For my moonlight, Yolandi Havemann
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In his monograph, *Ethics in the New Testament*, Jack T. Sanders aims to demonstrate conclusively that Jesus did “not provide a valid ethics for today” (Sanders 1975:29). Underlying this conviction is his steadfast commitment to imminent eschatology: “That Jesus held an imminent eschatology will have to be considered a fact” (Sanders 1975:5). Sanders (1986:xii; xiii) confirmed this view in a preface to the second edition of his book: “It is the main thesis of this book that imminent eschatology was the necessary framework for the selfless ethics of Jesus and of Paul…” and: “In any case, there is in my mind still no question that whatever ethical principle Jesus acknowledged or proposed are integrally tied to his imminent eschatology.” Hence, the ethics of Jesus are inextricably bound up with his overarching framework, which is imminent eschatology. However, the integrality of Jesus’ ethics with his imminent eschatology is only the first part of the argument. The second part of Sanders’ (1975:13, 23) argument is that modern man does not believe in an imminent eschatology anymore:

For modern man knows that, however imminent his own judgment may always be, the world and its problems will continue. […] It is after all, then, the continual pressure of the *continuous existence of the world and its problems* that finally breaks apart the existentialist attempt to render Jesus’ ethics valid. […] In other words, the ethical implications of the new quest of the historical Jesus would appear to be inappropriate to the modern understanding of “world.”

There is another part of the argument not expressly stated by Sanders, namely that the ancient and modern worldviews are incompatible; and so are their ethics (cf. Allison 2010:88). Ancient Judaism, of which Jesus was part, looked at the Torah for ethical

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1 Italics original.
guidance. Yet, their ethical behaviour was essentially motivated not by the Torah itself, but by both wisdom and eschatology (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:348, 372). The difficulty is that there exists a tension between these two motivations for ethical behaviour (cf. Piper 1989:77). An ethic motivated by and based on wisdom believes that the physical world will keep on existing more or less the way it is, while an ethic motivated by and based on eschatology expects the world to change, most commonly within the near future. The former ethic is based on the observation of both the created world and the typical conduct of people. The latter ethic is based on the expectation that the world (as we know it) is about to end. These are two opposing points of view that we as modern scholars (not modern people in general), because of our obsession with classification and taxonomy, struggle to integrate (see Allison, in Miller 2001:89-93, 110; 2010:88). As will become clear in the course of this study, ancient people did not have this problem and oftentimes held both positions simultaneously (cf. Piper 1989:159). The modern view of ethics, as described by Sanders, overlaps extensively with the ancient view of sapiential ethics, not least of all because both views imagine that the world will continue more or less as it is. A fundamental element of Sanders’ argument is that an ethic based on imminent eschatology is entirely incompatible with a modern ethic or an ethic based on wisdom (cf. Allison 2010:88).

Hence, Sanders’ argument is deductive and may well be summarised as follows: (1) Jesus held an imminent eschatology; (2) Jesus’ ethics were motivated by and based on his imminent eschatology, and are therefore inseparable from it; (3) the modern world does not subscribe to an imminent eschatology and neither does its ethics; (4) the ancient and modern worldviews are foundationally different and essentially conflicting; (5) thus, the ethics of Jesus are insignificant, irrelevant, inappropriate and inapplicable for modern society. The current study will attempt to address two aspects of this argument. The first is whether or not Jesus held an imminent eschatology. The second is whether or not sapiential and eschatological worldviews are incompatible. These topics will be addressed by appealing to the Sayings Gospel Q,² and more specifically, the Son-of-Man

² For my description of Q as a “Sayings Gospel” and not a “Sayings Source,” see section 2.4.1 below.
and apocalyptic-judgment logia within Q. However, before a theory can be presented, it is first necessary to give a brief overview of historical-Jesus research.

1.2 ~ A FOCUSED OVERVIEW OF THE OLD AND NEW QUESTS

1.2.1 Liberal Theology

It is well known that Hermann Samuel Reimarus started the quest for the historical Jesus when his private thoughts were published post-humously in 1778 (cf. Telford 1994:55; Martin 1999:29-30, 35; Wright 1996:16; 2002:6). Reimarus thought of Jesus as an eschatological prophet (cf. Martin 1999:36; McKnight 2005:271; Theissen & Merz 1998:3). This is true even though Reimarus, influenced by the rationality of the Enlightenment period, attempted to strip the gospels of their miraculous aggrandizements, including the resurrection story (cf. Patterson 1998a:30). According to Reimarus, the disciples and gospel writers invented these tales after Jesus’ death so that they could renovate the moral teachings of Jesus and turn them into a supernatural religion (cf. Martin 1999:35; Frey 2011:9; Wright 1996:17; 2002:7). Jesus himself was not interested in offending or abolishing the Torah (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:349-350). It was the disciples of Jesus who had removed themselves from the Torah and who had left early Judaism behind. Thus, both claims – that the historical Jesus should be seen as an eschatological figure and that he was a teacher of simple moral truths – have been with us since the very beginning. In Reimarus’s opinion, Jesus pleaded with people to change their lives radically in light of the imminent eschatological event.

Thanks to Heinrich Julius Holtzmann’s solution to the Synoptic problem and the emergence of the Two Source Hypothesis in 1863, researchers started feeling that they had a sure footing when it came to the historical Jesus (see Den Heyer 2002:43-45). Attention could now be paid to the most reliable source, historically: Mark (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:5; Martin 1999:42). However, Holtzmann’s solution to the Synoptic problem was not universally accepted and many scholars continued drawing on all four gospels in their descriptions of the historical Jesus (cf. Frey 2011:11). Q, the other source
behind Matthew and Luke was mostly overlooked and ignored during this time, sufficing only to supplement the Markan sketch of the historical Jesus (cf. Edwards 1976:3, 10-11, 14). For almost a century (1860’s to 1950’s), scholars believed that Q was of a lesser import than Mark, primarily because it was seen as didache (teaching) and not kerygma (preaching), but also because Mark seemed to be of greater importance to both Matthew and Luke. According to scholars of this period, the didache could only ever be a supplement to the kerygma.

“Rational” interpretations of the gospels, and Mark in particular, held that Jesus had experienced an intimate relationship with God and that he gave expression to this familiarity with the term “son of God.” He did not attempt to establish a new religion, but proclaimed the speedy arrival of the kingdom of God. In order to make rational sense of this proclamation, “enlightened” theologians of the second half of the nineteenth century had to do away with the apocalyptic language and imagery of the gospels (cf. Den Heyer 2002:45-46; see Patterson 1998a:27-29). According to these liberal theologians, “the Jesus behind the gospels” did not proclaim that God would intervene dramatically with fire and brimstone, but rather proclaimed that God’s kingdom would come within the confines of history. By means of a slow process of evolution, the kingdom of God was establishing itself on earth. No longer was the kingdom to be seen as a mythical and surreal utopia. Rather, the kingdom of God was an ideal to be aimed for through human progress and reason – an ideal that is slowly but surely cementing its place within the world. By stripping the gospels of their supernatural elements, liberal theologians believed that they could discover the essence of Jesus: the ethical or moral message enclosed in his teaching and preaching (see esp. Patterson 1998a:4, 27-32; cf. also Koester 1992:3; Mack 1993:30-32; Borg 1994a:4; Miller 2001:6; Wright 1996:18; 2002:9; Tuckett 1996:45-46; Martin 1999:36; Horsley 1999:19; Dunn 2005:187). The Q saying in Luke 17:21, about the kingdom of God being “within” (ἐντὸς) us, was arguably the most important proof text for liberal theology (cf. Frey 2011:11). Likewise, John’s brand of realised eschatology was preferred over apocalyptic and futuristic types of New-Testament eschatology (cf. Wink 2002:198; see section 1.2.3 below).
Thus, the “liberal” search for the historical Jesus progressively shifted away from Reimarus’s intuition that Jesus was a Jewish, apocalyptic prophet and towards his suspicion that Jesus was a teacher of morality. The moral teachings of Jesus were not only superior to Jewish obsession with the letter of the Law, but also timelessly and universally valid (cf. e.g. Baur 1847, esp. 585; see Theissen & Merz 1998:349-350). Liberal theology reached its zenith at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, with Adolf von Harnack arguably being its most prolific proponent (see Den Heyer 2002:63-69). Motivated by an apologetic attempt to defend the Christian faith, Harnack stripped the tradition of all its naïve fabrications, like the miracle stories and the resurrection, in order to salvage its essence. That essence was Jesus’ ethical preaching and message about the kingdom of God. The core of Christianity was not, in Harnack’s view, the person of Jesus, but rather the Father-God proclaimed by Jesus. Like his “liberal” partners, Harnack also believed that the kingdom of God was unfolding within history. Jesus was portrayed by him as a teacher of ethical ideals, a prophet of progress in the Western world, and an advocate for the establishment of God’s kingdom on earth and within history.

1.2.2 Albert Schweitzer

In an effort to reconstruct a biography of the historical Jesus behind the gospels, most importantly the gospel of Mark, liberal theology produced a sea of literature and many different pictures of Jesus. In 1892, one of these pictures of Jesus was put forward by Johannes Weiss, who went against the tide by focusing only on the Synoptic gospels and proposing that Jesus was, above all else, an apocalyptic prophet, who had expected the end of the world within his own lifetime (cf. esp. Koester 1992:4; Patterson 1998a:33-34; Miller 2001:7; cf. also Edwards 1976:33; Martin 1999:40; Dunn 2005:187; Frey 2011:12). According to Weiss, Jesus spoke of the kingdom of God as an event that would be ushered in via the apocalyptic agency of the Son-of-Man figure, an emissary who would return on the heavenly clouds and bring about a period of unthinkable violence and misfortune, ultimately ending in the judgment of everyone on earth (cf. Patterson 1998a:165-166). The ethical demands of Jesus were the preparatory conditions
not only for entering into God’s future kingdom, but also for side-stepping ultimate judgment (cf. Edwards 1976:33; Theissen & Merz 1998:143, 350; Miller 2001:8). Since this view was so atypical for the time, and since there was so much literature out there, Weiss’s proposal was mostly overlooked.

In a classic study, Albert Schweitzer (1906) pointed out the failings and shortcomings of liberal theology and the Old Quest. Schweitzer illustratedconvincingly that each author had constructed, not the historical Jesus, but his or her own subjective projection of Jesus (cf. esp. Den Heyer 2002:52-53; cf. also Witherington III 1995:9; Theissen & Mertz 1998:5-6; cf. Casey 2010:3). Many pictures of Jesus had seen the light, but none of them were historically reliable. All these studies suffered from the same fundamental flaw: they thought of and described Jesus as if he were living in their own time. They had failed to take the chronological, geographical and ethnic discontinuity between Jesus and themselves into account (see Miller 2001:6-7). This was true of every study except one: that of Johannes Weiss. Schweitzer revived the unpopular and unnoticed proposal of Weiss and judged it to be the best portrayal of the historical Jesus out there (cf. Koester 1992:4; Patterson 1998a:34, 166; Martin 1999:40-41; Miller 2001:7). According to Schweitzer, Jesus can and should not be modernised. Jesus is, and will always be, a stranger to both modernity and contemporary society (cf. Miller 2001:8-9). For Schweitzer, this included not only his person, but his ethics as well (see Sanders 1975:2-3). Unlike the liberal theologians, Schweitzer believed that the ethics of Jesus were alien and illogical for today’s society. Liberal theologians had watered down Jesus’ world-condemning imperatives to fit modern ethical ideals (cf. Patterson 1998a:35). Whoever ignores the strangeness of Jesus, constructs (and projects) an anachronistic Jesus. Only in embracing the discontinuity between Jesus and ourselves are we able to reconstruct a reliable picture of the historical Jesus.

In reaction to the many images of Jesus presented by liberal theology, Schweitzer (1913) constructed his own image of Jesus, one that would have a lasting influence, reaching into the present (cf. Tuckett 1996:45-46; Horsley 1999:69-70; Vorster 1999:307-308). More than anything else, the Jesus proposed by Schweitzer (à la Weiss) was inspired and
shaped by “consistent” or “thoroughgoing eschatology” (konsequente Eschatologie). Schweitzer used the word “consistent” or “thoroughgoing” (konsequente) to indicate that eschatology determined every aspect of the teachings, deeds and message of the historical Jesus. However, what Schweitzer understood as “eschatology” would in modern research rather be seen as apocalypticism (cf. Crossan 1998:274; Miller 2001:9; cf. also Den Heyer 2002:54). In a word, Schweitzer saw Jesus as a person who was completely controlled and consumed by his belief that the kingdom of God would appear very soon (cf. Borg 1994a:53; cf. also Casey 2010:3). This explains why he believed that Jesus’ ethics were irrelevant for modern society, a belief consequently adopted and argued by Sanders, among others (see section 1.1 above; cf. Kloppenborg 2005:8-9; Allison 2005:106). In Schweitzer’s view, the ethical programme espoused by Jesus was an “interim ethics,” valid only until the imminent end of the world (cf. Sanders 1975:3; Edwards 1976:33; Theissen & Merz 1998:143, 350-351; Casey 2010:311). It did not have, nor was it intended to have, any lasting significance. Rather than being timelessly valid, Jesus’ ethics were (in accordance with the view of Weiss) the conditions for becoming part of God’s kingdom. The ministry of Jesus, which included his ethical message, was principally determined by an imminent eschatology. This explained the strange extremism of some of his moral instructions.

As his ministry unfolded, Jesus became increasingly convinced that he had a fundamental role to play in the apocalyptic end that was unfurling. Matthew 10-11 (esp. 10:23) was a crucial (and historically reliable) text for Schweitzer (cf. esp. Den Heyer 2002:54-55; cf. also Borg 1994a:52; Miller 2001:9). These two Matthean chapters describe how Jesus sent his disciples on a mission to proclaim the kingdom of God. According to Schweitzer, Jesus must have been severely disappointed when the kingdom failed to arrive after the return of his disciples – the first delay of the parousia (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:143). From that moment on, Jesus was thoroughly convinced that he would have to sacrifice his own life in order to enforce the arrival of God’s kingdom (cf. Miller 2001:9). Jesus believed that, through his own suffering and death, he could compel and force the apocalyptic event to take place (cf. Wright 1996:19; 2002:10). Jesus was wrong, he failed and history continued as per usual, as if nothing had changed. Yet, in
Schweitzer’s view, the “fact” that Jesus was mistaken does not render his whole life meaningless. This strange man may still have meaning for us today. The more we accept his strangeness and his separateness from modern society, the more meaningful his life becomes for today. Even though the kingdom had not arrived, Jesus lived as though it had and allowed his expectation thereof to rule every aspect of his life (cf. Kloppenborg 2005:9-10). In this way, Jesus’ life and attitude takes on great significance for people of all times. Schweitzer is left unable to continue believing in the Christ of dogma, but finds it possible to be inspired by the man who lived and died as an apocalyptic prophet (cf. Patterson 1998a:34).

Initially, Schweitzer’s Jesus did not convince everyone (cf. Frey 2011:13). Liberal portraits of Jesus continued to be published. Eventually, however, Schweitzer’s Jesus came out victorious and remained the dominant paradigm for most of the twentieth century (cf. esp. Patterson 1998a:167-168, 171; cf. also Martin 1999:41; Miller 2001:10; Chilton 2005:115; Dunn 2005:187). The reason for this was not only Schweitzer’s compelling argumentation, but also the progressive evaporation of evolutionary ideals and historical positivism in the face of two world wars. An apocalyptic Jesus seemed to fit this situation of devastation and pessimism much better than the liberal Jesus. However, Schweitzer’s Jesus did not just persist because it was historically and contextually “convenient.” The three documents that were chronologically closest to Jesus – i.e. Mark’s gospel, Paul’s letters and the Q tradition behind Matthew and Luke – all portrayed him as being thoroughly immersed in and motivated by apocalypticism. After Schweitzer, an apocalyptic depiction of Jesus became synonymous with a historically-reliable image of Jesus (cf. Miller 2001:10).

1.2.3 Rudolf Bultmann and the “No Quest” period

The search for the historical Jesus was dealt a critical blow when William Wrede (1901) discovered the theological motif of the messianic secret in the gospel according to Mark (cf. Wright 1996:20; 2002:12; Bock 2002:144). This discovery, among others, led to the inescapable realisation that even the gospel of Mark was not historically reliable, and that
it could not function as a solid foundation upon which a biography of Jesus could be reconstructed (cf. esp. Den Heyer 2002:74; cf. also Theissen & Merz 1998:6; Martin 1999:42; Bock 2002:144). Wrede believed that not much could be said about Jesus, beyond that he was a teacher or prophet of some kind who lived a memorable life and was eventually executed (cf. Wright 1996:20; 2002:12). The views that the gospels were historically unreliable and that a historically trustworthy picture of Jesus could not be achieved were already expressed in 1892 by Martin Kähler, who had a huge influence on Rudolf Bultmann (cf. Patterson 1998a:35-37). Kähler argued that the historical Jesus was insignificant to the church, but that the “historic Jesus” remained significant for all time. With the word “historic,” Kähler meant the Christ of faith, who had died and had risen again. The gospels intended to evoke faith in the death and resurrection of Jesus (cf. Martin 1999:42-43). Their chief intention was not to be historical documents that relay the moral teachings of Jesus or promote his ethic. Instead, the canonical gospels present us with the historic Jesus – and it is all but impossible, in Kähler’s opinion, to separate this figure from the historical Jesus by means of the canonical evidence (cf. Witherington III 1995:10). Progressively over time, scholars started realising that the gospels were all subjectively written after Easter and that an objective reconstruction of the life of Jesus was perhaps an impossible task. On the other hand, Holtzmann’s solution to the Synoptic problem was confirmed and elaborated in 1924 by Streeter (cf. Casey 2010:4). Holtzmann’s solution had been gaining more and more support over the years. Streeter’s contribution in 1924 ensured that just about all subsequent scholars would favour Mark and Q in their lives of the historical Jesus.

It was in this atmosphere that Rudolf Bultmann entered the scene in 1921 with his *Die Geschichte der Synoptischen Tradition*, which was primarily concerned with tracing the history of the gospels’ genesis and evolution through form criticism (cf. Den Heyer 2002:78). According to Bultmann ([1921] 1963:371-372), the overriding majority of material in the gospels addressed the situation of the early church, which meant that the gospels had “no historical-biographical interest,” and had “nothing to say about Jesus’ human personality, his appearance and character, his origin, education and development.” The results of Bultmann’s form-critical approach also indicated that very little of the
teachings of Jesus recounted in the gospels actually go back to the Jesus of history (cf. Borg 1994a:4; Theissen & Merz 1998:6; Kloppenborg 2005:12). Despite these findings, the little that could be known about the teachings and message of Jesus prompted Bultmann to write a Jesus book in 1926 (simply entitled Jesus) in search of the historical person. In the introduction to this work, Bultmann ([1926] 1958:14) reiterates his belief that almost nothing can be known about the “life and personality” of Jesus, but continues to state that enough of his teachings is available to enable a relatively consistent picture of his message.

Bultmann’s work on the historical Jesus is interesting, not only because he was undoubtedly the most prolific New-Testament scholar of the twentieth century (see Van Aarde 2011b), but also because he was influenced by, and tried to stay true to, both the Schweitzerian and the liberal paradigms. Influenced by liberal theology, Bultmann (1921) moved aside all metaphysical and “unscientific” references to Jesus, including his pre-existence, virgin birth, miracles, passion predictions, resurrection and ascension (see Den Heyer 2002:78-79). These should, according to Bultmann, all be attributed to the early church. Like Schweitzer, on the other hand, Bultmann ([1926] 1958:27f., 124) believed that Jesus acted as a messianic prophet, advocating “the coming of the kingdom of God” (cf. Borg 1994a:48, 71; Kloppenborg 2005:12). However, Bultmann ([1926] 1958:39) refused to see Jesus as an “apocalypticist” who was fundamentally concerned with speculation over the signs and specific nature of the end-time. Bultmann attributed also these passages to the early church (cf. Chilton 2005:115; see Den Heyer 2002:80-81). Rather, Jesus’ expectation of the coming kingdom should be described as “eschatological.” In Bultmann’s opinion, Jesus emphasised the conduct and behaviour of people when proclaiming the coming kingdom. Jesus tried to persuade people to change their ways in light of the coming kingdom of God. In other words, the proclamation of the kingdom had essentially an ethical motivation and goal. Thus, Bultmann did not deny that Jesus preached imminent eschatology and also largely agreed that, although Jesus preached an ethic of “radical obedience” to the will of God, this was based on imminent

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3 When Jesus spoke of the Son of Man, he always did so in the third person, implying that he was referring, not to himself, but to someone else (cf. Van Aarde 2004b:425-426).
eschatology (see Sanders 1975:11-13). Nevertheless, as we will see, this futurist eschatology had an existential meaning and application for the present: it called for a final decision in the here and now (cf. Kloppenborg 2005:13).

Bultmann also touched upon a separate, but related, aspect of historical-Jesus research – not addressed thus far in this chapter – namely, the annoying difficulty of the presence of sapiential traditions in authentic Jesus material. His form-critical approach had convinced Bultmann that many (if not most) of the Jesus traditions about morality were contained in sapiential genres (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:353). He proposed two solutions to this complexity (see Mack 1993:32-34). Both solutions reaffirmed eschatological priority, but tried to account for the presence of wisdom amongst eschatological material. The first solution by Bultmann ([1921] 1963:108) was simply to give eschatological sayings in the Synoptic tradition priority and explain the presence of wisdom sayings as secondary interpolations. According to Bultmann, these traditions were introduced to construct an ethic for the time before the end of the world – something Schweitzer had already suggested (cf. Vorster 1999:307-308). The inauthenticity of the wisdom material was substantiated by two arguments (cf. Borg 1994b:19). Firstly, they could not be easily harmonised with an eschatological view of Jesus, which was historically most reliable. Secondly, Bultmann believed that the wisdom sayings stemmed from common and traditional folk wisdom, not from Jesus himself. The second solution by Bultmann ([1926] 1958:89-92) was to place the two traditions side by side and to claim that both called for “radical obedience.”

In 1935, C. H. Dodd proposed another solution to the (problematic) presence of wisdom material within the authentic Jesus material. As an eschatological prophet, Jesus had initiated a new age that was in continuity with his eschatological pronouncements. This new age simultaneously underscored the urgency of Jesus’ wisdom sayings. The proclaimed kingdom was an eschatological image, but then one that had been realised in the present by Jesus and his ministry (cf. Vorster 1999:308). The “real” message of Jesus was that all eschatological expectations had been and were being fulfilled in his person (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:243). Thus, the historical Jesus proclaimed a “realised
eschatology” and understood the kingdom of God as a present, not a future, reality that was being initiated by his person (cf. Borg 1994a:71; Frey 2011:16). The early church then corrupted this message by proclaiming an apocalyptic, futurist eschatology. Moreover, New-Testament descriptions of the future coming of the kingdom referred not to the ministry of Jesus or a future event within history, but to an otherworldly reality beyond space and time (cf. Edwards 1976:34). Parables about the theme of judgment were not about the final judgment, but about the present crisis caused by the introduction of God’s rule. It followed for Dodd (1935:109) that Jesus’ ethics were not interim ethics at all, but rather “a moral ideal for men who have accepted the Kingdom of God, and live their lives in the presence of his judgment and grace, now decisively revealed.”

In 1941, Bultmann published *Offenbarung und Heilsgeschehen*, a study where he pleaded for the “demythologising” of the New Testament (see Den Heyer 2002:86-89). Bultmann was not the first to recognize the mythical character of the Bible, but he differed from most of his predecessors by not rendering these myths utterly useless and insignificant for modern man. He firmly believed that by removing the mythical skin from these biblical stories, one is time-and-again left with a message that is not time-bound, but remains surprisingly relevant. This applies also to apocalyptic passages in the New Testament. Despite the obvious falsehood of apocalyptic language – viewed from the vantage point of modern science and reason – Bultmann claimed to be able to extract the *kerygma* of these passages by demythologising them (cf. Martin 1999:43). The apocalypticism and eschatology of the New Testament, when demythologised and “existentialised,” called for a (con)current decision that would bring about radical change in the here and now (cf. Martin 1999:43; see Edwards 1976:36-37; Frey 2011:13-14). The “existential eschatology” of Bultmann denoted “a dramatic internal change within an individual so that one may speak of the world (as the ground of identity and security) having come to an end for that individual” (Borg 1994a:71). Notably missing from this understanding of eschatology are the concepts of change in the external world and futurity.
These findings were then further transposed to the historical Jesus, who was not an apocalypticist concerned with the future, but who preached an eschatological message in order to radically influence and alter people’s lives in the present. This authentic core of Jesus’ preaching could also be demythologised by means of an existentialist interpretation (cf. Borg 1994a:4). Thus, the ethics of Jesus, although tainted by eschatology, could be demythologised, removed from their eschatological skins, and interpreted existentially (cf. Kloppenborg 2005:13). The existential interpretation of Jesus’ ethics took on a contextual flavour in Bultmann’s work (cf. Sanders 1975:11-14). Accordingly, Bultmann spoke of the “eschatological ethic” of Jesus, which is an ethic that calls for radical obedience to the laws of God, especially the love-command, in the present moment, as demanded by the context of each situation (and not by the Torah). Another attempt to preserve the eschatological essence of Jesus, but still argue for the continued relevance of his ethics, was made by Amos Wilder (1950). According to Wilder, the imminent eschatology of Jesus functioned merely as “sanctions” for his ethical prerogative (see Sanders 1975:9-11). Yet, these sanctions were only “formal” in nature. The “fundamental” sanctions (thereby implying the actual sanctions) were Jesus’ message of God’s innate nature, his appeal to Jewish Scripture and his appeal to his own authority and example.

In 1945, Werner Georg Kümmel illustrated that the authentic Jesus material contained both present and future sayings about the kingdom of God (cf. Frey 2011:16; see Edwards 1976:34-35). These sayings appeared side by side in the tradition and any attempt to separate them and to dismiss one group as inauthentic would be subjective and unwarranted. Thus, the authentic Jesus material – as well as the inauthentic church traditions – simultaneously supported both reigning views of a “realised eschatology” (à la Dodd) and a “consistent eschatology” (à la Schweitzer). In Kümmel’s opinion, the person of Jesus merged the present with the future. The content of the future kingdom was already present in Jesus. This result became the consensus view among scholars from the middle of the previous century onwards (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:53; cf. also Theissen & Merz 1998:244; Frey 2011:16). This consensus has at times been referred to as the “great synthesis” of historical Jesus research (cf. Borg 1994a:53). To be sure,
however, scholarly emphasis remained with the future aspect of the kingdom of God (cf. Borg 1994a:53-54). The present aspect of the kingdom was typically added as an afterthought to discussions of its future aspect. The future dimension of God’s kingdom remained its fundamental and defining quality.

Despite putting his own image of the historical Jesus forward, Bultmann declared the search to be unimportant and trivial for Christian faith. As one of the main advocates of dialectic theology, Bultmann deliberately chose against the historical Jesus for the kerygmatic Christ, as he was proclaimed by the early church (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:6; see Den Heyer 2002:81-82). Here, the influence of Kähler is clear (cf. Patterson 1998a:37). Yet, this choice was not meant to be an attack on, or a dismissal of, the relevance of historical-Jesus research. His own work on form criticism and his book on the historical Jesus, among others, serve as evidence of his commitment to the historical scrutiny of the biblical texts (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:115). Bultmann’s point in opting for the kerygmatic Christ was that historical-Jesus research is irrelevant, not as a means of historical enquiry or biblical exegesis, but when it comes to matters of kerygma and faith (see Van Aarde 2011b; 2012:7-8). In other words, historical-Jesus research, and especially form criticism, was legitimate and relevant as an investigative tool for historians and biblical scholars, but could never substitute or validate “raw” faith in the post-Easter Christ – nor could it ever serve as a foundation for the kerygma. Bultmann (1965:9) distinguished between the “that” (Daß) and the “what” (Was) of Jesus (cf. Van Aarde 2012:8-9 n. 17). Stories about Jesus – the “Was” of his life and ministry – were (and are) the result of faith in him, not the foundation of such faith. These stories were (and are) a way of asserting one’s faith and expressing the kerygma. The foundation for kerygma and faith, rather, is the belief that (Daß) God somehow became human in a historic person named Jesus. This partly explains why Bultmann held that historical-Jesus enquiries – which deal exclusively with the “Was” of Jesus’ life and work – were exercises in futility when it came to faith and kerygma.
Conceivably, most scholars (and laypeople) would agree with Bultmann on these matters, but unfortunately many from his own time (and thereafter) misunderstood Bultmann to mean that historical-Jesus research was wholly and utterly irrelevant. Bultmann’s focus on “demythologising” and “existentialising” the New Testament only ended in affirming these misconceptions. Ironically though, these exegetical processes were thoroughly rooted in critical and historical research. Bultmann’s dialectic theology never disposes of historic (historisch) inquiry or research, but employs it in search of the existential relevance (geschichtlich) of both the mythological bible and the historical Jesus (see Van Aarde 2011b; 2012). Additionally, Bultmann’s comments that nothing could be known of the “life and personality” of the historical Jesus led many to misconstrue Bultmann as declaring that nothing at all could be known about him. As we saw, this was not Bultmann’s position. Instead, he held that rather much could be known about the teachings of Jesus – so much so that a relatively consistent picture could be drawn of his overall message (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:115).

While Schweitzer’s unassailable critique demolished and ended the First Quest, thereby inaugurating a period of No Quest, Bultmann’s perceived (!) pessimism over both the feasibility and relevance of historical-Jesus research affirmed and prolonged the No-Quest period (cf. Telford 1994:33-34, 56; Witherington III 1995:9-10; Wright 1996:21-22; 2002:14-15; Martin 1999:41-42, 43; Bock 2002:144). The designation “No Quest” is a misnomer, since historical-Jesus research did not stall into a period of hiatus during this time (cf. Telford 1994:60; Bock 2002:144-145). Liberal theology and their ethical portraits of Jesus continued to exist alongside eschatological portraits of Jesus (cf. esp. Casey 2010:4, 12; cf. also Wright 1996:23; 2002:16; Allison, in Miller 2001:111-112). Nonetheless, this period was marked by a general pessimism over the feasibility and relevance of a search for the Jesus of history (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:3-4; cf. also Telford 1994:56; Martin 1999:42). After the Second World War, the results of form criticism were confirmed by redaction criticism (cf. Borg 1994a:4). Not only the supernatural and mythical aspects of the gospels, but also the ethical teachings of Jesus, were

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4 It should be noted that neither Schweitzer nor Bultmann ever used the term “No Quest,” or intended to eradicate historical research of either the bible or the person of Jesus (see Van Aarde 2011b).
manufactured by the church. It was generally believed by New-Testament scholarship that only a minimalist sketch of Jesus could be recovered behind the gospels. For the most part, the only historically reliable tradition about Jesus was that he was an apocalypticist who expected and preached the sporadic end of the world (cf. Martin 1999:41).

1.2.4 The New Quest

A student of Bultmann, Ernst Käsemann, is generally thought to have initiated a new era of Jesus research, commonly known as the New Quest (see esp. Patterson 1998a:38-42; cf. Koester 1992:5; Casey 2010:12; cf. also Telford 1994:56-57; Wright 1996:23; 2002:16). With a lecture on the subject in 1953 – published as an academic article in 1954 – Käsemann defended the opinion that historical-Jesus research could indeed be done properly and lead to trustworthy results (cf. Den Heyer 2002:96). Käsemann believed and argued that ignoring the historical Jesus would lead to a docetic disregard for the humanity of Jesus (cf. Martin 1999:44). He held that the historical Jesus could under no circumstances be made theologically irrelevant (cf. Borg 1994b:12). Käsemann further pointed to certain gospel pericopes that are indisputably and undeniably authentic (cf. Witherington III 1995:11). The gospels themselves built their theologies not only on the death and resurrection of Jesus (à la Kähler), but also on the historic works and words of an authentic, historical person. Käsemann defended certain aspects of continuity between Jesus and the early church (cf. Telford 1994:57). Regarding eschatology, Käsemann argued that the main difference between Jesus and John the Baptist was that the latter proclaimed an imminent and apocalyptic eschatology, while the former proclaimed the imminence of God and his kingdom in all aspects of life (cf. Sanders 1975:4; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70; Kloppenborg 2005:15; see Wink

5 Käsemann believed that his insistence on the theological relevance of the historical Jesus, as well as the continuity between this personage and the early church, was diametrically opposed to Bultmann’s preference for the kerygmatic Christ. Such a view of Käsemann’s relation to Bultmann can still be found among scholars today (cf. e.g. Borg 1994b:12; Telford 1994:57). Yet, Käsemann’s original valuation of his relation to Bultmann might actually rest on a gross misunderstanding of the intricacies and nuances of Bultmann’s theology (see Bultmann 1965:190-198; Schmithals 1968:262; 1988:149-158; Van Aarde 2011b).
2002:164-165). Jesus played down the apocalyptic element in John’s teaching, but the early church resurrected John’s apocalyptic views, which then became paramount. A few of Bultmann’s other students, like Philipp Vielhauer and Hans Conzelmann, also advocated a (quasi) non-apocalyptic Jesus (cf. Boyd 1995:55; Patterson 1998a:174-175; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70-71).

Käsemann’s main contribution was not in his views on eschatology, however, but in optimistically validating and starting the New Quest. Yet, despite this new optimism in some quarters, the New Quest still continued in the footsteps of the No Quest period (cf. Borg 1994a:4-5). Jesus was still largely believed to have preached an essentially eschatological message, which was then made relevant by interpreting it existentially (cf. Borg 1994b:11-12). This was despite the views of many of Bultmann’s students that the message of Jesus was not essentially apocalyptic or eschatological. The essential difference between the No-Quest and New-Quest periods was not so much methodological, but theological (cf. Borg 1994a:4-5; Patterson 1998a:39-40; Theissen & Merz 1998:7). Answers to historical questions remained largely the same. Instead, it was the theological relevance of these answers that changed. The New Quest was largely concerned with validating the historical roots of the *kerygma* by determining the extent of continuity between the Jesus of history and the Jesus of the gospels, as well as determining the significance of Jesus for both ancient and modern human existence (cf. Koester 1992:5; Borg 1994b:12-13). As such, theological questions and concerns, as opposed to historical ones, largely governed the New Quest for Jesus (cf. Charlesworth 1988:26).

In order to circumvent the mistakes made by earlier researchers, proponents of the New Quest focused their attention on historical-critical methods and various criteria of authenticity (see esp. Patterson 1998a:40-41; Den Heyer 2002:177-178; cf. also Telford 1994:57; Witherington III 1995:11; Bock 2002:146). The use of Aramaic to reconstruct authentic words of Jesus was put forward by Joachim Jeremias (1947; 1971) as one criterion for the search (cf. Bock 2002:147). Another criterion was already suggested by Bultmann and paid particular attention to the uniqueness of Jesus (see Van Aarde
2004b:427). It held that something was historically reliable if it did not derive from the early church. Ironically, this “criterion of dissimilarity” in a sense undermined the New Quest’s prerogative to discover aspects of continuity between the historical Jesus and the early church. Another criterion that was similarly suggested by Bultmann also focused on the supposed uniqueness of Jesus by being suspicious of any material that had close parallels in contemporary popular culture, especially the Jewish writings of antiquity. The belief was that the early church had probably attributed popular sayings and established wisdom to their hero, Jesus. The more unorthodox, intelligent and problematic sayings of Jesus were probably more authentic. This criterion also became known as the “criterion of dissimilarity.” Käsemann was the first not only to explicitly identify and describe these criteria of dissimilarity, but also to suggest that they be used together when determining the authenticity of single traditions (cf. Kloppenborg 2005:14). Together, these became known as the criterion of “double dissimilarity,” meaning that the tradition in question was dissimilar from both popular (Jewish) culture and the early church (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:7; Blomberg 1999:21-22). Out of all the criteria, the criterion of double dissimilarity reigned supreme during the New Quest (cf. Borg 1994b:15-16).

The import of the “double-dissimilarity” criterion, as well as the consensus that Jesus was an apocalyptic prophet, ensured that the wisdom material continued to be judged inauthentic (cf. Borg 1994b:19). Since the time of Bultmann, scholars simply accepted, on the one hand, that these sayings could not be harmonised with the reigning apocalyptic view, and, on the other, that they were little more than traditional folk wisdom attributed to Jesus by the early church. Another important criterion was that of “multiple independent attestation,” according to which a tradition is more likely to be authentic if it is independently attested in more than one source. The application of these criteria led to the inevitable realisation that only fragmentary glimpses of the historical Jesus could be reconstructed. What is more, these reconstructions were just as subjective as those done during the Old Quest, notwithstanding the rigorousness of the methodological approach (cf. Patterson 1998a:41-42). This realisation was disappointing and only succeeded in confirming the scepticism of the No-Quest period. Once again, the New Testament text
became paramount, as is clear in the replacement of form criticism with redaction criticism and the eventual replacement of both with literary and narrative criticism. Even though a New Quest had started, pessimism over the relevance and feasibility of historical-Jesus research carried over from the No Quest period and persisted (cf. Koester 1992:5). For most New Testament scholars (as well as systematic theologians), the “thoroughgoing pessimism” of Kähler remained (cf. Borg 1994b:13). Historical-Jesus research was mostly viewed as an academic cul-de-sac (cf. Telford 1994:33). Even those who were initially optimistic and enthusiastic about the New Quest started doubting the viability of the search, finally abandoning such efforts completely in the early seventies (cf. Witherington III 1995:11).

1.3 ~ THE THIRD AND RENEWED QUESTS

1.3.1 A revival of Jesus studies

The 1980s saw a renewed interest and revival in historical-Jesus research (cf. esp. Borg 1994b:16-17; cf. also Charlesworth 1988:26; Telford 1994:38, 47; Boyd 1995:46; Witherington III 1995:12; Wright 1996:29; 2002:23; Martin 1999:45). Up to and until the end of the New Quest, most historical-Jesus research was concentrated in Germany (cf. Borg 1994b:10-11). Scholars from other countries listened intently and sometimes even participated, but it was Germany that showed the way. English-speaking scholars, notably from the United States of America, should be credited with initiating and sustaining the revival of the 1980s (cf. Boyd 1995:50-51). In most European countries, pessimism over the reliability of our sources, particularly the gospel accounts, for a reconstruction of the historical Jesus increased as time marched on and is still the most prevalent stance. American and English scholars, however, became much more positive about both the viability and relevance of the search during the eighties (cf. Charlesworth 1988:25; Telford 1994:57; Witherington III 1995:12-13; Martin 1999:45; Wright 2002:38). This has led to a situation where the dominant voices in historical-Jesus research no longer came from Germany, but from the United States and England (cf. Borg 1994b:29).
A few features enabled this positive stance in the English-speaking world and distinguished the revival in Jesus studies from earlier searches. The first was a brand new appreciation for the importance of non-theological sciences, most notably cultural anthropology, archaeology, social history, feminist studies, linguistics, the social sciences and history of religions (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:7, 19; see 1994b:21-24; cf. also Charlesworth 1988:25; Telford 1994:52, 58; Witherington III 1995:247; Boyd 1995:57-58; Theissen & Merz 1998:10). This appreciation has led to an inter-disciplinary approach to historical-Jesus research, which has allowed scholars to discover new truths about Jesus and his world (cf. Martin 1999:45). One of the outcomes of an inter-disciplinary approach is that the historical Jesus has increasingly been described in terms of his socio-political significance and contribution (see Borg 1994b:24-25). The second feature that enabled a renaissance of Jesus studies was a newfound appreciation for non-canonical sources from antiquity (cf. Charlesworth 1988:25; Boyd 1995:52; Theissen & Merz 1998:11; Bock 2002:146-147; see Telford 1994:47-49) – an appreciation that was both fuelled and assisted by archaeological discoveries, like the Qumran scrolls and Nag Hammadi manuscripts, among others (see esp. Charlesworth 1988:30-172; cf. Borg 1994a:10-11, 19; cf. also Witherington III 1995:12; see Casey 2010:120-132). These findings have enabled scholars to reconstruct the period and world in which Jesus lived much more accurately than before (cf. Charlesworth 1988:9, 27). If these two features are used together, it enables researchers to draw a fairly authentic picture of the world in which Jesus operated (cf. Wright 2002:31-32). Such a picture has become essential for understanding Jesus himself (cf. Telford 1994:49; Boyd 1995:57). As a result, scholarship has increasingly favoured approaches that place Jesus within his wider Jewish and/or Hellenistic contexts (cf. Telford 1994:52, 58). In general, we could therefore say that the revival of Jesus research began an orientation that was (and still is) more directly interested in history than theology (cf. Charlesworth 1988:9, 26-27; Telford 1994:57). Partly due to the revived interest in the Jewish world of Jesus, the belief slowly but surely gained support that research on the historical Jesus should take as its starting point the Jewish Sitz im Leben and identity of Jesus (cf. Telford 1994:49, 52; Wright 1996:5-6; 2002:31-32; Bock 2002:141, 147; cf. also Koester 1994:541; Kloppenborg 2005:2; Fredriksen 2005:55). This development should be seen as one of
the most important features of the revived quest (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:10-11; Casey 2010:13).

The criteria developed during the New Quest were not totally abandoned, but were refined (cf. Witherington III 1995:12). In light of the attention paid to the first-century Jewish world of Jesus, the all-important criterion of double dissimilarity came under fire (cf. Casey 2010:13; see Den Heyer 2002:178-181; Borg 1994b:25-27). If this criterion is consistently applied, Jesus will as a matter of course be stripped of his Jewishness, on the one hand, and end up not having had any impact on the early church whatsoever, on the other (cf. Telford 1994:58; Witherington III 1995:46; Theissen & Merz 1998:8; cf. also Kloppenborg 2005:16; Casey 2010:104). Scholars now believe that to deny any continuity between Jesus and his Jewish world, on the one hand, or between Jesus and the early church, on the other, is anachronistic, unhistorical, unscientific, illogical and irresponsible. In view of our current theme, the consistent application of the criterion of double dissimilarity would result in a Jesus that is neither a wisdom preacher nor an apocalyptic prophet. Yet, the criterion of (double) dissimilarity did not disappear altogether (cf. Wright 1996:86; 2002:33-34). Researchers agree that it still has a (more limited) application. More specifically, if utilised correctly, the criterion of double dissimilarity points to those aspects that made Jesus unique, without stripping him of his Jewishness or his value for the early church (cf. Telford 1994:67; cf. also Casey 2010:104). At Jesus-Seminar meetings, Funk referred to this new application of the older criterion as the criterion of “(double) distinctiveness” (cf. Miller 1999:75). Applied to the ethics of Jesus, it indicates that he was both completely obedient to the Torah and creative enough to interpret these commandments in his own way, which brought him into conflict with certain Jewish groups, like perhaps the Pharisees. Despite his piety, he dined with sinners. The ethics of the historical Jesus might indeed be found in these unique aspects of his teaching. On the other hand, the ethics of the historical Jesus must always be understood and interpreted in light of their Jewishness. Apart from Aramaic, ethnicity and double dissimilarity, other criteria have also stood the test of time (see Telford 1994:67-68). Most important out of these are arguably the criterion of multiple independent attestation and the criterion of embarrassment (cf. Casey 2010:13, 102-105).
A brand new criterion was created, commonly referred to as the criterion of “historical plausibility” (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:11; Van Aarde 2004b:428; see Casey 2010:106-108). This criterion takes as its starting point not the uniqueness of Jesus, but his rootedness in Jewish culture of the time. It does this by asking two simple questions: “Given his environment, is it historically plausible that Jesus did or said this or the other within his lifetime?” and: “Is it possible to explain and clarify the rise of the early church from this tradition?” In a sense, this criterion is the polar opposite of the criterion of double dissimilarity.

New methodologies invariably lead to new results. The general consensus that Jesus was an eschatological prophet, which had governed historical-Jesus studies since the time of Schweitzer, started to wane (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:7, 18-19, 69; Borg, in Miller 2001:31; cf. also Miller 2001:10; Frey 2011:17; see Patterson 1998a:164-184; Patterson, in Miller 2001:69-70). The belief that Jesus’ eschatology was not future-oriented began gaining a lot of ground. This idea was not new. As we saw, Dodd had already held such a view, expressed by the term “realised eschatology.” Also the idea that Jesus’ eschatology was not temporal at all was expressed long ago by a number of scholars, most notably by Hans Conzelmann (cf. Patterson 1998a:174-175; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70; Den Heyer 2002:100-102). These a-temporal and non-futurist interpretations of Jesus’ eschatology started receiving a lot of support in the 1980’s. Recent polls of American historical-Jesus scholars indicate that a great majority of them have left behind the older consensus of an apocalyptic Jesus (see Patterson 1998a:170-171). This trend is the result of both deconstructionist and re-constructionist developments within New-Testament studies. Regarding the former, the material on which the eschatological Jesus was traditionally based came under fire. More precisely, the authenticity of the apocalyptic traditions in Q, Mark and Paul was increasingly approached with suspicion (cf. Patterson 1998a:172). These results were part of a movement in historical-Jesus studies called the Renewed Quest, which should be differentiated from another movement called the Third Quest (see section 1.3.7 below). Before distinguishing between these two quests, let us first look at the developments that led to the Renewed Quest’s abandonment of the eschatological Jesus.
1.3.2 The Son of Man

The older consensus of an apocalyptic Jesus was essentially based on four aspects (cf. Borg 1994a:8): (1) The general atmosphere of crisis betrayed by the gospels; (2) The Son-of-Man sayings, all of which were thought to predict the imminent coming of the Son of Man; (3) The sayings about the kingdom of God; (4) The expectation by the early church that the eschatological end would occur within their lifetimes. Out of these, the logia about the Son of Man were most central and foundational for an eschatological image of Jesus (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:52; cf. also Wink 2002:164; Van Aarde 2004b:424).

Just before and especially during the Renewed Quest, it became increasingly accepted by American (and a few other) scholars that the futuristic and apocalyptic Son-of-Man logia were not authentic, but were created by the early church after Easter in expectation of the second coming of Christ (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:8, 51, 52, 84-86; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70-71; cf. also Theissens & Merz 1998:245; cf. e.g. Burkett 1999:124; see e.g. Crossan 1991:254-256; Van Aarde 2004b). This development is clearly demonstrated by noting that the coming and suffering Son-of-Man logia consistently received eighty percent grey or black votes at the 1988 spring meeting of the Jesus Seminar (cf. Borg 1994a:15 n. 13; 1994b:18; Miller 1999:24; Burkett 1999:80). Some scholars believe that the inauthenticity of the apocalyptic Son-of-Man logia is evidenced by their apparent absence in the earliest stage of the Sayings Gospel Q (see Burkett 1999:79-80). With the Son-of-Man logia and the futurist aspects of Jesus’ eschatology moved aside, the way was cleared for scholars to interpret the kingdom-of-God logia non-eschatologically, particularly because the respective terms “Son of Man” and “kingdom of God” do not appear together in the same sayings (cf. Borg 1994a:8, 53-57, 86-88; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70-71; see Wink 2002:161-163). Likewise, the early church’s expectation of an imminent end (point 4 above) could now be explained as a consequence of the Easter event, as opposed to the preaching of Jesus (cf. e.g. Borg 1994a:57-59, 78-79; Borg, in Miller 2001:38). Lastly, the atmosphere of crisis in the Synoptic gospels (point 1 above) could now be attributed to the effect of the subversive wisdom of Jesus, as opposed to an expectation of an imminent end (cf. e.g. Borg 1994a:59, 89). Thus, the four pillars on which the apocalyptic Jesus was built started to collapse.
In order to fully appreciate these developments, it is necessary to take a very brief look at the history of Son-of-Man research. Throughout the patristic and Medieval periods, three interpretations of the term “Son of Man” persisted (mostly) unchallenged (see esp. Burkett 1999:3, 6-12; Müller 2008:9-31, 53-92; cf. also Lukaszewski 2011:1): (1) The term “Son of Man” was a title for Jesus that expressed his human nature (cf. e.g. *Adv. Prax.* 2; *Adv. Haer.* 3.19.1; cf. Wink 2002:19). (2) The term implied that Jesus was the genealogical son of a historical figure, most commonly Adam and/or Mary (cf. e.g. *Against Eunomius* III, I, 91; *On the Incarnation Against Apollinarus* I, 8; *Oration* 30, 21). Regardless of his or her actual identity, the notion that the term implied a historical figure provided additional support to the idea that the human nature of Jesus was being conveyed by the term “Son of Man.” (3) The term was derived from Daniel 7:13, which, it was believed, predicted the parousia of Jesus and his role as apocalyptic judge (cf. e.g. *Adv. Mc.* IV, 10, 9; *Dial.* 31, 1; 76, 1; *Adv. Mc.* IV, 10, 12; Hippolytus’ Commentary on Daniel IV, 10, 2). Thus, the term “Son of Man” was believed to denote the human nature of Christ and to connote his role as apocalyptic judge at the parousia (see Epistle to Rheginos 44:11-33; 46:14-18; see Vorster 1986:211-228, esp. 218).

After the Reformation, some interpreters sought to uncover the Semitic phrase that lay “underneath” the Greek ὄ νεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, appealing mostly to Semitic idioms like “son of man” (נִחָוּ, רֶה), “son of Adam” (נִחָוּ, רֶה) and “that man” (נִחָוּ, רֶה) (see esp. Burkett 1999:4, 13-21; Müller 2008:93-114; cf. also Lukaszewski 2011:2). These interpreters soon realised that the Semitic expression “son of” denoted membership in a group and that whatever followed specified the group. The Semitic term “son of man,” therefore, merely meant “man.” It followed that the term, as it appeared in the New Testament, did not refer back to a specific individual like Mary or Adam, but nonetheless expressed the humanity of Jesus (see e.g. Bucer 1527; Zwingli 1531; Beza 1559; Grotius 1641). As an expression of Jesus’ humanity, most interpreters also saw an element of lowliness in the term, whether it be lowliness of social class or of human nature in

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6 A fourth interpretation could be added: Gnostics believed that the term portrayed Jesus as the divine son of the god Anthropos (Ἀνθρώπος) (cf. Burkett 1999:6; see Müller 2008:32-52). This view died out with the death of Gnosticism and was not fundamental to later interpretations.

7 As opposed to the term “Son of God,” which expressed his divine nature (cf. Burkett 1999:7; Müller 2008:13).
general (cf. Müller 2008:99; see Burkett 1999:14-17). Conversely, other scholars believed that the initial article in the term stressed the Son of Man’s superiority, uniqueness and/or idealness (see Burkett 1999:17-19). In different ways, both of these views would go on to become a perfect fit for philosophers and liberal theologians of the Old Quest, who saw Jesus as the ideal example and perfect representative of history’s and humanity’s ultimate goal (see section 1.2.1 above; see Burkett 1999:18-20; Müller 2008:130-152). Despite these linguistic efforts, some scholars continued the tradition that the term “Son of Man” referenced Daniel 7:13 (cf. Müller 2008:101, 106). The main divergence from earlier interpretations was that “Son of Man” now became a messianic title that Jesus had applied to himself (see e.g. Chemnitz 1586). Although there was no shortage of novel interpretations after the Reformation, only three became widespread (see Müller 2008:93-114): (1) The term does not refer back to a particular individual, but still expresses the humanity of Jesus. (2) The term derives from Daniel 7:13 and functions as a messianic title for Jesus. (3) The term is not a title for Jesus at all and conveys a Semitic idiom by which someone could refer back to her- or himself. A few less-popular interpretations appealed to the use of the term “son of man” in Ezekiel and Psalms (cf. Müller 2008:99).

The most popular view of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries continued to be that the term “Son of Man” expressed the humanity of Jesus. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, an ever-increasing number of scholars began supporting the theory that the term “Son of Man” was a messianic title for Jesus, based on Daniel 7:13 (see Müller 2008:120-127, 140-176, 207-215; see e.g. Scholten 1809). By the end of the nineteenth century, this was the dominant view (cf. Burkett 1999:24, 69; see e.g. Holtzmann 1897). A host of scholars were hard-pressed to relinquish the previous view that focussed on Jesus’ humanity (see Müller 2008:128-130). Some of these latter scholars simply combined the emerging consensus with the former view that concentrated on the humanity of Jesus (cf. Burkett 1999:25; see e.g. Harnack 1907). For some of them, like Beyschlag (1891-92), “Messiah” and “Son of Man” were synonymous, both designating a human, earthly Messiah (see Müller 2008:120-127, 156). Like earlier, either the lowly or the superior connotations of the term could be
emphasised, only this time in specific reference to the Messiah (see e.g. De Wette 1836; Neander 1837).

After translations of 1 Enoch had become available in 1821, apocalyptic interpretations of the term “Son of Man” started gaining momentum (see Burkett 1999:26-31; Müller 2008:152-189). The Similitudes of Enoch, an ancient writing contained in 1 Enoch (chapters 37-71), also featured the term “Son of Man” and described this figure as a pre-existent, heavenly creature whose main function was to act as judge at the apocalyptic event (see Hannah 2011). Since the writing was generally thought to pre-date Christianity, scholars started believing that such an idea of the Son of Man was prevalent in the Judaism of Jesus’ time and that Jesus had adopted this idea and had applied it to himself (see Burkett 1999:4, 22-31; Müller 2008:177-189, 250-262, 273-268). This is sometimes called the “Son-of-Man concept” (Menschensohnbegriff), which Casey (2009:16) defines as the modern scholarly view that “Jews at the time of Jesus expected the coming of a glorious figure, the ‘Son of man’. ” The Son-of-Man concept was built primarily on the Similitudes of Enoch, but once established, it was read into other works as well, especially 4 Ezra 13 and Daniel 7:13 (cf. Burkett 1999:27; see e.g. Beyschlag 1866:9-34). Thus, Daniel 7:13 was understood by many scholars of this period as the end result of an emerging Son-of-Man concept in Judaism (see Müller 2008:349-351). Some scholars even went so far as to extract a long list of traits from various non-Jewish sources and use these traits to construct a supernatural, apocalyptic, composite Son-of-Man character underlying Daniel 7:13 (see Müller 2008:237-262, 276, 345-348, 351-354; see e.g. Mowinckel 1951).

The inevitable effect of all this was that the mortal Son of Man gave way to an apocalyptic Son of Man (cf. Burkett 1999:4). The Son of Man was still primarily seen as the Messiah, only now this expected Messiah was an apocalyptic judge instead of a this-worldly saviour (cf. Müller 2008:261-262, 418). Thus, the notion became established that Jesus had used the expression “Son of Man” in order to associate himself with the heavenly Messiah of contemporary apocalyptic texts, who would visit earth at the apocalypse not only to judge humanity, but also to substitute the current world-order with
God’s transcendent kingdom (cf. Burkett 1999:27, 70). This interpretation became increasingly popular from the 1850s onward and established itself as the predominant view among scholars throughout the first sixty years of the twentieth century (see Müller 2008:177, 182, 261-262, 272-286, 418; Burkett 1999:4, 29, 97). The influence of this line of interpretation on historical-Jesus research is nowhere more obvious than in the fact that both Johannes Weiss (1892) and Albert Schweitzer (1906) adopted it (cf. Burkett 1999:28, 30-31, 33, 45; Müller 2008:177, 186-187). It also became the assumption on which Son-of-Man scholarship after Schweitzer was built (cf. Burkett 1999:70; Müller 2008: 262; see below). During this time, it became customary to distinguish between apocalyptic and non-apocalyptic Son-of-Man logia.

Bultmann ([1921] 1968:112, 122, 128, 150-152) followed earlier suggestions and voiced the opinion that Jesus did not have himself in view when he spoke of the Son of Man (see Burkett 1999:37-38; Müller 2008:142, 166-168, 212-215; 287; cf. also Van Aarde 2004b:425-426). He expected the coming of another figure, seeing as he always spoke of the Son of Man in the third person. Bultmann also followed previous proposals when he divided the Son-of-Man logia into three distinct groups: (1) those that speak of the Son of Man as “coming;” (2) those that speak of the Son of Man as suffering, dying and rising again; and (3) those that speak of the Son of Man as being at work now already (cf. Edwards 1976:35; Sim 1985:233; Burkett 1999:43; Wink 2002:63; Müller 2008:264). From the first group of sayings, only those that differentiated between Jesus and the apocalyptic Son of Man were authentic. These sayings contained Jesus’ own apocalyptic predictions of the future coming of someone else, namely the Son of Man (cf. Burkett 1999:45). The early church then appropriated these sayings to Jesus himself. This valuation of the first group of sayings betrays Bultmann’s approval of the Son-of-Man concept (cf. Müller 2008:249, 346-347; Casey 2009:27). According to Bultmann, the second group of sayings was entirely created by the early church, seeing as (1) they could be distinguished from the first group, (2) they were absent from Q, and (3) they only made sense as retrospective theological assertions. The third group of sayings might have been authentic, but operated in a non-titular sense. The early church later turned these idiomatic occurrences of the Semitic expression “Son of Man” into a title for Jesus.
In other words, even though these sayings might be authentic, their usage of “Son of Man” as a title for the earthly Jesus was not. Ultimately, the only sayings that were deemed authentic in their titular usage of the expression “Son of Man” were apocalyptic in nature. After Bultmann’s 1921 proposal, most scholars agreed that only (some of) the apocalyptic sayings were authentic (see e.g. Tödt 1959; Jeremias 1967; cf. Burkett 1999:38; Wink 2002:193; see Müller 2008:284-291). A few scholars accepted the apocalyptic consensus without discarding the present or suffering Son-of-Man logia (see Burkett 1999:33-34, 46-50). In other words, these scholars argued for the authenticity of all the Son-of-Man logia, but seen through the apocalyptic paradigm. They achieved this by suggesting (1) that the earthly Jesus used the phrase proleptically; (2) that Jesus combined Daniel 7:13 with Isaiah 53 and revised the term to include his earthly ministry and his suffering; (3) that Jesus stayed true to Daniel 7:13, in which the Son of Man is both an apocalyptic and a suffering figure; or (4) that Jesus used all the Son-of-Man sayings with the same unifying theme in mind, like, for example, his authority.

From the middle of the twentieth century, many scholars started abandoning the apocalyptic consensus just described (cf. Müller 2008:326; see Burkett 1999:75-76). This was the result of three developments. The first of these was the research done on the idiomatic usage of the term in Aramaic (see Burkett 1999:82-96). As we have seen, the Semitic usage of the term “Son of Man” had already received attention during the Reformation, leading some scholars to argue that it was not a title, but simply a generic or indefinite term that meant “man” or “someone” (see e.g. Grotius 1641). Other scholars of that period argued that the Semitic expression was the way in which Jesus spoke of himself in the third person (see e.g. Camerarius 1572). Thus, the term was plainly used as a circumlocution for “I” or “myself.” Bolten (1792) was the first scholar to propose that the Syriac term “Son of Man” could simultaneously be used in a generic sense, meaning “man” or “humanity,” and in an indefinite sense, meaning “a man” or “someone” (cf. Müller 2008:118). In 1894, Eerdmans (1894:153-176) revived older views, but this time with more knowledge about the Aramaic term אֶלֶגֶב at his disposal.

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8 Tödt’s acceptance of Bultmann’s position had a profound impact on subsequent Q scholarship (see below). Tödt divided the Q Son-of-Man sayings into “coming” and “present” logia and argued that the latter group was secondary (see Müller 2008:403).
On linguistic grounds, he was able to argue, firstly, that the Aramaic term אַנְשֶׁהָב simply meant “man,” secondly, that Jesus used it as a circumlocution for “I,” and, thirdly, that it could not have been a messianic title in either Daniel 7:13 or the teachings of the historical Jesus (cf. Müller 2008:191). In the same year, Wellhausen (1894:312 n. 1) made the very same argument independently of Eerdmans, pointing out that Jesus spoke Aramaic and that the Aramaic term אַנְשֶׁהָב could not mean anything other than “der Mensch,” which Jesus used to reference himself in the third person (cf. Müller 2008:191; Lukaszewski 2011:2).

Wellhausen and Eerdmans managed to win over a few scholars (see e.g. Lietzmann 1896; Meyer 1896; Schmidt 1896), but the apocalyptic consensus still reigned supreme. Those who accepted the Aramaic explanation argued either for the generic-indefinite or the circumlocutional usage of the term by Jesus, although some scholars did combine the two (cf. Burkett 1999:89-90; see Lukaszewski 2011:2-6). What almost all these scholars had in common were the views that the original term could not have meant “Messiah” and that the early church had created the sayings that use the term “Son of Man” in a titular, messianic-apocalyptic sense (cf. Burkett 1999:45). These results were contested by Dalman (1898) and Fiebig (1901), who both argued from the original Aramaic that the term “Son of Man” often referred to a single individual and that it was used by Jesus as a self-designation in specific reference to Daniel 7:13 (see Müller 2008:197-199, 202-204; Lukaszewski 2011:4-5). Most scholars of the time were convinced by the results of Dalman and Fiebig, possibly because it gave additional support to the reigning apocalyptic consensus (see Müller 2008:205-206). As a result, suggestions that the term “Son of Man” originally operated in a circumlocutional, generic or indefinite sense disappeared almost entirely. For more than sixty years, the conclusions by Dalman and Fiebig prevailed as the mainstream philological solution to the Son-of-Man problem, contributing hugely to the proposals of both Weiss and Schweitzer (cf. Lukaszewski 2008:5; see Müller 2008:207-212).
This status quo was “rectified” in 1967 by an academic article of Geza Vermes, which caused a watershed in Son-of-Man scholarship (cf. Müller 2008:264, 311). He surveyed the utilisation of בֵּן נַאַו in a much broader range of ancient texts than anyone before him had done (cf. esp. Casey 2009:33; cf. also Burkett 1999:86; Müller 2008:311; Lukaszewski 2011:7). This survey convinced him not only that the Aramaic term בֵּן נַאַו functioned as a circumlocution for the personal pronoun “I,” but also that it had no titular usage or significance before the emergence of Christianity (cf. Borg 1994a:53; Theissen & Merz 1998:9; Wink 2002:252; Van Aarde 2004b:425; see Müller 2008:311-313). The most important result of Vermes’ study for our purposes was that it convinced a great number of scholars that the expression “Son of Man” originated from a non-titular, Aramaic term and that it was not used by Jesus in an apocalyptic manner (cf. Müller 2008:317). Instead, these scholars agreed that all the gospel texts that reference or allude to Daniel 7:13 are inauthentic. The “circumlocution theory” was taken over, modified and presented anew by a number of prominent scholars in the field, including Müller (1984), Schwartz (1986) and Hare (1990). However, not all scholars were convinced by Vermes’ suggestion that בֵּן נַאַו simply meant “I,” instead preferring a generic and/or indefinite explanation (see e.g. Colpe 1969). Nonetheless, other aspects of Vermes’ investigation did indeed convince almost every scholar in this field and are still accepted today (cf. Borg 1994a:53; Lukaszewski 2011:8-9). Casey (2009:33-34), for example, agrees not only that most of his examples are indeed working examples of the idiomatic use of the term בֵּן אַיָּא, but also that the definite and indefinite forms of the expression are interchangeable (cf. Lukaszewski 2011:7; Müller 2008:264, 314; see section 3.1.2 below). Also, many scholars still accept his understanding of the circumstances under which this idiom was most commonly used in Aramaic texts: “In most instances the sentence contains an allusion to humiliation, danger, or death, but there are also examples

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9 Colpe (1969) took the investigation of Vermes further by expanding the base of ancient Aramaic texts even more and surveying the entire Son-of-Man problem. This colossal investigation led Colpe (1969:406) to the following important conclusion: “A speaker could include himself in בֵּן אַיָּא as well as (א)יָא, whose generic sense was always apparent, or he could refer to himself and yet generalise at the same time.” This is an almost identical proposal to the one made by Grotius in 1641 (cf. Müller 2008:103). Unfortunately, Colpe bought into the Son-of-Man concept and therefore failed to make much use of this important discovery in his attempts to explain the teachings of Jesus. Nonetheless, the realisation that the Aramaic term אַיָא could, and usually did, simultaneously present both levels of meaning convinced a number of scholars, including Casey.
where references to the self in the third person is dictated by humility or modesty” (Vermes 1967:327; cf. Casey 2009:33-34; cf. also Lukaszewski 2011:7). Lindars (1980; 1981; 1983; 1985), Bauckham (1985), Casey (1987; 2009), Kearns (1988) and Crossan (1991) are among the scholars who took Vermes’ study further, but replaced his “circumlocution theory” with explanations that focused on the generic and/or indefinite use(s) of the term (see esp. Burkett 1999:90-92; Müller 2008:317-325; cf. also Lukaszewski 2011:8-9; Williams 2011:62; see sections 3.1.2 & 3.1.3 below). Thus, we still have this division today between scholars who prefer the “circumlocution theory” and those who prefer the “generic and/or indefinite theory.” At the moment, the latter seems to have the upper hand (cf. Burkett 1999:86-87; Wink 2002:252; Müller 2008:322). Despite this division, these scholars all tend to regard the future, apocalyptic Son-of-Man logia as inauthentic.

The second (concurrent) development that led to the rejection of the apocalyptic Son-of-Man consensus by numerous scholars was that the Son-of-Man concept started receiving severe criticism during the 1960s (cf. Müller 2008:264-265; see Burkett 1999:68-81). Already in the nineteenth century, a number of scholars had criticised the Son-of-Man concept on mainly two fronts: (1) The term “Son of Man” was not a fixed title in contemporary Judaism and did not feature as such in Daniel, 1 Enoch or 4 Ezra 13. Rather, it only became a title with the emergence of Christianity. (2) The canonical gospels consistently give the impression that the term “Son of Man” was not a known title at the time of Jesus or shortly thereafter. In the nineteenth century, the first objection was successfully challenged by contesting the non-titular interpretation of the Son-of-Man expression in 1 Enoch. The second objection was challenged by suggesting that the title was only known in a few limited circles. The 1960s criticism against the Son-of-Man concept was more successful (see Burkett 1999:70-76). The discovery of 1 Enoch at Qumran had a huge impact on the dating of the Similitudes of Enoch. Eleven copies of 1 Enoch were found, some in Greek and other in Aramaic, but not one of these included the Similitudes of Enoch (cf. Müller 2008:337). Resultantly, there was no other choice but to date the Similitudes of Enoch to a period no earlier than 70 CE (cf. Burkett

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10 These works represent a major change of mind from his earlier views (see Lindars 1975-76).
1999:72). Supporting this later date was the fact that not one Jewish or Christian work before the fifth century referenced or alluded to the Similitudes of Enoch, even though they do reference the rest of 1 Enoch with great regularity. Thus, the key text on which the Son-of-Man concept was constructed could no longer support it. A later dating of the Similitudes of Enoch meant that this text must have been dependent on Daniel 7:13 (cf. Müller 2008:339). In turn, such dependence indicated that the Similitudes of Enoch did not provide independent attestation of a Son-of-Man concept alongside Daniel 7:13.

The Son-of-Man concept was further criticised in an article by Perrin (1966), which convincingly demonstrated that the Son of Man was not a title in any of the three key writings used to validate the Son-of-Man concept (cf. Wink 2002:21; Van Aarde 2004b:426). Both the texts of 4 Ezra 13 and the Similitudes of Enoch were dependent upon Daniel 7:13 and, like the latter, did not use the term in a titular sense (cf. Wink 2002:53, 56-57, 59). Rather, the apocalyptic imagery of Daniel 7, which included the symbolic Son of Man, was used creatively and unreservedly by subsequent authors (cf. Burkett 1999:97; Müller 2008:355). It followed for Perrin that even if the Similitudes of Enoch could be dated to a time before the rise of Christianity, it would still not provide any evidence for a widely-known, cohesive Son-of-Man concept at the time of Jesus or the evangelists. Rather, the apocalyptic material based on Daniel 7:13 all attest to a wide range of divergent ideas. In his 1968 article entitled “Der apocalyptische Menschensohn ein theologisches Phantom,” Leivestad independently came to the same results as Perrin, thereby rejecting the Son-of-Man concept and affirming that the main texts utilised to develop this concept did not use the term “Son of Man” as a title (cf. Burkett 1999:75; Müller 2008:357). Perrin and Leivestad managed to convince a great number of scholars (cf. Müller 2008:356, 358-359). The final nail in the Son-of-Man concept’s coffin was when Geza Vermes (1967) indicated that the wide range of Aramaic sources he had inspected never use the expression “Son of Man” (ššìnô bêô) as a title for some kind of apocalyptic or messianic figure (cf. Müller 2008:311). This usage first appears in the writings of the early church. All these factors contributed to the abandonment of the Son-

11 The English translation of this article received a title that subsequently became just as well known as the initial German title: “Exit the Apocalyptic Son of Man” (see Leivestad 1971-72).
of-Man concept by most scholars of the time (cf. Müller 2008:342-343; cf. e.g. Dodd 1966:475; Winter 1968:784). Yet, not all scholars have discarded the idea and a few continue to defend it even to this day (cf. Müller 2008:355, 363-364; see Burkett 1999:76-78, 97, 109-114). Moreover, the rejection of a Son-of-Man concept does not necessarily mean the rejection of an apocalyptic understanding and application of the term “Son of Man” by Jesus (see Burkett 1999:78-79). Some scholars argue that Jesus himself used the term in reference to Daniel 7:13 and created a title either for himself or for another apocalyptic figure (see Müller 2008:369-372).

The third development that led to the widespread rejection of the apocalyptic Son of Man was that a number of scholars had started doubting the authenticity of the Son-of-Man sayings in toto. Some such voices had already appeared sporadically before the 1960s (see Burkett 1999:50-56). Volkmar (1876:197-200), for example, had noticed that the expression “Son of Man” was entirely absent from Paul’s writings and concluded that they were not authentic. Wrede (1904) argued that the peculiar use of the third person in Son-of-Man logia would make most natural sense if it were the early church that spoke about Jesus on his behalf (see Burkett 1999:39-42). In 1927, Case argued that it would make much more historical sense of the data if Jesus had not used the term at all, neither in reference to himself nor to someone else. In 1940, Grant argued that for Jesus to have seen himself as the type of apocalyptic figure described by Enoch, he could not have been of sound mind. For the most part, however, these suggestions fell on deaf ears. It was mentioned in section 1.2.4 above that Käsemann argued for a discontinuity between the non-apocalyptic message of Jesus, on the one hand, and the apocalyptic messages of John the Baptist and the early church, on the other. This view convinced Käsemann (1954:125-153) that Jesus never proclaimed or awaited a figure like the Son of Man – amidst other apocalyptic images. In Käsemann’s opinion, the Son-of-Man sayings betrayed the Christological considerations of the early church after Easter and infiltrated the Jesus tradition by way of Christian prophets speaking on Jesus’ behalf (cf. Burkett 1999:53).

12 Although the pre-Pauline formula (τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ [ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν]) in 1 Thessalonians 1:10 might indeed be an allusion to the Son of Man.
The first genuine threat to the authenticity of all the Son-of-Man sayings appeared in the works of Vielhauer (1957:51-79; 1963:133-177). He realised that the term “kingdom of God” and the term “Son of Man” did not appear together in sayings that could realistically be considered authentic (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:54; 64 n. 25; Patterson 1998a:174; Patterson, in Miller 2001:71; cf. also Edwards 1976:108; Theissen & Merz 1998:549-550; Burkett 1999:53-54; Müller 2008:292). According to Vielhauer, this was because these traditions did not originally or naturally belong together in contemporary Jewish thought. The Son-of-Man concept had to do with a future ideal that someone would come and save the day, while the kingdom sayings had to do with a present ideal that God was the king of our daily lives. Since Vielhauer, like most, held that the kingdom of God was central to the preaching of the historical Jesus, the Son-of-Man tradition was logically approached with suspicion. Consequently, Vielhauer (1957:51-79) surgically removed all but one (Mat. 24:37-39) of the Son-of-Man logia from the preaching of the historical Jesus in his tradition-historical analysis of the sources (cf. esp. Burkett 1999:54; cf. also Wink 2002:21; Van Aarde 2004b:426; see Patterson, in Miller 2001:70-71). Perrin (1966:17-28) agreed with Vielhauer that all the Son-of-Man sayings were inauthentic and sought to illustrate how the early church created the term through the midrashic exegesis of Jewish texts – which was not dissimilar to the “pesher” methodology of text analysis employed at Qumran (cf. Hurtado 2011:168-169; see Burkett 1999:54-56).

It was mentioned that Conzelmann argued for an a-temporal view of Jesus’ eschatology (see sections 1.2.4 & 1.3.1 above). This conviction compelled also Conzelmann (1957, esp. 281-288) to dispose of the “redundant” Son-of-Man figure (cf. Patterson 1998a:174-175; Van Aarde 2004b:425). We have seen that Leivestad (1968:49-105) came to the same results as Perrin in rejecting the Son-of-Man concept. However, as a response to Vielhauer, Leivestad argued that at least some of the Son-of-Man sayings must be authentic, seeing as they are only found in the mouth of Jesus himself in the gospels and they are absent from both Acts (bar 7:56) and the canonical epistles. Why would the term “Son of Man” appear in such a large number of logia attributed to Jesus (and only Jesus) if it had almost no real significance as a title or designation of Jesus in the early
church (cf. Wink 2002:21)? Perrin (1967:164-206) took this as his queue and made a suggestion that would prove to be of lasting influence. He suggested that the coming and the suffering Son-of-Man sayings (i.e. Bultmann’s first two groups) were not authentic, since they represented the conviction by the early church that the crucified and resurrected Jesus would come again to vindicate his followers and judge their opponents (cf. Borg 1994a:52; Wink 2002:255). Resultantly, only the logia that speak of the Son of Man as being at work in the present (i.e. Bultmann’s third group of sayings) should be regarded as authentic words of Jesus. The arguments of Vielhauer, Conzelmann, Leivestad and Perrin were subsequently adopted by many scholars of the Renewed Quest and contributed hugely to the abandonment of not only the apocalyptic Son of Man, but also the apocalyptic Jesus of history (cf. Burkett 1999:56, 79, 124; see Patterson, in Miller 2001:70-71; Wink 2002:164-165; cf. e.g. Borg 1994a:8, 52).

1.3.3 The parables of Jesus

The developments in Son-of-Man research represent the greatest “deconstructionist” reason why the apocalyptic Jesus started losing headway before and during the Renewed Quest. The “re-constructionist” reason why the eschatological portrait of Jesus started losing ground was the fact that a new picture of Jesus – one that could replace the eschatological picture – started to emerge (see Miller 1999; see also Frey 2011:17-18). The emerging picture of Jesus was that of a wisdom teacher (see Borg 1994b:17-19). This new picture was a direct result of the new methodology in Jesus research (described above), as well as new developments and discoveries in mainly four separate, but interdependent, fields of New-Testament research. The first of these was the research done on the parables of Jesus (cf. Borg 1994b:19; Patterson, in Miller 2001:71; see also Allison 2010:116-117). As early as the time when the gospels were written, the parables of Jesus had been interpreted allegorically. Although some individuals, like Tertullian and Martin Luther, had protested against this hermeneutical practice, the tradition of interpreting them in this way continued throughout the patristic period, the Middle Ages

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13 Crossan is an example of a scholar that, although firmly placed within the Renewed Quest, leaves enough room for (some form of) eschatology in the life and message of Jesus (see section 1.3.7 below).
and the Reformation (see Snodgrass 2005:248-250). This practice made the parables vulnerable to a number of illegitimate interpretations.

Adolf Jülicher was the first to present a systematic, well-argued case against the allegorical interpretation of the parables, with great success (cf. Laughery 1986:2; Patterson, in Miller 2001:71; see Snodgrass 2005:250-252). Jülicher (1888; 1899) argued that Jesus did not make use of allegory at all; neither did his parables include any features that could be defined as being allegorical. Rather, Jesus told stories with direct comparisons from everyday life that were easy to understand and self-evident. Whenever the gospel parables contained allegory or allegorical features, the evangelists had, according to Jülicher, invented them. In his view, each parable enunciated only one generally-valid maxim – a pious moralism revealing some or other feature about God’s involvement in the world. C. H. Dodd (1935) believed that the parables were essentially about a “realised eschatology” (see section 1.2.3 above). Influenced by the work of Jülicher, Dodd argued that the evangelists had at times reoriented and reapplied the original parable message of a “realised eschatology” to either a message centred on futuristic eschatology or a message centred on an ethical application. Dodd (1935:16) also put forward a very handy definition of a parable: “At its simplest the parable is [1] a metaphor or simile [2] drawn from nature or common life, [3] arresting the hearer by its vividness or strangeness, and [4] leaving the mind in sufficient doubt about its precise application to tease it into active thought.” A number of subsequent scholars have found this definition useful in their individual discussions of the parable enigma (see Funk 1966:133-162; Patterson 1998a:120-131).

Joachim Jeremias (1947) built and expanded upon Dodd’s work by applying form-critical techniques to the parables and illustrating how they grew in stages from the time of Jesus onwards (cf. Edwards 1976:13). During the period of No Quest, Jeremias believed that the way forward was to find the Aramaic sayings of Jesus hidden beneath the gospel accounts. He claimed to have found the original words of Jesus specifically in the parables, the Marcan texts that speak about the sporadic coming of God’s kingdom (cf. Mark 1:14-15), and in Jesus’ use of the words “abba” and “amen.” With regards to the
parables, the Aramaic Urtext behind the gospel accounts were reconstructed to reveal earlier versions that were not tainted by allegorical features or Christological reflections. Jeremias believed, like most scholars of the time, that the parables were predominantly about the imminent coming of God’s kingdom (cf. Borg 1994b:19; cf. also Allison 2005:101). These parables were not about an eschatology that had already been realised (as per Dodd). Rather, the eschatology proclaimed by the parables was in the process of realisation as the parables were being delivered (cf. Edwards 1976:35). By means of his parables, Jesus had, according to Jeremias, placed people in front of a crisis that demanded a decision to be made. The decision was either for or against the mercy of God, which was disclosed anew in the content of the parable itself. One can easily notice the affinities of Jeremias’ parable research with Bultmann’s overall paradigm. The parables were mainly about the imminent coming of God’s kingdom, but called for a decision for or against that kingdom in the moment of delivery. Despite his rootedness in the mindset of the No-Quest period, Jeremias’ suggestion that the parables were in the process of realisation as they were being delivered would have a major impact not only on subsequent parable research, but eventually also on the Renewed Quest.

