CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

Towards the end of 1989, President FW de Klerk established a committee to oversee the dismantling and destruction of South Africa’s “nuclear devices” (De Klerk 1993). In early 1990, the De Klerk government decided that:

all the nuclear devices should be dismantled and destroyed; all the nuclear material in Armscor’s [Armaments Development and Production Corporation of South Africa] possession be recast and returned to the AEC [Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa] where it should be stored according to internationally accepted measures; Armscor's facilities should be decontaminated and be used only for non-nuclear commercial purposes; after which South Africa should accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby submitting all its nuclear materials and facilities to international safeguards (De Klerk 1993).

An immediate task of the South African government after the 1989 decision to terminate the nuclear weapons programme was to decommission several nuclear weapons facilities in preparation for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) whilst maintaining the safety and security of the country's nuclear weapons equipment and stocks of highly-enriched uranium (HEU). More importantly, South Africa had to convince the international community of the sincerity of its intentions regarding nuclear non-proliferation. Apart from these developments, South Africa was also in the early phases of its political transition to democratic rule.

---

2 De Klerk (1993) referred to the dismantling and destruction of “nuclear devices” and not to atomic or nuclear bombs. Waldo Stumpf (1995a) of the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa (AEC), who had been involved in the development of South Africa’s nuclear weapons capability also referred to ‘devices’ (and not bombs) but also mentions “South Africa's nuclear deterrent”. In fact, Stumpf (1995a) confirmed that South Africa produced six “fission gun-type devices”.

3 In the so-called “Completeness Report” by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the Agency’s General Conference (GC) on 9 September 1993, the Agency referred to the “destruction of equipment used in the development and making of the nuclear weapons” and to the “termination of the programme” (IAEA 1993a: 27) (see Chapter 4).
On 24 March 1993, President de Klerk announced the extent of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme to the South African Parliament. The decision set in motion not only speculation about the ‘voluntary’ nature of South Africa’s intention to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme, but also the public announcement of the scope of this nuclear weapons programme. Barely a month later 26 South African parties established the Multi-party Negotiating Forum which subsequently adopted the constitutional principles that formed the foundation of the South African Interim Constitution and initiated the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) to prepare the country for its first inclusive democratic elections in April 1994. This resulted in the establishment of a Government of National Unity (GNU) under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, the President of the African National Congress (ANC) (Sisk 1995: 225-243). These developments resulted in the termination of sanctions and embargoes against South Africa; ended the country’s global isolation and resulted in changes in its nuclear-related relations.

South Africa is one of few countries to have terminated its nuclear weapons programme - others being Brazil and Libya. Apart from including the dismantling of its nuclear weapons programme, the post-1990 period has been most dynamic in terms of South Africa’s international relations and diplomacy. During this period it established numerous bilateral relations; acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereafter the NPT) in 1991; and joined or re-joined several nuclear-related organisations, including the IAEA, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (hereafter Wassenaar Arrangement or WA), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Zangger Committee (ZC), the Network of Regulators of Countries with Small Nuclear Programmes (NERS), the African Nuclear Regulators’ Group and the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) (DFA 2009a).

Apart from adopting a human rights-based foreign policy, South Africa reiterated that a “primary goal” of its foreign policy is to “reinforce and promote it as a responsible producer, possessor and trader of defence-related products and advanced technologies in the nuclear, biological, chemical and missile fields” (DFA 2009a).

---

4 Hereafter this is referred to as De Klerk’s 1993 announcement or the 1993 announcement.
5 Hereafter the full titles of treaties and other international agreements are indicated in italics, whereas their abbreviations, acronyms or shortened titles are in normal font.
The Government’s argument was that South Africa, in this way, “promotes the benefits which non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control hold for international peace and security, particularly to countries in Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)” (DFA 2009a).

Accordingly, a year into the GNU, South Africa entered into one of its first major nuclear-related diplomatic engagements. Its participation in and deadlock-breaking diplomatic efforts during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (REC) of the NPT have subsequently been hailed as a diplomatic success “winning it some credibility in the west, while not damaging relations with non-aligned states” (Masiza & Landsberg 1996: 31). At subsequent NPT conferences, South Africa achieved similar results (Taylor 2006). The evolution of South Africa’s brand of nuclear diplomacy has been more significant. Characterised by a combination of normative innovation, norm maintenance, coalition building, confrontation, independence, partnerships and parallelism, South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy has developed into a diplomatic niche role for the country.

Notwithstanding these successes, several nuclear-related issues have remained a concern, unresolved or took a long time to resolve. Despite several appeals by the IAEA, the protracted process of converting the country’s nuclear research reactor - the South African Fundamental Atomic Research Installation (SAFARI-1) - from operating with weapons grade HEU to operating with low-enriched uranium (LEU) was only completed by mid-2009. Issues pertaining to the safety of radioactive waste and the security of nuclear installations such as Pelindaba, the headquarters of the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA), have repeatedly been raised. The admission by Pakistan’s leading nuclear official, Abdul Qadeer Khan (hereafter AQ Khan or Khan), of the involvement of South African citizens in a global nuclear black market was a cause of considerable diplomatic embarrassment and compromised the country’s non-proliferation image (IISS 2007). Despite the sentencing of two individuals involved, several other individuals (i.e. South Africa and non-South African citizens) were not brought to book (NPA 2007 & 2008).

Globally, concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons continue in the wake of the Cold War as nuclear weapons states (NWS) and so-called threshold states
diverge on aspects of the NPT. Furthermore, concerns about nuclear terrorism remain on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in terms of the UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (UNSC 2004; IISS 2009: 1-2). In addition to this, there is the parallel initiative of the United States (US), namely the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) of April 2010 in Washington (US) and of March 2012 in Seoul (South Korea).

South Africa has not been shielded from these developments and has had to adapt its nuclear diplomacy and domestic legislation to maintain and enhance its status as an advocate and supporter of nuclear non-proliferation. Its nuclear diplomacy with so-called nuclear rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and India has also raised some diplomatic concerns among the traditional NWS who questioned South Africa’s nuclear intentions.

Irrespective of its non-proliferation stance, the South African government remains committed to an ambitious nuclear agenda. Whilst maintaining its status as a member of a unique nuclear non-proliferation club, it has set its sights on the construction of a pebble bed modular nuclear reactor (PBMR) (subsequently terminated in 2010); on enriching and recycling uranium; and on improving its share in the global medical isotope market. In February 2003, a few weeks prior to the US-led “Coalition of the Willing” invasion of Iraq, South African President Thabo Mbeki announced the impending departure of a team of South African disarmament experts to Iraq following Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s acceptance of South Africa’s offer to send an envoy to the country to “share with their government, scientists, engineers, technicians and people of Iraq its experience relevant to the mission of the UN and Iraq to eradicate weapons of mass destruction, under international supervision” (BuaNews 24 February 2003). Mbeki maintained that this intervention would “help to ensure the necessary proper cooperation between the United Nations inspectors and Iraq, so that the issue of weapons of mass destruction is addressed satisfactorily, without resorting to war” (BuaNews 24 February 2003).

---

6 This study uses the definition of a NWS as defined in Article IX of the NPT, namely a state which has “manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device” before 1 January 1967. This study defines a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) as a state that do not have a nuclear explosive capability.
The South African government also expressed its intention to develop its nuclear industry in its *National Nuclear Energy Policy* (2008) and in its *Ten Year Plan for Science and Technology* (2007) (DME 2008; DST 2007). In 2008, the Minister for Minerals and Energy stated that the *National Nuclear Energy Policy* “represents the Government’s vision for the development of an extensive nuclear energy programme” in order to develop a national nuclear architectural capability to “supply nuclear equipment and nuclear reactors” as well as the “ability to design, manufacture, and market, commercialise, sell and export nuclear energy systems and services” (DME 2008: 4 & 24).

Against the background of the aforesaid, this study is situated in the broader context of International Relations (IR), more specifically in the context of nuclear diplomacy. The development and use of nuclear weapons and other forms of WMDs have dominated the study of international relations since the end of the Second World War and, more specifically, since the end of the Cold War. One of the major strategies employed by the superpowers during the Cold War, in addition to nuclear deterrence, was nuclear diplomacy in an effort to achieve a Kantian “perpetual peace” in a global stand-off. Writing at the onset of the Cold War, former US diplomat and IR and diplomacy scholar, Henry Kissinger (1956: 351), stated that “in an international order composed of sovereign states, the principle sanction is the possession of superior force”. By the end of the Cold War, “superior force” was increasingly also defined in non-material terms or, as Joseph Nye (2002: 8-12) calls it, “soft power”.

The end of the Cold War also initiated a period of reflection by IR scholars. Accusations of realism and its theoretical variants’ inability to foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War initiated theoretical rivalries among proponents of various IR theories. One of the major consequences of this was the emergence of constructivism as an alternative approach to IR. Refined by Alexander Wendt (1992, 1994, 1995 & 1999) but pioneered by Nicholas Onuf (1989, 1998 & 2002) and Friedrich Kratochwil (1989) constructivists propose that states construct their reality and identity to achieve their national interests. For constructivists, this construction or change can be explained in terms of the diffusion of models, practices and norms. Accordingly, since norms evolve over time, norm development
can be explained in terms of the internationalisation and institutionalisation, or the life-cycle of norms (Barnett 2008: 168-169).

Since 1990, South African leaders, diplomats and government-employed nuclear scientists have repeatedly reiterated the government’s stance on nuclear non-proliferation. Diplomatically, the country’s adaptive ability to construct or reconstruct its nuclear-related identity, interests, role and norms has stood it in good stead. Notwithstanding this, very little is known in scholarly terms about the country’s nuclear diplomacy. Even less scholarly work has appeared on South Africa’s nuclear-related economic diplomacy. Therefore, the primary aim of this study is to analyse post-1990 South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. The study, therefore, contributes to the understanding of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy, particularly as it relates to the dismantling of its weapons and to the country’s ability to play an active diplomatic role in terms of nuclear non-proliferation.

South Africa’s influence on nuclear diplomacy has been acknowledged by scholars, diplomats and heads of states and governments (Geldenhuys 2006a). A question to consider is: Why, despite possessing enough enriched uranium, technology, skills, and clients, does the country not reverse the decision to terminate the South African nuclear weapons programme? In response, it is contended that the following propositions offer some explanation. Firstly, South Africa has constructed its norms, identity, role and interests in such a way to increase its diplomatic influence, authority, non-material power and economic incentives. Secondly, South Africa has constructed a unique brand of niche diplomacy, involving a number of diplomatic practices, to gain material and non-material rewards such as status, prestige and trade opportunities. It is furthermore argued that, informed by its foreign policy and diplomatic practice, South Africa employs the following strategies in its niche diplomacy, including:

- **Confrontation:** It attempts to direct the terms of the current debate away from realism; irrespective of some form of ideological confrontation with the major NWS such as the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and France.
- **Parallelism:** It attempts to cultivate a form of “realism lite” or enlightenment through parallel action alongside the one superpower and its coalition partners.
• Partnership: It engages in active partnership with the dominant power on a realistic footing (Henrikson 2005: 74).

Therefore, against the background of the aforesaid, the next section offers a review of some of the literature on South Africa’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy.

2. Literature survey

Although scholarship on South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme and its post-apartheid foreign policy has proliferated (see for example De Villiers, Jardine and Reiss 1993; Masiza 1993; Stumpf 1995a & 1995b; O’Meara 1996; Fig 1998; Van Vuuren 2003; Sanders 2006; and Venter 2008) much less scholarship has been devoted to post-apartheid South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. Several themes and trends are evident in the existing scholarship on post-apartheid South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. Firstly, authors have predominantly focused on the period immediately after 1994 until 1999, namely the Mandela presidency’s nuclear diplomacy (Motumi 1995; Muller 1996; Masiza & Landsberg 1996; Masiza 1998; Shelton 2000a, 2000b & 2006; Long & Grillot 2000; Harris, Hatang & Liberman 2004; Taylor 2006; Fig 2005 & 2009). This trend coincides with a general trend in post-1994 analyses of South Africa’s foreign policy where the idealism of the Mandela era is referred to in the context of the prodigal’s return as a middle, African and regional power, and a bridge builder *par excellence* (Barber 2004).

Secondly, there is a considerable lack of literature explaining South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy prior to the Mandela era, that is, from 1990 to 1994 under the presidency of FW de Klerk. Regarding the latter, Barber (2004: 67-68) is a notable exception with his reference to the nuclear diplomacy of the De Klerk presidency between 1990 and 1994. Moreover President Mbeki, as President Mandela’s successor, has contributed to an acceleration of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. During Mbeki’s presidential term (1999-2008) South Africa’s normative commitment to nuclear non-proliferation was supplemented with normative innovation and norm internalisation. This period also saw increased South African support for Iran’s nuclear programme; South Africa’s participation in inspections of Iraq’s nuclear facilities in March 2003; and increased South African exports of nuclear-related products. More importantly, the nuclear ambitions of the South African government became increasingly public.
In 1999, for example, the South African government became one of the investors in the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (Property) Limited, a company with local and international investors.

The Mbeki era also laid the foundation of post-1990 South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy with the rest of the African continent. South Africa acceded to the *African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty* (hereafter the Pelindaba Treaty or the Treaty of Pelindaba) which entered into force in July 2009. In contrast to this illustration of the country’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation during the tenure of President Mbeki was South Africans’ involvement in the nuclear proliferation network of AQ Khan. Essentially, current literature pays little attention to these post-Mandela nuclear-related developments.

Thirdly, the application of IR theories to analyse South Africa’s post-apartheid nuclear diplomacy is scant with Masiza and Landsberg (1996) and Taylor (2006) being notable exceptions. Multilateralism (Masiza & Landsberg 1996) and middle powership (Taylor 2006) have been applied to analyse South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy, but only in the context of the NPT and not in respect of any other international nuclear forum. This coincides with a general trend pertaining to the theoretical poverty noticeable in most post-1990 foreign policy analyses of South Africa and the country’s diplomatic conduct.

