or should be) no borders restriction to the market. Pennington (2011) vigorously challenges the many arguments against classical liberalism in contemporary political economy, in particular communitarianism and egalitarianism, and re-affirms the place of the minimal state in the economy. The market thus defined tends to work as the sole agent in the process of economic development and to deprive the state and the people of being agents in this same process.

The tension between the state and the market in the process of economic development gave birth to what is referred to as alternative development, also referred to as bottom-up or autonomous development. Alternative development is not concerned with structural macroeconomic change of the state or market kind. Instead it focuses on people (people at the grassroots, civil society groups, popular organisations) and their agency; that is, their capacity to effect social change (Pieterse, 2010, p.85; Anand, 2009, p.7; Cameron, 2000, p.632). For Nerfin (cited by Pieterse, 2010, p.85), alternative development is the field of the “third system” or “citizen politics” in so far as it is a reaction to both failed efforts of state and market-led development respectively. The state and the market are accused of having disregarded indigenous knowledge and popular participation (Brohman, 1995, p.130). Against this background, the people proceed as if the state and the market were not equally agents in the process of economic development.

Thus each of the three actors (the state, the market, and the people) tends to make each other patients rather than agents in the process of economic development. As a result, each of the three actors sees its freedom undermined rather than expanded. This is contrary to what Sen’s capability approach suggests but also contrary to the structure of the African value system as will be seen later.
Based on this concept of agency, the capability approach has been accused of being individualistic, insofar as Sen emphasises individual capabilities and seemingly ignores the way communities affect individuals (Evans, 2002; Jackson, 2005; Stewart, 2005). According to Jackson (2005, p.102), the reason why Sen emphasises individual capabilities rather than collective capabilities is that, his reflection is inspired by the liberal political philosophy rather than by social or cultural theory. Jackson pursues his argument and points out that although Sen takes an interest in how social circumstances affect the individual, his starting-point is the individual (cf. Nusbaum, 2000, pp. 13 & 59). Thus, certain scholars such as Ibrahim (2006), Ballet et al., (2007), and Cleaver (2007) have responded to such criticism by developing a perspective of collective capabilities.

Robeyns (2004, pp.21ff, see also 2000, pp.16-18) scrutinised the charge that Sen’s capability approach is individualistic, and that he does not consider individuals to be socially embedded. She does this by distinguishing between ethical individualism on the one hand and methodological and ontological individualism on the other hand. Ethical individualism claims that only individuals are units of moral concern in evaluating exercises and decisions. Methodological individualism claims that whatever is explainable can be explained by reference to individuals and their properties only. Finally, ontological individualism claims that only individuals and their properties matter, and all social entities and properties are identifiable by reducing them to individuals and their properties.

Robeyns (2004, p.22) argues that Sen’s capability approach cannot be charged for being methodologically and ontologically individualistic in that Sen himself recognises that “the options that a person has, depend greatly on relations with others and on what the state and other institutions do” as well as “those [individual] opportunities that are influenced by social circumstances and public policy” (Drèze & Sen, 2002, p.6).

Robeyns believes that Sen’s capability approach fits with ethical individualism. She argues that,

a commitment to ethical individualism is not incompatible with an ontology that recognises the connections between people, their social relations, and their social embedment (Robeyns, 2004, p. 22).
I concur with Robeyns especially as she would be comfortable with the Bantu conceptual framework in which I distinguish between umuntu- w’-ubuntu (who is aware of what counts in evaluative exercises and decisions) and umuntu-mu-bantu that refers to the individual’s embeddedness in social relations. Where I may distance myself from Robeyns though, is in the fact that her social relations characterise the community conceived of in the context of a Kantian or Rousseau’s social contract rather than the ontologically derived community characteristic of the African value system.

Thus, as Robeyns argues, the critique of Sen being individualistic in his capability approach is not wholly warranted. I see two perspectives from which Sen addresses the individual and the communal dimensions of capability. The first perspective is that of culture to which he alludes frequently (Sen, 1999; 2005; 2006; 2009b). The consideration of culture is dictated by the fact that neoclassical economics is done in a way that would make one believe that people live in a culture-free context.

The second perspective is the liberal philosophy of which the extreme version could deprive the individual of the awareness that activities are undertaken in society. Hence Sen’s major concern is how to address economic and social circumstances that affect the individual. This concern brings him to consider not individualism but agency (see Jackson 2005). Agency becomes an answer to the question of how individuals participate in the life of their community while at the same time preserving their individual autonomy. In fact, to make sure that this individual autonomy does not undermine the life of the community, Sen distinguishes between agency freedom and agency achievement in relation to community as well as to individual well-being. “Agency achievement refers to the realisation of goals and values she has reasons to pursue, whether or not they are connected with her well-being” (Sen, 1992, p.56). Well-being here means wellness, personal advantage or personal welfare. Agency freedom refers to “an increase in one’s ability to promote goals that one has reasons to promote” (Sen, 1992, p.60). He argues that agency and well-being are distinguishable and separate, but thoroughly interdependent:

A person as an agent need not be guided only by her own well-being. [...] If a person aims at, say, the independence of her country, or the prosperity of her community, or some such general goal, her agency achievement would involve evaluation of states of affairs in the light of those objects, and not merely in the
light of the extent to which those achievements would contribute to her own well-being (Sen, 1992, p.56).

This understanding of agency shows that people can go as far as sacrificing their personal well being in the search for the prosperity of the community. Thus Sen concentrates on individual capabilities along with the fact that the individuals are embedded in the society. He makes it clear that:

Individuals are socially embedded agents who interact with their societies and flourish fully only by participating in political and social affairs of their societies (Sen, 1999, pp. xi-xii; 2002, pp.79-80).

Nevertheless, Sen is aware of the tension that exists between the individual and the community as well as between universal norms and the particularity of cultures as is obvious in his reflection on culture and human rights, social choice and individual behaviour, individual freedom and social commitment (Sen, 1999), and more recently in his reflection on Culture and Development (2005), as well as in Violence and Identity (2006) and in The Idea of Justice (2009b).

But why the capability approach? What is its raison d’être? The capability approach arose as a response to approaches used to define and measure economic development such as the economic growth model, and the methods used to assess equality of opportunities as well as inequalities. But more fundamentally, Sen developed the capability approach to address the limits of utilitarianism (Sen,1987, p. 16; 1992, p.6), as well as the limits of Rawls’ theory of justice, which gives priority to liberty and emphasises the distribution of the primary goods (incomes, wealth, and opportunities) (Sen, 1992, p.8). For Sen, these theoretical frameworks are not sufficiently comprehensive to account for all the potentialities and possibilities of the human being. Thus, Sen’s suggestion is that development should be defined and evaluated in terms of agency and the expansion of the real freedoms [capabilities] that people enjoy (Sen, 1999, p.3). These freedoms include the freedom people have to engage in the process of development which, in turn, expands their freedom. It is against this background that Sen’s capability approach will help in formulating philosophical premises that would guide Africa’s economic development as a validation of what Africans believe and value.
Having outlined Sen’s capability approach, I shall now consider the philosophical premises that should lead economic development in Africa. These philosophical premises will address four major problems which make it difficult to ground development in Africa’s value system, namely: extroversion, the conception of development as an autonomous process whose end-product is delivered to people, development as the expansion of people’s capability, and how to achieve the involvement of all actors as agents in development.

7.3 Philosophical premises for Africa’s economic development

The contention of this research is that, although African strategies for economic development are crafted in Africa, their philosophical assumptions are not African. Hountondji (1992) explains this state of affairs in terms of the spirit of extroversion that has pervaded Africans. Extroversion consists in not being able to appreciate one’s beliefs, values, and potentialities; thus leading to an adoption “tout court” of foreign ideas and values which prove to be sterile in the African milieu (Ajei, 2007, p.6). This spirit of extroversion is often explained in terms of the colonial legacy and domination which robbed Africans of their self-confidence and self-appreciation (Ake, 1996, pp.18-23; Wiredu, 1996, pp.146 ff; Sindima, 1997, pp.13-23). The human self-transcendence requires that Africans move beyond those accidents of history which they tend to make an important part of their ontological make-up.

Furthermore, there is a tendency among African policymakers and planners to conceive of economic development as a project of which the end is the people. In other words development becomes an end result that has to be achieved for the people, but without the people. Behind this approach, lies the conception of economic development as an autonomous process independent of, *inter alia*, the cultural framework (Ake, 1996, p.12). Consequently this autonomous process is often used to justify the powers and liberties of leaders and those who advise them to design strategies of economic development without the involvement of the rest of the people. When these strategies fail, the failure is explained in terms of African people being enemies of progress - including their own progress. Yet this “ready made progress” is rejected simply because it is incompatible with the beliefs and values which structure the African identity (N'Dione, 1994; Ela, 1998; Matthews, 2004).
Thus, the philosophical premises that will be outlined must serve a triple purpose. The first aim is to reverse the spirit of extroversion in Africa’s policymaking and planning. The second aim is to challenge the way African policymakers and planners of economic development conceive and proceed in devising strategies of economic development. The third is to structure development in a way that responds to the African value system. With these three aims in mind, I concur with Ake (1996, p.125) who argues that:

[Organic] development is not a project, but rather a process by which people create and recreate themselves and their life circumstances to realise higher levels of civilisation in accordance with their choices based on their beliefs and values.