Since about the sixties of the previous century, parable scholars started finding the historical and/or eschatological method of interpretation of former academia insufficient (see Snodgrass 2005:254-256). These latter approaches were thought to have disregarded the attractiveness and force of the parables. In order to prevent this tragedy, scholars diverted their attention to aesthetic and hermeneutical aspects of parable interpretation. These scholars approached the parables with interpretive tools from existentialism and linguistics. Amos Wilder (1964), for example, highlighted the poetic dimensions of the parables and emphasised their use of language (cf. Patterson 1998a:124-125, 175; Patterson, in Miller 2001:71). In his view, Jesus made use of parables to create a world that depicted his vision of reality so vividly that it could be enacted and experienced through imagination. These stories did not simply point towards another reality, but made that reality tangible through imagination and vivid language. Ernst Fuchs (1964) similarly saw parables as language events that had the power to effectuate the realities to which they pointed. By making use of parables, Jesus was able to apply God’s love to
sinners, make God’s kingdom present, and open his audience up to God’s reality (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:320). Yet, this collection of scholars were not principally important because of their analysis of any one parable. Rather, their significance lies in their general application of language to the analysis of Jesus’ parables.

All the parable scholars mentioned thus far laid the foundation for Robert Funk’s (1966) highly influential work on the parables of Jesus (see Snodgrass 2005:256-258). Funk saw parables as metaphors that only receive meaning when the audience is drawn into them. It logically follows that parables can not be reduced to just one specific meaning. Therefore, it is impossible to reduce all parables to either pious moralisms (as per Jülicher) or a solitary eschatological point (as per Dodd and Jeremias). According to Funk, a parable can never be discarded once its meaning has been extracted. The parable itself is the message. Funk (1966:161) defined parables as “pieces of everydayness [that] have an unexpected ‘turn’ in them which looks through the commonplace to a new view of reality.” This “new view of reality” is what Jesus understood as the kingdom of God. It follows that the kingdom of God is not something that is expected in the near future, but is something that comes into being as the parable is being heard for the first time (cf. Sanders 1975:5). According to Funk, the parables did not only point towards a new reality (i.e. the kingdom of God), but also created that alternative reality as they were being told (as per Wilder and Fuchs).

Similarly, Norman Perrin (1967) interpreted the parables of Jesus as describing a non-temporal, symbolic kingdom of God. Crossan (1973; 1977) also adopted and expanded Funk’s understanding of the parables (see esp. Laughery 1986; see also Patterson 1998a:176-177; Snodgrass 2005:257-258, 261-262). According to Crossan (1977, esp. 106), a parable is a “polyvalent narration,” by which he means that it is a “paradox formed into narrative.” As such, parables become metaphors for their own “hermeneutical multiplicity.” One can see the influence of Funk here, especially in Crossan’s insistence that parables are by their very nature polyvalent and paradoxical – so much so that any clear-cut summary of a parable’s supposed moral message would by definition miss the mark (cf. Laughery 1986:5). The subversive and paradoxical nature
of parables precludes the distillation of timeless truths from them. The parables are so subversive that they completely shatter reality, leaving almost no room for reconstruction (cf. Laughery 1986:6). Since parables do not point to alternative realities, with which to replace the one that has been shattered, the audience is left clueless and in the dark. The parables disorient their hearers, without any promise of reorienting them again. This is left up to the hearers themselves. Each parable that begins with the phrase “the kingdom of God is like…” ultimately fails in describing the kingdom, but succeeds in making people think for themselves (cf. Laughery 1986:7). In his 2012 monograph, Crossan brings many strands of earlier publications on the parables together. In this work, Crossan distinguishes between three types of parables: (1) “riddle parables;” (2) “example parables;” and (3) “challenge parables.” According to Crossan, Jesus’ parables are examples of “challenge parables.” These functioned as a “participatory pedagogy,” meaning that the audience actively participated in their own education – if you could call it that (cf. Crossan 2012:95). The purpose of Jesus’ “challenge parables,” Crossan (2012:134) reasons, was not only to subvert (for the sake of subverting), but ultimately also to shift paradigms and overturn fossilised views without the use of violence. The second part of his book is focused on making the case that the canonical gospels are themselves “megaparables” about Jesus (see Crossan 2012:6, 157-252, esp. 246). Over the years, Crossan’s work, in particular, on parables has had an enormous impact, not only on our understanding of these literary forms, but also on our understanding of the historical Jesus (cf. Laughery 1986:17).

There have also been scholars who have travelled in the opposite direction. Schmithals (1997b; 2008), for example, argued, on the one hand, that not all parables necessarily (just because they are parables), originated with the historical Jesus, and, on the other hand, that the earliest parables – those that are most likely to go back to Jesus – make use of apocalyptic and imminent eschatology, as opposed to wisdom (see also Allison 2010:117-118). Nonetheless, the developments of parable interpretation traced so far allowed scholars of the Renewed Quest not only to divorce the parables of Jesus from their eschatological and Christological contexts within the gospels, but also to interpret them as stories about a transcendent reality called the kingdom of God (cf. Patterson, in
Miller 2001:71). Thus, the historical Jesus made use of parables when he wanted to teach people about God’s other-worldly realm. Parables could be seen as weapons in the arsenal of a wisdom teacher. Scott (1989), for example, attempted to reconstruct the original structures of Jesus’ parables in order to discover how these parables challenge and subvert conventional wisdom (see Snodgrass 2005:263-264). Moreover, the parables actually bring the kingdom of God into existence as they are being narrated – the kingdom can not be more immediately present than that! The influence of this trajectory of parable interpretation on the sapiential view of Jesus can be seen most directly in Funk’s 1996 monograph, *Honest to Jesus*, which is a direct result of his parable studies and portrays Jesus as a Galilean sage. Crossan’s view of Jesus is also a direct result of his research on parables, among other things. One aspect that all of these sapiential readings of the parables have in common is a high regard for the authenticity of some of the non-apocalyptic parables in the Gospel of Thomas (see Meyer 2003:24-26) – a writing to which we currently turn.

### 1.3.4 The Gospel of Thomas

The second field of research that led directly to a sapiential understanding of Jesus was the research done on the Gospel of Thomas (cf. Koester 1992:7; Patterson, in Miller 2001:72; Meyer 2003:7; cf. also Telford 1994:73). In December of 1945, the Nag Hammadi manuscripts were discovered (see Den Heyer 2002:137-145; see also Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:79-85; Patterson 1998b:33-37; Hedrick 2010:3; see further DeConick 2008:13-15). Scholars of the time were in agreement that the Coptic manuscripts had derived from the fourth century CE and that they were Gnostic in nature. Apart from offering a description of the world in which the New Testament came into being, these Gnostic texts had little value for uncovering the historical Jesus. There was one exception, though: the Gospel of Thomas, sections of which were only starting to be published from 1957 onwards (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:82). The full text was finally published in 1959 (cf. Hedrick 2010:3). Some of the sayings betrayed remarkable similarity to the Oxyrhynchus papyri discovered in the period 1897-1905, which also contained only
sayings of Jesus (see DeConick 2008:14-15). Not much attention was paid to these papyri when first discovered, but their importance had now become paramount (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:84-85). It was soon discovered that a few of these Oxyrhynchus fragments were portions of the Gospel of Thomas. From internal evidence, it was determined that these fragments should be dated to no later than 140 CE (see esp. Turner 1962a:16-19; cf. also Hedrick 2010:2). This indicated not only that the Coptic Gospel of Thomas had been translated from Greek (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:81-82, 85; Hedrick 2010:3), but also that its roots could be traced back to no later than the first half of the second century CE, perhaps even as early as the first century. This valuation was buttressed by the realisation that, long before the fourth century, certain church fathers were well aware of a gospel supposedly written by the apostle Thomas (see esp. Turner 1962a:14-16; cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:78; see Hedrick 2010:1-2).

Before its publication, Quispel (1957:189-207) investigated the Gospel of Thomas by making use of source-critical methods and by relying on certain linguistic features. His findings would be very influential in subsequent research. He maintained that the Gospel of Thomas had no literary association with the canonical gospels, but represented an independent tradition of Jesus’ early logia. He also looked at certain apocrypha as possible sources. It did not take long for scholars to start doubting the results offered by Quispel (cf. DeConick 2008:16). In the early sixties, scholars became increasingly convinced that Quispel’s position was untenable. In its stead, they proposed that the gospel, like most of the findings at Nag Hammadi, was thoroughly Gnostic. From this they concluded that the gospel must be dated to a later time, and that it must have been dependent on the canonical gospels (see e.g. Turner 1962a:11-39, esp. 31-39; 1962b:79-116, esp. 113-114; cf. Robinson 1990:viii; see Patterson 1998b:65-66). A number of scholars tried to prove that the Gospel of Thomas could be compared to, or even identified with, one of the ancient Gnostic communities known to scholars – most notably the Naassene Gnostics (see e.g. Schoebel 1960) or the Valentinian Gnostics (see e.g. Gärtner 1961). When it became apparent that the Gospel of Thomas could not be made

14 Although this is not a given (cf. Hedrick 2010:7).
to cohere with these Gnostic movements, scholars changed their approach and started asking whether the gospel embodied a generic type of Gnosticism (cf. DeConick 2008:16-17). As they compared the Gospel of Thomas to other Gnostic texts, these scholars became increasingly aware of the “complication” that a number of important Gnostic themes, like that of the Demiurge, were entirely missing from the document (cf. Patterson 1998b:54; Meyer 2003:4). It became all the more apparent, on the one hand, that the Gospel of Thomas, although undoubtedly Gnostic in nature, was “less Gnostic” than the other Nag-Hammadi texts, and, on the other, that the gospel contained some sayings that were clearly not Gnostic at all, being influenced, rather, by other traditions.

Koester (1971) addressed this difficulty by arguing that the Gospel of Thomas was only in the early stages of becoming a Gnostic text. The document could be seen as a type of “precursor” to so-called “full-blown Gnosticism.” Koester argued further that the Gospel of Thomas was made up of at least two layers, one of which is undoubtedly Gnostic in nature, and another of which derives from the first century. Moreover, he argued that the original gospel was neither composed much later than the New Testament, nor in any way dependent on the canonical gospels. Koester (1971:139) realised that when individual sayings from the Gospel of Thomas are compared to their counterparts in the New Testament, many of them lack the secondary elaborations often found in the New Testament (see Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:86-87). Somewhat astonishingly, the parables contained in the Gospel of Thomas showed remarkable agreement in wording and content with Joachim Jeremias’ Aramaic reconstructions of the “original” Synoptic parables (cf. Snodgrass 2005:253; see also Patterson 1998b:72-73). In those cases where the traditions from Thomas showed similar signs of secondary elaboration, such development happened independently if compared to the New Testament (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:87; Patterson 1998b:73). Additionally, the Gospel of Thomas represented a genre that antedated the narrative genre of the canonical gospels (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:88; cf. also DeConick 2008:17). The Gospel of Thomas contained only the words of Jesus, and lacked any reference to his birth, life, crucifixion, resurrection and death. In fact, there were no narratives about Jesus at all – only his words (cf.
The Gospel of Thomas had this in common with the Sayings Gospel Q.

Koester also found that the two sayings gospels had something else in common: wisdom traditions seemed to underlie both (see Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:88, 94-95, 103). Whereas Q had developed from an original sapiential kernel into an apocalyptic document (see section 1.3.6 below), the Gospel of Thomas had developed from the same, or a very similar, kernel into a proto-Gnostic document.\(^{15}\) Hence, wisdom traditions lay behind both sayings gospels, with each individual document later growing in a different direction – Q became more apocalyptic and Thomas became more Gnostic (cf. DeConick 2008:19). The earlier layer identified by Koester as originating in the first century (see above) could now be equated with these wisdom traditions. Since both Q and Thomas made use of the same, or a similar, sayings tradition, and since the Corinthian community seems to have known some of these sayings (cf. 1 Cor. 1-4; see Meyer 2003:5-6; Hedrick 2010:12-13), Koester held that the earliest sapiential layer in the Gospel of Thomas received its final form in Palestine or Syria around 50 CE. Another factor that contributed to this early dating was the absence of the apocalyptic Son of Man from the Gospel of Thomas, but its presence in Q (cf. DeConick 2008:19).\(^{16}\) From all this, Koester argued that the historical Jesus was not an eschatological prophet, but a sage who taught with the power and authority of Lady Wisdom (a.k.a. Sophia) (cf. DeConick 2008:18, 19). Koester claimed that, according to the Gospel of Thomas, the salvific role of Jesus was not to be found in his death on the cross, his resurrection or his second coming, but in his wisdom (see Patterson 1998b:55-56; cf. Meyer 2003:4).

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\(^{15}\) The academic article in which Koester makes these arguments was published in the same journal as Robinson’s influential article on Q, entitled ΛΟΓΟΙ ΣΟΦΙΩΝ (see section 1.3.6 below).

\(^{16}\) The results of Koester were not sui generis, but were foreshadowed by other scholarly investigations from earlier periods. Montefiore (1962:40-78), for example, came to the following conclusion after comparing the synoptic parables with those in the Gospel of Thomas: “Thomas’s divergencies from synoptic parallels can be most satisfactorily explained on the assumption that he was using a source distinct from the Synoptic Gospels. Occasionally this source seems superior, especially inasmuch as it seems to be free from apocalyptic imagery, allegorical interpretation, and generalizing conclusions. The hypothesis that [sic] Thomas did not use the Synoptic Gospels as a source gains strength from a comparative study of the parables’ literary affinities together with an examination of the order of the sayings and parables in Thomas” (quotation from page 78; emphasis added).
brand of wisdom encouraged people to find divinity, destiny and salvation within themselves.

The work done by Koester has convinced a number of scholars, especially in North America (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:85), some of whom were students of him (and of Robinson) (cf. Miller 1999:16; DeConick 2008:17). In 1990, it was seemingly acceptable to claim that Koester’s hypothesis represented the majority opinion of scholarship (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:103). A number of these scholars were and are convinced that the earliest layer of Thomas was a source entirely independent from the canonical gospels, and that it went back to a time either before or contemporaneous with the gospels, thereby bringing us closer to the historical Jesus (see e.g. Robinson 1990:viii-ix; Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:85-90; Patterson 1993:9-110; 1992:45-97; 1998a:173; 1998b:41-45, 66-75; Patterson, in Miller 2001:72; Meyer 2003:5-7, 18, 33; Hedrick 2010:16-17). If so, the significance of the historical Jesus was, according to these scholars, not to be found in his miracles, apocalyptic outlook, crucifixion, death or resurrection, but in his words; and only his words (cf. e.g. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:105; Patterson 1998b:56, 74; Meyer 2003:5, 22; Hedrick 2010:13). According to this branch of scholars, these words, as they are presented by the Gospel of Thomas, are undeniably sapiential and lack any hint of a reference to apocalypticism or eschatology (cf. e.g. Patterson 1998a:173; 1998b:49-51, 74-75; Patterson, in Miller 2001:72; Meyer 2003:21-22, 32; see also Davies 1983). Significantly, they all judge the parables to be non-apocalyptic in nature (see e.g. Meyer 2003:24-26). They also point out that Christological and other titles of Jesus are missing from the Gospel of Thomas, and that Jesus nowhere in Thomas acts as a prophet of the coming kingdom of God (cf. e.g. Patterson 1998b:56; Miller 2003:21, 24-26). Rather, Jesus is consistently depicted as a teacher of wisdom, concerned exclusively with the present (see e.g. Meyer 2003:19-22). The kingdom of God is not, according to their reading of the apocryphal gospel, to be found in some futuristic expectation, but can rather be experienced and witnessed in the here and now. Increased appreciation for the Gospel of Thomas among New-Testament scholars can indeed be noted as one of the
developments of the Renewed Quest (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:78). Other participants of the Renewed Quest have been eager to latch onto the research done by Koester and his disciples.

Yet, as with the other developments traced thus far, not all scholars are so eager to simply accept these conclusions (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:85-86). Dunn (1977:286), for example, argued that many of the Thomas sayings were “de-eschatologised.” With the latter term, Dunn means that, by virtue of his own observation, it seems as though many of the non-apocalyptic traditions in the Gospel of Thomas were originally apocalyptic, but were subsequently reinterpreted and rewritten in a way that was more this-worldly. In Dunn’s estimation, the Gospel of Thomas betrays signs of stripping the original sayings of their apocalyptic moulds. Instead of going back to earlier traditions, the lack of eschatology in the Gospel of Thomas is a later development. In Dunn’s (1977:286) opinion, Q (and its apocalyptic character) is “almost certainly” closer to the historical Jesus. Other scholars have agreed with Dunn, seeing no reason why the trajectory should necessarily be from wisdom to apocalypticism (cf. DeConick 2008:19). These scholars point to evidence that a trajectory from apocalypticism to wisdom is, in their view, just as plausible (see e.g. DeConick 2005a; Allison 2010:127-134). Moreover, “proto-Gnostic” is not accepted by everyone as a realistic characterisation of the Gospel of Thomas. A number of scholars have even denied the very idea that the Gospel of Thomas has Gnostic tendencies at all (see e.g. Lelyveld 1987:5, 134-135; see also Davies 1983). Even some of Koester’s students, like Meyer (2003:4), have grown wary of calling Thomas a “proto-Gnostic” or “gnosticising” gospel. Meyer (2003:19, 32-33), nevertheless, holds firm to the idea that early Jesus traditions can be extracted from later “gnosticising elements.” Despite the abovementioned concerns and efforts, most scholars cemented in the Renewed Quest refuse to change their minds about the Gospel of Thomas, judging these concerns and efforts to be mostly reactionary (cf. e.g. Meyer 2003:7). There is one recent study, however, that can not be ignored.
Of late, the best counter to the Koester-hypothesis has been that proposed by DeConick. By applying research on the anthropological phenomenon of “communal memory” to the Gospel of Thomas, DeConick (2005a:3-63) concludes that the document is a “rolling corpus” (see also DeConick 2005b:207-211; Kirk 2005:1-24). By this term she means that the document, as it stands, contains traditions from every phase in its tradition-history. DeConick (2005a:64-110) then proceeds to demarcate the sayings that she deems to be kernel sayings, and to separate them from later developments. After completing this procedure, DeConick (2005a:111-155) ends up with five “kernel speeches” – all of which (1) resemble Q to some extent; (2) fit the situation in Jerusalem before 50 CE; (3) present Jesus as God’s truth-speaking prophet; and (4) proclaim an imminent-apocalyptic eschatology. In the remainder of her book, DeConick (2005a:157-249) argues that the people responsible for Thomas were severely disappointed when the apocalypse failed to arrive, and were subsequently forced to adapt their imminent-apocalyptic worldview to an immanent-mystic belief system (see also DeConick 2005b:211-215). In 2010, exactly twenty years after the claim was made that the great majority of scholars follow in Koester’s footsteps (see above), Hedrick (2010:14-15) holds that scholarship has reached an impasse on whether or not the Gospel of Thomas was literarily dependent on the canonical gospels. He maintains that current scholarship can basically be divided into two opposing camps: those who defend and those who deny that the Gospel of Thomas was from the very beginning dependent on the canonical gospels. Meyer (2003:6) divides contemporary scholarship into three separate camps, adding a third category for more complex solutions to this vexing problem of intertextual relationships (cf. also Patterson 1998b:68 n. 37).

1.3.5 The Jewishness of Jesus

The third development within New-Testament academia that led to a sapiential understanding of Jesus was the rediscovery of his Jewish roots, already referred to above. Traditional Christian, and particularly Protestant, caricatures of Jewish, Torah-based ethics at the time of Jesus included the following (cf. esp. Theissen & Merz 1998:348-349; cf. also Casey 2010:3): (1) The Torah was “absolutised” after the Babylonian exile
by making it a constitutive component of the covenant, rather than maintaining it as a regulative feature within the covenant. (2) The Torah was exclusively construed and practiced in a casuistic manner. (3) Torah obedience was motivated by recompense and concentrated on superfluous merits. (4) The Torah was obeyed only formally, because it was commanded, and the moral essence of the Torah was resultantly overlooked. (5) Jews saw the Torah as a burden and suffered under the redundant, impossible demands of the scribes. It naturally followed from such an anachronistic, Christian understanding of early-Judaic ethics that Jesus was the one who had liberated his people from an absolutised, casuistic, superfluous, formal and burdensome Torah ethics. Despite Schweitzer’s plea not to conjure up depictions of Jesus that are mirror-images of oneself, scholars of the time continued to ignore or relativise the Jewish ethnicity of Jesus (cf. Casey 2010:3; see Den Heyer 2002:111-118). This tendency reached its pinnacle just before and during the Second World War. Academic works by Jewish scholars, highlighting the Jewishness of Jesus, were ignored and belittled as perfidious. In hindsight, one might say that this trend is inexcusable – and it certainly is! – but it is also explicable. Moxnes (2011) has argued persuasively that the different portraits of the historical Jesus that have been put forward by researchers have all been mirror-images, not just of the individual scholars, but also of the political, cultural and social agendas of their native countries. With Germany, for the most part, dominating the Old and New Quests, it should come as no surprise that German anti-Semitic ideologies also dominated these quests (see Moxnes 2011:95-120).

The end of the Second World War also brought an end to this anti-Semitic tendency. The Jewishness of Jesus was no longer denied, and neither were the findings of Jewish scholars. Classic studies by Jewish scholars of a generation gone by were revived. These included the important study by Klausner (1907), who saw Jesus as the representative of a remarkable Jewish ethic. There was also the monumental two-volume study by Montefiore (1909), who described Jesus as a prophet opposing the Jerusalem cult and externalised rites. Another classic Jewish scholar worthy of mention is Eisler, who thought of Jesus as a political rebel who wanted to found a this-worldly kingdom (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:9). What these latter classic studies had in common was a
disregard for the apocalyptic and imminent-eschatological features of Jesus’ message and person. Moreover, they also chipped away at the traditional, Christian images of Torah ethics at the time of Jesus. Montefiore (1909), for example, argued that it was anachronistic and unhistorical to separate Jesus’ “ethic of grace” from the rabbinical “ethic of works.” A few years later, Kittel (1924) compared the Sermon on the Mount with rabbinic literature and found that all the individual demands in the former had analogies in the latter. Hence, all Jesus’ moral stipulations were in theory also conceivable in mainstream Judaism of the time. In 1957, Braun discovered that, despite some important differences, the radical ethics of Jesus were comparable to the ethical demands of the Qumran community. In the post-Second-World-War period, Jewish scholars, like Flusser (1968), paid particular attention to the scanty gospel portraits of Jesus’ upbringing, from which they concluded that Jesus was brought up in accordance with Jewish practice, which left him accustomed to, and knowledgeable about, the Torah, and about Jewish tradition. The conclusion seemed inescapable: “Zij [Jezus] leefden serieus, verdiepten zich in de studie van Schrift en traditie, en trachten de geboden van de Torah in het dagelijks bestaan in praktijk te brengen” (Den Heyer 2002:117). This conclusion went against the traditional (Protestant) image of Jesus (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:347). Jesus’ newfound familiarity with, and rootedness within, the Torah eventually contributed to the trend of imagining him as a teacher of Torah morality.

Despite these broad strokes, Jewish scholars were not in agreement about everything. The canonical gospels describe Jesus as someone who had differentiations in attitude towards the Torah (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:347-348, 361). Jesus’ tendency to relativise Torah norms appears alongside his other tendency to accentuate them. In other words, the Jesus tradition reveals both a liberal relaxation of the Torah and a rigorist intensification of the Torah. 17 Jewish (and other) scholars are not always in agreement

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17 According to Theissen & Merz (1998:348), Jesus’ freedom towards the Torah is more in line with the sapiential manner of developing ethics, while his strictness towards the Torah is more typical of the eschatological manner of developing ethics. Such a deterministic division is not supported by comparative evidence, however. Although it is true that Jewish eschatological models and movements of the first century (like the Qumran community and John the Baptist’s movement) would stress the intensification of Torah obedience in order to bring about the coming age, sapiential traditions are more diverse with regards to the Torah. Traditional wisdom tends to emphasise strict Torah obedience (cf. Proverbs), while dissident
about how to explain this tension. Be that as it may, Jewish scholars tended to emphasise the embeddedness of Jesus within Torah morality. Geza Vermes (1973), for example, believed that the eschatological dimension of Jesus’ message and conduct was invented by the early church, most notably Paul and John. Vermes went against the tide when he described Jesus not as an apocalyptic prophet, but as a charismatic travelling Hassid. In Rabbinic literature, a Hassid is someone who goes beyond the Torah and its requirements for ethical and ritual observance in daily life. The Hebrew word derives from the noun נַעֲנָה, which literally means “kindness,” or “love,” and connotes the act of showing or expressing love for God and for one’s neighbour. It follows that Vermes saw Jesus as a travelling charismatic who practiced an ethical lifestyle aimed at applying and preaching the love command in every and all circumstances.

Whether or not they saw Jesus as an apocalyptic prophet, all Jewish scholars had one thing in common. They all held that Jesus lived and preached an ethic of Torah-observance, inalienable from Jewish tradition. These types of views about Jesus seemed to address a certain discrepancy and answer a question that had plagued researchers for some time: If Jesus did not intend to start a new religion or sect within contemporary Judaism, why did he call and entertain an inner circle of followers and a group of disciples? This historically reliable aspect of Jesus’ life did not correspond to an eschatological image of Jesus: If Jesus were so obsessed with the imminent coming of the kingdom, why would he waste any time gathering disciples? The answer to these questions became increasingly clear to some scholars: Jesus acted as a teacher. In many gospel accounts, some of which are very likely to go back to Jesus, Jesus is referred to as “Rabbi,” meaning “teacher” (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:354-355). Some researchers started portraying Jesus as a scribe or a lawyer, or even a Pharisee. Even a cursory glance at these Jewish studies betray a cultural and ethnic reaction against the discrimination, bigotry, violence and brutality experienced during the Second World War. By depicting Jesus as a mortal human being and a “thoroughbred” Jew, these wisdom tends to relativise Torah obedience. Thus, Jesus’ attitude towards the Torah should actually not be taken as an indicator of whether his person or message was eschatological or sapiential.

18 Theissen & Merz (1998:361-372) are probably correct in their explanation that Jesus radicalised ethical norms (in the more narrow sense), particularly the dual love-command, and relativised ritual and cultic norms, particularly purity laws, without abandoning them entirely (cf. esp. Q 11:42 for evidence of both).
scholars could take back what was rightfully theirs: the memory of a Jewish teacher who became an icon for the world. Even if this laudable reaction does not technically qualify as an example of a “nationalistic” reaction, it still represents the same sort of thing Moxnes (2011) describes in his book. At any rate, Jewish scholars like Vermes and Flusser have become formidable supporters, representatives and promoters of the Renewed Quest (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:9).

1.3.6 The Sayings Gospel Q

The fourth development that invariably resulted in sapiential views of the historical Jesus was an increase in the attention being paid to the Q source behind the gospels of Matthew and Luke (cf. Koester 1992:7; Borg 1994b:17; Patterson, in Miller 2001:71-72; cf also Telford 1994:73; Allison 2010:118). Harnack (1907) was the first scholar to comprehensively discuss Q. In his view, Q was simply a compilation of Jesus’ logia with a catechetical function and intent. Q did not represent a separate community with a distinct theology, Christology or soteriology. Rather, Q was a piece of paraenesis that made use of the didache (teachings of Jesus) to instruct those who had already accepted the kerygma (preaching) about the death and resurrection of Jesus (cf. Edwards 1976:3). For this liberal theologian, the eschatological elements in Q were subordinate to its ethical character, which was its essential feature. Q functioned as Harnack’s leading refutation against scholars who tried to subordinate Jesus’ ethics to his eschatology. For more than a generation of scholars, this became the prevailing interpretation of Q (cf. Edwards 1976:3).

As we saw in section 1.2.1 above, this devaluation of Q’s significance meant that it was only deemed useful as a supplement to Mark’s portrait of Jesus. Schweitzer did not pay much attention to Q, and it was Bultmann who first noted the importance of Q’s eschatological dimension (cf. Sim 1985:40). According to Bultmann, Q saw Jesus not only as a teacher of wisdom and the Torah, but also as a preacher of eschatological repentance and salvation. This realisation offered proponents of the dominant Schweitzerian view an opportunity to gain additional support for their arguments by
appealing to the eschatological dimension of Q. Streeter (1924), for example, argued that Q was most comparable to the prophetic books of the Old Testament, notably Jeremiah. Streeter also argued that Q represented a divergent stream within early Christianity. Whereas some early Christians, like Paul, focused on the death and resurrection of Christ as the centre of their faith and theology, other early Christians were embarrassed by Jesus’ inglorious death, preferring rather to focus on his parousia. Yet, Q was still seen as a supplement to the passion kerygma, and did not represent a distinct community alongside mainstream Christianity. By comparing Q to prophetic literature and by highlighting the importance of the parousia, Streeter underlined the eschatological character of Q over and above anything else. During the No-Quest and New-Quest periods, when the Schweitzerian paradigm predominated, research on Q continued in the same vein. Manson (1949), for example, also held that Q represented a separate stream within early Christianity, and that eschatology was the most prominent feature of Q. Manson’s chief contribution was highlighting two eschatological themes in Q, namely that the eschatological kingdom of God would appear historically in the person of Jesus, and that the eschatological judgment was imminent (cf. Sim 1985:41).

The most influential scholar on Q during the New-Quest period was undoubtedly Tödt (1959), whose prime interest was the Son-of-Man logia – both in general and in Q (see section 1.3.2 above). Tödt investigated the role and significance of the title “Son of Man” in Q, which led him to the all-important (and brand new) discovery that Q was not a supplement to the passion kerygma, but a literary representative of a completely different branch of early Christianity, to be separated from Pauline Christianity (see Edwards 1976:18-21). Whereas Streeter (et al) differentiated between divergent streams within early Christianity, Tödt ([1959] 1965:235-249) differentiated between opposing branches of early Christianity. The reason for Q’s collection and existence is betrayed by its mission instruction, which commissioned the disciples to proclaim the nearness of God’s eschatological kingdom (cf. Sim 1985:42). This message was in continuation with that of the historical Jesus. The Q people did not assume that this message had lost its relevance after the Easter experience. The Easter experience was not supposed to be the content of the proclamation, but its enabler. The Q people’s Christology was centred
around the eschatological Son-of-Man figure (cf. Müller 2008:403). Tödt ([1959] 1965:57-60) followed Bultmann ([1921] 1968:112, 122, 128, 150-152) in his belief that the historical Jesus did not identify himself with the eschatological Son of Man (see section 1.3.2 above). Yet, according to Tödt, the early church did make such an identification, and Q expressed as much by creating the so-called “present” Son-of-Man logia (cf. Edwards 1976:19; Müller 2008:403). For the Q people, Jesus could now, in hindsight after Easter, be identified with the Son-of-Man figure, not only at the eschatological event, but also during his earthly career. Despite this association, Q had no concept of a present or realised eschatology (cf. Sim 1985:43). Rather, it supported and professed an utterly futuristic and imminent eschatology. Although Q’s Jesus was already the Son of Man during his earthly ministry, the eschaton would only commence once the Son of Man arrives in the near future. By attaching themselves to the Son-of-Man figure, the Q people had assured their own salvation at the final judgment (cf. Müller 2008:403).

The work by Tödt provided an even firmer foundation for scholars of the New-Quest period to highlight the dominance of eschatology in Q (see e.g. Hoffmann 1972). Davies (1964), for example, argued that a futuristic and imminent eschatology was the dominating feature in all of the Q material. In his view, the Q document was compiled in order to continue the eschatological crisis initiated by Jesus. The ethical elements of Q provided only the requirements of the crisis. Thus, the ethic of Q was an eschatological ethic. Tödt also influenced Lührmann (1969), and his redaction-critical investigation of Q (cf. Edwards 1976:25). In Lührmann’s view, the Q people played down Jesus’ message of a realised eschatology in favour of a futuristic eschatology (see Sim 1985:45-46). The Q people took over Jesus’ eschatological message of God’s coming kingdom, but emphasised, unlike Jesus, the expectation of apocalyptic judgment. Although Lührmann agreed with Tödt that Q had primarily a futuristic eschatology, he was the first scholar to notice within the content of Q a concern for the parousia’s delay (cf. Edwards 1976:43). The following quotation, taken from Edwards (1976:43), is also telling and representative of this period of Q studies: “The community which used the Q material was definitely anticipating the arrival of Jesus as Son of Man in the near future. This eschatological orientation is the one most distinguishing feature of their theology. It overshadows and influences everything that they say and do.” The italics are original!
According to Lührmann, this delay forced the Q people to defer the point in time when the parousia would occur. The imminence of the Q people’s eschatological message was therefore undermined.

Although two related studies had presented similar results a year prior (see Suggs 1970; Christ 1970), the Renewed Quest’s interest in Q is generally thought to have started with an article by James Robinson (1971), entitled ΛΟΓΟΙ ΣΟΦΩΝ, which means “Sayings of the Wise.” Robinson compared Q to sapiential Jewish sources and found that, according to him, the genre of Q could best be explained as forming part of wisdom literature (cf. Sim 1985:46; Kloppenborg 1987a:27; Lührmann 1995:104; cf. also Tuckett 1996:64-65; Horsley 1999:75-76; see Edwards 1976:23-24). The Q people identified Jesus with Sophia, suggesting that they held, not a Son-of-Man Christology, but a wisdom Christology. Whereas Davies was the first scholar to argue that all the Q material should be interpreted eschatologically, Robinson was the first scholar to argue that all the Q material should be understood in terms of its wisdom element.

These results were very influential and gave rise to a spate of studies on the sapiential element in Q (cf. Sim 1985:46; Tuckett 1996:326). Koester (1971), for example, saw enough justification in the common traditions between Q and the Gospel of Thomas to postulate sapiential roots for both (see Tuckett 1996:66-67; Horsley 1999:76). Since the Gospel of Thomas had no futuristic Son-of-Man logia, Koester argued that neither did the original Sayings Gospel Q (cf. esp. Sim 1985:47; cf. also Boyd 1995:55; Tuckett 1996:67; Horsley 1999:73-74, 76). Patterson (1993) reached similar results when he compared the Gospel of Thomas with Q. He argued that both the apocalypticism in Q and the Gnosticism in the Gospel of Thomas were secondary developments, while the sapiential core to both should be regarded as primary. However, the distinguishing feature between Q and other wisdom material seemed to be the integrality of the themes of apocalypticism and judgment to the document (cf. Edwards 1976:24; Mack 1993:35-36). After Robinson, all the scholars who preferred an exclusively sapiential Q have, in one way or another, struggled with the annoying presence of eschatological themes.
throughout Q. Koester, for example, tried to circumvent this difficulty by simply attributing the apocalyptic Son-of-Man material to the early church.

According to Mack (1993:36-37), Kloppenborg “solved” the problem of the integrality of apocalyptic material within Q in 1987 by distinguishing two principal compositional layers within Q: an earlier sapiential layer and a redactional apocalyptic or judgment layer. Mack is wrong in assuming that Kloppenborg “solved” the problem of the integral presence of both wisdom and apocalyptic material within Q. As we will see later on, motifs of both traditions can be found in both layers. Apocalypticism seems to be integral to the document as a whole, with sayings that are indisputably apocalyptic occurring more frequently than sayings that are clear-cut examples of wisdom. What is more, Kloppenborg [Verbin] (1987a:244-245; 2000a:150-151) has redactional activity in mind when referring to the one layer as being “earlier” and the other as being “later” (cf. Vaage 1995a:75; Crossan, in Miller 2001:119; cf. also Tuckett 1996:68; Freyne 2000:227-228). Redactional activity does not necessarily correspond to the chronology of the Jesus tradition in such a direct way that the earlier layer in Q comes closer to the historical Jesus than the subsequent layer (cf. Koester 1994:540-541; see also Allison 2010:120-125).

Be that as it may, the stratification of Q into an “earlier” wisdom layer and a “later” apocalyptic layer seemed to confirm the idea prevalent among Renewed Questers that eschatology was added to the more authentic Jesus tradition after Easter (cf. Boyd 1995:55; Allison 2010:118). The pre-eminence of wisdom was seemingly further corroborated by the sapiential nature of Thomas’s earliest stratum. Mack’s direct application of the stratification of Q to the historical Jesus is typical of scholars rooted in the Renewed Quest (cf. Wright 1996:36-37, 41; Allison 2010:118-119). Borg (1994a:15 n. 13) provides another example of this tendency: “…the earliest stratum of Q is non-apocalyptic, with apocalyptic elements appearing only in the latest stratum, suggesting that the teaching of Jesus was ‘apocalypticised’ by some in the early church.”

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20 Later on in his book, Borg (1994a:94 n. 46) tries to clarify his view by voicing his own reservations about the layering of both the Gospel of Thomas and Q (cf. also Borg 1999:231). But he then goes on to
views are also expressed by Patterson (1998:171-172): “it has become increasingly clear that Q was not originally an apocalyptic document at all, but – to take the widely accepted view of Kloppenborg – a collection of wisdom speeches…” He continues to assert: “The Q apocalypse (Luke 17:22-37//Mat 24:23-28, 37-42), as well as the sayings of judgment against ‘this generation’ scattered throughout the document, affixed like barnacles to this earlier stratum of wisdom speeches, belong to a later edition of Q” (cf. also Patterson, in Miller 2001:72, 73). Robinson (2007:21) is yet another example, declaring that the earliest layer of Q “does in fact reflect what [the historical] Jesus had to say.” Although most studies on Q since the 1970’s have highlighted the sapiential nature of Q in disregard of its eschatology, a number of scholars have continued investigating its eschatological nature (see e.g. Schulz 1982). Despite Lührmann’s findings, the prevailing view, by far, among these latter scholars is the one put forward by Tödt, namely that Q held and professed an imminent, futuristic eschatology. Schmithals (1997), for example, argues that in Q the sapiential, this-worldly sayings are secondary, seeing as they are incompatible with the interim ethics of the historical Jesus, who was apocalyptic.

1.3.7 A schism in contemporary scholarship

At this juncture, it is necessary to distinguish between eschatology and apocalypticism. The term eschatology was coined in the seventeenth century, and derives from the Greek adjective ἔσχατος, η, ον, which literally means “last” or “final” (cf. esp. Sim 1985:68; Frey 2011:6; cf. also Borg 1994a:70; Crossan 1998:258; Miller 2001:5; Wink 2002:158). As such, in its broadest sense, “eschatology” is the teaching(s) about the last things (cf. Sim 1985:68; cf. also Borg 1994a:70; Patterson 1998a:164). However, the term has been applied variously by different scholars in the past (and present) (see Borg 1994a:70-74;
1994b:19-20). Not only have systematic theologians and biblical scholars interpreted and applied the term differently, but, within those fields themselves, the term has also met with varying degrees of interpretation and application (cf. Miller 2001:5; Frey 2011:6-7). For our current purposes, the term “eschatology” will refer to “a way of thinking,” common among ancient peoples, “that is centred on the end of the world” (Miller 2001:5). If we therefore state that the teachings of Jesus were eschatological, we imply that they were motivated by, and concentrated on, the end times.

This definition needs immediate clarification. Although eschatology might imagine the end of the physical world, it could also imagine the end of the world “as we know it” (cf. Borg 1994a:8-9, 70-71; Patterson 1998a:164). In other words, the term “eschatology” does not always imply the end of history or the cessation of the material earth, but could also imply the termination of evil forces within the world, like injustice, disease or the Roman Empire. It could, therefore, denote a dramatic, this-worldly change in the history of Israel (cf. Borg 1994b:19). Eschatology might be directed at the physical, social, religious, political or moral status quo, or even a combination of two or more of these aspects. Wright (1996:73) calls this latter type “horizontal eschatology,” and the type that believes in the cessation the space-time continuum “vertical eschatology.” The phrase “imminent eschatology,” used by Sanders in section 1.1 above, is an expression of the ancient view, held by many, that the world will come to an abrupt end in the very near future. It follows that the term “eschatology” does not by its very nature imply imminence (contra Edwards 1976:39; Borg 1994a:9). Whenever imminence is seen as a feature of the eschatology under view, this will be made clear by the term “imminent eschatology.” Lastly, as we have seen in section 1.2.3 above, Bultmann broadened the meaning of “eschatology” by interpreting it existentially (see Edwards 1976:36-37). In contrast, when the word “eschatology” appears in the current work, it will not refer to a drastic change in, or an end to, the subjective world of an individual, but rather to a drastic change in, or an end to, the history of Israel.
“Apocalypticism” is one form or type of eschatology (cf. Crossan 1998:259; Miller 2001:6). Apocalypticism foresees the end of the world as something brought on by divine intervention (cf. Crossan 1998:283). All people will witness and experience this cosmic happening, which will commence with an array of cataclysmic events (cf. Crossan 1991:238; Van Aarde 2008:538 n. 23; 543). Like eschatology, apocalypticism could also envisage this material world being replaced by either a this-worldly or an other-worldly future (cf. esp. Collins 1998:24, 54, 56, 58-59, 171, 176, 236, 280-281; cf. also Allison 1999:129; Crossan 1998:283; Crossan, in Miller 2001:56-57, 138). In fact, first-century Jewish apocalypticism most probably did not envisage an end to the world in the form of a cessation of the space-time continuum (see Wight 1992:280-338; 1996, esp. 202-214; 1999:265). Instead, God was most commonly expected to destroy the world, only so that He could then recreate and renew it (cf. Allison 1999:129). Eschatology tends to have an “open” and undetermined view of the future (see Wink 2002:158-159). People may still change the predicted future by adjusting their behaviour. Conversely, apocalypticism has a “closed” and deterministic view of the future. The behaviour of people has no impact on the predicted future per se, only on their own fate during the final judgment. Generally, it could be said that whereas eschatology lacks any precise idea of how exactly the end will be effectuated, apocalypticism entails a very precise description of how the end is imagined to take place (cf. Frey 2011:20). Van Aarde (2011a:40) explains this distinction more precisely:

All eschatologies, [including] ‘apocalypticism’, advocate that God’s perfect world will be brought about by a termination of the created world which is domesticated by systemic evil. An apocalyptic perspective on the end of the world consists of a cosmic cataclysm and catastrophe expressed by symbolic language pertaining to earthquakes, fallen stars, darkness in daylight, empty tombs, holy wars, etc.

It follows that apocalypticism is not just a worldview, but also a genre. These writings surely had metaphorical and symbolic applications, but they were also seen as literal descriptions of exactly how the world would come to an end (see Wright 1999:262-263; Allison 1999:130-134). Many, but not all, ancient apocalyptic texts sought to describe
the cataclysmic events that would accompany the end of the world (see Collins 1998). “Apocalypticism” fundamentally includes some type of “cosmic catastrophe” that will eradicate the circumstances and conditions of the world as they currently are (cf. Allison 1999:129). Traditional definitions and usages of “apocalypticism” viewed “imminence” as a necessary and integral aspect of apocalyptic eschatology. Recent research of Jewish apocalyptic writings around the time of Jesus has revealed, however, that not all apocalyptic materials were by their very nature imminent (cf. esp. Collins 1998:58, 176, 215, 255, 260; cf. also Borg 1994a:31; Frey 2011:22). Although many apocalyptic writings, including the book of Daniel, advocated that the end of the world would occur sporadically, apocalyptic eschatology was not necessarily imminent (contra e.g. Crossan 1991; Miller 2001:6; Allison, in Miller 2001:93; Wink 2002:159; Van Aarde 2008:543). It could, and quite frequently did, describe the cataclysmic end without any reference to the time of its occurrence. Some apocalyptic writings of the time even contradicted and overtly denied imminence (cf. Collins 1998:58, 176, 215, 255, 260). As we saw in section 1.2 above, participants of the Old and New Quests of the historical Jesus did not make this distinction, but instead saw all apocalypticism (and eschatology) as imminent (cf. Borg 1994b:19-21). In the current work, apocalyptic eschatology will be clearly distinguished from imminent eschatology.

The term “apocalyptic eschatology” will therefore in the present work refer to an eschatology that believes that the end of the world (as we know it) will be brought about by divine intervention and will be accompanied by cataclysmic events – whether or not that end was thought to be imminent. If we define the ministry of Jesus as apocalyptic, we are therefore saying that Jesus believed and taught that God would intervene directly and visibly, thereby bringing an abrupt end to the world, only to replace it with either a this-worldly or an other-worldly reality (cf. Allison 1999:129; 2010:32). To summarise, “apocalyptic eschatology” will denote something rather similar to Borg’s (1994a:73) definition of eschatology, when understood in the “narrow sense” of the word: “(1) chronological futurity; (2) dramatic divine intervention in a public and objectively unmistakable way, resulting in (3) a radically new state of affairs, including the vindication of God’s people, whether on a renewed earth or in another world.” This
definition leaves open whether or not the material earth will discontinue, and whether or not the history of mankind will cease, but closes off interpretations of apocalypticism as a mere event within history, like the destruction of the temple in 70 CE. Although Jews saw such events as “divine intervention,” these events were not effected in a “public and objectively unmistakable way” – to the extent that Israel’s enemies would also have seen it as “divine intervention.” In other words, an event like the destruction of the temple could be described as “eschatological,” but not as “apocalyptic” (see esp. Eddy 1999:43-49; cf. Witherington III 1995:246; Allison 1999:135-136; cf. also Borg 1999:240-241; contra e.g. Wright 1992:280-338; 1996:passim, esp. 202-214; 1999:265-266). This is unless, of course, the historical event in question is brought about via God’s unmistakable and observable involvement. So, for example, if the temple were destroyed by a lightning bolt from heaven or something equally cataclysmic, and not by a historic event, like the Roman War, it would indeed have been an apocalyptic happening.

In North American scholarship, all the developments traced thus far (in section 1.3) progressively led to the abandonment of the apocalyptic portrayal of Jesus, exchanging it rather for a sapiential depiction of him (see esp. Borg 1994b:17-19; cf. also Koester 1992:7; Borg 1994a:9; Patterson, in Miller 2001:69-70; Wink 2002:165; Frey 2011:17; cf. e.g. Patterson 1998a:177). Borg (1994a:82) defines the current consensus of the Renewed Quest accurately: “(1) wisdom is central to the Jesus tradition; and (2) this material suggest that, whatever else also needs to be said about Jesus, he was a teacher of subversive wisdom” (see also Borg 1994b:17-19). Theissen & Merz (1998) claim that: “In most recent North American exegesis, future eschatology is denied.” This brings us full circle. The pendulum of historical-Jesus research has returned to a position very similar to that of the Old Quest (cf. Koester 1992:5). By portraying Jesus as a sage of some kind, the focus has turned away from his eschatological message and back towards his ethical message. Granted the differences between the Old and Renewed Quests, of which there are many, there are also some noticeable similarities (cf. Frey 2011:18).
Be that as it may, the non-eschatological silhouettes of Jesus are directly attributable to the developments outlined above. Many are impressed by these developments and readily adopt an understanding of Jesus that has nothing to do with eschatology, mostly replacing the “outdated” eschatological Jesus with some type of teacher or sage. We have already seen that Funk’s image of Jesus is directly derived from his understanding of the parables of Jesus. Likewise, Stephen J. Patterson’s (1998) depiction of Jesus as a teacher of countercultural wisdom is a direct consequence of his research on the Gospel of Thomas. Similarly, Crossan’s (1991) portrayal of Jesus as a Jewish-Cynic-peasant sage is a direct result of his high regard for the Gospel of Thomas, for Q, for recent research on the parables of Jesus, and for the criterion of multiple independent attestation (cf. esp. Witherington III 1995:64-92; Boyd 1995:55; see esp. Wright 1996:41, 47-51; cf. Borg 1994a:32-36; Crossan, in Miller 2001:51-52; cf. also Casey 2010:18-20, 103-104). Mack’s (1988; 1993) portrayal of Jesus as a Cynic sage flows unswervingly from his high regard for both the parables of Jesus and Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q (cf. Boyd 1995:55; Wright 1996:34-35, 41). The Jesus Seminar’s (1993) selection of authentic Jesus material promotes a subversive, sapiential, fairly Hellenised, non-eschatological Jesus, and is based on all of these developments, especially the “discovery” of the earliest layers of both Q and the Gospel of Thomas (cf. esp. Boyd 1995:62; Wright 1996:39, 41, 81; cf. also Borg 1994b:18; see Miller 1999:16-17, 24, 69-74; 2001:10). In the Jesus Seminar’s publication of their results about the sayings of Jesus, significantly called The Five Gospels, none of his apocalyptic sayings appear in red (cf. Patterson 1998a:170). Conversely, there are more red sayings in the sapiential Gospel of Thomas than in the canonical Gospel of Mark (cf. Casey 2010:21). There is perhaps no stronger defender and promoter of a non-eschatological Jesus than Marcus J. Borg (cf. Frey 2011:17). Borg’s (1984; 1987) fourfold description of Jesus as healer, sage, social prophet and movement founder depends greatly on his acceptance of parable research, and his denial of the authenticity of the Son-of-Man logia. By the term “non-eschatological,” Borg (1994a:9) means a Jesus who did not proclaim “the imminent coming of the kingdom of God and the Son of Man, understood as involving the last judgment and the end of human history as we know it.”  

21 Compare this definition with that of Edwards (1976:39).
eschatological aspects of Jesus’ message (cf. Van Aarde 2004:424), but most of them deny the imminent and/or apocalyptic aspects of his eschatology (see e.g. Borg 1994a:82-84; 88-90; 1994b:21; Borg, in Miller 2001:34, 42). They also deny that an eschatological expectation dictated every aspect of his message and conduct (see e.g. Borg, in Miller 2001:43-48, 115-116).

Crossan (1998:257) is an excellent example of the latter, claiming that “[f]rom the very beginning of my own research, I have insisted that the historical Jesus was eschatological but not apocalyptic, although it has always been difficult for me to put a more positive name on that nonapocalyptic eschatology.” For Crossan (1998:259-260), the most definitive aspect and attribute of eschatology is that it is world-negating. Eschatology is born out of a resounding dissatisfaction with the status quo in the world “around us.” Hence, it is a communal defence mechanism against the perceived wickedness of the world (cf. Van Aarde 2008:538 n. 23). The specific form in which such a defence mechanism finds expression varies from group to group. Some might physically, symbolically or mystically withdraw from the physical world, while others might come to expect the destruction of the world (as we know it). According to Crossan, two ancient examples of this are the Gospels of Q and Thomas. Crossan (1998:260-271) argues that the Gospel of Q is an example of “apocalyptic eschatology,” while the Gospel of Thomas is an example of “ascetical eschatology” (compare Patterson 1998b:55). Regarding Q, Crossan (1998:264) differentiates between “primary” and “secondary apocalyptic eschatology.” The former results in a development of certain directives because the end is coming (soon), while the latter coerces, threatens, sanctions or motivates the doing of certain directives that were in place already and would have been expected in any case. In other words, in the former, eschatology is primary and foundational, while in the latter, morality is primary and foundational. In the former, eschatology determines morality. In the latter, eschatology is in the service of morality. Crossan (1998:264) sees Q as an example of “secondary apocalyptic eschatology.”
As Crossan (1998:264) acknowledges, this view of Q’s eschatology was foreshadowed by Kloppenborg’s “symbolic eschatology.” Even though Kloppenborg (1987b:291-292) makes use of different terminology, and prefers not to use the label “apocalyptic” of Q at all, his understanding of Q’s eschatology is very similar to that of Crossan. Kloppenborg (1987b:304) notices and explains that “Q uses threats of judgment and unsettling apocalyptic metaphors, not because it speaks from an ‘apocalyptic situation’ of anomie but because the symbolic character of apocalyptic language could be turned to Q’s particular aims.” Thus, Q makes use of apocalyptic images and language to support, sanction, buttress and motivate that which it holds most dear, namely a particular moral programme communicated by their specific brand of wisdom. These descriptions of Q’s eschatology is very similar to – if not exactly the same as – Bultmann’s understanding of the “eschatological ethics” of the historical Jesus. But Crossan goes further. He argues that the so-called “Common Sayings Tradition” behind Q and the Gospel of Thomas promoted an “ethical eschatology,” which should be separated from the specific eschatologies put forward by either of the individual sayings gospels (see Crossan 1998:282-283; cf. Van Aarde 2008:538, esp. n. 23). Crossan (1998:284) defines this “ethical eschatology” as an eschatology that negates the epistemic evils in the world, neither by projecting apocalyptic judgment upon her, nor by withdrawing from her, but by “actively protesting” and “nonviolently resisting” her. “Ethical eschatology” zooms in on the structural and systematic injustice in the world, and addresses it by both pointing it out and boycotting the process. In Crossan’s view, this is the type of “eschatology” that comes closest to the historical Jesus. Unlike apocalyptic eschatology, God is not violent, and He is not the one who acts (see above; compare Patterson 1998b:56). One can see that, in both Kloppenborg’s and Crossan’s understanding of eschatology, wisdom and morality rule. Eschatology is either made subservient to wisdom, or it is redefined in such a way that it almost – if not completely – seizes to be apocalyptic eschatology.

Not all scholars have been as accepting of the developments described so far, leading to a schism within contemporary historical-Jesus research (cf. Borg 1994a:69; Miller 1999:24; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70; see Van Aarde 2004b:423-424). There remain those who hold firm to a Schweitzerian understanding of Jesus (cf. Patterson, in Miller
These scholars view the developments that led to a sapiential understanding of Jesus with scepticism, possibly with a fair amount of justification. All the developments described above can indeed be undermined. As these sceptics point out, the whole of the Gospel of Thomas could have been dependent on the Synoptic gospels and should perhaps be dated to the second century CE, in which case, it does not even go back to the historical Jesus at all (cf. Blomberg 1999:21; Arnal 2005:41-42; see e.g. Witherington III 1995:48-50). Even if its early dating is accepted, it is not a given that the original Gospel of Thomas contained only wisdom, or that the Thomas-tradition developed from wisdom to apocalypticism (see Allison 2010:125-134).

Secondly, the parables, as they appear in the canonical gospels, are notoriously multivalent, and can be construed as advocating both a present and a future eschatology (cf. Allison 1998:128). Only if they are surgically removed from their gospel contexts do they appear to advocate some sort of wisdom or ethic. In any case, the parables of Jesus do not feature prominently (or at all) in the reconstructions of Jesus offered by these scholars (cf. Miller 2005:121). Also, rediscovering Jesus’ Jewish roots does not necessarily place him squarely within a wisdom tradition. Judaism of the time was complex, and included rich prophetic and apocalyptic traditions. Particularly, apocalypticism was something of a fashionable (and widespread) trait of first-century Judaism (cf. Allison, in Miller 2001:88). Maurice Casey (2010), for example, appealed primarily to the Jewish roots of Jesus (including his *lingua franca*, Aramaic), when he defended the notion that Jesus was primarily a prophet who preached both the present and the imminently-coming kingdom of God. In this context, it is perhaps ironic that the Jesus Seminar has been criticised by some for stripping Jesus of his Jewishness (cf. Miller 1999:75).

Regarding the latest research on Q – which is the fourth re-constructionist development noted in our overview – the documentary status and stratification of Q is simply rejected by most of these scholars (cf. Blomberg 1999:21; cf. e.g. Allison, in Miller 2001:95; see section 2.2 below). Lastly, there is still a fairly significant number of scholars who give

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22 These scholars tend to refer to their own efforts as the “Third Quest (of the historical Jesus)” (cf. Van Aarde 2002a:425).
precedence to the “coming” Son-of-Man logia and who regard the apocalyptic references to Daniel 7:13 to be authentic. A few scholars even continue to defend the notion that there existed a unified Son-of-Man concept at the time of Jesus (see Burkett 1999:76-78, 97, 109-114). Furthermore, scholars who defend an apocalyptic Jesus typically point to how little we know of the Son-of-Man sayings and how precarious it remains to make any kind of judgment call on their authenticity (cf. e.g. Allison 1998:128; Allison, in Miller 2001:95). It should perhaps be noted that these scholars do not deny that there are wisdom elements in the authentic Jesus material, or that Jesus might also have been a sage, in addition to being an apocalyptic prophet (cf. e.g. Allison, in Miller 2001:91). Rather, they prefer to see eschatology as the all-encompassing framework from which to interpret all the Jesus material, including his wisdom teachings.

The schism between historical-Jesus scholars is presently understood as two extreme points of view, one promoting imminent and apocalyptic eschatology, and the other promoting wisdom (cf. Telford 1994:72-73; Kloppenborg 2005:1). We have seen that there were scholars in the past who had managed to retain both points of view. Werner Georg Kümmel (1945) should probably be credited as the first scholar to demonstrate that the authentic Jesus material contains both present- and future-oriented assertions about the kingdom of God. According to Theissen & Merz (1998:244), there is relative consensus today that both present and future kingdom-sayings appear in the authentic Jesus material (cf. e.g. Wink 2002:165). This may be true formally, but it certainly does not seem to be the case in practice. Typically, scholars who prefer a sapiential Jesus tend to prefer present kingdom-sayings, and discount future kingdom-sayings as additions by the early church (see e.g. Mack 1988:73; Crossan 1991:passim; Borg 1994a:27, 51, 53-57, 86-88; Patterson, in Miller 2001:76). In a similar fashion, scholars who prefer an imminent-apocalyptic-eschatological Jesus tend to emphasise future kingdom-sayings, and interpret present kingdom-sayings as enmeshed in (imminent) eschatology (cf. Miller 2001:3; see e.g. Allison, in Miller 2001:24 on Q 10:9; 2001:96-99). As a result, we tend

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23 Horsley could also be added as one of these examples, was it not for the fact that he describes Jesus, not as a sage, but as a social prophet. Nevertheless, Horsley (1987:170-172, 190-192, 207, 324-325) downplays the eschatological dimension of the term “kingdom of God” (cf. Borg 1994a:30). Wink (2002:161-163) is another example of a scholar who views all the kingdom sayings as referring to the present, but who does not necessarily prescribe to a sapiential view of Jesus.
to get images of Jesus that are either consistently eschatological or fundamentally sapiential (cf. Telford 1994:72-73). Current historical-Jesus researchers by-and-large remain dividable into these two extreme points of view (cf. Miller 2001:1-2; Kloppenborg 2005:1). The cause of this division might be subconscious. In section 1.1 above, we discussed the modern struggle to integrate the two worldviews that motivated ethics in the ancient Jewish world. These were the sapiential and eschatological worldviews, which operated side by side in antiquity. In the course of that introductory discussion, I suggested that it is our modern, scholarly obsession with classification and taxonomy that lies at the root of the struggle to synthesise these two worldviews (see Allison, in Miller 2001:89-93, 110; 2010:88). The sapiential and eschatological frameworks are impossible for some modern scholars to reconcile, which explains the scholarly need to choose between the two in their depictions of Jesus (see e.g. Borg 1994a:82-83; Patterson, in Miller 2001:71, 76, 125-126).

This difficulty can not only be observed in the mentioned schism of the current quests, but is also apparent from the overview of historical-Jesus research given above. In each phase of the history of historical-Jesus research, one of these paradigms reigned supreme. In short, liberal theology preferred an ethical Jesus, the period after Schweitzer preferred an eschatological Jesus, and the current Renewed Quest prefers a sapiential, non-eschatological Jesus (cf. Borg 1994a:48-51, 74; Borg, in Miller 2001:31; Miller 1999:24; 2001:10). Another observation from the survey above also underscores the same point: There tended to be fervent reaction against the dominant position at different times, with the positive case against this dominant position typically being an argument for the opposite paradigm. Let me illustrate this with the two most obvious examples. Schweitzer reacted vehemently against the prevailing liberal image of Jesus, and proposed, in its place, an eschatological image. The Renewed Quest reacted no less vehemently against the century-old eschatological image of Jesus, and proposed, in its place, a sapiential image. After listing a number of English and German scholars who had historically been opposed to Schweitzer, Allison (in Miller 2001:114) makes the following statement: “My estimation is that the state of today’s English-speaking academy is not far from what it has been for a hundred years, that is, pretty much evenly
divided for and against Schweitzer.” Thus, both within the history of historical-Jesus scholarship, and within the current, two-fold separation between historical-Jesus scholars, we can observe a tendency to separate the sapiential-ethical elements of his person and message from the eschatological-apocalyptic elements of his person and message.

After separating the two, scholars tend to select only one and regard it as the all-encompassing paradigm for a complete understanding of the historical Jesus (cf. Miller 2001:1-2). These choices then tend to spill over into the way in which sources are approached, not only with regards to which sources and/or traditions are authentic and which are not, but also with regards to how these chosen authentic sources and/or traditions are to be analysed and understood. We have seen, for example, that scholars who prefer a sapiential Jesus would characteristically appeal to Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q, while those from the opposite camp would characteristically argue against Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy, and point out the apocalyptic traditions in Q. Ironically, the authentic Jesus material may underwrite either view of Jesus (apocalyptic or sapiential), depending on the methodologies, criteria and/or sources preferred. Theissen & Merz (1998:261-264) have argued, for example, that ethical (i.e. sapiential) and eschatological interpretations of the Lord’s Prayer may co-exist side by side. In other words, if Theissen and Merz are correct, the content of the Lord’s Prayer justifies both reigning views of the historical Jesus. Witherington III (1995:235) correctly holds that the symbolic “cleansing” of the temple could justifiably be construed as either a moral-sapiential act or a prophetic-apocalyptic act. Likewise, Miller (2005:115-121) lists a number of traditions, taken by most to be authentic, that could legitimately be read either as wisdom teachings or as apocalyptic pronouncements.24 Within this discussion, Miller (2005:118) explicitly states: “A number of Jesus’ words and deeds can be taken in either an apocalyptic or a non-apocalyptic sense […] Both readings are legitimate and the differences in meaning come not from the material itself but from the larger context one uses to interpret it.”

24 Although Miller argues that these traditions, particularly the parables, should preferably be read as sapiential teachings.
Wright should be credited as the first scholar to describe the contemporary schism in Jesus research accurately (cf. Boyd 1995:46-47; cf. also Van Aarde 2002a:425; Craffert 2003:339). Wright (1996:20-21, 28; 2002:12-13, 23) noticed that there was one group of scholars who favoured marching in the Wredebahn, while another group of scholars favoured the Schweitzerbahn. In other words, whereas some Jesus scholars followed in the footsteps of William Wrede and his “thoroughgoing scepticism,” other Jesus scholars followed in the footsteps of Albert Schweitzer and his “thoroughgoing eschatology.” He labelled the former trend the Renewed Quest, and the latter tendency he called the Third Quest (cf. also Funk 1996:64).25 Wright (1996:28) immediately qualified his distinction by acknowledging that it is not “hard-and-fast” (cf. Craffert 2003:339). There are scholars who incorporate aspects of both stances (cf. Wright 1996:78). Both sets of scholars also adhere to the broader developments mentioned in section 1.3.1 above, like the feasibility and viability of the search for Jesus, the centrality of Jesus’ first-century Sitz-im-Leben, the concentration on his Jewishness, the focus on history rather than theology, and the appreciation for both non-canonical sources and non-theological sciences (cf. Boyd 1995:57; cf. also Kloppenborg 2005:2; Fredriksen 2005:55). Yet, the distinction, according to Wright (and myself), is clearly visible and worth making – if only as a heuristic aid (cf. Craffert 2003:339).26

Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede) is more sceptical and cautious about the historical validity of information about Jesus in the gospels, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) is optimistic about the historical reliability of these canonical sources (cf. esp. Wright 1996:28; Bock 2002:147, 150; see e.g. Charlesworth 1988:19-21; cf. also

25 Craffert (2003) adds a third category, which he dubs “cultural bundubashing.” Bundubashing is the South-African word for the “rough ride of off-road travelling with a 4x4 vehicle” (Craffert 2003:341). This road takes its queue from anthropological studies and tries to understand Jesus in his own cultural world (cf. Craffert 2003:361). According to these questers, every aspect of Jesus’ life and message should be made accessible by means of a real comprehension of the foreign cultural system he lived in. This approach does not start with sifting through Jesus material in search of authentic traditions (Craffert 2003:362). Rather, a determination of the authenticity of individual traditions becomes the final destination. Whether or not something actually happened, it might still be “true” for the culture in which the story or miracle finds expression. In order to interpret this “truth” correctly, a cross-cultural “tool kit” must be used. A thorough understanding of the development and transmission of oral traditions is also indispensable (Craffert 2003:363).

26 Although Marcus Borg has certain affinities with the Third Quest, he should be classified as part of the Renewed Quest (cf. Wright 1996:28, 75 n. 215; 78; contra e.g. Boyd 1995:47; Bock 2002:148).
Borg 1999:231). Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede) imagines a great gulf between the historical Jesus and the early church, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) sees much continuity between Jesus and the early church (cf. Charlesworth 1988:15; Bock 2002:148; cf. also Borg 1999:233). Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede) tries to find the most reliable evidence by zooming in on particular traditions, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) tries to synthesise all the canonical evidence in order to form a more holistic view of Jesus’ entire ministry and message (cf. esp. Telford 1994:50, 52; Blomberg 1999:21, 22-23, 31; Bock 2002:151-152; cf. also Craffert 2003:342; Fredriksen 2005:65; cf. e.g. Charlesworth 1988:17-18; Witherington III 1995:247).

Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede), regarding method, begins with the text and works its way towards hypothesis, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) begins with hypothesis and works its way through the textual evidence in support of this hypothesis (see esp. Wright 2002:36-37; cf. Eddy 1999:42; cf. also Borg 1999:231). Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede) treats the Jesus tradition more or less diachronically, believing that the establishment of strata is of the utmost importance for a valid silhouette of Jesus, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) treats the Jesus tradition more or less synchronically, with a fair bit of disregard for its layering (cf. Telford 1994:69; Craffert 2003:349; see Borg 1999:231-233).

It follows that sources such as Q and the Gospel of Thomas are indispensable and central for the Renewed Quest, but dispensable and peripheral for the Third Quest (cf. Wright 1996:35; Bock 2002:150; see Boyd 1995:52-55; Witherington III 1995:48-50; cf. also Borg 1999:231; Craffert 2003:342; see also Arnal 2005:41-48). Although both the Third Quest and the Renewed Quest are heavily invested in non-canonical (and quasi-canonical) sources (see section 1.3.1 above), the difference between the two movements is that the Renewed Quest values them not only because they assist in reconstructing Jesus’ world, but also because some of them may contain authentic traditions about Jesus (cf. Boyd 1995:52). The Third Quest, conversely, values non-canonical sources only as tools for reconstructing the world in which Jesus lived. It has been a trend in the Renewed Quest to broaden the criterion of multiple attestation to include a variety of non-canonical sources (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:11). This tendency reached an apex in
the work of Crossan (1991), who has a higher regard for certain non-canonical sources than for the Synoptic gospels (cf. Boyd 1995:52; see Witherington III 1995:77-79, 236). It also follows from the distinctions noted above that both the historical-critical methods and the various criteria of authenticity are central for Renewed Questers, but only slightly useful for Third Questers, who tend to put all their methodological eggs in the basket of historical plausibility (cf. Telford 1994:49-50, 57-58; Witherington III 1995:12, 247; Wright 1996:79, 87; Blomberg 1999:21; Eddy 1999:42; Bock 2002:150). When criteria of authenticity are applied by the Third Quest, they usually function not to determine the authenticity of individual traditions, but to validate a larger historical portrait (cf. Telford 1994:52; Blomberg 1999:22, 31; Wright 2002:34). As one would expect, these different methodological foci also translate into different results. Whereas the Renewed Quest tends to emphasise the sapiential aspects of Jesus’ ministry and message, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) tends to emphasise the eschatological aspect of Jesus’ ministry and message (cf. Wright 1996:81; Blomberg 1999:21; see Boyd 1995:55-56).

Most of the Third Questers, including, for example, Witherington III (1995:247-248), Wright (1996:43, 58-59, 71, 79, 85-86), Meier (2001:3-4) and Sanders (2002:34), criticise the Renewed Quest for harbouring and advocating a non-Jewish Jesus (cf. Blomberg 1999:21; see Arnal 2005:24-26). Some have even accused or implied that scholars of the Renewed Quest are somehow anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic (cf. Miller 2005:113). Some go as far as to distinguish between the Third and Renewed Quests on the basis that the former “works more seriously with Jewish backgrounds” (Bock 2002:147). This line of critique should be discounted (see Arnal 2005). Virtually all contemporary Jesus scholars, of both the Third and the Renewed Quests, not only affirm the Jewishness of Jesus, but also portray Jesus in all his Jewishness (cf. Kloppenborg 2005:2; Arnal 2005:24-25, 34). What is more, individuals involved with the Renewed Quest have overtly and repeatedly denied these accusations (cf. Arnal 2005:26 n. 6). To these critics from the Third Quest, being a first-century Jew is synonymous with being apocalyptically minded and/or being isolated from Hellenistic influences (cf. Miller 2005:113). Likewise, to these critics, “being Jewish” means to be orthodox, traditional and non-subversive (cf. Kloppenborg 2005:2-3; see Arnal 2005:34-41). The various
Jesuses offered by the Renewed Quest may not be coloured by eschatology, and may in some cases be fairly unorthodox and/or Hellenised, but they are nonetheless thoroughly Jewish (cf. Arnal 2005:28, 34).

The best contemporary case for an eschatological understanding of Jesus is arguably that of Dale Allison (cf. Borg, in Miller 2001:31; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70; Miller 2001:11; cf. also Casey 2010:21). His views are presented most comprehensively in his 1998 book *Jesus of Nazareth: Millenarian Prophet*, and well summarised in his contribution to Miller’s (2001) monograph. Allison (in Miller 2001:17-20) believes that all research is pre-determined by the paradigm of the researcher. In true Third-Quest fashion, he explicitly voices his paradigm before even directing any attention to the literary evidence. The paradigm with which he approaches the Jesus tradition is that of a Jesus concerned primarily with the imminent end of the physical world, described by him as a “millenarian prophet.”

Allison (in Miller 2001:20-24) defends this paradigm with five arguments:

1. Both John the Baptist and the early church believed in the imminence and apocalyptic nature of the future kingdom of God. If Jesus was a disciple of John and the early church came into being as a result of Jesus’ teachings, then Jesus, according to Allison, must have proclaimed an apocalyptic eschatology. To deny this is to deny any continuity between John and Jesus, on the one hand, and between Jesus and the early church, on the other. This view was already expressed by E. P. Sanders (1985:91-95) more than a decade before Allison’s *Jesus of Nazareth*. It remains for both authors (cf. Sanders 1985:152), and others (see e.g. Wright 1996:160-162), the most important and compelling piece of evidence of an eschatological Jesus (cf. Crossan, in Miller 2001:122; Borg, in Miller 2001:117; Patterson, in Miller 2001:126; Wink 2002:164).

2. The widespread and deep-seated conviction by the early church that Jesus rose from the dead does not make sense unless they were already expecting, because of Jesus’ message, some sort of eschatological event to take place soon.

3. The early-Christian belief that the eschaton had commenced directly after the death of Jesus, as well

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27 “Millenarianism” could be defined as “the social expression of apocalyptic convictions” (Miller 2001:11). The difference between “apocalypticism” and “millenarianism” is that the former represents certain beliefs, while the latter represents a social group for whom these beliefs are foundational.

28 A couple of years ago, Allison (2010:45-86) added four additional arguments to these five.
as the early-Christian description of his death by means of apocalyptic imagery, can only be explained by the fact that Jesus himself proclaimed an imminent and apocalyptic end. (4) Eschatological perspectives (and movements) and apocalyptic literature flourished in the time of Jesus. Not only was the whole Roman Empire infected by this craze, but the Jewish people of Palestine were also contaminated by it. (5) In a few gospel texts, Jesus is explicitly compared to other apocalyptic figures, like John the Baptist, Theudas and Judas the Galilean. With his paradigm defended, Allison then proceeds to interpret the Jesus tradition from a perspective of apocalyptic eschatology.

Sanders (1985) follows a similar methodology in his depiction of Jesus as an eschatological prophet (cf. Borg 1994a:75). He extracts from the Jesus tradition eight seemingly undeniable “facts” about the historical Jesus, interprets these facts from an eschatological framework, and then concludes that Jesus must have been eschatological. The current intention is neither to dissect the views of Allison or Sanders, nor to enter into a discussion with their respective endeavours. All of their arguments have counter-arguments (see esp. Borg 1994a:74-84; also see the contributions of Crossan, Borg and Patterson in Miller 2001). The current intent is simply to hold these works up as examples of contemporary attempts at defending and re-establishing the view that Jesus held and taught an apocalyptic and imminent eschatology.

1.4 ~ THE RESEARCH GAP, FOCAL POINT AND CENTRAL THEORY

At long last, we are in a position to point out the research gap that will form the spool around which the present work will revolve. There have been attempts in the past to argue that Q was either a sapiential or an apocalyptic document (see section 2.4 below). There have also been attempts to try and understand Q’s own view of the historical Jesus (see e.g. Robinson 1997; 2007, esp. 65-80).²⁹ In the current study, I will bring these two strands of Q research together in a responsible way. This will be achieved by examining

²⁹ I do not here refer to Q’s Christology, soteriology or theology. Instead, I refer to Q’s understanding, remembrance and description of the historical person called Jesus.
the occurrences of wisdom and apocalypticism in Q, and then drawing conclusions from this examination about the historical Jesus. Important questions will be: Did Q think of Jesus as a wisdom teacher, an apocalyptic prophet, or both? If Q associated both wisdom and apocalypticism with Jesus, what was the interrelationship between these two? Did either enjoy preference, or were they equally important to the person and message of Jesus? There will be a concerted effort to let Q speak for itself. If the latter were possible, how would Q and the people behind it respond to the Renewed and Third Quests? The latter question basically sums up the current research gap. Q has been used again and again as a source of information about the historical Jesus, resulting in an array of reconstructions of him. The current study intends to provide the Sayings Gospel with an opportunity to respond to these reconstructions of Jesus. This opportunity is the lacuna presently being addressed.

Out of all the sources used to reconstruct an image of the historical Jesus, Q is perhaps in the best position to respond to these reconstructions (cf. Robinson 2007:1, 178), not only because of its chronological and geographical import, but also because it contains both sapiential and apocalyptic traditions. As such, Q is in a perfect position to assess and address the gulf between the Third and Renewed Quests. Hence, there are two levels to the present work. The first level focuses on Q in order to determine the roles of both wisdom and apocalypticism in Q. This exercise will constitute the focal point and bulk of the current study, leading us to the central theory: The Q people remembered and described Jesus as a sage who made use of apocalyptic eschatology to motivate and support his moral message. The acceptance or rejection of this theory will naturally have an impact on our understanding of the historical Jesus, which is the second level of inquiry in the current study. The second level focuses on the historical Jesus, and our understanding of him, given the results obtained in our investigation of Q. The importance of this second focus is difficult to underestimate: “So the question of whether the historical Jesus was an apocalyptic prophet may well be the single most important one about him because it goes directly to the essential nature of his message and mission” (Miller 2001:1; cf. also 2005:111; Kloppenborg 2005:1).
Critics of the purely sapiential Jesus have routinely criticised the use of Q in the first place as a possible source for the historical Jesus. As we have seen, these Third Questers have mostly attacked the documentary status of Q, the possibility of constructing a Q community and Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q (cf. e.g. Wright 1996:81). This study wants to approach the situation differently, and with a distinct line of enquiry. The central question is not whether the documentary status and stratification of Q are convincing, although these questions will also be addressed. The central question is, rather: How legitimate is it to construe a non-eschatological, purely sapiential silhouette of the historical Jesus on the basis of Q as a stratified document? In other words, if the documentary status of Q is accepted, and Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q is not just dismissed out of hand as an exercise in futility, does it automatically translate into an image of Jesus that is purely sapiential and fundamentally non-eschatological? How legitimate is it to say that the documentary status and stratification of Q supports the image of Jesus as a non-eschatological sage? This type of question has indeed been raised before. Koester (1992:7), for example, expresses similar concerns: “It is questionable, however, whether this early stage of Q can really be defined as non-eschatological, even more doubtful whether one can draw from such observations the conclusion that the preaching of the historical Jesus had no relation to eschatology.” As far as I can tell, however, no one has dealt with this concern in any thoroughgoing, systematic, methodical or painstaking manner, which is exactly what the present study wants to achieve.

The high regard for Q and the propensity to regard Q as a stratified document places the current study squarely in the camp of the Renewed Quest. However, there are two aspects of the current study that have affinities with the Third Quest as well. The first is the inclination to question the non-eschatological image of Jesus proffered by the Renewed Quest. Regarding Q, this inclination means that the current study will take the integrality of apocalypticism throughout Q seriously. The second aspect is the synchronic manner in which the present study approaches Q. By preferring to ask how Q remembered and described Jesus, this study approaches Q in a manner that is not at all dissimilar to the way in which the Third Quest approaches the canonical gospels in their
search for the Jesus of history. Although the results of this study will address the
Renewed Quest directly, they promise to also have great value, worth and significance
for the Third Quest.

