
by

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I would like to express my heartfelt thanks and appreciation to Professor Hussein Solomon for his unwavering support, inspiration and guidance he provided to me during the writing of this dissertation.

I would also like to express my heartfelt appreciation and love to my entire family, friends and colleagues for their amazing support during the completion of this academic odyssey.

Peace cannot be kept by force.

It can only be achieved by understanding.

Albert Einstein
ABSTRACT

The African continent has been beset with violent conflicts, civil wars and extended periods of instability. The continent’s future depends on the capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflict. Reacting to conflict has proven highly expensive for the international community and has strengthened the case for a greater focus on conflict prevention. This study will examine the role, relevance and success of preventive diplomacy in responding to and preventing violent and protracted conflicts in Africa, in particular recent international efforts to seek a concrete, comprehensive and all-inclusive peace settlement to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had resulted in what many analysts considered to be ‘Africa’s First World War’. The aim and objective of this study will be to assess the role of preventive diplomacy, in particular efforts by the international community to resolve the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The study of the success of preventive diplomacy in responding to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo will cover three distinct phases. The first phase will assess the historical development of the crisis in the former Zaïre dating back from 1997 to 1998 and initial steps that were taken to address the conflict. The next phase will cover the period dating from 1999-2000 following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, while the final phase will assess developments and efforts to secure peace by the international community from 2001 until 2004, while providing for a brief discussion on possible future developments. The research will commence by examining various theoretical contributions and insights produced on conflict prevention and the concept of preventive diplomacy. The examination of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy will be rooted in theoretical insights produced by Michael Lund (1996) and other influential contributions on preventive diplomacy. The theoretical framework for this study will be based on Michael Lund’s model of preventive diplomacy.
Although Lund’s conceptual framework provides a valuable insight into the theory of preventive diplomacy an additional theoretical consideration may be included into his assessment. Lund’s theoretical framework fails to address the impact of psychological variables and the extent to which prevailing conflict attitudes may exert a negative influence on a conflict situation. This may render the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy at the level of unstable peace obsolete if it fails to take prevailing conflict attitudes into account. This dissertation will also propose the inclusion of social-psychological approaches to augment the strategy of preventive diplomacy as developed by Lund. Very little conclusive and in-depth research has been conducted on how psychological variables, particularly conflict attitudes such as negative images, attitudes, perceptions and conflict behaviour can fuel and exacerbate a conflict situation, especially conflicts in Africa and how this may derail the success of preventive diplomacy in resolving such severe conflicts. In the numerous efforts to secure peace in the embattled Democratic Republic of the Congo scant consideration, evaluation and analysis has been produced on the way in which conflict attitudes such as misperception, fear, distrust, hostility and suspicion, became not only a major stumbling block to the peace process, but also negatively affected the outcome of the various peace agreements that were negotiated.

One of the core arguments this dissertation will posit is that preventive diplomacy has not been successfully applied in resolving conflicts in Africa, and will continue to fail, unless greater emphasis is placed on structural prevention, that includes an assessment and strategy for responding to conflict attitudes, such as misperception, hostility, suspicion, fear and distrust. It could be argued that preventive diplomacy initiatives when taken alone and independently of a broader strategy of conflict prevention are likely to fail unless they are linked to measures and actions that tackle the deeper or structural causes of conflict. Greater emphasis should be placed on timely and adequate preventive action, through the vigorous promotion of preventive diplomacy, particularly structural prevention. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is intermittently
erupting and will continue to do so, unless the structural causes of the crisis and the various conflict attitudes are effectively dealt with.

The study will commence with the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study, consisting of a discussion of conflict, preventive diplomacy, and conflict prevention. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo will be discussed as well as the underlying factors that contributed towards the brutal and excessively violent nature the conflict came to assume. The study will also examine the international response to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as the immediate diplomatic efforts initiated to resolve the crisis from 1998-1999, which culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement on 10 July 1999. An assessment of the intervention efforts initiated by the United Nations, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and other key African states, in particular South Africa will also be undertaken. The impact of psychological variables and the importance of assessing the crucial contribution of social-psychological approaches towards understanding and resolving conflict will be briefly considered with particular reference to the protracted tensions which persisted between Rwanda and the DRC, despite the conclusion of numerous peace agreements between both countries.

The final chapter will form an evaluation of the prospects for peace in the DRC beyond 2004 and will conclude the study with particular reference to the extent to which the research questions have been adequately addressed with final recommendations on the role of preventive diplomacy in addressing conflict.

**Key Concepts:** Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Prevention, Structural Prevention, Proximate Prevention, Ripeness Theory, Political Psychology, Social-Psychological Approaches, Psychological Variables, Conflict Attitudes, Great Lakes, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Inter-Congolese Dialogues, SADC, South Africa, UN, MONUC
OPSOMMING

Die Afrika kontinent gaan nou gebuk onder geweldadige konflik, burger-oorloë en verlengde tydperke van onstabiliteit. Die kontinent se toekoms is afhanklik van die kapasiteit om konflik te voorkom, te hanteer en op te los. Die reaksie op konflik situasies deur die internasionale gemeenskap is egter aansienlik duur en het die argument vir ‘n groter klem en fokus op die voorkoming van konflik geplaas. Hierdie studie het ten doel om die rol, toepaslikheid en sukses van voorkomende diplomatie om konflik te voorkom te ondersoek,veral die onlangse pogings deur die internasionale gemeenskap om ‘n volhoubare oplossing vir die konflik in die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo daar te stel. Diestudie van die konflik in die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo sal bestaan uit drie onderskeie tydperke. Die eerste tydperk sal konsentreer op die historiese aanloop tot die krisis in die voormalige Zaïre van 1997 tot en met 1998 en die voorlopige stappe wat geneem is om die konflik aan te spreek. Die volgende tydperk sal konsentreer op 1999-2000, veral met betrekking tot die ondertekening van die Lusaka Skietstilstand Ooreenkoms. Die derde en laaste tydperk sal fokus op die onderskeie pogings van die internasionale gemeenskap om ‘n oplossing vir die konflik in die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo te bewerkstellig vanaf 2001 tot en met 2004 met ‘n kortlikse oorsig van die vooruitsigte vir volhoubare vrede in die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo.

Die studie sal begin met ‘n ondersoek na verskeie teoretiese raamwerke oor konflik voorkoming asook die konsep van voorkomende diplomatie. Die ondersoek van konflik voorkoming en voorkomende diplomatie sal gegrond wees in die teoretiese bydrae van Michael Lund (1996). Die teoretiese raamwerk vir hierdie studie sal gebasseer wees op Michael Lund se model van voorkomende diplomatie.

Alhoewel Lund se konseptuele raamwerk ‘n waardevolle bydrae lever tot ‘n beter kennis en begrip van voorkomende diplomatie is dit nodig om ‘n addisionele
aspek daarby in te sluit. Lund se teoretiese raamwerk versuim om die impak van sielkundige veranderlikes op ‘n konflik situasie in ag te neem asook die impak van heersende konflik ingesteldhede. Dit kan heel moontlik die doeltreffendheid van voorkomende diplomasi ondermyn. Die studie sal dus die argument ondersteun vir die insluiting van sosiaal-sielkundige perspektiewe en benaderings tot konflik ten einde die strategie van voorkomende diplomasi te versterk. In die verband is weinig oortuigende en verklarende studies onderneem ten einde die werklike impak van hoe negatiewe konflik ingesteldhede ‘n konflik kan vererger en hoe dit dien ooreenkomstig die suksesvolle implementering van voorkomende diplomasi moontlik kan raak.

Een van die kern argumente van die studie is dat voorkomende diplomasi nie op ‘n doeltreffende wyse geïmplementeer word ten einde konflikte in Afrika aan te spreek nie. ‘n Verdere argument wat aangevoer kan word is dat voorkomende diplomatieke inisiatiewe wat onafhanklik van ‘n breër strategie van konflik voorkoming geïniseer word, heel moontlik nie sal slaag nie, tensy dit gekoppel word aan maatreëls wat die dieper en onderliggende oorsake van konflik aanspreek. Groter klem moet dus op konflik voorkoming geplaas word, veral structurele voorkoming. Die konflik in die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo kan weer opvlam as die onderliggende oorsake van die krisis asook die konflik ingesteldhede nie doeltreffend aangespreek word nie.

Die studie sal in aanvang neem met die bespreking van die teoretiese raamwerk van die studie. Die konflik in the Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo sal bespreek word, asook die onderliggende faktore wat bygedra het tot die geweldadige karakter van die konflik. Die studie sal ook die verskeie diplomatieke inisiatiewe deur die internasionale gemeenskap in oënskou neem, veral die ondertekening van die Lusaka Skietstilstand Ooreenkoms van 10 Julie 1999. ‘n Assesering van die verskeie diplomatieke inisiatiewe wat deur die Suider-Afrikanse Ontwikkelings Gemeenskap (SAOG), die Verenigde Nasies, ander Afrika state en veral Suid Afrika onderneem is sal ook onderneem word.
Die impak van sielkundige veranderlikes en die belangrike bydrae van sosiaal-sielkundige benaderings tot konflik sal kortliks bespreek word, met spesifieke betrekking tot die onderliggende en langdurige spanning tussen die DRK en Rwanda.

Die laaste hoofstuk sal die vooruitsigte vir volhoubare vrede in die DRK in oënskou neem, met finale voorstelle ter afsluiting rakende die uitbreiding van die rol van voorkomende diplomatie om konflik aan te spreek.

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALIR</td>
<td>Rwandan Liberation Army (<em>Armée de Libération du Rwanda</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAT</td>
<td>International Committee to Accompany the Transition (<em>Comité Internationale pour l’Appui à la Transition</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-FAR</td>
<td>Former Rwandan Armed Forces which took part in the 1994 genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forces Armées Congolaises (Congolese Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Rwandan Armed Forces (<em>Forces Armées Rwandaises</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (<em>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEMF</td>
<td>Interim Emergency Multinational Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Military Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l’Angola (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Assembly for Democracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD (G)</td>
<td>RCD (Goma)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-K/ML</td>
<td>RCD-Kisangani/Liberation Movement (<em>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Kisangani-Movement de Libération</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPVM</td>
<td>Third Party Verification Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDPs</td>
<td>Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (Union for Democracy and Social Progress)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>Union Nationale pour l’Indépendance Totale de l’Angola (National Union for Total Independence for Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defence Force</td>
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</table>
# Chronology of Key Events in the DRC Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1998</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 August</td>
<td>RCD rebels launch armed rebellion against DRC president Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Uganda and Rwanda back the rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-14 September</td>
<td>The first summit on the DRC conflict brings together seven heads of state from southern Africa and east Africa at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Another rebel movement, the MLC, is formed in Equateur Province under Jean-Pierre Bemba with Ugandan backing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1999</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed in Zambia by the six states involved in the conflict. The rebel MLC signed on 1 August, while RCD rebels sign later on 31 August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 August</td>
<td>UN Security Council authorises deployment of UN Liaison personnel in support of the Lusaka Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 November</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution 1279 establishes the United Nations Observer Mission in the Congo (MONUC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Former president of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire appointed to serve as facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogues provided for in the Lusaka Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 January</td>
<td>SADC gathers in Maputo to discuss peace implementation, but Laurent Kabila is absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 January</td>
<td>Security Council meeting on Congolese peace process. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan states that the Lusaka Agreement remains the only solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 February</td>
<td>Seven African Heads of State meet in Lusaka and adopt a new timetable for applying the DRC ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 February</td>
<td>UN Security Council expands MONUC in Resolution 1291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March</td>
<td>Sir Ketumile Masire visits Kinshasa where he is prevented from travelling in the interior of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 June</td>
<td>UN Security Council passes Resolution 1304 condemning Rwanda and Uganda for their violent actions in Kisangani.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 August</td>
<td>Kabila inaugurates the Transitional Parliament, the first legislative body since May 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td><strong>2001</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 January</td>
<td>DRC president Laurent-Désiré Kabila is assassinated. His son, Joseph Kabila assumes control of the presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 January</td>
<td>Rebels accuse Joseph Kabila of instigating new acts of war and reject him as Head of State. Fighting erupts in Eastern Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January</td>
<td>Joseph Kabila, in his capacity as president of the DRC, meets with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington D.C. and meets with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in New York to discuss the future of the DRC and prospects for peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 February</td>
<td>DRC’s new president, Joseph Kabila, takes part in his first summit on the DRC in Lusaka, together with four other countries involved in the conflict and the rebel movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>The UPC formed with Thomas Lubanga as leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24 August</td>
<td>Preparatory meeting for the ICD held in Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 October</td>
<td>First meeting of the ICD in Addis Ababa. Meeting fails to yield any positive developments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2002</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 February</td>
<td>Inter-Congolese Dialogue resumes, yet meeting is delayed for 10 days following disagreements surrounding the composition of the unarmed political opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 April</td>
<td>ICD Sun City peace talks adjourn after reaching wide agreement, but defer key terms on power sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 June</td>
<td>Former prime minister of Senegal, Moustapha Niasse, appointed UN Special Envoy to assist in driving Inter-Congolese Dialogue process forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 July</td>
<td>Peace accord between Rwanda and the DRC signed in Pretoria (also known as Pretoria I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 September</td>
<td>Luanda agreement signed between Uganda and DRC. A 100-day timetable is set for UPDF withdrawal after the establishment of the Ituri Pacification Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 December</td>
<td>Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition signed (also known as Pretoria II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 January</td>
<td>Adoption of resolution 1457, UN Security Council unanimously approves new six-month mandate for the panel of experts investigating the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 February</td>
<td>DRC President Joseph Kabila and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni reaffirm their commitment to the Luanda accord of 6 September 2002 following a two-day summit in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. The accord provides for the total withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the DRC and the normalisation of relations between Kinshasa and Kampala.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Delegates and parties to the conflict in the DRC convene for the follow-up ICD talks at Sun City, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 March</td>
<td>After 11 days of talks in Pretoria, delegates adopt a draft constitution and a memorandum on the military and security arrangements during the transition period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April</td>
<td>Signing of the Final Act. The Final Act sees the commitment of all parties to honour all the agreements they had entered into, including the Global and Inclusive Agreement signed on 17 December 2002, and Additional Memorandum of the Army and Security, as well as the Constitution of the Transition, adopted at Sun City on 1 April 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 April</td>
<td>At Sun City, South Africa, DRC government, rebel movements, political opposition parties and representatives of civil society agree to set up a transitional government to oversee democratic elections after two years. DRC President Joseph Kabila to retain his post, supported by four vice-presidents from rebel groups, and the civilian opposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 April</td>
<td>Violent clashes erupt in Bunia, exactly one day after the signing of the Final Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 April</td>
<td>Ituri Pacification Commission launched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>President Joseph Kabila sworn in as interim head of state of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Kinshasa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April</td>
<td>International Committee to accompany the transition (CIAT) holds first meeting at MONUC headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>Rebel UPC takes control of Bunia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May</td>
<td>RCD-Goma withdraws from talks of the follow-up committee of the Inter-Congoolese Dialogue, accusing the government of trying to keep the post of head of army for itself, and of wanting to control the majority of military regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>Swearing-in of a transitional government is postponed because of an argument over the composition of the national army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May</td>
<td>RCD-Goma announces it will rejoin negotiations leading to the formation of national transitional institutions in the DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 June</td>
<td>UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommends one-year extension of MONUC’s mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 July</td>
<td>First elements of a planned 3,800 UN peacekeeping task force for the Ituri District arrive in Bunia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 July</td>
<td>UN Security Council unanimously adopts resolution giving MONUC a stronger mandate and increasing its authorised strength from 8,700 to 10,800 troops. The Security Council also extends the mission’s mandate for another year, until 30 July 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 July</td>
<td>Fighting erupts between RCD-Goma and Mayi-Mayi militias in South Kivu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 August</td>
<td>Under Resolution 1501, UN Security Council authorises the EU-led multinational peace enforcement mission in Bunia to provide assistance to MONUC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September</td>
<td>UN troops take over from French-led multinational force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 September</td>
<td>New unified national army inaugurated, yet disagreement emerges about new name for the army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 September</td>
<td>RCD-Goma members accused of fomenting new rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 October</td>
<td>UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other forms of Wealth of the DRC releases its final report, listing names of individuals, companies and governments involved in the plunder of gems and minerals, and recommending measures to be taken to curb the exploitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 March</td>
<td>The UN Mission in the DRC, known as MONUC, announces it has repatriated 9,775 Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian combatants and their dependents through its disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>Representatives of seven armed militia groups from the embattled north-eastern district of Ituri sign an agreement in Kinshasa with the government to disarm and to participate in the transitional process towards democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 May</td>
<td>Congolese and Ugandan authorities establish two joint verification teams to monitor and eliminate border violations by rebels between the two countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Fighting breaks out in the eastern town of Bukavu, between soldiers loyal to the Kinshasa government and renegade soldiers of a former Rwandan-backed rebel group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 August</td>
<td>One of the nation’s four vice-presidents, Azarias Ruberwa, announced in Goma, that his RCD-Goma party, a former rebel group, has suspended participation in the government, accusing the transitional government of failing to establish proper guidelines for integrating former rebels into the new national army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September</td>
<td>A programme involving the disarmament of some 15,000 ex-combatants in the north-eastern district of Ituri, and their reintegration into civilian life, is officially launched in Bunia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 October</td>
<td>The International Criminal Court and the DRC sign an accord allowing the prosecutor to launch investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 November</td>
<td>A declaration of commitment to end conflict in the Great Lakes region is signed in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 November</td>
<td>President Joseph Kabila announces he will send some 10,000 more troops to the east of the country, in response to a threat by Rwandan troops to invade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 December</td>
<td>With a threat of renewed regional conflict in the DRC, the AU’s Peace and Security Council announces it will seek a greater role in helping to disarm Rwandan armed groups based in eastern DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December</td>
<td>Fighting between rival factions of the armed forces in the east of the DRC displaces an undisclosed number of people in the province of North Kivu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 December</td>
<td>The leaders of dissident soldiers in North Kivu Province in the DRC agree to a ceasefire following more than a week of fighting that had displaced tens of thousands of civilians.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Identification of the Research Theme

The African continent has been beset with violent conflicts, civil wars and extended periods of instability. The continent’s future depends on the capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflict. The continent’s turbulent history has been plagued by nearly 40 years of inter-state, intra-state, ethnic, religious and resource conflicts. Not less than 26 armed conflicts erupted in Africa between 1963 and 1968 affecting the lives and livelihoods of nearly 474 million people, representing 61% of the population of the continent and claiming over 7 million lives (NEPAD Secretariat 2005).

The end of the Cold War led to many of its proxy wars in Africa coming to an end. The security vacuum left in its wake was filled with a new phenomenon of small scale civil wars that have caused more casualties on the African continent over the last two decades than anywhere else on earth. Conflict in Africa has not only caused the death of millions of innocent civilians, it has also displaced, maimed and traumatized, many millions more, which in turn has contributed to further distrust, suspicion, hate and division in the process. These conflicts have disrupted Africa’s already fragile post-colonial, socio-cultural, political and economic systems. Of the 19 major armed conflicts that were active in 2004, the majority were in Africa and Asia, with six conflicts in each region. Africa has constituted one of the main arenas for major armed conflicts throughout the post-
Cold War period. Since 1990, 19 conflicts have occurred in 17 locations in this region. The vast majority (15) of the 18 intra-state conflicts in Africa in the period 1990-2004 concerned governmental power (Harbom & Wallensteen 2005:123).

Reacting to conflict has proven highly expensive for the international community and has strengthened the case for a greater focus on conflict prevention. The budget for U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa from July 2004 to June 2005 had amounted to a staggering US$2.86 billion. Africa received around US$7 billion in humanitarian aid between 1995 and 2001, and four of the top ten countries receiving such aid globally were African, much of it in response to violent conflict. Reconstruction is also expensive: it has been estimated that the reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Congo alone will cost an estimated US$20 billion (Commission for Africa 2005:153).

The reality has however been rather sobering. Successful conflict prevention has proven more elusive. Research undertaken over the period 1945 to 1993 suggests that about half of all peace agreements fail in the first five years after they have been signed (Licklider 1993:681). While the end of war can inaugurate a durable peace, the termination of one conflict often introduces a short interregnum until the outbreak of the next violent encounter.

Conflict prevention has remained a difficult and often elusive activity. The existing discourse on conflict is characterized by linear understandings of processes of conflict. According to Draman (2003:234) typically a conflict is considered to evolve through five stages: pre-violence, escalation, endurance, de-escalation, and post-conflict. Similarly Samarasinghe (nd:2) argued that any violent conflict consists of five basic phases, namely the pre-conflict phase, the conflict emergence phase, the conflict and crisis phase, which is characterized by chaos and complex emergencies, the conflict-settlement phase and the post-conflict phase. Regrettably the common approach to dealing with conflict in Africa focuses beyond the pre-violence stage. Conflict prevention is not a new
phenomenon. The post- Cold War era has provided ample opportunity especially in Africa for acting preventively.

A fundamental problem however for parties employing coercive or persuasive strategies in a conflict is when to ‘make peace’. While most studies on peaceful settlement of disputes see the substance of the proposals for a solution as the key to a successful resolution of conflict, a growing focus of attention according to Zartman (2000) shows that a second and equally necessary key lies in the timing of efforts for resolution. Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so—when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly stalemate (Zartman 2000).

According to Zartman (2001) the concept of a ripe moment centres on the parties’ perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), optimally associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe. The concept is based on the notion that when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), they seek an alternative policy or Way Out (Zartman 2001:8). The other element necessary for a ripe moment is less complex and also perceptual: a Way Out. Parties do not have to be able to identify a specific solution, only a sense that a negotiated solution is possible and that the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search for such a solution too. Without a sense of a Way Out, the push associated with the MHS would leave the parties with nowhere to go.

The more general process relevant to ending conflict at all social levels can be called ‘conflict termination’, a matter of at least one party in a conflict determining to abandon coercive behaviour and to adopt a form of settlement strategy that operates through concessions and conciliation (Mitchell 1981:165). Rather than continue costly and ineffective military operations, either because a perceived
stalemate exists or because defeat seems more likely than a decisive victory, a national government may take the difficult decision to initiate peace talks with an adversary. Alternatively, it could make a direct compromise offer to the opposing party in a conflict situation. The main objective is the termination of both parties’ conflict behaviour and the development of a compromise solution involving an abandonment of some goals underlying the original conflict situation. The major problem facing parties to a conflict is when to give up and start compromising. Therefore those wishing to terminate the conflict will argue that the costs and risks of prolonging the conflict far outweigh those of compromising now (Mitchell 1981:167). In this context it becomes distinctly possible for individual leaders within the same party to come to wholly different conclusions about the desirability of continuing or terminating their struggle. Analytically, three basic sets of circumstances exist for parties seeking an end to conflict, namely that of perceived success, perceived stalemate and of perceived failure. The problems of bringing a conflict to an end in these circumstances of victory, stalemate or defeat produce different orientations (and perceptions) to the basic problem, particularly in the kinds of cost-benefit calculations carried out by leaders considering a compromise (Mitchell 1981:174).

This study will examine the role, relevance and success of preventive diplomacy in responding to and preventing violent and protracted conflicts in Africa, in particular recent international efforts to seek a concrete, comprehensive and all-inclusive peace settlement to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had resulted in what many analysts considered to be ‘Africa’s First World War’. The aim and objective of this study will be to assess the role of preventive diplomacy, in particular efforts by the international community to resolve the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The study will commence with a discussion of conflict, its underlying factors, sources and the structure of international conflict.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) provides for an interesting, yet
complex discussion not only of the underlying causes of the conflict, but also of the effectiveness of the peace efforts that were undertaken to address the conflict in the difficult task of moving the country from a negative towards a positive peace.¹ Efforts to resolve the conflict began virtually simultaneously with the onset of hostilities. This culminated in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 10 July 1999, the peace talks facilitated under the auspices of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the historic Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition on 16 December 2002, the Draft Constitution of the Transition of 31 March 2003 and the Final Act of 2 April 2003.

1.2 Significance of the Research Theme

The research theme has relevance to many academic disciplines and similar studies could be done in the field of peace studies, political science, and political risk analysis. However this dissertation will focus on preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention, amidst the backdrop of the international community’s response and the effectiveness thereof to resolve the conflict in the DRC.

The research theme is situated within the field of international relations, as it will examine the conflict in the DRC and the subsequent deterioration in relations between the various neighbouring countries involved in the conflict and the subsequent international response and efforts launched by regional organizations and the international community to seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

The difficulty however of reaching this crucial stage in achieving an all-inclusive peace agreement is pronounced.

¹ Negative peace is the absence of violence of all kinds, but no other form of interaction either. Policies based on the idea of negative peace do not deal with the causes of violence, only its manifestations. Positive peace in contrast involves the search for positive conditions, which can resolve the underlying causes of conflict that produce violence.
The Constitution of UNESCO states in part that:

“since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed;…. And that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world…."

The document further suggests that ignorance, misunderstanding, misperception and mistrust lie at the roots of problems that arise among nations and through which their differences have all too often broken into war. The need to assess how conflict attitudes fuel and affect conflicts in the African context is therefore crucial, as this appears to be an often overlooked dynamic in conflict resolution theory when addressing conflict situations on the continent and that frequently sees the regression into all-out war.

Very little conclusive and in-depth research has been conducted on how psychological variables, particularly conflict attitudes such as negative images, attitudes, perceptions and conflict behaviour can fuel and exacerbate a conflict situation, especially conflicts in Africa and how this may derail the success of preventive diplomacy in resolving such severe conflicts. The complexity of a conflict situation also has the potential to affect the outcome of negotiations, which are deemed as critical to bringing parties to a conflict to end their violent confrontation. A further objective of this dissertation will be to provide a critical evaluation of the potential impact psychological drivers and variables may have in political conflicts, characterized by violent conflict and protracted crises.

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Negative peace—the absence of war—is invariably unsustainable and underpins the baleful statistic that half of Africa’s wars have reignited within a decade of ending. Yet the construction of a positive peace that addresses the multifarious motivations of the combatants and addresses their residual mutual suspicion is a challenge that lies beyond existing economic and political capacity (Furley & May 2006:5).

The significance of the research theme is that its analysis is an attempt to approach the topic from an analytical and evaluative perspective. Very little of the present research available on the conflict in the DRC has attempted to undertake a critical study of the conflict and peace process. Much of the available research has merely sought to regurgitate the litany of peace agreements that were concluded by the architects of the peace process, without attempting to undertake a more critical approach in probing the continuation of the conflict and the continued breach of the respective peace agreements. A critical appraisal of preventive diplomacy is also long overdue in order to point out the plethora of deficiencies to the implementation of this strategy in its present format and rigidly defined temporal application to responding to conflict.

In the numerous efforts to secure peace in the embattled Democratic Republic of the Congo scant consideration, evaluation and analysis has been produced on the way in which conflict attitudes such as misperception, fear, distrust, hostility and suspicion, became not only a major stumbling block to the peace process, but also negatively affected the outcome of the various peace agreements that were negotiated. The purpose of this dissertation will not be an attempt to provide an exhaustive analysis of the role of psychological drivers of conflict, nor an attempt to extrapolate its effects on the conflict situation in the DRC either, but will instead attempt to highlight the potential value of taking social-psychological perspectives of conflict into account in augmenting other approaches adopted to address violent and protracted conflict as well as highlighting the potentially negative influence this often underestimated variable can exert on negotiations to
prevent and end conflict.

1.3 Identification of the Research Problem

The study will aim to examine the question: Has preventive diplomacy been successful in resolving the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo? This problem necessitates the generation of subsidiary questions: Was preventive diplomacy applied in a timely, coherent and decisive manner to resolve the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo? Why do conflicts persist, despite various peace agreements? Were the peace initiatives and efforts developed to end the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo sufficient and effective to address a conflict of such a protracted, violent and complex nature? To what extent do psychological variables, notably conflict attitudes exacerbate a conflict and exert a negative influence on efforts to secure a diplomatic solution to a conflict? Under what conditions are psychological mechanisms crucial to the emergence of conflict? To what extent should an examination of psychological variables, particularly conflict attitudes as an exacerbating factor in a conflict situation and the social-psychological means to address it form part of the strategy of preventive diplomacy? To which extent has the DRC proven to be a manifestation of the need for preventive diplomacy to incorporate this often omitted approach?

One of the core arguments this dissertation will posit is that preventive diplomacy has not been successfully applied in resolving conflicts in Africa, and will continue to fail, unless greater emphasis is placed on structural prevention, that includes an assessment and strategy for responding to conflict attitudes, such as misperception, hostility, suspicion, fear and distrust. There is widespread recognition that the range of activities associated with preventive diplomacy—mediation, diplomacy, fact-finding, preventive peacekeeping deployments and so forth—are only a subset of a much wider range of responses and measures to conflict prevention. It could be argued that preventive diplomacy initiatives when
taken alone and independently of a broader strategy of conflict prevention are likely to fail unless they are linked to measures and actions that tackle the deeper or structural causes of conflict. Preventive diplomatic efforts often fail to take into account that warring factions do not always readily see the situation as it really is, but only through their programmed perception. The peace initiatives that emerged to end the war in the DRC did not take cognizance of the underlying conflict attitudes that were present from the outset of the conflict and the subsequent negotiations that followed to prevent further conflict. Furthermore, the continued implementation of preventive diplomacy (or often serious lack thereof) in its present format is likely to see the continuation of conflict and the repeated failure to cease hostilities, the failure to settle disputes and to ultimately resolve protracted conflicts in Africa. This study will also argue that preventive diplomacy consists of approaches and solutions to conflict that are often too generic. Therefore a diagnosis is often made of a conflict; a set of remedies is prescribed that often barely yields success in alleviating the immediate manifestations of conflict, often at the expense of treating and eliminating the structural and underlying causes of a conflict situation. This has resulted in denuding preventive diplomacy of a potentially significant role in addressing protracted violent conflict.

Greater emphasis should be placed on timely and adequate preventive action, through the vigorous promotion of preventive diplomacy, particularly structural prevention, which aims to arrive at positive peace. The conflict in the DRC could intermittently erupt again unless the structural and underlying causes of the crisis and the various conflict attitudes are effectively dealt with. This study will also support the assertion by Leatherman et al (1999:98) that preventive actions should be extended along the entire spectrum of conflict, whereby preventive diplomacy is contextualized, and its basic objective, the forestalling and reduction of violence, is elaborated in different phases and stages of the conflict as opposed to merely focusing on one specific stage in the conflict cycle.
Greater attention should also be paid to the pervasive influence of social-psychological approaches to conflict in order to devise durable solutions and sustainable peace agreements. This dissertation will attempt to argue that social-psychological approaches should form an integral part of any strategy of preventive diplomacy that seeks to secure a definitive end to violent conflict.

1.4 Demarcation of the Study

Conceptually the study is demarcated with reference to the following concepts. Key and salient concepts regarding the research problem are that of conflict, ‘preventive diplomacy’, ‘conflict prevention’, ‘structural prevention’, ‘proximate prevention’ as well as ‘conflict attitudes’, ‘social-psychological approaches’ and ‘psychological variables’. The concepts of conflict, preventive diplomacy, operational and structural prevention must be carefully studied as well as conflict attitudes, social-psychological approaches and psychological variables. For the purposes of this study greater focus and emphasis will be placed on the discussion, analysis and evaluation of the concept of preventive diplomacy, in particular the role it fulfils in responding to violent conflict. Once these concepts have been examined and scrutinized, it is possible to look at the various peace initiatives that were devised to secure lasting peace in the DRC and whether these initiatives truly addressed the various parties’ grievances and disparate attitudes and whether preventive diplomacy was effectively applied to resolve the conflict.

While the focus of the research will primarily be on the DRC and the peace efforts initiated, the scope is considerably broader, as it will attempt to apply lessons learnt from the peace process to end the conflict in the DRC to the value

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3 Conflict attitudes as defined by C.R. Mitchell (1981) are regarded as those psychological states or conditions (common attitudes, emotions and evaluations as well as patterns of perception and misperception that frequently accompany and exacerbate conflict. The ‘psychology of conflict’ is regarded as an exacerbating factor, arising through the stresses of being in a conflict, rather than being a prime cause of international disputes.
and critical importance of promoting determined preventive action in dealing with highly volatile and intractable conflicts in Africa.

The study of the success of preventive diplomacy in responding to the conflict in the DRC will cover three distinct phases. The first phase will assess the historical development of the crisis dating back from 1997 to 1998 and initial steps that were taken to address the conflict. The next phase will cover the period dating from 1999-2000 following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, while the final phase will assess developments and efforts to secure peace by the international community from 2001 until 2004, while providing for a brief discussion on possible future developments.\textsuperscript{4} Past experience of conflict (especially with the same adversary) will leave residual elements of prejudice and hostility to affect future behaviour. Such behaviour will undoubtedly reinforce previously held beliefs and attitudes, and make participants ready to develop more extreme levels of intolerance, hatred and suspicion (Mitchell 1981).

1.5 Literature Survey

Research into this topic requires a survey of a diversity of literature. In order to develop a comprehensive theoretical foundation for the research, it will be necessary to survey literature dealing with preventive diplomacy, preventive action, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, conflict management and peacemaking.

\textsuperscript{4} Due to practical considerations concerning the completion of the study, also considering that the case study of the conflict in the DRC serves an analytical purpose only, the study will primarily concentrate on the period from 1998 until 2004. The concluding chapter will however briefly assess developments in the DRC since 2004, in order to support the central assertion and argument of this study that the peace process did not produce a satisfactory outcome due to remaining tensions that were not effectively addressed and that the role of preventive diplomacy as applied to the crisis in the DRC was negligible and in many respects wholly insufficient.
Sources providing for a comprehensive account of conflict, the structure of conflict, the life cycle of conflict, conflict escalation and de-escalation and latent and manifest conflict include Mitchell (1981), Azar (1990), Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (1999, 2005), Chabal (2005), Harbom and Wallensteen (2005), Hyden (2006), Jackson (2006) and Wallensteen (2007). Much of the sources analysing and discussing conflict provide relatively limited analytical and evaluative value as to how conflict should be addressed and when intervention in a conflict situation is viable.


The sources, while providing a comprehensive overview and discussion of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy, however fail to provide for an account of the psychological dimensions of conflict, social-psychological approaches utilized to address conflict, conflict attitudes and its effects on conflict situations and attempts to prevent and effectively end conflict.


Efforts to secure peace, through the numerous peace initiatives negotiated to resolve the conflict in the DRC also warrant in-depth scrutiny and assessment. This requires a critical overview of the various documents, peace agreements and evaluations of the peace process produced between 1998 and 2003. These are divided into primary and secondary sources.

Primary sources include, The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999); Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda on the Withdrawal of the Rwandan Troops from the Territory of the DRC
and the Dismantling of the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe Forces in the DRC (2002); Agreement between the Governments of the DRC and the Republic of Uganda on Withdrawal of Ugandan Troops from the DRC, Cooperation and Normalisation of Relations between the Two Countries (2002); Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC (2002); Amendment of the Agreement Signed Between the DRC and Uganda (2003); Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations: The Final Act (2003).


Much of the available literature assessing and analyzing the conflict situation in the DRC has paid little attention to the structural deficiencies of the peace processes itself. The literature has instead focused more pertinently on providing in-depth explanations on the various manifestations of the conflict, while veering away from attempting to critically assess why underlying tensions continued to persist. Therefore a neat, compartmentalised, linear understanding of conflict has characterized much of the literature on arguably one of the most intractable and violent conflicts Africa has ever witnessed.
Important sources addressing the role South Africa played in securing a peaceful transition in the DRC include Mbeki (various speeches and statements between 2001 and 2004), and the Department of Foreign Affairs (statements and reports issued between 1997 and 2004), Kornegay and Landsberg (1999), Naidoo (2002), Solomon (2002) and Swart and Solomon (2004).

Sources examining efforts undertaken by the European Union to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict include the EU Presidency (press releases and statements between 2000 and 2004), Bourque and Sampson (2001), Olsen (2002) and EPLO (2001), Keukeleire (2004), Kronenberger and Wouters (2004).

Sources examining the role played by the African continent in contributing towards the peaceful resolution of the crisis include the African Union (various statements and reports produced between 2002 and 2004). Sources examining the response by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) include Malan (1998), Ngoma (2004), Dzimba (2001) and Nathan (2006).

1.6 Methodological Aspects

The methodological aspects concern the approach to, the methods used in and the levels of analysis of the study.

The research will commence by examining various theoretical contributions and insights produced on conflict prevention and the concept of preventive diplomacy. The examination of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy will be rooted in theoretical insights produced by Michael Lund (1996) and other influential contributions on preventive diplomacy. The concept of preventive diplomacy will be scrutinized and evaluated.

Within the context of conflict prevention and conflict resolution the conflict situation in the DRC will be discussed and the resulting efforts to secure peace in
the embattled nation. The adequacy and effectiveness of the peace efforts will be evaluated and the shortcomings to these strategies will be assessed.

The theoretical framework for this study will be based on Michael Lund’s model of preventive diplomacy. He proposed a model of conflict where at any of these points it would be possible to either continue upward on the scale of conflict, or turn downward and revert to a lower and more peaceful level. Michael Lund (1996) presents a place or stage in the full life history of a typical conflict that preventive diplomacy occupies in relation to actions taken at other points in a conflict. This includes the following stages of peace or conflict, namely War, Crisis, Unstable Peace, Stable (or Cold) Peace and Durable (or Warm) Peace.

Preventive diplomacy would typically commence when tensions in the relationships between parties are in danger of shifting from stable peace to unstable peace or worse. According to Lund (1996) it applies then not only to situations that have seen no recent conflict, but also to post conflict situations where violence or coercion have been largely terminated but the efforts of post conflict peace building are apparently insufficient to move the conflict into stable peace away from the danger of re-escalation. Its aim is to keep actual or potential disputes from taking the form of confrontation or all-out violence and to return them to processes of regular diplomacy or national politics, or a more desirable state of durable peace. Preventive diplomacy is therefore especially operative at the level of unstable peace.

Although Lund’s conceptual framework provides a valuable insight into the theory of preventive diplomacy an additional theoretical consideration may be included into his assessment. Lund’s theoretical framework fails to address the impact psychological variables and prevailing conflict attitudes may exert on a conflict situation. This may render the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy at the level of unstable peace obsolete if it fails to take prevailing conflict attitudes into account. This dissertation will also propose the inclusion of social-psychological
approaches to augment the strategy of preventive diplomacy as developed by Lund.

The dissertation will therefore also propose the inclusion of an additional dimension to complement Lund’s model, by examining how psychological variables fuel conflicts as developed by C.R. Mitchell (1981). According to Mitchell parties involved in a conflict situation are likely to possess complex cognitions and evaluations about themselves and the opposing party and the environment within which the conflict situation arises. These complex cognitions and evaluations necessitate a more detailed consideration of the nature of conflict attitudes, their causes, common features, the way in which they affect various forms of conflict behaviour, and the way in which they affect the negotiation process and act as a hindrance in efforts at finding a solution to the conflict. This warrants a closer assessment of the extent to which these aspects undermined the peace process in the DRC.

1.7 Structure of the Study and Outline

The dissertation will commence with Chapter 1 that will include the introduction to the research problem, the aims and objectives of the research, the research questions the dissertation will attempt to answer, an overview of the literature that will form part of the study as well as a delineation of the methodological aspects that will form the basis of the study. Following this the study will focus on the theoretical foundations. Chapter 2 will consist of the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study, consisting of a discussion of conflict, preventive diplomacy, and conflict prevention, and efforts to secure peace in countries emerging from periods of intense, protracted and violent conflict. This discussion will be specifically applied to the DRC. The theoretical framework will be discussed in the context of international efforts to resolve conflicts as they have emerged in particular the conflicts in the DRC and how preventive diplomacy can be and subsequently has been applied towards their effective
resolution. This chapter will also provide for a comprehensive discussion of conflict attitudes and the effect these variables can have in both exacerbating a conflict and hampering efforts to secure a durable and lasting peace agreement. The chapter will also examine the influence conflict attitudes exert on a conflict situation and the need to include an assessment of social-psychological approaches to conflict resolution. The conflict in the DRC will be discussed in Chapter 3. The historical roots of the conflict will be discussed as well as the political environment in which the conflict emerged as well as the underlying factors that contributed towards the brutal and excessively violent nature the conflict came to assume. The various negative conflict attitudes and underlying perceptions that exacerbated the conflict will also be evaluated as well as the various perceptions and grievances that drove the various parties to engage in conflict with each other.

Chapter 4 will examine the international response to the conflict in the DRC as well as the immediate diplomatic efforts initiated to resolve the crisis from 1998-1999, which culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on 10 July 1999. This chapter will critically examine the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the various peace initiatives that were initiated to mitigate the conflict and its devastating consequences. The chapter will also provide for a critical assessment of the Inter-Congolese Dialogues provided for under the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in order to determine and assess whether they were successful in securing a durable and sustainable peace in the DRC.

An assessment of the intervention efforts initiated by the United Nations, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and other key African states, in particular South Africa will form the basis of Chapter 5. This chapter will also assess the effectiveness of the United Nations Organization Mission (MONUC) in securing peace in the DRC as well as the shortcomings of the peacekeeping operation. Aside from the collective efforts under the auspices of the U.N., contributions by the European Union will also be briefly appraised. Chapter 6 is
an evaluation of the prospects for peace in the DRC and will conclude the study with particular reference to the extent to which the research questions have been adequately addressed with final recommendations on the role of preventive diplomacy in addressing conflict.

1.8 Conclusion

It is important to critically assess the role of preventive diplomacy in African conflicts. Successful conflict prevention has proven elusive and the need to assess and to understand the reasons why have become more pronounced in light of the severe destruction and devastation conflicts such as witnessed in the DRC have inflicted.

A fundamental problem for parties employing coercive or persuasive strategies in a conflict is when to ‘make peace’. This involves seeking solutions that will bring an end to violence and ultimately secure stability, security and the renewal of peaceful, normal and amicable relations. Such an outcome can be achieved only if all the parties make a concerted effort and decision to compromise through negotiation. Beyond the study of preventive diplomacy there exists very little research that attempts to assess the impact of psychological variables, particularly conflict attitudes on a conflict situation.

A further objective of the dissertation, one closely related to the study and assessment of efforts to resolve the conflict in the DRC, will be to explore the extent to which underlying conflict attitudes such as distrust, enmity and fear succeeded in perpetuating the conflict, exacerbated already volatile conflict situations and obstructed successful preventive diplomatic efforts. This especially holds true in assessing conflict in Africa and attempts to not only work towards post-conflict peace building, but also to strengthen capacities to execute the successful prevention of conflict. Preventive diplomacy has not been successfully applied in resolving conflicts in Africa, and will continue to fail, unless greater
emphasis is placed on structural prevention, that includes an assessment and strategy for responding to conflict attitudes, such as misperception, hostility, suspicion, fear and distrust. An argument that could be held forth is that preventive diplomacy initiatives when taken alone and independently of a broader strategy of conflict prevention are likely to fail unless they are linked to measures and actions that tackle the deeper or structural causes of conflict. Hence the need to consider the theoretical context of preventive diplomacy and to reassess the role of preventive diplomacy, the role of psychological variables in conflict situations and the need to ensure the effective practical application of these concepts to effectively assist in preventing violent conflict.
CHAPTER 2

A Conceptual and Theoretical Framework of Conflict and Preventive Diplomacy

2.1 Introduction

Between 1946 and 2002 there were a total of 226 armed conflicts. No less than 116 of those—or just over half—occurred between 1989 and 2002 in seventy-nine different locations around the world. In 2002, there were 31 conflicts active in twenty-four locations around the world. Out of the 31 active conflicts in 2002, 13 were taking place in Africa. By the middle of the 1990s, the African continent appeared to be a chief beneficiary of the end of the Cold War. Wars that had been sustained by the Cold War, as well as by South African destabilization, were on the verge of ending (Wallensteen 2007:25). The African continent also experienced the greatest fluctuation in terms of the number of conflicts that have been experienced—from 14 wars in 1989 and 17 in 1990 and 1991, while the number of conflicts was down to 9 in 1995, only to reflect an increase to 14 in 1998. While the number of conflicts in Africa revealed an exponential decrease, the severity of these conflicts showed a rapid increase.

Very early in the development of an armed conflict, there is likely to be a host of actors with vested interests in a conflict situation. Conflict situations are neither simple nor stable. A particular conflict is rarely left alone to be the concern of only the original parties. Conflicts attract attention, some of which may be benign, other more malicious. There are actors who often search for ways in which to use a situation for their own, highly particular purposes. Other parties may simply be involved to protect themselves, their economic or political stability or their extended interests (Wallensteen 2007:193). This may subsequently bring them into a conflict, siding with a party or making them into new parties. The linkages
are many and the motives varied. This will have many effects. It may prolong the conflict, increase destruction or the reverse.

The more parties with stakes in the outcome of conflict, the more difficult it will be to arrive at settlements by means of negotiations, mediation or other forms of intervention. The interconnections between conflicts are best described in terms of a regional ‘conflict complex’. It is a way of describing how conflicts are connected to one another. At a given moment in time, conflicts may occur in two or more areas but in the same geographical region. Although they may appear separate, closer scrutiny is likely to establish interconnections (Wallensteen 2007:193). These are known as ‘regional conflict complexes’, where primary and secondary parties are engaged in the same region.

This chapter will provide a brief discussion and analysis of conflict, the nature of internal conflict, protracted conflict, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy, and efforts to secure peace in countries emerging from periods of intense, protracted and violent conflict. The research will commence by examining various theoretical contributions and insights produced on conflict, conflict prevention and the concept of preventive diplomacy. The examination of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy will be rooted in theoretical insights produced by Michael Lund (1996) and other influential contributions on preventive diplomacy. The concept of preventive diplomacy will be scrutinized and evaluated.

This theoretical discussion will then be specifically applied to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter referred to as the DRC) in the subsequent chapters to follow. The theoretical framework will be discussed in the context of prevailing theoretical contributions that assess conflict, the nature of conflict and that of protracted social conflict and how preventive diplomacy can be and subsequently has been applied towards the effective resolution of conflict. This chapter will also attempt to advocate for the inclusion and comprehensive discussion of social-psychological approaches towards gaining a comprehensive
understanding of conflict, notably conflict attitudes and the effect these variables can have in both exacerbating a conflict and hampering efforts to secure a durable and lasting peace agreement, particularly in relation to preventive diplomacy. The chapter will also highlight and examine theoretical contributions that consider the influence conflict attitudes exert on a conflict situation and the subsequent need to integrate social-psychological approaches as an alternative means of addressing violent conflict. The study will posit that very little research has been conducted on how psychological variables, particularly conflict attitudes such as negative images, attitudes, perceptions and conflict behaviour can fuel and exacerbate a conflict situation, especially conflicts in Africa and how this may derail the success of preventive diplomacy in resolving such severe conflicts.

2.2 Defining Conflict

Conflict is a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other but not both. According to Mitchell (1981:15) conflict refers to actual behaviour (which often involves coercion and usually violence). The behaviour is aimed at least at preventing the opposing party preventing one from reaching one’s own goals. Its absence is taken to be a sign that the parties are in a cooperative relationship, in a condition of peaceful coexistence, or ‘at peace’. Conflict according to Wallensteen (2007:15) can be defined as a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources.

The *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* (UCDP) of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, University of Uppsala, defines a major armed conflict as a contested incompatibility concerning government and/or territory over which the use of armed force between the military forces of two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, has resulted in at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a single calendar year (SIPRI 2005:134). The definition provides for an
additional delineation by providing for two thresholds (25 and 1000 battle-related deaths, respectively), resulting in three categories of intensity, namely minor armed conflicts—conflicts with more than 25 deaths but fewer than 1000 for the year and for the duration of the conflict, intermediate armed conflicts—conflicts with more than 25 deaths and fewer than 1000 for a year, but more than 1000 for the duration of the conflict and finally wars—conflicts with more than 1000 battle-related deaths in one year.

Another distinction can be made between manifest and latent conflicts. A conflict manifests itself in the use of force or violence leading to human casualties. Latent conflicts are hidden in societal cleavages but have not broken into open confrontation. Analysts interested in conflict prevention tend to be especially concerned with these latent conflicts. Another distinction is between social cleavages that are either vertical or horizontal. The former are based on ethnicity, race or religion, whereas the latter are based on control of or access to economic resources (Hyden 2006:192). Domestic political conflicts include a diverse amalgam of civil strife, ranging from protests, strikes, riots, plots, assassinations, coups d’état, to civil wars. Accordingly political conflicts can be conceptualized along two different spectrums, one distinguishing between scale of destruction caused by the conflict, the second identifying how far the conflict involves a particular issue as opposed to the regime at large. This typology does not preclude the possibility that in reality more than one type of conflict may occur together with others listed in the matrix. The purpose is to highlight the need to distinguish between conflicts with limited or widespread consequences in terms of focus and human life (Hyden 2006: 192).

2.3 The Nature of Internal Conflict

An important question raised by Vasquez (1995:137, in Ramsbotham et al 1999:78) is whether it is possible to find a ‘unified theory of conflict’, sufficient to account for the prevailing patterns of post-Cold War conflict. There are
irreducible discrepancies between major schools of analysis. Certain theories are regarded as being internal, as they locate the sources of conflict mainly within the nature of the protagonists; some are relational, because they look for sources mainly in relations between conflict parties (e.g. theories in behavioural sociology and social psychology) and some are contextual, because they look mainly outside to the conditioning contexts that structure the conflict.