Such is the kind of conception of development which meets the African conception of the person as umuntu-w-ubuntu/umuntu-mu-bantu. What does this mean in terms of Sen’s capability approach? First of all, in relation to the issue of extroversion, it is imperative to reconnect with Sen’s idea of capability as the freedom of people to lead the kind of lives they value and have reason to value. Secondly, in relation to the issue of economic development as autonomous and an end product delivered to people, it is imperative to reconnect with the fact that the capability approach makes people the agents of their own development. Thirdly, in relation to development in itself, it is imperative to reconnect with Sen’s definition of development as an expansion of people’s capability, that is, capability liberates development, and the development achieved fosters further people’s capability which, in turn, stimulates further development. People’s freedoms are expanded to create and recreate themselves. Fourthly, in relation to the African value system, it is imperative that the process of economic development be conceived in terms of baking the cake together which involves the participation of all the actors as agents, namely the state, the people, and the market. I shall consider each aspect in turn.

---

55 The idea “baking the cake together” comes from my discussion (on the link between African development and Sen’s capability approach) with Professor Georges Enderle from the University of Notre Dame. I am grateful to Professor Enderle for his enlightening insight.
7.3.1 From extroversion to the freedom of Africans to lead the lives they value

The first philosophical premise consists of the shift from extroversion to the freedom of Africans to lead the lives they value. The issue at stake is how capability as “the freedom of people to lead the lives they value and have reason to value” could help Africans to escape from extroversion so as to ground their economic development in what they believe and value. Basically, the ability of people to lead the life they value starts by questions of self-definition and this, in turn, leads to self-awareness, the awareness of context, as well as the potential people have. These are such fundamental questions as: Who are we as a people? How should we live, given who we are? What could be the best ways to face our own situation and the circumstances of the world we live in? These questions are about people’s identity and their unique way of living, their conception of the world around them, and their way of being and doing things. This unique way includes the ability of people to envisage economic development on their own grounds as well as the freedom to do so.

In the recent literature about Africa’s development situation, there is a question that occupies the minds of African and non-African scholars and leaders: “What is wrong with the continent?” (Calderisi, 2006, p.2; Niang, 2006; Mills, 2010 among others). I suggest that “what is wrong” is not asking and engaging with the above fundamental questions about “the ability of Africans to lead the lives they value and have reason to value”. In this process of questioning, Africans would bring into their awareness the beliefs and values that define them and which are the deep source of their inspiration. This is what I could refer to as the recovery of people’s spirit as a ground for their creative pride. The recovery of this spirit is in itself a source of empowerment for action, a fortiori, economic development.

Thus, the first philosophical premise consists of “capability as the freedom of people to lead the lives they value”. This assumption is aimed at dealing with the issue of extroversion which does not allow Africans to appreciate their own beliefs and values in the process of economic development. Its relevance relates to two aspects. Firstly, capability as the freedom of people to lead the lives they value would stir Africans’ awareness of their ontological make-up and the beliefs and values that constitute it as a basis of their economic development.
Secondly, capability as the freedom of people to lead the lives they value could stir the independence of the spirit of African people as a basis of their “élan spirituel” and their creative pride (Ntibagirirwa, 2008). These two aspects constitute the wealth which Africans would bring to what Sen (1999, 2009) calls public discussion or reflection on plans and policies that should shape their process of economic development. This public discussion means that people are already exercising that agency to which I shall now turn.

### 7.3.2 From development as an autonomous process to agency-based development

The second philosophical premise has to do with agency. It consists of the shift from the conception of development as an autonomous process to agency-based development. Agency describes better umuntu w’ubuntu/umuntu-mu-bantu in that the concept refers to people in action from within themselves and with others. The link between economic development and agency concerns the relationship between people and the economic development they desire to achieve. It entails changing the conception of economic development as autonomous and an end product offered to people without their participation to people being the starting point of their economic development that empowers them in return. The key to this conception of development and people is the concept of agency. In his *Development as Freedom* (1999), the central point Sen makes is that (economic) development must be conceived of in terms of human agency.

Agency refers to agent and agent means a person in action. However, the concept of agent can be understood from two points of view. First, the concept of agent is used “to denote a person who is acting on someone else’s behalf […]”, and whose achievements are to be assessed in the light of someone else’s (the principal’s) goals” (Sen, 1999, pp.18-19). Secondly, agent refers to “someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives” (Sen, 1999, p.19). It is this second understanding that is considered here in so far as I am concerned with the agency role of the individuals as members of the community and as participants in the processes that lead to their development.

Agency entails two things which are interlinked, namely, the ability to act, and autonomy. First of all, by definition agency implies the ability to act; that is, “people are seen as being actively
involved in shaping their destiny, and not just as passive recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs” (Alkire, 2003, p.15). A lack of agency means not acting, being passive, or a recipient, and allowing others to act on one’s behalf to the extent of being dependent. A lack of agency may arise because one is naturally not disposed to act or is not given the opportunity to act.

In normal conditions (when people do not suffer from mental or physical deficiency), it is hard to say that people can be “in a natural disposition” of passivity. The human being is created with the ability of incessantly going beyond oneself. To echo Heidegger (1962), the human being is a being-ahead-of-itself; that is, the human being is characterised by self-transcendence. In Aristotle’s thinking, which Sen espouses, human flourishing is not achieved once and for all. It is a horizon which people keep tracking. This pursuit characterises people’s self-transcendence. However, external circumstances such as exclusion, poverty, powerlessness, exploitation, and a lack of things such as education, health and food, which increase people’s spiritual and material capability, can deprive people of such ability (see Sen, 1999, pp. 87ff & 137ff).

Focusing on the deprivations which poverty can cause, Alan Gewirth (2007) argues that people do lose their capacity to act as agents because their freedom and well-being are undermined by their lack of the means of subsistence. They are led to make decisions they would not make if their basic socio-economic needs were being met. This is what has been referred to as realised agency. This leads to another aspect which is important in the definition of agency, namely, autonomy.

Agency presupposes that people who act are aware of their autonomy. According to Gasper (1997, p.298), autonomy can be understood from two points, namely, the critical and the substantive points of view. The critical perspective of autonomy has to do with the ability to form, not just adopt, one’s own conception of the good. Here autonomy has to do with the individual decision-making on various matters of one’s society, including the policies of economic development.

Secondly, autonomy is understood in a substantive way. The substantive autonomy refers to the content of agency. According to Black and Mooney (2002, p.198),
substantive autonomy emphasises the processes of formation of an agent’s desires, beliefs and emotional attitudes, including attitudes and beliefs about herself.

There are two issues to be considered here. The first issue is how to differentiate the agent’s informed desires from mere preferences. Informed desires means that agents reason about the implications of their desires not only for themselves but also for others. As far as preferences are concerned, agents tend to supply reasons for choosing this or that option without reference to others. Given this tendency, the question is how to make sure that, effectively, people do not fall into mere preferences whose implications do not involve other people. This leads to the second issue.

The second issue is how to deal with the desires, beliefs and preferences that foster the agent’s life but which could endanger the public good in the long run. Thomas Scanlon (1993, p.187) recalls what Harsanyi referred to as the “principle of preference autonomy”, that is, ‘the principle that, in deciding what is good and what is bad for a given individual, the ultimate criterion can only be his wants and his own preferences’. Such wants and preferences could be misled if they advance the cause of the individual only. But the concept of preference is more complex than it appears at first sight.

Sen (1982, p.41; see also 2002, pp.300ff *inter alia*) argues that autonomy, preference and commitment must be linked. In this respect, he distinguishes three aspects of preferences: subjective preferences which reflect the personal welfare of agents, objective preferences which represent agents’ choices when their welfare is not affected by their decisions, and meta-rankings which refer to the fact that the agents choose what they judge to be most appropriate. In this distinction, Sen interprets preference not in terms of the satisfaction of selfish choices and desires, “but in terms of values that individuals may generally accept in the context of some social exercise” (Sen, 2002, p.309).

Thus both critical and substantive autonomy are important aspects of agency and give substance to what has been referred to earlier as instrumental agency. The critical aspect of agency helps people to make sure that nothing is imposed on them. In other words, people must understand the state of affairs that is presented to them and discuss it on the basis of the beliefs and values they hold. Substantive autonomy helps individuals to be aware of how they
are affected by the realities of their own cultural framework. This awareness may even bring people to adjust their realities to new contexts or to transform these realities in order to be able to confront the future.

Agency as ability to act and autonomy provide the grounds upon which to build participatory development. As in the definition of capability, agency leads people to the awareness of themselves, the beliefs and the values they hold in esteem. What has not been the case in Africa is seeing people as both the end and agents of development:

If the people are the agents of development, that is those with responsibility to decide what development is, what values it is to maximize, and the methods for realizing it, they must also have the prerogative of making public policy at all levels (Ake, 1996, p.126).

According to Kabede:

When human agency is involved and given priority, development becomes an issue of human capabilities [...] and shifts from development economics to issues of entitlements and empowerment (Kabede, 2004, p.110).

So far, I have analysed human agency as the second philosophical premise. The relevance of this premise lies in the very definition of the concept of agency: people in action. As such, people must be involved in the process of their economic development. In fact, they are entitled to participate in the development. Thus development itself is not conceived of as an autonomous process, but a process whose starting-point and end-point is the people.

I shall now turn to development as the expansion of capability, or as Sen puts it, “the expansion of the real freedoms which people enjoy”.

