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The purpose of this schedule is to elicit the understandings of the SADTU provincial leadership on the rationalisation policy. It attempts to understand how the perceptions and beliefs of the provincial leadership influenced and shaped the implementation of the rationalisation policy in the Western Cape.

1. What was your understanding of the teacher rationalisation implemented by the ANC government in 1996? How in your understanding was this process different from the one initiated by the NP in 1993?

2. Why did SADTU support the rationalisation process in 1996?

3. In 1998, SADTU then changed its position and threatened national strike action. Why did this happen?

4. What was the support of ordinary members like for the rationalisation process in the Western Cape?

5. The Mother of All Marches organised by the WCPTSF drew many SADTU members out onto the streets in defiance of their union. Why do you think this happened?

6. How were mandates obtained during the period of negotiations with the government during the second rationalisation process?

7. To what extent were ordinary members in the union consulted about the process? To what extent do you think were their voices heard in the final agreement?
8. What in your view was the main aim of the rationalisation policy?

9. What about the VSPs? Do you think it contributed to the failure of the policy? Why did the union insist on VSPs being granted as a precondition for rationalisation?

10. Why was the rationalisation plan linked to a three year salary improvement package? Was this the trade-off for the union agreeing to rationalisation?
The purpose of this interview schedule is to ascertain the type of implementation difficulties experienced and how the provincial department of education intended to deal with such. It also aims to ascertain the role of SADTU in the negotiation and implementation process.

1. How did you understand the rationalisation process of 1996?

2. How was it different from the 1993 process?

3. What in your view were the major obstacles to the implementation of the plan?

4. Do you think the policy was successful in creating a more equitable schooling system through the redeployment of educators?

5. Why were so many VSPs granted and how did this impact on the system?

6. How did you try to manage the VSPs once it had become clear that it was negatively impacting on the system? How was the implementation plan adjusted?

7. To what extent did the community protests against rationalisation impact on the policy? And the Grove court case?

8. What was the role of SADTU in the rationalisation process? And why do you think the union was supporting the policy?
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE A3  
SADTU Membership

*The purpose of this schedule is to elicit the understandings of rank-and-file SADTU members of the rationalisation process, as well as probing their perceptions of how they were represented by the leadership in this process.*

1. When and why did you join the union?

2. Did you belong to another union prior to SADTU?

3. What was your view on the rationalisation process of 1996?

4. Did the union consult you on your views of the proposed rationalisation policy?

5. Do you think your views were taken into account when the union agreed to the process? Why or why not?

6. What was your view of redeployment?

7. Why do you think did the union support rationalisation?

8. What happened at your institution? Did anyone volunteer for redeployment? How many took the VSP? How were teachers in excess identified?

9. What was the SADTU site’s position on rationalisation?

10. How did rationalisation impact on your school?
11. What was the position of parents? And learners?
The purpose of this schedule is to elicit the understandings of the leaders of the WCPTSF who actively resisted the rationalisation process in the Western Cape. It aims to test their understandings of why so many SADTU members supported them, whilst still remaining members of the union.

1. Why did the WCPTSF oppose the rationalisation scheme?

2. What was your relationship with SADTU like at the time? And with SADTU members?

3. To what extent were you able to mobilise and recruit SADTU members?

4. What was the nature of support for the anti-rationalisation movement at the time?

5. Tell me a little more about your attempt to challenge rationalisation in the courts. How did this link to the Grove court case?
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

Documentary evidence is crucial in a study of this nature as it provides critical information about the union’s position at the time. Documents provide a glimpse into the situation as it developed in the Western Cape, as well as provide insights into the debate around rationalisation as it occurred at the time. Documents also provide corroborating evidence for interview sources, and can support and augment other sources.

The following primary documents were collected:

Minutes of meetings
Pamphlets and newsletters produced by SADTU, WCPSF, NUE, CTPA and TLSA
Official circulars from WCED
Minutes of ELRC meetings
Hansard Records
Newspapers
Written reports of events

The documents will be summarised according to the following:

1. Who wrote the document?

2. What was his/her organisational affiliation?

3. What was his/her role in the rationalisation process?

4. When was it written?

5. What was it responding to?

6. What were the historical origins of the document?
7. Who was its intended audience?

8. What is the main claim of the document?

9. How does this document contribute to an understanding of the rationalisation process in the Western Cape?

10. Which new themes does the document point to?

SUMMARY
This article postulates that the inability of the post-apartheid government to deal decisively with the “legacies of apartheid education” is linked to the macro-educational policy trajectory endorsed by the African National Congress government in the early 1990s. It notes that post-apartheid education policymaking shows similarities with the National Party reforms initiated towards the end of the 1980s in education. In the late 1980s the apartheid government implemented a broad educational framework consonant with the rise of neo-liberal restructuring emerging internationally. It is argued that the teacher unions, and the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) in particular, were active role-players in shaping the new educational trajectory and discourse and that it was particularly because of the acquiescence of the unions that the government was able to embark on the road of neo-liberal restructuring with very little organised opposition. SADTU’s weak opposition to the rising influence of neo-liberal educational restructuring greatly facilitated the creation of a two-tier education system that South Africa is grappling with today, one for the rich and one for the poor.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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KEY WORDS

Teacher Unions
Globalisation
Neo-liberalism
Redress
Post-Apartheid Educational Restructuring

Introduction
Post-apartheid education in South Africa has been characterised by neo-liberal policymaking that perpetuates, and in some cases exaggerates, the glaring inequalities bequeathed to the new South Africa by the apartheid system. The inability of the post-apartheid government to deal decisively with the legacies of apartheid education is linked to the macro-educational policy trajectory endorsed by the African National Congress (ANC) government in the early 1990s. In fact, post-apartheid educational policy shows similarities with the National Party (NP) reforms initiated towards the end of the 1980s in education. Kallaway (1989) has argued that in the late 1980s the apartheid government was implementing a broad educational trajectory consonant with the rise of neo-liberal conservatism emerging internationally. It will be argued that the teacher unions, and the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) in particular, were active role-players in shaping the new educational trajectory and discourse, and that it was particularly because of the acquiescence of the unions that the government was able to embark on the road of neo-liberal restructuring with very little organised opposition. The alliances that promoted neo-liberal restructuring in the South African case were very different from what Apple (1999) refers to as “the cast of characters” that promoted neo-liberalism in the developed world. Apple has suggested that in the US and England the cast of characters includes fractions of capital, neo-conservative intellectuals, religious fundamentalists and fractions of the professional middle classes. In the SA case this cast is very different and includes organised labour, civil society formations, government and even sections of the left wing, in particular the SACP.