Johan Galtung (1969: 72) proposed an influential model of conflict that encompasses both symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. He suggested that conflict could be viewed as a triangle, with contradiction (C), attitude (A) and behaviour (B) as its vertices. Here the contradictions refer to the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived ‘incompatibility of goals’ between the conflict parties generated by what Mitchell refers to as a ‘mis-match between social values and social structure’. In a symmetric conflict, the contradiction is defined by the parties, their interests and the clash of interests between them. In an asymmetric conflict, it is defined by the parties, their relationship and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship. Attitude includes the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves. These can be positive or negative, but in violent conflicts attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger and hatred.

Attitude includes emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative (will) elements. Analysts who emphasize these subjective aspects are said to have an expressive view of the sources of conflict (Ramsbotham et al 2005:10). Behaviour is the third component. It can include cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent conflict behaviour is characterized by threats, coercion and destructive attacks. Analysts who emphasize objective aspects such as structural relationships, competing material interests or behaviours are said to have an ‘instrumental view’ of the sources of conflict. Galtung argues that all three components have to be present together in a full conflict. A conflict structure without ‘conflictual’ attitudes or behaviour is a
latent (or structural) one. Galtung sees conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another. As the dynamic develops, it becomes a manifest conflict formation as parties' interests clash or the relationship they are in becomes oppressive. Conflict parties then organize around this structure, to pursue their interests. They develop hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour and thus the conflict formation starts to grow and intensify. As it does so, it may widen, drawing in other parties, deepen and spread, generating secondary conflicts within the main parties or among outsiders who are drawn into the conflict situation. This often considerably complicates the task of addressing the original, core conflict (Ramsbotham et al 2005:10).

Conflicts are extremely dynamic and can change their ‘face’ over time. Policymakers need to know which method of conflict management-negotiation, mediation, multiparty conferences or humanitarian intervention- is most likely to be successful in any given type of conflict situation. The confusion over matching appropriate interventions to conflict is particularly acute. It is unlikely that conflict can be eliminated from human interaction. Conflict is a universal condition, inevitable, often necessary, and sometimes beneficial. It cannot be exorcised from human relations, and it is present wherever there are incompatibilities that prevent both parties' demands from being met at the same time (Zartman 2001: 3). It is therefore crucial to provide for an assessment of conflict and its various stages in terms of the life cycle of conflict.

2.4 Theoretical Frameworks discussing the Life Cycle of Conflict

According to Swanström and Weissmann (2005:9) a conflict is not a static situation, but a dynamic one and the intensity level changes over a conflict’s life cycle. An understanding of the conflict cycle is essential for an understanding of how, where and when to apply different strategies and measures of conflict prevention and management.
As suggested by Ramsbotham et al (2005:22) the new patterns of major armed conflict that became prominent in the 1990s suggested a more nuanced model of conflict emergence and transformation. This model views conflict formations arising out of social change, leading to a process of violent or non-violent conflict transformation and resulting in further social change in which hitherto suppressed or marginalized individuals or groups come to articulate their interests and challenge existing norms and power structures. A schematic life cycle of conflict sees a progression from peaceful social change to conflict formation to violent conflict and then to conflict transformation and back to peaceful social change. The sequence could also deviate and can move from conflict formation to conflict transformation and back to social change, avoiding violence. Or it can proceed from conflict formation to violent conflict back to the creation of fresh conflicts. In response there has been a differentiation and broadening in the scope of third-party intervention. Whereas classical conflict resolution was mainly concerned with entry into the conflict itself and with how to enable parties to violent conflict to resolve the issues between them in non-violent ways, the contemporary approach is to take a wider view of the timing and nature of intervention.

As alluded to by Ramsbotham et al (2005) earlier, that in order to develop effective strategies for early warning, preventive action and preventive diplomacy, analysts and practitioners need a nuanced understanding of conflicts, including their background causes and escalatory dynamics. According to Leatherman et al (1999: 43) the literature has typically treated these factors in relation to a multi-phase conflict cycle.

2.4.1 The Phase Model of Conflict

The so-called phase model of conflicts is considered useful in that it specifies targets for external involvement; first in early warning and prevention, then in conflict resolution and finally in post-conflict peace-building. The model does however provide rather simple and too obvious precepts for action. Instead of
being uni-dimensional, conflict processes are usually multidimensional and unfold in a disjunctive manner. There are internal tensions within a conflict process, hinting both to threats of escalation and opportunities for resolution. The phase model also tends to focus primarily on the means to manipulate the conflict process, but neglects other relevant dimensions such as goals, interests and internal conditions of the actors involved. Dimensions of conflict unfold along their own trajectories, although there may be synergistic effects among background trajectories and between the different elements in the escalation process (Leatherman et al 1999: 43). The cycle models fail to take into account the multiple levels to every conflict and the continuing shifts between them. There are also usually multiple issues across which the nature and salience of conflict varies. The phase models allude to conflict processes and dynamics, without specifying how they lead to different outcomes. It is important to consider which types of behaviours drive and accelerate the greater destructiveness of conflict and which, on the other hand, decelerate such trends.

It is also crucial to consider the escalatory dynamics of conflict. The multidimensional nature and multiple levels of conflict make for phases of escalatory dynamics that are seldom neatly ordered. The phases of conflict can therefore be divided between pre-conflict, intra-conflict and post-conflict stages in which the first and third phase are predominantly non-violent. Preventive action has to be tailored to different phases, with their characteristic structures and processes, types and levels of violent conflicts.

The conflict resolution field has tended to treat the escalation of conflict as a question of means. Simple phase models of conflict highlight changes in adversaries’ tactics and resources. The models track how disputes evolve into crises and violence and war erupt. Diplomatic efforts have traditionally operated from this model and premise, and thus deploying short term efforts to contain violence and settle issues (Leatherman et al 1999: 73). Less attention has been accorded to understanding how structural causes fuel conflict escalation, or
developing a more complete picture of how conflict escalates across dimensions other than parties’ means.

2.4.2 Models of Conflict Escalation and De-escalation

Conflict escalation can be understood either as an automatic process embedded in the dynamics of conflict or as a series of strategic unilateral moves by the parties involved. Zartman (1991: 516) argues that passage from one phase to another in conflict escalation is preceded by a stalemate. This forces parties in conflict to rethink their goals and means, and if they prove unrealistic or inadequate, a redefinition of the situation is required. Stalemate is considered to be the key both to the escalation process and the shift of ends, means, tactics and leadership. Stalemates are pivots of conflict dynamics, which can lead to escalatory and de-escalatory processes. For conflict resolution to be successful, it is important either to maintain the current stalemate or support de-escalatory tendencies.

Conflict escalation can be conceptualized along two axes: vertical and horizontal. Vertical escalation refers to the increase in the intensity of the dispute in terms of the conflict behaviours, and means used. They may involve actions that range from the imposition of economic, material, social, political or symbolic cost, with no physical injuries or deaths, to an action that explicitly includes threats, risks or actual loss of human life. Such indicators provide measures of the intensity of antagonism. The intensity of the conflict increases as more and more actions take place outside the framework of the country’s political and legal system. Horizontal escalation expands the geographical scope of conflict and brings into the sphere of non-violent or violent action new groups, communities, or states (Leatherman et al 1999:76). The horizontal expansion of conflict may also involve the spill over of conflict in regional contexts. Under the rubric of horizontal escalation it is possible to think of the expansion in the number of issues at stake (issue proliferation) or in their size (issue inflation) and also in the parties’ goals.
At the outset of conflict, the issues at stake tend to be discrete and more narrowly defined. As the conflict persists, both the size and number of issues tend to grow, if for instance the failure to achieve early solutions itself becomes a new source of grievance. The concept of “meta-conflict” has been used to describe the situation when initial issues at stake have become greatly outweighed by new issues, which the escalation of conflict produces (Leatherman et al 1999:76).

Theoretical frameworks dealing with conflict escalation and de-escalation offer very little evaluative value either. The theoretical framework as discussed by Ramsbotham et al (2005:11) offers a simplistic model in which escalation phases move along a normal distribution curve from the initial differences phase that are part of all social developments, through the emergence of an original contradiction, that may or may not remain latent, on up through the process of polarization in which antagonistic parties form and the conflict becomes manifest and culminating in the outbreak of direct violence and war. The model proceeds to indicate the de-escalation phase proceeding from ceasefire, agreement, normalization and ultimately reaching the point of reconciliation. This model is overly simplistic in its presentation of the various stages of conflict, with regards to its escalation and de-escalation and fails to address the means through which this transformation occurs.

The most salient shortcomings of the aforementioned models are that neither take into account that conflict is a dynamic process. Galtung rightly asserts that conflict is a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another. The models discussed in relation to conflict do not take cognisance of this important fact. Furthermore this influential element is not often explicitly taken into account when devising coherent strategies to successfully intervene in and end conflict. A major oversight that most models presenting conflict possess is the scant attention
accorded by analysts to provide for an explicit discussion of conflict prevention and its vital role in relation to conflict.

2.5 Conflict Prevention

Preventive diplomacy certainly occupies a central place in any attempts to prevent conflict and indeed full-scale war. Intervening in advanced conflicts is exceptionally difficult, costly and prone to failure. A wealth of theoretical and applied research on conflict prevention has been generated since the 1950s (Menkhaus 2004: 420), and a promising array of international, regional and non-governmental mechanisms for conflict prevention has been established or expanded in the 1990s. As Reychler (1999:135) rightly asserts one of the challenges faced by the international community in this decade will be to create a more effective system to prevent violence.

Conflict prevention is not a transitory, ad hoc reaction to emerging and potential problems. It is a medium and long-term proactive operational or structural strategy undertaken by a variety of actors, intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a stable and more predictable international security environment. According to Carment and Schnabel (2003:11) conflict prevention involves attitudinal change, it can be multi-sectoral, is malleable as a concept and as a policy, can be applied at different phases of conflict and can be implemented by a range of actors acting independently or in concert.

Yet conflict prevention has remained underdeveloped, undervalued and to an extent elusive in practice. Many seemingly avoidable intrastate and interstate conflicts in recent years have inspired only token international efforts at prevention.

According to Aggestam (2003:13) most of the studies of conflict prevention are empirically oriented and lack explicit theoretical frameworks and operational
definitions. The opposite is also true, as certain studies of conflict prevention often do provide explicit theoretical frameworks discussing the modalities of conflict prevention, without pertinent attention to the operational aspects of its contents. Therefore a vast gap can be identified between theory and practice. This could potentially undermine the successful execution of a much-needed strategy of conflict prevention that coherently and decisively deals with conflict. Traditional diplomatic strategies tend to be reconceptualised and renamed without any real change of substance and content. A wide variety of concepts have emerged to refer to conflict prevention, such as ‘blind prevention’, ‘complex prevention’, ‘direct prevention’, ‘structural prevention’, ‘preventive diplomacy’, ‘preventive engagement’ and ‘preventive deployment’ (see Björkdahl 2002; Brown and Rosencrance 1999; Carment and Schnabel 2001 and Lund 1996).

There has been a lack of consensus on the scope and definition of conflict prevention. There is also no agreement on the scope of prevention itself. A definition of conflict prevention is essential as this establishes the parameters of preventive strategies (Menkhaus 2004: 425).

According to Menkhaus (2004: 434) to operationalise conflict prevention more effectively, six prerequisites must be met: firstly, the analytical capacity to predict and understand conflicts must be present, secondly the structural capacity to predict and alert should be present (are functional early warning systems in place?), thirdly the operational capacity to prevent (do we have a toolbox of preventive methods?), fourthly, a strategic framework to guide coherent preventive action (is an effective strategy for preventing conflicts present, in order to determine which tools of conflict prevention are to be used when?), the fifth prerequisite is the structural capacity to respond and finally the political will to prevent (is there a commitment to undertake and support preventive action?).

Early warning and conflict prevention are based on proactive responses to potential threats to national and/or human security (Leatherman et al 1999:27). In
the early warning and prevention of conflicts, normative queries seek answers to questions such as: How much and what kind of violence is acceptable? Should the parties be treated equally in conflict prevention? What types of preventive measures are justifiable to contain the danger of escalation?

In terms of phases, preventive action has three basic objectives, namely to prevent latent disputes from developing into hostilities, and to find means to resolve them non-violently when they do, to hinder the further escalation of violence and finally to avert a breakdown and relapse into violence during the post-conflict peace-building phase.

2.5.1 Types of Conflict Prevention

Most analysts distinguish between preventive measures that address the underlying causes of conflict and those designed to address imminent armed conflict. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict distinguishes between ‘operational prevention’, described as ‘early engagement to help create conditions in which responsible authorities can resolve tensions before they lead to violence’, and ‘structural prevention’, which encompasses ‘strategies to address the structural causes of deadly conflict (Carnegie Commission, 1997: 40, 69).

Direct prevention has a more limited agenda. The emphasis is placed largely on short-term strategies and interaction of the conflicting actors and third parties. This approach is guided by a pragmatic ambition of prevention without any comprehensive prescribed formula. The primary goal is not to resolve all outstanding issues of disputes but rather to control and remove the imminent causes to violent escalation both within and between states (Cockell 2003:198).

Proximate Prevention consists of three basic preventive measures, namely preventive peacemaking, preventive deployment, and preventive humanitarian
action. Structural prevention consists of the following basic categories of preventive measures, namely preventive peace building, preventive disarmament and preventive development.

Ultimately the structural strategies of prevention are the most effective ones and therefore the prevention of deadly conflicts requires the thwarting of economic failures, social breakdowns and environmental degradation. According to this view, “a comprehensive preventive strategy must first focus on the underlying political, social, economic and environmental causes of conflict” (Leatherman et al 1999:97). Yet Lund (1996) asserts an overemphasis on the structural causes of conflict is inaccurate, as social inequities and resource scarcity do not always lead to deadly conflict, and they can produce healthy non-violent conflict that acts as a catalyst for positive social change. Lund (1996:35) therefore contends that such a broad focus for preventive diplomacy risks overlooking the more proximate behavioural sources of violent conflicts, which in rich and poor states are considered to be political in nature.

Evans (1993) provides a distinction that contrasts early prevention with late prevention. Late prevention refers to diplomatic initiatives taken after disputes are about to cross the threshold into armed conflict, whereas early prevention involves engagement in preventive diplomacy as soon as early warning signals indicate a dispute, when the dispute is ‘more ripe’ for resolution.

Another distinction is made between ‘light prevention’, which is aimed at preventing situations with a clear capacity for violence from degenerating into armed conflict. The aim is to prevent latent or threshold conflicts from becoming severe armed conflicts. ‘Deep prevention’, in contrast, aims to address the structural causes, including underlying conflicts of interest and relationships.

As Ramsbotham et al (2005:125) contend it is nevertheless generally recognized that when it comes to conflict prevention in practice, there is a long way to go in
translating rhetoric into reality. Menkhaus (2004: 429) stresses that to be effective and comprehensive, a preventive strategy must integrate different types of prevention and differentiate between preventive ‘toolboxes’ that are appropriate for each stage of conflict.

Of the five types of preventive action (structural prevention, early prevention, late prevention, conflict management and peace-building), emphasis should be placed on early prevention. When disputes are close to the point of violence, light or operational prevention comes into play-this is referred to as preventive diplomacy. The effort to resolve conflict at an early stage is at the heart of prevention. It involves identifying the key issues, clearing mistrust and misperceptions and exploring feasible outcomes that bridge the opposing positions of the parties. It is at the early stages of a dispute where preventive measures have the greatest chance of success, but also where preventive diplomacy appears to be the most underdeveloped and underutilized.

**2.6 Preventive Diplomacy**

According to White (1997: 250) from the perspective of world politics as a whole, diplomacy refers to a process of communications that is central to the workings of the international system. If world politics is simply characterized by the tension between conflict and cooperation, diplomacy together with war can be said to represent its two defining institutions. If conflict and cooperation are located at two ends of a spectrum, diplomacy will feature on that spectrum at the cooperation end representing forms of interaction that focuses on the resolution of conflict by negotiation and dialogue. In a fundamental sense, diplomacy is related to the attempt to manage and create some sort of order within a system of world politics; the object being to prevent conflict spilling over into war.

In the post-Cold War era, the evolving interest in preventive diplomacy has been directed at expanding the concept to address a wide variety of different kinds of
conflicts from escalating. This view uttered in the rubric of preventive diplomacy argues, that, rather than trying only to mitigate conflicts when they reach a virtually unmanageable scale, deliberate efforts should be made to keep them from erupting in the first place. The basic logic of preventive diplomacy has become unassailable: act to prevent disputes from escalating or problems from worsening, reduce tensions that if intensified could lead to war and deal with today’s conflicts before they become tomorrow’s crises.

Preventive diplomacy is defined as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (Boutros-Ghali 1992). This tripartite definition thus sees preventive diplomacy as acting at several levels of a conflict. Preventive diplomacy is distinguished from peacemaking which is “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means”, peace enforcement, which refers to “the use of armed force, as under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to contain or end a violent conflict” and peacekeeping which involves efforts to maintain a ceasefire and foster a political settlement as well as the deployment of United Nations and other peacekeeping forces in the field” and from post-conflict peace-building, which involves efforts not only to maintain order, but also, after a settlement is implemented, to increase cooperation among the parties to a conflict and to deepen their relationship by addressing the conditions that led to the dispute, fostering positive attitudes and allaying distrust, and building or strengthening common institutions and processes through which the parties interact and to identify and support such structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. The instruments of preventive diplomacy were defined rather broadly to include, confidence-building measures such as the exchange of military missions, risk reduction centres, information exchanges and monitoring of regional arms control agreements, fact-finding “in accordance with the U.N. Charter, early warning, preventive deployments, that is, inserting armed forces before a crisis develops and demilitarized zones.” (Osler Hampson 2002). Former U.N. Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali broadened and publicized the concept of preventive diplomacy in his report ‘An Agenda for Peace’. His more ambitious approach is rooted not in particular agents, tools of prevention, or kinds of conflict addressed, but in the notion of responding to violent conflicts as they emerge and spread. He foresaw preventive diplomacy acting to limit such conflicts at not one, but several points—or “thresholds”—in their development: very early on, when preventive diplomacy focuses on the basic sources of disputes; later, when it tries to prevent disputes from becoming violent; and much later, when it seeks to contain the expansion of escalated violence.

Preventive diplomacy primarily (but not exclusively) seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out. Peacemaking and peacekeeping seeks to halt conflicts and preserve peace once attained and post-conflict peace-building seeks to prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and people (du Plessis 2003: 14).

Michael Lund (1996:37) defines preventive diplomacy as “action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change.”

Lund (1996:32) stresses that a less ambiguous, more precise definition is needed if the heightened interest in preventing conflict is to produce any policy guidance and a meaningful assessment is to be made of its promise and limitations. A more rigorous definition is required, yet should also be generic and flexible enough to be applicable to different contexts and yet specific enough to be operationalised. Importantly it should also indicate when during the emergence of a conflict situation preventive action is taken. This is the biggest omission in actual attempts at implementing preventive diplomacy in real-time.
African conflicts-the operational aspects related to preventive diplomacy is seldom effectively initiated, seen through and concluded.

The definition as provided by Boutros-Ghali implies conceptually that preventive diplomacy means action to address almost any instance of potential or actual violence. This definition treats the basic causes of disputes (dispute prevention), keeps disputes from becoming violent (violence avoidance), and limits escalation of erupted violence (violence containment) (Lund 2006: 7).

Lund (1996:34) stresses that defining preventive diplomacy to include all these possible entry points into conflict appeals to many constituencies and some conflict analysts, as the definition embraces an extremely broad range of forms of intervention. But from an analytical point of view, associating preventive diplomacy with interventions throughout virtually the entire life span of a conflict-from the causes of a dispute through many possible levels of escalated, sustained violence-makes the concept too broad to be useful and has serious pitfalls. Yet in assessing and considering the role preventive diplomacy has to play in mitigating African conflicts, and the fact that many of Africa’s conflicts have continued, escalated and worsened, despite intense negotiations and the signing of peace agreements, an argument should be made for the implementation of preventive diplomacy at various stages of conflict and not simply at one particular stage in the life cycle of conflict.

The conceptual core of preventive diplomacy has to do with keeping peaceable disputes from escalating unmanageably into sustained levels of violence and significant armed force- in terms of the definition provided by ‘An Agenda for Peace’ ‘to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts’. This essential core could easily be lost if the concept incorporates a host of actions-related and important, but different-that are taken both at very early and at very advanced stages of conflicts.
2.6.1. Sub-types of Preventive Diplomacy

Lund (1996:46) identifies and distinguishes between three varieties or sub-types of preventive diplomacy, namely pre-conflict peace building, pre-emptive engagement and crisis prevention. These differ in terms of the conditions for which they are suited, their tasks, their time frames, and their instruments.

The primary objectives of pre-conflict peace-building are the creation of channels for dispute resolution, to build political institutions, the definition of norms, changing attitudes and reducing the sources of conflict. The intensity of conflict at which this sub-type operates is unstable peace, where it is vital to diffuse political instability, to remove uncertainty, distrust and animosity. Violence is still however possible at this stage (Lund 1996:47). Pre-emptive engagement has as its primary objectives the addressing of specific disputes, channelling grievances into negotiations and attempting to engage the parties. The intensity of the conflict is usually low-level conflict over particular issues, tensions, polarization and violence is still a possibility. Crisis prevention has the objective of blocking violent acts and reducing tensions. The intensity of conflict is at the level of near crisis, low-level violent acts, taking up arms, issuing threats and violence is probable.

Preventive diplomacy as a concept suffers from ambiguity. It is associated with similar concepts including preventive action, preventive deployment, preventive engagement, preventive measures, conflict prevention and crisis prevention. It has usually served as a sub-set of conflict prevention, yet deserves greater attention, and a distinct role to play in dealing with situations of conflict.

Lund (1996) asserts that even when preventive diplomacy is distinguished from peacetime diplomacy, on the one hand, and crisis diplomacy, on the other, it still includes great variety in terms of types, instruments (or “tools”) and those tasked with the implementation of intervention. Peacetime diplomacy is the mode of
diplomacy conducted by states that enjoy more or less stable relations. On the national level, peacetime politics constitutes the governing processes or national politics of more or less stable countries. By and large, a basic order prevails because the parties value preserving order and their relationship more highly than they value the objectives pursued in specific disputes. Thus chances are low that these tensions will rise to a level where parties threaten or use arms, violence or repression as the means for settling emerging disputes. States may also engage in military cooperation to strengthen their security. Crisis diplomacy, or crisis management, lies on the other side of preventive diplomacy conceptually and involves efforts to manage tensions and disputes that are so intense as to have reached the level of confrontation. The threat of force by one or more party is common, and the actual outbreak of hostilities is highly likely.

The key to preventive diplomacy is the timing of its activation in relation to evolving conditions in a given place on the ground. Accordingly, preventive diplomacy is not confined to any particular instrument or agent. In principle, it might involve several types of “functional” activity: diplomatic (in the narrow sense), military, economic, social, political-institutional, judicial-legal and normative-ethical. Preventive actions are needed when peace is unstable and threatens to erupt into violence. In the pre-conflict phase preventive diplomacy can assume different forms in efforts to bloc violent acts (“crisis prevention”), engage parties to cooperation (“pre-emptive engagement”), and promote dispute resolution (“pre-conflict peace-building”).

Preventive diplomacy is possible, yet difficult, but its implementation is deemed necessary (Jentleson 1996). One of the four primary bases to this claim is the opportunities for meaningful response strategies. In the work ‘Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized’ there were specific and identifiable opportunities for the international community to limit, if not prevent, the conflicts. This principle acknowledges that in the case of the conflict in Somalia no amount of preventive diplomacy could have completely pre-empted some level of conflict, but trace a
virtual litany of missed opportunities presenting solid evidence that timely diplomatic interventions at several key junctures might have significantly reduced, defused and contained that violence (Jentleson 2000).

The attractiveness of preventive diplomacy must therefore be contrasted with its feasibility and effectiveness. ‘An Agenda for Peace’ defines preventive diplomacy as “action to prevent disputes between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur”. A main feature of this definition is its focus on the objectives of preventive action and the neglect of its implementation strategies that can be both ethically problematic and politically contested. In Africa, where conflict has wreaked havoc in many states there is an urgent need to move beyond debates over whether preventive diplomacy is possible, difficult or necessary. There is a definite need to evolve the role preventive diplomacy plays, particularly in addressing conflicts in Africa. There is also a need to provide greater substance and value to this role.

From the aforementioned statement, it is clear that a conceptual framework is necessary to provide for an accurate assessment of conflict as well as the key junctures in a conflict’s lifecycle where intervention should be initiated.

2.7 Michael Lund’s Conceptual Framework

As discussed earlier the core and salient issue is the timing and nature of intervention in a situation of conflict. Yet this requires a conceptual framework that can serve as a guideline to understand not only the various stages of conflict, but also a conceptual framework that provides for a clear and concise evaluation of the most optimal phases where intervention could be executed to address a conflict situation.
Michael Lund (1996:37) devised a figure that depicts the place or stage in the full life history of a typical conflict that preventive diplomacy occupies in relation to actions taken at other points in a conflict. (See Table 1).

The need to adopt a conceptual framework that integrates these two aspects is therefore fundamental towards not only understanding conflict, but also to identify the most optimal instruments for intervention and providing for an evaluative component as well to assess the success or failure thereof.

The theoretical framework for this study will be based on Michael Lund’s model of preventive diplomacy. He proposed a model of conflict where at any of these points it would be possible to either continue upward on the scale of conflict, or turn downward, and revert to a lower and more peaceful level. Michael Lund (1996) presents a place or stage in the full life history of a typical conflict that preventive diplomacy occupies in relation to actions taken at other points in a conflict.

This includes the following stages of peace or conflict: War is sustained fighting between organized armed forces. It may vary from low-intensity but continuing conflict or civil anarchy to all-out “hot” war. Crisis is tense confrontation between armed forces that are mobilized and ready to fight and may engage in threats and occasional low-level skirmishes but have not exerted any significant amount of force. The probability of the outbreak of war is high. In national contexts, this condition might involve continuing political violence. Unstable Peace is a situation in which tension and suspicion among parties run high, but violence is either absent or only sporadic. A “negative peace” prevails because although armed force is not deployed, the parties perceive one another as enemies and maintain deterrent military capabilities. A balance of power may discourage aggression, but crisis and war are still possible. Government repression of groups is one domestic variety of this level of conflict.
Closely related to this notion is Johan Galtung’s seminal thinking on the relationship between conflict, violence and peace. As discussed earlier Galtung views conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another. Galtung furthermore provided for a distinction between direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence. Changing conflict behaviour ends direct violence, structural violence is ended by removing structural contradictions and injustices and cultural violence by changing attitudes. Negative peace is the absence of violence of all kinds, but no other form of interaction either. Policies based on the idea of negative peace do not deal with the causes of violence, only its manifestations. Galtung (1996) defined negative peace as the cessation of direct violence. Positive peace in contrast involves the search for positive conditions, which can resolve the underlying causes of conflict that produce violence. Galtung defined positive peace as the overcoming of structural and cultural violence as well.

*Stable (or Cold) Peace* is a relationship of wary communication and limited cooperation within an overall context of basic order or national stability. Value or goal differences exist and no military cooperation is established, but disputes are generally worked out in non-violent, more or less predictable ways. The prospect of confrontation or war is low. Domestic equivalents of this involve national political compacts among competing, sometimes hostile political factions. *Durable (or Warm) Peace* involves a high level of reciprocity and cooperation, and the virtual absence of self-defence measures among parties, although it may include their military alliance against a common threat. A “positive peace” prevails based on shared values, goals and institutions (e.g. democratic political systems and the rule of law), economic interdependence, and a sense of international community. Peaceful, institutionalized settlement of disputes prevails. The domestic form of this stage ranges from processes of national reconciliation to a legitimate constitutional democracy, within which there are shifting political allegiances and a sense of social justice. The possibility of conflict or repression is virtually nonexistent.
According to Lund’s conceptual framework the course of disputes that become violent conflicts is traced in relation to two dimensions: the intensity of conflict (the vertical axis) and the duration of the conflict over time (the horizontal axis). The line depicted in Table 1 that forms an arc from left to right across the diagram portrays the course of a conflict as it rises and falls in intensity over time. As suggested by the arrows that deviate from the line, the course of actual conflicts can exhibit many different long and short life-history trajectories, thresholds, reversals and durations. According to Lund (1996) even conflicts that have abated can re-escalate. The model is said to have heuristic value in allowing analysts to make useful distinctions among the conflict interventions that relate to different levels of intensity.

The far left column of the diagram displays five levels or stages of amicability or animosity (labelled as “Stages of Peace or Conflict”) that can exist among two or more parties. As explained in the legend cited above these five levels (war, crisis, unstable peace, stable (or cold) peace and durable (or warm) peace) delineate gradations in various aspects of the parties’ relationships, such as their awareness of differences and separate identities, political polarization, value congruence, mutual trust and hostile behaviour. All the levels involve some degree of conflict, but of significantly different intensity and forms of expression.

Placed around the outside of the arcing line are widely used terms for various kinds of interventions into conflicts. These terms are arranged in two roughly parallel series: the “P” series (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building) which is generally employed in discussions associated with the United Nations; and the “C” series (conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict management, conflict mitigation, conflict termination and conflict resolution), which is generally preferred in the academic literature of conflict. Either series may be used, provided that it is understood that the terms form sequences of related but different conflict interventions, each applicable to differing stages of a conflict.
2.7.1 Lund’s Preventive Diplomacy “Toolbox”: Policies and Instruments for Preventing Violent Conflicts

As discussed earlier the key to preventive diplomacy is the timing of its activation in relation to evolving conditions in a given place on the ground. Therefore preventive diplomacy is not confined to any particular instrument or agent. The key to whether a tool is used for preventive diplomacy, however, is whether it is being specifically targeted and oriented to places and times where violence or armed force are threatening in the medium-term. Central tasks include suppressing violence, disarming belligerents, addressing the issues in dispute by engaging the parties in dialogue or negotiations, creating or strengthening the procedures and institutions through which such negotiations can be regularized in permanent institutions such as governments and modifying perceptions and feelings of mistrust and suspicion among the parties. Although many situations will call for the performance of all of these tasks, specific circumstances will dictate which tasks have the highest priority. One of the most important factors that determines which tasks are of greatest importance, and thus which instruments and agents are likely to be most needed, is how remote or close at hand the threat of violence is- i.e. the degree of hostility that exists between potential parties to a conflict (Lund 1996:45).

In this respect Lund (1996) has developed a preventive diplomacy ‘toolbox’ consisting of instruments that can be utilized for the prevention of violent conflicts. These include the following salient aspects: Military approaches consist of restraints on the use of armed force that includes arms control regimes, confidence-building measures, non-aggression agreements, preemptive peacekeeping forces (for deterrence and containment), demilitarized zones, arms embargoes, non-offensive defence force postures. The threat or use of armed force consists of deterrence policies, security guarantees, maintaining or restoring local or regional “balances of power”, use or threat of limited shows of force.
It has become conventional wisdom that violent conflict is likely to continue unabated without a renewed and persistent commitment to the elimination of the underlying sources of conflict. What is therefore required is a holistic approach to conflict prevention, management and resolution. In this sense Lund provides a comprehensive approach to addressing conflict.

Non-military approaches consist of two salient aspects. Firstly coercive diplomatic measures (with the use of armed force) consists of diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, moral sanctions, war crimes tribunals. Non-coercive diplomatic measures (without armed force or coercion) consists of non-judicial tools, including international appeals (moral suasion to conflicting parties to urge accommodation), propaganda, fact-finding missions, observer teams, bilateral negotiations between opposed parties, third-party informal diplomatic consultations by official entities, track-two diplomacy, conciliation, third-party mediation, conciliatory gestures and concessions, non-violent strategies, economic assistance or political incentives (to induce parties’ cooperation). Judicial or quasi-judicial measures include mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes, arbitration and adjudication.

Development and governance approaches consist of policies to promote national economic and social development including measures such as preventive economic development aid, economic trade with conflict-prone states or areas, economic integration and society-to-society bilateral cooperative programs. A second crucial aspect is the promulgation and enforcement of human rights, democratic and other standards, which includes political conditionality, international human rights standard setting, election monitoring and military-to-military consultations. The final salient component is national governing structures to promote peaceful conflict resolution. This includes power sharing, consociation, federalism, federation, confederation, autonomy, partition, secession and the creation of trusteeships and protectorates. (Lund 1996:205).
Due to the complexity of the conflict cycle, the preventive diplomacy toolbox needs to be open for alternative thinking and potential expansion and consequently the concept and role of preventive diplomacy should also be redefined and expanded.

According to Leatherman et al (1999:98) it is necessary to extend preventive actions along the entire spectrum of conflict, from latent tensions through the culmination and resolution of conflict to post-conflict peace-building. According to this approach preventive diplomacy is contextualized and its basic objective, the forestalling and reduction of violence, is elaborated in different stages of the conflict as opposed to merely focusing on one specific stage- unstable peace as suggested by the theoretical framework of Lund.

Therefore according to the approach by Leatherman et al (1999:99) the key phases of preventive diplomacy include: conflict prevention that entails preventing violent disputes from arising between parties either by structural, institutional, economic, or cultural remedies, secondly escalation prevention, which entails preventing both the vertical and horizontal escalation of hostilities to more destructive means of warfare and to involve additional actors and thirdly post-conflict prevention entailing the prevention of the re-emergence of disputes by reintegrating and reconstructing the war-torn society. Early prevention of conflict is preferable because it is more feasible; at this stage issues are still specific and more amenable to transformation, the number of parties to the conflict is limited, thus reducing its complexity and early measures are cost-effective.

Lund’s theoretical framework differs from this argument.

Preventive diplomacy would typically commence when tensions in the relationships between parties are in danger of shifting from stable peace to unstable peace or worse. According to Lund (1996:41) it applies then not only to
situations that have seen no recent conflict, but also to post-conflict situations where violence or coercion have been largely terminated but the efforts of post-conflict peace-building are apparently insufficient to move the conflict into stable peace away from the danger of re-escalation. Its aim is to keep actual or potential disputes from taking the form of confrontation or all-out violence and to return them to processes of regular diplomacy or national politics, or a more desirable state of durable peace. But if it fails, and such situations deteriorate into crisis, preventive diplomacy ceases to apply as a concept. At the operational level of conflict prevention, Michael Lund argues that preventive measures are especially effective at the level of unstable peace, which is defined as “a situation where tension and suspicion among parties run high but violence is either absent or only sporadic” (Lund 1996:39). Preventive diplomacy is therefore deemed as being especially operative at the level of unstable peace.

An argument should be made for the utility of preventive diplomacy beyond the narrow confines of Lund’s conceptual framework. Even Lund (2006:9), has acknowledged this and provides an expanded definition that builds upon his original discussion of the concept: “Preventive diplomacy, or conflict prevention, consists of governmental or non-governmental actions, policies, institutions that are taken deliberately to keep particular states or organized groups within them from threatening or using organized violence, armed force, or related forms of coercion such as repression as the means to settle interstate or national political disputes, especially where the existing means cannot peacefully manage the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change. Defined in such a way, preventive diplomacy might be needed either before a new conflict starts or after a violent conflict has abated to avoid relapse.” Clearly Lund asserts that preventive diplomacy could be applied after a violent conflict has already manifested itself, has abated, but where the potential exists for a relapse.
As alluded to earlier classical conflict resolution was mainly concerned with entry into the conflict itself and with how to enable parties to violent conflict to resolve the issues between them in non-violent ways, however the contemporary approach is to take a wider view of the *timing and nature of intervention*. Central to this aspect is identifying this crucial point where intervention in a situation of conflict is feasible. The crucial aspect therefore in assessing any conflict situation relates to *when* intervention should be considered-related to the actual operational aspects of preventive diplomacy in practice.

### 2.7.2 Ripeness Theory- Propitious Conditions for the Implementation of Preventive Diplomacy

The key to preventive diplomacy is the timing of its activation in relation to evolving conditions in a given place on the ground. A particularly important aspect in relation to preventive diplomacy is the timing of intervention. A salient question in this regard is related to the most propitious time in the emergence of a conflict to conduct a preventive effort.

A salient question that requires examination is *when* protracted conflicts are ‘ripe for resolution’. ‘Ripeness of time’ is considered to be the absolute essence of diplomacy, and in the case of preventive diplomacy the core foundation upon which its successful implementation rests.

One of the most influential ideas in the field of conflict management is that conflicts cannot be resolved at just any point in their development but must be “ripe for resolution.” According to this approach, an essential condition making for ripeness is a “mutually hurting stalemate” between the parties to conflict—that is, a point in a conflict where neither party can prevail over the other. Once they recognize that they have reached such a stalemate and cannot achieve their objectives by armed struggle, the parties become more willing to enter into negotiations and there may be a chance for peace. This is not necessarily the
case and if none of the sides is comfortable with the present and can see no way forward to settle the dispute—perhaps fearing further destruction, there is likely to be a moment requiring a change of action (Wallensteen 2007:43). At this point, parties might agree on a ceasefire to reduce losses. In this context it is deemed as limited strategic thinking, where the goals essentially are maintained. A ceasefire, in other words, may slow down the move towards a settlement and, instead, prolong the fighting and is a major obstacle to conflict termination. The hurting stalemate can also be turned into an ‘enticing opportunity’ for a move forward to settlement of a conflict.

Although this theory is said to clearly deal with the advanced stages of conflicts in which armed struggle has been waged for some time, some analysts have suggested that its logic makes preventive diplomacy inherently futile. If disputants refuse to negotiate until they have engaged in significant, albeit fruitless, violence, then attempts to engage them in a peaceful process of settlement before violence has occurred are doomed to failure.

The concept of ripeness for resolution is considerably helpful, as it raises the pertinent question of what conditions may be needed in the relationship of the parties and their circumstances before preventive diplomacy can make headway. Lund (1996:133) however critiques the application of the theory of mutually hurting stalemate to pre-violent stages of conflict as being suspect. Yet considering the following closely related and salient aspect of what is known as a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ may render ripeness theory of particular importance where the successful implementation of preventive diplomacy is concerned.

Closely related to this is the concept of ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS). Two approaches to the study and practice of negotiation can be identified in this context. Here preventive diplomacy, if applied coherently could play a determining role in whether or not conflict is successfully mitigated or exacerbated. One approach and considered to be of longest standing holds that
the key to a successful resolution of conflict lies in the substance of the proposals for a solution. Parties resolve their conflict by finding an acceptable agreement. The other holds that the key to successful conflict resolution lies in the timing of efforts for resolution. Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so- when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties find themselves in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. Ripeness is better conceptualized as being part of a continuum. The conceptions of ripeness have tended to fall into two broad categories. The first group tends to view ripeness in terms of temporal factors related to when within the lifecycle of a dispute mediation is attempted.

Ripeness theory is intended to explain why, and therefore when, parties to a conflict are susceptible to their own or others’ efforts to turn the conflict toward resolution through negotiation. The concept of a ‘ripe moment’ centres on the parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate, optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe. The notion behind the concept is that, when parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them, they seek a way out (Zartman 2006:102). There must however be a way out for both of the parties- the weaker as well as the stronger. This line of argument gives a particularly important role to outside powers. They can point to the existence of a stalemate and a danger of catastrophe in the near future, also known as a ‘precipice’. The calculations that accompany the decision-making of the warring parties are by necessity, complex.

The other element necessary for a ripe moment is less complex and controversial: the perception of a way out. Therefore if two parties to a conflict perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution. The ripe moment is however necessarily a perceptual event, not one that stands alone in objective reality. It can be resisted so long as the parties in question refuse or
otherwise are able to block out that perception. A stalemate therefore exists in the minds of the leaders. If it is reflected on the battlefield, in the form of trenches and unbreakable defensive lines, there is a stalemate in the war and it might be the right opportunity to interject ideas of conflict resolution. It may come, for instance, right after one side has tried and failed to break the military stalemate with an offensive. The rational calculations are difficult to consider and see from the outside. At a certain moment in time, it may be possible to argue rationally for a continuation of war as well as a search for peace. This makes it difficult at any one particular time to determine, with some certainty, that there is a ripe moment (Wallensteen 2007:44).

However the same calculations can pull the equation in a different direction. In a negotiation, a party may therefore have alternative recourse to action that remains outside the realm of the talks. Rational calculations attempt to apply a specific timing to the resolution of conflicts- it attempts to specify when a conflict can be brought to an agreed ending. From a rational calculation perspective the urgency of solving a conflict, using the ripe moment, may be lost and hence timing is considered crucial. Opportunities should be seized, particularly in a situation where a war is ongoing (Wallensteen 2007:45).

An extension of the notion of ripeness to the relations between enduring rivals offers significant intuitive appeal. Enduring rivalries are among the most dangerous and conflict-prone dyads in the international system. As a result, developing means to aid conflict prevention and management between long-term rivals is a critical goal. The very nature of enduring rivalries, with their legacy of mutual distrust and pain, makes conflict prevention and conflict management more difficult to achieve than in other types of disputes (Greig 2006: 264).

The second group conceives of ripeness in terms of contextual factors related to the dispute and the relationship between the disputants. In this context Greig (2006:264) identifies a number of contextual factors that influence the prospects
for mediation success. One of the most salient aspects is the level of threat, both inside and outside the rivalry, perceived by the rivals is likely to have a powerful influence on the degree to which rivals are open to international mediation efforts. The powerful effect of past experiences between enduring rivals is a fundamental feature of enduring rivalries. As a result, the specific (and correct) timing of mediation attempts within the lifecycle of an enduring rivalry is likely to have a strong effect on the likelihood of mediation success.

Perceptual aspects are increasingly problematic in relation to the successful implementation of preventive diplomacy. In this context social-psychological approaches to conflict resolution can play a vital role in cultivating the perception of a way out and thus the viability of conflict termination and ultimately reaching a sustainable peace settlement.

An analogous notion of “ripeness for prevention” may apply to early stages of conflicts, even to their pre-violent stages. A party may be open to preventive efforts only after it has both asserted its interests and encountered some level of resistance to its pursuit of its cause. Preventive diplomacy should however also avoid action that is either too little, too late or too much, too soon.

Lund asserts that preventive action can be taken too early. Conflicts at their early stages must contain certain ingredients before violence becomes possible. At a minimum they require discrete parties who are conscious of possessing common interests, which they perceive at risk because of the actions of other parties, particular disputes over issues that reflect this clash of interests and assertive statements or activity by the parties to realize their interests. Preventive action is best launched at points where there already exists sufficient interest and motivation on the part of the disputants to seek a peaceful resolution, yet not so early that the disputants are incited to intensify their confrontation. Early action is vital if violence is to be pre-empted and the disputants are not to entrench
themselves in rigid positions from which it is difficult to withdraw (Lund 1996:135).

2.7.3 The Nature of Intervention

The nature of the intervention is another crucial and related aspect that works in coordination with the timing. Central to the conduct of preventive diplomacy, this issue according to Lund is often dealt with implicitly rather than explicitly. A more synoptic and inter-organizational approach to developing preventive interventions is required. In considering possible options for action, an important step is often omitted. A salient question that should be asked from the outset is- “what is the problem on the ground?” Rather than invoke familiar remedies simply because they are convenient or available, policymakers and practitioners should proceed inductively, working from the ground up to tailor a response that meets the particular circumstances of each conflict situation. The first-step in tactical preventive diplomacy is needs assessment-closely scrutinizing the pre-conflict situation in order to devise appropriate responses to avoid the onset of violent conflict.

Disputes become violent or peaceful depending on one or more of the following six deficiency or need factors. Firstly, there is lack of restraints on violence where few limitations restrict the ability of parties to resort to armed force. Secondly, there is a lack of a process, where no procedures or institutions exist through which a dispute can be discussed and solutions sought. Thirdly, a lack of resources exist, where parties lack the material wherewithal in any effort to keep the dispute from worsening. A lack of solutions exists, where parties lack proposals for settling the issues that divide them. Another major aspect is related to a lack of incentives, where parties lack sufficient motivation to accept any of the solutions. Finally a lack of trust is present, where the perceptions and attitudes of the parties toward each other are so negative that they are unable to contemplate particular solutions or to comply with them (Lund 1996:140).
crucial oversight in the application of successful preventive diplomacy is the failure to carry out a precise inductive needs assessment in alerting those who would seek to prevent escalation of a specific dispute to the particular configuration of problems where preventive action is required.

An especially powerful factor in pre-conflict situations that assists in determining which positive or negative inducements suit which circumstances is how remote or close at hand a threat of violence is, or the degree of cooperation or hostility that exists between parties to a conflict. The greater the use of or the inclination to use armed force by the parties to the dispute, the more preventive force would have to be applied. Yet the often unexplored aspect is why there is such a propensity and inclination to continue resorting to armed force when more amenable means of resolving goal incompatibilities exist?

2.8 A Critique of Lund’s Theoretical Framework

Lund’s theoretical framework is vastly superior to many other theoretical frameworks that evaluate conflict. It provides an actual analysis of the various stages of conflict and which methods of prevention should be applied at a specific stage. It therefore focuses on the key aspect in responding to conflict situations—the timing and nature of intervention. Lund (1996:51) stresses that very few articles or scholarly research have investigated what kinds of policies or actions prevent conflicts and under what conditions. Descriptive materials elaborate considerably about preventive programs and actions carried out, by whom, and in which countries or regions. Yet they remain silent with regards to the critical evaluation of the results of these activities and initiatives. Lund therefore rightly asserts that a vast gulf exists between praxis-theory and actual implementation on the ground. In social sciences almost all empirical research on conflicts deals with their advanced violent stages, their basic causes and the problem of managing, containing or terminating them. Accordingly Lund (1996:52) stresses that very little research discusses how manifest conflicts
develop out of their latent sources and how they could be potentially prevented.

Lund acknowledges that ethnic conflict is receiving growing attention, but the research is often overly generic rather than grounded in specific cases. When individual conflicts are assessed it is usually confined to the enumeration of their sociological and cultural sources and describes their politics, but as static factors; it does not trace the dynamics of their emergence or solution. Little empirical analysis exists that closely looks at specific processes through which these conflicts grow and the types of interventions that might avert their escalation. Some scholars are starting to look closely at the incipient stages of ethnic conflicts and related crises such as genocide in order to develop early warning indicators and conflict models. Yet these analyses thus far have more to say about the origins of potential conflicts as opposed to the measures to be taken in order to avert them. Lund (1996:53) also highlights that pertinent theoretical frameworks provide promising hypotheses about conflict escalation, but these theories have not been rigorously tested in real-world instances of post-Cold War conflicts. Therefore greater attention should be afforded to the critical evaluative issues of conflict prevention itself-what factors account for effective prevention? How can conflict prevention, notably preventive diplomacy be improved in order to guarantee successful intervention without the prospect of a relapse, or total degeneration into war and violence? Which considerations should be included and should form an integral part in conflict prevention? Lund (1996:82) stresses that perhaps the most important question to which policymakers and practitioners need answers involves the issue of effectiveness, namely do preventive efforts actually make a difference, or does the non-escalation of disputes have little to do with deliberate preventive action? If preventive diplomacy does have an impact, why?

An aspect that is often underestimated in terms of needs assessment is the lack of trust that could undermine progress in the entire preventive diplomatic effort.
and most importantly of all a lack of understanding of the structural and underlying causes of Africa’s conflicts.

2.8.1 Shortcomings in Lund’s Theoretical Framework- Advocating the Inclusion of Social- Psychological Approaches to Preventive Diplomacy

Although Lund’s conceptual framework provides a valuable insight into the theory of preventive diplomacy and the salience of the position it occupies in relation to conflict, an additional theoretical consideration may be included into his assessment. Lund’s theoretical framework fails to address the impact psychological variables and prevailing conflict attitudes may exert on a conflict situation.

As alluded to earlier the concept of ripe moment as conceptualized by Zartman, centres on the parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate, optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe. The other element necessary for a ripe moment is said to be less complex and controversial: the *perception* of a way out. Therefore if two parties to a conflict perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution. The ripe moment is however necessarily a perceptual event, not one that stands alone in objective reality. It can be resisted so long as the parties in question refuse or otherwise are able to block out that perception. Lund’s theoretical framework stresses that preventive diplomacy would typically commence when tensions in the relationships between parties are in danger of shifting from stable peace to unstable peace or worse. But if it fails, and such situations deteriorate into crisis, preventive diplomacy ceases to apply as a concept. Lund’s theoretical framework therefore remains silent with regards to providing an effective response to a situation where perceptual aspects are impeding the successful implementation of preventive diplomacy and ultimately the successful conclusion of a peace agreement and the return to a situation of durable and ‘positive peace’.
Furthermore Lund’s theoretical framework remains relatively silent on the adverse effect psychological drivers of conflict can have on preventive diplomacy and how preventive diplomacy is equipped (or not equipped) to deal with this often-underestimated component that often accompanies and exacerbates conflict. This may render the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy at the level of unstable peace obsolete if it fails to take prevailing conflict attitudes into account. The specific and constructive role that preventive diplomacy could play in African conflicts may furthermore be rendered useless if there is not a deeper and more profound understanding of the psychological make-up of the African state and security environment that could in turn play an obstructive role in addressing conflict if and when it arises. Lund’s approach has been an attempt to create a theoretical framework that could be applicable to any and all conflict situations, irrespective of their location, without taking cognizance of the important fact that each conflict situation, while characterized by similar patterns of violence, have vastly different origins, trigger factors, circumstances and complexities that require different approaches and remedial efforts and a preventive diplomacy tailor-made to the dynamics of each conflict situation. This is particularly important in assessing the complex African security environment.

2.8.2 The Complex Security Dynamic in Africa – A Barrier to Preventive Diplomacy?

The key characteristics of contemporary warfare in Africa reveal what Jackson (2006:19) describes as the profound disjuncture between traditional security analyses and the kind of approaches that are needed for excavating the real causes of Africa’s wars.