---

56 Sen (1999, pp. 38-40) outlines five of these entitlements which he refers to in terms of instrumental freedoms. These include the political entitlements (encompassing opportunities of political dialogue, dissent and critique, voting rights and participatory selection of legislators and executives); economic entitlements (income, wealth, availability and access to finance, conditions of exchange, access to markets and fair prices; social entitlements (literacy and numeracy, effective participation in economic and political activities, access to information); transparency entitlements (basic trust, right to disclosure leading to preventing corruption and financial irresponsibility, for instance); and finally, protective security entitlements (a social safety net to prevent people from being objects of misery, starvation or death, unemployment benefits).
7.3.3 From development as an end product delivered to people to development as the expansion of capability

The third philosophical premise is the conception of development as the expansion of capability. The basic idea of Sen’s *Development as Freedom* is that development has to be assessed in terms of the expansion of capability or the real freedoms people enjoy; that is, in terms of how development enhances the freedom of people to lead the lives they value and have reason to value on the one hand, and how these freedoms, in turn, stimulate further development.

The definition of development as the expansion of capability can be interpreted in three ways. The first way is to see the expansion of capabilities as an actual achievement of a given policy of development. In Sen’s terms, it would be the issue of whether such a policy of development enhances people’s substantive freedoms, that is, elementary capabilities (being nourished, being housed, avoiding morbidity and premature mortality, being literate or numerate), political participation, freedom of speech, etc. If Sen’s definition were to be understood only from this perspective, and the planning of development done accordingly, the expansion of capability would only be a determined objective which would not necessarily involve the people’s agency. The implication would be that people would remain in a state where they were patients rather than agents of their development, as in any top-down approach to development. People could be given food without participating in food production, or they could be educated yet not be allowed to use the knowledge and the skills acquired; or in the global economy they could be consumers instead of being both consumers and producers. This is, for instance, the case with institutions dominated and controlled by centre elites, that is, political leaders and civil servants often referred to as “state custodians” (Mbaku, 2004, p.3)

Thus, one cannot think of the validation of what people believe and value without reference to people’s agency. Obviously that is not the kind of expansion of capability Sen is referring to since he conceives development as “the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities, social deprivation, as well as the over-activity of oppressive states” (Sen 1999: 3). Sen was echoing Denis Goulet who observed that:

> Participation of some sort is quite easy to obtain when it is induced by power wielders at the macro level. Strong governments easily “mobilise” large masses
to lend the appearance of support to their policies or leaders (Goulet, 1989, p.168).

As Goulet himself would observe, the expansion of capability cannot rely on “mobilisation” by the very fact that mobilisation is inauthentic and could encapsulate manipulation and co-optation. Instead, expansion of capability involves “organisation which can truly empower people” (Goulet, 1989, p.168).

The second perspective can thus be formulated: structural institutions involved in the planning of economic development consider the expansion of capability as a means to achieve further development. In other words, policies of development should include the empowerment of people in order to allow them to participate in the process of development so as to achieve further development. This is the whole issue of the interaction between agency and structural institutions, that is, how they feed each other (see Table 7-2).

Although the involvement of people is possible, the risk of treating people as a means of development remains. Earlier in the Chapter Four, I referred to a situation of participatory implementation whereby the decision-makers determine the goals (the goal of development, for instance) and the means (the people) to achieve them. In this process, the role of the people is limited to implementing the goals being targeted and to deciding the tactics. People are thus allowed to decide tactics, but they cannot have what they believe and value validated in the process because they do not own the whole process in the first place. There is no proper public discussion involved in the process. Public discussion may require going beyond the traditional social theory which often gives precedence to structure over agency (Jackson, 2005, p.106). The risk of making people the means of development could be avoided if human agency and social structures are perceived as intertwined and mutually reinforcing (Cf. Jackson, 1999; Mouzellis, 1995; Giddens, 1984). The following table (Table 7-2) is a schematic representation of the interaction between (individual/collective) capabilities and the structural institutions.
The third perspective is the combination of the first and the second perspectives. The capability expansion is both the end and the means of development. Part A in table 7-2 gives the ideal type of this capability expansion: development planning, policymaking and execution are the business of both the structural institutions and the people; as the people participate in their development, they become involved in the structural institutions of their society; and as the structural institutions involve the people, these institutions work better. This is the social and political meaning of development (Williams, 2004).

As a result, the duality between top-down/bottom-up, leadership-people duality, which has often characterised Africa’s development practice, is avoided. In Chapter Six, I referred to a group of participants who argued that LPA and NEPAD are true expressions of what Africans believe and value insofar as they are strategies of economic development produced by African leaders/intellectuals. This argument arises from the top-down approach which was mostly used in the state-led development. Certain proponents of participatory development reacting to both state-led and market-led development advocate a bottom-up approach. One flaw of this approach is that development is thought of in a way that tends to exclude structural institutions, particularly the state. By advocating an interaction between structural institutions and the people in the process of development, the aim is to transcend mutual exclusion among the actors involved in development. Anthony Payne is right when he defends the new political economy launched in 1996, saying:

---

57 See On the link between local cultural values and projects of economic development: an interpretation in the light of the capability approach. Synthesis report of my fellowship at Notre Dame University (2009)
[...] the methodology we have in mind rejects the old dichotomy between agency and structure, and states and markets [...] and seeks instead to build on those approaches in social science which have tried to develop an integrated analysis (Payne, 2006, p.1)

So far the third philosophical premise consists of a shift from the conception of development conceived as an end product delivered to people to the conception of development as the expansion of people’s capability. The expansion of people’s capability is both the end and the means of development. When development is seen as the expansion of people’s capability, the development planning and the policies thereof become the business of both the people and structural institutions. The benefit of this philosophical premise is that it makes it possible to transcend the various dualities in the process of economic development.

I shall now consider the fourth philosophical premise which will lead to the overall structure of economic development that fits with the African value system.

7.3.4 Baking the cake together: from capability to an inclusive process of economic development

The fourth philosophical premise is the principle of baking the cake together which concerns the involvement of all actors in the process of economic development. This principle is derived from the fact that the capability approach leads to economic development as an inclusive process. In the capability approach no one should be a patient of development. Furthermore, the idea of baking of the cake together expresses traditional African collaboration and cooperation towards a given end. The process of economic development is such that everybody has to contribute to the baking of the cake (that is, to economic development), and enjoy it not simply because it is good, but also because each one has contributed to its baking. Thus, the importance of this fourth philosophical premise is that it leads us to a structure of economic development that fits with the African value system. To recall, in this value system, no actors should be excluded in any process meant to involve them. That is the very meaning of the values of togetherness, collaboration and cooperation that are said to characterise African community.
As argued earlier, there are three major actors that structure the dynamics of economic development, namely the state, the people and the market. These actors must all be seen as agents in the process of Africa’s economic development. The following figure (Figure 7-1) represents the structure of an African economic development approach that responds to Sen’s capability approach and fits with the way the (Bantu) Africans conceive of themselves and the world around them.

Figure 7-1: The structure of economic development based on the African value system.

The triangle of the state, the market and the people may not seem new or original. The state-people-market relationship is featuring in the language of corporatism (Anand, 2009, p.9, Grant, 1985, pp.3-4). In the case of developing countries, Todaro and Smith (2009, p.573) argue that:

Successful economic development requires improved functioning of the public, private, and citizen sectors. Each plays essential and complementary roles in attaining balanced, shared, and sustainable development.

From 1998 to 2002, the government of Costa Rica used the model called the “Triangle of Solidarity” (ToS) in order to achieve participatory governance that could address poverty
Smith, 2004, p.63; see also Smith, 2003, p.73). A similar approach is found in some other Latin American countries which aim at creating public spaces for political debate and what is called the economy of solidarity (Baiocchi, 2003; Souza, 2001; Jenkins, 2001; Kaufman & Dilla, 1997). Andreasson (2010, p.8) talks of “developmental nexus” which is thus described: “a site of political action where the state, market and societal actors converge and interact to produce policies aimed at socio-economic development”.


The representation of Africa’s economic development being proposed is, in certain ways, similar to Mbigi’s golden triangle, Andreasson’s developmental nexus, or the triangle of solidarity referred to by theorists of the social and solidarity economy. However, I differ from them by the fact that I arrive at this triangle as the result of validating the Bantu ontological make-up. The triangle I propose is meant to make the point that the process of economic development structured on the basis of the African value system must be inclusive. The cosmological and anthropological dimensions of the African community are such that their cohesion should be safeguarded and no aspect should be excluded or undermined.

The state, the people and the market must work inclusively to achieve a sustainable economic development. All of them must see the process of development as an expression of their capabilities and must see their capabilities expanded.

I now explain how the different components can work together. I begin with the state-people synergy.

7.3.4.1 State-people synergy: social/political processes and social/political participation

The problem that arose in post-colonial Africa’s development is that the people have come to view the prime duty of state authorities as “helping the people”, and people’s efforts as instrumental rather than political. The implication is a narrow view of public responsibility on the part of state institutions from which the people always expect “favours” and immediate
rewards for their vote or approval of leadership (Kurer, 1997, p.180). The social/political participation is intended to emphasise that the state and the people are distinct entities that interact not in view of favours and immediate rewards, but as agents in the process of economic development which, in return, empowers both of them.

As the above figure (Figure 7-1) shows, the state is understood in structural-functional terms. The state includes structures and institutions that shape the political life and the economic policymaking. To echo Handley (2008, p.7), those state structures and institutions include the cabinet, top-ranking politicians who deal with matters of economic policy, civil servants in the appropriate ministries, socio-economic commissions, and parliament. By the people, I mean the citizens in relation to the state apparatus and institutions. The people are often referred to as the general public, the population, or the masses. They include the people at the grassroots, local communities, the civil society organisations, and popular organisations.

