A CRITICAL REVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICA'S APPROACH TO THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY SINCE 1994

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By

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Study Leader: Prof M Hough

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANC African National Congress
AU African Union
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations
CCSA Cabinet Committee for Security Affairs
CODESA Convention for a Democratic South Africa
CCI Crime Combating & Investigation
DMI Department of Military Intelligence
DOD Department of Defence
EU European Union
ESDI European Security and Defence Identity
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JCPS</td>
<td>Justice, Crime and Prevention Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRC</td>
<td>Ministerial Intelligence Review Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDF</td>
<td>National Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>National Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NESS</td>
<td>National External Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIA</td>
<td>National Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICOC</td>
<td>National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSMS</td>
<td>National Security Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIRR</td>
<td>South African Institute of Race Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>State Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSSC</td>
<td>Secretariat of the State Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBVC</td>
<td>Transkei, Bothuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Transitional Executive Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation</td>
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ABSTRACT


**By:** I.M. Siko.

**Study Leader:** Prof M. Hough.

**Department:** Political Sciences, University of Pretoria.

**Degree:** Master of Security Studies.

The South African Government adopted a new policy approach to national security in 1996. Whilst this contemporary approach is acknowledged, particularly in raising the political profile of issues such as poverty, environmental matters and human rights, it nevertheless raises concern about its sustainability in the long term, particularly with regard to the over-wide agenda that views national security in the broad sense to incorporate political, military, economic, social and environmental matters. This concern resulted in the need to appraise the significance of the factors that underpin the fundamental shift in South Africa's approach to national security; to conduct an assessment of the understanding and perceptions held about South Africa’s approach to the national security; and to propose some measures which Government can use to sustain the new approach to national security including possible areas for further research.

This study was carried out following a qualitative research methodology that combines both the descriptive and analytical approaches. The descriptive approach largely draws from the literature survey of primary and secondary sources while interview questions were formulated with the intention of eliciting perceptions held by a selected group of individuals about South Africa’s approach to national security.

The findings confirmed that notwithstanding the elevation of the political profile of non-military issues in the country’s new paradigm on national security, its most
important shortcoming is to seemingly automatically elevate these non-military issues to the status of national security issues. The research finding also established that South Africa’s contemporary approach to national security is understood differently by the different strata of society, including a skewed perspective within the security forces. Most importantly, the study indicates that there is a requirement to adjust and align the imperatives of 1994 with the emergent realities of 2004 and beyond through the institution of requisite changes with a focus towards an integrated national security policy.

It is therefore clear that a number of issues regarding South Africa’s current approach to national security need to be further debated and researched including the underlying assumptions, but also the further operationalisation and implementation of national security policy.

**OPSOMMING**

**Onderwerp:** ’n Kritie se Oorsig van Suid Afrika se Benadering tot die Konsep van Nasionale Veiligheid sedert 1994.

**Deur:** I.M. Siko.

**Studieleer:** Prof M. Hough.

**Departement:** Politieke Wetenskappe, Universiteit van Pretoria.

**Graad:** Magister in Veiligheidstudies.

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering het ’n nuwe beleidsbenadering tot nasionale veiligheid in 1996 aanvaar. Alhoewel hierdie eietydse benadering erken word, veral aangesien dit die profiele van aangeleenthede soos armoede, omgewingsaangeleenthede en menseregte verhoog, bly dit ’n vraag hoe houdbaar dit sal wees oor die langertermyn. Hierdie situasie lei tot die noodsaaklikheid om die faktore wat die fundamentele verskuiwing in Suid-Afrika se benadering tot nasionale veiligheid onderskraag, te evalueer; om ’n opname te doen oor die insig en begrip oor Suid-Afrika se benadering
tot nasionale veiligheid; en om sekere riglyne voor te stel wat die Regering kan gebruik om die nuwe benadering tot nasionale veiligheid, asook moontlike areas vir verdere navorsing, te onderskraag.

Hierdie studie is gedoen ooreenkomstig ‘n kwalitatiewe navorsingmetodologie waarin beide die beskrywende en analitiese benaderings saamgevoeg is. Die beskrywende deel is hoofsaaklik gebaseer op ‘n oorsig van primêre en sekondêre bronne, terwyl vrae vir onderhoudsvoering geformuleer is om die opinies van ‘n geselekteerde groep individue oor Suid-Afrika se benadering tot nasionale veiligheid te bepaal.

Die resultate bevestig dat nieteenstaande die uitbreiding van die politieke profiel van nie-militêre aangeleenthede, is die ernstigste tekortkoming steeds die neiging om skynbaar outomaties hierdie nie-militêre aangeleenthede tot die status van bedreigings vir nasionale veiligheid te verhef. Die navorsingsresultate het ook aangedui dat Suid-Afrika se huidige benadering tot nasionale veiligheid nie dieselfde begryp word deur die verskillende strata van die samelewing nie, en dit sluit ‘n verwronge perspektief by die veiligheidsmagte in. In die besonder wys die studie dat daar ‘n behoefte bestaan om die imperatiewe van 1994 aan te pas by die intredende realiteite van 2004 en die toekoms deur die nodige veranderinge aan te bring met die fokus op ‘n geïntegreerde nasionale veiligheidsbeleid.

Dit is daarom duidelik dat ‘n aantal aangeleenthede oor Suid-Afrika se huidige benadering tot nasionale veiligheid verder bespreek en nagevors moet word, nie net oor die onderliggende opvattings nie, maar ook oor die voortgesette operasionalisering en uitvoering van ‘n nasionale veiligheidsbeleid.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. BACKGROUND

As South African society moved amidst shifts in its strategic environment to an era no longer dominated by the overlay of the Cold War and Apartheid, emulating societal shifts in its national security approach became important. The Cold War effectively militarised the study of security in the sense that mainstream Security Studies, according to Baldwin (1993:36) has: “traditionally devoted less attention to the goal of security than to the means by which it is pursued. More accurately…the field has tended to focus on one set of means…that is, military statecraft.”

On the other hand, the post-Cold War scenario led to important changes in the concept of security. For example, the United Nations (UN) Human Development Report (1994) presents the case for a new paradigm focusing on human security. The changes are from an exclusive emphasis on territorial security to a greater emphasis on human security; and from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development.

In the post-1994 period, the new democratic Republic of South Africa developed a cardinal set of values, namely, that the new South Africa now views national security in the broad sense to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters. Security is now regarded as:

An all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being. (White Paper on Defence, 1996)
Prior to the new Government of National Unity, in April 1994, the South African Government did not incorporate these values. A culture of secrecy permeated the entire rubric of national security resulting ultimately in a dysfunctional national security system.

Both external and domestic causal factors played a role in shaping the contemporary approach to national security in South Africa. Among these factors are the changes in the post-Cold War strategic environment; the new thinking on security; and South Africa’s new political dispensation together with its attendant democratic policy imperatives. These changes made it increasingly clear that there is a need for a paradigm shift – a new integrated approach to national security, including a policy framework and new security structures.

2. THE AIM OF THE STUDY

The aim of this research is to identify and to evaluate the significance of the factors that underpin the fundamental shift in South Africa’s approach to national security.

The research study seeks to achieve the following specific objectives:

* to provide an insight into government’s approach to national security;

* to conduct an assessment of the understanding and perceptions held with respect to South Africa’s approach to the national security;

* to propose concrete measures which Government can use to sustain the new approach to national security; and

* to identify shortcomings in the current approach to national security in order to propose possible areas for further research.

3. LITERATURE OVERVIEW

This section reviews a few of the most important research works on the theory of national security as well as that describing the current South African view and system, and identifies certain shortcomings that necessitate the need for further research.
The meaning that is attached to the concept of security, including a clear grasp of what national security entails is crucial and at the heart of an effective and efficient approach to national security issues. A number of writers view national security essentially in terms of values, threats or national interest from the perspective of the state. For example, according to Trager and Simonie (1973:36) “National security is that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries.” Brown (1983:4) defines national security as “the ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders.”

Other writers adopt an alternative view to the ‘state-centered’ paradigm that focuses on the security of human collectivities. As a case in point, Buzan (1991:17) explains these factors as a combination of military security, political security, economic security, societal security and environmental security. Buzan, further argues that while the concept of security can be mapped in a general sense, it can only assume a specific substance in relation to concrete cases. Hence it becomes important to factor in the specific reference of the South African state as an objective set of circumstances. Accordingly, national security assumes a specific substance in view of the country’s distinctive vulnerability in respect of socio-political cohesion and economic capability. Security in the modern idiom corresponds with new realities since the end of the bipolar Cold War era. These realities include the importance of non-military elements of security, the complex nature of threats to stability and development, and the reality of international interdependence.

These definitions provide for an indication of national security as a set of basic political, military, socio-economic and environmental threats or vulnerabilities confronting states in general. As such, national security is clearly a problem of many dimensions. Particularly relevant for this study and in the context of South Africa, the White Paper on Defence (1996) views national security as: "an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety…"
The importance of this study lies in its attempt to describe and analyse the paradigm shift in South Africa’s approach to national security. For this purpose, the study intends to identify and evaluate the broad principles and policy concerning national security and to expand on these, as well as based on identified shortcomings and to formulate some measures which Government can use to sustain the new approach to national security. In view of the limited availability of South African literature on the issue of national security post-1994, it is possible to identify areas in which further research may be conducted.

4. RESEARCH PROBLEM

The research problem in this study can be sub-divided into a number of specific issues which are addressed in the research. Some of the main questions which the research attempted to answer are as follows:

- what are the specific principles and objectives underlying the post – 1994 approach to national security?
- why was this approach adopted?
- what are currently the main threats?
- is the current national security approach not too wide?

Following from the research problem, the study is based on the following assumptions:

a. the changed strategic environment requires a new approach to the concept of national security;

b. the post-Cold War and post-Apartheid security threats have become largely non-military in nature; and

c. the broadened conception of national security is conceptually and practically problematic.
5. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

This section describes the general methodology - qualitative, descriptive, analytic, including the approach followed in the interviews process. This is then followed by a brief reference to the fact that both primary (official publications, legislation) and secondary sources (books, journals, monographs) were used.

The historical approach largely draws from the literature survey of primary and secondary sources and used to expand on concepts, ideas and constructs in the assumptions. Based on the literature review, interview questions were formulated with the intention of eliciting perceptions held by a selected group of individuals about South Africa’s approach to national security. The selection of these research participants is based on their considered expertise and knowledge of the research topic, and are located inside South Africa.

A qualitative research methodology was used to expand on concepts, ideas and constructs revealed in the discussions in order to answer the research theme. Qualitative research is considered the appropriate approach for this particular research purpose. As described by Maxwell (1996:17-20) it allows one to understand the meaning, for participants in the study (meaning as used in the broad sense to include cognition, affect, intentions or participants’ perspective). Also to understand the particular context, that is, how events, actions, and meanings are shaped by the unique circumstances in which these occur.

Qualitative research is also considered a suitable tool for the interpretation of the respondents’ perspectives, so as to enable a meaningful and in-depth description of the issues being researched (Berg, 2004:11). It allows the respondent’s subjective interpretation and understanding of the research topic to enrich the results of the research by removing the decision and judgement of relevance from the researcher and place it with the respondent.

Research participants were selected using a judgement sampling technique (Berg, 2004:36) based on the identified person’s considered expertise and knowledge of the topic being researched. According to Maxwell (1996:71-72) the strength of judgement sampling is manifold. For example, it assists the researcher to arrive at
typicality of the settings, individuals, or activities selected. Secondly, it aids the researcher to satisfactorily capture the heterogeneity in the population. Thirdly, it allows the researcher to establish particular comparisons to illuminate the reasons for differences between settings or individuals.

Research participants were located in the following sectors of society: the department of defence, universities, defence industry, security studies institutions, parliament, including defence correspondence. Ten potential participants were identified and only eight agreed to participate in the research.

These participants collectively have a broad knowledge of current issues in the national security debate. Each participant was approached by the researcher and asked to participate in the research. This was done, firstly by means of a telephone call and, secondly by e-mail to confirm the appointment. In order to safeguard the research from bias, certain criteria was designed and used in selecting the interviewees. The criteria included – knowledge of/practitioner in the national security field; population group and institutional affiliation as depicted in Table 1 below:

**Table 1: Organisational Affiliation and Population Make-Up of Interviewees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational Affiliation</th>
<th>Population Group</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence Industry</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
<td>White/African</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Studies Institution</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist Defence</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The organisational affiliation of the research participants is of importance for the development of an understanding of the research results. It is sufficiently spread to
cover the core institutions relevant to the research theme. It is noted that the research participants predominantly consist of males, this being due to the historical locus of the national security debate in the hands of males.

A semi-standard interview technique was used since it allowed for the necessary flexibility to explore a variety of lines of inquiry that arise during the discussions. According to Berg (2004:81), this line of inquiry affords the interviewer freedom to probe beyond the answers to prepared standardized questions. It also allows respondents the opportunity to repeat themselves. The provision of discussion points prior to the actual discussion enabled the respondents to explore and present their own world views. Since the research is interested in understanding the perceptions of participants, the interviewing technique provides a useful means of access (Taylor & Bogdan: 1998:98). According to Henning, van Rensburg, Smit (2004:50) “research interviews are but one of many types of interviews – all of which assume that the individual’s perspective is an important part of the fabric of society and of our joint knowledge of social processes and of the human condition.”

Discussion points were used as a resource tool during the discussions. These were formulated along the guidelines offered by Denzin (1970:129) to accurately convey meaning to the respondent, motivate to elicit clear attitude and opinion, and being precise enough. Each respondent was then forwarded a copy of the transcribed discussion for validation and approval prior to incorporation into the research.

6. THE STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

The research study consists of an introduction, in which the research the objectives; research problem and methodology are set out. Chapter Two provides an overview of the salient literature pertinent to the concept of national security. It covers related themes in terms of understanding national security in both the developed world and developing world contexts, including the notion of threats to national security and related collective security concepts. Finally, the chapter concludes with an assessment of the consequences of the new thinking on national security.
Chapter Three looks at the National Party Government’s approach to national security (1984-1993) and the transition period towards the new South African Government. Aspects pertaining to the negotiation process, from the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) through the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) are discussed. Chapter Four focuses on the post-1994 South African Government’s approach to national security in terms of two themes. The first theme provides an outline of the new approach to national security (constitutional, legislative and policy framework). The second theme provides an analysis of these policy provisions with a view to appreciating those determinative variables such as the principles underpinning national security, the objectives of national security, and threat perception, and concludes by raising pertinent implications for decision-making in national security.

Chapter Five, consists of three parts. In the first part it provides a brief overview of the literature discussing South Africa’s current approach to national security. The second part focuses on the key aspects of the interview findings including an analysis of the responses. The third part addresses two aspects: the first aspect covers a brief analysis of the functioning of the national security system which is based on the fact that the National Security Council (NSC) is dormant and needs to be revived; the second aspect provides a critical analysis of the contemporary approach to national security.
CHAPTER 2

NATIONAL SECURITY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Chapter Two is to single out the emerging efforts at the broadening of the concept of national security. The chapter commences with a literature review of related national security themes in terms of understanding national security in both the developed world and developing world contexts. It covers the thinking on the concept of national security in the traditional and the contemporary perspectives, including the notion of threats or sources of threats to national security during these periods.

As a basis for understanding national security in both contexts, an appreciation is given of the changes in the international environment that necessitated the shift from the traditional thinking on security to the contemporary thinking, including the underlying normative and ideological underpinnings. Related collective security concepts are also dealt with. Finally, the chapter concludes with an assessment of the consequences of the new thinking on national security.

Towards this end, both the realist ‘state-centred’ approach and alternative views that advocate a broadened approach to national security, including human security, are examined. Both these views provide some understanding of national security as a complex set of threats or vulnerabilities confronting states in general. A singular particularity of what the concept of national security entails is examined. This reveals that there is a dilemma in both the narrow and broad conceptualisation of national security, which in turn gives rise to the research assumptions that were identified.

2. NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD

Traditionally, national security had a rather narrow military focus that emphasised the physical protection of the state against external military threats. In contrast, the
contemporary or broadened approach adopts the view that security problems and challenges of the post-Cold War period have rendered states more susceptible to threats for which there are no military solutions, such as societal, economic and environmental problems.