Africa’s wars have been characterized to a large extent by the involvement of a multiplicity and diversity of military and non-military actors, namely government military formations, rebels, insurgents, private militias, warlords, criminal gangs, mercenaries, child soldiers and a plethora of other external actors who exert
some or other form of influence (albeit it positive or negative) in conflict situations in a particular country. In addition these actors are often embedded in highly complex ‘war networks’ (or what can be described as a ‘regional conflict complex’), that straddle territorial boundaries, identity and ethnic groups. The notion of purely civil or internal wars is no longer sustainable; most African wars are actually regional conflict formations, with added global connections and influences.

The purported aims of the protagonists in Africa’s wars are also defying simple categorization. The multiplicity of participants translates into a multiplicity of objectives. While some groups may articulate genuine political grievances, or seek state power or self-determination, others pursue ethno-nationalist or religious goals, such as ethnically or religiously pure political communities or the maintenance of elite power (Jackson 2006:20). Simultaneously local actors may be engaged in struggles to gain access to critical resources, such as water, land, grazing rights or security. In some instances violence is transformed from instrument to objective, that is, from a means to an end, to an end in itself.

Extending these analyses, more openly constructivist approaches start with a salient question too often ignored by security studies scholars: what makes ordinary people acquiesce to or participate in political violence directed against those they once coexisted peacefully with? Constructivist ontology suggests that the causes of war lie in the deliberate creation of a society-wide ‘conflict discourse’ by political, military and ethnic entrepreneurs that structures knowledge and action (Jackson 2006:24). These elites monopolise politics, media, academia, religion and popular culture, using them to reconstruct political and social discourses towards hatred, inter-group conflict and ultimately war. The main features of these discourses include: identity construction and the creation of an ‘other’; creating or drawing upon a discourse of victim-hood and grievance; creating a discourse of imminent threat and danger to the political community;
and overcoming social and cultural inhibitions and norms that prohibit interpersonal violence.

Conflict is a multi-faceted process and not one amenable to simple explanation. From state-controlled warfare to psychological brutality, there is a wide range of social, economic, political and personal factors that account for what is taken to be a single phenomenon. Equally the question of cause and effect, and of possible motivation, invites careful consideration (Chabal 2005:2). The issue of why force is meted out, collectively or individually, is always intricate, even if its consequences are plain to behold.

The extent of violence experienced in Africa today raises the question of rationality in two distinct ways as discussed by Chabal (2005:10). Firstly, can such a degree of violence ultimately serve any purpose? Secondly, are the types of particularly violent conflicts currently witnessed in a number of countries evidence of ‘irrational’ behaviour or, evidence of the behaviour of ‘irrational’ people?

The crux as Chabal (2005:10) contends is whether the type and range of conflict found on the continent can be explained in terms of power or whether there are other processes at work that would invalidate a political approach to the question. Anthropologists, economists, psychologists and even sociologists may contend that a number of individual and collective cases of violent conflict on the African continent cannot simply be reduced to mere political explanations only. Chabal (2005:13) does however stress that although it would be simplistic to claim that all violence in Africa can be attributed to politically instrumental reasons, it is unwise to neglect the political roots of present conflict processes.

Orthodox analyses of Africa’s wars have only been capable of providing limited understandings of their causes and characteristics. Moreover as Jackson (2006:25) stresses that the failure of effective conflict analysis has too often
resulted in remedial bankruptcy: misconceiving the deeper causes of Africa’s wars, practitioners have repeatedly applied unsuitable or ultimately damaging solutions to conflict settlements. The conceptual failure of conflict analysis has presaged the normative failure of conflict resolution. The true nature of Africa’s wars suggests that conflict management has become wholly insufficient as a durable solution to endemic violence. What is required is the prioritisation of preventive and transformative approaches to conflict resolution. Therefore it is necessary to explore the important role preventive diplomacy can play in addressing conflict in Africa, well beyond the traditional narrow confines that have been accorded to its place and role in the life cycle of conflict. It is furthermore important that a comprehensive understanding is present in any strategy of preventive diplomacy as to the pervasive influence conflict attitudes can assume in situations of violent conflict and this understanding should form an intricate part of preventive diplomatic efforts that are initiated.

It has therefore become a critical exercise to conduct an in-depth analysis of the structural causes of conflict in order to construct effective responses to prevent it, manage it, ultimately to transform it and subsequently to eliminate or mitigate the circumstances that facilitate the development and outbreak of violent conflict.

Furthermore – and one of the salient aspects this dissertation will address- is that the analysis of politics and conflict in Africa, it should be added, is impossible without a wide-ranging, or inter-disciplinary, framework, making use of the insights provided by other social sciences. Violence and conflict in Africa are still amenable to rational analysis and there can be no successful conflict prevention, resolution or transformation, unless the structural causes of violence are properly understood and taken into account.

The structuralist school places considerable importance on the dynamics of conflict and the interests of the parties, arguing that mediated interventions that are not timed to coincide with hurting stalemates run a real risk of failure. There
is general consensus that ripeness is more of a cultivated and not just an inherited condition (Crocker et al 1999:25). In fact, mediators can deploy a myriad of techniques and measures to foster the ripening process in order to move the parties from a hurting stalemate to a political settlement. In addition to timing, it is crucial to have a strategy of peacemaking and mediation, to know how to move the parties, to have a sense of how they can be engaged in a process and to understand the dynamics of the conflict cycle and the point at which the mediator decides to enter it.

Therefore the need to utilize a synthesis of perspectives or paradigms is pronounced. The trouble however with establishing paradigms, is that they rarely translate well into reality. Another shortcoming of paradigms is that they can imply that one approach will be more successful than the others in dealing with all of the issues and events of the conflict cycle. The fact that more than one set of factors are at play in any given conflict argues against an intervention strategy that is directed at a single cause or at alleviating only one set of social or political pressures. It seems more useful to envision intervention as a coordinated series of concurrent and consecutive strategies directed towards the long-term goal of resolving the conflict.

A critical omission, therefore in Lund’s theoretical framework is particularly related to the absence of social-psychological approaches in his preventive diplomacy toolbox. The inclusion of social-psychological approaches is critical to revealing the deep fissures that often exist, persist and exacerbate a conflict situation, despite the signing of peace agreements. The failure to consider psychological drivers of conflict could potentially render the use of any other approaches in preventing violent conflict obsolete, even futile and could undermine the successful conclusion of a peace agreement.

According to Solomon (n.d:233) unfortunately the various interventions in the DRC conflict have been characterized by third-party attempts to arrive at paper
peace agreements as quickly as possible. The psychology of diplomacy, though, teaches us that the process of reaching an agreement is often more important than the agreement itself.

2.9 Understanding The Psychology of Preventive Diplomacy- The need to incorporate Social-Psychological Approaches

The dissertation will propose the inclusion of an additional dimension to complement Lund’s model, by examining how psychological variables fuel conflicts as developed by C.R. Mitchell (1981). According to Mitchell parties involved in a conflict situation are likely to possess complex cognitions and evaluations about themselves and the opposing party and the environment within which the conflict situation arises. These complex cognitions and evaluations necessitate a more detailed consideration of the nature of conflict attitudes, their causes, common features, the way in which they affect various forms of conflict behaviour, and the way in which they affect the negotiation process and act as a hindrance in efforts at finding a durable solution to conflict.

Azar (1990:10) furthermore drew on research by influential scholars such as Mitchell (1981) to trace the process by which mutually exclusionary experiences, fears and belief systems generate reciprocal negative images, which perpetuate communal antagonisms and solidify protracted social conflict. Antagonistic group histories, exclusionist myths, demonising propaganda and dehumanising ideologies serve to justify discriminatory policies and legitimise atrocities. In these circumstances a dynamic similar to the ‘security dilemma’ emerges whereby actions are mutually interpreted in the most threatening light, the worst motivations tend to be attributed to the other side, the space for compromise and accommodation shrinks and proposals for political solutions become rare, and tend to be perceived on all sides as mechanisms for gaining relative power and control (Azar 1990:15 in Ramsbotham et al 2005:88).
According to Solomon (n.d: 231) one of the major omissions in many of the activities around preventive diplomacy relates to those variables relating to personality and psychology. This, according to Solomon is a damning omission, given the fact that there is a burgeoning literature that graphically illustrates the importance of psychological determinants for those engaging in preventive diplomacy. Holsti (1983:405), for instance, notes that ‘attitudes and psychological predispositions typically surround any serious conflict or crisis.’ Jones (1988:238) illustrates how facts are a peculiar ordering of reality according to one’s own personal bias, which in turn, is determined by certain psychological drivers.

Within the often narrowly-defined ambit of diplomacy, the psychology of political relations between states (and adversaries to conflict) is rarely touched upon or explored in a more in-depth nature (Seldowitz 2004: 47). Diplomats and negotiators rarely consider the importance of psychology to their interactions with parties to a conflict situation, and rarely is consideration accorded to the behaviour of states or their leaders and the significance this may hold for the overall outcomes and success of peace negotiations.

As Seldowitz (2004:48) contends even a cursory analysis of attempts to resolve regional conflicts indicates that diplomats and negotiators involved in peace talks often ignore psychological factors of conflicts at their own peril. In Africa this has led to the failure of many peace agreements that appeared to have dealt with all aspects that lead to conflict.

Psychology plays two related but different roles in international affairs. Psychological factors influence what states or their leaders believe is important. In other words, during substantive negotiations psychology plays a decisive role in determining the objectives of the sides. An understanding of the other parties’ perceptions and outlook can provide valuable insight into how to approach negotiations. Furthermore nations, like individuals possess their own characteristics, patterns of behaviour and historical context that in essence
shapes the psyche of a nation. Therefore states are inclined to react based on these inherent beliefs and perceptions that may or may not have been shaped by past experiences that were traumatic, caused trauma, fear or considerable suspicion and enmity. Thus, what might seem as a rational compromise that protects both sides’ vital interests to an outside mediator may well be perceived differently by the parties themselves (Seldowitz 2004:48).

There is also a vastly different approach adopted by psychologists and diplomats to abnormal behaviour. The primary task of the diplomat in this respect is to ascertain whether the abnormal behaviour is the product of a particular leader or reflects ideas shared by a large segment of the population (Seldowitz 2004:49). The reaction to abnormal behaviour is also a particular feature of diplomacy, whereby diplomats attempt try to turn another state’s abnormal behaviour to their advantage, or at worst view it as something that must be overcome gradually. Attempts to change deeply-rooted behaviour is usually reserved for long-term programmes intended to slowly change popular attitudes. This is often a critical omission that deeply affects the successful implementation of a peace agreement.

International conflict is a process driven by collective needs and fears, rather than being entirely a product of rational calculation of objective national interests on the part of political decision makers (Kelman 2004:59). International conflict is also is an interactive process with an escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic, not merely a sequence of action and reaction by stable actors. When discussing the concept of conflict, perception should also be included as a central concept since the conflicts and the opponent’s intentions often are defined according to subjective perceptions. There could be an abundance of space for agreement in a conflict, but if the parties perceive the conflict as being impossible to resolve or the opponent to be untrustworthy this might not help in resolving the conflict (Swanström and Weissman 2005).
The step-by-step approach to conflict transformation refers to the process of ‘confidence-building’ measures. In this context perceptions exist that the conflict has engendered such a level of mistrust, suspicion, and extreme perceptions between conflicting parties that a realistic process must start with very small but clearly coordinated measures that indicate ‘good faith’ and an interest in pursuing a change in the conflict from war to negotiations (Lederach 1995: 203). To ensure the success of preventive diplomacy there may be a need to address deep-rooted suspicions regarding outcome and ultimate motives in order to secure a mutually satisfactory outcome.

Closely related to this is the second paradigm of third-party intervention in conflict, which focuses on the processes of communication and exchange as a way to change perceptions and attitudes (Crocker et al 1999:22).

The social-psychological study of conflict is characterized not so much by the nature of the conflicting units it studies, as by its approach to conflict. This approach is distinguished by its focus on the interplay between psychological and social processes. It is concerned with the perceptions, beliefs, and values of the conflicting units as well as their actualities; these may or may not correspond. It is concerned with how the social realities of the parties in conflict affect their perceived and experienced realities and how the psychological realities of the conflicting parties affect the development of their social realities (Deutsch & Shichman 1986:220).

The social psychological perspective on conflict highlights the possibility of discrepancy between the objective and the perceived state of affairs. Recognition of this possibility suggests a typology of conflicts that emphasizes the relationship between the two. Such an emphasis leads to specification of the types of distortion that can occur, including the non-recognition of real conflicts of interest as well as their displacement and misattribution (Deutsch & Shichman 1986:220). Under certain conditions a large conflict may seem so potentially
dangerous that it exerts a strong pressure to reach agreement. To reduce the size and intensity of conflict, one may diminish the perceived opposition between the parties in values and interests through emphasizing common super ordinate goals and through the techniques of controlled communication. (Deutsch and Shichman 1986:222). These techniques essentially assume that perceived opposition can be reduced if the conflicting parties can be led to see how much they have in common, if their differences can be seen in the context of their similarities and agreements. They also commonly assume that perceived differences will decrease if misunderstandings are eliminated through improved, open, full and direct communication between the parties. Sometimes, however, the removal of misunderstanding sharpens the awareness of conflicting interests or beliefs, an awareness that had been beclouded by benevolent misunderstandings (Deutsch and Shichman 1986:222).

In certain instances controlling the importance of what is perceived to be at stake in a conflict may prevent the conflict from taking a destructive course. Furthermore cooperation induces and is induced by a perceived similarity in beliefs and attitudes, openness in communication, an attitude of trust, sensitivity to common interests and orientation toward enhancing mutual power rather than power differences (Deutsch & Shichman 1986:227).

High-intensity social conflicts are of particular importance, wherein disputes have a tendency to expand and escalate so that they become independent of their initiating causes. A number of key elements include an anarchic social situation, a win-lose or competitive orientation, internal conflicts (within each of the parties) that express themselves through external conflicts, cognitive rigidity, misjudgements and misperceptions that lead to distorted views that may perpetuate conflict, unwitting commitments, whereby the parties not only become overcommitted to rigid positions but also become committed, unwittingly to the beliefs, defences and investments involved in carrying out their conflictual activities, self-fulfilling prophecies, vicious escalating spirals, and finally
gamesmanship orientation, which turns the conflict away from issues of what in real life is being won or lost to an abstract conflict over images of power (Crocker et al. 1999:23).

The social-psychological approach to mediation centres on providing a forum in which parties can explore options and develop solutions, often outside the highly charged arena of a formal negotiating structure. The approach also involves appeals to superordinate goals and values. It plays on the parties’ aspiration for legitimacy and their desire to be part of the broader political community.

In this approach, the use of moral suasion and symbolic rewards or gestures is important. To this school, the establishment of a dialogue, of a pattern of exchanges and contacts between and among official parties or other influential representatives, helps set the stage for a lasting peace built on an agreement developed by the parties in a collaborative process.

A key to this process is often the involvement in the dialogue not just of the principal political authorities but of a wider group of civil and opinion leaders whose support is essential for the long-term sustainability of the peace process.

One of the driving assumptions behind the social-psychological approach is that although parties identify specific issues as the causes of conflict, conflict also reflects subjective, phenomenological, and social fractures and, consequently, analyzing “interests” can be less important than identifying the underlying needs that govern each party’s perception of the conflict (Crocker et al. 1999:23). Because much of human conflict is anchored in conflicting perceptions and in misperception, the contribution of third parties lies in changing the perceptions, attitudes, values, and behaviours of the parties to a conflict.

Social-psychological approaches stress the importance of changing attitudes and the creation of new norms in moving parties toward reconciliation. Early
intervention, according to this formulation, is preferable because once relations have deteriorated because of violence, and attitudes are embedded in “we-they” images of the enemy, it becomes much more difficult for mediators to move the parties toward sober reflection about their real-world choices and to change perceptions (Crocker et al 1999:25). According to Crocker et al (1999) it seems more useful to envision intervention as a coordinated series of concurrent and consecutive strategies directed towards the long-term goal of resolving the conflict. The social-psychological approach concurs with the assessment of Lund that most conflicts- even protracted ones-have a life cycle of their own, characterized by various phases or stages. These include a period of rising tension between or among parties, followed by confrontation, the outbreak of violence, and the escalation of military hostilities.

During these various phases or stages of conflict, the intensity of the security dilemma among rival communal groupings is likely to vary. Parties will tend to feel more secure in their relations with other groupings when the level of violence is low, formal ties exist between different groups, and institutionalized channels of communication, though perhaps frayed, are still available. At this stage of the conflict cycle, there may well be more chances for mediation because attitudes and perceptions have not hardened and parties are still willing to talk to each other (Crocker et al 1999:26). As violence increases, different groups start to arm themselves, and factions become increasingly aware of the real-power asymmetries that exist between themselves and other groups, the security dilemma will become more acute and the desire for peaceful and cooperatively based strategies of conflict will weaken.

The notion of a conflict cycle suggests that while the level of violence is low (a condition that may occur at the beginning and at the end of a conflict cycle), there are greater opportunities for a variety of mediators to engage both the parties and the larger society in a wide range of activities. These conditions, however, present fewer opportunities for a real movement toward settlement on disputed
issues. As one approaches higher levels of violence, the opportunities for mediators to engage the parties may diminish, but the likelihood of mediation success, that is, helping the parties to negotiate an agreement, may well increase as the conflict reaches a plateau or what Zartman calls a hurting stalemate (Crocker et al 1999:27). Lund’s theoretical framework identifies where preventive diplomacy would be most effectively applied, yet fails to distinguish between the varying nature of the level of violence and the potential barriers to entry that could be experienced as depicted in the following table by Crocker et al (1999:28) (See Table 2). This model clearly identifies the level of violence, the number of potential entry points, the potential barriers to entry and the opportunity to exercise procedural control. It is clear that as the level of violence rises, the number of potential entry points in a conflict situation declines as perceptions and attitudes are hardening. The barriers to entry are increasing as parties perceive increasing risks of negotiation, coupled with status and legitimacy concerns. As a situation of high levels of violence transpires, the number of potential entry points into a conflict situation is even less, as “we-they” images of the enemy have hardened. Furthermore the barriers to entry are high as parties are locked into a continuing struggle. Therefore although a peace agreement has been formally signed, the underlying issues that led to conflict in the first place, as well as the accompanying tensions and suspicions and deeply-entrenched hatreds and enmity amongst parties may continue to persist.

Although both realist approaches to conflict management as discussed earlier are based on a model of conflict-the security dilemma—that is, in essence, psychological, the means and methods that both types of realists identify to manage conflict and restore political order are not (Osler Hampson 2001:395). Therefore none of the aforementioned approaches address the issue of dealing with the psychological origins of conflict and the “embedded enemy images” which are a serious obstacle to managing conflict and reducing tensions. Practitioners arguing for a greater consideration of psychological aspects argue that peace-building is about changing attitudes and that attitudinal change
requires a change in the procedures, roles and structures of the disputing parties, including the development of institutional capacity at the local or communal level for dealing with conflict (Osler Hampson 2001:396). Attitudinal change can be fostered through special problem-solving workshops and/or third-party assistance in developing and designing other kinds of dispute resolution systems that are compatible with local culture and norms and are directed at elites at different levels (top, middle range, and grassroots) in society.

The problem-solving workshop, pioneered by John Burton and Herbert Kelman, is based on the assumption that conflict is a subjective, phenomenological, and social process. It takes issue with the ripeness thesis about hurting stalemates on the grounds that, because conflict is essentially a matter of perceptions, third-parties have to work on changing the perceptions, attitudes, values, and behaviours of the parties to a conflict. Ripeness, in other words, does not emerge automatically. It has to be cultivated with the assistance of third parties who help the parties to a conflict reach a better understanding of the dimensions of the conflict and the joint strategies required for a mutually acceptable solution (Osler Hampson 2001:396). The problem-solving workshop attempts to change the process of interaction among conflicting parties. Problem solving seeks to open channels of communication between the parties, allowing both sides to see their respective intentions more clearly and to be more aware of their own reactions to the conflict.

Thus, a social-psychological perspective-without denying the importance of objectively anchored national interests, the primacy of the state in the international system, the role of power in international relations and the effect of structural factors in determining the course of an international conflict-enriches the analysis in a variety of ways by firstly exploring the subjective factors that set constraints on rationality and by conceiving international conflict as a dynamic process, shaped by changing realities, changing interests, and changing relationships between the conflicting parties (Kelman 2004:59). International or
ethnic conflict must therefore be conceived as a process in which collective human needs and fears are acted out in powerful ways. Such conflict is typically driven by non-fulfilment or threats to the fulfilment of basic needs. In this context needs include very centrally, such psychological needs as identity, security, recognition, autonomy, self-esteem and a sense of justice (Kelman 2004:60). Closely related to these central needs in inter-group conflict situations are fears about the denial of needs- fears focusing on perceived threats to security or identity. Needs for identity and security and similarly powerful collective needs, and the fears and concerns about survival associated with them, are often important causal factors in inter-group and inter-communal conflict (Kelman 2004:60).

The causes of conflict generally combine objective and subjective factors, which are related to each other in continually circular fashion. Conflicts therefore focusing on issues such as territory and resources almost invariably reflect and further magnify underlying concerns about security and identity. Whatever their role in the causation of a conflict, subjective forces linked to basic needs and existential fears contribute heavily to its escalation and perpetuation. It is such needs and fears that often create resistance to change, even in those situations in which both parties, or significant elements of both parties, have come to the conclusion that it is in their best interest to put an end to conflict. Despite this perceived interest, the parties are often unable to extricate themselves from the escalatory dynamic in which they are caught up. This is often the greatest omission of virtually any and all strategies of preventive diplomacy that are implemented and why these strategies are often doomed to failure. Therefore one of the critical objectives of conflict resolution is the elimination of violent and destructive manifestations of conflict, fuelled and exacerbated by persistent negative conflict attitudes.

In this context key psychological obstacles exist to the detriment of preventive diplomacy’s effective functioning eschewing the positive role it can play,
especially in the African context (Wessells 2004:80). Psychologically, the changing nature of a conflict poses significant challenges to preventive diplomacy. Even following a ceasefire or the signing of a peace agreement, communities on the ground remain deeply divided, harbouring lingering hatreds, and confronting persistent structural causes of violence that may not have been adequately addressed by the signing of a peace agreement.

Preventive diplomacy has not been successfully applied in resolving conflicts in Africa, and will continue to fail, unless greater emphasis is placed on structural prevention, that includes an assessment and strategy for responding to underlying sources of conflict that frequently produce negative conflict attitudes and consequently further conflict and violence. This study will argue that preventive diplomacy initiatives when taken alone and independently of a broader strategy of conflict prevention are likely to fail unless they are linked to measures and actions that tackle the deeper or structural causes of conflict.

Further consideration of the conflict triangle introduced by Johan Galtung provides a helpful analytical tool in this respect. Reviewing Galtung's thesis in retrospect however reveals salient aspects that are potentially instructive for the theory of preventive diplomacy too. It suggests that a conflict moves among the triangle's three corners, where corner A refers to conflict attitudes, B to conflict behaviour, and C to the conflict or contradiction itself (the incompatibility). A conflict sequence can begin in any of these corners. In later writings, Galtung gives somewhat more emphasis to C as a more frequent-or even logical-starting point. The dynamics are still most important, however even expressed in terms of conflicts having life-cycles.

A conflict has its own life-cycle. It appears, reaches an emotional, even (and often) violent climax, then tapers off, disappears- and more often than not reappears. The spiral of hatred and violence becomes a meta-conflict, over the goals of preserving and destroying. Meta-conflicts take on their own lives,
overshadowing the root conflict in the incompatibility, contradiction. In this way Galtung (2000:8) contends that a conflict develops an almost external character, vexing and waning, disappearing and reappearing. The original, root, conflict recedes into the background. Conflicts may combine, in series or parallel, into complex conflict formations with many parties and many goals, because the same parties and/or the same goals are involved.

Galtung furthermore contends a need to consider a third dimension to the three components of conflict, consisting of C, contradiction, the root of the conflict, A, reflecting attitudes and B, behaviour. The basic thesis, is that conflict work done only on focusing on aspects of A (attitudes) and B (behaviour) is superficial (described by Galtung as a “band-aid approach”). There is no alternative but to work on the root of the conflict, the contradiction itself.

In this context Galtung proposes the inclusion of a third dimension—depth. In this context it is necessary to consider and assess the existence of deep contradictions, deep attitudes and deep behaviour.

In conflict deep contradictions and fault lines can be distinguished. The basic premise of this argument is that underneath all contradictions between parties to conflicts are deep contradictions that steer the surface contradictions in the conflict struggle. In considering deep attitudes Galtung observes that underneath attitudes are deep attitudes—assumptions and axioms. By de-individualizing we are presented with deep culture, a web of notions about norms. In considering deep behaviour and basic needs Galtung stresses that underneath behaviour is deep behaviour, pre-programmed partly by instincts, partly by needs (Galtung 2000:8).

In this respect Galtung stresses the need to pay equal attention to all dimensions in a conflict. A focus on attitudes alone leads to the assumption that the problems derive from hateful or distorted mindsets. Furthermore a focus on behaviour only
is very frequent, since this is where the violence is located. Therefore simply by attempting to modify the conflict behaviour (through direct or proximate prevention of conflict), may simply ‘sweep the violence under the carpet’, making it less visible, but it may also have no impact on the underlying contradiction. Lastly a focus on contradiction only, runs the risk of increasing hatred and violence if the approach to contradiction is violent (Galtung 2000).

From this it follows that the resolution of conflict-conflict transformation-is a ‘never-ending process’. A solution ‘in the sense of a steady-state, durable formation is at best a temporal goal’. Conflicts are generally not solved, resolved or dissolved. Parties, goals and incompatibilities (issues) are usually still present.

Negotiation provides a rich context for the study of social-psychological variables, social-cognitive processes, attitudes, influence, inter-group relations and emotions. A general paradigm that has guided most social-psychological research on negotiation posits that the conditions that prevail at the time of negotiation have an impact on psychological states, and these states have either a direct impact on outcomes, or an indirect impact that is mediated by the strategies and tactics chosen by the parties (Carnevale and Leung 2006:63). Psychological states also include negotiator cognition, beliefs about the issues, whether outcomes are framed as gains or losses, and how information is processed, and so on.

The sheer complexity of the conflict in the DRC (as will be later explained) therefore requires the examination of the effects psychological variables, notably conflict attitudes came to exert on the situation and the potential utility of the social-psychological approach towards securing not only an end to conflict, but the achievement of sustainable and ‘positive peace’. These complex cognitions and evaluations will necessitate a more detailed consideration of the nature of conflict attitudes, their causes and common features, the manner in which they develop and change over time, the way in which they affect various forms of
conflict behaviour, or act as a hindrance or help in efforts at finding a solution to the conflict. In considering the conflict situation as it escalated in the DRC, the failure to include a consideration of these aspects may have contributed to major failures to prevent and ultimately resolve the underlying tensions that led to the exacerbation and further escalation of conflict in the embattled country. The study will further assess the influence of perceptions during conflict and the effect psychological variables may have on efforts to terminate conflict.

The task to secure a transition from a negative towards a positive peace is often difficult. Preventive diplomacy often fails to take into account that warring factions do not always readily see the situation as it really is, but only through programmed (and often highly subjective and psychologically charged) perceptions.

Very little research has been conducted on how psychological variables, particularly conflict attitudes such as negative images, attitudes, perceptions and conflict behaviour can fuel and exacerbate a conflict situation, especially conflicts in Africa and how this may derail the success of preventive diplomacy in resolving such severe conflicts. Tetlock and Goldgeier (2000:82) argue that any approach that fails to consider psychological factors is incomprehensive. Psychological research focuses on the role of cognitive factors, individual and cultural characteristics and motivational factors affecting judgements, actual negotiation behaviours, and outcomes of negotiations. The need to incorporate psychological negotiation research as a salient tool to provide for a more coherent understanding of diplomatic negotiations aimed at ending conflict is therefore crucial in order to design peace agreements that are durable.

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5 Negative peace is the absence of violence of all kinds, but no other form of interaction either. Policies based on the idea of negative peace do not deal with the causes of violence, only its manifestations. Positive peace in contrast involves the search for positive conditions, which can resolve the underlying causes of conflict that produce violence.
During any intense crisis the sense of being the target of a serious and continuing threat will increase anxiety, and lead to such a high level of stress that response may be ill considered and violent. Conflicts frequently produce stress, tension, fear and a sense of frustration, which act as intervening variables between degrees of conflict and psychological reactions at both individual and party level (Mitchell 1981). A common contention exists that conflicts bring about recognizable patterned psychological reactions, both cognitive and evaluative. Parties to a conflict provide ample signals to the outside world that they are loggerheads- their behaviour and the antagonistic use of language, symbols, interactions and public statements issued are heavily-laden with language that expresses negative perceptions. Therefore social-psychological aspects of conflict warrant far greater attention. As Sawyer and Guetzkow (2006:12) however stress, international conflict does not necessarily arise simply from misperception and misunderstanding. Conflict appears to result largely from objective incompatibility of goals among states. A primary assertion of this dissertation, however, is that even the genuine existence of conflict of interests may be heightened or mitigated by psychological factors, and that these may influence its eventual outcome.

2.10 Conclusion

Conflict is a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other but not both. Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into violent conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Conflicts are extremely dynamic and can change their ‘face’ over time. Policymakers need to know which method of conflict management-negotiation, mediation, multiparty conferences or humanitarian intervention- is most likely to be successful in any given type of conflict situation. Conflict prevention forms an integral part of efforts to respond to violent conflict. A further distinction between structural and direct or operational prevention is
also made. Michael Lund (1996:37) devised a figure that depicts the place or stage in the full life history of a typical conflict that preventive diplomacy occupies in relation to actions taken at other points in a conflict.

The theoretical framework for this study will be based on Michael Lund’s model of preventive diplomacy. He proposed a model of conflict where at any of these points it would be possible to either continue upward on the scale of conflict, or turn downward and revert to a lower and more peaceful level. Michael Lund (1996) presents a place or stage in the full life history of a typical conflict that preventive diplomacy occupies in relation to actions taken at other points in a conflict.

Preventive diplomacy would typically commence when tensions in the relationships between parties are in danger of shifting from stable peace to unstable peace or worse. According to Lund (1996) it applies then not only to situations that have seen no recent conflict, but also to post conflict situations where violence or coercion have been largely terminated but the efforts of post conflict peace building are apparently insufficient to move the conflict into stable peace away from the danger of re-escalation.

A critical omission in Lund’s theoretical framework is particularly related to the absence of social-psychological approaches in his preventive diplomacy toolbox. The inclusion of social-psychological approaches is critical to revealing the deep fissures that often exist, persist and exacerbate a conflict situation, despite the signing of peace agreements. The failure to consider psychological drivers of conflict could potentially render the use of any other approaches in preventing violent conflict obsolete, even futile and could undermine the successful conclusion of a peace agreement.

The dissertation will propose the inclusion of an additional dimension to complement Lund’s model, by examining how psychological variables fuel
conflicts as developed by C.R. Mitchell (1981). According to Mitchell parties involved in a conflict situation are likely to possess complex cognitions and evaluations about themselves and the opposing party and the environment within which the conflict situation arises. These complex cognitions and evaluations necessitate a more detailed consideration of the nature of conflict attitudes, their causes, common features, the way in which they affect various forms of conflict behaviour, and the way in which they affect the negotiation process and act as a hindrance in efforts at finding a solution to the conflict. Conflict attitudes consist of those psychological states or conditions that accompany (and frequently exacerbate) both conflict situations and resultant conflict behaviour. According to Mitchell (1981: 25) the ‘psychology of conflict’ is best regarded as an exacerbating factor, rather than a prime cause of social and international disputes.

These complex cognitions and evaluations will necessitate a more detailed consideration of the nature of conflict attitudes, their causes and common features, the manner in which they develop and change over time, the way in which they affect various forms of conflict behaviour, or act as a hindrance or help in efforts at finding a solution to the conflict. In considering the conflict situation as it escalated in the DRC, the failure to include a consideration of these aspects may have contributed to major failures to prevent and ultimately resolve the conflict in the embattled country. The study will therefore seek to examine the pervasive influence psychological variables and social-psychological approaches can come to assume in conflict through considering the role played by stress, and cognitive consistency and the need to maintain cognitive consistency, the development of group identity, notably the development of ‘own-party’ images, the maintenance of a positive ‘own-party’ image and the role an enemy plays in this regard. The study will further assess the influence of perceptions during conflict and the effect psychological variables may have on efforts to terminate conflict.
Table 1: Life History of a Conflict as depicted by Michael Lund (1996)
### Table 2: Entry Points in the Conflict Cycle (Crocker et al 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Violence</th>
<th>Number of Potential Entry Points</th>
<th>Barriers to Entry</th>
<th>Opportunity to Exercise Procedural Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Many (Perceptions and attitudes have not hardened)</td>
<td>Low-Medium (Parties are open to consultation with many different third parties; may avoid high-level mediators)</td>
<td>Low (Parties are not yet prepared to eschew violence if demands cannot be met through negotiation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising</td>
<td>Declining (Perceptions and attitudes are hardening)</td>
<td>Medium-High (Parties perceive increasing risks of negotiation, coupled with status and legitimacy concerns)</td>
<td>Low (Parties still believe that they have the option of escalating conflict and/or accepting resulting costs/losses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Few (“We-they” images of the enemy have hardened)</td>
<td>High (Parties are locked into a continuing struggle)</td>
<td>Moderate-High (Alternatives to mediation have worsened as conflict reaches a plateau or “hurting stalemate.”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declining in the aftermath of a peace settlement</td>
<td>Rising (Perceptions and attitudes may be softening)</td>
<td>Low-Medium (The settlement provides openings for a variety of third-party mediators.)</td>
<td>Moderate-High (Parties may be more willing to sustain the negotiation process at different levels, but danger of spoilers persists.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 3
The Origins of the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

3.1 Introduction

The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has resulted in a devastating war that has embroiled the entire Great Lakes region in chaos, causing widespread instability, insurrection, violence, brutal conflict, the internal displacement of millions of innocent civilians and a staggering refugee crisis. The conflict has claimed nearly three million lives (IRIN 2003). It has also been described as one of the most complex conflicts since the end of the Cold War. According to Rogier (2003:1) by its complexity and multidimensional nature, the DRC conflict should have repudiated the widely held assumption that most contemporary conflicts since the end of the Cold War take place within rather than between states. Serving as the battlefield for a number of state and sub-state actors from various countries-the latter often acting as proxies of the former-the DRC and the wider Great Lakes Region became an epitome of these ‘Regional Conflict Formations’ (RCF) that now seem to characterize the warfare of the early twenty-first century. This was considered to be the first time that a war in Africa pitted one group of African countries against another. Susan Rice – then-Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs – in October 1998 described the conflict situation as becoming “akin to Africa’s First World War.”

The DRC is regarded as a paradigmatic case of state failure. The Congolese territory has been the theatre of two major wars since 1996, which resulted from three sets of causes, each inherited from a distinct period in the Great Lakes/Central African region’s history. The legacy of Belgian colonialism instrumentalized identity issues and pitted two groups against each other-the Hutu and the Tutsi-that ironically shared the same language, culture, history, social organization and territory. Secondly, the conflicts in the Congo find their
roots in the failure of former Zaïre, which derived from Mobutu’s patrimonial rule over the country and the manipulation of ethnic differences. Thirdly, the DRC’s descent into chaos was fuelled by the civil wars in Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda, which each spilled over across the Congolese territory’s eastern borders. The country’s vast natural resources also presented a major incentive for the continuation of the conflict in the DRC. The conflict in the DRC has its origins in decades of failed attempts at controlling the region, vying for power through internal power struggles and a desire to control the country’s wealth of natural resources.

According to Mans (2003:180) only after a conflict has taken its course, does it become possible to point out political and diplomatic shortfalls retrospectively. The nature of preventive diplomacy suggests that it does not reveal itself easily. Therefore as Mans rightly points out the violent conflict in the DRC provides for a discussion on preventive diplomacy, how it failed and what lessons are to be learnt from the process.

As Mans (2003:179) further points out the crisis in the DRC has few traces of preventive diplomacy and any peace initiative would rather fall under the rubric of peacemaking. In contrast to theory, the conflict in the DRC is far more complex and extended beyond a mere deterioration from dispute into violent conflict. The DRC has also experienced more than one conflict throughout its turbulent history and, as a consequence should have had more than one solution (Mans 2003: 179).

There is a growing need in modern-day conflicts to understand a conflict’s asymmetric chronology, the nature of different alliances and the relevance of interrelated interests. Furthermore there is a need to take into account the multi-layered and increasingly complex character of modern-day conflicts. One of the crucial obstacles to successful conflict prevention lies in the lack of expertise regarding the specific background of a given conflict (Mans 2003:187). It is
therefore considered crucial to have a comprehensive understanding of any conflict situation in order to devise effective strategies for its resolution.

The conflict in the DRC will be discussed in this chapter. The historical roots of the conflict will be discussed as well as the political environment in which the conflict emerged as well as the underlying factors that contributed towards the brutal and excessively violent nature the conflict came to assume. The various conflict attitudes and perceptions that exacerbated the conflict will also be evaluated as well as the various perceptions and grievances that drove the various parties to engage in conflict with each other. The discussion will commence with a brief consideration of both the structure and nature of conflict as developed by C.R. Mitchell. This chapter, apart from briefly discussing the aforementioned components of international conflict, will also attempt to provide for an assessment of the related and integral elements of conflict, such as conflict situations, conflict processes, conflict behaviour and conflict widening and escalation and how each of these crucial aspects manifested itself as the conflict in the DRC unfolded.

3.2. The Structure of Conflict

The development of conflict, as a context for preventive diplomacy, can be analytically illustrated with reference to the triadic structure of conflict and the phases of conflict development (du Plessis 2003:15).

C.R. Mitchell (1981:16) provides for a fundamental distinction that can be drawn between the three inter-related components present in a discussion about conflict or a dispute. They are a conflict situation, conflict behaviour and conflict attitudes and perceptions. Conflict situations relate to scarcity and goal incompatibility and include conflict over values, interests, means and attribution. Conflict behaviour is the actual or manifest behaviour of opposing parties attempting to alleviate scarcity and achieve incompatible goals. Conflict attitudes are patterned
expectations, orientations and perceptions that develop from and accompany the conflict situation. These three structural components may be analytically considered separately, but in any real world conflict, all three are intimately connected with each other in complex ways.

3.3 The Nature of Conflict

According to Swanström and Weissmann (2005:9) a conflict is not a static situation, but a dynamic one and the intensity level changes over a conflict’s life cycle.

Conflicts consist of three major components, which can alter steadily over time or alternatively become wildly unstable. Conflicts can be dynamic in that issues and attitudes, as well as behaviour change markedly. Dynamic processes in conflicts may be sought in three major areas: firstly within the parties themselves, as goals, attitudes and behaviours change, or party structures alter in response to changes in adversary or environment, secondly between the parties, as differing patterns of communication and inter-action emerge over time, and the conflict escalates, de-escalates, intensifies or dies down, expands or contracts in the attribute spaces it occupies and thirdly between the parties and their environment, as the latter reacts to the conflict in ways ranging from efforts at quarantine to the involvement of third parties in roles such as supplies of resources, interveners, intermediaries or imposers of limits on behaviour or settlements (Mitchell 1981:47).

As stated earlier, a situation of conflict is defined as any situation in which two or more social entities or ‘parties’ (however defined or structured) perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals. Mitchell (1981: 17) further elucidates that ‘goals’ refer to consciously desired future outcomes, conditions or end states, which often have intrinsic (but different) value for members of particular parties, but which also bring with them other increased benefits or decreased costs for
party members. The major source of incompatible goals lies in a mismatch between social values and social structure. Many conflict situations involve conditions of scarcity and values, which place a premium on the possession of the same resources or positions. Others result from value incompatibilities regarding use or distribution of resources, about social and political structures, or about beliefs and behaviour of others.

3.4 The Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Origins, Issues, Context and Historical Background

Two main aspects are considered as being fundamental to understanding the context of conflict, namely the intensity of the conflict and hostilities, and the type of dispute and issues in conflict. The intensity of a conflict is recognized as a fundamental determinant of how amenable a conflict will be to mediation and how effective a given strategy may be (Bercovitch and Houston 2006:234). The intensity of conflict can be explained by a number of factors such as the severity of prior conflict, the level of hostilities, the number of fatalities, the level of anger and intensity of feeling, the types of issues at stake, and the strength of the parties’ negative perceptions. Many of these dimensions involve subjective interpretations of emotions, anger, hatred, revenge and moral justification of behaviour. As the intensity of conflict increases, so does the influence of these subjective factors on disputant behaviour. As a result, many elements in a conflict are open to misinterpretations and miscommunication by the parties involved.

3.4.1 The Failure of the state of Zaïre and the First Congolese War (1996-1997)

The cause of the country’s decent into chaos, anarchy and all-out regional war can be traced back to the rule of Mobutu Sese Seko when the country was known as Zaïre. The 1996-1997 war in Zaïre was considered to be the widest
interstate war in modern African history.

Zaïre under the leadership of Mobutu was characterized by an unparalleled capacity to institutionalize kleptocracy at every level of the social pyramid and his unrivalled talent for transforming personal rule into a cult and political clientelism into cronyism (Rotberg 2003: 31). Mobutu’s regime was based upon an extreme form of patronage within the context of a declining resource base. The state controlled the formal sector of the economy and used the resources it extracted to purchase political support as opposed to making much-needed economic investments. Mobutu accumulated and disbursed one of the largest personal fortunes, largely by controlling the state’s finances and contracts, particularly those dealing with the extraction of the country’s massive mineral wealth. In this context the state was seen as the “personal fiefdom of the president” (Metz 1996:8).

The growing impetus to support flourishing efforts at promoting democracy in Africa, made the support of Mobutu’s regime highly problematic.

In the executive, Mobutu and his allies held reign. On the other hand, following Mobutu’s landmark speech on 24 April 1990, in which he permitted citizens to join parties other than the ruling Popular Movement for the Revolution (MPR), the result was an independent source of authority in the legislature and the appointment of the Prime Minister. Mobutu struggled with the growing opposition to control naming the Prime Minister and the government. As part of the struggle for power, some 200 parties emerged, many of which were financed by Mobutu. Mobutu’s unrelenting efforts to thwart democratic opposition forces, his highly personalized style of leadership, built partly on repression and partly on extensive patronage networks, his scandalous squandering of the Congo’s wealth, his megalomaniac obsession with grandiose development schemes at the expense of public goods for the masses, played a pivotal role in the ultimate demise of the state. Another major contributing factor to state failure in Zaïre was
the influence of the *Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ)*, whose higher ranks were themselves plagued by corruption, patronage and ethnic favouritism, and whose lower ranks were left able to complement their meagre pay through ransom and looting (Rogier 2003:1).

Those who occupied positions of authority used them to pursue their own interests. As long as Mobutu’s authority was not challenged, officials were permitted wide ranging behaviour. The Armed Forces of Zaïre (FAZ) were regularly unpaid, and often could only be controlled by sending in the Special Presidential Division (DPS) or other “elite” security forces whose regular salaries ensured the effectiveness of hierarchical authority structures. Because the military reported directly to Mobutu, as did the provincial governors, each competed with the other to control affairs in the provinces. Thus, just as within the armed forces, various elements of the state worked against each other (Reed 2004:138).

The Mobutist state also manipulated protracted disputes in eastern Congo over ethnicity, citizenship, and related land rights. From 1993-1994, local conflicts in eastern Congo actually became regionalized as a result of the turmoil in both Burundi and Rwanda. In 1993, the assassination of Burundi’s first elected Hutu President, Melchior Ndadaye, on 21 October, triggered a first flow of Hutu refugees to South Kivu. As a result the situation of the Banyamulenge6 worsened, since Burundian Hutu rebels intended to expel them in order to prepare for the settlement of Hutu newcomers. In this context, the sudden influx in 1994 in South and North Kivu of hundreds of thousands of (Hutu) refugees fleeing Rwanda and the eventual victory in Kigali of the (Tutsi-led) *Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR)* had devastating effects. Moreover, these refugees

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6 The name ‘Banyamulenge initially designated long-established Tutsi residents of South Kivu distinct from the Tutsi of North Kivu and Tutsi refugees of the 1959-1962 Rwandan revolution. The term has been gradually used to designate all Tutsi living in North and South Kivu.
included tens of thousands of Hutu extremists (the Interahamwe militias) and members of the ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) who had just perpetrated genocide.

In January 1993, the army rank-and-file angry at having being paid with new Z5 million bank notes (issued by the central bank, but declared illegal), embarked on a looting spree and violent riots, in which approximately 1000 people were killed (EIU 1998:5).

Although the country possesses some of the richest natural resource endowment in all of Africa-copper, gold, diamonds, oil and silver are all found in vast quantities-on his death in exile in September 1997, Mobutu left an impoverished populace and country indebted at the level of a staggering 200% of GDP (Adelman & Rao 2004).

3.5 Conflict Situations- Issues, Interests, Values, Attribution and Means

Many conflicts are over issues such as the occupation of particular scarce positions, the creation of alternative sets of positions (as when a group wishes to secede from one national society and establish another, complete with independent decision-making roles or the exclusion of particular others from scarce positions (as when one group works to prevent another occupying positions of political influence within a society) (Mitchell 1981:20). Differences such as these can stratify into permanent divisions where the have/have-not lines reinforce each other. In circumstances such as these goal incompatibilities tend to follow similar patterns, and social entities possess whole inter-linked sets of goal incompatibilities leading to situations of almost wholly conflicting interests, with no shared goals to offset that conflict.

Issues in conflict are divided into disputes over limited resources, where one party will win, absolutely or relatively, and the other will lose, but both will exist at
the end of conflict (resource conflicts) and disputes where the continued existence of one of the parties is at issue and at stake (survival conflict). Often survival conflicts are considered to be more intractable. These conflicts are usually the type of conflict where not enough effort is expended to find a durable solution to ensure that the conflict does not erupt again.

The circumstances of Mobutu’s ouster and the conflict in eastern Zaïre could be traced directly to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

3.5.1 Rwanda’s involvement in Zaïre

War hardens ethnic identities, while ethnic wars also generate intense security dilemmas, because the escalation of each side’s mobilization rhetoric presents a real threat to the other. Another challenge is related to ending conflicts of such a nature, as ethnic fears and hatreds hardened by war are extremely resistant to change. As ethnic conflicts escalate, populations come increasingly to hold enemy images of the other group, either because of deliberate efforts by elites to create such images or because of increasing real threats (Kaufmann 1996: 138).

To Rwanda the three-decade rule of Mobutu Sese Seko had left Zaïre a failed state. Zaïre’s political history and the lack of unity of the state, together with its collusion with Rwandan génocidaires (perpetrators of genocide), made it a greater threat. Under Mobutu, Zaïre assumed a protective stance towards Rwanda, which was then governed by President Habyarimana.

At the heart of the two wars in the Congo was the unfinished ten-year old Rwandan civil war. The conflict began with the 1990 assault of the predominantly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) against the regime of the Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana. When the RPF first invaded Rwanda on 1 October 1990, Zaïre along with France and Belgium, militarily intervened on behalf of the Habyarimana government. In August 1993 the Rwandan government and the
RPF signed the Arusha Accords, which called for a power-sharing regime and the merging of RPF forces into the national army. Hutu hard-liners who were excluded from the peace talks, resisted implementation of the Arusha agreement. Motivated by the ideology of “Hutu Power”, which called for the exclusion of all Tutsi from Rwandan society and politics, the hard-liners set in motion a plan to annihilate all Tutsi and moderate Hutu (Roessler and Prendergast 2006:234). The assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 signalled the start of the Rwandan genocide.

This conflict reached a bloody climax in the 1994 genocide, which left a staggering 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu dead and ultimately led to RPF’s capture of the capital, Kigali. After their defeat, the forces of the former regime fled to Eastern Congo, from where they continued their war against the newly installed Tutsi-dominated regime. In 1996, Rwanda intervened in the DRC in an attempt to secure final victory in its war against forces of the former Hutu government, which were retraining and re-arming in refugee camps along the two countries’ border (International Crisis Group 2000: 12).

3.5.2 The Genocide in Rwanda

After the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) defeated the Hutu government of Rwanda and about a million Hutu fled to surrounding countries, especially Congo (then Zaire). This exodus was peculiar in that entire army units crossed the border, as did government and political leaders. The Rwandan government was confronted with a huge task in its attempts to rebuild Rwanda in the wake of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi minority and the massacres of moderate Hutus. It has mainly pursued military tactics in the region where Hutu extremists continued to carry out lethal – and genocidal – attacks from the former Zaire where they found refuge and arms.
3.5.3 The Role of the Interahamwe and ex-FAR in the Regional Conflict

The Interahamwe and the Former Forces Armées Rwandaise (ex-FAR) had played a predominant role in the conflict in Rwanda since the early 1990s, especially between 1994 and 1996. They are considered to hold prime responsibility for the 1994 Rwanda genocide (Gnamo 2004:30). During the post-genocide period, members of both groups fled to refugee camps in eastern Zaïre. They integrated with other refugees, and controlled and created insecurity in these camps. These militiamen, together with the former Rwandese soldiers and security forces were considered to be the primary proponents of Hutu extremism. Not only did they incite the Rwandese population to exterminate the Tutsi, together with Hutu liberals, but they also succeeded in extending the Rwandese conflict to the neighbouring regions. The Interahamwe and the ex-FAR were accused of bringing the Rwandese problem to regions where the Tutsi and Hutu lived together in communities, generally known under the name of Banyarwanda (which means people of Rwandese origin, both Tutsi and Hutu). They were furthermore accused of disrupting the precarious inter-ethnic relations and balance in the eastern provinces of the former Zaïre, where Tutsi, Hutu and other ethnic groups, had lived together in relative harmony (Gnamo 2004:31). The refugee camps served as their bases and the Interahamwe and ex-FAR crossed the Zaïrian border to engage in a series of incursions against the Tutsi-dominated government. In 1995-1996 the Interahamwe, with the support of the Zaïrian authorities and soldiers Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) were engaged in what appeared to be ethnic cleansing against the Zaïrian Tutsi (Banyamulenge).