In the context of multilateralism, a limited number of studies on South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy with the rest of the African continent exist. African efforts, including South Africa’s role in these efforts, to declare the continent a denuclearised zone have been analysed by, amongst others, former South African diplomat David Fischer (1993 & 1995); South African academic Marie Muller (1996); and former South African diplomats Jean du Preez (Parrish & Du Preez 2005; Stott, Du Rand & Du Preez 2010; Du Preez & Maettig 2010), Thomas Markram (2004) and Pieter

---

7 Considerable differences, even in official AU and UN documents, in the spelling of the formal title of the Treaty occur. See, in this regard, UNSC (1996), AUPSC (2006) and AU (2010) that uses *African Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty* and *African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty*. For the purposes of this study, the spelling *African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty* is used throughout.
Goosen (1995). In addition to this, Nigerian academic Adebayo Oyebade (1998) and Nigerian diplomat Oluyemi Adeniji (2002) have also addressed the issue.

In the fourth place, few of the above-mentioned studies link domestic and foreign policy issues. Whereas South Africa’s civil society was locally and internationally active prior to 1994, the intensity of its activity has waned since 1994, especially regarding foreign policy issues (Nel & Van der Westhuizen 2004), and national and international nuclear issues. Historically, South Africa did not have an active domestic anti-nuclear civil society movement. However, prior to 1990 an active pro-ANC anti-nuclear civil society movement operated outside the country; especially in the UK and at the UN under the leadership of Abdul Minty, who later became South Africa’s diplomatic representative at the IAEA. Reddy’s (1994) edited collection of Minty’s statements and speeches are testament to this.

Since 1990, some international and national anti-nuclear civil society movements operate in South Africa. Notable examples are Greenpeace International; the Coalition against Nuclear Energy (CANE); and the Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG). These and other organisations have made submissions to Parliamentary Portfolio Committees on Energy, Foreign Affairs, and Environmental Affairs on South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. The most notable and only post-1990 South African civil society engagement on nuclear issues has been the Conference on Nuclear Policy for a Democratic South Africa held in Cape Town from 11 to 13 February 1994, and which was organised by the EMG and the ANC (EMG & Western Cape ANC Science and Technology Group 1994). This linkage of domestic sources of foreign policy and diplomatic practice is of particular relevance as it has been repeatedly indicated by the ANC-led government since 1994 as a prime focus of post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy.

A fifth aspect is that only Auf der Heyde (2000) has analysed the development of the country’s post-apartheid nuclear policy. His analysis focuses on the energy-related
aspects in policy developments and excludes nuclear diplomacy. However, Fig (2010) refers to some elements of South Africa’s nuclear policy, but only in the context of the PBMR.

In the sixth instance, former South African diplomat Thomas Markram (2004) offers an assessment of South Africa’s disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control policies between 1994 and 2004. Apart from some analysis, Markram makes a significant contribution in compiling speeches and documentation on South Africa’s early post-1990 nuclear diplomacy. Given his background, he steers clear of controversy and offers an assessment with little theoretical substance.

Finally, few nuclear-related issues per se have been addressed. Notable exceptions include some analysis of export control regimes (Masiza 1998) and the NPT (Masiza & Landsberg 1996; Van der Westhuizen 1998; Geldenhuys 2006a; Taylor 2006; Shelton 2000a, 2000b & 2006). South Africa’s relations with multilateral nuclear related organisations such as the IAEA and the UN is remarkably under-researched, with former South African diplomat-turned-IAEA-official David Fischer (1997) and Hecht (2006) the notable exceptions. Analyses of this and other related issues are critical for an understanding of the country’s nuclear diplomacy.

Scant reference to some aspects of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy is made elsewhere. For example, Geldenhuys (2006a: 103) has briefly analysed South Africa’s role as norm entrepreneur in terms of the NPT; the Pelindaba Treaty; the New Agenda Coalition (NAC); and the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI). In their study, Long and Grillot (2000) compared South Africa and the Ukraine’s ideas and beliefs about nuclear weapons. Although dated, their analysis represents an emerging trend of an increase in constructivist analyses of nuclear diplomacy and nuclear security (Das 2009). Shelton (2006: 277-278) and Cawthra and Møller (2008: 139-141) described South Africa’s role in non-proliferation against the background of the African continent and some African states’ nuclear ambitions. However, the absence of more recent and comprehensive and theoretical analyses of the country’s nuclear diplomacy is evident from the literature review.

Nuclear diplomacy can be described as niche diplomacy. First coined by Australia’s former foreign minister, Gareth Evans, niche diplomacy is meant to refer to
specialisation. It also refers to "concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate return worth having rather than trying to cover the field" (Evans in Henrikson 2005: 67). The ability to "generate return worth having" implies that a state wants to achieve non-material objectives with niche diplomacy which, in turn, can generate international prestige, status, material benefit, soft power and moral authority. For South Africa, these incentives are of particular importance to convince the international community of its commitment to continue with a non-weapons nuclear programme. To acquire and maintain a diplomatic niche requires recognition, and a secured position in a globally competitive arena requires publicity, including advocacy, positive branding, and the moral high ground. A major implication of a country’s niche is that it has some kind of advantage over other countries. This advantage is either locational, traditional or consensual (Henrikson 2005: 70-72).

As will be argued, South Africa bases its nuclear diplomacy on normative innovation, independence, and consensus-seeking techniques. Moreover, the country has invested in the global socialisation of norms. Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert (2007: 97; 104-105) have described this socialisation process as construction, enactment and compliance, whereas Koh (1997: 2598-2599) has described it as interaction, interpretation and internalisation. Lastly, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 894-905) offer their life-cycle of norms to explain this process: norm emergence by norm entrepreneurs, norm cascade (acceptance) and norm internalisation.

Therefore, against the background of the above-mentioned review, the purpose of this study is to offer an original contribution in the analysis of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy since 1990 by building on some of the preliminary theoretical and analytical contributions made by Geldenhuys (2006a: 93-107) on South Africa’s role as norm entrepreneur. The practical relevance of the study is that it contributes to scholarship on South Africa’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy, nuclear disarmament, and to scholarship on the concepts nuclear diplomacy and niche diplomacy, by applying a constructivist perspective.

3. **Formulation and demarcation of the research problem**

The possession of nuclear weapons awards states and non-state actors with considerable power and influence. Yet, South Africa has decided to dismantle its
nuclear weapons and terminate its nuclear weapons programme. It is not the aim of this study to determine why it took that decision, but rather to clarify “the what” and “the why” of its nuclear diplomacy. The study concerns itself with one major question: Why and how South Africa, as a former nuclear weapons state and developing country, became so influential in terms of nuclear diplomacy? In response, the main thesis of this study is that since 1990 South Africa has conducted its nuclear diplomacy by constructing certain norms, and its identity, in a particular way to serve its national and international interests, and in the process - as a norm entrepreneur - aligning itself with internationally settled norms and advancing new and/or nascent nuclear norms.

South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy has not only created a practical reality (no more nuclear weapons), but also a normative reality by bestowing upon the country a position and a role as a state that has relinquished its weapons programme to secure and maintain, as a norm entrepreneur, a certain moral high ground in international negotiations. Increasingly, there is a shift of emphasis away from Western states and Russia’s nuclear power to those of developing countries. Of the top nine states with nuclear weapons inventories in 2009, for example, more than half are developing countries, including China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel (Norris & Kristensen 2009: 87). Israel has never declared its possession of nuclear weapons and is regarded as an undeclared nuclear weapons state although it is widely accepted that the country has nuclear weapons. China (with 11 nuclear power plants) and India (with 17) operate the largest number of nuclear power plants in the developing world (Schneider et al. 2009: 2).

Therefore, the objective of the study is to:

- position and clarify the concept of niche diplomacy in the broader context of foreign policy and diplomacy and to provide a theoretical framework for a constructivist analysis and explanation of a diplomatic niche role through norm construction and state identity;
- identify South Africa’s niche diplomacy, specifically its norm construction and state identity based on four selected case studies; and

---

10 The choice of 2009 figures here is deliberate as it reflects some of the realities during the period under discussion. More recent figures, where applicable, will be presented in the thesis but the aim is to present figures that reflect the context of the period under discussion.
• Evaluate the research findings and make recommendations.

The research problem is demarcated with reference to the following considerations and limitations of the study. Firstly, the study’s conceptual focus is limited to nuclear diplomacy as earlier defined. Secondly, for analytical purposes, the study is limited to four case studies representative of South Africa’s construction and conduct of nuclear diplomacy. These are the nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes (especially in terms of the NSG, the ZA and the WA); South Africa’s relations with the IAEA; South Africa and the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (ANWFZ) in terms of the Pelindaba Treaty; and the nuclear non-proliferation regime in terms of the NPT. These case studies represent South Africa’s approach to the practice of nuclear diplomacy in a multilateral context which, in some instances, is supplemented by bilateral diplomacy. These case studies have also remained on and dominated the global nuclear agenda since 1990. Moreover, these cases represent the most dynamic areas of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy since 1990 as evidenced by the establishment of the ANWFZ in 2009 and South Africa’s leading role in the establishment of continental nuclear institutions.

Thirdly, the study is limited to the South African government’s nuclear diplomacy. It does not focus on the role of civil society. Therefore, the African and global campaign against South Africa’s nuclear programme falls beyond the scope of this study. Similarly, the study does not focus on the diplomatic activities of the ANC in exile and the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), amongst others, related to the creation of global awareness of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme (Thomas 1996; Reddy 1994; Purkitt & Burgess 2005: 183-184). In this respect, the study does not focus on the historical anti-nuclear position and activities of individuals, for example, the ANC anti-nuclear activists Abdul Minty, Denis Brutus and Kader Asmal. Abdul Minty, in particular, has become synonymous with the ANC’s nuclear diplomacy during its period in exile (Reddy 1994). In this study, the ANC’s post-1990 position is represented by Abdul Minty whose role in the country’s nuclear diplomacy pre-dates the chronological scope of this study but who, as an ANC member and, since 1994, an ANC government appointee, represents continuity in respect of the ANC’s nuclear diplomacy.
It also does not focus on the South African diplomatic and foreign policy institutional framework *per se* as in the case of, for example, Hughes (2004) and Van Nieuwkerk (2006: 37-49). However, some reference will be made to the institutional environment to illustrate particular aspects of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.

Finally, the study is limited to the period 1990 to 2010. This period commences with the unbanning of the ANC in 1990 and culminated in the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the NPT and the First Conference of Parties (COP) of the Pelindaba Treaty. Both events are illustrative of the development of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy since 1990. Where relevant, references will be made to developments prior to 1990 and after 2010. By limiting the study to the period from 1990 to 2010, it will not address the development of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme. Reference will only be made to some of South Africa’s successes and failures pertaining to its nuclear diplomacy in the context of its early relations with the IAEA. In summary, the study is therefore demarcated in terms of its conceptual focus (nuclear diplomacy); theoretical approach and analytical framework (constructivism); and period of enquiry (1990 to 2010).

4. **Methodology**

The theoretical approach of this study on South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy is one of constructivism, which maintains that states construct or reconstruct their identities, normative behaviour, roles and interests according to their interests, and *vice versa* in a mutually constitutive manner (Zehfuss 2002; Reus-Smit 2005).

The study is qualitative in nature. Following an inductive method, the selected case studies are utilised to determine certain diplomatic styles and practices and use of instruments. To the extent that a narrative description of some of the main developments in South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy from 1990 until 2010 will be presented, the study adds to the diplomatic history of South Africa.

The study is based on primary sources such as speeches, presentations and statements by South African presidents, diplomats, and nuclear scientists. These are supplemented by reports, policy statements and documents of the South African government, and by submissions and presentations to the Portfolio Committee on
Foreign Affairs, which has a constitutional obligation towards the country's international relations.

Empirical data on South Africa's voting at the IAEA and UN; import and export figures; diplomatic interactions; nuclear facilities; and nuclear-related industrial production is also used.

The aforesaid primary sources are supplemented by secondary sources that include South African and international media reports; academic literature including books and peer-reviewed journals; and analyses by South African and international non-governmental research institutions and think tanks.

5. Structure of the research

This study comprises seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to South Africa's nuclear diplomacy since 1990. It includes a literature review of the topic and presents the main research questions to be addressed. It includes an overview of the study's methodology, structure, limitations and expected contribution. As a theoretical framework, Chapter 2 (Nuclear diplomacy: a conceptual framework) serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it presents constructivism as the study's theoretical approach. The study follows Alexander Wendt (1992, 1994, 1995 & 1999) and Christian Reus-Smit's (2002 & 2005) approach to constructivism. Chapter 2 analyses and clarifies ontological and epistemological issues pertaining to constructivism; its origins; main tenets; and claims. Secondly, the chapter includes a conceptual analysis of nuclear diplomacy and positions it in the broader context of foreign policy, diplomacy and nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, the chapter serves as a basis and framework to analyse and explain South Africa's efforts to secure a diplomatic niche through norm construction and state identity.

Whereas Chapters 1 and 2 present the theoretical and analytical framework of the study, Chapters 3 to 6 apply these frameworks to and analyse four selected case studies representative of South Africa's nuclear diplomacy. Cutting across these four selected case studies are South Africa's multilateral relations with the IAEA and the UN; and its bilateral relations with NWS, NNWS and FNWS (former nuclear weapons states); the role of South African decision-makers such as presidents FW de Klerk, Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Kgalema Motlanthe and Jacob Zuma, and foreign
ministers such as Pik Botha, Alfred Nzo, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Maite Nkoane-Mashabane; and the country’s domestic implementation of its international commitments through legislation, the establishment of institutions and the continuous regulation of nuclear issues.