The literature review reveals that the concept of national security has been endowed with a particular content and with different interpretations. The traditional (Western-oriented) thinking on national security is a product of the Cold War period, whereas in the context of developing countries, national security has been defined differently from the definitions generally found in the Western literature. The traditional thinking focuses on the values, threats or national interest within the state-centric perspective of external military threats against the state and the maintenance of its own security and survival. In contrast, contemporary thinking views the concept of national security broadly as interlinked with the notions of democracy and development. Hence post-Cold War national security policy requirements need to be approached within an adequate conceptualisation of national security.

2.1 Traditional Thinking on National Security

The concept of national security has been approached along different perspectives during and after the Cold War years. The traditional (Western-oriented) thinking on national security was largely shaped by the political and ideological circumstances of the Cold War. According to Brown (1983:4) national security is “the ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions and governance from disruptions from outside; and to control its borders.”

Louw (1978:10-11) defines national security as “the condition of freedom from external physical threat, which a nation-state enjoys. Although moral and ideological threats should be included, it is really physical violence which is generally perceived as the ultimate leverage against a state and therefore as the real and tangible danger to its survival.” Trager and Simonie (1973:36) define national security policy as “that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries.” This definition
presupposes the existence of a uniform set of national values such as the basic principles upon which the political, social and physical existence of a state are based. The assumptions upon which security in its traditional usage is based are, as stated by Ayoob (1995:5), two-fold. Firstly, that most threats to a state’s security emanate from outside its territory. Secondly, that those threats are mainly military in nature and usually require a military response in order to safeguard the security of the state. These definitions of national security, according to Ayoob, do not adequately take into account the non-military threats to security. By virtue of emphasis on the military dimension of national security, this thinking also has the potential to lead to the militarisation of society.

Although the traditional thinking on national security remained dominant until the end of the Cold War, views that challenged this narrow conceptualization of security began to emerge as early as the 1950s. For example, Lasswell (in Romm, 1993:3) argues for a broader conceptualization of security, namely that: “all measures which are proposed in the name of national security do not necessarily contribute to the avowed end. Our greatest security lies in the best balance of all instruments of foreign policy, and hence in the co-ordinated handling of arms, diplomacy, information, and economics; and in the proper correlation of all measures of foreign and domestic policy.”

2.2. Post-Cold War Security Thinking

The domestic, regional and international environments have changed drastically since the end of the Cold War. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has led to a fundamental, although uncertain transformation in the international order. The former equilibrium that was based on the balance of nuclear weapons capability potentials’ by the superpowers, together with its erstwhile relevant conceptualisation of security, have undergone radical redesigns in order to be meaningful in a new era. The new and emerging European security architecture is a case in point.

Slabbert (2000: 41-42) points at some of these changes in terms of the appearance of a global economy; international movement towards democracy; the decreasing
importance and power of the nation state; changes in the distribution of power in the international system; and changes in inter-state relations to a more unstable situation, including a mixture of co-operation and competition.

A number of analysts and observers of national security have advanced various reasons in favour of a shift away from the traditional thinking to contemporary thinking on the concept of national security. Acharya (in Buzan, 1994:24) observes that one relevant outcome of the post-Cold War era “is the withdrawal of competitive, ideologically driven superpower interventions into the domestic and regional politics.” Snyder (1999:2) raises the question of the need to come up with new concepts of security in order to address the military, political, economic and social realities of the post-Cold War. Mutimer (1999:77) also points out that the demise of the Soviet threat gave impetus to a rethinking of the concept of national security.

In addition to individual writers, institutions too have expressed their positions in this regard. As examples, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (1992) has observed that the international security research agenda was undergoing a change by way of replacement of the erstwhile East-West military balance with a rethinking of the full range of political, economic, military, social, religious, technological, ethnic and ethical factors that impact on security world-wide. The UN Human Development Report (1994) presents a case for a new paradigm shift from an exclusive emphasis on territorial security to a greater emphasis on human security, and from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1998:14) recognizes the connections between security and the developmental agenda in the sense that security cannot remain static in the traditional military sense, and that it requires a broadening of its definition to also include an emphasis on achieving human security and economic and social stability.

2.3 Redefining Security

Given the changing nature of the international environment referred to earlier, a growing body of literature that highlights the new thinking on national security emerged during the post-Cold War years (Buzan, 1991; Fischer, 1993; Mathews, 1995; UNDP, 1994).
Buzan broadens the concept of security to comprise of components such as the political, economic, societal and environmental, in addition to the military, and draws the conclusion that the most important and effective provider of security should remain the sovereign state. In a different vein, Mathews (1995:5) also argues in favour of the redefinition of the concept of security based on global developments, to now include resources, environmental and demographic issues. Booth (1994:4-10) provides a conceptualisation of security beyond a military determination of threats and argues that human security is of greater significance than state security; that governments must cease to be the primary referents of security because they have become the main source of insecurity for the populations under their sovereignty, rather than the military forces of a neighbouring state. Undoubtedly, this approach clearly challenges the idea of a state as an effective provider of security to its citizens.

According to Fischer, the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, hosted by the UN General Assembly during August and September 1987, adopted the following definition of security: “Security is an over-riding priority for all nations. It is also fundamental for both disarmament and development, and comprises military, political, economic, social, humanitarian, human rights and ecological aspects” (1993:9-10). The security of individuals and communities of which states are constituted is ensured by the guarantee and effective exercise of individual freedom, political, social and economic rights, as well as by the preservation or restoration of a liveable environment for present and future generations. Security also implies that essential human needs, notably in the areas of nutrition, education, housing and public health are ensured on a permanent basis. While an adequate protection against dangers to security should also be maintained, the ways and means to attain security are defined in national, inter-governmental, as well as non-governmental or global terms.

From the foregoing, two main theories can be identified. On the one hand, there is an approach that retains emphasis on the primacy of the state within the broadened thinking on security. On the other hand, there is an approach based on a set of assumptions that attempts to replace the state as the primary referent of security, and which highlights the interdependency and trans-nationalisation of non-state actors.
2.4 Human Security

The UNDP Human Development Report (1994: 23) describes human security as meaning “safety from such on-going threats as hunger, disease and repression, protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and human development.” Similarly, the OAU Solemn Declaration (2000) proposed that the notion of security must encompass the various aspects of society and the environmental dimensions of the individual, family, and community, local and national life.

The report of the independent Commission for Human Security (2003:4), launched at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, described human security as being concerned with safeguarding and expanding people’s primary freedoms in a manner that protects them from serious threats, while empowering them to assume responsibility for their own lives. According to the report, human security is defined in the following terms of protecting the essence of all human lives, fundamental freedoms and creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that collectively provide people the stepping stones of survival, livelihood and dignity.

When viewed in this manner, human security is said to complement the security of the state in three respects. Firstly, in that it is concerned with the individual and the community rather than the state. Secondly, threats to people’s security include threats and conditions that have not always been classified as threats to state security. Thirdly, that the extent of actors is increased beyond the state alone. The report argues that the challenges to security and its protectors have become complicated. While the state remains the basic provider of security, in many cases it fails to fulfil its security obligations, if not, becoming a source of threat to its own people. Hence, the focus now shifts from the security of the state to the security of the people and with human security as the objective, there must be a stronger and more integrated response from states and communities.

In her address at the Parliaments Uniting for African Unity Conference, Ginwala (2002) advanced an important point with respect to human security and the security of
the state. Ginwala argued that the shift in thinking from a sole concern with the security of the state to a concern with the security of people “came the notion that states ought not to be the sole or main referent of security. People’s interests or the interest of humanity, as a collective, become the focus. In this way, security becomes an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety, and participate in the process of governance…”

Most importantly, as Ginwala further argued, this approach to human security does not seek to substitute the security of the state, but to complement it. Both human security and the security of the state are seen as mutually dependent, namely that while security between states remains a necessary condition for the security of people, individuals also require protection from the arbitrary power of the state through the rule of law and emphasis on civil and political rights as well as socio-economic rights.

While not denying the importance of these rights, it needs to be borne in mind, as reflected in Donnelly (1993:607-40), that there is disagreement across cultures and states over what rights qualify for protection. What may be upheld in one state or society as indispensable human rights or their inclination to assign priority to substantive political and procedural rights over and above socio-economic claims, may not correspond with another state’s or society’s cultural and national dispositions. As an illustration of this point, the following examples should suffice: human rights in the People’s Republic of China, the Serb intransigence in Kosovo or the Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

The preceding sections clearly indicate that the traditional definitions of national security are narrowly focused in terms of preserving the state’s integrity, territory and safeguarding or extending its vital national values. In contrast, the end of the Cold War era gave impetus to the new thinking on the concept of national security in order to address the new realities of the post-Cold War era. Hence security is now defined comprehensively to include additional dimensions to that of the military. The distinctive context of the developing world provides another challenging conceptualisation to security as will be argued in the next section.
3. NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

National security thinking in the developing world acknowledges the difference between the developed world context of national security and the nature of security threats confronting the developing countries. As observed by Job (1992:3) it becomes important to adopt a perspective that attempts to address the contemporary nature of the developing countries as opposed to the traditional thinking perspective that concentrates on states as unitary actors, and sovereignty and external threats as the primary fundamentals of national security. In the developing world, national security assumes a distinct form in view of these countries’ distinctive vulnerability in respect of socio-political cohesion and economic capability in a number of respects. For example, the importance of non-military elements of security, coupled with the threats to stability and development.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the ‘state’ in the developing world, in contrast to the developed world, according to Job (1992: 8-11) is the regime, which refers to persons who hold the highest offices or effectively command the coercive forces of the state. On the other hand, the population that is the collective of individuals whose self-identification is based on common ethnicity, language, race, and historical experience is viewed as the basis for the expression of legitimate political identity and power. The perceived security of each of these involves differing notions of threat and response to it.

Another important factor in considering national security in the developing world is the nature of both internal and external challenges confronting states in this category. The internal challenges faced by most developing countries are identified by Job (1992:17-18) and Sayigh (1990:3) as ranging from the absence of a single nation in the sense of a socially cohesive society; a variety of communal groups contending for their own securities; the questionable legitimacy of the regime in power; the weakness in effective institutional capacities to provide peace, order and the requisite conditions for physical existence; and the predominant sense of threats to and from the regime in power as opposed to externally derived threats to the existence of the nation state.
As a product of both history and the peculiar process of state-making, the state in developing countries is visibly distinguished by its focus on what Buzan (1991:99) described as the internally generated threats to the security of the government. Hence, under these circumstances, there exists a prevalence of competing notions of security championed by the contending forces within society.

The external challenges impacting on the security of most developing states are appraised in relation to their occupying a peripheral position in the world. With the ending of the Cold War, the United States (US) and other industrialised countries lost interest in the developing world because of the change in focus to address the emerging socio-economic and political stability problems of the former states of the Soviet Union. Compounding this state of affairs, according to Jackson (1990:87), is the consequence of the developed countries’ contribution to the domestic insecurity of developing countries by supporting authoritarian governments, rebels, insurgents, or opposition forces against a legitimate government. Given these internal and external challenges of national security in developing countries, Ayoob (1995:8-9) defined the concept of security in a strictly political sense as follows: “Security-insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities both internal and external that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes.”

This definition conveys a significant departure by qualifying state security or insecurity in terms of vulnerabilities (political, military, economic and environmental) that threaten the survival of the state. Put differently, these vulnerabilities become part of the security equation only when they so threaten the survival of the state. Hence Ayoob (1995: 11-12) proposed that an appropriate definition in this context must satisfy two requirements. First, it must overcome the external orientation and military bias that are contained in the Western definition. Second, it must remain in the political domain while cognisant of variables in societal activity that are likely to impact on the political domain and may have to be considered in the security equation.

In line with Ayoob’s proposal for a suitable definition of national security, Sola (1989:11) argued for an integrated assessment through the addition of non-military
dimensions of security, while Oyebade and Alao (1998:196) commented that the necessity to broaden the concept of security over and above the confines of territorial integrity or external aggression, has rendered the economic component of security for developing countries the most important.

4. THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

In the preceding sections, references were made to the broadening of the security agenda to specifically include a wider range of threats, and an emphasis on human security. However, all threats to the state or to individuals or societies do not necessarily constitute national security threats.

Threats to national security may be understood as referring, according to Ullman, as cited by Buzan (1991:17), to significant threats that limit the scope of policy choices that may be available to the government of a state in respect of national security. There is, however, no consensus concerning threats to national security but a whole new area of incisive analysis of causes, linkages and explanations of when an action or sequence of events constitutes a threat to national security.

This lack of consensus about threats to national security has been recognised. For instance, Buzan (1991:112-134) raised an important question relating to the difficulty of distinguishing those threats that warrant qualifying as threats to national security. He argued that the difference between challenges and threats to national security range from the routine to serious, drastic and unprecedented threats. An additional difficulty to consider is the fact that threats to security do not form a neat static agenda but rather one of assigned changes in priority. Hence the identification of an issue as a national security problem becomes “a matter of political choice rather than objective fact”.

Notwithstanding these challenges, certain criteria may be useful in identifying national security threats. These are for example, the type of threat or the intensity of a threat - its proximity, probability of occurrence, specificity, consequences and time-span. However, it is generally accepted that threats of invasion, political
destabilisation and blockade belong to the legitimate national security category for all states.

As already stated, the broadened concept of national security includes in addition to the military dimension, the non-military components of national security, namely political, economic, social and environmental issues. From this basis, sources of threats may derive from within any of these specific dimensions. Threats may be further categorised as arising internally or externally.

In a general sense, Buzan (1991:112-134) sheds a useful perspective on the nature of the sources of threats to national security, for example, that military threats are a critical concern in view of the potential danger it poses to the entire fabric and components of the state. Political threats by virtue of the organizational stability of the state; economic threats as related to the economic capability of a state as an important base upon which the relative status of its powers rests; societal threats in connection with issues of language, religion and cultural tradition, ethnic identity and custom; and environmental or ecological threats that are often random and part of the natural conditions of life, such as natural disasters (earthquakes, floods or drought). It should again be emphasised that not all threats arising from the above-mentioned sources are necessarily national security threats.

5. RELATED COLLECTIVE SECURITY CONCEPTS

Related to the concept of national security, are notions such as collective defence, collective security, common security, comprehensive security, and co-operative security. Collective defence or alliances are structures whereby regional actors seek to ally themselves with other like-minded states against a perceived common threat or enemy. Osgood, as cited in (Snyder (1999:105), defines collective defence as a formal agreement that commits states to combine their military forces against a certain state or states and also obliges the consideration of the use or threat of force. This type of security consideration offers a political advantage to the members in terms of influence to respective security policy decision-making. Alliances can be military or political, and bilateral (two states) or multilateral (three or more states). Examples are the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty
Organisation (Warsaw Pact) that were established for the purposes of countering the perceived threat posed to the security of the other and its allies.

In a collective security arrangement, the members agree not to use force to resolve their differences and to respond collectively to any violation of this rule. The collective security approach argues that institutions assist to overcome international anarchy by contributing towards moulding the interests and practices of states, which, in turn forms the rationale for international co-operative security among states by institutionalising confidence among the participants, and by increasing the level of trust to demilitarise interstate competition (Snyder, 1999:107). The UN provides an example of a collective security structure.

In accordance with the Palme Commission of 1982, common security has as its primary focus the military means of security but recognises the security interdependence of all states in the international system. It is based on the principle that unilateral security is no longer possible as states are increasingly economically, culturally, politically and militarily interdependent. Hence states need to adopt security policies that do not threaten the security of other states. Evans (1993:14-15) describes common security as a “commitment to achieving security with others, not against them.”

According to Evans (1993:14-16), comprehensive security attempts to broaden the traditional military focus of national security to include economic and political issues and to address security at the domestic, bilateral, regional and global levels. Examples of this type of security arrangement are Japan and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and include the principles of “balanced national development through endeavours in every aspect of life: ideological, political, economic, social cultural and military.” Furthermore co-operative security refers to a broad approach to security which is multidimensional in scope and favours multilateralism over bilateralism. It involves a gradual process that seeks to shape state policy makers’ attitudes about security and offers alternatives to the narrow military focus in terms of transparency, reassurance, prevention and interdependence. An important element of co-operative security is the development of ‘habits of dialogue and cooperation’ among regional states. As example of this, is the current
European Union (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the European Union.

The Treaty of Amsterdam, as cited in the European Communities (1999:17-18), sets out the guiding principles underlying the EU’s foreign and security policy namely, to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence, integrity and security of the Union; to preserve peace and strengthen international security and co-operation; and to consolidate democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights.