The interaction between the state and the people is manifested in the participation in social and political processes. This participation consists of a public discussion on what, how, and why policies of economic development should be elaborated and implemented as well as the sharing of responsibilities. Thus, what brings the state and the people together in the process of economic development is the participation in the social and political processes that shape economic development. The process of economic development becomes democratic (cf. Sen 1999, p.34). Sen’s capability approach to development requires that democracy be defined not just in terms of fair and free elections, but rather as a public discussion:

> The issue of public discussion and social participation is central to the making of policy in a democratic framework. The use of democratic prerogatives - both political liberties and civil rights- is a crucial part of the exercise of economic policy making itself [...] (Sen, 1990, p.110).

Participation requires a mind shift in terms of power. Escobar (1984), Ferguson (1994), Williams (2004), to name but a few, discuss the issue of power and participation in the processes of economic development. For instance, Williams (2004:558) considers the aspect of the depolitisation of development. He argues that subjects in participatory development are never controlled, even though participation may indeed be a form of subjection. It is not clear what Williams meant here. However one could interpret Williams as saying that participation
requires a certain organisation and discipline to which the concerned actors have to subscribe. Williams further investigates the participatory development’s ability to open up new spaces for political action, and suggests the repolitisation of participation in terms of an open-end and ongoing process of engagement with political struggles.

Ordinarily, the state assumes the position of power to the extent that the decision-making process tends to follow the top-down pattern. The people tend to assume a position of powerlessness and passivity, awaiting to execute the decisions from the top. The public discussion requires that the state move away from its self-centredness and the belief that it is the role of the state to plan and to run development. The state must challenge the preconception of itself as the sole agent of development (Theron, 2008, p.4; Pieterse, 2010, p. 25). Challenging its own self-centredness should lead the state to making the people part of the machinery of development governance (Cornwall, 2002, p.18). As far as the people are concerned, the mindshift requires them to develop a kind of self-confidence that moves them beyond the belief that they are there to enjoy the fruits of development produced and delivered by the state.

Thus, participation should neither be perceived as the depolitisation of the state nor the repolitisation of the people. Instead it must be seen as an opportunity for both actors, the state and the people to realise their agency. No state without the people; no people without the institutional organisation (cf. Williams, 2004, p. 558ff).

I now turn to the state-market synergy.

7.3.4.2 State-Market synergy: political/economic processes and political/economic participation

In the African political economy, the relation between the state and the market is as problematic as the relation between the state and the people. According to Kurer (1997, p.160), “African businesses operate constantly under conditions where market decisions are overridden by government”. Accordingly, the reference made earlier in Chapter Six to leaders treating the people as their clients to whom they “deliver” development applies also to the market. Kurer rightly points out that:
Africa’s political elite is [...] dominated by the exchange of material benefits for political support. This clientelist structure generates pressures to provide personal benefits to supporters, to expand the revenue base and to soften bureaucratic allocation. [...] The dependence of business on the support of the state to provide capital and profit opportunities prevents the emergence of a capitalist class with a secure power base outside politics (Kurer, 1997, p.169; see also Mbeki, 2009).

Hence, there is a need to delineate the state and the market as two distinct entities that must interact to achieve sustainable economic development. As I have already defined the state, I shall first define the market before proceeding with the participation in the political and economic processes. The concept of the market is not as simple as it appears at the first sight.

According to Rosenbaum (2000), to whom I am partly indebted for the following insights, the definitions of market can be classified into three categories. The first category consists of observational definitions. Firstly, the market is defined as a geographical area or a place in which exchange of commodities and services takes place between sellers and buyers (Hodgson, 1988, p. 173; Lipsey, 1983, p.69). Secondly, the market refers to people who exchange. Gravelle and Rees (1992, p.3; see also Jevons cited by Hedgson, 1988, p.173; Marshall, 1919, p.182) argue that a market exists whenever people are prepared to enter into an exchange transactions, regardless of time and place. These definitions refer to the market in terms of what it is.

The second category is that of functional definitions. Here the emphasis is on the functions of the market or what it does. In orthodox economics, the market is a mechanism of resource allocation and the determination of prices by supply and demand (cfr. Boyer & Drache, 1996, p.3). In heterodox economics, the smithian invisible hand that allocates the resources and determines the prices is replaced by an institutional structure, - the state, which determines the price as well as the supply and the demand, based on either production or income effects.

The third category consists of structural definitions. The market is defined in reference to its mechanisms and structures. Hedgson (1988, p.174) argues that a market is a set of institutions in which commodity exchanges regularly take place, and are facilitated and structured by those
very institutions by means of contract agreements, property rights, and other regulatory mechanisms.

For the sake of this research, a synthesis of the three categories of definitions is needed. Thus aspects of the market considered in the structure of inclusive development processes must include: location, exchange, pricing mechanisms, resource allocation, transactions, and the people in terms of labour (both employers and employees), buyers and sellers. All these different components are but aspects of the market as an organised business; more precisely, a business community. The structural institutions intervene in terms of participation in the market processes and are part of the market, although only extrinsically.

Figure 7-2 shows that the interaction between the state and the market consists of participation in political and economic processes. As in the case of the state-people interaction, participation must be premised on public discussion in/on the process of economic development. However, the achievement of the synergy between the two entities in development presupposes a prior premise: the recognition of an intrinsic interdependence of the state and the market as agents involved in shaping developmental policies (cf. Andreasson, 2010, p. 53). Underhill and Zhang argue that the state and market agents, despite the analytical distinction, evolve and exist symbiotically in practice, and that the developmental outcome of the whole is distinguishable from the interests of particular state or market agents (quoted by Andreasson, 2010, p.53).

Mbigi (2005, p.58) discusses the pathway of development and outlines two principles which could serve the purpose of this discussion, namely the market principle and the democratic principle. The market principle requires the state to recognise that every economic activity and wealth creation requires the market. The role of the state vis-à-vis the market is not simply to facilitate the market processes as is often suggested by the proponents of a minimal state involvement in the economy, or to catalyse or promote the market as suggested by proponents of the developmental state. Instead, market actors must be substantially involved in the political processes and strategies devised to shape economic development. The state must engage with the market to such an extent that the market achieves the goals of both economic growth and sustainable economic development.

Handley (2008, pp. 20-21) suggests that the interaction between the state and business should be seen in terms of timing and sequencing. She says:
It matters whether it is business or the state that emerges and consolidates the foundations for its political capacity first. In particular, if the state is able to consolidate itself […] this can strengthen the hand of that state in subsequent interactions with business. […] the ideological and policy flavor of the era in which local business community emerges will shape the nature of the state and its intervention in the economy, and hence will determine the kind of market in which business interests will have to function (Handley, 2008, pp. 20-21).

However, one must be aware of the power struggle between the two entities. This power struggle can only be avoided if there is public debate on the policies of economic development and the role each actors should play. The state and the market do not emerge separately, contrary to what Handley holds. Both the state and the market presuppose the existence of the people. Wherever there are people, there is also production and consumption, and exchange between people; and therefore, the market.

The interaction between the two agents requires a political space (Mohan & Stokke, 2000, p. 247). This political space must avoid two problems. The first is caused by the belief that the state can do it alone as has been the case in the state planned economy and the Keynesian model of economic development in the aftermath of the market failure. The second is caused by the belief that the market can do it alone, as has been the case with the free market economy in the aftermath of the failure of the state economy. Avoiding the two problems leads to dissolving the mutual accusation which often results in the intervention of the state in the name of market failure or the market self-imposition in the name of government failure.

I shall now turn to the last aspect of the structure, namely, the people-market synergy.

7.3.4.3 People-market synergy: social/economic processes and social/economic participation

As the state, the people, and the market have already been defined, I will move straight to the interaction between the market and the people. The interaction between the people and the market presupposes participation in the processes of economic development. This
participation cannot be fulfilled without a public discussion between the two actors. How can this public discussion be organised, who should organise it, and on which platform?

In ordinary language, to talk of the market is to talk of what is referred to as the economic elites also known as economic operators who dominate the exchange, pricing mechanisms, transactions and resource allocation. These are the major players who tend to dominate the market. The public discussion involves the people and those who play a major role in the market, coming together to reflect and discuss how and what policies of development should be shaped and implemented, and how each one should be empowered to do so.

Mbigi (2005, p.149) talks of economic liberation as consisting of the right to an economic vote, the right to economic opportunities, the right of employment opportunities, and the right to basic needs. The economic liberation has two aspects. The first aspect is the demarginalisation of the population, which tends to withdraw from the formal economy in favour of the economy of subsistence, so that they can also play a role in the market system and contribute to the overall economy. When they are withdrawn from their marginal position, the participation in the public discussion geared to devising policies of development is no longer a matter of rights in general, but what Sen has called “entitlements”, that is, participation becomes a legal right. The second aspect is to bring the economic elites to change their mind about seeing the people as passive consumers, when the economic entitlements is such that they must participate in wealth creation.