Globalisation and Neo-liberalism
By the 1990s there was a real sense across the world that the globe was indeed a smaller place and that human societies were increasingly integrated and interconnected. At a
very general level, globalisation thus refers to the notion that the world economy, culture and the nations of the world are increasingly interconnected and that events and processes that affect people in one part of the world will invariably impact peoples in other parts of the globe. Held et al suggest that “globalisation may be thought of initially as the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual” (Held et al, 1999: 2).

The notion of scale has become increasingly important in the theorisation of globalisation. Harvey (1982) refers to scale as “nested hierarchical structures of organisation at local, national, regional and global levels”. Globalisation seeks to alter and restructure these spatial relationships or scales. Brenner (1998) refers to this process as “re-scaling”. Scales are socially and politically constructed through ideologies and discourses (Taylor et al, 2001) and re-scaling involves struggles over space and scales involving a range of actors including capital and labour, states, social movements and supra-national organisations. Harvey (1982) refers to this struggle over space and scale as “territorialisation” which Robertson argues involves re- and de-territorialisation i.e. “strategic relational moves by actors to work beyond the boundaries of existing institutionalised relations that represented various interests in various ways to fix a new hierarchical pattern and set of boundaries” (Robertson, 2002: 25).

An important aspect that the notion of scale introduced into the debate on globalisation is the idea that it is not only a set of material processes, but also a set of contested ideologies and discourses that operate across a number of different spatial scales. Sklair (1995, 1999) has argued that this contestation can best be understood if it is located within the “structures of an ever-more globalising capitalism” linked to neo-liberalism.

Neo-liberalism is a political philosophy that has become increasingly prominent in the late 1980s-early 1990s that downplays the role of government intervention in the economy. Neo-liberalism strongly advocates the market as a means to increase economic growth and achieve greater social equality. The rise of neo-liberalism internationally is
closely linked to the coming to power of Reagan (1981) in the United States of America (US) and Thatcher (1978) in Britain.

Key features of neo-liberalism are:

(1) The withdrawal of the state from the economy through processes of privatisation and deregulation. (2) Social provision on health, housing, welfare and education had to be reduced. (See Kallaway, 1995; Chisholm and Fuller 1997 and Samoff, 1994) (3) Large public sectors are inefficient, unresponsive and wasteful. Public sector restructuring involves privatisation, outsourcing of non-core business activities and the introduction of an entrepreneurial ethos into the public sector (Fairbrother, 2000).

Chisholm et al (1999) argue that the ANC government has voluntarily adopted a (neo-liberal) structural adjustment programme by putting the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic strategy in place. GEAR, they argue, commits South Africa to the key policy characteristics of structural adjustment programmes, including:

- Export-led growth
- Fiscal deficit reduction
- Restructuring of state assets (privatisation)
- Reduction of the public service
- The relaxation of exchange controls; and
- The shifting of the cost of social and welfare needs of the citizenry.

Akoojee and McGrath also noted that the imposition of the neo-liberal GEAR strategy was “the product of an internal change rather than one imposed from outside, as had been the case in many African countries” (Akoojee and McGrath, 2003:24). The policy was primarily designed to ensure South Africa’s economic competitiveness and its integration into the global economy.

rationalisation process in particular, have been framed by notions of cost reduction and fiscal austerity that are linked to GEAR. Education policy since 1990, it is argued, has developed in terms of the broader economic logic that conditioned reform in South Africa. Chisholm (1997) has pointed to the emergence of a “global language” about education that is increasingly shaping education systems in line with neo-liberal market-oriented strategies. Fataar (1997) warned that the constraining context of GEAR would impact negatively on educational reconstruction. Vally and Tleane (2001) argued that GEAR places an emphasis on education reform in a context of fiscal austerity, decentralization of education and the concomitant shift of financial responsibility for education from public to private sources. They further contend that the original intention of the teacher rationalisation measures, to ensure equity between schools by redeploying teachers from areas of over-supply to areas of under-supply, had been seriously undermined by budgetary constraints linked to neo-liberal macro-economic policies.

The Western Cape: An Overview

The Western Cape province is one of the nine provinces of the new South Africa. It is has a population of about 4.2 million people. Demographic patterns in the Western Cape differ markedly from the rest of the country, with the numeric dominance of coloureds in the province. By the early 1990s the provincial population was constituted as follows:

Coloureds : 59.7%
Whites : 22.1%
Africans : 17.8%
Asians : 0.7% (Kruss, 1995:91)

The demographic pattern of the province is a direct result of the history of slavery, colonialism and apartheid at the Cape. It is primarily because of its history of slavery that the Western Cape occupies a relatively unique position in the political economy of South Africa (James and Simons, 1992). Penn (1992) has shown that a large number of
children, fathered by white settlers at the Cape, were of mixed-blood. The descendents of this group became known as the “Coloureds”.

A distinguishing feature of the apartheid period (mid-twentieth century) of the Western Cape has been the Coloured Labour Preference Policy (CLPP). This policy determined that employers had to first consider coloureds for jobs before they were allowed to employ Africans. Particular types of jobs were also reserved for coloureds. An important consequence of the CLPP has been the spatial and social separation of coloureds and Africans. Bundy (1992) has argued that this separation based on race has had a tremendous influence and impact on the nature and terrain of struggle in the Western Cape. “Politically and historically these factors (geographic, cultural and linguistic barriers) have translated into real difficulties for those who have sought to construct strategies or organisations linking the different communities” (Bundy 1992:210-211).

**Teacher Unions in the Western Cape**
The wide range of teacher organisations that operated in the apartheid era was a direct result of the existence of fifteen racial/ethnic education departments. By 1990 four education departments existed in the Western Cape. These were:

(i) The Department of Education and Culture in the House of Representatives (HoR) responsible for coloured education;

(ii) The Department of Education and Culture in the House of Delegates (HoD) responsible for Indian education;

(iii) The Department of Education and Training (DET) responsible for African education;

(iv) The Department of Education in the House of Assembly (HoA) responsible for white education.