For three important reasons, co-operative security is the most effective regional security structure in the post-Cold War era. First, it involves a broader definition of security; second, it provides a platform to non-state actors; and third, it assumes a gradual approach to the development of co-operation. The other approaches, namely, collective defence, collective security, common security, and comprehensive security - all reveal, according to Snyder (1999:117), a state-centric approach to regional security.

6. CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW THINKING ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Among the main features of new thinking on security, two can be identified as of significance to this study. Firstly, that national security is viewed broadly to incorporate military, political, social, economic, and environmental issues. Secondly, that the referents of national security now include the state, people, geographic regions and the global community.

Contemporary thinking on national security raises a number of challenges for national security policy practitioners. This is reflected in some of the questions and criticism from a number of analysts and writers on the subject. Deudney, as cited in Ayoob (1995:10), questions the necessity of combining environmental threats with military threats since each poses a different kind of harm, and would require protection from different institutions. Nathan (1994:18-19) acknowledges that the strength of the broadened concept of national security resides in raising the political profile of issues
such as poverty, environmental decay and abuse of human rights but concedes that this broadening creates such a wide agenda as to be unmanageable.

Equally important in this connection is Weaver’s contention as cited by Lipschutz (1995:10) that: “redefining security in a conventional sense, either to encompass new sources of threat or specify new referent objects, risks applying the traditional logic of military behaviour to non-military problems.” Hough and Du Plessis (2000:44-45) argue that in its additional extension to include environmental issues, the broadening of national security risks the danger of reverting back to the securitisation of issues. Lastly, and in a similar vein, Ayoob (1995:9) cautions against an excessive open-endedness of the concept of national security because it would very likely prevent the delimitation of the concept and thereby reduce its analytical utility.

Notwithstanding the importance of these questions and criticisms, Booth (1994:6) justifies the broadening of the concept of national security when he states that: “If we are serious about human rights, economic development, the lot of women…then we must simply accept the problems of an expanded agenda and of the need to settle the question of priorities in the political process.” A position such as this one would require focusing on the management of real security threats by making political choices between these competing demands.

7. CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided a number of interrelated themes that are essential for an understanding of the concept of national security. It has shown that national security is a complex set of perceptions about threats or vulnerabilities confronting states in general. In particular, the end of the Cold War has clearly prompted a probing debate about what is – or what should be – the approach to national security. The new strategic environment has now permitted the enlargement of the national security agenda. Rather than risk to ignore important perspectives in this connection, this chapter has highlighted some of the indicators of what national security has become and where it might, or should be heading.
Overall, this chapter lays a theoretical basis upon which to appraise South Africa’s new approach to the concept of national security and within the context of its own situation and the post – Cold War global environment. The next chapter focuses on the key factors that both informed and shaped South Africa’s new approach to national Security.
CHAPTER THREE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY BEFORE 1994 AND THE TRANSITION PERIOD

1. INTRODUCTION

South Africa’s new approach to national security is informed by a combination of factors. Among these can be mentioned, firstly, the untenable past securitisation of society by the pre-1994 government. Secondly, the activist posture of the liberation movement prior to and during the negotiations for a new political dispensation. Thirdly, the influence of new thinking on the concept of security. Fourthly, the organising principles of the determinants of a future national security approach in terms of the new Constitutional provisions of 1996 (traceable to the Interim Constitution of 1993).

The previous chapter provided a number of interrelated themes that are essential for an understanding of the concept of national security in both the developed and developing world contexts, and with specific reference to post-Cold War developments. It suggests that there is indeed a strong case for a holistic and integrated perspective on national security, that is, concerns for the state, human security, as well as the general developmental aspects. Overall, it laid a theoretical basis upon which to appraise South Africa’s new approach to the concept of national security and within the context of the country’s objective conditions.

In order to gain insight into the nature of South Africa’s new approach to national security, both in ideological and methodological terms, this chapter provides a brief historical background of the previous national security dispensation, including some main features of the transition period (1989-1993).
2. THE APPROACH OF THE NATIONAL PARTY GOVERNMENT TO NATIONAL SECURITY, 1984-1993

A brief historical account of South Africa’s approach to national security during the period 1984-1993 is outlined in terms of three features. These are the official views; secondary sources; and the national security management system.

2.1 Official Views

The official views of Government to national security during the period 1984 – 1993, are better explained by looking back at the provisions of the Defence White Papers of 1975 and 1977, including the accounts of the House of Assembly Debates. The Defence White Paper (1975: 3-4), outlines defence strategy in the following terms:

It involves economy, ideology, technology, and even social matters and can therefore only be meaningful and valid if proper account is taken of these other spheres…all countries must, more than ever, muster all their activities – political, economic, diplomatic and military – for their defence. This, in fact, is the meaning of ‘Total Strategy’.

In explaining Pretoria’s strategic situation in the introduction to the Defence White Paper of 1977, President P.W. Botha, who had been the Minister of Defence argued that it was a battleground in the East/West conflict and that military strategy was a component of a ‘broader national strategy’ in order to secure the survival of the principle of the right of self-determination. The Defence White Paper further stated that:

The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we now live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields – military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, etc… The defence of the Republic of South Africa is not solely the responsibility of the Department of Defence. On the contrary, the maintenance of the sovereignty of the RSA is the combined responsibility of all government departments. This can be
taken further – it is the responsibility of the entire population, the nation and every population group.

In this context, Botha, informed the House of Assembly that: “It is a psychological struggle as well as an economic one. It is a diplomatic and military struggle. Therefore it is a total struggle. For that reason I have quite correctly advocated that we develop a total strategy. A total strategy presupposes that the State, private enterprise and the citizenry should be clear about their aims…” (House of Assembly Debates, 17 April 1978, col 4868). In the same vein, some ministers upheld these views, for example, D.J.L. Nel, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, (House of Assembly Debates, 9 March 1984, cols 2668-2669); and General M.A. de M. Malan, Minister of Defence, (House of Assembly Debates, 14 September 1987, cols 5904-5905).

These examples clearly describe the official view and approach to national security during this period, and which was considered to be total strategy in terms of the mobilisation and co-ordination of political, economic, diplomatic and military means in defence of the principle of the perpetuation of minority rule. Notwithstanding this espoused official position, it would be important to take into consideration unofficial views on the Government’s approach to national security, a focus of the following section.

2.2 Unofficial Views

In traditional terms, South Africa’s definition of national security tended to be interpreted in a way that elevated the preservation of the state and a specific ideology to a position of primacy, at the expense of the security of those the state was obliged to serve. This was in line with the apartheid ideology, on which a “total strategy” was based in order to defeat Pretoria’s enemies’ “total onslaught”. Davis (1987:159) explains total strategy in this context as a state of affairs wherein all the elements of the elite – politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen, the press, and state security apparatus have their activities tied down to a single overriding objective of defeating the total onslaught directed from Moscow. It was highly centrally planned in order for South Africa’s myriad administrative, intelligence and military structures to be united behind a focused leadership. Frankel (1984:29) observed that:
During the 1980’s South Africa had taken on many of the institutional and psychological features of the so-called ‘garrison state’ by having transformed apartheid from a crude and loosely articulated doctrine of racial repression to a highly sophisticated programme for the design and development of authoritarian state structures…denial of popular aspirations, disregard for values of tolerance, justice and democracy.

This situation was further described by Frankel (1984:69) as a biased interpretation of the world in terms of which South Africa “confuses communism, nationalism, dissidence, subversion, racism and imperialism into an inter-penetrable melange from which only the security of the White state emerges as constant and paramount.” According to Cawthra (1986: 26-35) the basic reasoning of this national security doctrine was that there was a “communist total onslaught” in all spheres against the security of the state. Grundy (1988:10-11) similarly observed that South Africa’s national security thinking converged on the state, centralisation and the conviction of the white population of the country that they lived in a world that was basically hostile to South Africa. Hence the notion of “total onslaught” that shaped the ideological and political atmosphere in which that government’s decisions about military, political, diplomatic, religious, psychological, cultural, economic and social matters were taken.

In a similar vein, Nathan (1992:10) noted that: “Although the partisan nature of apartheid security policy purported to be in the ‘national interest’, its primary goal was to maintain the system of minority rule and safeguard the racially exclusive state and the white community. Security strategy was formulated by a select group of cabinet ministers and security officials, excluding parliament and the public from effective participation.”

In contrast to the official views of Government to national security, unofficial sources tended to be critical of the former. The unofficial analyses of the situation pointed at the gravitation of the state and its parochial ideology into a position of primacy. As one of the consequences, the Government established a state programme for the design, development and maintenance of authoritarian state structures aimed to negate popular aspirations of the entire South African population, justice and democracy.
These unofficial views are further strengthened when seen in the context of the mechanism which Government put in place in order to implement the national security management system. This is covered in the section that follows.

3. THE NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The National Security Management System (NSMS) was a centralised state structure with immense political power, outside of parliament, and in which the police, military and intelligence agencies played an important role. This section briefly reviews the official sources, including relevant legislation in this connection and followed by secondary sources on this topic.

3.1 Official Views

State President Botha, outlined the functioning of the State Security Council, established in 1972, in the following terms, (RSA, House of Assembly Debates, 14 August 1987, cols 3835-38360):

This security management system is functioning under the auspices of the State Security Council. The State Security Council, in turn, makes regular reports to the Cabinet. In both instances the State President is Chairman. In other words, he has control of a useful instrument which enables him to take those steps in the field of security which are vital to the support of the social order and to the organisation and marshalling of forces against the revolutionary elements.

The Cabinet Committee for State Security carried the responsibility for the NSMS and the latter included the State Security Council (SSC), the Joint Work Committee, and the Secretariat of the State Security Council (SSSC).

3.2 Legislation

The Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act (Act 64 of 1972), provided for the establishment of the State Security Council and formed a key statutory basis
for the intelligence function. Section 2 of the Act describes the functions of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) as “to formulate, for approval by the Council, a policy relating to national security intelligence, and after consultation with the departments of State entrusted with any aspect of the maintenance of the security of the Republic, to coordinate the flow of security intelligence between such departments.” It also provided for key politicians and officials to be appointed and to act in an advisory function only to Government on national security matters.

The National Intelligence Service Act, (Act No. 104 of 1978), elaborated on the functions and regulatory mechanisms of the National Intelligence Service. The latter was responsible for military intelligence and politically accountable to the Minister of Defence.

The former Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei (TBVC) states security agencies were all structured on their South African counterpart. This was clearly the case in terms of security legislation, organisation, functions and powers. The Transkei security agencies functioned in terms of the Intelligence Services and State Security Council Act, (Act No. 16 of 1977) and the intelligence services and the State Security Council of Transkei were endowed with similar powers and functions as that of their South African counterpart. Bophuthatswana’s Internal Intelligence Service Special Act of 1984, allowed it to carry out secret intelligence operations without accountability to its own parliament but only to the President of Bophuthatswana. Venda’s National Security Intelligence and National Security Council Act, (Act No. 4 of 1980), which was amended in 1983, provided for the creation of a National Security Council, identical to the SSC of South Africa. A similar pattern shaped the intelligence structures and legislation in the Ciskei, whereby the National Security Act (No. 13 of 1982) prohibited the activities of or banned political organisations which threatened to challenge the authority of the government.
3.3 Unofficial Views

The task of the national security management system was to manage South Africa’s four power bases, that is, the political, economic, social/psychological and security as an integrated whole (Cawthra, 1986:35-40). Heading the system, was the State Security Council (SSC), which was technically a cabinet committee responsible for
making and implementing decisions related to state security. Under the Vorster government, the State Security Council remained politically and legally subordinate to the Cabinet (Geldenhuys, 1984:92), whereas under the Botha government, according to Frankel (1984:227), it was “the focal point of all national decision-making and governmental power.” As observed by Seegers (1996:166), the security agencies generally dominated the State Security Council, as can be seen from the organisational structure of the NSMS depicted in Figure 1 above.

Under the SSC came the Interdepartmental Committees, which included all state departments for the purpose of co-ordinating common interests in the national security agenda. Implementation and monitoring of the decisions of the SSC, was carried out by a number of Joint Management Centres (JMCs) located in towns or cities throughout South Africa. Both the Interdepartmental Committees and the JMCs, were dominated by the military (Cawthra, 1986:35).

Another important component of the security apparatus was the intelligence agencies, namely, the NIS and the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI). The former functioned as a central intelligence ‘think tank’ and concerned itself with the evaluation of intelligence gathered by all the system’s intelligence operatives (Grundy, 1983:13; Geldenhuys, 1984:149)

Davis (1987:201-202) attributed the failure of “total strategy” to a combination of strategic errors such as fractious inability of the ruling elite to deliver reforms that were sufficiently substantial to curtail rebellion/uprising; inability to define precisely the political complexity of South Africa’s population in order to defeat the insurgency waged by the liberation movements; and failure to recognise the growing popularity of the anti-apartheid resistance movement. Furthermore “total strategy” became a policy managed by generals instead of politicians, a war waged through conventional means against a politically-driven uprising. According to Davis (1987:202): “Instead of rallying ‘around the flag’, white ethnic splits widened, morale dropped, and draft evasion soared. Emigration, while still low, reached record levels in 1985 and again in 1986, as black political unrest intensified.”
This section explained the national security management system of the previous dispensation in terms of selected official views, related legislation, as well as unofficial views. The national security management system was clearly a centralized state structure which enabled government to undertake certain measures in the area of security which were seen as critical to the support of the social order and to the organisation and marshalling of forces against the insurgency.

The failure of the national security management system was attributed to a number of factors such as the untenable apartheid system; inability to dismantle the apartheid apparatus; no real sharing of political power; inter-agency feuding; and the failure to recognise the growing support for the anti-apartheid resistance movement, both internally and internationally.

These developments clearly set the scene for a change in the leadership of government; incremental restructuring of the national security management system; and a significant shift towards a negotiated alternative political dispensation. The next section deals with these issues within the context of the transition period and the Interim Constitution of 1993.

4. THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION

Prior to describing developments in the transition period and the Interim Constitution, it may be important to briefly consider the restructuring of the national security management system under de Klerk’s government during the period 1989-1993. The need for considering this aspect here is in the proposition that firstly, national security institutions are entities capable of being adjusted to changes in their operating environments and, secondly, that paradigm shifts seldom entail an immediate and total break with the past, on the contrary, they are prone to reflect evolutionary increments towards desired alternatives.

4.1 Security Restructuring under de Klerk: 1989-1993

During the period 1989-1993, de Klerk instituted drastic changes in the structural mechanism for the management of national security, according to Cilliers and
Reichardt (1995: 146-164). Firstly, the SSC and its NSMS was dismantled and replaced by a Cabinet Committee for Security Affairs (CCSA) chaired by de Klerk. Secondly, the Security Branch was combined with the Criminal Investigation Division to form a new Crime Combating and Investigation unit (CCI) in 1991. The latter, however, still retained the Security Branch command structure and organisation. Thirdly, and in order to harness the intelligence requirements necessary to gain his declared purpose of negotiating a new political dispensation, de Klerk introduced substantial revisions to government’s intrusive intelligence gathering.

In order to curtail the influence of the Botha-era secuocrats on national decision-making, de Klerk undertook a gradual restructuring of the South African security and intelligence community with the aim of curtailing their range of functions and power to act independently. For instance, he introduced measures to ensure that authority and responsibility for security activities rested with cabinet, and also took direct control of the NIS. These changes are reflected in Figure 2.
4.2 Selected Official and Unofficial Views

An attempt to outline the factors that led to the decision about negotiations for a new constitution introducing a new political dispensation, is a complex exercise because many arguments have been advanced. There were those who believed that de Klerk’s government was forced to abandon the apartheid system due to international pressure...
(sanctions and isolation), and the activities of the liberation movement. There were also those who believed a state of ‘stalemate’ was reached. On the other hand, there was also general acknowledgement that the realities and circumstances of the time, namely, the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the fall of the Berlin Wall, were determining factors as they demanded pragmatism from the opposing parties, namely the National Party government and the liberation movements.

4.2.1 Official Views

The official views regarding the transition period include statements made in the House of Assembly Debates (political, constitutional and defence); pronouncements of the Government in terms of the Groote Schuur Minute, the Pretoria Minute, including the Manifesto for the New South Africa; as well as relevant aspects pertaining to the South African Defence Force (SADF).