The hypernationalist rhetoric used for group mobilization often includes images of the enemy group as a threat to the physical existence of the nation, in turn justifying unlimited violence against the ethnic enemy (Kaufmann 1996:140).

This was deemed as one of the contributing factors to the crisis of 1996-1997, which had vast repercussions on the Congolese political climate. The genocide
was also credited as one of the catalysts for the 1996-1997 war in Congo/Zaïre. The attitude and subversive activities of the *Interahamwe* and the ex-FAR were considered to be the root causes for the 1996-1997 war of the *L'Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre* (AFDL). The war which ultimately came to be led by Laurent Kabila and supported actively by neighbouring states Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, aimed at destroying and neutralizing Zaïrian refugee camps in order to separate the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR from other refugees (Gnamo 2004:31). Many observers contend that the genocide in Rwanda was neither a tribal meltdown nor an accident provoked by the death of President Habyarimana. President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on 6 April 1994. The militia proceeded to execute the genocide immediately prior to the announcement of the crash. A report produced by the U.N. Special Rapporteur confirmed the accusations. According the report these orders were carried out by the Interahamwe and can be traced back to the government via local political and administrative authorities. Militiamen described a campaign of incitement to exterminate, which was orchestrated and masterminded and organized by the top government officials at the national levels, gendarmerie at regional and local levels, and by all those who were opposed to the Arusha Peace Accords and power sharing.

This migration had crucial and long-lasting implications for the security of Congo and of the entire region. Internally, the migration of these Hutu extremists made things dramatically worse for Congolese Tutsi who became the new targets of the *génocidaires*, regardless of the fact that they were Congolese. The genocide in Rwanda and its aftermath therefore profoundly altered the perceptions among Banyarwanda themselves by creating a deep fracture between Congolese Hutu and Tutsi (Rogier 2003:5). The massive surge of Hutu refugees into the Goma area, followed in early 1996 by countless atrocities committed by Interahamwe against local Tutsi, led to a situation where collective identities quickly degenerated into rival communities. Once considered allies and victims in their fight for Zaïrian citizenship, the Banyarwanda suddenly turned against each other.
with ferocity. With extremist Hutu in eastern Congo attacking both Congolese Tutsi and Tutsi-led Rwanda, the stage was set for a Tutsi rebellion in Congo, eventually assisted by Rwanda.

The trigger came in 1996 when South Kivu’s Governor in the Mobutu administration exhorted all Tutsi to leave the country or face retaliation. The Banyamulenge rebelled to protect themselves against Hutu extremists. The FPR was most likely to retaliate against Mobutu’s regime for the assistance given to the late Rwandan President Habyalimana in the early 1990s.

In 1995 and 1996 the Tutsi of North Kivu, the province in which the majority of Hutu refugees in Zaire were installed, suffered massacres and ethnic cleansing, which Kinshasa did nothing to prevent. In 1996, when the anti-Tutsi ideology spread by the Hutu refugees started to become more virulent in South Kivu, the Tutsi of that province decided to take the initiative: they armed themselves and launched a rebellion in September 1996 with the complicity of Rwanda (Reed 2004:146).

In October 1996, reports of armed resistance to the Hutu/autochtone alliance began to surface from South Kivu province. The authority structures within the institutions of state, and particularly the armed forces, continued to disintegrate. The unifying factor was that none of Zaire’s domestic political actors recognized the internal base of the rebellion, thereby denying the role that the nationality question had played in mobilizing opposition to the government. Rather all sought to define it as an act of external aggression (Reed 2004: 146).

Following the initial reports of armed rebellion in South Kivu, the governor, Lwasi Ngabo Lwabanji adopted a confrontational stance. He declared that all Banyamulenge in his province had seven days to leave the area or to be treated as rebels and face an all out “declaration of war”. While the government in Kinshasa downplayed the seven-day ultimatum, it reiterated the call for the
departure of the Banyamulenge, Zaïrians of Rwandan descent—some of whom had resided in that country for centuries. In spite of the transfer of military aircraft to the region, the FAZ steadily lost territory to the rebels, who became known as the AFDL.

The Banyamulenge spearheaded the fight with military, strategic and logistical support from Rwanda and Uganda. The attacks commenced in September 1996. On 13 October 1996, the first group of Hutu refugees started to flee the rebel’s incursion into the Eastern Zaïrian town of Uvira. Three days later, the fighting intensified around Uvira, which was captured on 24 October 1996. This was followed by the fall of Bukavu and Goma on 30 October and 1 November 1996, respectively. The Interahamwe and the ex-FAR were easily defeated.

The beginning of the 1996-97 war was intimately linked to these conditions in Eastern Congo. The Rwandan government repeatedly warned that it could not accept the presence of the people who had perpetrated the genocide not only camping on its borders but being allowed to rearm and use UNHCR camps as rear bases from which to attack Rwanda (International Crisis Group 1999: 4).

Rwanda had several points on its agenda in the run-up to the eventual war against Kabila. The country was engaged in battling with the ex-FAR (former Rwandan government troops) and Interahamwe militias responsible for the 1994 genocide. Unlike any other player in Congo, Rwanda’s war had been fought mainly on Congolese soil since the overthrow of the Habyarimana regime in 1994. The Rwandan conflict was exported onto its neighbour’s territory when the entire former government removed itself to the camps in Eastern Zaïre after the genocide and re-established itself there. Since then, the Rwandans have been claiming that Congo represents a security threat to the very existence of the Rwandan state (International Crisis Group 1999: 26).

When remnants of the defeated Forces Armées Rwandaises (ex-FAR) poured
into Zaïre, they brought with them substantial supplies of machine guns, grenades, mortars and other light weapons (Winter 2004: 40). Zaire and particularly President Mobutu, played an important role in guaranteeing the survival of the génocidaire government in exile. Furthermore the U.N. reported that Zaire played a central role in effectively rearming the génocidaire apparatus.

The situation in Zaïre and the entire region continued to deteriorate drastically. The final stage of the deterioration began, when despite their threats to the contrary, there was a growing realization among the génocidaires that they had little chance of retaking power in Kigali (Winter 2004:43). As Mobutu and local government officials manipulated the violence for political advantage, Rwandan génocidaires with numerous Zairian allies and accomplices, turned their weaponry on the one target group every one could agree on: the Masisi Tutsis. Killings escalated and the surviving Masisi Tutsis fled to Rwanda as refugees. Rwanda correctly labelled the attacks as the continuation of the genocide.


The military advance by the AFDL was directed at breaking the pan-Hutu alliance that had emerged between the Rwandan refugees in Zaïre, the FAZ, and the Hutu and autochtone militias. Thus the strategy the AFDL adopted was to disburse the refugees from the camps, first in South Kivu and later further to the

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7 The region of Masisi, consisted of an area with a population predominantly of Rwandese origin (both Hutu and Tutsi, but predominantly Hutu) and of indigenous non-Banyarwanda referred to as autochtones. The Banyarwanda were long-term residents and gained Zairian citizenship in 1960 at Zaire’s independence. However like ethnic Rwandese elsewhere, they were seen by many Zairians as foreigners, a perception given legitimacy by the Zaire government’s decision to strip away their citizenship. Tensions between autochtones and Hutu Banyarwanda were dramatically heightened by the influx of refugees and génocidaires from Rwanda in the summer of 1994.
north, depriving their enemies of safe areas, a civilian shield and a pool for recruits.

The rebels quickly assumed control of the cities of Uvira, Goma and Bukavu, a region home to some one million refugees. They also suffered under the persecution of AFDL fighters. Many joined the Zaïrian army to resist the AFDL and save Mobutu, their backer. In fact, with the overthrow of Mobutu, and the victory of Laurent Kabila, who was backed by their enemies, they had everything to lose.

On 4 November 1996, the AFDL declared a unilateral three-week ceasefire. This was considered as a possible strategy to plan the next phase in their bid to take Kinshasa.

While political discord was omnipresent, both the FAZ and the AFDL seemed to be laying the groundwork for the demise of Mobutu's Zaïre. The AFDL adopted a strategy of expanding the military front and weakening the FAZ psychologically, as well as militarily. Prior to actually capturing a city, the AFDL would announce its fall, which caused the FAZ to retreat in panic.

Rwanda’s decision to back Kabila’s rebellion and to intervene in former Zaïre was motivated by much more pressing concerns. Kigali’s objective was to restore security on its western border by bringing to a halt incursions into Rwanda by genocidal Hutu Interahamwe militia and ex-FAR. Within weeks, AFDL rebels and Rwandan troops forcibly evacuated and destroyed the refugee camps set up in eastern Zaïre, causing most of their residents to return to Rwanda, while a number of Hutu extremists and civilians were pursued to their deaths in the jungle.

Zaïre continued to deny U.N. and other reports about its role in arming the génocidaires. By 1996 the attitudes of the Rwandan government and RPA had
shifted. It was deemed clear that the international community would not disarm the génocidaires or separate them from the refugees. It was clear that the innocent hostage refugees would not return home to the degree necessary to stabilize the situation. It was also clear that Zaïre, particularly the President and the army, were complicit with the génocidaires. The génocidaires had achieved possession of substantial territory in Zaïre from which they could operate with impunity (Winter 2004:46). Rearming and drawing into its ranks thousands of new recruits from the refugee camps significantly increased the génocidaires’ military capacity.

The end of the Mobutu era was closely linked with the eastern provinces. The vast distance between the Kivus and Kinshasa has always implied a closer relationship with their tiny neighbour, Rwanda. The 1994 genocide, however, had left the deepest mark on daily life in eastern Congo. The Rwandan Hutu population and members of the government went into exile in what was then known as Zaïre, using the shelter of humanitarian camps to re-coordinate the political hard-liners to prepare for a military attack on the new Tutsi rulers in Kigali. When the Rwandan military led major attacks on Congolese camps to dismantle the threat of a radical exile government, Rwandan war criminals were forced to flee deep into the forests of the Kivus. (Mans 2003:192). The presence of Rwandan rebels has been cited as one of the major reasons for a prolonged nation-wide conflict. The so-called first rebellion was initiated in 1996 by Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda to oust President Mobutu who had been supporting DRC-based rebel groupings fighting the governments of Kampala, Bujumbura and Kigali. In this context, Rwandan security concerns proved to be the most serious and then-Vice President Kagame proved to be the most willing to intervene in Congolese territory. The creation of Kabila’s AFDL provided the external backers with a Congolese platform for their military campaign (Mans 2003:192).
3.5.4 Uganda’s Motivations for Involvement in the First Congolese Conflict

Uganda’s intervention in Zaïre was propelled by strategic considerations. The most salient of which was to prevent the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which was partly based in Zaïre, from carrying out cross-border raids into south-western Uganda. According to the Ugandan government, the ADF received sanctuary and military and political support from the governments of Zaïre and Sudan. The Museveni government further asserted that the diplomatic efforts, which had been initiated to persuade the two neighbouring countries to stop assisting the rebels, had failed. The only viable option that remained was to pursue the ADF into Zaïre and Sudan (Otunnu 2004:45). Another strategic consideration was the need to control insurgency activity caused by the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF). One of the key WNBF military bases was in Bunia (near the Zaïre-Uganda border).

The intensification of armed incursions into Rwanda had the potential of destabilizing Uganda because the two countries share a border, and Uganda has a Tutsi/Hima population which does not only rule the country, but is also quite unpopular amongst those ethnic groups that felt alienated from political and economic power in the country.\(^8\) Also the coordination of armed activities between the Rwandan-Hutu refugees and Burundian-Hutu refugee warriors did not only increase instability in both Rwanda and Burundi, but also threatened

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\(^8\) The origin of the Tutsi ethnic-nationalism is often traced to the so-called ‘golden age’ of the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. During this period the Tutsi constructed and controlled feudal societies in the present-day Rwanda and Burundi. Their subjects, especially the majority Hutu population, experienced varied forms of exclusion from socio-economic and political power. During that era, the Tutsi’s sphere of cultural, economic and political influence extended to amongst other Ankole in western Uganda. In Ankole, Tutsi influence was enhanced by the presence of the Hima, who belonged to the same ancestral lineage as the Tutsi and so shared common cultural roots. Equally important, the Hima, who enjoyed their ‘golden age’ during the same period, imposed a similar oppressive and exploitative feudal regime in Ankole. The determination of some Rwandan-Tutsi and Ugandan-Tutsi/Hima to control, oppress and exploit their numerically dominant subjects, namely the ‘Rwandan Hutu’ and the ‘Ugandan Hutu’ (the Bairu), further strengthened their influence and provoked anti-Tutsi nationalism in the two territories.
Uganda’s national security and economic interests in the region. To counter the security threats posed by the Hutu refugee-warriors, who received sanctuary and military support from Zaïre, Uganda was prompted into taking military action against them in Zaïre. Strategic considerations certainly played an important role in Uganda’s armed intervention. However the government overplayed their importance and held them forward as the sole argument for the armed intervention, not because the seriousness of the situation justified such weighty action, but because they provided the most palatable explanation for the local public and international community (Otunnu 2004:48).

Many factors influenced the timing of Uganda’s involvement in Zaïre. The anarchy in the country, caused in part by the power vacuum and by incessant rivalries between the political elites, was escalating. Mobutu’s popularity and that of his armed forces had hit an unprecedented low. Zaïre’s rapid disintegration as a state suggested to both Museveni and Kagame that it was possible to topple the government through armed intervention (Otunnu 2004:57). Uganda played an important role in the ensuing conflict. Kampala mobilized military and diplomatic support from the continent and from major western democratic countries. The support was intended to meet a number of carefully crafted objectives, namely to train and unify anti-Mobutu armed groups, and then present them as champions of democratic and responsible governance, to facilitate the collapse of the Mobutu regime, to consistently present the refugee camps as a major source of regional instability that had to be eliminated, to furthermore present almost every Hutu as a perpetrator of genocide, thereby justifying atrocities committed against members of this ethnic group and ultimately to present and justify the impending armed intervention by Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda as a popular uprising by Zaïrians against the despotic regime of Mobutu and to present Uganda as a credible and impartial promoter of a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaïre (Otunnu 2004:64). With the ‘support’ of the OAU, Uganda escalated the war against Mobutu, at the same time as it participated in the OAU and UN-sponsored consultative meetings that called for a regional peace
conference. The meetings also called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, the respect of Zaïre’s national sovereignty and that of neighbouring states, the withdrawal of foreign troops and mercenaries from Zaïre, and advocated the protection and the security of refugees and internally displaced persons. The ‘contradictory’ roles Uganda played required it to disguise its active participation in the war against Mobutu, while it ‘mediated’ between the warring groups. It had to disguise its participation in the armed struggle because of both the OAU and UN charters and the growing domestic opposition to what was seen as a war to construct a Tutsi empire in the region.

The crisis in Zaïre had also affected Museveni’s legitimacy at home. As soon as the war broke out, his legitimacy eroded because Uganda’s role in the war was perceived largely in terms of militarism, Tutsi expansionism and the quest for personal wealth. Another unintended effect of the war was that government propaganda during the crisis reinforced public scepticism about the real motives for the armed intervention. The scepticism was directly related to the fact that, for months, the government of Uganda denied that Ugandan troops were fighting in Zaïre.

3.5.5 The Rise of Laurent-Désiré Kabila

Uganda furthermore had an interest in maintaining its regional and international influence in the region. One of the most reasonable ways of handling this serious political dilemma was to promote a non-Tutsi as the spokesperson of the AFDL. As a consequence, Laurent Kabila was given this role. Laurent Kabila had been associated with the armed struggle in Zaïre since the murder of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Kabila was chosen as spokesman, probably in part because he was the oldest among the founders but more importantly because he had a long history of participating in anti-Mobutu protests going back to the 1960s.
Kabila surfaced again in 1994 when the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) took power in Rwanda. Ugandan President Museveni introduced him to then-Rwandan Vice-President Kagame, whom, Museveni says, had a sharper conflict with President Mobutu over the presence of Rwandan refugees on the Rwanda-Congo border, held hostage by Interahamwe militias and elements of the former Rwandan Army (International Crisis Group 1999:5).

Kabila’s appointment as spokesperson was also the result of his personal contacts in the region. These contacts made him the most suitable candidate to speak on behalf of the predominantly Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed opposition. However, at first only the most visible person during the war, Kabila took advantage of his new role and declared himself the leader of the rebellion (Otunnu 2004:66). President Museveni expressed his discontent at Kabila’s unilateral decision to declare himself the leader of the “Allied” forces in Zaïre. Although Kabila became the leader of the rebellion, it was Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola that ultimately overthrew Mobutu’s forces. Even though Uganda and Rwanda claimed that their armies did not participate in the war, the contrary was observed and Rwanda’s Kagame later confirmed that it was his army that ultimately toppled Mobutu from power, since Kabila’s army was too weak to face Mobutu’s demoralized army (Otunnu 2004:67).

The conflict ended with the fall of Kinshasa on 17 May 1997, Laurent-Désiré Kabila proclaimed himself President of the newly named Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) an act that would soon turn him into a dictator. The first Congolese war had started upon the conclusion of an alliance between Kabila and Kigali. The second conflict broke out in August 1998 as soon as the ‘marriage of convenience’ broke down.

3.6 ‘Africa’s First World War’, 1998

The regional war in the Congo had three structural causes: foreign armed groups
(notably the Interahamwe and ex-FAR militias) using the country as a base to destabilize or overthrow neighbouring governments, the intervention of foreign armies to defend the Kabila regime and the failure of successive Congolese central government, which pursued devastating divide-and-rule policies that provoked violent opposition. The regional countries’ material exploitation of the Congo further protracted the conflict by entrenching foreign interests and sparking violent competition for lucrative territory. Laurent Kabila appeared solely motivated by the desire to cling to power. Recognizing his precarious security situation, Kabila turned to foreign and local forces to bolster the weak and unreliable Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) (Roessler and Prendergast 2006:234).

Conflict situations often bring about a marked increase of coercive or violent behaviour by one or both parties and that this phenomenon is frequently accompanied by an increase of hostility, hatred and suspicion as well as increasingly distorted perceptions of an enemy among members of parties in conflict. It is important to note and emphasize the inter-relations of the three components of conflict, and the way in which these are closely linked in the real world. Conflict behaviour itself can be considered as an important influence in affecting the other two components of conflict, especially if it involves high levels of violence, and damage or loss to participants (Mitchell 1981:29).

When the AFDL took control of Kinshasa, on 17 May 1997, it was initially met with an enthusiastic welcome. However, after perhaps one of the shortest honeymoons any victorious revolutionary leader has enjoyed, Kabila found his policies challenged and his association with his foreign supporters, especially the Rwandan Tutsi, viewed with suspicion. It would appear that this initial enthusiasm stemmed from appreciation of the end of Mobutism rather than from approbation for the AFDL’s program or style of governance (International Crisis Group 1999:8).
After assuming power, Laurent Kabila continued to rely on Rwanda’s military support and staff. His alliance with Kigali’s and Kampala’s leadership eventually began to disintegrate because of these respective governments’ disappointment with Kabila’s inability or unwillingness to prevent renewed attacks by Rwandan and Ugandan rebels from the Congolese territory. It also became clear that he would not represent a break from dictatorial rule and nepotism. He made no attempt to deal with the negative forces in the eastern forests and merely concentrated on taking over the corrupt state apparatus left behind by Mobutu.

Rwanda’s first invasion of the Congo made Kabila president of the country. The Hutu exiles were scattered by the war, and tens of thousands of ex-FAR, Interahamwe and many innocent civilians lost their lives in the fighting. Nevertheless the new ruler of the Congo soon turned against his former benefactors, and even made use of the same Interahamwe and ex-FAR responsible for the 1994 genocide (International Crisis Group 2000: 12)

These opponents of the Kigali regime found sanctuary in the vast, virtually ungoverned Kivus from where they waged a campaign to destabilize the country and topple the dominant Tutsi regime in Kigali. The Rwandans regarded the ex-FAR and Interahamwe as savage criminals with whom there could be no compromise. They remained determined to neutralize them and destroy the threat they posed.

Conflict behaviour may be defined as overt actions undertaken by one party in any situation of conflict aimed at the opposing party with the intention of making that opponent abandon or modify its goals. An immediate challenge posed by the definition held forth is the problem of interpreting the motivations of a behaving party. According to Mitchell (1981: 29) it is possible that an action may be perceived by an adversely affected party as having the objective of forcing it to abandon a particular disputed objective, but that in spite of such a perception this was not the underlying intention of the actor.
Such behaviour will, almost inevitably, involve an increase in the levels of anger, hatred, resentment, fear or desire for revenge on the part of those suffering damage. Over time the behaviour of the opposing party may appear to become, in itself sufficient reason for continuing and intensifying one’s own conflict behaviour (Mitchell 1981:52).

A new outbreak of genocide was indeed mounted by the ALiR\(^9\) from May 1997 to April 1998. Furthermore, Rwanda’s ostensible support, as crucial as it was, became embarrassing and did little to improve the self-proclaimed President’s lack of internal legitimacy, but rather made him appear as a ‘stooge’ for Kigali’s new strongman, Paul Kagame (Rogier 2003: 6).

The backers of Kabila, Rwanda and Uganda in particular, might have believed that the change in Zaïre would address their security concerns and bring stability to the region, and eventually foster cooperation and development. However approximately one year after his takeover of state power, with direct support of his neighbours, Kabila changed his attitude toward his former allies. After consolidating his power in Kinshasa he embraced a form of nationalism that was hostile to Uganda and Rwanda (Gnamo 2004:35).

Since the success of the AFDL war, the Rwandans have argued that they have legitimate security interests in Congo, which justified their troops remaining in the DRC after Kabila was brought to power. They had again used the security argument to explain their intervention, accusing Kabila of training the ex-FAR and Interahamwe.

The rebel forces, comprising Congolese soldiers, Congolese Tutsi Banyamulenge, Rwandan, Ugandan and some Burundian government troops, all

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\(^9\) The Interahamwe and ex-FAR became known as the Armée de Libération du Rwanda (ALiR), and were found both in Kabila’s conventional army and in the Kivus.
accused Kabila of turning into a dictator and increasing regional instability by his support for the guerrilla groups opposed to the governments of his former allies, including the Rwandan ‘génocidaires’.

A deteriorating diplomatic relationship between Kabila and his allies that initially helped him take power began to emerge. This deterioration was caused by three salient issues: Kabila’s quest for regional leadership, his tolerance of rebel groups aiming to destabilise the governments of his neighbours on the DRC territory and his unwillingness to co-operate on economic projects. It reached a point where, at the beginning of 1998, both Kabila and his former government allies started secretly to prepare for possible conflict. As early as February 1998, the Rwandans started planning a coup, said to have been vetoed by Uganda on the grounds that it was not going to be credible either internationally or regionally. By May 1998, there were signs that Kabila was also preparing for war with Rwanda and Uganda. Relationships between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda deteriorated to the extent that they led to the near breakdown of official communication between the respective governments. It became clear that the behaviour (and perceptions) of the erstwhile allies in the conflict had been dramatically altered by the events that unfolded since the first rebellion had reached its bloody climax and conclusion. Rapidly diverging interests were moving the parties ever closer to conflict and all-out confrontation.

Another element refers to behaviour as purposeful action. Conflicts bring about or reinforce a psychological double standard, whereby one’s own party’s behaviour can be explained as a necessity and one’s adversaries by choice. Given such a process, both cause and blame can be shifted firmly onto an adversary and discomfort avoided by the perception that certain actions were forced on our side through lack of choice, so that our response was thoroughly reasonable, given the kind of circumstances which we ignore in the case of our adversary’s actions (Mitchell 1981:118). The implications of the perception is that ‘we’ react in this (admittedly rather unpleasant) fashion because we have to;
there is no alternative for us. The enemy had alternative possible courses of action and chose not to take them.’

It appeared as if the rapidly deteriorating relations between the erstwhile allies had reached the point of no return and that both Rwanda and Uganda, having grown disillusioned with Kabila’s behaviour, had found sufficient impetus for continuing and intensifying their objective of rebelling against him.

One of the most common and significant ways in which individuals and nations manage to misperceive a situation, or others involved in a conflict or dispute, is the process of *selective perception*. The members of one party do not see everything accurately while their adversaries constantly misperceive a situation. Slanted interpretation can occur over a place, a policy, but most particularly over an event, which has to be set in a context of perceptions and expectations, and then evaluated as part of a meaningful pattern.

Interpreting incoming information in context (or in accordance with some pre-existing structure of knowledge) has formed the basis of a large segment of the discussion on psychological processes underlying conflict. According to Mitchell (1981: 112) it does little to explain *why* the original assumptions about bad faith, aggression and inherent untrustworthiness of the opposing party are created and subsequently reinforced. Given that through the processes of group identification, individuals possess an image of themselves and their own group as peaceful and reactive, the power-orientated actions of an opponent cannot be perceived and evaluated as anything other than aggressive and given the image of the opposing party as threatening and aggressive, then the power-orientated actions of oneself and one’s group are perceived as reactive, defensive and wholly consistent with peaceful intentions. The two images are mutually complementary and thoroughly interdependent.
A related element is that of issue polarization and the perception of different degrees of freedom of action held by one’s own party and by the enemy. Issue polarization theory in its basic form, argues that there is often a strong tendency for parties in conflict to perceive that even more interests and issues are mutually incompatible than is actually the case. A dispute is therefore likely to widen to include many new issues and to create rivalries where none existed before, or where (in other circumstances) none might have developed. An expanding confrontation begins and accelerates, covering numerous issues (Mitchell 1981: 115).

3.6.1 Rwanda’s Motivation for the Second Rebellion

Relations between the former allies became increasingly strained from one week to the next. Kigali and Kampala did not hide their irritation with Kabila, who they saw as incapable of conducting a coherent policy in regard to commerce, thus preventing the economy from stabilising; incapable of creating a national consensus because he excluded all opponents from power, as well as those in favour of a regional or ethnic balance; incapable of preventing extremist Hutus and the Ugandan guerrillas of the Allied Democratic Forces (Islamic, and supported by Sudan) from attacking Rwanda and Uganda from Congo.

The AFDL’s 1997 victory only succeeded in quelling the movement’s internal conflicts for a short time. In July 1998 the dismissal of the Rwandan contingent of the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC – Congolese Armed Forces) served to accelerate an armed rebellion. Kabila’s efforts since 1997 to free himself of his dependence on his former Ugandan and Rwandan sponsors threatened the security and economic interests of these two countries (International Crisis Group 1998).

In July 1998, rumours of a planned coup supported by the Rwandans prompted Kabila to send home the Rwandan troops that were training, and even
commanding his army. It was during their departure that a military uprising was declared in the east of the country, backed by Kigali. A rebel offensive was launched towards Bas-Congo with the objective of seizing Kinshasa and installing a new government.

On 27 July 1998 President Kabila announced that he was terminating “the Rwandan military presence that has assisted us since the liberation of Congo.” He added: “this marks the end of any foreign military presence in Congo” (Lemarchand 2003:45). Kabila decided to oust the Rwandan military commanders within ADFL ranks and send them back to Rwanda. It was this dismissal of the Rwandan contingent of the Congolese army that accelerated the launch of the armed rebel movement.

The expulsion of the Rwandan soldiers in July 1998 sparked a bitter conflict and precipitated Kigali’s decision to prevent Kabila from dictating the terms of their relationship. They were not ready to give up the influential role they had been playing in Kinshasa. It became clear from the outset that Rwanda would intervene in Congolese affairs whenever it deemed its national security interests at stake (International Crisis group 1998). Rwanda therefore had the most at stake, due to the fact that remaining elements of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe fighters posed an ongoing security threat. Kigali’s invasion of the Congo was an attempt to neutralize and eliminate these threats to Rwandan security and to install a “more accommodating regime in Kinshasa (Roessler and Prendergast 2006:240). Kigali also pursued purely economic interests as well and in support of its parallel efforts to exploit resources from eastern Congo and control the lucrative coltan and diamond markets, Rwanda pursued a policy of direct rule. It established a Congo Desk, to oversee its commercial and military operations in the neighbouring country, which was said to have been distinct from Kigali’s official national treasury. An estimation placed the Congo Desk’s budget, which was based entirely on the exploitation of Congo’s resources, at a staggering
US$320 million for 1999, or 20% of Rwanda’s GNP (Roessler and Prendergast 2006:240).

The lack of a political solution to Rwanda’s internal problems had been creating instability in the entire region. The incursions of ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia from Kivu sustained a climate of great fear among the Tutsi population that made any reconciliation effort impossible. Less than two years after the overthrow of Mobutu, Rwanda was engaged in another war in Congo, which was proving no more successful than the first in defeating Rwanda’s enemies. Instead, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe had found new allies on each occasion. Congo was likely to be an extended battlefield for the Rwandan civil war as long as those suspected of participation in the genocide remained on DRC territory.

Faced with a growing insurgency in their own Northwest at the beginning of 1998, and the apparent support of the Kabila regime for their long time enemies, Rwanda decided to attempt a second invasion of its neighbour.

On 2 August 1998, barely 14 months after the end of the war initiated by the anti-Mobutu coalition, the emergence of a new armed movement announced the beginning of a further "war of liberation" in the Democratic Republic of Congo, this time against the regime of Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The conflict arose out of differences between the founder members of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo - AFDL), the coalition that installed Laurent Kabila at the head of the Congo in May 1997. It is interesting at this point to observe that this conflict was also justified as being a war of liberation.

In many instances where the different components to conflict interact this can come to contribute to the enlargement of the original conflict situation. Conflict widening or the instance where conflict becomes more complex is through other parties becoming involved in the original situation of goal incompatibility, either
because they possess complementary goals, or because their interests dictate the support of one side rather than another. Existing parties take up new issues and thus become parties to new conflicts. New parties are formed to take up existing issues, other parties are drawn into the conflict as protagonists and new issues may also develop. In many cases of intra-national conflicts the process of widening a conflict involves more militant groups, aiming to bring about radical changes in the social structure and having a propensity to advocate, and use more violent methods (Mitchell 1981:58).

Rwanda and Uganda led another military intervention against Kabila and then set up a new rebel movement in Goma-the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) under leadership of Professor Wamba dia Wamba. A number of civilians had joined forces to form the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD - Congolese Assembly for Democracy), which brought together quite disparate groups around a core that could be called “the disillusioned of the first liberation”.

3.6.2.1 The role of The Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)

The RCD also needed time to win credibility and to succeed in making the conflict look like a purely internal civil war, but their cohesion was undermined on several fronts.

The RCD was formed on 1 August 1998, just one day before the war broke out, which indicates a lack of political preparation. The movement is officially based on criticism of the AFDL that had grown since Kabila took over. Indeed, Kabila had distanced himself from the movement and its founders.

The RCD’s operating philosophy and apparent objectives appear to differ significantly from these on which the AFDL was posited. In the protocol agreement signed by the RCD’s founders, the most striking element is the claim
that Kabila's primary fault was to claim personal credit for the victory of the Congolese people over Mobutu. In short, the AFDL victory created a window of opportunity for Kabila that he had wasted no time in putting to use for his own ends (International Crisis Group 1999: 16).

The founder members of the RCD were a heterogeneous coalition whose opposition to Kabila was the only common denominator. They came from diverse political backgrounds and only joined together in August 1998 to launch the rebellion against Kabila. The civilian RCD had neither a charismatic nor a clear-cut leadership (the RCD movement later split into two factions, RCD-Goma and RCD-Kisangani, backed by Rwanda and Uganda respectively).

On 2 August 1998, an armed rebellion led by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) began in the Kivus-once again-where it seized power in Goma before moving against the country’s capital. President Kabila immediately implicated Kigali in this rebellion and immediately accused Rwanda and Uganda of military invasion. From its beginnings in North Kivu, the rebellion had spread to cover more than forty percent of DRC territory, drawing in the armies of seven African countries.

The lines of battle had been drawn and redrawn as the fighting that began in the east of the country spread quickly to the west, and then returned again to the east following a failed attempt by the rebels in early August 1998 to seize the capital, Kinshasa. When the rebellion broke out on 2 August, Uganda publicly acknowledged its support for the rebels, while Rwanda denied any involvement. However, Kigali made several announcements that it would enter the war against Kinshasa because of the massacres of Tutsi in the Congolese capital and the arrests, followed by massacres, of Tutsi in several other cities (Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kisangani). These massacres and the “threats of genocide” with the complicity of the Congolese authorities provided an a posteriori diplomatic
justification for the presence of Rwandan-Ugandan troops in Congo (International
Crisis Group 1999:1).

Another related element to the process of conflict widening is when conflicts are
spoken of as becoming ‘polarized’, as the parties move further apart in some
fashion and some ‘gap’ between them widens. Furthermore conflicts change over
time because parties become more absolute in the positions they take up
regarding particular goals. A party can change from demanding some of a value
to demanding all of it, or from being willing to compromise over a given issue to
being unwilling to make any concessions at all (Mitchell 1981:59).

The best-known dynamic aspect of human conflict is its tendency to ‘escalate’. Normally the concept of ‘escalation’ is used in a confined sense to refer to a
process by which the parties to a conflict embark upon a mutually destructive
process of increasing the level of coercion or violence in the threats or actions
they direct against each other (Mitchell 1981:60).

The most important driving factor in escalation can be mutually negative
perceptions where emotion rules over rational thinking. Escalation can be viewed
in this light as a negative process- an increasing inability to empathize with an
adversary. Changes in attitude during a dispute can also occur, with hostility or
distrust increasing or decreasing or with wholly new attitudes and beliefs about
the situation and the adversary emerging within both parties. A process of
reinforcement can take place.

The hostility towards Kabila shown by the different Congolese parties had been
incorporated into the agendas of both Kampala and Kigali. For both these
governments, the destruction of rebel rear bases in North Kivu were of the
utmost priority, both militarily and politically. Rwanda’s leaders believed that it
was vitally important that the Hutu guerrillas were defeated because of the
strongly ethnic turn that the confrontation with Kabila had taken.
Conflict escalation can be understood either as an automatic process embedded in the dynamics of conflict or as a series of strategic unilateral moves by the parties involved. Zartman (1991: 516) argues that passage from one phase to another in conflict escalation is preceded by a stalemate. This forces parties in conflict to rethink their goals and means, and if they prove unrealistic or inadequate, a redefinition of the situation is required. Stalemate is considered to be the key both to the escalation process and the shift of ends, means, tactics and leadership. Stalemates are pivots of conflict dynamics, which can lead to escalatory and de-escalatory processes. For conflict resolution to be successful, it is important either to maintain the current stalemate or support de-escalatory tendencies.

Conflict escalation can be conceptualized along two axes: vertical and horizontal. Vertical escalation refers to the increase in the intensity of the dispute in terms of the conflict behaviours, and means used. They may involve actions that range from the imposition of economic, material, social, political or symbolic cost, with no physical injuries or deaths, to an action that explicitly includes threats, risks or actual loss of human life. Such indicators provide measures of the intensity of antagonism. The intensity of the conflict increases as more and more actions take place outside the framework of the country’s political and legal system.

3.7 Motivations for Uganda’s Involvement in the Conflict

Uganda also justified the effort to unseat Kabila by citing its security interests. Beneath the surface, Kampala had other motivations for the war such as its hopes for greater regional prestige, and economic gain. Viewed as the mastermind of the first rebellion that installed Kabila in power, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni could not afford to remain out of the second rebellion (International Crisis Group 2000:29).
Overall, Uganda had taken the same position as the Rwandans in this war, but its concerns extended beyond mere security considerations. Nonetheless, Kampala had solid grounds for criticizing Kabila’s regime. The latter had shown itself incapable of preventing murderous attacks from within its territory by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), one of the three anti-Museveni guerrilla movements in Uganda (International Crisis Group 1998: 17).

Uganda is also fighting a civil war, which pitted the Ugandan army against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the western part of the country neighbouring Congo, and against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Although the ADF was created before Kabila came to power, the Ugandan government accused Kinshasa of giving it support.

Uganda’s presence in Congo can also be explained by its involvement in Sudan’s civil war between the Khartoum government and the SPLA. Uganda’s military presence had not been limited to the border areas where the Ugandan rebels were active; it went as far as Kisangani, thousands of kilometres from the border. The explanation given for pushing so far inside Congo was to take control of strategic facilities such as airfields to prevent their use by Sudan, Uganda’s hostile northern neighbour. Uganda supports the Southern Sudan Liberation Army, which is fighting the Sudanese government, while Sudan supported the LRA against the Ugandan government.

The UPDF ostensibly intervened in the DRC to destroy the rebel ADF’s Congolese rear bases, and to prevent supplies from transiting the region in the future. For instance President Museveni explained to the Ugandan Parliament that, ‘like his predecessor Mobutu had done, he [Kabila] entered into an agreement with the Sudan government to destabilize Uganda. Kabila put at the disposal of the Sudan Congo’s airports to enable the Sudanese to supply the ADF and to use these facilities to destabilize Uganda directly’ (International Crisis Group 2000:30).
The Ugandan president certainly wanted to create the impression of having benevolent intentions by playing the democratic game. He told diplomats that he wanted to remove his troops from the DRC and even signed a ceasefire agreement in Libya on 17 April 1999, which included troop withdrawals. In order to promote a conciliatory image, he announced that he was ready to negotiate with his own rebel group, the LRA. However, on other occasions, he reiterated his belief that the Congolese had never been liberated through armed resistance, and the Ugandan people should therefore be prepared to sacrifice themselves in order to help their neighbours attain ‘true liberation’ (International Crisis Group 1999: 29).

The cohesion and discipline of the UPDF had suffered from its involvement in the war in the DRC. The access to Congolese resources had proved an irresistible temptation to many a UPDF officer. In fact, the spoils of war, which Uganda had tasted in the first invasion, always loomed large among the reasons for Kampala’s second intervention to further exploit resources that included coltan, diamonds, and gold. Uganda’s extraction of mineral resources disastrously heightened the conflict in Ituri between the Hema and Lendu people (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 241).

Horizontal escalation of conflict expands the geographical scope of conflict and brings into the sphere of non-violent or violent action new groups, communities, or states. The horizontal expansion of conflict may also involve the spill over of conflict in regional contexts. Under the rubric of horizontal escalation it is possible to think of the expansion in the number of issues at stake (issue proliferation) or in their size (issue inflation) and also in the parties’ goals. At the outset of conflict, the issues at stake tend to be discrete and more narrowly defined. As the conflict persists, both the size and number of issues tend to grow, if for instance the failure to achieve early solutions itself becomes a new source of grievance. The concept of “metaconflict” has been used to describe the situation when initial
issues at stake have become greatly outweighed by new issues, which the escalation of conflict produces (Leatherman et al 1999:76).

**3.8 Motivations for Burundi’s involvement in the DRC**

Spillover from the Burundian civil war has also contributed to the chaos in the DRC. Soon after the outbreak of the second war, the Burundian army deployed along on the DRC side of Lake Tanganyika, in order to guarantee the safety of its borders. The Government of Major Pierre Buyoya had feared that Kabila would offer the rebels bases, from which to wage their war in Burundi. But then as the FAC failed to make headway in its own war, and his allies grew more wary of shedding their soldiers’ blood, ties between the Burundi rebellion and the Kabila government deepened. In return for Kinshasa’s support, the *Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie*—*Forces de la Defence de la Démocratie* (CNDD-FDD of Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye) agreed to assist Kabila in his war. They had become virtual mercenaries to Kinshasa. The importance of their contribution to the DRC president’s war effort moreover meant that Kabila could not permit them to sign a peace deal with the Burundi government. Trapped in the Congo by their own greed and ambition, Burundi’s most important rebel group now waged Kabila’s war as much as its own.

**3.9 The Failure of the Second Rebellion**

The advance on Kinshasa failed only at the last minute. This was due to two factors. First, the arrival of Zimbabwean and Angolan troops to support Kabila, which came as a surprise to the rebel coalition.

The external parties on the Kabila coalition side had very clearly intervened in the conflict. When it looked like the rebels might succeed in taking Kinshasa a week after the war broke out on 2 August 1998, three Southern African states, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, provided support to save the regime. President
Laurent Kabila’s request for military assistance was promptly dealt with. The Victoria Falls meeting on 8 August 1998 decided to support Kabila’s failing army and brought military defeat to the rebel army just outside the capital. They justified this as an obligation to save the government of a legitimate SADC member state from the external aggression of Rwanda and Uganda. In an address to the September 1998 summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Durban (South Africa), President Mugabe of Zimbabwe said that if the three countries had not intervened, Congo would have been left with no government at all (International Crisis Group 1999:7).

Secondly, officially-encouraged ethnic propaganda was inciting Kinshasans to hunt down and kill Tutsis. The tense situation could have further degenerated into large-scale ethnic killings if the Rwandan Tutsi troops had entered Kinshasa and tried to overthrow Kabila (International Crisis Group 1999:2).

In the first two weeks of the war, the rebel coalition seized Goma, the North Kivu capital, as well as Bukavu and Uvira in South Kivu. This enabled them to establish a foothold in Eastern Congo, which borders Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

When the August 1998 RPA attack on Kinshasa failed, Kigali was forced to improvise a new strategy for a more protracted war. Its solution was to turn back to the RCD, which was created at the conflict’s start to provide a Congolese political face for Rwanda’s war effort. Internal divisions plagued the RCD from the outset. The movement never represented a coherent political program or belief. Instead, it was a coalition of opportunistic politicians who shared little more than a common antipathy for Kabila (International Crisis Group 2000:21).

The Rwandans created the RCD in order to provide a political justification for their war. Likewise the Congolese politicians who signed up for the movement sought to use Kigali’s military to capture their state. But instead of helping, the
two hurt one another. Kigali’s transparent effort to conceal its bellicosity behind the rebel movement undermined its own credibility. As its creator, moreover, Rwanda found itself responsible for its ally’s brutality.

From the outset, Rwanda and Uganda disagreed with one another over the best strategy for the war. Initially, Rwanda sought to topple Kabila through military means alone. When Uganda entered the war, Museveni tried to assert his authority by advocating a more political approach of ‘empowering the Congolese’. The pressure of these differences fractured the rebel RCD movement, as individual leaders adopted the positions of their sponsors (International Crisis Group 2000: 33). RCD-Goma’s lack of legitimacy can be attributed to its failure to provide the average Congolese with a modicum of security.

3.10 Kinshasa in Crisis

After the rebel attack against Kinshasa at the end of August 1998, and the lynchings of presumed rebels that followed, calm seemed to return to the Congolese capital. But the situation remained very tense as it was feared that many of the rebels who had infiltrated the city were still present. Consequently, at the beginning of September, “peoples’” roadblocks were set up, manned mainly by young people, who “took charge” of checking identities. This indicated the level of hostility felt by the people of Kinshasa towards the rebels. (International Crisis Group 1998:9).

The Kinshasa authorities had played on and actively encouraged the anti-Tutsi feelings that developed in Kinshasa during the year that the Rwandan army was involved in running the “new Congo”, when the population suffered real abuse at the hands of Rwandan soldiers. All this had led to an atmosphere of anti-Tutsi hysteria in the capital not dissimilar to that reigning in Rwanda before the 1994 genocide.
Especially in times of threat the maintenance of a high level of group conformity is essential, particularly with regards to perceptions and attitudes as well as behaviour (Mitchell 1981: 88). In times of crisis even the most open-minded groups tend to limit freedom of thought and insist upon a high level of conformity.

Kabila had the support of a part of the Congolese population before the rebellion began because a certain amount of progress had been made under his administration. There was remarkably unanimous support among Kinshasa’s poor who appreciated the improved security in their daily lives, particularly the fact that they were no longer abused by soldiers as happened under Mobutu. In the working class neighbourhoods of the capital, people were often heard to say: “Now we are free, free to move round” without fear of extortion (International Crisis Group 1998:11). A large number of Congolese who were previously hostile to Kabila’s regime rallied to his support when their nationalist sentiments were aroused against the involvement of foreigners in the rebellion.

3.10.1 Kabila- Anarchist or Nationalist?

The emergence of pervasive psychological dimensions to the conflict in the DRC soon became apparent, as Kabila became more militant in his actions and his statements against his perceived enemies more virulent and emotionally charged.

In maintaining a positive ‘own-party’ image the role of the enemy is central. Mitchell (1981: 94) refers to another crucial problem that is likely to confront any individual member of a group (or nation) striving to maintain his image of the group with which he identifies as being essentially fair, just, strong-but-peace-loving and highly principled. This dilemma arises frequently when the individual and his group or nation are in intense conflict with another party, for almost inevitably both sides will employ violent forms of conflict behaviour that run
counter to accepted norms of permissible behaviour, held within the group. The solution to the dilemma is usually found in dehumanization. This involves convincing oneself that the enemy is inhuman, cruel, barbaric and uncivilized to the extent that the customary standards of ethics and morals that apply within ‘our’ more civilized group do not apply to the enemy. It is therefore considered far easier to plan, order and carry out a cruel and vicious policy against a group regarded in such profoundly negative terms. A party in conflict that fulfils the role of enemy can serve as a scapegoat upon which frustrations or feelings of aggression may be directed. The presence of an enemy fulfils a functional role, particularly psychologically.

With vast areas in the east beyond the authority of the government, Kabila had resorted to media propaganda in order to reach the population there. This was pitched at three different levels: nationalist, ethnic and military. By appealing to his population to resist the ‘foreign aggressors’ and playing on their nationalist feelings, he had gained considerable popularity. When the war broke out, he handed Rwanda a tailor-made argument to become involved by saying: "The war should be taken to where it came from ... We will defend ourselves... the Rwandans will not win the war... we're not going to lower ourselves to be the pawn of a little country like Rwanda and a little people." (International Crisis Group 1999:14). Mobutu had already portrayed the 1996 rebellion as a Rwandan rebellion. Kabila believed that Rwanda’s support for the 1996 rebellion was now widely understood, which made it far easier to raise international suspicion about its involvement since 1998. At the same time, he wanted to erase all memory of the well documented assistance provided by Rwanda in 1996-1997. Such foreign support, especially from Rwanda, did not earn him the people’s approval. It is interesting to note how conflict attitudes, and perceptions revealed themselves already at a very early stage in the conflict.

According to Mitchell (1981: 99) perceptions which result from the activation of psychological processes may be classified into those, which concern the
perceiver’s own, self or group, the adversary and third parties in the overall environment within which the conflict occurs.

One vital element of the positive image held about one’s own group (or nation) particularly exacerbates tendencies to respond forcefully and aggressively to perceived threats by another group, or any situation in which one’s own goals are thwarted by the activities of another. This is referred to as virile self-image and is connected with pride in the qualities of one’s own chosen group and associated with the process of rationalization. The latter transforms pride into a set of supportable and justifiable reasons for taking actions, which can then be further rationalized as ‘defensive’ (Mitchell 1981: 101). In such situations a nation may be convinced by its leadership that their reputation as a strong-but-wise, tough-but-peace-loving entity is at stake, rather than the actual details of any current problem. This relates to the notion that a nation’s pride is at stake, so that it must demonstrate courage to the adversary and enemy. In addition to a virile self-image, it is considered important for members of a group or nation engaged in conflict to maintain their perception that their party is also essentially moral in its dealings with others (even the adversary).

In this context Kabila had masterfully used the war to turn himself into a Congolese nationalist, accusing Uganda and Rwanda of aggression and ‘imperialist intentions’. Boosting his popularity in this way is a political investment he expected to realize in future elections; he hoped that his wartime reputation would transform him into a ‘liberator’ in the people’s eyes. He would like to appear as the successor to Patrice Lumumba, the national hero who was killed after Zaïre won independence (International Crisis Group 1999:14).

A particularly potent image is known as the ‘unified enemy’ image. This is an image which sees the enemy as a single, unified entity, the members of which are all equally bent upon our downfall, equally evil, and equally implacable in their pursuits of a set of unjust and immoral goals (Mitchell 1981: 109). The
second component of Kabila’s populist strategy had been wilfully to incite ethnic hatred. A year prior he was perceived as pro-Tutsi, but in order to play on nationalist sentiment, he had to turn against his former allies. Tutsi Rwandans and the Congolese Banyamulenge believe the anti-Tutsi propaganda was based on the perception of many Congolese that this war was a foreign invasion. People’s Militia Groups were created- a move encouraged directly by Kabila himself. Kabila publicly appealed to his people in an August 1998 radio broadcast to "take up arms, even traditional weapons - bows and arrows, spears and other things to crush the enemy, to kill Tutsi, "otherwise they will make us their slaves.” The war had brought him some of the legitimacy that he had been lacking since May 1997 when he was seen as ‘a puppet of the Tutsi’ (International Crisis Group 1999:14).

At this point it is crucial to note that the prospect of preventive diplomacy succeeding in such a hostile political environment was to a certain degree destined for failure from the outset. Successful preventive action is fostered by crucial indigenous factors arising in the conflict arena itself, of particular importance is accommodating leaders. This is considered by Lund (2006:18) as an important variable as they alert third parties to important leverage points for conflict prevention strategies. The leaders of parties to a dispute increase the chances of success when they show moderation in their words, actions, and policies; make conciliatory gestures and seek bilateral or multilateral negotiations with give-and-take bargaining. Failure is likely if parties engage in provocative rhetoric, unilateral pre-emptive hostile acts, uncompromising policies, or coercion and force that worsen tensions.

3.11 The Allies-The role of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola in the Conflict

In the midst of the conflict, efforts were been expedited to seek solutions to ending the conflict, albeit that these were subtle statements that were drowned
out by the battle cries for war. Kabila and his allies continued to insist that they would stand and fight.

Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe was the first country to respond to Laurent Kabila’s call for help at the end of August when the latter was experiencing defeat after defeat and the rebellion was making great strides forward. Mugabe was also involved in the first military investigation team sent to Congo by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). He also organised a summit meeting in Harare right at the start of the war in an attempt to initiate negotiations. Zimbabwe’s participation was largely regarded as being based on economic and mining interests. Zimbabwe also attempted to portray itself as a credible member of the international community with its intervention efforts.

Speaking after a four-nation summit between Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and the DRC in Kinshasa on 21 February 1999, Zimbabwean President Mugabe was reported on state-run television in Kinshasa as saying that the allies would spare no effort to help the DRC restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Lashing out at Uganda and Rwanda, Mugabe said:

“There is no doubt on our part that they intend the war to continue … to exploit the resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The time has come for the international community not only to exert pressure on them to withdraw … but also to recognize that their aggression is against international law, and therefore must cease. As I said, we are determined to put an end to this war, and today we re-examined other ways of putting an end to this aggression by all means.” (IRIN 1999).

Beyond the façade of diplomatic showmanship, Zimbabwe’s intervention was also motivated by pure economic self-interest. President Mugabe exploited his strong personal relationship with Laurent Kabila to acquire lucrative contracts with the Kinshasa government. Recognizing the potential for further enrichment,
Mugabe offered military hardware and thousands of troops to the Kabila regime despite widespread domestic opposition and protests from international donors (Roessler and Prendergast 2006:242). Indeed Zimbabwe’s military intervention in the Congo was designated as “self-financing” in a September 1998 bilateral deal signed by Kinshasa and Harare. As payment for the intervention, the Mugabe regime secured one of the largest timber concessions in the world, gaining the right to exploit more than eighty million acres of forests in the Congo. Mugabe’s closest allies benefited, while Zimbabwean and Congolese elites illegally transferred US$ 5 billion of mining assets from the Congolese state to private companies from 1999 to 2002, amounting to stealing from the state the equivalent of the Congo’s entire gross domestic product (GDP) for the year 2000 (Roessler and Prendergast 2006:242).

Namibia’s involvement was based on similar interests to that of Zimbabwe and its military involvement following the first reports of Namibian casualties were not received well by opposition groups and the population.

The Angolan army entered the war on the side of Kabila without announcing it was doing so and while the rebels were relying, as the result of diplomatic contacts, on it doing nothing “for at least fifteen days”. Angola made no sensational declarations of support for Kabila – contrary to those made by Mugabe and Nujoma. Angola’s main reason for intervening in Congo was not to save Kabila’s regime, but to protect its own strategic interests, which was achieved by winning control over major air bases on the common border with Congo.

Angola first entered the DRC war to save Kabila’s regime and, afraid of the vacuum that might result from his fall, guarantee that no support would be forthcoming from Kinshasa to the UNITA rebels of Jonas Savimbi. It suspected that Rwanda and Uganda had close ties to these rebel opponents (International Crisis Group 2000: 54).
Indeed, Luanda was critical of the Kinshasa government for allowing the UNITA guerrilla movement to use Congolese territory as a transit for diamonds from the mines it controls, and which it uses to finance its activities (International Crisis Group 1998: 22). In 1996-97 Angola assisted the rebellion headed by Kabila and profited from the occasion to cut off President Mobutu’s support for UNITA. UNITA took advantage of Angolan intervention in the DRC to launch its current offensive, which had resulted in the destruction of many towns and the deaths of thousands of civilians. They saw that government troops were thin on the ground in Angola with more than three brigades deployed in Congo (International Crisis Group 1999:24).

South Africa refused to send troops to the DRC and insisted that a diplomatic solution should be found. The DRC did not consider South Africa to be neutral as it provided weapons to Rwanda and maintained cordial relations with Uganda.

In November 1998, tensions rose between Rwanda and Uganda, leading the latter to establish the Gbadolite-based Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC).

3.12 The Creation of the Mouvement de Libération Congolais (MLC)

Uganda, a major military backer of the RCD, had registered its disappointment with the party’s political programme by backing a rival anti-Kabila group led by businessman Jean-Pierre Bemba, which emerged in Northern Congo in November 1998. Since he launched the MLC in November 1998, Bemba had sought to establish himself as the sole legitimate actor on the Congolese political stage. He subsequently devoted himself to the organisation of an army, a territorial administration, and the beginnings of a mass political party (International Crisis Group 2001a:21).
The movement, led by Jean–Pierre Bemba, had risen from relative obscurity to a central position in the DRC, and constituted a real competitor to the RCD.

When the war broke out, Bemba, eager to engage in the anti–Kabila movement, was isolated by the RCD – the only existing rebel movement. Efforts to bring together Bemba and the mainstream RCD movement had been unsuccessful despite meetings in Kampala between Bemba and the RCD leadership. Bemba played a significant role for Ugandans because he expressed a strong belief in the importance of mobilizing the population. The Ugandans felt that Kabila, whom they had originally supported, had not been able to popularize his government and widen his political base.

Uganda’s support for Bemba was the result of the power struggle between the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and had created differences between Kampala and Kigali over their approach to the war. The Rwandans and the Ugandans had essentially different approaches to the war in Congo. The Ugandans believe that a political approach must accompany military action in order to ensure a durable solution. According to Museveni, Congo had never been “liberated” and the Congolese must be empowered to do this for themselves. The Rwandans gave absolute priority to the military approach, which was intended to neutralize their enemy and secure the Kivus (International Crisis Group 1999:20).

Whenever a pattern of behaviour is perceived as being successful, a party is likely to repeat the pattern in the same or future conflicts. The reinforcement of negative perceptions may also lead to the intractability of conflict to such an extent that it may become increasingly difficult or in some instances virtually impossible to find a solution to a conflict situation that both parties will accept. As has been pointed out earlier attitudes affect behaviour. Mitchell refers to this situation as the development of malign or benign spirals and emphasizes that the existence of a situation of major goal incompatibility between parties predisposes
them to enter into a malign spiral, from which it is difficult to escape. Escalation becomes easy, de-escalation increasingly difficult (Mitchell 1981:63).

Mitchell’s discussion of these interrelated components is summarized as a number of simple propositions, namely that situations affect behaviour-goals, especially salient goals, being frustrated call forth intense efforts to achieve those goals, secondly situations affect attitudes-goal incompatibility is likely to increase suspicion and mistrust, thirdly behaviour affects situations as success may bring more issues into the dispute as demands escalate, fourthly behaviour affects attitudes as destruction increases anger, success can affect the sense of in-group solidarity, fifthly attitudes affect behaviour as expectations that the opposing party is to be considered a clear and present danger and finally attitudes affect situations as more issues will be perceived to be in dispute with an adversary, so that long drawn-out confrontations may develop. The latter is closely related to the concept of protracted social conflict- a situation that was developing in the DRC.

The major reason why the negotiations had not taken off is that the nature of the conflict had not been clearly identified. In fact, it emerged as a civil war that had taken on complex external dimensions. The DRC’s internal political problems were (and in most instances continue to be) at the roots of the security concerns of neighbouring states; and these regional interests are themselves the reason why the conflict had developed such military magnitude (International Crisis Group 1999:12). The motives that contributed to the immediate decision to continue the conflict were manifold and severely impeded attempts to launch diplomatic negotiations. The sheer complexity of the conflict was exacerbated by the number of parties that became embroiled in the war. It also became apparent from the outset that the parties to the conflict were reluctant to discard the military option altogether and continued to issue strongly worded statements in favour thereof.
Mobutu dismembered the Congolese state long before Kabila took power in Kinshasa. Territorial sovereignty is often an illusion in Africa, but in the case of the DRC amounted to a complete fantasy. Kabila’s rule was restricted to a few major towns (Kinshasa, Kikwit, Mbandaka, Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi, Kolwezi, Lubumbashi) and strategic locations (the port of Matadi and the Inga hydro-electricity dam) and some important roads and rivers (International Crisis Group 2000: 47). Political repression and divide and rule tactics had permitted Kabila to overcome the domestic discontent with his rule.

3.13 Conclusion

Conflict is a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other but not both. According to Mitchell (1981:15) conflict refers to actual behaviour (which often involves coercion and usually violence). The behaviour is aimed at least at preventing the opposing party preventing one from reaching one’s own goals.

Conflict situations often bring about a marked increase of coercive or violent behaviour by one or both parties and that this phenomenon is frequently accompanied by an increase of hostility, hatred and suspicion as well as increasingly distorted perceptions of an enemy among members of parties in conflict. It is important to note and emphasize the inter-relations of the three components of conflict, and the way in which these are closely linked in the real world.

In many instances where the different components to conflict interact this can come to contribute to the enlargement of the original conflict situation. Conflict widening or the instance where conflict becomes more complex is through other parties becoming involved in the original situation of goal incompatibility, either because they possess complementary goals, or because their interests dictate the support of one side rather than another. Existing parties take up new issues
and thus become parties to new conflicts. New parties are formed to take up existing issues, other parties are drawn into the conflict as protagonists and new issues may also develop. The most important driving factor in escalation can be mutually negative perceptions where emotion rules over rational thinking.

This chapter has provided an in-depth exploration of the origins of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is regarded as a paradigmatic case of state failure. The Congolese territory has been the theatre of two major wars since 1996, which resulted from three sets of causes, each inherited from a distinct period of the Great Lakes/Central Africa region’s history. The legacy of Belgian colonialism, which instrumentalized identity issues and put two groups against each other-the Hutu and the Tutsi-that ironically shared the same language, culture, history, social organization and territory. Secondly, the conflicts in the Congo find their roots in the failure of former Zaire, which derived from Mobutu’s patrimonial rule over the country and the manipulation of ethnic differences. Thirdly, the DRC’s decent into chaos was fuelled by the civil wars in Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda, which each spilled over across the Congolese territory’s eastern borders.

The first rebellion ended with the fall of Kinshasa on 17 May 1997, Laurent-Désiré Kabila proclaimed himself President of the newly named Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) a motion that would soon turn him into a dictator. The first Congolese war had started upon the conclusion of an alliance between Kabila and Kigali. The second conflict broke out in August 1998 as soon as the ‘marriage of convenience’ broke down. On 2 August 1998, barely 14 months after the end of the war initiated by the anti- Mobutu coalition, the emergence of a new armed movement announced the beginning of a further "war of liberation" in the Democratic Republic of Congo, this time against the regime of Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The conflict arose out of differences between the founder members of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo - AFDL), the coalition that
installed Laurent Kabila at the head of the Congo in May 1997. The major reason why the negotiations had not taken off is that the nature of the conflict had not been clearly identified. In fact, it emerged as a civil war that had taken on complex external dimensions. The DRC’s internal political problems were (and in most instances continue to be) at the roots of the security concerns of neighbouring states; and these regional interests are themselves the reason why the conflict had developed such military magnitude.

It appeared as if the DRC at this critical juncture was heading for a continuous state of emergency, conflict and crisis. It therefore became ominously clear that the process of securing a viable diplomatic solution to the conflict had to be expedited. The aforementioned discussion has made it possible to critically examine the responses to the conflict in the DRC and whether or not the measures adopted to respond to the crisis in the embattled country were carried out in a timely, coherent and coordinated manner. The subsequent discussion will attempt to analyze and critically assess whether preventive diplomacy was initiated in a timely manner to end the conflict in the DRC. There is also a distinct need to undertake a critical analysis of the various obstacles incurred during attempts to resolve the crisis in the DRC. There will also be an attempt to cast light on the potential influence of negative conflict attitudes in prolonging a conflict and blocking progress in a peace process. The conflict in the DRC will also serve as a case study, advocating the need to include a more thorough consideration of the social-psychological approach to conflict resolution to inculcate a perception of the possibility of achieving a negotiated settlement in order to achieve a sustainable peace settlement.
CHAPTER 4
The role of Preventive Diplomacy in the DRC Conflict-
A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement

4.1 Introduction
A fundamental problem for parties employing coercive or persuasive strategies in a conflict is when to ‘make peace’. This involves seeking solutions that will bring an end to violence and ultimately secure stability, security and the renewal of peaceful, normal and amicable relations. Such an outcome can be achieved only if all the parties make a concerted effort and decision to compromise through negotiation. The more general process relevant to ending conflict at all social levels can be called ‘conflict termination’, a matter of at least one party in a conflict determining to abandon coercive behaviour and to adopt a form of settlement strategy that operates through concessions and conciliation (Mitchell 1981:165). Rather than continue costly and ineffective military operations, either because a perceived stalemate exists or because defeat seems more likely than a decisive victory, a national government may take the difficult decision to initiate peace talks with an adversary. Alternatively, it could make a direct compromise offer to the opposing party in a conflict situation. As Mitchell rightly points out, an important characteristic of conflict termination is that it is basically a bilateral process, the main roles being played out by the adversaries.

The DRC provides for an interesting yet troubling discussion not only of the conflict itself, but of the actual steps initiated in attempts to restore sustainable peace, stability and security. With both Dialogues concluded under the Lusaka process accompanied by months and years of intense and gruelling negotiation, the fair question in retrospect would be whether the Lusaka agreement and the Inter-Congolese Dialogues provided for under the agreement’s auspices had been a success?
This chapter will aim to examine the salient question: Has preventive diplomacy been successful in resolving conflicts in Africa? Has greater emphasis been placed on operational prevention, to the detriment of structural prevention of conflict? Was preventive diplomacy applied in a timely, coherent and decisive manner to resolve the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo? Were the peace initiatives and efforts developed to end the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo sufficient and effective to address a conflict of such a protracted, violent and complex nature? Should preventive diplomacy not have been applied throughout the entire conflict in a more sustained and concerted manner in order to have avoided the relapses into conflict that occurred? To what extent should an examination of psychological variables, particularly conflict attitudes as an exacerbating factor in a conflict situation and the social-psychological means to address it form part of the strategy of preventive diplomacy? To which extent has the DRC proven to be a manifestation of the failure of preventive diplomacy to incorporate this often omitted approach towards understanding and resolving conflict?

Preventive diplomacy initiatives when taken alone and independently of a broader strategy of conflict prevention are likely to fail unless they are linked to measures and actions that tackle the deeper, structural causes and origins of conflict. Ultimately the structural strategies of prevention are considered to be the most effective ones and therefore the prevention of deadly conflicts requires the thwarting of economic failures, social breakdowns and environmental degradation. According to this view “a comprehensive preventive strategy must first focus on the underlying political, social, economic and environmental causes of conflict” (Leatherman et al 1999:97). Yet Lund (1996) asserts an overemphasis on the structural causes of conflict is inaccurate, as social inequities and resource scarcity do not always lead to deadly conflict, and they can produce healthy non-violent conflict that acts as a catalyst for positive social change. Lund (1996:35) therefore contends that such a broad focus for preventive diplomacy risks overlooking the more proximate behavioural sources
of violent conflicts, which in rich and poor states are considered to be political in nature.

This chapter provides a brief background to the immediate diplomatic initiatives that were launched in response to seeking a swift and decisive end to the conflict in the DRC as it erupted in 1998. It also briefly examines the pre-negotiation stages, which ultimately led to the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The Agreement itself is assessed in terms of its main provisions. The discussion also briefly assesses the Inter-Congolese Dialogues provided for under the Lusaka Agreement, and debates whether these deliberations have contributed to securing any genuine successes among the failures and losses that have been incurred on the road to the Lusaka Peace Agreement.

4.2 An Assessment of Preventive Diplomacy in the DRC

The decision to terminate a conflict, which is often a tacit acknowledgement of defeat or deadlock, is a difficult and lengthy one. Very few, if any, violent and protracted conflicts and wars have ended suddenly. Conflicts are intense, brutal, cause severe trauma to mostly uninvolved civilians, and breed extreme distrust, fear and suspicion among the participants.

An important definitional issue pertains to the differing goals of conflict resolution versus crisis management. There is no single definition of ‘successful’ conflict resolution. Whereas general conflict resolution focuses on seeking long-term remedies that address the structural causes of conflict and underlying issues, interventions in crises have a distinct mission (Wilkenfeld et al 2003:281). The primary mission of crisis management is to terminate the immediate crisis before it escalates or spreads. Securing a ceasefire or other form of de-escalation would be considered a successful instance of crisis management but is not always considered a successful conflict resolution outcome.
Disentangling regional conflict complexes typically involves two contrasting approaches to a peace process. A gradual way is to approach a regional conflict complex conflict by conflict. This assumes that those conflicts open to solution are brought to an end as speedily as possible. This is done in the hope that continued conflict in neighbouring countries will not affect the implementation of the accords. By removing one conflict in one country from the agenda, the region has a shared experience and this can generate energy to go on to the next conflict. A regional momentum for peace is created as tensions also decline in other relationships (Wallensteen 2007:197). This approach is often the one preferred by stronger regional actors, as it gives them a central role. One danger with the conflict-by-conflict approach is that the interconnections in the region might be so strong that it will be difficult to implement an isolated agreement.

Often the first steps taken by the parties have been to establish a truce of some sort. It makes sense, as it is difficult to pursue negotiations at the same time as violence is being practiced between the parties.

There is also a bolder approach, which is to take on the most difficult conflict first, thus hoping to remove the entire regional conflict complex in a short time span. This implies that the most crucial conflicts are identified and resolved, even thought they may initially seem to be the ones most difficult to manage. This is considered by Wallensteen to be a bolder approach, as it requires a shared analysis of what the central issues are and highly concerted actions to tackle them.

Conflicts that can be ended at some unambiguous and available termination point are thus rare. Usually parties to a conflict are faced with the problem of ending a conflict by working towards a settlement through an indeterminate, almost trial and error, process (Mitchell 1981:166). The basic but complex question facing parties and their leaders is always when they should accept the terms the adversary offers, given that circumstances may change to their
disadvantage and subsequent terms may be worse. Another problem facing parties to a conflict is when to give up and start compromising. This presents a particular challenge to the successful initiation of preventive diplomacy. The war in the DRC had produced a catastrophe in the region and posed severe difficulties at finding a durable solution that would produce peace.

As discussed earlier the key to preventive diplomacy is the timing of its activation in relation to evolving conditions in a given place on the ground. Therefore preventive diplomacy is not confined to any particular instrument or agent. The key to whether a tool is used for preventive diplomacy, however, is whether it is being specifically targeted and oriented to places and times where violence or armed force are threatening in the medium-term. Central tasks include suppressing violence, disarming belligerents, addressing the issues in dispute by engaging the parties in dialogue or negotiations, creating or strengthening the procedures and institutions through which such negotiations can occur on a frequent and regular basis in permanent institutions such as governments and modifying perceptions and feelings of mistrust and suspicion among the parties. Although many situations will call for the performance of all of these tasks, specific circumstances will dictate which tasks have the highest priority. One of the most important factors that determines which tasks are of greatest importance, and thus which instruments and agents are likely to be most needed, is how remote or close at hand the threat of violence is- i.e. the degree of hostility that exists between potential parties to a conflict (Lund 1996:45).

Preventive diplomacy would typically commence when tensions in the relationships between parties are in danger of shifting from stable peace to unstable peace or worse. According to Lund (1996:41) it applies then not only to situations that have seen no recent conflict, but also to post-conflict situations where violence or coercion have been largely terminated but the efforts of post conflict peace building are apparently insufficient to move the conflict into stable peace away from the danger of re-escalation. Its aim is to keep actual or
potential disputes from taking the form of confrontation or all-out violence and to return them to processes of regular diplomacy or national politics, or a more desirable state of durable peace. But if it fails, and such situations deteriorate into crisis, preventive diplomacy ceases to apply as a concept. At the operational level of conflict prevention, Michael Lund argues that preventive measures are especially effective at the level of unstable peace, which is defined as “a situation where tension and suspicion among parties run high but violence is either absent or only sporadic” (Lund 1996:39). Preventive diplomacy is therefore deemed as being especially operative at the level of unstable peace.

Empirical studies of mediation success and conflict escalation theory appear to confirm the presumption that pre-crisis and pre-violence intervention into conflict would generally be easier, and save more lives than reactive responses to manage, contain, or terminate all-out wars. The less violent and enduring the conflict, the greater the ability of third-party mediators to gain access and achieve a peaceful settlement. Issues tend to be simpler and singular, rather than complex and multiple; fatalities, and thus passions, are lower; disputants are less polarized and politically or militarily mobilized behind rigidly opposed causes (Lund 2006:9). Interventions that act before violence or repression can lead to a spiral of victimization and revenge, have a better chance of achieving results.

Conflict prevention is most operative when ordinary peacetime diplomacy and politics have begun to break down and tensions rise, but before crisis management is necessary. Addressing neither peaceable relationships nor conditions of cooperation nor crisis and war, it is activated specifically in troubled, unstable places and times when it is likely that regimes or people will take up arms or use other forms of coercion such as repression to ‘resolve’ emerging political differences. The aim is to keep actual disputes from taking the form of confrontation or all-out violence and to return them to the processes of peacetime diplomacy or regular national politics. If conflict prevention fails and the situation deteriorates into a crisis, the notion of preventive diplomacy ceases to apply, at
least until the conflict has abated, in which case it is again needed to avoid a renewal of violent conflict (Lund 2006:12).

The fundamental question that this dissertation therefore seeks to explore is whether preventive diplomacy was in fact applied in a timely manner after the ‘First Rebellion’, given that tensions remained alarmingly high, which ultimately led to the outbreak of the ‘Second Rebellion’ and the devastating conflict being witnessed in the DRC at present.

However given the inaction that followed after the first rebellion and much of the second rebellion that followed in 1998, it is also crucial to assess whether preventive diplomacy played any constructive role at all in relation to the conflict situation in the DRC. Lund argues that there is a clear distinction between conflict prevention, crisis management and conflict management. According to his classification as mentioned earlier, prevention ceases to apply as a concept when a dispute has already deteriorated to the stage of violent conflict (Mans 2003:182). Yet modern-day conflicts cannot be assessed utilizing such a rationalist approach. While Lund’s theory suggests that a country or region passes through several stages of conflict, it becomes increasingly difficult to use such a blueprint for appropriate analysis of African conflicts. A specification of the stages of crisis or conflict requires a general agreement on the situation in the country. As Mans (2003: 182) stresses this is often difficult to determine, as governments in times of crisis may not be objective. While leaders may demand diplomatic or military assistance, opposition groups are likely to have a different reading of the situation. Lund presents the transition from one stage to the next as both chronological and explicit. There is no room for local differences (on a political, ethnic, military level) or intermediate setbacks (such as ceasefire-violations), two of the most prominent features of the asymmetric conflicts of the past decade.

As Mans (2003:184) stresses it is useful to regard the conflict in the DRC as
three overlapping wars, rather than one single sequence of conflict. The concept of preventive diplomacy might be appropriate at different times within the same country, as wars and conflicts tend to create several dynamics, with separate events on the margins. Preventive diplomacy is not a single action, neither is it an event. Diplomacy unfolds in a political climate, which in turns determines the character and intensity of certain diplomatic initiatives. A conflict often reveals a range of different stages, and therefore, may provide reason to engage in conflict prevention and peacemaking simultaneously. The salient issue as Mans (2003:189) rightly points out is whether preventive diplomacy would have been applicable in the DRC after the second rebellion had started. Theory suggests that prevention had already failed, yet the complex realities that manifested in the DRC required more than mere peacemaking alone. The original disputes in the DRC ultimately deteriorated into conflict. Open warfare occurred and the peace process evolved around diplomatic efforts to convince the belligerents to stop fighting. This has significant implications for the nature of intervention.

4.3 The Nature of Intervention in the DRC Revisited

The nature of the intervention is another crucial and related aspect that works in coordination with the timing. Central to the conduct of preventive diplomacy, this issue according to Lund is often dealt with implicitly rather than explicitly. A more synoptic and inter-organizational approach to developing preventive interventions is required. In considering possible options for action, an important step is often omitted. A salient question that should be asked from the outset is- “what is the problem on the ground?” Rather than invoke familiar remedies simply because they are convenient or available, policymakers and practitioners should proceed inductively, working from the ground up to tailor a response that meets the particular circumstances of each conflict situation. The first-step in tactical preventive diplomacy is needs assessment-closely scrutinizing the pre-conflict situation in order to devise appropriate responses to avoid the onset of violent conflict.
Disputes become violent or peaceful depending on one or more of the following six deficiency or need factors. Firstly, there is lack of restraints on violence where few limitations restrict the ability of parties to resort to armed force. Secondly, there is a lack of a process, where no procedures or institutions exist through which a dispute can be discussed and solutions sought. Thirdly, there is a lack of resources, where parties lack the material wherewithal in any effort to keep the dispute from worsening. A lack of solutions exists, where parties lack proposals for settling the issues that divide them. Another major aspect is related to a lack of incentives, where parties lack sufficient motivation to accept any of the solutions. Finally a lack of trust is present, where the perceptions and attitudes of the parties toward each other are so negative that they are unable to contemplate particular solutions or to comply with them (Lund 1996:140). A crucial oversight in the application of successful preventive diplomacy is the failure to carry out a precise inductive needs assessment in alerting those who would seek to prevent escalation of a specific dispute to the particular configuration of problems where preventive action is required.

Among political analysts, the debate about appropriate intervention strategies can be characterized as a debate between “realist” and “liberal” interpretations of the sources of inter-communal conflict. Within these competing paradigms there are different schools of thought about the nature of intervention strategies deemed desirable or warranted.

“Hard” realists argue for a narrow range of intervention strategies that largely revolve around the use of force (threatened or actual) to restore order. According to Osler Hampson (2001:389) one of the most forceful advocates of hard realism Chaim Kaufmann argues that so-called ethnic wars are the result of the processes of political mobilization, hypernationalism, and inter-communal security dilemmas that engender “ethnic cleansing”. As tensions rise and conflict escalates, “populations come increasingly to hold enemy images of the other groups, either because of deliberate efforts by elites to create such images or
because of increasingly real threats. Even ostensibly defensive measures will be seen as threatening, leading to a spiral of escalating hostilities. Like hard realism, soft realism believes that conflict can be understood as a rational political process-driven by strategic behaviour on the part of ethnic entrepreneurs-in which the costs of civil war and violence are deemed to be lower than any of the political alternatives. However, unlike hard realism, soft realism believes that there is a role for the exercise of soft power—that is, mediation, exchanges of information and negotiation—in the management of ethnic conflict (Osler Hampson 2001:391). Third-party interventions do not have to be coercive in order to be effective, but they do have to be sensitive to the dynamics and structure of conflict if they are to affect its course. Governance-based approaches see ethnic and communal conflicts less in terms of strategic security dilemmas and more in terms of a set of causal relationships in which the key variables are the denial of human rights, due process of law and of liberal pluralist forms of democracy. Human rights violations are seen as underpinning the security dilemma and as key contributing factors to conflict-escalation processes. Fear of human rights violations engenders self-defence and creates the security dilemma that drives escalation. Governance-based approaches see the challenge of peacebuilding and third-party involvement largely in terms of the creation of participatory governance structures, the development of new social norms and the establishment of the rule of law and democracy (Osler Hampson 2001:393).

As alluded to earlier, classical conflict resolution was mainly concerned with entry into the conflict itself and with how to enable parties to violent conflict to resolve the issues between them in non-violent ways. However the contemporary approach is to take a wider view of the \textit{timing and nature of intervention}. Central to this aspect is identifying this crucial point where intervention in a situation of conflict is feasible. As mentioned earlier, those wishing to terminate a conflict will argue that the costs and risks of prolonging the conflict far outweigh those of compromise in the present and that the admittedly uncertain benefits of a rapid
settlement outweigh the more uncertain benefits to be obtained at some unspecified time in the future.

The crucial aspect therefore in assessing any conflict situation relates to when intervention should be considered-related to the actual operational aspects of preventive diplomacy in practice.

4.4 Ripeness Theory- Propitious Conditions for the Implementation of Preventive Diplomacy in the DRC

As alluded to earlier, classical conflict resolution was mainly concerned with entry into the conflict itself and with how to enable parties to violent conflict to resolve the issues between them in non-violent ways. However the contemporary approach is to take a wider view of the timing and nature of intervention. Central to this aspect is identifying this crucial point where intervention in a situation of conflict is feasible. As mentioned earlier, those wishing to terminate a conflict will argue that the costs and risks of prolonging the conflict far outweigh those of compromise in the present and that the admittedly uncertain benefits of a rapid settlement outweigh the more uncertain benefits to be obtained at some unspecified time in the future.

The structuralist paradigm of mediation is based on the belief that through the use of persuasion, incentives, and disincentives (a costing process), parties to a conflict can be led to and through a negotiated settlement. This paradigm, anchored in a rational choice view of the world, treats the causes of conflict as objective- as opposed to subjective- issues that can yield to negotiation (Crocker et al 1999:20).

It is premised on the familiar notions of “ripeness” and “hurting stalemate” as advanced by I. William Zartman. Of the various factors that may make resolution more attractive, thereby enhancing the prospects for successful third-party
intervention, Zartman suggests that the prime “condition” is if neither side in a conflict feels it can win a conflict and the parties perceive the costs and prospects of continuing war to be more burdensome than the costs and prospects of settlement. The prospects for a negotiated settlement to a dispute are thus greater when war weariness has set in among the parties and a conflict has reached a plateau or hurting stalemate in which unilateral solutions are no longer believed to be credible or achievable.

Therefore if two parties to a conflict perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution. The ripe moment is however necessarily a perceptual event, not one that stands alone in objective reality. It can be resisted so long as the parties in question refuse or otherwise are able to block out that perception. A stalemate therefore exists in the minds of the leaders. If it is reflected on the battlefield, in the form of trenches and unbreakable defensive lines, there is a stalemate in the war and it might be the right opportunity to interject ideas of conflict resolution. It may come, for instance, right after one side has tried and failed to break the military stalemate with an offensive. The rational calculations are difficult to consider and see from the outside. At a certain moment in time, it may be possible to argue rationally for a continuation of war as well as a search for peace. This makes it difficult at any one particular time to determine, with some certainty, that there is a ripe moment (Wallensteen 2007:44).

According to this approach, an essential condition making for ripeness is a “mutually hurting stalemate” between the parties to conflict—that is, a point in a conflict where neither party can prevail over the other. Once they recognize that they have reached such a stalemate and cannot achieve their objectives by armed struggle, the parties become more willing to enter into negotiations and there may be a chance for peace. This is not necessarily the case and if none of the sides is comfortable with the present and can see no way forward to settle
the dispute—perhaps fearing further destruction, there is likely to be a moment 
requiring a change of action (Wallensteen 2007:43). At this point, parties might 
agree on a ceasefire to reduce losses. In this context it is deemed as limited 
strategic thinking, where the goals essentially are maintained. A ceasefire, in 
other words, may slow down the move towards a settlement and, instead, 
prolong the fighting and is a major obstacle to conflict termination.

The argument therefore in the case of the conflict in the DRC could be made that 
not all parties were equally supportive of a negotiated settlement at a time when 
a decision was reached to initiate a ceasefire. Timing is considered to be all 
important if mediated interventions are to be successful and potential mediators 
are well advised, according to the theory of ripeness, to wait until the parties are 
sufficiently “exhausted” on the battlefield to push for a negotiated political 
settlement (Crocker et al 1999:21).

At any one time, it is possible for individual leaders within the same party to come 
to wholly different conclusions about the desirability of continuing or terminating 
their struggle. By signing a peace agreement, leaders put themselves at risk from 
adversaries who may take advantage of a settlement, from disgruntled followers 
who see peace as a betrayal of key values, and from excluded parties who seek 
either to alter the process or destroy it (Stedman 2006:255).

The main reason Laurent Kabila had been forced to negotiate was the 
weakening commitment of his allies to continuing the war, and the growing 
pressure on his regime. At the time of the signing of the Lusaka ceasefire 
agreement in July 1999, he faced the threat of imminent military defeat. The 
agreement may have been his only way of clinging to power. Despite his claims 
of victories, he had not recovered any of the territory taken by the rebels and 
their allies since the beginning of the war. The option of a comprehensive military 
victory over the rebels had become elusive.
Kabila’s hold over the north east of the country continued to deteriorate, despite the signing of the agreement. By signing the agreement, Kabila sought to ensure that at least he would not be removed from power as a result of a crushing military defeat at the hands of the rebels. On 26 July he went to South Africa to ask President Mbeki to put pressure on Rwanda and Uganda in the hope of forcing the rebels to sign the ceasefire deal. This represented a major shift in his approach (International Crisis Group 1999b: 7). This appeared to represent the opportune moment for the vigorous initiation of preventive diplomacy.

4.5 The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement: Conflict Prevention or Cure?

There has been much recent discussion about the requirements for successful peace building and the construction of durable political settlements to end violent conflict in societies that have experienced prolonged civil strife as a result of communal cleavages of ethnic, religious or other kinds (Osler Hampson 2001:387).

The debate is marked by a growing sense of pessimism about the ability of external third parties not only to influence the process of negotiation but also to assist with the implementation of a settlement once a peace agreement is reached. Many analysts accept the argument that implacable “ancient hatreds” fuel these civil conflicts and believe that coercive or non-coercive interventions by external actors to end violent conflict are likely to be marginal at best and counterproductive at worst. In contrast to this viewpoint, a second school of thought (termed by Osler Hampson as the “interventionist school”) believes that a variety of coercive and non-coercive measures can be used to affect the course of a conflict and bring the parties, if not to the negotiating table, at least to some other form of political accommodation that will end violence (Osler Hampson 2001:387).
One approach and considered to be of longest standing holds that the key to a successful resolution of conflict lies in the substance of the proposals for a solution. Parties resolve their conflict by finding an acceptable agreement.

Lund (2006:18) furthermore identifies salient factors that are considered important determinants of violent or non-violent resolution of emerging political disputes. All these are considered proximate factors that are more or less amenable to policymakers’ manipulation, but two of these are especially critical for the successful implementation of preventive diplomacy. Firstly, third parties must be unified in supporting firm, unequivocal pressures behind a process of peaceful settlement-before any one disputant has generated a militant political constituency or actually deployed armed force or coercion on the ground to attempt to resolve the dispute. Multi-tracked intervention strategies must utilize several policy tools to address the several political, military and psychological sources of potential violence, such as immediate threats to physical security, inter-communal distrust, and the absence of a workable process to engage the parties in dispute management. Another condition for successful preventive involvement is measured by the extent to which major global and regional powers and neighbours actively support (or at least tolerate) preventive efforts, without undermining them by overt or covert political or military backing of one disputant or another (Lund 2006:190). In this context the Lusaka peace process was challenged from the outset by severe impediments and intransigence by all parties to the conflict, but notably by Laurent Kabila who placed immense strain on its successful negotiation and implementation.

Most of today’s armed conflicts are carried out between groups with long-standing animosities and mistrust. The division and polarization is often so sharp and deep between these groups that most observers of the conflict, whether within or outside the setting, share the belief that peace efforts can emerge only if outsiders are involved (Lederach 1995).
In a generic sense conflict containment refers to systemic responses aimed at limiting and removing conflict as a dysfunctional phenomenon. In a more specific context it pertains to conflict management. In this respect conflict management refers to a range of procedures or techniques employed to prevent the development of a conflict situation, to prevent conflict from resulting in destructive behaviour once it has become manifest and to remove the sources of conflict through some form of settlement agreement or resolution of conflict (du Plessis 2003:19). Lund (1996:46) identifies and distinguishes between three varieties or subtypes of preventive diplomacy, namely pre-conflict peace building that aims to create channels for dispute resolution, changing attitudes and reducing the sources of conflict, pre-emptive engagement has as its primary objectives the addressing of specific disputes, channelling grievances into negotiations and attempting to engage the parties and finally crisis prevention, with the objective of blocking violent acts and attempting to reduce tensions. These subtypes point to the fact that it is extremely difficult in theory and in the actual application and implementation to limit preventive diplomacy to only one particular stage of conflict development. Although preventive diplomacy is operative at the level of unstable peace, where the ultimate aim is to keep/prevent disputes from turning into confrontation or all-out violence and to return them to the process of regular politics, or durable peace it purports to but does not always cease to apply as a concept elsewhere (du Plessis 2003:30).

Given this context therefore, efforts to resolve and to ultimately prevent the outbreak of further conflict in the DRC began virtually simultaneously with the onset of hostilities—precisely six days after the war broke out on 2 August 1998. With the conflict at its most intense and violent, regional leaders decided to take decisive action to put an end to the war. The DRC war has already seen approximately 23 recorded peace initiatives since 1997. The early talks, spearheaded by SADC, began almost immediately after the war broke out, but quickly reached an impasse due to divisions within the organization, SADC members’ lack of neutrality, the Kabila government’s distrust of South African
motives, and Rwandan and Ugandan opposition to any mediation effort spearheaded by Mugabe. In September 1998, President Frederick Chilubua of Zambia assumed the role of lead mediator, representing SADC as a more neutral actor despite existing tensions with Angola (Roessler and Prendergast 2006:244). The failure of the early SADC initiatives provided avenues for alternative forums to address the conflict, which included a meeting of defence ministers in Addis Ababa in September 1998, a Francophone summit in November 1998 in France, attended by 34 African heads of state, and an OAU conference in Burkina Faso in December 1998. Each initiative on its own however failed to produce a comprehensive agreement.

A key obstacle to achieving the successful implementation of early prevention (which is deemed to be the most opportune time for clearing mistrust and misperception and bridging the opposing positions of the parties) in the DRC was Laurent Kabila’s refusal to meet face-to-face with the MLC and the RCD. Given that parties to a conflict have decided to embark on the process of conflict termination, both, at some stage in the proceedings, will usually have to abandon the process of long-range tacit bargaining as their main strategy and engage in face-to-face negotiations. The very fact that the parties are in often intense conflict with each other, and hence not communicating with ease, makes it difficult even to set up a suitable meeting (Mitchell 1981:196). Reluctant to legitimize the rebel groups, whom he viewed as foreign invaders, Kabila at first rejected any type of dialogue with them. Thus initiatives to resolve the conflict were at first based on only partial participation of the parties.

A meeting in Windhoek, Namibia, on 18 January 1999, led to significant progress, in which the respective sides committed themselves to signing a ceasefire agreement, but only Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola and the RCD were represented. The absence of Laurent Kabila had left the negotiations incomplete (Roessler and Prendergast 2006:244). A potential breakthrough was achieved in Sirte, Libya on 19 April 1999, when Presidents
Kabila and Museveni signed a ceasefire accord. The absent parties however rejected it outright. The very fact of engaging in formal negotiations would indicate that, on most occasions, the parties involved have decided to attempt to find a solution through means other than coercion. Hence the nature of their behaviour in the conflict situation is often marked by noticeable changes, such as formal ceasefires or unilateral restraints on further coercion (Mitchell 1981:197).

In June and July 1999, all of the sides were finally represented in Lusaka as Chiluba tried once again to forge consensus on a ceasefire agreement. At this point in time the Kabila regime was under extreme military pressure and Rwandan forces had made significant gains threatening to advance to the capital of Kinshasa. Kabila thus made a tactical decision to seek a political settlement. Kabila’s commitment to a political solution effectively thwarted the advance of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) as international pressure compelled Rwanda and Uganda to sign the Lusaka Agreement. Furthermore the negotiations granted Kabila and his allies the opportunity to rearm, reorganize and to thwart the capture of Mbuji Mayi by the RPA. Thus the Lusaka Agreement represented, not a genuine commitment by Kabila to end the war and share power, but a calculated decision to regain the military balance and survive politically.

Eleven months into the war, negotiations culminated in the Zambian-brokered ceasefire agreement, signed on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka. Six African nations and the three major rebel groups eventually delivered their signatures, and the diplomatic community celebrated an all-inclusive peace deal- for the time being (Mans 2003:195).

On 10 July 1999, the DRC government and other parties to the conflict signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The long-awaited Lusaka summit was delayed several times as the preliminary meeting of foreign ministers struggled to reach consensus on the technicalities of the draft agreement. Delegations from the DRC government and three Congolese rebel groups eventually entered into
direct talks in July 1999, independent of their respective allies, in an effort to make some progress. A third week of negotiations elapsed before the 10th July ceasefire agreement was signed by the leaders of the six states that were parties to the conflict: the DRC, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Rwanda and Uganda. The rebel groups did not sign the Lusaka agreement initially (Cilliers and Malan 2001:30).

A major problem in terminating a conflict is that there may already exist serious internal cleavages and disputes within a party in conflict and competing factions may utilize efforts to reach a compromise settlement in the inter-party conflict in intra-party struggles (Mitchell 1981:186). Internal cleavages are likely to reappear when problems of ending a conflict have to be confronted. Even where no significant intra-party differences existed before the start of the conflict, they are likely to develop when the problems of compromise or surrender approach. Even the most unified party will exhibit signs of internal disunity when the need to make a possibly disadvantageous compromise becomes pressing.

Although each of the states involved in the war had solid political or tactical reasons to sign the Lusaka Agreement, the rebels, who had gained the military upper hand going into the talks, were reluctant to commit to a ceasefire.

There are numerous obstacles even to beginning a process of negotiation. Examples that frequently arise are the positions of relative advantage of the various parties; internal constraints within each party that militate against compromise; and the difficulties of communicating to the adversary a desire to compromise without giving the impression of weakness or lack of resolution. These factors can combine to prevent any negotiation taking place until one or other party reaches the point of exhaustion (Mitchell 1981:200).

The MLC had made significant gains during the course of negotiations and maintained a high popularity in the areas it controlled, which imbued Bemba with
a greater degree of legitimacy and equal status at the negotiating table. Bemba was eager to exploit this advantage.

The creation and signing of the Lusaka agreement was however achieved with much difficulty. A split in the RCD delayed the process, with each side at first refusing to acknowledge the other’s assumed status at the peace talks as well as their authority to sign. Personality differences and power struggles within the RCD, between Emile Ilunga and Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, contributed to the rebel group’s delay in signing the agreement. Wamba was replaced by Ilunga as RCD leader in May 1999, but continued to participate in the talks. Another delay occurred when the former head of the RCD, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, sat down in the seat reserved for the RCD representative, claiming his right to do so as leader of the movement. As the official leader of the party, Illunga refused to sign the accord if Wamba did so (Roessler and Prendergast 2006:246).

There were intensified demands for changes to the Lusaka agreement, which threatened the basis of the peace process. Many hurdles had to be overcome before the preparatory talks in Gaborone could take place. Most of them were created by Laurent Kabila, who signed the Lusaka agreement only under extreme military pressure (Cilliers and Malan 2001:65).

In addition, Rwanda exerted little pressure on RCD-Goma to sign the agreement as they sought to ensure the rebel movement’s freedom to continue its pursuit of the Interahamwe.

Tanzania and South Africa were instrumental in eventually securing the rebels’ allies signatures on the agreement. From 3-9 June, 1999, Tanzania tried to mediate these leadership wrangles between RCD-Goma and RCD-Kisangani factions (International Crisis Group 1999:2). South Africa and Tanzania were also driving the diplomatic efforts to persuade the RCD to sign the Lusaka agreement. In a joint press conference with Kabila in Pretoria on 29 July 1999, President
Thabo Mbeki called on the rebels to sign the ceasefire agreement. As part of his diplomatic initiative to end the conflict in the DRC, he also hosted a meeting on 8 August 1999, with the Presidents of Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania.

Uganda subsequently secured the signature of Jean–Pierre Bemba, leader of the MLC and on 1 August 1999. Jean-Pierre Bemba became the first of the Congolese rebel leaders to sign the ceasefire agreement on behalf of the MLC, yet continued to capitalize on its military advantage.

Uganda demanded that Wamba dia Wamba sign either for the entire RCD, or at least for RCD-Kisangani. Although Rwanda had signed the agreement, its proxy RCD-Goma had not.

The fragmentation of the RCD led to the paralysis of the signing of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement on 10 July 1999. A compromise however allowed fifty RCD representatives to eventually sign the accord on 31 August 1999. Initial assessments were highly optimistic that peace would follow the signing of the agreement.

4.5.1 Main Provisions of the Agreement

The Lusaka Agreement entailed seven major provisions—the cessation of hostilities and disengagement, orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces, national dialogue and reconciliation, re-establishment of state administration, disarmament of the armed groups, formation of a national army and the normalisation of the security situation along the common borders between the DRC and its neighbours.

The most crucial task was the cessation of hostilities—which was clearly and concisely called for:
“The Parties agree to a ceasefire among all their forces in the DRC.

“The ceasefire shall mean: a. the cessation of hostilities between all the belligerent forces in the DRC, as provided for in this Ceasefire Agreement (hereinafter referred to as “the Agreement”); b. the effective cessation of hostilities, military movements and reinforcements, as well as hostile actions, including hostile propaganda; c. a cessation of hostilities within 24 hours of the signing of the Ceasefire agreement. The Ceasefire shall entail the cessation of: a. all air, land, and sea attacks as well as all actions of sabotage; b. attempts to occupy new ground positions and the movement of military forces and resources from one area to another, without prior agreement between the parties; c. all acts of violence against the civilian population by respecting and protecting human rights. The acts of violence include summary executions, torture, harassment, detention and execution of civilians based on their ethnic origin; propaganda inciting ethnic and tribal hatred; arming civilians; recruitment and use of child soldiers; sexual violence; training and use of terrorists; massacres; downing of civilian aircraft; and bombing the civilian population; d. supplies of ammunition and weaponry and other war-related stores to the field; e. any other actions that may impede the normal evolution of the ceasefire process.” (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999: Article 1).

The parties were tasked with ensuring the strict and swift implementation of the Agreement. Chapter Three of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement presented a timetable of 270 days for the full implementation from the date of signature. Analysts also criticized the insufficient time (only 30 days) provided for the disarmament of the various rebel groups, considering that these groups had not been willing to hand over their weapons (Solomon and Mngqibisa 2000).

The disarming of armed groups in the DRC had been the most contentious issue under discussion in all the peace initiatives since the start of the conflict. The Lusaka ceasefire revolved around the disarming of armed groups, and the
mediator spent much of the time building consensus on how to disarm these groups, as there was no common ground amongst the belligerents as to who should carry out the disarmament process.

On the coming into force of the Ceasefire Agreement in the DRC, the parties would agree to do their utmost to facilitate the Inter-Congolese political negotiations, known as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which were to lead to a new political dispensation in the DRC. All the resolutions adopted by these negotiations were to be binding on all participants. The Dialogue would also provide for agreement on the formation of a new Congolese national army, comprising the Congolese Armed Forces and the armed forces of the RCD and the MLC; the holding of free, democratic and transparent elections; and the drafting of a constitution, which would shape the new dispensation in the DRC after the elections. A Joint Military Commission (JMC) representing all the signatories was established under the ceasefire agreement to regulate and monitor the cessation of hostilities. Both the JMC and the Observer Groups were supposed to start executing peacekeeping operations until the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force.

45 days after the signing of the ceasefire agreement, the DRC government, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), unarmed opposition groups and the Congolese civil society were supposed to begin open political negotiations that should result in a new political dispensation in the DRC. All parties would have equal status in the debate. The negotiations would be held under the authority of a neutral facilitator. Topics to be tackled in the debate were democratic elections, the formation of the national army and the re-establishment of state administration throughout the DRC (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999).

Each signatory could interpret the provisions laid out in the agreement differently. Each party to the agreement had markedly different priorities. For the Kabila
government, the agreement had to secure its legitimacy and re-establish state authority over DRC territory. For Zimbabwe, the agreement emphasized the DRC’s sovereignty, legitimising therefore their intervention and guaranteeing Zimbabwe a lead role in the solution to the DRC conflict. Angola’s inclusion of UNITA on the list of groups to be disarmed gave the Angolan government the opportunity to shop for diplomatic support against UNITA, ensure that whoever succeeded Kabila would not be sympathetic to UNITA, and secure a commitment to closing down UNITA supply routes through Congo (International Crisis Group 1999b:4). For Rwanda, the agreement recognised for the first time the security threat posed by the Interahamwe and ex-FAR and called for a regional response. For Uganda, the agreement weakened Kabila by calling for a National Dialogue, rebuilds regional solidarity under Ugandan political and economic leadership, and placed Museveni in a position of unrivalled power in East and Central Africa. By making the Congolese rebels signatories, the agreement brought them international recognition and weakened Kabila.

The almost immediate violation of the Lusaka Agreement thwarted attempts to secure a swift resolution to the crisis. By October 1999 Kabila’s forces had begun to push eastwards, while Rwanda and the RCD-Goma tightened their grip on the strategic diamond town of Mbuji-Mayi. Both sides insisted they were merely responding to violations by the enemy (Fourie and Solomon 2002:5). This stalemate lasted almost a year and a half and placed considerable strain on the prospects of further dialogue between the disparate adversaries. The agreement failed to achieve its core objective- the immediate cessation of hostilities. The negotiations were regarded as a platform for securing international recognition rather than representing a commitment to peace by the signatories (Fourie and Solomon 2002:15). Each party suspected the other of playing a double game, and used this as justification for its own duplicity in the absence of an international guarantor who could compel compliance.
4.6 The Inter-Congolese Dialogue

Any conflict process consists of a series of actions and reactions, as both parties attempt to achieve their respective goals, and at any point of the process one or both parties may still perceive that they are more likely to achieve their ultimate objectives through their chosen coercive strategies, rather than through negotiated compromise (Mitchell 1981:196). However given that parties even to international conflicts do engage in negotiations at numerous stages during a conflict’s lifecycle, and that some negotiations eventually achieve what appear to be relatively satisfactory compromises, it is important to analyse the negotiating process and understand its structure and dynamics as well as its relationship to the broader process of ending conflicts.

According to Article 19 of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement:

“On the coming into force of the Agreement, the Government of the DRC, the armed opposition, namely, the RCD and MLC as well as the unarmed opposition, shall enter into an open national dialogue. These inter-Congolese political negotiations involving civil society (les forces vives) shall lead to a new political dispensation and national reconciliation in the DRC. The inter-Congolese political negotiations shall be under the aegis of a neutral facilitator to be agreed upon by the Congolese parties. All the Parties commit themselves to supporting this dialogue and shall ensure that the inter-Congolese political negotiations are conducted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 5 of Annex “A”. (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999: Article III, Clause 19).