The various teacher organisations were shaped by political and working conditions in the racial and ethnic education departments in which they were located. In the Western Cape, like elsewhere in the country, two types of teacher organisations existed prior to the
formation of SADTU in October 1990: Relatively large, conservative teacher associations officially recognised by the various racial departments in which they organised, and small radical teacher unions that did not enjoy official recognition.

The development of alternative radical unions that rejected cooperation with the racial education department authorities was a direct result of the inability of the associations to address the conditions in schools and to improve the working conditions of black teachers. The small teacher unions mushroomed in the turbulent 1980s and were often directly or indirectly linked to the then banned ANC.

The formation of SADTU on 6 October 1990 signalled a new era in teacher politics. SADTU brought together the conservative teacher associations and the more militant teacher unions. SADTU Western Cape region was launched on 20 April 1991, but the region was severely constrained by the refusal of the various racial education departments to recognise it, as well as the decision by the Cape Teachers Professional Association, the largest teachers organisation in the Western Cape, not to join the new union.

**Educational Restructuring, 1990-1994**

In May 1990 the NP Minister of Education, Gene Louw, established an Education Renewal Strategy task team with instruction to develop the blueprint for a future educational system. The task team presented the *Education Renewal Strategy: A Discussion Document* (subsequently referred to as the ERS) to the apartheid government in June 1991.

The ERS was in line with a more conservative neo-liberal globalisation agenda in education that was emerging internationally. It stressed the extension of the role of the private sector in schooling, called for the devolution of control of schooling to local communities and for these communities to assume greater financial responsibilities for education provisioning.
The ERS also made recommendations to equalise provision between black and white education by shifting resources away from the previously more advantaged sectors (white, coloured and Indian). The ERS proposed that the relatively privileged sectors of the apartheid education sector had to be rationalised.

In February 1992 the state announced its plans to cut its contribution to white education by 17%, primarily impacting on staffing services with 4000 teaching jobs identified as redundant. But the retrenchment of 4000 white teachers at a time when the NP had to be wary of its own white constituency was a risky political move. A deal was struck with white teachers which allowed a teacher who was identified to be retrenched, to be granted early retirement with full pension benefits. These teachers would receive an annuity in addition to generous gratuities, a severance pay-out as well as relocation costs, if required. “Retrenched” white teachers could also return to teaching in future if they could secure posts. More than 4000 teachers accepted the retrenchment packages, significantly reducing government responsibility to white education.

Buoyed by its success in the white education sector, the government now turned its attention to the other “privileged” education sectors, coloured and Indian education.

**Restructuring in the Western Cape**

In September 1992 Abe Williams, the Minister of Education in the HoR, announced that his department was spending nearly 90% of its budget on teacher salaries and that it was facing a budget deficit of more that R170m. The HoR calculated that 5790 posts had to be cut to meet its budget shortfall. The Minister also announced a Rationalisation Plan for the HoR which included the termination of all contract teaching positions, the cancellation of all textbook orders for 1993, the suspension of study and vacation leave for teachers and a moratorium on the appointment of substitutes.

Unlike the response in the HoA, the rationalisation announcement in the HoR was met with widespread condemnation. The three major teacher organisations in the HoR in the
Western Cape, SADTU, the TLSA and the CTPA, came out in strong opposition to the rationalisation plan. But there was very little agreement amongst the three organisations on the reasons for the introduction of the rationalisation measures and thus how to combat them.

SADTU, and the CTPA, did not reject the principle and necessity of restructuring/rationalisation, nor the actual measures of the rationalisation plan, but articulated opposition to the right of the NP to introduce rationalisation without consulting with the “rightful representatives of the people” (Interview, Geyer, 2006). The “Anti-Unilateral Restructuring Campaign” was formulated by the union as a response to the rationalisation plan in the HoR.

The TLSA on the other hand rejected the nature and content of the rationalisation programme. It argued that the rationalisation measures were linked to structural adjustment programmes that were imposed on developing countries internationally by the capitalist forces of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It argued that the IMF and the World Bank were imposing structural adjustment on South Africa in exchange for loans and that one of the conditionalities attached was the reduction of the public service and the withdrawal of the state from economic life (see Educational Journal of the TLSA, Oct-Nov 1992).

A wave of mass protests swept over the Cape Flats. The protests reached a crescendo in October 1992. Mass action took the form of protest marches to regional departmental offices, blockading busy motorways, placard demonstrations and mass meetings. On 2 November 1992, the Minister of Education in the HoR, Abe Williams, announced the withdrawal of the rationalisation measures (The Cape Argus, “Williams backs down”, 2 November 1992). Williams cited the threat to the year-end examinations as the major reason for the withdrawal of the measures. It was however sustained mass action and the relatively united response demonstrated by the teacher organisations and the community of the Western Cape that forced the HoR to withdraw its rationalisation plans.
Towards the first national teachers’ strike

A number of key national developments in early 1993 led SADTU nationally to call a strike ballot. These were: (i) A deadlock in national salary negotiations (ii) Increased industrial (strike) action of SADTU members (iii) The “department specific” merit awards in the HoD (iv) The refusal of the Transkei homeland to grant salary parity to its female teachers led to a strike by more than 29 000 SADTU members in that department. SADTU WC registered 85% participation in the national ballot with 92% of members voting in favour of strike action. The overwhelming mandate of the union in favour of strike action was largely as a result of the New Deal announced by the HoR in May 1993.

On 17 May 1993 the HoR announced the reintroduction of its rationalisation plan with effect from 1 July 1993 due to increasing budgetary pressures. It announced a New Deal which would allow all teachers (previously teachers in promotion posts were excluded) to apply for early retirement. The scheme would also provide for 5 additional pensionable years for all teachers, as well as 6 months state contributions to medical aid and housing subsidies.

In May 1993 the new staff establishments¹ were supplied to all schools and the extent of the impact of rationalisation on individual schools became apparent. At the 36 high schools in the Mitchell’s Plain area 296 level 1 posts were identified as in excess, 15 posts at a school in Stellenbosch, 13 posts at Grassy Park High and 8 at South Peninsula High School. The threat of mass retrenchments thus faced HoR teachers and SADTU members voted overwhelmingly in favour of strike action as a result.