(a) House of Assembly Debates

In his address at the opening of Parliament in 1990, State President de Klerk, stated that:

For South Africa, indeed for the whole world, the past year has been one of change and major upheaval. In Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union itself, political and economic upheaval surged forward in an unstoppable tide…The year 1989 will go down in history as the year in which Stalinist Communism expired…” (Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 2 February 1990, cols 3-4).

General M.A. de M. Malan, Minister of Defence, also noted that the year 1989, signified a watershed in modern world politics in terms of authoritarian systems of government coming to an end, power blocs disappearing and new ones taking shape. (Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 17 May 1990, cols 9529-9533).
(b) **Groote Schuur Minute**

The *Groote Schuur Minute*, (1990:17-18) stated that: “The government undertakes to review existing security legislation to bring it into line with the new dynamic situation developing in South Africa in order to ensure normal and free political activities.” It further contained among others, agreements on the release of political prisoners and the lifting of the state of emergency.

(c) **The Pretoria Minute**

In the *Pretoria Minute*, (1990:18) delegations of the Government and ANC reaffirmed their commitment to the *Groote Schuur Minute* and “agreed that in the context of the common search for peace and stability, it was vital that understanding should grow among all sections of the South African population that problems can and should be solved through negotiations…” With regard to a review of security legislation, the Government committed itself to give immediate consideration to repealing all provisions of the *Internal Security Act*. It also contained agreement on the suspension of armed struggle by the ANC and on the return of political exiles.

(d) **Manifesto for the New South Africa**

Guided by these developments with respect to the undertakings of Government, de Klerk addressed the opening of Parliament, in February 1991, by outlining his proposed set of values and ideals as a basis for a *Manifesto for the New South Africa*. These were peace, freedom and security for all; prosperity: a free and equitable economic system; progress: an equitable social system; and participation: a free and democratic political system (Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 1 February 1991, cols 3-4).

(e) **The SADF and the Transition**

On the issue of the SADF and political transition, R.P. Meyer, Minister of Defence and Communications, stated in the House of Assembly that “firstly, there is the point of departure that there can only be one national defence force in any democratic
country – not more than one – which is controlled constitutionally and is established under constitutional authority. This leaves no room for any political party or organisation to maintain its own private army or military wing in a democratic country…” (Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 26 March 1992, cols 3007-3008).

In preparation for the composition of the defence force of the future, and in his capacity as Minister of Defence and Communications and of Constitutional Development, Meyer stated that the SADF has drafted principles that it wishes to establish in a future defence force. These are that:

the defence force shall ensure the territorial integrity of the country, be non-partisan and apolitical, loyal to the constitution and responsible to the government of the day, shall not discriminate on the grounds of race, colour, gender or religion; appointments and promotions shall be based on military merit and ability; and shall maintain its present standards of proficiency, affordable force levels in relation to clearly defined national priorities. (Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 26 May 1992, cols 9323-9328).

(f) Changes in the Internal and External Environment

State President de Klerk, in addressing the opening of Parliament in 1991, gave recognition to the dramatic changes in both the internal and international environments (Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 1 February 1991, cols 20-21):

The exploitation of regional conflict in our part of the world to further ideology and power has come to an end. Political opportunism, diplomatic blackmail and playing off the two major powers against each other for the achievement of questionable political objectives cannot be used effectively against us any longer. Revolution is no longer a marketable product in the world today. The resources of the destabilisation and
propaganda campaigns against South Africa are drying up. The anti-South Africa industry is facing insolvency. Sanctions are withering away.

4.2.2 Unofficial Views

McKinley (1995:308) holds the view that the demise of the USSR served as an impetus in the negotiation process, while according to Friedman (1993:10-13); and Lodge (1992:6), the former Soviet Union was already exerting pressure on the ANC to seek an acceptable settlement with Pretoria. Given these circumstances, negotiations became more attractive than the alternative option of a ‘winner takes it all.’ Some observers attributed this co-operative spirit to the fact that both parties faced potentially strong rivals, namely, the extreme left for the ANC and the extreme right for the NP (Horowitz, 1991:271; Africa Confidential, 17 April 1992).

The official views regarding the transition period made a pointed statement in recognition of significant changes in the international environment, including the necessity for a negotiated settlement in South Africa. Certain key principles such as a free and democratic political system and a constitutionally established single national defence force would not be jettisoned. This position is elaborated on in the next sections that deal with the negotiations phase in terms of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, and the Transitional Executive Council, including the Interim Constitution.

4.3 Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA)

CODESA was based on the Declaration of Intent of 20 December 1991, which had as its objective to create a united democratic South Africa and to facilitate the process of formulating a new constitution. The opening statement of the Declaration of Intent reads as follows:

We, the duly authorised representatives of political parties, political organisations, administrations and the South African Government, coming together at this first meeting of the Convention for a
Democratic South Africa, mindful of the awesome responsibility that rests upon us at this moment in the history of our country.

It further declared its commitment to bring about a unified South Africa; to heal the divisions of the past; to improve the quality of life of the people; to create a climate conducive to peaceful constitutional change; and to set in motion the process of drawing up a new constitution.

The negotiations about the future democratic character of South Africa during the period of December 1991 to June 1992 assumed formal expression in CODESA. The different political organisations came together at the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park, for the multi-party negotiations, with a view to paving a way to bring peace and stability in the country by creating a constitutional system (The Argus, 20 December 1991; SAIRR, 1991:1xxiii).

Both the ANC and the NP/South African Government set the procedural arrangement of ‘sufficient consensus’ by which if both opposed a proposed item it was rejected. CODESA I, according to Seegers (1996:275-6) “would frame all subsequent negotiations around issues such as an undivided South Africa, adult suffrage, the doctrine of a separation of power, and a bill of rights.” CODESA II led to the signing of a Record of Understanding of 26 September 1992, between the ANC and NP/South African Government, where a single constitution-making body was agreed upon, including the constitutional principles to guide this body.

In order to facilitate the work of CODESA, it was decided that five working groups had to be established. Of relevance for this research is Working Group 1, which was responsible for creating a climate that would be conducive to free political activity. Working Group 1 was subdivided into three subgroups. Subgroup 1 dealt with aspects related to ‘completing the reconciliation process.’ Subgroup 2 was responsible for, among other things, the role and composition of the security forces of South Africa and the TBVC states. Subgroup 3 was responsible for the creation of the climate and opportunity for free political participation (Hough, 1992:58-59).
The negotiations phase unfolded on the basis of the realisation by the NP and the ANC that in order to resolve the political stalemate, there was a need for negotiations (Kane-Berman; Maphai, 1994:53; McKinley, 1995:170). Important milestones in this process were marked by the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), which was reinforced by way of the Transitional Executive Council Act of 1993, all of which paved the way for the Interim Constitution.

4.4 The Transitional Executive Council

The Transitional Executive Council Act, 151 of 1993 was promulgated with the idea of promoting the preparation for and transition to a democratic order in South Africa, in conjunction with all legislative and executive structures at all levels of government. Pertinent to this research, the following Subcouncils under the control and supervision of the TEC were established: the Subcouncil on Defence; the Subcouncil on Law and Order, Stability and Security; and the Subcouncil on Intelligence.

The TEC, further provided for the powers and duties with regard to defence, such as a code of conduct for all military forces; to institute research on issues such as parliamentary control, composition, manpower policy, organization and executive command of a future South African defence force; and “to oversee any planning, preparation and training for a future South African defence force” (Article 16 of the TEC).

The Subcouncil on Law and Order, Stability and Security was assigned the task of establishing a national inspectorate made up of members of policing agencies; a national independent complaints mechanism under the control of a civilian; formulate a set of values and objectives for the promotion of law, order, stability and security for policing agencies and; introduce a code of conduct for policing agencies (Article 15 of the TEC).

In terms of Article 20 of the TEC, the Subcouncil on Intelligence was tasked to establish a Joint Co-ordinating Intelligence Committee; formulate a set of principles on intelligence and with a view towards providing a national intelligence capability in
the new democratic order; formulate a code of conduct for all the services for the transition period and as a building block for a new democratic order; and make proposals about appropriate legislation for intelligence agencies in addition to mechanisms of accountability and political supervision.

On the transitional control of the armed forces during the transition period, the broad aim of the Subcouncil on Defence, according to Cilliers and Reinhardt (1995:20), was to level the political playing field before the elections by ensuring that no military force gained an unfair advantage for any political party. It was agreed that the SADF would remain under parliamentary control until after the elections. In accordance with the TEC Act, the Sub-Council on Defence “shall budget for and be allocated the necessary resources to establish and maintain a force, to be known as the National Peacekeeping Force, the functions of which shall relate to the maintenance of peace and public order in South Africa” (Article 16 sub-articles (10 (a), (b) and (11) of the TEC).

In retrospect, the need for a Peacekeeping Force stemmed from considerations such as “the legitimacy crisis confronting the SA Police (the Internal Stability Unit in particular) and SADF in the townships at that stage, the level of distrust and mistrust of these forces at a political level, and therefore the requirement for an all-inclusive but non-partisan force in the run-up to and during the elections…” Cilliers and Reichardt (1995:38).

The establishment of the TEC represented a decisive moment in the negotiations for a new political dispensation in South Africa (Aluju, 1994:43). The incumbent South African government could no longer take decisions without the support of the TEC. Similarly the TEC, not only legalised the CODESA decisions, but also enhanced the status of this negotiating forum to become a shadow parliament of the country. One important feature concerning the CODESA decisions was to increase the threshold when taking decisions dealing with security forces in that a minimum majority of 75 percent was stipulated and considered acceptable to the TEC’s Subcouncils on Law and Order, Defence and Intelligence (SAIRR, 1994:508).
4.5 The 1993 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa

The Interim Constitution, namely the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, was enacted in order to introduce a new Constitution for the Republic of South. The main purpose of this Constitution, according to its preamble, was to make “provision for the promotion of national unity and the restructuring and continued governance of South Africa while an elected Constitutional Assembly draws up a final Constitution.”

Section 214 (1) of the Interim Constitution made provision for the establishment of the South African Police Service and the National Defence Force. With respect to the former, it stipulated that: “There shall be established and regulated by an Act of Parliament a South African Police Service, which shall be structured at both national and provincial levels and shall function under the direction of the national government as well as the various provincial governments.” Section 215 provided for the following powers and functions, namely, “the prevention of crime; the investigation of any offence or alleged offence; the maintenance of law and order; and the preservation of the internal security of the Republic.”

Section 224(1) of the Constitution stated that “the National Defence Force is hereby established as the only defence force for the Republic.” In terms of Section 224(2) “the National Defence Force shall at its establishment consist of all members of – (a) the South African Defence Force; (b) any defence force of any area forming part of the national territory; and (c) any armed force as defined in section 1 of the Transitional Executive Council Act, 1993 (Act 151 of 1993) …” It further provided under section 224 (3) that “save for the National Defence Force, no other armed force or military force or armed organization or service may be established in or for the Republic…” The functions of the National Defence Force are spelt out in section 227, and accountability in section 228.

The Interim Constitution, according to Seegers (1996:320), considered the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) as an institution that served the state, including the traditional support to the police and thereby preserving the secondary
function of the military in domestic territory. Further, while security dealt with armed challenges, it is equally concerned with economic development, environmental issues, protection of rights, and welfare. Nathan (1992: 15-16) stated that the rationale for this concern with non-military issues stems from the political need to enable people “to live in peace and harmony, enjoy equal access to resources and participate fully in the process of governance.”

Arguing the question of the control of the armed forces, Seegers (1996:321) as well as Nathan (1994:60-63) pointed out that the cardinal constitutional issue was civilian control of the security forces, which required among others, constitutionally protected criteria, direct and indirect parliamentary control, de-concentration of security agencies’ powers, and military self-restraint through discipline, loyalty and professionalism.

While the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the SANDF received considerable attention through lengthy provisions (respectively from sections 214 to 223 and from section 224 to 228) in the 1993 Constitution, the intelligence community was left to operate without “specific intelligence-related constitutional provisions” during the transitional period (O'Brien, 1995:117; Basson, 1994:278-293). Even though the Interim Constitution did not specify the constitutional mandate governing the intelligence community in South Africa, the constitutional principles did, albeit superficially, cater for the intelligence structures as part of the security forces.

For example, Constitutional Principle No XXXI, stated that “Every member of the security forces (police, military and intelligence), and the security forces as a whole, shall be required to perform their functions and exercise their powers in the national interest and shall be prohibited from furthering or prejudicing party political interest.”

This section described developments in the transition period in terms of de Klerk’s restructuring of the national security management system; the significant shift towards a negotiated alternative political dispensation in terms of official and unofficial views; the Convention for a Democratic South Africa; and the TEC, including the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
5. CONCLUSION

The question analysed in this chapter concerns the fact that South Africa’s new approach to national security is informed by a combination of factors, among which are the untenable past securitisation of society by the pre-1994 government; the activist posture of the liberation movement prior to and during the negotiations for a new political dispensation; the influence of new thinking on the concept of security; and the organising principles of the determinants of a future national security approach in terms of the new Constitutional provisions of 1996, traceable to the Interim Constitution of 1993.

In explaining this proposition, brief reference was made to the former national security dispensation, including some main features of the transition period. It has been shown that the approach of the National Party Government to national security during the period under review was informed by the ideology of apartheid which was enforced as well as sustained through a tight security apparatus in terms of a “total strategy” which mobilised the necessary resources, both diplomatic and coercive in the hands of the state.

This chapter has also shown that when taking over as State President in the period 1989-1993, and in order to curtail the influence of the Botha-era securocrats on national decision-making, de Klerk undertook a gradual restructuring of the South African security and intelligence community. Such measures were also undertaken for the purpose of harnessing the intelligence requirements necessary to gain his declared intent of negotiating a new political dispensation.

On the transitional control of the armed forces during the transition period, the broad aim of the negotiation process was to level the political playing fields before the elections by ensuring that no military force gained an unfair advantage for any political party. Hence it was agreed that the SADF would remain under parliamentary control until after the elections. The necessary resources would be allocated to establish and maintain the National Peacekeeping Force, the functions of which would relate to the maintenance of peace and public order.
The process of negotiations and the transition process clearly represented a fundamental shift that entailed moving from an adversarial national security paradigm to a co-operative security paradigm characterised by incremental and cumulative shifts. As observed by MccGwire, (2001:778-779), the erstwhile dominant paradigm of exclusionary national security was no longer valid and had to be replaced. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter and in the context of the post-1994 South African approach to national security in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, including specific policy constructs by way of appreciating those determinative variables such as the principles underpinning national security; the philosophy; the objectives of national security; and national security strategy and threat perception.
CHAPTER 4

SOUTH AFRICA’S NEW APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY, 1994-2002

1. INTRODUCTION

South Africa’s new approach to national security is informed by its national interests in terms of a set of shared priorities regarding the future political dispensation and relations with the rest of the world. The official views on national security are reflected in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, including policy documents such as the White Paper on National Defence; the White Paper on Intelligence; the National Strategic Intelligence Act; the Defence Review; the National Crime and Prevention Strategy; and descriptions of the National Security Council functions, including the Draft National External Security Strategy.

These policy documents constitute invaluable policy constructs towards the new approach to national security. In the next sections, these documents are described and analysed with a view to appreciating those determinative variables such as the principles underpinning national security; the broad philosophy; the objectives of national security; and national security strategy and threat perception.

2. PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNING NATIONAL SECURITY

The principles that underpin national security are anchored in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 and include defence, intelligence, including safety and security.

2.1 Constitutional Principles

The principal basis for national security in South Africa is derived from the Founding Provisions in section 198 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, which states that:

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The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms; non-racialism and non-sexism; supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law; universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.

National security is, in addition, underpinned by the following principles enshrined in Section 198 of the Constitution:

a. National security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life.

b. The resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes any South African citizen from participating in armed conflict, nationally or internationally, except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or national legislation.

c. National security must be pursued in compliance with the law, including international law.

d. National security is subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive.

The Constitution further provides, with respect to the SANDF, the SAPS, and the intelligence services, that these institutions shall act in accordance with the Constitution and the law, in addition to customary international law as well as international agreements binding on the Republic. Most importantly, is that these security services shall be subject to the principles of transparency and accountability through the supervision of the multi-party parliamentary committees. (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, sections 200-204).
The Constitution (1996: 200-204) also explicitly outlines the purposes and constrain for which the security services are established. In the case of the SANDF, it is provided that it shall be established for the purposes of defending and protecting the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people within the constitutional prescripts and the principles of international law regulating the use of force. Cabinet, as well as the Presidency with regard to its employment, also makes provision for political responsibility. Further, a civilian Secretariat for Defence is to be established by legislation and to operate under the direction of a Cabinet member responsible for defence.