These two aspects lie in the midst of a legendary tension which exists between the people and the market and which the public discussion should deal with. There are various ways of expressing this rivalry and enemity. In the search for a way out of the Great Depression of 1929, Keynes complained about the market not being able to deliver the good. Andreasson (2010, p.15) talks of people’s aspirations to a better life clashing with the markets’ imperatives of accumulation and profits. I have already expressed the fact that people revert to themselves in the form of local development in which they feel self-confident, empowered and their participation taken care off. The post-Marxists talk of this empowerment as a matter of collective mobilisation of marginalised groups against the disempowering activities of both the state and the market (Mohan & Stokke, 2000, p. 248; see Castells, 1997; Friedmann, 1992). Escobar (1992, p. 424) observes the distrust of the market actors who regard the grassroots orientations as disrupting the link between development, capital and science, and thus
destabilising the machinery of the development apparatus. Others talk of unhealthy and unskilled people who neither participate effectively in development project and the market arena, nor have a full voice in these decisions that affect them (cf. Todaro & Smith, 2009, p.570).

The participation of the market and the people in the development process becomes an opportunity to escape from the abuses of the market power geared to accumulation and profits so as to take care of the grievances of the people. According to Streeck and Schmitter (1985, p.119), people often respond to such abuses by informal collusion and cliententistic arrangements. It is not clear what is meant by “informal collusion” and “cliententistic arrangements”. It is possible that Streeck and Schmitter are referring to such actions as demonstrations and marches against businesses on the one hand, and the tendency people have to associate with the state so as to weaken the negative impact of the market on them, on the other hand. A concrete example could be the recent South African Youth League march to the Chamber of Mines and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, (October 27, 2011) which seems to be a follow-up of the appeal for the nationalisation of certain sectors of South Africa’s economy. One could also refer to the 2011 march on Wall Street in New York and other major centres of business in the United States of America. Such acts could be perceived as an obstacle to the normal evolution of the market. Yet, according to Bowles and Gintis (2002), it is in this way that the people deal with what they consider to be the market failures that affect them.

In return the people could deal with the grievances of the market, so that they are both agents in the development process. The way the people could proceed is first of all by appreciating what the business community can do in the process of economic development. What the business community can do could include, among other things, to provide capital and support the funding for learning of sciences, to make available affordable health facilities and skills which people often lack for them to participate meaningfully in the social and economic processes. This appreciation should lead to people’s confidence and good faith in the market as the necessary ingredients for a stable economic exchange; while the market would provide the people with opportunities for sustainable production and consumption (cf. Streeck & Schmitter,1985, p.119). It is within this kind of interaction between the people and the market that a sustainable process of economic development could unfold.
So far, I outlined how the three actors could work together in Africa’s process of economic development on the principle of baking the cake together. I shall present schematically what the three agents become in the process and what links them (Figure 7-2). The state, the people, and the market are seen as distinct entities which cooperate for development and mutual empowerment. In the process of cooperation, each is empowered and achieves fully its identity: a strong state with independent structures and institutions, an enlightened people who understand development policies because they are part of the decisionmaking, and the market, consisting of a capitalist class with power independent of politics.

**Figure 7-2: The three actors according to what they become in the process of development**

So far I have dealt with the fourth philosophical premise which consists of the principle of baking the cake together. This principle echoes the idea of cooperation and collaboration in the African value system. Yet it is derived from the capability approach. Its relevance lies in the fact that it leads to a structure of economic development that fits with the African inclusive value system. The capability approach is such that all actors must be agents in the process of economic development. The state, the people and the market must be involved in the process of economic development as in the process of baking the cake together.

I shall now conclude this chapter.
7.4 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the philosophical premises that should lead economic development in Africa. These premises must address three major problems which bedevil Africa’s planning of development, namely the spirit of extroversion, the designing of plans and policies of economic development as if development were an autonomous process of which the product is delivered to people, and finally the problem of exclusion which leads each of the three actors (state, people and market) to proceed in development without involving others.

I outlined Sen’s capability approach and indicated that its aspects - the ability of people to lead the lives they value and have reason to value, agency and the expansion of the real freedoms people enjoy, which could be seen as expressions characteristic of umuntu-w’ubuntu/umuntu-mu-bantu. I argued that these aspects do not only underlie the process of economic development, but that they are also aspects in relation to which development itself must be defined and shaped. Accordingly, based on Sen’s capability approach I laid down four premises on which economic development in Africa should be based.

The first premise consists of shifting from extroversion to the freedom of Africans to lead the lives they value and have reason to value. The relevance of this premise lies in the fact that it allows Africans to appreciate their beliefs and values in the process of economic development.

The second premise consists of the shift from the conception of development as an autonomous process to an agency-based development. I argued that the relevance of this premise lies in the very definition of the concept of agency, namely the people in action. In other words, this premise is geared to getting people involved in economic development as a process whose starting-point and end-point is these same people.

The third premise is the shift from the conception of development as an end product delivered to people to the conception of development as an expansion of capability. The importance of this premise lies in the new understanding of development as the expansion of people’s capability. This expansion itself is geared to achieving further development. Moreover, I argued that this premise provides the possibility of transcending the various dualities that are often observed in the processes of development so that development is the business of both the people and their structural institutions.
Finally the fourth premise is the principle of baking the cake together, derived from the fact that, in Sen’s capability approach, none of the main actors (the state, the people, or the market) should be made a patient in the development process. The relevance of this premise is two-fold. First, its importance lies in the fact that it leads to a structure of economic development that fits with the African value system. Secondly, in the process of cooperation, each of the three actors or rather agents is empowered and achieves fully its identity.

The four premises should allow any African strategy of economic development to be rooted in what Africans believe and value. The next chapter is the general conclusion. It will present an overview of the macro-argument of this research, identify the implications of the research findings, and provide a critical reflection on the research project.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

This concluding chapter consists of three sections. The first section is a summary of the macro-argument developed so far. The second section deals with the implications of the findings. The third section is a critical reflection on the research which will identify contributions made by this study and areas in need of further investigation.

8.1 Summary of the macro-argument

The focus of this research has been an appraisal of the cultural foundations of Africa’s strategies of economic development, taking LPA and NEPAD as case studies. The aim was to generate four philosophical premises that should guide economic development in Africa. I argued that, although LPA and NEPAD were designed in Africa, their respective philosophical bases are not African. To substantiate this claim, the introductory chapter provided the background of the research as well as the methodological considerations that inform the study. In Chapter Two, I excavated the theories of economic development that are alleged to have informed LPA and NEPAD and the cultural value systems that underpin them respectively. I also engaged with certain architects who designed the two plans in order to gather their views about the cultural foundations of economic development in Africa (see Chapters Five and Six).

Both the theoretical and the empirical findings (Chapter Two, Four and Six) led to the conclusion that LPA was informed by the dependency theory that originated in Latin America. I showed how the dependency theory is based on the Latin American value system. I outlined four salient characteristics of this value system, namely, the Iberian Catholicism, humanism, emphasis on logic and dialectics, as well as the concept of the human being which is such that individuals are valued because of the unique inner quality of worth they each possess. I argued that these beliefs and values structure the ontological make-up of Latin Americans and are the ultimate foundation of the dependency theory.
As far as NEPAD is concerned, the theoretical argument (Chapters Two and Four) showed that this African strategy of development was informed by the neo-liberal theory of economic development. I outlined nine salient features of the culture in which neo-liberalism originated, namely, human sovereignty, individual sovereignty, freedom, emphasis on private property, self-interest, materialism, the quantification of value, instrumentalisation of labour, and the emphasis on reason. These characteristics underlie a cultural value system with a corresponding ontological make-up from which the neo-liberal theory of economic development emerged. However, beside the neo-liberal theory, the empirical findings (Chapter Six) suggested that NEPAD was also informed by some other contending approaches to development of which the most prominent one is the developmental state. The developmental state has its deeper roots in East Asia where it emerged as a response to Western approaches to development.

In Chapter Three, I outlined the African value system and its ontological foundation that should be (or should have been) taken into consideration in African planning of economic development. Central to this value system is the emphasis on the community and the conception of the human being within it. I highlighted the cosmological and anthropological dimensions of the African community and argued that, in this cultural framework, the human being is conceived of as umuntu-w-ubuntu (being-with/in-self) and umuntu-mu-bantu (being-with/in-others). I argued that Umuntu-w-ubuntu refers to the human person as one realizes oneself as an individual person in one’s universe, including one’s guiding principles, cherished values, innovating and constructive choices, self-determination, and self-realization in harmony with others. The ubuntu of the umuntu (ubuntu bw’umuntu), or the humanity of the human being, is assessed in terms of what a person can do and be for other people to enhance their life. I referred to umuntu-mu-bantu, as a human person who recognizes her/his situation among others as a moral necessity. A person is recognized by other people through the way that person enhances their life. People enhance the life of others by their creativity, initiative, and innovation, self-determination, self-realization, and their care and respect.

Both the theoretical and the empirical findings concurred on the fact that, in the two strategies of economic development taken as case studies, the African value system has been neglected to the extent of being ignored. In Chapter Four I argued that the African value system was neglected because the architects of the two strategies failed to strike a balance between the
universality of theories of economic development and the particularity of African value system. Two reasons were outlined to substantiate this claim.

The first reason is the distinction between development economics which pertains to the Third World Countries and orthodox economics which pertains to developed countries. The development economics led to the state as a policy framework in which LPA was designed. Orthodox economics led to the market as a policy framework in which NEPAD was designed. I argued that, although, both policy frameworks could have been articulated so as to take into account the African value system, the architects who designed LPA and NEPAD did not take African beliefs and values into account as a foundation of economic development.

The second reason was that the architects who designed the two strategies did so against the background of what economics does rather than what economics is. A strategy of development built on what economics does, tends to neglect people’s participation in the process of economic development. After distinguishing between accidental and essential participation, I suggested that the latter is inclusive and mediates between economic development and the beliefs and values people hold. Essential participation translates economic development from the universal conception to its local feasibility.