The research gap will be addressed in a systematic way. Firstly, we will look at Q in its
entirety (chapter 2). Important and integral questions about Q need to be addressed
before we may move ahead. The first question is whether Q should be understood as a
document or as a loose collection of disparate traditions. Secondly, Kloppenborg’s
stratification of Q will come under scrutiny. We have already seen the significance of
this theory on the Renewed Quest’s sapiential Jesus. The genre of Q must also receive
attention. Whether Q is an apocalyptic or a sapiential writing will be very telling of the
memory of Jesus it retains. The next item on the agenda will be to determine the
ethnicity of those who wrote and nurtured Q, which will not only be important for
subsequent arguments, but will also be relevant to the larger historical-Jesus debate,
seeing as the Jewishness of Jesus has become an integral aspect of said debate. The last
theme of discussion in chapter two will be the precise nature of Q’s eschatology, which
could be highly suggestive of Jesus’ own eschatological outlook.

In chapter three, we will zoom in on Q’s apocalyptic-judgment and Son-of-Man sayings
specifically. An exegetical examination of these logia will concentrate particularly on the
focal point of the current study, namely the interrelationship between wisdom and
apocalypticism in Q. Regarding the Q pericopes they appear in, these two (apocalyptic-
judgment and Son-of-Man) traditions overlap extensively, but not completely. Their
appearance in the same pericopes makes perfect sense, given the fact that both traditions
often have to do with the apocalyptic end of the world, during which the Son-of-Man
figure will oversee the final judgment (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:267). These two
traditions were purposely chosen because both of them have a history of both sapiential
and apocalyptic interpretations. Within this history, either interpretation (sapiential or
apocalyptic) routinely takes place in expense and disregard of the other. Seeing as the
Son-of-Man figure has had such a great impact on historical-Jesus research, these logia
are especially relevant to the present investigation. In chapter four, the study will zoom
in one more time on a single Q saying, namely Q 6:37-38. The purpose will once again be to determine the relationship between wisdom and apocalypticism in Q. This logion appears in Kloppenborg’s first stratum and has historically been viewed almost exclusively as a wisdom saying. Thus, whereas chapter three focuses on apocalyptic sayings in Q (and their relationship to Q’s wisdom), chapter four focuses on a sapiential saying in Q (and its relationship to Q’s apocalypticism). The last chapter will summarise the findings, and expound their impact on our understanding of the historical Jesus.

As is obvious from the overview just given, the current study moves in a centripetal direction, from historical-Jesus research in general (chapter 1), to the Q document (chapter 2), to the Son-of-Man and apocalyptic-judgment logia within Q (chapter 3), to one specific logion about judgment (chapter 4). Throughout this process, the focal point is on the relationship between imminent, apocalyptic eschatology, on the one hand, and wisdom, on the other. All quotations of, and references to, the Sayings Gospel Q will be derived from the so-called Critical Edition of Q, which is a scholarly reconstruction of Q that was overseen and edited by Robinson, Hoffmann and Kloppenborg (see Robinson 1997). This project, to which a number of prominent scholars contributed, is commonly referred to as the International Q Project. Unless otherwise specified, the text put forward by the Critical Edition of Q will be the normative text for this study. Because of its import for the present study, the Critical Edition of Q is reproduced in Appendix A.
2.1 ~ THE DOCUMENTARY STATUS OF Q

According to Kloppenborg [Verbin] (1987a:89-95; 2000a:66-72), the existence and nature of the double tradition can be best accounted for and explained by the positing of only one source, as opposed to two or more. In the first place, the content of Q represents a number of common themes, with a unique style and form, when compared to the rest of the New Testament (cf. Catchpole 1993:5, 59). Despite the varied application of formal characteristics and rhetorical method, Q undoubtedly displays a distinctive profile over and against Mark. Moreover, Q deliberately attempts to unify the material by relating disparate elements scattered across the double tradition. Secondly, the relative similarity in the sequence of Q, as it is found in Matthew and Luke respectively, is not only an argument for its written status, but also for its unity (cf. Catchpole 1993:5). Despite similarity in the overall sequence, there are further similarities in the sequences of independent sayings, even though they might be clustered together by one gospel and spread out in the other. Disagreements in sequential order, both on the macro- and micro-structural levels, can more often than not be explained on account of the redactional tendencies of the two evangelists.

According to Kloppenborg, these two observations – i.e. the similarity in content and relative sequence – compel the scholar to regard Q as a single document. Kloppenborg further applies Ockham’s razor – otherwise known as the principle of parsimony – to Q, as a controlling principle. In view of our current theme, Ockham’s razor requires that persuasive and undeniable evidence be given for positing two or more sources behind the double tradition. The lack of such evidence obliges the positing of one single document. Very few scholars today would deny the Semitic character of Q under the Greek surface.

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30 Take, for example, the mention of the “Coming One” in Q 3:16, Q 7:18-23, Q 10:13-15 and Q 13:34-35; the motif of judgment throughout Q; the relationship between Jesus and the Baptist in Q 3:7-9,16-17, Q 6:27-42, Q 7:24-26,31-35 and Q 17:3-4; the relationship between Jesus and his followers in Q 6:39-40, Q 10:16 and Q 22:28-30.
However, despite the presence of Semitic features at the level of syntax, style and idiom (see Bussby 1954), the close-to-verbatim agreement between Matthew and Luke in some pericopae demands a Greek Q, especially if Q is to be considered a single document (see Kloppenborg 1987a:51-64; see also Tuckett 1996:83-92). There seems to be relative agreement today, especially among scholars of the Renewed Quest, that the Q used by the two writers of the double tradition was a Greek document (cf. Vaage 1994:8; see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:72-80). Several quotations derive unmistakably from the Septuagint, and Q 13:35 cites the Septuagint version of Psalm 117:26 word for word (cf. Allison 1997:47). Furthermore, the Septuagint version of Genesis 7:7 might be reflected in Q 17:27 (cf. Allison 1997:47).

These arguments are seen by most, Q scholars and critics alike, as the most important arguments for Q’s documentary status. They have presently been recounted in only a very summarised form both because these arguments have been hulled over extensively in other studies, and because the present author does not see them as all-important. There is another factor, mostly overlooked in disputes about the documentary status of Q, that is much more persuasive of the probability that Q was a document. When Q was “discovered,” it was seen as remarkable and very telling that it consisted almost exclusively of sayings, to the exclusion of other types of tradition. This smidgen of awe all but disintegrated as people got used to the idea of a Q source in subsequent years. To the present writer, it remains “awe-fully” telling that the double tradition agrees almost exclusively about the sayings of Jesus, and not much else. The morsels of narrative in Q all function to set the stage and paint the background for the sayings and speeches that then follow (cf. Q 3:7a; 6:20a; 7:1, 3, 6-8, 9a, 18, 24a; 9:57, 59; 11:14-15, 16; 17:20a). This amazing “coincidence” is most explicable if both evangelists made use of the same written source. If the double tradition was dependant on oral tradition, or a number of isolated written sources, one would expect there to be more than only sayings of Jesus. One would at least expect the double tradition to also contain various deeds of Jesus, as well as more narrative content.

31 The temptation narrative quotes Deut 6:16, Deut 8:3 and Ps 91:11.
Mainly two factors prevented some scholars from history to see Q as a single document. The first was the temptation story, which differs from the rest of Q in that it is a narrative with one or two sayings, not a saying or speech introduced by a short narrative. This oddity has in recent years been explained as a normal and expected feature of these types of literature, which are prone to being introduced by short narrative sections (see section 2.4.5 below). Thus, the presence of the temptation narrative is not an argument against the documentary status of Q, but entirely explicable as an expected feature of a writing that deals only with sayings. The second factor historically preventing certain individual scholars from seeing Q as a single document was the fact that there were no other documents of this sort available in antiquity. This changed when the Gospel of Thomas was discovered, providing comparative proof of a single document containing only the sayings of Jesus (cf. Boyd 1995:53). Some scholars had long believed that Q was a single document containing almost entirely the sayings of Jesus. That this hypothesis was subsequently supported by a physical document is no less telling or astounding than the fact that the double tradition is almost exclusively made up of Jesus’ sayings (see Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:82-84). Both elements point in the same direction, namely that Q was a single document. A great deal of imagination is required if one attempts to explain these two (astonishing) elements by means of oral tradition or a multiplicity of written sources.

To the astonishing feat of discovering an actual sayings document could be added the similarly astonishing reality that other examples of sayings-documents have also been “uncovered” in the early Church, including the parables and sayings collection behind Mark 4, the sayings tradition behind the Epistle of James, the logia collection mentioned by Papias (cf. Hist. Eccl. 3.39.16), the sayings of Jesus in the first six chapters of the Didache, and the sayings in the apocryphal agrapha (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:93; Meyer 2003:20). Whether or not “Sayings of the Wise” (ΛΟΓΟΙ ΣΟΦΩΝ) is an acceptable genre designation for Q (see section 2.4.1 below), it is certainly significant that pupils have been collecting the sapiential sayings of noteworthy sages in all ancient cultures, including Jewish, Persian, Egyptian and other Mediterranean
cultures (see Patterson 1998b:36-37). Examples of such collections are embedded in Jewish works such as Proverbs, the Wisdom of Solomon, and Sirach.

2.2 ~ THE STRATIFICATION OF Q

2.2.1 Introduction

Whether or not you agree with the practice of stratifying Q, and notwithstanding all the contributions made up to the present day, Q scholarship can be divided into the time before and the time after John S. Kloppenborg. Even some of his most notable opponents can not help but sing his praises and appreciate the quality of his work (cf. e.g. Sato 1995:140; Horsley 1995b:41; Tuckett 1996:69, 73; Allison 1997:3). To be sure, Kloppenborg built on the Q scholarship that predated him, but his 1987 monograph, The Formation of Q, changed the face of Q scholarship (cf. Kirk 1998:35; cf. also Tuckett 1996:69). The impact of his hypothesis was (and is) extensive and farreaching. For the first time since the “discovery” of Q, one theory on its composition and genre had gained wide acceptance, frequently forming the basis for other studies (cf. Tuckett 1996:69, 70; Horsley 1999:62; Freyne 2000:227; cf. e.g. Vaage 1994:7, 107; Cotter 1995b:117; Arnal 2001:5). Another impact of The Formation of Q was to divide Q scholarship more clearly into two groups, those for and those against the stratification of Q – each with its own arguments within the current debate.

Furthermore, Kloppenborg laid to rest Kleiliteratur conceptions of Q (cf. Kirk 1998:35). These conceptions had enabled past scholars to postulate an array of tradition history and redactional models without any attempt to control their own methodologies (cf. Kirk 1998:64). Such a lack of literary-critical controls made it possible for scholars to apply just about any analytical model to Q in support of their tradition- and redaction-histories (cf. Kirk 1998:65). Kloppenborg’s Formation also marked the end of the undervaluation of Q’s redactor (cf. Kirk 1998:35). The disappearance of Kleiliteratur conceptions enabled Kloppenborg to do away with the idea that Q was created sui generis, which, in turn, further enabled him to make large-scale comparisons with ancient literature (cf.
Kirk 1998:35-36, 64). Such comparative studies have, since then, become a programmatic hallmark of Q research. Former disregard for the structural features of Q, and the literary contexts of individual sayings, was nipped in the bud by Kloppenborg (cf. Kirk 1998:36, 64). Contemporary Q research grants primary importance to the literary, compositional and rhetoric features within the framework structure of Q (cf. Kloppenborg 1995:2).

2.2.2 Kloppenborg’s proposed stratification

Kloppenborg’s analysis of Q, building on the methodologies and work of James Robinson, Dieter Lührmann, Helmut Koester, Arland Jacobson, Dieter Zeller et al, was fourfold. First, based on literary considerations, he attempted to determine “the compositional principles which guide the juxtaposition of originally independent sayings and groups of sayings” (Kloppenborg 1987a:98). These results were then utilised further to determine “the order in which sayings were added to one another and the method by which the association was accomplished” (Kloppenborg 1987a:98). Thirdly, these results were then applied to determine the compositional or redactional activities in Q (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:99). The result of this investigation was the stratification of Q into Q¹, Q² and (to a lesser extent) Q³, each stratum differing from the other with regard to implied audience, characteristic forms and characteristic motifs (see Kloppenborg 1987a:166-170, 238-262). Finally, in an attempt to determine the genre of each Q stratum, Kloppenborg compared the different strata he identified with literary material from antiquity, arriving at the conclusion that Q¹ displayed most similarities to the Instructional genre, while Q² could appropriately be identified as a chreia collection (see Kloppenborg 1987a:263-328). Similarity between Q¹ and the Instructional genre is indicated by the naming of the sage, the abundance of imperatives (especially with regard to where these appear within the structure of each wisdom speech), the careful concern with which the sayings are organised and structured, and the projected Sitz im Leben of the Q people as a community of believers.
In the process, Kloppenborg (1987a:244-245) had also managed to make a case for identifying Q¹ as the formative stratum and Q² as the main redaction, although he was cautious not to draw conclusions concerning the chronological priority or tradition history of either stratum based on his stratification model (cf. Vaage 1995a:75; Crossan, in Miller 2001:119; see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:150-151; Freyne 2000:227-228; cf. also Tuckett 1996:68; see Allison 2010:120-125). His main reason for identifying Q² as redaction was its position within the Sayings Gospel (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:143). Firstly, Q² appears at the beginning and end of Q. Secondly, Q² seems to function as the organising principle in four, perhaps five, blocks of material. Finally, Q² interrupts the flow of Q¹ speeches (cf. Cotter 1995a:135). The characteristic motifs of Q² could therefore be seen as redactional themes, which included judgment, polemic against “this generation,” a Deuteronomistic concept of history, and – a motif added only later by Kloppenborg [Verbin] (2000a:118-121, 143) – allusions to the story of Lot (cf. Cromhout 2007:261). The remaining material seemed to be untouched or minimally influenced by such themes. Instead, these traditions displayed concerns that were internally similar, having to do mainly with legitimising “a somewhat adventurous social practice – including debt forgiveness, the eschewing of vengeance, and the embracing of an exposed marginal lifestyle” (Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:144). Mack (1993:108) extended this argument by also pointing out that Q² betrays a knowledge of Q¹, whereas Q¹ betrays absolutely no knowledge of Q². These observations pointed to a compositional direction from Q¹ to Q². Mack, however, went further than Kloppenborg in applying these findings to the Q people, and postulating a sequential tradition history of the Q group. Although two layers were distinguished, Kloppenborg [Verbin] (2000a:120-121, 128, 147-150) identified several interpolations, commentaries or glosses (which were added to Q¹) adhering more to the redactional than the formative stratum (cf. Q 6:23c; Q 10:12, 13-15; Q 12:8-10; Q 13:26-29, 34-35; Q 14:16-24; cf. Tuckett 1996:70, 72). The two strata were further distinguishable in terms of their rhetoric. Q¹ uses a hortatory rhetoric of persuasion, whereas Q² utilises a defensive, rhetorical strategy of prophetic pronouncement and declamation (cf. Kloppenborg 1995:12; Cromhout 2007:263). Lastly, the sub-collections identified as Q¹ appeared to follow a fairly set structure, being introduced by programmatic sayings, followed by second person
imperatives, and concluded by a saying emphasising the importance of the instruction (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:145).

In the end, Kloppenborg had managed to separate two layers within Q, based on considerations of its overall structure, implied audience, characteristic (literary) forms, characteristic motifs, rhetorical strategies, and structural concerns of individual pericopes (see McLean 1995:333-334). The same considerations enabled him to determine the genre of each stratum. Based on the positioning of the two layers within Q, Kloppenborg was also able to determine that Q² represents the main redaction of the Sayings Gospel. Mack (1993:131-132) fully agrees with Kloppenborg and sees a definite shift from Q¹’s *aphoristic* style (characterised by imperatives, exhortations, and indirect address) to a style more representative of dialogue, narratives, controversy stories, warnings, descriptive parables, apocalyptic pronouncements, warnings, and examples from Judean history (characterised by pronouncements, direct statements and direct address). All in all, Kloppenborg’s analysis began with the final form of Q, and worked its way “downwards” or “backwards” in order to determine its compositional layers (see McLean 1995:333-334). Observations of the final text’s continuity (in terms of theme, audience and form), as well as its discontinuity (in terms of redactional seams or disruptions of literary “flow”), formed the basis of Kloppenborg’s analysis. The strengths of such an analysis are that it frees the interpreter from unqualified assumptions about Q’s origins and genre, and that it takes serious the literary context of each individual saying within the structure and rhetoric of Q (cf. McLean 1995:334, 340).

Q³ mainly consists of the temptation narrative (Q 4:1-13), separated from Q¹ and Q² for nine reasons (see Kloppenborg 1987a:247-248; Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:152-153). Firstly, the *narrative genre* of the temptation story shows a stark contrast with the genres of the other two layers. Secondly, the *form* of the temptation story, having a three-part debate and mythic motif, is unparalleled in Q. Thirdly, the presence of explicit Biblical quotations introduced by a citation formula (*γεγραπται*) is unique to the temptation story, with the only parallel in Q 7:27. Fourthly, the title “Son of God” appears nowhere else in Q (cf. Mack 1993:173). Fifthly, the theme of “miracle” is used differently with
Sixthly, the devil is here called ὁ διάβολος and not βελέζυλα, as in the rest of Q. Seventhly, Jesus is opposed directly to the devil, and not “this generation,” as in the rest of Q. In the eighth place, the temptation narrative’s positive view of Jerusalem and the Temple is severely opposed to Q’s otherwise negative valuations of Jerusalem (cf. Mack 1993:173). Lastly, the assumption that the Torah is an appropriate basis for rhetorical appeal is, according to Kloppenborg, unmatched by the rest of Q, apart from Q 11:42c and Q 16:17. Mainly because of the centrality of the Torah and nomistic piety evident in the latter two texts, both of them are seen as interpolations that, together with the temptation story, constitute Q³ (cf. Mack 1993:173; Cromhout 2007:264).

2.2.3 Kloppenborg’s supposed assumptions

In what follows, I will discuss the validity of Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy of Q by addressing each of the arguments against it, starting with the assumptions he is said to have held when stratifying Q. Some argue that Kloppenborg simply assumed that all of Q could be reconstructed. This line of attack seems more concerned with the absence of the crucifixion in Q than with the impact of such an assumption on his methodology for stratifying Q (see Ingolfsland 2003:219-224). In reality, the impact of the extent of Q on Kloppenborg’s stratification model is minimal, since the differences between the identified strata (i.e. form, audience and motif) would still prevail even if we couldn’t reconstruct all of Q.

Kloppenborg has also been said to assume that the individual sayings and small sayings-clusters in Q were originally independent (see Horsley 1999:62-63, 65). Kloppenborg does indeed hold such a view, not least of all because of the influence on him of previous Q scholarship and their preoccupation with form-criticism. Kloppenborg (1987a:98) stated in no uncertain terms that he presupposed, adopted and built upon the results of form-critical analyses that predated him, including the works of Lührmann, Zeller and

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Jacobson. However, Kloppenborg does not simply and uncritically assume the genesis of Q. Rather, he is compelled by internal evidence to take up this perception of Q. Not only are many of the sayings in Q juxtaposed arbitrarily, but they are also joined via an array of quite varied methods – i.e. by using catchwords, by thematically joining sayings with common structures or formal elements, by syntactical devices, by rhetorical composition, or by including disparate sayings within the same communicative event (see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:124-128). No wonder a previous generation of scholarship saw them as haphazardly combined sayings with no apparent order whatsoever. Furthermore, Kloppenborg’s analysis of Q does not start with form-criticism, and neither does it end there. Instead, he works from the final form “downwards” to single clusters and (only then) to individual sayings. Form-criticism is not the only weapon in his arsenal. Kloppenborg applies redactional, compositional and rhetorical analyses to Q. In as much, he goes above and beyond previous form-critical analyses of Q. In the end, Kloppenborg’s “assumption” is warranted by the evidence and his method is not controlled, dictated, restrained or inhibited by this assumption.

Ingolfsland (2003:222-223) claims that Kloppenborg assumes the Bultmanian theory that Q should be regarded as “a transitional stage between the un-messianic preaching of Jesus and the fully self-conscious kerygma of the Hellenistic churches” (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:21; see Bultmann [1948-53] 1951-55:1.3). Ingolfsland (2003:223) then says that if Jesus’ preaching was messianic, Bultmann’s postulation of Q as a transitional document fails, and that, if this happens, the case for redaction within Q is weakened or eliminated. But Ingolfsland fails to show how the concept of Q as a transitional document has any impact on the assumption or case for or against redaction within Q. I would suggest that it doesn’t. Kloppenborg’s case for stratification is built on literary considerations, not assumptions on the nature and place of Q within tradition history. In fact, Kloppenborg [Verbin] (1987a:244-245; 2000a:150-151) warns against confusing his proposed stratification in any way with tradition history, or with the chronological prominence of any of these strata. According to Horsley (1999:63), Kloppenborg takes for granted that “there must have been different strata in Q.” Yet, without such assumptions, no study or analysis would be possible at all. A redaction-critical study of Mark also presupposes
that redaction took place. With Kloppenborg’s analysis, the proof is in the pudding. Regardless of what he assumes, proving his assumption(s) to be accurate is another story altogether. What makes Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy so compelling is not that he puts forward a comfortable hypothesis, but that he corroborates his hypothesis with in-depth analysis of the text. If his assumption that Q must have had different layers could not be corroborated by the Q text itself, then it would simply have been an assumption. However, Kloppenborg “proves” his assumption by employing a meticulously literary examination of the text, something his critics do not do (see esp. Piper 1995b:3-4; McLean 1995:333-334; cf. also Tuckett 1996:73, 345).

A host of scholars have accused Kloppenborg of assuming that wisdom and apocalyptic material are incompatible and that he uses this presupposition to separate Q¹ from Q² (cf. Allison 1997:4; see Tuckett 1996:327-328; Horsley 1999:25-26, 77; Ingolfsland 2003:224-226; see also Casey 2002:29-30). The objection is, in other words, that Kloppenborg treats Q as if apocalyptic and wisdom traditions are incompatible (cf. Kirk 1998:41). Hence, he feels the need to separate the two traditions by manufacturing two layers (cf. Allison 1997:4). Horsley (1999:19) claims that Kloppenborg stratified Q in order to separate prophetic material in Q from non-prophetic material. Kloppenborg [Verbin] (2000a:145-146 n. 61, 150-151 n. 71) denies that he sees wisdom literature as being incompatible with apocalyptic or prophetic material, and even mentions that there are ancient writings with the propensity to inextricably combine the two (cf. Arnal 2001:5). However, the objection is valid, since Kloppenborg did indeed use the presence of apocalyptic themes in individual Q¹ pericopae as evidence for redaction. Yet, he only does this after initially determining and identifying the two primary strata within Q. In other words, Kloppenborg does not simply presuppose two strata and then “prove” his theory by separating the two on the basis of redaction-criticism. Rather, he first identifies the two strata and then analyses the redactional activity within Q based on the results of the first investigation. In any case, if Kloppenborg was mainly concerned with the separation of sapiential and apocalyptic material, he would probably have done a better job of it. As it stands, Kloppenborg’s two strata both contain sapiential and apocalyptic (as well as prophetic) material, something he himself points out (cf. Kloppenborg
1987a:169, 239). Kirk (1998:41) is correct in asserting that such criticism will not be entirely successful unless these scholars start engaging in the literary-analytical aspect of Kloppenborg’s hypothesis, which they do not.

2.2.4 Kloppenborg’s supposed methodological deficiencies

We now turn to arguments against Kloppenborg’s method. Some scholars question the plausibility and feasibility of stratification in the first place. Meier (1994:179) typically argues that by attempting to determine the location, possible redaction and theology of Q, “exegetes are trying to know the unknowable.” (But is this not the goal of science – to know the unknowable?) These objections usually start with noting that Q is the result of a hypothesis. As such, attempts to discern Q’s documentary status, written language, sequential order, theology, audience, or compositional history, are all built and dependant upon the Two Source Hypothesis in the first place (see Tuckett 1996:1-2; Horsley 1999:61-62). It is thus a case of building one hypothesis on top of another. However, these scholars are simply wrong about at least three of these endeavours. The very same arguments made to postulate the Two Source Hypothesis were also put forward with regard to Q’s documentary status, its language of composition, and its sequential order (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:111). In other words, these three aspects of Q were based not on the Two Source Hypothesis as such, but were rather determined by appealing directly to the patterns of agreement and disagreement between Matthew and Luke in the double tradition. What concerns us, however, is Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q, which was indeed based on an acceptance of the hypothesis that Q was the written document used as a source by both Matthew and Luke.

First off, if the hypothesis of Q is widely accepted, then attempting to discern its compositional history is warranted (see Arnal 2001:2-3). Should we think it legitimate and acceptable to posit the Q document as a solution to source-critical issues, but illegitimate and unacceptable to investigate the very same document for its compositional or socio-historical value? This is not how science works! Most contemporary biological, natural, astronomical and palaeontological sciences are based on the theory of evolution.
There is no need for these scientists to defend or justify the evolutionary theory or their assumption thereof, seeing as it is commonly accepted as the best theory available. The reason it is the best theory out there is because it is corroborated time and again by the data. Individual sciences, like genetics and zoology, for example, also corroborate each other consistently in substantiating the theory of evolution. Is the same not true of the two-source theory? This theory is accepted by an overwhelming majority of New-Testament scholars as the best theory available, because it is corroborated time and again by the data. As such, it is not only legitimate to survey the evidence in search of Q’s compositional history, but also necessary, and even compulsory, to do so – that is, if New-Testament science is indeed interested in gaining and generating knowledge, which is supposed to be the chief goal of any scientific undertaking, and does not have any hidden agendas, like authenticating biblical historicity or safeguarding faith, for instance.

Critics of stratification, whether it be the theory posited by Kloppenborg or not, tend not to engage these theories at all, but rather tend to dismiss them from the outset (cf. Arnal 2001:4). A closer look reveals the (veiled) reasons behind such condemnations. Largely, these reasons have nothing to do with research methodology or scientific approach. Instead, they seem to be motivated by an unwillingness and/or inability to abandon former conclusions contested by Q (cf. Arnal 2001:4, 7). Thus, the prime unease with Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q is that it could be used in reconstructions of the historical Jesus or Christian origins that call former conclusions about the historical Jesus and the genesis of Christianity into question – not to even mention the historical reliability of the Bible and the canonical portraits of Jesus.

Casey (2002; 2010:78-86), among many others, prefers a “chaotic Q,” by which he means that Q was not a single Greek document, but rather consisted of a number of loose traditions that circulated on their own. Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q is only possible or legitimate if it is accepted that Q was a single document. In other words, this objection by Casey is similar to (but not the same as) the previous objection, since it questions one of the theories on which Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q was built. Casey (2002; 2010:81-83) agrees that there are passages with strong verbal agreement and that these passages must have reached Matthew and Luke in Greek, but he argues that the passages
with little verbal agreement represent separate translations from Aramaic. If this could be shown conclusively, then a more chaotic understanding of Q would surely be preferable. Indeed, in his 2002 monograph, Casey devotes most of his space to reconstructing Aramaic sources for the double tradition with little verbal overlap. His knowledge of the Aramaic language is impressive, and his reconstructions elucidate much of the interpretation of these individual passages in their original social contexts.

However, Casey (2002:189; 2010:82) concludes his painstaking efforts by putting forward only one passage that might have reached both Matthew and Luke in Aramaic, namely the woes against the Pharisees and scribes. He admits that all the other passages considered by him reached Matthew and Luke in Greek, but that they all originally had Aramaic substrata. One would think that an argument mostly based on demonstrating that parts of Q were Aramaic when they reached Matthew and Luke would have had more evidence to substantiate this claim. One would also imagine such an argument to put forward the best pieces of evidence. If, then, the best and only piece of evidence for the claim that some of Q reached Matthew and Luke in Aramaic is the singular passage in Q 11:11-51, the suggestion of a chaotic understanding of Q rests on a frail foundation indeed. Moreover, the verbal disagreements between the two gospel versions of the woes against the Pharisees and scribes can plausibly be explained as representing the editorial activities of the two evangelists. Thus, Casey’s main argument against Kloppenborg, and for a chaotic Q, rests on a singular passage that can also be explicated in other ways. The cumulative weight of the arguments for a single Greek Q by far outweighs Casey’s most important argument for a chaotic Q. In any case, it is not sure that both evangelists could speak Aramaic, let alone translate an Aramaic source into Greek. What we do know with absolute certainty is that much of Q reached the two evangelists in Greek. This can not be denied. For this reason, it is highly likely that the passages with little verbal agreement were in Greek when Matthew and Luke got hold of them. Since both gospel authors were undoubtedly fluent in Greek, and since it is undeniable that at least some of Q was transmitted in Greek, the burden of proof falls on opposite arguments, including the argument that the two evangelists received some Q material in Aramaic. One passage is not enough proof of this, especially if it is possible to explain that passage differently.
If evidence of Aramaic portions of Q is dismissed, then evidence of a chaotic Q vanishes with it.

Casey (2002:25; 2010:83-84) also pounces on the argument of common order, claiming both that Kloppenborg’s compilation of such material is highly selective, and that he constantly has to supply reasons why some individual pericopes are not in common order. First off, Kloppenborg is indeed selective in compiling individual pericopes that betray a common sequence internally, but his main argument is not concerned with the internal sequence of individual pericopes. Instead, his main argument has to do with the rather substantial degree of correspondence between Matthew and Luke in the sequencing of the double tradition as a whole. Only after indicating this, does Kloppenborg move on to the internal sequencing of selected individual pericopes as supporting evidence. It is only to be expected, given the editorial techniques employed by both evangelists, that some pericopes would not be in common order, both internally, and with regards to their placement in the double tradition as a whole. These individual cases require explanation, something attempted by Kloppenborg. These explanations are, for the most part, rather convincing. Unable to convincingly refute the relative common order of the double tradition as a whole, Casey (2010:84-85) puts forward an alternative explanation for this occurrence. He argues that the relative agreement between Matthew and Luke in the sequencing of the double tradition is explicable even if they did not both have access to a similar Greek document: “If they both [Matthew and Luke] inherited the ‘Q’ material in pieces, written on wax tablets or single sheets of papyrus, it would be entirely natural that they should insert some pieces in the appropriate places of Mark’s narrative” (Casey 2010:84). Casey continues: “Moreover, some places are so obviously appropriate that they would occur naturally to two authors who were independent of each other.” He cites Q 3:7-9 as an example of this. This is a very convenient example, however, and one of the few cases where this holds true. The placement of most of the double tradition are in fact not “obviously appropriate.” Much of the double tradition are not placed in the same Markan positions by Matthew and Luke respectively, but in spite of this still follow the same relative sequence. The best way to explain this happenstance is to put forward a single source for both evangelists.
The distinction between Q² and Q³ has occasionally been called into question. Tuckett (1996:73-74) holds that a nomistic outlook is more widespread in Q than allowed for by Kloppenborg. In fact, Allison (2000:25-73) has convincingly shown that the Moses image, and allusions to a new exodus, are indeed thematically evident throughout Q – something denied by Kloppenborg. Since Kloppenborg uses references to the Torah to delineate Q³, the need for a Q³ is questioned. According to Cromhout (2007:283), “the material assigned to Q³ fits very well with the rhetorical character of the material found in the main redaction.” He mentions, as an example, the importance of the temptation story in Q’s overall Christology. He also sees continuity between the polemic and apologetic strategies of Q² and Q³. Tuckett (1996:419-421) offers an array of textual examples to indicate that, thematically, the temptation narrative is closely connected to the rest of Q. He does this to argue that the temptation narrative should not be seen as a subsequent or final stage of redaction. However, the only thing Tuckett (and Cromhout) accomplishes to “prove” is that the temptation story shows thematic continuity with the rest of Q, something that is to be expected in any case (cf. Arnal 2001:5).

Tuckett (1996:421-422) acknowledges that there are formal discontinuities between the temptation narrative and the rest of Q, but dismisses them as being explicable on the grounds that the temptation story is an introduction or prologue to the rest of the document. He holds up the prologues in the Gospels of John and Mark as examples. These are not legitimate comparisons, however. The gospels are complete narratives and their prologues are in touch with the remainder of their writings. The Sayings Gospel, on the other hand, is a compilation of sayings, and its narrative prologue is at odds with the remainder of this document. Lastly, Tuckett (1996:423) attempts to disprove the argument that the temptation story was added later by pointing out that this narrative is not alone in referencing scripture. He provides a few examples of other Q texts that implicitly refer to scripture. However, Kloppenborg’s argument (see section 2.2.2 above) was never that Q does not reference scripture at all, but that the temptation story is unique in quoting scripture directly, and even using a citation formula (γέγραπται) to introduce the quotation.
I agree with Allison, Tuckett and Cromhout that Kloppenborg underestimates the widespread presence of, and important roles attributed to, the Torah and Moses throughout Q. However, I disagree with them that it requires doing away with a third compositional layer, particularly when it comes to the temptation story. As we have seen in section 2.2.2 above, references to the Torah was not Kloppenborg’s only reason for identifying the temptation story with a third stratum. Other reasons included appeals to the temptation story’s genre, form, vocabulary, content, Christology and positive stance towards the Temple and Jerusalem. Besides, Kloppenborg (1987a:247) was not the first to notice the anomalous character of the temptation story, with some scholars seeing it as a *Fremdkörper*, others excluding it from Q altogether (see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:246-247, 152), and yet others going as far as to change their initial theories because of it (cf. Tuckett 1996:43).

However, Kloppenborg’s suggested interpolations (Q 11:42c and Q 16:17) do not, in my view, necessarily belong with the third stratum. Tuckett (1996:73) also objects to removing these texts from Q, but for reasons quite different from mine. He maintains that passages should not be excised from a text simply because they do not reflect the same concerns as other parts of that text. I agree with this statement and (I am guessing) so would Kloppenborg. Tuckett, however, misunderstands Kloppenborg’s reasons for wanting to add those interpolations to Q³. These interpolations are extrapolated from Q² on literary grounds, since they interrupt the flow of their immediate literary contexts (see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:152-153). I agree with Kloppenborg that the flow might be interrupted by these texts, at least in the case of Q 11:42c, but this still does not allow for these interpolations to be added to Q³ (*per se*). The issue here is not whether these clauses are interpolations or not. They clearly are. The issue is whether or not this justifies them being added to Q³.

Kloppenborg Verbin’s (2000a:153) primary reason for assigning these texts to the third layer is their “common perspective on the centrality of the Torah.” But, as we have seen, the centrality of the Torah is not a theme or viewpoint alien to Q². If the mentioned passages were added by a redactional hand, there is not enough evidence to assume that it
was the Q³ hand that did this. It could also have been part of the “complex prehistory” of Q² (Tuckett 1996:71), particularly if nomism and the importance of the Torah are features inherent to Q². The fact that these redactional clauses only modify individual sayings, and do not seem interested in the overall structure or redactional activity of Q, probably points to their inclusion at an earlier stage (cf. Tuckett 1996:418-419). In other words, their presence within larger units probably indicates that they were part of the development of individual sayings during the prehistory of Q, and did not play any part in the subsequent composition of Q. The literary history of Q 11:42c and Q 16:17 is perhaps then better determined by form-criticism than by redaction- or composition-criticism. In summary, I agree that the temptation story was added later to an existing Q document, but I disagree that Q 11:42c and Q 16:17 represent the same compositional activity.

According to some, Kloppenborg’s distinction between Q¹ and Q² on the grounds of implied audience is perhaps not as thoroughgoing as he claims. Horsley (1995b:40; 1999:64) identifies only one cluster in Q² (Q 11:14-26, 29-32, 39-52) directed at the out-group, with the remainder of Q² directed at the Q people (cf. also Tuckett 1996:72). Although Horsley uses the terms “projected audience” and “implied audience,” he seems to be missing the point that much of the Q² material are directed at the opponents of Q indirectly, as part of their polemic against them. Naturally, the actual audience of Q² is the Q people. However, the projected audience are outsiders opposed to the Q people (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:167). The general orientation of Q¹ is directed (either directly or indirectly) at insiders. The general orientation of Q² is directed (either directly or indirectly) at outsiders (see Mack 1993:134-135). Put differently, the mentioned audience or recipients of Jesus’ words do not necessarily represent the projected audience. The latter sometimes need to be inferred and not extrapolated.33

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33 For example, the mentioned audience in Q 7:9 is “the crowd who followed him” (τω ἄκολουθοντι αὐτῷ ὥσον). The word “followed” (ἀκολούθοντι) could also be translated “accompanied” and has strong semantic connotations with “discipleship” (see Kingsbury 1978). As such, a strong argument could be made for seeing the mentioned audience as early followers or disciples of Jesus. This is probably also the intention of the passage, i.e. to portray Jesus as speaking to his followers. The Q group would then apply this saying as if Jesus were directly speaking to them, the in-group. However, such an understanding does not take full cognisance of the whole saying on a semantic level. The content of the saying is: “Not even in Israel have I found such faith.” This is the response Jesus gave to the Centurion after he requested that
Horsley lists the following Q² clusters that are, according to him, directed at the in-group: Q 7:18-23, 24-28; Q 12:39-46, 51-53, 57-59 and Q 17:23-35. Horsley, however, does not analyse these texts to prove his statement. On face value, Q 7:18-23, for example, speaks to John’s disciples. It is not at all clear that these disciples should necessarily be seen as forming part of the in-group. The text further lists the miracles of Jesus and his benefit to the poor in order to legitimise his public career and authority. The authority of Jesus is accepted by the Q people without question. They arrange their whole lives around Jesus’ authority, sometimes with devastating results (see sections 2.3 & 2.5.4 below). Rather, the need to legitimise Jesus’ public career and authority arises in relation to their polemic against outsiders. In other words, Q 7:18-23 functions to legitimise Jesus in opposition to claims from outsiders directed against him. This becomes evident in verse 23, where those not “offended” by Jesus are seen as being blessed. The projected audience, therefore, comprises those who are indeed offended by Jesus. The named audience in Q 7:24-28 are the ὀχλοὺς. Although these crowds came to listen to Jesus, it is once again not clear that they necessarily represent the Q people. Just like Jesus was legitimised in the previous text, John is legitimised in the current text. If John were understood by the Q people as being the messenger who prepared the path for Jesus (verse 27), then John’s legitimacy is inseparably connected with that of Jesus. Whether or not the historical John actually foretold Jesus’ appearance and ministry is not important currently. What is important is that the Q people thought that this was John’s purpose. If John’s prophecy about Jesus was illegitimate for any reason, doubt would fall on the authenticity of Jesus himself. Q 7:24-28, therefore, is an attempt to legitimise John in order to indirectly legitimise Jesus. As such, this text forms part of Q’s polemic against outsiders, who probably had their suspicions about the legitimacy of both John and Jesus.

Jesus heal his son by simply saying a word. The Centurion should probably be seen as a Gentile, otherwise the saying of Jesus (“Not even in Israel”) would not make sense. In other words, gentile faith in Jesus is contrasted with the lack thereof shown by the rest of Israel. The theme of non-repentance is directed at wider Israel. Sometimes this theme appears in contexts where Jesus addresses these outsiders directly (cf. e.g. Q 10:13-14). Therefore, Q 7:9 is an example of a Q saying indirectly directed at outsiders. So, although Jesus speaks to the in-group, he has the out-group and their fate in mind.
The apocalyptic and prophetic nature of Q 12:39-46 can not be denied. The whole text is about being ready when the Son of Man comes. The actual audience is not mentioned, but one can presume it was either the crowds or his disciples. If those who will not be ready for the Son of Man are to be equated with those who did not heed the words of Jesus, then the outsiders’ fate is declared in no uncertain terms in verse 46. The projected audience, therefore, is probably outsiders, since they are the ones who will not be ready when the Son of Man comes. Their judgment is put alongside the fortuitous fate of the Q people (cf. verse 44). Q 12:49, 51, 53 is obviously directed at the Q people themselves, but speaks to the consequences of their choice to become members of the group. As such, it puts the opposition they experience into perspective. The text clearly delineates insiders from outsiders, a line of distinction that runs through patriarchal families. Similarly, Q 12:58-59 speaks directly to the Q people, directing each individual on how to deal with ἀντιδίκος σου. Its proximity to Q 12:53 makes it probable that outsiders are intended with ἀντιδίκος σου. If this interpretation is correct, the Q people are coached on how to deal with outsiders that seek legal retribution – perhaps as a result of the impact their abandonment of the patriarchal family had on such families. Q 17:23-35 is obviously apocalyptic. Outsiders are clearly meant by the third person plural of εἰπωσιν in verse 23. The same is true of ἐκεῖνος and ἀπαντάς in verse 27. Q 17:34-35 clearly distinguishes between those who παραλαμβάνεται and those who ἀφίεται, i.e. between insiders and outsiders. Thus, although Q 17:23-35 (on face value) warns the in-group about the coming Son of Man, it serves a similar function as Q 12:39-46 above. The outsiders’ fate are polemically described as being fatal (cf. verses 24, 27, 37, 34-35). The passage is thus indirectly directed at outsiders, warning them of their imminent demise in the face of apocalyptic judgment. Four out of the six texts thought by Horsley to be directed at the in-group are, in fact, indirectly aimed at the out-group. The actual and projected audiences in the remaining two texts (Q 12:49, 51, 53 and Q 12:58-59) might be the Q people themselves. Nevertheless, all six passages have one thing in common: they all programmatically address the polemic and apologetic concerns of the Q people over against their opponents.

34 The “coming of the Son of Man” should not necessarily be interpreted as referring to the parousia of Jesus (see Horsley 1999:70-71).
Some scholars maintain that Kloppenborg’s distinction between Q¹ and Q² on the grounds of *characteristic forms* is perhaps not as thoroughgoing as he claims. Regarding Kloppenborg’s second common feature (i.e. that of form), Horsley (1999:65) counts only one (Q 11:29, 31-32) of the *chreia* listed where “this generation” is (expressly) criticised for not responding to the kingdom message. Horsley here confuses content with form. Kloppenborg has *literary* reasons for identifying Q² with comparative *chreiai*. This objection should rather be made against the *motifs* Kloppenborg identifies within the main redaction. Although “this generation” is not everywhere overtly mentioned or criticised for not responding to the kingdom message, the harsh judgmental language and apocalyptic pronouncements in Q² are directed against them. Whether directly or indirectly, Q² polemically and apologetically targets outsiders, and, according to the Q text, these outsiders are best identified with “this generation.” Thus, the term “this generation” names the outsiders identified in the foregoing discussion as the projected audience.

Horsley (1999:65) only identifies one saying (Q 17:23-24) that could form-critically be classified as “apocalyptic.” This is simply not true. There are many forms in Q² that should rightfully be classified “apocalyptic” (cf. Q 3:9, 16-17; Q 7:22, 35; Q 10:12, 13-15; Q 11:19-20, 23, 26, 30, 31-32, 49-51; Q 12:8-9, 10, 39-40, 44, 46, 49; Q 13:25-27, 28-29, 30, 35; Q 14:23; Q 17:20-21, 24, 26-28, 30, 34-35; Q 19:26; Q 22:28, 30 – to list only the most obvious examples). The principal aim of the main redaction is to voice its polemic against “this generation.” The authors of Q² do this by drawing on all the tools at their disposal, at times using prophetic forms and themes, and at other times utilising apocalyptic forms and motives. They use whatever tool seems most applicable at the time (and in that specific literary context). Horsley’s apprehension in calling these sayings “apocalyptic” might stem from the fact that he views them as referring to the present, and not to the future. His argument might therefore be based on the semantics of the word “apocalyptic.” Regardless of whether we call these sayings apocalyptic or not, they are still prophetic, and mainly concerned with polemic against outsiders. Horsley (1999:67) further asserts: “[I]n fact, much of the material in both strata would be described as prophetic according to traditional form-critical criteria of form and
function.” He doesn’t continue to prove this statement, however. Kirk (1998:152-403) has conclusively demonstrated that the prophetic forms in Q¹ act as incentives for the framework genre’s wisdom imperatives. These prophetic motive clauses are even delivered in sapiential idiom (cf. Kirk 1998:270). Kloppenborg (1987a:168-169) has shown that chreiai predominate in Q², with much of the prophetic sayings being imbedded in, and presented as, chreiai. Kloppenborg (1987a:170) never denied the presence of prophetic sayings in Q². The existence of these prophetic forms makes all the more sense if the aphoristic and subversive nature of Q’s wisdom is fully comprehended (see Kirk 1998:306, 333-336).

Jacobson (1989:152) discovers possibly some chreiai in Q¹ (cf. Q 6:23, Q 9:57-62; Q 12:11-12; cf. Kirk 1998:41). Kloppenborg (1987a:240) knew from the beginning that Q¹ contained chreia, but saw thematic and literary continuity between these chreiai and the wisdom material in the rest of Q¹. Kirk (1998:152-403) illustrates that the chreiai in Q¹ are integrated into a format that is characteristic of Instructions. The formative layer employed chreiai in support of the overall argumentation of its framework genre (cf. Kirk 1998:270). Allison (1997:6-7) notes that Q 6:20-23 alludes to Isaiah 61, something rather more distinctive of Q² (cf. Q 3:16-17; Q 7:18-23; Q 13:35). However, Allison (1997:6) is wrong in seeing this as evidence that “there are literary and editorial techniques that cut across [Kloppenborg’s] proposed layers.” Allison confuses “literary and editorial techniques” with common themes. Allusions to the same Old Testament text within different literary contexts is not a literary or editorial feature to be distinguished. It is a case of the author of Q¹ and the redactor of Q² drawing upon a common theme and, as a result, belongs rather to our next discussion.

A case could also be made for identifying wisdom forms in Q² perhaps more at home in Q¹ (cf. point 7 below). However, the haphazard style of chreia collections, and the way in which it tended to absorb other sayings into its overall structure, renders such an objection invalid (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:323). Casey (2002:31) objects that it is possible to reconstruct some of Kloppenborg’s identified chreiai, like Q 9:57-58, in their original Aramaic forms. Casey (2002:31) is probably correct, not only in his Aramaic
reconstruction of this and other Q passages, but also in claiming that these Q sayings “were originally Jewish and transmitted in Aramaic, and […] were not originally examples of Greek chreiae.” However, the prehistory of Q is inconsequential for the conclusion that the second layer was made up of *chreiai by the time the document reached the two evangelists*. Once again, the tendency of *chreiai* to absorb other sayings into their overall structures accommodate both Casey’s theory that some of them were originally not *chreiai* and Kloppenborg’s theory that Q² consisted mostly of *chreiai* when Q received its final redaction. Tuckett (1996:353) seems to be in agreement with Kloppenborg when it comes to form, although he is reluctant to admit this: “[I]t would seem that any sapiential elements in the tradition have been overlaid by a powerful eschatological / prophetic element … In one sense this might support Kloppenborg’s thesis of a prophetic Q² succeeding a sapiential Q¹.” However, he downplays the wisdom element, and sees it as both undervalued by Q and supportive of the prophetic element (see also Boring 1991:232-233). Nonetheless, Tuckett, perhaps unwittingly, supports Kloppenborg’s compositional theory in as far as it estimates that pre-existing polemic and prophetic traditions were incorporated into a more wisdom-type document.

According to some, Kloppenborg’s distinction between Q¹ and Q² on the grounds of *characteristic motifs* is perhaps not as thoroughgoing as he claims. This objection must be distinguished from the objection encountered earlier, i.e. that Kloppenborg assumes that wisdom and apocalyptic material are incompatible. The two objections are similar, but the former attacks his *assumption* of incompatibility, whereas the current objection tries to invalidate his *method*. The two objections contradict and nullify one another. Let me explain. If wisdom and apocalyptic traditions are not incompatible, then there should not be a concern with the presence of apocalyptic motifs in the sapiential layer of Q. In other words, it does not undermine Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy. The opponents of Kloppenborg betray their own inability to make peace with the compatibility of wisdom and apocalypticism by pointing out the latter within the formative layer. Within the current objection, we must distinguish further between arguments pertaining to the content of Q¹ and arguments concerned with the content of Q². I will start with the former.
One of the criticisms of Kloppenborg’s thesis is the presence of judgment and apocalyptic themes in the proposed sapiential layer (cf. Horsley 1999:67, 81; see Hoffmann 1995:187-188; Tuckett 1996:160-163; cf. also Sato 1995:140; Casey 2002:29). This apparently undermines his whole hypothesis. Jacobson (1989:152) discovers some possibly prophetic sayings in Q¹ (e.g. Q 6:23, Q 9:57-62; Q 12:11-12). However, these are subordinate to the sapiential framework genre of the formative layer. We have already seen Allison’s argument based on the common allusions to Isaiah 61 within both strata. Based hereupon, Allison (1997:7) concludes that the relevant texts should be assigned “to the same redactional stage.” But why? Allusions to the same text, even if they contain Christological implications, simply indicate continuity between Q¹ and Q², and says nothing about redaction (cf. Arnal 2001:5). To use the possibility of allusions to the same Old-Testament text as evidence for redaction is preposterous. Allison (1997:4-5) is further concerned over the fact that Kloppenborg has the need to view all Deuteronomistic themes in Q¹ as interpolations. Horsley (1999:66) has a similar concern over Kloppenborg’s need to see prophetic and outsider-directed passages occurring in the sapiential stratum as interpolations (cf. also Casey 2002:29). However, the interpolations are identified on literary grounds by Kloppenborg (1987a:240, 242-244) and only thereafter added to Q² because of their strong similarities with the implied audience, forms and themes of the redactional layer. Allison (1997:7) also feels that a Deuteronomistic theology can be found in other “authentic” Q¹ texts, especially the idea of “rejection.” These observations are curious in light of Allison’s (1997:27-30) discussion on Q 12:35-Q 17:37, where he states that “the section remains transparently practical wisdom with a strong eschatological component.” Why would Allison see the need to undermine Kloppenborg’s thesis in light of the presence of certain themes in both layers if he himself admits that such thematic overlap is indeed possible?

Tuckett (1996:160-161) argues that the motif of a futuristic eschatology is not only evident in Q², but in Q¹ as well, listing the beginning and end of the inaugural sermon, the mission charge and even the teaching on cares and prayer as examples. As we have seen,

36 He lists: Q6:22-23b; Q 9:58; Q 10:3, 10-11, 16; Q 12:4-5, 11-12.
37 Quotation from page 28. See also page 42.
the previous argument betrays Tuckett’s own incapability to make peace with the fact that wisdom and apocalyptic (or prophetic) material were not incompatible in ancient literature. In any case, Kloppenborg did not separate the two strata on thematic and theological grounds, but on literary and rhetorical grounds, after which he extrapolated certain common themes. It would seem that Tuckett (et al) confuses the results of Kloppenborg’s analysis with its original criteria (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:151).

The presence of prophetic material within Q¹ or the reshaping of Q¹ in line with a more eschatological and/or prophetic outlook does not disprove Kloppenborg’s theory – on the contrary, it only adds to the idea that a Q² redactor had a hand in the reshaping of Q¹. Wisdom literature of the Hellenistic age tended to be more eschatological and futurist in their approach (cf. Kirk 1998:52). Furthermore, Q’s aphoristic nature qualifies its appropriation of prophetic material.

A similar, but different, objection is that the so-called “sapiential layer” seems to discuss topics dissimilar to the admonitions that are characteristic of Q¹, such as mission, discipleship and the Holy Spirit (cf. Tuckett 1996:72; see Horsley 1999:66, 88-89). However, if wisdom is concerned with the right behaviour before God, then discipleship is wisdom in that it views the following of Jesus’ example as the correct conduct before God. Furthermore, mission, as Q understands it, is merely the act of informing others about this new wisdom. Also, the mission instruction uses wisdom forms to deal with sapiential themes, such as equipping, provisioning, table manners, hospitality, labouring, and the responsibilities of messengers (see Kirk 1998:346-350, 358-359). Moreover, the mission instruction is inaugurated in verses 2 and 3 by small forms most at home with the genre of wisdom Instruction (cf. Kirk 1998:346).

If Q 9:57-60 is seen as part of the missionary discourse, the whole pericope is cast in the mould of a chreia elaboration (cf. 38)

38 The reference to “harvest” in verse 2 does not in and of itself pre-suppose apocalyptic judgment (à la Joel 4:9-17; Isa 9:2-3; 27:12; Jer 51:33; Hos 6:11; Rev 14:15-20; 2 Esdras 4:26-37). A literal reading of this verse as a proverb would rather suggest that agricultural labour is intended (compare Prov 6:8; 10:5; 20:4; 26:1; Job 5:5; Sib. Or. 3:244-245; 2 Baruch 10:9; Pseudo-Phocylides 163-170; cf. Piper 1989:133). A literal understanding of the word “harvest” not only appears in wisdom literature, but in some apocalyptic literature as well (cf. e.g. Jer 5:17; Qumran Scroll 4Q285 1-2:4-8; see e.g. the Treatise of Shem). If the agricultural labour in Q 10:2 is indeed symbolic of something, it is, in this Q context, symbolic of the mission itself, not apocalyptic judgment (compare Prov 25:13; cf. Piper 1989:134; cf. also Allison 1997:14; contra Edwards 1976:102; Catchpole 1993:164). There are also some intertextual examples of the “harvest” metaphor being symbolic of wisdom itself (cf. e.g. Sirach 6:18-22; 24:25-26).
Kirk 1998:359). Apart from the announcement of judgment in Q 10:12-15, and the thanksgiving in Q 10:21, there is nothing in the mission instruction that could be equated with prophetic texts, and even those two texts are explicable within the sapiential framework genre of the mission instruction (see Kirk 1998:358-363). Lastly, despite not being a thoroughgoing theme, the Holy Spirit could easily be afforded some significance within this new wisdom described above.

Jacobson claims that the motifs in Q¹ are not consistent throughout (cf. Horsley 1999:67). Conversely, Kirk (1998:270) argues for the cohesion and coherence of Q¹. Allison (1997:5) claims that the beatitudes in the inaugural sermon betray little sapiential content or formulation (cf. Hoffmann 1995:188). However, Kloppenborg (1987a:173) knew that the beatitudes were concerned with eschatological reversal and reward when he developed his stratification model, and pointed it out then already, which just shows that he does not allow themes to dictate his stratigraphy, but literary features (see also Van Aarde 1994:151-179, esp. 170, 174-175). It also shows that Kloppenborg is not uneasy with the presence of eschatological themes in his so-called wisdom layer. In other words, he does not presuppose the incompatibility of wisdom and prophetic, or apocalyptic, material. Allison’s claim that the beatitudes betray little sapiential content is based on the erroneous assumption that eschatological themes are not indicative or characteristic of wisdom material. He simply fails to realise the tendency of contemporary wisdom literature to incorporate eschatological themes (cf. Kirk 1998:52). In fact, beatitudes also appear in wisdom texts from Qumran (cf. Kirk 1998:391). Eschatology is not always a good designator for genre. In the end, Q¹ treats wisdom topos (Kirk 1998:271), with the prophetic and/or apocalyptic themes supporting and motivating the rhetoric of those topos within the framework genre. The beatitudes are indeed wisdom forms that betray and develop eschatological themes (cf. Patterson, in Miller 2001:77).

I now turn to arguments based on the content of Q². According to Horsley (1999:65), the motif of judgment against Israel and a positive attitude towards Gentiles is not a thoroughgoing common feature within Q². Horsley (1995b:40; 1999:65) counts only two short passages (Q 11:29-32 and Q 11:39-52), neither of which display apocalyptic motifs,
exhibiting all three common features utilised as criteria for separating Q² from Q¹. “It seems unwarranted, therefore, to believe that a whole redactional layer of Q was directed against Israel and to proceed with a redactional judgmental stratum as a working hypothesis about Q” (Horsley 1995b:40). However, his reasons for discounting the other judgmental discourses are arbitrary. Horsley (1995b:40) admits that the purpose of Q 7:1-10 is to “challenge Israel to fuller response,” but “not to exemplify a mission to Gentiles.” The latter statement is an entirely separate matter and irrelevant to the stratification discussion. The former statement conforms to Kloppenborg’s more comprehensive understanding of the main redaction’s apologetic nature. Horsley further asserts that Q 11:31-32 should not be seen as evidence for a gentile faith, and, as a result, holds that there is no reference to the condemnation of Israel in that passage. Once again, Horsley conflates separate issues. Gentile faith is irrelevant for a determination of redactional activity in Q. Moreover, gentile faith is not the primary reason for understanding Q 11:31-32 as a passage directed against Israel. The point, rather, is that the author attempts to polemically shame Israel by comparing her unfavourably with Gentiles. Horsley also claims that John’s preaching (as well as other critical Q² passages) is both positively and negatively apocalyptic, and therefore not explicitly judgmental. This is an illogical argument. The fact that both negative and positive aspects can be extracted from John’s preaching does not automatically mean that it is “not explicitly judgmental.” All it means is that it might not be solely judgmental. In any case, Horsley admits that John’s sermon is “a vindication of Jesus and John vis-à-vis outside critics.” As such, Horsley, perhaps unwittingly, admits that John’s sermon is polemic in nature.

That Jesus is equated with Sophia in the second stratum (and not in the first sapiential stratum) has led some to argue against Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy on the grounds that the second stratum is supposed to represent apocalyptic judgment and not wisdom (cf. Tuckett 1996:351-352; Allison 1997:4; Horsley 1999:67; cf. also Jacobson 1989:152). They miss the point of Kloppenborg’s designation of Q¹ as “sapiential” and Q² as “prophetic” or “apocalyptic.” These are not designations of genre, but of the most central and characteristic themes of these layers. Once again, these opponents betray their own incapability to accept that wisdom and apocalyptic themes are not incompatible. At any
rate, that Jesus is only at the redactional stage identified with Sophia confirms the continuity between the two layers (see section 2.4.4 below; cf. Mack 1993:147, 151). The main purpose of the introduction of the Sophia-theme was polemical, functioning in combination with the deuteronomistic view of history to charge “this generation” with killing the prophets (see Hartin 1995:158-159). However, the deuteronomistic theme was sufficient in and of itself to serve this polemical purpose, without having to be conflated with the Sophia-theme. If Jesus was the last in a long line of prophets murdered by “this generation,” then the accusation is complete. It could simply have been God (and not Sophia) who sent the prophets. When compared to other Jewish texts of the time, Q is unique in adding Sophia to the deuteronomistic theme (see Horsley 1999:117-118; contra Jacobson 1992:257). As such, the introduction of Sophia probably had its conception in something authentic, like the sapiential nature of the teachings of Jesus. The identification between Jesus and Sophia probably functioned to legitimise and authorise the teachings of Jesus, who was now privy to divine wisdom (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:324; Mack 1993:152). In the early church, wisdom traditions generally tended to develop in a Christological direction (cf. Schottroff 1995:356). The beginnings of such a development can already be seen in Q¹ (cf. Q 10:16). This development could be explained by the possibility that, although Jesus was already seen as a teacher of wisdom in Q¹, he was only identified with Sophia by the time of redaction. Analyses of Proverbs 1-9 have indicated that a similar development occurred there, with the teachings on practical wisdom preceding the personification of Wisdom in Proverbs 9:4 (cf. Hartin 1995:152).

Allison (1997:5) points to Q 11:31-32, where Jesus is compared to both a wise man (Solomon) and a prophet (Jonah). But, as we have seen, the presence of both prophetic and wisdom themes within one layer is not an argument against Kloppenborg. The reference to wisdom (Solomon) indicates thematic continuity with Q¹, as can be expected

39 There is evidence to suggest that Jesus is not at all equated with Sophia in Q, but that he is only portrayed as the last and most important emissary, messenger and/or prophet of Sophia (cf. Horsley 1999:3; see Tuckett 1996:218-221; cf. also Hartin 1995:159; Jacobson 1995:376; see also Piper 1989:165-170; cf. Q 7:35; Q 11:31, 49-51). It is perhaps only later, in the Gospel according to Matthew, that Jesus is identified with divine Sophia (cf. Hartin 1995:159). It is also possible that Q represents traditions that depict Jesus as being both a messenger of Sophia (cf. Q 7:35) and Sophia herself (cf. Q 10:22) (cf. Schottroff 1995:356). Whatever the case, both views substantiate continuity between Q¹ and Q².
from a document composed by the same group. On the other hand, the prophetic reference (Jonah) indicates Q²'s distinctiveness as a separate compositional layer. Sato (1995:140) struggles to see how one redactional layer could discuss both salvation and disaster. Yet, biblical material – not to even mention modern Christianity – is bursting with examples of apparent contradictions by the same author. Sato’s concern is ironic if it is considered that Horsley (1995b:38-40, 92) notices a “positive-salvific” and a “negative-judgmental” aspect to the isolated instance of John’s preaching, not to mention Q as a whole. Even more ironic is the fact that Horsley notices a harmony between the two sides of the coin, and uses this as part of his argument against Kloppenborg. As far as all of the previous is concerned, arguments based upon the motifs apparent in each layer do not substitute, and are never superior to, thoroughgoing literary analyses (cf. Kirk 1998:55).

A number of scholars would plainly prefer a simpler compositional activity. Hoffmann (1995:187) mentions the possibility that the same author might actually have put disparate material together, simply because he found them already in such multiplicity in the Jesus tradition. Tuckett agrees and gives three reasons for preferring a unitary compositional happening (cf. also Horsley 1999:67). Firstly, Q² has a more complex prehistory than simply being viewed as the redactional material added to Q¹. Secondly, Tuckett (1996:71-72) questions whether the “wisdom sayings” in Q¹ ever belonged together in a literary whole before being redacted by Q². According to him, evidence rather points to the fragmentary and multi-faceted nature of Q¹. Thirdly, it is not sure that the six blocks of Q¹ material ever belonged together before being redacted by Q². Tuckett (1996:72-74) further maintains that there are other possibilities, and perhaps more justifiable possibilities, to account for the development of Q into a final form. Dunn (2003:156-157) agrees and maintains that Kloppenborg fails to illustrate that Q¹ “ever functioned as a single document or stratum.” He also, while maintaining an oral or written Q, proposes a single compositional act. Tuckett postulates the possibility that Q²

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40 Tuckett (1996:72) talks about the “five” collections of sayings identified by Kloppenborg. However, Kloppenborg [Verbin] (1987a:238; 2000a:146) identified six sapiential blocks in Q¹.
made use of independent collections of sayings when creating the final Q form. Tuckett’s concerns are valid and can be summarised in the following quotation:

If, as I have tried to argue, it is unnecessary to postulate a Q³ subsequent to Q², and if the pre-Q² material is perhaps rather more disparate, and the alleged ‘Q¹’ stratum not necessarily capable of being shown to have existed as a literary unity in its own right before Q², then we may have a rather simpler model, viz. a Q-editor taking up and using (possibly a variety of) earlier materials.

Despite these objections, Q¹ betrays internal evidence of sophisticated composition (cf. Kirk 1998:38). Apart from similarities in audience, forms and motifs, certain structural and rhetorical features also seem to indicate that the wisdom blocks were probably redacted together (see Kloppenborg 1987a:242-243; Piper 1989:35-36, 61-63, 72-73, 139; Kirk 1998:61-62, 269). It even seems as though the structuring techniques, genre patterns and stylistic devices betrayed by the formative stratum were quite conventional when compared to Instructions of the time-period, like Sirach and Pseudo-Phocylides (cf. Kirk 1998:269). The methods by which Q² material were interpolated into Q¹ material suggest that the wisdom blocks were probably already written down before the Q² redactor got to them (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:244; Kirk 1998:269). Such evidence points towards two different redactors for Q¹ and Q² respectively, as well as towards a single redactor for all the Q¹ material. That Q² has a complex prehistory, and that the sayings in Q¹ are rather loosely connected, do not invalidate the compositional activity betrayed by the Sayings Gospel and identified by Kloppenborg. As far as the disparity of Q¹ is concerned, Tuckett seems not to take the very nature of wisdom collections into account. Unrelated and dissimilar sayings often appear side by side in many wisdom texts known to have existed as a unity. The book of Proverbs is a good example of this. On the surface, sayings might appear unorganised and disparate, but careful composition is betrayed when analysing stylistic, rhetorical and thematic commonalities within the corpus (see esp. Loader 2006:1177-1199, esp. 1197; cf. also Allison 2010:90). Disparity is therefore not a good indicator of composition, particularly in wisdom texts. Identifying a prehistory for Q² does not take away that this layer was added subsequently, and that it
should therefore be regarded as the main redaction, mainly because of its positioning, its function in organising the text, and its proclivity to disrupt the flow of Q¹.

2.2.5 Findings

Most objections to Kloppenborg’s proposed stratification reiterate aspects thereof that had been noted by Kloppenborg from the very beginning. Some of the arguments against Kloppenborg’s supposed assumptions are not able to prove that these assumptions even existed. In the cases of those that did exist, none of the arguments are able to show how these assumptions impacted either Kloppenborg’s analysis or his ultimate results. Objections to Kloppenborg’s method are equally unconvincing. Arguments against implied audience seem to be a simple case of misunderstanding. Both the presence of prophetic and apocalyptic forms and motives in Q¹ and the occurrence of wisdom forms and motives in Q² were already identified by Kloppenborg in his original analysis. These features do not invalidate Kloppenborg’s stratification, but only go to show that he did not allow content to dictate his literary analysis. It also indicates that he did not regard prophetic and wisdom material to be incompatible or mutually exclusive. Critics of Kloppenborg appear to be nitpicking. They tend to draw upon certain isolated examples when building their cases against him. Yet, they all fail to engage in a similarly literary-critical examination of the text. Finally, Tuckett’s preference for a simpler compositional activity fails to convince, simply because he does not engage the text in a comprehensive and literary-critical manner. Evidence of disparity in Q¹ and of a prehistory for Q² do not refute Kloppenborg’s proposed compositional history. Arnal (2001:5) is thus correct when he says that no one has been able to successfully refute Kloppenborg’s theory of stratification, arguably because none of them have addressed Kloppenborg’s detailed literary arguments.
2.3 ~ FAMILY FEUDS

This section is not central to the current discussion, but will prove to be indispensable as an interpretive framework for upcoming arguments, judgments and text-analyses. Some time ago, Blasi (1986:246) had recognised a tension between Q 9:57-60 and Q 10:2-16 (cf. Horsley 1995b:43-44; cf. also Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:182). The former indicates that the Q people were socially disruptive by breaking up families in the name of the kingdom. The latter indicates that the Q people expected support from households, and promoted reconciliation, prayer and ethical virtuosity within such households. Blasi explains this by proposing that the tension was between itinerants, who disrupted traditional families, and the rest of the Q people, who continued to operate as traditional households. It is unlikely, however, that households and household disrupters existed side by side in idyllic harmony. Surely, a better explanation would be that biological families were disrupted, but that new fictive families were created when the Q group was formed. The establishment and configuration of fictive families was a well-known feature of village life, usually occurring during times of economic hardship as a direct reaction to pressures from above (see Oakman 2008:252-253). Fictive families were sanctioned by strong religious beliefs, and emerged in both villages and coalitions as attempts to reclaim some form of power in the face of oppression. Such fictitious families historically tended to emphasise new social orders, where domestic economics would replace political economics. The Q people did not make use of existing family structures, but substituted patriarchal families with fictive kinship structures. Thus, by the time Q¹ was written, the Q people were probably a settled group, operating as a “new family” on a household system.⁴¹

⁴¹ Vaage (1994:38-39) claims that the origins of the Q people might have been similar to the radical lifestyles of Cynics. Apart from the ambivalent references in Q 10:4 and the deliberately Cynic readings of the Mission Discourse, there is no direct evidence for Cynic-like beginnings of the Q people. Even if such a possibility is accepted, the Q document as it stands is concerned with community life, not a lifestyle based on anti-civilisation praxis. The complimentarily of itinerancy and community has been a matter of some debate.
Establishing “new families” would undoubtedly have caused major disruptions in traditional family life. Family division is already evident from Q¹. Although it might not have been the intention of the Q mission to divide families (cf. Q 10:5-7), families were divided (cf. Q 9:58, 59-60; Q 12:51, 53; Q 14:26; 16:18; cf. Jacobson 1995:366-367). This rift seems to have occurred mostly between young adults and their parents (see Destro & Pesce 2003:217-222). Most of these young recruits were probably married with children (see Destro & Pesce 2003:217-222). The whole extended family, first generation (grand)parents included, would have lived together in the same dwelling. Q 9:59-60 clearly preaches against the Decalogue’s commandment to honour thy father and mother (cf. Schottroff 1995:354; Jacobson 1995:361-362; cf. Acts 5:6, 7-10; 8:2). The same saying probably also advocates forsaking (ἀφες) one’s family, which is described as being “dead” (το/ις νεκρο/ις), so that one can join the Q movement (ἀκολουθήσω σοι) (cf. Moxnes 2003:54-55). Q 14:26 is even more in your face, advocating hatred (μισεί) between children and parents. Filial respect, submission and obedience were demanded and expected in ancient Judean culture (cf. Jacobson 1995:363). “Stubborn and rebellious” children were to be stoned to death (cf. Deut 21:18-21). Both of these sayings (Q 9:59-60 & Q 14:26) would have been entirely insensitive and extremely offensive to ancient Judean ears (see Jacobson 1995:361-364).

42 Arnal (2001:174-177) reads these Q sayings as general statements about either the cost of discipleship (Q 9:59-60) or the fate of humanity (Q 9:58), not to be taken literally. Generally in Q, Arnal (2001:183) reads references to the poor metaphorically, as part of Q’s rhetoric of social inversion “to communicate the repudiation of social hierarchy.” Yet, the social programme described by Arnal would undoubtedly have been welcomed more by the poor than the wealthy and would have found better support among underprivileged than privileged individuals. Arnal’s aim is to refute the theory of itinerancy. However, a literal reading of these texts do not necessarily promote itinerancy, as will become clear. In keeping with the nature of the Q document as a whole, it is our current intention to read all Q texts as if they reflect the social location of the Q people in some way or another.

43 The word hate (μισεί) refers here not to a feeling or emotion such as “dislike intensely,” but to an orientation or action such as not to “recognise one’s responsibility toward someone” (Jacobson 1995:364), which is the direct opposite of love or honour (τίμα) in the LXX version of Exodus 20:12 and ἡττος in the MT. In terms of group orientation and responsibility, the word denotes abandonment of, distancing from, separation from, alienation from or forsaking of the group in question, in this case the traditional family (cf. Moxnes 2003:58). See also Josephus’s Ant. 6.255, 324; 7.254.

44 It is doubtful that such commandments were actually practiced.
Besides the division between children and parents, Q 16:18 probably also reflects a situation where husbands and wives were divided, ultimately ending up in divorce (see Schottroff 1995:354-355; Jacobson 1995:371-373). Q members who had divorced as a result of joining the movement were not allowed to remarry. Individuals from both genders appear to have left their families in exchange for Q membership (cf. Jacobson 1995:363; Destro & Pesce 2003:220; see also Freyne 2000:271-272, 282-283). If Q 9:58 is read in conjunction with Q 9:59-60, the actual situation in which many Q people found themselves comes to the fore. Because of their abandonment of the patriarchal family, many of the Q people were probably homeless and, even worse, family-less. Since ancient Mediterranean households were the nucleuses and sources of all social, economic, religious and cultural identity and activity, such schisms must have had a tremendous impact on the Q people (see esp. Destro & Pesce 2003:212-213; cf. Jacobson 1995:378-379; cf. also Horsley 1995a:195-196; 1999:297). The Q people were seen as being “poor” (Q 6:20), probably because they no longer enjoyed family support, among other reasons (cf. Schottroff 1995:360; Moxnes 2003:62-63, 114). Fidelity towards the Jesus movement was regarded to be more important than belonging to a patriarchal family (cf. Jacobson 1995:364; Arnal 2001:175; see Mack 1993:136, 139-141).

Jewish villages behaved corporately, and family networks made decisions together (cf. Draper 1999:33; Horsley 1999:52-53, 297). Abandoning one’s family invariably meant abandoning the larger groups that were constituted by networks of families, resulting in an honour-shame ripple effect (see Destro & Pesce 2003:212-213; cf. Douglas 1995:123; Moxnes 2003:52). According to ancient views, the extended family and/or household structure in which an individual found him- or herself controlled and determined his or her behaviour, activity and social position (cf. Oakman 2008:249). If a child leaves, the father is perceived as being unable to control the actions of his children, bringing shame to the abandoned family. The child who leaves is also shamed by the family and the larger community, not least of all for dishonouring his or her parents and “not knowing his or her place” within the family and community (cf. Moxnes 2003:52). Moreover, young males who forsook their families “represented a provocation to the very order of the community” (Moxnes 2003:72). Young men were expected to succeed their fathers.
as *paterfamilias*. With the father-child relationship severed, the traditional source of honour and identity is broken, and the young individual is left honour-less (cf. Moxnes 2003:95-96). Apart from the impact on the *honour* of both parties, abandonment also had an impact on the *sustenance* of both parties. The child who had left had, in effect, robbed the abandoned family of a pair of hands to work the fields. Conversely, the child who had left could no longer expect support from his or her family. However, if the father is the one who decides to abandon societal structures, the entire family would in most cases likely follow – although not in all cases, as is apparent from Q 16:18. The father would typically then be shamed by the greater community, and such shame would spread to the whole family. Fathers who joined the movement would have severed their ties with community-based, agricultural (or other vocational) networks, rendering them unable to provide, and thereby endangering the well-being of their entire families. Wives who left their husbands would have been shamed for dishonouring their husbands, “not knowing their place,” and giving up their virtuousness and purity (cf. Moxnes 2003:52). Joining the Q community would have left women husbandless and children fatherless, placing them in a particularly vulnerable socio-economic position. Women’s abandonment of patriarchal families would not only have had an impact on *them*, but also on the families left behind, seeing as women’s contribution to agricultural labour could sometimes be extensive, and could include, among other things, fruit gathering, animal tending and vine tending (cf. Horsley 1995a:200-201; Freyne 2000:284; Arnal 2001:114). Since economy at the lower levels of society was primarily a family endeavour, Q 16:13 might effectively represent a choice between family support and the kingdom – or Q membership, in other words (cf. Jacobson 1995:369).

Rebellious individuals and families who broke away from the community proper were faced with constant challenges from the greater community, with regard to both honour and subsistence (cf. Douglas 1995:123; Destro & Pesce 2003:215). Joining the Q movement meant being shamed, rejected and ostracised by the larger community (cf. Moxnes 2003:61, 114). Missionaries historically preached the kingdom to their co-ethnics, but not only was their kingdom-message rejected, they themselves were also
rejected.\(^{45}\) For most of the individual Q members, self-definition was no longer to be found from the most important group that traditionally served to provide a sense of self (cf. Moxnes 2003:43, 48-49). Abandoning one’s family must have been very unsettling, seeing as it implied cutting loose from the most important, and sometimes the only, location where personal identity was found (cf. Horsley 1995a:195-196; Moxnes 2003:68, 151). The fear that accompanied leaving family and abandoning self-identity is reflected in Q (see Moxnes 2003:49-51; cf. Q 9:58). As a result, fictive kinship patterns were created (cf. Freyne 2000:206; see Jacobson 1995:374-376). That the Q movement did not just advocate abandoning one’s family, but also constituted new fictive families, is clear from Q 11:11, where it is taken for granted that the men in the audience (τίς ἐστιν ἥμων ἄνθρωπος) would have children (ὁ γιὸς αὐτοῦ) in need of support (cf. Arnal 2001:174). Since all ancient life and self-identity was rooted in, and determined by, the group, Moxnes (2003:57-58) is probably correct in claiming that the saying in Q 17:33 reflects the abandonment of patriarchal family as the locus of identity in favour of the Q movement as the new locus of personal identity.

In order to effectively replace patriarchal family as the primary locus of identity, the Q movement had to establish a new social structure, and support such a structure ideologically by means of a substitutive symbolic universe (cf. Moxnes 2003:91). An alternative symbolic universe was created by projecting a new kind of family, with God acting as the Father, Q members acting as children, and other Q members acting as siblings (cf. Q 6:36; Q 11:2-3, 13; Q 10:21-22; Q 12:22-31 for God as Father; cf. Q 6:35 for members as sons; cf. Q 6:41-42; Q 17:3 for other members as brothers). For the Q people, God replaced the traditional patriarch as the source of protection, identity, sustenance and honour (see Moxnes 2003:115-121, 152; cf. esp. Q 11:11-13). There are suggestions that common meals might have been important occasions for group and/or “family” assemblies (cf. Jacobson 1995:375; cf. e.g. Q 7:34; Q 10:7; Q 12:42; Q 13:29; Q 14:21-24). By the time Q\(^2\) was composed, kinship divisions were already an established

\(^{45}\) Apart from all the Q passages pointing to rejection, the absence of a significant Jesus movement in Galilee during the second Century CE also indicate that the Q missionaries were largely unsuccessful in convincing their co-countrymen of the kingdom message (cf. Freyne 1988:271). If Q 10:5-15 is authentic, the failure of the Q missionaries might be continuous with Jesus’ own failure in Galilee.
fact, but still happening as the movement grew (cf. Q 12:49-53; cf. Mack 1993:204; Jacobson 1995:364). It was now held that Jesus actually intended family division when he inaugurated the kingdom of God (cf. Jacobson 1995:366; Horsley 1995b:44; Cotter 1995b:127; Moxnes 2003:58-59). Family division is now legitimised by prophetic tradition (cf. Micah 7:6), and seen as a necessary evil for the investiture of the kingdom. Jesus is associated with the tradition of the rebellious son when called a “glutton and a drunkard” (Q 7:34; cf. Qumran Scroll 11Q19 LXIV:4-6). Also at the Q² level, the greatest division is apparently between parents and children, or parents-in-law and children-in-law. These traditions might denote a situation where younger people, including the middle generation, were more attracted to the Q movement than older people (see esp. Destro & Pesce 2003:217-222; cf. also Jacobson 1995:365; Moxnes 2003:59). If Q 12:51, 53 alludes to Micah 7:6, which is highly likely, it provides further evidence of the Q group’s appeal and attractiveness for young people (cf. Jacobson 1995:365; cf. Destro & Pesce 2003:219). Nevertheless, it is very credible that at least some older people were also attracted to the movement (cf. Luke’s version of Q 12:51-53). In Q 11:19-20, Jesus reflects on the negative impact of his kingdom on family honour. Q 12:51, 53 describes the impact of the Q movement in dividing and destroying the patriarchal family (cf. Moxnes 2003:58).