Concerning the SAPS, the Constitution (sections 205-208) stipulates that a national police service must be instituted to operate in the national, provincial and local areas of government. The functions of the police service are set out as preventing, combating and investigating crime, maintaining public order, protecting and safeguarding the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and upholding and enforcing the law.

Sections 209-210 of the Constitution further provides with regard to the intelligence services, that a presidentially appointed head of each intelligence service assumes political responsibility for the control and direction of the services. The purposes, powers and functions of the intelligence services are regulated by legislation, which also provides for the coordination and civilian monitoring of the activities of those services.

These Constitutional provisions clearly prescribe a fundamental break from the tradition of military involvement in politics (as was the case during the period when the National Security Management System was in force, including the predominant role of the military and security forces in the political life of the country) that characterised South Africa in the previous dispensations. At the same time, they set the tone in the development of a framework for the country’s new approach to national security, particularly with regard to the checks and balances in terms of civilian supervisory measures; separation of areas of responsibility; and budgetary control.
2.2 Safety and Security

According to both the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998:9-12), and the National Crime Prevention Strategy (1998:3), policing services in South Africa have “shifted from an inheritance of authoritarian law and order responses, to a broader concept of safety and security for all citizens with emphasis on proactive crime prevention.” One of the key components of this new policy approach is the ‘demilitarisation and civilianisation’ of the police service. In particular, the crime prevention strategy is earmarked to serve as a multi-agency approach to crime prevention to influence the operations of the departments of safety and security, justice, correctional services, welfare, defence, intelligence, health as well as education, and for the provision of the mobilisation and participation of civil society in assisting to address crime.

The principles underpinning national security were further elaborated upon in the official statements by the relevant ministries concerned with national security. This is dealt with in the section that follows.

3. BROAD PHILOSOPHY

The broad philosophy underscoring the national security approach has been developing over the period under review, as reflected in the official speeches referred to below and covering the periods 1996, 2000 and 2004 respectively.

3.1 1996: Policy Phase

In his address to the Senate during the reading of the State Expenditure Budget, 28 May 1996, J.M. Nhlanhla, Deputy Minister for Intelligence Services, pointed out that:

The establishment of the ministry of intelligence services would be another first for the country and indeed for the intelligence services themselves. The Ministry will exert executive authority over the intelligence services particularly in the areas of inter alia, financial and
budgetary accountability, policy formulation, ministerial sanction for the conduct of intelligence activity and legislative accountability.

For the intelligence services, the years 1995/96, reflected a period of introspection, revitalisation, corporate re-engineering and infrastructure development in the sense of having effected the amalgamation and integration of the members of six different intelligence services into the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the South African Secret Service and facilitated the establishment of the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC) as the interface between the intelligence structures and policy makers. Also important to note during this phase, was the appointment of a Ministerial Intelligence Review Commission (MIRC) to review certain significant aspects of the civilian intelligence services by way of ensuring greater cooperation and coordination, avoid overlaps and duplication as well as recommending new areas of focus in keeping with the emerging new needs and, most importantly, to ensure that the activities of the intelligence services are subjected to both Parliamentary and executive supervision and control. ([http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1996/960723-13796.htm](http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1996/960723-13796.htm))

In a press release by A.B. Nzo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the Foreign Affairs Budget Vote, House of Assembly, 18 June 1996, the minister stated that the Department entrusted with the task of conducting South Africa’s foreign policy, “our primary objectives are the promotion and protection of South Africa’s sovereignty and independence, as well as the security and the welfare of our citizens.” Also emphasised in this press release, were principles such as commitment to Africa, the promotion of human rights, support for democracy and political stability, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, and the participation of the following role players in the structures of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security - Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Safety and Security, the South African Intelligence agencies, and the SANDF.

3.2 2000: Transition Phase

In the Address by Minister N. Dlamini-Zuma, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the National Assembly, on 14 March 2000, she reiterated the country’s commitment to
participate in peace missions wherever a contribution was required and a legitimate international mandate exists. Reference was also made to the newly established Cabinet Committee and Cluster Committee system on International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS), which was envisaged to lay a firm basis for coordination of government’s efforts on foreign policy.


On the occasion of the Defence Budget Vote, National Assembly, 7 April 2000, M. Lekota, Minister of Defence, stated that: “The defence function is about developing and maintaining the capability to ward off threats or dangers to this country and its people. Some of these threats are created by human beings, some are created by natural forces.” (http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2000/0004111255pl1006.htm.)

The Minister of Safety and Security, S.V. Tshwete, in his Budget Vote, National Assembly, 18 May 2000, referred to the National Intelligence Estimate of 1999, as followings: “Security concerns resulting in localised pockets of violence and crime, as well as threats to human security in the form of social services must receive our undivided attention.” Further on, Minister Tshwete stated that in addressing crime and security implies integrating crime prevention and combating with socio-economic upliftment. (http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2000/000522955a1007.htm.)

In the Budget Speech by J.M. Nhlanhla, Minister for Intelligence Services, 24 May 2000, the following pertinent aspects to the philosophy underpinning South Africa’s approach to national security are stated:

As we live in an interdependent world, where transnational security threats are a common concern, the vision, mission and plans for our Intelligence Services are located in a global context...We speak of organs that forewarn of things to come, giving insights. Our national security perspective has shifted the focus towards human security and we think beyond traditional military threats.

With reference to national security threats, the minister mentioned the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the management and disposal of nuclear waste material, organised crime, terrorism and espionage.

3.3 2004: Consolidation Phase

On the occasion of the Secret Services debate, on 24 June 2004, R. Kasrils, Minister for Intelligence Services spelt out the intelligence challenges of today’s world when he said that:

The security threats of the new century are very different from those of the old. They pose new challenges, for which a new approach is required. The polarised world order of the Cold War era has given way to more uncertainty and unpredictability… At the same time there is relentless pressure on resources such as energy, water, minerals, fertile land and food, leading to increased competition and potential for conflict… It affects everyone, especially a new and diverse nation like South Africa, with a range of domestic challenges and wide international responsibilities, including our obligations within our region and our commitment to the African renaissance, to the African Union and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).


With reference to global responsibilities, Kasrils, pointed out that: “We cannot allow states to fail, economies to collapse and conflict to occur unchecked. This is not just because we have a moral responsibility to help others, but because these are a breeding ground for threats to the wider world, including South Africa and Africa.”

In the National Budget Vote, in June 2004, Minister of Defence, M. Lekota, stated among others, that:

A defence force engaged in peacekeeping operates entirely differently from a defence force at war. Peacekeeping strives to achieve sustainable peace. Its actions are premised on supporting key
role players to move forward out of a conflict situation. Thus its training will be based on, among other things, international law and respect for human life and human rights. It will provide security support to role players if necessary; it will provide logistical support like secure communications, medical services for wounded and sick combatants; it will provide engineering expertise for the rebuilding of the country. It will even be involved in post-conflict resolution to ensure that combatants are demobilised effectively, that they are disarmed and that they are re-integrated into society.

During the Budget Vote 25 on Safety and Security, in June 2004, the Minister of Safety and Security, C. Nqakula, stated that:

One of the key elements of the strategy and tactics of the South African government, leading to the true liberation of the people and thoroughgoing democracy, is the vision of peace and stability. Government, therefore, believes that peace and stability should not be defined only in terms of the military and the police, but also as it relates to political, economic, social and environmental questions.

The foregoing statements clearly represent important indicators of the unfolding national security perspective over this period and with the focus towards human security and beyond traditional military threats in accordance with the country’s changing external strategic environment.

Principles such as a commitment to Africa, the promotion of human rights, support for democracy and political stability, conflict resolution, peacekeeping as well as post-conflict reconstruction, come to the fore. This philosophy further informs and provides direction to the national security objectives pursued by government as will be shown in the section that follows.
4. OBJECTIVES OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The South African White Paper on Defence for the Republic of South Africa (1996:3) and the White Paper on Intelligence (1994:3), both reinforce the Constitutional principle that national security is now approached from a broad perspective to include political, economic, social and environmental matters, over and above the military and police, including an emphasis on the security of the citizens.

According to the White Paper on Defence, (1996:9), “National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of South Africa’s people, and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security.” Equally important, is the observation that South Africa’s engagement with other states shall be one of peaceful relations; the reiteration of the constitutional imperative of adherence to international law on armed conflict and to all international treaties to which South Africa is party; and a declaration towards the SANDF’s primarily defensive orientation and posture, including a recognition that stability and development are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing, hence the commitment to the promotion of regional security in Southern Africa.

With regard to the White Paper on Intelligence (1994:3), it was argued that maintaining and promoting the country’s national security, peace, stability, development and progress, should be the key objectives of government, namely, the pursuit of democracy, sustainable economic development and social justice; and including regional security policy in terms of advancing the principles of collective security, non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes. It further argued that this new approach to national security implies that the then Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) “is integral to and forms the core of the country’s emerging national security doctrine.” The RDP’s focus on addressing the basic needs of the people, developing human resources, building the economy, and democratising the state and society, is thus viewed as part of the broader national security agenda.

In addition to the above objectives, those objectives that are spelt out in the National Crime Prevention Strategy, referred to in the preceding section, should also be taken
into consideration. The national security objectives may be illustrated as in the diagram below:

Figure 3: Diagrammatic Representation of the National Security Objectives

This diagram suggests that in the South African situation, the national security objectives straddle three levels - national, regional, international and based on the key premises that security, peace and stability, and growth and development are regarded as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. The next section on the NSC functions will further show these embedded linkages between security, peace, stability, growth and development in South Africa’s new approach to national security.
5. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FUNCTIONS

What follows in this section is a brief outline of a consolidated approach to the co-ordination of national security issues approved by Cabinet in June 2000, including issues such as the identification and referral of specific issues to the NSC.

According to the White Paper on Defence (1996:8), the SANDF will continue to be “an important instrument of last resort but it is no longer the dominant security institution. The responsibility for ensuring the security of South Africa’s people is now shared by many government departments and ultimately vests in Parliament.” It is for this reason, among others, that the core members of the NSC comprise of the deputy president and the following ministries/departments: Safety and Security, Defence, Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Finance and Justice.

Hough and du Plessis (2000:57-62), point out that the NSC is “an integrated, multi-departmental national security co-ordinating structure” that was established to ensure that a rapid response capability was in place to effectively address critical threats to the security of the country and its people. The main objectives of the NSC are co-ordination of intelligence and security operations as well as liaison with and between the Cabinet Clusters in relation to national security issues.

As a coordinating structure, the functions of the NSC are to:

a. develop national security policy in general;

b. prioritise national and foreign security issues for the attention of cabinet;

c. exercise an early warning function with respect to potential threats to national interests and security;

d. provide policy guidelines for planning to meet urgent and/or severe threats to security;
e. approve plans and programs of action regarding such threats;

f. direct, monitor and evaluate the execution of such plans;

g. develop appropriate responses to crises;

h. co-ordinate assistance to other governments in crisis situations; and

i. liaise with the Cabinet Cluster Committees in relation to co-ordination of their activities regarding security issues. (Hough and du Plessis 2000:60)

A diagrammatic representation of the integrated, multi-departmental national security co-ordinating structure of the National Security Council coordinating functions is reflected in Figure 4.
This brief outline of the NSC’s functions show both linkages between security, peace, stability, growth and development on the one hand, and on the other hand, it confirms the consolidated approach to the coordination of national security issues. An aspect related to the objectives of national security as outlined above, together with the NSC functions, is the question of a national security strategy. This is dealt with in the next section.
6. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The aim of strategy, according to Beaufre (1965:23), “is to fulfil the objectives laid down by policy, making the best use of resources.” Accordingly, national strategy may be viewed as the art of mobilising and directing the total resources of a nation in order to safeguard and promote its interests against its enemies. Acceptance of strategy as consisting of ends, ways and means, leads to the notion that national security strategy has to do with the achievement of those national security objectives as set out by government and fulfilled through the utilisation of the requisite methods and appropriate resources.

The direction of South Africa’s national security strategy also resides in a number of official documents. Firstly, the South African Defence Review (1998), which elaborates on the principal concepts that sustain the White Paper on Defence (1996), with regard to international law and armed conflict, defensive posture, defence spending and the peace-time force, international peace operations, regional security and internal deployment contains certain elements of national security strategy. One of the critical pronouncements in the South African Defence Review pertains to the defensive posture, according to which the government undertakes not to have aggressive intentions towards any state and commits itself to non-violent forms of conflict resolution, with the stress on preventing conflict by way of co-operation with other states.

During 1996, a draft National External Security Strategy (NESS) was circulated. It inter alia stated that:

An external security strategy to cope with the challenges facing South Africa in the new post-Cold War environment must be built on cooperation with other partner states and with international organisations with the aim to foster a regional, continental and global environment of peace and stability in which growth and development, democracy and respect for human rights can prosper. (Hough and du Plessis 2000:68-67)
The focal areas of NESS are: protecting and promoting South Africa’s national interests in a competitive world; contributing towards international peace, stability and security; promoting regional security in Southern Africa; and projecting a defensive and non-threatening military posture.

The foregoing clarifies the fact that even in the absence of an integrated national security policy and a national security strategy, there is a clear and deliberate linkage between national security, human security, and a developmental agenda, including preventive conflict by cooperation with other states.

There can be no question that South Africa’s approach to national security has undergone a drastic change since the previous dispensation in order to meet the needs of both challenges in the domestic and shifting geopolitical international environments. From the available literature on this subject, this new approach is acknowledged in terms of being less militaristic and state centric than was the case under the previous dispensation. At the same time, however, Nathan (1993:47) criticises this broad approach for its elasticity in that it complicates the construction of threat scenarios. Hough and Du Plessis (2000:44-45) similarly argue that in its additional extension to include too many issues, the broadening of national security risks the danger of reverting back to the securitisation of issues. Hough (2003:19) also cautions against a parochial or too broad definition of national security because of its inclination to result in wastefulness of resources.

7. THREAT PERCEPTION

Threats in the context of national security are closely related to vulnerabilities and are in turn a mirror of insecurity often experienced by states. There is general consensus that threat assessment is often not an objective process. According to Buzan (1991:115), the difference between ordinary challenges and threats to national security manifest in a complex of trivial, serious, drastic and unprecedented forms.

In the context of South Africa, the threat perception view adopted by government is derived from both official policy documents and official pronouncements. The White
Paper on Defence (1996:25-33) distinguishes three categories of threats to national security, namely, threats arising from the global context, threats in the regional context and threats from the domestic environment. Global context threats include the risk of armed hostilities, inter-state conflicts and arms proliferation. In contrast, regional context threats range from chronic underdevelopment, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, refugees and displaced people, disease and environmental degradation, including cross-border trafficking in drugs, stolen goods and small arms.

Both regional instability and underdevelopment threats to national security can, according to the White Paper on Defence (1996:30), “be addressed meaningfully only through political reform, socio-economic development and inter-state cooperation...the prevention and management of inter and intra-state conflict is primarily a political and not a military matter.”

The White Paper on Defence (1996:12-15) also states that: “for political, strategic and geographic reasons, defence co-operation with other Southern African states is a priority. South Africa will seek to strengthen the security and defence forums of SADC.” Further, that the government will conduct its foreign policy, arms trade and external defence activities in line with international law and norms. The South African Defence Review (1998:50) confirms this position:

The government does not currently, and will not in the future, have aggressive intentions towards any state. It regards the use or threat of military force as a measure of last resort...The emphasis lies on preventing conflict through cooperation with other states, particularly in Southern Africa.

In the domestic context, threats that invariably impact negatively upon socio-economic development and reconstruction are identified as personal insecurity, social instability, endemic crime, criminal violence; and public and political violence.

This statement and position is reinforced by way of taking into account the various non-military aspects of security as well as the distinction between the security of the state on the one hand and on the other, the security of people. Hence in chapter three
of the South African Defence Review (1998:5) it is asserted that: “South Africa is not confronted by an immediate conventional threat and does not anticipate external aggression in the short to medium term.” Therefore, any assessment of defence contingencies must be based on a threat-independent, in contrast to a threat-specific approach.