Once parties to a dispute have decided to attempt to arrive at a compromise through negotiation, a wide variety of factors will have an impact on the nature and outcome of the negotiating process, and on whether that process leads to a successful compromise or a complete breakdown of discussions and a return to coercive strategies (Mitchell 1981:202). Factors such as the skill of the
negotiators, their accountability to constituents, the limits of potential concessions set by the two sides, time pressures, tactics used during the negotiations, incentives for reaching some agreement, the number of disputing parties involved and their often disparate (and irreconcilable goals), all contribute towards the success or failure of face-to-face bargaining.

The outcome of negotiations will be most strongly affected by the issues being bargained over. Normalisation negotiations are concerned with the establishment of a mutually acceptable relationship. Such negotiations are appropriate at the end of a conflict process when an end to coercive strategies is desired by both sides (Mitchell 1981:203).

The Inter-Congolese Dialogues had a dual purpose: to produce a negotiated settlement to end the war in the DRC, and to revive and consolidate the process of democratisation. This had been thwarted initially by Mobutu Sese Seko and thereafter by Laurent Kabila in his brief and violent tenure as president of the DRC (Naidoo 2002).

In contradiction with the Lusaka agreement, President Laurent Kabila had on numerous occasions declared that the National Dialogue would never be held under occupation. His representatives had argued for a separation of the military and political aspects of Lusaka - requiring the withdrawal of foreign troops before a national dialogue could take place (International Crisis Group 2000:81). The most bitter pill of the Lusaka agreement for Kabila had always been the principle, which stipulated that all participants enjoyed equal status.

The involvement of mediators in the termination of conflict plays a crucial and often underestimated role (Miall 1992). The purpose of mediation is to assist the belligerents to come to a mutually acceptable settlement. Mediators do so by persuading the parties to change their perceptions of the value of current situations and future outcomes and by building trust and restoring confidence.
between the disputants. Yet the mediator's sole purpose is mostly confined to facilitating, not dictating a compromise. If the dispute concerns issues that are not fundamental to the belligerents' identity or existence, it may also be easier for mediation to formulate an agreement with which both parties are content. In the DRC however even the status of the mediator became a contentious issue.

Another obstacle to the negotiation process was the difficult choice of a mediator who would be trusted and accepted as non-partisan by all signatories. It would be five months before former president of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, was accepted in this role. Laurent Kabila refused all cooperation with Masire, requesting the appointment of a new facilitator and even seeking to launch his own dialogue to circumvent the Lusaka process (Cilliers and Malan 2001:66).

According to Mitchell’s theory, the problem for those committed to the peace process becomes one of persuading the parties of the need to make a compromise settlement, while redefining defeat in such a way that it appears a partial victory. Often this proves impossible, which is why leaders tend to change when the time comes to make peace (Mitchell 1981:184). One condition of arriving at a compromise solution is the removal of the leader responsible for beginning the conflict. The victors dislike dealing with the governments against whom they have been fighting (Mitchell 1981:190).

Spoilers exist only when there is a peace process to undermine, that is, after at least two warring parties have committed themselves publicly to a pact or have signed a comprehensive peace agreement (Stedman 2006:257). Peace creates spoilers because it is rare in civil wars for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial. This could also directly be related to conflict attitudes. Even if all parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously, and they often strongly disagree over the terms of an acceptable peace. Spoilers who have signed peace agreements for tactical reasons have an incentive to keep their threat hidden and thus minimize the amount of violence they use; they want the
peace process to continue as long as it promises to advantage them against their adversary. Spoilers operating from within a peace process need to comply enough to convince others of their perceived goodwill, but not so much that it weakens their offensive military capability.

Spoilers are led by individuals who see the world in all-or-nothing terms and often suffer from pathological tendencies that prevent the pragmatism necessary for compromise settlements of conflict. Laurent Kabila served as a spoiler to the peace process on several occasions during critical junctures in both its negotiation and attempted implementation. Spoilers are irreconcilably opposed to any compromise peace- any commitment to peace by a spoiler is tactical- a move to gain advantage in a struggle to the death.

Laurent Kabila, considered a major ‘spoiler’ of the peace process since its inception, was assassinated on 16 January 2001. His son Joseph Kabila, who expressed his commitment to the Lusaka Agreement, succeeded him shortly thereafter. The assassination of Laurent Kabila and the appointment of his son Joseph as President of the DRC brought fresh hope to the stalled Lusaka Peace process and ultimately impetus for a renewed mandate to prevent the further outbreak of conflict.

The need therefore to extend preventive actions along the entire spectrum of conflict, from latent tensions through the culmination and resolution of conflict to post-conflict peace building is necessary. According to this approach preventive diplomacy is contextualized and its basic objective, the forestalling and reduction of violence, is elaborated in different stages of the conflict as opposed to merely focusing on one specific stage- unstable peace. Therefore according to the approach by Leatherman et al (1999:99) the key phases of preventive diplomacy include: conflict prevention that entails preventing violent disputes from arising between parties either by structural, institutional, economic, or cultural remedies, and most critically it should be argued escalation prevention, which entails
preventing both the vertical and horizontal escalation of hostilities to more destructive means of warfare and to involve additional actors.

The international community seized the opportunity afforded by the late president’s murder and re-engaged in the DRC. Leaders in the U.S., Europe, and the United Nations immediately recognised the new president in order to give him the confidence to break from the policies of his father and implement the terms of the Lusaka ceasefire (International Crisis Group 2001:1). In return, Joseph Kabila agreed to join an Inter-Congolese Dialogue facilitated by the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, and welcomed a quick deployment of MONUC, the UN military observer mission for the Congo.

The achievements of the 15 February 2001 regional summit on the DRC in Lusaka and the 21-22 February Security Council meeting had revived hopes for a rebirth of the long-stalled peace process. The summit parties committed themselves to implement the Kampala and Harare plans for disengagement of forces, signed in April and December 2000. Joseph Kabila had welcomed the talks-yet not without his own set of reservations. Kabila’s acceptance of Masire’s role in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue inspired euphoria among Congo’s well-wishers. Resolution 1341 in fact ‘welcomed the expressed willingness’ of the DRC authorities ‘to proceed with the dialogue under the aegis of the neutral Facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire.’ The new president however, neglected to inform Masire of this change in position for another week. Kabila, moreover, had previously told the UN Special Envoy to the DRC that no dialogue could take place prior to the complete withdrawal of foreign forces (International Crisis Group 2001a:19). There appeared to be little agreement on the context in which the dialogue would unfold. In contrast to many of the rebels, who believed a transitional government should be put in place before the dialogue, Masire foresaw the talks as ending in the establishment of a transitional government to run the country until elections could be held.
The first significant outcome of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was the May 2001 Declaration of Principles which reaffirmed the inclusion of the RCD, the MLC the political opposition and representatives of civil society and the adoption of the principle of consensus. The Lusaka Agreement also stipulated that ‘all participants in the negotiation shall enjoy equal status’ (International Crisis Group 2001:16).

Sir Ketumile Masire brokered ‘pre-dialogue talks in Gaborone from 20-24 August 2001. The Gaborone meeting also produced signs of rapprochement between the MLC and the DRC government, with Jean Pierre Bemba sharing consensus with Joseph Kabila over the immediate withdrawal of troops.

Addis Ababa was selected as the location for the opening salvo of the Dialogue. The talks however ended in failure. By exploiting the confusion caused by the facilitator over the objectives of the meeting, the government blocked the debate from the outset. It left the Addis Ababa talks once it had achieved what the delegation had ultimately participated in the process for- postponing the meeting. The RCD and MLC were anxious about the date on which to convene the Dialogue. Their uncertainty was attributed to the fact that they did not want the process to lose momentum and shared concerns over Joseph Kabila’s commitment to the negotiations. The DRC government, however, never had any real intention of entering in constructive talks at Addis Ababa, as they employed stalling tactics and were not prepared to even discuss trivial matters (Whitman 2003).

Attendance at, and role within, the negotiations are considered powerful factors in determining the outcome of any talks. Who is excluded and who included can often determine what range of potential outcomes will be considered (Mitchell 1981:208). The problem of ‘status’ at negotiations is a major consideration that needs to be taken into account. Often, however as Mitchell (1981:208) contends there are more subtle and influential aspects to the problem of status than the
mere question of diplomatic precedence, and the refusal to lose face. In many conflicts, particularly protracted conflicts, the defined status of the parties, once generally accepted, has an important effect upon the relative positions of advantage of the negotiators. Important differences will stem from defining an international conflict as between an ‘aggressor’ and the ‘defender’ of a legitimate status quo, or as a ‘war of national liberation. Often, when possible negotiations are being discussed, parties will try to establish their status and relationship in such a way as to give themselves maximum advantage in subsequent deliberations (Mitchell 1981:208). The difficulty in setting up discussions between the representatives of government and non-governmental entities is one reason for the intractability of transnational disputes to directly negotiated settlements and ultimately to the successful outcomes of preventive diplomacy. The particular danger is that having been excluded from participation in negotiations, rival factions might find it easier to condemn the eventual agreement reached.

The status with which parties in conflict come to any discussions has an important impact upon what is discussed, the way it is discussed and the outcome of negotiations.

At a meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, significant headway was made on the composition of delegations for the ICD. A preliminary agreement was reached on the representation of the Mayi-Mayi, religious orders, traditional chiefs and the unarmed opposition. The movement forward was hampered when the MLC rebels proposed a revolving presidency every three years, that the seat of prime minister be allotted to the unarmed political opposition and that the presidency of the parliament should be allotted to the Forces vives de la nation. The DRC government immediately rejected this proposal, stating that the post of head of state was neither vacant nor negotiable. Faced with the government’s intransigence over the presidency issue, the MLC promptly declared that it was no longer interested in attending further discussions, while the RCD expressed its intention to continue fighting (Swart and Solomon 2004:23).
Negotiations at the end of many conflicts also contain strong elements of redistribution as the original issues in the conflict involve some demand for change by at least one party, either in the distribution of valued resources or roles, or in the behaviour of one party and its relationship with the other (Mitchell 1981:204). Hence negotiations are likely to be facilitated by the ‘normalisation’ elements in the situation, and hindered by the lingering ‘redistribution’ elements. The likely success of the overall process of conflict termination, the prevention of further conflict and the final process of negotiation will largely depend upon the relative importance of both the normalisation and redistribution elements in the minds of adversaries, and their leaders (Mitchell 1981:204).

Hindrances to negotiations may be based on different and genuinely held definitions of a conflict situation. Differences arising from cultural and ethnic backgrounds can affect negotiations both indirectly (by making difficult the development of even a minimal level of trust) and directly (by even preventing agreement on what the negotiations should be about) (Mitchell 1981:214). This can lead to a total inability on the part of the adversaries to understand their opponents’ definitions of the problem and the issues in dispute, and can result in a party developing the conviction that the other side is deliberately distorting what the conflict is really about, to its own tactical advantage.

4.6.1 The Resumption of Talks in South Africa

The government of the DRC declared a ceasefire in the east of the country in January 2002 after renewed fighting had threatened to derail the Sun City peace dialogues, which finally began in February 2002. The DRC announced its unilateral ceasefire decision for fear that clashes between its government troops and the Rwandan army would have a negative impact on the outcome of the dialogue (SAPA-AFP 2002). The RCD accepted the ceasefire offered as an olive branch, after they threatened to pull out due to the renewed fighting. The ICD resumed on 25 February 2002, but was paralysed for 10 days by unresolved
quarrels over the composition of the unarmed political opposition delegation. Groups excluded from the non-armed component demanded to be included (Naidoo 2002:11). The MLC refused to participate in the debates until the issue had been resolved. Then a clash ensued over the question of power sharing. The RCD-Goma and the MLC had gone to Sun City with one priority in common: replacing Joseph Kabila as leader during the transition period. On the other side, the DRC government went to the negotiations with the aim of validating Kabila’s presidency (International Crisis Group 2002:4) On 14 March 2002, troops serving the RCD and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) entered Moliro on Lake Tanganyika, creating the perfect situation for the government delegation to walk out of the talks.

Official negotiations over power sharing did not commence until 8 April 2002, four days before the official closing date, and after the arrival of President Thabo Mbeki. During the preceding weeks no draft document had been submitted for discussion. President Mbeki proposed and put forward two plans entitled “Mbeki I” and Mbeki II”. On 9 April the MLC declared that it accepted Kabila as president. The RCD, however, announced that its rejection of Kabila was non-negotiable (International Crisis Group 2002:5).

The DRC conflict had appeared ‘ripe for resolution’ following the start of the ICD in South Africa. However, after seven weeks of negotiations a partial agreement was reached on 19 April 2002 between Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC and the government of Joseph Kabila. This however was an accord outside the framework of the ICD. Named the Political Agreement on Consensual Management of the Transition in the DRC (PACMT), this arrangement united Kabila and Bemba and basically consolidated their control of the transitional authority (Naidoo 2002:6). This entailed awarding the post of prime minister to Bemba. Most notably the accord heralded the end of the anti-Kabila coalition and confirmed the isolation of the RCD and its ally Rwanda. With its existence threatened, the RCD responded by forming an alliance with the UDPS, (the
Congolese opposition party led by Tshisekedi) and threatened to renew hostilities (International Crisis Group 2002: ii). This raised serious concerns that Masire’s failure to negotiate a new round of dialogue including the non-signatory parties, especially the RCD-Goma rebels, would leave the DRC de facto partitioned.

The primary stumbling block to the peace process was lack of confidence and trust between the signatories. Despite four separate meetings between the Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, and Joseph Kabila, little genuine headway was made to instil a working relationship based on genuine trust.

4.6.2 The Pretoria and Luanda Agreements

Despite overt tensions, another important development driven by the efforts of the South African government as well as cooperation between the heads of state from the DRC and Burundi led to the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 30 July 2002. In terms of the memorandum, the DRC and Rwanda agreed to cooperate in order to end hostilities between the two states:

“The government of the DRC reaffirms its stated legitimate right that the forces of the government of Rwanda withdraw from the territory of the DRC without delay. The government of Rwanda reaffirms its readiness to withdraw from the territory of the DRC as soon as effective measures that address its security concerns, in particular the dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces, have been agreed to. Withdrawal should start simultaneously with the implementation of the measures, both of which will be verified by MONUC (UN Organisation Mission to the DRC), JMC (Joint Military Commission) and the third party. The DRC government will continue with the process of tracking down and disarming the Interahamwe and ex-FAR within the territory of the DRC under its control. The Parties agree that their respective governments would put into place a mechanism for the normalisation of the security situation along their common
border. This mechanism may include the presence of an international force to cooperate with the two countries, in the short term, to secure their common border” (Memorandum of Understanding 2002).

The discussions however achieved relatively little and no institutional follow-up was provided for. Implementation of the Pretoria agreement set a timetable for completion within 90 days. After 45 days none of the preliminary steps had been taken (Rusamira 2002:71). The failure to ensure the swift implementation of yet another agreement represented yet another missed opportunity for the successful implementation of preventive diplomacy and an end to conflict in the DRC.

On 6 September 2002, in the presence of President Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Joseph Kabila and the Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, signed a protocol of agreement providing for the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from key Congolese cities and the normalisation of bilateral relations, which became known as the Luanda Agreement:

“In order to respect national sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence as well as international borders, the parties agreed as follows: To work towards the restoration of the dignity and sovereignty of the DRC as well as address Uganda’s security concerns, to refrain from all types of military and logistical support including the provision of bases and sanctuary to the armed groups, inter-ethnic militia, subversive organisations and all rebel movements against the interests of the Parties, and to work closely together in order to expedite the pacification of the DRC territories currently under the Uganda control and the normalisation of the situation along the common border.”

Both agreements (with Rwanda and Uganda) were considered a ‘fool’s bargain’ as both Kampala and Kigali merely sought recognition from the DRC government of their national security concerns. Neither of these agreements was likely to
provide for the disarmament of the negative forces operating on Congolese territory (Rusamira 2002:72).

The Sun City accord gratified the personal ambitions of Jean-Pierre Bemba by offering him the position of prime minister. The accord also achieved victory for Joseph Kabila by securing the backing of the MLC, the RCD-ML and the RCD-N, which meant a symbolic reunification of 60% of the DRC (International Crisis Group 2002:7). Moreover this allowed him to eliminate the anti-Kabila coalition and isolate Rwanda, which was perceived as the enemy of Congolese unity. The Sun City accord also gave Kinshasa an undeniable military advantage: not only would MLC soldiers be joining the ranks of the FAC to make it a far more powerful military force, but the zone occupied by Rwanda would be encircled. The Kinshasa government however still remained suspicious of Bemba’s real intentions. A triangular relationship between Kinshasa, the RCD and the MLC was the ideal sought after. The RCD-Goma rebels desired more powerful positions and rejected the offer of the presidency of the parliament (Naidoo 2002:16).

The failure of the Lusaka agreement was perpetuated by the ICD held in Sun City in April 2002. The parties failed to reach consensus, because of the intense rivalry between the MLC and the RCD, who did not care to be seen as equals (Solomon 2002:150). Civil society groups were also fearful of being dominated by the three large armed organisations that had been holding the country hostage for a protracted period. The partial agreement reached between the government and the MLC was the minimum result required to save the ICD (International Crisis Group 2002). The Sun City talks began badly, were poorly organised and substantially failed to address the real issues.
4.6.3 Peace at Last? The Agreement of 17 December 2002 and 1 April 2003

Despite the various setbacks, a groundbreaking pact on interim rule was agreed upon in principle by consensus during talks in Pretoria in October 2002 between the DRC government, the RCD and the MLC (Sapa 2002). South Africa’s minister of local government, Sydney Mufamadi, had mediated the peace deal in Pretoria in a last desperate effort to salvage the failures of the ICD in Sun City. Presidents Kabila and Museveni both followed this with an announcement of their readiness to launch the Ituri Pacification Commission. After 1999 Ituri became embroiled in the regional conflict between Uganda, Rwanda and the government of Kinshasa and their respective Congolese allies and proxies, with Uganda playing a particularly active role. The Ugandan government and the UPDF played the various armed groups off against each other. Uganda generally sided with the Hema militia, the Union des Patriotes Congalais (UPC) who after the takeover of Bunia in August 2002 carried out ethnic cleansing against the Lendu. In retaliation the Lendu massacred nearly 1000 civilians in Nyankunde. The violence degenerated into a cycle of fear and retaliation that fuelled genocidal inter-ethnic conflict (International Crisis Group 2004:2).

The 177-member Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC) finally convened under the auspices of MONUC and proposed a mechanism for the pacification and rebuilding of Ituri. The main outcome of deliberations, the Ituri Interim Administration, failed due to the deteriorating security environment precipitated by the Ugandan army’s withdrawal in April-May 2003 and MONUC’s failure to fill the security vacuum. This subsequently led to a campaign of violence launched by the Lendu militias against the Hema in Bunia in May 2003, witnessed by MONUC, who failed to provide protection to civilians who were under imminent threat of physical violence (International Crisis Group 2004:3). Attempts to ensure a mediated resolution to the violence failed and the Hema-UPC led by Thomas Lubanga eventually gained control of all Bunia.
The Ugandan army withdrew two battalions from the DRC, and on 17 December 2002 the warring parties signed a peace deal after more than four years of devastating civil war. Signatories expressed their gratitude to President Thabo Mbeki for his and South Africa’s support in the peace process (Sapa 2002).

On 17 December 2002 in Pretoria, the main Congolese parties to the conflict, including the DRC’s government, RCD-Goma, MLC, RCD-ML, RCD-N and the Mayi-Mayi, finally signed the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC (also called ‘Pretoria II’).

Government representatives and rebel groups from the DRC converged upon South Africa yet again for the final session of the Inter-Congolese Dialogues in 2003. This led to the unanimous endorsement of a transitional constitution to govern the DRC for two years. This followed the agreement signed on 17 December 2002 by the approximately 360 delegates in attendance in Pretoria, in which a government was shaped that would prepare for the first democratic elections to be held in the former Zaïre in nearly 40 years. The resolutions agreed upon would, together with the 34 other resolutions adopted during previous sessions, constitute the so-called Final Act in the DRC peace process. According to President Thabo Mbeki:

“… all the signatories to the Final Act committed themselves to honour all the agreements they had entered into, including the Global and Inclusive Agreement signed on 17 December 2002, an Additional Memorandum of the Army and Security, and the Constitution of the Transition, adopted at Sun City on 1 April 2003. The united leaders of the people of the DRC also recommitted themselves to a number of important objectives in that they agreed to pursue the goals of peace, national unity and reconciliation and to protect the rights of all citizens and promote democratic governance’(Mbeki 2003).
After the historic deal was signed on 1 April, the UN’s secretary-general, Kofi Annan, welcomed it, calling it a breakthrough, which is potentially of ‘great significance.’

Signatories of the Final Act renewed their commitment to cease hostilities and embark on the process of setting up a restructured and integrated army, which would comprise the MLC, the RCD, rebel splinter groups and the pro-government Mayi-Mayi militia. The constitution and the inclusive agreement of 17 December 2002 were declared the only sources of authority for the duration of the two-year transition to the elections. The agreement also called for reunification, pacification, reconstruction, restoration of territorial integrity, transparent elections at all levels and the re-establishment of the state’s authority throughout the country. The delegates agreed that Kabila would keep his post as president in the new national government. The four vice-presidential posts were to be filled by members of the rebel movements and the non-armed political opposition parties. President Kabila also decreed an amnesty for people accused of ‘acts of war, political crimes and crimes of opinion’ committed during the period between 2 August 1998 and 4 April 2003. He justified this step as being necessary to reunite the Congolese people, many of whom had been among the nearly 2.5 million victims of the war.

On 7 April 2003 President Joseph Kabila took the oath of office as head of a transitional government that would aim at restoring peace and democracy. Kabila would also head the committee, which had the responsibility for ensuring that all parties to the peace pact abide by it. President Kabila however was not present to sign the crucial accord in person, which in the eyes of many may have been construed as a blatant disregard for the peace process especially at such a crucial juncture in its attempted implementation.

The formation of the transitional government on 1 July 2003 had been hailed as a positive development. It was followed by the signing of an agreement between
the government, the RCD-Goma and the MLC on the sharing of military positions in the new administration. President Kabila firmly declared that ‘with the formation of the transitional administration, the war which still shrouds several parts of the nation has lost its purpose, as all pretexts put forward to justify it are void’.

The launch of the parliament in August 2003 was another positive step. The National Assembly and Senate of the two-year transitional government convened in Kinshasa, and were presided over by President Joseph Kabila and his four vice-presidents. The opening session had been heralded as the first and crucial step towards the reunification and the pacification of the Congo.

According to Jentleson (2001:253) the onset of mass violence transforms the nature of a conflict. A rubicon is crossed, on the other side of which resolution and even limitation of the conflict become much more difficult. Prevention is more difficult when the interests of major domestic actors are served more by perpetuation and intensification of the conflict than by its resolution. The capacity of leaders who see their interests well served by the conflict to expand and maintain constituencies is that much greater when they have retribution and revenge to invoke. This was a grossly underestimated factor that did not receive the attention it deserved in the various peace agreements to respond to the crisis in the DRC.

Mitchell (1981:71) asserts that mutual fear and hostility are marked characteristics of parties in conflict. An inter-related cluster of emotions, attitudes, prejudices and perceptual distortions accompany most forms of conflict, and lead to its continuation and exacerbation.

One analysis posits that parties are solely motivated by insecurity and only seek party survival. According to this view, the only reason for parties in civil wars to fight is their fear that if they make peace and disarm, then their adversary will
take advantage and eliminate them. The lack of an overarching authority that can enforce a political settlement in civil war means that warring parties cannot credibly commit to making peace, either in the short term (through disarmament) or in the long term (through a constitution). Thus any party who violates or opposes a peace agreement does so, primarily out of fear.

More specifically attitudes between particular nations are highly relevant to the process of negotiation and whether or not they are destined to succeed or doomed to failure. As a result of all the prior relations between a given pair of nations, each may be considered to hold a certain ‘attitude’ or ‘image’ of the other. These attitudes or images are crucial to the process and outcome of international negotiation because-distorted or not- they influence substantially both, the actions one party takes toward the other, and the interpretations he places upon the acts of the other (Sawyer and Guetzkow 2006:161).

A negative attitude stemming from whatever source is likely to predispose a negative interpretation of subsequent actions. It is considered cognitively inconsistent for perceived enemies, which opposing parties dislike and distrust in making honest, conciliatory moves. There has also been observed tendencies toward consistency in interpersonal perception. In international negotiation, this may be illustrated by interpretations given to a disarmament proposal made by the other party; whether one decides that it is a genuine proposal or merely for propaganda purposes depends in large part upon *a priori* attitudes that prevail (Sawyer and Guetzkow 2006:163).

The Lusaka Ceasefire agreement partially succeeded in ending hostilities. In terms of Lund’s theoretical framework, depicting the various stages of conflict and peace, the Lusaka process succeeded in moving the situation in the DRC from all-out war to a mixed situation of crisis and unstable peace. Crisis is characterized by tense confrontation between armed forces that are mobilized and may engage in threats and occasional low-level skirmishes, where the
probability of the outbreak of war is high. Unstable peace is a situation in which tension and suspicion among parties run high, where a “negative peace” prevails and parties perceive one another as enemies and maintain deterrent military capabilities. The preventive diplomatic efforts that were launched in the DRC did not succeed in moving the conflict to a situation of stable (or cold) peace nor has it succeeded in creating a climate for the emergence of durable (or warm) peace yet.

Another thesis in stark contradiction to that of the hurting stalemate suggests that belligerents rarely address the underlying issues in the absence of a decisive military victory for one of the belligerents. The brief interruption of conflict therefore does not necessarily imply that the parties to a conflict have satisfactorily resolved the issues in dispute (Werner 2006:301). Military stalemates could therefore increase the risks of recurrent conflict. Another problem relates to the viability of peace enforcement. While both parties may agree that a particular settlement is preferred to the continuation of war, one or both belligerents may anticipate gains by failing to observe its terms or implement its conditions. A ceasefire therefore does not necessarily imply that a conflict has reached its end. Furthermore a peace agreement may not be the end of conflict either. As Wallensteen (2007:27) contends that tangible proof should be presented of peace agreements that were concluded and where there has been no conflict for an extensive period of time.

The question of urgency and timing leads to an observation that it is not possible to count on the goodwill of the parties and that much violence according to Stedman (1997) comes after peace agreements have been made, not before. It should be noted that there are also ripe moments for destruction of peace agreements and peace processes too.
The ink on the ominously titled Final Act sealing peace in the embattled DRC had hardly dried when reports appeared of ethnic violence in which at least 1,000 people were killed in the Droro massacre in the Ituri region.

Rwanda said that although it had pulled out of the DRC in line with the July 2002 agreement, it did not rule out the possibility of redeploying its troops to the DRC if the perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 were not disarmed. Furthermore artillery fire was exchanged between local Mayi-Mayi militia (allegedly backed by the DRC) and fighters of the RCD. This was followed by reports of a massacre in the eastern DRC in which 60 people, mostly women and children were killed.

A major problem in ending conflict is that serious internal cleavages and disputes within a party may already exist. Cleavages also appear when the problems attendant on the ending of a conflict have to be confronted. Even in cases where no significant intra-party differences existed before the start of the conflict, they are likely to develop when questions of compromise, surrender or the cessation of hostilities arise. The most integrated party will exhibit signs of internal disunity when the need to make a possibly disadvantageous compromise becomes pressing (Mitchell 1981:187).

An unavoidable course of events had conspired to spark off yet another crisis in the DRC with the eruption of violence in Bunia in the Ituri region, which prompted the international community to take decisive action. The crisis in Ituri province began on 7 May 2003 when Uganda withdrew more than 6,000 troops from Bunia. Rival Lendu and Hema tribal groups fought bloody clashes in which civilians were the main victims. Conflict broke out in the Ituri district due to infighting in the rebel Congolese group FAPC, a breakaway faction of the Hema group, the UPC. A DRC armed faction, the Party for the Unity and Safeguard of Integrity of Congo (PUSIC) blamed government troops for the killings in the Ituri regions.
Custodians of a peace process must interpret why a particular party attacks a peace process or refuses to meet its obligations to implement a peace agreement. Several interpretations are possible. A party that has signed an agreement but refuses to fulfil its obligations may be motivated by fear. It may see an agreement as desirable, but fears placing its security into the hands of its adversary. A party may renege on its commitment because it has signed a peace agreement for tactical reasons; if the agreement seems as though it will bring the party to power, it may abide by the agreement, if not it could seek to potentially undermine the agreement. The intentions behind continued violence need to be evaluated - is it an attempt by the spoiler to force its way into negotiations or an attempt to weaken the commitment of the internal parties as a means of destroying a negotiated settlement? These actions should be connected to a judgment about the spoiler’s motivation - is it based on limited grievances or a motivated by total goals that are entirely in opposition to agreement (Stedman 2006:265).

The armed forces and the final composition of the country’s defence establishment had remained a serious stumbling block as the peace process progressed. RCD-Goma rejoined the negotiations for implementing the formation of a national transitional government for the DRC, but withdrew from talks on 22 May 2003, after accusing the government of trying to keep the post of the head of army for itself and seeking to control the majority of the military regions (IRIN 2003). The swearing in of the transitional government was delayed due to arguments dealing with the composition of the national army — a point of contention that had emerged on many previous occasions as well. The question of a national army that would unify the numerous armed factions in the DRC remained one of the unresolved issues carried over into the transitional period.

Although the armed forces had combined to form one army, the armed forces were far from united. The military chief of staff of the DRC, Lt-Gen Liwanga Mata Nyamunyobo issued a summons to officers of the RCD-Goma to appear before
the Military High Court for having refused to take part in the inauguration of the newly unified national army. However, uncertainty remained over the precise name of the new force. RCD-Goma said it was opposed to the army being called the *Forces Armees Congolaises* – the name that had been used by the former Kinshasa governments of President Joseph Kabila and his late father (IRIN 2003). ‘We are adhering to law, and we therefore want the army to be called the *Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo* as was stated in the transitional Constitution pending a decision on a definitive name’.

The controversy emerged as the leadership of the newly unified national military was sworn into office in the presence of President Joseph Kabila, his four vice-presidents and other members of the recently installed two-year national transitional government. Some 30 officers from the former belligerent forces, who were named to head the various military branches and regions, solemnly pledged ‘fidelity to the DRC, obedience to the President of the Republic and respect for the institutions and laws of the country and of the military’. The danger, however, always exists, given the past experiences of conflict within the DRC, that the military may become a source of discontent and a threat to security if disenfranchised.

Accusations were levelled against members of RCD-Goma for fomenting a new rebellion. The spokesman of the transitional government of the DRC, Vital Kamerhe, equated an item of internal RCD-Goma correspondence leaked to the media with an act of rebellion: ‘Members of the RCD who want to maintain the status quo with regard to administration and military control of territories as was the case during the war are in fact saying they want to continue the rebellion’ (IRIN 2003).

RCD-Goma military officials and members of parliament had demanded a general amnesty and guarantees of their personal security before reporting to Kinshasa. Many members had remained behind in Goma due to security
concerns and fear of being arrested for their wartime activities. The fact that such suspicion and concern existed points to inherent deficiencies in the terms of the settlement. No genuine amnesty had been offered to rebel members implicated in war crimes for whom international warrants of arrest had been issued. Controversy on this front was an inevitable result of the appointments of the military.

The almost immediate collapse of the Lusaka Agreement is well known, particularly due to the inherently problematic nature of the peace process by which it was concluded. According to Mans (2003:195) three major obstacles hindered the successful implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Firstly, Lusaka as a regional peace deal included non-DRC actors and excluded some domestic parties. The Lusaka agreement perfectly represented the external power balance between Kabila’s allies, Rwanda and Uganda. The main considerations for the brokering of the ceasefire were, therefore, of a military nature and therefore took into account the armed forces of the belligerents only. The Mai-Mai militias were excluded, which led some of their military commanders to officially reject the ceasefire out of protest. Another concern was the implied alliance of the armed opposition of this group with that of the so-called ‘negative forces’. While some Mai-Mai groups may have entered into “temporary” alliances with other armed non-state actors to undertake particular military operations, they would deny a shared ideology and would further contend to be fighting for their country rather than as a rebel opposition. The result was that Mayi-Mayi groups continued small-scale warfare in opposition to macro-political efforts to reach an agreement-this omission was said to have laid the foundations for the third Congo war (Institute for Security Studies 2002:14).

Secondly, the ceasefire was signed and the agreement concluded at a time when no party was forced to return to the negotiation table. Without a hurting stalemate, it proved cumbersome to achieve the complete cessation of fighting-the military solution remained viable and attractive. The key to successful conflict
resolution lies in the timing of efforts for resolution. Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so. The third obstacle to the successful implementation of the Lusaka agreement lay in the provisions made for the Joint Military Commission (JMC), the joint body that consisted of two members of each belligerent party, as well as UN, OAU and Zambian representatives. With a clear mandate to “regulate and monitor the cessation of hostilities until the deployment of UN and OAU military observers”, it operated from its Lusaka headquarters. Its fundamental functioning was frustrated by the fact that there was no willingness to stop fighting as agreed upon. Parties had signed the agreement fully convinced that the other party would break the provisions of the ceasefire, which would allow the war to resume under the pretext of *self-defence* (Liongo 1999:12).

Any faction seeking to end a conflict before some victory has been achieved will lay itself open to the dangerous charge of selling out to the enemy and that of betrayal and serves as a strong deterrent to any compromise move towards the enemy. On the other side of the spectrum a major factor underlying any factional commitment to continuing is often that the costs of surrender will be asymmetrically distributed among the factions within the party. Defeat and even compromise will impose losses, but these will not be borne equally. Those who stand to lose most by surrendering will almost inevitably oppose the suggested compromise. Furthermore individuals, groups and factions may receive both material and psychological rewards from their part in the conduct of the struggle and those may be lost once peace is achieved. While material gains and losses are relatively easy to quantify, psychological satisfaction derived from engaging conflict is often overlooked, and often grossly underestimated as to why so many conflicts continue unabated and often descend into indefinite war and conflict. Ending a conflict presents special problems, depending upon whether a party begins the process from a position of perceived advantage, disadvantage or stalemate (Mitchell 1981:195).
The Lusaka agreement’s major flaw may have been to entrust the signatories with too much initial responsibility with regard to disarmament, given the level of suspicion that clouded talks and negotiations and subsequent encounters between the parties. As Rusamira (2002:65) argues, none of the signatories and parties to the conflict had ever shown a real political commitment to put an end to the war through peaceful negotiation. However, the violent nature of the conflict demanded that talks had to be pursued with the utmost urgency. The manner in which the Lusaka agreement was concluded reflects that the agreement was hastily put together to fulfil the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Yet four years on and many more victims later, bullets and barrages of gunfire continued in defiance of that ceasefire (Malan and Boshoff 2002). Many analysts also believe that the parties signed the agreement to hide their real intentions. The warring parties may have used the agreement as a pretext to continue the war on the basis of ‘self-defence’, if fully convinced that the other party would violate the agreed-upon ceasefire.

4.7 Conclusion: The DRC beyond Lusaka: The Need to Expand the Role of Preventive Diplomacy

Empirically wars often do not end when peace accords are signed. In fact, the process of ending conflict in a negotiated settlement often continues long after agreements are signed (Walter 2006:206). Therefore conflict prevention, notably preventive diplomacy should also not cease, especially if a conflict continues in defiance of peace.

According to Leatherman et al (1999:98) it is necessary to extend preventive actions along the entire spectrum of conflict, from latent tensions through the culmination and resolution of conflict to post-conflict peace building. According to this approach preventive diplomacy is contextualized and its basic objective, the forestalling and reduction of violence, is elaborated in different stages of the conflict as opposed to merely focusing on one specific stage- unstable peace as
suggested by the theoretical framework of Lund.

Therefore according to the approach by Leatherman et al (1999:99) the key phases of preventive diplomacy include: conflict prevention that entails preventing violent disputes from arising between parties either by structural, institutional, economic, or cultural remedies, secondly escalation prevention, which entails preventing both the vertical and horizontal escalation of hostilities to more destructive means of warfare and to involve additional actors and thirdly post-conflict prevention entailing the prevention of the re-emergence of disputes by reintegrating and reconstructing the war-torn society. Early prevention of conflict is preferable because it is more feasible; at this stage issues are still specific and more amenable to transformation, the number of parties to the conflict is limited, thus reducing its complexity, and early measures are cost-effective.

An argument should be made for the utility of preventive diplomacy beyond the narrow confines of Lund’s conceptual framework. Even Lund (2006:9), has acknowledged this and provides an expanded definition that builds upon his original discussion of the concept: “Preventive diplomacy, or conflict prevention, consists of governmental or non-governmental actions, policies, institutions that are taken deliberately to keep particular states or organized groups within them from threatening or using organized violence, armed force, or related forms of coercion such as repression as the means to settle interstate or national political disputes, especially where the existing means cannot peacefully manage the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change. So defined, preventive diplomacy might be needed either before a new conflict starts or after a violent conflict has abated to avoid relapse”. Clearly Lund asserts that preventive diplomacy could be applied after a violent conflict has already manifested itself, has abated, but where the potential exists for a relapse.

This was the critical omission of the Lusaka peace process.
As alluded to earlier preventive diplomacy initiatives when taken alone and independently of a broader strategy of conflict prevention are likely to fail unless they are linked to measures and actions that tackle the deeper, or “root” causes of conflict.

The discussion, analysis and assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the failure of peace to transpire despite vigorous diplomatic manoeuvring supports the core assertions of this analysis and discussion—namely that psychological drivers exert a definite, observable and decisive negative impact on conflict, the negotiation process and the quality of a peace agreement. Therefore the aforementioned discussion and analysis points to a truism—that preventive diplomacy is often not initiated in time and is therefore not always undertaken at the optimal intervention point—that of unstable peace. The reason why preventive diplomacy often fails at this intervention point and thus fails to move a conflict situation to sustainable peace could be attributed to the omission of social-psychological approaches in the strategy of preventive diplomacy—therefore rendering all other approaches as only being effective in the short-term.

Therefore, psychological drivers, which could be included as one of the salient root causes and exacerbating factors of conflict, should be addressed at both the level of proximate/direct prevention and structural prevention. If evaluated against the schematic representation of the various entry points in the conflict cycle produced by Crocker et al (1999) the architects of the peace process in the DRC were provided with ample and opportune means to end the hostilities. However the failure to eliminate and to effectively deal with the lingering distrust and tensions that exacerbated the violent nature the conflict assumed in the DRC led to the creation of several, almost insurmountable barriers to entry. The disparate adversaries, due to the almost intransigent positions they held perceived negotiations as being increasingly risky and thus opted to accept potential losses for the sake of achieving military victory, which subsequently led to the entrenchment of enemy-images. Therefore the peace talks as they were
structured during the Lusaka process achieved moderate successes in reaching (an almost enforced) negotiated solution to the conflict, yet critically failed to alter the deeply entrenched negative perceptions and climate of distrust that succeeded in sustaining the justification for continuing the conflict.

Preventive diplomacy will also be less prone to abject failure if it addresses these psychological drivers and conflict attitudes more implicitly - not simply as a by-product of a conflict situation which will cease once a peace agreement is reached. Conflict attitudes are inextricably linked to the complexities of conflict and therefore successfully altering these negative conflict attitudes will create a more conducive climate for peace negotiations to succeed.

The way negotiations are carried out is almost as important as what is negotiated. The choreography of how one enters negotiations, what is settled first and in what manner is inseparable from the substance of the issues. The Lusaka Agreement has proved to be important, not only as a solution to the conflict in the DRC but also as a route towards peace. Yet, the Lusaka agreement has been a flawed agreement on many fronts.

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was born out of a desperate attempt to end the conflict in the DRC. The agreement was negotiated on idealistic and overly optimistic terms; yet on many occasions negotiations took place in bad faith and amidst the backdrop of continuous fighting among the disparate participants. The agreements were only partially implemented on many occasions. None of the parties to the conflict are or have been capable of dealing with opposition through any means other than war or repression. Thus the notion of power sharing is foreign to them, and the prospect of a government of national unity in the DRC may never fully appeal.

One of the other problematic aspects had been that the facilitator of the internal peace process, Sir Ketumile Masire, operated parallel to, rather than as part of,
the peace mission in the DRC. The divergence between the speed with which MONUC wished to act and the much slower process necessitated by the ICD has led to irritation within MONUC. (Cilliers and Malan 2001:72) The UN has repeatedly emphasised the need to ensure that progress in the political sphere (the ICD) is made simultaneously with the military aspects: the withdrawal of foreign forces and the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation or resettlement of armed groups.

The repeated failures of the ICD raised serious doubts about the framework of the Lusaka agreement, whose three pillars were intertwined. This meant that the absence of one could cause the collapse of them all. Thus without the disarmament of the negative forces, the withdrawal of foreign troops was not seriously pursued, which resulted in the failure of many of the agreements that were undertaken during the ICD. A permanent mechanism for security and defence co-operation between the Congo and its neighbours and bolstered by sound bilateral agreements had been suggested as the only viable way to guarantee that the DRC would not become a source of destabilisation (International Crisis Group 2002:19).

The true deficiency of the Dialogue lay in its attempt to mitigate the crisis by creating new institutions without looking at the internal causes of the situation. These were the breakdown of the state and the collapse of the political, economic, and social dimensions of the lives of the Congolese people. This environment of disorder subsequently affected the entire surrounding region. The need to analyse and assess the particular interventions undertaken by both African states and the international community is critical in revealing the severe difficulties of successfully undertaking effective conflict prevention and the pitfalls encountered in the haphazard manner in which preventive diplomacy was executed in addressing the conflict in the DRC.
The next chapter will be devoted to revealing the critical shortcomings in the intervention strategies undertaken by the international community, particularly focusing on the responses initiated by several African states, notably the member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and South Africa.
CHAPTER 5
The African and International Response to Conflict Prevention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

5.1 Introduction

Peace implementation, or the process by which warring parties implement and comply with their written commitments to peace, is often the most difficult phase in the resolution of armed conflicts (Stedman et al 2002). As pointed out by Rogier (2004), “the signing of the Lusaka Agreement was brought about not only by the persistent efforts of third parties, but also by contextual factors: the accord was brokered at a time when the military situation had reached a stalemate”.

According to Aggestam (2003:13) most of the studies of conflict prevention are empirically oriented and lack explicit theoretical frameworks and operational definitions. In the post-Cold War era, the evolving interest in preventive diplomacy has been directed at expanding the concept to address a wide variety of different kinds of conflicts from escalating. This view uttered in the rubric of preventive diplomacy argues, that, rather than trying only to mitigate conflicts when they reach a virtually unmanageable scale, deliberate efforts should be made to keep them from erupting in the first place.

It is the operational practice of external assistance at the field level that ultimately determines how effective it will be. Operating in unstable, volatile, risky and politicized post-war situations is not easy, especially if conflict continues and it is not surprising that it is at the level of implementation of new policy approaches to post-war situations that international assistance most frequently fails. There is an urgent need for operational reform to make rules and practices conducive to effective assistance in such special situations (Stiefel 1999:26). There is also an urgent need to improve the quality of such assistance; what counts more often is
not so much what is done but how it is done. There must be more listening and discussion and less imposition, more facilitation and empowerment and less control, more sensitivity to intangible processes and less emphasis on output and measurable results. There needs to be more quality, and possibly less quantity. What is required is more than technical knowledge, but a deep understanding of post-war rebuilding, of the subtleties of inter-group relations, of issues of power-sharing and of reconciliation. External actors require in-depth knowledge and understanding of local and national actors, forces and dynamics. Defining an assistance policy and (successfully) implementing it requires clear and concise analysis based on a holistic understanding of the post-war situation (or the current conflict situation, if there is a continuation of conflict), the country-specific context in which the antagonists operate, the legacies of war, the root causes of conflict, the different actors involved as well as an understanding of the dynamics of peace and war (Stiefel 1999:26).

These aspects are particularly important, given that the initiation of a peace process, accompanied by the reconstruction of a war-torn state and society and the engagement of the antagonists in the conflict is essentially viewed and interpreted as being political in nature. Therefore every seemingly trivial task undertaken is translated as a possibly significant political act. The effectiveness of preventive diplomacy in this context depends on the ability to understand the political context and to fit constructively into it (Stiefel 1999:27). Therefore the quantity of intervention initiated can also do greater harm, unless the aforementioned aspects are taken into careful consideration, carefully integrated into a strategy of preventive diplomacy that is tailor-made to the particular dynamics of a conflict and crisis situation and careful attention is accorded to the qualitative aspects of intervention by means of preventive diplomacy.

The key to preventive diplomacy is the timing of its activation in relation to evolving conditions in a given place on the ground. Accordingly, preventive diplomacy is not confined to any particular instrument or agent. In principle, it
might involve several types of “functional” activity: diplomatic (in the narrow sense), military, economic, social, political-institutional, judicial-legal and normative-ethical.

Preventive actions are needed when peace is unstable and threatens to erupt into violence. In the pre-conflict phase preventive diplomacy can assume different forms in efforts to bloc violent acts (“crisis prevention”), engage parties to cooperation (“pre-emptive engagement”), and promote dispute resolution (“pre-conflict peace building”). Peace support operations generally refer to the range of activities that may be undertaken to preserve and restore peace before the outbreak of conflict, during conflict and after conflict has been resolved or terminated. Preventive diplomacy is primarily a strategic instrument for maintaining an unstable peace during the onset and nascent escalation phase of a crisis, where latent conflict is evident, through conflict prevention using Track One and Track Two diplomacy (du Plessis 2003:20). The nature and scope of preventive diplomacy extends in theory and in practice well beyond the ambit of the narrow confines accorded in the definitions of preventive diplomacy. Another method has been to consider the timing of the intervention vis-à-vis the stage of armed conflict. Operations are classified according to whether they are deployed before hostilities occur (such as some forms of preventive deployment), during low-intensity conflict, during full-scale war, or following armed conflict. This distinction closely correlates with the theoretical model of preventive diplomacy as developed by Michael Lund.

Therefore the timing and nature of intervention of proposed peacekeeping missions in situations of violent conflict are critical in terms of whether preventive diplomacy would succeed in securing a transition from unstable peace towards stable peace and beyond.

This chapter will provide a brief overview and assessment of the parallel efforts that were initiated by the international community and key African states in
response to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The chapter will commence with a brief theoretical evaluation of peace restoration strategies as part of the context of preventive diplomacy. The chapter will provide a critical evaluation of the role of the United Nations and the European Union (EU) in responding to the conflict in the DRC. This chapter will firstly however consider the regional and continental approaches and responses that were initiated to address the conflict in the DRC. The section will commence with an overview of the peace initiatives of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union and South Africa- an important role-player in the peace process.

5.2 Preventive Diplomacy- The Application of Lund’s Theoretical Framework to Situations of Real-World Conflict

As discussed earlier the key to preventive diplomacy is the timing of its activation in relation to evolving conditions in a given place on the ground.

Preventive diplomacy would typically commence when tensions in the relationships between parties are in danger of shifting from stable peace to unstable peace or worse. According to Lund (1996:41) it applies then not only to situations that have seen no recent conflict, but also to post conflict situations where violence or coercion have been largely terminated but the efforts of post conflict peace building are apparently insufficient to move the conflict into stable peace away from the danger of re-escalation. Its aim is to keep actual or potential disputes from taking the form of confrontation or all-out violence and to return them to processes of regular diplomacy or national politics, or a more desirable state of durable peace. But if it fails, and such situations deteriorate into crisis, preventive diplomacy ceases to apply as a concept. At the operational level of conflict prevention, Michael Lund argues that preventive measures are especially effective at the level of unstable peace, which is defined as “a situation where tension and suspicion among parties run high but violence is either absent
or only sporadic” (Lund 1996:39). Preventive Diplomacy is therefore deemed as being especially operative at the level of unstable peace.

According to Leatherman et al (1999:98) however it is necessary to extend preventive actions along the entire spectrum of conflict, from latent tensions through the culmination and resolution of conflict to post-conflict peace-building. According to this approach preventive diplomacy is contextualized and its basic objective, the forestalling and reduction of violence, is elaborated in different stages of the conflict as opposed to merely focusing on one specific stage-unstable peace as suggested by the theoretical framework of Lund.

The key phases of preventive diplomacy thus include: conflict prevention that entails preventing violent disputes from arising between parties either by structural, institutional, economic, or cultural remedies, secondly escalation prevention, which entails preventing both the vertical and horizontal escalation of hostilities to more destructive means of warfare and to involve additional actors and thirdly post-conflict prevention entailing the prevention of the re-emergence of disputes by reintegrating and reconstructing the war-torn society. Early prevention of conflict is preferable because it is more feasible; at this stage issues are still specific and more amenable to transformation, the number of parties to the conflict is limited, thus reducing its complexity and early measures are cost-effective (Leatherman (1999:99).

Most real-world conflicts progress beyond the confines of unstable peace and result in conflict or full-scale war, and therefore an argument should be made for the utility of preventive diplomacy beyond the narrow confines of Lund’s conceptual framework to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Even Lund (2006:9), has acknowledged this and provides an expanded definition that builds upon his original discussion of the concept: “Preventive diplomacy, or conflict prevention, consists of governmental or non-governmental actions, policies, institutions that are taken deliberately to keep particular states or organized groups within them
from threatening or using organized violence, armed force, or related forms of coercion such as repression as the means to settle interstate or national political disputes, especially where the existing means cannot peacefully manage the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change. So defined, preventive diplomacy might be needed either before a new conflict starts or after a violent conflict has abated to avoid relapse”. Clearly Lund asserts that preventive diplomacy could be applied after a violent conflict has already manifested itself, has abated, but where the potential exists for a relapse.