Apart from those who had left their families behind in order to join the Q movement, there were probably also others who joined the Q movement because they were already without family and/or land (see Freyne 2000:284-286). In the first half of the first century CE, some families and individuals were forced off their lands, giving rise to a growing “landless class,” which constituted beggars, bandits, prostitutes and others (cf. esp. Freyne 2000:205; Arnal 2001:139-140, 146; Oakman 2008:21, 25, 224; cf. also Horsley 1995a:60, 215-216, 219; 1995b:43; Moxnes 2003:150; cf. Q 19:12-26; Mark 12:1-11; Luke 12:16-20; 16:1-17; Mat 6:12; 18:23-34; 20:1-15; Thom. 21; War 2.427; Ant. 17.271). The rise of brigandage and popular rebellions meant not only that males left their families behind, but also that many men lost their lives, both of which must have had an impact on women, either by widowing them prematurely, or by depriving them of opportunities for marriage (cf. Horsley 1995a:219-220; 1996:36, 123; Oakman 2008:13,
20-21, 224). Seeing as marriage was the primary means through which women were able to ensure economic stability and future sustenance, a sizable group of desperate, poor and marginalised women must have lived in Galilee. With the break-up of extended families due to economic pressures, the age-old roles and honour of traditional patriarchs were considerably weakened (cf. Moxnes 2003:42). The extended and household family units were also under increasing economic pressure from the outside, rendering it less and less capable to support all its members. While the economic inability of family structures to provide for all its members motivated individuals, particularly younger individuals, to leave their homes, the diminished importance of family patriarchs and fathers must have eased the decision to leave tremendously.

The very same economic developments that weakened family structures also created profitable opportunities for young individuals outside the family structure, such as day-labouring or getting involved in village-level industries, like the fishing industry in Capernaum (cf. esp. Destro & Pesce 2003:225; Moxnes 2003:43, 149-150; cf. also Horsley 1995a:194, 201; 1996:116; Arnal 2001:109, 111, 126, 150; Chancey 2002:164; Weber 2007:460; see Freyne 2000:101-103, 110, 169-170, 188; Moreland 2007:143-157; Edwards 2007; Savage 2007). We may thus speak of both a pushing and a pulling factor motivating young people to abandon their homes. For these individuals, particularly women and younger adults, the Q movement might indeed have seemed like an attractive alternative to a patriarchal family (see Freyne 2000:285-286; Moxnes 2003:42-43). The Q movement offered a social network similar to, but different from, patriarchal families, which could fill the social vacuum created when these individuals left home or lost their husbands. The “new family” represented by the Q movement promised to elevate and accept the marginalised and those without honour, particularly women and children, as well as men who were perceived as weak by the greater community (cf. Moxnes 2003:94-95). The parable in Q 13:18-19, about the impure mustard seed sown illegally into a house garden, suggests that the Q movement was mostly made up of marginalised, impure and “displaced” people (cf. Moxnes 2003:112). The “new family” was not simply an emulation or imitation of traditional families, but crossed its borders, discarded its hierarchy and comprised a different compositional and social structure (cf. Moxnes 2003:112).
2003:105). Although another male image, that of God as Father, replaced the traditional 
*paterfamilias* image, there are no indications that this new image perpetuated male 
supremacy (cf. Moxnes 2003:121-122, 152). Rather, the providential and protective 
attributes of God are emphasised, not the authoritarian aspect of his role as Father. 
Moreover, God’s position as *paterfamilias* was seemingly not transferable to other males 
in the Q group. That the Q people operated on *egalitarian* ideals is doubtable (see Elliott 
2003), but that they were fictive siblings living under the imagined providential care of 
God is indisputable. In the end, the Q movement provided a household with a new 
family to those who were homeless and alone.

2.4 ~ THE GENRE OF Q

2.4.1 Introduction

According to Kirk (1998:69), “[g]enres are patterns for structuring communication acts.” 
As such, genres create templates for the implementation of communicative and rhetorical 
strategies (cf. Kirk 1998:69). However, genre is not only invested in the form of a 
Most literary theorists would agree that determination of genre is invaluable and 
absolutely necessary for the interpretation and understanding of any text (see Tuckett 
1996:103-104; cf. also Van Aarde 1994:151). Genre does not only serve the heuristic 
purpose of classification for and in texts. Perhaps more importantly, it also serves a 
critics speak of “genre conception” when emphasising the importance of genre to the 
understanding of a text (see Hirsch 1967:78ff.). Genre conception enables one not only 
to understand the text as a whole, but also each of its constituent parts in relation to the 
the writer’s (or speaker’s) mode and content of communication, while also guiding the 
reader’s (or hearer’s) interpretation and understanding of said communication (see Kirk 
1998:69-70). While text producers integrate genre conventions into a text to guide 
readers or listeners as to the correct reading of said text, recipients engage inculcated
genre knowledge when they decipher texts (cf. Kirk 1998:71). The latter is not only
guided by genre conception, but also restricted by it. Certain understandings of a text are
out-rightly prohibited by the genre conception of that text. When these prescriptive
conventions are ignored, misunderstanding is bound to follow. Hence, the determination
of Q’s genre is indispensable for interpreting the meaning of either the document as a
whole or of any constituent part thereof. Although genre is not entirely determinative of
the production, reception and presentation of a text, it still plays such an irreplaceable
role that any study of Q which disregards or undervalues inquiries of genre is at risk of

In 1971, Robinson suggested “Sayings of the Wise” (ΛΟΓΟΙ ΣΟΦΩΝ) – referring to the
Mediterranean wisdom collections customarily collected under that title (see section 2.1
above) – as a possible designation of Q’s genre (see Patterson 1998b:36-37). Perhaps
because of the differences between Q and these collections, the proposed title did not
catch on. Subsequent scholars, including Robinson himself, have preferred either
“Sayings Source” or “Sayings Gospel” as a proper title for Q. As you would have
noticed, I prefer the latter. Both designations communicate the (correct) idea that Q was
a single written document, and not a number of loose-standing oral traditions (see section
2.1 above). However, the title “Sayings Source” describes Q only in relation to
something else. In other words, the name “Sayings Source” could convey the idea that Q
is only valued as the “source” of Matthew and Luke, and not as a free-standing document
in its own right (cf. Robinson 1990:viii; see Robinson 1997). On the other hand, the
designation “Sayings Gospel” confers the (correct) notion that Q is its own document,
and existed as such before the canonical gospels came into being.

Furthermore, describing Q as a “gospel” is not inappropriate. The evangelists did not
refer to their own literary works as “gospels” (cf. Vorster 1981:7-8). Mark does indeed
begin his gospel with the opening phrase “The beginning of the gospel (τοῦ εὐαγγέλιου)
of Jesus Christ,” but the word “gospel” (εὐαγγέλιον) is not used (anachronistically) here
as an indication of genre. “Gospel” was not yet seen as a genre at that time. Instead,
Mark simply meant that this was the beginning of the “good news” of Jesus Christ, which
is what the word εὐαγγέλιον literally means (cf. Robinson 1990:vii; cf. also Newman 1993 s.v. εὐαγγέλιον). This is evidenced by the fact that neither Matthew nor Luke took over from Mark the word “gospel” to describe their literary creations – whether it be as its genre, its theme, its style or something else. Matthew introduces his gospel with the term βίβλος γενέσεως (genealogical book), which probably refers only to the first seventeen verses, and not the whole gospel. Luke (1:1) calls his gospel a διήγησις (narrative account). It was only much later that the church fathers first used the word “gospel” as a way of identifying the genre of the canonical gospels (cf. Vorster 1981:8). Still, not all the church fathers used the word “gospel” as a designation for (the genre of) the canonicals gospels. Justin, for example, called the canonical gospels ἀπομνημονεύματα (memories of the apostles) (cf. Apo. 66.3). The unique content, structure and composition of each canonical gospel even convinced some scholars that each of these texts should be seen as a different genre. Schulz (1964:138, 141, 143), for example, held that Mark should be seen as a gospel, Matthew as a homology, Luke as a vita or historia (biography or history), and John as a composition of revelatory speeches and semeia (miracle stories).

In view of all this, it is perhaps not even justified to speak of the canonical gospels as “gospels” (cf. Gundry 1974:114; Vorster 1981:26). However, seeing as we are in all probability stuck with this designation, we might as well continue using it – as long as we do not then claim that the literary works of the evangelists have “sole custody” of, and exclusive entitlement to, this designation. The happenstance that a certain text is conveyed in a narrative structure or form is not supportive evidence that it might be a gospel. Conversely, the lack of a narrative framework or structure does not mean that the text in question can not be classified as a gospel (cf. Meyer 2003:39). As far as our earliest sources, including the canonical gospels, were concerned, a “gospel” (εὐαγγέλιον) was any text, written or oral, that purported to be telling people about the “good news” of Jesus and/or the “good news” of the kingdom of God (cf. e.g. Mat 11:5; 26:13; Mark 1:15; 8:35; 10:29; 13:10; 14:9; 16:15; Luke 4:18; 7:22; 9:6; 20:1; Acts 8:25; 14:7, 21; 15:7; 16:10; 20:24; Rom 1:1, 9, 15, 16; 2:16; 10:15, 16; 11:28; 15:16, 19, 20, 29; 16:26). The exact content of the good news differs from one text to another. Some
may tell about the “good news” of Jesus’ sacrificial death and/or resurrection, while others may convey the “good news” of his miracles. Still others may proclaim the content of Jesus’ teachings and message as “good news.” Jesus himself is often described as preaching the “gospel,” usually not about himself, but about the kingdom of God (cf. e.g. Mat 4:23; 9:35; 24:14; Mark 1:14).

Crossan (1998:31-40) distinguishes between four “types” of gospels, of which “sayings gospels” (like Q) is one, and “biography gospels” (like the canonical gospels) is another (cf. also Meyer 2003:39; Van Aarde & Dreyer 2010:4 n. 14). That Q purports and desires to preach (or rather “teach”) the “good news” is without any doubt. Q 7:22 claims that Jesus “brought the good news” (ἐναγγέλζονται) to the poor (cf. Robinson 1990:vii; Meyer 2003:40) – a task that Q took over from Jesus, and ran with (cf. Q 6:20, 29-30; 10:24; 11:2-4, 9-13, 39-52; 12:6-7, 22-31, 33-34; 13:30, 34-35; 14:11, 16-23; 15:4-10; 16:13; 22:28, 30). The evangelists even seem to realise that the content of Q was “good news.” The Sermon on the Mount, which Matthew took over from Q, is described by him as “the good news of the kingdom” (το εναγγελιον της βαςιλειας) (cf. Mat 4:23; 9:35; cf. Robinson 1990:vii; Meyer 2003:40). Lastly, that ancients could see a document containing only the sayings of Jesus as a “gospel” is specifically evidenced by the Coptic version of the Gospel of Thomas, which opens with the (appended) heading “The Gospel according to Thomas” (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:90). For all these reasons, an ever-increasing number of scholars, especially in North America, are now, as a matter of course, referring to Q as the “Sayings Gospel” (see Neirynck 1995b:421-430; cf. Neirynck 2001:57, esp. n. 14).

Much more important than the semantic question of what to label the Q document is the literary question of which genre from antiquity Q best resembles. Q is arguably one of the most difficult texts when it comes to determining its genre – an issue that has led to widespread disagreement and controversy among scholars. Ever since Q’s “discovery,” scholars have been struggling to determine its genre, not least of all because it contains small forms of more than one type of genre. As with the rest of the historical-Jesus debate, the main rift was between those who advocated an (imminent) eschatological
understanding of Q and those who promoted an ethical and/or sapiential understanding of Q (see section 1.3.7 above). In the meantime, scholarship had realised that the themes of apocalypticism, prophecy and wisdom were not antithetical, mutually exclusive or incompatible for the authors of antiquity (cf. esp. Tuckett 1996:334; Horsley 1999:77; cf. also Edwards 1976:46; Piper 1989:159; Frey 2011:22). On the contrary, some obvious examples of ancient literature that mix apocalyptic and wisdom material, are: Proverbs 8, 1 Isaiah, Matthew, the Didache, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, 4 Ezra, Tobit, the Similitudes of Enoch, and the Wisdom of Solomon (cf. esp. Allison 1997:4; cf. also Kloppenborg 1987a:37; see Theissen & Merz 1998:372-374). Ancient writers even attributed some individual sayings to both genres (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:37). This accords well with the tremendous diversity of early Christian texts, views and movements (cf. Tuckett 1996:66). The inclusion of both apocalyptic and sapiential material in the same document was not only a feature of early Christian writings, but also of other ancient writings, like, for example, the foundational sources about Mohammed, including the Qur’an (cf. Allison, in Miller 2001:111).

In general, ancient genres were not as exclusive as modern genres, and ancient writings sometimes mixed genres freely (cf. Allison 1997:41; contra Oakman 2008:3). This phenomenon occurred in both directions. Prophetic or apocalyptic material would employ sapiential forms and vice versa (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:380; see Edwards 1976:71-73; Sato 1995:141-142; Piper 1989:137-155). However, this occurrence does not turn prophetic and apocalyptic genres into wisdom, or wisdom material into prophetic or apocalyptic books (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:37; 2000a:181; see Edwards 1976:44-46). The ancient rationale behind the incorporation of apocalypticism into sapiential writings is explained concisely and effectively by the pseudepigraphical Jewish writing 4 Maccabees (1:16): “Wisdom, I submit, is knowledge of things divine and human, and of their causes.” The Judaism of the first century was the heyday of both apocalypticism and wisdom (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:373). Both traditions were seen as a way to bypass the Jerusalem cult and the Torah in gaining direct access to God.46

46 However, Torah obedience was always reinforced by apocalypticism and only sometimes reinforced by wisdom.
Apocalypticism did this by claiming to have glimpsed the next world, while wisdom did this by claiming to have direct access to Sophia. Both traditions produced a never-before-seen wealth of Jewish literature.

2.4.2 Wisdom, prophecy or apocalypticism?

If wisdom and apocalyptic (and/or prophetic) material are not incompatible, one question still remains: Should Q be seen as being part of the prophetic, apocalyptic or wisdom genre? In other words, is Q a wisdom collection that contains some (albeit important) apocalyptic and prophetic themes, or is Q an apocalyptic and/or prophetic book containing some (albeit important) wisdom material? With regard to apocalypticism, most scholars would agree that the eschatological and/or apocalyptic nature of Q (specifically) is subsidiary to and in service of its prophetic and/or sapiential function as a genre (cf. Horsley 1999:72, 74; see Kloppenborg 1987b:292-303). For the most part, previous views of the intrinsic and all-encompassing nature of apocalypticism as a category of Q’s genre have recently been abandoned (cf. Horsley 1999:72). The current debate is rather concerned with choosing between prophetic and sapiential designations for Q’s genre. This does not mean that the apocalyptic character of Q is discarded. On the contrary! Identifying Q as a prophetic genre would accommodate an apocalyptic view of the historical Jesus, since apocalyptic content was often formally advocated by means of prophetic writings (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:249). Thus, if Q is demonstrated to be a prophetic writing, Jesus could be seen as an apocalyptic prophet, particularly if themes of apocalypticism predominate. There have been proponents on both sides of the spectrum, claiming either sapiential or prophetic predominance (see Tuckett 1996:327-329). There have also been those in the middle, who refuse to choose between the two genres, claiming that the two are not mutual rivals (see Tuckett 1996:328-329).

47 Although such debates are still alive and well as far as the whole of the Jesus tradition is concerned (cf. Oakman 2008:103).
Most scholars opting for a prophetic designation do so because of the sheer bulk of prophetic material in Q, not least of all the overwhelming presence of the “judgment” theme (cf. Tuckett 1996:342; see e.g. Edwards 1976:50-54). Boring (1991:231) takes this criterion to its logical extreme by calculating the percentages of prophetic material within Q. This line of argumentation is inherently flawed. Percentages of small genres say nothing about the framework genre of Q (see Kirk 1998:46-47). Tuckett (1996:346-354) claims that a lot of Q¹ material is blatantly “un-sapiential” and determined more by futuristic eschatology than wisdom as such.⁴⁸ Boring (1991:323) makes a similar point, claiming that the immediacy of revelation characteristic of Q coheres more with the prophetic genre, which is immediate, than the wisdom genre, which is timeless (cf. also Horsley 1999:66; see Sato 1995:141-142, 150). However, Boring is simply wrong, as there are many intertextual examples of wisdom material typified by revelatory wisdom (see Kirk 1998:45-46; see e.g. Sirach 24, Wis. Sol. 7-9, *Pseudo-Phocylides* 1-2, *Golden Verses* 46-48; Hesiod’s *Works and Days*). Tuckett’s “evidence” for calling texts within Q¹ “un-sapiential” is that some of the sayings teach ideas which are contradictory to conventional wisdom traditions – like, according to Tuckett, Q 12:22-31 (see also Horsley 1999:88-89). In other words, although the structure and form of much of Q¹ cohere with the Instructional genre, the content does not. However, this is not evidence that something is not wisdom, it is simply evidence that it might represent subversive and/or aphoristic wisdom (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:320; Kirk 1998:306). The same kind of “evidence” could be used against the genre designation of Qohelet, which also calls traditional wisdom into question, but no serious scholar today would consider Qohelet to be anything else than wisdom literature (cf. Kirk 1998:46).⁴⁹ Q (10:21) itself admits that the content of its wisdom is not in line with that of traditional sages, but based on the unconventional teachings of Jesus (cf. Horsley 1999:118).

⁴⁹ Tuckett (1996:332-334) does make mention of these internal shifts in wisdom literature and even refers to Qohelet, but still goes on to argue that traditional wisdom should be seen as the only proper definition of what wisdom really is. This narrow understanding of “wisdom” permeates his whole argument against the sapiential nature of Q.
Although some of the literary forms of wisdom were remarkably stable for more than a millennium, the content of wisdom was not stagnant, but forced to change and adapt according to new insights, situations, contexts and paradigms (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:382, 385; Kirk 1998:93; see Mack 1993:45-46). Tuckett’s definition of wisdom is simply far too narrow. He sees wisdom simply as a genre of material that tries to “explain” the world, and make “general observations about life in general” (Tuckett 1996:334, 342; cf. also Sato 1995:141). The wisdom genre, however, lends itself to, and contains, very broad applications and references (cf. Vorster 1999:312). Apart from instruction on ethical behaviour and lifestyle choices, wisdom is also concerned with matters such as intelligence, practical skills, craftsmanship and governance. Tuckett maintains that a definition of wisdom should not include elements of apocalypticism or prophecy, for this would stretch the category so much that “wisdom” could include almost anything and become useless as a designation of genre (see Tuckett 1996:333-337). This conviction is unconvincing, however, in view of the fact that Tuckett (1996:335, 349-354) admits that a lot of Q should be seen as wisdom, but then wisdom shaped by prophetic themes and eschatological concerns (cf. also Edwards 1976:42). If the category of “wisdom genre” loses its heuristic appeal when it is shown to contain elements of prophecy and apocalypticism, then, by the same token, the category of “prophetic genre” should lose its heuristic appeal if it is shown to contain elements of wisdom. One can not help but wonder why “prophecy” is not in danger of becoming useless as a designation of genre with the discovery of sapiential elements within it. As a genre, wisdom has historically been much more inclusive of other genres than has been the case with prophecy (cf. Crenshaw 1976:953).

50 It is perhaps interesting to note that, according to Tuckett (1996:161-163), Kloppenborg’s definition of “apocalypticism” is too narrow and restrictive. Tuckett does, however, agree with Kloppenborg’s overall analysis of the nature of Q’s apocalypticism: “Q’s ‘apocalyptic’ language is at times unusual in relation to other contemporary uses of such language in being somewhat negative, and also being generated within a rather more world-affirming ethos than some other apocalyptic language.” So, we have here a case of Tuckett and Kloppenborg agreeing both that Q contains wisdom and apocalypticism and that the content and nature of those two elements in Q differ from other contemporary wisdom and apocalyptic texts.
2.4.3 Kloppenborg and Sato

Kloppenborg (1987a) argued convincingly that Q¹ should be seen as part of the Instructional genre, and that Q² must be seen as a chreia collection. Such internal shifts were somewhat common in wisdom literature and a relevant example is the Gospel of Thomas, which shifted from aphoristic instruction to another distinctive style of instruction (cf. Mack 1993:182). The manner in which the formative stratum was redacted – i.e. by catchword and thematic connections – also conforms to the compositional techniques employed by the wisdom genre (see Kloppenborg 1987a:322-323). Overall, Q exhibits minor peculiarities when compared to other wisdom material. Firstly, in the formative stratum, the author does not speak in the voice of the parent, like in most other Instructions (cf. Horsley 1999:81). However, the unconventional ethic promoted by Q, especially its relative and contemptuous view of the patriarchal family, explains its apprehension to draw upon parental instruction (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:318-319; 2000a:159; cf. Q 9:59-60; Q 14:26-27; see section 2.3 above). As such, Q forms part of a larger movement within wisdom literature that tended to relativise the conventional importance placed on family bonds (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:319; Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:159). Chreia collections almost entirely lacked any references to parental instruction (see Kloppenborg 1987a:313-314).

Secondly (and subsequently), Q does not convey conventional wisdom, but aphoristic or subversive wisdom (see Horsley 1999:81-82). The usual truisms, principles and proverbial wisdom characteristic of Instructions in particular make way for imperatives, injunctions, extreme examples, and evocative imagery more characteristic of aphoristic wisdom (cf. Mack 1993:45). These observations, however, are not a designation of a framework genre shift (from wisdom to prophetic, for example), but of an internal genre shift (from one type of wisdom genre to another). Thirdly, the mention of John the Baptist and Jesus is not, according to Tuckett (1996:342), a characteristic feature of chreia collections, which apparently tended to be anonymous. This may be true of the more tradition wisdom collections, but certainly not of later developments. Attributing a saying to a particular sage was not only the territory of chreiai, but also a distinctive
feature of the Instructional genre (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:265, 277, 306, 317). In any case, the authority afforded Jesus by the Q people more than validates his name appearing in their principal faith document. Lastly, the regular use of the second person plural is discontinuous with the more usual use of the second person singular in wisdom literature (cf. Tuckett 1996:343). The high probability that Q is addressed to a faith community of sorts (see sections 2.5.4 & 2.3), and not just to people in general, explains its use of the second person plural. In other words, unlike most other Instructions and chreia collections, Q is not just wisdom for wisdom’s sake, but wisdom promoting a particular life practice for a specific community.

In the end, these “peculiarities” can all be explained if the specificity of Q, among other comparable wisdom material, is accounted for. Genre was never stagnant, but fluctuated. Genres were adapted and transformed to address particular (and changing) circumstances within particular (and changing) communities. Furthermore, producers of literary texts had tremendous freedom to work with when applying genre conventions to their compositions, with genre conventions supplying the raw parameters within which such innovation could be applied (cf. Kirk 1998:70, 77). As such, none of these “discrepancies” invalidate Kloppenborg’s stratification model, or his attribution of genre to the various Q layers. Q is still a wisdom genre, regardless of whether or not it displays every single traditional characteristic of that genre (see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:382-383). Although there have been objections to these results, which we shall consider in detail later, no one to my knowledge has proposed an alternative genre(s) for Q which was based on a similarly detailed, thoroughgoing literary and rhetorical exposition of the Q text (cf. Tuckett 1996:73, 345; see also Piper 1995b:3-4; McLean 1995:333-334).

Migaku Sato (1988), however, is an example of difference (cf. Tuckett 1996:329). Like Kloppenborg, he also gives literary considerations precedence, and works from the final macro-text “downwards” to its constituent sayings and clusters (cf. Catchpole 1993:60). Sato compares Q to prophetic books, distinguishing three formal and structural features evident in both. Firstly, he claims that the divine origin of sayings is a feature of Q comparable to other prophetic books. Sato sees evidence of this feature in Q 10:16, Q
10:22, Q 11:49 and Q 11:51b. However, he ignores the fact that Q lacks the most important literary formula of that genre, namely “thus says the Lord” (πάντες λέγει ο Κύριος), or, in fact, any reference to divine speech whatsoever (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:321; Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:142; Kirk 1998:51, 88). In Q, God never speaks. There are none of the usual visions, oracles or framing formulas one would normally attach to the prophetic genre.\textsuperscript{51} Furthermore, associating the sage with divine Sophia was also a regular feature of Instructional wisdom genres (cf. Kirk 1998:51; see e.g. Prov 1-9; Sirach; \textit{Shube-awilum}). As with Boring (see above), Sato is simply wrong in thinking that the wisdom genre does not contain revelatory material (cf. Kirk 1998:51).

The second feature identified by Sato is that Q, similar to other prophetic material, names the human tradent of the divine sayings. However, if Q is a prophetic book, it is the only one with two prophets operating alongside one another. Sato’s claims that John has no independent relevance for Q, and that Jesus is the actual prophet, do not convince. Furthermore, naming a human figure is not a distinctively prophetic feature. To the contrary. Wisdom traditions are often attributed to named sages (see Kloppenborg 1987a:263-316). This is especially true of Instructions and chreia collections, with the latter sometimes even naming the collector (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:306). In fact, the chreia is predicated upon the significance of the sage (cf. Kirk 1998:46). Aphoristic wisdom, by calling traditional wisdom into question, necessarily needs to be associated with the individuality of the sage (cf. Kirk 1998:46). Thirdly, Sato extrapolates prophetic micro-genres from Q, including call narratives, doom oracles, visions, woes, eschatological correlatives, admonitions, makarisms and proclamations of salvation and

\textsuperscript{51} Edwards’ (1976:48-49) attempt to define the occurrences of the emphatic introductory formula “[Truly, I say to you” ([άχρητος ἔχει /άληθεν] λέγω υμί) in Q as prophetic formulas comparable to “Thus says the Lord” should not be accepted. Plainly, these two formulas are not the same thing. Whereas the former emphasises the content of a statement, whether that be a sapiential or prophetic statement, the latter invokes divine authority. The formula “[Truly, I say to you” could indeed be appealing to the authority of Jesus, but would that be his authority as sage or as prophet? It is certainly not his authority as God. Q betrays absolutely no knowledge of Jesus as the second person in the Trinity. Such Christological elaboration antedates Q. Appealing to the authority of Jesus is not the same as appealing to the authority of God! In a discussion of Q 12:22-23, Edwards (1976:124) says: “Although it opens with the prophetic introduction (Therefore I tell you), the saying itself is a wisdom admonition.” Should this not be evidence enough that the so-called “prophetic introduction” was not intended by Q as a prophetic formula at all? This saying rather supports the idea that the phrase “[Truly, I say to you” was intended to emphasise and legitimise Jesus’ wisdom?
condemnation. As for the first of these micro-genres, it is doubtful whether the baptism of Jesus should be seen as a prophetic call story, even if it is accepted to be part of Q. When we first meet Jesus (Q 6:20), there is an obvious lack of any prophetic formulas. Even if Sato succeeds in indicating that all these micro-genres are prophetic in nature, it still says nothing about the framework genre of Q (cf. Kirk 1998:51). Individual units of a literary document should always be interpreted in relation to their larger literary contexts (cf. Horsley 1999:84). In addition, Sato also illustrates that Q lacks important elements also absent in prophetic material, like parables, miracle stories (for their own sake) and an account of the prophet’s death. Sato, however, has to divorce Luke 14-19 from Q in order to eliminate any possibility of the presence of parabolic material in Q. Furthermore, the death of the sage is not always expressed by wisdom books either (see Kirk 1998:50-51). Despite these methodological flaws, the whole of Sato’s last argument is an argument *ad silencium*.

Overall, the rhetoric of the Sayings Gospel, like that of other wisdom documents, appeals to nature and ordinary human transactions (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:321). Most notably lacking from Q are rhetorical appeals to God’s authority, an integral feature of all prophetic literature. In other words, Q’s rhetoric tries to convince in a manner more at home with a wisdom document than a prophetic document. Kloppenborg Verbin (2000a:141) agrees with Sato both that Q contains substantial portions of prophetic speech patterns and that Q as a whole should not be seen as sapiential. Nonetheless, Sato’s compositional analysis is flawed in that it requires him both to divorce large chunks of material from Q, and to render significant blocks of material as “unmotivated” additions.52 In the end, Sato’s compositional analysis fails to prove perhaps the most important element of his analysis, i.e. that Q is *framed* as a prophetic book (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:142). Sato (1988:4) does attempt to show that the inaugural sermon is framed by prophetic material, namely Q 6:20-23 and Q 6:47-49 (cf. also Hoffmann 1995:188). However, he expressly states that Q 6:20-23 is a wisdom text, which only infiltrated prophetic material secondarily (cf. Kirk 1998:51). The

“eschatologisation” of the beatitudes in Q 6:20-23 is not evidence of them having been transformed into prophetic material (see Kirk 1998:51-52; cf. Patterson, in Miller 2001:77). Sato (1988:208) himself acknowledges the eschatological tendencies of wisdom literature conceived during the Hellenistic period. Also, it is not at all clear that Q 6:47-49 should necessarily be read as a prophetic passage, if at all. Sato (1988:79-85, 94-95) further acknowledges that there are certain crucial discrepancies between Q and other prophetic material. Jesus is not just a prophet, but a more exalted figure, indispensable for individual salvation. The themes of discipleship and mission are foreign to prophetic material. The way in which John and Jesus are juxtaposed does not have an equivalent in prophetic material. Lastly, the abundance of parables and blessings is unusual for a prophetic book. The difference between these peculiarities noted by Sato and the discrepancies of Kloppenborg’s genre determination is that the former transgresses beyond the parameters of prophetic genre conventions, whereas the latter applies innovation within the boundaries of wisdom literature. In any case, Sato (1995) seems to have readjusted his earlier contentions to align somewhat substantially with those of Kloppenborg.

### 2.4.4 Scholarly confusion

Scholars are not confused about the fact that Kloppenborg sees the formative stratum as a wisdom layer. However, many of them are confused about the (literary and rhetorical) reasons why Kloppenborg assigns Q¹ to the Instructional genre. This is true even though Kloppenborg Verbin (2000a:159) explains his reasons for doing so:

To argue that Q¹ conforms to the genre of an “instruction” is to assert a “family resemblance” between Q and other documents typically designated “instructions.” This is asserted in the first place on the basis of Q¹’s dominant grammatical forms, then the nature of argumentation (its warrants and methods), then the nature of the authorial “voice,” and finally, its typical idioms and tropes. The designation “instruction” does not rest on a subjective judgment about its theological orientation – that is, that it is “sapiential” rather than “prophetic” or “apocalyptic.”
Moreover, Q¹ reflects on the instructional process itself, contemplating master-student relationships, the importance of good guidance, the value of good speech, the need for exemplary behaviour, and the process of (re)searching what is hidden but knowable (cf. Q 6:40-49; Q 10:16; Q 14:26-27; Q 17:1-2; Q 12:2; see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:197-198). Jesus and God are put forward as mimetic ideals (cf. Q 6:35-36; Q 9:58; Q 11:13; Q 12:3; Q 14:26-27; cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:198). The framework genre of the formative layer treats wisdom topoi (cf. Kirk 1998:271). Within the genre-argument, scholars constantly ignore another important reality, probably sidetracked by the titles “sapiential” and “prophetic” bestowed upon each layer respectively. Regardless of the content or titles given to the two layers, both genres put forward by Kloppenborg (i.e. Instruction and chreia) are instructional wisdom genres (cf. Catchpole 1993:60; Kirk 1998:78). Fair enough, content is perhaps just as important as form and structure when it comes to genre determination (see Kirk 1998:75-76). However, the ambiguous nature of Q’s content urges Kloppenborg (1987a:38) to give precedence to framing devices and formulae over content when determining Q’s genre.

The innovation and flexibility afforded producers of individual texts, referred to earlier, included the mixing of genres (cf. Kirk 1998:77). This (partly) explains why ancients did not see prophetic and wisdom material as being mutually exclusive. In such cases, when genres are mixed, it is critical to determine the framework genre, since it is the framework genre (Makrogattung) that organises constituent small genres (Mikrogattungen) into a coherent whole (cf. Vorster 1981:25-26; Catchpole 1993:60; Kirk 1998:77; cf. also Horsley 1999:84). The framework genre structures a text into a hierarchy of sorts, by placing certain small genres in predominant positions, and other small genres in subordinate positions (see Kirk 1998:77-78). The former informs the recipients as to the rhetorical intent of the text as a whole, whereas the latter lends support to the overall argument by strengthening or amplifying it. After analysing a number of Instructions, Kirk (1998:149) shows that one of the recurrent features of the genre is an “implicit or explicit threat of divine sanction.” The latter coheres unsurprisingly with the essential deed-consequence reasoning of much sapiential rhetoric,

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53 Emphasis original.
which places the consequences of behaviour within a divinely-sanctioned cosmic order (cf. Kirk 1998:149). As such, it is easy to see how Instructions would utilise prophetic forms, such as pronouncements of judgment and woes, in support of its framework genre. The assimilation of prophetic material makes even more sense for aphoristic wisdom, which attempts to subvert the current social structure in exchange for a different one (see Kirk 1998:335-336).

In his genre-criticism of Q, Kirk (1998:88, 152-403) managed to demonstrate (rather conclusively) that wisdom comprises the framework genre of Q, with prophetic micro-genres employed to support the framework rhetoric. By contrast, Sato’s (1995:157) best explanation for the presence of sapiential blocks in Q is that they “can rightly co-exist with the prophetic sayings.” Q is a wisdom text comparable to other wisdom texts of the time, including Sirach, Wisdom of Solomon, Pseudo-Phocylides and the Pythagorean Golden Verses (cf. Kirk 1998:399). In his third chapter, Hirsch (1967), a literary theorist, distinguishes between levels of genre. The first level is the broadest. Each level thereafter becomes more and more specific. It is at the lowest level that texts show their individuality. At the highest level, Q should probably be seen as a wisdom text. At the lower levels, the importance of prophetic and apocalyptic themes start to become important. It is at these lower levels that one can see Q as a specific kind of wisdom collection, namely one that includes a lot of futuristic, eschatological, apocalyptic and prophetic themes. These types of themes were indeed characteristic of wisdom literature composed during the Hellenistic period (cf. Kirk 1998:52). The main redaction of Q shows continuity with Q¹ when it comes to its genre, as determined by literary and rhetorical considerations.

Q² contains deliberate structuring devices and purposeful pragmatic unities, both adhering to the genre known as a chreia collection (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:209).54 Much of the prophetic sayings in Q are presented as reactions to specific

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54 According to Sato (1995:140), the genre of chreia collections is “too formal and abstract” to say anything about the content of Q. He maintains that many prophetic books could also be seen as chreia collections, simply because they are introduced by introductory remarks. These are two separate objections. The latter doesn’t value the specificity of chreia collections over against other genres with introductory remarks.
situations, meaning that they are structured as *chreiai* (see Q 3:7-9, 16-17; Q 11:14-26; Q 11:16, 29-32, 33-36; see Kloppenborg 1987a:168-169). When compared to other *chreia* collections from antiquity, Q² (and Q as a whole) is one of the more sophisticated example of the genre (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:323-324; Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:209). To be sure, it is a different sub-genre than that of Q¹. Nevertheless, as a genre, it still attempts to be wisdom. *Chreiai* were collected, serialised and attributed to *sages* – experts in *wisdom* (see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:160-161, 306-307). This is what most opponents of Kloppenborg fail to acknowledge or comprehend. Although Q² displays prophetic and apocalyptic *themes*, it still attempts to be wisdom by fashioning such themes within a wisdom mould (or framework genre). *Chreia* collections were, as a matter of fact, very adaptable to different sorts of contents (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:163). Once again, scholars fail or refuse to understand the literary and rhetorical reasons why Kloppenborg relates Q² to the genre of a *chreia* collection:

Whereas at the formative stratum the dominant grammatical form was the hortatory imperative buttressed with a variety of programmatic statements, motive clauses, and concluding warnings, the main redaction contains woes, warnings of judgment, and prophetic correlatives. It also includes *chriae* occasioned by a healing (7:1-10), a question from John the Baptist (7:18-23, 24-28, 31-35), and two challenges to Jesus (11:14-23, 29-32). The presence of prophetic sayings does not, however, turn Q into *chresmologoi* – an oracle collection. For although prophetic forms are present and the examples of prophets are invoked (6:22-23; 7:26; 10:23-24; 11:32, 49-51; 13:34-35), and while an Elijah-like figure is described in 3:16-17; 7:22, most of the sayings of Q² are framed as *chriae* rather than as direct oracles. Q employs the technique of extending or elaborating an initial *chria* by appending additional *chriae*, or by attaching further sayings to the initial *chria*.

(Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:202)

*Chreia* collections sandwiched a wisdom saying within a context to highlight the innovation and originality of the sage. The purpose was to show that the sage practiced what he preached, not simply to provide some kind of abstract background. The former objection fails to detect the literary and rhetorical reasons for the genre identification.
In other words, although there are isolated examples of prophetic forms in individual Q units, the compositional framing of the document coheres to that of the wisdom genre (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:381). Form criticism might be able to isolate prophetic forms within Q, but it will also be obliged not to ignore the existence of sapiential forms within Q. It is redaction- and composition-criticism that identifies Q as a wisdom book, by taking serious the literary features, rhetorical strategies, structuring tendencies, and compositional modus operandi of the macro-structure (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:381). A futurist eschatology is not evidence for determination of genre. Neither does it disprove the determination of Q as a wisdom book (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:385). Although older wisdom collections tended to focus on the present, later developments, like the sapiential Qumran texts and the Wisdom of Solomon, entertained hopes and expectations for the future (cf. Kirk 1998:52; see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:385-386).

According to Mack (1993:153-159), the framers of Q introduced John into the narrative in order to align Jesus’ former role as wisdom teacher with his supplementary role as apocalyptic prophet. Seeing as ancients did not perceive an incongruity between the two identifications, this is unlikely. John’s presence in Q is perhaps better explained as a component of Q’s prehistory, necessitated by its authenticity (cf. Tuckett 1996:109). Narratively, John’s introduction also functions to prepare the audience for what is to come (cf. Edwards 1976:55; see Cotter 1995a). Comparable to other ancient literature, John’s anticipatory sermon programmatically introduces themes for the rest of Q (see Kirk 1998:395-396). Whether Q² was chronologically second or not is inconsequential with regard to the fact that it undeniably displays literary features of a wisdom genre, and, inasmuch, shows continuity with Q¹. The Sayings Gospel Q as a whole should therefore be seen as a wisdom collection displaying themes and micro-forms of prophetic judgment and apocalypticism. These latter themes are much more pertinent in Q², but still conveyed in the overall literary composition and structure that is wisdom. Even if the redactional stratum came chronologically second, it still attached enough worth to the “more sapiential” stratum to retain it as part of their fundamental “faith” document. The wisdom element of their “faith” remained important, even if they were at a later stage
consumed with apology and boundary-related concerns (cf. Mack 1993:164). It might even have been more important at this stage (cf. Mack 1993:164).

Sophia herself also features in the main redaction and forms an integral part of the apocalyptic-prophetic themes encountered in Q². The prophetic themes and the Sophia theme are inseparably conflated, and equally important, for Q²’s theology. This last statement is evident in the fact that each of the prophetic themes and the Sophia theme receive redactional emphasis at various points in Q² (see Tuckett 1996:195-196). Tuckett (1996:351) claims that Q uses the Sophia image to emphasise the prophetic aspect of the Sayings Gospel. This remains to be shown, however. If anything, the Sophia concept is perhaps afforded primary importance on a semantic level. She is the agent who sends the prophets and announces judgment on their persecutors (Q 11:49-51). Sophia is thus superior to the prophets in that she sends them to deliver her message to Israel. Jesus is seen as the final prophet and messenger of Sophia (see Tuckett 1996:220-221, 281-282). In a way, then, Sophia is even superior to Jesus as the Agent who sends him – that is if Jesus is not to be wholly identified with Sophia (see section 2.2.4 above).

### 2.4.5 The temptation story

On its own, the temptation story (Q 4:1-13) should be seen as a narrative (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:246). However, the function of the temptation story within the context of Q is to demonstrate and legitimate the hero’s virtue (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:261, 326). A heroic career is projected for Jesus. His teachings must then subsequently validate this claim. Conversely, Jesus’ teachings are put in a mythical context by the temptation story, and thereby legitimised before they are even taught. Jesus’ particular ethic is illustrated paradigmatically by the temptation story, and thereafter further developed and justified by his teachings (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:327). The hearers are assured that their attention to what follows will not be in vain. The temptation story is not dissimilar to Greco-Roman ordeal stories found at the beginning of such biographies (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:261). Also common was the ordeal or temptation of the wise man at the beginning of wisdom Instructions (see Kloppenborg
1987a:260, 278-279; see e.g. prologues of Amenemhat I; Aesop; Ahikar; Ankhsheshonq; Sentences of Secundus; Demonax). The “testing”, “temptation” or “ordeal” of the sage is a prominent theme at the beginning of many wisdom texts (see Kloppenborg 1987a:279, 326-327; see e.g. Prov 1:10-11, Sirach 2:1, 4-5; Wis. Sol. 1:16-2:20). *Chreia* collections are also preoccupied with the biographies of their sages (cf. Kirk 1998:400). If the formative and redactional strata of Q should be seen as wisdom, then the narrative prologue of Q should be seen as an attempt to legitimise that wisdom. The temptation story is thus in service of the macro-genre, and should therefore also be seen as part of the deployment of wisdom in Q. It serves to legitimise not only the sage, but his Q teachings as well. Although the temptation story is a step in the narrative direction, the purpose it served in Q, just before Matthew and Luke used it, was subordinate to, and in service of, the overall wisdom genre. The nature of Q as a wisdom collection is not violated or discontinued by the introduction of a narrative prologue (see Kloppenborg 1987a:327-328). Attaching a legitimising prologue to the beginning of a sayings collection was simply an option available to wisdom collections of antiquity.

### 2.5 ~ ETHNICITY AND Q

#### 2.5.1 Introduction

At the very beginning of Greek civilisation, the word ἔθνος, from whence the English word “ethnicity” originates, could refer to just about any type of group, including, among others, flocks of birds, bands of warriors, a trade association, or the inhabitants of a village, town, city or region (see Duling 2012:297-298). Yet, at the commencement of the Hellenistic period, and throughout its duration, the word ἔθνος became increasingly used as a way of referencing “other,” meaning non-Greek, groups of people. Ancient Jews used the Greek word ἔθνος and the Hebrew equivalent *גֵּזָה* exclusively in reference to groups of “other” people (see Duling 2012:299-300). These terms were used either in a neutral manner or in a negative manner. The latter usage emphasised the oppositional “otherness” of the outsider group.
Ethnic identity is achieved and maintained through boundary formation and maintenance. The latter happens in two ways simultaneously: (1) Like-minded individuals and groups come together to form a larger ethnic group – a process and stance that is called the “us” aggregative self-definition. (2) Ethnic groups demarcate themselves from “others” who are different – a process and stance that is called the “us-they” oppositional self-definition. Five key approaches to the social-scientific idea of “ethnicity” can be identified (see Duling 2012:292-294). The first, Primordialism, which was first introduced by Shils (1957) and Geertz (1963), maintains that “natural affections” hold ethnic groups together. Hence, internal bonds between individuals and smaller groups (like families and clans) are so powerful, compelling and passionate that they are cemented into the very fibre of an ethnic group. These bonds are indescribable and are maintained involuntarily, being deeply rooted in language, territory, custom, family and religion. These foundations determine group behaviour, group norms and group values. Two noteworthy factions constitute this first approach. Socio-biological Primordialists explain ethnic group formation and solidarity as an evolutionary strategy intended to increase the chances of survival during natural selection. Conversely, Cultural Primordialists, who constitute the majority, explain ethnic group formation and solidarity as both “natural” and culturally generated. The second social-scientific approach to “ethnicity,” Constructionism, was first introduced by Frederik Barth (1969). It argues that ethnic identity and solidarity is not natural, fixed or inherent, but freely chosen and fluid. According to this view, boundaries are constantly and perpetually being constructed and reconstructed. These social-scientists argue that, although the “cultural stuff” of any ethnic group (like place of origin, eating habits and dress codes) are important for boundary formation and maintenance, the act itself of forming and maintaining boundaries is all-important. Whereas the Primordialists focus on ethnic features, Constructionists focus on understanding the reasons behind and methods of boundary formation and maintenance.

The remaining approaches to “ethnicity” are all rooted in Constructionism. The third approach to “ethnicity,” Instrumentalism, argues that ethnic groups construct identities consciously and out of self-interest. Ethnic identity and boundary formation are
motivated by political and economic agendas. The fourth is known as the Social Psychological approach and takes Instrumentalism further. It holds that the creation of kinship myths, the establishment of ethnocentricity and the tendency to stereotype outsiders are all based on the economic, political and social advantages enjoyed by ethnic groups. The last approach is known as the Ethno-symbolic approach. It argues that, even though ethnic groups constantly change and adapt, they are able to endure because of their nostalgic attachment to the past, which finds expression in various myths and symbols. Today, the Constructionist approach is upheld by most social scientists, although these scholars still disagree about whether ethnic identity is involuntary or self-interested (see Duling 2012:293-294). Duling (2012:294-296) constructs a model of ethnic identity out of nine aspects of “cultural stuff,” or “cultural features of ethnicity.” These aspects are: (1) an ethnic group’s name; (2) common ancestral myths; (3) shared “historical” memories; (4) “phenotypical features,” meaning traits that result from genetic predisposition and environmental influence, including genetic traits, physical traits and behavioural traits; (5) an ethnic group’s (home)land, both local and regional; (6) their language, including features such as dialect and accent; (7) “kinship,” which includes all the smaller groups that make up the larger ethnic group, like family, tribe and nation; (8) ethnic customs, such as eating habits, dress codes and preferences in music; (9) religion, which encompasses ancient politics as well. In keeping with the Constructionist approach, Duling’s model allows for change and adaptation of the “cultural stuff.” These “cultural features of ethnicity” are not only shaped by an ethnic group’s norms, values and behaviour, but also influence such norms, values and behaviour. Such “cultural stuff” further serves the purpose of constructing and maintaining ethnic boundaries (cf. Duling 2012:327). Duling (2012:296) sees this model of ethnicity as a heuristic tool that could enable researchers to arrange, classify and describe the data available. Although this model will not be mentioned directly, it serves as the underlying foundation and heuristic paradigm for just about everything that follows in this section (2.5).
2.5.2 The geographical location of Q

Seeing as the Jewishness of Jesus became an important factor in the Renewed Quest (see sections 1.3.1 & 1.3.5 above), a section on the ethnicity of Q and its authors is presently justified. Allison (1997:52-53) bases his argument for a Palestinian origin on a few textual indicators: (1) His Q1 lacks any indication of a gentile mission; (2) Q 13:29 addresses the inhabitants of Israel and Jerusalem as if these places were the centre of their world; (3) Luke (Q?) 12:54-56 betrays and presents climatologic knowledge of Palestine; (4) Q 17:23 speaks of the kind of sign prophets concentrated, to our knowledge, in Palestine. That Q originated somewhere in Palestine is accepted as a truism by virtually all Q scholars today. Most of these scholars also feel that it is possible to home in even further, and locate Q, with a fairly high level of certainty, in Galilee. For the most part, this judgment is based on the mention of three Galilean villages, Capernaum, Chorazin and Bethsaida, in Q 10:13-15. Although Tuckett (1996:102) is correct when he says that the latter is hardly conclusive evidence for placing the whole of Q in Galilee, it remains the most likely point of origin. A number of corroborating indicators seem to confirm such a provenance. Q’s Jesus seems much more stagnant than, for instance, Mark’s Jesus. Jesus’ sedentary activity in Q is based in and around Capernaum (cf. Reed 1995:21). After his temptation and inaugural sermon, Jesus enters Capernaum, after which none of the verbs referring to him denote movement (see Reed 1995:20-21). In all of Q, it is only in Q 7:1 that a place (Capernaum) is specifically named to locate a saying or act of Jesus (cf. Reed 2000:139; Arnal 2001:161). Moreover, apart from Tyre and

55 Distinctions between the terms “village,” “town” and “city” tend to be very imprecise and blurred in ancient sources (see Horsley 1995a:191-192). Freyne (1988:145-146) is very helpful in this regard. Physical characteristics are apparently not sufficient to distinguish between them. Unlike today, population size or had very little to do with attributing terms like “city,” “town” or “village” to a particular settlement (cf. Reed 2000:70, 167). Features of internal organisation and political (in)dependence are much more telling around the turn of the Millennium. Cities tended to be politically and socially organised around Greek democratic ideals, whereas towns and villages tended to be organised around kinship, seniority and prosperity. Furthermore, cities tended to be much more cosmopolitan, whereas the inhabitants of villages and towns were prone to homogeneity. These distinctions are not always helpful and some towns or villages might be very large and rather prosperous. Distinctions between the terms “town” and “village” are almost impossible to draw. In most cases, the two terms are used interchangeably by ancient writers. In the current study, Freyne’s definitions of “city” and “town” or “village” will suffice. As an attempt not to evoke anachronistic ideas of modern towns, the current study will prefer the term “village” for all settlements deemed not to qualify as cities (in the way Freyne understands the term “city”). This includes Capernaum, even though the Gospels tend to refer to it as a polis (see Reed 2000:166-169).
Sidon, the three villages by the Sea of Galilee seem to be the only places treated by Q as if they were real places, known by the author(s) (cf. Arnal 2001:159). These indications strongly suggest a geographical provenance for the Q people in or around Capernaum.

Reed (1995:21-24; 2000:170-196) developed this argument further by considering the geographical position and social characteristics of all the settlements mentioned in Q. Using this information, Reed allocated each of these cities and towns to one of three concentric circles. Moving in a centrifugal direction (from the centre outwards), the three villages mentioned above, in addition to Nazara and Gath-Hepher, belong to the first circle. Jerusalem, Tyre and Sidon belong to the second circle. Nineveh and Sodom find themselves in the third circle. Reed concludes that Q was probably penned somewhere in the central circle, possibly the hub thereof, Capernaum. The cities of the second and third circles are not real prospects for consideration. Q’s distanced and disinterested tone towards Jerusalem takes this city off the table as a possibility. Regarding the (mythical) cities of the third circle, neither of them existed at the time Q was conceived. Capernaum is further suggested as a real possibility by some additional factors. Firstly, this village is at the heart of the woes in Q 10:13-15, directed at unrepentant cities (cf. Reed 1995:21-22; 2000:183). Secondly, Q 10:15 addresses the village directly (σύ), after addressing Chorazin and Bethsaida indirectly in Q 10:13 (σοι). The intensity of their condemnation differentiate these three villages from the other six places mentioned by Q, designating them to be most significant to the Q people, with Capernaum at the nucleus of the equation (cf. Reed 1995:21). Out of the three, “Capernaum in particular is singled out for special condemnation” (Cromhout 2007:286). It is therefore very likely that Capernaum was an important and central hub for the Q people (cf. Reed 2000:184).

Kloppenborg Verbin (2000a:174-175) has further argued that Q’s protests and rhetoric against the Pharisees and scribes “presume quite specific knowledge of the practices of Pharisees on the part of the audience.” Such knowledge would indicate a Palestinian home for Q, but not a principally Judean home. Apparently, Q’s rhetoric fits the assumed situation of Lower Galilee before 70 CE, particularly with regard to Pharisaic activity within that region (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:175). Not too much weight should be
put on this argument by Kloppenborg, given the shortage of incontestable knowledge we have about the Pharisaic movement before the temple was destroyed in 70 CE. The probability that Q originated somewhere near Capernaum is further supported by the general insignificance of Capernaum (as well as Chorazin and Bethsaida) in biblical tradition, outside of Q (see esp. Reed 1995:21-22; 2000:140-141, 183-184; cf. Arnal 2001:160; cf. also Tuckett 1996:102; Allison 1997:53). Yet another supporting factor is the strong textual connection between Capernaum and the origins of Jesus. Finally, Q shares important references to Capernaum with the Signs Source behind the Gospel of John (see Robinson 1995:267-268). The only miracle in all of Q – the healing of the Centurion’s son – is corroborated by the Signs Source to have occurred in Capernaum (compare John 4:46-54 & Q 7:1-10). Q’s condemnation of Capernaum might also have a parallel in the Signs Source (compare John 6:24 & Q 10:15). In general, Q’s pervasive and particular use of rural, agricultural and natural imagery, as well as its specific usage of urban imagery, fits a Galilean context very well (see Reed 2000:189-195). All the evidence viewed thus far strongly suggest Lower Galilee as a real possibility for the location of Q’s conception, with Capernaum and its surrounding district at the heart of the equation. These results cohere with the relative consensus among contemporary scholars that Q did indeed originate in Galilee (cf. Horsley 1999:46).

56 Before Jesus appeared on the scene, Capernaum is not mentioned even once. Shortly after the time of Jesus, Josephus (cf. Life 72; War 3:519) and rabbinic sources (cf. Midr. Qoh. 1:8; 7:26) only mention it by the way. Capernaum only starts being referenced more frequently with the subsequent rise of Christianity.

57 The gospels all agree in placing and confining Jesus’ public ministry in Galilee (cf. Freyne 1988:143; Reed 2000:10). Despite Luke’s rather loose application of the term πόλις, the Gospels further agree that Jesus’ career was directed at Galilean villages (cf. Freyne 1988:143). Capernaum was within walking distance of most of the villages and cities Jesus is said by the Gospels to have visited during his public ministry (cf. Vorster 1999:296). In Mark 1:21-28, Jesus preaches at the local synagogue in Capernaum, where his first miracle also takes place. Other miracles also occur in Capernaum (see Mark 1:32-34; 2:1-12). Mark 1:29 also sees Capernaum as the hometown of Andrew, John, Simon and James. Mark places Jesus in a house in Capernaum in Mark 2:1 (ἐν οἰκίᾳ) and Mark 9:33 (ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ) (cf. Reed 2000:139). Matthew (4:13-16) likewise mentions that Jesus “lived” or “settled” (κατῴκησεν) in Capernaum after leaving Nazareth (cf. Moxnes 2003:48). Matthew 9:1, 7 calls Capernaum “his [Jesus’] own city” (τὴν ἰδίαν πόλιν), where he went to “his house” (τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ). Luke 4:23 recognises Capernaum as an important centre for Jesus’ miracles. After starting his public career in Nazareth and facing rejection there (Luke 4:16-23), Jesus turns to Capernaum (see Luke 4:31-32; cf. Moxnes 2003:48). According to John 2:12, Jesus “stayed” or “remained” (ἦμεν) in Capernaum for a few days with his biological family (ἡ μητέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ ἄδελφοι αὐτοῦ). John 6:24 describes Capernaum as the place where people would go looking (ζητοῦντες) for Jesus if they could not find him. Significantly, four (out of a possible five) Johannine references to Capernaum are from the Signs Source (cf. Reed 2000:139).
2.5.3 Galilean ethnicity

Earlier scholarship simply assumed that first-century Galilee was inhabited by numerous Gentiles and perhaps a few Judeans. Typically, these scholars would point out Galilee’s “long history of conquests by ancient near eastern empires” (Mack 1993:56). This “long history” supposedly “proved” that Galilee held mixed peoples, including many Gentiles. Some scholars have also claimed that the inhabitants of Galilee were not Judeans – meaning the southern tribes of Israel – but, for the most part, Israelites – meaning the northern tribes of Israel (see e.g. Mack 1993:52-54, 59; Horsley 1995a:39-40). According to this view, many Israelite populations had escaped Assyrian deportation, and were still occupying the region when Jesus lived (cf. Horsley 1999:50, 55). Horsley (1995a:26-27; 1996:22-23) believes that the Assyrians deported only the upper classes and left the peasantry behind. With the advent of Hasmonean colonisation, these Israelites were joined by Judeans from the South (cf. Horsley 1995a:243). The implication of assuming such a Galilean group was that Galilee had been cut off from Jerusalem and the temple for more than six hundred years (cf. Horsley 1995a:50-51; 1999:50, 102). With such a view of the Galileans, it was reasonable to assume that the time period spent outside Judean control made Galileans anything but observant and devout to the Torah or the temple (cf. Mack 1993:59; see Horsley 1995a:51, 281; 1995b:39; 1999:55-58; see also Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:229-234). The Assyrian conquest happened more than a hundred years before the high priest, Hilkiah, supposedly discovered Deuteronomy (cf. 2 Kings 22:3-13), and the Pentateuch received its final edit.

Two factors have contributed to dispelling these erroneous views, namely a critical rereading of ancient texts, and the emergence of new archaeological evidence (see Freyne 2000:176-182). In short, both brands of evidence indicate that Galilee was almost completely depopulated after the Assyrian campaign (see esp. Gal 1992; Reed 2000:29-31; Chancey 2002:32-33; cf. also Freyne 2000:11, 177, 219-220; Edwards 2007:359; Savage 2007:194; Cromhout 2007:234-235). Galilee was then sparsely repopulated during the Persian and Hellenistic Periods, probably by Syro-Phoenicians (see esp. Reed 2000:35-39; Chancey 2002:34-36, 43; see also Edwards 2007:359-361; Moreland
The Hasmoneans subsequently recovered the region (see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:215, 221-222). Not only were Judeans repopulating Galilee during this time, but they were also driving out whoever had thinly repopulated Galilee during the Persian and Early Hellenistic periods (see esp. Reed 2000; Freyne 2000:67-77, 179-182; 2007; Chancey 2002; 2005:37-38; 2007:91; see also Aviam 2004; 2007; Edwards 2007:361, 371-372; Cromehtout 2007:231-256; Cappelletti 2007; cf. Moxnes 2003:42). Hence, archaeological and textual evidence corroborate each other in depicting first-century Galilee as a region inhabited primarily by Judeans (cf. Wright 1996:37 n. 32). The Judean repopulation of Galilee was extensive and embraced both urban and rural areas, as well as all socio-economic levels. Urban and rural private spaces betray Judean presence, while urban public spaces reveal Hasmonote administration and rule before the introduction of Roman client-kingship. These archaeological findings, combined with a critical rereading of the literary texts, have led Freyne (2004:62-82) to abandon his former position that Galilee continued to be populated by Israelites after the Assyrian campaign (cf. Freyne 1988:144, 170). Reed (2000:34), Freyne (2000:117; 2007:22), Chancey (2002:34) and D. R. Edwards (2007:359) all conclude that Horsley’s position of an Israelite village culture surviving

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58 Moreland (2007) has recently contested these results. Although he agrees that the archaeological evidence supports the idea that some Judeans occupied Galilee, he does not agree that they necessarily constituted the majority. He has mainly three counter-arguments. Firstly, he points to the fact that the majority of Galileans were agrarian villagers, who left very little archaeological remains indicative of ethnicity. As such, Moreland argues that we should not simply assume their Judean ethnicity. Secondly, Moreland reminds one of the probability that miqva’ot were mostly restricted to wealthier homes. He then goes further to suggest that the same might have been true of stone vessels as well. In other words, the material remains are indicative of purity concerns among the elite, not necessarily the majority. Thirdly, Moreland points to the general lack in first-century Galilee of ossuaries associated with secondary burial customs. All three arguments are ad silencium. More importantly, the first two arguments are simply misguided. As it stands, stone vessels (as well as bone profiles lacking pork!) were not only discovered in wealthy (urban) homes, but also in poor (village) homes, like those excavated at Capernaum. This bolsters both of Moreland’s first two arguments. On the one hand, the majority was not silent in expressing their Judean ethnicity in the material remains. On the other, Judean ethnicity was not only a feature of the elite. Moreland’s third argument is simply based on the lack of ossuaries for secondary burial. Even if this is accepted, it still does not void the other three indicators of Judean ethnicity. Moreland fails to indicate from the archaeological profile who else could have inhabited Galilee. He does argue for a continued Syro-Phoenician occupation of Galilee, but his fallacious arguments are based both on the politico-economic relations between Galilee and the coastal cities, which are undeniable, but has no bearing on Galilean ethnicity, and on archaeological evidence of Galilee being thinly repopulated during the Persian and Early Hellenistic Period, which are similarly undeniable, but inconsequential for the first century. The only “evidence” of a first-century Galilee being populated by Syro-Phoenicians are the presence of Syro-Phoenician cities on the Northern and Western border regions of Galilee, once again an undeniable situation, but one that has no bearing on the ethnicity of “Galilee proper.”
and continuing in Galilee throughout the third Iron Age is hard to maintain, and has to be abandoned. In his groundbreaking study, Chancey (2002) has also comprehensively refuted any notions that Galilee might have held a significant number of Gentiles.

Thus, it would seem that Galilee “operated within the exclusive realm of covenantal nomism” and also “shared the same symbolic universe as those Judeans that lived within Judea” (Cromhout 2007:255). They seem to have practiced circumcision, obeyed the Torah and observed the Sabbath (cf. Cromhout 2007:255; see Freyne 1980:309-318; 1988:155; 2000:52-54, 80-85; contra Horsley 1995a:152-157; see Life 65-66, 74, 112-113, 134-135, 148-154, 158; Ant. 13.337; 18.261-288; War 2.184-203, 591-593, 634). The archaeological evidence signifies a direct cultural and religious continuity between Judea and Galilee. This can be explained as part of the Hasmonean colonisation of Galilee, which was seen as part of the ancestral “promised land” (cf. Cromhout 2007:256). Inhabitants of both provinces reminisced over the same memories and stories from history. Galileans also perceived the temple and Jerusalem to be central to their centripetal cultic belief and practice, even occasionally making pilgrimage visits to the site (see Freyne 1988:178-187; 2000:130, 154; Reed 2000:57-58; contra Horsley 1995a:144-147; cf. Luke 2:41, 44; Ant. 2.280; 17.254-258; 20.118, 123; War 2.237). Although there were occasional Galilean (and Judean!) criticisms of Jerusalem and the temple, these were not representative of Galilean views generally (see Freyne 1988:187-190). Rather, Galileans continued bringing tithes to the temple, or offering them up

59 It is highly unlikely that the cultic centres of Mount Gerazim and Dan had any religious pull or influence on local Galileans whatsoever (see Freyne 1988:182-184).

60 The fact that Galileans undertook pilgrimages to Jerusalem is particularly significant given the dangers such travels entailed, which included possibly coming face-to-face with life-threatening bandits and robbers (cf. Luke 10:30; 22:35-37), facing Samaritan hostility (cf. Luke 9:26; Ant. 20.123; War 2.237) and facing brutal Roman officials in Jerusalem (cf. Luke 13:1). Not only were the travels dangerous, they also had economic implications. Pilgrimages to Jerusalem probably entailed a period of three weeks away from home (cf. Cromhout 2007:242). Peasants and craftsmen had to leave their farms and work stations behind when leaving for Jerusalem. They had to carry enough foodstuffs and the like for the journey. Finally, they gave up portions of their livelihood to the Temple. In light of all these factors, the little tradition must have had good religious reasons for embarking on such pilgrimages. The religious reward must have outweighed even these potentially lethal dangers and economic implications. The only explanation is a deep-seated conviction that the Temple really is the centre of their religious universe, from where God blesses his children.

61 Cf. 1 Enoch 14:18-22; 15:3-4, the Testament of Levi 2-7 and War 6.300-309 for evidence of Galilean criticisms of the Temple. Sepphoris’s pacifistic attitude during the Great Revolt was not indicative of its religious views of Jerusalem and its Temple, but of its general neutrality with regard to the aspirations of
willingly to priestly representatives, until the Temple was destroyed in 70 CE (cf. Freyne 2000:154). Galilee was seen by all Judeans – those living in Galilee, as well as those living in Judea – as part of the ancestral promised land, given to them by the very same God who resides in the Jerusalem temple (see Freyne 1988:190-198). God’s providence motivated their innate connection, and their pilgrimages, to the cultic centre. For Jews, the Torah legitimised the link between temple and land, and provided stipulations applicable to both. The production of oil lamps and stone vessels indicate that Galilee had not only cultic, but also economic, ties with Jerusalem (cf. Aviam 2004:23). Torah observance was generally accepted by Galileans as the proper way in which to express gratitude for, and faithfulness towards, the covenant, represented by both symbols of land and temple (see Freyne 1988:198-213).

Texts such as John 6:52 and John 7:49-53, among others, should not allow scholars to erroneously conclude that Galileans were lax in observing the Torah. These texts rather reflect the views of Jerusalemites, who saw themselves as religiously superior to those from Galilee, who were cut off from the temple by the province of Samaria (see Freyne 1988:208-212). Such social divisions should not be misinterpreted as evidence for cultural or religious discontinuity between Galilee and Judea. Although Judea might have judged Galileans for their perceived ignorance, as well as their proximity to neighbouring Gentiles, they still thought of Galileans as co-ethnics. For the most part, the Galileans, including the peasantry, were not deterred or distressed by Jerusalem’s expectations of them concerning Torah observance. However, Galileans, particularly those from the countryside, resisted rigorist, and painfully strict, interpretations of the Torah, being concerned, rather, with day-to-day activities, such as craftsmanship, farming and survival (cf. Freyne 2000:154). They were dissatisfied with, and opposed to, movements like Pharisaism, which tended to expound the Torah so rigorously that it became impractical for day-to-day living, and a hindrance for survival. Such fanatic

the Great Revolt (cf. Freyne 1988:190; see War 2.574-575; 3.61-62; Life 348, 373-380). The city refused to participate in the Revolt (cf. Life 30, 37, 39, 104, 124, 232, 243-347, 373, 394). The Sephoris coinage of 67 CE, inscribed with the term Εἰνήσινος (city of peace), confirms this (see Reed 2000:100-101). Sephoris’ inaction seems to have been chiefly motivated by self-preservation (see Chancey 2002:78-79) – a strategy that paid off in the end (cf. Cappelletti 2007:79). In fact, the Temple is in this context described as being “common to us all,” including the inhabitants of Sephoris.
movements were sure to emanate from Jerusalem (cf. Acts 9:1). All in all, historical sources tend to portray Galileans as observant of the Sabbath, loyal to the pilgrimage, faithful to tithe payments, concerned with the purity of the temple, and anxious about the presence of uncircumcised Gentiles among them.

As we have seen, Capernaum should be seen as a very probable location for the origin of Q. A closer look at what we know of Capernaum is therefore warranted. Archaeology indicates only slight hints of occupation for the Middle Bronze and First Iron Ages (2,200 BCE-1,000 BCE), and a lack of occupation for the latter two of the Iron Ages (1,000 BCE-587 BCE), with the first signs of occupation dating to the Late Hellenistic Period (167 BCE-63 BCE) (see Reed 2000:144-145). As with the rest of Galilee, this occupational history corresponds to Hasmonean colonisation, pointing to Capernaum’s Judean ethnicity. The Judean ethnicity of Capernaum is corroborated by archaeology (see Reed 2000:50, 156-161; cf. Chancey 2002:103). If Bethsaida is located at et-Tell, which it probably should be, then this village also shows clear signs of Judean occupation (see Savage 2007). There is possible evidence of an earlier synagogue structure in Capernaum, underneath the limestone synagogue from the fifth century. That this earlier structure was a synagogue is not unlikely, given the ancient custom of building holy sites on top of one another (cf. Chancey 2002:104). The general lack of evidence for first century synagogue structures anywhere else in Galilee has convinced Reed (2000:154-155) that this earlier structure in Capernaum does not date to the first century. Reed’s reasoning might be circular here. Moreover, a first-century synagogue has been discovered at Gamla (cf. Aviam 2007:121). Although this structure falls outside the formal boundaries of Galilee in the first century, its relatively close proximity to Capernaum might indicate that Jews from this fishing village were being exposed to a

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62 As with all settlements excavated along the shore of the lake, Miqva’ot were lacking, probably because the lake would have replaced a need for immersion pools (see Reich 1990; Reed 2000:50, 157-158). Besides, Miqva’ot were not a feature of rural homes, but could rather be found near important public areas like synagogues or olive presses (cf. Oakman 2008:259; see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:231-234). The presence of miqva’ot in the domestic sphere was a feature restricted to wealthier urban homes (cf. Moreland 2007:140; Cromhout 2007:246).

63 If the earlier structure in Capernaum is not a synagogue building, then there is no evidence that such buildings were in Galilee during the first century. If there is no evidence of synagogue buildings in Galilee during the first century, then the one in Capernaum could not very likely have been a synagogue.
variety of Diaspora-type customs and praxes, including the use of synagogues. Chancey (2002:104) states that “[c]eramic evidence clearly dates the construction of the pavement to the first century CE at the latest” (cf. Runesson 2007:239). There appears to be a rising consensus among scholars not only that the structure at Capernaum was a synagogue, but also that it should indeed be dated to the first century CE (see Runesson 2007:232-233). The gospels (Mark 1:21-29; Luke 7:5; John 6:59) mention a synagogue in Capernaum. Reed (2000:154-155) has contested these Biblical references by arguing that the ones by Mark and John probably refer to a gathering or assembly, not an actual building (see also Horsley 1995a:222-227; 1996:131-132, 146-148). However, the verbs and prepositions in the Markan pericope all connote movement in relation to an actual structure. Reed admits that Luke 7:5 refers to a building, but has argued that Luke’s reference might be tainted by his Sitz im Leben in the Diaspora, where synagogue buildings were more prominent. This is a fairly weak argument, especially if seen in conjunction with the Markan reference to an actual building. In this instance, archaeological and literary sources overlap in placing a synagogue building in Capernaum during the first century CE. The basalt synagogue confirms the Judean

64 Verse 21 says: εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὴν συναγωγήν. The verb εἰσέρχομαι is placed by Louw & Nida (1993 s.v. εἰσέρχομαι) in the semantic domain 15.93, which is defined as: “to move into a space, either two-dimensional or three-dimensional.” This “space” is then described by them as an “area or structure.” The use of the preposition εἰς with the verb εἰσελθὼν only adds to the understanding that movement “into” a physical structure is implied, especially since εἰς is followed by the Accusative noun τὴν συναγωγήν (cf. Newman 1993 s.v. εἰσέρχομαι). The definite article before συναγωγή strengthens the current case even further, seeing as an article would not usually be used in reference to a general assembly, especially not when that assembly enters into the narrative or discourse for the first time as in Mark 1:21 (compare James 2:2). The phrase ἦν ἐν τῇ συναγωγῇ αὐτῶν in Mark 1:23 might refer to either a general assembly or a specific structure, with the verb ἦν and the preposition ἐν lending themselves to both interpretations. However, the use of αὐτῶν probably designates a general gathering. The context (ἦν ἐν τῇ συναγωγῇ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενον ἐν πνεύματι ἀκαθάρτῳ) also validates such an understanding. If so accepted, this verse simply refers to the assembly who had already been described as being gathered in the synagogue building. Verse 29 states: ἐκ τῆς συναγωγῆς ἐξελθόντες. Louw & Nida (s.v. ἐξέρχομαι) places the verb within semantic domain 15.40 and goes on to define it as such: “to move out of an enclosed or well-defined two or three-dimensional area.” Semantically, the verb denotes movement “out of” or “from within,” the direct opposite movement as εἰσέλθων in verse 21. Furthermore, as in verse 21, the current context also repeats the compound verb’s equivalent preposition, namely ἐκ. Moreover, the definite article τῆς is once again used before συναγωγῆς. If the phrases εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὴν συναγωγήν (verse 21) and ἐκ τῆς συναγωγῆς ἐξελθόντες (verse 29) are read in conjunction with one another, they leave no doubt that an actual structure is in mind here. Lastly, not only does the whole of verse 29 concern itself with physical movement (cf. ἐξελθόντες, ἔλθον), but also with movement from one physical structure (συναγωγής) to another (οἰκίαν). The idea that Mark has a general gathering, as opposed to a physical building, in mind when he uses the noun συναγωγή in verses 21 and 29 of his first chapter does not hold up against close scrutiny. The Johannine phrase ἐν συναγωγῇ and its context is unclear about the implied use of “synagogue” there.
ethnicity of Capernaum during the first century CE, and the limestone synagogue attests to a Judean ethnic continuity into later periods.

### 2.5.4 Ethnicity and Q

Despite claims of a lack of references to Israel’s past, very few scholars would disagree that Q was written for a Jewish audience (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:256; see also Horsley 1999:95-96; Cromhout 2007:267-268). Q alludes to, references and assumes important texts, personages and sites from Israel’s traditions (cf. Cotter 1995b:124; see Horsley 1995b:41-42). Q’s Jesus more than once directly quotes scripture. References and allusions to scripture are undoubtedly also present throughout Q. Apart from referencing scripture directly, more subtle allusions to generic Jewish traditions feature throughout Q. Jerusalem is put forward as the ruling nucleus. The Pharisees and the scribes are the only formal groups overtly mentioned and are depicted as rival analysts of Jewish tradition. Aramaic words, like γέννα in Q 12:5 and μαμώνας in Q 16:13, are used without any need to translate them or explain their meanings. Gentiles are referred to as being part of the out-group, and this is done in such a way that it functions to strengthen internal self-definition (cf. Q 6:33-34; Q 12:30). Referring to the rest of the world as “the nations” is also a distinctively Jewish feature (cf. Cotter 1995b:118-119; cf. Q 12:30). Israel’s epic history is referenced numerous times. Q takes the audience’s

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65 The following direct quotations can be listed: Q 4:4 (cf. Deut 8:3); Q 4:8 (cf. Exod 20:8; Deut 6:13); Q 4:12 (cf. Deut 6:16); Q 7:22 (cf. Isa 29:18-19; 35:5-6; 42:6-7; 61:1-2); Q 7:27 (cf. Exod 23:20 / Mal 3:1).


67 Horsley (1999:95-98) lists the following: Q 3:7-9, 16-17 alludes to the Mosaic covenant and “harvest” as a symbol of judgment; Q 4:1-13 references 40 years in the wilderness, the agency of the Holy Spirit and the title “Son of God”; Q 9:57-62 alludes to Elijah and Elisha; Q 10:21-24 contrasts Jesus’ mission with past experiences; Q 11:2-4 appeals to the Law of Moses; Q 11:14-15, 17-20 contextualises Israel’s dualistic view of the struggle between God and Satan; Q 12:39-40 mentions the Son of Man; Q 16:16-18 references the Mosaic Torah; Q 17:23-37 alludes to the sudden acts of judgment in the times of Noah and Lot; Q 22:28-30 mentions the twelve tribes of Israel and alludes to the traditions of God’s justice being effected for widows and orphans, but also for the whole of Israel.
knowledge of Solomon’s wealth for granted (cf. Cotter 1995b:118; cf. Q 12:27). Other Jewish heroes are also expressly named.68 A knowledge of the traditional stories of these heroes, on the part of the audience, is taken for granted. The prominence of Jewish cities and villages is apparent. Gentiles function apologetically in Q to shame a predominantly Jewish audience (cf. Q 7:1-10; Q 10:12-15; Q 11:31-32; Q 13:28-29; see Reed 2000:135-136). Shaming one’s own group by comparing them to other ethnic groups was a common topos at the time (cf. Reed 2000:188). Q uses the Torah as a basis for polemic and rhetorical argumentation, and affirms the continued validity of the Torah (cf. Q 4:1-13; Q 11:39, 41, 42, 46; Q 16:16-17; cf. Horsley 1999:115).

Earlier contentions of a (northern) Israelite ethnicity for Galilee seemed to fit the content of Q like a glove. Throughout Q, arguments are not based on the temple, the priesthood, purity distinctions, or the Torah, even in instances where such references could substantially have validated their case. Many terms, references and themes in Q draw upon northern, pre-monarchic traditions (see esp. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:199, 203-206; see also Mack 1993:143-144; Horsley 1996:122-123, 174; 1999:120).69 Traditional Israelite themes, however, do not necessarily point to Israelite ethnicity or genealogical continuity (cf. Reed 2000:60). These traditions and stories were assimilated by Judeans before the Assyrian conquest, and were cultivated by them throughout the Babylonian, Persian and Hellenistic periods. Although Moses and David are not expressly mentioned, Allison (2000:25-73) has shown convincingly that allusions and references to these heroes are prevalent throughout Q (see also Cromhout 2007:310-311). According to Reed (2000:59, 204-208), Jonah was probably venerated and re-applied as an indigenous hero by Galileans in and around Gath-Hepher. Likewise, the centrality of the prophetic theme in Q is not an indication of Israelite ethnicity, but simply a theme that fitted Q’s

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69 These include: The word “Israel” in Q 7:9 and Q 22:30; the centrality of prophetic themes throughout Q; nostalgic ideals for tribal equality (Q 22:30); references to pre-Monarchic patriarchs like Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Noah (Q 3:8; Q 13:28-30; Q 17:26-27); the reference to Jonah in Q 11:29-31; allusions to Elijah and Elisha in Q 7:21-23 and Q 9:57-62; the lack of direct references to kings and priests, particularly David and Moses (Solomon is either remembered for his wisdom or used as a negative example of wealth and kingship); the lack of any reference to Judeans (Ἰουδαίοι); the lack of a Zionist theology.
specific message aptly, particularly as a means by which to both justify their persecution and legitimate their critique of Jerusalem (see Reed 2000:209-210). Galilee was not opposed to Judean influence. In fact, they were Judeans themselves.