The National Strategic Intelligence Act, No. 39 of 1994, provides that the coordination and interpretation of national strategic intelligence for use by the State and the Cabinet is for the purposes of detection and identification of any threat or potential threat to the national security of the Republic.

Threat perception, therefore, and in addition to the principles, objectives, together with the strategy underpinning national security, all imply that rationality ought to prevail in the selection of courses of action to follow in order to maximise one’s value position on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis and probabilities of opponent’s actions (Snyder, 1961:25). Hough (2003:19) states that given the competitive environment and the assumption that not all threats are necessarily national security threats, it is advisable to guard “against either understating or overstating threats to national security.”

As an indication of strategies to be adopted in addressing threats to national security, two instances are cited. Firstly, in his speech on the National Defence Appropriation Bill on 21 June 1995, (www.gov.za), the former Minister of Defence, J. Modise, stated that: “We are an important partner with the capability and resources to assist in the protection of our region. All threats to the region are threats to ourselves. As such, we need to project peace, security and democracy throughout Africa.” Secondly, and echoing similar sentiments to his predecessor Minister J. Modise, Minister M. Lekota, stated in his Defence Budget Vote, National Assembly (2001:2) that: “External military threats, internal threats to the constitutional order, the promotion of regional security through defence co-operation within the SADC framework, and the promotion of international security through participation in peace operations and military co-operation in support of our foreign policy goals are among the contingencies we must be prepared for.”
The adoption of a broadened concept of national security with its accompanying array of referent objects of security, namely, individual, state and regional security inevitably complicates the security equation by way of the source of threat (military, political, societal, economic and/or environmental) and nature of the threat (domestic or external). Notwithstanding that certain criteria may be used for identifying national security threats, for example the intensity of a threat (proximity, probability of occurrence, specificity, consequences and historical setting), it is however problematic in that threat analysis contains a significant subjective element by virtue of dependence on perceptions of threat. Hence the decision as to which issues are threats to national security in the circumstance of a competitive environment of political, economic, military and ecological pressures on a state, among others, becomes a question of political choice rather than objective fact (Buzan, 1999:115; and Booth, 1994:6).

In determining when a threat is indeed a threat to national security, Hough (2003:18-19) suggests that the following questions should be taken into account: is the threat directed to state stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity? Are any vital national values threatened? Does the threat require exceptional measures? Do the threats involve illegal or unconstitutional activities? Is the threat trans-state?

South Africa’s new approach to national security is clearly a composite of specific and basic constitutional principles, and defined objectives at the national, regional and international levels. At the core of this national security approach is an array of role players implicit from the broad-based adopted definition of national security that incorporates military, political, social, economic, and environmental issues. Also, the referents of security now include a change in emphasis as opposed to the previous dispensation in terms of the state, people, geographic regions and the global community. Overall, this new approach reveals a strong case for human security that includes general developmental aspects.

8. CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided a number of inter-related themes that are essential for an understanding of South Africa’s new approach to the concept of national security.
Firstly, the new approach is underpinned by specific principles that are anchored in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and cover defence, intelligence, safety and security. Secondly, the broad philosophy behind South Africa’s approach to national security approach has developed over a number of years with emphasis towards human security. Thirdly, national security objectives cut across three levels - national, regional, international and are based on the key premises that security, peace and stability, and growth and development are regarded as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing.

In the fourth instance, the envisaged NSC functions are similarly linked to issues related to security, peace, stability, growth and development and are to be managed in a coordinated cluster approach at national level. There are also indicators of a national security strategy based on deliberate linkages between national security, human security, and a developmental agenda, including preventing conflict by cooperation with other states.

While the strength of this new approach is acknowledged, particularly in raising the political profile of issues such as poverty, environmental decay and human rights, its weakness would appear to derive from questions such as the following: whether this broad approach to national security create such a wide agenda as to be unmanageable in practice? Are there any merits or demerits in combining environmental threats with military threats in a national security equation?

A clear appreciation of this broad-based approach to national security necessitates that questions that emerge from the research problem and derived from the relevant official policy documents and available literature be investigated. There seems to be a need to question the appropriateness of this new approach and based upon the assumption that the adoption of a broad concept of national security is problematic both conceptually and practically.

In view of these concerns, chapter five makes a critical assessment of South Africa’s new approach to national security also based on a number of interview questions with selected experts in the field of national security. Following the general theme of the research, the interview questions indicate some of the perceptions regarding South
Africa’s new approach to the concept of national security. Finally, it also contains an assessment of the overall national security approach to determine whether it is internally consistent; whether it represents a coherent approach; and whether there are any adjustments required as indicated, for example, by the Defence Update 2005, which is intended to review both the White Paper on Defence of 1996 and the Defence Review of 1998.
CHAPTER 5

SELECTED VIEWS REGARDING SOUTH AFRICA’S CONTEMPORARY APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY

1. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter dealt with a number of inter-related aspects that are important in understanding South Africa’s contemporary approach to national security. This framework is derived from constitutional principles and White Papers and policy pronouncements pertaining to defence, intelligence, safety and security, and the emphasis on human security including the cross-cutting national security objectives at the national, regional and international levels.

Having established that this contemporary approach not only covers a broad range of issues (both military and non-military) but also commits the country to national, regional and international roles, it is therefore logical to conduct a critical review of this approach based on the above considerations including the questions that arise from the literature review. The key issue raised in the previous chapter is that South Africa’s new approach to national security is broad and generally problematic particularly due to its perceived elasticity and unmanageability in practice.

In this regard interview questions were formulated and presented to selected respondents in order to establish perceptions regarding South Africa’s new approach to national security, including a determination of internal consistency, coherence or whether it has been in need of a review as indicated, for example, by the Defence Update, initiated in 2005, which was intended to review both the White Paper on Defence of 1996 and the Defence Review of 1998.

Chapter Five, therefore, consists of three parts. In the first part a brief evaluation of the official documents containing aspects of South Africa’s current approach to
national security is provided. The second part focuses on the key aspects of the interview findings including an analysis of the responses. The third part addresses two aspects: firstly it includes a brief analysis of the functioning of the national security system which is based on the fact that the NSC is relatively dormant and needs to be revived, and secondly it provides a critical analysis of the contemporary official approach to national security.

2. AN OVERVIEW OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION ON SOUTH AFRICA’S APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY

In Chapter Two it was stated that among the main features of the new thinking on security, there are two significant aspects. Firstly that national security is viewed broadly to incorporate military, political, social, economic, and environmental issues. Secondly, that the referents of national security now include the state, individuals, geographic regions and the global community.

The process of negotiations and the transition process in South Africa clearly represented a fundamental shift that entailed moving from an adversarial national security paradigm to a co-operative security paradigm characterised by incremental and cumulative shifts – a replacement of the erstwhile dominant paradigm of exclusionary national security. Constitutional and policy provisions regarding the country’s foreign policy, defence, intelligence as well as safety and security, are all anchored to a deliberate linkage between national security, human security and a developmental agenda, including preventive diplomacy through co-operation with other states.

A reading of the White Papers on Defence, Intelligence, Safety and Security, and the Defence Review; policy pronouncements including the State of the Nation Addresses; and Cabinet Lekgotlas, including statements by the various ministers in the Budget Votes, all clearly represent important indicators of the unfolding national security perspective over this period and with a focus towards human security and beyond traditional military threats in accordance with the country’s changing external strategic
environment. However, and as observed earlier, there is a lack of a clear and integrated national security policy and national security strategy.

Additional shortcomings in this connection were identified in the DOD Annual Report. Firstly, there are “certain aspects of policy in the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review that are not aligned with developments and the requirements of the strategic environment.” Secondly, that “the apparent absence of a co-ordinated DOD policy and strategy for collective security management with regional counterparts contributes to conflicting approaches detrimental to the security interests of South Africa” (DOD Annual Report 2002-2003:11).

This lack of a clear and integrated national security policy and national security strategy is officially acknowledged as reflected in the Department of Defence’s Strategic Business Plan FY2004/05 to FY2006/07 “The national security strategy is derived from implied national interests, the objectives of the Clusters, which include the New Partnership for Africa’s Development.” In the aftermath of the combined intervention of South Africa and Botswana forces in Lesotho in 1998, the SANDF stated that the “national security policy was not fully defined…” (Hough, 2001:33). In addition, NICOC is now leading an inter-departmental attempt to formulate a national security strategy and revive the NSC (JCPS Cluster Programme of Action 2006). As an intelligence body NICOC should probably not be the lead department for this task but part of an inter-departmental core group lead by the Office of the President or Department of Foreign Affairs.

It needs to be explained that this absence of an integrated and clear national security policy and national security strategy is understood in the sense of the absence of the existence of an integrated policy document (covering both analytical and implementation frameworks) because in reality the expression of national security policy and national security strategy as manifested can be observed in a number of instances during the period under review. These include membership of and participation in the collective security arrangements of SADC and the AU; the conclusion of Memorandums of Understanding with many states on the African
continent including major countries in Europe, America and Asia; and the deployment of the SANDF in a number of peace support missions in Africa.

As is evident from the issues discussed in the previous chapter, South Africa’s contemporary approach to national security has been positively acknowledged in terms of elevating the political profile of issues such as poverty, environmental decay and abuse of human rights. However, it has nevertheless been criticised in some respects, among which the most important are creating an over-wide agenda which is partially unmanageable; its potential for the securitisation of issues; and the inclination to result in wastefulness of resources (Nathan, 1994:18-19; Hough and Du Plessis, 2000:44-45).

These shortcomings in terms of a wider security agenda, potential for securitisation of issues as well as wastefulness of resources are implicit in the Chairperson for the Portfolio Committee on Defence, Professor Asmal’s address to Parliament, during 2004:

> Notwithstanding the strength of the process followed on the White Paper on Defence, it was also characterised by a number of acknowledged and implicit limitations. Significant amongst these was that the White Paper on Defence was partially predicated on an assessment of the political and strategic environment that prevailed between the years 1995-1996. It did not, and could not, anticipate the magnitude of changes that were to occur in the domestic, sub-regional, continental and international environment towards the end of the last century.

In this context, Asmal, further stated that since no policy remains static in the light of changes in the strategic environment, and that the policy assumptions contained in the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review be appraised with a view to examine those issues that require revision such as: “the emergence of a broader human security agenda and its implications for the management of the national

3. KEY ASPECTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEW RESPONSES

The purpose of the interviews was to establish the perceptions and understandings of South Africa’s contemporary approach to national security, including a determination of its internal consistency, coherence, and whether it was in need of a review, as indicated, for example, by the initiative of the Defence Update 2005, which was intended to review both the White Paper on Defence of 1996 and the Defence Review of 1998. This section covers two areas of the interviews. The first part deals with key aspects of the interview findings while the second part provides an analysis.

3.1 Key Aspects of the Interview Responses

The key question raised from the previous chapter is that South Africa’s new approach to national security is broad and generally problematic particularly in its perceived elasticity and unmanageability in practice. In order to fulfil the objectives set out in Chapter One, namely to:

- provide insight into government’s approach to national security;
- establish the understanding or perceptions held with regard to South Africa’s approach to the concept national security;
- propose measures that Government may adopt in order to sustain the new approach to national security; and
- identify shortcomings in the current approach to national security in order to propose possible areas for further research, with the aim of contributing towards the country’s national security policy framework.

interviews were conducted with the following respondents based on their respective considered expertise in the field of national security:
Respondent 1: is a white male and a South African correspondent for Jane’s Information Group, an independent defence consultant and writer on South African and regional defence and security issues.

Respondent 2: is a black male who was for a number of years involved in planning and programming in the Department of Defence and is currently General Manager Business Sustainment at one of the leading banks in South Africa.

Respondent 3: is an Indian male and actively involved in the policy and planning area in the Department of Defence.

Respondent 4: is a white male and a defence analyst on national policy processes and national security.

Respondent 5: is a white male and is Dean of Research at a South African university.

Respondent 6: is a white male at one of the military institutes and specialises in trends in security thinking and military training.

Respondent 7: is a white female and is a Political Science lecturer at one of the universities in South Africa.

Respondent 8: is an Indian male who played a pivotal role in one of the Parliamentary Oversight Committees.

The key aspects of the interview findings are dealt with in the order of the six questions that were posed to each respondent.
3.1.1 What are your perceptions regarding South Africa’s current approach to national security?

The first question sought to establish the respondents’ understanding or perceptions regarding South Africa’s new approach to national security. Respondents identified the change in the political context as demanding a corresponding change in the approach to national security. Respondents in general expressed the view that the general perception of national security has shifted away from the military and police focused approach to the softer security issues - economic growth, poverty alleviation, environmental protection, and human security, which render the concept much more elastic. Hence the new generation national security issues and resultant policy approaches were indicative of linkages between growth, stability and development on the one hand and on the other, between South Africa and the region. In the words of Respondent 4, the new approach was too broad, ambitious in scope and still state-centric.

All respondents concurred that the understanding or perceptions about the country’s national security approach was varied among the general public, academics and the professionals in the security forces. The general public does not think in terms of national security issues but rather in terms of ‘bread and butter’ issues such as employment, education, housing and medical health. The academic community seemed to agree that national security should not be reduced to purely military issues only. Respondents explained the divergent signals coming from academics as attributable to the following: that some of those in the strategy world understand South Africa’s new approach to national security but choose not to pronounce on it because it does not fit their world paradigm – “let us spend less on defence and security”; and that some research institutes generally dealt with national security related issues, Political Science or International Relations but less with national security policy as a dedicated focus. According to Respondent 5, South Africa was generally faced with a problem with regard to its own understanding of foreign affairs, intelligence and military relations.

Regarding the defence and security sector some respondents noted that there has been a major shift since the early 1990s. Respondent 2, asserted that by virtue of their
specific profession, the military, the police and intelligence community invariably promote those issues that would allow them to practice their professions without being oblivious to other non-military, non-police and non-intelligence related issues.

The majority of respondents identified the absence of an integrated and clear official document on the country’s national security policy and the failure on the part of government to both explain to, and educate the citizenry about national security in general as a serious shortcoming that should to be addressed.

3.1.2 Whether the broadened concept of national security creates an over-wide and open-ended agenda which is unmanageable in practice?

Respondents were generally in agreement with the overall broad concept of national security and its consequent wider agenda. According to Respondents 2 and 6, the broadened concept has the potential to be manageable or unmanageable, depending on the priorities assigned, including the choices made in the light of prevailing circumstances. However, other respondents cautioned as follows: Respondent 3, warned against a ‘Pretoria must provide syndrome’, a position that is very likely to make things unmanageable. Respondents 1 and 4 concurred that a wider agenda becomes problematic when only a single state department such as the Department of Defence is expected to provide security to the citizenry. Since the security agenda has been broadened, other state departments must ‘buy-into’ such an approach and implement it in a coordinated manner. The majority of respondents acknowledged the potential of the broadened approach to securitize everything.

3.1.3 What are the merits or demerits of combining non-military threats with military threats?

Respondents had different perspectives on this question. The first perspective evoked was that an inherent degree of tension exists between the needs of human security (socio-economic) on the one hand and defence security resources allocations on the other. Even though emanating from different perspectives, respondents were positive that there were more merits in a national security approach with a mix of both military and non-military issues. Military threats it was submitted, have elements of non-
military threats while non-military threats can escalate to a military threat. It therefore becomes a question of how the decision-makers interpret and ultimately accept the best option to deal with the situation with a caveat that combining a number of issues often creates challenges for coordination.

A second perspective suggested that in the emerging national security environment in the world there does not seem to be a neat boundary between military and non-military threats and that the one will inevitably flow into the other. Hence it was important to consider threats to security on a spectrum that involves elements that are non-military, and elements that are military and para-military. As an example, attention was drawn to non-military issues such as the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme in Mozambique, and the Katse dam in Lesotho, but which could obviously impact on defence and security because they are a type of strategic asset that is likely to require protection.

A third perspective from respondents pointed to a shortcoming in combining both the military and the non-military dimension, which could result in a securocratic type of approach where security issues are reduced to military solutions. A fourth perspective was one of consensus among respondents that it would be very difficult for security to prevail within the South African borders unless security is equally promoted in the region. In the context of peace support operations, according to Respondent 4, “the military cannot be expected to resolve such a conflict because the problem is not basically a military issue. However, if the military is not present to maintain conditions of relative stability and relative peace, efforts to resolve the conflict may fail.”