The SADTU ballot had the desired effect. On 19 May 1993 a meeting took place in Cape Town between the NP, led by De Klerk, and the ANC, led by Mandela, to address the growing education crisis and to avoid a national teachers’ strike. The meeting reached the following agreements:

¹ A staff establishment indicated the number of teachers a school qualified for in terms of the number of pupils it had enrolled. This was achieved by simply dividing the number of learners at a school by the PTR. Principals and other management staff were included in the ratios.
1. An Education Forum would be established where the restructuring of education and retrenchments could be addressed.
2. The government agreed to re-open the aborted public sector salary negotiations. (De Klerk Press Release, 20 May 1993)
3. The specifics of the issues in education would be addressed between the various education departments and SADTU without delay.

The meeting between SADTU and the National Department of Education (NDE) took place on 21 May 1993 and the following agreements were reached:
1. Salary negotiations to resume within four weeks.
2. No new rationalisation programmes would be initiated. All future rationalisation programmes would be referred to the Education Forum.
3. Merit awards in all education departments would be reviewed.
4. SADTU would publicly announce the suspension of the strike (SADTU Press Release, 21 May 1993).

On the evening of 21 May 1993 the SADTU president, Shepherd Mdladlana, suspended the strike with an announcement on national television without consulting the membership. SADTU WC rejected the NEC’s decision claiming that democratic decision-making did not occur on the matter (SADTU WC Press Release, 23 May 1993). It also rejected the aspect of the draft agreement which determined that no “new” rationalisation measures would be introduced, as it argued that it meant that “old” measures like the HoR ones could logically be concluded. The SADTU Western Cape REC resolved to continue with the regional strike on 24 May 1993 and to review this position on 25 May 1993. The NEC, pressured by the firm position of the Western Cape, managed to shift the draft agreement with the NDE and all outstanding matters, including the rationalisation measures in the HoR schools, were referred to the National Education and Training Forum (NETF). In an about-turn by the SADTU WC leadership, prompted by a major attack on the SADTU WC leadership by the NEC, and the chairperson in particular, the regional leadership urged its members to accept the revised agreement.
Rationalisation continues

The HoR announced in early June 1993 that the rationalisation measures for coloured education were not covered by the 26 May agreement, and that it “does not form part of the matters that will be dealt with by the envisaged National Education Forum.” (SADTU, Western Cape Bulletin, June 1993) The HoR would thus proceed with the abolition of 3200 posts, as initially identified. The HoR also cut spending on coloured education by nearly 50% (The Cape Argus, 11 July 1993). The allocations of most HoR schools were slashed with between 30% to 50%. Ravensmead High School was cut from R117 000 to R84 000 and South Peninsula from R75 000 to R53 000 (The Cape Argus, 11 July 1993). Many other schools faced similar cuts. SADTU WC resolved “…to unite all our comrades about the necessity for a national response to this onslaught by the De Klerk regime” (SADTU, Western Cape Bulletin, June 1993).

When new salary negotiations with the NDE deadlocked, SADTU declared a new national strike to commence on 16 August. The SADTU WC again voted overwhelmingly in favour of the continuation of the strike. On 16 August thousands of SADTU members across fifteen different education departments came out on strike. The strike in the Western Cape was well supported in the HoR schools, with significantly support from schools in the HoD and DET.

The SADTU NEC was placed under severe pressure by the ANC to bring the strike to a speedy end (Interview, NEC member, 2006). Two meetings took place between members of the SADTU NEC and the president of the ANC, Nelson Mandela in early August to try and find a resolution to the education dispute. The union subsequently accepted the NP offer of 15% across the board increase, as well as a R1437 minimum wage for teachers. The meeting also resolved to refer the rationalisation matter of the HoR to the NETF for resolution. On 25 August 1993 the NEC announced the suspension of the strike noting that “significant gains have been made in respect of our battle for a living wage, general salary increases and the job security of teachers” (SADTU, Press Release, 25 August 1993).
The August strike ended in defeat for SADTU, particularly for its Western Cape region. It was clear that very little had actually been achieved prompting the Mitchell’s Plain SADTU branch to note, “It seems there are forces inside and outside SADTU that are pressurising our negotiators.” (SADTU, Minutes of REC meeting, 27 August 1993). In fact many SADTU members felt that “nothing was gained” (SADTU, REC Meeting Minutes, 20 April 1994).

The aftermath of the strike shifted the progressive energies of the union away from the rationalisation battle. The primary reason for this related to the breakthrough in negotiations with the NP. By the end of September 1993 it was clear that the CODESA negotiations would lead to the first democratic elections. The focus of the union shifted to electioneering in support of the ANC. The September SADTU National General Council resolved to apply for membership of COSATU with immediate effect. It further resolved to commit the union and its resources to work for an ANC victory in the upcoming April elections and to release senior leaders to the ANC election lists at all levels. The Council resolved to release the following leaders to the ANC national election list:

- Shepherd Mdladlana²
- Randall van den Heever
- Duncan Hindle
- Ismail Vavi
- Thami Mseleku.

From October to December 1993 the activities of the union were dominated by electioneering and voter education. Some SADTU members were critical of the preoccupation with an ANC victory in the elections, often described by the SADTU leadership as “the historic mission” of the union. The Bellville branch noted that, “Members are saying that the union is doing nothing to solve the problem (i.e. rationalisation), that SADTU is worried about the elections and not teachers’ welfare” (SADTU REC Minutes, 20 April 1994).

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² Mdladlana is currently the Minister of Labour in the Mbeki cabinet. Van den Heever and Vavi are both senior members of parliament and Hindle (Director General: Education) and Mseleku (Director General: Health) are both senior government bureaucrats.
By the beginning of 1994 SADTU WC was in complete disarray with many branches weak and non-functioning. The vibrant organisation of the early 1990s had virtually collapsed, but for a small number of committed members that had to sustain it through the initial euphoria of an historic ANC victory.

**Educational restructuring, 1994-2001**

The ANC swept to power in the historic April 1994 elections ending centuries of colonialism and four decades of institutionalised racism of the apartheid system. The first task of the new democratic government was to consolidate the fifteen racial and ethnic education departments into one national department. The negotiated settlement that gave birth to the new South Africa established a semi-federal constitutional state. The Constitution established three spheres of government (national, provincial and local), with nine provinces: The Western Cape, Gauteng, Eastern Cape, North West, Mpumalanga, the Eastern Cape, the Northern Cape, Limpopo, Free State and KwaZulu-Natal. Some provinces like Limpopo and the Eastern Cape were essentially the consolidation of a number of very poor and underdeveloped former homelands (Bantustans), whilst some provinces like the Western Cape and Gauteng inherited the well-established infrastructure and industries of the former white South African provinces.