As alluded to earlier classical conflict resolution was mainly concerned with entry into the conflict itself and with how to enable parties to violent conflict to resolve the issues between them in non-violent ways, however the contemporary approach is to take a wider view of the *timing and nature of intervention*. Central to this aspect is identifying this crucial point where intervention in a situation of conflict is feasible. The crucial aspect therefore in assessing any conflict situation relates to when intervention should be considered-related to the actual operational aspects of preventive diplomacy in practice.

5.3 The Regional Response to the Conflict in the DRC: The Role of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) adopted the strategies of disarmament, the peaceful resolution of conflict and institutional development as the foundations on which peace, human security and conflict prevention should be built. In terms of conflict prevention, management and resolution the salient strategies identified by SADC places a premium on preventive diplomacy, negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration and adjudication by an international tribunal; to establish an early-warning system in order to facilitate prompt action to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict, to mediate in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflicts, to develop conflict prevention,
management and resolution capacity and to ensure full regional cooperation in conflict management (Dzimba 2001:29).

Efforts to resolve the latest conflict (the ‘second rebellion’) that erupted on 2 August 1998 began virtually simultaneously with the onset of hostilities-timing being one of the key requirements if preventive diplomacy is to succeed. Approximately 23 recorded peace initiatives had been adopted since the outbreak of hostilities in 1997-with very little success, given the continuation and intensification of violence and hostilities in August 1998. The conflict in the DRC was therefore swiftly progressing towards re-escalation as tensions amongst the erstwhile allies were ominously moving from unstable peace towards crisis and ultimately all-out confrontation and war.

There had been a flurry of diplomatic efforts – several ‘track one’ efforts comprising “regional and continental summits, ‘shuttle’ missions by Western envoys and intercontinental bilateral meetings”, complemented by ‘track two’ efforts by initiated by “some non-governmental organizations in South Africa” (Naidoo, 1999: 155). The conflict had indeed produced more peace initiatives, summit meetings, and opportunities for statesmanship than any other conflict in Africa’s turbulent history.

Propitious conditions were therefore present in the DRC to extend and to augment the role of preventive diplomacy, through contextualizing this approach to the specific circumstances that led to conflict in the first instance; by furthermore elaborating preventive diplomacy’s basic objective-forestalling and reducing violence at different stages of the crisis as it began to unfold, as opposed to merely focusing on one specific stage-unstable peace.

While the timing of the intervention in the DRC had been commensurate with a narrowly-defined conception of preventive diplomacy, the nature of the intervention posed particularly problematic implications from the outset.
The nature of the intervention is a crucial and related aspect that works in coordination with the timing. Central to the conduct of preventive diplomacy, this issue according to Lund is often dealt with implicitly rather than explicitly. A more synoptic and inter-organizational approach to developing preventive interventions is required. In considering possible options for action, an important step is often omitted. A salient question that should be asked from the outset is- “what is the problem on the ground?” Rather than invoke familiar remedies simply because they are convenient or available, policymakers and practitioners should proceed inductively, working from the ground up to tailor a response that meets the particular circumstances of each conflict situation. The first-step in tactical preventive diplomacy is needs assessment-closely scrutinizing the pre-conflict situation in order to devise appropriate responses to avoid the onset of violent conflict (Lund 1996:140).

It is against this background that some member states of SADC had to make their decisions regarding participation or non-participation in the conflict in a military manner.

President Nelson Mandela, as early as February 1997, had offered his good services and diplomatic facilitation for a negotiated outcome to the first Congolese war. On 2 May 1997, although AFDL troops were already battling their way towards Mobutu’s last barrier to conquer Kinshasa, Mandela managed to convene a meeting between Mobutu and Laurent Kabila on board the South African army warship ‘Outeniqua’ in international waters off Congo-Brazzaville (Koko 2007:38). While Mobutu accepted that he had to step down, he was prepared to hand over power to the speaker of the transitional parliament. Laurent Kabila and the AFDL however simply expected him to resign and hand over the reins of power to them. In defiance of the talks, AFDL troops were already marching on Kinshasa and militarily seizing power. The momentum for preventive diplomacy was being lost from the start.
When the AFDL took control of Kinshasa, on 17 May 1997, it was initially met with an enthusiastic welcome. However, Kabila soon found his policies challenged and his association with his foreign supporters, especially the Rwandan Tutsi, viewed with suspicion. (International Crisis Group 1999:8). In July 1998, rumours of a planned coup supported by the Rwandans prompted Kabila to send home the Rwandan troops that were training, and even commanding his army. It was during their departure that a military uprising was declared in the east of the country, backed by Kigali.

On 2 August 1998, barely 14 months after the end of the war initiated by the anti-Mobutu coalition, the emergence of a new armed movement announced the beginning of a further "war of liberation" in the Democratic Republic of Congo, this time against the regime of Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The conflict arose out of differences between the founder members of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo - AFDL), the coalition that installed Laurent Kabila at the head of the Congo in May 1997.

In an attempt to restore South Africa’s credibility as a mediator Mandela met with President Kagame of Rwanda and later with President Museveni of Uganda to promote the idea of a negotiated settlement and ceasefire for the conflict. In October 1998 he offered his good offices and diplomatic facilitation to the warring parties. The DRC government however rejected Mandela’s offer.

The DRC (upon that time only recently joining the regional organisation), requested military assistance from the SADC to respond to and contain the threat posed by the invasion that was now being led by its former allies Rwanda and Uganda. With the DRC a member of the SADC, the conflict in the country had become of great concern to the regional grouping, particularly the negative effects the conflict would have on regional stability (Ngoma 2004:2). The strategic and symbolic value of the SADC resolving the conflict in the DRC was
stressed by the observation that some way and means had to be found of institutionalizing conflict prevention, management and resolution within SADC in order to bring stability to what was once touted as Africa's shining example of democracy and prosperity (Kornegay and Landsberg 1999).

It is in this context that the move by some members of SADC to send troops to the DRC in 1998 to stop the government from being overrun by rebel forces supported by Ugandan and Rwandese forces may be viewed. However, the fact that other states in the sub-region did not participate in this support mission revealed a divisive tension within the sub-region, probably only comparable in significance to the liberation wars in the sub-region when the apartheid regime in South Africa was considered to be the single most critical issue upon which the regimes in the sub-region based their foreign policy positions (Ngoma 2004:3). The DRC conflict however revealed deep-seated divisions and tensions within the SADC community of states.

Consensus exists that SADC has failed to pursue its goal of regional peace and security in an effective manner (Nathan 2006: 606). In addition to being unable to prevent conflicts effectively, SADC does not have a record of successful peacemaking. In most intra-state conflicts SADC refrained from critical comment and diplomatic engagement, in attempts to avoid tensions amongst member states and to maintain a posture of unity and solidarity.

After the second rebellion broke out in 1998, a meeting of the respective Ministers of Defence was convened in Zimbabwe. After the meeting, President Robert Mugabe then chairperson of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) concluded that military assistance had to extended to the embattled regime in the DRC. In this context Mugabe announced ‘Operation Sovereign Legitimacy’ as a regional peace enforcement operation under SADC auspices. As a peace enforcement operation, this intervention was considered to be illegal in terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter proposing that only the UN
Security Council has the legal authority to launch enforcement operations to protect international peace and security.

President Mandela also expressed his condemnation of the decision to intervene, since he was not properly consulted during this decision. Mandela’s stance was primarily based on the South African adherence to its doctrine of democratic peace and to the commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes (Koko 2007:38).

Nevertheless, in the wake of the Harare meeting of defence ministers, Mugabe claimed that the fourteen countries belonging to SADC had come to a ‘unanimous’ decision to help Kabila. Mandela publicly reprimanded Mugabe for his inflammatory talk, and called upon SADC countries rather to work towards a peaceful settlement. An emergency summit of SADC leaders was convened in Pretoria on 23 August 1998. The leaders present decided to confirm their recognition of the legitimacy of the government of the DRC and to call for an immediate ceasefire, to be followed by political dialogue on a peaceful settlement to the crisis (Malan 1998).

In his capacity as Chair of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), President Robert Mugabe immediately convened a meeting in Victoria Falls of heads of state from Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. South Africa at this time was excluded due to simmering tensions with Pretoria over the issue of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) (Nathan 2006:613).

Mugabe subsequently referred the matter to an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) meeting in Harare at the conclusion of which he declared that SADC had decided unanimously to respond to Laurent Kabila’s appeal for assistance. This was followed by a decision by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia to deploy troops in the DRC on behalf of SADC.
The intervening states justified the deployment as an act of collective defence against the alleged invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda. They also claimed that the deployment had been authorised by the Organ and the ISDSC. The Organ was however not operational, the ISDSC had no mandate to initiate military action, and only a few SADC states were present at the meetings convened by Mugabe (Nathan 2006:113). The intervention was therefore not predicated on any principle of collective defence or an altruistic foreign policy decision, but rather military intervention by the three states as military allies of the DRC engaged in conflict, with each country possessing a plethora of narrowly defined interests of their own.

Zimbabwe had several objectives and interests to defend by intervening in the DRC on the side of Kabila. One of the primary motivations was however economic, as Mugabe and Kabila entered into lucrative joint enterprises, including mining interests. President Robert Mugabe had often stressed the fact that his military partnership with the DRC was a long-term investment for Zimbabwe. Apart from the fact that Zimbabwean soldiers had accumulated personal wealth from the mining of diamonds in Kasai, the Zimbabwean government regarded the Congo as a new frontier from which it could secure the much-needed resources it required to rebuild its economy (International Crisis Group 2002:15). Ironically it was Mugabe who accused Uganda and Rwanda of their intention to continue the war in order to exploit the resources of the DRC.

President Nelson Mandela, as Chair of the SADC Summit challenged Mugabe’s authority to send troops on behalf of SADC. The Zimbabwean President replied with a thinly-veiled insult:

“No one is compelled within SADC to go into a campaign of assisting a country beset by conflict. Those who want to keep out, fine. Let them keep out, but let them be silent about those who want to help.”
Supported by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, South Africa pursued a diplomatic solution to the crisis in the DRC. Mandela convened an emergency meeting of the SADC Summit in Pretoria, but Mugabe declined to attend, proclaiming that “it is not possible for SADC to resolve the crisis as SADC as the regional grouping was deeply divided on this matter”. The Summit insisted that military action was unacceptable and called for an immediate ceasefire and the commencement of negotiations (Nathan 2006:114).

On 3 September 1998, however, President Mandela surprised observers by announcing at a press conference during the Non-Aligned Movement’s Summit that SADC had unanimously supported the military intervention by its member states in the DRC. This turn-around may have been designed to present a façade of sub-regional unity and to lessen tensions between Mandela and Mugabe over the issue.

The few ‘SADC Allies’ committed to military intervention argued and attempted to cast their intervention as being solely based on the mandate of the SADC Treaty, Article 4, read in conjunction with the objectives of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), in response to hostile action by foreign states that required a defensive response by SADC. However, there is a critical view that the involvement in the conflicts of the three SADC states was motivated by their desire to protect their political and economic interests in the embattled country. Just as the Southern African states were tied to supporting the liberation movements, in the same way, SADC through its Treaty and Article 5 resolved to “promote and defend peace and security”.

In an attempt to restore confidence in South Africa as a credible mediator to the growing crisis in the DRC, President Mandela met with President Kagame of Rwanda and later with President Museveni of Uganda to promote the idea of a negotiated settlement and ceasefire to the conflict. In October 1998, he offered
his good offices and diplomatic facilitation to the warring Congolese parties (Koko 2007:38).

The actions by these SADC member states revealed a preference for a military solution (thereby causing conflict widening and escalation and the exacerbation of tensions) as opposed to adopting a prudent approach that included first and foremost preventive diplomacy and attempts to prevent the exacerbation of tensions in the region. The nature and characteristics of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security also posed administrative and operational challenges for the sub-region’s collaborative regional security arrangement (Ngoma 2004:5).

Zambia’s position over the military intervention had generally been regarded as one of neutrality because of the role it assumed after the intervention. Although it was clear that the state did not contribute troops for the intervention, it is nevertheless unclear what grouping the state was in at the decision-making time for the intervention (Ngoma 2004:9).

The claim that Zambia had earlier indicated its support for the military intervention, along with the ‘SADC allies’, would seem to have been collaborated by President Kagame in regard of the country’s conduct in the conflict itself. The Rwandan leader regarded Zambia as “enemy ground”, given that President Frederick Chiluba, aside from serving as a safe corridor for Zimbabwean troops and arms into the DRC, provided sanctuary to the Interahamwe génocidaires”. While Zambia’s geographical imperatives more than likely determined its function as a supply line for ‘SADC allies’, it is highly unlikely that it would knowingly have provided refuge to the Interahamwe génocidaires. The ability of Zambia to perform the role of ‘referee’ was further weakened by the Angolan government’s distrust of former President Chiluba, whom they had accused of “supplying UNITA with arms and transit routes for smuggling diamonds” (Ngoma 2004:9).
The DRC government overtly rejected President Mandela’s offer to mediate in the crisis, while SADC officially supported Zambian President Frederick Chiluba’s mediation efforts that would ultimately lead to the negotiation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999.

Despite these suspicions, Zambia’s official position in the DRC conflict was that of a mediator – a position placed upon it by the SADC Summit, ostensibly as a bridge to the two opposing views in which Zimbabwe favoured the military option while South Africa preferred negotiations between those involved in the conflict. Zambia’s position was to avoid “tain(ting) the (peace) process with preconceived position(s)” and in this regard, to be “assisted by the regional organization whenever possible” (Solomon and Mngqibisa 2000).

The implications for the country’s role as peacemaker have not just been felt at the international level but also at both the regional and domestic level. At the regional level, President Chiluba obtained the reputation of a shrewd politician who was able to survive despite being distrusted by both sides in the DRC conflict. This skill gained him new respect by the region’s elder statesmen, like Presidents Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Jose dos Santos of Angola, and the envy of his counterparts in Malawi, Tanzania and Botswana.

The subjective perceptions and approach that was adopted by the countries in defending their decision to become involved in the conflict revealed the importance of the psychology of conflict.

In a conflict situation, both suppression and repression can remove from immediate awareness events showing one’s party in a bad light, or acting cruelly or unjustly, or behaving against its stated principles, or acting dishonestly or in bad faith, Success in repressing such information, will of course, make it all the more difficult for the member of one party to understand the way they are
regarded by their opponents, and thus further confirm the latter's essential malevolence (Mitchell 1981: 80).

Other features and processes which are deemed important aspects of the psychology of conflict include a lessening of participants’ ability to empathize, an increased tendency to universalize one’s own frame of reference, a likelihood of the development of tunnel vision, and an increased probability of perceived polarization of the environment within which conflict occurs. In the first instance the firm adherence to a consistent image of the conflict renders it difficult to empathize with the opponent’s genuine fears, suspicions, grievances or beliefs about one’s own goals and intentions (Mitchell 1981: 82).

A similar function is performed by a process of using language to obscure a real situation that exists, or the actual consequences of actions upon others, Some psychologists refer to this as the use of meaningless assigns often appears to be a form of propaganda aimed at changing outsiders’ perceptions and evaluations of the conflict (Mitchell 1981). In reality it is much more a process by which those directly involved in a conflict, particularly a violent and destructive one, maintain a desirably low level of psychological stress in highly distressing circumstances. It is typified by the constant use of euphemism, or abstract labels to obscure or soften the real meaning of an event or situation which might otherwise be unpleasantly disturbing. The process involves the use of softer or vaguer and more acceptable language to describe unpleasant and stress-provoking events.

Statements issued by Presidents Mugabe and Nujoma respectively, succinctly revealed the subjective and perceptual elements that are entrenched in conflict situations:

“The Zimbabweans responded to a call for assistance by the DRC government following the invasion by Uganda and Rwanda… I think our decision was a gallant one and our response so far has been just as gallant. We have prevented
the aggressors from achieving their goal.... As the Commander-in-Chief, I took the necessary action to come to the aid of an aggrieved neighbour and fellow member of SADC... Ours was a response to an urgent appeal by the Congo to the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security... I did so conscious of the inherent dangers and problems including the death of our troops. It is an honourable act of enlightened self-interests.” (Mugabe 1999).

The decision by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe to respond to the request for military help of the DRC government was, as would be expected, not without some negative implications for the interveners, with some of the severest criticism being reserved for Zimbabwe.

Regarding the intra-regional dynamics, the differences between Zimbabwean and South African leadership over the structure and operation of the OPDS would seem to have brought into the open the differences in regional approaches to issues of regional security in general and the DRC in particular (Ngoma 2004:10).

A mainly African-driven process placed great pressure on the belligerents, which culminated in the signing of a ceasefire agreement by the Heads of State of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the Minister of Defence of Angola on 10 July 1999. The ceasefire agreement was then signed by the Ugandan-backed MLC on 1 August 1999 and, finally, by 50 people representing both factions of the RCD on 31 August 1999 (Rogier 2006:99).

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement however only provided for the cessation of hostilities pending a political settlement among the Congolese parties themselves. The 90-days accorded to the process evolved into 3 months and three years of intense negotiation.
Moreover, the vigorous South African-led push towards a regional protocol on defence and security upon which a regional Southern African pact was to be constructed, the signing of the SADC Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation Protocol at the 2001 SADC Summit in Malawi and the subsequent adoption of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact at the Dar es Salaam summit in August 2003 are indicative of the presence of sub-regional cohesion despite whatever differences may have existed over the military intervention in the DRC. This gives some hope for the creation of a unified approach to issues of conflict (Ngoma 2004:11).

5.4 The UN response to the conflict in the DRC: The role of United Nations Observer Mission (MONUC)

Another invaluable tool in the preventive diplomacy toolbox is the deployment of peacekeeping forces. Traditional peacekeeping involves the deployment of military units and civilian officials in order to facilitate the negotiated settlement of a conflict. It is based on the consent of the parties (normally authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter). Multidimensional peacekeeping is also consent based and is designed to implement a comprehensive negotiated peace agreement (Doyle and Sambanis 2000:782). It includes a mix of strategies to build a self-sustaining peace, ranging from those of traditional peacekeeping operations and institutional transformation. Peace enforcement is a usually multilateral military intervention, authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is designed to impose public order by force, if needed, with or without the consent of the host government.

United Nations operations in areas of crisis have generally been established after conflict has occurred. However as du Plessis (2003:24) points out planning for circumstances warranting preventive deployment, which could take place in a variety of instances and ways, are required. Preventive deployment could take place when a country feels threatened and requests the deployment of an
appropriate UN presence along its side of the border alone. In conditions of crisis within a country, preventive deployment could also assist in alleviating suffering and to limit or control the spread of violence.

As the conflict in the DRC continued to produce mass casualties, Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General reiterated the importance of conflict prevention in his report on the prevention of armed conflict:

“Since assuming office, I have pledged to move the United Nations from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention. (Annan 2001:3).

The United Nations has attached greater importance in the past to operational prevention through preventive diplomacy, undertaken when violence appears imminent. Present UN efforts have attempted to shift towards focusing on moving forward on the implementation of a structural prevention strategy-one that would address the root causes of armed conflict, addressing the various political, social, cultural, economic and environmental and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate symptoms of armed conflicts (Annan 2003:2).

The presence of several thousand armed foreign combatants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo lies at the heart of the conflict in the Great Lakes region. Unless and until this problem is resolved, lasting peace cannot be restored. The presence of foreign armed groups is not only damaging to internal security, but also represents a standing obstacle to the improvement and normalisation of relations between the DRC and its neighbours (Swarbrick 2003:163).

In view of the need to safeguard the security of Rwanda and to prevent a resumption of cross-border attacks, the need to disarm, demobilise and repatriate the foreign armed groups operating on DRC territory was set as a major objective of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, along with the withdrawal of all foreign Governmental forces and the Inter-Congolese dialogue. In paragraph
11 of Article III of the Agreement, the signatories stipulated that the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, should be requested to constitute, facilitate and deploy a peacekeeping force in the DRC to “track down all armed groups” (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999: Article III, Clause 11).

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement called for a United Nations force with a mandate not only for peacekeeping but peace enforcement as well. “The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in collaboration with the OAU, shall be requested to constitute, facilitate and deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force in the DRC to ensure implementation of the agreement, and taking into account the peculiar situation of the DRC, mandate the peacekeeping force to track down all armed groups in the DRC. In this respect, the UN Security Council shall provide the requisite mandate for a peacekeeping force” (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999: Article III, Clause 11a).

On 6 August 1999, the Security Council passed Resolution 1258 to authorize an initial deployment of UN military liaison officers to the capitals of Lusaka’s signatories. Their mission was to lay the groundwork for a much larger operation (International Crisis Group 2000:73). Seven months after the Lusaka ceasefire, on 24 February 2000, the Security Council finally passed Resolution 1291, which authorised the dispatch of 5,037 military personnel and 500 Military Observers (MILOBS). The mission laid out in the resolution however, fell short of Lusaka’s call for a peacekeeping force.

Chapter 9 of the Lusaka Agreement dealt specifically with the issue of disarmament of the armed groups. The Lusaka Agreement stipulated two important principles, namely that disarmament should be voluntary and that it would be undertaken at the initiative of the signatories themselves (International Crisis Group 2001c:16). The Lusaka signatories were hopeful that the UN would actually take the responsibility of tracking, neutralising, identifying, screening and demobilising negative forces. This was however an overly optimistic assessment. MONUC was initially provided Chapter VI authority, with no peace enforcement
mandate whatsoever. Its main duty was to observe the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, report to the UN Security Council and monitor the progress made by the belligerents in implementing the agreement signed.

5.4.1 Resolutions Adopted by the UN in Response to the Crisis: 2000-2004

Throughout the crisis situation the United Nations remained actively engaged in exploring ways to address the conflict in the DRC. The Security Council adopted resolution 1291 of 2000 by which a decision was reached to carry out the phased deployment of MONUC. In its resolution 1316 (2000) of 23 August 2000 the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of MONUC to allow for further diplomatic activities in support of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (Annan 2000:1). In October 2000, President Laurent Kabila adopted a more pragmatic approach indicating his willingness to facilitate the deployment of MONUC troops in the DRC (Annan 2000b). During this time discussions were initiated for MONUC phase II deployment. During a meeting in November 2000 SADC Ambassadors expressed their concern that the peace process was faltering and called upon Secretary-General Annan to become more actively involved in salvaging the peace process.

The highly volatile environment in the Kivus, marked by frequent and violent attacks by non-signatory armed groups continued to raise serious concerns that the peace process was faltering. By its resolution 1332 of 14 December 2000 the Security Council extended the mandate of MONUC and endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposal to deploy additional UN military observers to monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire and disengagement plans adopted by the parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. During this period newly-appointed President Joseph Kabila expressed his desire that the mandate of MONUC be extended during his first meeting with the Special Representative to the Secretary-General, Mr Kamel Morjane.
The UN Security Council adopted a more hard-line stance with the adoption of resolution 1341 of 2001, by demanding that the parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement fully implement the Kampala plan and the Harare sub-plans for disengagement and redeployment of forces without reservations within the allotted time as set forth in the Harare Agreement. The Security Council extended the mandate of the mission with the adoption of resolution 1355 of 2001 and extended the presence of MONUC to June 2002.

In his ninth report to the Security Council in 2001 the Secretary-General presented the initial plan of MONUC for its phase III deployment, which indicated that the Mission would take a step-by-step approach to the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of the armed groups while continuing with relevant phase II tasks, in particular monitoring the disengagement of the parties to new defensive positions, investigating alleged ceasefire violations and observing the withdrawal of foreign forces.

5.5 Pretoria’s Prudent Preventive Diplomacy: South Africa’s Prominent Role in Addressing the Conflict in the DRC

It may be deduced, not without a measure of accuracy, that South Africa’s superior economic and industrial as well as military capacity is the sine qua non for Africa’s development, and for the SADC region it is the basis for peace and security (Ngoma 2004:7). With the largest population, biggest economy (at least fifty times the size of Zimbabwe’s) and largest as well as most developed military force in the region, South Africa’s involvement in regional issues is virtually assumed. It is for this reason that its position on the conflict in the DRC had particularly been significant.

Then-Deputy President Thabo Mbeki highlighted the salience of establishing a credible peacekeeping force as early as December 1998, when he put forward
the concept of a peacekeeping force composed of the belligerents themselves under a neutral command. The rationale behind the proposal was that the sheer size of the force required in the DRC was far greater than either the UN or the world’s major military powers would be willing to provide (Swart and Solomon 2004:17).

South Africa clearly preferred the role of peacemaker to that of peacekeeper. However, the outcomes of the Lusaka ministerial meeting of 16 January and the Windhoek mini-summit of 18 January 1999 indicated that Pretoria had been ‘upstaged’ as peacemaker by those who were directly involved in the conflict (Malan 1999).

5.5.1 The Sun City Talks-Underestimating the Psychology of Diplomacy?

The partial failure of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue meeting at Sun City, South Africa, from 25 February to 19 April 2002, had thrown the Congolese peace process into dangerous confusion. The limited agreement for a transition government, struck between Joseph Kabila’s government and Jean-Pierre Bemba’s *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo*, backed by the majority of delegates from unarmed political opposition groups and civil society, and approved by Angola, Uganda and Zimbabwe did not in itself offer any real solutions to the Congo’s problems.

Essentially, this agreement marked the beginning of a political realignment, most notably the end of the anti-Kabila coalition, and sealed the isolation of the *Rassemblement congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD) together with its intransigent ally Rwanda (International Crisis Group 2002:1).

The new chapter in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, when it resumed on 25 February 2002 at Sun City, was characterised by a series of blockages, many of which were the direct result of insufficient political preparation for the meeting.
The first ten days of the dialogue were paralysed by unresolved quarrels over the composition of the unarmed political opposition delegation. The MLC refused to participate in the debates until the issue had been satisfactorily resolved. The only solution proposed by the facilitation team was to increase the overall number of delegates to 359.

The complete lack of mediation between the belligerents and their foreign allies did nothing to resolve the deep-rooted conflicts, and since Ketumile Masire had always perceived that he was being sidelined. The talks were also dominated by more logistical than pressing political matters, while the key debates were totally paralysed. Masire was not even capable of putting to good use the exceptional team of commissioners at his disposal (Mustapha Niasse, Abdusalam Abubakar, Amadou Ould Abdallah, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Albert Tevoedjré), mainly because he had simply failed to draw up a strategy to involve them. Indeed, several of the commissioners were so disgruntled with the situation that they decided to leave Sun City in the middle of the debates (International Crisis Group 2002:5).

Luckily for the dialogue, pressure from Congolese public opinion and the unarmed components (civil society and political opposition) succeeded in getting the negotiations back on track, and work was at least able to continue in four out of five commissions (social, cultural and humanitarian affairs, economy and finance, peace and reconciliation and security and defence). In addition, international pressure and the intervention of South-African President Thabo Mbeki a few days before the end of the negotiations put the question of President Kabila’s status back on the agenda, resulting in the signature of a minimum transition agreement between two of the three belligerents.

For the most part, the results achieved during the 45 days of negotiations were technical resolutions assessing the requirements for international aid and reconciliation. All of the commissions postponed discussions of the politically
sensitive questions, and left them to be dealt with by future transitional bodies (and therefore much of the critical and underlying root causes of the conflict were left unaddressed, and in many instances exacerbated tensions, despite the signing of key agreements).

The political progress that emerged from Sun City was obviously not just down to luck. Between Addis Ababa and Sun City, all the participants and their allies were busy preparing strategies and forging important contacts. Despite all this, however, the intransigence and general suspicion of the protagonists, and the absence of any real mediation, meant that the contacts eventually turned sour. It is therefore abundantly clear that grave psychological barriers prevented the parties to the peace talks from engaging each other more openly and with a sense of confidence and trust.

At first, the RCD was quick to criticize the Sun City accord, alleging that the agreement was the result of foreign manipulation and a coup d’état against the Lusaka accords. It called for an immediate return to Sun City and the continuation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue under the auspices of the Masire facilitation team (International Crisis Group 2002:10). It also immediately formalised the alliances established during the dialogue and created the Alliance for the Preservation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ASD), which brought together the RCD, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) headed by Etienne Tshisekedi, the “Dynamic for a Neutral Transition” headed by Raphaël Katebe Katoto (DPTN), the Congolese/Lumumba National Movement (MNC/L) headed by François Lumumba, the Lumumbist Progressive Movement (MLP), and the Party for a New Society (RNS), among other parties.

The creation of the ASD was an attempt to harness the legitimacy of those who were traditionally opposed to Mobutu and to hide behind a legalistic and formalistic attitude as the defender of the Lusaka accords. Such an attitude,
moreover, left the door wide open to all those who were unhappy with, and felt excluded from, the Sun City accord.

Another particularly potent image is known as the ‘unified enemy’ image. This is an image which sees the enemy as a single, unified entity, the members of which are all equally bent upon another party’s downfall, equally evil, and equally implacable in their pursuits of a set of unjust and immoral goals (Mitchell 1981: 109).

In order to try and explain the inflexibility of the RCD in the power-sharing negotiations, their objectives and negotiating strategies must be examined, as well as the situation in zones occupied by the RCD and the RPA. First, in terms of security aspects, the RCD’s position is clearly influenced by the Rwandan position on the issue of disarming the ALIR. Rwanda has constantly asked the Kabila government to disarm the ALIR as a prerequisite to any negotiations whatsoever.

When Kabila attempted in 1998 to gain independence from his Rwandan (and Ugandan) backers, they went to war against him and transformed their military presence into occupation of large swaths of the eastern half of the country (International Crisis Group 2005:2). Kabila responded by taking thousands of ex-FAR and Interahamwe into his armed forces, where they renamed themselves the Rwandan Liberation Army (Armée de Libération du Rwanda, ALIR). This consisted of two branches, one fully integrated in the Congolese army and used in the frontline, the other fighting a guerrilla war in the east against the Rwandan army and the ANC (Armée Nationale Congolaise), the armed wing of Rwanda’s local allies, the RCD-G (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma).

Amidst this background the Congolese government first wanted a guarantee of a Rwandan withdrawal before giving “this gift to Kagame.” Distrust continued to smoulder on both sides (International Crisis Group 2002:11). Rwanda’s
obsession with security, its militaristic ideology and its desire to resolve domestic political problems by force and by instrumentalising the Congo had prevented it from accurately analyzing the political situation and the interests of its Congolese allies.

The RCD, MLC and certain radical factions among the political opposition, refused to endorse Joseph Kabila as transitional president. The MLC amended its position on 9 April 2002, while the RCD insisted that its rejection of Kabila was non-negotiable (International Crisis Group 2002:5).

5.5.2 Thabo Mbeki: Salvaging the Dialogue

To avoid the imminent failure of the dialogues, Masire appealed to Mbeki to attempt to broker a last minute deal, as only four days of negotiations remained (Rogier 2006:104). It therefore appeared as if official (and in many respects the most critical) negotiations over power sharing only took place as the last minutes of the ICD process were looming. In an attempt to produce a solution that would be amenable to all parties and therefore secure South Africa prestige as ‘Africa’s peacemaker’, President Mbeki put forward two proposals, known as ‘Mbeki I’ and ‘Mbeki II’ on 10 April 2002. The ‘Mbeki I’ proposal suggested the creation of a ‘Council of State’ made up of President Joseph Kabila (as head of the council), two RCD and MLC representatives, and a prime minister from the political opposition. Civil society was offered the presidency of parliament as well as other institutions of support to democracy. The defence, police, security and intelligence services were to be neutral. The RCD, MLC and some members of the political opposition rejected ‘Mbeki I’ for favouring the government of Joseph Kabila (Koko 2007:40).

The general rule seems to be that the higher the sacrifices involved, the more the people will feel that some significant gains must be achieved in the final settlement to make up for all they have endured (Mitchell 1981:180). The more
prolonged the conflict, the more difficult it becomes for the leaders to accept anything short of a significant improvement on the pre-conflict situation as a final settlement. Serious obstacles remain from the point of view of the leaders of the defeated party, and some of these also constitute problems for leaders of the successful party. One such dilemma is making defeat palpable to the rank-and-file of the defeated party. The task of the leaders of a losing party in persuading followers to accept the necessity for a compromise is never an easy one. It is especially difficult following a long and costly conflict, in which major sacrifices have been demanded of the followers by the party leadership (Mitchell 1981:183).

In an attempt to maintain the momentum of the negotiations ‘Mbeki II’ was initiated the following day. The second proposal suggested the creation of the ‘High Council of the Republic’ and offered RCD-Goma a first vice-presidency, overseeing the ministerial portfolio of defence, home affairs, security services and the organization of elections. The second vice-presidency, in charge of economy, finance and reconstruction would be awarded to the MLC (Koko 2007:40). The political opposition would be allotted the position of prime minister, to lead a government made up of five vice-prime ministers, ministers, vice-ministers. The presidency of the mono-cameral 500-seat parliament was left to civil society. When the proposal was unveiled, the MLC and the Kinshasa government denounced ‘Mbeki II’ for favouring the RCD. The two parties then produced a joint alternative proposal that would dramatically reduce the political prominence of RCD-Goma in the transitional government. Kabila would remain president, assisted by three vice-presidents from the RCD, MLC and civil society, while the political opposition was to keep the position of prime minister. The proposals received instant backing from the majority of participants in the ICD, who were eager to avoid power-sharing solutions dictated by the RCD and its ally Rwanda (Swart and Solomon 2004:29). However, there was no further agreement on the proposal. While the facilitation team sought to prolong the talks for one additional week, Kabila’s government and Bemba’s MLC struck a deal on
the sidelines of the ICD. The Sun City Accord confirmed Kabila as president for the transition period, while allotting the seat of prime minister to Bemba. The RCD-Goma opted to remain outside of this agreement. Kabila and Bemba predictably failed to implement the Sun City Accord.

5.5.3 Salvaging the Opportunities Missed: The Pretoria Agreements

While the Inter-Congolese Dialogue appeared to have ended in failure in April 2002, and the peace process seemed to have then reached a stalemate, significant developments nonetheless occurred during the second half of 2002. Mustapha Niasse, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to the DRC was granted a six-month mandate (extended until March 2003) to broker the long-anticipated all-inclusive agreement (Rogier 2006:106).

From June 2002 until October 2002, Mustapha Niasse concluded three missions in the region, during which he discussed with all parties concerned their views pertaining to power sharing during the transition period. The UN envoy benefited from the crucial support of the South African mediation team, led by Minister of Provincial and Local Government Sidney Mufamadi. Although President Mbeki’s unsuccessful intervention at Sun City made it difficult for South Africa to play a prominent role, Pretoria remained nonetheless highly committed to the peace process.

On 30 July 2002 the Pretoria Agreement (also known as Pretoria I) between the DRC and Rwanda was concluded. This included a commitment by Rwanda to withdraw all troops from the DRC, while the Government of the DRC had to ensure the dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces in the DRC. The UN and South Africa were entrusted with a number of verification tasks. This included the establishment of a third party verification mechanism and the creation of the secretariat of the third-party verification mechanism in Kinshasa,
which was to oversee and verify the implementation of the various commitments made by the signatories (Annan 2002:2).

In terms of the Pretoria I agreement concluded on 30 July 2002 with regards to the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory and the dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, signed by both the South African President and UN Secretary-General as witnesses added nothing significant to the agreement concluded three years earlier during the Lusaka process. Rwandan President Paul Kagame pulled out his forces without waiting for Joseph Kabila to comply, due to the growing perceptions that Rwanda was primarily responsible for the failure of the Sun City negotiations, causing the country to feel increasingly isolated. These actions were a major departure for Kigali, a few months after preventing the RCD-Goma from making a deal at Sun City.

The conclusion of the Pretoria and Luanda agreements appeared to have finally paved the way for a negotiated settlement and peace to become a reality.

5.5.4 Peace at Last? The Pretoria II Agreement

Despite the various setbacks, a pact on interim rule was agreed upon in principle by consensus during talks in Pretoria in October 2002 between the DRC government, the RCD and the MLC (Sapa 2002). South Africa’s minister of local government, Sydney Mufamadi, had mediated the peace deal in Pretoria in a last desperate effort to salvage the failures of the ICD in Sun City. Presidents Kabila and Museveni both followed this with an announcement of their readiness to launch the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC). The Ugandan army withdrew two battalions from the DRC, and on 17 December 2002 the warring parties signed a peace deal after more than four years of devastating civil war.

On 17 December 2002 in Pretoria, the main Congolese parties to the conflict, including the DRC’s government, RCD-Goma, MLC, RCD-ML, RCD-N and the
Mai-Mai, finally signed the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC (also known as ‘Pretoria II’). Short of addressing the causes of the conflict, this agreement reflected a deal between the principle warlords as to how they would share power at the governmental level, during the transition period.

In brief, President Kabila would remain Head of State (and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces), but would be assisted by four Vice-Presidents in charge of governmental commissions, each comprising ministers and deputy ministers. In total the transitional government would include no less than 36 ministers and 25 deputy ministers (Rogier 2006:108).

Following the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo on 17 December 2002, the Special Envoy for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Moustapha Niasse continued efforts to ensure that no further delays would occur during the final session of the Dialogues. Attempts to launch the Ituri Pacification Commission as envisioned by the Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002 failed to yield any results at the start of 2003 (Annan 2003b:3). The importance of MONUC’s role in the region was reinforced with the adoption of Security Council resolution 1493 of 28 July 2003 whereby the mandate of MONUC was again extended until 30 July 2004.

Although this agreement was a necessary step towards the conclusion of the peace process, the Pretoria II agreement did not stem from the political will of the signatories but was achieved, just like the previous agreements, after protracted and intense negotiations characterized by severe distrust and enmity amongst the disparate participants who did not care to be seen as equals and, which subsequently led to the conclusion of the peace agreements under intense international pressure exerted in particular by the UN, South Africa and Western countries. In the end the parties’ motives for signing were to avoid being marginalised and to preserve their share of the power (Rogier 2006:108).
Furthermore the Pretoria II agreement could only be described as being ‘global and all-inclusive’ in so far as the distribution of political positions and privileges that had been negotiated amongst the stakeholders considered to be the major national players. Another set of salient issues were agreed upon in March 2003 with the approval of three documents. The first document related to the ‘Memorandum regarding the mechanism for the establishment of a restructured and integrated army’. The second document approved in March 2003, entitled ‘Memorandum regarding the security provisions during the Transition’, the signatories requested the international community to provide for their personal security and safety in Kinshasa. Rebel leaders in particular agreed to come to the capital in order to take up their functions, but wanted assurances that their security would be guaranteed at all times (a reflection of the deep-rooted suspicion and distrust that continued to cloud relations, despite the symbolic process of signing and concluding various peace agreements). The final round of discussions led to the adoption of the transitional constitution (Rogier 2003:110).

5.6 MONUC: Mission Impossible?

MONUC was given a limited Chapter VII mandate to defend itself along with ‘civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’. Together with the JMC, MONUC was broadly directed to ‘monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigate any violations’ (International Crisis Group 2000:73). It was also instructed to assist with humanitarian operations, and cooperate with the Facilitator of the National Dialogue.

In particular, the United States, whose diplomats and military planners designed the MONUC mission, and whose logistical capabilities could permit its success, had persistent reservations and reluctance about deployment in the DRC.
The American concept contained several shortcomings. First, the MONUC mandate was impossible to accomplish because it did not realistically address the issue of armed groups. Resolution 1291 ignored the fact that three intertwined, but very different, types of conflict were underway in the DRC: conventional war, guerrilla insurgency and ethnic bloodletting. The “blue-helmets” could monitor the first, but not the second or third, in which they would face intolerable risks (International Crisis Group 2000:75).

Despite the continued presence of MONUC in the DRC the Secretary-General raised concerns over the continued ceasefire violations. The situation in Ituri became volatile with the fighting that erupted between Lendu and Hema militias in May 2003, following the withdrawal and departure of Ugandan troops.

These developments are instructive for peacekeeping and peace-building. International peace building mandates must take into account the characteristics of the factions involved in conflict. Peace building operates not upon stable states but upon unstable factions (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 783). The more hostile and numerous the factions, the more difficult the peace process is likely to become, and the more international assistance is needed to establish peace. In more hostile circumstances, international peace enforcement can help solve commitment and cooperation problems by imposing order or by directly implementing peace agreements or by raising the costs of defection from them. Long-term trusteeship may be required to overcome deep distrust and powerful incentives to defect from the peace. In practice however, peacekeeping missions often fail to achieve their objectives and can often exacerbate violence and hostility (Kaufman 1998:194).

The greatest obstacle to the success of MONUC in the first three years of its deployment was not the inadequate mandate given to the mission by the UN Security Council or the Council’s evident lack of political will, but the warring parties’ own violations of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and their repeated
obstruction of the U.N. peacekeeping mission (Roessler and Prendergast 2006:254). Laurent Kabila in particular depended heavily upon the foreign military assistance of Angola and Zimbabwe, while domestically he employed the Mayi-Mayi and other militias to counter RCD-Goma and other rebel groups. The withdrawal of the foreign armies would have left him vulnerable on the security front. Despite a more accommodating political approach, Joseph Kabila continued to rely on the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces, the Mayi-Mayi, and other militias in the east. These groups furthermore undermined MONUC’s attempts to carry out a disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme, and to curtail further violence in the Kivus and Ituri (Roessler and Prendergast 2006:255).

The main rebel groups, the MLC and the RCD, also flouted the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and obstructed MONUC’s deployment. The MLC continued its offensives towards Kinshasa and became ensnared in fighting in the Ituri district. RCD-Goma also refused for a number of years to demilitarize the strategic city of Kisangani, despite persistent demands by MONUC and the UN, and continued its offensive in the Kivus.

The Lusaka signatories abided by hopelessly unrealistic objectives and timelines for peace implementation and created an environment that remained hostile towards conflict prevention and peacekeeping. Any peace process is shaped and influenced by the cooperation of the warring parties, specifically by their commitment to the peace agreement or ceasefire that initiated the process of ending and preventing further conflict. When the end of war, however, potentially jeopardizes the warring parties’ political, economic, or security positions, they have little incentive to cooperate unless international pressure alters their cost-benefit calculus.

Solomon (n.d.:) also refers to the crucial aspect of timing in relation to the deployment of peacekeeping forces. In this context Ryan (1998:84) calls for
preventive peacekeeping-action that is taken to stop destructive conflict developing, not action that is taken after the destructive conflict is underway (traditional peacekeeping). In this context MONUC failed to prevent the further outbreak of violence.

5.6.1 Continued Violence in the DRC- A Revised Mandate for MONUC

The small town of Bunia became engrossed in violence between rival Hema and Lendu militias. On 30 May 2003, the UN Security Council made a unanimous decision to authorise the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to help stabilise the situation. The relevant parts of Resolution 1484 (2003) read as follows:

“[The Security Council] Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [a]uthorises the deployment until 1 September 2003 of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia … to ensure protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town. … [The Security Council] authorises the Member States participating in the Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia to take all necessary means to fulfil its mandate.” (UN Security Council Resolution 1484).

At this critical juncture the European Union in particular adopted a proactive stance towards preventing further violence.

EU policy in the field of conflict prevention deviates from the linear approach to violent conflict, which suggests that only efforts to forestall the outbreak of violence and thus keeping the conflict latent are regarded as prevention. The EU has acknowledged that the rather cyclical and recurrent nature of conflict implies the need to devise and utilise instruments aimed at addressing the social,
economic and political circumstances underpinning conflicts, namely the ‘root causes’ and the most ‘proximate causes’, that could lead to the outbreak or violent escalation of a conflict (Pérez 2004:94). In situations where preventive measures have either failed or where they have not been applied in the first place, there is a need to resort to short-term actions with the three-fold objective of, reducing manifest tensions and/or preventing the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict, preventing the vertical (intensifying of violence) or horizontal (territorial) escalation of existing violent conflict and ending violent conflict (Pérez 2004:96). Preventive and reactive instruments frequently coincide, since preventing the (re)escalation of a conflict may also be understood in terms of reacting to a conflict \textit{ex post facto} (Pérez 2004:100).

Furthermore, even when conflict prevention actions are successful in preventing or limiting the escalation of a conflict and limiting the intensity, this success is often limited in time and proves to have no lasting effects when the related or underlying fundamental problems are not addressed and resolved (Keukeleire 2004:152).

In May 2003, the EU decided to launch the first EU-led military intervention outside Europe, known as Operation ARTEMIS, which was deployed to Bunia in the DRC. The operation was conducted in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003) and the Council’s Joint Action adopted on 5 June 2003.

The 1,400-strong IEMF, deployed under the auspices of the European Union (but composed mainly of French combat soldiers) was a remarkably positive experiment in terms of efficient co-operation between the UN and a regional organisation. In fact, by having been limited in time and space, the IEMF provided a stopgap to the UN, allowing it to better prepare the transition from passive to active operations. The IEMF re-established security in Bunia,
effectively responded to UPC provocations, and weakened the militia’s military capabilities (Boshoff 2003:141).

The IEMF-led Operation ARTEMIS had been a remarkably positive experiment in co-operation between the UN and a regional organisation, in the domain of peace and security. The IEMF has provided a stopgap to the UN, limited in time and space, which has allowed it to better prepare the transition from peace-keeping to peace enforcement, in a situation where there was not much peace to keep, but rather a war in progress (which had to be stopped) and a peace to build (Sow 2003:210).

As a consequence of the 2003 crisis in eastern DRC, particularly in the district of Ituri, the United Nations Security Council finally granted the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) the mandate and means commensurate with the grave humanitarian and security situation on the ground. Resolution 1493, adopted unanimously on 28 July 2003, authorised MONUC to use “all necessary means” to fulfil its mandate, increasing its military strength to 10,800 personnel (Boshoff 2003:135).

The signature of the ‘Final Act’ at Sun City on 2 April 2003 demonstrated a reinvigorated commitment by the Congolese to national reconciliation and the peace process. This renewed momentum gave the international community the necessary confidence to commit itself fully to the peace process in the DRC, a commitment made explicit by the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1493, in particular the granting of a Chapter VII mandate to the mission. In fact, MONUC was granted a robust mandate largely as a result of requests made by the International Emergency Military Force (IEMF) deployed in Ituri. Well aware that the sending of an emergency force to Ituri had not been agreed upon by all belligerent parties, the French Government requested from the Security Council that the IEMF be equipped with a Chapter VII mandate. Later on, the Security Council gave the same powers to MONUC in order to ensure balance with the
IEMF, from which MONUC had to take over. Since such a mandate could not be geographically limited to the Ituri district, MONUC as a whole was finally made a Chapter VII operation.

In order to facilitate its new mandate, role and vision, MONUC developed core programmes focusing on peace and security, aimed at ending violence, facilitating the transition, leading eventually to free and fair elections and the functioning of the transitional government and support for the establishment of the rule of law and human rights, including the development of stable government institutions. The provisions of the ‘Final Act’ of 2 April 2003, and the subsequent adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1493, required a revision by MONUC of its Concept of Operations. This new concept was announced during July 2003, with the principal aim of providing support to the Transitional Government.

The new mandate has introduced a tangible change in mindset and led the UN Mission members to re-interpret their role and rules of engagement in a more proactive manner.

Since the beginning, the DDRRR process was designed on the key, but wrong, assumption that foreign armed groups would agree to disarm and demobilise voluntarily. While this assumption has hardly been confirmed, MONUC sticks to the voluntary-based process for three main reasons. First, the only alternative option, forcible disarmament, was discarded for being too risky, too costly and no less unrealistic given the absence of troop contributors for such a mission (Rogier 2003:263).

The UN also played a crucial role in the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT), which provided pivotal support in the installation of the Transitional Government. The first meeting of the Committee was convened in April 2003. On 17 April the Committee met with President Joseph Kabila’s
Follow-up Commission, with a view of establishing closer relations (Annan 2003c:3). The U.N. also played a pivotal role in addressing the crisis in Ituri, following attacks by the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), which led to mass-killings and destruction in the region. In March 2003 Ugandan forces recaptured the town of Bunia. This led to rising tensions between Rwanda and Uganda over the increased presence of Ugandan troops in the region. The Special Representative of the U.N. proposed convening a trilateral meeting of the heads of State of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. In an effort to broker a ceasefire on the ground, and establish a local political process by which the conflict could be addressed peacefully, MONUC also intensified its consultations with key players early in March. This led to the signing on 18 March, of a ceasefire agreement by the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda and six armed groups (except for UPC, which had lost virtually all of its territorial control), which paved the way for convening the much-awaited Ituri Pacification Commission (Annan 2003c).

5.6.2 Pretoria-From Peacemaker to Peacekeeper

South Africa played an undeniably instrumental role in the peace process in the DRC. This was a role Pretoria was committed to maintain and see through until the advent of peace in the Great Lakes Region. South Africa also placed a high premium on the optimal use of diplomatic instruments as a means to pre-empt and prevent conflict in the region and continent.

The South African government was also actively involved in lobbying for the creation of a viable UN peacekeeping presence in the embattled country. This was partially instrumental in securing the creation and deployment of MONUC, to which President Mbeki committed South Africa to playing an active role. In April 2001 South Africa deployed the first contingent of military support staff to augment MONUC’s forces (Koko 2007:43). In May 2003 President Mbeki had also made an impassioned plea to Kofi Annan to authorize MONUC to act more
aggressively in defending civilians. President Mbeki, in his capacity as Chairman of the African Union (AU) appealed to Annan that UN troops should be given a mandate to open fire on militia attacking civilians in renewed ethnic clashes in Bunia, (Ituri) in eastern Congo (Swart and Solomon 2004:37). As highlighted earlier the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF). On 1 September 2003, MONUC took over from the French-led mission after the UN Security Council had finally agreed on 28 July 2003, to strengthen MONUC by providing the mission a Chapter VII mandate.