In Chapters Five and Six, the empirical findings further disclosed reasons why what Africans believe and value were neglected in Africa’s strategies of economic development. First, certain participants in the research argued that the two strategies studied are a corroboration of African beliefs and values not in the anthropological sense, but in so far as they are produced by African leaders and intellectuals. This argument corresponds with the first reason of the theoretical findings in which it is presumed that the state or the market can alone achieve the desired economic development independently of the cultural context.

Secondly, certain other participants argued that the issues of development on which the two strategies of economic development focused are universal economic issues, which can be dealt with irrespective of the cultural context. This argument harmonises with the second reason given in the theoretical findings, namely, the fact that the architects who designed LPA and NEPAD did so against the background of what economics does and not what it is.
In both cases, what people believe and value are seen as redundant in the process of economic development.

The empirical research highlighted a further reason why African beliefs and values were neglected and/or ignored. The participants argued that the neglect is a result of extroversion that characterises African planning of economic development. The architects who design African plans of development tend to shape them not according to the African cultural reality, but rather according to the global economy.

In Chapter Seven I introduced Sen’s capability approach as a way of taking into consideration what Africans believe and value. The relevance of the capability approach lies in the fact that its foundation is not culture. In this way, the capability approach can serve to inform how development could be achieved in a particular cultural context. More precisely, the basis of Sen’s capability approach is not social anthropology, but rather philosophical anthropology, which makes it applicable to different value systems.

The capability approach has four features which, I argued, could help in grounding Africa’s strategies of economic development on the beliefs and values that structure the African value system. These aspects are the following: capability as the freedom of people to lead the life they value and have reason to value; human agency; the conception of development as the expansion of capability; and the fact that the capability approach is participatory in the sense that no one should be seen as a patient in the process of economic development. The relevance of these aspects of Sen’s capability approach lies in the fact that they lead to the conception of development as a process by which people create and recreate themselves based on the beliefs and values they hold. This conception of economic development links with the African conception of the human being as umuntu w’ubuntu/umuntu-mu-bantu discussed in Chapter Three.

Based on these fundamental features of the capability approach, I outlined four premises that should guide any African strategy of economic development. The first premise consists of the shift from extroversion to the freedom of people to lead the lives they value and have reason to value. This premise was aimed at dealing with the spirit of extroversion which prevents Africans from appreciating their beliefs and values in the process of economic development.
The second premise revolves around human agency. This premise deals with the shift from the conception of development as an autonomous process to the conception of development as an agency-based process. In other words, development conceived as an agency-based process, has the people as its starting-point and end-point.

The third premise deals with the shift from the conception of development as an end-product to development as the expansion of capability or the real freedoms people enjoy. The relevance of this premise is threefold: Firstly this premise means that the expansion of people’s capability is both the end and the means of development. People’s capabilities are not only the primary end of development, they are also its principal means. True development enhances people’s capabilities which stimulate further development. Secondly, development conceived of as the expansion of people’s capability becomes the concern of both the people and their structural institutions. Thirdly, the interaction between people and their structural institutions makes it possible to transcend the various dualities often observed in certain development approaches such as the bottom-up and top-down development.

The fourth and last premise is the principle of baking the cake together. This premise was derived from the fact that the capability approach leads to development as an inclusive process, and therefore, expresses the traditional practice of collaboration and cooperation as found in African communities. The relevance of this premise lies in the fact that it leads to a structure of development that fits with the African value system. The implication is that the three major actors in the development process, namely, the state, the people and the market, which tend to exclude each other, are all agents and must work together inclusively.

These are the main tenets of the macro argument of this study. I shall now consider the implications of these findings.
8.2 Implications of the research findings

The implications that will be outlined concern the four philosophical premises that were generated in this study to guide strategies of economic development in Africa. I shall consider the implications of each premise in turn.

The first premise consists of the shift from the extroversion to the freedom of people to lead the lives they value and have reason to value. There are three main implications of this premise. The first implication is that African planners and policymakers should realise that there is no model of development that is universally applicable to all societies or all times. To echo Mbigi (2005), African planners and policymakers should keep constantly in mind that no society has ever developed by imitating the development path of another. Each society has to find its own path to development based on the beliefs and values that structure its own identity or ontological make-up. The suggestion being made here is that the success of African strategies of economic development cannot be achieved by simply copying foreign paradigms, but rather by taking seriously the African cultural roots and heritage and build upon them.

However, the idea that African planners and policymakers should not copy foreign paradigms is not meant to suggest that Africa should not learn from the experience of other societies. As a matter of instance, from developed countries, Africa needs to learn the technological experience; but this technological experience itself must be framed within the African ethos. I am echoing Michio Morishima (1982) who argues that, in Japan, the economic success was achieved thanks to the combination of Western Technology and the Japanese ethos. From the newly developed countries of East Asia, African planners and policymakers may not imitate or replicate the developmental state, but, instead, learn from them what Michael Loriaux (1999, p.252) calls “the moral ambition” to develop.

The second implication of the first premise is a call to demarginalise African beliefs and values. The shift from the extroversion to the freedom of Africans to lead the life they value and have the reason to value means that Africans must demarginalise their beliefs and values. Extroversion has marginalised and is still marginalising the African beliefs and values, and relegated them to irrelevance in favour of borrowed beliefs and values. One may recall Axel Kabou (1991) and Etounga Mangellé (1990) who claim that African beliefs and values are
the cause of Africa’s economic underdevelopment to the extent that Africa needs a programme of cultural adjustment. Such a claim is the basis for upholding imported beliefs and values that create bonds of domination and sustain the spirit of dependence in African processes of economic development.

To demarginalise the African beliefs and values will require that African planners and policymakers admit that these beliefs and values have their own rationality which is independent of the Western and Eastern episteme. In other words, the suggestion that is being made is that African planners and policymakers need to realise that African beliefs and values are part of the wisdom which is not part of the structures of political power and scientific knowledge (Mudimbe, 1988, p. xi) of those who have dominated or tend to dominate Africa. This wisdom and its rationality might simply need to be creatively updated so that the African traditional production, exchange and consumption respond to the contemporary conditions and the world’s quest for newness in the global economy.

The third implication follows from the second one, and concerns those who produce knowledge in Africa. The shift from extroversion to the freedom of Africans to lead the lives they value and have reason to value will need to deal with intellectual extroversion. By intellectual extroversion, I mean the tendency of African intellectuals to adopt ideas, concepts and values that are not African, mostly from the developed countries of the West and of the East (nowadays). The suggestion is that it is necessary to take seriously Hountondji (2002, p.231) who warns about the “[African] intellectual subordination to the questions and expectation of the learned public in the West”. The consequence of this intellectual subordination is that, foreign ideas and knowledge systems are given a driver’s position rather than being used as a supplement or a complementary input to what Africans already have. In other words, African planners and policymakers will need deal with the fact that extroversion in Africa’s economic development is partly, yet very significantly, a result of intellectual extroversion.

Thus, to achieve the shift from extroversion to the freedom of Africans to lead the life they value and have reason to value, Africans may need to engage in the process of what Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986) calls “the decolonisation of the mind”. Intellectual colonisation has affected negatively the perception that African intellectuals have of themselves and of the African value system of which they are part. To escape from extroversion in order achieve an
endogenous development, African intellectuals will need to take full and clear responsibility of themselves, and develop confidence in what they are and have. This should lead African intellectuals to understand that the role of ideas and concepts of development that are borrowed from outside Africa can only serve to complement the local knowledge they produce for local development needs.

The second set of implications pertains to the second premise, that is, the shift from the conception of development as an autonomous process to the conception of development as an agency-based process. I shall outline four major implications which are all suggestions about how the exercise of human agency could be achieved effectively, namely, people’s empowerment, democratic space, public discussion, and leadership style.

The first implication of the premise of human agency as the ultimate source of economic development is the suggestion that people have to be empowered to participate broadly to the extent of taking initiative in the process of economic development. This empowerment may require that certain requirements be fulfilled so that people are both active and creative. The first set of these requirements consists of social needs. These include such needs as being nourished, being healthy, being literate, being housed, having access to resources, having security, having one’s (human) rights respected and protected. These are part of what Sen refers to as basic capabilities in the process of people’s empowerment.

The second set consists of political needs which, if fulfilled, spur the pursuit of aspirations and ideals embedded in the beliefs and values people hold deeply. There are three such needs, namely, the democratic space, the public debate, and leadership. I shall consider each of these as further implications of the conception of development as an agency-based process.

Accordingly the second implication is the suggestion that the exercise of human agency needs a democratic space or democratic openness. Agency cannot be exercised fully in a politically closed space. In other words, human agency is better protected and promoted in a space where everybody has a right of expression, enjoys civil and political freedoms (for instance, freedom to determine who should govern and by which principles, the possibility to scrutinise and criticize authorities, political participation, freedom to choose between different political parties, free expression of one’s opinions, freedom from coercion and intimidation, political dialogue, and freedom of association). I am emphasising here Sen’s
suggestion that developing and strengthening a democratic system is essential for the process of development. Human agency cannot be divorced from a democratic space. Crocker (2008, p.277) reiterates also the same suggestion when he argues that citizen agency and participation, political pluralism, and democratisation have beneficial effects on preventing and combating hunger and achieving economically related goals.