Provinces are funded through a national equitable share formula. According to this formula, which takes into account the number of citizens per province, the poverty status of the citizenry, number of school going children, its social capital requirements, etc., provinces are allocated a share of the national revenue by the national government. Provincial legislatures determine the allocation for education, balancing other social and economic imperatives. The national Department of Education thus has no control over how a province decides to allocate and spend its budget.

The GNU, led by the ANC, inherited an economy in crisis. The economy was in decline with low growth rates, high government debt and poor competitiveness. At the same
time, high levels of political violence especially in KwaZulu-Natal and on the Rand, and the threat from the far white right-wing, were other political realities confronting the GNU. The ANC was thus very careful not to implement any drastic measures to either alienate the right, whilst at the same time beginning to signal to the masses of the people that it was serious about redressing the backlogs and inequalities of the past. What was clear however, was that the ANC government had to “undertake a general restructuring of the economy and a reorientation of the economy towards the historically excluded masses at the same time” (Hirsch, 2005). But, government was keen not to send the wrong signals to international markets either. This essentially meant operating within the confines of the policies set by the international financial institutions like the IMF and the WB. “The ANC decided to err on the side of caution”, Alan Hirsch, Chief Economist in the Presidency argues (Hirsch, 2005).

One of the first tasks of the post-apartheid government was to ensure equality in educational funding and provisioning across provinces. Fiske and Ladd (2004) have shown that South Africa has done fairly well in terms of equalising budgets across provinces. Another major initiative of the new government was to “right-size” the education sector by equalising Pupil to Teacher Ratios (PTRs) among and within provinces. In early 1996 the General Secretary of SADTU, Thulas Nxesi, argued that: “To the disadvantaged, rationalisation is a long overdue process. It means the redistribution of financial and human resources in order to effect equity…Born out of struggle and being part and parcel of the course of the poor, SADTU aligns itself with the …position that rationalisation must take place to address the imbalances of the past” (Sadtu News, 1996, Quoted in Chudnovsky S, 1998:26).

**Extension of labour rights to teachers**
The new government, through the introduction of a new labour relations regime changed the industrial relations system. Teachers were drawn into the formal industrial relations system as ‘employees’, were given the legal right to strike, as well as the statutory right to engage in socio-economic protests through section 77 of the Labour Relations Act. These were major advances in trade union rights for teachers, particularly in the era of
neoliberal globalisation. This runs contrary to other contexts where established
democracies are rolling back trade union rights in the name of labour market flexibility.
These victories were primarily due to the strength of the labour movement in South
Africa, its alliance with the liberation movement, and the absence of a coherent and
inclusive labour relations framework prior to 1994.

In education, SADTU proposed the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC) as a
replacement for the NETF after the 1993 strikes to provide an organised chamber for the
normalisation of education labour relations. The ELRC was established in March 1994
and provided a forum for negotiation and discussion for the organised teaching profession
and the state in the education sector. In many respects the creation of the Council in 1994
was an historic development for education labour relations.

By mid-1995 the Council entered into discussions on the question of the restructuring of
the apartheid education system. On 29 September 1995 the ELRC agreed to Resolution
4/95 that set the PTR to 1:35 for secondary schools and 1:40 for primary schools. These
ratios were to be phased in over a period of five years, but the mechanisms through which
they were to be achieved were crucially left undefined. A proposal to achieve educational
parity was made by the state in late 1995, but it was rejected by the unions, SADTU in
particular, on the basis that it would lead to large scale retrenchments in the education
sector. This resolution was replaced with resolution 3 of 1996 signed on 2 May 1996 by
all parties to the ELRC.

Resolution 3 of 1996 was a comprehensive agreement that provided a mechanism
through which the education system could be right-sized. The right-sizing of the
education sector was closely linked to improved salaries and working conditions for
educators. The resolution proposed the rationalisation (right-sizing) of the education
sector through a process of Voluntary Severance Packages (VSP) and Redeployment. In
terms of the right-sizing formula the number of learners at a school had to be divided by
either 35 (for secondary schools) or 40 (for primary schools) to determine the total
number of educators a school qualified for. This formula was based on the agreed to PTRs as per Resolution 4/95. Any teachers in addition to this number were deemed to be “in excess”. In terms of the resolution any teacher could volunteer for a Voluntary Severance Package. Teachers taking the VSP thus had their posts abolished. All existing vacancies or those created as a result of rationalisation were reserved for those educators deemed to be in excess. The resolution further indicated that all temporary teachers who were in substantive posts (a vacant educator post on an approved staff establishment), would be treated as permanent educators for the purpose of rationalisation. In terms of Section 1.9 c(i) of the resolution, the process of redeployment would only be initiated once the VSP process had been completed. At the completion of the process of rationalisation in a particular province all posts identified as in excess were to be abolished. This would then complete the process of rationalisation in that province.

**SADTU’s response to the resolution in the Western Cape**

In the Western Cape the SADTU leadership enthusiastically embraced the signing of the resolution as a major step forward in the continuing efforts of the new ANC government to effect equity in education. The SADTU WC Provincial Executive Council members were dispatched to all corners of the province to sell the resolution to their members. SADTU members were divided. The union leadership emphasised that the resolution was aimed at effecting equity in education. A significant aspect of the mobilisation of support this time around was the exclusive focus on their members. Many SADTU leaders made it clear that they were a teachers union and therefore had no obligation to be reporting back to a wider audience. This was an important break with the long tradition within the small left-wing teacher unions that operated in the Western Cape in the 1980s that sought to build close ties with their local communities. This decision was crucially informed by the massive public protests that enveloped the signing of Resolution 3/96 in the Western Cape.

Many SADTU members were sceptical and criticised the union’s close ties with the ANC government (Interview, Felix, 2006). The uncertainty of the redeployment scheme and the general threat to their continued employment meant that many union members were
ambivalent about the new measures. Mass SADTU meetings were often very vocal with members insisting to know their futures.