The rationale behind the sequence of chapters is to present the chronological, rather than the thematic, development of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. South Africa’s first involvement in nuclear diplomacy began in the early 1940s and illustrates the country’s initiation into the global nuclear export control regimes. By the 1950s, South Africa became a founder member of the IAEA. Despite its contribution to the nuclear non-proliferation norms at this stage, the country’s policies resulted in increased global isolation to such an extent that, during the 1960s, African governments joined in the global condemnation of South Africa’s domestic policies. In fact, African states took this condemnation further by declaring Africa a nuclear weapons free zone; a situation that could only be realised when South Africa’s complete nuclear disarmament was confirmed by the IAEA. The final case study addressed here is South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in terms of the NPT. With its ratification of the NPT in 1991, South Africa came full circle in terms of its normative commitment to nuclear non-proliferation; nuclear disarmament; and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Chapter 3 (South Africa and the nuclear export control regimes) analyses South Africa’s involvement in multilateral nuclear export control regimes. Globally, trade in nuclear products, services and equipment annually amounts to billions of dollars. The global nuclear non-proliferation export regimes are controlled through various mechanisms such as the NSG, the WA and the ZC. Since 1990, South Africa has been a voluntary member of these groups, whose purpose it is to control nuclear proliferation for peaceful uses, as well as to control nuclear weapons manufacturing states. Therefore, this chapter traces the origins of various nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes, as well as South Africa’s membership of, involvement in and compliance with these regimes. It also explores the country’s nuclear diplomacy with the various committees, groups and arrangements in terms of South Africa’s

11 The study follows Article III of the Statute of the IAEA in referring to the “peaceful uses” rather than peaceful use of nuclear energy. Similarly it uses “peaceful purposes” rather than peaceful purpose of nuclear energy (IAEA 1957).
construction of the norm of nuclear non-proliferation, South Africa’s identity, roles and interest *vis-à-vis* nuclear exports. The chapter also analyses developments in and the implications of South African involvement in the proliferation network of AQ Khan. The chapter concludes with an assessment of South Africa’s diplomatic instruments and achievements.

The purpose of Chapter 4 (South Africa’s diplomatic relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency) is to analyse South Africa’s diplomacy with the IAEA. South Africa was a founder member of the IAEA in 1957. The country lost its designated seat on the IAEA Board of Governors (hereafter Board or IAEA Board) in 1977 due to global condemnation of its domestic policies. However, as this chapter outlines, subsequent to the country’s accession to the NPT in 1991, the country signed various agreements with the IAEA which resulted in the IAEA’s verification of the complete dismantling of the South African nuclear weapons programme in 1993. In addition to this the chapter also analyses the legal and diplomatic framework of South Africa’s post-1990 relations with the IAEA. The chapter focuses on six case studies representing South Africa’s relations with the IAEA since it resumed its seat on the Board. These case studies focus on the membership of the Board; the right of state to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; South Africa’s effort to lead the Agency; the country’s position on the IAEA nuclear fuel reserve; the impact of the AQ Khan network’s activities in South Africa on the country’s relations with the IAEA; and the conversion of the SAFARI-1 from using HEU to LEU. The chapter concludes with an assessment of South Africa’s relations with the IAEA.

Chapter 5 (South Africa and the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty) traces the origins of nuclear weapons free zones as an expression of the norm of nuclear non-proliferation. In addition to this, it traces the evolution of the Pelindaba Treaty as the idea of an ANWFZ originated in the 1960s. Chapter 5 analyses South Africa’s involvement in the Treaty process until it entered into force in July 2009. The chapter also analyses the country’s nuclear diplomacy with the African Union (AU) and African states in terms of the First COP of the Pelindaba Treaty and the First Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE or hereafter the Commission). The chapter concludes with an assessment of South
Africa’s nuclear diplomacy with Africa, the country’s state identity and its nuclear diplomatic challenges on the continent.

The purpose of Chapter 6 (South Africa and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) is to outline the background, purpose and content of the NPT as a multilateral treaty. It traces South Africa’s involvement in the various NPT conferences - including the 1995 REC and the RevCons of 2000, 2005 and 2010 - since it acceded to the Treaty in 1991, that is, from the De Klerk presidency. South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy pertaining to the NPT review processes is analysed in terms of South Africa’s construction of unresolved issues, South Africa’s identity, roles and interest vis-à-vis the Treaty, and the country’s norm construction. The chapter concludes with an assessment of South Africa’s diplomatic instruments and achievements in respect of the NPT.

As a concluding chapter, Chapter 7 (Evaluation and recommendations), provides an evaluation of the study’s findings by revisiting the main research question and thesis of the study. It synthesises the main summaries of each chapter, draws conclusions from them and indicate key findings. At a meta-theoretical level, it also reflects on the ontological and epistemological contribution of the study. The implications of the study’s conclusions are assessed and recommendations are offered for future research on South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.

6. Conclusion

This chapter presented a brief overview of several nuclear-related developments in South Africa - since President De Klerk took office in 1989 and the ANC came to power in 1994 - that prompt and contextualise this research. The chapter indicated that very little scholarly research on these developments was conducted. The chapter also outlined the rationale for a study on South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. It outlined the study’s theoretical approach and analytical framework, and identified four case studies to illustrate South Africa’s niche role in nuclear diplomacy through the construction of norms and a particular state identity. Finally, it indicated the demarcation and structure of the study.

Accordingly, the next chapter presents a conceptual analysis of the core concept of this study, namely nuclear diplomacy. The concept “nuclear diplomacy” offers an
analytical instrument to explain South Africa’s international behaviour (namely, securing a niche role through norm construction and state identity) regarding its “nuclear past” and “nuclear future”, and provides a point of departure for the development and application of a constructivist approach to identify and explain the norm construction and state identity that characterises South Africa’s niche role through nuclear diplomacy.
CHAPTER TWO

NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. Introduction

Once scientists split the atom and the true power of atomic energy became evident, an increasing number of states realised the strategic value of atomic energy in power politics, in conflict and to enhance their status and prestige. The Manhattan Project was one of the first government-sponsored projects on the development of atomic bombs and nuclear weapons. It ultimately resulted in the US dropping two atomic bombs on Japanese cities in August 1945. This ended the Second World War. This event effectively became “the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war” (Graybar 1986: 888). Since then “(t)he connection of science with war has grown gradually more and more intimate” (Russell 1976: 83), resulting in an arms race between the two Cold War superpowers, the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This arms race resulted in a new form of diplomacy, namely nuclear diplomacy to conduct relations between the superpowers.

The technology and expertise to develop atomic bombs; nuclear weapons; and WMDs continue to have an attraction for some state and non-state actors. This attraction is evident in the continued efforts of more states to acquire nuclear capabilities for defence purposes or to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes such as power generation or in the field of nuclear medicine. In the wake of the Second World War, efforts to control the development, use and trade in nuclear technology and services soon became one of the defining features of international relations (Kissinger 1956: 351). Of more significance was the realisation, as early as the 1950s, that traditional diplomacy was no longer the best practice to address issues concerning nuclear stalemates and “atomic blackmail” (Kertesz 1959a & 1959b). Consequently a particular brand or niche of diplomacy emerged, namely

---

12 “Atomic [or nuclear] blackmail” is when a state with a nuclear weapons capability threatens to use its nuclear weapons if its demands are not met, or when it wants to advance its national interests.
atomic diplomacy (Alperovitz 1965; Jones 1980; Graybar 1986) or nuclear diplomacy (Quester 1970; Bargman 1977).  

Between its onset in the 1950s and the collapse of the USSR, the Cold War produced several nuclear crises. These included the Cuban Missile Crisis, France’s nuclear tests in the Pacific and unwillingness of some NWS to ratify the NPT. By 2010, at a global level, the major success of nuclear diplomacy was to avert the use of atomic bombs and weapons by warring parties. More importantly, nuclear diplomacy contributed to the entrenchment of the so-called “nuclear taboo” (the non-use of nuclear weapons) as a norm of international relations (Tannenwald 2005 & 2007). Once introduced, a particular weapon and its use become legitimate. However, this has not been the case with nuclear weapons, which have been severely delegitimised to such an extent that the “nuclear taboo” is “associated with a widespread revulsion toward nuclear weapons and broadly held inhibitions on their use” (Tannenwald 2005: 5). Notwithstanding this, a number of states such as the US, Russia and China continue to develop nuclear weapons and maintain stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

As this study focuses on South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy since 1990, the country’s nuclear diplomacy prior to 1990 is not discussed. However, it is noted that the origins of South Africa’s atomic and nuclear diplomacy date back to the period prior to the outbreak of the Second World War when the Prime Minister of the UK, Winston Churchill, requested the then South African Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, to conduct a geological survey of South Africa’s uranium resources in order for the UK to secure uranium for its own nuclear programme. Donald Sole, a South African diplomat at the time, explained in his memoirs that the “genesis of South Africa’s atomic energy policy” could be traced back to a meeting in May 1944 between South Africa’s Prime Minister, General Jan Smuts, and the Danish nuclear scientists Niels Bohr (Fourie et al. 2010: 263; Fig 1998: 165). After the end of the Second World War, South Africa became a founding member of the multilateral IAEA created under the auspices of the UN. In 1948, South Africa established the Atomic Energy Board,

---

13 The concepts atomic diplomacy and nuclear diplomacy are defined later in this chapter and are, in their respective historical and academic contexts, used interchangeably in this study.
14 South Africa’s pre-1990 nuclear diplomacy is extensively analysed by De Villiers, Jardin and Reiss (1993); Albright (1994); O’Meara (1996); Van Vuuren (2003); Harris, Hatang and Liberman (2004); and Venter (2008).
the forerunner of the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEB 1968), presently known as NECSA. In 1957, South Africa’s nuclear science and nuclear diplomacy developed under the aegis of the IAEA’s “Atoms for Peace” programme. It was the result of the South African government’s bilateral nuclear collaboration agreement with the US, the *US-South African Agreement for Co-operation*. The latter resulted in South Africa’s acquisition of a nuclear research reactor and an assured supply of HEU fuel for the reactor (Masiza 1993: 36).

By the 1970s, South Africa’s international isolation and domestic instability increased due to the global condemnation of and domestic opposition to its policy of apartheid (Fig 1998: 166). As a result the country’s nuclear diplomacy entered a new stage. This included UNSC sanctions against South Africa, its suspension from the IAEA Board of Governors and secret nuclear-related bilateral relations with declared NWS, including the US, the UK, France and Israel. International sanctions and embargoes against South Africa and increased isolation did not deter South Africa from enriching and exporting uranium (UN 1994) or to manufacture, according to President FW de Klerk (1993), six “nuclear devices”.

By the end of the 1980s, the Cold War ended and with it, the USSR’s involvement in African conflicts and support of national liberation movements on the continent. Consequently, efforts to find a lasting solution to the conflicts in Southern and South Africa increased. President De Klerk announced on 2 February 1990 that his government had unbanned the ANC and other liberation movements, and would release Nelson Mandela (on 12 February 1990) and other political prisoners. These events ushered in a new political and diplomatic era for the country. Of particular importance was De Klerk’s announcement that South Africa would suspend its nuclear weapons programme which paved the way for the country’s accession to the NPT in 1991 (NTI 2010a).

This study contends that South Africa, between 1990 and 2010, secured a niche role for itself in the form of nuclear diplomacy through norm construction and state identity. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to present a conceptual framework to analyse the concept nuclear diplomacy by adopting a constructivist approach. In order to achieve this, the chapter is divided into three main areas. The first area concerns conceptual analysis as a methodological approach. The second area
includes the emergence, assumptions, characteristics and contribution of constructivism. The third area is that of diplomacy; nuclear diplomacy in particular. The chapter clarifies various aspects of diplomacy before proceeding to define and explain the nature and scope of nuclear diplomacy as a type of diplomacy. With particular reference to nuclear diplomacy, the chapter concludes with a classification of the concept niche diplomacy.

2. **Conceptual analysis as a research method**

Concepts are the building blocks of theory and they provide scientific explanations of events or phenomena. However, as Heywood (1999: 6) cautions, “(i)n politics ... the clarification of concepts is a particular [sic] difficult task”. Two types of concepts can be distinguished, namely normative and descriptive concepts. The former is described as values, referring to ideals, which should or must be achieved. Value-laden concepts include, for example, concepts such as freedom, tolerance and equality. These concepts often advance or prescribe specific forms of conduct, instead of describing events or phenomena. In contrast, descriptive or positive concepts refer to ‘facts’ which have an objective or demonstrable existence; referring to what is (Heywood 1999: 7). Therefore, the utility of conceptual analysis as a method to the study of IR is that it provides greater clarity, which contributes to a shared understanding of the meaning and utility of a particular concept (Baldwin & Rose 2009: 780-781).

The rationale for conducting a conceptual analysis of nuclear diplomacy is prompted by the following considerations. Firstly, conceptual confusion exists regarding the definition of and aspects related to the concept of nuclear diplomacy. Apart from being loosely defined, the concept nuclear diplomacy is often used synonymously with other concepts such as atomic diplomacy, non-proliferation diplomacy, nuclear disarmament, nuclear arms control and nuclear deterrence.

Secondly, contemporary developments in the practice of diplomacy require greater conceptual clarity and a shared understanding in order to articulate and entrench new norms on nuclear weapons and energy. Thirdly, after the end of the Second World War, international relations were defined by the nuclear arms race between the superpowers (the US and USSR) who competed for nuclear power supremacy.
However, since the end of the Cold War, some middle powers and even small states are vying for nuclear capabilities to enhance their power, status and prestige and to meet domestic energy needs. This is a departure from the historically predominant US-USSR nuclear rivalry and poses challenges to diplomacy and state sovereignty.