The third implication is the suggestion that the exercise of human agency requires a public debate or discussion. This requirement flows from the democratic space or openness. Public discourse means that democracy amounts to more than limited public balloting, and should rather be understood much more capacious in terms of the exercise of public reason (Sen 2009b, p.324). In more precise terms, the exercise of human agency implies the need to move beyond the conception of democracy in terms of fair and free elections so as to create a platform of a public discussion at various levels of policy and decision-making.

The suggestion of public discourse as an aspect of the exercise of the human agency goes even further to the issue of the kind of democracy that could accommodate it. In Africa, the kind of democracy that prevails is mostly the liberal democracy based on the party competition, or political pluralism. The exercise of agency calls for a kind of democracy that accommodates public discussion and socio-economic participation. The proponents of the capability approach suggest and emphasise deliberative democracy.

The relevance of deliberative democracy as a political space for the exercise of human agency resides in its very definition. Deliberative democracy emphasises public deliberation of free and equal citizens (Brohman, 1998, p.401), the exchange of views and reasons concerning public issues (Rawls cited in Crocker, 2008, p.309), and the realisation that public problems require public decision-making in the light of general interests (Held, 2006, p.237; see also Dryzek cited by Held, 2006, p.236). In short, deliberative democracy strengthens discursive and communicative rationality which allows collective solutions to collective problems (see Dryzek, 1990, p.54).

Finally, the fourth implication is the suggestion that the exercise of agency may require a change in leadership style. To recall, the issue of leadership was highlighted by certain participants in the empirical research who argued that the two strategies studied are a corroboration of African beliefs and values not in the anthropological sense, but in so far as
they are produced by African leaders and intellectuals. The observation that the two strategies are produced by African leaders and intellectuals indicates that the rest of the people are prevented from exercising their agency in matters that concern them. The same observation is true of the process of economic development dominated by the state, the market and even the people in the case of local developmentalism. A public problem is made a private matter. The exercise of human agency may require African leaders and intellectuals to shift from the position of domination to a position of shared and collective leadership, particularly in the field of economic development which is the concern of this research.

Thus, the suggestion so far is an invitation to take seriously Mulwa’s claim that “a collective leadership involves active and evenly spread participatory processes of decision-making” so that both the leader and other actors are agents who are empowered in the process (Mulwa, 2008, p.134, see also Maathai, 2009, p.111).

These are the implications pertaining to the exercise of agency, or the shift from the conception of development as an autonomous process to the conception of development as an agency-based process. The different implications could be summed up as follows: People are not simply beneficiaries of economic and social progress in society, but ought to be active agents of change (Fukuda-Parr, 2003, p.308).

I shall now turn to the implications of the third premise.

The third set of implications pertains to the third premise, namely the shift from the conception of development as an end-product to development as an expansion of capability or the real freedoms people enjoy. There are two main implications of this premise.

The first implication is that the primary concern of the development process is not development for its own sake, but the people and what they become in the process. This implication pertains to the fact that the expansion of people’s capability is both the end and the means of development. It is an invitation to take seriously the Human Development Report 2010 (see also Human Development Report 1990) which suggests that in the pathways to human development, “people are the real wealth of a nation”. There are two things that need to be highlighted here. From a theoretical point of view, the people should be engaged in the process of understanding that the genuine development is that in which they are fully
involved. From a practical point view, people should be engaged in the discussion of policies which lead to their own development. I concur with Fukuda-Parr who suggests that, for people to be able to engage in the discussion of development policies, certain basics need to be taken seriously. These include:

[...] expanding the range of things that a person can be and do, such as being healthy and well nourished, to be knowledgeable, and to participate in the community life, [...], removing the obstacles to what a person can do in life, obstacles such illiteracy, ill health, lack of access to resources, or lack of civil and political freedoms (Fukuda-Parr, 2003, p.303).

The second implication is the importance of institutions that have enough political will to achieve economic development. An important feature of this political will is what was referred to earlier as the “moral ambition” to achieve development. This is what Cooper and Vargas (2004, p.255) see as the political feasibility of sustainable development. The political will which aims at development is better perceived in the efforts to achieve effective governance. Effective governance is one which is free from clientelism of which African political life is often accused, corruption, rent-seeking behaviour, the allocation of resources without reference to political criteria, and authoritarian behaviours that prevent people from being creative and innovative. Thanks to effective governance, it would be possible to “avoid that the political elite becomes the business elite at the same time”. In the same way, effective governance makes it possible to avoid that business organisations overlap with state institutions (Kurer, 1997, p.163). Without effective governance, it would be impossible to achieve the expansion of capabilities.

The suggestion is that the political will leads the state institutions to provide a political environment in which economic development can flourish to the extent of expanding people’s capabilities.

The third implication concerns the people. The people need to trust their (state) institutions enough to collaborate with them in order to achieve sustainable development. This trust could create a framework in which people would have a share in the political power, have effective public participation, as well as civil and political freedoms that are sufficient to probe the incumbents of structural institutions, particularly when they are entrenched in bureaucracy. If
this implication were translated in concrete terms, development should be understood henceforth as:

[...] a process by which the members of a society increase their personal and institutional capacities to mobilize and manage resources to produce sustainable and justly distributed improvements in their quality of life consistent with their own aspirations (Korten, 1990, p.67).

I shall now consider the implications of the fourth and last premise: The principle of baking the cake together which leads to development as an inclusive process. There are two main implications of this premise.

The first implication of this premise is that African planners and policymakers need to learn from the history of economic development: The state, the people and the market each on its own cannot achieve economic development. The experience of economic development in Africa in the last decades and the present world economic crises are proving that neither the state, nor the market, nor the people each on its own can lead a sustainable economic development. Economic development cannot be achieved when the major actors exclude one another. It can only be achieved by the inclusion of all actors; more precisely, the inclusion of the state, the people and the market. That is what I have called elsewhere the *ubuntu* economy (Ntibagirirwa, 2009, pp. 307-308).

The second implication is that each of the three major actors of the inclusive economic development has to know what is required of them for the principle to be effectively operative. According to Duncan Green (2008, pp. 12, 13 & 14) what is required of the state is the capacity to guarantee security, the rule of law, to work out effective strategies to ensure inclusive economic growth and development.

What is required of citizens is the capacity to combine rights and obligations which link individuals to the state. This includes obeying laws, exercising political, civil and social rights in order to improve the quality of political and civic life through the involvement in the formal economy and formal politics as well as collective action that allows their voice to be heard.
What is required of the market as organised business or business community is a certain measure of deferred gratification so as to reinvest rather than skim off profits, accept the redistribution of wealth and income for the sake of national stability and economic growth, avoid any kind of behaviour that could undermine the state such as bribery and inappropriate lobbying, but also avoiding certain behaviour that can undermine the people such as denying them labour rights, or affordable goods and services.

These are the two implications that can be drawn from the fourth premise.

Having drawn up the implications of the four premises, I shall now turn to the contributions of the research and new areas for further research.

### 8.3 Contributions and new areas for further research

This dissertation is but a contribution to the ongoing search for solutions to the challenging quest for African economic development. Firstly, I will outline the contributions made by focusing on each of the three major objectives pursued and the methodology used. Secondly, I will outline the contributions made in certain specific areas. Where necessary I will highlight the limitations of this study areas open for further research.

I begin with the contributions related to the three objectives of this study.

The first objective was to make a critical assessment of two strategies of economic development against the backdrop of theories of economic development that were alleged to have informed them respectively and the cultural assumptions of these theories. Using both theoretical reflection and an empirical approach, I demonstrated that the two major African strategies of economic development, taken as case studies, relied on theories of economic development whose cultural foundations are not African. This argument supports the claim that, although the two strategies of economic development were designed in Africa, their respective philosophical bases were not African.
The second objective was to investigate the relationship between African cultural values and economic development and the extent to which the neglect of the African value system in African policymaking and planning could jeopardise development plans in Africa. Through theoretical reflection and empirical research, I demonstrated that the beliefs and values that structure the African value system have been neglected to the extent of being ignored. I argued that the implication of this neglect is that the two strategies of development taken as case studies do not provide sufficient room for people’s participation in the process of their economic development. Participation, I emphasised, makes possible the democratisation and the inculturation of economic development, and thus translates the universal conception of economic development into local and cultural feasibility.

The third objective was to outline philosophical premises that could guide development planning in Africa. Using Sen’s capability approach, I proposed four philosophical premises which, I argued, could link African economic development to what Africans believe and value. The relevance of the four premises proposed is four-fold.

Firstly, these premises make possible to deal with the extroversion which plagues African economic development. Secondly, they make it possible to base development on human agency. This allows to free Africans from the conception of development as an autonomous process so as to embrace the conception of development as an agency-based process. Thirdly, they lead to the conception of development as the expansion of the real freedoms people enjoy rather than development as an end product. Finally, they lead to an inclusive development à l’Africaine. The principle of baking the cake together makes it possible to see the state, the people and the market as actors that all have to work in synergy to achieve sustainable economic development.

I now turn to the methodological approach followed in this study.

As far as the methodological approach is concerned, I privileged the philosophical path. This path leads to examination, analysis, clarification of ideas, reflection, and insight as highlighted in Chapter One. It focuses on the question “why” which allows one to grapple with the first or ultimate causes of every reality. The philosophical path is the path of critical reflection. This perspective helped to go deeper to the problem of economic development in Africa and to make concrete proposals of what could be an adequate solution.
Another important contribution is the use of Sen’s capability perspective. In proposing the philosophical premises that should guide development in Africa, I adopted Sen’s capability approach whose ultimate foundation is not culture as is the case with the theories that informed LPA and NEPAD respectively. The starting-point of the capability approach is not social anthropology but rather philosophical anthropology so that it leads to a kind of economic development that links with the beliefs and values that structure the African culture.