The approaching local government elections in 1995 and the desire of the ANC to make inroads into the province impacted directly on the rationalisation process. The ANC government was massively defeated in the national elections in 1994 by the previous apartheid government. The National Party fought the entire election on the historic suspicion of black people by the coloureds. The large coloured community regarded the ANC as a black organisation and voted for the apartheid rulers.

In many parts of the coloured community the rationalisation scheme was perceived as having “clearly (been) developed to take from the coloureds to give to the blacks” (Interview, Williams, 2006). This notion was also prevalent in the union, with many union members arguing that their black counterparts would be insulated from the effects of rationalisation. The union fractured along racial lines. SADTU PEC members made the argument at various meetings that coloured schools operated by the ex-HoR were “to make certain sacrifices to ensure the educational upliftment of their comrades in the black township schools who have been historically more disadvantaged by apartheid” (Interview, Felix, 2006).

**The Western Cape Parents, Teachers and Students Forum (WCPTSF)**
The WCPTSF was a community movement founded in late 1995 in response to the announcements of teacher rationalisation. The Forum (as the WCPTSF became popularly known in the Western Cape) drew on the experiences of the previous round of resistance and sought to oppose the nature of the rationalisation measures. It also stressed that it was not opposed to the pursuit of equity in education, but that it opposed the interpretation of equity by the state (Interview, Bell F, 2006).

The Forum was a loosely knit organisation that brought together a range of individuals with various political beliefs and ideologies. It was crucially located in the coloured communities on the Cape Flats, although it made various attempts to reach out across the
racial divide. A number of attempts were made to link up with activists in the black townships of Langa, Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. However, the Forum failed to cement any concrete support from teachers in the African community (Interview, Bell, 2006).

The relationship between SADTU and the WCPTSF was an acrimonious one. SADTU criticised the Forum as a “colouredist attempt to cling to the scraps they received under apartheid” (Interview, Hefke, 2006). The Forum retorted that the union had sold out its members and education in South Africa. Despite the bitter recriminations between the two organisations, many ordinary SADTU members either openly or covertly supported the Forum (Interview, Felix, 2006). In the Cape Town branch of the union, a large section of the membership actively supported the Forum and indeed actively recruited members for the Forum (Interview, Felix, 2006). In April 1996 a number of Forum community meetings were held in the Greater Cape Town area and drew large numbers of parents, teachers and students. Large numbers of SADTU members attended one such meeting in the Kensington Civic Centre where they decided to support the community movement against the imposition of the rationalisation measures as organised by the Forum. A number of SADTU members gathered after this meeting where they decided to actively support an opposition movement from within the union (Interview, Felix, 2006). These were all rank and file union members who were opposed to the manner in which the union had dealt with the rationalisation process (Interview, Felix, 2006).

Throughout the first quarter of 1996 the Forum organised community meetings with parents, teachers and students throughout the Peninsula. These meetings were held at schools, in staff rooms, school halls, at local community libraries or in civic centres. The meetings were often very well attended and parents in particular were often very vocal in their opposition to the new measures. The Forum was however unable to translate the support from parents into concrete recruitment into the structures of the organisation. It is very difficult to clearly identify the reasons for this. One of the reasons related to the kinds of demands on time that participation in the Forum was making (Interview, Bell F, 2006). Another was linked to the general atmosphere of the time and the perception that
many believed that the new democratic government needed more time to effect social and economic transformation (Interview, Williams, 2006).

**The implementation of Resolution 3/96**

In the Western Cape a Provincial Task Team (PTT), as envisaged in Resolution 3/96, was established on 27 September 1996 to deal with rationalisation and redeployment in the province. The PTT was composed of the WCED, with two representatives each from the teacher organisations represented in the province. The functions of the PTT were identified as the following:

- Coordinating the transfer of educators in excess;
- Advising the Provincial Redeployment Agency (PRA) on the transferability or otherwise of educators.

The PTT met regularly throughout 1996 to establish the procedures for the identification and redeployment of teachers in excess, as well as the procedures for the filling of vacancies.

The first agreement reached in the PTT was that the Western Cape province would phase in new PTRs over a five-year period, and that these would be staggered for the various ex-racial departments. The following table is based on the agreement concluded in the PTT in this regard:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PTRs for Primary Schools</th>
<th>PTRs for Secondary Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1:29</td>
<td>1:26</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1:33</td>
<td>1:28</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1:35</td>
<td>1:30</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1:38</td>
<td>1:33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1:40</td>
<td>1:35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The initial projections of the WCED indicated that approximately 12 000 teachers would be superfluous in the province. The WCED experienced substantial budget cuts based on revised equitable share allocations and proceeded to offer the VSP and encouraged teachers to volunteer for early retirement in order to ensure that it could stay within budget (Interview, Pillay, 2006). The VSP was based on years of pensionable service and it was the longer serving, and thus more experienced teachers, who often stood to benefit the most from the VSP. Schools where teachers were identified as in excess often lost their most experienced teachers. Fiske and Ladd (2004) noted that, “The average teacher in coloured schools in 1996 had nearly four and a half years of education beyond the matriculation exam, but by the next year the typical teacher had one-third less training.” Also, it was the teachers with scarce skills subjects like Mathematics, Science and Accounting, who stood the best chance of finding alternative employment who opted for the VSP. A principal at a Cape Town school noted, “We have lost thirteen of forty-nine staff members, especially math teachers, and now we can’t find anyone to teach accounting” (Quoted in Fiske and Ladd, 2004:203).

Teachers in management positions, like principals and head of departments, also stood to benefit more than other teachers. Teachers who accepted the VSP had their posts abolished in the middle of the year. The first massive exodus of teachers based on Resolution 3/96 was at the end of June 1996. By September 1996 the WCED reported granting 4 800 VSPs and that 1800 applications were still pending (IPTT Minutes, 18 September 1996). But by October 1996 the chaotic condition at many schools in the HoR-schools compelled the WCED to reassess the blanket granting of VSPs.