In the fourth place, states are increasingly threatened by the aims and activities of non-state actors regarding, for example, the nuclear black market; even more so after the 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11) attacks on the US and the exposure of the AQ Khan proliferation network (IISS 2007). This has resulted, amongst others, in nuclear diplomacy which contributed to normative innovation concerning the concept and phenomenon of nuclear terrorism and to the subsequent adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of WMDs (UNSC 2004).

Finally, an analysis of the nuclear diplomacy of a state such as South Africa, which discontinued its nuclear weapons programme and dismantled its nuclear weapons, can provide insight into nuclear diplomacy and a better understanding of current and future nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

This study therefore follows Baldwin and Rose’s (2009: 782) approach to conceptual analysis and includes concept development, concept comparison, concept clarification, concept correction and concept identification. In this context and due to both the suitability and utility thereof, nuclear diplomacy is accordingly analysed from a constructivist perspective.

3. Constructivism: selected theoretical aspects

This section provides a brief overview of constructivism in order eventually to contextualise aspects, indicators, instruments and practices of nuclear diplomacy. The constructivist notion of the social nature of international interactions resonates well with diplomacy as a social activity between states. This notion is supported by the constructivist Christian Reus-Smit (in Randal 2008: 7, 101) who commented that diplomacy is “integrated with, and embedded in, other social practices” and that state sovereignty is “intersubjective, requiring recognition from others, shifting diplomacy further into the realm of social practice”. Thus, the conduct of nuclear diplomacy can be deemed to be a social practice based, inter alia, on the reciprocal recognition and intersubjective understandings of states.
As one of the more recent and contested theoretical developments in IR, constructivism’s rise in the wake of the nuclear arms race-dominated Cold War is ascribed to four factors (Reus-Smit 2005: 195-196; Kubálková, Onuf & Kowert 1998: x). Firstly, rationalists challenged critical theorists to move beyond theoretical critique to a substantive analysis of international relations. Secondly, the end of the Cold War undermined the explanatory power of neo-realism and neo-liberalism as neither could explain or predict the systemic transformations reshaping the world order. Thirdly, a new generation of scholars emerged in the 1990s that embraced the propositions of critical international theory but acknowledged the need for theoretical innovation. Finally, their frustration with the dominance of rationalist theories contributed to their embracing of constructivism. According to Reus-Smit (2005: 192, 203), the relationship between constructivism and rationalism is a source of discontent (see Table 1). For example, whereas constructivists emphasise interest formation, rationalists emphasise interest satisfaction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Constructivism</th>
<th>Rationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>Deeply social</td>
<td>Self-interested and rational egoists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identities are constituted by norms, ideas and values</td>
<td>Identity and interests are autogenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norms shape identity and interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interests</strong></td>
<td>Endogenous to social interaction</td>
<td>Exogenous to social interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and interest</td>
<td>Learnt through communication and reflection on role</td>
<td>Actors pursue interests strategically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formation**</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interest satisfaction paramount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Society</strong></td>
<td>Constitutive realm</td>
<td>Strategic realm where rational pursuance of interests occurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledgeable and social actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Determines political agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reus-Smit (2005: 189-193)
With its focus on norms, identity and interests, constructivism is the inverse of realism. Unlike realism and neo-realism which focuses on the material and agency in world politics, constructivism focuses both on the material and immaterial or social aspects of international relations. Accordingly, this study follows Reus-Smit (2005: 188) by emphasising “the importance of the normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action and the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures”.

Constructivism makes the epistemological claim that meaning and knowledge are socially constructed. Epistemologically, constructivism is not interested in how things are but rather how things became what they are. Therefore, proponents of constructivism share an epistemology which makes interpretation a crucial part of social sciences and emphasise contingent generalisations. The latter, according to Adler (2002: 101), “open(s) up our understanding of the social world”.

Constructivism makes the ontological claim that the social world is constructed. All strands of constructivism converge on an ontology that depicts the social world as mutually constituted intersubjective and meaningful structures and processes (Adler 2002: 100-101). Thus, material sources only acquire meaning through social interaction and shared knowledge. From this, he deduces a number of implications. These are that the social world consists of intersubjective understandings and knowledge, as well as material objects; that social facts are determined by human agreement, account for most of the subject matter of IR and depend on human consciousness and language; and that humans operate in the context of and reference to their collective understandings, rules and language. Finally, the mutual constitution of agents and structures are considered to be part of constructivism’s ontology (Adler 2002: 100-101).

Constructivists distinguish and problematise the relationship between the levels of observation and action. Accordingly, Guzzini (2007: 25) deduces that constructivism is defined by stressing the “reflexive relationship between the social construction of knowledge and the construction of reality”. Therefore, reality determines knowledge, and *vice versa*. 
Wendt’s (1999: 92) introduction of ideas as a “fourth factor” laid the foundations for an ideational view. For him, “ideas constitute those ostensibly ‘material’ causes in the first place” (Wendt, 1999: 94). He maintains that “the meaning of the distribution of power in international politics is constituted in important part by the distribution of interests, and that the content of interests are in turn constituted in important part by ideas” (Wendt 1999: 135). He also states that:

the claim is not that ideas are more important than power and interest, or that they are autonomous from power and interest. Power and interest are just as important and determining as before. The claim is rather that power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up. Power and interest explanations presuppose ideas (Wendt 1999: 135).

Thus the power-interest-ideas nexus constitutes an important aspect of international relations. In fact, for constructivists, their core ideational element is intersubjective beliefs which include ideas, conceptions and assumptions shared among people. Ideas only matter once they are widely shared.

Tannenwald (in Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 166) similarly defines ideas as “mental constructs held by individuals, sets of distinctive beliefs, principles and attitudes that provide broad orientations for behaviour and policy”. She identifies four types of ideas:

- Ideologies or shared belief systems such as Marxism, Liberalism and Fascism that are a systematic set of doctrines or beliefs reflecting a group, class, culture or state’s social needs.
- Normative beliefs such as human rights which consist of values and attitudes that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong, just from unjust.
- Causal beliefs which focus on cause-effect and provide strategies for individuals on how to achieve their objectives.
- Policy prescriptions which are specific programmatic ideas that facilitate policy-making by specifying how to solve a particular policy issue (Tannenwald in Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 167).

Based on these ontological assumptions, several post-Cold War studies applied constructivism to explain the development of and changes in identities, interests,
ideas, norms and rules.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, the emergence of constructivism has implications for IR. In particular and in the context of this study, it provides a theoretical approach to analyse South Africa’s norm construction and state identity since the termination of its nuclear weapons programme.

In conclusion, constructivism has made the following ontological, epistemological and methodological contributions to IR and the study of diplomacy (Adler 2002: 100-104):

- It explains why states converge around specific norms and identities which in turn explain the origins of the interests of states (Finnemore 1996).
- It contributes to an understanding of change by explaining changes in terms of material and non-material aspects such as the emergence of new constitutive rules, the evolution of new structures, and the agent-structural origins of social processes (Ruggie 1998). Moreover, constructivists have generated empirical research on agency by focusing on social entrepreneurs, epistemic communities and transnational advocacy networks.
- It contributes to understandings of meaning through social communication.
- It highlights the importance of language and speech acts to social life (Kratochwil 1989). Language is not only a medium for the construction of intersubjective meanings, but is also a source of power.
- It emphasises the importance of the relationship between acting, communicating and rationality. By advancing the concept’s practical or communicative rationality, constructivists explain actor actions and motives in terms of their consequences and appropriateness (Finnemore 1996).
- It re-focused attention on the main forms of power such as speech acts, hegemonic power and moral authority (Onuf 1998; Checkel 2000; Hall 1999).
- It contributes to an understanding of concepts such as norms and identity in order to understand an actor’s international behaviour, diplomatic practices and change (Klotz 1995).

\textsuperscript{15} These included studies on global civil society (Chandler 2005); security communities (Adler & Barnett 1998); European integration (Christiansen 1997; Christiansen, Jørgensen & Wiener 1999); the European Union’s (EU) international interactions (Rumelili 2004); state sovereignty (Biersteker & Weber 1996); security (McSweeney 1999); Kosovo (Frederking undated); language and international relations (Debrix 2003); multilevel governance (Aalberts 2002); Japan’s responses to the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 US-led invasion in Iraq (Catalinac 2007); and South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy (Van Wyk 2004).
• It contributes to an understanding of sovereignty and how state boundaries are socially constructed (Walker 1993; Bartelson 1995).
• It views institutions as “reified sets of inter-subjective constitutive and regulative rules” (Alder 2002: 104) that coordinate, pattern and channel behaviour, and establish new collective identities, shared interests and practices (Ruggie 1998).
• It results in research on epistemic communities, transnational advocacy networks and moral communities that contributed to an understanding of international governance (Keck & Sikkink 1998).

Having outlined the origins, assumptions, characteristics and contribution of constructivism, the next section provides a conceptual classification of and a framework for the analysis of diplomacy, in particular nuclear diplomacy as a specific type of diplomacy.

4. The strands of constructivism

Notwithstanding some agreement among scholars on the ontology of constructivism (Reus-Smit 2005; Adler 2002; Omelicheva 2011), there is less agreement on the various forms, strands or varieties of constructivism which indicates the heterogeneity of the concept (Zehfuss 2001: 53-75; Jacobsen 2003: 39-60). In order to illustrate these differences, a selection of these classifications and typologies of constructivism are presented.

Referring to ‘forms’ of constructivism, Reus-Smit (2005: 199-201) distinguishes between systemic, unit-level and holistic constructivism. Systemic constructivism focuses on the interactions between unitary state actors only; ignores the dynamics of a state’s domestic environment; and emphasises the interactions and relations between states in the international arena. Wendt (1992, 1994, 1995 & 1999) is regarded as the most important exponent of this form with his strong focus on identity as the underlying text of a state’s interests. Unlike systemic constructivism, unit-level constructivism focuses on the domestic rather than the international environment. Its proponents, including Katzenstein (1996), focus on the relationship between the domestic legal and social norms, and identities and interests of a state. Holistic constructivism bridges the domestic-international divide created by systemic
and unit-level constructivism by focusing on all the factors that determine the identity and interests of a state. As such, holistic constructivists are mainly concerned with global change and its impact on a state’s sovereignty. Amongst others, Ruggie (1998), Kratochwil (1989), and Koslowski and Kratochwil (1995) are the main proponents of this form and focus on the development of the normative and ideational structure of the contemporary international system and the social identities which emerge from it.

Adler (2002: 97) identifies “various strands” of constructivism, namely modernist, modernist linguistic, critical and radical constructivism. Identifying Adler and Barnett (1998), Checkel (2000), Finnemore (1996), Katzenstein (1996), Ruggie (1998) and Wendt (1999) as proponents of modernist constructivism, Adler (2002: 98) concludes that they focus on the “causal social mechanisms and constitutive social relations” in international relations. Elaborating on modernist constructivism, modernist linguistic constructivists such as Kratochwil (1989) and Onuf (1989) explain and understand social reality by identifying the processes and discourses whereby language such as speech acts and rules constitute social facts and social realities. Adler’s (2002: 98) third ‘strand’, critical constructivism, espoused by Linklater (1998) and Cox (1986), is concerned with the mechanisms of knowledge and discourses which underpin social and political orders. Radical constructivists hold the view that material reality cannot be truly represented and focus on discourse, narratives and text. For example, a radical constructivist such as Der Derian (1990) maintains that no discourse, narrative or text is more valid than the other and that science thus becomes just another discourse.

Hopf (1998: 172) differentiates between two ‘variants’ of constructivism, namely conventional and critical constructivism. The former provides an alternative to mainstream IR theory by reconceptualising balance-of-threat theory, the security dilemma, neoliberal cooperation theory, and the notion of democratic peace. The latter, namely critical constructivism closely resembles critical theory.

Kolodziej (2005) distinguishes between light and heavy constructivism as the “principal factions” among constructivists. He includes Koslowski and Kratochwil (1995) in the former category since they concluded that change in the USSR occurred as a result of domestic changes (i.e. changes in the identity of Soviet
decision-makers) and not as a result of changes in the material capabilities of the superpowers as suggested by Wendt (1992, 1994, 1995 & 1999). Heavy constructivists, the so-called Miami Group which includes Nicholas Onuf (1989; 1998 & 2002) and Vedulka Kubálková (Kubálková, Onuf & Kowert 1998), maintain that actor behaviour cannot be generalised; that no specific rule or rules can exist for actor and agent behaviour beyond the construction of rules; and that actors are capable of redefining their identities as the unintended consequence of their behaviour (Kolodziej 2005: 284).

In her analysis of Russia’s post Cold War interests and identity, Clunan (2009) identifies aspirational constructivism as a particular type of constructivism. This strand, similar to constructivism in general, maintains that social institutions and national identities emerge from the continued interaction between human agents and social structures. However, aspirational constructivism departs from other types of constructivism by benefitting from social psychology and proponents of social identity theorists. The latter maintains that identity requires “positive distinctiveness” or self-esteem to create an identity based on historical experiences to create their aspirations for the future (Clunan 2009: 1-3).

Yet another typology of constructivism is offered by Omelicheva (2011). Referring to ‘variants’ of constructivism, she distinguishes between sociological, feminist, interpretive and emancipatory constructivism. In addition to these, she distinguishes between transnational and societal constructivists. Whereas the former, espoused by Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner (2001), stresses the influence of international norms, institutions and other ideational structures, societal constructivists (or ‘culturalists’) like Hopf (2002) and Katzenstein (1996) emphasise the significance of domestic institutions, culture, and norms.