Philosophy is often criticised for being too general and even abstract. This critique could lead to the charge that the study undertaken is theoretical and abstract. To take care of this charge that may arise, the study considered an empirical component which consists in engaging with the architects who designed the Lagos Plan of Action and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. The theoretical findings were compared with the empirical findings that result from a dialogue with some architects who wrestled with Africa’s development issues at the level of planning and policymaking. From this point of view, this research could be seen as bearing both theoretical and practical marks.

To a certain extent, the issue of the cultural assumptions of economic development pertains to the domain of the anthropology and/or the sociology of development. Although my research could be seen as bearing a mark of the anthropology and sociology of development, I cannot claim to have paid attention to these social sciences. The reference to cultural assumptions was motivated by the search for the ultimate roots of economic development. In the process I showed that the neglect of the beliefs and values that structure people’s value systems could lead to development impasse. The social sciences such as sociology and anthropology tend to be descriptive while the approach used in this research is mostly prescriptive. This could be seen as a shortcoming of this research which might be overcome by adopting an interdisciplinary approach to economic development.

Finally, I now turn to the contributions made in specific areas.

This study also made a contribution to a number of other discourses. First of all, it could be seen as an attempt to apply African philosophy to issues of economic development. African philosophy applied to development is still a young, yet a vast field which needs further development. The fact that I ventured on a field which is not sufficiently explored could be
seen as a contribution and some proof of the originality of this research. At the same time, this very fact underlines a limitation which may not be easy to deal with. One aspect of the limitation is that of the availability of sufficient literary resources. How could this limitation be overcome? The empirical component of this research could be seen as one attempt to deal with this limitation. The semi-structured interviews that were used in the empirical research could be understood as a suggestion that, in the absence of written materials, a dialogical approach of the Socratic kind (question-answer, oral discussion) should be explored, especially in the African philosophizing applied to particular issues.

Regarding the capability approach, this research made a double contribution. First of all, it is a contribution in the area of the link between culture and the capability approach from an African perspective. The focus of this research has been on participatory development and collective capability in the context of African culture. The reflection in this area is still at its beginning. This research could be seen as opening a new area of study, which needs to be further explored.

Furthermore, in this study, Sen’s capability approach was only introduced towards the end of the study as a tool used to develop the philosophical premises that should inform development in Africa. Accordingly, I cannot claim to have given a full account of Sen’s capability approach. In particular I have not considered the criticism often levelled against the practical significance of the capability approach to policymaking (Sugden, 1993, p.1953), nor did I consider Rawls’ critique that the capability approach is an “unworkable idea” (Rawls, 1999, p.13).

Nevertheless, I considered and defended Sen’s capability approach against the charge that it is individualistic in order to show that it aligns with the conception of the human being in the African value system. This consideration and defence may not exonerate me from the fact that I departed from a certain “bias”: Since the capability approach is based on a philosophical anthropology rather than social anthropology, it could help to ground African economic development on the beliefs and values that structure the African value system. Future research could use the capability approach as its starting point, thus providing enough space to deal systematically with the criticism levelled against it as well as the extent to which it is suited for an understanding and an assessment of the issue of economic development in Africa.
This research also made a contribution in the area of development ethics in Africa. The issues of capability, agency, and expansion of people’s capability concern how people ought to live. Furthermore the capability approach deals with how development should be governed so that everybody can benefit from it. A development ethics in Africa from Sen’s capability perspective is also relatively new. This research focused on the general Bantu conceptual framework, that of umuntu-w-ubuntu/umuntu-mu-bantu characterised by agency, the ability to lead the life people value and have reason to value, and the expansion of capabilities that makes possible a participatory and inclusive development. I have not dealt with the issues of how this applies to particular communities at the very local level, for instance. These questions suggest that there is a need to consider case studies that deal with issues which are not touched at the general level.

When talking about beliefs and values that should underlie economic development, I have been quite general rather than specific. I dealt with the structure of the African value system as well as the Bantu concept of the human being, rather than with particular beliefs and values. A focus on particular beliefs and values would have distinguished those which foster development from those that could hamper development. Such focus could be more concrete than this research has been. Thus research that would focus on particular beliefs and values that are needed for Africa’s development and those that might hamper development needs to be envisaged. Such focus would require a descriptive social scientific approach that deals with the “what” question rather than a prescriptive philosophical approach that deals with the “why” question. Alternatively, as already suggested, an interdisciplinary approach could combine both social sciences and philosophy.

Finally the four premises proposed to inform development in Africa could each constitute a topic of research. In so far as the space provided for this research did not allow it, I cannot claim to have been exhaustive in their elaboration. In this research the four premises have been formulated as the end result of a process of analysis and reflection on the practice of development planning in Africa and the lessons that can be learned from Sen’s capability approach. At this level, I feel that each of them has only been introduced and consequently, they all are in need of further development.
These are the contributions and the new areas for further research. I cannot claim to have addressed the whole question of the impasse in Africa’s quest of economic development. Instead, I believe I have posed the question differently.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES


~ 259 ~


~ 260 ~


Cameron, J. (2000). Development economics, the new Institutional economics and NGOs. Third world quarterly, 21 (4), 627-635.


Jenkins, P. (2001). Relationship between the state and civil society and their importance for sustainable development. In M. Carley, P. Jenkins, & H. Smith (Eds.), *Urban development and civil society: The role of communities in sustainable cities* (pp. 50-87). London: Eathscan.


~ 278 ~


~ 280 ~


Seers, D. (1980). The cultural lag in economics. In J. Pajestka & C.H. Feinstein (Eds.), *Proceedings of a conference held by the international economic association in collaboration with the Polish economic association, Warsaw, Poland* (pp. 3-16). London: Macmillan


~ 289 ~


Zea, L. (1953). *America como consciencia* (2nd ed.). Mexico City: UNAM.


ANNEXES

ANNEXE 1: CONSENT FORM

1. Nature of the study

The research to be undertaken has three objectives, namely:

- to critically assess the LPA and NEPAD against the backdrop of the theories of economic development that inform them respectively and their cultural assumptions;

- to investigate the relation between African cultural values and economic development and the extent to which the neglect of these in Africa’s economic policymaking and development planning could render development plans ineffective;

- to propose certain African philosophical guidelines that could guide future economic development in Africa. These philosophical guidelines should help African economists and policymakers to re-appropriate a particular theory of economic development if it is borrowed from a culture other than that of Africa. Alternatively, they could constitute a basis for a development theory that may be constructed in Africa.

Your participation will help in the process of achieving the above objective.

2. Procedure

If you agree to participate, you will be required to participate in a face-to-face interview with the researcher. This interview will consist of a series of open-ended questions regarding the relationship between cultural values and economic development in Africa. On the one hand, the aim is to know how African economists and policymakers respond to the concern that African cultural values could have been a missing link between development plans (LPA and
NEPAD particularly) in Africa and the economic development they have purported to achieve. On the other hand, the aim is to know whether adapting development policies to African value system or adapting African value system to development policies could advance the cause of economic development in Africa.

The interview will take about one hour. The participation in this research is voluntary. All information will be treated confidentially and anonymously. No person other than the researcher will have access to the information. After they have been analysed, the data will be stored according to the policy of the University of Pretoria. Once completed the copies of the consent form will be returned to the researcher for their records.

The researcher can be contacted at any time after the completion of the interview concerning any queries. The data will be available from the researcher.
3. Consent form

I agree to take part in the research project as explained in the above statement. This means (tick with “X”):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To be interviewed by the researcher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To allow the interview to be audio-taped and/or video-taped</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To make myself available for any further interview if required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I understand that I will be given a transcript of the data concerning me for my approval before it is included in the write-up of the research.

I understand that my participation is voluntary. This means that I can choose not to participate in part or throughout the entire project and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way.

I understand that any data that the researcher extracts from the interview for use in reports or published findings will not, under any circumstances, contain my names or any of my identifying characteristics.

Participant’s name

Signature

Date
ANNEXE 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE (FOR LPA)

I. Introduction

3. Self-introduction of the interviewee
4. Brief explanation of the research being carried out
5. Terms and conditions

II. Research questions

a. Could you give me some background about how LPA emerged?
b. Was the dependency theory known to you at the time you worked on the LPA document?
c. LPA is perceived as a classic interpretation of the dependency theory in the African development planning. To what extent is this the case?
d. Is culture (as a system of beliefs and values that structure people’s identity) related to economic development?
e. Did you consider LPA to be a true expression of what Africans believe and value?

III. Concluding the interview

a. Do you have any other comment to make?
b. Appreciation by the researcher and later followed up.
ANNEXE 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE (FOR NEPAD))

I. Introduction

1. Self-introduction of the interviewee
2. Brief explanation of the research being carried out
3. Terms and conditions

II. Research questions

1. Could you give me some background about how NEPAD emerged?
2. Was the Neo-liberal economic theory known to you at the time you worked on the NEPAD document?
3. NEPAD is perceived as a classic interpretation of the Neo-liberal theory in African development planning. To what extent is this the case?
4. Is culture (as a system of beliefs and values that structure the people’s identity) related to economic development?
5. Did you consider NEPAD to be a true expression of what Africans believe and value?

III. Conclusion of the interview

1. Do you have any other comment to make?
2. Appreciation by the researcher and later followed up.