Seeing Galilee as inhabited by Israelites also had an impact on the interpretation of Q. Q’s reaction to Jerusalem and its temple – as the symbolic nucleus for southern interests, both cultic and political – was traditionally explained as reflecting general “Galilean” (Israelite) sentiments. Every aspect of Q’s opposition to Jerusalem, the temple and the Pharisees could thus be explained as a reflection of general “Galilean” animosity towards Judean influence (see Horsley 1995b:38-39, 42; 1999:55-58, 89, 99, 101). Pharisees were seen as the embodiment of Judean influence in Galilee (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:205; see Mack 1993:141-144; see also Horsley 1995a:149-151; 1995b:42; 1999:56). Judean interests were physically represented by the Pharisees, and symbolically represented by Jerusalem, as the destination of local goods and produce. Q was seen to be negative towards purity distinctions (cf. Q 11:39-41), tithing (cf. Q 11:42), and the social, religious and economic roles of Jerusalem and the Temple in Galilean society (cf. Q 11:49-51; Q 13:34-35).

Q’s negative stance towards the Pharisees, Jerusalem and “this generation” cannot be denied (cf. Q 3:8; Q 7:9, 31-35; Q 11:29-30, 31-32, 39-44, 46-52; Q 13:34-35; Q 22:28, 30; cf. Hoffmann 1995:191; see Horsley 1995b:46; 1999:120-121, 277), and Jerusalem’s geographical distance from Capernaum might still have had an impact (cf. Tuckett 1996:439; see Reed 1995:22-23). However, these attitudes must be interpreted as a result of Q’s own polemic, and not of Galilean sentiments in general (see Reed 2000:60-61). In other words, the Q people had their own reasons for detesting the Pharisees, Jerusalem and “this generation.” Reasons for such abhorrence must be extrapolated from Q itself, not attached to its ethnicity, which was Judean. In fact, throughout Israel’s history, but particularly around the turn of the common era, various southern groups also (at times brutally) criticised and opposed the high priesthood, the temple and Jerusalem (see 1 Enoch 92-105; Lam 2:13-17; Qumran Scrolls; see Horsley 1999:57-58, 99-100, 113). Popular prophetic and messianic movements, not only in the countryside, but also in
Jerusalem itself, were expressly and decidedly against the temple and its city. As a breakaway movement, Q must have shown signs of both continuity and discontinuity with traditional Judaism (see Tuckett 1996:426-427). After a thorough internal analysis of the two strata,\(^7_0\) Cromhout (2007) reconstructs Judean ethnicity in Q. He focuses on the continuities and discontinuities between the Q people and Judaism of the time. Much of what follows is indebted to his analysis of ethnicity in Q.

I will start with *continuities* between the Q people and their co-ethnics at the Q\(^1\) level. The Q people saw themselves as part of Israel, and coveted the cultural and symbolic identity that goes with such an identification (cf. Tuckett 1996:427). In other words, they were part of a privileged people, occupying an ancestral “promised land.” The proximity within which the Q people and other Judeans lived almost necessitated some “degree of social overlap and relationship” (Tuckett 1996:427). The Q people clearly distinguished themselves from Gentiles, who were disapproved of, and seen as outsiders (cf. Q 6:33-34; Q 12:30; cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:241; cf. also Horsley 1999:95; see Tuckett 1996:202, 402-403). The Gentiles clearly (and matter-of-factly) formed part of “them” in an us-them distinction (cf. Tuckett 1996:403, 426). Q’s mission was aimed at Jews (see Tuckett 1996:425-426). The Q people did not abandon covenantal concerns completely (see Horsley 1999:115-116). Q\(^1\) also shares historical memories with broader Judea. References and allusions are made to Moses (Q 6:27-35; Q 10:4), the prophetic tradition (Q 6:20-21), Elijah and Elisha (Q 9:61-62), the story of Lot (Q 9:61-62) and Solomon (Q 12:27). Tuckett (1996:435-436) finds it noteworthy that Q says nothing about the Eucharist, and sees this as an indication that Q did not actively try and form boundaries between themselves and their co-ethnics by way of a new cultic act.\(^7_1\)

The *discontinuities* between the Q people and the rest of Israel had, on the Q\(^1\) level, primarily to do with their radical understanding of God’s kingdom. Israel is not yet what it is supposed to be. Only when Israel assimilates the kingdom of God will it really be

\(^{70}\)Cromhout sees Kloppenborg’s Q\(^2\) as part of Q\(^3\).
\(^{71}\)Tuckett (1996:435) admits, though, that this argument is an argument *ad silencium*. It is still interesting, especially tradition-historically. The rite of Baptism could possibly have its origin with the Q people in Galilee, while the Eucharist might have its origin with the Jerusalem movement in Judea. The two most important Christian rites (from a Protestant perspective) might have two quite separate origins.
what it is supposed to be. The Q people believe that they will play a determining role in restoring and aligning Israel with the kingdom. The content of Q¹ suggests that purity concerns played second fiddle to matters concerning the kingdom of God (cf. Q 10:7-8; Q 7:34). The covenant must be renewed in light of the kingdom. The Q sermon (Q 6:27-45) tries to renew the covenant by redefining relationships between Judeans, who should strive for love, mercy, justice, forgiveness, and the like (see Horsley 1995b:43-44). As we argued in section 2.3 above, immersion into the Q movement often resulted in a rift between members and their families and co-ethnics, who seem to insult and oppose them (cf. Mack 1993:136; cf. also Horsley 1995b:44). The Jesus movement experienced ongoing “violence and exploitation,” viewing local judicial systems with suspicion (see Q 6:22-23, 27-36; Q 12:2-12, 22-31, 58-59; Q 14:27; Q 16:16; Q 17:33). The elitist Pharisees particularly seem to target them with rapacity (cf. Q 10:3; Q 11:39; Q 16:16; cf. Horsley 1999:270). Regardless of their exact Christology, the Q people saw the person of Jesus as integral to the inauguration of the kingdom. The reception or rejection of Jesus was tantamount to the reception or rejection of God himself (cf. Q 10:16). Their high regard for Jesus and his kingdom thus separated the Q people from their co-ethnics (cf. Tuckett 1996:426). The Torah is ruthlessly reconstructed and reinterpreted in light of the kingdom. The holiness codes of Leviticus 19, the importance of the patriarchal family, and divorce law, are all altered to align with the kingdom, which is believed to have replaced the old era of the Torah and the prophets (see Q 6:27-45; Q 9:59-60; Q 14:26; Q 16:16, 18). Given all this, it is clear that the message and conduct of the Q people betray high levels of discontinuity with the rest of Israel, placing Jesus and his kingdom in the centre of their ideology.

Even at the Q² level, there were some aspects of continuity with Israel. The Q people still saw themselves as being part of Israel, and continued to nurture the cultural and symbolic identity that goes with such an identification (cf. Tuckett 1996:427). In other words, they were still part of a privileged people occupying an ancestral “promised land.” Q had a positive attitude and relationship with territorial Israel (i.e. the land). Particularly significant in this regard is their expectation of an eschatological ingathering of scattered

Ironically and paradoxically, Q’s polemic against greater Israel betrays its connection with her (cf. Tuckett 1996:427, 434). “[T]he very existence of hostility reflects an element of social identity between the two groups” (Tuckett 1996:427). One can almost say, the harsher the polemic language, the closer the cultural connection. Q² is preoccupied with the future of territorial and ethnic Israel, with Gentiles operating as part of a past or future perspective (see Tuckett 1996:196-197, 399; cf. Horsley 1999:95). Gentiles are only referred to as part of a rhetorical device in the polemic of the main redaction to shame Israel (see Q 7:1-10; Q 11:31-32; Q 10:12-14). Although a gentile mission might have existed, it was very much subordinate to the Q people’s mission to greater Israel (see Q 10:2, 7-8; Q 13:18-19; Q 14:16-24; cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:241; Hoffmann 1995:197; see also Tuckett 1996:403-404).73 The ἐκατοντάρχος of Q 7:2 should probably not be seen as a Centurion, but as a public official managing Antipas’ military apparatus (see Reed 2000:161-162). “Overall, Gentiles do not belong to Q’s symbolic universe” (Cromhout 2007:377). Q still feels that it properly belongs to the Judean symbolic universe. As such, previously held notions, that Q’s polemic is so strong that the Q people must have given up all hope for Israel, must be abandoned (see Tuckett 1996:196-207; Horsley 1999:94-95). Similarly, former convictions that “this generation” refers to all Israel, past, present and future, must be abandoned (see Tuckett

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72 This text was historically seen as referencing Gentiles. However, the main comparative texts (Ps 107:3; Isa 27:12-13; 43:5-6; Hos 11:11; Zech 2:10; 8:7-8; 10:10; Baruch 4:4, 37; 5:5; 1 Enoch 57:1; Ps. Sol. 11:2-3) refer rather to the ingathering of scattered Jews.

73 Scholarly opinion is much divided on the issue of a gentile mission (see Tuckett 1996:393-404). As we’ve seen, the Q people must’ve had some contact with Gentiles and Hellenisation must also have had some, albeit small, impact on the Q people. Those who want to believe that a gentile mission existed point to Q texts exhibiting a remarkably positive attitude to them (cf. e.g. Cotter 1995b:126). Others note that a “remarkably positive attitude” toward Gentiles doesn’t even begin to prove a gentile mission (cf. e.g. Hoffmann 1995:197; Horsley 1999:64-65). In general, the textual evidence seems ambiguous and inconclusive (cf. Tuckett 1996:394, 401). Q’s treatment of Gentiles as instruments with which to shame greater Israel and Q’s view of Gentiles as “them,” however, makes it unlikely that a gentile mission had occupied the Q people to any large extent, if at all (cf. Hoffmann 1995:197; Tuckett 1996:403). Furthermore, the polemic is aimed exclusively at Israel. In general, Q seems unconcerned with the fate of Gentiles. Q is probably aware of a gentile mission, but not actively engaged in it (cf. Tuckett 1996:403). Kloppenborg (1987a:241) sees a development, with Q¹ not fully engaged in a gentile mission, but Q² developing some kind of sympathy for Gentiles (perhaps over and against greater Israel). Cotter (1995b:126) believes that the Q people were at the Q² stage at least open to gentile membership. According to Hoffmann (1995:197), the Gospel of Matthew represents the first programmatically stated, conscious movement toward a gentile mission or membership, with Q only standing at the start of this new direction.
1996:196-201). Rather, the term probably refers to unresponsive Judeans contemporary with the Q people (see Tuckett 1996:199-201).

The Q people are in many respects presented as normal Judeans. They accept tithing and ritual purity as integral to the Torah (see Q 11:39-44). Q 11:39-41 does not explicitly condemn or affirm the practice of purity rites, since the emphasis is on (or against) the Pharisees (see Tuckett 1996:412-413). Yet, the passage could be interpreted as a condemnation of purity rites. Redactional activity is obvious in the inclusion of Q 11:42c, but that does not automatically place the interpolation on par with Kloppenborg’s Q³ (see section 2.2.4 above). This emendation clearly guards against any interpretation of Q 11:39-44 that would lead to the abolishment or abandonment of the tithing praxis (cf. Tuckett 1996:410). Abstract ideals, like justice and mercy, emphasised by the Q people’s interpretation of the Torah, must not undermine or illegitimate the more visible rites of tithing and purity observance. The Q people further show concern for the future of the temple (cf. Q 13:35). In ritual and covenantal praxis, therefore, the Q people show strong continuity with the rest of Israel. They explicitly dissociate themselves from those messianists who have forsaken covenantal praxis (cf. Q 13:27). They further affirm their

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74 Horsley (1995b:38-40; 1999:64-65) suggests that the term “this generation” could have Gentiles in mind, as opposed to Israel. His “evidence” for such a suggestion is that Q 7:1-10 is the only text that overtly mentions Israel. However, there is absolutely no positive evidence for seeing “this generation” as referring to Gentiles. From the overall picture of Q’s attitudes toward Israel and Gentiles respectively, it seems much more likely that “this generation” refers to Israel. In the same article, Horsley (1995b:46-51; 1996:182-183; 1999:69, 89, 299) also makes a case for viewing “this generation” as referring only to the ruling elite in Q 11:16, 29-32 and Q 11:39-52. Although these texts occur in contexts where the scribes and Pharisees are overtly mentioned, the term “this generation” itself implies a broader application. In this literary context, it probably refers to those committed to the teachings of the Pharisees and scribes, perhaps meaning the rest of Israel. That greater Israel itself is also targeted (and not just the Pharisees and scribes) is obvious from other texts (cf. e.g. Q 3:7-9; Q 7:9, 31-35; Q 10:10-16; Q 11:14-15, 17-20; Q 11:23; Q 12:49, 51, 53; Q 13:24-27; Q 14:26; Q 17:26-30, 34-35; Q 22:28, 30). The most hostile language and the greatest severity of Q’s polemic is perhaps reserved for the ruling elite, but that does not disqualify its general negativity toward greater Israel as well. In further support of his argument, Horsley (1999:298-299) also claims that “this generation” was not condemned for its rejection of Jesus and his (or the Q people’s) message, but for killing the prophets and loading burdens on the people. Apart from the fact that other texts (beside Q 13:34-35; Q 11:49-51 & Q 11:39-52) do indeed condemn greater Israel for rejecting Jesus and the Q message, Horsley betrays a very superficial reading of even those texts he selected to further his argument. Although it is true that those texts selected by Horsley condemns “this generation” for killing the prophets, these condemnations should be read as part of the Q people’s rhetoric and polemic against their opponents, not as representative of the actual reasons such polemic was necessary in the first place. As indicated by other Q passages, the Q people were rejected by their co-ethnics. As a result, they had to come up with some kind of polemic to justify their position and establish group boundaries against former co-ethnics. The content of their polemic was the killing of the prophets, but their reason for needing a polemic in the first place had nothing to do with the killing of the prophets.
allegiance to the Torah (cf. Q 16:17). In contrast to Matthew or Luke, Q does not entertain thoughts of future Torah nullification, but simply accepts its present validity (cf. Tuckett 1996:406). Q 16:16 is put into perspective by the following verse, which guards against any interpretation that would render the Torah invalid or irrelevant (cf. Tuckett 1996:407). The kingdom supersedes the Torah, but the latter does not surrender its purpose in the process. Redactional activity cannot be denied here, but, once again, that does not automatically place Q 16:17 on par with Kloppenborg’s Q³. Q 16:18 continues by illustrating that, if anything, the Q people’s interpretation of the Torah is even more rigorous, not leaving any wiggle room or grey areas (cf. Tuckett 1996:408). Both redactional clauses (Q 16:17 & Q 11:42c) attempt to safeguard against a qualitative distinction between the ceremonial and ethical interpretations of the Torah – interpretations, in other words, that would inevitably yield the Torah redundant and superfluous (cf. Tuckett 1996:410). Jesus himself is held up as a prime example of Torah obedience (cf. Q 4:1-13). Q tries to explain, within its apologetics, that the Q people have not abandoned the Torah: “By recognising the everlasting validity of the Law, Q reclaims or affirms the Judean ethnic identity of the community and of its hero, Jesus” (Cromhout 2007:373). The Q people still hope for solidarity with their co-ethnics (cf. Mack 1993:141; see Tuckett 1996:201-207; Horsley 1999:94-95). Although their Christology separates them from other Judeans, it also betrays their Judean ethnicity in as far as Q² identifies Jesus with the prophetic tradition in general, with prophets like Elijah and Elisha, with the eschatological Son of Man (see sections 3.2 & 3.3 below), with Sophia, and perhaps even with Moses and the Exodus (see Mack 1993:141-142). Q² affirms common ancestry with broader Israel and accepts the presence of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the post-apocalyptic world (cf. Q 13:28; cf. Horsley 1999:283).

As a result of the Q people being ignored or opposed, Q² shows much discontinuity with the rest of Israel, as is also evident from their polemic against Jerusalem, the Pharisees, the scribes and greater Israel, sometimes referred to as “this generation” (cf. Reed 2000:61; see Q 3:8; Q 7:9, 31-35; Q 11:29-30, 31-32, 39-44, 46-52; Q 13:34-35; Q 22:28, 30). The temple is criticised for being “forsaken” (cf. Q 13:35). According to Q² (3:7-9), “covenantal status is no longer a birth right” (Cromhout 2007:368). Q²’s strong polemic
against unrepentant Jews, referred to as “this generation,” points to a situation where opposition had intensified (cf. Mack 1993:204; Tuckett 1996:201). Much of the polemic against “this generation” must have come from frustration with constantly facing challenges to individual and group honour from the larger community. The rhetoric against opponents of Q focuses on shaming them, threatening them with a coming judgment, and complaining about their lack of repentance. The latter of these should probably be understood as a failure on their part to accept and validate the Jesus movement represented by the Q people (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:204). The rhetoric of Q² thus represents a stage in the development of Q where the Q people were obliged to legitimise their existence and ethos by defending themselves against those who were either unwilling to acknowledge their claims, or who out-rightly opposed the movement. Q² represents a struggle for legitimacy within Galilean society. Their opponents, however, seem to already be in a place of legitimacy and influence (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:205). The Pharisees enjoy social prominence (cf. Q 11:43), and the θηλείς are able to impose burdens (cf. Q 11:46b, 52).

There is evidence in Q² of active opposition and repression, sometimes presented in the form of apathy and neutrality (cf. Q 11:23, 39, 49-51; Q 12:8-10, 58-59; Q 17:33; see Tuckett 1996:283-323). From the vantage point of the Q people, this rejection might have been experienced as direct persecution. This “violent rejection” convinced the Q community that they were associated with, and symbolic descendents of, the prophets of old (cf. Tuckett 1996:165, 195, 300, 322). This deuteronomistic view of history is conflated with the concept of (rejected) Sophia – a combination that led to the conviction that Sophia sends out the prophets, who ultimately suffer rejection and even murder (cf. Tuckett 1996:195, 322; see Horsley 1995b:50-51; Hartin 1995:157-159; see e.g. Jer 7:25-34; 25:4-14; Neh 9:5-37; Dan 9:4-19; Jub. 1:7-26). In reality, this opposition was probably not systematic or physically violent in nature, but restricted to verbal abuse, taunts and social ostracism (see Tuckett 1996:322-323). The apathy shown by greater

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75 However, there might be enough evidence to suggest that the Pharisees, in particular, didn’t exert much political or social authority in the period before the Jewish War in 70 CE (see Tuckett 1996:438-447).
76 However, such violent persecution also refers to oppression of the people by the ruling elite (see Horsley 1999:272-273).
Israel and their failure to “repent” provokes the strongest language from Q (cf. Tuckett 1996:322). This is perhaps understandable. If the Q people were physically or systematically opposed, it would at least have shown that they mattered to the rest of Israel. They and their message are just ignored, though. This might have hurt more than actual, direct, confrontational opposition. Q members are alienated from their co-ethnics, and respond with severe polemic, and intense apologetics, which included pronouncements of judgment and destruction, doom oracles, and ridicule (see Mack 1993:140-141, 204). According to some scholars, the Q people fostered a glimmer of hope (cf. e.g. Tuckett 1996:434). Should Israel accept Jesus, and join the Q group, Jerusalem, the temple and “this generation” will be saved. The Q people’s hope for the restoration of Israel is probably one of the reasons why it made use of such strong polemic against “this generation.” The polemic might be aimed at converting Jews to the Q movement, in order to “save” them (see Tuckett 1996:201-207; cf. Horsley 1999:69, 95). Q² demonstrates a strong consciousness of difference between themselves and other Judeans (cf. Tuckett 1996:426). Although the polemic against “this generation” might have intended the conversion of broader Israel, its primary function was undoubtedly inward, serving mainly to redefine group boundaries, to re-impose group identity, to increase internal solidarity, to legitimise the Q people’s beliefs, and to rationalise opposition from broader Israel (see Kloppenborg 1987a:167-177; Piper 1995a:53-54; cf. Hoffmann 1995:196).

Whereas Christology is assumed in Q¹, it is explicitly used as part of Q²’s apologetic and polemic. The status of Jesus is defended and explained explicitly. The person of Jesus serves as a delineating factor separating the Q people from other Judeans (cf. Mack 1993:204; Tuckett 1996:426). The Q people has reconstructed the traditional sacred canopy, defined by covenantal nomism (cf. Mack 1993:143). Jesus now represents the essence of their sacred canopy. This has implications for their use of the Torah. Jesus is held up as the new Moses, and as qualitatively more important than Moses. Although they affirm and claim Torah obedience, this obedience applies to the Torah given by Jesus. They claim correct interpretation of the Torah (cf. Q 11:46b, 52), emphasising ethical aspects such as justice, mercy and faithfulness, as opposed to the less important
ritual aspects (see Q 11:39-44). Compared to Q¹, historical memories are even more prevalent in Q². They share these memories to affirm and explain the status of Jesus. Some positive allusions and references are made, connecting John to Elijah (cf. Q 3:7-9, 16b-17; 7:27) and Jesus to Isaiah (see Q 7:18-23) and Elijah (see Q 7:18-23). However, past traditions are predominantly used negatively to denounce broader Israel (cf. Mack 1993:144). Q²’s polemics show little or no sentimental connection with the past. Israel’s privileged status is not overtly affirmed. Historical memories are used in the service of eschatology and prophecy. Jesus’ activities are interpreted as the fulfilment of long-standing Judean expectations (cf. Horsley 1995b:39; see e.g. Q 7:18-23; Q 10:21-24; Q 11:14-20; Q 12:51-53). The kingdom qualifies the meaning and usefulness of past events. We have seen that common ancestry is affirmed, but the presumption of privilege attached to such ancestry, including divine election, is denied (cf. Q 3:8). Ancestry is rather linked to the killing of the prophets (cf. Q 11:47-48). Compared to Q¹, the focus has shifted to the consequences for broader Israel, should they refuse to accept Jesus and his kingdom.

The formative stratum is preoccupied with kinship, and the tension between the kingdom of Jesus and the “old” system, dominated by the Torah and the prophets. Ethnic identity receives more attention in the main redaction. In Q¹, the Q people are finding themselves and trying to digest the impact of the kingdom on traditional covenantal nomism. In Q², the Q people are defending themselves and trying to legitimise their existence and practices against traditional covenantal nomism. In both strata, however, ethnic continuity with broader Israel is restricted to a common name (Israel), a common place

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77 According to Cromhout (2007:375), the term “this generation” recalls “the primordial sins of the generation in the wilderness and the time of Noah (Q 7:31-35; Q 11:29, 31-32, 50-51).” Other negative allusions and references are the gentile cities of Sodom, Tyre and Sidon (Q 10:12-14), the Ninevites and the Queen of the South (Q 11:16, 29-32); Noah and Lot (Q 17:34-35; cf. Q 3:3), a Deuteronomistic theology (Q 6:23c; Q 11:47-51; Q 13:28-29; Q 14:16-24), Abel and Zachariah (Q 13:28-29), Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (Q 13:28-29; 22:28-30).  

78 Although it can be agreed with Horsley (1999:119, 284) that references to Abraham function to repudiate elitist (great tradition) claims to privileged ancestry, we do not agree that such references to Abraham serve this purpose exclusively. Rather, references to Abraham repudiate both general Jewish claims of privileged ancestry and specific great-tradition claims of such privileged ancestry. The polemic is thus aimed both at “this generation” and the great tradition represented by Jerusalem, the Temple, the Pharisees and the scribes. Both understandings is permitted by Q 13:28-29. However, only the former understanding is allowed by Q 3:8, regardless of what Horsley claims.
(the promised land), common historical memories, a common ancestry, and a common us-they perception of Gentiles. They try to put Torah observance forward as an aspect of continuity, but, in reality, Torah observance plays second fiddle to kingdom observance. All other aspects of ethnic Judean identity were reconstructed in light of Jesus and his kingdom. The Q people did away with elements traditionally believed to be crucial for Judean ethnicity and self-identity. Purity concerns, Torah obedience, covenantal nomism, the patriarchal family, and a high, positive regard for the shared ancestral past, were all aspects that made a Judean inherently and noticeably Judean. The Q people abandoned these elements, all of which were crucial to ethnic identity-formation.

This void had to be filled with new identity markers. A high regard for the person of Jesus, as well as participation in the kingdom of God, replaced these traditional elements. The Q movement represented their new family (see Jacobson 1995:374-376). Their initiation into this family was probably effectuated by the new rite of water immersion. All previous practices and beliefs had to be re-evaluated in light of Jesus and his kingdom. Although the Q people saw themselves as part of a reform movement within traditional Judaism (cf. Tuckett 1996:436), they were destined, from the very beginning, to be a movement outside of Judaism (cf. Cromhout 2007:380). The Q people tried their utmost to bridge their differences with greater Israel, and to remain part of her (see Tuckett 1996:438, 449-450). However, they undermined Judean ethnic identity and, as a result, failed to convert broader Israel to their cause – or even to have other Judeans sympathise with their ideologies. The main difference between the Q group and other Judean sects was that the latter tried to renew traditional covenantal nomism, whereas the former (and other messianist movements) reconstructed covenantal nomism (cf. Cromhout 2007:380; contra Horsley 1995b:39). The Q people might have thought that they were busy renewing Israel, but they were actually reconstructing core Jewish beliefs to such an extent that those core beliefs became unrecognisable to broader Israel (see Horsley 1999:296-297). So, as far as the Q people were concerned, they were Judeans, but as far as the rest of Israel were concerned, they were Judeans no longer. Although the Q people might still see themselves as being authentically Judean, at the Q² level (or stage?) they are in actual fact a separate religious and social grouping, with an entirely
distinct identity (cf. Hoffmann 1995:196). The Q people stand in opposition to their former compatriots, who are scorched as “this generation.”

### 2.6 ~ THE ESCHATOLOGY OF Q

#### 2.6.1 Futuristic eschatology in Q

Very few scholars would deny that Q 3:7-9, 16b-17 references a futuristic eschatology, and likely also an imminent eschatology (see e.g. Sim 1985:177-178). These texts expound the Baptist’s eschatology, however, and not the eschatology of Jesus (cf. Sim 1985:181, 213-214). Since we are mainly interested in the Q community’s memory of Jesus, these texts will be pushed aside for the moment. The following Q texts indisputably place a futuristic eschatology in the mouth of Jesus: Q 6:21-23; Q 10:12-15; Q 11:19, 29-32, 50-51; Q 12:4-5, 8-10; Q 13:28-29; Q 17:23-24, 26-30. Not only is the future tense repeatedly employed, but the imagery in each of these texts recalls familiar apocalyptic images. All these texts speak straightforwardly and

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79 For apocalyptic imagery, consider μελλούσης ὄργῆς, μετανοίας, ἀξίνη, ἀξίνη πρὸς τὴν ῥίζαν τῶν δέντρων κεῖται, ἐκκόπτεται, πῦρ, βάλλεται, πτῶν, διακαθάραι, ἀώνω, συναγαγεῖν, οίτον, ἀποθῆκνη, ἄχουρον, κατακάυσε, πυρὶ and δορθέῳ. For indications of imminence, consider ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ, ἡδὲ and ἀξίνη πρὸς τὴν ῥίζαν τῶν δέντρων κεῖται. John’s symbolic instruments of judgment are poised and ready to strike at any moment. The pericope as a whole leaves the impression of heightened urgency in the face of the coming wrath.

80 It is not certain whether or not Q 17:28-29 should be included in Q. Its inclusion or exclusion does not, however, have any impact on our current exegesis.


82 See κλαίοντες / πνεύμοντες, γελάσετε / παρακληθῆσονται, ὁνειδίσωσιν, διώξωσιν / ἐκβάλωσιν, χαίρετε and ἐν τοῖς ύπόπουλοις in Q 6:21, 23 (cf. Isa 60:14; 61:2-3, 10); ἔσχησεν and ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ in Q 10:12; Τύρω καὶ Σιδώνι, ἐν τῇ κρίσει, ύπόπουλο, ὑψωθησθῇ, ἔδω καὶ καταβήσῃ in Q 10:14-15; κρίται in Q 11:19; Ἰουνάν, σημεῖον (x 4), ἐγερθῆσαται, ἐν τῇ κρίσει (x 2), κατακρινεῖ, ἀναστήσονται, κατακρινοῦσιν, μετενόησαν and Ἰωάννα in Q 11:29-32; ἐκζητηθῆ and ἐκζητηθησάται in Q 11:50-51; ἡμερεῖς ἐν τῶν ἀγγέλιοι and ἐν τῶν αἰώνων in Q 12:8-10; ὁ κλαυτός καὶ ὁ βρυγγός τῶν ἄνωτον, ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν, ἐκβάλλομενος, ἀνακληθῆσονται and τὸ σκότος τὸ ἐξώτερον (Matthew only) in Q 13:28-29; ἀπρατητῇ, ἀπράπτουσα / ἐξέρχεται, ὑπὸ τὸν ὑπὸν ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῆς ὑπομόνης (Luke only), λάμπει (Luke only), ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ αὐτοῦ (Luke only, with text-critical difficulties), ἀνατολῶν (Matthew only), φαίνεται (Matthew only) and δυσμῶν (Matthew only) in Q 17:23-24; Νῦν (x 2), κιβωτόν, κατακλυσμὸς.
unequivocally about a future event. More importantly, it is impossible to interpret any of these texts purely and exclusively as wisdom texts. In other words, these texts are futuristic and apocalyptic by their very nature, and any attempt to explain them as non-eschatological texts would be unwarranted and unjustified. What is blatantly missing in all of these texts is any reference whatsoever to the imminence of the predicted apocalypse (see esp. Sim 1985:206-223; see also Borg, in Miller 2001:42-43 on Q 11:31-32 & Q 10:13-14; contra Kloppenborg 1987a:153; Catchpole 1993:passim, esp. 251 on Q 17:26-30). Rather, we get the impression from these texts that the apocalyptic event will occur at an undetermined time in the future. The references to Noah, Jonah, Tyre and Sodom suggest that the apocalyptic event will be devastating, and that it will take place unexpectedly (cf. Sim 1985:233; Catchpole 1993:251; see Casey 2009:226-228). The time can not be predicted, only the fact of its happening. Q 17:27, in particular, contrasts the everydayness of life, where people eat, drink, get married and go about their daily business, with the suddenness, devastation and unexpectedness of the primeval flood (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:157; Kirk 1998:261; Catchpole 1993:250; cf. also Allison 2010:35). Suddenness should not be confused with imminence (see Allison 2010:40-41)!

Another feature of these texts is that the apocalyptic event is not described in terms of the phrase “kingdom of God.” The latter term is absent from all but one of these texts. Although the term “kingdom of God” occurs in Q 13:28, which is clearly an apocalyptic and futuristic passage (see Kirk 1998:251-252), it is not utilised there as a description or sign of the eschatological event (contra Sim 1985:204; Kirk 1998:253). Rather, the text takes for granted that the kingdom of God will already be in existence by the time the future event takes place. It does not specify when the kingdom comes into being, only that it is already there when the fortunate recline with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Notably absent from Q 13:28 is any reference to the kingdom “coming” or “happening” or “being brought into existence.” The apocalyptic event of Q 13:28-29 is ultimately the

and ἀπόλεσεν / ἦρεν in Q 17:26-30; θρόνων and κρίνοντες in Q 22:28, 30. Although the term ὁ νῦς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου does occur in some of these texts, it has deliberately been ignored in this footnote on account of its multiplicity of interpretational possibilities (see section 3.2.1 below). Depending on the context, the term could denote either “human being” or the eschatological Son of Man from Daniel 7:14. The same applies to the kingdom of God, which, as we have seen, has traditionally been interpreted as a present reality, a future reality or both.

83 And perhaps Lot, if Q 17:28-29 is judged to be part of Q (cf. Catchpole 1993:248).
eschatological ingathering of the Diaspora (and/or the Gentiles), who will subsequently be fortunate enough to recline in the already-existing kingdom of God (see Allison 1997:176-191). In this text, the kingdom of God is neither a sign nor a result of the apocalyptic event described (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:236).

These are not the only texts that might refer to a futuristic, eschatological event. There are a number of texts that could be read either exclusively as present wisdom texts, or exclusively as future apocalyptic texts. These include: Q 6:20, 37-38, 47-49; Q 11:2b, 21-22; Q 12:31, 33-34, 39-40, 42-46, 49, 51, 53, 54-56; Q 13:24-27, 30, 35; Q 14:11, 16-23; Q 17:34-35, 37 and Q 19:12-13, 15-24, 26. Out of these, only Q 6:20, Q 11:2b and Q 12:31 are highly unlikely to have a futuristic eschatology in mind. Even though Q 6:20 appears with the beatitudes that are undeniably future-oriented (i.e. Q 6:21-23), it neither puts forward a single apocalyptic image, nor does it have a single verb in the future tense. Scholars tend to read it as an eschatological text because of its appearance with Q 6:21-23, and because of its possible allusion to Isaiah 61:1 (cf. e.g. Catchpole 1993:86; Allison 2010:42). In the latter text, the prophet claims to have been anointed by God “to preach good news to the poor.” Although the content of the good news is eschatological in the rest of Isaiah 61, the proclamation thereof in verse 1 happens in the present. In Q 6:20, the announcement happens in the present, and the content of that announcement also refers to the present, as is demonstrated by the present tense of ἐστίν (cf. Wink 2002:161-162). Some interpreters have argued that the latter verb should be read as a futuristic present (cf. Sim 1985:183; cf. e.g. Catchpole 1993:86). For a number of reasons, such an interpretation is highly unlikely. Firstly, whenever the present tense refers to a past or future action in the New Testament, this is usually made obvious by the immediate context. In other words, the sentence in which the verb occurs will characteristically indicate in some way or another that the present tense actually refers to a past or future action. In Q 6:20, there is no such indication. Secondly, it is much more probable that ἐστίν here fulfils the function of a gnomic present. Whereas the latter three beatitudes motivate the μακάριοι assertion with a future event in their respective apodoses, the first beatitude motivates it with a gnomic, timelessly-valid maxim. Thirdly, there are no other examples of the futuristic present in Q, and the utilisation thereof is plainly not a feature
of Q. Q prefers to make use of the future tense when denoting a future action, and does so readily and repeatedly throughout the document (cf. Sim 1985:184). If this Q logion had a future action in mind, it would very likely have used a future-tense verb. This is particularly applicable in the current case, where the saying is followed by three beatitudes with future verbs in their apodoses. Thus, we have to conclude that Q 6:20 does not refer to a future event.

The second text that in all probability has nothing to do with a futuristic eschatology is Q 11:2b (cf. Borg, in Miller 2001:42; contra Catchpole 1993:185; Allison 2010:36-38). A small number of indicators have led scholars to view this text in futuristic terms. The verbs ἀγαθήσθω and ἐλθέτω both appear in the aorist imperative, which usually means that the action is simply mentioned as a once-off event, and not as a continuing or repetitive event. As with all imperatives, the action is commanded, and, as a result, can only be fulfilled in the future (cf. Sim 1985:204). Moreover, the fact that the realisation of the actions denoted by the two verbs need to be prayed for indicates that these actions have not yet occurred. Thus, Q 11:2b does seem to refer to the future (cf. Edwards 1976:107). The future it refers to, however, is not an eschatological future, but the survivalist future of tomorrow (cf. Kirk 1998:324; contra Sim 1985:204-205). There are a few reasons for preferring such an interpretation. Firstly, there is an absence in this text of unambiguous apocalyptic imagery. True enough, verse 4 could be seen as a request in view of the eschatological judgment, but the fulfilment of the request is intended for the present and/or immediate future of daily subsistence. The request to “let your kingdom come” is expressed with an aorist imperative verb (ἐλθέτω), which means that there is no focus on the time of the event. If futuristic eschatology were at play, one would have expected the author to make this clear by means of a future verb or a temporal particle. The reference to “bread” (ἄρτον) in verse 3 may remind one of the eschatological reward in the second beatitude. Yet, for a number of reasons, an eschatological rendering of ἄρτον is unlikely in this context (cf. Catchpole 1993:224): (1) The beatitude in question does not contain the word ἄρτος. (2) In this context, such a view does not fit the use of the possessive personal pronoun ἡμῶν. (3) In the rest of Q, ἄρτος does not refer to an eschatological meal, unless this is expressly and unambiguously so qualified (cf. e.g. Q
4:2-4; Q 11:11). (4) The presence of both ἐπιούσιον and σήμερον in verse 3 almost necessitates a non-eschatological reading of ἀρτον. The possible eschatological references are unconvincing. Rather, verse 3 in toto “appears to be a wisdom-like assumption that God does assist his people by means of the regularity of his creation” (Edwards 1976:108).

Secondly, although the exact meaning of the word ἐπιούσιον in verse 3 is in doubt (cf. Catchpole 1993:223), it should probably be translated as “for today,” “for the coming day,” or “necessary for existence” (cf. Newman 1993 s.v. ἐπιούσιος, ὅν). This means that the imperative in verse 3 refers to either the present or the immediate future of daily existence. This view is reinforced by the simultaneous presence of the word “today” (σήμερον / ἡμέραν) in the sermon (cf. Catchpole 1993:224). Seeing as ἐπιούσιον and σήμερον are the only temporal indicators in the whole passage, they probably apply to verse 2b as well. Thirdly, the Lord’s prayer was very likely followed by Q 11:[5-8], 9-13, which takes up the theme of daily existence in the present world (cf. Piper 1989:20, 23, 24; see Catchpole 1993:201-223, 225; Kirk 1998:177-180; Robinson 1997; see also Allison 1997:13-15). Fourthly, seeing as the author(s) of Q preferred using future verbs when denoting eschatology, the absence thereof in the Lord’s Prayer renders an eschatological reading of it improbable. It is possible that verse 4 has an eye on the eschatological judgment, but this is not certain. Lastly, if Kirk (1998:310-311, 319-327) is correct in his presentation of the macro-genre of Q 10:23-Q 13:35, it follows that the need for daily sustenance in the Lord’s Prayer was deliberately and compositionally contrasted with the wealth and oppression of the religious authorities in Q 11:39-52. For all these reasons, the most likely exposition of the Lord’s Prayer is that the βασιλεία σου has something to do with daily existence. Daily subsistence always applies to both the present and (concerns over) the immediate (non-eschatological) future.

The same explanation applies to Q 12:31, our third text that should probably not be read as an expression of futuristic eschatology (contra Catchpole 1993:185). As a whole, Q 12:22b-31 assumes the continued existence of the world as we know it. It is certainly a wisdom text, offering advice for daily survival in a tough world (cf. Edwards 1976:124;
Catchpole 1993:35; see Kloppenborg 1987a:216-221; Piper 1989:24-36). The audience is advised not to worry about subsistence in the present or the immediate future. God will provide! The only future-tense verb in the whole passage occurs in verse 31 (προστεθήσεται). The remainder of the passage deals in the present and aorist. The few subjunctive verbs conote the uncertainty of the immediate future, which is the cause of anxiety. The adversative conjunction at the beginning of verse 31 (πλ/uni1F74ν / δέ) has a dual function. Linguistically and structurally, it ties verse 31 to verse 29 (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:218). Semantically and rhetorically, it indicates that the “kingdom of God” should be sought instead of, or rather than, the foodstuffs, fluids and clothes of verse 29. The latter three items are present realities of daily existence. Now, if God’s kingdom must be sought instead of these present realities, it logically follows that the kingdom in question can be nothing other than a present reality itself (cf. Sim 1985:184). Moreover, the present imperative verb (ζητε/uni1FD6τε) in verse 31 indicates that the kingdom must be sought from the present moment on. This strongly suggests that the kingdom is an existing reality, able of being found in the present moment (cf. Sim 1985:184). Lastly, verse 31 explains the “more” (πλε/uni1FD6όν) of verse 23 (cf. Catchpole 1993:32; Kirk 1998:226). Verse 31, therefore, states that a life in pursuit of the kingdom is “more” than a life in pursuit of necessities (cf. Catchpole 1993:32). This contradiction between a necessity-oriented life and a kingdom-oriented life indicates that the “kingdom” is seen here by Q as an entity capable of being sought in the present (cf. Piper 1989:76). Hence, if the future verb in verse 31 is read in conjunction with the rest of the verse and passage, as it should be, then an eschatological interpretation is taken off the table.

The future verb προστεθήσεται denotes the immediate future of normal, run-of-the-mill existence. This is the future that Jesus’ audience worried about, and this is the future being addressed in the current pericope (see Kloppenborg 1987a:219-220; contra Sim 1985:205). Moreover, there is a notable lack of any unmistakable apocalyptic imagery. Those who want to read a futuristic eschatology into the text could point to the correlation between φάγητε and the second beatitude, or to the possible apocalyptic

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84 Cf. φάγητε (x 2), ἐνδύσησθε, πίητε.
85 Compare the future verb προστεθήσεται in Q 12:31 with the future verbs in Q 11:9-13. In both texts, the future verbs apply to the immediate future of normal, run-of-the-mill existence.
connotations of the words σπείρουσιν, θερίζουσιν, αὖριον, κλίβανον and βαλλόμενον (cf. Piper 1989:31). This goes beyond the text, however, and these Greek words make perfect sense in their immediate sapiential contexts as references to daily existence (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:220). The lack of verbs in the future tense – apart from προστεθήσεται, which references the immediate future of daily survival – and the further lack of any unequivocal apocalyptic imagery makes it extremely unlikely that Q 12:22b-31 even alludes to futuristic eschatology (contra Piper 1989:31, 33; Catchpole 1993:34). This conclusion is further supported by both Luke’s and Matthew’s (varied) interpretations of the kingdom saying in verse 31. Luke 12:32 states that the Father took pleasure (εὖδόκησεν) in granting his flock the kingdom. The fact that εὖδόκησεν is in the aorist tense indicates that, by the time Luke wrote his gospel, he understood the giving of the kingdom as a completed action in the past. Matthew 6:34 summarises the Q pericope by encouraging his audience not to worry about the physical needs of tomorrow (αὖριον). In other words, Matthew also understood the future tense of προστεθήσεται in Q 12:31 as a reference to the immediate future of daily survival.

If we remove the foregoing three texts from the list of texts that could justifiably be interpreted either by means of an exclusively sapiential paradigm or an exclusively eschatological paradigm, we are left with the following: Q 6:37-38, 47-49; Q 11:21-22; Q 12:4-5, 33-34, 39-40, 42-46, 49, 51, 53, 54-56; Q 13:24-27, 30, 35; Q 14:11, 16-23; Q 17:34-35, 37 and Q 19:12-13, 15-24, 26. Let us accept, for the moment, that every one of these texts exclusively denote a futuristic eschatology. 86 Remarkably, they all display the same two features as our first grouping of apocalyptic texts, namely, they all lack any reference to either the kingdom of God or the imminence of the eschatological event (see Sim 1985:206-223; contra Kloppenborg 1987a:153). To start with the latter, the current list of texts seem to confirm the belief that the apocalyptic event would occur unexpectedly at an uncertain and indeterminable time in the future. The bulk of these texts simply mention the apocalyptic event, without elaborating about the time of its

86 This is not my actual position. I hold, firstly, that at least some of these texts (most notably Q 11:21-22 and Q 12:33-34) should probably not be read in an eschatological sense at all and, secondly, that none of them are “eschatological” to the exclusion of wisdom. However, it is unnecessary for our current purpose to make these arguments.
occurrence. This strongly suggests that Q could, for the most part, take this piece of information for granted on behalf of the audience. Nonetheless, there are a small number of texts that address the temporal question directly. Out of these, Q 12:39-40 is the most straightforward, stating in no uncertain terms that the apocalyptic event will occur “at an hour you do not expect” (ἡ ὥρα σοὶ δοκεῖτε) (cf. Sim 1985:234). The point of the subsequent parable (Q 12:42-46), as it currently stands in Q, is to underline the unexpectedness of the eschatological event, as is made clear by the phrase ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἡ σοῦ προσδοκᾷ in verse 46 (cf. Casey 2009:220). Apart from its unexpectedness, verse 46 further reveals that another aim of the parable is to highlight the impossibility of knowing when the future event will take place. These two features complement one another. If it were possible to calculate when the apocalyptic event will take place, then the event would not occur at an unexpected time. The use of χρονίζει in verse 45 should not be seen as a concern over the delay of the apocalypse (contra Kloppenborg 1987a:150). This description forms part of the narrative framework of the parable, not of its application. When the parable is applied in verse 46, the focus is on the unexpectedness of the apocalypse, not its delay.

In Q 12:54-55, the apocalyptic imagery is apparent. These images are followed by the lucid statement in verse 56 that, although people are able to read meteorological and natural phenomena to determine physical time, they are not able to read the same phenomena to predict metaphysical time (cf. Kirk 1998:237). The sombre scene of Q 17:34-35 is comparable to Q 17:27 (cf. Kirk 1998:261; see above). In Q 17:34-35, everyday, run-of-the-mill activities (literally! - ἀλήθουσαί ἐν τῷ μύλῳ) are unexpectedly interrupted by what can only be assumed to be the apocalyptic event. These activities are contrasted to the unexpectedness of the apocalypse. If the parable in Q 19:12-13, 15-24, 26 is exclusively read from an eschatological viewpoint, it corroborates the other texts we have looked at. What is particularly interesting is the phrase “after a long time” (μετὰ δὲ

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88 If all aspects of the parable could be directly applied, it would logically follow, for example, that the Q people saw themselves as Jesus’ slaves.
89 Cf. πυρράζει (x 2), ὁ σύρανός (x 2), χειμῶν and στυγνάζων.
πολὺν χρόνον) in verse 15. This phrase suggests the exact opposite of an imminent eschatology. However, it is uncertain that this phrase goes back to Q, seeing as it only occurs in the Matthean version of the parable. Given Matthew’s habit of adding comments about the parousia’s delay to his parables (cf. Sim 2005:151), it is highly likely that this phrase originated not with Q, but with Matthew. Moreover, Q as a whole leaves the impression that it is impossible to know anything about the time of the apocalyptic event. If it were known that the apocalypse would not happen in the immediate future, some knowledge of the time of the apocalypse is indeed betrayed. Such knowledge goes against the grain, and contradicts the rest of Q, which claims total ignorance of the point in time when the apocalyptic happening would occur. The only piece of knowledge they seem to have is that it would occur suddenly, unexpectedly and without warning. Thus, the temporal phrase that opens Q 19:15 was probably invented by Matthew, and not originally part of Q. Even if it were originally part of Q, the temporal phrase forms part of the parable proper, and not its application in verse 26 (see my comments on Q 12:45 above). It follows that Q betrays no concern over the postponement or delay of the apocalypse.

Comments in Q about judgment on “this generation” should also not be seen as implying an imminent judgment (see Sim 1985:211-213). The fact that “this generation” will be judged at the final judgment does not mean that this apocalyptic judgment will occur within the lifetimes of “this generation” (contra Allison 2010:33). This is not what Q says. “This generation” is the object of judgment, not an indication of the time of judgment. Q 11:31-32 makes this explicit when it says that “this generation” will be raised from the dead (ἐγερθεῖσαι) before they are judged. In other words, the apocalyptic judgment will occur at least after everyone from “this generation” have passed away. “This generation” will be raised at the same time (μετά + genitive) as the Queen of the South and the Ninevite men. These people had already passed away by the time this logion was uttered, indicating that the general resurrection is probably implied (cf. Borg 1994a:54; cf. also Allison 2010:39). Far from supporting imminent eschatology, this text explicitly denies it.  

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As we saw (section 1.3.6 above), Tödt (1959) was the father of reading imminent eschatology into Q. This proposal was extremely influential, and many scholars after him simply took an imminent eschatology for granted when they approached Q. Yet, the evidence upon which Tödt based his theory was surprisingly weak (see Sim 1985:208-211). In fact, it rested on the shoulders of only one text: Matthew 10:23. This text has no Lukan parallel, and no serious scholar today would accept it as part of Q. Thus, Tödt’s whole argument for eschatological imminence was based on a text that actually falls outside the scope of Q. One scholar could be held up as a prime example of how convincing Tödt’s argument was for the time, and of how scholars uncritically followed his lead. R. A. Edwards (1971) elaborately described the impending nature of the parousia as a feature of Q’s theology, without once providing any support for his position. On more than one occasion, Edwards explicitly and excitedly utters his approval of Tödt’s theory, and then continues to describe the Q people’s heightened anticipation of the rapidly-approaching end. What is most curious about Edwards’ approval is that he excludes Matthew 10:23, the very text upon which Tödt’s theory was based, from his own version of Q. Many scholars have made the same mistake. All subsequent efforts to “prove” that Q proclaimed an imminent eschatology have, as a matter of course, been read into the text.

2.6.2 Realised eschatology in Q

Proposals of a “realised eschatology” in Q have traditionally been based on the “present” kingdom-of-God logia. We have already handled three of these texts. It was argued that Q 6:20, Q 11:2b and Q 12:31 indeed refer to the present, but that a lack of apocalyptic imagery makes it highly improbable that these texts refer to the predicted apocalyptic happening (contra Allison 2010:38-39). This does not mean that Jesus failed to proclaim a realised eschatology in the sense that his historical ministry introduced a new age, during which a number of Old-Testament prophecies were realised. It does mean, however, that Jesus did not, according to these three Q texts, speak of the “kingdom of God” in an apocalyptic or imminent sense. The remaining texts that could be employed to argue for a realised eschatology, are the following: Q 6:21-23; Q 7:1, 3, 6-9, 18-19, 22-
23, 28; Q 10:5-9; Q 11:14, 20, 21-22, 52; Q 13:18-21; Q 16:16 and Q 17:20-21. It cannot be denied that these Q texts understood the historical ministry of Jesus as fulfilling the prophecies of old, and as introducing a new era (see Sim 1985:179-197; cf. Wink 2002:118; cf. also Allison 2010:42). This new era could indeed have been interpreted as forming part of the eschatological age. If this is so, then it is understandable that Jesus, according to Q, at times incorporated such views about his ministry into his sapiential argumentation and rhetoric.

None of these texts, however, betray any indubitable references to imminence or apocalypticism (cf. Wink 161-162; contra Allison 2010:42). In fact, there does not seem to be any sense of (temporal) urgency whatsoever. If Catchpole (1993:60-70) is correct in viewing the Q passages about John the Baptist (esp. Q 7:24-27) as “editorial statements designed to define the person of Jesus by reference to his eschatological function,” then it is Jesus’ role in relation to “realised eschatology” that is specifically in view here, not his prophetic role in relation to “apocalyptic eschatology” (cf. Q 7:18-19, 22-23; see Sim 1985:177-192; contra Edwards 1976:55). In Q 12:49, Jesus wishes that the apocalyptic fire had already been hurled upon the earth, which is an indication that the predicted apocalyptic event had not yet occurred during his ministry. Hence, the ministry of Jesus could indeed be seen as the fulfilment of certain prophecies, and could even in some sense be described as “realised eschatology,” but the latter should not be confused with the apocalyptic eschatology that Q clearly also held. Whether or not he saw his ministry as some type of fulfilment of Jewish expectations, Q’s Jesus, in no uncertain terms, predicted the occurrence of a future, apocalyptic event. Although they overlap, and although they are not incongruent, these are two separate matters that should not be confused.

Furthermore, that Q prescribes to a realised eschatology should not be taken as evidence that the apocalyptic event was expected soon thereafter (see Sim 1985:206-208). Q 17:20-21, if it were part of the Sayings Gospel, stated that the kingdom of God was not coming visibly (μετὰ παρατηρήσεως), but that it was within or among (ἐντὸς) his audience (cf. Wink 2002:162). Regardless of whether ἐντὸς should be translated
“within” or “among,” the point is that Q’s Jesus possibly told his followers that the kingdom of God was not an expected future event (cf. Casey 2009:223; contra Allison, in Miller 2001:111-112; 2010:98-116). In this pericope, he does not go on to explain what the kingdom actually is, but the rest of Q leaves the impression that it was inseparably connected to his earthly ministry, during which he fulfilled the Old-Testament prophecies by healing the sick, raising the dead, and bringing good news to the poor (cf. esp. Q 6:20; Q 7:22, 28; Q 10:9; Q 11:2b-4, 14, 20 and Q 12:22b-31). The time of the appearance of God’s kingdom is specifically identified with the ministry of Jesus in Q 16:16 (see Sim 1985:188-192; contra Catchpole 1993:234). However, Q 16:16 implies, together with Q 10:9, that the kingdom of God, although it was initiated by Jesus’ earthly ministry, did not discontinue at the consummation of that earthly ministry (cf. Sim 1985:196). Thus, the earthly ministry of Jesus marked the beginning, but not the end, of the kingdom of God. Whenever and wherever the humanitarian conduct of Jesus is continued by others, the kingdom of God is manifesting itself on earth. Moreover, Q 13:28-29 indicates that the kingdom of God would extend into, and continue after, the apocalyptic event. This logion should not be used as proof texts to argue that the “kingdom of God” represented some kind of eschatological reality separate from the earthly “kingdom of God,” but should rather be seen as evidence of continuity between this age and the one to come. Whatever the phrase “kingdom of God” might have denoted and/or connoted to the Q people, it certainly did not refer to a futuristic, imminent or apocalyptic reality per se. An apocalyptic understanding of the term “kingdom of God” has traditionally been read into the text.

2.6.3 Findings

In sum, it must be stated that Q did not advocate or adhere to an imminent eschatology (see Sim 1985:206-223). Q did, nonetheless, promote and believe in both a futuristic and an apocalyptic eschatology. The term “kingdom of God” is not used in Q to refer to this apocalyptic or futuristic eschatology (cf. Robinson 2007:127; contra Allison 2010:38-39). This finding is in accord with the usage of the term “kingdom of God” in the Gospel of Thomas (see Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:99-100, 119-120).
At most, God’s kingdom referenced the realised eschatology that was Jesus’ historical ministry (see Sim 1985:181-197). Specifically, it had the humanitarian acts that Jesus performed during his public ministry in mind. In a way then, the “realised eschatology” of Q’s Jesus is comparable to and compatible with Crossan’s proposed “ethical eschatology” (see section 1.3.7 above). This so-called “realised eschatology” should be clearly distinguished from Jesus’ apocalyptic eschatology. The former implies that Jesus fulfilled a number of Old-Testament prophecies, thereby inaugurating a new this-worldly era during his public ministry. The latter denotes a future event of *divine intervention* that would *terminate history* – or history as we know it – and bring about a new this-worldly or other-worldly order. Whether or not Q understood the ministry of Jesus in terms of a realised eschatology is not central to our purposes. We are mainly interested in how Q recounts the relationship between his sapiential and apocalyptic messages.

### 2.7 ~ FINDINGS

In sum, this chapter has produced the following results:

- Q was most likely a single document that was written in Greek.
- Unless and until Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy of Q can be successfully refuted, it remains the best proposal of its editorial development, and should be upheld.
- As a whole – and in all three redactional layers – Q was a sapiential document, albeit one that contained apocalyptic and prophetic micro-genres.
- Those responsible for Q were from Galilee, but they were nonetheless ethnically, politically and religiously Judean.
- The eschatology of Q was thoroughly apocalyptic, but not imminent.

In view of the overall intention of this study, these results would suggest that Q remembered and described Jesus primarily as a wisdom teacher. Significantly, this conclusion is not drawn from Q’s stratigraphy, but from its genre. The results of this chapter further suggest that Q remembered and described the person, message and mission of Jesus as firmly rooted in apocalypticism. This is true even if the stratification
of Q is upheld, as it is in this study. Suggestions, mostly by Renewed Questers, that Jesus was not in any way, shape or form apocalyptic are hard to reconcile with this memory of Jesus. The Q people clearly remembered Jesus as such. Nonetheless, the usage of apocalyptic and prophetic micro-genres suggest that Q’s Jesus used apocalypticism in support of his sapiential message. The Judean ethnicity of Q proves, to state the obvious, that “wisdom” and “Judaism” were not mutually exclusive ideas. Suggestions, mostly by Third Questers, that a sapiential Jesus equals a non-Jewish Jesus are therefore refuted. Another consequence of the abovementioned results is worth mentioning at this point: Taking the documentary status and stratification of Q seriously confirms the sapiential Jesus of the Renewed Quest, but confutes the non-apocalyptic Jesus of the Renewed Quest.

True enough, Q’s memory and the historical Jesus might be two completely opposite entities. Yet, such scepticism about Q’s mnemonic abilities seems altogether unjustified given Q’s chronological and geographical proximity to the historical Jesus. If anything, Q is one of the best sources – if not the best source – to exploit when looking for authentic memories and information about the historical Jesus. The latter is true because the Q people lived closer to the time and the place of this elusive historical figure than anyone else we have access to in the historical record. If Q’s memory of Jesus turns out to be inherently and substantially flawed, it would stand to argue, like many scholars during the No-Quest period did, that nothing at all can be known about Jesus. Once again, such pessimism seems wholly unfounded and unrealistic. This study (and student) holds that it is not only legitimate, but also desirable and necessary to reach conclusions about the historical Jesus from the Sayings Gospel Q and our knowledge thereof. There is a difference between equating results about Q to results about the historical Jesus and pondering the relevance of results about Q for our knowledge and understanding of the historical Jesus. The first is illegitimate, while the second is vital. The significance of Q’s specific brand of eschatology will receive attention in chapter five. These conclusions were based on a bird’s-eye-view analysis of Q as a document. What remains now is to determine whether or not these findings are supported by individual traditions within Q. It is to this endeavour that we now turn.
CHAPTER 3: APOCALYPTIC-JUDGMENT
AND SON-OF-MAN LOGIA IN Q

3.1 ~ SON-OF-MAN LOGIA IN GENERAL

3.1.1 Authenticity

As a term and an expression, “Son of Man” is highly likely to be authentic (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:542, Müller 2008:1; Owen 2011a:vii; see Witherington III 1995:95-97; Hurtado 2011:168-172; 545-546, 548-550; Bock 2011:90-92; cf. also Wink 2002:19, 198, 255; Casey 2010:116, 358). Apart from Acts 7:56, John 12:34 and Revelation 1:13 and 14:14, all the Son-of-Man sayings appear on the lips of Jesus, implying that it was unique and typical of the way in which Jesus spoke. Jesus is not once in the canonical gospels called the Son of Man by anyone but himself. Moreover, apart from two instances where Jesus implicitly (not explicitly!) calls himself “prophet” (i.e. Mark 6:4 par.; Luke 13:33), the gospels depict Jesus as using only the phrase “Son of Man,” and nothing else, in reference to himself. In the New Testament, it appears only in literary works by the gospel writers – i.e. the four gospels, Acts and Revelation – meaning that it is entirely absent from the New-Testament epistles, including all the Pauline letters. Despite

90 Burkett (1999:56) does not believe that this peculiarity serves as evidence that the Son-of-Man expression is authentic. His counter-argument is that other inauthentic titles, like Son of God, also appear on the lips of Jesus. True as this may be, the current argument is not that the term “Son of Man” sometimes appears on the lips of Jesus, but that it always appears on the lips of Jesus in the canonical gospels. This is indeed a remarkable phenomenon that can not simply be shrugged off. While other Christological titles appear mostly in confessions about Jesus and only rarely on his own lips, the Son-of-Man expression occurs only on the lips of Jesus and never in confessions about him (cf. Owen 2011a:vii; Hurtado 2011:169; Bock 2011:90).

91 Both these texts are probably well-known first-century Jewish proverbs (cf. Wink 2002: 275 n. 2). Furthermore, Jesus probably rejected the title “prophet” as a designation for himself in John 1:21.

92 As was indicated in a footnote in section 1.3.2, the pre-Pauline formula (τὸν ὦν αὐτῶν [έκ τὸν οὐρανῶν]) in 1 Thessalonians 1:10 might be an allusion to the Son of Man. Wink (2002:207-211) argues that Paul was aware of the term “Son of Man,” but deliberately chose not to use it in order to accommodate his gentile audiences. Apart from the fact that there is no direct evidence of Paul’s familiarity with this expression, it is highly unlikely that a theologian so obsessed with Christology would have ignored one of the most attested titles for Jesus had he known about it. However, if Paul did deliberately ignore this term, it adds to out argument of its futility for the early church and its likely authenticity on the grounds of the
having a *Sitz im Leben* in early confessions about Jesus (cf. Mark 8:38; Acts 7:56; John 9:35ff.), the term is absent from the confessions, creeds and liturgy of the early church. Neither does it occur in the predicative form: “Jesus is the Son of Man,” or “Jesus, the Son of Man.” It seems as though the early church did not have much Christological use for the term. An argument of dissimilarity (or “distinctiveness”) is applicable here, seeing as the term’s presence in the Jesus tradition, and its absence as a confessional title in the early church, renders it highly likely that Jesus made use of the term. And although the term “son of man” was well-known in first-century Judaism, the specific form “the son of the man,” employed by Jesus, was highly unusual for the time (cf. Owen 2011b:29-30; Shepherd 2011:50; see Owen & Shepherd 2001). Thus, we have a case of “double dissimilarity.” The term was of no confessional value to the early church, and it was formulated in an atypical way if compared to contemporary Judaism.

That does not, however, disqualify an appeal to historical plausibility. Although the specific form was unusual, the term itself formed an integral part of many Jewish traditions, being well-attested in both Aramaic and Hebrew writings before and during the ministry of Jesus. It follows that Jesus, who was an Aramaic-speaking Jew, in all likelihood did make use of the term. The term further appears in every single complex of the Jesus tradition, including the four canonical gospels and the Gospel of Thomas (86), summoning the criterion of multiple independent attestation. Within the four canonical gospels themselves, the criterion of multiple independent attestation could also be applied, since the term occurs in independent traditions like Mark, Q, Matthew’s *Sondergut*, Luke’s *Sondergut* and John. Lastly, the tendency by all the canonical gospels criterion of dissimilarity. On the other hand, if a traveller like Paul, who came into contact with numerous branches of early Christianity, was ignorant of this title, it also attests to its unpopularity in the early church, thereby also summoning the criterion of dissimilarity. Burkett (1999:123) argues that the term “Son of Man” is absent from the remainder of the New Testament simply because, although it was important for the “Palestinian Christianity” of the gospels and the early chapters of Acts, it was not useful at all for the “Hellenistic Christianity” of the rest of the New Testament. However, to suggest that the gospels were particularly interested in preserving “Palestinian Christianity” is dubious (cf. Hurtado 2011:170). Also, Burkett’s suggestion does not explain why John would use the title in his Gospel, but not in his epistles. John’s writings were all intended for the exact same Christian community. In his Gospel he faithfully recounts the use of the expression “Son of Man,” while in his epistles he chooses not to make use of the expression at all. The only conclusion to be drawn from this is that, for John, the term “Son of Man” had historical value, but not confessional value. Finally, it is curious that the term “Son of Man” does not appear before the seventh chapter of Acts, seeing as the first few s deal specifically with the emergence of “Palestinian Christianity” (cf. Hurtado 2011:170).
to translate the Aramaic term literally, with the inelegant Greek form ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, could also be held up as an argument for its authenticity (cf. Hurtado 2011:160). Why else would all the evangelists do this if not to remain faithful to the authentic words of Jesus (cf. Hurtado 2011:170)? In light of all this, we have to conclude that even if all the individual Son-of-Man sayings were created by the early church, the expression “Son of Man” was in all probability authentic.

The extreme likelihood that the term “Son of Man” is authentic does not necessarily imply that all of the Son-of-Man logia are authentic. Seeing as the “suffering Son-of-Man” sayings are not in Q (cf. Sim 1985:233), we shall leave them aside in our present discussion. In my overview of Son-of-Man scholarship (see section 1.3.2 above), I tried to indicate that, regarding the authenticity of these logia, scholars have routinely felt obliged to choose between one of four possibilities: (1) all the Son-of-Man sayings are authentic; (2) all the Son-of-Man sayings are inauthentic (3) only the future Son-of-Man sayings are authentic; (4) only the present Son-of-Man sayings are authentic (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:550; Burkett 1999:44). Naturally, proponents of an apocalyptic Jesus tend to support the first or third positions, while proponents of a sapiential Jesus tend to support the second or fourth positions (cf. esp. Theissen & Merz 1998:245; cf. also Borg 1994a:8, 51; Borg, in Miller 2001:41; see e.g. Crossan 1991; Van Aarde 2004b; also see e.g. Witherington III 1995:95-97). It follows that scholars who defend a sapiential understanding of the historical Jesus and those who defend an apocalyptic interpretation can readily appeal to this term. All they need do is support their choice by arguing for the authenticity of preferred logia. Arguments appealing to authenticity abound, and have in the past (and present) supported any one of the four positions noted. The wide range of proposals of authenticity put forward – ranging from the one extreme that all Son-of-Man sayings are authentic to the other extreme that none of these sayings are authentic, with no shortage of positions in between – testifies to the inadequacy of this approach in reaching reliable results. The same is true of arguments about (in)authentic Son-of-Man expressions in Q, specifically (cf. Burkett 1999:79-80 n. 25; see Müller
According to Theissen & Merz (1998:550): “scholars are not yet in a position to make a well-founded decision between the [four] possibilities [noted above]” (cf. also Burkett 1999:5; Allison 1998:128; Allison, in Miller 2001:95). What is needed is a more objective means by which authenticity could be gauged. Some believe that philological research into the linguistic roots of the expression “Son of Man” will provide such a handle on arguments pertaining to authenticity. Using Aramaic as a criterion of authenticity is not legitimate in all cases, but seeing as Jesus used the term “Son of Man” in Aramaic, it remains, for these scholars, the best criterion for determining the authenticity and original meaning of these sayings in particular (cf. Casey 2009:61). Recently, the most influential philological proposal of exactly how the Aramaic idiom functioned at the time of Jesus is the one made by Maurice Casey (cf. Müller 2008:313; Hurtado 2011:172; Owen 2011b:28). It is therefore worthwhile for our purposes to take a quick look at his philological offering.

3.1.2 Maurice Casey

In 1976, Casey proposed that Vermes’ idiomatic examples from ancient sources had two levels of meaning (cf. Müller 2008:314). According to Casey (1976:147-154), the term (אָנָּן) could be employed to make a general statement (first level of meaning) that was in effect applicable to the speaker herself, albeit indirectly (second level of meaning). As many scholars before him had recognised, the general level of meaning often contrasted people with animals. Thus, the general level of meaning often identified an aspect of humanity that was unique if compared to animals. By paying particular attention to research done by other scholars on translation theory, Casey was able to

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93 Schürrmann (1975:146-147) believes that all the Son-of-Man sayings in Q developed after the earliest layer was penned down and before the final redaction was made (i.e. in the second of his four layers). Both Schulz (1972:481-489) and Vaage (1991) distinguish between the coming Son-of-Man sayings and the earthly Son-of-Man sayings in Q. Yet, whereas Schulz believes the former to be more authentic, Vaage believes the latter to be more authentic. Schulz here follows Tödt’s (1959) original proposal, while Vaage agrees with Polag’s (1977) original position. Tuckett (1993) sees Son-of-Man logia in both tradition and redaction, implying that both sapiential and apocalyptic Son-of-Man logia are authentic. Tuckett here follows the initial proposal of Collins (1989). These views on the authenticity of Son-of-Man sayings in Q specifically overlap completely with the four general positions on authenticity noted above.
argue that the translation of מַרְבָּר (מַרְבָּר) with ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου was both natural and practically inevitable (see Müller 2008:314-315). The latter term is both an example of what Casey calls “translationese,” and the best option available to the ancient translators. In the same year (1976b), Casey looked at the Ge’ez version of the Similitudes of Enoch, and found that the term מַרְבָּר (מַרְבָּר) was used to reference Enoch specifically. As such, Casey was able to make a case for disregarding the Similitudes-of-Enoch text as evidence for a Son-of-Man concept in first-century Judaism.

Casey took this incentive further in his 1980 monograph on the relation between Daniel 7:13 and the Son-of-Man difficulty, arguing that the Son-of-Man concept was a scholarly construct, and not a feature of first-century Judaism at all. According to Casey, Daniel 7:13 did play a role in some Son-of-Man texts, but these instances were too few to be authentic, or to explain how the term had originated. Casey believed that the early church had invented the small number of Son-of-Man sayings that were influenced by Daniel 7:13. All this work by Casey led him to the conviction that only those Son-of-Man sayings that were derived from the Aramaic expression מַרְבָּר (מַרְבָּר) could possibly have been authentic. At the end of his book, Casey (1980:236) put forward a table that illustrated how the Son-of-Man logia developed in line with the gospel traditions. Son-of-Man logia derived from the Aramaic term מַרְבָּר (מַרְבָּר) were almost exclusively from the most authentic sources, particularly Mark and Q. Casey then attributed all the other Son-of-Man sayings, including those derived from the early exegesis of Daniel 7:13, to the early church, and demonstrated how well these sayings fitted into the theologies and Sitze im Leben of the respective gospel writers.

Casey continued his investigation in 1987 by arguing that מַרְבָּר (מַרְבָּר), when used idiomatically, may occur with or without the prosthetic definite article מַרְבָּר, without changing the meaning or reference point of the idiom at all. Another piece of the puzzle was fitted when Casey (1994) surveyed the utilisation of מַרְבָּר (מַרְבָּר) in both the Peshitta and the Targums. This survey confirmed his 1976 proposal that the Aramaic term מַרְבָּר (מַרְבָּר) when used idiomatically, was oftentimes used in generic statements with
specific reference to the *speaker*. However, he also found that (א) № ר בר could be utilised in generic statements with particular reference to *someone other than the speaker*. This person could be *any* specific (well-known) individual, like Joseph or Moses. As such, (א) № ר בר did not have any “messianic overtones” in and of itself, but could indeed be referring to the Messiah when he is expressly mentioned in the (con)text. Moreover, the Aramaic term could be referencing the speaker *and* one or more other persons.

In 1995, Casey appealed to brand-new evidence from various related fields, including bilingualism, translation studies, and recent research on translation techniques in the Septuagint. Former scholars had struggled to understand why the translators would have kept υ ιος in their translations, as well as why they would have used the article before υ ιος so consistently if they were translating (א) № ר בר. At times, these scholars even accused the ancient translators of making either deliberate or unintentional mistakes, and proposed better alternatives (cf. Van Aarde 2004b:433; cf. e.g. Collins 1987:399; 1989:14; 1990:190; Hare 1990:249-250; Ross 1991:191). In reaction to these anachronistic suggestions, Casey (1995) maintained, firstly, that many bilingual translators suffered from transference, and, secondly, that translators of sacred texts often operated with a hefty degree of literalism. It followed for him that the translators acted within the norm when they translated (א) № ר בר with ὁ υιος του ἀνθρωπου (cf. Müller 2008:315). In Casey’s opinion, the article before υιος, as well as the use of υιος itself, was understandable within the contexts of transference and literalism. Moreover, by keeping the article and υιος, the translators ensured that the references to Jesus was obvious in the Greek versions of these sayings. Also, Casey opined, translators suffering from transference would inadvertently have noticed both the generic and the specific references of these sayings in the Greek text. Continuing his interest in translation theory, Casey (1998; 2002a) subsequently paid particular attention to the translation strategies used by ancient authors. This focus allowed Casey to offer an explanation not only for why the term ὁ υιος του ἀνθρωπου never occurred in reference to someone other than Jesus, but also why the term almost never occurs in the plural. According to Casey, the strategy of the translators of (א) № ר בר was to use the Greek term ὁ υιος του
\(\text{ἀνθρώπου}\) when it referred to Jesus, and not to translate the term otherwise. In the same year that his 2002 monograph on Q appeared, Casey (2002b) also argued that generic nouns may interchangeably appear in either the definite or indefinite states, without affecting their meaning or function.

All of Casey’s efforts on the Son-of-Man problem converge in his 2007 monograph (cf. Müller 2008:316).\(^94\) After providing a selectively focused overview of Son-of-Man scholarship in chapter one, Casey continues in chapter two to explain and justify his methodological approach in uncovering the idiomatic use of the term “Son of Man” in the Aramaic language. He argues four points that underlie, and are fundamental to, his method: (1) The Aramaic language remained surprisingly stable for centuries. This allows one not only to uncover the idiomatic usage of the expression “Son of Man” from a wide chronological range of Aramaic sources, but also to reconstruct the Aramaic Vorlage of certain Greek sayings from just as wide a range of sources.\(^95\) (2) When Aramaic nouns function in a generic way, they could occur in either the definite state\(^96\) or the indefinite state,\(^97\) without any difference in meaning. Seeing as the term \(\text{(Aramaic)} (\text{א})\) is a generic term for “man,” it could appear in either state without causing a change in meaning. (3) The expression \(\text{(Aramaic)} (\text{א})\) could reference humanity in general or a more restricted grouping of people. When appearing in the singular, it could also imply an individual, “whether anonymous, generic or specific” (Casey 2009:67). (4) When used idiomatically, the speaker would employ the term \(\text{(Aramaic)} (\text{א})\) in a general statement, only to say something indirectly about either himself, himself and others, or someone else indicated by the literary context. Casey concludes that Jesus used the term in this way.

Chapter three of Casey’s book is entirely devoted to persuasively dispelling the Son-of-Man concept.

\(^94\) In the present study, all references to and quotations from this monograph stem from its Second Edition, printed in 2009.
\(^95\) Casey appeals to Aramaic sources as early as 750 BCE and as late as 1200 CE (cf. Lukaszewski 2011:10).
\(^96\) Also known as the “emphatic state” or “determined state.”
\(^97\) Also known as the “absolute state.”
These three chapters lay the foundation for the rest of the book, which argues for the authenticity of those logia that can be reconstructed in their original Aramaic forms, and the inauthenticity of those logia that “clearly” did not originate from the *lingua franca* of Jesus. Casey provides cumulative support for his distinction between authentic and inauthentic sayings by appealing to historical plausibility, which is undoubtedly Casey’s favourite criterion after the use of Aramaic reconstructions. As such, he argues that the sayings with Aramaic underlays all have plausible *Sitze im Leben* in the life of the historical Jesus, while the sayings without such underlays all have plausible *Sitze im Leben* in the early church. Casey’s “solution” naturally relegates all the Son-of-Man sayings based on Daniel 7:13 to the early church. Surprising about Casey’s work is that the *suffering* Son-of-Man sayings, which are generally in the Renewed Quest regarded as inauthentic, are shown to stem from the Aramaic language, and to have plausible *Sitze im Leben* in the life of Jesus (cf. also Wink 2002:256). Particularly relevant in our case, is Casey’s proposal that the Son-of-Man sayings *developed* from their Aramaic-idiomatic usage in the ministry of the historical Jesus to their titular-apocalyptic usage (with reference to Daniel 7:13) in the early church. If this division is accepted, Q would contain both the *earlier* Son-of-Man logia that stem from the Aramaic, and the *later* Son-of-Man logia that allude to Daniel 7:13 (cf. Edwards 1976:35; Müller 2008:318).

According to Casey (2009:270-272), the following Son-of-Man sayings in Q are authentic: Q 7:31-35; Q 12:8-10; Q 9:57-60. Conversely, Casey regards the following Son-of-Man logia in Q as inauthentic: Q 6:22; Q 11:30; Q 12:40; Q 17:24, 26, 30. A particular difficulty concerns Q 6:22. In Luke, the saying ends with “Son of Man” (τὸν ἄνθρωπον), but in Matthew the saying simply ends with “me” (ἐμοῦ). The saying itself is probably authentic, seeing as it can be reconstructed in its original Aramaic without much difficulty (cf. Casey 2009:239-240). Its multiple attestation in the Gospel of Thomas (68-69) augments its probable authenticity. According to Casey, the

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98 In Q 22:30, the term “Son of Man” occurs only in the Matthean version of the saying and was very likely added by him to the Q material he inherited. The theme of the Son of Man sitting on a throne is particular to Matthew (cf. Mat 25:31) and absent from the rest of Q and the New Testament. Moreover, Matthew’s introduction of the term “Son of Man” into this context makes perfect sense in light of his midrashic use of Daniel 7:13-14. Verse 14 of the latter text specifically describes the glory, power and authority of the Son of Man at the apocalyptic end, when he will have dominion over everyone and everything. Hence, Q 22:30 probably never had the term “Son of Man.”
reconstructed Aramaic only makes proper sense if the Matthean version (without the term “Son of Man”) is followed, suggesting that, although the saying is probably authentic, the inclusion of the term “Son of Man” is not. At any rate, the saying probably did have the phrase “Son of Man” by the time Q received its final redaction, seeing as the deliberate exclusion thereof by Matthew makes more sense than its deliberate inclusion by Luke (cf. Catchpole 1993:93; cf. also Wink 2002:274 n. 3; 305 n. 111; Casey 2009:239). Matthew probably disliked the fact that the term failed to reference either the apocalyptic role of Jesus at his second coming, or anything significant about Jesus’ public career. Matthew was probably also displeased with the fact that “Son of Man” could here be interpreted as a reference to someone other than Jesus. Thus, on the one hand, Q 6:22 is authentic, but, according to Casey, the term “Son of Man” is not. On the other hand, Q 6:22 appeared with the term “Son of Man” when the two evangelists made use of Q.