3.1.4 When does an issue constitute a national security threat?

According to respondents an issue becomes a national security threat when it has become serious enough to undermine the viability of the state to a point where the state becomes dysfunctional. A military attack upon one’s country for example undermines the ability of the state to exist and at the same time literally threatens the lives and property of the citizens. Another example offered by Respondent 1, was when an issue migrated beyond the borders and could not be handled diplomatically
such as cross-border crime or a major turmoil in a neighbouring state. In the opinion of Respondent 3, an issue becomes a national security threat when “it threatens the coherence of society, the coherence of the state, the ability of society to function and the ability of the state to function.”

Respondents pointed out that it was difficult to determine when an issue really becomes a national security threat. Respondent 1, observed that what could become a national security threat although not inherently a security issue as such, would be if the government of Lesotho decided to deny South Africa access to water supply from the Katse dam, or if Mozambique decided to put up the Cahora Bassa hydro-electric scheme for sale and would no longer supply electricity to South Africa. The potential for these types of problems is real, particularly for South Africa, as its ‘national key points’ extends outside the country.

Respondent 2, made the point that for an issue to constitute a threat or risk depends on both the likelihood of it happening and the potential impact. Whether economic, environmental, social, political or military, it was both the impact and probability that should inform decision-makers with regard to intervention measures.

3.1.5 Whether it was in South Africa’s national interest to participate in collective security arrangements in the region?

All the respondents endorsed the importance of South Africa’s involvement in regional collective security efforts. Respondent 1, referred to “The richer brother in the family assuming some responsibility to help his fellow brothers.” Respondent 2, remarked that “if our neighbour’s house is on fire, we have to go and help to put out the fire lest it poses a threat to us as well.”

Respondents 1, 2, and 5, cautioned that investment in peace support missions should not outstrip the country’s capacity nor be disproportionate to what the country hopes to gain and that there should be national consensus about the defence budget regarding participation in peace support efforts in the region. Respondent 3, raised doubts about South Africa’s own realization of how huge the peace support mission
effort was, including the duration and the investment it would take to change the fundamental issues causing insecurity in Africa. The majority of respondents observed that there was insufficient effort on the part of government to educate the citizenry about why South Africa is involved in peace support missions in Africa. Linked to this shortcoming, respondents raised the question of training and education programmes aimed at changing the culture and mind-set of the security forces in particular regarding involvement in peace support missions.

3.1.6 What measures would you propose towards sustaining government’s new approach to national security?

Respondents raised a number of proposals in this regard. Firstly, that Government should come up with a clear and succinct statement about its national security goals by producing an integrated national security policy document. Secondly, that Government must educate the citizenry and security forces about its national security policy, and develop a capacity to direct national security understanding and debate and thereby to influence it in the direction it deems appropriate. Thirdly, that Government should simplify the various government policy publications into something coherent for the ordinary men and women in the street.

In the fourth instance, that there was a need to secure additional sources of funding for peace and stability efforts in Africa and to established a regional peace support fund into which all member countries would contribute proportionate to their gross domestic product. Lastly, that domestically there needs to be some consensus with regard to how far should South Africa go in assisting other African states.

To give expression to a kind of ‘Mbeki doctrine’ according to Respondents 1 and 6, will require investment in mobility, sustainability, equipment and intelligence capability. And most importantly, according to the majority of respondents the new approach to security can only be sustained if all relevant sectors of the state and not only the security forces take possession by way of an interdepartmentally co-ordinated and institutionalised practice.
3.2 Analysis of the Interview Responses

This section provides an analysis of the interview responses. The interview responses are examined against the background of the literature review presented in Chapter Two, regarding the national security conceptual framework. The interpretation of the responses is presented in six parts corresponding with the interview questions. As noted above, the responses varied on specific questions while converging on others.

3.2.1 What are your perceptions regarding South Africa’s current approach to national security?

Respondents acknowledged the validity of shifting away from a Cold War mind set of bi-polar aggression and towards a new broad understanding of national security. This indicates a movement from an insular, military understanding of national security, to a holistic understanding, wherein both military and non-military issues have prominence. This view is underscored by Snyder (1999:2) in raising the question of the need to come up with new concepts of security in order to address the military, political, economic and social realities of the post-Cold War.

Respondents’ acceptance of the new generation national security issues is in line with the body of literature on this new thinking on national security as reflected in Chapter Two: Buzan, 1991; Fischer, 1993; Mathews, 1995; and the UNDP Human Development Report, 1994, all of which recognized the linkages between security and the developmental agenda - human security, and economic and social stability.

Respondents’ acknowledgement that one cannot hope to have growth and stability, and peace and development in South Africa unless it manifests itself in the rest of the region and continent, is supportive of government’s stance and pronouncements in the White Paper on Defence; the White Paper on Intelligence; and the various Budget Votes.

Respondents also presented divergent and complementary views concerning the perceptions or understanding of the new national security approach within the different strata of society. A common thread underscored the observation that South
Africa’s national security construct is clearly understood differently at the different strata of society – the general public, academics and within the security forces. This may be illustrative of a tension at the core of relations between the Government and citizenry. In addition to identifying the academics’ low level of attention to national security policy as a dedicated focus, respondents further identified two issues as indicative of a weakness on the part of Government. These are firstly, the absence of an integrated and clear national security policy and national security strategy. Secondly, a failure to educate the citizenry in general and the security forces in particular about its national security approach.

These shortcomings may be an indication that the ‘national consensus’ on government’s new approach to national security may be subtly eroding, as public perceptions become less instinctively sympathetic and supportive.

3.2.2 Whether the broadened concept of national security creates an over-wide and open-ended agenda which is unmanageable in practice?

Respondents were generally in agreement with the overall broad concept of national security as could be seen from the interview responses. In convergence with both Buzan (1999:115) and Booth’s contention (1994:6) that which issues are threats to national security in a competitive environment of political, economic, military and ecological pressures on a state, becomes a question of political choice rather than objective fact, respondents qualified their acceptance of the new approach on the basis of assigning priorities and making choices in accordance with prevailing circumstances. Similarly, Ginwala (2002); Ayoob (1995: 11-12); Sola (1989:11) and Oyebade and Alao (1998:196) have argued in favour of the necessity to broaden the concept of security over and above the confines of territorial integrity or external aggression.

A remark by Respondent 2, that the broadened concept is both manageable and unmanageable depending on the selected choices based on the prevailing circumstances, is highlighted by Nathan (1994:18-19) who conceded that the broadened approach nevertheless creates a wide and perhaps unmanageable agenda; Hough and Du Plessis (2000:44-45) raised the danger of reverting to the
securitisation of issues; and Ayoob (1995:9) cautioned against an excessive open-endedness of the concept because it would very likely prevent the delimitation of the concept and thereby reduce its analytical utility.

However, respondents cautioned that government cannot be held responsible for providing all the needs and aspirations of the citizenry except to promote those necessary conditions in which citizens can strive to achieve security, thereby enabling them to satisfy their needs and aspirations. And more poignantly, a ‘Pretoria must provide syndrome’ is dangerous and very likely to render the new approach unmanageable.

The observation by some respondents that since the security agenda has been broadened other state departments must ‘buy-into’ this approach and implement it in a coordinated manner, seems to make a case for a more integrated approach on the part of government in its management of national security.

In order to substantiate the interpretation of these observations, another relevant view is that of Groom (1996:2-3) who identified a changing world order that has meant that the factors and thought processes that were pivotal during the bipolar adversarial tradition of the Cold War, were now freer to flourish, and global systems are consequently freer to develop according to new characteristics and dynamics into a complex and interactive world system, characterized by a marked decrease in the degree of polarity in the important dimensions of military, economic, cultural and leadership functions. The implication of Groom and the respondents’ observation is that Government must adopt a more integrated approach in its management of national security. This also indicates that the public interest is as important as national security interests. As Groom (1996:7) stated, this implies a clear need to enfranchise a wide range of relevant but previously excluded actors.

3.2.3 What are the merits or demerits of combining non-military with military threats?

Respondents acknowledged that there are both advantages and disadvantages in combining non-military issues with military issues. The first advantage in a national
security approach with a mix of both military and non-military issues is that a military threat may be dealt with better through non-military means such as political diplomacy. This perspective is underscored by Ayoob (1995:5) when he argued for a national security perspective that adequately takes into account the non-military threats to security. And in the context of peace support operations, it was argued that the military on its own cannot resolve such conflicts because they were not basically a military issue. However, if the military was not present to maintain conditions of relative stability and relative peace within which political and diplomatic efforts can be engaged towards a peaceful settlement, this could result in failure.

Respondents felt that an inherent degree of tension exists with respect to resources allocation between the needs of human security (socio-economic) on the one hand and defence and security operations. A separation of these two dimensions may result in a securocratic approach where security issues are reduced to military solutions. However, a disadvantage of considering the totality of the national security spectrum, particularly during periods of peace, was to dismiss or minimize the role of the security forces. These responses are in congruence with Deudney’s view as cited in Ayoob (1995:10) which questioned the value of combining environmental threats with military threats.

Most respondents noted the difficulty to maintain security within the South African borders unless that security is equally promoted in the region. This connection with the region and continent appeared prominently in the pronouncements by the relevant ministries and state departments during the periods 1996 to 2004.

3.2.4 When does an issue constitute a national security threat?

According to the respondents a security issue becomes a national security threat when it has become serious enough to undermine the viability of the state to a point where the state becomes dysfunctional. Ayoob (1995: 9), and Snyder (1999:8) observed that threats to security can derive from diverse factors.

As noted in the interview responses, both the impact and probability of an event occurring should inform decision-makers with regard to intervention measures. This
was well voiced by Ullman, as cited by Buzan (1991:17), namely that there is no consensus concerning threats to national security but a whole new area of incisive analysis of causes, linkages and explanations of when an action or sequence of events constitute a threat to national security. The absence of consensus about when an issue does constitute a national security threat was also raised by Buzan (1991:112-134) when he stated that threats to security do not make up a neat static agenda but rather one of assigned changes in priority - “a matter of political choice rather than objective fact.” Accordingly, security can only be achieved by balancing all the instruments of policy. A useful indicator from the respondents is reference to the type of threat or the intensity of a threat in terms of proximity, probability of occurrence, specificity, consequences and duration.

3.2.5 Whether it was in South Africa’s national interest to participate in collective security efforts in the region?

Respondents’ endorsement of the importance of South Africa’s involvement in regional and continental collective security arrangements reflects the changing national security paradigm in that it identifies threats, mainly of a non-military nature that transcend national borders, posing common regional problems that demand collective responses. As noted in Chapter Two, national security can be strengthened by entering into collective security arrangements with other states, specifically cooperative security according to Evans (1993:16).

Both the White Paper on Defence, (1996:9) and the White Paper on Intelligence (1994:3), emphasize the principles of collective security. Besides South Africa’s own economic self-interest for a stable sub-region and continent, it is as important not to ignore, as observed by Hough and du Plessis (2000:68-67), that a strategy to cope with the challenges facing South Africa in the new post-Cold War environment must be built on cooperation with partner states.

Having raised the caution that investment in collective security arrangements should not outstrip the country’s capacity, including the importance of securing a national consensus on the defence budget towards peace support efforts, it cannot be denied
that competition for resource allocations generate an enduring, dynamic strain that needs careful balancing.

Interview responses regarding Government’s involvement in peace missions in general, lack of educating the citizenry about Government’s involvement in peace missions, including the need for peacekeeping training programmes for the security forces, fit in with the Minister of Defence’s pronouncement in the Budget Speech (June 2004) that “the political imperatives, which guided us in 1994 have altered, and in our structures, our training and our modus operandi must be adjusted and fine tuned to align ourselves with our role on the African continent.” However, the concerns raised by respondents in respect to involvement in regional and continental peace support missions, clearly suggest that government’s involvement here should be informed by internal consensus, political sensitivity and managed in an ongoing educative, consultative spirit with internal stakeholders through a governmental integrative capacity to direct national security understanding and debate.

3.2.6 What measures would you propose for government in order to sustain the new approach to national security?

The sixth and last question sought to establish the measures that could be proposed for government in order to sustain the new approach to national security. An insight into the interpretation of these proposed measures can be quite informative as it points to specific issues respondents felt strongly about, positively or negatively. These are reflected in Table 2, and not in any order of importance.
Table 2: Proposed Measures for Government to Adopt in Order to Sustain its Contemporary National Security Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Explanatory Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security Policy</td>
<td>An urgent need for government to provide a clear and succinct statement of national security goals by producing an integrated national security policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of citizenry</td>
<td>There is need to educate the citizenry about government’s national security approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Programmes for Security Forces</td>
<td>To educate the security forces about government’s national security policy and introduce leadership training courses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for Peace Missions</td>
<td>Government should secure additional sources of funding for peace support operations in Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jointness</td>
<td>Create a coordinated and integrated approach in the management of national security.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The differences and similarities of the responses to all six questions may be attributed to the fact that each respondent has a unique frame of reference, based on his/her respective background.

4. ANALYSIS OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM

The previous section on the key aspects of the interview responses should also be considered in the context of the envisaged NSC functions referred to in Chapter Four. It will be recalled that a consolidated approach to the coordination of national security issues was approved by Cabinet in June 2000, including the identification and referral of specific issues to the NSC.

According to the White Paper on Defence (1996:8), “the responsibility for ensuring the security of South Africa’s people is now shared by many government departments and ultimately vests in Parliament.” It is for this reason, among others, that the core members of the NSC were identified as comprising the President, and Deputy President including other specified ministries and departments.
The NSC should have the responsibility for broad national security issues at strategic and policy level and not line functional security operations, be accountable to Cabinet, and should not have any structures parallel to Government departments. In addition to the membership of key ministries or departments, it would be of critical importance and pragmatic to also include national security advisors in the NSC as depicted in Figure 5.

**Figure 5: Proposed National Security Council Structure**

Ministries/Departments of: Foreign Affairs, Safety and Security, Defence, Intelligence, Home Affairs, Finance and Justice.

National Security Advisors on Foreign Affairs, Defence, Intelligence

As observed by Chuter (2000:39-40), a sensible policy and position which is robust and commands respect, is invariably a product of a number of role-players, and is best contained in the concept of a ‘policy community’ defined in Chuter (2000:40) as “all those with knowledge of the problem and an interest in solving it.” A ‘national security community’ in this sense does not seem to be in place. As proposed above, the membership of the NSC should be limited to Ministries/Departments of Foreign Affairs, Safety and Security, Defence, Intelligence, Home Affairs, Finance and Justice, including national security advisors from the respective ministries or departments.
Admittedly, and as acknowledged by Chuter, the proper organisation of departments and ministries of defence and security is a complex one in terms of dominance, management and the organisation of the state itself. Pertinent to the South African system of a cluster approach is that critical national security decisions are made by officials in the foreign ministry, the Cabinet or the President’s office for political reasons and sent out as a directive for implementation by relevant line functional department(s).

One of the challenges to the relatively dormant NSC as an institution is to integrate medium and long-term planning; to provide an effective and efficient structure for the postulation of future security contexts; perform analyses to assess the impact of these futures upon the organisation; and proactively develop appropriate national security strategies as new contingencies come to the fore.

Another important consideration pertains to the roles and relationships at the strategic policy level *vis-à-vis* the operational level. The relationship clearly entails those stakeholders focused at the strategic level and the other set of stakeholders focused on the operational or application level. The significant interface between these stakeholders indicates the close relationship that must be maintained between them. At inter-departmental level, the IRPS and JCPS clusters do deal with certain national security issues but these clusters are still one level below the NSC.

In order for the NSC to be sustainable, it should have to embody norms and practices that transcend socio-political divides. The establishment of such norms and practices involves in turn the negotiation of substantive meanings for the vocabulary of inclusivity, participation, partnership and most importantly the development of a sense of a national security community.

Two aspects are dealt with in this section. Firstly, a critical analysis of the current approach to national security and secondly, a brief comparison of the national security approach of the previous dispensation with the current approach.

5.1 A Critical Analysis of the Current Approach to National Security

The related policy papers on defence, intelligence, and safety and security, place emphasis on a broad agenda for national security issues that is coupled to the regional component while the relevant legislation reinforces this position. As noted in the previous Chapter, Budget Vote submissions by the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Intelligence, Safety and Security respectively during the period 1996-2004 shifted the focus towards human security and beyond traditional military threats.