Omelicheva (2011) also refers to the distinction between so-called thick, critical or post-modernist, and thin or conventional constructivism. For a thick constructivist like Albert (2001) social reality is dependent on the processes associated with social construction where research plays an active part in the construction and reconstruction of reality and science. In contrast, Checkel (2000), Finnemore (1996), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Katzenstein (1996) and Wendt (1999), who espouse
thin constructivism, stress the intersubjective in text meanings constituting reality, identity and interests.

Against the aforesaid, this study positions itself in systemic constructivism in the Wendtian (1992, 1994, 1995 & 1999) tradition by focussing on identity as the underlying text of a state’s interests. Notwithstanding this, the study departs somewhat from Wendt’s constructivism by also following aspects of Clunan’s (2009) aspirational constructivism that, amongst others, maintains that identity requires “positive distinctiveness” or self-esteem to create an identity based on historical experiences to create their aspirations for the future. This is relevant to South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy by securing a niche role through norms construction and state identity since 1990 as a departure from the country’s past nuclear diplomacy.

5. Criticism made against Wendt’s constructivism

Constructivists are by no means a homogenous group as the variety of approaches indicates. Although widely lauded for his contribution to constructivism, Wendt (1992, 1994, 1995 & 1999) has been widely criticised. His critics not only include neo-realist, Marxists and world system theorists but also fellow constructivists. In fact, Kolodziej (2005: 261, 283) refers to the growing “internal quarrels” among constructivists and that “many constructivists vigorously object that Wendt does not represent their positions”. However, it is not the objective of this study to offer a comprehensive criticism of constructivism, in general, and Wendtian constructivism in particular. Notwithstanding this, note should be taken of the main criticism levelled against Wendt. The criticism is sub-divided into two main areas, namely that of ontology and epistemology by focusing on the main Wendtian themes of the state and the international system, change and identity.

Ontologically, Wendt (1999) claims that states are the main actors and units of analysis in IR theory, that the key structures in the state system are intersubjective instead of material, and that state identities and interests are constructed by these social structures and not exogenously given. Wendt (1999) justifies his emphasis of the state by maintaining that his theory is about the interstate system. In response, Reus-Smit (1999) and Adler (2013) criticise Wendt for failing to explain the
emergence and decline of international systems, and his inability to explain the change of international systems (Adler 2013).

Wendt’s claim that the state is the principal unit of analysis is contested by the presence of powerful non-state actors such as non- and inter-governmental organisations in international politics. Accordingly, some constructivists like Adler (2013) argue that constructivism opens alternative avenues to explain international relations by focusing on actors other than states (Adler 2013). However, a scholar like Bhakar (in Adler 2013: 133) maintains that only individuals – and not states – can express agency. Similarly, Wight (2006), for example, maintains that, although states are ontologically real, they are structures rather than agents.

This ontological criticism has several implications for this study. In the first instance, in its practice of nuclear diplomacy post-1990 South Africa constructed its identity and interests in respect of its nuclear diplomacy and not as exogenously given. Secondly, it interacted with state and non-state actors such as the IAEA and the UN.

Wendt’s (1999) epistemological claim that meaning and knowledge are socially constructed has been similarly criticised (Adler 2013). Whereas Wendt (1999) argues that causal theories answer the ‘why’ and sometimes the ‘how’ questions, constitutive theorists explain the features of objects by referring to the structures within which these objects exist (Adler 2013: 130). For example, according to Wendt, the factors that constituted the Cold War are not the same as the causes of the Cold War (Adler 2013: 130).

Wendt is criticised for his view of change and for failing to explain how norms are formed, how identities are shaped, and how interests are defined (Jervis 1998: 976). Apart from neo-realists, Marxists are also critical of Wendt’s constructivism. Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory focuses on the material – unlike Wendt’s non-material – structure of the international system and global capitalism which limits the social interaction Wendt maintains exists between actors (Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 175). Thus, although Wendt (1999) admits that identities can change, he does not clearly explain what exactly happens when these identities change. His claim that state identity exists a priori, reinforces his ignorance of
domestic processes of identity formation, and the interplay between domestic and international levels (Zehfuss 2002: 60-61).

Wendt’s emphasis of the international system in shaping identity has also been criticised by his fellow constructivists. Finnermore (1996), for example, departed from Wendt’s position on the centrality of the social interaction between states as a determinant of identity and interests and focused on the norms of international society and its effect on identity and interests. Hopf (in Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 172) adds to this by arguing that in order to determine how a state’s identity affects its interests, a state’s interaction with other states as well as its interactions with its own society should be considered. With reference to domestic factors, Keck and Sikkink (1998), and Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) demonstrate how domestic factors such as regime type and domestic actors such as non-governmental organisations determine state identity. Similarly, in his study on Japan, Katzenstein (1996) illustrates how domestic – rather than international – norms influence state identity and interests. Despite the centrality of identity to his ontology, it is unclear when identity matters for Wendt. In this regard, Zehfuss (2002: 62-63) observes that identity can easily be confused with behaviour as Wendt maintains that identity must be inferred from behaviour.

Given Wendt’s (1992) rejection of neo-realism, it is expected that some of his fiercest critics are neo-realists. Wendt’s assertion that a state’s identity and thus its interests are constructed in its interaction with other states and through intersubjective understanding is rejected by neo-realists. Proponents of the latter position assert that a state’s identity and interests are given before it interacts with other actors. Wendt, therefore, places too much emphasis on international norms as states often disregard them by invading other states and declaring war. Moreover, neo-realists question the constructivist claim that peaceful relations between states can be established and maintained based simply on their social interaction. States, neo-realists argue, operate in an international system which is anarchical and hierarchical where each state has to fend for itself in its search for security in an uncertain environment. Uncertainty is increased by deception. States do not, as constructivists maintain, always engage in sincere social interactions with other states (Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 168, 172-173).
This epistemological criticism against Wendt has implications for this study. Wendt failed to explain how norms are formed, how identities are shaped, and how interests are defined. In this respect, this study departs from Wendt. Drawing on social identity theory, Clunan (2009) identifies the three main sources of identity and interests as self-esteem, aspirations and ideas. For her, a state’s identities and interests rest on two pillars, namely its political purpose and its international status. A state’s political purpose includes beliefs about the appropriate political and economic governance of the state. In other words, it includes ideas about “what values, principles, traits, and symbols characterize the country and what values and principles should govern relations between countries. It also involves ideas about what the country’s national mission is” (Clunan 2009: 29-30). National identity’s second pillar, international status, refers to the rank and positioning of a state in an “imagined international hierarchy” of political, military, social, and economic power which involves evaluations of the material power possessed by a state itself, and all other parties (Clunan 2009: 29-30). The value of political purpose is that it informs the state about the in-groups to which it should belong. These in-groups are defined by material attributes such as power, wealth, political and economic governance, culture and tradition. A state’s political purpose, therefore, also indicates whether it is a status-seeker or a status-maintainer (Clunan 2009: 32).

Rationalists in the realist tradition hold that all states have to fulfil a number of tasks such as providing security and improving welfare which constitute their national interest. Material factors such as geography, military strength and economic strength determine how (through conflict or cooperation) a state pursues its national interest based on its identity (Clunan 2009: 4-5).

One other cause for a change in state identity can occur when a state has arrived at a particular critical historical juncture (Clunan 2009: 19). A good example of such a critical historical juncture is the USSR at the end of the Cold War that resulted in the disintegration of the USSR and the formation of the Russian Federation. In a case such as this a new syncretic identity, involving historical and new identities, is often established.

Clunan (2009: 34-35) identifies three identity management strategies that the state can employ, namely mobility, competition and creativity. Mobility (leaving one group
to join another group) includes assimilation. In the latter case, one group dissolves into another and takes on the identity of the second group to acquire membership of a more satisfactory group. Competition involves social action to change prevailing conditions or a situation and social competition over status and prestige. Creativity aims to redefine or change the attractiveness of existing attributes of an actor.

Despite his focus on the state, Wendt neglects to focus on diplomacy (which is a main theme of this study) as an instrument available to a state to interact with other actors. Diplomacy, as a settled norm in international relations, can thus be described as one of the structures to which Wendt refers. It can also be described as one of the intersubjective understandings between states. Wendt is, however, silent on the origins, practice and actions of diplomacy, and how and why it changes over time. Therefore, Wendt's (1994) “black box” on identity should be opened up in order to understand the domestic and international dynamics that underlie a state's identity and interests, and its conduct of diplomacy. In fact, this has already commenced as constructivist scholars increasingly pay attention to the domestic determinants of change (Reus-Smit 1999; Clunan 2009) and to the domestic impact of international norms (Checkel 2000; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999).

For Wendt, interaction between actors and their intersubjective understanding results in routinised practices whereby social facts are created. Once a practice is internalised it underpins social facts and constitutes identity and interests. Routinised practices create stability and, for its part, stability reinforces an agent’s identity and interests. Flockhart (2012: 89) similarly distinguishes between practice and action where the former refers to automatic activities that are ‘embedded’ in daily routines contributing to stability instead of change. Accordingly, practice-based diplomacy involves routinised activities that contribute to predictability and stability. Therefore, the power of diplomacy is that it is a social practice that reproduces and inculcates intersubjective practices that constitute social structures and agents. Diplomacy as an action refers to intentional behaviour related to a specific objective with the intention of solving a problem or introducing new ideas which often constitute the initial step to change a particular practice (Flockhart 2012: 88).
6. Diplomacy: selected theoretical aspects

Constructivists regard a state as a sovereign actor in a social relationship with other actors. These social relationships are guided by sets of rules, norms, practices and institutions, one of which is diplomacy. However, diplomacy is also one of the instruments employed to achieve foreign policy objectives which originates in a government’s domestic policy objectives; amplifying the domestic/foreign policy nexus manifest in a state’s conduct of its diplomacy.

6.1 Defining diplomacy

Notoriously difficult to define, diplomacy has been described as the “conduct of relations between sovereign states through the medium of officials based at home and abroad” (Berridge & James 2003: 69); as “an institution...orientated towards problem-solving and negotiations rather than violence and coercion” (Brown 2005: 93); as a “major ingredient of power” with the purpose of “enabling states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda or law” (Berridge 2005: 1); and as something which “is concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and other actors” (thus also involving non-state actors) (Barston 2006: 1).

In addition to these definitions, International Law also provides meaning to diplomacy. By 2011, the *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* (1961), which entered into force in 1964, enjoyed nearly universal support (UN Treaty Collection 2011). The Convention describes the functions of diplomacy as representation, the protection of nationals and state interests, negotiation, gathering information and reporting, the promotion of relations between states, and the development of economic, cultural and scientific relations (UN 1961).

As an instrument to conduct foreign policy, maintain channels of communication and negotiate agreements, diplomacy is a normative concept which acknowledges mutually constituted norms such as state sovereignty, the pacific settlement of disputes and state representation (Du Plessis 2006: 125; 2008: 96). Firstly, the relationship between diplomacy and foreign policy (see *Figure 1*) can be explained in the context of linear escalation or progression, ranging from political (diplomacy) to military (use of force) instruments in accordance with international norms on the
pacific settlements of disputes and the use of force in terms of Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter (see Figure 1A). Secondly, the relationship between diplomatic and military instruments of foreign policy can be explained in terms of the utility of each instrument (see Figure 1B). Each of these instruments is versatile, ranging from influence to coercion, depending on the context of a particular situation.

Figure 1: Diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy

Du Plessis (2006: 136; 2008: 96 as adapted)
6.2 Typology of diplomacy

In order to achieve its foreign policy objectives, a state and its designated officials employ various types of diplomacy (as a particular instrument of foreign policy). These types include various channels, including direct telecommunications, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, summitry and mediation (Berridge 2005: 91).

The classification and typology of diplomacy is based on three dimensions of diplomacy (see Table 2). Duration refers to the nature (continuous or non-continuous) of diplomacy by being permanent or temporary (ad hoc). Form refers to the number of actors involved, namely bilateral or multilateral. Level-type refers to the status of diplomatic representatives (Du Plessis 2006: 139).

6.3 Parameters of diplomacy

The parameters of diplomacy refer to “factors that provide a framework or basis for diplomacy and prescribe, regulate or limit diplomatic practice” (Du Plessis 2006: 142). Four parameters of diplomacy can be distinguished, namely the policy, institutional, legal and moral parameters. The policy parameter refers to decisions concerning the ends and means of diplomacy. The institutional parameter determines the locus and process of policy formulation that influence diplomacy, including bureaucratic institutions and infrastructure for policy implementation. The legal parameter refers to the provisions and prescriptions pertaining to the use of diplomacy in terms of International Law. The moral parameter includes international morality, ethical guidelines for international conduct and behaviour and norms relating to diplomatic practice, which links to some of Holsti’s (2004: 178-210) observations on diplomacy. He explained the historical changes in diplomacy and diplomatic practice. Holsti also focused on changes pertaining to norms, institutions, ideas and practices pertaining to diplomacy in the twentieth century. Among these are increased specialisation, a proliferation of issues, technological innovation, the ‘democratisation’ of diplomacy and the rise of public diplomacy. For Barston (2006: 1), Holsti’s observation refers to the “widening content of diplomacy” resulting in “changes in the substantive form of diplomacy” as reflected in specific types of diplomacy such as, for example, environmental diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy,
disaster and emergency diplomacy and nuclear diplomacy. The next section addresses nuclear diplomacy as a particular type of diplomacy.