A feature that inadvertently pops up when one considers Casey’s division between authentic and inauthentic Son-of-Man logia in Q is that they cut across Kloppenborg’s two layers. The formative layer contains both authentic (Q 9:57-60) and inauthentic (Q 6:22) Son-of-Man sayings. The main redaction, too, holds authentic (Q 7:31-35; Q 12:8-9, 10) and inauthentic (Q 11:30; Q 12:40; Q 17:24, 26, 30) Son-of-Man traditions. This feature supports the case made by Kloppenborg (and myself) that the redaction history of Q should not be directly translated into the tradition history of the historical Jesus (cf. sections 1.3.6, 2.2.2 & 2.2.4 above). In other words, Q’s formative stratum (as a whole) is not automatically closer to the historical Jesus than its main redaction (cf. Koester 1994:540-541; see Allison 2010:120-125). Some traditions in Q¹ are close to the historical Jesus, while other traditions in Q¹ are further removed. The same is true of Q². Each Q pericope should be assessed independently as to whether or not it actually goes back to the Jesus of history (cf. Casey 2010:84). A second feature of Casey’s proposed division between authentic and inauthentic Son-of-Man logia is that it cuts across the separation between sapiential and apocalyptic material. At least two of Casey’s authentic Son-of-Man logia address intrinsically apocalyptic themes (cf. Wink 2002:178). In other words, there are authentic (Q 7:31-35; Q 9:57-60) and inauthentic (Q 6:22) sapiential Son-of-Man sayings. Similarly, there are authentic (Q 12:8-9, 10) and inauthentic (Q
11:30; Q 12:40; Q 17:24, 26, 30) apocalyptic Son-of-Man sayings. In both authentic sayings just noted (Q 12:8-9, 10), it is not the expression “Son of Man” that is necessarily apocalyptic, but the whole saying. In each case, the term “Son of Man” could be interpreted non-apocalyptically, but the saying in toto could not.

Q 12:10 is not only authentic because of Casey’s ability to reconstruct an Aramaic underlay, and his ability to invoke the criterion of historical plausibility. The authenticity of this logion is corroborated by two other criteria, namely that of multiple independent attestation (Mark 3:28-29 // Q 12:10 // Gos. Thom. 44) and that of dissimilarity. Regarding the latter, Jesus here refrains from the early church’s tendency to have him demonise his adversaries (cf. e.g. Mat 23; cf. Wink 2002:83). Moreover, Jesus permits the act of “speaking against” the Son of Man, something the early church would never have permitted – or invented (cf. e.g. 1 Cor 12:3; cf. Wink 2002:83). Like Q 12:10, the authenticity of Q 12:8-9 is also corroborated by criteria other than Aramaic and historical plausibility. Although Q 12:8-9 does not appear in the Gospel of Thomas, it is attested independently by Mark in 8:38, and perhaps even by Paul in Romans 10:9 (cf. Wink 2002:207). Additionally, this logion refrains from the tendency in the early church to identify Jesus with the Son-of-Man figure, thereby summoning the criterion of dissimilarity (cf. Wink 2002:178). Thus, both of these logia adhere to no less than four historical-Jesus criteria, putting their authenticity beyond serious doubt.  

99 In fact, Mark (3:28) changes the phrase “Son of Man” to the plural “sons of men” for this very reason (cf. Wink 2002:83, 274 n. 3; Casey 2009:117).

100 There have been two main objections to the authenticity of Q 12:8-9 (see Burkett 1999:38-39). Käsemann (1954) argued that the saying looks like a prophecy uttered by Christian prophets (see section 1.3.2 above). Käsemann’s hypothesis that Christian prophets were responsible for the secondary Son-of-Man sayings is no longer valid. Vielhauer’s (1957) argument, on the other hand, is still valid today. It entails that the pressure put on Christians by outsiders to deny their faith in Christ reflects a post-Easter situation, not a conceivable situation in the ministry of Jesus. As a counter-argument it could be stated that such a situation is in fact conceivable during the ministry of the historical Jesus (cf. Allison 1997:100). Jesus ended up being crucified, indicating a measure of political and religious pressure on both him and his followers. By mentioning “synagogues,” Q 12:11 specifically mention the threat against Jesus and his followers as one emanating from Jewish authorities. This is in line not only with the situation in the early church (see Acts 4:1-22; 5:17-42; 7:54; 8:1-3; 17:5-8, 13; 20:3; 21:11, 27-36; 23:1-35; 24:1-27; 25:1-27), but also with the situation in the lifetime of Jesus (see Mark 14:10-11, 43, 47, 53-65; 15:1-15 par.). The failure to mention the Roman Empire as an additional threat is perfectly in line with the ministry of Jesus, probably more so than it is in line with the situation in the early church, where the Roman Empire increasingly became more and more of a threat. We have to conclude that Vielhauer’s subjective argument is unconvincing. Our more objective criteria of multiple independent attestation, dissimilarity, Aramaic...
high probability that these two apocalyptic Son-of-Man sayings in Q are authentic supports my overall theory that Q’s memory of the historical Jesus as someone who made use of apocalypticism in his teachings is authentic. Ironically, then, the very same development that caused so many scholars to abandon the apocalyptic Jesus – i.e. the search for the Semitic roots of the expression “Son of Man” – currently supports the idea that apocalypticism, in some way or another, formed part of Jesus’ ministry and message.

### 3.1.3 Casey criticised

However, there are some difficulties with Casey’s methodological approach, which has been criticised by a number of scholars. Here are some of the main objections:

- Contrary to what Casey claims, the Aramaic language did not remain stable for such a long period of time (cf. Hurtado 2011:173; Lukaszewski 2011:11, esp. n. 50). In fact, the development of the Aramaic language can be divided into different epochs, each with its own dialect and grammar. The examples Casey provide to demonstrate that the language remained stable are trivial and of no use. Owen (2011b:29) dubbed his appeal to specific examples “an extended exercise in obfuscation.”

- It follows from the previous objection that the Aramaic construction (א) ו(ר) is anachronistic and grammatically ambiguous (cf. Shepherd 2011:51; see Owen 2011b:30-31; Lukaszewski 2011:10-12, 20-21). It neither represents the particular dialect (like Middle Aramaic) of a specific people (like the Galileans), nor does it fit into any specific time period (like the first century AD). Rather, it represents four divergent Aramaic terms (א & א, ) each of which may have had a different meaning. Casey uses this problematic and ambiguous term not only to discover the original idiomatic usage of the term, but also to “reverse-translate” the Aramaic Vorlage of Greek sayings.

and historical plausibility seem more determinative. Wink (2002:64) also believes that Q 12:8-9 is probably authentic.
The definite singular form “the son of man” (בֵּן יָהֳנָן) – which is necessary to translate the Greek term ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου – appears only twice in all of the Aramaic literature from Palestine contemporary with Jesus (see esp. Owen & Shepherd 2001; cf. Owen 2011a:viii; 2011b:29-30; Shepherd 2011; Hurtado 2011:172; cf. also Müller 2008:2). In neither case does it function to make a generic reference. Moreover, the almost complete absence of this form in Middle Aramaic utterly contradicts the idea that it was a familiar idiom when Jesus lived (cf. Hurtado 2011:173). The indefinite singular form “a son of man” (בֵּן גָּזַן) appears more frequently in Middle Aramaic, but never in the generic way Casey proposes. Rather, this generic application is always achieved either by the plural form “the sons of men” (בֵּנוֹי גָּזַנים) or plainly by “man” (גָּזַן). These observations apply not only to Aramaic, but also to Hebrew and Greek, and are representative of the term’s usage in the Old Testament, including both the Masoretic Text and the Septuagint (see Hurtado 2011:160-162, 173).

The definite and indefinite states of nouns had not yet coalesced in Western Aramaic of the first century CE (cf. Owen 2011b:29; Shepherd 2011:51-52; Lukaszewski 2011:12; see Owen & Shepherd 2001; Williams 2011:72-77). This means that the expression בֵּן יָהֳנָן had not yet lost its determinative force at that time, and could therefore not have been used in generic expressions by Jesus (cf. Owen 2011b:31-32).

It is not a given that an Aramaic phrase, whether it be the one proposed by Casey or not, lies behind the Greek expression ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (see Lukaszewski 2011:17-20, 25-27; Williams 2011:68-69). The term might be a Greek original. It might also have originated from Hebrew, from one of the pre-Arabic dialects, or from another Semitic language.

Casey appeals to studies of translation theory that concentrate on modern languages (cf. Lukaszewski 2011:18). The few times that he does appeal to ancient translation techniques, particularly of the Septuagint, he tends to oversimplify the modus operandi. Particularly, the Septuagint’s consistent refusal to translate the expression “son of man” with a definite article speaks against the
suggestion that translators (quite naturally) added or kept the definite article when translating this term in the sayings of Jesus (cf. Hurtado 2011:162).

- Throughout the argumentation of his hypothesis, Casey almost entirely ignores secondary scholarship devoted to the grammar of the Aramaic language (cf. Owen 2011b:32-33).

- According to Owen (2011b:34-35), the examples put forward by Casey to substantiate the particular idiomatic use of מַרְאֵה proposed by him are not discussed adequately. In his view, the literary context of these examples are consistently ignored. For example, the literary context of Sefire 3:14-17 – a text Casey (2009:81) puts great stock in “because it establishes the use of this idiom long before the time of Jesus” – clearly identifies the term מַרְאֵה there as a specific reference to a future heir of the kingdom. In fact, these examples only accomplish to illustrate that the form \( \text{מַרְאֵה \ ιός το\(\) \ άνθρωπο\(\)u} \) is consistently avoided by these ancient authors.

- As was the case with his examples of the idiomatic use of מַרְאֵה, Casey does not spend enough time or effort trying to understand the actual use of the term \( \text{ο\(\)ιός το\(\) \ άνθρωπο\(\)u} \) in its various literary gospel contexts before reconstructing the Aramaic Vorlage (see Williams 2011:65-66). As a result, attempts to construe certain Son-of-Man logia as generic have been forced (cf. Burkett 1999:94).

- One can not simply assume, as Casey does, that only those sayings capable of being reconstructed into their (supposed) Aramaic originals are authentic (cf. Williams 2011:73; see Owen 2011b:48-49). Apart from the possibility that Jesus might at times have spoken another language, the translators might also at times have paraphrased Jesus’ sayings – not to even mention the complicated process of their oral and written transmission.

- One should only appeal to the phenomenon of transference as a last resort, when all other attempts at understanding the text have been ruled out (see Williams 2011:71-72). Given the infrequent appearance and “detectability” of this phenomenon, Casey’s appeal to it in supporting his hypothesis is highly suspect.
• The suggestion that all ancient translators succinctly made use of the same translation strategy – only translating \((\text{\`\`\`})\) with \(\text{\`\`\`}\) when it referred to Jesus – goes against the evidence (see Williams 2011:70-71). Such consistency among translators never occurred spontaneously, only deliberately. Also, there is no evidence from antiquity of translators intentionally rendering the same expression in two or more different ways.

• Casey’s “corporate” reading of Daniel 7 is not accepted by all, neither is his assumption that a messianic reading of this text is inherently erroneous and inauthentic (see Owen 2011b:35-38).

• According to Burkett (1999:92-96), Casey’s approach leads to “implausible results” – results that can not be applied to most of the gospel sayings themselves (see also Owen 2011b:38-39). His “solution” forces us to believe that only a handful of sayings are authentic, and that, out of these, not a single one survived with its original meaning intact, while the overwhelming majority of them were created by the early church.

• When Casey utilises the criterion of historical plausibility, he assumes \textit{a priori} not only that Jesus himself could not have appealed to Daniel 7, but also that Jesus himself could not have preached an apocalyptic message (see Owen 2011b:39-45). Thus, all apocalyptic sayings are “naturally” attributed to the early church as references to the parousia of Jesus.

These objections are noteworthy and legion enough to cause concern. Hence, although Casey’s “solution” is currently the most influential and best argued philological study on the Son-of-Man problem, and although it (unexpectedly) supports the idea that the historical Jesus made use of the expression “Son of Man” in an assortment of apocalyptic contexts, his hypothesis is fundamentally and methodologically problematic (cf. Hurtado 2011:176). In such circumstances, one might be pressed to appeal to one or more of the \textit{other} philological “solutions” to the Son-of-Man problem. Most scholars in this field now agree on three fronts: (1) Jesus used the expression “Son of Man” in a circumlocutional, generic and/or indefinite sense, thereby referring to himself, either directly or indirectly. (2) Sayings are only authentic if they can be “reverse-translated”
into Aramaic. (3) The early church added the titular Son-of-Man logia, particularly those where the expression itself refers to Daniel 7:13. Lindars (1980; 1983), for example, argues that אבָנָר ב was an Aramaic idiom by which the speaker could refer to a selected class of individuals, among whom the speaker self was included, translating the term “a person / someone in my position.” Bauckham (1985) believes that Jesus used the Aramaic term אבָנָר ב in the indefinite sense – meaning “someone” or “a man” – as an intentionally ambiguous self-reference (see also Fuller 1985). Kearns (1988) proposes that the term was used by Jesus in a generic, non-titular sense. Chilton (1996; 1999) argues that Jesus employed the expression “Son of Man” generically, as a reference to himself and others, as well as distinctively, as a reference to an apocalyptic angel other than himself.

Unfortunately, these “solutions” suffer difficulties similar to those of Casey (see Burkett 1999:92-96). These scholars are all faced with the same fundamental predicament, which is that the grammatical form needed to understand the expression “Son of Man” in its original Aramaic is almost entirely absent in Middle Aramaic (cf. Shepherd 2011:51). Unless and until first-century Galilean sources are excavated containing the exact Aramaic form needed, Aramaic reconstructions and philological “solutions” will remain unconvincing (cf. Shepherd 2011:60; Hurtado 2011:174; Lukaszewski 2011:26-27). The proposals that suggest an indefinite meaning, like those by Bauckham, Fuller and Lindars, all suffer from an additional difficulty. Regardless of what the original Aramaic term might have meant, the Greek term ὁ ζυγός τοῦ ἄνθρωπον could not under any circumstances have been translated with “a man” (cf. Burkett 1999:92-93). Suggestions of transference or mistranslation do not explain away this difficulty. The proposal by Lindars, in particular, was met with widespread disapproval and refutation (cf. Lukaszewski 2011:9, esp. n. 40). Kearns’ suggestion that אבָנָר ב derives from Ugaritic is problematic for a variety of reasons (cf. Casey 2009:48). Also, his suggestion that the

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101 Lindars (1985:35) denies that he understands “Son of Man” as an indefinite term, claiming rather that he interprets it as a generic term in which the definite article is used idiomatically to communicate an indefinite statement. Yet, his translations and applications of the term do betray the former understanding (see esp. Bauckham 1985:23-33; cf. also Müller 2008:318). Burkett (1999:92) agrees and also categorises him with other scholars who prefer the indefinite interpretation.
term ה Lansing (א) has multiple meanings (like citizen or Lord) is erroneous (cf. Casey 2009:48-49). Kearns here confuses the term’s idiomatic point of referral with its denotative meaning.

What is particularly relevant to our topic is that these scholars mostly agree that the early church added the titular Son-of-Man logia, particularly those where the expression itself refers to Daniel 7:13. Despite such a relative consensus, this belief ultimately remains an assumption. It has not been proven with any degree of persuasiveness. There need not have been an existing Son-of-Man concept in order for Jesus to have used the term in an apocalyptic way or context. Apocalyptic texts dating to the first century all interpret Daniel 7:13 as a reference to a specific individual figure (cf. Burkett 1999:118). Although a few rabbinic texts did interpret Daniel 7:13 as a corporate reference to all of Israel, most of these writings viewed the “one like a son of man” in Daniel 7:13 as a specific figure (cf. Burkett 1999:118-119). Whenever Daniel 7:13 was seen as a reference to a specific figure in the first century – which was almost all the time – that figure was associated with the Messiah. It follows that even if there were no unified Son-of-Man concept in the first century – which there wasn’t! – it was still natural at the time to see the “one like a son of man” in Daniel 7:13 as a specific messianic-apocalyptic figure (cf. Bock 2011:90, 94). In fact, the absence of a specific Son-of-Man concept was probably conducive to Jesus’ (and Q’s) intent with the expression, not least of all in allowing him to fill this term with meaning and content as he used it (cf. Bock 2011:89, 96-97). As such, there is no real reason to doubt that Jesus himself could have used the expression “Son of Man” in reference to Daniel 7:13 (cf. Bauckham 1985:28, 29-30).

According to Owen (2011b:30), in fact, the most natural philological explanation of Jesus’ use of the Aramaic expression “Son of Man” is that he used it in reference to Daniel 7:13. Likewise, Williams (2011:75) believes that “the linguistic evidence is compatible with the idea of a defined [Son-of-Man] concept, if that concept could be established in pre-Christian sources on other grounds.” Thus, the Aramaic roots of the expression “Son of Man” do not necessarily contradict the idea that Jesus made use of this expression in reference to an apocalyptic figure, be it himself or someone else. We
have seen that, according to Casey’s “solution,” the Aramaic-idiomatic term “Son of Man” appears in two authentic logia (Q 12:8-9, 10) that are apocalyptic in nature and theme. One or both of these two sayings are also considered authentic by Lindars, Bauckham, Fuller and Chilton. Added to these two sayings, some other, intrinsically apocalyptic, sayings are also believed to be authentic by Lindars (Q 11:30), Bauckham (Q 11:30; Mark 14:62 par.), Fuller (Q 11:30; 12:40; 17:24, 30) and Chilton (Mat 19:28). Hence, all these scholars (perhaps inadvertently) agree that Jesus was not averse to apocalyptic themes, and that he discussed them on occasion. According to Burkett (1999:93), the only occurrence of “Son of Man” that can with any degree of confidence be said to have a generic Vorlage is the one that appears in the apocalyptic saying in Q 12:10. Given everything that has so far been said in this chapter, it is no surprise that the two views currently predominating Son-of-Man scholarship are the (messianic-) apocalyptic view and the idiomatic-non-titular view (cf. Burkett 1999:5, 122). The current division between scholars like Casey, Lindars, Bauckham, Fuller, Kearns and Chilton, on the one hand, and scholars like Owen, Łukaszewski, Shepherd, Williams and Bock, on the other, mirrors an almost identical division at the end of the nineteenth century between scholars like Wellhausen, Eerdmans and Lietzmann, on the one hand, and scholars like Dalman and Fiebig, on the other (cf. Müller 2008:315; see section 1.3.2 above). This division is further not only a cause, but also a result, of the current schism between historical-Jesus researchers on whether Jesus was primarily a wisdom teacher or an apocalyptic prophet (see section 1.3.7 above).

3.2 ~ A FOCUSED EXEGESIS OF Q

3.2.1 A synchronic approach to the Son-of-Man sayings

Theissen and Merz (1998:542) summarised the state of scholarship on the Son-of-Man problem with the following statement: “Unfortunately the two linguistic and literary traditions which could give us a clear understanding [i.e. “Son of Man” as an apocalyptic figure and “Son of Man” as a generic expression] provide no clear information about how the term is to be understood” (cf. also Borsch 1992:144, in Burkett 1999:121). Our
foregoing investigation has confirmed this pessimism. Decades of discussing and debating the authenticity of individual Son-of-Man sayings have ended in a cul-de-sac. Although philological research has some promise, we unfortunately do not currently have nearly enough extant texts, from either the right period or the right region, that would enable us to put forward a “solution” with any degree of confidence.

All that is left, then, is to consider Q’s synchronic treatment of the term “Son of Man.” Diachronic questions of authenticity must retreat to the background, so that room can be made for synchronic questions of literary context. Given the wide range of concurrent opinions on which Son-of-Man sayings (in Q) are in fact authentic (see section 3.1.1 above; cf. Burkett 1999:79-80 n. 25), the time has perhaps come to give precedence to a synchronic study of (Q’s) Son-of-Man logia (see Schenk 1997). Bock (2011:89) maintains that “any ‘son of man’ remark [will] be ambiguous unless it is tied to a specific passage or context.” Actually, a synchronic approach is more in touch with our current intention – stated at the outset – which is to uncover how the Q people “remembered and described Jesus.”

Our synchronic investigation will mostly concentrate on what Burkett (1999:32-42) calls “the question of reference.” In other words, the following investigation will mainly concern itself with discovering what each occurrence of the expression “Son of Man” in Q refers to. These results should assist us in our overall quest to determine the relationship between wisdom and apocalypticism in Q. In answering “the question of reference,” we must first determine whether a saying refers to Jesus or not. If it refers to Jesus, we must determine whether it is used as a title or as a straightforward self-reference. If, on the other hand, it does not refer to Jesus, we must determine who (or what) it does in fact refer to. Lastly, if Jesus did use it as a reference to himself in the third person, we must decide whether or not other people were also implied by the term. The sequence in which these questions are discussed will be determined by each individual saying.
3.2.2 Two sapiential Son-of-Man sayings

The first Son-of-Man saying we will consider is the one in Q 7:34. Theoretically, the idiomatic use of ὁ ὑιὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου could, in this literary context, imply more than one person by means of the masculine singular. The masculine singular of the participles ἐσθίων (eating) and πίνων (drinking) may be explained as an extension of that Aramaic idiom. As such, the masculine singular forms of these two participles may be referencing a group or class of people. The same can, however, not be said of the response by “this generation,” since the idiom is concluded beforehand. These opponents are not speaking in idiomatic terms when they describe the Son of Man as “a person (ὁ ἀνθρώπος) who is a glutton (φάγος) and a drunkard (οἶνοπότης), a friend (φίλος) of tax collectors and sinners.” The Son of Man is clearly portrayed here as a single, individual person (ὁ ἀνθρώπος) (cf. Wink 2002:89). In this instance, the four nouns referring to the Son of Man are in the nominative masculine singular because they refer to no more than a single person. If the response by “this generation” was an extension of the foregoing idiom, it would also have featured ὁ ὑιὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Instead, it features ἀνθρώπως only. If the response did not refer to more than one person, neither did the initial statement. In other words, although it is theoretically possible to read the two participles (ἐσθίων & πίνων) as an extension of an Aramaic idiom that implies more than one person, the literary context renders such a reading extremely unlikely (cf. Wink 2002:89). Just like the four nouns in the response, these two participles are in the masculine singular form because they refer exclusively to a single individual. Thus, in the case of Q 7:34, we may rule out any “corporate” or generic interpretation of the term “Son of Man.”

It seems very probable that the expression in this case refers to Jesus. The larger literary context (Q 7:18-35) is preoccupied with establishing the relationship between John the Baptist and Jesus (cf. Piper 1989:124; Kirk 1998:366, 377; cf. also Allison 1997:8). In

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102 Casey (2009:137) observes: “Everyone does come eating and drinking, otherwise they die!” However, it does not necessarily follow from such a general observation that Q 7:34 was intended to be understood in such a generic way. Clearly, the Greek text refers specifically and solely to Jesus himself. As a result of his commitment to the generic level of meaning, Casey is obliged to put forward a novel interpretation of this text and introduce backgrounds not explicit or implicit in the text itself (cf. Owen 2011b:45).
all probability, this theme is carried forward in Q 7:33-34 by comparing not only the two
personages and their respective lifestyles with one another, but also the responses
extorted by each of them (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:111). Whereas the Baptist refrained
from eating and drinking, the Son of Man did not. However, both received a negative
response from “this generation” (cf. Kirk 1998:376). What is more, both received a
positive response from tax collectors and sinners (compare verses 29 and 34). This
comparison would only make sense if the term “Son of Man” did indeed here refer to
Jesus (cf. Wink 2002:89). Such a conclusion is confirmed by the consistent use of the
masculine singular form, which appears no less than eight times in verse 34 alone.

This leaves us with a choice between understanding the term “Son of Man” here as a self-
reference or a title. Since Jesus is not making a Christological or soteriological statement
about himself, but simply mentioning his mundane habit of “eating” and “drinking,” it
seems unlikely that the expression was meant as a title for Jesus. The word “came” has
no titular significance in this context, but simply indicates vocation, implying that Jesus
saw it as his duty to eat and drink with sinners (cf. Wink 2002:88-89). It is possible that
the expression “Son of Man” here connotes the lowliness and/or shamefulness of Jesus,
who is being accused of the shameful behaviour – typical of lower-class people – of
acting as a glutton and a drunkard (cf. Kirk 1998:380; cf. also Casey 2009:137). The
potential generic and corporate interpretations have already been refuted. We have also
seen in section 3.1.3 above that the indefinite interpretation would never be an
appropriate or acceptable explanation of the Greek form ὁ νεῖός τοῦ ἄνθρωπον. Besides,
the memorable actions of Jesus are specifically in view here. By process of elimination,
we have to conclude that Jesus used the term “Son of Man” in Q 7:34 as a mere reference
to himself, and only himself, in the third person (cf. Wink 2002:89). It might be
worthwhile, in view of our topic, to just mention that the term “Son of Man” here features
in a sapiential passage (see Kirk 1998:381-383), and that it does not allude or refer to an
apocalyptic figure of any kind.
The next Son-of-Man saying to be discussed is the one in Q 9:58. This logion does not make sense as a reference to some specific entity other than Jesus, whether it be an apocalyptic emissary, an expected Messiah, or something else. There is absolutely no indication of apocalypticism in the saying itself, its utilisation of the expression “Son of Man,” or its literary context. Q 9:58 does not make a Christological or soteriological statement, indicating that it was probably not employed as a title for Jesus. Both the opening statement in verse 57 and the greater literary context (Q 9:57-60; Q 10:2-9) indicate that we have to do here with the (sapiential) topic of discipleship (cf. Edwards 1976:101; Kloppenborg 1987:190; Kirk 1998:347; cf. also Allison 1997:11). The word “follow” (ἀκολουθέω) – a usual indicator that discipleship is in view – appears not only in verse 57, but is also repeated in verse 60 (see Kingsbury 1978). In both cases, Jesus is the one potentially being followed. As many have noticed before, this probably implies that the Son-of-Man saying purports to elucidate the potential cost, harshness and difficulty of discipleship. This makes it unlikely that the term “Son of Man” could here imply someone or something other than Jesus.

However, the term “Son of Man” does not necessarily exclude others from participating in Jesus’ fate, meaning that it could be read as a non-exclusive reference to Jesus and others (see Casey 2009:168-178). A non-exclusive idiomatic interpretation is perhaps supported by the fact that the animals “foxes” (ἀλώπεκες) and “birds” (πετεινά), with which the Son of Man is compared in verse 58, appear in the plural. Also, logical reasoning leads to the realisation that discipleship by its very nature implies more than the person being “followed.” However, the number of animals featuring in the comparison may have absolutely no bearing on the interpretation of the term “Son of Man.” Furthermore, even though the undertaking of discipleship implies more than one person, the Son-of-Man reference may exclusively be to the lifestyle of Jesus himself, while the saying in toto implies a degree of participation in that lifestyle (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:192). It is rather unlikely that the term “Son of Man” here represents or alludes to humanity in general, even though the present text compares (a) human(s) to animals. Discipleship was not something shared by all people. Neither can the statement that “the Son of Man does not have anywhere to lay his head” be logically applied to all of
humankind (contra Edwards 1976:101; Wink 2002:82). Both verbs of which Son of Man is the subject (ἔχει & κλίνει) appear in the third person singular, suggesting an individual person. Yet, this is completely compatible with the idiomatic use of the expression “Son of Man.” Finally, verse 58 is Jesus’ answer to the anonymous comment in verse 57 (cf. Edwards 1976:101). The fact that Jesus is in view in verse 57 suggests that Jesus is also meant with the expression “Son of Man” in verse 58.

Hence, in Q 9:58, the expression “Son of Man” is probably used by Jesus as a self-reference in the third person (cf. Meyer 2003:21). This self-reference may or may not include a group of disciples sharing in Jesus’ lifestyle. If it does imply participation, it is the saying and the literary context that allow this implication, not the expression “Son of Man” (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:192). Thus, the saying may be paraphrased something like this: “Remember before you commit to following me that, unlike many animals, I often do not have shelter or refuge.” The unstated implication is that if you follow Jesus, you will share in his hardship (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:191; cf. also Allison 1997:13; cf. further Casey 2009:170). The reading of Q 9:58 that is most natural, and that remains most faithful to the literary context, is one that has Jesus use the term “Son of Man” as an exclusive self-reference (cf. Casey 2009:178). It is possible that the expression “Son of Man” here connotes the lowliness of Jesus not having a permanent residence, and/or the humility or embarrassment of Jesus not being able to provide refuge for his disciples (cf. Kirk 1998:340, 341; cf. also Casey 2009:175). Once again, we should probably just add that this reference to the Son of Man occurs in a sapiential text, and does not refer or allude to an apocalyptic figure at all (cf. Meyer 2003:21).

3.2.3 A synchronic approach to the apocalyptic-judgment sayings

In the remainder of this section, we will focus on the apocalyptic-judgment material in Q, some of which include apocalyptic Son-of-Man sayings. The reason for this choice is twofold. Firstly, judgment is one of the most prominent themes in Q. Secondly, final judgment is one of the most integral and significant features of both wisdom and apocalypticism, not only as an image, but also as a theme (cf. Allison, in Miller 2001:26-
Although authenticity and diachronic development will not be ignored, the main purpose will once again be to analyse the *synchronic* relationship of these apocalyptic traditions with the sapiential material in Q. As the hypothesis in section 1.4 clearly states, the *primary* objective is to determine how the Q document *remembered* and *described* Jesus, not to search for the Jesus of history or to unlock the developmental prehistory of Q. Whenever the expression “Son of Man” appears in a saying, it will be examined within its literary context, and with special attention to “the question of reference.” If we remove from our list the *sapiential* Son-of-Man sayings (Q 7:31-35; Q 9:57-60) that have already been discussed, we are left with the following *apocalyptic judgment* sayings, some of which contain the expression “Son of Man”:


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103 Once again, our interest is with the traditions about Jesus, not John the Baptist. So, Q 3:7-9, 16b-17 will not form part of our investigation.

104 Although Q 6:22 is clearly sapiential, the apodoses of this and the previous two beatitudes discuss the flipside of apocalyptic judgment, which is apocalyptic salvation (or alleviation, rather). Therefore, the last three beatitudes will be included in our discussion. Regarding a separate matter, Q 6:37-38 will form the crux of a subsequent discussion and will therefore be overlooked in the present analysis.

105 The Pharisees and scribes of Q 11:39b, 41-44, 46b-48, 52 are criticised for their treatment of the “little people,” but unlike the woes against the Galilean towns, they are nowhere expressly threatened with apocalyptic judgment. Resultantly, these texts will not receive any treatment currently.

106 Although some have interpreted the parables in Q 12:42-46, 58-59 non-eschatologically, its proximity to Q 12:39-40 and its comparable application makes it extremely likely that an apocalyptic judgment is being suggested (cf. Kirk 1998:238-239). Concerning Q 12:49, 51, 53, it is not at all clear that verse 49 should be added to Q. If this verse is excluded from Q, an eschatological interpretation of verses 51 and 53 is not obviously apparent (compare Pseudo-Phocylides 42-47; *contra* Kloppenborg 1987a:151-152). This text could just as well be referencing the public ministry of Jesus, which resulted in family division and inter-familial feuds (see section 2.3 above). Moreover, even if verse 49 were to be included in Q, it remains uncertain that it references apocalyptic judgment *per se*. There is no doubt that verse 49 has apocalyptic eschatology and the apocalyptic event in view (see section 2.6.1 above), but there are no direct references to the aspect of judgment specifically. General uncertainty regarding the acceptance of Q 12:54-56 into the Sayings Gospel has also prevented me from discussing *this* saying here (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a n. 219).

107 As should be obvious at this point, I have taken a conservative approach in my selection of the relevant logia by restricting myself to only those logia that undeniably and indisputably (1) belong in Q (2) as the apocalyptic judgment sayings (3) of Q’s Jesus.
3.2.4 The beatitudes

The Lukan version of Q 6:20-23 commences with the comment that Jesus raised (ἐπάρας) his eyes to his disciples (τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ) before he started speaking. This image, in no uncertain terms, recalls a Jewish rabbi and sage (cf. Casey 2009:169-170). Firstly, it was common for Jewish rabbis to be seated when instructing their followers. Secondly, the pupils of ancient wisdom teachers were distinctively referenced by the term “disciple” (μαθητής). The Matthean version is even more explicit in this regard, and expressly states that Jesus sat down (καθίσαντος) before he started teaching (ἐδίδασκεν) his disciples (οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ). The verb ἐδίδασκεν leaves no doubt that a traditional, wisdom-teaching scenario is imagined. The Lukan version should probably be followed in this case, but the allusion to a sage instructing his disciples remains clear, nonetheless. Notably missing is the prophetic formula “thus says the Lord” (τάδε λέγει ὁ κύριος) or, in fact, any reference to God whatsoever (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:140; Kirk 1998:51).

Besides introducing Jesus as a sage in Q 6:20, the sapiential nature of the inaugural sermon is also indicated by the structure of Q. It was customary for Jewish wisdom literature to introduce a sapiential argument with one or more beatitudes (cf. Van Aarde 1994:174). As was common in wisdom literature of the time, the two passages appearing directly before and after the inaugural sermon were most likely intended to identify and legitimise both the sage and his message (see Kirk 1998:388-390, 396-397). Formally, the inaugural sermon corresponds best with the wisdom genre, not only because of all the imperatives and motive clauses, but also because of the reproduction of common sapiential themes, and the utilisation of cause-and-effect reasoning (see Edwards 1976:61, 84-93; Kloppenborg 1987a:187-188). Ceresko (1999:31) maintains that parallelism is probably the most basic and fundamental building block of wisdom sayings. The parallelism of Q 6:20-23 is more than apparent. Each beatitude is

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108 It should perhaps be mentioned at this stage that the use of motive clauses to substantiate commands and prohibitions was a characteristic feature of wisdom literature (cf. Edwards 1976:59). This realisation is important for and integral to everything that follows in the remainder of the current work.
paralleled by the other three, and each subsequent causal clause is paralleled by the other three causal clauses.\textsuperscript{109}

The sapiential message of Jesus commences with four beatitudes. The protasis\textsuperscript{110} of each beatitude should be seen as the content of Jesus’ sapiential message. The sapiential message that the poor, hungry, mournful and persecuted are blessed in the present moment was fairly radical and subversive for the time (see Kloppenborg 1987a:188-189).

Although these beatitudes allude to Isaiah 61 (see section 2.6.1 above), they differ from Isaiah in precisely this way. Whereas the content of Isaiah’s good news was that the unfortunate could look forward to deliverance in the future, the content of Jesus’ good news was that the poor were already blessed in the present. Each apodosis is an attempt at providing supportive proof for the unorthodox wisdom teachings, as is clearly indicated by the use of the conjunction ὅτι in each case. In other words, each wisdom teaching is supported by its own causal clause. We have already seen in section 2.6.1 above that the causal clause in Q 6:20 is sapiential in nature. The remaining three causal clauses\textsuperscript{111} are eschatological, as is made perfectly clear by the future-tense verbs in verse 21, and the mention of “heaven” in verse 23 (cf. Edwards 1976:62).\textsuperscript{112} Although the causal clauses of the last three beatitudes discuss eschatological themes, they are nonetheless part and parcel of the pericope’s wisdom genre (see Kloppenborg 1987a:188-189; cf. also Patterson, in Miller 2001:77). Hence, each of these causal clauses is “a wisdom statement about a condition of the future” (Edwards 1976:62). In sum, Q 6:20-

\textsuperscript{109} The unorthodox and subversive content of the inaugural sermon is not evidence that there is a prophetic “undertone” or “foundation” beneath this wisdom teaching (contra Edwards 1976:87). Neither does the radical nature of the sermon even begin providing proof that imminent eschatology lies beneath this extended piece of wisdom (contra Edwards 1976:86).

\textsuperscript{110} In other words, the following: (1) Μακάριοι ο/πτωχοί; (2) μακάριοι ο/πεινώντες; (3) μακάριοι οί κλαίοντες / πενθούντες; (4) μακάριοι οί ἐστε ὅταν ἔνειδίσωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ διώξωσιν ἃν πονηρόν καθ’ ὑμῶν ἐνεκεν τοῦ οὐοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. The fourth protasis is my own reconstruction from the varying Matthean and Lukan versions.

\textsuperscript{111} They are: (1) ὅτι χορτασθήσονται / χορτασθήσεσθε; (2) ὅτι παρακληθήσονται / γελάσετε; (3) χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλάσσατε / σκιρτήσατε, ὅτι / γὰρ ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολύς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς / τῷ οὐρανῷ. Technically, the third example is not a causal clause, but a double command, followed by its own motive clause. However, if read in conjunction with the beatitude in verse 22, the whole sentence in verse 23a (two commands plus motive clause) fulfils the same semantic function as a causal clause (cf. Edwards 1976:84). Verse 23b is yet another motive clause, functioning in this case to substantiate the double command in verse 23a. The latter is a sapiential micro-genre that explores a prophetic theme (cf. Edwards 1976:63).

\textsuperscript{112} Cf. (1) χορτασθήσονται / χορτασθήσεσθε; (2) παρακληθήσονται / γελάσετε; (3) ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς / τῷ οὐρανῷ.
23 as a whole should be seen as a wisdom teaching of Jesus. This teaching is supported and motivated by eschatological themes in three out of the four causal clauses (cf. Piper 1989:77). More specifically, Jesus’ wisdom is motivated by the eschatological reversal of the fortunes of the poor, hungry, mournful and persecuted (cf. Edwards 1976:84).

Here is a table of our current findings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sapiential statement / command</th>
<th>Apocalyptic motivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>μακάριοι οἱ πεινώντες</td>
<td>ὕτι χορτασθήσεσθε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μακάριοι οἱ πενθοῦντες</td>
<td>ὕτι παρακληθήσεσθε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μακάριοι ἕστε ὅταν ὄνειδίσωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ διώξωσιν καὶ ἐξίσωσιν πᾶν πονηρόν καθ’ ὑμῶν ἴνα οὐράνιον τοῦ ὑιοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου</td>
<td>ἡρτῆτε καὶ ἀγαλλιάσθη ὕτι ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολὺς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In section 3.1.2, it was noted that Matthew probably removed the phrase “Son of Man” from the saying in verse 22 when he copied it, implying that it was originally part of Q 6:22. According to most scholars, the Son of Man is put forward here as the reason why (ἕνεκεν) the followers of Jesus are being persecuted (cf. Piper 1989:61; Catchpole 1993:94; Kirk 1998:391, 392; Wink 2002:101; cf. also Allison 1997:101; Hurtado 2011:164). If that is indeed the case, then there is no sign of the influence of Daniel 7:13, and the term “Son of Man” acts as either a title for Jesus, or a self-reference in the third person (cf. Casey 2009:239). The term can not in this case be viewed as inclusive of other people besides Jesus (cf. Catchpole 1976:94; Casey 2009:240; cf. also Williams 2011:75; contra Wink 2002:101). In support of a titular understanding, it could be argued that Jesus does not speak of himself in the same mundane way he did in Q 7:34 or Q 9:58. Rather, he puts himself forward as the reason for persecution, which betrays a somewhat swollen sense of self-regard and self-interest. However, Jesus is not making any Christological or soteriological claim. He is simply stating that those who follow his lead might be subject to persecution. In other words, the mortal Jesus, and his earthly ministry, is the cause of persecution. The expression “Son of Man” could in this case easily be replaced by the proper noun ‘Jesus’ without changing the logia’s meaning. As such, the best understanding of the present logia is probably that Jesus used it as a non-titular self-reference.
It is, however, also possible that the Son of Man is put forward as the reason why (ἐνεκέν) the persecuted are blessed. If such a reading is followed, it implies that the persecuted are blessed because of their reward at the apocalyptic court, where the Son of Man will confess them before the angels (cf. Q 12:8-9; cf. Catchpole 1976:94; Allison 1997:101). The second interpretation is supported by the fact that it coheres with the other beatitudes in having an apocalyptic apodosis follow the sapiential protasis. This would indicate that verse 23 is not to be read in sole conjunction with verse 22, but as a summary statement of all the beatitudes in verses 20-22. Thus, we may need to amend our discussion above, which would result in the following table of the sayings in verses 21-23:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sapiential statement / command</th>
<th>Apocalyptic motivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>μακάριοι υἱοί πεινώντες</td>
<td>ὅτι χορτασθήσεσθε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μακάριοι οἱ πενθοῦντες</td>
<td>ὅτι παρακληθήσεσθε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μακάριοι ἔστε ὅταν ὀνειδίσωσιν ύμᾶς καὶ διώξωσιν καὶ εἴπωσιν πᾶν πονηρὸν καθ' ὑμῶν</td>
<td>ἔνεκεν τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χάρητε καὶ ἀγαλλιάσθε</td>
<td>ὅτι ὁ μισθὸς ύμων πολὺς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If this interpretation is accepted, it follows that the expression “Son of Man” is here neither a title for Jesus nor a self-reference in the third person. If it does in any way refer to Jesus, it refers to his role as an agent of the apocalyptic event. However, it is not a given that Jesus should in this text be seen as the apocalyptic agent. The Son of Man could easily here be viewed as someone other than Jesus. In summary, Q’s Jesus uses the expression “Son of Man” in Q 6:22 either as a reference to himself in the third person, or as an allusion to an apocalyptic agent, who may or may not be Jesus himself. If the former is accepted, nothing of value can be added to our greater discussion, apart from noting that the expression once again, like in Q 7:34 and Q 9:58, occurs in a sapiential saying and pericope. If the latter option is preferred, we have evidence of the Son-of-Man expression functioning in an apocalyptic sense, so as to motivate a wisdom teaching of Jesus with apocalyptic eschatology. There are five reasons for preferring the former interpretation: (1) The preposition ἔνεκεν follows directly after the phrase καὶ

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113 As reconstructed in the Critical Edition of Q.
εἴπωσιν πᾶν πονηρὸν καθ’ ὑμῶν, and not after μακάριοι ἐστε.  (2) The former explanation results in a fine parallelism, wherein four beatitudes starting with μακάριοι are followed by four causal clauses containing ὅτι.  (3) Both Matthew and Luke understood the term “Son of Man” here as a mundane, non-eschatological reference to Jesus (cf. Casey 2009:239).  (4) For the most part, the second interpretation is not even mentioned or discussed by scholars as an option.  (5) 1 Peter 4:14 betrays knowledge of this tradition, and presents it in accordance with the second interpretation (cf. Wink 2002:207).

3.2.5 The mission discourse

In section 2.2.4, it was argued that the mission discourse (Q 10:2-16) is not alien to the wisdom teachings of Jesus. In fact, the thematic content and linguistic forms of the mission discourse are in perfect harmony with Jesus’ overall sapiential message. In section 2.6.1, it was argued that Q 10:2-9 betrays no signs of promoting an apocalyptic and/or futuristic eschatology. To be fair, the threefold use of the word “harvest” (θερισμός) in verse 2 could be recalling an eschatological image intentionally (cf. Edwards 1976:102; Catchpole 1993:164; cf. Joel 4:9-17; Isa 9:2-3; 27:12; Hos 6:11; Rev 14:15-20). As I argued in a footnote in section 2.2.4, however, such is not the only possible reading of that image. In my view, seeing the “harvest” reference as a symbol of the mission itself fits much better with the literary context of the missionary discourse. All the same, even if the “harvest” reference is viewed as a deliberate apocalyptic image, it does not harm or quash our current argument, but actually supports it. Both the individual saying in verse 2 and the whole mission discourse is introduced with the phrase “He said to his disciples (μαθηταῖς).”114 The mention here of “disciples” is a deliberate attempt to introduce the mission discourse, including verse 2, as a piece of wisdom. The core of the wisdom saying in verse 2 is the sapiential admonition to ask (δεήθητε) (cf. Edwards 1976:102). Syntactically, this admonition is an inferential

114 Luke has the personal pronoun ἀυτούς in place of the direct reference to “disciples.” Nevertheless, this personal pronoun still refers to the (seventy or seventy-two) followers or disciples of Jesus mentioned in verse 1. In Matthew, Luke and Q, the content of what Jesus says is clearly directed at his “disciples.”
command, as is made obvious by the conjunction οὖν. As such, the semantic and rhetorical function of the preceding maxim is to substantiate the subsequent admonition. In other words, if the threefold reference to “harvest” is indeed an allusion to apocalyptic eschatology, an eschatological theme is here presented within a sapiential micro-genre as a piece of wisdom (cf. Edwards 1976:102). Verse 9 might allude to the so-called “realised eschatology” of Jesus, which is simply another way of saying that Jesus introduced a new age by fulfilling the prophecies of old.

The mission discourse ends in verses 10-11 with the wisdom instruction for the “workers” (ἐργάται) to “shake the dust off their feet” (ἐκτινάξατε τὸν κονιορτὸν τῶν ποδῶν ὑμῶν in Matthew) if any town does not welcome them (cf. Catchpole 1993:174, 187). This instruction is followed by the prophetic comment that this inhospitable town will fare worse than Sodom at the apocalyptic judgment (cf. Edwards 1976:49, 104; Catchpole 1993:174). Most scholars agree that Q 10:12 is a transitional verse between Q 10:2-11 and Q 10:13-15 (cf. e.g. Kloppenborg 1987a:196; cf. Kirk 1998:353). Luke’s version of Q 10:12 only has “that day” (ἡμέρα ἐκείνη), while Matthew is clearer with his designation “day of judgment” (ἡμέρα κρίσεως). Matthew probably felt the need to explain which day was meant, suggesting that Luke’s version is likely to be more original at this point. Even so, it is absolutely apparent that “this day” refers to the apocalyptic judgment (cf. Allison 2010:34). Not only is “Sodom” mentioned, a town routinely associated with apocalyptic judgment in the Old Testament, but there is also no other explanation that would make sense of ἡμέρα ἐκείνη in this context (cf. Edwards 1976:104; Catchpole 1993:175; Kloppenborg 1987a:196; see Kirk 1998:350-358). This is indeed how Matthew understood Q.

Luke’s version has the conjunction ὅτι, but Matthew’s version does not. It is difficult to determine whether the conjunction was in Q originally. Unlike the beatitudes, ὅτι does not in this case function to introduce a causal clause. Rather, it functions to introduce direct speech after λέγω. Regardless, verse 12 still acts as an explanatory justification of the sapiential instruction in verses 10-11 (cf. Catchpole 1993:175, 187). Verse 12
explains and gives a reason why the workers must “shake the dust off their feet.”\textsuperscript{115}

Hence, the outcome of the apocalyptic judgment has an impact on how to live and act in the present (cf. Edwards 1976:104). It supports and motivates present action. Although the prophetic theme of apocalyptic judgment figures strongly in verse 12, it should still be viewed as a sapiential micro-genre, most likely an aphorism (see Kirk 1998:353-354; contra Edwards 1976:104). Compositionally, verses 13-15 are little more than an elaboration and amplification of the reason given in verse 12 (cf. Edwards 1976:104-105). As such, the (prophetic) woes against the Galilean towns mainly function to strengthen the case for the directive in verse 10 (see Kirk 1998:351-352, 359-361). Thus, the apocalyptic eschatology of Q 10:12-15 provides motivation and justification for the wisdom of the missionary discourse, particularly verses 10-11.

3.2.6 The Beelzebul accusation

The short story in Q 11:14 contextualises and sets the stage for the subsequent interaction between Jesus and his opponents. As such, this pericope (Q 11:14-15, 17-20) should probably be seen as a sapiential \textit{chreia} of challenge and riposte (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:168; Kirk 1998:184, 328). The sapiential character of this pericope is also indicated by the repeated use of conditional clauses and rhetorical questions, as well as the overall argumentative nature of the passage (cf. Edwards 1976:111). In verse 15, Jesus is accused of casting out demons in the name of Beelzebul. Verse 17 represents both the crux of Jesus’ sapiential lesson, and the heart of his rhetorical argument against the sceptics (see Kirk 1998:185-186). There Jesus makes the assertion that it is impossible for a divided kingdom or household to prevail. The conditional-clause-plus-rhetorical-question construct in verse 18 is intended to provide added support to the statement made in verse 17, and to strengthen its overall case. The construct achieves this not only by \textit{concretising} the open-ended maxim in verse 17, but also by \textit{applying} the maxim to the initial accusation (cf. Kirk 1998:187). Verses 17-18 imply that if Jesus is

\textsuperscript{115} Explaining and arguing statements or commands are signature attributes of the wisdom genre (cf. Edwards 1976:45; see section 2.3 above). Prophetic genres are more interested in basing their pronouncements on divine authority, not logical reasoning. This distinctive characteristic of wisdom will be crucial to the reasoning of the remainder of this work.
casting out demons with the aid of Beelzebul, then Satan’s kingdom is divided, and will come to a fall (cf. Mat 12:26).

Jesus then continues with a slightly different argument in verses 19-20 (contra Kirk 1998:187), where he, once again, makes use of two conditional clauses (cf. Edwards 1976:111). The first takes a negative answer to the Beelzebul accusation to its logical extreme (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:125), while the second takes a positive answer to the Beelzebul accusation to its logical extreme. In the first sentence, the conditional clause is followed by a rhetorical question. In the second sentence, it is followed by a statement. We are mainly interested in the first conditional sentence. In the rhetorical question, the term ο/υιοί ήμῶν probably intended to recall the patriarchal families’ younger generation, and the rupture Jesus’ ministry caused between younger and older generations (see section 2.3 above). The conditional sentence, therefore, argues that if Jesus is working with Beelzebul, so are the sceptics’ children, or at least those who follow Jesus. In order to defend their families’ public honour, the sceptics must have vehemently denied the implied accusation that members of their own families were in cahoots with Beelzebul.

This denial enabled Jesus to make the following statement: “This is why they will be your judges” (διὰ τοῦτο αὐτοὶ ήμῶν κρίται ἔσονται). The reference to “judges” (κρίται), and the fact that ἔσονται is in the future tense, indicate that this statement refers to apocalyptic judgment. The standard conjunctional construction διὰ τοῦτο should be translated with “therefore” or “for this reason” (cf. Newman 1993 s.v. διὰ; Edwards 1976:111), thereby indicating that we are dealing with an inferential statement. This means that the apocalyptic statement forms part of Jesus’ overall argument. As in the rest of verses 19-20, the second-person personal pronoun ήμῶν here refers to the sceptics of verse 15 (τινές δὲ εἶ ἀντίου). The third-person personal pronoun αὐτοί can only be referencing ο/υιοί ήμῶν from the foregoing sentence. In other words, in response to the sceptics’ denial that their own biological children are working with Beelzebul, Jesus claims that the sceptics will for this very reason be judged by their own sons at the apocalyptic judgment. Thus, the sceptics’ children are working with God and will
therefore be afforded the privilege of judging the rest of Israel, their own parents included, at the apocalyptic judgment (cf. Q 22:28, 30; cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:125).

Both conditional sentences, by the way, end up denying that Jesus was working with Beelzebul when he healed the mute. The argumentative and rhetorical nature of the pericope, as well as its formal characteristics, strongly suggest that it should be read as a sapiential passage (cf. Kirk 1998:188, 327). The introductory story in verse 14 supports this, and renders the wisdom genre to be that of a *chreia* (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:168). In this passage, the apocalyptic sentence is part and parcel of the sapiential argument. Jesus employed his own beliefs about the apocalypse to strengthen his sapiential argument and message. Hence, apocalyptic eschatology was utilised in the service of Jesus’ overall wisdom message. This was the main purpose of the apocalyptic statement in this pericope. However, the apocalyptic statement was also a natural and logical consequence of Jesus’ sapiential argument and message. Thus, Jesus made an important conclusion about the nature of the apocalypse, and based this conclusion on his wisdom teachings. Said differently, Jesus made use of his wisdom to deduce and explain important aspects of the apocalypse. His wisdom was the *base* from which he speculated about the end times.

### 3.2.7 The sign of Jonah

Like the previous pericope, Q 11:16, 29-32 is commenced with a short story that functions to contextualise Jesus’ subsequent message. As such, the whole pericope is presented as a challenge-and-riposte *chreia* (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:168; Kirk 1998:195, 328). In this pericope, the main content of Jesus’ sapiential message is that “this is an evil generation” and that “it will not get a sign” (cf. Catchpole 1993:51). There is a likely wordplay here with σημείον. Those who asked Jesus for a sign probably implied a miracle, seeing as miracles were commonly called σημεία. However, the word

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116 Kloppenborg (1987a:131) denies that the τινες were asking Jesus for a miracle, preferring to interpret the request of Q 11:16 as a request for a “legitimation sign.” His argument in support of this view is that Q did not refer to miracles as σημεία, but rather as δυνάμεις. However, the only text Kloppenborg is able to provide in support of his argument is Q 10:13. One text is scarcely enough evidence to put forward
σημεῖον could also denote a “warning sign,” and was just as commonly used in apocalyptic literature to reference the signs that would precede, and warn about, the apocalyptic event. This is the σημεῖον Jesus continues to address. Thus, a few people asked Jesus for a miracle, but he continued to discuss apocalyptic signs. Moreover, the miracles (σημεῖα) Jesus had already done are the signs (σημεῖα) of the apocalypse. So, Jesus refuses to do the former in this circumstance, and continues to speak about the latter (cf. Mark 8:11-12; cf. Wink 2002:90-91).

The allegation that “this generation” will not get a sign to forewarn them against the apocalypse is a sapiential statement about the theme of apocalyptic eschatology. In other words, apocalypticism is in verse 29 a theme that forms part of the content of Jesus’ sapiential message. Verse 30 further develops this theme by means of an apocalyptic micro-genre, sometimes called the “eschatological correlative” (cf. Edwards 1976:41, 114). Verses 31-32 are prophetic micro-genres that further develop the apocalyptic theme of verse 30 (cf. Edwards 1976:50). In toto, verses 30-32 function in the current literary context to support and explain the sapiential claims that “this is an evil generation” and that “it will not get a sign” (cf. Catchpole 1993:243; see Kloppenborg 1987a:133-134; Kirk 1998:195-196). This is made apparent by the use of the conjunction γάρ in verse 30, which turns that assertion into a causal statement. Moreover, verses 31-32 make use of authoritative examples from scripture to validate, support and explain the sapiential assertion in verse 29 (cf. Kirk 1998:197, 198). Thus, apocalyptic forecasts are used to validate Jesus’ wisdom. Apocalypticism was commonly used in such a manner by first-century wisdom texts (cf. Kirk 1998:198). On the one hand, apocalypticism, in this pericope, forms part of the content of Jesus’ wisdom, and, on the other hand, apocalypticism is used to strengthen and support Jesus’ wisdom.
With regards to the interpretation of the Son of Man in Q 11:30, scholarship is generally divided between two options (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:132). A number of scholars believe that the Son-of-Man reference is here an allusion to Daniel 7:13 (cf. Kloppenborg 132 n. 134; Kirk 198 n. 182; cf. e.g. Catchpole 1993:246). Other scholars have thought that the term “Son of Man” functions in Q 11:30 as an unmistakable term for Jesus during his this-worldly ministry. In support of the former view, attention could be drawn to both the literary context (verses 31-32), which develops apocalyptic themes, and the future tense of the verb ἔσται in verse 30 (cf. Catchpole 1993:246). There are, however, excellent reasons for preferring the second view.

In this text, one must first determine the meaning of the word “sign” (σημείον) before any judgment can be reached on the usage of the term “Son of Man.” One question is fundamental at this point: what exactly was Jonah’s sign? It could not have been the ‘historical’ figure of Jonah himself (cf. Catchpole 1993:245), since Jonah spent a whole day gallivanting in Nineveh, without raising as much as an eyebrow (cf. Jonah 3:4). Yet, when Jonah cried out his apocalyptic message, the people of Nineveh took notice and radically changed their ways (cf. Jonah 3:4-9). This reaction ultimately led to their apocalyptic salvation (cf. Jonah 3:10). It logically follows that “Jonah’s sign” must have been his apocalyptic message (cf. Wink 2002:91; contra Catchpole 1993:246).

This conclusion indicates that the Son of Man could not in Q 11:30 have referenced the apocalyptic agent of Daniel 7:13. Neither in Daniel 7, nor in Q, does this figure bring any kind of message (contra Edwards 1976:114). Instead, he simply appears at the apocalyptic event, when it is already too late for repentance or redemption. In Q 11:30, the referent of the Son of Man must be Jesus (cf. Kirk 1998:198). Once this is accepted, the comparison between Jesus and Jonah becomes clear. The message of both Jonah and Jesus was about apocalyptic destruction and repentance (cf. Jonah 3:4, 10; Q 10:12-15; cf. Wink 2002:91). In both cases, the apocalyptic message represented the only warning sign of apocalyptic doom (cf. Jonah 3:5; Q 11:29; cf. Kloppenborg 1987:133). Both Jonah and Jesus became a sign by means of their this-worldly conduct (cf. Jonah 3:1-4; Q 11:16).
The literary context in Q 11:31-32, which also mentions Jonah, the Ninevites and “this generation,” supports the foregoing conclusion, even if it does develop apocalyptic themes (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:133). The noun “something” (πλείων) is in the neuter here because it refers back to the “sign” (σημείον) of verse 29, which is the Son of Man’s message (see Wink 2002:91-92; contra Catchpole 1993:242). Like Jonah and Solomon, the one responsible for this “greater message” (πλείων) not only has to be flesh and blood, but must also have been on earth at some stage before the apocalypse arrives. It follows that the mysterious figure of verses 31-32 cannot be the eschatological figure of Daniel 7:13, since that figure only arrives on the scene when it is too late (cf. Q 17:23-24). The respective messages of Jonah and Solomon were beacons for their contemporaries. Similarly, the message of the arcane figure in Q 11:29-32 has to be a beacon for his contemporaries, including “this generation” (cf. Wink 2002:90-91). The latter statement is supported by the vocabulary of Q 11:31-32. The interjection “look!” (ἰδοὺ) and the adverb “here” (ὅδε) both indicate that this figure must be a corporeal person that existed when Q 11:29-32 was spoken. As Kloppenborg (1987:133) puts it: “the double saying [in Q 11:31-32] pronounces judgment upon those who refuse to respond to some present reality which is greater than Jonah or Solomon.” 117 In light of all this, the “something greater than both Jonah and Solomon” has to be the message of the earthly Jesus. It follows that the Son-of-Man reference in verse 30 must be to Jesus during his worldly ministry – that is, if we are to make sense of the explanatory examples in verses 31-32 (cf. Kirk 1998:198). Hence, both the book of Jonah and the literary context in Q support the proposal that Jesus, and not the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13, is the Son of Man in Q 11:30.

When discussing the comparison between Jesus and Jonah, it was argued that the “sign of the Son of Man (or Jesus)” is his apocalyptic message, not his person. Also this conclusion is confirmed by Q 11:31-32, where it is said that the Queen of the South and the Ninevites experienced apocalyptic favour, not because they knew Solomon or Jonah, but because they heeded the wisdom (σοφίαν) of Solomon, and the announcement (κήρυγμα) of Jonah, respectively (cf. Catchpole 1993:242; Kirk 1998:198). Verse 32

117 Italics original.
explicitly states that the Ninevites will experience apocalyptic favour because (ὅτι) they repented (μετενόησαν) when they heard Jonah’s apocalyptic message (κήρυγμα). Likewise, verse 31 explicitly states that the Queen of the South will experience apocalyptic favour because (ὅτι) she listened (ἀκούσατι) to Solomon’s sapiential message (σοφία). Although Solomon was primarily known for his wisdom and wealth, he was also admired in the first century for his role as a staunch preacher of repentance in the face of apocalyptic judgment (see e.g. Wis. Sol. 6:1-19; cf. Kloppenborg 1987:133-134; Catchpole 1993:242). In general, contemporary wisdom often included stern messages of repentance (cf. e.g. Wis. Sol. 11:23; 12:10, 19; Sirach 17:24; 44:16, 48). According to Q 11:31-32, both the Queen of the South and the Ninevites will experience apocalyptic salvation, because they took the respective messages of Solomon and Jonah to heart. According to Q 11:29-30, on the other hand, “this generation” will experience condemnation at the apocalypse, because they failed to heed the sign of the Son of Man, meaning Jesus’ message (cf. Piper 1989:167).

If the Son of Man does not in this case refer to the Danielic emissary, what are we to make of the fact that, in verse 30, the verb ἐσται appears in the future tense? Kloppenborg (1987:132) believes that it could be a gnomic future that points to present time. It is much more likely, though, that Q’s Jesus used the future tense because he intended future time (cf. Edwards 1976:114; Catchpole 1993:246). There are two ways to explain the future tense in this case. Seeing as the ‘Son of Man’ here refers to the corporeal Jesus, the future tense could indicate the rest of his earthly ministry, including the immediate future during which Jesus will or will not give a sign. The future tense of the verb δοθήσεται in verse 29 could be held up as evidence in support of this interpretation (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:132). However, such an explanation would exclude the part of his ministry that had already been completed, including his concurrent message of apocalyptic doom. This seems unlikely to have been the intention (cf. Wink 2002:90-91). It is much more likely that the future tense does indeed here point to future time, most likely the predicted time of the apocalypse (cf. Edwards 1976:114; Catchpole 1993:246). When “this generation” stands before God at the apocalyptic court (cf. Q 12:8-9), the “sign of the Son of Man,” meaning Jesus’ message, will have been their only
warning of apocalyptic judgment (cf. Wink 2002:91). Just like the acceptance of Jonah’s message resulted in apocalyptic pardon (cf. Jonah 3:10), Jesus’ message, if accepted, will result in apocalyptic pardon. Just like the respective messages of Solomon and Jonah will result in apocalyptic favour for the Queen of the South and the Ninevites (cf. Q 11:31-32), the message of Jesus, if accepted, will result in apocalyptic favour for “this generation.” Q 11:30 is therefore looking forward at the apocalyptic event, and predicting that “this generation” will regret not heeding the “sign of the Son of Man,” which they had already received during their lives on earth (cf. Piper 1989:167). In dealing with Q 11:29-30, Wink (2002:91) states: “[The Son of Man] will not come in the future to judge; rather, he is the present standard by which one will be judged in the future.” Just like the message of Jonah could only be appreciated after it had resulted in apocalyptic pardon, the message of Jesus – i.e. the sign of the Son of Man – will only be appreciated after it had already resulted in apocalyptic destruction. The beauty of hindsight!

If the expression “Son of Man” here refers to the earthly Jesus, is it possible that Q 11:30 implies more than only Jesus with its use of the expression? If more people are implied, it certainly does not include all of humanity, since only a few individuals throughout history have preached at all. The silent masses are exactly that: silent. The generic and indefinite interpretations of the term “Son of Man” are therefore taken off the table. However, the idiomatic use of the expression “Son of Man” could perhaps imply a selected group of individuals. Jesus was certainly not the only one in Israel’s history to preach a message of repentance. Q 11:29-32 recalls also Jonah and Solomon. The apocalyptic message of John the Baptist also comes to mind (cf. Q 3:7-9, 16-17). Unfortunately, this view goes against the intention of Q 11:29-32, where the Son of Man is compared to Jonah and Solomon. Such comparison with other historical figures naturally excludes these figures from being the Son of Man himself. When dealing with Q 7:34, we concluded that the comparison in that context between Jesus and the Baptist meant that the term “Son of Man” referred there exclusively to Jesus. The same is true in

118 Koine Greek does not have a perfect-future tense that would enable it to articulate something similar to the English phrase “will have been.” The future tense alone must suffice.
the present (con)text. One entity (the Son of Man) is compared with another entity (Jonah and Solomon respectively), indicating that the two are mutually exclusive.

The elevated role Q 11:30 bestows upon the Son of Man, in view of apocalyptic judgment, opens up the possibility that the term “Son of Man” is here used as a title for Jesus (cf. Edwards 1976:114). However, it is the “sign” – i.e. the apocalyptic message – that carries soteriological weight, not the Son of Man (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:133). Instead, the expression “Son of Man” refers here to the earthly Jesus and his mortal ministry. If the expression “Son of Man” was intended as a title for Jesus, one would have expected the Son of Man himself to be the enforcer of soteriological and apocalyptic salvation, not merely his message. To conclude, as with the other Son-of-Man texts we have looked at, the expression “Son of Man” here refers exclusively to Jesus during his earthly ministry. Even though it appears in a text that handles apocalyptic images and themes, it is neither a title for Jesus, nor a reference to the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13.

3.2.8 Sophia judges “this generation”

Q 11:49-51 is basically a declaration that “this generation,” particularly those in charge of the official Temple cult, will be held accountable at the final judgment for all the prophets and sages who had been killed in the past (cf. Catchpole 1993:270; see Kirk 1998:319-324). According to Luke, this declaration was uttered by η σοφία. Matthew presents it as part of a long monologue by Jesus (cf. Mat 23:1). Matthew’s intention to add Q 11:49-51 to a longer discussion explains why he would remove η σοφία from the text, which means that η σοφία is probably original.119 Moreover, the fact that Matthew placed these words in the mouth of Jesus means that he understood η σοφία to refer to Jesus (cf. Piper 1989:164). If the current pericope is taken together with the preceding woes against the Pharisees and scribes, the entire section resembles a prophetic micro-genre, commonly found in apocalyptic literature. This micro-genre traditionally

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119 Piper (1989:164-165) adds six additional reasons for accepting the reference to η σοφία as part of Q originally.
consisted of a series of accusations, the messenger formula “Thus says the Lord,” and a subsequent announcement of judgment (cf. Edwards 1976:69; Kirk 1998:316; see Kloppenborg 1987a:143-144). However, the replacement of Yahweh with ἡ σοφία signals a deliberate attempt at presenting this prophetic micro-genre as a piece of wisdom.

There are only two ways of interpreting the occurrence of ἡ σοφία in this Q text (cf. Piper 1989:165). The first is to see it, as did Matthew, as a reference to Jesus, in which case the narrator utters the phrase διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ σοφία εἶπεν, and associates Jesus with the heavenly Sophia. The second is to see ἡ σοφία as a reference to the heavenly Sophia, but not to Jesus. In this case, Jesus\textsuperscript{120} quotes Sophia in this pericope, and the phrase διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ σοφία εἶπεν is spoken by Jesus as part of his wisdom teaching commenced in Q 11:29a. If the first possibility is chosen, and Jesus is associated with ἡ σοφία, then it logically follows that the apocalyptic announcement of this pericope was spoken as part of Jesus’ wisdom message. If the second possibility is chosen, and Jesus is not associated with ἡ σοφία, then it logically follows that the apocalyptic announcement formed part of the chreia introduced in Q 11:29a, and that Jesus quoted ἡ σοφία to grant his sapiential teaching added authority. In other words, no matter which option is chosen, the passage is deliberately cast in a sapiential mould. The content of Jesus’ sapiential message was that “this generation” will be held responsible for the killing of the prophets and sages. In this passage, an apocalyptic theme forms part of the sapiential message of Jesus. All in all, Kirk (1998:333-336) puts forward enough evidence to support the view that the so-called “controversy discourse” (Q 10:23-24, Q 11:2-52, Q 13:34-35) should, in its entirety, be seen as a wisdom text that develops prophetic and apocalyptic themes.

\textsuperscript{120} Although Jesus himself is not expressly mentioned, there are two indicators that Jesus should in this case be seen as the one quoting Sophia. Firstly, Jesus is introduced in Q 11:16 as the “speaker” of the extended wisdom teaching in Q 11:16-51. Secondly, Jesus is implied in the thematic content of this pericope (Q 11:49-51) and depicted as the last prophet killed by “this generation” (cf. Piper 1989:169).
3.2.9 Proclaiming Jesus in public

The wisdom forms and argumentative nature of Q 12:2-12 leave no doubt as to the sapiential genre of this pericope (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:208; Kirk 1998:206, 208-209; Piper 1989:55-56). Additionally, the whole pericope is wrought with parallelism. Q 12:2-12 starts in verse 2 with a general and familiar maxim, based on experience, that all secrets and hidden truths will at some stage be exposed (cf. Edwards 1976:120; Kloppenborg 1987a:206; Kirk 1998:206; Piper 1989:57). This maxim provides the reasoning and justification for the subsequent admonition in verse 3 to proclaim the content of Jesus’ message in public (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:210). It is not clear when the exposure of “all things hidden” will take place. If Jesus were implying that the predicted disclosure would occur during the apocalyptic judgment, as the divine passives seem to suggest, then this is yet another example of an apocalyptic logion providing the justification and motivation for a particular piece of wisdom (cf. Kirk 1998:207). However, it is not clear that verse 2 should in fact be read in an apocalyptic light (cf. Piper 1989:76-77).

The same cannot be said of verse 5, though. The admonition to proclaim Jesus’ message in public is further substantiated by two admonitions: a negative one in verse 4, and a positive one in verse 5 (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:208). Both are concerned with anxiety (cf. Piper 1989:52). The first (negative) admonition reassures Jesus’ audience that they need not fear (μὴ φοβηθῆτε / φοβεῖσθε) human beings, who are only able to kill the body, but have no power over the soul (cf. Piper 1989:53). This directive is corroborated in verses 6-7 by reassuring these people that God cares for them, and that God will protect them (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:207; see Piper 1989:52-55). Thus, people are instructed to proclaim Jesus’ message, and are encouraged not to be afraid when doing so, because God will protect them (cf. Kirk 1998:208). Allison (1997:168-172) argues that verses 6-7 are not at all about protection, but about the fact that God is omniscient. To be sure, the followers of Jesus are not promised that they will escape tribulation. The body might still be killed (verse 4), the sparrow still falls to the ground (verse 6), and the hairs might still perish (verse 7). If Allison is correct, which is likely, the consolation of
verses 6-7 are not that God will protect the audience against physical abuse, but that God is in control, and that He is aware of said abuse. Whichever interpretation is preferred, the rhetorical function of verses 6-7 remains the same, which is to argue the case of verse 4. Verse 5 provides quite a different type of rationale for the admonition to proclaim Jesus’ message in public. It admonishes Jesus’ audience to be afraid (φοβηθῆτε / φοβεῖσθε) of the one who has the ability to destroy both the body and the soul. That verse 5 refers to the apocalypse is without any doubt (cf. Piper 1989:55; contra Kloppenborg 1987a:208-210). It openly speaks about the soul (ψυχήν), and about Gehenna (γέενναν / γεέννη) – or “hell” (cf. Allison 2010:34). In effect, those who fail to obey the admonition in verse 3 are implicitly threatened with eternal damnation (cf. Kirk 1998:208). If Q 12:4-7 is taken as a whole, the admonition in verse 3 is motivated by juxtaposing one’s fate in the present world with one’s destiny in the future world and proposing a choice for the latter (see Edwards 1976:120-121; cf. Allison 1997:174). The Q people are encouraged to face even certain death in view of the eschatological reward. Once again, a wisdom teaching of Jesus – this time a sapiential directive – is motivated and supported by apocalyptic eschatology (cf. Piper 1989:56; Allison 1997:174).

The positive and negative admonitions in verses 4 and 5, respectively, find their indicative counterparts in verses 8 and 9, both of which are concerned with providing supplementary motivation for the admonition in verse 3 (cf. Kirk 1998:209).121 That both verses 8 and 9 denote apocalyptic eschatology should be accepted as a matter of course (see Edwards 1976:40-41, 121; see section 2.6.1 above). Verse 8 motivates the admonition in verse 3 by disclosing the apocalyptic reward for such behaviour at the final judgment (cf. Sim 1985:233). Conversely, verse 9 motivates the admonition in verse 3 by revealing the apocalyptic punishment for the opposite behaviour at the final judgment (see Wink 2002:181-182). Whereas verse 8 provides a completely new motivation for the admonition in verse 3, verse 9 states explicitly what was already implied by verse 5, namely that those who deny Jesus in public will be denied at the apocalyptic judgment. The only possible outcome of such denial is eternal damnation, as verse 5 clearly points

121 As is clear from the phrases: Πάς οὖν ὅστις / ἃς ἂν ὡμολογήσει / ὡμολογήσῃ ἐν ἑμοί ἐμπροσθέν τῶν ἀνθρώπων and ὁ δὲ / ὅστις δ’ ἂν ἀρνήσηται / ἀρνησάμενός με ἐμπροσθέν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
out. Thus, whereas verse 5 implicitly motivates the initial admonition with the threat of eternal damnation, verse 9 motivates it explicitly with the very same threat (see Kirk 1998:209-210). In verses 8 and 9, present action is motivated by eschatological reward and punishment (cf. Edwards 1976:121). Q 12:8-9 leaves absolutely no doubt that, in Q, Jesus motivated and justified his wisdom teachings, including his admonitions, with apocalyptic eschatology. The obvious apocalyptic readings of verses 5, 8 and 9, in a backhanded way, render an apocalyptic interpretation of verse 2 highly probable (cf. Piper 1989:56). Thus, in Q 12:2-9, three, perhaps four, apocalyptic motivations are supplied for a singular sapiential admonition. Moreover, in all these cases, the apocalyptic motifs were part of the rhetorical fabric of the sapiential argument (cf. Piper 1989:60).

Luke has the phrase “Son of Man” in Q 12:8, but Matthew does not. Most scholars agree that Luke is more original at this point (cf. Piper 1989:58). The phrase “Son of Man” is also attested in a parallel saying at Mark 8:38. Luke had no reason to add the phrase ‘Son of Man’ here (cf. Piper 1989:58). Besides, it is not customary for Luke to add this phrase to his sources (cf. Catchpole 1993:93). Hence, it is very likely that those responsible for the Critical Edition of Q are correct, and that this phrase was originally part of Q (see Robinson; Hoffmann & Kloppenborg 2000). Matthew probably replaced it with the typically-Matthean κάγὼ, because the saying, as it stood, could be construed to mean that someone other than Jesus was the Son of Man (cf. Piper 1989:58; Catchpole 1993:93; cf. also Casey 2009:186). Matthew did not overreact in this regard, seeing as this individual saying has been elemental in convincing a large number of prominent scholars throughout history, including Bultmann, that the historical Jesus did not use the term “Son of Man” in reference to himself (cf. Burkett 1999:38; see Casey 2009:186-187; see section 1.3.2 above). In a sense, this view is legitimate, since the text does indeed seem to differentiate between the Son of Man (ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) and the personal pronoun “me” (ἐμοί), which refers to the speaker, Jesus (cf. Piper 1989:58). Such a reading is not a given, though (cf. Burkett 1999:38). It is not demanded by the text. Furthermore, Matthew understood the term here as a reference to Jesus. Despite the concurrent
presence of the personal pronoun, Q’s Jesus may still be using the term “Son of Man” in reference to himself.

The saying would not make any sense if we were to translate “Son of Man” with the indefinite term “a man.” The saying demands a more specific referent. The logion would make no more sense if “Son of Man” were to be translated with the generic term “man,” meaning humanity in general (contra Catchpole 1993:93). That would imply that the perpetrator will witness against herself at the apocalyptic judgment. It would also imply that outsiders, like Gentiles and “this generation,” would be witnesses at a trial that does not concern them in the slightest. Casey (2009:179-194) argues that the term “Son of Man” references the multitude of witnesses at the apocalyptic court, among whom Jesus will be the primary witness. The problem with this suggestion in a synchronic reading of the text is that such an interpretation is not possible in Greek. It is, however, possible that a bilingual audience might have been able to recognise an Aramaic idiom underlying the Greek. If so, the main witness will still be Jesus. If Jesus and his message is so essential for both apocalyptic deliverance and apocalyptic judgment (cf. Q 3:16-17; Q 7:23; Q 10:22; Q 11:23, 30-32; Q 13:35; Q 17:23-24, 33), why would there be a need for additional witnesses? These witnesses seem superfluous.

It seems more likely that Jesus is here referring only to himself in the third person (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:212; Kirk 1998:210; cf. also Catchpole 1993:92). In verse 8, the first part of the saying is inverted by the second part (cf. Piper 1989:56, 59; Catchpole 1993:198). The subject of ὑμολογήση in the protasis becomes the object of ὑμολογήσει in the apodosis. Similarly, in verse 9, the subject of ἀρνηθήσεται in the protasis becomes the object of ἀρνηθήσεται in the apodosis. This inversion is customary in sayings of retribution, of which Q 12:8-9 is a certain example (cf. Piper 1989:58, 59; see section 4.2 below). In turn, it is customary for sayings of retribution to swap the subjects and objects of each leg of the saying. Hence, the structure of this logion more than implies that the personal pronoun “me” in the protasis of verse 8 should be equated with the term “Son of Man” in the apodosis. This indicates that the most natural reading of the text is that Jesus
used the expression “Son of Man” in exclusive reference to himself. As we saw, this is also how Matthew understood this text.

There is, however, another, equally-valid explanation for the use of the term “Son of Man” in this context, namely that it refers to an apocalyptic agent. Q 12:8-9 obviously alludes to Daniel 7:13 (cf. esp. Casey 2009:181; cf. also Burkett 1999:123; Wink 2002:178; Bock 2011:91-92; cf. further Kirk 1998:209). In fact, out of all the Son-of-Man logia in Q, this one employs the most obvious imagery from Daniel 7:13. The repeated use of the preposition έπροσθεν (“[standing] before”), plus the references to “angels,” are unmistakable images of an apocalyptic courtroom (cf. Kirk 1998:209; see sections 4.4.1 & 4.4.3 below). It is extremely doubtful that either the author or the audience would have been confronted with Q 12:8-9 without calling to mind the image of Daniel 7:13. This would explain why he used a personal pronoun to speak of himself directly in the first part of the saying, and used the term “Son of Man” in the second part of the saying. The use of the personal pronoun “me” (ἐμοί), in the first part of the sentence, allowed Jesus to be absolutely unambiguous about the fact that it was he himself that needed to be confessed in public. On the other hand, the use of the term “Son of Man,” in the second part of the sentence, allowed Jesus to recall the image of Daniel 7:13, while at the same time referring to himself in the third person.

In Daniel’s vision, the “one like a son of man” is an individual being with ultimate power. This does not mean that he could not have been a symbol for some type of corporate entity, like the “saints” of Daniel’s vision or the whole Jewish nation. Unfortunately, however, the phrase “one like a son of man” is not interpreted in Daniel 7:15-28. All we have is the vision itself, where the “one like a son of man” is clearly described as a single figure. The Similitudes of Enoch and 4 Ezra 13 demonstrate that it was customary in first-century Judaism to interpret the “one like a son of man” in Daniel 7:13 as a singular apocalyptic-messianic figure (see Müller 2008:339-343). Moreover, the multitudes of Daniel 7:11 are not judicial witnesses in the court proceeding. In fact, there is no mention of witnesses in Daniel 7 at all. Verse 16 rather gives the impression that the multitude are simply there to observe, not to give witness. Also, the “one like a
son of man” does not form part of the multitude, whether they be witnesses or not, but is distinguished from them as a completely separate entity. It may be able to corroborate Casey’s suggestion from other intertexts, but it is certainly not possible to do so from Daniel 7:13, which is undoubtedly the most important intertext for Q 12:8-9 (see Burkett 1999:122-123).