In September 2003 the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan convened a high-level meeting of heads of State and senior representatives of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, as well as South Africa, Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania, where a declaration of Principles on Good-neighbourly Relations and Cooperation was adopted. The declaration included a commitment towards respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the respective states (Annan 2003d:7).

In many respects the entire Inter-Congolese Dialogue (and possibly the entire peace process) reflected nothing more than the conclusion of peace by elites-who ultimately had the greatest losses to incur if side-lined. In this respect Rogier (2006:111) contends that even if an ‘elite pact’ was necessary to end the war, it had not been sufficient to build peace.

Despite these major strides, the presence of Rwandan combatants in the eastern DRC remained a major challenge to MONUC. These persistent outbreaks of fighting in the eastern DRC have continued to hamper, disrupt and delay the operations of MONUC to disarm, demobilize and repatriate foreign ex-combatants- the main and critical focus of the mission to date.
Key issues for the reconstruction of the DRC were not adequately (if at all) addressed during the whole process. According to Rogier (2006:111) the ICD can be considered a failure in spite of the signing of the ‘global and all-inclusive’ agreement. Not only was this peace deal (and the subsequent memoranda) negotiated largely outside the framework of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, but the nature and shortcomings of the Pretoria II agreement indicated, that, far from laying the foundations of a new Congo, the ICD was reduced to a bargaining forum between warlords and predatory leaders.

Responsibility for the failure of the dialogue was partially blamed on the forces vives and the unarmed opposition. The ICD was also not purely Congolese either. Neighbouring countries played a major role in the Congo war and continued to exert their influence during the dialogue process through their proxies. Due to support by Rwanda and Uganda, many armed groups formed part of the negotiating process (while crucial, this led to the exacerbation of tensions, as many of the armed groups continued the conflict against the backdrop of the peace process). Therefore negotiations cannot realistically succeed against the background of continued fighting. In particular hostilities continued in eastern Congo and points to an important aspect applicable to any peace agreement, irrespective of the circumstances surrounding a conflict situation- a ceasefire agreement should not only be signed but strictly enforced.

The lessons learnt from the initial difficulties in containing the further outbreak of violence in the DRC, subsequently led to a reassessment of the U.N.’s approach in preventing the further outbreak of conflict in the DRC, which also subsequently contributed to the adaptation of the mandate of MONUC.
5.6.3 The role of MONUC during the Transition Phase: From Observer to Enforcer

During this period the Secretary-General also laid emphasis on the importance of ensuring that the Transitional Government fulfil its mandate and that all Congolese parties must from the outset provide strong and clear signals of their intention to implement the agreements they signed, including the immediate cessation of hostilities, including cessation of inflammatory rhetoric and propaganda (Annan 2003c:9). The adoption of Security Council resolution 1468 (2003) endorsed the preliminary vision of the role of MONUC during the transition phase.

Subject to the concurrence of the Security Council, the Mission’s currently mandated priorities would be readjusted, and would consist of the following elements: (a) to provide political support to the transition by assisting the Congolese parties in the implementation of their commitments, leading to the holding of elections, which will be one of the important elements in the Mission’s exit strategy; (b) to contribute to local conflict resolution and the maintenance of security in key areas of the country; (c) to continue with its mandated task of the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of foreign armed groups while contributing to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Congolese combatants; (d) to serve as a catalyst for the coordination of international political and donor efforts concerning the core issues of the transition; and (e) to contribute to confidence-building between the DRC and the neighbouring States (Annan 2003c:9).

The Secretary-General acknowledged the importance of addressing the conflict in the Kivus, which included an overall assessment of the role and presence of the U.N. and MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Even in the face of numerous and competing priorities in the DRC, the importance of the Kivus cannot be overlooked. Two recent wars in the country began there, and the
region remains a pivotal component of the overall peace process (Annan 2003c:15).

There is a clear need to address the structural causes and trigger factors of existing conflicts, and to contain new ones. The international community can play a vital supporting role in creating peaceful solutions to local conflicts. To this end, MONUC has already produced policy guidelines for its personnel based on the following approach: (a) crisis management to address acute security concerns between different groups; (b) post-conflict measures aimed at building confidence; and (c) conflict prevention initiatives to avoid the recurrence of violence (Annan 2003c:16).

The U.N. sustained its support of the transition process, convening a meeting in February 2004 between the Transitional Government and a number of member states to review the status of security sector reform and to reach a common understanding on the key issues that needed to be addressed urgently to meet the timetable of the transition. This included the need for the Transitional Government to develop a comprehensive national security policy (Annan 2004a:5). During this period mounting tensions in Bukavu in February 2004 posed yet another challenge to MONUC. This also led to accusations by ministers close to the President and the Mayi-Mayi component of the Transitional Government against the RCD-G, accusing it of “preparing a third rebellion” in the Kivus. Hard-line elements opposed to the transition, fomented a campaign claiming that MONUC had not acted in an impartial manner. Extremist propaganda, including pamphlets containing hate messages against MONUC and calling upon the population to attack its personnel, were also circulated (Annan 2004b).

Following protracted mediation, on 22 September 2004, the Foreign Ministers of the DRC and Rwanda signed the terms of reference for the Joint Verification Mechanism, which provides a framework for the parties to address jointly cross-
border issues of mutual concern, including the remaining ex- FAR/Interahamwe in the country.

Separately, on 26 October 2004, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda signed an agreement brokered by the Government of the United States of America on regional security, with a view to strengthening trilateral relations and enhancing efforts to prevent the use of their territories by foreign combatants. Under the agreement, the parties recommitted themselves to ensuring the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of foreign armed groups within 12 months of the date of its signature and established a Tripartite Joint Commission.

On 19 and 20 November 2004, the first summit of heads of State and Government of the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region took place in Dar-es-Salaam. The leaders of 11 African States, including the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, declared their collective determination to create sustainable peace and security for the States and people of the Great Lakes Region. Towards this end, guiding principles were established in the areas of peace and security; democracy and good governance; economic development and regional integration; and humanitarian and social issues (Annan 2004c:3). This culminated in the signing of the of the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region on 20 November 2004.

Despite these lofty commitments the U.N. had a difficult task of diffusing tensions when security along the border with Rwanda in both Kivus seriously deteriorated in November/December 2004. Rwanda accused the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) of launching attacks on Rwanda, while the DRC accused the Rwandan government of the presence of Rwandan troops on Congolese soil. The situation was exacerbated with a massive build-up of Rwandan troops on Rwanda’s border with the DRC. Lingering tensions, that
have repeatedly threatened to extend into all-out violence and bloodshed has repeatedly challenged MONUC’s ability to keep the peace.

The overall goal of MONUC in the DRC has been the holding of credible elections followed by a stable and sustainable peace. The deployment of the MONUC mission in the DRC provides ample evidence for the utility of preventive diplomacy in concert with other means of attempting to resolve conflict as it progresses through its various stages in the conflict cycle.

The major omission with the deployment of peacekeeping forces is that in most instances, deployment is only undertaken when violence has already exacted an unacceptably high toll, which makes it increasingly difficult to address a conflict situation. In the case of the MONUC deployment (as the events in Bunia transpired) the U.N. was forced to re-evaluate its objectives and had to adapt the mandate of the mission. MONUC was entrusted with very little effective conflict prevention capabilities, which rendered it paralyzed to effectively prevent the outbreak of further violence.

The outbreak of violence in Bunia and the fact that the U.N. had to deploy an emergency force to restore order also strengthens the argument for extending preventive diplomacy beyond the narrow confines of unstable peace and calls forth the need to expand the application of preventive diplomacy across the entire spectrum of conflict. As witnessed during the various diplomatic initiatives initiated by various key figures in the U.N., preventive diplomacy can be applied during and after the outbreak of hostilities and should not be discarded, as it forms a critical foundation upon which to achieve the return to a situation of durable peace.
5.7 The Response of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and African Union (AU) to the conflict in the DRC

The OAU was called upon to adopt a more proactive role in responding to and preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts in Africa. The response by the continental body to the impending crisis in the DRC revealed the major weaknesses and inability to respond to and preventing violent conflicts in this regard. The OAU also acknowledged its inability to successfully constitute a viable peacekeeping force to be deployed to the DRC. In this context the OAU was seen as adopting a reactive stance towards conflict on the continent and could therefore not play a significant role in conflict prevention efforts when the second rebellion in the DRC broke out (Van Nieuwkerk 2004:44). The limitations of the OAU were ascribed to the organisation’s strict adherence to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Furthermore despite the creation of a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution in 1993, member states lacked both the political will and respect for the functioning of this crucial mechanism.

Upon the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999, the OAU, in concert with the Parties, established the Joint Military Committee (JMC) to ensure compliance with the Ceasefire. The JMC played a decisive role in that regard, prior to the deployment of MONUC.

One of the core and salient mechanisms that were introduced upon the establishment of the African Union was the AU Peace and Security Council in 2002, which succeed the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution adopted in 1993. The establishment of this new body was a clear sign that the AU was ready to adopt a more proactive approach towards responding to and preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts on the continent. Despite the advent of this much vaunted organ, the AU has not been able to play a meaningful peacemaking or peacekeeping role in the conflict in the DRC (Van
Nieuwkerk 2004:53). From the outset of hostilities the AU played a role more akin to that of an observer to the peace initiatives in the DRC and in many instances was overshadowed by regional leaders and the SADC. The AU also was seen as merely echoing statements and positions that was adopted by the UN to the conflict situation and adopted a more symbolic role as opposed to playing any tangible role in the actual negotiation and mediation process (Carayannis and Weiss 2003: 292).

As member of the International Committee in Support of the Transition and of the Technical Committee established by the International Community to support the electoral process, the African Union actively supported the transition process, alongside the United Nations, the European Union, representatives of the Permanent Members of the Security Council based in Kinshasa and other African and foreign partners of the peace process. Through a Special Representative in the DRC, the AU participated in all the CIAT and Technical Committee meetings (African Union 2004a:6).

In December 2004 the 21st Meeting of the Peace and Security Council issued a communiqué expressing its concern at renewed tensions in the eastern DRC and expressed its concern at the continued presence of the ex- FAR/Interahamwe in the DRC, which constitutes a security problem for Rwanda, and urged Rwanda to refrain from any unilateral action (AU Peace and Security Council 2004:1). The communiqué also requested that a summit be convened at the utmost urgency bringing together the Heads of State of Rwanda and the DRC, in the presence of the African Union, United Nations and other stakeholders with the objective of defusing tensions and to consider ways and means to effectively address the issue of the disarmament and demobilization of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe.

In this respect the AU Peace and Security Council appeared to have faltered in providing an effective response to defuse tensions between Rwanda and the DRC.
The Rwandan threat of military intervention in the DRC provoked a strong reaction from the Congolese authorities. On 29 November 2004, President Joseph Kabila summoned the Ambassadors of permanent member countries of the United Nations Security Council to draw their attention to the seriousness of the situation and inform the latter of his Government’s intention to dispatch 10,000 soldiers to the East of the country, bordering Rwanda, to reinforce the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) already deployed in the region. On 2 December 2004, he placed the FARDC on the alert and declared that his country would defend itself (AU Peace and Security Council 2005:4).

On 7 December 2004, the UN Security Council adopted a presidential statement whereby it:

“Expressed its grave concern over the many reports referring to military operations by the Rwandan army in the East of the DRC and the threats of the Rwandan Government in this regard; Demanded that the Rwandan Government immediately withdraw all the forces it may have on the territory of the DRC and called on all States in the region to refrain from any action or declaration which could violate international law, threaten the already fragile stability of the region, or the transition process backed by the international community; Recognized that the presence of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe is still a source of instability in the region, a threat to the civilian populations and an obstacle to relations of good neighbourliness between the DRC and Rwanda.” (AU Peace and Security Council 2005:7). Tensions were ultimately successfully diffused.

The AU Peace and Security Council report focused attention on the underlying tensions that led to the difficult relationship between Rwanda and the DRC in the first place. The grievances of Rwanda against the DRC focused essentially on the presence in the Kivus of armed Rwandan groups that left Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. The threat they posed to the security of Rwanda and the feeling
that they are backed by the Congolese authorities were regularly put forward to justify the armed Rwandan interventions and/or threats of intervention in The Congo (AU Peace and Security Council 2005:8).

The AU Peace and Security Council report was also one of the very few reports issued that paid particular attention to the pervasive influence of these underlying tensions and negative conflict attitudes as a source of potential future conflict:

“Equally, sustained efforts should be made to build trust between the DRC and Rwanda, for without trust, the instability prevailing in the region will only be exacerbated with the attendant risks for the ongoing process in the DRC. In this regard, there is an imperative need to resolutely tackle the problem of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and other negative forces whose presence in the DRC endangers the security of this country and that of neighbouring countries.” (AU Peace and Security Council 2005:12).

The AU Peace and Security Council also placed a high premium on the successful outcomes of the Declaration on Peace, Security and Democracy in the Great Lakes:

“The process of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region initiated by OAU/AU and the United Nations, and conducted under their auspices with the support of the international community is about to climax into a number of conclusions crucial to the countries of the region. On 20 November 2004, the Heads of State and Government of the 11 Member States of the process, at their first summit, signed the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region. In that Declaration, the Heads of State made a commitment to, among other things, work resiliently together to build a stable, safe and developed region while strictly complying with the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. After Dar-Es-Salaam, the process will, with the adoption of a
Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the region, culminate in the second Summit, which will take place in Nairobi, Kenya, in November 2006. This document, which will bring together the 11 member countries of the process, is the outcome of lengthy negotiations between the parties during which the stakeholders progressively improved their relations.” (AU Peace and Security Council 2006:9).

5.8 Conclusion: From Theory to Praxis-Extending the role of Preventive Diplomacy

Peace implementation, or the process by which warring parties implement and comply with their written commitments to peace, is often the most difficult phase in the resolution of armed conflicts. Operating in unstable, volatile, risky and politicized post-war situations is not easy, especially if conflict continues and it is not surprising that it is at the level of implementation of new policy approaches to post-war situations that international assistance most frequently fails.

The interventions undertaken by international organizations and the international community reflected the importance of expanding the role of preventive diplomacy beyond the rigid framework suggested by Lund. In the case of the DRC it has called for the implementation of preventive diplomacy in a sustained and continuous manner in order to avert the exacerbation of conflict situations. Therefore the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the Final Act did not herald the immediate cessation of combat and hostilities and therefore provided the belligerents with ample opportunity to continue conflict in defiance of the peace process. Clearly therefore preventive diplomacy should not cease “at the water’s edge”. Therefore the viability of preventive diplomacy acting at several, not one juncture in the conflict cycle should be explored.

Propitious conditions were therefore present in the DRC to extend and to augment the role of preventive diplomacy, through contextualizing this approach
to the specific circumstances that led to conflict in the first instance; by furthermore elaborating preventive diplomacy’s basic objective-forestalling and reducing violence at different stages of the crisis as it began to unfold, as opposed to merely focusing on one specific stage-unstable peace.

The key to preventive diplomacy is the timing of its activation in relation to evolving conditions in a given place on the ground. It is therefore crucial to consider the timing of the intervention vis-à-vis the stage of armed conflict. Operations are classified according to whether they are deployed before hostilities occur (such as some forms of preventive deployment), during low-intensity conflict, during full-scale war, or following armed conflict.

In terms of conflict prevention a litany of missed opportunities often present solid evidence that timely diplomatic interventions at several key junctures might have significantly reduced, defused and contained the violence in the DRC. While most of the responses by the UN, the EU and other international role players stressed the need for vigorous conflict prevention efforts, this proved elusive in practice. The crucial aspect therefore in assessing any conflict situation relates to precision timing (if and when possible) for launching an intervention.

A mainly African-driven process placed great pressure on the belligerents, which culminated in the signing of a ceasefire agreement by the Heads of State of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the Minister of Defence of Angola on 10 July 1999.

The OAU was called upon to adopt a more proactive role in responding to and preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts in Africa. Within the framework of the mandate of preventive diplomacy, the OAU attempted to operationalize the concept, while dealing with potential or incipient and full-blown conflicts. The response by the continental body to the unfolding crisis in the DRC revealed the major weaknesses and inability to respond to and preventing violent conflicts in
this regard. The OAU also acknowledged its inability to successfully constitute a viable peacekeeping force to be deployed to the DRC. In contrast, South Africa, assuming the chairmanship of the newly constituted African Union, partially succeeded in placing the crisis in the DRC back on the international agenda. South Africa has projected itself as a regional powerbroker and had received wide-spread support from Western donor governments to sustain its commitment (Mans 2003:215).

Lund asserts that preventive action can also be taken too early. Conflict at their early stages must contain certain ingredients before violence becomes possible. At a minimum they require discrete parties who are conscious of possessing common interests, which they perceive at risk because of the actions of other parties, particular disputes over issues that reflect this clash of interests and assertive statements or activity by the parties to realize their interests. Preventive action is best launched at points where there already exists sufficient interest and motivation on the part of the disputants to seek a peaceful resolution, yet not so early that the disputants are incited to intensify their confrontation. Early action is vital if violence is to be pre-empted and the disputants are not to entrench themselves in rigid positions from which it is difficult to withdraw (Lund 1996:135).

The partial failure of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue meeting at Sun City, South Africa, from 25 February to 19 April, had thrown the Congolese peace process into dangerous confusion. The limited agreement for a transition government, struck between Joseph Kabila’s government and Jean-Pierre Bemba’s *Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo*, backed by the majority of delegates from unarmed political opposition groups and civil society, and approved by Angola, Uganda and Zimbabwe did not in itself offer any real solutions to the Congo’s problems.
The notion of a conflict cycle suggests that while the level of violence is low (a condition that may occur at the beginning and at the end of a conflict cycle), there are greater opportunities for a variety of mediators to engage both the parties and the larger society in a wide range of activities. These conditions, however, present fewer opportunities for a real movement toward settlement on disputed issues. As one approaches higher levels of violence, the opportunities for mediators to engage the parties may diminish, but the likelihood of mediation success, that is, helping the parties to negotiate an agreement, may well increase as the conflict reaches a plateau or what Zartman calls a hurting stalemate (Crocker et al 1999:27). Lund’s theoretical framework identifies where preventive diplomacy would be most effectively applied, yet fails to distinguish between the varying nature of the level of violence and the potential barriers to entry as outlined in the table by Crocker et al (1999:28). This model clearly identifies the level of violence, the number of potential entry points, the potential barriers to entry and the opportunity to exercise procedural control. It is clear that as the level of violence rises, the number of potential entry points in a conflict situation declines as perceptions and attitudes are hardening. The barriers to entry are increasing as parties perceive increasing risks of negotiation, coupled with status and legitimacy concerns. As a situation of high levels of violence transpires, the number of potential entry points into a conflict situation is even less, as “we-they” images of the enemy have hardened. Furthermore the barriers to entry are high as parties are locked into a continuing struggle. Therefore although a peace agreement has been formally signed, the underlying issues that led to conflict in the first place, as well as the accompanying tensions and suspicions and deeply-entrenched hatreds and enmity amongst parties may persist.

Although both realist approaches to conflict management as discussed earlier are based on a model of conflict-the security dilemma-that is, in essence, psychological, the means and methods that both types of realists identify to manage conflict and restore political order are not (Osler Hampson 2001:395).
Therefore none of the aforementioned approaches address the issue of dealing with the psychological origins of conflict and the “embedded enemy images” which are a serious obstacle to managing conflict and reducing tensions. Practitioners arguing for a greater consideration of psychological aspects argue that peace-building is about changing attitudes and that attitudinal change requires a change in the procedures, roles and structures of the disputing parties, including the development of institutional capacity at the local or communal level for dealing with conflict (Osler Hampson 2001:396). Attitudinal change can be fostered through special problem-solving workshops and/or third-party assistance in developing and designing other kinds of dispute resolution systems that are compatible with local culture and norms and are directed at elites at different levels (top, middle range, and grassroots) in society. The problem-solving workshop, pioneered by John Burton and Herbert Kelman, is based on the assumption that conflict is a subjective, phenomenological, and social process. It takes issue with the ripeness thesis about hurting stalemates on the grounds that, because conflict is essentially a matter of perceptions, third-parties have to work on changing the perceptions, attitudes, values, and behaviours of the parties to a conflict. Ripeness, in other words, does not emerge automatically. It has to be cultivated with the assistance of third parties who help the parties to a conflict reach a better understanding of the dimensions of the conflict and the joint strategies required for a mutually acceptable solution (Osler Hampson 2001:396). The problem-solving workshop attempts to change the process of interaction among conflicting parties. Problem solving seeks to open channels of communication between the parties, allowing both sides to see their respective intentions more clearly and to be more aware of their own reactions to the conflict.

Empirically wars often do not end when peace accords are signed. In fact, the process of ending conflict in a negotiated settlement often continues long after agreements are signed (Walter 2006:206). Therefore conflict prevention, notably
preventive diplomacy should also not cease, especially if a conflict continues in defiance of peace.

For the most part, the results achieved during the 45 days of negotiations during the Inter-Congolese Dialogues were technical resolutions assessing the requirements for international aid and reconciliation. All of the commissions postponed discussions of the politically sensitive questions, and left them to be dealt with by future transitional bodies (and therefore much of the critical and underlying root causes of the conflict were left unaddressed, and in many instances exacerbated tensions, despite the signing of key agreements).

According to Leatherman et al (1999:98) it is necessary to extend preventive actions along the entire spectrum of conflict, from latent tensions through the culmination and resolution of conflict to post-conflict peace building. According to this approach preventive diplomacy is contextualized and its basic objective, the forestalling and reduction of violence, is elaborated in different stages of the conflict as opposed to merely focusing on one specific stage- unstable peace as suggested by the theoretical framework of Lund.

As alluded to earlier preventive diplomacy initiatives when taken alone and independently of a broader strategy of conflict prevention are likely to fail unless they are linked to measures and actions that tackle the deeper, or structural causes of conflict. This important caveat is also applicable to peace support operations that are deployed without taking cognizance of this critical fact.

The greatest obstacle to the success of MONUC in the first three years of its deployment was not the inadequate mandate given to the mission by the UN Security Council or the council’s evident lack of political will, but the warring parties’ own violations of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and their repeated obstruction of the UN peacekeeping mission.
The 1,400-strong IEMF, deployed under the auspices of the European Union (but composed mainly of French combat soldiers) was a remarkably positive experiment in terms of efficient co-operation between the UN and a regional organisation. EU policy in the field of conflict prevention deviates from the linear approach to violent conflict, which suggests that only efforts to forestall the outbreak of violence and thus keeping the conflict latent are regarded as prevention. In situations where preventive measures have either failed or where they have not been applied in the first place, there is a need to resort to short-term actions with the three-fold objective of, reducing manifest tensions and/or preventing the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict, preventing the vertical (intensifying of violence) or horizontal (territorial) escalation of existing violent conflict and ending violent conflict.

In many respects the entire Inter-Congolese Dialogue (and possibly the entire peace process) reflected nothing more than the conclusion of peace by elites-who ultimately had the greatest losses to incur if side-lined. In this respect Rogier (2006:111) contends that even if an ‘elite pact’ was necessary to end the war, it had not been sufficient to build peace.

Despite achieving major strides in the signing of crucial peace agreements, the presence of Rwandan combatants in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo remained a major challenge to MONUC. These persistent outbreaks of fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have continued to hamper, disrupt and delay the operations of MONUC to disarm, demobilize and repatriate foreign ex-combatants, the main focus of the mission to date.

In addressing the multifarious dimensions and dynamics of conflict the tools utilized by preventive diplomacy should consist of a mix of both proximate and structural prevention measures in order to effectively address conflict-as it emerges, when hostilities break out, after hostilities have subsided, but tensions threaten to cause the outbreak of further violence and during post-conflict peace
building to avert the emergence of further and new conflict situations. In this respect preventive diplomacy should also consist of a cyclical response to conflict situations and should be applied during the whole life cycle of a conflict situation as it develops. It should therefore not be limited to a specific role, but should be adapted to play a supporting role in parallel to other conflict prevention measures. The critical components in this respect would be preventive peacemaking and preventive deployment, preventive peace-building and preventive disarmament. These measures could be augmented with the development of pre-emptive conflict prevention- by adopting a sustained process of pre-emptive diplomacy that could be implemented on a sustained basis in countries that have witnessed recent devastating conflict in order to avoid the breakdown of peace and governance processes that have been adopted and are being implemented to ameliorate post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

The key phases of preventive diplomacy should therefore include: conflict prevention that entails preventing violent disputes from arising between parties either by structural, institutional, economic, or cultural remedies at the level of unstable peace as developed by Michael Lund’s theoretical framework, secondly and most importantly preventive diplomacy could continue to play a role during escalation prevention, (at the level of crisis and war in order to compliment efforts undertaken during crisis diplomacy[crisis management], peacekeeping [conflict termination], peacemaking[conflict management] and peace enforcement[conflict,mitigation]), which entails preventing both the vertical and horizontal escalation of hostilities to more destructive means of warfare and to involve additional actors and thirdly post-conflict prevention entailing the prevention of the re-emergence of disputes by reintegrating and reconstructing the war-torn society, which includes playing a role in peacetime diplomacy and post-conflict peace building and sustained consultations and efforts aimed at the resolution of the first signs of emerging conflict and the exacerbation of tensions that could play a contributing factor to new conflict situations.
The omission of social-psychological approaches towards understanding the root causes of the conflict in the DRC contributed partially to critical failures in effectively responding to and preventing further incidents of violent conflict. The underlying needs that governed each party’s perception of the conflict were particularly problematic to securing a workable and sustainable peace process from the outset. None of the approaches adopted considered the potential psychological impact and barriers to securing a viable peace, notably the presence of the deeply entrenched enmity and distrust that prevailed, particularly between the disparate adversaries Rwanda and the DRC.

The presence of several thousand armed foreign combatants in the DRC lies at the heart of the conflict in the Great Lakes region. Unless and until this problem is resolved, lasting peace cannot be restored. The presence of foreign armed groups is not only damaging to internal security, but also represents a standing obstacle to the improvement and normalisation of relations between the DRC and its neighbours.
CHAPTER 6
Evaluation and Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

This chapter will commence with a brief and final consideration of the theoretical framework as presented by Michael Lund and will be evaluated against the backdrop of continuing violence in the DRC in order to establish whether a viable role for preventive diplomacy can be identified beyond the level of unstable peace.

This chapter will conclude an assessment of the role of preventive diplomacy in African conflicts. The aim and objective of this study has been to examine the role, relevance and success and potential shortcomings of preventive diplomacy in responding to and preventing violent and protracted conflicts in Africa, in particular recent international efforts to seek a concrete, comprehensive and all-inclusive peace settlement in the DRC.

The study aimed to provide extensive answers to tentative research undertaken based on the following research problem questions: Has preventive diplomacy been successful in resolving conflicts in Africa? Has greater emphasis been placed on operational prevention, to the detriment of structural prevention of conflict? Was preventive diplomacy applied in a timely, coherent and decisive manner to resolve the conflict in the DRC? Were the peace initiatives and efforts undertaken to end the conflict in the DRC sufficient and effective to address a conflict of such a protracted, violent and complex nature? Should preventive diplomacy not have been applied throughout the entire conflict in a more sustained and concerted manner?

The concluding arguments will support the original assertion that was made at the start of this study that preventive diplomacy has not been successfully
applied in resolving conflicts in Africa, and will continue to fail, unless greater emphasis is placed on structural prevention. Preventive diplomacy initiatives when taken alone and independently of a broader strategy of conflict prevention are likely to fail unless they are linked to measures and actions that tackle the deeper or structural causes of conflict.

In terms of conflict prevention a litany of missed opportunities often present solid evidence that timely diplomatic interventions at several key junctures might have significantly reduced, defused and contained the violence in the DRC. While most of the responses by the UN, the EU and other international role players stressed the need for vigorous conflict prevention efforts, this proved elusive in practice. The crucial aspect therefore in assessing any conflict situation relates to when intervention should be considered-related to the actual operational aspects of preventive diplomacy in practice.

Preventive action is best launched at points where there already exists sufficient interest and motivation on the part of the disputants to seek a peaceful resolution, yet not so early that the disputants are incited to intensify their confrontation. Early action is vital if violence is to be pre-empted and the disputants are not to entrench themselves in rigid positions from which it is difficult to withdraw (Lund 1996:135). In the context of Lund’s theoretical framework it is necessary to reassess the role of preventive diplomacy in the DRC.

The underlying philosophy of preventive diplomacy, however, is that it is preferable to prevent incipient disputes or latent conflicts rather than to have to undertake major politico-military peace operations to resolve and terminate manifest conflict (du Plessis 2003:36). Preventive diplomacy continues to suffer from a conceptual ambiguity that detracts from its analytical value and operational utility as a preventive measure of disputes and conflict. Its eventual utility and use is dependent on its location within the broader context of the
development of conflict and matched responses in the form of peace-orientated strategies. In ideal type terms it is primarily, but not exclusively, a strategic instrument for maintaining an unstable peace during the onset and nascent escalation phase of a crisis, where latent conflict is evident, through conflict prevention by means of diplomatic means (du Plessis 2003:37). In this context it is therefore critical to assess whether preventive diplomacy had in fact played a constructive role in the conflict in the DRC.

6.2 Was Preventive Diplomacy Applied in a Timely, Coherent and Decisive Manner to Resolve the Conflict in the DRC?

The peace process through which the transition in the DRC was achieved was fundamentally flawed- from its inception, the drafting of the various peace agreements and the negotiations that ultimately led to the signing of the Final Act in 2003. Most importantly this painstaking process has not translated into heralding the creation of sustainable or positive peace either.

The DRC could be cited as a significant example of a conflict that has not conformed to the linear understanding of the life cycle of conflict and the means to respond to conflict situations. The various interventions undertaken during the peace process and the transition phase have had relatively little or negative impact on moving the conflict from a situation of unstable peace towards durable and warm peace. Preventive diplomacy in the DRC has always therefore led a marginal life as a feasible alternative to reactive and, therefore, ad hoc peacemaking (Mans 2003:212). The relative lack of expertise of the local circumstances not only blocked prevention from taking place, but also neglected emerging opportunities for preventive diplomacy within peacemaking and resulted in a poor prognosis on actions undertaken. Preventive diplomacy in reality was not applied in the DRC at all as there was relative inaction to avoid both the first and the second rebellion and the subsequent conflicts that erupted as a result thereof.
Furthermore there was no genuine diplomatic realisation of the complexities of the war and therefore no peace initiatives were borne off the main track of the conflict (Mans 2003:213). Peace initiatives in the DRC had consistently been behind reality and proved incapable of addressing the conflict at the right time. Diplomatic efforts had not managed to end the second rebellion- considered as the core of virtually all subsequent clashes that had been witnessed. The conflict in the DRC could only realistically qualify for conflict prevention in theory. The greatest value of the conflict in the DRC however is to be found in the important lessons to be drawn out of the failure to develop, vigorously implement, and see through a comprehensive strategy of preventive diplomacy to end violent conflict.

While all conflict settlements require the mutual agreement of both sides, in some instances that agreement arises out of duress or is compelled on one side by the other. As a result, either the settlement does not directly address the political issues in dispute or the settlement decides these issues at the expense of the weaker side. While such agreements may settle the conflict, they are unlikely to resolve it as they have not eliminated, and in fact may have exacerbated, the underlying issues in dispute (Miall 1992). Since grievances remain, such exploitative or incomplete agreements provide a permissive condition for the resumption of hostilities (Werner 2006:299).

It is often the nature of the experiences gained by the rivals in relation to one another, rather than the duration of rivalry per se, that influences the prospects for mediation success (Greig 2006:265). Rivalry policies are not easy to change either. In general, conflict tends to beget conflict. Repeated conflicts between rivals, particularly those that involve significant numbers of fatalities, are likely to engender considerable hostility toward the adversary among the general population. In the DRC this appeared to be the make-or-break factor that ultimately influenced and severely undermined the peace process.
Subsequent wars and conflicts have led to the emergence of what has become known as the security dilemma, a situation in which the actions taken by each state to increase its own security had the effect of simultaneously decreasing the security of its neighbours. Faced with what is perceived (either correctly or incorrectly) to be a threatening international security environment, national leaders take action they perceive to be defensive ones to protect themselves from these external threats. Knowing that their own motivations are peaceful, these leaders tend to make the assumption that their true (peaceful) intentions are equally clear to all of their neighbours. As a result policymakers, pursuing what they believe to be purely defensive military build-ups often fail to understand how their actions are likely to be perceived (or misperceived) by neighbouring states (Cottam et al 2004:260).

6.3 An Endless Cycle of Conflict: Tensions and Conflict between Rwanda and the DRC

Negotiations have a tendency to give advantages to elites and, if peace agreements ‘do not effectively touch upon the underlying issues in the conflict, such [agreements] do not last’ (Wallensteen 2007:37).

The continued presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 8,000 to 10,000 Hutu rebels with links to the 1994 genocide in their home country, Rwanda, is a key source of regional instability and continues to undermine the peace process. Though too weak to imperil Rwanda’s government, and though many of its members are not themselves génocidaires, the FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda) gives Kigali justification for continued interference in the Congo and threats to invade (International Crisis Group 2005:2).

The tense and confrontational nature of the relationship between RCD-Goma, the DRC government and Rwanda, which persisted despite the conclusion of the peace process, revealed particular aspects related to the negative influence
conflict attitudes can exert on a conflict situation. The crisis provoked by the struggle in late May and early June 2004 for control of Bukavu, the capital of the DRC’s strategically sensitive South Kivu province that borders Rwanda, served as a stark reminder that the political transition agreed in May 2003 was not synonymous with peace. Instead, it should be seen as another phase of the war that began in 1998, cost the lives of millions, and has never been conclusively ended (International Crisis Group 2004:1). In this context tensions escalated in July 2004, akin to the outbreak of the ‘Second Rebellion’ as more than 20,000 DRC troops were gathering on the eastern border with Rwanda, accusing Kigali of actively backing renegade soldiers who occupied Bukavu, while President Kagame, vehemently denying the accusations, accused Kabila of preparing an attack and an invasion (Woodside 2004:5). Only major diplomatic manoeuvring by the international community ultimately defused tensions and prevented yet another potentially catastrophic conflict. The Bukavu crisis had dramatically shown that preventive diplomacy still had a constructive role to play and that peace building in North and South Kivu remains an urgent priority. To a large extent, the intertwined and complex conflicts that are still brewing in these eastern provinces continue to be riddled with ethnic antagonisms and communal rivalry over access to land and mineral resources. The levels of violence in the Kivus remain alarmingly high and could undermine the construction of sustainable peace in the DRC and the entire Great Lakes region.

The DRC’s improved relations with other countries in the region, in particular Rwanda, have been crucial in preventing further conflict. Rwanda sponsored both the 1996 and 1998 wars; its influence was still evident after the peace deal, and it backed the RCD dissidents’ insurgency in 2004. Its RCD allies were sure to lose most of their power at elections, and Kigali worried that it would no longer have a proxy to protect its interests (International Crisis Group 2007:5).

Tensions between the two countries remain high. While peace in a nominal sense does exist, a resumption of hostilities remains a real possibility. Only a comprehensive understanding of Rwanda’s long-term security interests and
foreign policy goals vis-à-vis the DRC can offer insight into prospects for a definitive peace (Curtis 2005).

The presence of the FDLR has been at the heart of the problem between Rwanda and the DRC for the last 13 years. Efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement between the FDLR and the Rwandan government have been repeatedly thwarted and intransigence by the Rwandan government has repeatedly ruled out FDLR demands for national political dialogue. The continued presence of FDLR rebels in the eastern DRC provides Rwanda with a continued pretext to militarily intervene in the region.

A key bargain that remained unfulfilled was the definitive Rwandan withdrawal in exchange for disarming of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the insurgent force with strong links to the génocidaires of 1994 and provided the strongest justification to Kigali for renewed conflict. Consequently Rwanda focused its attention to the Hutu insurgent threat as the primary rationale for possible further military action in the DRC.

Rwanda’s reckless decision to escalate tensions followed almost immediately after the summit pledge of the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region that was held from 19-20 November 2004 and attended by eleven regional leaders, including President Paul Kagame. The pledge called on all parties to “fully support the national peace processes in the region and refrain from any acts, statements or attitudes likely to negatively impact them” (International Crisis Group 2004b:1). On 30 November President Kagame declared that the failure of the UN and other countries to disarm the FDLR would force Rwanda to re-enter the Congo. These and other statements were made to convince would-be detractors of Rwanda’s inherent right to intervene in the Congo, as it had done in 1996 and 1998 (Curtis 2005).
The cornerstones of the Congolese peace process – the Lusaka Accords of July 1999 and the July 2002 Pretoria Agreement – both placed the onus on the Kinshasa government to take action on the demobilisation and repatriation of the FDLR in exchange for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops.

The establishment of a Joint Verification Commission (JVC) and a Tripartite Commission supported by the U.S. provided the possibility for genuine cooperation and confidence building. The JVC brings Rwandan and Congolese army officers together to investigate allegations made by either country, while the Tripartite Commission convenes leaders from the three countries. However, despite numerous treaties and other agreements, relationships between the parties have been generally unsatisfactory and marked by considerable mutual suspicion (International Crisis Group 2005:5).

Some of the armed groups have always been lukewarm about multi-party democracy. The rebels of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) were particularly reluctant to participate in the peace process, as most Congolese saw them as a Rwandan proxy force, and they stood to lose most of their gains in elections. In the end, international pressure and a popular outcry made isolation appear more costly than joining a transitional government. (International Crisis Group 2006a:1).

Progress on all fronts has been hampered by institutional weakness, inefficiency and a lack of political will. Power sharing in the administration, security services and the courts had progressed slowly or not at all. The power sharing formula “1+4” between the four major power centres – Kabila’s government, the RCD, the political opposition and the Movement of Liberation of the Congo (MLC) – undermined progress in many areas.10 In the words of a parliamentarian: “Even

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10 “1+4” refers to the power-sharing agreement in the peace deal, which gave the presidency to Kabila, flanked by four vice presidents, from his own party, the RCD, the MLC and the political opposition.
though they had signed the peace deal, each belligerent tried to keep the institutions weak, corrupt and factionalised. They tried to get during the transition what they could not get during the negotiations in South Africa”.  

The RCD participated in the transition against the will of many hard-line members, who tried on several occasions to undermine it. According to an RCD parliamentarian, “The RCD did not think the transition would continue until the organisation of elections. They thought the process would fail, and they would return to arms. That’s why they did not change their military movement into a political party and favoured military solutions” (International Crisis Group 2006a:15).

Kabila has emerged from the transition as the clear winner of the peace process. More than three years after the establishment of the transitional government, the intertwined local, regional and national dimensions of the conflict are not completely resolved but no longer endanger his rule (International Crisis Group 2007b:1). Kabila’s dominance upset his main competitors in the transition, the Rwandan-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC). Some RCD members were particularly reluctant to implement the peace deal on his terms and launched repeated insurgencies in the East. The crisis was exacerbated by hardliners in Kabila’s camp, who thought they could still crush the RCD militarily and abort the transition (International Crisis Group 2007b:3).

Between 8,000 and 12,000 Forces Démocratiques de Libérations du Rwanda (FDLR), Rwandan Hutu rebels, still roam the hills of South Kivu with no significant national or international effort to disarm them. Although these fighters no longer have the strength to represent a genuine security threat for Rwanda, they offer it both a real incentive and an ideal excuse to remain deeply involved in the political affairs of the two Kivus through the manipulation of frightened Rwandophone communities and periodic threats of military intervention. Moreover, it is only in the Kivus that national and regional forces opposed to the
current peace process have the opportunity to confront one another and the Kinshasa government and ultimately weaken the transition.

The continuing presence of conflict in the eastern DRC, however presents tangible evidence in support for the extension of preventive diplomacy’s role in addressing and preventing the outbreak of renewed violence, despite the conclusion of peace agreements in response to specific incidences of violence. It is therefore necessary to extend preventive actions along the entire spectrum of conflict, from latent tensions through the culmination and resolution of conflict to post-conflict peace building. According to this approach preventive diplomacy is contextualized and its basic objective, the forestalling and reduction of violence, is elaborated in different stages of the conflict as opposed to merely focusing on one specific stage- unstable peace as suggested by the theoretical framework of Lund. Therefore according to the approach by Leatherman et al (1999:99) the key phases of preventive diplomacy include: conflict prevention that entails preventing violent disputes from arising between parties either by structural, institutional, economic, or cultural remedies, secondly escalation prevention, which entails preventing both the vertical and horizontal escalation of hostilities to more destructive means of warfare and to involve additional actors and thirdly post-conflict prevention entailing the prevention of the re-emergence of disputes by reintegrating and reconstructing the war-torn society.

The continued violence presently being witnessed in eastern Congo also holds particular implications for the thesis of a mutually hurting stalemate and the notion of ripeness. A stalemate is considered to be a key pivot of conflict dynamics, which more often than not leads to escalatory processes in conflict. While both the substance of a peace agreement and timing of its implementation are considered to be central elements in the resolution of conflicts, a critical element necessary for a ripe moment to translate in the resolution of conflict, as the protracted and complex nature of the conflict in the DRC illustrated is the perception of a way out. Therefore if two parties to a conflict perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution
(a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution. The ripe moment is however necessarily a perceptual event, not one that stands alone in objective reality. It can be resisted so long as the parties in question refuse or otherwise are able to block out that perception.

The lack of trust and faith in the peace process in the DRC severely compromised both the negotiation and implementation of the various peace agreements that emerged. Although a peace agreement has been formally signed, the underlying issues that lead to conflict and the accompanying tensions, suspicions and deeply entrenched enmity among parties may continue to persist.

The dehumanization of the enemy plays a central role in this whereby the group faces not just a specific threat from the opponent, but rather a diabolical enemy. The mobilization of individuals to collective action and violence involves change in their psychological state. Key stages are identified, namely the perception of threat, then the distortion of incoming information and finally rigid interpretations of the world. The breakdown of political processes and institutions produces structural changes in the conflict, which prove difficult to reverse, and repair. Insecurity, polarization and confrontation between groups also breeds negative attitudes and perceptions, which tend to persist (Rubin, Pruitt and Kim 1994:86). The crux of preventive diplomacy and peace-building therefore is located in redressing the mobilization of tensions resulting from the underlying causes of conflict (de Zeeuw 2001:17). The need to include social-psychological perspectives towards gaining a comprehensive understanding of conflict is therefore crucial.
6.4 Incorporating Social-Psychological Perspectives in the Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy

The social-psychological perspective provides a useful framework for considering the processes involved in conflict, whether the conflict is interpersonal, inter-group, or international. The social-psychological approach is also considered to possess conceptual relevance for the understanding of large-scale conflict processes.

A common contention exists that conflicts bring about recognizable patterned psychological reactions, both cognitive and evaluative. Parties to a conflict therefore provide ample signals to the outside world that they are at loggerheads—their behaviour and the antagonistic use of language, symbols, interactions and public statements issued are heavily-laden with language that expresses negative perceptions. A critical omission in Lund’s theoretical framework is particularly related to the absence of social-psychological approaches in his preventive diplomacy toolbox. The inclusion of social-psychological approaches is critical to revealing the deep fissures that often exist, persist and exacerbate a conflict situation, despite the signing of peace agreements. The failure to consider psychological drivers of conflict could potentially render the use of any other approaches in preventing violent conflict obsolete, even futile and could undermine the successful conclusion of a peace agreement.

The social psychological study of conflict is characterized not so much by the nature of the conflicting units it studies, as by its approach to conflict. This approach is distinguished by its focus on the interplay between psychological and social processes. It is concerned with the perceptions, beliefs, and values of the conflicting units as well as their actualities; these may or may not correspond. It is concerned with how the social realities of the parties in conflict affect their perceived and experienced realities and how the psychological realities of the
conflicting parties affect the development of their social realities (Deutsch & Shichman 1986:220).

One of the driving assumptions behind the social-psychological approach is that although parties identify specific issues as the causes of conflict, conflict also reflects subjective, phenomenological, and social fractures and, consequently, analyzing “interests” can be less important than identifying the underlying needs that govern each party’s perception of the conflict (Crocker et al 1999:23). Because much of human conflict is anchored in conflicting perceptions and in misperception, the contribution of third parties lies in changing the perceptions, attitudes, values, and behaviours of the parties to a conflict. Social-psychological approaches stress the importance of changing attitudes and the creation of new norms in moving parties toward reconciliation. Early intervention, according to this formulation, is preferable because once relations have deteriorated because of violence, and attitudes are embedded in “we-they” images of the enemy, it becomes much more difficult for mediators to move the parties toward sober reflection about their real-world choices and to change perceptions (Crocker et al 1999:25).

Lund’s theoretical framework identifies where preventive diplomacy would be most effectively applied, yet fails to distinguish between the varying nature of the level of violence and the potential barriers to entry as outlined in the table by Crocker et al (1999:28) (See Table 2 in Chapter 2). This model clearly identifies the level of violence, the number of potential entry points, the potential barriers to entry and the opportunity to exercise procedural control. It is clear that as the level of violence rises, the number of potential entry points in a conflict situation declines as perceptions and attitudes are hardening. The barriers to entry are increasing as parties perceive increasing risks of negotiation, coupled with status and legitimacy concerns. As a situation of high levels of violence transpires, the number of potential entry points into a conflict situation is even less, as “we-they”
images of the enemy have hardened. Furthermore the barriers to entry are high as parties are locked into a continuing struggle.

In this context key psychological obstacles exist to the detriment of preventive diplomacy’s effective functioning eschewing the positive role it can play, especially in the African context (Wessells 2004:80). Psychologically, the changing nature of a conflict poses significant challenges to preventive diplomacy. Even following a ceasefire or the signing of a peace agreement, communities on the ground remain deeply divided, harbouring lingering hatreds, and confronting persistent root causes of violence that may not have been adequately addressed by the signing of a peace agreement. This undoubtedly contributed to the escalation and excessively violent nature of the conflict in the DRC and the severe difficulty that continues to face peacemakers in resolving this protracted crisis.

6.5 Conclusion

Peace agreements have produced different outcomes and a convincing argument can hardly be held forth that these agreements have convincingly and decisively turned the tide of conflicts that have engulfed Africa. The mixed outcome underlies a fundamental challenge that faces Africa- that is developing the capacity of African states to resolve old, current and emerging conflicts.

As the conflict in the DRC has repeatedly shown, it is necessary to challenge the argument held forth by Lund that preventive actions, particularly preventive diplomacy should be confined to a particular entry point in the conflict cycle and if unsuccessful be totally excluded as having any further role or value. This is based on the argument that even though conflict or war has erupted, once a peace agreement has been concluded the potential for peace returning to a situation of instability remains omnipresent. The post-conflict phase is considered to be the phase in the life cycle of conflict when hostilities have ceased. In
practice however tensions may flare up again and a fragile peace process may relapse into conflict (de Zeeuw 2001:11). The deductive approach to peace-building seems to pay little attention to the needs, interests and particularities of the local conflict situation to which assistance is often channelled. There is therefore a disconnect between gaining a true appreciation and understanding of the intricacies and complexities of a conflict situation as well as a gross lack of understanding the various personalities engaged in a conflict situation.

Research conducted by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) on transition in war-torn societies supports this assertion and clearly contradicts compartmentalized, linear understandings of the various phases in a conflict. The UNRISD study notes that, “This historical time span from war to peace is a long period in which both seem to co-exist, where peace has come to some areas, but not to others, where conflict lingers and remains an omnipresent threat and occasionally flares up again. Reconstruction and rebuilding take place throughout this period”. (UNRISD 1995). Therefore it could be asserted and argued that preventive diplomacy may therefore still have a potentially valuable role to play in parallel with other conflict resolution initiatives.

The discourse on violent conflict and conflict prevention in Africa has also revealed many shortcomings that could potentially be remedied by future research. The majority of literature has concentrated on conflicts that have already escalated into violence and on violent conflict involving large numbers of victims, rather than on potentially violent conflict before the outbreak of hostilities has actually begun, or on small-scale violence with few casualties. (Engel 2005:226).

Despite the existence of an abundance of literature on the subject matter, a sociology of violence in Africa has not yet been developed- therefore focus is largely concentrated on conflict, not on violence (Engel 2005:226). Furthermore a culture of prevention sui generis does not yet exist. Policy and analysis is
concerned more with real, but rarely with potential ‘trouble spots’. Therefore the mainstreaming of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy has only begun. Therefore the conflict in the DRC has presented but one of many potential case studies to intensively study the dynamics and underlying tensions that fuel and exacerbate violent conflict in Africa (as opposed to the mere immediate manifestations of war and conflict) that goes beyond mere cause/effect debates and therefore seeking to probe the motivations for reverting to violent behaviour in the first place. Another increasingly crucial site of enquiry is the social-psychological aspects of violent conflict, which has to be included in the research agenda.

Despite the importance of negotiated settlements and the signing of peace agreements, as a reflection of the commitment to the process, there can be no successful conflict prevention, or conflict resolution that will facilitate the advent of sustainable peace, unless the structural causes of violence and conflict are properly understood and effectively addressed. In the case of the DRC a coherent strategic framework to guide preventive action at the most opportune time when it was most needed was sorely absent. The greatest omission in the entire preventive diplomatic effort in the conflict in the DRC was the entrenchment of a negative peace, where only the immediate manifestations of violence were addressed, to the neglect of decisively addressing the crucial underlying causes that exacerbated the conflict. The DRC regrettably has to be included in the baleful statistic that half of Africa’s wars reignite within a decade of ending. The abject failure to successfully apply preventive diplomacy in the DRC has led to devastating consequences and the loss of nearly 4 million civilians and has provided a far greater and significant impetus towards adhering to the dictum that prevention is better than cure.
Appendix A: Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section
BIBLIOGRAPHY