In January 1997 the PTT agreed to do “matching” at the level of the province to facilitate redeployment. Matching occurred when a teacher identified as in excess was “matched” to a post at another school for which the teacher was suitable. For example, if a Mathematics Grade 12 teacher was identified as in excess at his/her school and a vacancy existed for a Grade 12 Mathematics teacher at a neighbouring school, that teacher could simply be transferred (redeployed) to the vacant post. The teacher unions supported this process, but white ex-Model C schools objected.
A group of eighty white Model C schools, led by the Grove Primary School in Kenilworth, Cape Town referred the matter to court in late 1996. At issue for them was the right of the School Governing Body (SGB) of a public school, enshrined in the South African Schools Act (1996), to choose which teachers it wanted to employ at their schools. The court case, which became popularly known as the Grove Case, had a major influence on the outcome of the rationalisation process. A very important issue that emerged was what was called “double parking” by educators. The matching process initiated by the WCED to implement Resolution 3/96 was brought to an abrupt halt all over the province. The outcome of the Grove Primary case meant that the WCED was unable to match or redeploy those teachers who were declared in excess and these teachers were thus “parked” in their excess posts, while substitute teachers had to be employed in the vacancies created by those non-excess teachers who had taken the VSP. The WCED thus had to pay two salaries instead of one, thus “double parking”. As a result of “double parking” the WCED overspent with around R400 m in 1996. To deal with its financial crisis the WCED decided to increase the PTRs to 33:1 (secondary schools) and 40:1 (primary schools). As a result, thousands of temporary teachers in the WCED were dismissed. 12 568 temporary teachers had their contracts terminated in 1997 in the Western Cape and an additional 7 318 temporary contracts were terminated at the beginning of 1998 (Fiske and Ladd, 2004:111). By April 1998 Thulas Nxesi, the General Secretary of SADTU noted, “Across the country temporary teachers have been dismissed. The threat of wholesale retrenchments is on the agenda. Schools particularly in underprivileged areas are operating without teachers. And this has been the case for many months” (SADTU, Educators Voice, April 1998). Nxesi continued, “For months and months we have been meeting with the Department of Education and for months we have been putting these issues on the agenda, but government has shown no political will to solve the crisis. In fact things are getting worse” (SADTU, Educators Voice, April 1998).

In early February 1998 SADTU announced a two-day strike for 25-26 March 1998. SADTU identified overcrowding in schools, infrastructure backlogs, the lack of textbooks and the retrenchments of teachers as its key grievances. In an attempt to defuse
the crisis the then Minister of Education, Professor Sibusiso Bengu, met with a SADTU delegation led by its president, Willie Madisha, on 14 April 1998 and an agreement was reached that a national working group would be formed to investigate and make recommendations to the Minister. The meeting however deadlocked on the major issue at stake, the retrenchment of teachers. SADTU wanted a moratorium on the retrenchment of teachers and the state refused (SADTU, Educators Voice, April 1998). The government then proceeded to make a formal proposal in the ELRC calling for the nine provinces to be allowed to set their own PTRs in terms of their own budgets. SADTU rejected the devolution of power to the provinces claiming that it would “lead to uneven educational development in the country” (SADTU, Educators’ Voice, July 1998). Both parties agreed to mediation by the ELRC to find an amicable solution, but the talks broke down in April 1998. The major reason for the impasse was the massive increase of personnel costs in most provinces, but particularly in the Western Cape, as a result of the Grove judgement and “double parking” of teachers in excess. Personnel expenditure reached an all time high of 91% in the 1998/99 financial year ‘crowding out’ non-personnel expenditure on items such as textbooks, stationery, infrastructure and educator training (Department of Education, 2001). Many provinces called on the National Department of Education to take a stronger position vis-à-vis the unions (Fiske and Ladd, 2004:101).

In order to “stop the spiralling over-expenditure of 1997-1998” (Department of Education, 2001) the Department issued Regulations 593 and 594 on 17 April 1998. Regulation 593 allowed the Member of the Executive Council to determine the number of educators’ posts in a province based on the budgetary allocation of the province. It also determined that educators in excess of the approved educator posts in a province would be dealt with in terms of the Labour Relations Act of 1995. This effectively meant that teachers could henceforth be dismissed from permanent employment based on the operational requirements of the employer.

SADTU condemned the unilateral declaration of policy on rationalisation and announced a two-week programme of action from 1-12 June 1998 starting with a go-slow on 1 June
and leading to an indefinite national strike if the Regulations were not withdrawn by 12 June. The mass action by SADTU forced the Minister of Education back to the negotiation table and a framework agreement was signed on 10 June 1998 averting a national teachers’ strike (The Cape Argus, 10 June 1998). The framework agreement committed the Minister to the withdrawal of the controversial retrenchment regulations; it extended the contracts of temporary teachers to December 1998 and committed the Minister to finding the funds to extend the said contracts (Daily Dispatch, 10 June 1998). The framework agreement also set 31 August 1998 as a deadline for a final agreement, failing which the Department would be allowed to unilaterally declare policy.

At the time the union went to its fourth national congress in September 1998 there was still no agreement. There was however an agreement that the parties would attempt to find a workable solution and that the state would try to avoid the unilateral declaration of policy. The upcoming 1999 general elections were beginning to impact on the pace and nature of negotiations (Interview, Pillay, 2006). Despite the SADTU Congress endorsing COSATU’s rejection of GEAR and calling on the government to revoke the GEAR policy, it also resolved to “encourage its members to vote for the ANC and to campaign on its behalf to achieve a two-thirds majority” (SADTU, Fourth National Congress, Resolutions, 1998). It also resolved to “commit material and human resources to the ANC election campaign and to support the COSATU resolution calling for the collection of an election levy” (SADTU, Fourth National Congress, Resolutions, 1998).

On 17 November 1998 after six months of intense lobbying and negotiations two resolutions were signed in the ELRC: (i) Resolution No 5 of 1998, The Transfer of Serving Educators in terms of Operational Requirements; and the Advertising and Filling of Educator Posts, committed the government to the process of redeployment by balancing the obligations of the employer against the rights of the school governing bodies to make recommendations in the appointment of educators. (ii) Resolution No 6 of 1998, Procedure for Rationalisation and Redeployment of Educators in the Provisioning of Educator Posts, replaced the procedures established by Resolution 3 of 1996. Because
of the problems experienced in many provinces with the School and College Right Sizing Committees, these too were now abandoned. The Circuit Manager/District Manager and the school principal were to identify teachers in excess.