**Table 2: Typology of diplomacy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>FORM</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Resident mission in receiving state</td>
<td>Resident missions at inter-governmental organisations (IGO) such as the UN, the European Union and the AU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diplomatic, consular and specialized representation such as attachés</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inter-governmental</th>
<th>(state – state / state - IGO / IGO – IGO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>TYPE AND LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-governmental</td>
<td>(state – state / state - IGO / IGO – IGO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| | High level and ministerial visits (by heads of government and state, ministers) | Serial summits (Summits of the AU heads of state and government) |
| | Ad hoc personal diplomacy (at ministerial and trans-governmental level not involving diplomats) | Ad hoc summits and/or conferences |
| | | Parliamentary diplomacy (UN General Assembly) |
| | | Conference diplomacy on specific issues such as climate change and racism |

| | Non-governmental | Bilateral | Multilateral |
| | (at least one actor is non-governmental) | | |

| | Multitrack and two-track diplomacy involving non-governmental and transnational actors such as interest and pressure groups, multilateral corporations, non-governmental organisations, national liberation movements, terrorist groups) |

Du Plessis (2006: 140)
6.4 Norms and diplomacy

Diplomacy is one of the most enduring institutions and norms of international relations (Frost 1996: 104-112). Norms also play an important role in the conduct of diplomacy and their raison d'être is based on settled norms such as state sovereignty, equality and diplomatic immunity. A settled norm can be described as a norm that is “generally recognised and that any argument denying the norm requires special justification” (Frost 1996: 105). Another indicator of a settled norm is the way in which an act which is an infringement of it, is undertaken. According to Frost, acts contravening norms are often undertaken ‘clandestinely’. A third indicator of a settled norm is the “concept of the norm” which is regarded as settled, and not the “conception of the concept” (Frost 1996: 105-106).

In the case of nuclear diplomacy, norms also play a role in the conduct of diplomacy. Several settled norms are associated with nuclear diplomacy, namely a state’s right to develop a nuclear capability; the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and the “nuclear taboo”. These settled norms have been entrenched in government policies, various legal documents, and bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Several constructivists have contributed to the revival of norms in IR. Klotz (1995) and Price (1995), for example, focused on anti-apartheid and sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa; on pressures by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on governments to assist groups in other states fighting for human rights (Keck & Sikkink 1998); on norms and human rights (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999); on international systems (Hall 1999); on law as a generator and distributor of norms, and speech acts (Frederking undated); and on development through poverty alleviation programmes (Finnemore 1996).

For constructivists, the utility of norms in the practice of diplomacy is wide-ranging. Firstly, norms are explanatory variables of diplomacy as norms. They are “intersubjective beliefs about the social and material world that tell actors what they can and should do” in particular circumstances (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007: 97) or a “standard for appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 891). Secondly, norms are regulative in that they order, prescribe and regulate diplomatic action and thereby enable meaningful diplomatic action. In
the third instance, norms are constitutive as they provide actors with an understanding of their mutual or individual interests, which can affect a state's diplomatic stance and/or behaviour on a particular nuclear-related issue (Katzenstein 1996). Slaughter et al. (in Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert 2007: 101) similarly maintain that norms play a “constitutive role” in the formation of an actor’s identity and interests as the identity of an actor can affect its compliance (or not) with a particular norm.

International Law defines and validates state sovereignty and jurisdiction; to protect the key values shared by all states; and to foster interstate cooperation, i.e. diplomacy. It achieves these objectives by providing modes of legitimation, communication, reassurance and cooperation. International Law can be defined as a dynamic, normative and constitutive process involving transnational networks of governmental and non-governmental actors (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007; Reus-Smit 2004; Sharp 2009). This dynamic, normative and constitutive process includes three stages, namely interaction between transnational actors; the interpretation of an international norm by these actors; and the internalisation of that particular norm in the domestic legal system of states. Therefore, Koh (1997: 2598-2599) concludes that states obey International Law due to “internalised obedience” instead of “enforced compliance”.

An actor’s consistent compliance with International Law and adherence to settled norms contribute to its predictability, trustworthiness, credibility, status and prestige. Undermining International Law and settled norms often result in an actor’s loss of credibility and bargaining strength. The voluntary observance of International Law and settled norms serves a state’s long-term interests as it derives benefits from the stability and predictability of the international order (Joyner in Kegley & Raymond 2010: 262; Geldenhuys 1989). Therefore, the logic of nuclear diplomacy is to comply with settled norms on the use of nuclear power. An actor’s norm compliance rests on a number of considerations. Firstly, norms express the dominant ideas of society. Non-compliance may result in detrimental sanctions and therefore actors comply in order to avoid such actions. Secondly, compliance with norms may be beneficial to an actor’s interests (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007: 97).
Due to their focus on identity as a determinant of action or behaviour, constructivists are interested in nuclear diplomacy as a particular type of instrument of a state's foreign policy. As foreign policy can also be regarded as ‘action’, proponents of constructivism take interest in the logics of action, namely, the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequence, to determine how to act to maximise their interests in line with their identity (Flockhart 2012: 85-86). The logic of consequences focuses on calculating which action will maximise the interests of the actor, whereas the logic of appropriateness contends that actions should be taken with reference to the defined rules and norms that will render the proposed action proper and legitimate behaviour.

Constructivists also concern themselves with change, especially with norm change. For constructivists, change can be explained in terms of diffusion (of models, practices and norms), and the internationalisation and institutionalisation of norms. As previously indicated, norms evolve over a period of time, and can be explained in terms of the internationalisation and institutionalisation of norms, or the life-cycle of norms (Barnett 2008: 168-169).

Furthermore, constructivists are also concerned with the political process whereby actors are socialised into norm construction, enactment and compliance (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007: 97, 104-105). This socialisation process is also described by Koh (1997: 2598-2599) as interaction, interpretation and internalisation. In addition, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 894-905) have identified three stages in the life-cycle of norms, namely norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalisation (see Figure 2). The first stage entails the emergence of a norm through the initiative of norm entrepreneurs in governments, inter-governmental organisations (INGOs) and/or NGOs that call attention to a particular issue. The second stage involves the cascade of norms when norm entrepreneurs publicise the need for the entrenchment of a norm by socialising with governments and organisations. As a final stage, the internalisation of a norm occurs when an actor internalises a particular diplomatic norm through a social learning process, or socialisation. In this respect, Checkel (in Sjöstedt 2008: 12) distinguishes between instrumental internalisation when an actor behaves as expected and deepened internalisation when an actor accepts a particular norm and identity discourse.
The impact of norms is determined by three features of norms. These are the norm’s specificity, namely how well the norm is defined by norm entrepreneurs and how it is intersubjectively conceptualised by divergent actors; the norm’s durability, namely how long the norm has been in effect; and the norm’s concordance, namely, how well a norm is diffused to different actors (Sjöstedt 2008: 11).

In the process of constructing norms, there is always some competition between beliefs and interests. Therefore, norm construction, enactment and change are political processes. Politics, according to Reus-Smit (in Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007: 105), involves four forms of reason and action, namely idiographic, purposive, ethical and instrumental forms. Each form of reason and action expresses and replicates social identities, actor interests, mutual moral principles and preferred means of action. At a global level, all of these forms of reason and action are consolidated in International Law.

Figure 2: Three stages of the life-cycle of norms

Finnemore & Sikkink (1998: 894-905)
Constructivists are also concerned with establishing the origins of interests. This resulted in constructivists’ ontological attack on rationalist approaches to interests. Constructivists claim that:

neither interests nor power exists independent of the social context in which actors are enmeshed. Interests and identity are constructed socially; they are plastic and may be redefined. International law may be understood as both a reflection of identities and as a social artefact that reinforces identities, interests, and power (Simmons & Steinberg 2006: xxxiv).

Thus, diplomacy is based on specific norms explaining, regulating and constituting state interests, identity and behaviour. In its practice of diplomacy, a state either complies with these norms, or not, depending on its interests and identity. However, the dynamic nature of diplomacy requires a state to regularly respond and adapt to emerging diplomatic issues in order to advance its interests. Often new diplomatic issues result in global change which manifest in the emergence of new norms through norm construction, enactment and compliance. The origin and evolution of nuclear diplomacy is one example of the impact of norms on diplomacy. However, a state’s diplomatic practice is also determined by its identity and interests as the next section outlines.

6.5 Identity, interests and diplomacy

Wendt (1999: 231) reminds us that “identities refer to who or what actors are” whereas “interests refer to what actors want”. For constructivists, a state has multiple identities, including a social and a corporate identity, which determine its interests and actions (Wendt 1992, 1994, 1995 & 1999; Finnemore 1996) and therefore the way it conducts diplomacy.

In this respect Wendt (1999: 224-233) identifies four types of state identity, namely personal or corporate identity; type identity; role identity; and collective identity. Personal or corporate identity is constituted by the ‘self-organizing’ structures that make an actor a “distinct entity” and always has a material base. Type identity refers to actors who share one or more characteristics such as skills, values, attributes, knowledge and historical commonalities. Role identity exists only in relation to others, that is, it refers to the identity of the ‘self’ relative to the ‘other’. Collective
identity is regarded as a combination of role and type identities in order to overcome collective action problems (such as the environment and global warming) defined by international or regional actors. It merges the previous types in order to establish a single identity.

For Wendt (1999: 230, 233), a state’s identity “can take multiple forms simultaneously within the same actor”. This means that actors often choose a particular social/corporate, type, role or collective identity in the light of their interests. Since “state interests are constructions”, Wendt (1999: 234) maintains that national interests refer to the “reproduction requirements or security of state-society complexes”, that is, to objective interests. Moreover, national interests are not merely regarded as “normative guidelines for action” but also “causal powers that predispose states” to act in a particular way.

Apart from his typology of state identity and reference to interests, Wendt (1990: 231-232) also distinguished between two main types of interests which have a bearing on this study, namely:

- Objective interests which refer to the needs or functional imperatives that an actor has to fulfil if its identity is to be reproduced, namely reproduction requirements.
- Subjective interests which refer to beliefs that actors “have about how to meet their identity needs”, namely an actor’s preferences.

George and Keohane (1980: 217-238) identify three national interests, namely, physical survival, autonomy and economic well-being, a frame of reference that Wendt (1999) also employs. To these he adds the fourth national interest of collective self-esteem which, according to him, refers to “a group’s need to feel good about itself, for respect or status” (Wendt 1999: 235). Accordingly, a state’s collective self-image can either be negative or positive, depending on historical relationships such as experiencing dominance or subjugation. Each of these state identities (personal or corporate identity, type identity, role identity and collective identity) has certain “production requirements”, namely objective interests that determine beliefs about how to meet these subjective interests. National interest is therefore an objective interest, namely survival, autonomy, welfare and collective self-esteem,
geared towards a state’s self-interest which can vary depending on an actor’s construction of its identity and interests (Wendt 1999: 243).

How, then, do constructivists relate identity and interests to nuclear diplomacy? This question presents the study with an analytical, theoretical and conceptual *terra incognita*. An actor’s conduct and practice of nuclear diplomacy can be defined as an expression of its identity and its interests. In Cold War nuclear diplomacy, some states defined their identity in terms of their possession of nuclear weapons and capabilities, whereas their interests referred to what the specific state wanted.

In the case of pre-1994 South Africa, the purpose of its nuclear diplomacy was to establish a nuclear capability to protect the South African government against a perceived global communist threat to its national interests (O’ Meara 1996; Venter 2008). During this period, South Africa’s corporate identity was constituted by the “self-organizing” structures that make an actor a “distinct entity”. In terms of its nuclear capabilities South Africa was on par with NWS, whereas in terms of its identity type, the pre-1994 South African government regarded itself as a Western enclave which shared one or more characteristics with the West. South Africa’s role identity was blatantly anti-communist, whereas its collective identity was shared with Western anti-communist states.

Based on these state identities, the pre-1994 South African government constructed its objective and subjective interests, which manifested in national interests such as state survival; the protection of its sovereignty; economic welfare; and political autonomy despite global opposition to the then government’s policy of apartheid. Moreover, in Wendtian terms, pre-1994 South Africa’s collective self-esteem was based on the needs of South Africans of European descent (Whites) to feel good about themselves; to be respected; to exercise their near Messianic Mission in Africa; and efforts to secure their survival through the development of nuclear weapons. Albright (1994) explained South Africa’s pre-1994 nuclear identity, namely that South Africa’s nuclear weapons emerged from a:

> technological ‘can-do’ mentality that coincided with South Africa’s increasing international isolation in the 1970s and 1980s [due to its domestic policy of apartheid]. The emerging strategy was to bring Western governments to
South Africa’s aid in the event of an overwhelming attack by Soviet-inspired military forces then in Southern Africa.

Thus, the case of South Africa provides an illustration of the relationship between norms; a state’s interests and its identity as seen from a constructivist point of view; and how this influences nuclear diplomacy. Subsequent chapters will elaborate on this relationship.

7. Nuclear diplomacy

Originating during the Cold War, the concepts nuclear diplomacy (used but not defined by Quester 1970) or atomic diplomacy (referred to by Jones 1980: 89-117) are often used synonymously with the concepts of arms control and disarmament. Nuclear diplomacy is also sometimes used synonymously with the concept of nuclear non-proliferation, which has been defined as the “prevention of the spread of [nuclear] weapons of mass destruction” (NTI 2010b: 15). To clarify these ambiguities, this section outlines the context, nature, scope, forms, meaning and use of nuclear diplomacy, followed by an analysis of nuclear diplomacy as a particular niche of diplomacy.

7.1 Context of nuclear diplomacy

The twentieth century's technological development has been unprecedented due to the scientific innovations and contributions of scientists such as Einstein, Oppenheimer and Bohr in the field of nuclear physics. The harnessing of atomic power and its subsequent political-strategic use against Japan to end the Second World War has had major implications. An example of the failure of diplomacy is the atomic annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in August 1945 by the US. These events signalled the first and only use of nuclear weapons in warfare. Since 1945 the non-use of nuclear weapons (the “nuclear taboo”) has become one of the prevailing norms driving diplomacy during the Cold War to such an extent that a unique ‘brand’ of diplomacy, namely nuclear diplomacy, emerged to facilitate states’ interaction pertaining to all aspects of nuclear energy.