Chapter 2, noted Buzan’s (1991:112-134) useful perspective on the nature of the sources of threats to national security, such as military, political, economic, societal and environmental or ecological threats. Ayoob (1995: 9) drew attention to economic or ecological threats becoming part of the security equation only when they assume such dimensions as to threaten the political disposition of a state. It may be argued that if national security objectives cut across several state departments, it logically means that it should not have been contained in a White Paper for a specific department only. National security policy should reside with and be driven from the Presidency and not a line function department because of the political choices that have to be made.

The regional dimension of South Africa’s national security interests and responsibilities is inescapable. This has placed a greater burden on South Africa as a key player, both institutionally and in peacekeeping operations which ultimately require that a balance should be found with regard to commitment of resources either for internal or external purposes.
The interview responses confirmed the research theme that South Africa’s contemporary approach to national security is very broad and generally problematic. These responses further showed that this approach was understood differently among the different strata of society, including a skewed understanding within the security forces themselves. Secondly, that the issue of manageability or unmanageability was dependent on the assigned priorities and the choices made by decision-makers. Thirdly, that there were more advantages in combining non-military and military threats in a national security equation than there were disadvantages. Fourthly, that for an issue to constitute a critical threat to the security of a country depends on the probability of the event and impact. In the fifth instance, that it was definitely in South Africa’s national interest to participate in collective security initiatives in the region and the continent. In the sixth and last discussion point, a number of relevant measures were proposed for government to sustain the new approach to national security.

The analysis of the interview responses strongly indicated that the changes in the strategic environment internally within the country, the region and the continent, clearly demand that government reappraise its national security policy assumptions. For a number of reasons proffered by respondents, it is clear that a chasm prevails here and also requires some adjustment and alignment of the imperatives of 1994 with the emergent realities of 2004 and beyond.

The emergent change in the national security paradigm from a military focus towards a combination of military and non-military issues, requires that government takes cognisance of a range of stakeholders’ needs when developing national security policy. There is therefore, the need to integrate stakeholder inputs and proposals into a national security policy, particularly for purposes of legitimacy as well as public support. This came out very strongly from respondents in terms of proposed measures for government to sustain the new approach to national security.

Underlying several of the shortcomings regarding the country’s national security approach is the pressure towards ‘Pretoria shall provide.’ Although the contemporary approach does not lack inclusivity, with hindsight, government may have lacked the
time as well as incentives to step back, re-examine central assumptions, explore alternatives, and be more self-conscious about how it should be implemented.

5.2 A Brief Comparison of the National Security Approaches Prior to and Post-1994

As was indicated in Chapter One, no in-depth comparison will be made between the national security approach and the national security management system of the previous dispensation with that of the new government, therefore a brief comparison will suffice.

The previous government’s approach to national security was based on the ideology of apartheid which was enforced and sustained through a tight security apparatus in terms of a “total strategy” which mobilised diplomatic and coercive resources in the hands of the state. It was further firmly anchored around a predominant ‘Whites only’ constitution, White Papers on Defence, and legislation as well as policy pronouncements in the House of Assembly Debates during this period.

In traditional terms, South Africa’s definition of national security tended to be interpreted in a way that elevated the preservation of the state and a specific ideology to a position of primacy - authoritarian state structures with the concomitant denial of popular aspirations, disregard for values of tolerance, justice and democracy. Although the partisan nature of apartheid security policy purported to be in the ‘national interest’, its primary goal was to maintain the system of minority rule and safeguard the racially exclusive state and the white community.

As explained in Chapter Three, the previous National Security Management System (NSMS) was a centralised state structure with immense political power, and in which the police, military and intelligence agencies played an important role. For purposes of enforcement, certain pieces of legislation were enacted and in the former TBVC states security agencies were all structured on their South African counterpart. This was clearly the case in terms of security legislation, organisation, functions and powers. This system enabled government to undertake certain measures in the area of security which were seen as critical to the support of the social order and to the organisation and marshalling of forces against the insurgency.
In contrast, the contemporary approach is underpinned by specific principles that are anchored in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and include defence, intelligence, and safety and security. The constitutional provisions clearly indicate a fundamental break from the tradition of military involvement in politics that has characterised the previous dispensation. These provisions were further strengthened by checks and balances in terms of civilian oversight measures; a separation of areas of responsibility and budgetary control; and appropriate legislation as well as policies that were put in place.

The broad philosophy underpinning this new approach places emphasis on human security, with national security objectives cross-cutting the national, regional and international levels, based on the premise that security, peace and stability, and growth and development are inter-linked and mutually reinforcing. Despite any criticism against the previous security approach, the functioning and structuring was much better than what is currently the case.

6. CONCLUSION

This chapter commenced with an overview of the literature discussing South Africa’s contemporary approach to national security. It then focused on the key aspects of the interview findings, including an analysis of the interview responses. It also provided some critical analysis of this current approach including the functioning of the national security system. Based on the general theme of the research and interview responses, some indication of the attitudes and perceptions regarding South Africa’s new approach to national security was established.

The interview responses confirmed the research theme that South Africa’s new approach to national security was very broad and generally problematic. It established that the new approach is understood differently by the different strata of society, including a skewed perspective within the security forces.

Analysis of the interview responses strongly indicates that there is a requirement to adjust and align the imperatives of 1994 with the emergent realities of 2004 and
beyond. From the respondents’ proposed measures for Government, the following are singled out as pertinent to sustain the contemporary approach to national security:

a. An urgent need for government to pronounce a clear and succinct statement of national security goals by producing an integrated national security policy.

b. A requirement to educate both the citizenry and the security forces about government’s national security approach.

c. To institutionalise a culture of jointness in the management of national security.

A sustainable approach to national security development requires the appropriate legislative framework, policies and dynamic leadership. It also requires the strengthening of the efficiency of the state itself.

The next chapter provides a summary of the research; an assessment of the assumptions formulated in the Introduction; and some conclusions regarding the current South African approach to national security.
CHAPTER 6

EVALUATION

1. SUMMARY

The aim of this research was to identify and to evaluate the significance of the factors that underpinned the fundamental shift in South Africa's approach to national security. The research objectives were aimed at, firstly, providing insight into Government’s approach to national security; secondly, to conduct an assessment of the understanding and perceptions held with respect to South Africa’s approach to national security; thirdly, to propose concrete measures which Government can institute in order to sustain this new approach to national security; and, fourthly, to identify shortcomings in the current approach to national security in order to propose possible areas for further research.

Chapter One, an introduction to the research, outlined the background to the study and identified the research problem as having derived from the fundamental shift in approach to national security since 1994, and as distinct from the previous dispensation. This shift in approach informed the need to critically review and analyse South Africa’s approach to national security in the post-1994 period. A qualitative research methodology that combines both the descriptive and analytical approaches was adopted in conducting this study. Based on the review of both primary and secondary sources, interview questions were formulated in order to establish the perceptions held by a selected group of individuals about South Africa’s approach to national security. This chapter located the study of South Africa’s contemporary approach to national security within the broad ambit of the academic field and suggested that even though Political Studies provide most of the relevant terminology and analysis, the study of national security is appropriately situated within the field of Security and Strategic Studies.

Chapter Two, on the concept of national security, provided a number of inter-related themes that are essential for an understanding of national security. It showed that national security is a complex set of perceptions about threats or vulnerabilities confronting states in general. Related collective security concepts were dealt with,
including an assessment of the consequences of the new thinking on national security. This chapter showed that there was a dilemma in both the narrow and broad conceptualisation of national security. Overall, it laid a basis upon which to appraise South Africa’s contemporary approach in this regard within its socio-political context and against the background of the post-Cold War changes in the international system.

Chapter Three dealt with the South African approach to national security before 1994 and the transition period through specific themes. Firstly, South Africa’s contemporary approach to national security is informed by a combination of factors, including the untenable past securitisation of society by the pre-1994 Government. Secondly, the activist posture of the liberation movement prior to and during the negotiations for a new political dispensation, and thirdly, the influence of the new thinking on the concept of security. The process of negotiations and the transition process in South Africa clearly represented a fundamental shift that entailed moving from an adversarial national security paradigm to a co-operative security paradigm which is characterised by incremental and cumulative shifts.

Chapter Four, on South Africa’s new approach to national security in the period 1994-2002, focused on relevant legislation and policy documents. From these sources it became clear that South Africa’s approach to national security was informed by its national interests in terms of a set of shared priorities regarding the future political dispensation and relations with the rest of the world. It also addressed the principles underpinning national security in South Africa and the broad trends covering the policy phase, the transition phase and the consolidation phase over this period. In addition, this chapter highlighted the objectives of national security, the National Security Council functions, and national security strategy and threat perception.

Chapter Five, on selected views regarding South Africa’s contemporary approach to national security, provided a brief overview of the literature discussing South Africa’s current approach to national security as well as key aspects of the interview findings including an analysis of the interview responses. It further addressed three aspects: firstly, a brief analysis of the functioning of the national security system; secondly, a
critical analysis of this contemporary approach to national security; and, thirdly, a brief comparison of the national security approaches prior to and post-1994.

2. TESTING OF THE ASSUMPTIONS

The assumptions on which the research was based were threefold. These assumptions refer to the changed post-Cold War strategic environment; the largely non-military nature of the post-Cold War and post-Apartheid security threats; and the problematic nature of a broadened approach to national security.

2.1 Assumption: “The changed strategic environment requires a new approach to the concept of national security”

A number of analysts and observers of national security have advanced various reasons in favour of a shift away from the traditional thinking to contemporary thinking on the concept of national security. Acharya (in Buzan, 1994:24) observes that one relevant outcome of the post-Cold War era was the regression of competitive, ideologically driven superpower interventions into domestic and regional politics; Snyder (1999:2) observes the need to come up with new concepts of security in order to address the military, political, economic and social realities of the post Cold-War; and Mutimer (1999:77) notes that the termination of the Soviet threat gave impetus to a re-thinking of the concept of national security.

Besides individual analysts and observers of national security, institutions too have expressed their positions in this regard, for example, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (1992); UN Human Development Report (1994); and the document of the OECD (1998) advise a rethinking of the full range of political, economic, military, social, religious, technological, ethnic and ethical factors that impact on security world-wide; a greater emphasis on human security; and recognition of the connections between security and the developmental agenda (economic and social stability).
Nathan (1994:18-19) acknowledged that the strength of the broadened concept of national security resides in raising the political profile of issues such as poverty, environmental decay and abuse of human rights but concedes that this broadening creates such a wide agenda as to be unmanageable. Booth (1994:6) justifies the broadening of the concept of national security when he states that: “If we are serious about human rights, economic development, and the lot of women...then we must simply accept the problems of an expanded agenda and of the need to settle the question of priorities in the political process.” The assumption that the changed strategic environment requires a new approach to the concept of national security, was thus confirmed.

2.2 Assumption: “The post-Cold War and post-Apartheid security threats have become largely non-military in nature”

The second assumption posits that the post-Cold War and post-Apartheid security threats have become largely non-military in nature. As indicated in Chapter Two, the international security agenda has undergone a change by way of replacement of the Cold War balance of power with a rethinking of the full range of political, economic, military, social, religious, technological, ethnic and ethical factors that impact on security world-wide. According to the UN Human Development Report (1994) emphasis is now on human security while from the OECD perspective there is recognition of the connections between security and the developmental agenda, namely, human security and economic and social stability (1998:14).

Snyder (1999:8), observed that in contrast to the Cold War period when security threats were primarily military in nature, in the post-Cold War era threats to security can derive from diverse factors such as the environment or human rights and that security can only be achieved by balancing all the elements of policy.

Regarding the changed nature of post-Apartheid security threats having become largely non-military in nature, in Chapter Four it was shown that the threat-perception lens adopted by Government distinguishes three categories of threats to national security. These are threats arising from the global context, threats in the regional
context and threats from the domestic environment. Global context threats include the risk of armed hostilities, inter-state conflicts and arms proliferation. Regional context threats range from chronic underdevelopment, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, refugees and displaced people, disease and environmental degradation, including cross-border trafficking in drugs, stolen goods and small arms. In the domestic context, threats that invariably impact negatively upon socio-economic development and reconstruction are identified as personal insecurity, social instability, endemic crime, criminal violence and public and political violence. According to the White Paper on Defence (1996), appropriate measures with which to address both regional instability and underdevelopment threats to national security, are through political reform, socio-economic development and inter-state co-operation.

Hence an understanding of national security in both the developed and developing world contexts suggests that there is indeed a strong case for a holistic and integrated perspective on national security, that is, a mixture of concerns for the state, human security, as well as the general developmental aspects. The assumption that the post-Cold War and post-Apartheid security threats have become largely non-military in nature is confirmed.

2.3 Assumption: “The broadened conception of national security is conceptually and practically problematic”

The third assumption is based on the notion that the broadened national security approach is, however, also conceptually and practically problematic. The review of official and secondary sources confirmed the above notion while the analysis of the responses to interviews reinforced this assumption. The analysis from interviews further established that South Africa’s contemporary approach to national security is understood differently by the different strata of society, including a skewed perspective within the security forces. The analysis of the interviews further indicates that there is a requirement to adjust and align the imperatives of 1994 with the emergent realities of 2004 and beyond. In addition, South Africa’s contemporary approach is criticised for its elasticity, which complicates the construction of threat scenarios; the danger of reverting to the securitisation of issues; and, for its potential to result in wastefulness of resources.
South Africa’s approach to national security has been broadened to cope with political, social, economic and environmental threats in addition to the traditional military threats. This clearly implies a fine balancing act when setting priorities in the political process. What needs to be factored into a broadened approach to national security is, firstly, Buzan’s perspective on the nature of the sources of threats to national security, including criteria for determining what issues are assigned the status of national security threats. Secondly, Ayoob’s view that economic or ecological threats become part of the security equation only when they assume such a serious condition as to threaten the political disposition of a state, should be considered. In this regard, a significant number of interview respondents confirmed this view with regard to the South African situation. Thus, the assumption that the broadened concept of national security is conceptually and practically problematic was confirmed.

3. CONCLUSION

This study on South Africa’s contemporary approach to national security forms part of the various initiatives undertaken by scholars and institutions in the country with a view to understanding and thereby contributing towards the review and re-alignment of the new approach to national security. One of the driving factors in this regard is the dynamics of the country’s internal and regional political, socio-economic and environmental challenges.

The study has shown that notwithstanding the elevation of the political profile of non-military issues in the country’s new paradigm regarding national security, realistic adjustments have to be instituted with a focus on national security policy implementation in addition to a national security framework.

In the context of a developing country and a fledging democracy, South Africa’s contemporary approach to national security signifies a clear departure from the external orientation and military bias of the Western tradition as well as the parochial and untenable previous dispensation’s national security approach. Nevertheless, its most important shortcoming is to automatically elevate social, economic and environmental issues to the status of national security issues. It should only take
cognisance of these variables when they are also likely to impact on the political domain, and it is only then that these variables may have to be considered as part of the national security equation.

Moreover, it is not unfair to generalise that the public today are unlikely to be satisfied with loose generalities – especially those based on platitudes which appear increasingly irrelevant to and remote from their own daily experiences. The challenge that Government faces in a better-informed, questioning society is to identify, articulate and prepare cogently to promote and defend its approach to national security. Unless these propositions are both understood and accepted by Government, its governance will be questionable and ultimately untenable.

Dramatic changes in the global geopolitical scene and South Africa’s return to the international fold after the demise of apartheid; its emerging regional and continental role; and the need for urgent quest for stability and socio-economic development on the African continent, present major challenges to South Africa’s new approach to national security. The core functions and values of the new national security approach need to be clearly spelt out, nurtured and protected from inadvertent compromise. In order to sustain this new approach to national security, Government must formulate dispassionate, explicit and persuasive policy statements.

There can be no question that South Africa’s approach to national security has undergone a drastic change since the previous dispensation in order to meet the needs of challenges posed by the domestic and shifting geopolitical international environment. As shown in the preceding chapter, this will require, on the part of Government, a balancing of the internal demands of society; national consensus on, and investment in regional security arrangements; and deployment of peace support operations.

In the above context, Nathan (2006:21) asserts that there is an urgent need for a public debate on national security and intelligence policy. He further raises the following questions: “What, for example, do we mean by national security? What is the balance between the security of the state and the security of citizens? What constitutes a threat
to security? Who makes these determinations? Do they influence government policies? Can the public examine and debate the determinations?”

It is therefore clear that a number of issues regarding South Africa’s current approach to national security need to be further debated and researched including the underlying assumptions, but also the further operationalisation and implementation of national security policy.
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