The 1998 dispute was an opportunity missed for SADTU. The upcoming 1999 elections and the desire of the ANC to make inroads into the NP stronghold in the Western Cape provided the union with sufficient leverage in the negotiations process. But during the course of the year the demands put forward by the union in January 1998 re infrastructural developments at schools, redress, the abolition of school fees, the provision of water, toilets and electricity, as well as the provision of learning and teaching support materials, were watered down and the nature and scope of the deliberations in the ELRC shifted away from these key areas of transformation to technical aspects of the rationalisation process.

**Conclusion**

The introduction of the rationalisation programme by the post-apartheid government was a continuation of the rationalisation programme initiated by the National Party government in the early 1990s. The rationalisation programme, whilst attempting to address the great racial disparities inherited from apartheid, was also about not expanding the overall responsibility of the new state to educational provisioning.

The support of SADTU for the rationalisation programme was born out of the historic alliance between the organised progressive trade union movement, led by COSATU, and the ANC. From an industrial relations perspective one could argue that the agreement reached between the DOE and SADTU was an innovative response to the twin pressures for greater productivity and job retention in an era of globalisation. This would be consistent with the role of traditional trade unions. The union used its close ties with the ANC to shift the employer from Resolution 5/1995 which called for retrenchments of teachers, to Resolution 3/1996 which agreed to retain teachers through redeployment.
Also, the extension of labour legislation and collective bargaining to the education sector, the formation of the ELRC and the extension of the right to embark on socio-economic protest action in terms of Section 77 of the LRA, were important milestones in the development of teacher trade unionism in South Africa. This is even more important when assessed in terms of the broader global neo-liberal context where governments were attempting to roll-back labour legislation.

Politically, however the union appears to have missed an opportunity to push for the fundamental restructuring of South African education. SADTU entered the post-1994 period relatively strong. This is what prompted Willie Madisha the president of SADTU to declare, “Fundamental principles of redress and equality have been allowed to fall through the cracks” (Madisha, 2001). As a union affiliated to COSATU it played a significant role in the transition from apartheid to democracy and was thus politically strong.

But the NP was part of the post-1994 Government of National Unity, a key compromise of the CODESA negotiations, led by the ANC. SADTU’s political alliance with the ANC, despite the advantages and benefits it afforded the union, meant that the union’s ability to steadfastly represent the best interests of its members and education at large, was compromised. The rationalisation process in the Western Cape demonstrates that it was difficult for SADTU to effectively represent the interests of its members whilst it was aligned to the partisan political interests of the ANC. The ANC’s intervention in the mass educational struggles of the union at key moments (the termination of the 1993 strike, the termination of the 1998 strike) disarmed and disillusioned many SADTU members, sapping the progressive energies of the rank-and-file membership.

Drawing on the experiences and memories of previous struggles, many SADTU members who were part of the 1993 anti-rationalisation struggle, felt it important to move beyond economistic issues to broader political aspects that impacted on education in this period.
The large number of SADTU members who joined the WCPTFS’ mass protest actions and who participated in its structures, is indicative of the need of SADTU members to focus on the broader issues of transformation and redress in the Western Cape. But the demand for transformation and redress was perceived as politically risky by the ANC, who was keen to allay the fears of the white minority and global capital during the period of transition.

The political interests of the ANC government were in line with neo-liberal interests, both at home and abroad, and were not necessarily serving the interests of ordinary SADTU members nor the millions of poor learners across the country. SADTU was critically influenced by the triumphalism and euphoria of the coming to power of the ANC and the dramatic and unexpected defeat of the apartheid system. But SADTU’s assertion that the union did not fully comprehend the conjunctural conditions and the threats and opportunities created by the new dispensation, and that it did not fully understand the real implications of the rationalisation policies and its relationship to GEAR until it was too late, seems implausible. In fact, this relationship was vociferously advocated by the TLSA and the WCPTSF throughout the period under discussion. The union’s scepticism about GEAR (underscored by President Mbeki’s attack on the union at its National Congress in 1998) and its potentially disastrous consequences for workers in South Africa, also point to the fact that SADTU indeed understood the complexity of the relationship between neo-liberal restructuring (GEAR in this case) and the teacher rationalisation programme.

The cast of characters responsible for the introduction of neo-liberal policies in education in SA was thus indeed different from the cast in the US and England, where Apple (1999) suggested it includes fractions of capital, neo-conservative intellectuals, religious fundamentalists and fractions of the professional middle classes. In the South African case the former liberation movements, led by the ANC, civil society formations, the Communist Party and organised labour (COSATU), were driving forces behind the implementation of neo-liberal policies.
TINA (There Is No Alternative), prevalent in union circles in the early 1990s, contributed in no small measure to the lack of organised resistance to the introduction of GEAR and the teacher rationalisation programme, as its education corollary. TINA was of course based on the belief that globalisation was an unstoppable phenomenon that had to be accommodated and embraced in the developmental agenda of modern nation states. Despite the acceleration in globalisation in the contemporary period, it is an historically contingent process that is replete with contradictions. This notion of process is indeed important as it challenges the juggernaut thesis, held by SADTU, and many others in the labour movement that regarded globalisation as an unstoppable force. As Robertson has argued, the problem with this approach is that it disregards human agency. At each turn that SADTU members, or regions, organised in opposition to the new policies, the union would demobilise its members so as not to jeopardise the nation-building project of the new South Africa, as narrowly defined by the ANC. This led to many struggles, both within the union – between ordinary members and the union leadership, and between the national union and the regions/provinces (the 1993 strikes) - and between the union and the state (the 1998 strikes). These struggles were about re-scaling and involved the “strategic relational moves by actors to work beyond the boundaries of existing institutionalised relations that represented various interests in the various ways to fix a new hierarchical pattern and set of boundaries” (Robertson, 1999:25). And in this period the struggle was won by those seeking to fix a new hierarchical pattern that would favour the middle-classes (irrespective of race) and capital. The new hierarchy and set of boundaries however remain uneven and contradictory. The struggles against inequality and social justice in education are set to continue.

The rationalisation process did not lead to greater equity in the education system. In effect, it created new inequalities based on social class. The rationalisation programme can be analysed in terms of a broader rightward shift by the ANC government, marked by its adoption of the GEAR programme, after its coming to power in 1994. Again, it must be pointed out that this was a GNU which reflected the compromises of the negotiated settlement. The GNU undoubtedly imposed restrictions on the ANC in terms of the pace
of its transformation agenda. However, it is clear that GEAR was adopted by the ANC and not imposed from outside.

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