Another major implication of the harnessing of atomic power and its use in 1945 against Japan is that not only did it terminate the Second World War, but it also
resulted in an arms race between the US and the USSR and smaller but ambitious powers such as the UK, France and China, and in the emergence of scholarship on the nature of the relationship between power, diplomacy and technology. In spite of their alliance during the Second World War, the US and the USSR soon embarked on a competitive nuclear arms race after the Second World War that dominated the international arena until the 1990s and beyond.

In the post-Cold War context, nuclear diplomacy remains as important as ever. States such as North Korea and Israel have not ratified the NPT and continue to destabilise geopolitical relations. Apart from this, an increasing number of states including Algeria and Nigeria, for example, have announced their intention to develop nuclear energy. Since 2000, Iran in particular has refused to comply with international norms on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear dismantlement. Suspected of developing nuclear weapons, the country has maintained that, on the contrary, it is developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These developments bring the possession and utility of a nuclear capability into question.

7.2 Nature and scope of nuclear diplomacy

The diplomatic utility of nuclear capabilities is that a state derives power, status, prestige and influence from them (Jones 1980: 90). Despite ideological divisions and competition between the two superpowers during the Cold War, cooperation on nuclear-related security issues such as nuclear weapons and capabilities, and the application of nuclear power occurred. Nonetheless, conflicts did emerge over the threat of the use of nuclear weapons including, for example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and on account of the superpowers’ erection of nuclear bases in proxy states such as Cuba and West Germany. Throughout these times of conflict and cooperation, the superpowers engaged diplomatically on these issues, resulting in a new type of diplomacy or niche diplomacy, namely nuclear diplomacy. As a new type of diplomacy, nuclear diplomacy focuses specifically on nuclear arms control, nuclear non-proliferation and/or disarmament, which are related and overlapping concepts often used interchangeably (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 2001: 374).

The development of nuclear diplomacy is associated with four distinct concepts, namely nuclear deterrence; nuclear arms control; nuclear disarmament; and nuclear
non-proliferation. The “power to dissuade” or deter has become a major element of nuclear diplomacy since the publication, after the Second World War, of Bernard Brodie’s *The absolute weapon* (1946). In a subsequent article in *Foreign Affairs*, Brodie (1948: 23-24) explained nuclear deterrence:

> The problem to which we now return is the problem of how to accomplish this act of persuasion in an atomic age, when the already precious objective of peace is made immeasurably more precious by the immeasurably enhanced horror of the alternative.

Brodie explained this “horror of the alternative” as the threat of the devastation of cities, nations and territories using nuclear weapons; a threat which became one of the main tenets of nuclear deterrence. Defined as the persuasion of an opponent that the cost of the use of a nuclear weapon outweighs the benefits of its use, nuclear deterrence can also be defined as the threat to an adversary to not take a particular course of action (Wilson 2008: 422). In *The anatomy of deterrence*, Brodie (1959) outlined the elements of nuclear deterrence, namely capability and credibility. In order for successful nuclear deterrence to occur, a state has to be able to respond to an attack or an impending attack (capability). Successful nuclear deterrence is also incumbent upon the fact that a state believes that it can be attacked (credibility).

Dominated by Realist scholars in the wake of the Second World War and during the Cold War, a main element of nuclear deterrence is that the purpose of nuclear weapons is not to wage war, but to prevent it. Moreover, to be effective, a nuclear deterrent capability cannot be kept secret as public knowledge of nuclear weapons capabilities can intimidate an adversary (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 2001: 351-354).

Kegley and Wittkopf (2001: 515-547), and Waltz (1990: 731-745), amongst others, explain nuclear deterrence as an example of nuclear diplomacy between the US and the USSR. Kegley and Wittkopf (2001: 515-547) explained US-USSR nuclear deterrence in several phases. The first phase, compellence (1945-1962), involved US nuclear weapons superiority over the USSR as well as its coercive diplomacy involving an act of war or a threat to the USSR especially during the Korean War. The second phase, mutual deterrence (1962-1983), saw the improvement of the USSR nuclear arsenal and its threats to the US during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both
superpowers pursued extended deterrence to protect their territories as well as their allies. By the 1970s the superpowers reached a nuclear stalemate, or Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Proponents of MAD maintained that nuclear deterrence is achieved by a large nuclear arsenal, the capability to survive a nuclear attack and then delivering a second-strike retaliatory attack. Therefore, proponents of MAD support “deterrence through punishment” (Rourke 2003: 363). The nuclear arsenals of both superpowers laid the foundation for the first diplomatic negotiations on limiting their nuclear arsenals, namely the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1972 and 1979.

However, subsequent to the USSR invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, relations between the US and the USSR worsened and accelerated the nuclear arms race in the 1980s. Although MAD continued to dominate nuclear deterrence debates, another debate, namely Nuclear Utilization Theory (NUT) emerged. Proponents of NUT maintained that MAD is too much of a gamble and preferred “deterrence through damage denial” (Rourke 2003: 363) which involves the use of nuclear weapons in a ‘limited’ way (Kegley & Wittkopf 2001: 519).


The concept of arms control takes conflict as a given (Müller, Fischer & Kötter 1994: 2) and has been defined as “agreements designed to regulate arms levels either by limiting their growth or by restricting how they may be used” (Kegley & Raymond 2010: 241). This presupposes the continued, but restrained and regulated, existence of national arms and military establishments (Lamb 1988:19) deemed adequate for security and the promotion of political objectives. Therefore, arms control seeks to:

impose some kind of restraint, regulation, or other limitations on the qualitative design, quantitative production, method or location of deployment, protection, command and control, transfer to third parties, and planned, threatened, or
actual use of military forces and weapons (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 2001: 374-375).

Therefore, as an element of nuclear diplomacy, arms control differs from disarmament in that it involves the continued (but controlled and limited) existence and ownership of arms.

Disarmament, on the other hand, is the “reduction or elimination of weapons” (Kegley & Raymond 2010: 241); “a strategy to preserve peace” (Müller, Fischer & Köttter 1994: 2); and the “prohibition against their future production” (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 2001: 374) as a “means of reducing the likelihood of war” (Lamb 1988:19). The mere existence of nuclear weapons causes instability and insecurity. Therefore, it is assumed that by reducing nuclear arms, conflict and insecurity can be minimised. With regard to nuclear weapons, both nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament occur. But nuclear diplomacy is not only limited to arms control and disarmament. It is also concerned with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for civilian and medical purposes, employed in terms of the structures and norms set out by the IAEA.

Whereas concepts such as nuclear deterrence and containment dominated Cold War nuclear diplomacy, the concept of nuclear non-proliferation dominates post-Cold War nuclear diplomacy (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 2001: 378). Sparked by fears over the nuclear capabilities of the independent former Soviet states after the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of the commercialisation of nuclear-related services and goods by private enterprises, nuclear diplomacy’s focus shifted to the concept of non-proliferation, namely the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states. Two types of proliferation are distinguished, namely vertical and horizontal proliferation. Vertical proliferation refers to the increase in nuclear stockpiles in existing NWS, defined by the NPT as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967”, thus including China, France, the UK, the US, and the USSR (Russia) (UN 1968). Horizontal proliferation refers to the acquisition of nuclear stockpiles by new states or de facto NWS (Chakma 2004: 228), including India, North Korea, Pakistan and Israel.
By January 2010, nuclear weapons have proliferated vertically and horizontally (see *Table 3*). This proliferation, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, includes a total of more than 22,000 warheads in NWS and new NWS (Kile *et al.* 2010; Norris & Kristensen 2009: 86-95), compared to 20,000 in NWS in 1995 (Albright *et al.* 1995: 327). In 1995, the US operational inventory included 7,770 strategic and “several hundred” tactical warheads, compared to 8,527 strategic and 2,000 to 6,000 tactical warheads for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Russia. The inventories of the UK, France, and China included 250 to 300, 500, and approximately 300 respectively (Albright *et al.* 1995: 327). This is far less than the estimated 70,000 nuclear weapons which existed in NWS nuclear arsenals during the Cold War (Tannenwald 2007: 1).

*Table 3: SIPRI’s estimated global nuclear weapons inventories (2010)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
<td>12 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>9 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>70-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>60-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>22 600</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Albright *et al.* (2010)

Despite these figures, the number of nuclear weapons has remained relatively stable since 1990. In addition, more states have voluntarily disarmed their nuclear weapons and joined the NPT such as the former USSR states of Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine who decided to transfer the Soviet-era nuclear weapons on their territory to
Russia; a process which was completed in 1996 (Spector 2002: 122). In 1990, 141 states were party to the NPT (UN 1990: 457). By the time the 1995 REC took place, 181 states were party to the NPT (UN 1995a: 248). At the 2010 NPT RevCon, which took place in New York in May 2010, 189 states were party to the NPT (UN 2011a). Only three states have not signed the NPT, namely India, Pakistan and Israel. Taiwan is not recognised as a sovereign state and North Korea withdrew in 2003.

Nuclear diplomacy includes arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation as well as nuclear deterrence. Accordingly, in this study, nuclear diplomacy is defined as the interaction among and between international actors (be they states, international organisations, individuals and transnational non-state organisations) on nuclear-related issues, actors and interests (be they material or non-material) to achieve objectives aligned with an actor’s construction of its self- or national interests, its particular identity and the nuclear-related norms it initiates, innovates, maintains, and with which it is compliant or non-compliant. This definition includes a variety of actors and is not limited to states as the traditional and only actor in the nuclear field. Increasingly, non-state actors such as private corporations participate in scientific research and development, and trade in nuclear material, goods, equipment and services. Moreover, concerns have also been raised about the illicit trade in nuclear material, goods, equipment and services.

In 1995 the IAEA established the IAEA Illicit Traffic Database (ITDB) to gather information on “incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials” (IAEA 2007). From January 1993 to December 2006, a total of 275 incidents involving “unauthorized possession and related criminal activities” were recorded. These incidents included “illicit trafficking” elements such as illegal possession, movement, or attempts to illegally trade in these materials (IAEA 2007). Currently 96 states, including South Africa, participate in the ITDB. Thus, the practice of nuclear diplomacy is both bi- and multilateral.

7.3 Forms of nuclear diplomacy

In the context of nuclear diplomacy, the most notable case of long-term bilateral nuclear diplomacy is that practiced between the US and USSR which culminated in SALT in 1972 and 1979; START of 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2012; and the Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) of 2002 (Waller 2002: 99-117). Other bilateral nuclear diplomatic efforts include, for example, nuclear-related cooperation agreements between the US and China; between the US and South Africa; and uranium trade between Brazil and Turkey.

The first examples of successful multilateral nuclear diplomacy are the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 and the NPT of 1968 (Waller 2002: 103; Kegley & Raymond 2010: 241-242). The former prohibited nuclear testing anywhere on earth (except underground) and the latter “slowed down the expansion of the club for nuclear powers” (Hughes 1997: 141). Multilateral nuclear diplomacy is predominantly conducted under the auspices of multilateral organizations such as the UN; the IAEA; the Conference on Disarmament (CD); the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO).

Apart from multilateral conferences and summits, states also participate in multilateral nuclear diplomacy through their accession to and ratification or signing of international nuclear-related agreements. Another form of multilateral nuclear diplomacy involves the interactions between a single state (as the host) and a number of other states. President Barack Obama’s nuclear summits in 2010 and 2012 are examples of this form of diplomacy. Upon the invitation of President Obama and on behalf of the US, 47 states met in Washington in April 2010 on matters relating to nuclear security and nuclear terrorism (Obama 2010). A similar follow-up meeting of the NSS took place in South Korea in 2012.

These forms of nuclear diplomacy have resulted in the establishment of new nuclear norms (such as the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones), nuclear export regimes, agreements and conventions on nuclear terrorism. So-called non-proliferation export control regimes include the NSG; the Australia Group (AG); the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC); the WA; and the ZC (CNS 2011a).

Regionally, several non-proliferation organisations and regimes are in operation. In Europe, the European Union (EU); the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM); the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC); the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC); the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA); the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA); the CIS; the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU); and the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) all serve as fora for nuclear diplomacy (CNS 2011a).

In Asia, the Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East (ACRS); the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO); the Permanent-5 Efforts for Mid-East Arms Transfer Restraint; the Six-Party Talks on North Korea; and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) are fora for the conduct of nuclear diplomacy. In Africa, the AU fulfils a similar function. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC); the Organization of American States (OAS); the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL); and the Rio Group operate. Other global and regional non-proliferation organisations include the Group of Eight (G-8); the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT); the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); and the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (CNS 2011a).

Major multilateral nuclear non-proliferation treaties include the NPT; the CTBT; the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty) (PTBT); the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management; and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty) (CNS 2011b).

Regional nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) that are multilateral in nature are some of the recent normative innovations of nuclear diplomacy. By 2011, several NWFZs were operational (see Chapter 5) (CNS 2011b).

Thus, the forms of nuclear diplomacy have expanded since 1945 and now included both bi- and multilateral diplomacy. Diplomatic interactions between states on
nuclear-related issues were established during the Cold War. Subsequent to the end of the Cold War, new nuclear security concerns such as nuclear terrorism, illicit nuclear trafficking and the danger posed by rogue or deviant states emerged, which are addressed through export control regimes, NWFZs and multilateral organisations and treaties.

7.4 The meaning, implications and utility of nuclear diplomacy

For the purpose of this study, the operational definition of the concept of nuclear diplomacy was based on constructivist tenets. Therefore, in following Guzzini (2007 & 2009), the clarification of the concept nuclear diplomacy includes an analytical assessment of its meaning and a constructivist analysis of its performative aspects which are embedded in its conceptual history or genealogy. The latter, in particular, involves the development of nuclear diplomacy and its conduct. According to Guzzini (2009: 12), an analysis of a concept in terms of its meaning is “part of the social construction of knowledge”. More importantly, the definition of a concept is in itself an exercise of power and therefore “part of the social construction of reality”. Thus, in defining nuclear diplomacy a particular reality is constructed.