By employing his usual self-reference (Son of Man) in a saying that recalled Daniel 7:13, Q’s Jesus was probably associating himself with the apocalyptic Son-of-Man figure in that text (cf. Bock 2011:89, 93, 96-97; see Theissen & Merz 1998:552-553; contra Hurtado 2011:171-172). For whatever reason, Q’s Jesus only did so indirectly, in a veiled, ambiguous and oblique manner. Given the high likelihood that this saying is authentic (see section 3.1.2 above), it is very probable that the historical Jesus identified himself with the symbolic figure of Daniel 7:13 (cf. esp. Dodd 1971:112; Allison 2010:39; cf. also Bauckham 1985:28; Wink 2002:64, 178; see France 1971; Nebe 1997:125-131), but only did so indirectly, via ambiguous sayings like these (cf. Bauckham 1985:29-30; Meier 2001:646; see Hengel 1983; Hampel 1990; Nolland 1992:17-28).122 Jesus was certainly smart and innovative enough to use the term “Son of Man” in such a way (see esp. Wright 1996:170-171, 478-479, 632-633; cf. Dunn 2001:547; Bock 2002:151; Tuckett 2003:184; cf. also Chilton 1996:45).123

For those who were familiar with the Sayings Gospel Q (and/or those who knew Jesus personally), the only logical conclusion to draw from this dual (apocalyptic and ordinary) usage of the term “Son of Man” would have been that Jesus himself was claiming to be the symbolic figure described by Daniel (cf. Dodd 1971:112). According to Lindars (1983:87), the “advocate” logion in Q 12:8-9 “paves the way for the identification of the

122 This is not primarily an attempt at “rescuing” the apocalyptic Son of Man (see Müller 2008:363-374, esp. 374), but the inevitable result of the textual analysis of Q 12:8. The latter text has the term “Son of Man” as both a self-reference by Jesus, and an apocalyptic reference to Daniel 7:13. Moreover, the high probability that this text is authentic leads to the inevitable conclusion that the historical Jesus himself used the term in such an ambiguous manner, thereby implying (but not stating outrightly) that he was to be identified with the Danielic Son-of-Man figure.

123 Opposite proposals seem more absurd, like that the historical Jesus did not know Daniel 7:13 or that he was incapable of using the term “Son of Man” in reference to this text (cf. Bock 2002:151). It was not only scribes who knew the Jewish scriptures and tradition (cf. Wright 1996:64-65).
Son of Man, assumed to be an exclusive self-reference on Jesus’ part, with the Danielic Son of Man figure.” Jesus probably intended this conclusion to be drawn, but also obscured it with the use of a vague term such as “Son of Man” (cf. Bock 2011:89, see Bauckham 1985:28-30). The probability that Jesus only hinted at an association with the figure of Daniel 7:13 suggests that this identification was not fundamental to “his self-understanding and his use of the expression” (Hurtado 2011:171). Of greater importance to Jesus was referring to himself by means of the term “Son of Man,” and having his audience grasp this application. Ultimately, the expression “Son of Man” in Q 12:8 not only contributed to the apocalyptic imagery of this saying, but also assisted in making obvious the allusion to Daniel 7:13. If we take the greater context into consideration, the term “Son of Man” contributed to Q 12:8’s primary function, which was to motivate and support the initial wisdom admonition in Q 12:3 with apocalyptic eschatology.

Q 12:10 is notoriously difficult to interpret (cf. Edwards 1976:121). Since this difficulty is in large part due to the ambiguity of the term “Son of Man” in this particular saying, we will address the “question of reference” before analysing the saying itself. Even though verse 10 follows directly after Q 12:8-9, it is doubtful that this saying also references an apocalyptic figure. What would cause someone to say something bad or derogatory about an imaginary angelic being like the one in Daniel 7:13? Nothing comes to mind! If one believes that the Son of Man is here a reference to an apocalyptic figure (cf. Edwards 1976:122), one would have to explain the existence of a logion that prohibits the unlikely occurrence of someone speaking against a paranormal figure with a singular purpose only to be fulfilled at a future date.

The generic and indefinite uses of the term seem more probable (cf. Wink 2002:85). Both would in this case amount to the same meaning, namely the act of speaking against one’s fellow man (cf. Casey 2009:140, 143). The saying would then maintain that the sin of speaking against one’s fellow man is forgivable, but not the sin of speaking against the holy spirit. Unfortunately, the literary context testifies against such an interpretation. Q 12:2-12 is chiefly about confessing or denying both the person and the message of Jesus (cf. verses 3, 8a, 9a). This means that the current saying is most naturally read, in its Q
context, as referring exclusively to Jesus (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:212; Kirk 1998:210). Thus, we have yet another example of Jesus using the term “Son of Man” as an exclusive self-reference in the third person. He might have used the term in this Q context because he was embarrassed to mention that there were people who “spoke against” him in public, thereby attacking and denigrating his social status (*contra* Wink 2002:85). By allowing this transgression against his person, Jesus could also have been emphasising his lowliness.

Most interpreters who have rejected the “self-referential conclusion” did so because Q 12:10 would then be contradicting Q 12:8-9. And indeed it does (cf. Sim 1985:235-236; Kloppenborg 1987:207-208; 211-212; Kirk 1998:210). Verse 9 promises apocalyptic judgment to those who deny Jesus, while verse 10 claims that those who deny Jesus will be forgiven. This contradiction is no reason to doubt the likelihood that “Son of Man” here refers to Jesus, though. Deliberately placing such direct contradictions side by side was not an unusual or uncommon practice in ancient wisdom literature (cf. Kirk 1998:211, 346; cf. also Allison 2010:90). Although Q 12:10 does not explicitly reference apocalyptic judgment, it is highly likely that the mentioned “forgiveness” (*ἀφεθήσεται*) refers to that final judgment, not least of all because of the apparentness of apocalypticism in the preceding verses, and the future tense of the verb *ἀφεθήσεται* (cf. Edwards 1976:122).

This verse should probably be read in conjunction with verses 11-12, where the admonition in verse 3 is further motivated by reassuring Jesus’ audience that the holy spirit (*ἱγιον πνευμα* in Luke) would teach (*διδάξει* in Luke) them what to say when they are brought before the synagogues (cf. Kirk 1998:213). Understood in combination with verses 11-12, verse 10 implies that it would not be forgiven at the apocalyptic judgment if anyone ignores the instruction of the holy spirit, and refuses to confess Jesus publicly in front of the religious authorities. Such a reading might offer a solution to the

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124 Casey (2009:143) believes this logion originally followed the Beelzebul accusation and therefore proposes a potentially different reason for Jesus’ embarrassment. However, it is very likely that, in the Sayings Gospel *Q*, this saying followed Q 12:9 and not the Beelzebul accusation.

125 It has been suggested that this contradiction might be an indication of changed circumstances in the lives of the Q people (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:212).
contradiction between verses 8-9 and verse 10. To deny Jesus is forgivable, unless it was
instructed by the holy spirit, in which case it is unforgivable, like in verses 8-9. At any
rate, the sapiential reassurance in verses 11-12 is motivated and supported by the
apocalyptic warning in verse 10. In the end, apocalyptic eschatology is utilised in the
service of the wisdom of Q 12:2-12, most notably to argue the case of the admonition in
verse 3, which must be obeyed without fear (see Piper 1989:59-61).

3.2.10 The speed of lightning

Q 17:23 is a dual prohibition not to follow, or go looking for, false prophets, whether
they be in the wilderness or indoors (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:159). That verse 23 should
be seen as a wisdom text is indicated by two linguistic features. The first indication is the
utilisation of small forms to introduce two parallel prohibitions, both of which consist of
the same construction: negative particle plus subjunctive (μὴ ἀπέλθητε μηδὲ διώξητε in
Luke; and μὴ ἔξελθητε […] μὴ πιστεύσητε in Matthew). The second indication is the
parallelism of verse 23. Luke’s version has two parallel conditional clauses (καὶ ἔροοσιν
ὡς ἢν Ἧδε, καὶ ἤδε), followed by two parallel prohibitions (μὴ ἀπέλθητε μηδὲ
dιώξητε). In Matthew’s version, a conditional clause and prohibition (ἐὰν οὖν εἴπωσιν
ὡς ἢν τῇ Ἐρήμῳ ἔστιν, μὴ ἔξελθητε) is followed by a parallel leg of conditional
clause plus prohibition (εἰ δέ τοῖς ταμείοις, μὴ πιστεύσητε).

The prohibitions not to follow false prophets are motivated and justified by the motive
clause in verse 24, as is obvious from the use of the conjunction γάρ (cf. Kloppenborg
called the “eschatological correlative,” or the “prophetic correlative,” and describes the
arrival of the Son of Man at the apocalyptic event (cf. Edwards 1976:41, 142;
(lightning) in a comparison clause also indicates the sapiential nature of verse 24 (cf.
Edwards 1976:142). Moreover, if Matthew’s version is followed, parallelism can also be
noted as a feature of the saying in verse 24, with ἡ ἀστραπῆ ἔξερχεται ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν
being parallel to φαίνεται ἔως δυσμῖν. All these indicators point to the fact that verse
24 constitutes a sapiential argument that makes use of an apocalyptic theme and small form to prove its case. The appearance of the Son of Man is likened to the vividness, suddenness, unexpectedness, finality, and devastating power of lightning and thunder (see esp. Kloppenborg 1987a:163-164; cf. Sim 1985:233; Catchpole 1993:254, 274; Kirk 1998:256; cf. also Casey 2009:215, 227). Be that as it may, the use of γὰρ at the beginning of verse 24 is enough indication that the apocalyptic saying is both a statement in support of the sapiential prohibition in verse 23, and an integral part of its structure.

The Son-of-Man reference is here an obvious allusion to Daniel 7:13 (see esp. Casey 2009:212-228; see also Piper 1989:139-142; Catchpole 1993:78, 246, 250-255; Kirk 1998:257-268; cf. also Bock 2011:91). No other interpretation would make sense of the apocalyptic imagery and language in this logion. The text is completely silent about whether or not Jesus is to be associated with this Son of Man. Whether or not the audience of this logion made such an identification depends not on the text itself, but on whether or not Jesus was already associated with Daniel’s Son of Man prior to them hearing this logion. The obvious allusion to Daniel 7:13 has caused many interpreters to doubt the authenticity of this saying (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:160 n. 257). However, it was argued in section 3.1.3 above that an allusion to Daniel’s vision is not necessarily an indication of inauthenticity. Even if this saying were secondary, the authors of Q probably introduced it, and inserted the term “Son of Man,” because they were influenced to do so by the historical Jesus himself (cf. Q 12:8). In other words, their potential fabrication of this saying does not take away from the likelihood that the historical Jesus had used the term “Son of Man” in reference to Daniel 7:13, and had indirectly associated himself with this figure. Hence, the people responsible for Q operated in complete continuity with the message and person of the historical Jesus when, and if, they created this saying. The term “Son of Man” highlights and polishes the apocalyptic imagery of Q 17:24, thereby doing its part in substantiating the wisdom of verse 23 with apocalyptic eschatology.
The apocalyptic themes of finality, vividness, unexpectedness, suddenness and devastation are taken up and elaborated by verses 26-27, 30, 34-35 and 37, which paint vivid pictures of just how unexpected, sudden, devastating, visible and final the apocalyptic event will be (cf. Edwards 1976:142; Catchpole 1993:254, 274; see Kloppenborg 1987a:162-166; Kirk 1998:259-262; cf. also Allison 2010:35; see also Casey 2009:217-218, 226-228). Verse 26 expresses its apocalyptic theme by means of the same micro-genre as verse 24, namely the “eschatological” or “prophetic correlative” (cf. Edwards 1976:41, 142; Kloppenborg 1987a:160, 164; Kirk 1998:260). Moreover, in these passages, like in verse 24, the Son-of-Man figure acts, in line with Daniel 7:13, as an emissary of the apocalypse (cf. Bock 2011:91; see also Piper 1989:139-142; Catchpole 1993:78, 246, 250-255; see further Casey 2009:212-228). As in verse 24, this figure may or may not be identified with Jesus. For these reasons, these subsequent passages should all be read in conjunction with verse 24, and they all form part of the supportive argument in favour of the sapiential prohibition in verse 23 (see Kirk 1998:259-262). Just like the “sign-of-Jonah” passage, Q’s wisdom is here substantiated by an appeal to authoritative figures from Scripture, traditionally associated, in one way or another, with the apocalyptic event (cf. Catchpole 1993:255). The rhetorical argument of the entire passage is that the apocalyptic Son of Man will appear so suddenly and unexpectedly from heaven that there is no need to go looking for him on earth (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:161; cf. also Casey 2009:215). Put differently, you will not be able to find the Son of Man before he finds you. As in verse 24, the possible inauthenticity of the two Son-of-Man expressions, or the relevant logia for that matter, does not contradict the likelihood that the historical Jesus used this term in reference to Daniel 7:13. As a whole, Q 17:23-37 is a wisdom text that makes use of apocalyptic themes in its sapiential arguments to support the initial prohibition (cf. Kirk 1998:267).

126 As was the case with verse 24, the authenticity of these sayings is doubted by many (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:160 n. 257).
3.2.11 Three parables: Be ready, judgment awaits!

The apocalyptic sayings in Q 12:40; Q 13:24-30, 34-35 and Q 22:28, 30 will be treated together. In all three cases, the statements about the apocalypse follow after one of Jesus’ parables. Parables were used by Jesus to teach and instruct people, indicating that these parables should naturally be classified under the wisdom of Jesus (cf. Edwards 1976:74; see Kirk 1998:234, 246-248). It is extremely likely that these parables originally circulated independently, with their apocalyptic explanations only added later (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:149, 165, 225). This does not automatically mean that the apocalyptic sayings are inauthentic or secondary (cf. Koester 1994:540-541). They probably also circulated independently, and were only added to the parables later on (cf. Casey 2009:219). Moreover, it is just as likely that the relevant parables originally had quite different applications than the apocalyptic ones subsequently added. Despite all this, the redactional activities of the Q compilers remain illuminating for our current theme, particularly since we are mainly interested in how the Q people remembered and described Jesus (see section 1.4 above).

Q 12:40 (artificially) applies the parable in verse 39 to the unexpectedness and “unknowability” of the apocalyptic event (cf. Catchpole 1993:57; Kloppenborg 1987a:149; see Kirk 1998:232-233). The parable is followed by the sapiential admonition to be ready for the apocalyptic event (cf. Edwards 1976:126). This admonition is then supported by a motive clause, initiated by the conjunction ὅτι, foretelling that the Son of Man will come unexpectedly. At this juncture, the term “Son of Man” is an obvious allusion to Daniel 7:13 (cf. esp. Casey 2009:219; cf. also Edwards 1976:126; see Kirk 1998:232-233). As in Q 17:24, this figure may or may not be identified with Jesus, depending on whether or not such an identification had already preceded the delivery of the logion itself. Regarding the use of this term, the same comments as those made about Q 17:24, 26, 30, earlier on, also apply in the current context. The admonition is further supported by the parable in verse 39. In other words, the sapiential instruction to be watchful is supported by the eschatological Son-of-Man
saying that follows (cf. Piper 1989:77). This whole logion is then supported by the preceding parable.

The artificial application of apocalypticism to the parables of Jesus is nowhere more apparent than in Q 13:24-29. The application actually contradicts the sapiential admonition with which the parable began. Whereas verse 24 claims that many (πολλοί) will attempt to enter through the narrow door, but that few (ὁλίγοι in Luke) will succeed, verse 29 claims that many (πολλοί in Matthew) will participate at the apocalyptic feast (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:235; see Kirk 1998:246-247). The admonition in verse 24a, to enter through the narrow door, is supported by the motive clause in verse 24b, as is clear from the use of the conjunction ὅτι in the latter. It is possible, but not certain, that this motive clause alludes to apocalyptic eschatology. If so, we have yet another example of a piece of wisdom being motivated by apocalyptic eschatology. The parable in verses 24-27 is seen by the compilers of Q as a story about the eschatological reversal of fortunes (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:379; see Kloppenborg 1987a:235-236). Whatever the original (sapiential) intent of the parable, it has here been recast as a story of one’s eschatological fate (cf. Edwards 1976:132). In this literary context, the parable’s function is to support and legitimise the sapiential admonition in verse 24 (cf. Piper 1989:109, 114). This apocalyptic theme is then elaborated by the three apocalyptic logia in verses 28-30, 34-35 (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:227, 237). These logia are now put forward by the compilers of Q as the application of the parable in verses 25-27.

The crux of these apocalyptic logia is appropriately summarised by verse 30, which may or may not have been in Q (cf. Allison 2010:36). These subsequent logia are not concerned with a specific feature of the apocalyptic event, like its suddenness or unexpectedness, but rather with the reversal of fortunes that will accompany said event. The “many” of verse 29, who will come from East and West to share in God’s kingdom, should probably not be seen as Gentiles, but as Diaspora Jews who were faithful to the message of Jesus (see Allison 1997:176-191). Reserved for apocalyptic condemnation, on the other hand, is greater Israel, specifically those in charge of the Jerusalem cult (cf. Piper 1989:108; see Kirk 1998:313-315). Whether or not verses 34-35 harbour any hope
that Jerusalem will repent and confess Jesus, the text is about that city’s *eschatological* fate (cf. Allison 1997:192). A case could be made for viewing these two verses as a prophetic micro-genre. Although the lament over Jerusalem reminds one of sapiential small forms, and the image of the protective hen is a well-known wisdom theme, “the prophets” (το/uni1F7Aς προφήτας) are overtly mentioned, and verse 35 simply looks a lot like a prophetic saying (cf. Edwards 1976:67). Whether this saying is prophetic or sapiential, the text is ultimately about eschatology (see Edwards 1976:132-133). In the end, all the logia in Q 13:28-30, 34-35 undoubtedly contain apocalyptic themes, but they are put forward as the application of the parable in verses 24-27 (cf. Sim 1985:204; see Kirk 1998:248-249, 251-252, 315).¹²⁷

Like the previous two apocalyptic sayings, Q 22:28, 30 also follows after one of Jesus’ parables, situated in Q 19:12-13, 15-24, 26 (cf. Allison 1997:35). The parable as a whole, including verse 26, accommodates a non-eschatological interpretation. It should primarily be seen as a sapiential parable that ends with a “gnomic moral” in verse 26 (cf. Kirk 1998:298). As a “purely” sapiential parable, it critiques the elite, and exposes the unfortunate status quo of village peasants for what it really is (cf. Oakman 2008:252). However, the literary context of the parable in Q suggests that it was recast by the framers of Q as a parable that develops apocalyptic eschatology (see Kloppenborg 1987a:164-165). Although the future tense of the passive verbs δοθήσεται and ἄρθησεται in verse 26 make perfect sense in the context of the wisdom espoused by the parable itself, these future passive verbs eased the way for an apocalyptic application of the parable. Thus, the parable is reapplied as a teaching that describes one or more features of the apocalyptic event.

Q 22:28, 30 then explicates and elaborates upon this apocalyptic understanding of the parable application in verse 26. The Q people are exposed as those to whom “more will be given” (δοθήσεται) at the eschatological reward, seeing as they will sit on thrones and

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¹²⁷ If Catchpole (1993:257-262) and Allison (1997:19, 201-202) are correct and Q 13:34-35 did follow immediately after Q 11:14-52 in the Sayings Gospel, then it is part of the *eschatological* content of Lady Wisdom’s *sapiential* message (see above). The *message* remains sapiential in nature, even though it develops an eschatological *theme*.
act as judges. Conversely, greater Israel is exposed as those from whom “will be taken away” (ἀρθῇσται), seeing as they will be the object of eschatological judgment. In this new apocalyptic mould, it is possible that the kingdom of God is implied as the object of ἔχοντι in verse 26. If the latter is accepted, the apocalyptic reapplication of verse 26 states that although the Q people already had the kingdom, they will get the added privilege of judging greater Israel at the final judgment. As intended by the framers of Q, the addition of Q 22:28, 30 puts the apocalyptic intent of both the application in verse 26, and the parable as a whole, beyond doubt.

The logion in Q 22:28, 30 is obviously apocalyptic in nature (compare Qumran Scroll 1QpHab V:3-5; cf. Wink 2002:183; Casey 2009:238; cf. also Allison 2010:42; see section 2.6.1 above). Yet, there is a crucial difference between Matthew and Luke at this point. Luke says that “those who remained with Jesus” (οἱ διαμεμενηκότες μετ’ ἑμοῦ) will judge (or establish justice for)¹²⁸ the rest of Israel at the final judgment. Matthew says that “those who followed Jesus” (οἱ ἀκολούθησαντες μοι) will receive said privilege. Matthew’s version should probably be preferred. He places this saying in chapter 19 of his gospel, which is packed with motifs and sayings from Q. The concern placed in Peter’s mouth – that the disciples have left everything behind to follow Jesus, and that Jesus is now disserting them – mirrors in a very real way the concerns of the Q people, and one of the likely reasons why the document was written in the first place (see section 2.3 above). Jesus responds to Peter in Matthew as he probably also responded in Q. The privileged position afforded his followers at the apocalyptic judgment by far outweighs the abandonment and neglect they may experience in the present. Conversely, Luke places the saying in the heart of the last supper as a reassurance that those who remained with him during all his trials will judge (or establish justice for) Israel at the apocalyptic event. In particular, the reference to “remaining” with Jesus anticipates his abandonment during the Passion events (cf. esp. Luke 22:54-62). Luke has obviously adapted this Q saying to fit into his narration of the last supper, and his overall Passion story.

¹²⁸ For the possibility that κρίνοντες should here be translated as something akin to “establish justice for,” cf. Horsley (1991:196) and Van Aarde (2011c:1 n. 3).
Regardless of whether Luke or Matthew is preferred at this point, the inner circle of Jesus’ followers is specifically in view. This inner circle could imply the close disciples of Jesus during his earthly ministry, the leaders of the Q people, or both. Luke’s phrase “those who remained with Jesus” (οἱ διαμεμενηκότες μετʼ ἐμοῦ) obviously implies those who showed unwavering support for Jesus. Matthew’s “those who followed Jesus” (οἱ ἀκολουθήσαντές μοι) is even more direct. It is well-known that “following” Jesus was a metaphor for discipleship (see Kingsbury 1978). The specific references to the “twelve” (δώδεκα) thrones – if Matthew is followed – and the “twelve” (δώδεκα) tribes, probably also allude to the twelve disciples of Jesus (cf. Allison 2012:42). Discipleship should indeed be seen as a sapiential theme in Q. Those who “followed Jesus” were those who lived in accordance with his sapiential teachings. If, then, Q 22:28, 30 alleges that “those who followed Jesus” (οἱ ἀκολουθήσαντές μοι) were going to partake in judging the remainder of Israel, it is actually encouraging the Q people to remain compliant and committed to the sapiential teachings of Jesus in view of the apocalyptic reward. Kirk (1998:294-298) proposes a macro-structure of the so-called “eschatological discourse” (Q 12:2-Q 22:30), and views the current logion about judging Israel as an inversion of Q 12:2-12. If accepted, this proposal provides added support to our current proposition. Q 12:2-12 clearly has the “followers of Jesus” in mind, and instructs them to proclaim the sapiential message of Jesus without fear. If Q 22:28, 30 is indeed an inversion of Q 12:2-12, then it is clear that the former logion also has in mind the followers of Jesus, meaning those who remain faithful to his sapiential message. On the surface, Q 22:28, 30 might seem like a straightforward apocalyptic saying, but beneath the surface it is a piece of encouragement in the service of Jesus’ sapiential message.

In all of these last three cases, the rhetorical functions of the parables were to act as support for the apocalyptic logia that followed. This goes against the pattern we have been able to deduce from the other apocalyptic sayings. In those cases, apocalyptic eschatology was put forward to motivate and justify certain sapiential sayings. The only exception was Q 11:19b, where a characteristic of the apocalyptic judgment naturally followed as a consequence of Jesus’ wisdom. The current logia should be interpreted in a similar light. The framers of Q attempted to interpret Jesus’ parables in order to deduce
from them aspects about the nature of the apocalyptic event. More than any other sapiential form, the parables of Jesus naturally lent themselves thereto, not least of all because of their open endings. The framers’ intention was simply to attach Jesus’ sayings about the apocalyptic end to his sapiential parables. They undoubtedly believed that this attachment would add additional support to individual apocalyptic sayings that circulated independently. The most likely reason for such compositional activity is that the redactors believed that they were acting in continuity and harmony with the manner in which Jesus himself taught. In other words, although these parable applications are very likely secondary (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:149), the practice of deducing from sapiential rhetoric important information about the nature of the apocalypse is probably authentic. It is rather telling that these logia were added to existing wisdom traditions, probably for added legitimacy.

3.2.12 Two more parables: Be ready, the court awaits!

The remaining two logia, Q 12:46 and Q 12:59, will also be treated together. Like the foregoing logia, these two sayings also acted as the applications of two respective parables. The difference between these two sayings and the previous three, however, is that the former were probably not loose-standing traditions that were subsequently added to the parables (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:150, 153). Rather, they were most likely originally part and parcel of the parables themselves. These parables might not initially have been apocalyptic at all, but they were nevertheless interpreted as such by the Q people later on. Thus, in the two cases we are dealing with now, each sapiential parable as a whole has been applied and interpreted as an apocalyptic teaching. Taken on their own, these two parables should be seen as wisdom texts (cf. Kirk 1998:234, 240).

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129 As parable applications, not necessarily as traditions in their own right (cf. Koester 1994:540-541).
130 The same could be said of Q 19:26, which was originally part of the parable in Q 19:12-26 itself, but subsequently cast in an eschatological mould. As such, this parable could have been discussed together with Q 12:46 and Q 12:59. For the sake of convenience and to guard against unnecessary reiteration, this parable application will not be discussed again presently. Suffice it to bear in mind that it actually also belongs in the current category of parables.
Besides the fact that it represents a *parable*, Q 12:42-46 betrays its sapiential prehistory most noticeably by addressing the traditional wisdom theme of the “faithful and wise servant or house-manager” (ὁ πιστὸς οἰκονόμος / δοῦλος [καὶ ὁ] φρόνιμος). The mere usage of the words “wise” (φρόνιμος) and “faithful” (πιστὸς), both in isolation and in combination, is enough justification for seeing this passage as a wisdom text (cf. Edwards 1976:66). Moreover, the parable is deployed in accordance with didactic convention (cf. Edwards 1976:66). Like Q 12:40, the application of the parable in Q 12:42-46 has to do with the unexpectedness of the apocalyptic event (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:150; Catchpole 1993:57). The proximity of Q 12:42-46 to Q 12:40 strongly implies that, by the time Q was framed, its compilers had already started viewing this parable as an apocalyptic teaching. Similar vocabulary between verses 46 and 39-40 leads to the same conclusion. In its current form and position, the parable in verses 42-46 encourages the Q people to remain faithful, in view of the apocalyptic event, which will occur unexpectedly (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:150; cf. also Allison 2010:35).

On a surface level, Q 12:58-59 has nothing to do with apocalyptic eschatology. Rather, it is a wisdom admonition that covers the typical and commonsensical sapiential theme of avoiding judicial procedures (compare Prov 6:1-5; 25:7-10; Sirach 8:14; Qumran Scroll 4Q416 2, II:4-6; *idem*. 4Q417 1, II:6-8; *idem*. 4Q418 8:3-5; cf. Edwards 1976:129; Kloppenborg 1987a:152-153; see Kirk 1998:238-239; Piper 1989:105-107). The judge is not God or the Son of Man. The judge has either a human assistant (ὑπηρέτης) or a human officer of the court (πράκτωρ) directly under him, depending on whether you follow Matthew or Luke, but definitely not the celestial being you would expect in an apocalyptic saying. The punishment is prison (φυλακή), not eternal damnation. The moral of the parable is to pay any debts, and repair any broken relationships with your opponents, before you end up in jail, where you will not leave before your obligation has been met (cf. Prov 6:1-5; Piper 1989:106).

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131 Compare γινώσκετε, ὡρα, ἦ, ὡρα, δοκεῖτε and in verses 39-40 with ἦ, ὡρα, ἦ, γινώσκει and προσδοκά in verse 46.
The placement of this parable in the overall structure of Q suggests, however, that it was indeed interpreted apocalyptically by the framers of Q (cf. Kirk 1998:238-239). Also, the formula \( \lambda \varepsilon \gamma \omega \ldots \omicron \upsilon \mu \eta \ldots \varepsilon \omega \varsigma \), in verse 59, is much more typical of prophetic and apocalyptic-judgment sayings than of wisdom sayings (cf. Edwards 1976:129; Kloppenborg 1987a:153). It would appear as if verse 59, which could not formerly have been an independent saying, was attached to the original wisdom saying in verse 58 in order to bring out the apocalyptic application (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:153; Piper 1989:106). If Q 12:59 is applied to apocalyptic judgment, it makes a point quite separate from verses 40 and 46. The emphasis is no longer on the unexpectedness of the apocalyptic event, but on its finality and irrevocability.\(^{132}\)

In both of these cases, the framers of Q searched the *wisdom* of Jesus, conveyed via his parables, to speculate about the nature of the apocalyptic event. The most likely explanation for this *modus operandi* is that the Q compilers wanted to act in continuity with the historical Jesus, whom they remembered as a wisdom teacher, who based his claims about the end of the world on his wisdom. The last four apocalyptic sayings that were discussed all indicate that Jesus based his claims about the nature of the apocalypse on his wisdom. Thus, whereas apocalyptic sayings in Q were primarily used as motive and causal clauses in the service of sapiential arguments, wisdom sayings (especially parables) were sometimes used and reapplied as the ground and foundation for speculating about the specific nature of the apocalyptic event. In both cases, the wisdom of Jesus was superior in function to his apocalyptic predictions. On the one hand, apocalyptic claims were based on wisdom. On the other hand, apocalyptic claims were used to lend additional support to individual wisdom sayings. What Allison (1997:28) says about Q 12:33-Q 22:30 seems applicable to the document as a whole: “[Q] remains transparently practical wisdom with a strong eschatological component.”

\(^{132}\) Kirk (1998:239) follows Kloppenborg (1987a:154) in reading apocalyptic imminence into the phrase “on the way” (ἐν τῇ ὀδῷ). The purpose of this phrase is rather to prepare the narrative setting of the parable. Deducing imminence from this phrase is a perfect example of how imminent eschatology is oftentimes read *into* the Q text rather than taken *from* it.
3.3 ~ FINDINGS

3.3.1 Apocalyptic-judgment sayings

In our discussion of Kloppenborg’s stratification, it was mentioned that there are apocalyptic themes present in both the formative stratum and the main redaction of Q. This statement has currently been corroborated by individual traditions within Q. The apocalyptic-judgment sayings cut across Kloppenborg’s two main strata. There are apocalyptic-judgment sayings in both Q¹ (Q 6:21-23; Q 12:2-7) and Q² (Q 10:12-15; Q 11:19, 29-32, 49-51; Q 12:8-10, 40, 42-46, 58-59; Q 13:28-29; Q 17:24, 26-27, 30, 34-35; Q 22:28, 30). The findings of chapter two are therefore corroborated by chapter three. More precisely, the stratification of Q does not directly translate into a non-apocalyptic silhouette of Jesus. Moreover, an exegetical examination of the apocalyptic-judgment sayings indicated that Jesus was chiefly remembered and described by Q as a wisdom teacher. The apocalyptic images and language function in Q to support the sapiential message of Jesus (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:376). This verifies the proposals by Crossan and Kloppenborg that Q held and promoted a “secondary apocalyptic eschatology,” or a “symbolic eschatology,” depending on whose phrase is to be preferred (see section 1.3.7 above). Additionally, it confirms that the historical Jesus, from Q’s point of view at least, taught something similar to Bultmann’s “eschatological ethics” (see section 1.2.3 above).

On a rhetorical level, Jesus made use of apocalypticism to strengthen and motivate his sapiential message. Wisdom also functioned as the basis from whence Jesus made important deductions about the nature of the apocalyptic end. Thus, we can certainly affirm the hypothesis proposed in chapter one: *The Q people remembered and described Jesus as a sage who made use of apocalyptic eschatology to motivate and support his moral message.* Yet, this hypothesis, although not wrong, lacks a certain aspect that was uncovered during the course of our investigation in this chapter. We have seen that apocalypticism was not only (and flatly) used to substantiate particular pieces of wisdom, but was also an integral part of the content of these sapiential traditions. The apocalyptic
traditions were not merely footnotes to the moral message and sapiential intent of Jesus. Rather, apocalyptic images and metaphors were very much integral and central to the wisdom of Jesus, so much so that they are impossible to extract from his wisdom.

In light of this, the hypothesis suggested in chapter one deserves the following qualification: *Apocalyptic eschatology also formed an integral part of the sapiential message of Q’s Jesus.* This qualification could easily lead one to conclude that Crossan’s “secondary apocalyptic eschatology” and Kloppenborg’s “symbolic eschatology” were off target, but such an appraisal would be wrong. Whenever apocalypticism forms an integral part of the content of Jesus’ wisdom, its *intent* is to warn and slate religious leaders and greater Israel that they will get their punishment in the end. Not once in Q is apocalyptic eschatology used as a basis from whence to introduce, formulate or compose any specific moral directive or piece of wisdom – not even in those cases where apocalyptic eschatology forms an inextricable part of the content of Jesus’ wisdom (cf. Allison 2010:97). The wisdom and ethics in Q are not based on apocalypticism. Instead, either apocalypticism is used in the service of existing wisdom, or aspects of the nature of the apocalypse are deduced from existing wisdom (cf. Allison 2010:97). Whenever apocalyptic themes form part of the wisdom of Q, they should be understood in terms of the latter. That religious leaders and greater Israel will one day be judged is a natural inference to draw from Q’s wisdom.

### 3.3.2 Son-of-Man sayings

Given the almost complete absence (outside the New Testament) of the definite forms א‎ ו‎ן‎ ב‎ (Aramaic), ב‎ ו‎ר‎ (Hebrew) and Ὁ ὑἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (Greek) in Palestine, during and before the first century, the time has perhaps come to stop grasping at non-existent Aramaic straws in trying to determine the meaning behind Ὁ ὑἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Instead, should we not be looking at how the Greek term Ὁ ὑἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου is utilised in the New Testament and other documents like Q, and take that as our best indicator of what the underlying Aramaic term א‎ ו‎ן‎ ב‎ actually meant? Leivestad had already suggested such a *modus operandi* in 1968 (cf. Müller 2008:358). A growing number of
scholars recently favour such a direction of enquiry (see esp. Müller 2008:375-419, esp. 375, 418-419; cf. also Casey 2009:176; see e.g. Schenk 1997). If we follow this path, we are sure to arrive at the same destination as Hare (1990:246): “Whatever its spelling and pronunciation, the Aramaic underlying ho huios tou anthropou was understood as referring exclusively to Jesus” (see also Smith 1991). The point is that even in the canonical gospels, the expression “Son of Man” is consistently translated as an exclusive self-reference of and by Jesus. Bock (2011:90), for example, states: “The designation Son of Man appears 82 times in the Gospels and is a self-designation of Jesus in all but one case, where it reports a claim of Jesus (Jn 12.34)” (see also Hill 1983:35-51; Müller 1984; Schwartz 1986; Hare 1990; Smith 1991; Hurtado 2011).

Our investigation of Q has found that the term was not only used by Jesus as an exclusive self-reference, but also as a non-titular self-reference. We have found six Q sayings (Q 6:22; Q 7:34; Q 9:58; Q 11:30; Q 12:8; Q 12:10) where Q’s Jesus uses the expression “Son of Man” as a non-titular self-reference (compare Robinson 2007:97-117). This result goes against the assumption by a number of scholars that “in Q […] Son of Man has come to be used as a christological title” (Kloppenborg 1987a:192), or that “Q uses Son of Man as a title of dignity, not to refer to Jesus’ humble guise” (Kloppenborg 1987a:213; cf. also Kirk 1998:341, 380; Edwards 1976:40, 41, 114; Piper 1989:126). Also in this instance, a number of recent studies on the use of the term “Son of Man” in the gospels have produced results similar to ours. Synchronic analyses of the individual canonical gospels reveal a likely diachronic development of the expression “Son of Man” from an exclusive, non-titular and “more or less colourless,” self-reference to a title for Jesus (cf. Müller 2008:419). In other words, although the gospels, on numerous occasions, do use the expression “Son of Man” as a title for Jesus, it seems that its pre-canonical roots are to be found in its use as a non-titular self-expression. Thus, both in terms of it being an exclusive self-reference, and in terms of it being a non-titular self-reference, our current findings are independently corroborated by recent studies on the use of the expression “Son of Man” in the canonical gospels.
There are four additional reasons for preferring the result that the term “Son of Man” was used by Jesus as an exclusive, non-titular self-reference (cf. Hurtado 2011:167, 174): (1) It would explain why Jesus used the term in such a wide variety of seemingly incompatible contexts. (2) It would explain why Matthew and Luke, on certain occasions, felt uninhibited enough to substitute the term “Son of Man” in their sources with “I.” (3) Not only in Greek, but also in Hebrew, and in Aramaic, the definite form of the expression “the son of the man” had a particularising force, meaning that it referred to someone or something in particular. (4) It would explain why the term occurs almost exclusively in the mouth of Jesus. Thus, the proposal by Vermes that the Aramaic expression “Son of Man” was a circumlocution for “I” seems to be corroborated not only by recent synchronic studies of the individual canonical gospels, but also by our present investigation of Q. Vermes was legitimately criticised by a number of scholars, mainly because the examples he put forward of the term’s circumlocutional use were actually examples of its generic and/or indefinite use(s) (cf. Burkett 1999:86-87). Despite this line of criticism, Vermes’ proposal should still be accepted, simply because it provides the best explanation for the translation, utilisation and development of the Greek term ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου in the New Testament. The singular-definite form may still have connoted humility, danger, lowliness, humanity (in contrast to animals), death or something else, but given the almost complete lack of this form in the appropriate sources, we simply can not be sure. For similar reasons as those just noted, Hurtado (2011:159-177) comes to the following conclusion:

I submit that the diversity of sentences/sayings in which ‘the son of man’ is used in the Gospels leads to the conclusion that in these texts the expression’s primary linguistic function is to refer, not to characterize. The expression refers to Jesus […], but does not in itself primarily make a claim about him, or generate any controversy, or associate him with prior/contextual religious expectations or beliefs. ‘The son of man’ can be used in sayings that stake various claims about Jesus […], but it is the sentence/saying that conveys the intended claim or statement, not the ‘son of man’ expression itself. […] Instead, we are to attribute to the referent, Jesus, the import of these sentences.
These comments are true in those cases where the term is an obvious reference to Jesus (Q 6:22; Q 7:34; Q 9:58; Q 12:8; Q 12:10), but not in those cases where someone or something other than Jesus might be the referent. We have seen that some Q sayings (Q 12:8; Q 12:40; Q 17:24, 26, 30) undoubtedly refer to the apocalyptic agent of Daniel 7:13. Thus, Hurtado is still correct in claiming that the function of all Son-of-Man sayings is “to refer, not to characterise,” but in the case of the latter group of sayings, the primary referent has changed. The referent in this second group of sayings is primarily (and most obviously) the apocalyptic agent of Daniel 7:13. It is only after identifying Jesus with the Danielic emissary, and only if this identification is made, that these sayings become indirect allusions to Jesus.

Q 12:8 appears in both groups. It was argued that this saying is likely to be authentic, and that it has two legitimate points of reference, namely the human Jesus and the apocalyptic figure in Daniel 7:13 (cf. Tuckett 2003:184). Most scholars today consider the other sayings in this group to be secondary. Yet, these remaining logia share an important feature with Q 12:8, which is that none of them make the association between Jesus and the Danielic figure obvious. In other words, in all of the apocalyptic Son-of-Man sayings, the association between Jesus and the Son of Man is not a given. Most Son-of-Man scholars believe that the framers of Q made deliberate midrashic use of Daniel 7:13 when they introduced these sayings into Q (cf. Burkett 1999:122-123; cf. e.g. Perrin 1974:33; Mack 1988:71 n. 14; Wink 2002:162; see e.g. Vermes 1973:160-191; Van Aarde 2004b). However, it would seem that, when they did so, they deliberately tried to stay true to the oblique nature of Q 12:8. Hence, those responsible for Q went to great lengths to stay true to the way in which the historical Jesus made use of the term “Son of Man.”

We are now in a position to draw some results from our synchronic study of Q about the diachronic development of the term “Son of Man.” Given the almost complete absence of the forms נָאַר (Aramaic), נִשָּׁה (Hebrew), and ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (Greek) in Palestine, during and before the first century, it is highly likely that the historical Jesus coined this singular-indefinite form of the term, and applied it as an exclusive reference
to himself. As an uncommon form, this was in all likelihood a highly memorable feature of Jesus’ idiolect: “This would be an example of what competent users of languages often do, adapting idiomatic expressions, either in form or connotation, to serve some new and particular semantic purpose” (Hurtado 2011:175). Jesus went beyond this innovation, though. He also used the novel term on at least one occasion (Q 12:8) as an ambiguous reference to both himself and the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13 (cf. Allison 2010:39). This usage invited (but did not oblige) the conclusion that Jesus was the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13. The framers of Q came to this very conclusion, but tried to stay true to the historical Jesus by both obscuring and inviting this association. Thus, at least six Son-of-Man sayings in Q are authentic (Q 6:22; Q 7:34; Q 9:58; Q 11:30; Q 12:8; Q 12:10). These sayings all refer exclusively to the earthly Jesus. Two of them occur in literary contexts that are completely non-apocalyptic (Q 7:34; Q 9:58), while the remaining four occur in literary contexts that develop apocalyptic themes (Q 6:22; Q 11:30; Q 12:8; Q 12:10). One authentic saying (Q 12:8) implies that Jesus is to be identified with the apocalyptic Son of Man from Daniel 7:13. Two authentic sayings appear in Kloppenborg’s Q¹ (Q 6:22; Q 9:58), while the remaining four appear in Q² (Q 7:34; Q 11:30; Q 12:8; Q 12:10). That leaves another four inauthentic logia that are, nonetheless, in keeping with the essence of Jesus’ apocalyptic-sapiential message, as well as his original usage of the term “Son of Man” (Q 12:40; Q 17:24, 26, 30). Once again, this division between authentic and inauthentic Son-of-Man logia cuts across, not only Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q, but also the synthetic division between apocalyptic and sapiential Son-of-Man logia.

Ultimately, our main aim with the Son-of-Man logia in Q is not to determine authenticity, but to determine how Q remembered and described Jesus using the term “Son of Man.” A synchronic analysis of Q has illustrated that those responsible for the document remembered and described Jesus using the term primarily as a non-titular self-reference in the third person. This usage is remarkably similar to the way the term is used in the Gospel of Thomas (cf. Meyer 2003:21). However, Q also remembered and described Jesus using the term in contexts where the imagery of Daniel 7:13 is called to mind (cf. Allison 2010:39; contra e.g. Robinson 2007:97-117). The latter usage, when combined
with the memory of Jesus using the term in exclusive reference to himself, implied that Jesus should be identified with the apocalyptic figure from Daniel 7:13 (see Theissen & Merz 1998:552-553). According to Q’s memory and description of Jesus, he both intended and obscured this identification with his clever use of the expression “Son of Man.” Even if some of the apocalyptic Son-of-Man texts (Q 12:40; Q 17:24, 26, 30) were added later, which seems likely, these midrashic additions were in line with the intentions of Jesus as remembered by Q in that they both implied and obscured the identification between Jesus and the Danielic Son of Man (cf. Q 12:8). In each one of those cases that refer to the Son-of-Man figure in an apocalyptic sense, the reference, in some way or another, supported and substantiated the sapiential message of Jesus. The apocalyptic references to the Son of Man also formed an integral and vital part of each sapiential message itself. Hence, the Son-of-Man logia in Q not only corroborate the findings about the apocalyptic-judgment logia in Q, but also provide added support to the overall hypothesis of this study: *The Q people remembered and described Jesus as a sage who made use of apocalyptic eschatology to motivate and support his moral message. Apocalyptic eschatology also formed an integral part of the sapiential message of Q’s Jesus.*
CHAPTER 4: “DO NOT JUDGE!” (μὴ κρίνετε) IN Q (6:37-38)

4.1 ~ RECONSTRUCTING THE Q TEXT

The Lukan and Matthean versions of Q 6:37-38 differ substantially. In fact, the only verbal agreements between the two are the admonition not to judge (μὴ κρίνετε), the motive clause that follows (μὴ κριθήτε), and the concluding supportive maxim (ἡ μέτρω μετρεῖτε [ἀντιμετρηθήσεται υμῖν]). Luke adds to the initial prohibition not to judge three further admonitions, one warning against condemning others (καταδικάζετε), another commanding people to forgive (ἀπολύστε), and yet another commanding people to give (δίδοτε) (cf. Piper 1989:37; Catchpole 1993:121). Each of these additional admonitions are then followed by a motive clause (καταδικασθήτε, ἀπολυθήσεσθε, and δοθήσεται υμῖν, respectively), similar in grammatical form and rhetorical function to the initial motive clause (μὴ κριθήτε).

These extra three admonitions and motive clauses should be seen as Lukan additions. The first means just about the same as μὴ κριθήτε, and appears somewhat superfluous. The second takes further the theme of (apocalyptic) forgiveness, a prominent theme for Luke, but not really for Q (cf. Q 12:10; 17:3-4 vs. Luke 5:20-24; 7:47-49; 11:4; 12:10; 23:34; Acts 5:31; 13:38; 26:18; cf. Kloppenborg 2006 & Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:90; see section 4.3.2 below). In adding this particular saying, Luke might have been motivated by a need to propose forgiveness as the positive flipside of judgment (cf. Piper 1989:38). The third addition latches onto the idea, already expressed in Luke (Q) 6:30, that you should give to others (cf. Tuckett 1996:432). The repetition (in both verses 30 and 38) of this admonition is unlikely to have been a product of such a compact and succinct document as Q, but not of a lengthy and elaborate gospel such as Luke (cf. Carruth 1992:89-90, in Youngquist 2011:81-82). Moreover, the directive to give to others betrays Luke’s own interests here by expressing the trademark Lukan themes of...
charity, wealth-redistribution and almsgiving (cf. Piper 1989:37-38; Kloppenborg 2006 & Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:90, 91). Luke probably added these three admonitions to replicate a “list of four,” something he has an apparent affinity for (cf. Luke 6:22, 24-26, 27-28; cf. Marriott 1925:100, in Youngquist 2011:55; Piper 1989:38). In fact, Luke might have been responsible for elaborating other Q material in this way, notably Q 6:22 and Q 6:27-28 (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:91). None of these additional sayings are developed by the supportive argumentation that immediately follows in Q. Also, there are no real satisfactory explanations for why Matthew would have deleted these three admonitions if he had any knowledge of them (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:90-91).

There are a few reasons for rejecting the popular argument that these additional admonitions contain “un-Lukan terminology” (unlukanische Ausdrücke), and should therefore be accepted as part of Q (cf. e.g. Schweizer 1982:82, in Youngquist 2011:60). Firstly, even if both the vocabulary and style of these additions were “un-Lukan” – something denied by the current author – the thematic content of these additions are, as we have seen, genuinely and essentially Lukan. Secondly, although the stylistic form of these additional admonitions is not typically Lukan, the style is explicable as an attempt by Luke to create a fourfold parallelism by modelling his additions after the original admonition (Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε, καὶ οὐ μὴ κριθῆτε). Thirdly, at least two of the words (ἀπολύω & δίδωμι) featured in these additional admonitions are well-known to Luke (cf. Moulten & Geden 1963 s.v. ἀπολύω & δίδωμι). Each of these words appear twice in the Lukan context – once in the active voice, and once in the passive voice. The verb in the remaining admonition (καταδικάζω) is indeed a hapax in Luke, but it is also unattested in Q, and very unpopular in the rest of the New Testament, where it appears only three additional times – twice in Matthew, and once in James (cf. Moulten & Geden 1963 s.v. καταδικάζω; cf. also Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:91). Luke was certainly not unfamiliar with the concept expressed by the verb καταδικάζω, seeing as he used the noun καταδίκη in Acts 25:15 – its only appearance in the New Testament (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:91). Fourthly, it makes sense why Luke would have used this uncommon verb in the current context. The verb καταδικάζω is more specific than the
verb κρίνω, and Luke probably wanted to clarify the exact application of the admonition not to judge (cf. Patton 1916:289, in Youngquist 2011:69). Also, Luke needed to find a word that was fairly close to, if not synonymous with, κρίνω, in order to create his fourfold parallelism, which consisted of two negative legs (Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε, καὶ οὐ μὴ κριθήτε καὶ μὴ καταδικάζετε, καὶ οὐ μὴ καταδικασθήτε), and two positive legs (ἀπολύτε, καὶ ἀπολυθήσεσθε δίδοτε, καὶ δοθήσεται ύμῖν) (cf. Drury 1976:136, in Youngquist 2011:73). Thus, Luke’s appendage of καταδικάζω both mimics and heightens the Q admonition against judgment (cf. Fleddermann 2005:295, in Youngquist 2011:84).

In Luke, the admonition to give is followed by a strange sentence: “A good measure, pressed down, shaken together and running over, will be poured into your lap” (μέτρον καλὸν πεπιεσμένον σεσαλευμένον ὑπερεχυνόμενον δώσουσιν εἰς τὸν κόλπον ύμῶν). This maxim recalls “the Palestinian custom of using the fold of a garment as a container for grain” (Catchpole 1986:124, in Youngquist 2011:60). Not only for this reason, but also because it rather looks like a traditional maxim, is it unlikely to have been created by Luke ex nihilo, and might even have formed part of the Jesus tradition at some stage (cf. Catchpole 1986:124, in Youngquist 2011:60; Tuckett 1996:430).

However, this sentence makes more sense in its Lukan position than it would in Q. Luke attempts to motivate the preceding admonition by arguing that if you give to others, you will receive more than the content of what you gave in the first place. The vocabulary and imagery of this statement (cf. esp. μέτρον) naturally links it to the subsequent Q saying: “For with the measure you measure, it will be measured to you” (ὁ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε ἀντιμετρηθῆσεται ύμῖν). However, despite this superficial correlation between the two, the Lukan saying actually contradicts the Q saying (cf. Blair 1896:100, in Youngquist 2011:67). The former claims that you will receive more than what you give out, while the latter claims that you will receive exactly the same as what you give out (cf. Fairchiland 1989:106, in Youngquist 2011:61). Hence, Q 6:38 does not logically fit into its Lukan placement. It does not make sense as a motivation for the admonition to give (δίδοτε). If you only got back what you gave, what would be the motivating factor?
Luke’s justification – that you would receive more than what you gave – makes much more sense as a motivating factor for the admonition to give (cf. Montefiore 1927:420 & Schweizer 1982:82, in Youngquist 2011:70, 75). Conversely, Q’s motivation – that you will receive exactly what you give – makes much more sense in its Q position after the admonition not to judge than in its Lukan position (cf. Montefiore 1927:420, in Youngquist 2011:70). The knowledge that you will be judged just as harshly as your own judgment of others would be an excellent incentive not to cast judgment. Moreover, the occurrence in this passage of two words (σεσαλευμένον & κόλπον) that are Lukan favourites supports the notion that he added this saying to the Q context (cf. Marriott 1925:99, in Youngquist 2011:55). Finally, Mark (4:24) adds the phrase “and even more” (καὶ προστεθῆσεται ύμῖν) to his version of the “measurement” logion in Q 6:38. Luke was probably tempted by this parallel saying in Mark to add an extra motivating maxim - μέτρον καλὸν πεπιεσμένον σεσαλευμένον ύπερεκχυμάνην δώσουσιν εἰς τὸν κόλπον ύμῶν - to his version of the teaching (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:92). Both the Markan and Lukan variations have the effect of increasing the expected reward to “more than” what was “measured” in the first place. In light of all this, we have to conclude that only the verbal agreements with Matthew can be taken from Luke as part of Q.

Luke’s elaboration of Q 6:37-38 was quite masterful. First he added a few extra admonitions. One of these (δίδοτε) allowed him to add a traditional maxim as a supporting maxim (cf. Tuckett 1996:432). The latter maxim not only had the same imagery as the original Q saying, but also produced the same effect as the Markan parallel. Adding this traditional maxim about measurements to the teaching in question then allowed Luke to affix the Q saying about measurements directly after it, without much difficulty (cf. Vaage 1986, in Youngquist 2011:77). In the process, however, Luke managed to (unintentionally) contradict himself. Luke’s elaboration of the Q text was probably motivated by two factors: (1) He wanted to smooth out the (apparent) abrupt introduction of a new theme in Q 6:38. (2) He wanted to emphasise more than Q the positive side of apocalyptic judgment, which included “forgiveness” and “receiving more than what was given” (cf. Catchpole 1993:123).
Matthew has only one phrase added to the verbatim agreement between Luke and Matthew: “For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged” (ἐν ὁ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε). The latter agrees syntactically, formally and grammatically with the maxim in Q 6:38, resulting in a strong parallelism between the two (cf. Marshall 1978:266, in Youngquist 2011:44; Piper 1989:38; Catchpole 1993:121). Both are introduced by a relative pronoun in the dative case (ὁ), and the conjunction γὰρ, directly followed by a dative noun (κρίματι & μέτρῳ), a second-person, present, indicative, active verb (κρίνετε & μετρείτε), and a future, indicative, passive verb (κριθήσεσθε & μετρηθήσεται). Matthew’s general affinity for parallelisms, and his specific affinity for introducing or creating them when copying Jesus’ sayings, suggests that he probably added ἐν ὁ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε here (cf. Luz 1985:51, in Youngquist 2011:45).

Matthew must have thought that the Q maxim (ὁ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρείτε μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν) was too vague, and too easy to misapply. His addition of ἐν ὁ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε should be seen as an attempt to clarify the meaning and application of Q’s maxim. Matthew thereby spells out the intended meaning of Q (cf. Reiser 1990:251-252, in Youngquist 2011:46). In his Sermon on the Mount, Matthew shows great interest in the topics of “reciprocity” and “judgment” (cf. Carruth 1992:89, in Youngquist 2011:47; Youngquist 2011:52). In fact, Matthew shows a particular interest in the theme of “reciprocal judgment” elsewhere in his gospel (cf. Mat 5:21-26, 40; 23:32-33; see Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:53-54). His need to clarify a saying that deals with reciprocal judgment is therefore understandable. This was quite unnecessary, however.

The application of the Q maxim to the admonition not to judge invariably leads to the same interpretation. The Q text makes perfect sense without the addition of Matthew’s explanatory maxim. Additionally, Matthew’s need to add this explanatory line might have been motivated by the (seemingly) abrupt introduction of a new theme in Q 6:38 (cf. Piper 1989:38). Thus, Matthew attempted not only to explain the maxim in Q 6:38, but also to introduce a more seamless transition between the admonition in Q 6:37 and the maxim in Q 6:38 (cf. Piper 1989:38).
Luke might also have been attempting to introduce a more seamless transition, but went about it in a different way. Whereas Luke introduced three additional admonitions, and a supporting maxim that was thematically similar to Q 6:38, Matthew added an explanatory maxim that was formally and grammatically similar to Q 6:38 (cf. Davies & Allison 1988:669 & Becker 1996:308, in Youngquist 2011:46, 48; cf. also Catchpole 1993:121). The likelihood that both evangelists attempted to smooth out the transition between Q 6:37 and Q 6:38, as well as the fact that they employed two utterly different strategies to achieve this smooth transition, support the current proposition that Matthew added ἐν ὃ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε to the Q text (cf. Piper 1989:38; Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:53). It also validates our previous conclusion that Luke added three admonitions and a maxim to Q. In the end, ἐν ὃ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε seems rather superfluous and redundant in a Q context, where pithy sayings are the norm, rather than the exception. Moreover, if the phrase ἐν ὃ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε was indeed part of Q, why would Luke have left it behind (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:53)? Luke had no clear theological reasons for doing so. In fact, the mere absence of this Matthean addition in Luke should warn us against adding it to Q (cf. Reiser 1990:251, in Youngquist 2011:40; Catchpole 1993:121). The conclusion seems justified: The phrase ἐν ὃ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε should be seen as a Matthean addition.

This leaves us with a few minor uncertainties. Luke begins the admonition not to judge with the conjunction καί, while Matthew has no conjunction. This admonition probably followed Q 6:36, another admonition about showing mercy. In the literary context of Q, the conjunction καί would have functioned to connect the two admonitions of verses 36 and 37, respectively (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:180). The need to link verses 36 and 37 is explicable on account of the thematic and formal similarities between them (see below). Moreover, Luke is highly unlikely to have introduced the ineloquent καί at this point, seeing as the use of a resumptive καί is not a trademark feature of Luke’s own style (cf. Marriott 1925:92-93 & Carruth 1992:88, in Youngquist 2011:22). In fact, he frequently omits or replaces the resumptive καί in his redactional copying of other sources, especially Mark. Whenever the resumptive καί is present in Luke, it is routinely attributable to his source at that point. Matthew also tends to dispose of the resumptive
καὶ in his sources, which explains why it is not present in the Matthean version of this logion. Since Matthew had, in his gospel, already covered the theme of “mercy” comprehensively, and since he was introducing a new section in chapter 7, his omission here of καὶ coheres completely with his redactional activities (cf. Worden 1973:319 & Gundry 1982:120 & Carruth 1992:88, in Youngquist 2011:24-25). For these reasons, Luke’s καὶ should probably be accepted as stemming from Q.

As with his other motive clauses, Luke begins the one about judgment with another καὶ, and both negative particles: οὐ μη. There are text-critical issues and uncertainties with Luke’s use of καὶ οὐ here. A number of text variants prefer the conjunction ἵνα in its place. Unsurprisingly, this is exactly what Matthew has. Matthew’s text leads in the motive clause with the conjunction ἵνα. The different reading in Luke could be explained as an effort by copiers of Luke to align the third gospel more with the first. However, a genuine, alternative version of this verse in Luke could also explain the textual variation. This uncertainty in Luke gives precedence to the Matthean version, which introduces the motive clause with ἵνα μη. Seeing as both gospels use μη, and both gospels betray traditions of using ἵνα, the construct ἵνα μη should probably be preferred as the most original Q rendition. Against this conclusion, it could be stated (1) that Luke is not averse to the Matthean construction ἵνα μη, which features elsewhere in his gospel; (2) that Matthew tends to add the construction ἵνα μη to his sources, especially Mark; and (3) that Luke’s οὐ μη occurs frequently in all three gospels, most commonly in Jesus’ sayings (cf. Youngquist 2011:37). These observations are not determinative, however. Luke does in fact have a tendency to remove ἵνα [μη] from his sources, sometimes replacing it with an οὐ [μη]-type construction (cf. Luke 8:17; 18:18; 22:4; 23:25; cf. Cadbury 1920:137, in Youngquist 2011:34). He also has a habit of adding καὶ whenever it might help a sentence read more smoothly (cf. Harnack 1907:31, in Youngquist 2011:34). In my view, the text-critical difficulties with Luke’s οὐ μη should be decisive at this point. Moreover, the Lukan use of οὐ with μη looks very much like an attempt to (over)emphasise and dogmatise this motive clause (cf. Vaage 1986, in Youngquist 2011:34). In doing so, Luke transgresses beyond the borders of Q, which is simply interested in communicating morality and wisdom at this point.
Matthew begins the Q maxim in verse 38 with καὶ ἐν. The preposition ἐν is superfluous, and explicable in the Matthean context as a need to parallel the same preposition in the phrase ἐν ὑ ὅγαρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε. It is somewhat probable that Matthew was copying Mark’s (4:24) ἐν here, and not that of Q. He might have done the same thing when copying Q 3:16-17 (par. Mark 1:7-8) and Q 14:34 (par. Mark 9:50) (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:116). On the other hand, Luke has a tendency to drop the instrumental ἐν from his sources, and might have done so here, precisely because it is superfluous in its current Q context (cf. Cadbury 1920:204 & Carruth 1992:90 & Fleddermann 1995:85; 2005:115 & Youngquist 2006 & Kloppenborg 2006, in Youngquist 2011:113, 114, 115). However, Luke does not always avoid the instrumental use of ἐν (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:116). In fact, he retains it quite often when copying his sources. More significantly, he often produces it autonomously, not only in Sondergut material (cf. Luke 22:49), but also when he is rephrasing Mark (cf. e.g. Luke 4:32 // Mark 1:22; Luke 21:19 // Mark 13:13). Against most scholars, I believe that, in this instance, Matthew preferred Mark’s ἐν over and above Q’s lack thereof, because it enabled him to create an even better parallel with his ἐν ὑ ὅγαρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε – a probability that is largely overlooked by scholars (see Youngquist 2011:113-116). The conjunction καὶ links the Matthean ἐν ὑ ὅγαρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε to the Q maxim copied by him. Thus, once we accept that Matthew added the explanatory maxim ἐν ὑ ὅγαρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε to the original Q text, his use of καὶ ἐν before the authentic Q maxim also becomes explicable.

Luke introduces the Q maxim with the conjunction γάρ, but Matthew does not. On the other hand, Matthew introduces his explanatory maxim with the very same conjunction (cf. Reiser 1990:250 & Fleddermann 1995:85, in Youngquist 2011:93, 94). One can understand why Matthew would move the conjunction back one phrase. When he added an additional maxim between Q’s motive clause and Q’s maxim, he was forced by the linguistic rules of Greek to move the conjunction γάρ backwards, so that it would still follow the motive clause (cf. Carruth 1992:90 & Gundry 1982:120, in Youngquist 2011:93, 96). Hence, the earlier conclusion that Matthew added the phrase ἐν ὑ γάρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε to Q is currently substantiated, seeing as it provides the best
explanation of the differences between the two gospels, especially their respective usages of the conjunctions and prepositions they inherited from Q (cf. Fleddermann 1995:85, in Youngquist 2011:48). The likelihood that γάρ stood in Q is also substantiated by the agreement between Luke and Matthew in their act of reproducing this preposition against Mark (4:24), who lacks it (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:97).


We are now ready to produce a reconstruction of the Q text:

37 Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε, ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε·
38 ὡς γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθήσεται υμῖν.

37 And do not judge, so that you are not judged;
38 for with that measurement you measure with, it will be measured to you.
There are three formal indicators of the likelihood that verses 37 and 38 want to be read together. The first is the (semi)colon at the end of verse 37. The second is the use of the conjunction γάρ at the beginning of verse 38. The third is the fact that verse 38 begins with the relative pronoun ὃ. Although this pronoun is in congruence with a noun (μέτρῳ) in verse 38 (as opposed to verse 37), the decision to place this pronoun first in the sentence structure signals a deliberate choice to link the two verses. As such, the relative pronoun ὃ deliberately associates μέτρῳ with the implied “judgment” of verse 37. There is a poetic simplicity to the saying as we have constructed it. Verses 37 and 38 are in parallel. Both begin with an active verb (κρίνετε & μετρεῖτε), and is then followed by a passive verb (κριθήτε & μετρηθήσεται). The two verbs of prohibition (or negative admonition) in verse 37 (μὴ κρίνετε & μὴ κριθήτε) are followed by two indicative verbs in verse 38 (μετρεῖτε & μετρηθήσεται). The two verbs of verse 37 have the same stem (κρίνω). This is paralleled by the fact that the two verbs of verse 38 also have the same stem (μετρέω). Two of the features just identified are paralleled in verse 36. In verse 36, the same stem (οἰκτίρμων / τέλειος) is also reproduced. Furthermore, verse 36 also produces an imperative verb of (positive) admonition (Γίνεσθε in Luke), followed by an indicative verb (ἔστιν). Hence, there is a fair bit of formal agreement between the admonitions in verses 36 and 37-38, respectively. It follows that our reconstruction of Q 6:37-38 not only makes the best linguistic sense of the two applicable verses (internally), but also fits in perfectly with the immediate literary context of Q (externally).

Due to the slight stylistic agreement between verse 36 and verses 37-38, a case could be made for relating the maxim in verse 38 to both preceding admonitions. In that case, the maxim could be interpreted “either salvifically or judgmentally” (Catchpole 1993:121). Without disregarding such a possibility completely, our focus is rather on the logion in Q 6:37-38, and the internal relationship between its constituent forms. In any case, the text does seem to prefer and advocate a reading that puts most of its weight on the connection between verses 37 and 38. In the first place, there are a number of formal links between verses 37 and 38, but not one between verses 36 and 38. Secondly, the stylistic linkage between verses 36 and 38 is much weaker than that between verses 37 and 38. Thirdly, to state the obvious, verse 38 is sequentially closer to verse 37 than to verse 36. In the
fourth place, the maxim in verse 38 clarifies and substantiates the reciprocal theme of the motive clause in verse 37, not the *imitatio Dei* theme of the motive clause in verse 36. Lastly, Matthew understood the maxim in verse 38 as an exclusive reference to judgment. Although Luke added the positive values of “forgiveness” and “generosity” to the mix, these were not in reference to the Q maxim itself. Thus, our case for attaching the maxim in verse 38 directly to the preceding admonition, and only tentatively (and secondarily) to the mercy logion, is based on the form, style, order, rhetoric and subsequent interpretation of the literary text.

### 4.2 - MICRO-GENRE

It was argued in section 3.2.4 above that Q 6:20a introduces the inaugural sermon as a sapiential genre. The whole sermon should indeed be seen as a piece of wisdom teaching. Although some scholars question the sapiential nature of individual sayings in the inaugural sermon – most notably, Q 6:20-23 and Q 6:47-49 (cf. e.g. Sato 1988:4; Hoffmann 1995:188; Tuckett 1996:160-161, 337; Allison 1997:5) – they all admit to the obvious sapiential nature of the inaugural sermon as a whole (cf. Horsley 1999:88). The fact that Q 6:37-38 appears within the literary context of the inaugural sermon provides enough justification for classifying this individual logion as part of the wisdom genre. Nevertheless, the micro-genre of Q 6:37-38 must still be examined in its own right.

Regarding form, there are a number of good reasons for categorising Q 6:37-38 as a sapiential logion. The saying begins with a prohibition, and is immediately followed by a motive clause (cf. Edwards 1976:89; Kloppenborg 1987a:180; Piper 1989:36-37; cf. also Murphy 1981:6; Winton 1990:28; Ceresko 1999:35). The prohibition-and-motive-clause construction is then substantiated by the maxim in verse 38 (cf. Murphy 1981:4; Kirk 1998:91). Not only are there three traditional wisdom forms – i.e. the prohibition or negative admonition, the motive clause, and the maxim – but the last two clauses are also argumentative in nature. The first provides a rhetorical reason for obeying the initial prohibition. However, the reason provided is not self-evident. In other words, it is not obvious that people would be judged if they judge others. This claim needs to be
substantiated. As the conjunction γὰρ clearly shows, the maxim in verse 38 provides exactly this: additional justification that the claim the verse 37 is actually true (cf. Piper 1989:61-62). Particularly telling is that the maxim in verse 38 was a traditional wisdom saying of the time (cf. Mark 4:24; cf. Perdue 1986:10; Piper 1989:38). As such, verse 38 provides “gnomic authority to the opening admonition” (Kirk 1998:168). The whole logion is argumentative and rational in nature and form. Added to the sapiential small forms, and the argumentative nature of the logion, is the parallelism pointed out in section 4.1 above. These three formal characteristics, if considered together, leave little doubt that the logion should be classified under the category of “wisdom genre.” The use of a traditional wisdom saying in verse 38 puts this genre-classification entirely beyond doubt.

Could the same be said of the logion’s thematic content, however? After discussing the characteristic traits of wisdom literature, Crenshaw (2010:16) asserts: “It follows that wisdom is the reasoned search for specific ways to assure wellbeing and the implementation of those discoveries in daily existence.” Q 6:37 is undoubtedly concerned with the “wellbeing” of its hearers, as is evident from the phrase ἵνα μὴ κρίνετε. It is also concerned with the implementation of the saying in “daily existence,” seeing as the admonition μὴ κρίνετε attempts to direct behaviour towards other people (cf. Piper 1989:44). Crenshaw (2010:16) goes on to say: “Wisdom addresses natural, human and theological dimensions of reality, and constitutes an attitude towards life, a living tradition, and a literary corpus.” Q 6:37-38 undeniably addresses “human dimensions of reality.” Whether you are the subject or object of judgment, the act thereof formed as much a part of ancient everyday life as it does of modern everyday life. The saying also constitutes an “attitude towards life.” It’s goal is to persuade people to live without feelings of judgment in their hearts (cf. Piper 1989:44). Overall, the logion does seem to promote ideals comparable to other wisdom literature. This does not necessarily mean that we are here dealing with conventional wisdom. Such a conclusion can only be reached after comparing this piece of wisdom with other sapiential messages and texts.
It is something of an axiom that wisdom traditions tended to motivate and substantiate their individual wisdom sayings by drawing, above all else, on both nature and human conduct. Like most maxims, the one in verse 38 coheres to this general rule of thumb by substantiating the claim in verse 37 with an image from everyday human conduct (cf. Piper 1989:38). The image evoked by the maxim is, of course, that of barter exchanges, especially in the ancient marketplace, where common household goods, and everyday staple foods, were measured out to determine their cost (cf. Duling 1995:170-171, in Youngquist 2011:48). That the Q people were familiar with the marketplace is evidenced by Q 7:32 and Q 11:43. The bartering of goods was reliant upon the social value of reciprocity. People exchanged goods of the same or similar value. In order to ensure that this was indeed the case, goods were measured by means of scales, balances and weights. Thus, the measurement (or value) of goods a person gave up during a reciprocal exchange was similar, or the same, as the measurement (or value) of goods received in return. The saying in verse 38 is, therefore, a truism, observable everywhere, and all the time. Maxims like this one tended to be based on experience and observation (cf. Murphy 1981:4; Kirk 1998:91). In other words, the saying in verse 37 is substantiated by relating the abstract subject matter of moral judgment to the way in which reciprocity plays out in normal, daily, run-of-the-mill barter exchanges (cf. Duling 1995:170-171, in Youngquist 2011:48).

On a purely literal level, the relationship between the prohibition and the motive clause is one of reciprocity. The ancient social value of reciprocity ensured the equal distribution of goods within the village (see Malina 1993:99-103; cf. also Oakman 2008:137-138). However, reciprocity also regulated the distribution of abstract values in ancient societies, like honour, mercy, love, and the like. If someone showed kindness to you, you were obliged to return the favour. You remained indebted to that person, unless and until you were able to show the same measure of kindness in return. Reciprocity also applied to negative values, such as hate and envy, in which cases reciprocity encouraged, and translated into, retribution and the principle of *jus talionis* (or the “law of retribution”). According to the principle of *jus talionis*, a person will receive the same evil in return that he or she inflicts upon another person (cf. Piper 1989:38-39; Catchpole 1993:107).
The logion in Q 6:37-38 is, therefore, a piece of experiential wisdom that would have made perfect sense as a reference to the reciprocal principle of *jus talionis*, without the need for additional explanation (cf. Edwards 1976:89; Piper 1989:39). If you judge others, they will judge you. This was how society worked.

As a wisdom saying, there would also have been a cause-and-effect aspect to the argument. Wisdom kept itself busy with analysing the patterns in nature and in human life. In other words, the statement “If you judge others, they will judge you” is a social pattern observed by sages in the cause-and-effect schema of daily life (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:180 n. 45; Piper 1989:38). The implied truism on which the saying in verse 37 is based – i.e. if you judge others, they will judge you – is the result of both a sapiential analysis of human behaviour, and the social value of reciprocity. Thus, the prohibition not to judge is supported by a motive clause that appeals both to common wisdom, and to the ancient value of reciprocity. In turn, the abstract concept of moral judgment in the motive clause is supported in the subsequent maxim by the concrete idea of measuring goods. Thus, an abstract argument is substantiated by concrete evidence. Cumulatively, we have made a very strong argument for viewing Q 6:37-38 as a wisdom saying. Firstly, the saying appears within the inaugural sermon, which is deliberately introduced as a piece of “wisdom teaching.” Secondly, all the formal characteristics indisputably point to wisdom. Thirdly, the thematic content, read literally, are directly aligned with the genre conventions of wisdom material. There should be no doubt that, besides the sapiential nature of this logion, eschatological themes and images are also implied (see sections 4.3 & 4.4 below). However, the most obvious and literal rendering of this logion’s thematic content compels us to classify the saying as a sapiential logion.

The micro-genre of the wisdom saying in Q 6:37-38 is either that of an Instruction, or that of a *chreia*. In order for a wisdom saying (or action) to be a *chreia*, it needs to adhere to the following criteria (cf. Hock & O’Neil 1986:26; Robbins 1996:61): (1) The saying (or action) must be expressed concisely; (2) It must be introduced by a short story or anecdote; (3) The main character of the anecdote must be overtly mentioned, and must be a particular personage; (4) The function of the anecdote must be to contextualise the
particular wisdom saying; (5) There must be a causal and thematic link between the anecdote and the saying (or action); (6) The function of the anecdote must also be to provide a clearer understanding of the saying (or action) in question. Regarding the last criterion, the interpreter should ask herself the following: “If the anecdote is removed, does the saying (or action) lose some of its meaning or impact?” If the answer is “no,” then the logion in question is not a chreia.

Regarding the second criterion, the inaugural sermon is indeed introduced by a very short story in Q 6:20a. It is not clear, however, that this introduction should be seen as an anecdote. Nothing particularly out-of-the-ordinary happens. Regarding the third criterion, Jesus is indeed mentioned explicitly. It is the first, fourth, fifth and sixth criteria, however, that seem to halt any designations of the inaugural sermon as a chreia. Although each of the logia in the inaugural sermon is “expressed concisely,” the sermon as a whole is introduced by Q 6:20a. Thus, the saying introduced by the short story in verse 20a is not concise at all. With regards to the fourth criterion, one could argue that the short story of verse 20a in some sense contextualises that which follows. The function of the sermon’s introduction, however, is not primarily to contextualise the sayings that follow, but rather to introduce Jesus as a wisdom teacher at the beginning of his public career in Q. This becomes clear if one applies the sixth criterion to the inaugural sermon. None of these sayings would become any less obvious in meaning if you should remove the introduction in verse 20a. Neither would they sacrifice their rhetorical impact in any way. Lastly, although there might have been a causal link between the introduction and the sermon itself – in the sense that the sermon followed directly after Jesus raised his eyes – there is absolutely no thematic link between the introduction and the sermon itself. As such, neither the inaugural sermon, nor any constituent part thereof, should be classified under the heading “chreia.”

Does this then, by default, mean that Q 6:37-38 should be seen as an Instruction? I believe so. Admonitions – and imperatives as their form-critical indicators – abound in the inaugural sermon. Although not determinative, such a compounding of admonitions, as a feature, is most prominent within the wisdom genre of Instruction (cf. Kloppenborg
Furthermore, attributing a saying to a particular sage was not only the territory of the *chreiai*, but also a distinctive feature of the Instructional genre (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:265, 277, 317). Regarding Q 6:37-38 in particular, the formal criteria identified above were trademark features, not only of wisdom material in general, but also of Instructional speeches, specifically (see Kirk 1998:167-168). Moreover, the thematic content and intention of Q 6:37-38 cohere with the content and intention of most Instructional speeches. Lastly, making use of a traditional piece of wisdom, like the maxim in verse 38, was more characteristic of Instructions than of *chreiai*.