The implications of nuclear diplomacy are wide-ranging. Nuclear diplomacy denotes the existence of a particular type of diplomacy that determines and applies internationally-agreed safeguards and principles to verify the nuclear facilities and intentions of states. It also involves the safety and security of nuclear material, scientists and installations. Lastly, it entails the enforcement of norms relating to the development, application, maintenance and transfer of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.

A more significant implication of nuclear diplomacy is that it is an instrument of power, authority and influence. States with a nuclear capability wield significant power, authority and influence. However, a state such as South Africa, which no longer has nuclear weapons, continues to wield considerable soft or normative power. Checkel (2008: 80) refers to the ‘compulsive’ and “multi-faceted face of power”, which refers to broader conceptions of power to capture its institutional and productive dimensions. Institutional power is defined as actors’ “control of others in indirect ways, where formal and informal institutions mediate between A and B;
working through the rules of these institutions”, whereas productive power is generated by discourse and knowledge systems through which meaning is produced and transformed (Checkel 2008: 80).

This study follows Baldwin (2002: 177-191) in employing power as a generic concept that is used interchangeably with related concepts such as influence, control, coercion, force, persuasion, deterrence, compliance and inducement. The departure from “power as resources” to “relational power” reiterates the social, rather than material, construction of power. Power is a multidimensional concept that, according to Baldwin (2002: 178-179) includes the dimensions of scope, domain, weight and means. Scope refers to the aspect of B’s behaviour affected by A, which implies that an actor’s power may vary from one issue to another. The domain of an actor’s power refers to the number of actors under its influence. This implies that an actor can have considerable influence in one area, and almost none in another. The weight of an actor’s power determines the probability that B’s behaviour is or could be affected by A and A’s ability to influence B is dependent on the cost to A. For example, is it costly or cheap to get B to do what A wants? Means refer to the different ways in which an actor can exercise influence, namely through symbolic, economic, military or diplomatic means.

Apart from understanding what nuclear diplomacy means, it is also instructive to determine what nuclear diplomacy does. Therefore, the performative aspects of nuclear diplomacy are equally important. Five performative aspects of nuclear diplomacy can be identified, namely its official representation at bi- and/or multilateral conferences; meetings and negotiations on nuclear-related issues; its establishment and maintenance of nuclear-related relations with other actors; its initiation and maintenance of ideas on the use of nuclear technology; its socialisation in order to entrench nuclear-related norms in international relations, considering that material resources only “acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded” (Kegley & Raymond 2010: 40); and its intersubjective understandings of the “nuclear taboo” and the peaceful uses of nuclear power. Therefore, nuclear diplomacy is a useful practice which has meaning for states. Moreover, nuclear diplomacy has implications for the conduct of a state’s diplomacy, as well as its international relations.
7.5 Elements of nuclear diplomacy

A number of observations can be made about the practice of nuclear diplomacy. Firstly, it is a particular type of diplomacy or a diplomatic niche. Secondly, it is a “Janus-faced” diplomatic practice. Actors, on the one hand, attempt to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, attempt to acquire nuclear-related capabilities. In the third instance, more diplomatic instruments and initiatives should be developed to accommodate non-state nuclear actors, as the existing export and trade regimes are not sufficient to address pertinent issues in respect of nuclear non-proliferation. Finally, the so-called “nuclear taboo” regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons persists, whereas the civilian use of nuclear energy has increased substantially with scientific developments in several areas, including medicine and physics.

The conduct of nuclear diplomacy includes a variety of practices focussing on various aspects of controlling the use of nuclear energy. As indicated earlier, it entails, amongst others, arms control, non-proliferation and deterrence. These correlates of nuclear diplomacy undermine a comprehensive understanding of state relations on the issue of nuclear power. The concept nuclear diplomacy nevertheless provides a comprehensive approach to state practices that prevent nuclear catastrophes but also their attempts to secure nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As a diplomatic practice, nuclear diplomacy is no different from other modes of diplomacy identified by, amongst others, Berridge (2010: 25-251). These modes are telecommunications, including routine and crisis diplomacy; bilateral diplomacy, including conventional and unconventional bilateral diplomacy; multilateral diplomacy, including international organisations; summitry of Heads of States and Governments; and mediation of conflict.

However, nuclear diplomacy differs from these modes in that it has a specific focus area (nuclear energy). Actors involved in it are divided into two categories, namely NWS and NNWS, with an increasing number of developing states with a nuclear weapons capability.
7.6 Power, authority and nuclear diplomacy

A state’s nuclear capability empowers it significantly. The direct opposite of this does not necessarily apply to states such as South Africa and Libya that have terminated their nuclear weapons programmes. Instead of experiencing a decrease in power, these states are regarded as having unrivalled normative, or soft, power due to their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. Like hard power, soft power also endows a state with significant authority. The concepts power and authority are closely intertwined. In fact, authority is regarded as a form of power. In a Dahlian sense, power is the ability of an actor to get another actor to do something it would not do otherwise. But in the case of authority, the subordinate actor is driven by obligation - not by power or force - to do something it would not do otherwise. As a form of power, authority can be defined as “legitimate domination” but, as Lake (2007: 51) maintains, it is ‘distinct’ from but “intimately related” to coercion. The purpose of coercion is to manipulate incentives so that the subordinate actor complies, but there is no obligation on the subordinate actor to do so.

Authority is no longer only public authority. It has increasingly taken on private dimensions. For Hall and Biersteker (2002: 5) “there are so many sites or locations of authority that are neither state, state-based, nor state-created”. Moreover, the state is no longer the “sole, or in some instances even the principal, source of authority, in either the domestic arena or in the international system”. In fact, Rosenau (1992: 253-272) referred to this phenomenon as the “relocation of authority”. Hall and Biersteker (2002: 9-18) distinguish between three types of authority: market, moral and illicit authority. Rosenau (1992: 265-269) adds spontaneous authority as illustrated by the spontaneous convergence of prodemocracy forces on Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, in May 1989. Rosenau (in Beeson 2004: 518) also identifies the following other types of authority, namely moral, knowledge-based, reputational, issue-specific and affiliative authority.

Reference was previously made to the rights and obligations associated with authority. Reus-Smit (2002: 1) argues that states’ recognition of the authority of International Law results in their compliance with that law. Legal obligations focus on the importance of settled norms and procedures in International Law as regulators of international relations (Reus-Smit 2002: 2).
It is widely accepted by theorists that the contemporary international system lacks political authority. This view of the anarchical nature of the international system is shared by constructivists, most notably through Wendt’s (1992: 391-425) statement that “anarchy is what states make of it”. For Lake (2007: 56), hierarchy exists when one (dominant) actor possesses authority over another (subordinate) actor. In Max Weber’s view authority derives from law, that is, law precedes authority. However, if authority creates law, then authority must precede law (Lake 2007: 53-54). But authority is also conceptualised as relational, namely resting on a ‘bargain’ or ‘exchange’ between ruler and ruled. Lake (2007: 55), therefore, maintains that a relational conceptualisation of authority can also be applied to the international system, based on a ‘bargain’ or ‘exchange’ of compliance.

Hall and Biersteker (2002: 4) assert that authority is an institutionalised form or expression of power. For them, power and authority are distinguished by the latter’s legitimacy claims. In other words, the latter involves both the claiming of rights and the recognition of obligations. Moreover, possessing legitimacy indicates some form of normative consent and recognition of an authority by the governed, ruled or regulated. This results in an “implicit social relationship” based on trust, recognition and norms (Hall & Biersteker 2002: 5).

For Hurd (2007: 29) legitimacy is one instrument to increase power. Hurd (2007: 7) defines legitimacy as “an actor’s normative belief that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed”. He describes it as a “subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and is defined by the actor’s perception of the institution”. The source of a perception is the “substance of a rule, the procedure or source by which it is constituted”. According to Hurd (2007: 12):

legitimacy matters to social institutions because it affects the decision calculus of actors with respect to compliance, it empowers the symbols of the institution, which become political resources that can be appropriated by actors for their own purposes; and it is the key to their being recognized by actors as ‘authoritative.

As a socially-constructed phenomenon, legitimacy affects and determines an actor’s behaviour, identity and interests (Hurd 2007: 16 & 19). International institutions,
therefore, according to Hurd (2007: 19) constitute states; their interests; their behaviour; and how institutions can be “sites for the contest between states over status, legitimacy and power”.

For constructivists, power is a social construct, determined by a state’s identity, interests and roles. Therefore, in its conduct of nuclear diplomacy, a state will attempt to assert its (hard or soft) power to enhance its interests. But power also bestows a state with authority which, according to Cutler (2002: 27), “requires a basis of trust rather than calculation of immediate benefit”. Consequently, nuclear cooperation between actors must involve the development of habits, norms, rules and shared expectations. The institutionalisation of cooperation on these norms, habits and rules means that actors recognise the legitimacy and efficacy of its authority. One example of this authority is niche diplomacy.

8. **Niche diplomacy**

Niche diplomacy refers to diplomatic specialisation in a particular area. It also refers to “concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate return worth having rather than trying to cover the field” (Evans in Henrikson 2005: 67). The ability to “generate return worth having” implies that a state wants to achieve non-material objectives with niche diplomacy which, in turn, can generate international prestige, status, material benefit, soft power and moral authority. For a state to acquire and maintain a diplomatic niche, it requires authority, influence, power, recognition, a secured position in a globally competitive arena through publicity, advocacy and positive branding (Henrikson 2005: 70-71).

The concept of niche diplomacy, according to Cooper (1997: 5), also focuses on “the ability of individual countries to identify and fill niche spaces on a selective basis through policy ingenuity and execution”. Therefore, niche diplomacy can serve as an instrument to examine the behaviour of a state whose “leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through international institutions” (Keohane in Cooper 1997: 8). Typically, states practicing niche diplomacy focus on a specifically selected issue, organisation or activity. Moreover, the sources of niche diplomacy are located in the tenets of
middle power diplomatic behaviour, which have a strong normative foundation and emphasise “entrepreneurial flair and technical competence” (Cooper 1997: 6, 9).

Other key features of niche diplomacy are the focus on consensus and coalition building; cooperation on an issue-specific basis; and adopting the role of bridge-builder, mediator, facilitator or catalyst. The latter involves planning, convening and hosting meetings, prioritising for future meetings on a particular issue, and drawing up declarations and manifestos (Cooper 1997: 9).

Countries engaged in niche diplomacy employ various diplomatic practices including confrontation, parallelism and cooperation to achieve material and non-material rewards such as status, prestige and trade opportunities. Cooper (1997: 1-24) provides a useful analytical framework to determine the link between a state’s identity, role and interests in respect of its nuclear diplomacy (see Figure 3). He initially distinguishes between the form of a state’s behaviour (heroic or routine approach) and the scope of its activity (discrete or diffuse) but then proceeds to distinguish between the focus or target of its diplomatic activity (multilateral or regional) and the intensity of its diplomatic style (combative or accommodative).

**Figure 3: Cooper’s extended framework of middle power behaviour**

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTENSITY (of diplomatic style)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARGET (of diplomatic activity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Cooper (1997: 17)
The two latter two aspects, namely the target of diplomatic activity and intensity of diplomatic style is used to produce a 2x2 matrix (see Figure 3) which serves as an extended framework to describe, classify and analyse middle power behaviour. In the context of nuclear diplomacy, Cooper’s extended framework will be applied to South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.

9. Conclusion

This chapter outlined some of the key elements of constructivism relevant to the study. It focussed primarily on the importance of identity, interests, roles and norms (see Figure 4), which inform diplomatic behaviour in three ways. Norms are constitutive (they constitute what is considered as activity), constraining (they limit an actor’s action); and enabling (they allow for a certain course of action). Against this background, this study contributes to the formulation of a constructivist approach to nuclear diplomacy (see Figure 4). In the context of nuclear diplomacy, a state’s identity is mainly determined by the distinction between NWS and NNWS in terms of the NPT. A state’s role in its conduct of nuclear diplomacy is that it either complies with nuclear norms, or not, whereas its interests are either material or non-material. Finally, the three major norms associated with nuclear diplomacy are the three pillars of the NPT, namely nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Against the aforesaid, this study traces South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy from 1990 until 2010 through four illustrative case studies. In each case, the country applied one, or a combination, of three niche diplomatic strategies during this period, which resulted at times in one or more particular identities, roles, interests, norms and ideas (see Figure 4).

Constructivists maintain that diplomacy is guided by the intersubjectively shared norms, ideas and values of actors. This opens the way for the inclusion of the social aspect of their diplomatic behaviour. The social aspect is important since shared ideas, norms and values constitute an ideational structure which constrain and shape actor behaviour (see Figure 4). Moreover, these shared ideas and knowledge are major building blocks of the international reality. The ideational structure constitutes and regulates actors. In other words, in its interactions (or socializing)
ideational structures contribute to an actor’s redefinition of its interests and its identities. These ideational structures and actors (or agents) co-constitute and co-determine each other.

**Figure 4: Elements of a constructivist approach to nuclear diplomacy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Niche diplomatic strategies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confrontation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Parallelism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Roles</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear weapons state</td>
<td>Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-nuclear weapons state</td>
<td>Non-compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear export control regimes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelindaba Treaty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case studies illustrative of South Africa’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy

Having outlined the origins, assumptions, characteristics and contribution of constructivism, the next section provides a conceptual classification of and a framework for the analysis of diplomacy and nuclear diplomacy in particular.

This chapter presented the analytical framework and constructivist approach that forms the basis for the discussion and analysis of the study’s four case studies, namely South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in respect of the nuclear non-proliferation
export control regimes; the IAEA; the Pelindaba Treaty; and the NPT in the next four chapters of the study.