Rhetorically, verse 37 acts as an enthymeme. Robbins (1998:191) defines an enthymeme as “…an assertion that is expressed as a syllogism.” Although one of the notable features of an enthymeme is the presence of a rationale, usually introduced by causal conjunctions, such as ἵνα, ὅτι or γάρ (cf. Robbins 1998:191), the absence of a rationale “may not mean that an enthymeme was not intended” (Vinson 1991:119). Furthermore, although it was characteristic of an enthymeme to leave a premise or conclusion unexpressed, being confident that the premise or conclusion was obvious enough to be inferred by the audience (Robbins 1998:191-192), this was not always the case (cf. Mack 1990:39; Robbins 1996:59). In other words, although the presence of a rationale and the suppression of a premise or conclusion are trademark characteristics of an enthymeme, these characteristics are not absolutely determinative when trying to decide whether a saying is an enthymeme or not. The saying in Q 6:37 is expressed syllogistically. The unexpressed major premise is that, if you judge other people, you will also be judged. If this saying is unpacked in terms of logical and deductive thinking, the argument looks something like this:

(a) If you judge someone else, you will also be judged.
(b) So do not judge other people,
(c) in order that you may not be judged.
There is no inherent or apparent logic in the assumption that you will also be judged if you judge other people. It is only if (a) above is known, and perhaps taken for granted, that (c) is the logical result of (b). Matthew was probably concerned that his audience would not be able to infer the major premise, and added it (perhaps unnecessarily) to the Q text (cf. Henderson 1996:258 & Fleddermann 2005:294-295, in Youngquist 2011:49). The high probability that we are dealing with an enthymeme is supported by the following characteristics of Q 6:37: (1) The logion is syllogistic in nature. (2) It contains a rationale that is introduced by ἵνα. (3) The major premise is left unexpressed. A maxim is finally added to the enthymeme in order to clarify and support the unexpressed major premise. So far, the logion in Q 6:37-38 has been considered at face value, and on its own, as a wisdom Instruction. The literary context was ignored. Here is a diagrammed summary of our present results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logion</th>
<th>Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε</th>
<th>ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small form</td>
<td>Prohibition</td>
<td>Motive clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Jesus' and/or Q's Audience</td>
<td>Other people in general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>Other people in general</td>
<td>Jesus' and/or Q's Audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Influence moral behaviour</td>
<td>Support the prohibition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logion</th>
<th>ὡ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε</th>
<th>μετρηθῆσαι ύμῖν.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small form</td>
<td>Maxim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Jesus' and/or Q's Audience</td>
<td>Measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>Measurement</td>
<td>Jesus' and/or Q's Audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Support the previous logion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As will be discovered in section 4.3.1 below, the verbs κριθῆτε and μετρηθῆσαι are probably also examples of the divine passive, in which case the subject of both actions is God (cf. Robbins 1998:196; Kirk 1998:168). Although the divine passive was commonly used in apocalyptic and prophetic material, it was not exclusive to those writings. The divine passive was also used in wisdom literature. According to ancient wisdom, people were responsible for their own fate, because of the choices they made. Nevertheless, God was still in complete control of the whole system. As such, he managed and determined both the daily, and the ultimate, fate of each person on earth. In wisdom writings, the
divine passive expressed this role of God in the daily lives of people. It follows for our current saying that the use of two divine passives (κριθῆτε & μετρηθῆσεται) does not necessarily indicate the presence of prophecy or apocalypticism. Instead, the current application of divine passives is in perfect harmony with the sapiential worldview. If κριθῆτε and μετρηθῆσεται are indeed divine passives, it nonetheless has an impact on our understanding of the current logion. In this case, the subject of each of these verbs is no longer “other people in general,” but God. In other words, if you judge other people, God will judge you. Seen as a wisdom text, the emphasis is still on causality, and on this world. Hence, your judgment of others has an impact on God’s judgment of your fate in this world. Your judgment of others is the cause, and God’s judgment of you is the result. The foregoing table then changes to the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logion</th>
<th>Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε</th>
<th>ἕνα μὴ κριθῆτε</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small form</td>
<td>Prohibition</td>
<td>Motive clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Jesus’ and/or Q’s Audience</td>
<td>God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>Other people in general</td>
<td>Jesus’ and/or Q’s Audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Influence moral behaviour</td>
<td>Support the prohibition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logion</th>
<th>ὁ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε</th>
<th>μετρηθῆσεται ὑμῖν.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small form</td>
<td>Maxim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Jesus’ and/or Q’s Audience</td>
<td>Measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>Measurement</td>
<td>Jesus’ and/or Q’s Audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Support the previous logion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both levels of meaning are probably in mind here. In other words, the intended subject of κριθῆτε is simultaneously both other people and God. Hence, if you judge other people, you will be judged in return, not only by those same people, but also by God. For ancients, the concurrent and simultaneous implication of both subjects would not have caused a contradiction. For these ancients, if other people judge you, it is because God has willed it to be so. God’s this-worldly judgment of someone was at times indirectly accomplished through other people. Put differently, other people’s direct judgment of someone was the result of God’s indirect judgment of the person in question. God controlled the everyday fate of someone by controlling the reciprocal system. Thereby,
God ensured that a person got what she gave, whether it be positive or negative. Hence, if you are judged by someone, it is probably because God is punishing you for judging someone else. In so doing, God has enacted his judgment of you.

4.3 ~ THE LITERARY CONTEXT

4.3.1 The inaugural sermon

The synchronic literary context of Q 6:37-38 is the inaugural sermon in Q. Given the positioning of this logion by both Matthew and Luke in their respective sermons on the mount and plain, this placement of the logion in Q should be accepted as a matter of fact. Matthew and Luke do differ about exactly where this logion belongs in the sermon. We will follow the great majority of scholars on this issue, and accept the Lukan order and placement as most original (see Youngquist 2011:3-21). Although scholars disagree about the diachronic history of the inaugural sermon, they are in relative agreement that, as it stands, Q 6:20-49 represents a synchronic, compositional unity (cf. Kirk 1998:390). The inaugural sermon should be subdivided into four blocks: (1) the beatitudes in Q 6:20-23; (2) the command to love one’s enemies, and supportive argumentation, in Q 6:27-35; (3) the commands to be merciful and not to judge, with supportive arguments, in Q 6:36-42; (4) the extended rhetoric to hear and obey Jesus’ teachings in Q 6:43-49.133

The themes in the beatitudes of persecution and eschatological reversal provide the foundation for the admonition in Q 6:27 to love one’s enemies (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:178; Catchpole 1993:16). The last beatitude claims that the persecuted are blessed, because their eschatological reward is great. This declaration naturally leads into the admonition to love one’s enemies, and to pray for one’s persecutors (cf. Allison

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133 This subdivision differs from that of Kloppenborg (1987a:172), but coheres largely with those of Piper (1989:36, 44, 78), Allison (1997:79-95) and Kirk (1998:158-159, 167-168, 173). However, the subdivision currently offered agrees with that of Kloppenborg against the others in connecting verse 36 more closely with verses 37-38 than verses 27-35. As such, my subdivision overlaps completely with that of Catchpole (1993:60-134).
If the persecuted are blessed in the eyes of God, then they are in an excellent position to show love to their persecutors, and to pray for them (cf. Catchpole 1993:112).

The unorthodox command to love one’s enemies is the programmatic admonition for everything that follows (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:177, 179; Kirk 1998:159). This admonition is followed by Q 6:29-30, which provides admonitory examples of how one could love an enemy in practice (cf. Piper 1989:111; see Kirk 1998:159-160). The next order of business is to substantiate the admonition rhetorically with three arguments. The first argument is that obedience to the love-of-enemies command will transform adherents into sons of God. But how does loving one’s enemy translate into divine sonship? The first argument needs substantiation, which is subsequently provided by the claim that the heavenly Father brings good and bad weather to the righteous and the sinful alike (see Kirk 1998:161-162). This is indeed a subversive piece of wisdom. Traditional sapiential logic held that God would reward the righteous and punish sinners (see Catchpole 1993:105). The maxim of verse 35 argues a different theology – one in which God rewards and punishes everyone all the same, regardless of their individual virtues or vices. This is an imitatio Dei argument, but one that relies on an alternative image of God (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:176). Thus, imitating God by showing love to one’s enemies translates for the author into sonship of the most high (cf. Ps 146:9; Sirach 4:10). The argument is that adherents of the admonition to love one’s enemies will resultantly be or become (ἐσεσθε / γένησθε)\(^{134}\) sons of God, mainly because, in doing so, they are imitating God (cf. Catchpole 1993:26).

The second argument is simply an appeal to the conventional logic and authority of the golden rule (cf Catchpole 1993:115; see Kirk 1998:163-165). Besides its function to substantiate the initial admonition, the golden rule also describes the love to be shown to enemies as an action, not just an attitude (cf. Piper 1989:83; Catchpole 1993:28). The examples of verses 29-30 support this interpretation. The third argument is one of holiness, formulated by means of a series of rhetorical questions (cf. Kloppenborg

\(^{134}\) If γένησθε is here preferred, this saying might provide yet another example of wisdom being substantiated by eschatology. Yet, Catchpole (1993:26) is probably correct in preferring both ἐσεσθε and a non-eschatological interpretation of this argument.
That verses 32 and 34 should be read in conjunction with the opening admonition in verse 27 is lexically and grammatically indicated by the repetition of ἀγαπᾶτε, and thematically indicated by the repetition of the idea to love not only one’s friends and family (cf. Allison 1997:83). The Judean people separated themselves from the Gentiles, and believed that they were morally superior to other nations – literally, “holier-than-thou.” In verses 32 and 34, Jesus argues that the Jews are not really morally superior to the Gentiles if they love only those who would love them in return, since the Gentiles do exactly the same thing. In other words, Jesus argues that the Jews should love their enemies, so that they can separate themselves from the Gentiles, and truly be holy (cf. Catchpole 1993:102). Jesus implies that this is the only way in which the Jews would in reality be able to illustrate their moral superiority to other nations. These rhetorical questions overtly describe “love of enemies” as something that must be done (ποιοσιν), thereby supporting the idea introduced by the practical examples of verses 29-30, and the golden rule, that the love in question is primarily understood as an action (cf. Piper 1989:84).

The admonition to be merciful and the commandment not to judge should be seen as a further development of the theme to love one’s enemies (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:181; Catchpole 1993:124, 128). There are no less than six reasons for reading Q 6:36-38 in relation to the admonition to love one’s enemies: (1) The admonition to show mercy is rhetorically similar to the admonition about loving one’s enemies. Both use imitatio Dei arguments (Q 6:35c-d // Q 6:36b) to support their respective admonitions. (2) The prohibition against judging others is similar in form to the admonition about loving one’s enemies. Both logia have an admonition (Q 6:27-28 // Q 6:37a), a motive clause (Q 6:35c // Q 6:37b), and a rationale (Q 6:35d // Q 6:38). (3) Q 6:27 and Q 6:36-38 are thematically similar. Both texts are concerned with promoting a morality where the wellbeing of the other party is primary. (4) There is a causal relationship between Q 6:27, on the one hand, and the two respective logia in Q 6:36 and Q 6:37-38, on the other. If you love indiscriminately, you will not only show mercy to everyone, but you will also refrain from judging others. (5) Whereas Q 6:29-30 provides concrete examples of how

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135 See below my reasons for joining verse 36 with verses 37-38.
one could love one’s enemies in practice, Q 6:36-38 provides more abstract examples of how to do the same thing. (6) There is an intertextual relationship between Q 6:27 and Q 6:36-38. The idea that one’s enemies deserved to be judged and punished – which is exactly what Q 6:37 prohibits – was widespread and commonplace in the ancient world (see Howes 2004). This traditional attitude is attested by a great number of contemporary Jewish texts (cf. e.g. Gen 14:20; Lev 26:7-8; 2 Sam 22:41; Ps 6:10; 7:6-9; 18:40; 25:18-20; Isa 1:24; Nah 1:2; Zeph 3:15; Wis. Sol. 11:8-9; 12:20-22; Sirach 51:8; Test. Jud. 23:5; Jub. 23:30-31; 30:22-23; Pseudo-Philo 31:2; 39:6; 3 Macc. 6:9-10; Qumran Scrolls 1QM XVIII:11-13; 4Q14 11:4; 1QpHab V:4-5; 4Q176 21:1-5; 4Q381 31:5, 8).

Reading Q 6:36-38 in light of the love-commandment illuminates these passages. It is rather obvious that one would show mercy to a family member or loved one, but this admonition has in mind those people who are nasty, malicious, spiteful and cruel. Q 6:36-38 can (and should) not be read separate from its context in the inaugural sermon. Showing mercy is held up as one of the ways in which the love-commandment of verse 27 must be enacted. The comparative clause in Q 6:36b represents another imitatio Dei argument, and refers back to the indiscriminate kindness of God in Q 6:35, which acts as its foundation (cf. Piper 1989:83, 86; cf. also Allison 1997:83). That verse 36 intentionally refers back to verse 35 is indicated by the repetition of the phrase “your Father” in both verses, as well as the imitatio Dei arguments in both (cf. Catchpole 1993:119, 120, 124; Kirk 1998:162). Q 6:35 describes God’s mercy, not in terms of eschatology, but as an attribute that determines the dealings of God in the daily lives of people (cf. Piper 1989:84). Thus, if verse 36b is read in conjunction with verse 35, as it should be, the admonition to be merciful is substantiated by a non-eschatological argument (contra Catchpole 1993:124). This argument could be paraphrased as follows: The fact that God indiscriminately shows mercy in the daily lives of all people obliges the audience of Q to do the same. Such a reading is substantiated by the present tense of the verb ἐστίν in verse 36. If the comparative clause in verse 36b were intended as eschatology, one would have expected to find this verb in the future tense. However, verse 36b might also be referring back to the kindness and compassion of God in the

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136 τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν in Matthew’s version of Q 6:35 and ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν in both versions of Q 6:36.
beatitudes. If so, the argument sounds a bit different: The fact that God will show mercy at the apocalyptic event obliges the recipients of that mercy to do the same in the present. Thus, if verse 36 is read in light of the beatitudes, we have yet another example of a wisdom admonition (Γίνεσθε / ἔσεσθε οἰκτίρμονες\textsuperscript{137}) being motivated by apocalyptic eschatology (ὡς ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν οἰκτίρμων ἔστιν). In this case, the gnostic present ἔστιν would indicate that mercy is a timeless attribute of God. Hence, God is already merciful in the present, even though he will only effect the eschatological reversal described by the beatitudes in the future.

Relating verse 36 to the beatitudes has an impact on the prohibition not to judge in verses 37-38, which is both an explication and the flipside of the admonition to show mercy. “The effect of the juxtaposition of 6:37-38 [with 6:36] is twofold: to interpret the ethic of non-condemnation as an act of mercy, and to see this mercy as imitation of divine action” (Kloppenborg 1987a:181). Whereas verse 36 makes use of a positive admonition to connote apocalyptic salvation, verses 37-38 use a negative admonition to connote apocalyptic judgment. In both cases, however, the admonitions themselves are not apocalyptic, but their subsequent motive clauses are. In verse 36, it is the comparison clause (ὡς ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν οἰκτίρμων ἔστιν) that must be read in juxtaposition with the beatitudes, turning it into an apocalyptic argument. In verse 37, it is the motive clause (ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε) that must be read in combination with the beatitudes (and verse 36), turning it into an apocalyptic argument.

That Q 6:37-38 alludes to apocalyptic themes is further substantiated by two factors. (1) The verbs κριθῆτε and μετρηθῆσεται are quite probably examples of the divine passive, in which case the subject of both actions is God (cf. Robbins 1998:196; Kirk 1998:168).

It was noted in section 4.2 above that the divine passive is not necessarily an indication of the presence of apocalypticism. In spite of that, the possible hint at apocalypticism should not be summarily ignored. Edwards (1969:14) long ago discovered a possible prophetic-eschatological Gattung in the New Testament. This proposed Gattung is

\textsuperscript{137} Matthew’s τέλειοι is almost certainly secondary. In the inaugural sermon, Jesus radically rewrote the Jewish Law. Matthew probably had a need to reconcile this logion with Leviticus 19:2.
typically made up of two parts containing the same verb. In the first part, the verb is usually in the active voice, and refers to human activity. In the second part, the verb is usually in the passive voice, and refers to the eschatological judgment of God. Q 6:37-38 has all these features in common with Edwards’ eschatological *Gattung*. Moreover, the fact that μετρηθήσεται is not only in the passive voice, but also in the future tense, is highly suggestive of apocalyptic intent. (2) God is expressly mentioned in the preceding logion as the enactor of divine mercy (ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν οἰκτίρμων ἔστιν), making it highly likely that God is also implied in verses 37-38 as the enactor of divine judgment (compare *m. Shab.* 127b; 151b; *t. Bab. Kam.* 9:30; *p. Bab. Kam.* 8:10; cf. Sanders 1977:133-134).

The two logia in Q 6:36-38 are wisdom texts. On the surface, they are concerned with little more than promoting a particular type of morality in the daily conduct of people. Moreover, if taken at face value, the supportive motive clauses of both admonitions are based exclusively on wisdom. However, if these motive clauses are read within the literary context of the inaugural sermon as a whole, including the beatitudes, they betray allusions to apocalypticism beneath the literal surface. In both admonitions, apocalypticism is then employed in the service of wisdom. The moral lifestyle advocated by Q 6:36-37 is reinforced and motivated by allusions to apocalyptic motifs. These conclusions about the presence of apocalyptic themes in Q 6:36-38 are only preliminary. The text neither overtly mentions apocalyptic images, nor explicitly employs apocalyptic language. If the connection between Q 6:36-38 and the beatitudes is denied, then an “unadulterated,” sapiential, non-eschatological rendering of Q 6:36-38 remains possible. This conundrum will receive attention in the subsequent section.

between “mercy” and “judgment” was traditionally expressed in one of two ways. Mercy was either seen as the exact opposite of judgment (see Catchpole 1993:117-119, 123), or mercy was an adjective that described one of the attributes of judgment.

Despite the exact nature of their interrelationship, there is an astonishing number of Jewish texts – from the Old Testament,\textsuperscript{138} the Dead Sea Scrolls,\textsuperscript{139} other contemporary Jewish intertexts,\textsuperscript{140} and the New Testament\textsuperscript{141} – that mention the words and/or concepts of “judgment” and “mercy” in the same breath. That Q also saw the concepts of mercy and judgment as inextricably linked is evidenced by Q 11:42. As such, the arguments that follow after Q 6:36-38 are intended to support both admonitions. It should be noted, though, that these supportive arguments are indeed thematically closer to the judgment logion than the mercy logion. Nonetheless, the theme of mercy is never entirely absent.

The first supporting argument is inferred by the two rhetorical questions in Q 6:39 (cf. Piper 1989:40; cf. also Horsley 1999:223). The very act of pointing out someone else’s mercilessness betrays that same trait in the one making the accusation. Likewise, the very act of passing judgment on someone else’s moral wrongdoings is morally wrong.


\textsuperscript{139} 1QS II:8-9, 14-15; IV:4-5; V:3-4; VIII:2; X:16, 20; XI:12-13; 4QS\textsuperscript{b} 4:1-2; 1, I:3; IV:1-3; 1 QM XVIII:11-13; 4QM\textsuperscript{a} 8-10, I:1-6; 1QpHab VII:16; 4Q176 19-20:1-4; 21:1-4; 11Q5 XVIII:16-18; XIX:3-5; 11Q6 a:4-8; 4Q381 33:4-9; 4QH\textsuperscript{a} IV:10-11; V:4-5, 11-12, 23; VI:17; VII:19-24; VIII:17; IX:29:33; X:24-25; XII:30-32, 36-40; XIII:1-4, 21-22; XIV:9; XV:26-30, 35; XVII:3, 8-10, 14-15, 30-31, 34; XVIII:5-9, 18, 29-32; XX:10; 4QH\textsuperscript{b} 1:1-2, 11; 4Q381 3:1-2; 7, II:1-23; II:12-15; 4Q511 III:1-4; 4Q418 81:7-8; 4Q521 2, II,9; 4Q403 I:18, 23-27; 4Q405 23, I:12; 4Q434 1, I:1-8; 4Q502 16:1-2.


When you judge other people, you yourself are transgressing. By judging other people, you are in fact drawing attention to your own misgivings, and your own infallibility. How can someone who is less than perfect judge another’s imperfection? Or, as Romans 2:1 (NIV) puts it: “You, therefore, have no excuse, you who pass judgment on someone else, for at whatever point you judge the other, you are condemning yourself, because you who pass judgment do the same things” (cf. Allison 1997:86). The acts of judging and of withholding mercy induce unfavourable results for both parties, not just the hypothetical recipient of these actions. The second argument in favour of the two relevant admonitions is the statement in verse 40 that a disciple is not superior to his teacher. Although he does not say so directly, Jesus holds up himself as a rhetorical example. In other words, this is an imitatio Jesu argument (see Kirk 1998:169, 172, 391-393). The inaugural sermon commenced with an image of a sage called Jesus, who was instructing his disciples. In verse 40, Jesus indirectly asks his disciples that they follow his lead – a request that includes the morality proposed by the current sermon – and not the lead of “blind teachers.” If Jesus showed mercy to others, and if he refrained from judging them, then his followers should do the same (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:184-185). Allison (1997:95) suggests that the sage of verse 40 should be seen as God, and not Jesus. The acceptance of this proposal would not change the essence of the current rhetoric, but simply change it from an imitatio Jesu argument to an imitatio Dei argument.

The vivid illustration of verses 41-42 constitutes the third argument (cf. Horsley 1999:223). This striking image from everyday, human experience latches on to the first argument’s theme of impaired vision (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:182; see Kirk 1998:170-171). Apart from the theme of “blindness,” the first and third arguments also share a certain vividness, as well as the use of rhetorical questions. Lastly, the two arguments share similar concepts (cf. Catchpole 1993:127).142 The crux of the argument is easy to extract, and very similar to that of the first argument (cf. Piper 1989:40). A merciless and judgmental attitude distorts moral and spiritual vision. People who display these qualities go around looking for transgression in others, but fail to even notice their own

142 Both are about a guide and a person being guided. Both imagine a scenario where not only the guide, but also the one being guided, are hindered by the same debilitating factor. Lastly, unlike other blind-leading-the-blind sayings, the focus is on the guide and not the one being guided.
shortcomings. In fact, these shortcomings are often far worse than the transgressions that were initially identified. Jesus likens the former to a wooden beam (δοκόν), and the latter to a tiny splinter (κάρφος). Thus, the argument is that by judging others, and by withholding mercy from them, people are actually committing far worse atrocities than whatever those people were guilty of in the first place. Ironically, it is only when people rid themselves of their judgmental attitudes, that they are, in fact, capable of judgment. Moreover, when people are in this perfect position to judge, they will no longer have the desire to judge. Mercy will replace judgment! If the prohibition against judgment is read in combination with its third supportive argument, it follows that the original prohibition of verse 37a (καὶ μὴ κρίνετε) is about moral judgment, as opposed to apocalyptic or judicial judgment (cf. Piper 1989:37; Kirk 1998:171). It prohibits people from judging the moral behaviour of others.

Piper (1989:42-43) points out another way in which the third argument illuminates the initial prohibition (cf. also Catchpole 1993:128; Allīson 1997:92). The judging act is here specifically applied to one’s “brother” (τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ σου), implying that the object of the initial prohibition (καὶ μὴ κρίνετε) is a person’s “brother.” As in the African-American community, the word “brother,” in ancient Judaism, denoted not only a brother of kin, but also a fellow Jew (cf. Catchpole 1993:107, 125). However, Piper considers the cluster about judgment (Q 6:37-42) separate from its literary context in the inaugural sermon. As we saw, the prohibition against judgment should be seen as an application of the programmatic admonition to love one’s enemies. This admonition represents the most important lens for interpreting each individual component of the sermon. Conversely, Q 6:41-42 is primarily a rhetorical argument in support of the prohibition against judgment. This is its most important function in the sermon. As such, the prohibition not to judge is first and foremost a directive about how to treat one’s enemies, including fellow Jews. It is of course possible, perhaps even likely, that the prohibition against judgment particularly has Jewish enemies in mind (cf. Catchpole 1993:107), which would explain, and integrate, both the reference to enemies in verse 27, and the reference to brothers in verses 41-42. Such a view is substantiated by the mention of prophets (τοὺς προφητας / της προφητας), Gentiles (οι ἑθνικοι), and tax collectors (οι
τελώναι) in verses 32 and 34 (see Piper 1989:84-85). It also makes the best sense of
the golden rule in verse 31, as well as the allusion to Leviticus 19:18 in verse 27 (cf.
Catchpole 1993:115).

The inaugural sermon is concluded in Q 6:43-49. This fourth block of material is linked
to the previous one by similar images. Q 6:41-42 mentions a wooden beam or log
(δοκόν). The subsequent pericope speaks not only of trees (δένδρον), where wooden
beams and logs originate, but also of houses (οἰκίαι), where wooden beams and logs end
up. Furthermore, Allison (1997:93) points out that the threefold use of καρπός in verses
43-46 mirrors the threefold use of κάρφος in verses 39-42. This last block of material
should be further subdivided into two components, namely verses 43-46, on the one hand,
and verses 47-49, on the other (see Edwards 1976:90-93; Allison 1997:93-95). Neither
of these pericopes should be read as “parables” (cf. Piper 1989:47). They are,
nonetheless, thoroughly sapiential (cf. Catchpole 1993:130).

Verses 43-45 use examples from agriculture to argue that one’s deeds reveal one’s heart
(see Kirk 1998:173-175). Conversely, one’s heart instigates one’s deeds. Thus, a good
person will do good deeds, and a bad person will do bad deeds (see Robinson 1997).
That people’s deeds are being addressed is indicated, not only by the Q text itself, but
also by the familiar metaphorical use of the word “fruit” (καρπός) as a traditional
reference to deeds and their consequences (cf. e.g. Prov 31:16, 31; Ps 58:11; Jer 6:19;
17:10; Micah 7:13; Hosea 10:13; Wis. Sol. 3:13-15). It is wisdom that informs the nature
of what exactly constitutes good deeds. This, in turn, is obvious from the well-known
metaphorical use of the word “treasure” (θησαυρός), which customarily represents “the
resources of wisdom made available through instruction” (Catchpole 1993:133; cf. e.g.
Prov 2:4; Sirach 1:25; 20:30; 41:14; Wis. Sol. 7:14; Baruch 3:15; Q 12:33-34). The
wisdom of verses 43-45 is followed by a rhetorical question in verse 46: “Why do you
call me ‘master, master,’ but do not do what I say?” The point is that a student must act

143 Matthew’s mention of “Gentiles” and “tax-collectors” should in this case be preferred as deriving from
Q (cf. Catchpole 1993:102).
This cluster of sayings can not be read separate from the rest of the inaugural sermon. If so interpreted, the pericope has two converging interpretations. (1) Love, mercy and non-judgment are primarily verbs, not nouns. The instruction is not to have a change of heart, but to act differently. However, such improved conduct is impossible without an initial change of heart, which is another point of the pericope (see Piper 1989:50-51; Robinson 2007). (2) People are disciples of Jesus only if and when they act in accordance with his moral message, which entails, above all else, the admonition to love one’s enemy (cf. Edwards 1976:91; Catchpole 1993:41, 99; Kirk 1998:392). Two of the most basic and crucial ways in which a person can do this are to show mercy and to desist judging others (cf. Catchpole 1993:124, 128).

Verses 47-49 only confirm the exegesis of the foregoing pericope (cf. Edwards 1976:92; cf. also Allison 1997:94). These verses are introduced with the phrase: “Every one who hears (ἀκοόων) my sayings and acts (ποιῶν) on them...” This phrase encapsulates the intent and objective of the foregoing pericope. Jesus is not mainly teaching pleasant ethical principles, but also moral directives, intended to radically alter and transform people’s conduct. Only if and when people start implementing Jesus’ moral message on a daily basis, will their lives be built on bedrock foundations (cf. Catchpole 1993:97). Yet, people will only be able to change their conduct, if they first change their attitude. The likelihood that the first argument is specifically interested in good or bad speech does not change our current interpretation thereof (e.g. λαλεῖ τὸ στόμα in verse 45; cf. Prov 13:2; 18:20-21; Sirach 27:6; 37:22-23; cf. Catchpole 1993:132). The act of judging someone else usually finds expression in verbal communication, as is clear from the question πῶς δόνασαι λέγειν; in verse 42. In fact, the interest in speech as a demonstration of obedience to the love commandment is another feature that binds Q 6:43-45 to Q 6:41-42.
4.3.2 Apocalyptic judgment in the rest of Q

The *theme of judgment* determines the broader literary context of Q 6:37-38 within the Sayings Gospel Q. Kloppenborg’s main redaction is sometimes also referred to as the “judgment layer.” One of the central themes of this layer, as we have seen in sections 2.2.2, 2.2.4, 2.4.4, 2.5.4 and 2.6.1 above, is the announcement of apocalyptic judgment against a host of rivals, including “this generation,”\(^{144}\) Galilean towns,\(^{145}\) sceptics,\(^{146}\) and the twelve tribes of Israel.\(^{147}\) Besides the vociferous announcement of *apocalyptic* judgment, *moral* judgment is also furnished upon the specific conduct of certain religious groups, including religious authorities in general,\(^{148}\) and Pharisees and scribes in particular.\(^{149}\) In *both* of Q’s two main layers, people are judged if they do not accept the message of Jesus, whether they be family members or not.\(^{150}\) Worse yet, the moral conduct of those who *do* accept the message of Jesus, but who are too afraid to proclaim it in public, is harshly judged. Not only that, they are also threatened with apocalyptic judgment.\(^{151}\) One can not help but wonder how the inaugural sermon and these announcements of judgment could possibly co-exist in the same document (see Robinson 2007:119-139). There are a very small number of passages that seem to persist with the moral message of the inaugural sermon. Q 17:3-4, for example, preaches the innumerable forgiveness of one’s brother (see Catchpole 1993:135-150). Despite this similarity in theme, however, Q 7:3-4 does not once mention enemies or opponents as the recipients of forgiveness. Furthermore, Q 7:3 explicitly commands people to rebuke (ἐπιτίμησον) their brothers if they should sin, which directly contradicts the admonition not to judge (cf. Allison 2002:33). For the most part, the remainder of the Sayings Gospel consistently contradicts the core message of the inaugural sermon (see Robinson 2007:119-139). Whereas the inaugural sermon preaches against the judgment of others,

\(^{147}\) Cf. esp. Q 22:28, 30.
\(^{148}\) Cf. esp. Q 7:30; Q 13:30, 34-35; Q 14:11.
\(^{149}\) Cf. esp. Q 11:39b, 41-44, 46b-48, 52.
\(^{150}\) Cf. esp. Q 7:9; Q 10:10-12; Q 11:19, 23; Q 12:49, 51, 53; Q 14:26; Q 17:34-35.
\(^{151}\) Cf. esp. Q 12:8-10.
the rest of Q announces the judgment of just about every group imaginable (cf. Wink 2002:180, 189-190). Gone is the mercy and compassion of Q 6:36!

There is another side to this coin, however. The judgmental nature of the rest of Q does indeed contradict the prohibition against judgment (καὶ μὴ κρίνετε), and the intention of the logion as a whole, but it is simultaneously in continuity and harmony with the motive clause (ἲνα μὴ κριθῆτε). If the motive clause in Q 6:37b refers to God’s apocalyptic judgment, it is in perfect continuity with the announcement of God’s apocalyptic judgment in the rest of Q. Conversely, the programmatic announcement of apocalyptic judgment in all of Q supports and corroborates our earlier intuition that the motive clause in Q 6:37b alludes to apocalyptic judgment. An apocalyptic understanding of Q 6:36-38 implies that the opponents of Q deserve the apocalyptic judgment of God, because, according to Q, these opponents are merciless and judgmental by their very nature. Moreover, an apocalyptic reading of Q 6:37-38 harmonises the wisdom of this logion with the apocalypticism of the rest of Q. Therefore, the probability that apocalyptic eschatology supports the sapiential prohibition in Q 6:37-38 is currently corroborated by both the synchronic literary context of the inaugural sermon and the diachronic literary context of the rest of Q. Here follows a graphic illustration of these results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logion</th>
<th>Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε</th>
<th>΄ἲνα μὴ κριθῇτε</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small form</td>
<td>Prohibition</td>
<td>Motive clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
<td>Apocalyptic judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Jesus’ and/or Q’s Audience</td>
<td>God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>Enemies in particular</td>
<td>Jesus’ and/or Q’s Audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Influence moral behaviour</td>
<td>Support the prohibition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logion</th>
<th>ώ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε</th>
<th>μετρηθῆσαι υμῖν.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small form</td>
<td>Maxim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Jesus’ and/or Q’s Audience</td>
<td>Measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>Measurement</td>
<td>Jesus’ and/or Q’s Audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Support the previous logion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As this table clearly shows, the context of the inaugural sermon changes the object of the prohibition from “other people in general” to “enemies in particular.” Both of these readings could fit quite comfortably in a non-eschatological mould. The contexts of both the inaugural sermon and the rest of Q changes the subject of the motive clause from “other people in general” to “God.” Although it is possible that God is here implied as the enactor of non-eschatological, this-worldly justice, the prevalence of the theme of apocalyptic judgment in the rest of Q renders such a reading highly unlikely. In the rest of Q, apocalyptic judgment is meant wherever references to both God and judgment occur together in the same literary context.

4.3.3 Judicial judgment in the rest of Q

There is one last possibility for interpreting Q 6:37-38. Piper (1995a) made an important contribution to our understanding of Q by noticing, within Q’s aphoristic sayings, a thread of pessimism aimed at institutionalised violence and exploitation. More specifically, the institutionalised legal system was met with distrust, and courts were to be avoided at all costs (cf. Piper 1995a:60; cf. also Horsley 1995b:45). We do not have much information about judicial administration in Galilee. Josephus (War 2.570f.; Life 79, 128; Ant. 16.43) certainly claims that legal matters were decided in accordance with, and by appealing to, Judean law, as opposed to Roman law (cf. Horsley 1995a:232-233; Freyne 2000:79). Most likely, local elders (πρεσβύτεροι), magistrates (ἀρχόντες), village scribes (κωμογραμματεῖς), and specialists in Judean Law (νομοδιδάσκαλοι) would have dealt with village administration and minor misdemeanours, including, among other things, matters pertaining to boundary determination and burial arrangements (cf. Freyne 1988:152; Horsley 1996:150; cf. Judith 6:12-16; 8:10, 35; 10:6; 13:12; Luke 5:17). Hence, at village level, run-of-the-mill justice was oversaw at village assemblies by local community leaders (cf. Horsley 1995a:232-233; 1996:120, 149-150; cf. War 2.570-571). Hasmonaean rulers would probably have dealt with more serious crimes, and Herodian judges with major offences (cf. Freyne 1988:141-142).

152 In later Rabbinic times, local judicial leaders were referred to as parnasim and/or hazzan (cf. Horsley 1996:149-150).
Importantly, the Hasmonean rulers were likely assisted by the Pharisees, who acted as experts of Mosaic and Hasmonean law at court proceedings (see Horsley 1995a:149-151; cf. Ant. 13.295-298, 408-409). The same is probably true of the scribes mentioned in Q 11:46b. Besides being accused of assisting the aristocracy in oppressing the poor, there are hints in the woes against the Pharisees and scribes that the issue of justice in court proceedings is also at play, perhaps as a contributing factor. Q 11:42 specifically accuses the Pharisees of giving up “justice and mercy and faithfulness” – an indictment that makes all the more sense if read against a juridical background. Furthermore, the scribes mentioned in verse 46b are not just any scribes, but νομικοίς (experts in the law). These scribes were responsible for recording the very laws that had severe consequences for the people. The verb δεσμεύουσιν, in verse 46b, might also indicate a court proceeding, through which the “burdens” were made official and “binding.”

Sepphoris and Tiberias were probably centres of Roman administration, including judicial administration, in Galilee (see Horsley 1995a:163-174; cf. Life 38). Given the fact that Galilee was no longer under the direct control of Jerusalem from the time of Antipas onwards, Galilean villagers who had committed serious offences might indeed have encountered Herodian judges and legal officials. However, the predominantly Judean ethnicity of both Sepphoris and Tiberias, as well as Antipas’ policy of including Judean rulers in his administrative retinue (cf. Freyne 1988:142; Reed 2000:121-122; Chancey 2005:56), indicates that prominent Judean personalities, including perhaps Hasmonean aristocrats, Pharisees and experts in Judean law, must have participated in the court system at these two cities (cf. Freyne 1988:142; Horsley 1995a:173). Whether facing village-level or urban-level courts, therefore, peasants and rural artisans were much more likely to come into contact with Judean, than Herodian, judges. Nonetheless, the possibility of contact with Herodian judges should not be taken off the table.

The judicial issues raised by Q, as well as the imagery it utilises in this regard, are rather formal, and typical of courts at higher urban levels (cf. Reed 2000:193). Lower-level citizens were mostly suspicious of higher-level courts, and with good reason (cf. Horsley 1996:120). The interests of those from the lower levels of society would not have been protected by these judges and lawmakers (see Garnsey 1970). Urban courts were geared towards servicing the wealthy and “respected” citizens over and against the lower classes (cf. Horsley 1996:120). Being forced to appear in higher (urban) courts, or seeking legal redress from these courts, were considered extremely dishonourable by Mediterranean societies. Not only would an unfavourable outcome be shameful, but the act of appearing in court was shameful in and of itself, not least of all because it drew attention to the fact that an individual was incapable of dealing with his or her own problems and equals. Despite references to higher (urban) courts, Q (12:11-12) also has smaller ( rural) courts or village assemblies (συναγωγὰς) in mind. Based upon Q’s juxtaposition of sayings about legal matters and sayings concerned with sustenance, Piper (1995a:61-62) further argues for a relationship between the subsistence levels of the Q people and judicial proceedings in general. The official judicial system, run by the city, probably offered very little assistance in terms of poverty alleviation. On the contrary, the courts probably played their part in maintaining the status quo. These results are affirmed by the fact that much of Q concerns itself with local judicial matters. Not only were their specific judicial concerns indicative of ordinary village folk, but, conversely, they were also concerned with pressures from official courts, and matters such as corvée.

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154 These include: persecution (Q 6:28), physical assault (Q 6:29), and indebtedness (Q 6:30; Q 12:58-59).
155 These include: magistrates, judges, rulers, law suits, and litigation.
156 E.g.: 1. Q 12:4-7, 11-12 (concerned with the courts) appears directly before Q 12:22-31 (concerned with daily survival). 2. Q 11:3 (concerned with daily survival) appears directly before Q 11:4 (concerned with debt cancellation).
157 These include managing conflict (Q 6:27-29; Q 12:2-7, 11-12; Q 17:3-4); lending and borrowing (Q 6:30); corvée (Q/Mat 5:41); maintaining sustenance (Q 11:2-4, 9-13; Q 12:22-31); divorce (Q 16:18); solidarity and reconciliation (Q 15:4-10; Q 17:1-4); attitudes toward wealth (Q 12:33-34; Q 16:13); and the “workers” (Q 9:57-62; Q 10:2-11, 16).
Piper (1995a:62-63) finds evidence in Q that the Q people had not only a lack of confidence in the legal system, but also anxiety for authorities, and suspicion over administrative procedures. The institutions of power were viewed with enough apprehension to render voluntary surrender the favoured alternative. Such concerns further indicate a rather low social level. Q 6:22-23 suggests that the Q people were persecuted, and Q 16:16 suggests that the Q people were subjected to some types of violence. That such violence and persecution came from the (Roman and Judean) elite might be implied by the reference to Gehenna in Q 12:5, which was a place that particularly connoted a brand of judgment that was reserved for rulers (cf. Horsley 1999:273). Reference to a heavenly courtroom, in Q 12:8-9, might also hint at oppression from the elite, since the apocalyptic metaphor of a heavenly courtroom developed specifically in response to the incidences of earthly injustice carried out by the powers that be (cf. Horsley 1999:273-274). Q 12:4 suggests that a meeting with judicial (and other) authorities might well end up being fatal (cf. Horsley 1999:272). The tone in which the whole discourse (Q 12:2-12) is delivered suggests that injustice, suppression and repression from above were realities with which the Q people were faced. It is further interesting that the only saying in this literary context taken over by either the Didache or the Gospel of Thomas is Q 12:10, about the sin against the Holy Spirit, indicating that similar threats of injustice and oppression were totally absent by the time these later documents came into being (cf. Horsley 1999:274).

If the reference to “wolves” in Q 10:3 is understood in terms of its traditional connotation of “rulers,” this passage confirms that Q people could meet their end when dealing with authorities. Q 14:27 also implies that opposing the Romans might have lead to (a particularly painful) death. The fact that, in the Lord’s Prayer, the petition “cancel our debts” (Q 11:4) follows directly after “give us bread” (Q 11:3), probably reflects a situation where indebtedness subjected the Q people to severe poverty and starvation (cf. Horsley 1999:278; Oakman 2008:104). Moreover, in Q 11:4b, the word πειρασμόν probably connotes judicial proceedings, suggesting that indebtedness was initiated, maintained and enforced by the legal system, possibly in the form of debt contacts (cf.
A similar conclusion can be made from Q 12:58-59 (cf. Oakman 2008:225). Verse 59 puts the legal proceedings of verse 58 within the context of indebtedness. This passage advises not to go to court for the alleviation of debts, but to try and negotiate with the “legal opponent” (ἀντίδικος) before even getting to court. Within this context, the ἀντίδικος is most likely understood as a legal landowner, or some sort of creditor. The reason for such advice is simple: You will lose, be forced to pay your debt in full, and perhaps even go to prison! It is possible that Q 9:58 refers to the inevitable outcome of indebtedness that all peasants feared: losing house and home, and becoming “landless.” In general, Q betrays and endorses a negative attitude towards money (cf. Q 12:33-34; Q 16:13). It is at least possible that Q grasps and exposes the inevitable and detrimental link between monetisation and indebtedness (cf. Reed 2000:98). On the whole, Q seems concerned with the vulnerability of the underclass, in relation to both the Judean and the Roman elite. The conditions criticised by Q cohere with what is known of Galilean conditions in general, and Antipas in particular.

Regarding the administration of territorial justice, Josephus (Ant. 18.106-108) compares Antipas unfavourably with Philip (cf. Freyne 2000:214). Rather than reaffirm the Judean and Roman political and judicial institutions by calling upon them, and trusting in them for justice, sustenance and the allocation of honour, Q advocates relying on God, and the social dynamic that is his kingdom, for those things. God is contrasted with such institutions as the real source of merciful justice, endless providence and limitless honour. Furthermore, the kingdom of God is the means through which these things are provided for his children. For Q, justice at local level supersedes justice at higher levels. Local reciprocity provides sustenance. Honour is transferred from the Father to his children. Apart from these views, apocalyptic hopes of justice, sustenance and honour are also anticipated.

Suffice it to say that Q betrays a gloomy attitude to the institutionalised judicial system, and that the Q people had valid reasons for fearing not only court appearances, but also the authoritative figures who were in charge of such proceedings. It is surely possible that this genuine concern lies behind the saying in Q 6:37-38. Such an appraisal is

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158 See tractate Shebi’it 10:3-7 in the Mishnah; tractate Gittin 37a in the Talmud and Murabba’at 18.
further confirmed by the inaugural sermon, especially the examples of how to love one’s enemies in Q 6:29-30. The actions\textsuperscript{159} described by Luke 6:29 and Matthew 5:39-41 require figures of authority as subjects. If the phrase καὶ τῷ θέλοντί σοι κριθῆναι in Matthew 5:40 is accepted as part of Q, then we have an explicit reference to judicial judgment, as opposed to apocalyptic or moral judgment, in the inaugural sermon. This Matthean phrase is the only other instance where the verb κρίνω (of Q 6:37) is repeated in the rest of the inaugural sermon. It is really significant that the only other occurrence of the verb κρίνω in the inaugural sermon denotes judicial judgment, and not moral or apocalyptic judgment – that is, of course, if this Matthean phrase was part of Q.

The idea that there was a deliberate connection between these two texts from the inaugural sermon might be supported by the use of the passive verb κριθέτε in Q 6:37b. The passive of κρίνω was mostly reserved for the judicial act of standing trial (cf. Louw & Nida 1993a:555). If Q 6:37-38 is associated with the theme of juridical judgment – which appears both in Q 6:29-30 and throughout the Sayings Gospel as a whole – then this logion specifically exploits the existing fear of the institutionalised legal system to support its argument against judging other people. In such a case, the argument goes something like this: Do not act as judge and jury over other people, especially your enemies, or you yourself will inevitably face the terrifying situation of being judged in a court of law by an authoritative figure. In light of Matthew 5:40, a separate possible understanding of Q 6:37a remains open. In the literary context of the former text, the verb “judging” (κριθῆναι) is a shorthand for the act of “taking someone to court.” If this application is transferred to Q 6:37, judicial judgment is implied by both verbs. In such a case, the argument of Q 6:37 would look a bit different: Do not take people to court, especially your enemies, or you yourself will inevitably face the terrifying situation of being judged in a court of law by an authoritative figure.

\textsuperscript{159} These are: τῷ τύπτοντι σε ἐπὶ τὴν σιγόνα // ὅστις σε ῥαπίζει εἰς τὴν δεξιὰν σιγόνα [ου]; τοῦ ἀἵροντος σου τὸ ἰμάτιον // τῷ θέλοντί σοι κριθῆναι καὶ τὸν χιτώνα σου λαβεῖν: ὅστις σε ἄγγαρεύει μίλιον ἐν (Matthew only).
There is no real indication in Q 6:37a of which meaning is to be preferred, but the literary context does seem to invite a more general application than the second possibility. Q 6:27 is a general admonition to love one’s enemies, and Q 6:36 implores people to show mercy in general. Neither of these two instructions references a specific act of Torah obedience. Neither of them is comparable to the saying against divorce in Q 16:18, for example. Moreover, the three arguments in support of Q 6:37a are of a general nature, not the type of arguments you would expect in support of a specific commandment like “Do not take people to court!” This is particularly true of the third argument (Q 6:41-42), which does indeed seem to be defending a prohibition against moral judgment in general, as opposed to a specific prohibition against taking people to court. Thus, we have to conclude that the prohibition in Q 6:37a is about moral judgment in general, not about the specific act of taking people to court. The motive clause in Q 6:37b, however, could still reference judicial judgment. Here is a schematic overview of such an interpretation of Q 6:37-38:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logion</th>
<th>Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε</th>
<th>ἱνα μὴ κριθήτε</th>
<th>Small form</th>
<th>Prohibition</th>
<th>Motive clause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
<td>Judicial judgment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Jesus’ and/or Q’s Audience</td>
<td>Enemies in power, probably a human judge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>Enemies in particular</td>
<td>Jesus’ and/or Q’s Audience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Influence moral behaviour</td>
<td>Support the prohibition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again, the main difference between this interpretation and the previous two lies in the subject of the motive clause. “Other people in general” and “God” are substituted as subjects, and replaced by “enemies in power, probably a human judge.” This turns the motive clause into a statement about judicial judgment, as opposed to moral or apocalyptic judgment.
4.4 ~ THE INTERTEXTUAL CONTEXT

4.4.1 The Old Testament

The purpose of this intertextual investigation is to determine whether the passive verb in Q 6:37 has moral, judicial or apocalyptic judgment in mind. Investigating the theme of “judgment” in the Old Testament, or the use of the words “judgment” (κρίσις & κρίμα) and “judge” (δικαστής & κρίνω) in the Septuagint, will not aid much in our current goal with the investigation of Q 6:37-38. The Old Testament uses the word and concept of “judgment” in reference to all three types of judgment – moral, apocalyptic and judicial. The same is true of the concept of “mercy.” This means that the audience of Q 6:37-38 had access to all three types of judgment in the tradition. A much more promising enterprise is to focus on the saying in verse 38, paying particular attention to the connotative meaning(s) behind the verb “measure” (μετρέτε / μετρηθήσεται), and the noun “measurement” (μέτρο). It was indicated in section 4.2 above that references to “measurements” called to mind the act of measuring goods during barter exchanges, and that such references were, therefore, very good illustrations to use in sapiential statements about reciprocity and retribution. What remains is to determine whether the concept of “measurements” also induced apocalyptic and/or judicial associations.

It is well-known that the concept of psychostasia was an integral and widespread feature of Egyptian mythology (cf. Pearson 1976:249; see Brandon 1969:91-99, esp. 99). The Egyptian Book of the Dead (125) describes the final judgment as an act of weighing the hearts of the dead against justice on a pair of scales (cf. Wink 2002:178). The idea of psychostasia spread from Egypt to many other nations of the time (cf. Brandon 1969:99).

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160 Cf. e.g. Gen. 19:9; Ex. 2:14; Deut. 19:15.
161 Cf. e.g. Isa 51:5; Ezek 7:8; Joel 3:12; Zech 14:5.
162 Cf. e.g. Exod 18:26; Jos 23:2; Prov 31:9.
163 “Psychostasia” is the academic term for the weighing-of-the-soul concept (cf. Brandon 1969:91). Although the “soul” is most frequently associated with this concept in ancient literature, other items might also be weighed, like the “heart” or the “spirit.” Regardless of the exact item being measured or weighed, it was always some or other symbol for a person’s inner being (cf. Brandon 1969:91). The purpose of the weighing action remains the same in ancient literature: It was an impartial means by which some or other divine or supernatural figure determined how people should be judged.
Early Greek literature, like the *Iliad*, made regular use of the expression “weighing of the souls” to describe judgment (cf. e.g. *Iliad* 22:179, 209; cf. Wink 2002:178). Other examples from the ancient world could be added. Islam, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism and Buddhism all use imagery from psychostasia to portray impartial, post-mortem, and divine judgment (see Brandon 1969:109-110). The crucial question for our intentions is whether or not this concept of psychostasia was a recognised and recognisable feature of Second Temple Judaism. Our starting point is the key intertext for Q 6:37-38.

Leviticus 19 is indisputably the most important intertext for the inaugural sermon as a whole (see Allison 2002:29-38). Q 6:36 is mirrored by Leviticus 19:2. The second-person imperative verb of Leviticus 19:2 (σέσθε / ἐσεσθε) is replicated by a second-person imperative verb in Q 6:36 (ἐσεσθε / Γίνεσθε). Furthermore, both texts justify their imperatives with an *imitatio Dei* rationality. Yet, the Old-Testament text is significantly altered by the Q saying when it exchanges “holiness” (σεβασμός / ἁγιος) for “mercy” (οἰκτίρμονες). Thus, the *form* of the original statement (second-person imperative plus *imitatio Dei* justification) is kept intact, but the *meaning* is radically renovated with the substitution of ἁγιος for οἰκτίρμονες. Similar exegetical activities appear in rabbinical commentaries on Leviticus (cf. e.g. *Lev. Rab.* 308; *b. Shab.* 133b). Like Q 6:36, these rabbinical writings also substitute holiness for another virtue. Q 6:36 is an example of Q’s Jesus reconstructing established Mosaic Law. Q’s Jesus deliberately trades holiness for mercy (cf. Borg 1984:128). This trade-off is in continuity with the woes against the Pharisees and scribes (cf. esp. Q 11:42, 46b; see section 4.3.3 above).

The prohibition not to judge (καὶ μὴ κρίνετε) in Q 6:37a antithetically contradicts the commandment in Leviticus 19:15 to judge your neighbour (τὸν πλησίον σου). In Leviticus, the syntactical object of the judging act is one’s neighbour. This object is deliberately removed from the Q text. The removal of the syntactical object of judgment in Q is yet another indication that verse 37 should be read in combination with the admonition to love one’s enemies in Q 6:27. In other words, the prohibition against judgment does not only have family members, loved-ones or friends in mind, but all people happening to cross one’s path, including enemies. Just as with the
instruction to be merciful, Q 6:37 provocatively rewrites and reapplies conventional Mosaic Law. In the current case, however, the exact opposite of the Torah tradition is commanded. Hence, Q’s Jesus advocates the following: “Regardless of what Leviticus teaches, you must not judge other people, not even enemies!” The reconstruction and modification of Leviticus 19 is a trademark tendency of the entire inaugural sermon (see Allison 2002:33-34). This tendency was not altogether unusual in Jewish tradition (see Allison 2002:34-37). Q 6:37 adds the qualification “so that you are not judged” (ἵνα μὴ κριθήτε) to the Leviticus intertext, where it is entirely absent. The popularity and familiarity of Leviticus 19 in first-century Judaism necessarily indicates that Jewish audiences would have picked up on the relationship between the inaugural sermon and this favoured Old-Testament text (see Allison 2002:37-38). This applies not only to the general connection between these two texts, but also to the more subtle nuances and allusions to Leviticus 19 beneath the surface of the inaugural sermon.

Q supports the latter qualification by cleverly drawing upon and reapplying an entirely separate commandment in Leviticus (19:35-37). The latter text is a commandment not to be dishonest in day-to-day dealings, expressed by means of a negative admonition not to use fraudulent measuring implements, and a positive admonition to use measuring implements that are accurate. A literal translation of the Masoretic Text is quite revealing for our purposes: “You must not do injustice (בָּשִׂים) in judging (מִכְוָא) length, weight or quantity. You must have balances / scales of justice (מַלאָם יָדָרַם), stones / weights of justice (אַכְרָנִין-אֲנָבָה), an ephah / grain measure of justice (אֲפָה) and a hin / oil measure of justice (הִנָּו אֲנָב).” There are three Hebrew words in the Leviticus text that occur within the semantic field of the concept “judgment.” The first (בָּשִׂים) denotes the type of injustice or wrongdoing that would typically be carried out by an evildoer or criminal (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. בָּשִׂים; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. בָּשִׂים & יָדָר). The second (מִכְוָא) denotes a legal decision in a court case, lawsuit or arbitration (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. מִכְוָא; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. מִכְוָא). The third (אֲפָה) is repeated four times, and denotes that which is just and (legally) right (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. אֲפָה; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. אֲפָה).
In Leviticus 19:35-36, these words are used figuratively to connote unfair and dishonest dealings when goods are being sold or bartered. Hence the NIV’s paraphrase of Leviticus 19:35-36: “Do not use dishonest standards when measuring length, weight or quantity. Use honest scales and honest weights, an honest ephah and an honest hin.” The Septuagint did not translate the denotations of judgment and justice away: “You will not do injustice / dishonesty (ἀδικον) in judgment (κρίσει) in measures (μέτροις), neither with weights (σταθμίοις) nor with balancing scales (ζυγοίς). Just / fair / honest balancing scales (ζυγά δίκαια) and just / fair / honest weights (στάθμια δίκαια) and just / fair / honest dust (χούς δίκαιος) will be for you.” As with the Masoretic text, the Septuagint’s translation uses the concept of judgment or justice figuratively to connote unfair and dishonest dealings when goods are sold or bartered. The individual(s) responsible for Q 6:38 obviously noticed the references to judgment in the original Masoretic and/or Septuagint text(s) of Leviticus 19:35-36. These references to the concept of “judgment” in a text that deals with the idea of “measuring honestly” enabled Q’s Jesus to link the admonition against judging others with a normal maxim about measurements. The saying in Q 6:37-38 has two crucial words in common with the Septuagint’s version of Leviticus 19:35-36. The Q logion’s κρίνετε and κρίθητε parallel the Septuagint’s κρίσει. Also, the Septuagint’s μέτροις is repeated three times in Q 6:38 with the phrase μέτρον μετρηθήσεται. The link between Q 6:37-38 and Leviticus 19:15, 35-36 is quite ingenious, and culminates in a total revision and inversion of the original Mosaic commandments.

The Torah commandment of Leviticus 19:35-36 was incorporated into the common wisdom of Israel. Proverbs 11:1 states: “A false balance is [an] abomination to the Lord: but a just weight is his delight” (KJV). Proverbs 20:23 simply repeats the same sentiment: “Divers weights are an abomination unto the Lord; and a false balance is not good” (KJV). A third Proverb (16:11) reiterates the same basic principle: “A just weight and balance are the Lord’s: all the weights of the bag are his work” (KJV). The interesting aspect of this third saying is that it occurs in the midst of five sayings that instruct the king of Israel in particular. Proverbs 16:10, which immediately precedes the wisdom saying just quoted, states: “A divine decision (µσχ) is upon the king’s lips; in
judgment (בָּמַשְׁפָּהּ), he does / must not act unfaithfully (לָא הָכְפִיל) with his lips.” The noun בָּמַשְׁפָּהּ denotes specifically a decision or divination made with God’s assistance through the casting of lots (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. בָּמַשְׁפָּהּ). As in Leviticus 19:35-37, the word בָּמַשְׁפָּהּ denotes a legal decision in a court case, lawsuit or arbitration (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. בָּמַשְׁפָּהּ; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. בָּמַשְׁפָּהּ). When the two legs of this parallelism are taken together, the “divine decision” of the first leg signifies a legal decision made with God’s help. It follows that this wisdom saying has the king’s role as legal judge specifically in mind. Hence, the wisdom saying in verse 11, about just weights and balances, follows upon another wisdom saying about judicial judgment. It seems as though Q was not the first ancient writing to connect the commandment in Leviticus about measuring instruments with the concept of judgment. This connection was already part of Israel’s wisdom tradition. The Septuagint did not translate the references to legal judgment away, preferring to keep both the reference to the “king” (βασιλέως) and the reference to a “divine decision” (μαντεῖον). Like Q 6:37, the Septuagint’s translation of Proverbs 16:10 employs the verb κρίσει when referring to “judgment.” In both the Masoretic text and the Septuagint’s translation of Proverbs 16:10-11, measuring instruments, like balancing scales and weights, are linked to legal judgment.

Earlier on in the same chapter, Proverbs (16:2) also makes mention of the measuring act, only this time it is not the king who acts as the subject of the action, but God: “All a man’s ways seem innocent to him, but motives (דָּרְזָה) are weighed (וֹתֵב) by the Lord (ה’יָהוֹ)“ (NIV). One of the more literal meanings of the Hebrew word translated here as “motives” (דָּרְזָה) is “spirit” (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. דָּרְזָה; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. דָּרְזָה), which is how the King James Version translated the word. This lexical meaning denotes the essence of what it means to be human. In at least this respect, the Hebrew noun דָּרְזָה is not conceptually dissimilar to the Platonic “soul” of Hellenistic thought. In its Qal stem, the Hebrew verb דָּרְזָה literally means to “examine” (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. דָּרְזֶה) or to “test” (cf. Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. דָּרְזֶה). However, the Pi’el and Pu’al stems of דָּרְזָה mean to “measure” or “weigh” something.
This more than suggests that the Qal stem connoted “examination” by means of “measuring,” “weighing” or “counting” something. In light of all this, Proverbs 16:2 could just as well be paraphrased as such: “All man’s ways seem innocent to him, but his spirit is examined when it is weighed by the Lord.”

In all of the Old Testament, the Qal stem of the verb מַסֵּד occurs only in two other texts, both of which are from Proverbs (cf. Prov 21:2; 24:12). In all three texts, it appears in the participle, and in contexts where God is the implied or stated subject (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. מַסֵּד; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. מַסֵּד). The two other occurrences of this verb take the noun “heart” or “inner being” as object, thereby supporting the likelihood that מַסֵּד should in Proverbs 16:2 be translated as “spirit” (or even “inner being”). The reason for “weighing” man’s “spirit” is not overtly mentioned in Proverbs 16:2, but the immediate context surely suggests that it has everything to do with man’s fate, both in this world, and in the one to come. In verse 2, the word מַי ("innocent” or “pure”) implies that a man’s ways is sometimes not innocent, and therefore worthy of judgment. Verse 3 argues that God is in control of a person’s destiny in this world. If verses 2 and 3 are read together, they suggest that a person’s destiny in this world is determined by God’s act of measuring the weight of that person’s deeds (cf. Brandon 1969:99).

With the phrase “day of disaster” (יִמְדָּעֵד יְהוָה), verse 4, on the other hand, correlates God’s act of weighing a person’s deeds with the apocalyptic event that will inaugurate the world to come. Thus, Proverbs 16:2-4 symbolically describes the judging act of God as a procedure of weighing people’s deeds. This judging act occurs not only at the final apocalyptic event, but also within this lifetime, where it is implemented indirectly by God via the inevitable consequences of unacceptable behaviour. This latter understanding of God’s involvement in people’s lives formed the basis of traditional wisdom, and the book of Proverbs. It is also the crux of what is criticised by both Job and Ecclesiastes, although Job (42:7-17) might be understood as ultimately reaffirming this sapiential schema. The Septuagint left out verse 2 in its translation of Proverbs 16.
The other two proverbs where the verb קורא appears in its Qal stem are remarkably similar to Proverbs 16:2, and only seem to affirm the results above. Proverbs 21:2 states: “All a man’s ways seem right to him, but the Lord weighs the heart” (NIV). In the original Hebrew text, there are only three small differences between Proverbs 16:2 and Proverbs 21:2: (1) The latter text changes the singular of the word “way” (לְדָרוֹת) to a plural (לְדָרוֹת); (2) The word “pure” or “innocent” (יְאוֹרָי) is exchanged in the latter text for the word “smooth” or “right” (יְשֵׁר); (3) As we have seen, the latter text prefers the word “heart” (לְבָבוֹת) instead of “spirit” (לִבּוֹת). In all other respects, the two texts are exact copies of one another. Like the Jewish word “spirit,” the word “heart” also symbolised the essence of what it means to be human. Verse 1 of Proverbs 21 mentions the king, and states that even his heart is in God’s hands. Thus, although the king, as we saw, weighs the hearts of others, and determines their destinies, God weighs his heart, and ultimately determines his destiny. The focus of Proverbs 21:1-8 is on this world, not on apocalyptic judgment. This is especially obvious in verse 5, where the reward is monetary profit in this world, and the punishment is material poverty. For some reason or another, the Septuagint changed the verb “weigh” in verse 2 to “guide” or “direct” (κατευθύνει).

The last text of this nature, Proverbs 24:11-12, advises the wise to direct others in the ways of righteousness, in order to save them from apocalyptic death and slaughter. It is in this context that the following rhetorical question is asked of the wise: “If you say, ‘But we knew nothing about this,’ does not he who weighs the heart perceive it?” (NIV). That Proverbs 24:11-12 has the apocalyptic event in mind is not only indicated by the words “death” (מְתָא), “slaughter” (גֹּדֵה), and “life” or “soul” (לִבּוֹת), but also by the future tense and general effect of the rhetorical question at the end of verse 12: “Will he not repay each person according to what he has done?” (NIV). Although God is not overtly mentioned as the subject of the weighing action, there should be no doubt that God is the intended subject. As in the previous text, the Septuagint had exchanged the verb “weigh” for another verb – i.e. “know” (γινώσκει) in the case of Proverbs 24:12. At any rate, there are three occurrences in the Masoretic text of Proverbs (16:2; 21:2 & 24:12) that symbolically link God’s judgment of people’s deeds with the act of weighing their inner beings, which is either expressed as their “spirits,” “hearts,” or “souls.”
Proverbs 21:2 focuses on God’s causal, this-worldly judgment, while Proverbs 24:12 focuses on God’s apocalyptic, other-worldly judgment. Proverbs 16:2 elaborates on both. This indicates that these two types of judgment were neither contradictory nor mutually exclusive in contemporary Jewish thought. It also indicates that the symbolism of weighing someone’s inner being was already an obvious metaphor for God’s judgment when these proverbs were conceived.

Another wisdom text that deals with this theme is Job 31, where the protagonist is in the midst of defending himself and his own blamelessness against his friends. In verse 2, Job says that man’s lot is determined by God. Verse 3 carries this forward by stating that God effects ruin for the wicked and disaster for those who transgress. In verse 4, Job admits that God sees his actions and counts his every step. In sum, Job argues that God determines the fate of each man on earth by counting his righteous and sinful deeds, and by then rewarding or punishing him accordingly (cf. Brandon 1969:99). In light of this, Job laments in verses 5-8 that, if he had transgressed in any way whatsoever, then others should be judged and punished just as harshly. In the midst of this lamentation (verse 6), Job makes the following assertion: “Let God weigh me (נַבְרֵנָן) in honest scales (כָּלַחַתָּוֹן יְשׁוֹעַ), and he will know that I am blameless” (NIV). Job 31:6 clearly associates the images of being “weighed” and of “honest scales” with God’s this-worldly judgment (cf. Brandon 1969:100).

It should be noted that the prophetic tradition also reproduces the commandment of Leviticus 19:35-36. Ezekiel makes use of this commandment as part of his efforts to reorganise the Jewish cult after the Babylonian exile. The Leviticus mandate appears in Ezekiel 45:10, which is part of a whole passage about standardising the types of produce and measurements to be used during cultic sacrifices (cf. also Amos 8:4-6; Micah 6:11). In verses 11-12, Ezekiel spells out, in no uncertain terms, just how precise, accurate and consistent these measuring instruments are to be from now on. The intention behind this development was to protect the poor against exploitation by the cultic and regal leaders of Israel (cf. esp. Ezek 45:8-9). In this sense, the Ezekiel text is an attempt to incorporate the Leviticus command as part of a brand new piece of legislation. What is missing for
our purposes, however, is a connection between correct measurements and the act of (judicial) judging. Although not particularly useful for illuminating Q 6:38, this prophetic application of the Leviticus text to a post-exilic situation does attest to the popularity and prevalence of the commandment in Leviticus 19:35-36. This directive occurs in all three of the Tanakh’s major segments, namely the Torah (Deut 19:35-36; 25:14-16; Lev 19:35-37), the Nevi’im (Prov 11:1; 16:10-11; 20:10, 23), and the Ketuvim (Ezek 45:8-9; Amos 8:4-6; Micah 6:11).

The apocalyptic book Daniel (5:1-31) describes a scene where a human hand appeared out of nowhere, in the midst of a royal banquet, and wrote four Aramaic words on the palace walls. The king, Belshazzar, summoned Daniel to interpret the writing. The four words were “minay” (מִנְיָה) (appearing twice), “tekel” (תֵּקֵל), and “pharsin” (פַּרְשִׁין). All three Aramaic words were units for measuring weight (cf. Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. מִנְיָה, תֵּקֵל & פַּרְשִׁין). The first unit (מִנְיָה) was usually used to measure the weight of precious metals, like gold and silver (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. Aramaic מִנְיָה). Daniel’s interpretation of this word was that God had counted or weighed (כָּפָן) Belshazzar’s kingdom, and had brought it to an end. The second unit (תֵּקֵל) was also used to measure precious metals and luxury items (cf. e.g. Gen 24:22; Exod 30:23). Daniel’s explanation of this word was that Belshazzar had been weighed (כָּפָן) in the balance (כָּפָן) by God, and found lacking. The third unit (פַּרְשִׁין) constituted half a “minay,” and/or half a “tekel” (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. Aramaic פַּרְשִׁין; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. פַּרְשִׁין). Through clever wordplay (cf. פַּרְשִׁין & פַּרְשִׁין), Daniel explains the third word as meaning that Belshazzar’s kingdom was divided, and was given to the Medes and the Persians. Although the word “judgment” occurs nowhere in this pericope, God is indeed portrayed as judging Belshazzar and his reign (cf. esp. Dan 5:22-23). In Daniel’s interpretation of the writings on the wall, measurements, balancing scales and weights are used to symbolise God’s judgment of Belshazzar (cf. Brandon 1969:100).

The fulfilment of the prophecy that God will judge Belshazzar is accomplished that same night already, when Belshazzar is killed and his kingdom is taken over by Darius the Median (cf. Dan 5:30-31). In its literary context, this narrative is not an example of post-
mortem, other-worldly judgment, seeing as the judgment is furnished upon a single individual within the confines of history (cf. Brandon 1969:100). However, the apocalyptic nature of the book as an entity, as well as its apocalyptic application to the situation in Palestine after Alexander the Great, suggest that this passage could also be interpreted as a reference to post-mortem, other-worldly judgment. If this passage is viewed together with Daniel’s visions in chapters 7 to 12, the death of the king symbolises the death of all the wicked at the apocalyptic end. Regardless of how we interpret Daniel 5:1-31, the king’s judge in this pericope is God. Our examination of Proverbs 16:10-11 revealed that measurements of weight and balancing scales were symbolically linked to acts of juridical judgment by the king of Israel. In the current text, balancing scales and units of measurement are used to symbolise God’s judgment of a foreign king. In this way, Daniel 5:1-31 is very similar in meaning to Proverbs 21:1-2. Thus, measurements and balancing scales came to symbolise both human and divine judgment. Although these references to units of measurement and balancing scales are translated away by the Old Greek version of the Septuagint, they are picked up again by the Theodotion version.

The idea that there was a connection between human and divine judgment was not an alien or inconceivable concept in Jewish thought. References to God’s heavenly council or court are scattered throughout the Old Testament. These texts liken God’s heavenly court to human courts. Not only is the heavenly court itself described with images and symbols of human courts, but the court proceedings are similar to that of earthly courts. Often, those partaking in the proceedings of the heavenly court use legal terminology. 1 Kings 22:19-22 paints a vivid picture of God on his throne, surrounded by the host of heaven. Job 1:6 has the sons of God “stand before the Lord” (לֹאִים בַּהוֹלֵךְ לְמַעַן הָאָדָם) in heaven (cf. also Job 2:1). The expression “stand before the Lord” (לֹאִים בַּהוֹלֵךְ לְמַעַן הָאָדָם) has legal connotations, and specifically calls to mind someone appearing before a judge.

The Septuagint retained this associative meaning, and even enhanced it, when it translated with παραστήσατε ενώπιον τοῦ κυρίου. “Stand before” is one of the translation possibilities of παραστήσατε, but there are a number of alternative
possibilities (cf. Newman 1993 s.v. παρίστημι & παριστάνω). The Septuagint clears up this confusion by adding the preposition ἐνώπιον after παραστήναι. This preposition literally means “before” or “in front of,” but is often associated with the act of standing before someone in judgment (cf. Newman 1993 s.v. ἐνώπιον). Moreover, one of the semantic meanings for παραστήναι is “to hand over,” and could literally mean: “to deliver a person into the control of someone else, involving […] the handing over of a presumably guilty person for punishment by authorities…” (cf. Louw & Nida 1993a:485; 1993b s.v. παρίστημι). Another possible meaning of παραστήναι is “to show to be true,” denoting specifically the act of providing evidence in order to reveal the truth (cf. Louw & Nida 1993a:673; 1993b s.v. παρίστημι). The setting of Job 1:6 in heaven and the combination of παραστήναι with ἐνώπιον leave a clear image, difficult to overlook, of an accused standing before a judge during a courtroom trial. In this (legal) case, God is the judge, and the sons of God ( µυθλοαÔh; ynEB"), or the angels of God (ο/uni1F31 /uni1F04γγελοι το/uni1FE6 θεο/uni1FE6), including Satan, are the ones in the dock.

Daniel 7:1-28 is one of the best examples in the Old Testament of a heavenly court being described with the imagery of human courts. Verses 13-14 received attention in our discussion on the Son-of-Man figure (see chapter 3 above). Above all else, this pericope describes Daniel’s vision about God’s apocalyptic judgment. Verses 9-10 describe the preparation of the heavenly courtroom, in anticipation of the commencement of unspecified legal proceedings. This preparation included the placement of thrones, the assembling of numerous attendees, and the moment when God, referred to here as the Ancient of Days, took his seat (cf. Wink 2002:52). Although the vocabulary of the current text differs from that of Job 1:6, the attendees are likewise described as “standing before” (και στη δικαιεσ) God. The Septuagint uses the same verb (παρειστήκεισαν) as in Job 6:1, but this time it appears without the preposition ἐνώπιον.

Then follows the phrase βδῆναι, γαία. The noun used here (γαία) can denote either “judgment” or “court” (cf. Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. γαία). This explains why the respective translations by the King James Bible (“the judgment was set”) and the New International Version (“the court was seated”) are so different. Although both options are
possible, the latter should perhaps be preferred. This is how the Septuagint understood the noun, translating it with “court” (κριτήριον). Apocalyptic language and imagery permeates this whole pericope. It culminates in verse 26 with the court (κριτήριον) of God judging the fourth beast, taking away his kingdom, and destroying it forever. In this case, the Septuagint translates κριτήριον not with “court” (κριτήριον), but with “judgment” (κρίσις). In this verse, the apocalyptic judgment of God is clearly depicted as taking place via God’s heavenly court, which is described with images of an earthly court (cf. Wink 2002:52).

4.4.2 Other Jewish intertexts

Non-canonical literature of the Second-Temple period commonly, and frequently, used judicial courtroom language and imagery in descriptions of God’s this-worldly and other-worldly judgment.\footnote{Some examples of such texts are: Wis. Sol. 4:20; 11:8-10; 12:1-27; Sirach 4:9; 5:5; 18:20; 41:2-3; Let. Jer. 6:53-54, 64; Song of the Three 3-5; 1 Enoch 40:7; 41:9; 45:6; 63:9-12; 65:6; 68:4; 69:29; 96:4; 97:4, 99:2; 100:11; 104:8-10; 2 Enoch 19:5; 34:1; 40:13; 41:2; 55:3; 62:3; 65:5-6; 66:2; 71:6, 8, 10; 72:4; Sib. Or. 1:274; 2:215-219, 233-251; Ap. Zeph. 8:5; 4 Ezra 16:65; 2 Baruch 13:8, 11; 19:1, 3; 31:6; 40:1; 44:4; 83:2-3; 84:1-2, 6-7; Ap. Abr. 24:7; 26:1-7; Ap. Adam 3:16; 5:2-3; Test. Abr. [A] 13:8; [B] 11:2, 5-8; Test. Mos. 3:12; Jub. 4:22-23; 10:17; 31:32; Jos. Asen. 21:11-21; Life Adam 32:2; 39:3; Pseudo-Philo 11:2, 12; 19:4, 11; 22:6; 23:7; 24:3; 29:4; 32:8-9; 14-18; 62:10; Pseudo-Phocylides 52; Manasseh 5, 10; Ps. Sol. 5:4; 10:4; 17:43; Qumran Scrolls 1 QM XI:16; XVII:2; 11Q13 II:13-14; 4Q157 1, ii:2; 1QpHab V:3-5; X:3-5; XII:5; 4Q171 IV:7-10; 4Q372 1:28; 4Q227 1:3; 4Q215 2, II:4—5; 4Q542 II:5, 12; 4Q381 31:5; 45:4; 76-77:8-13; 1QHXVII:14-15; XXV 5:10-13; 4Q511 1:4; 10:11; 18:8-10; III:3; 4Q418 126, II:3-4; 4Q504 VI:2-8.} The analysis of such texts falls beyond the scope of the current investigation, which will rather focus on the concept of psychostasia in non-canonical, Jewish intertexts. This endeavour will commence with apocryphal literature of the Second-Temple period. The aim is still to establish the relationship between judgment and psychostasia in contemporary Judaism.

In 2 Esdras 3:28-36,\footnote{Within 2 Esdras, chapters 3-14 as an entity is sometimes also referred to as 4 Ezra. The very same text is therefore referenced by both of the following designations: 2 Esdras 3:28-36 and 4 Ezra 3:28-36. The current work conforms to the former referencing convention.} the author laments the fact that gentile nations like Babylon prosper regardless of how sinful, godless and wicked they are. Conversely, Israelites keep God’s commandments, living virtuous lives, but still they suffer. This leads him to
question the sapiential schema according to which God always rewards the righteous and punishes the sinful. Whereas the book of Job addresses the theodicy question by comparing the lives of individuals with that of Job, 2 Esdras 3:28-36 addresses the same question by comparing the lives of different nations with that of Israel. The pericope does not explicitly say so, but the obvious undercurrent is a wish for justice within the world, whereby people and nations are fairly and impartially judged by God according to their deeds (cf. 2 Esdras 4:18; cf. Brandon 1969:98, 99, 110). It is within this literary context that we find verse 34, and the following statement: \[166\] “So weigh our sins in the balance against the sins of the rest of the world; and it will be clear which way the scale tips.” In this text, the item being weighed is not the “heart,” “soul” or “spirit,” but the sins of the different nations. Nevertheless, the purpose remains the same, namely to ensure fair and impartial judgment by God (cf. 2 Esdras 4:18; cf. Brandon 1969:98, 99, 110).

In chapter four, the angel Uriel answers Ezra and explains that God will produce justice for Israel at the apocalyptic judgment. Although God’s judgment might seem unreasonable in this world, the future judgment will be wholly fair and impartial. Ezra is still not satisfied, and asks Uriel, in verse 33, how long Israel must wait and suffer in this world before God decides to introduce apocalyptic judgment. In verses 36-37, Uriel answers Ezra’s question about when the apocalyptic event will transpire by quoting the archangel Jeremiel: “As soon as the number of those like yourselves is complete. For the Lord has weighed the world in a balance, he has measured and numbered the ages.” Thus, God weighs not only the deeds and inner being of each individual, but He also measures the number of righteous individuals. According to this text, the exact number of people who will be rewarded at the final judgment has been pre-ordained by God. Before this number has not been achieved, the apocalyptic event will not take place. In 2 Esdras, God is the one who judges, and the symbolism of “weighing” and “measuring” is invoked in reference to both his this-worldly judgment (cf. 2 Esdras 3:34) and his apocalyptic judgment (cf. 2 Esdras 4:36-37).

\[166\] All translations of Jewish apocrypha are taken from The New English Bible: The Apocrypha, printed in 1970 by Oxford University Press and Cambridge University Press.
The apocryphal writing Wisdom of Solomon is a prime example of how wisdom and apocalypticism became integrated genres during the Second-Temple period. In verses 15-20 of chapter 11, this writing describes how God, if He so wished, could have punished the Egyptians with more than ten plagues, and how God could have obliterated them with a single breath. Yet, God chose not to do these things, because it was not part of his plan. This latter idea is expressed in verse 20 with the statement: “…but thou hast ordered all things by measure and number and weight.” In a word, the author expresses the belief that God’s judgment against the Egyptians was measured. In verses 21-26, the author continues to explain that God is powerful, and that He is in full control of his judgment. If He shows mercy to a person or nation, it is because He loves his creation, and because He chooses to spare it. It is within this context that the author says in verse 22: “…for in thy sight the whole world is like a grain that just tips the scale.” The idea that, to God, the whole world is merely a grain (of sand?) communicates his unfathomable strength and power (cf. verse 2). The phrase “that just tips the scale” is unnecessary for the communication of this analogy. It is highly likely that this phrase is introduced to the statement of verse 22 in order to allude to God’s judgment. This understanding is reinforced by the conjunction δὲ, with which verse 23 begins. After saying that the world is to God like a grain that tips the scales, verse 23 states: “But (δὲ) thou art merciful…” The mercy of God is therefore described as the opposite of whatever is meant by “tipping the scale.” The most obvious counterpart of God’s mercy is his judgment (see section 4.3.1 above). The argument that the reference to a “scale” symbolises God’s judgment is further supported by the literary context of chapter 11 as a whole, which deals, overtly and directly, with the subject matter of God’s judgment and mercy (cf. esp. Wis. Sol. 11:8-10). The central point of verses 15-26 is that God has the power to exert judgment and/or show mercy whenever and however he pleases. The same symbolism is expressed in the Wisdom of Solomon 12:26; only, on this occasion in reference to God’s judgment in the world to come: “…but those who do not take warning from such derisive correction will experience the full weight of divine judgment.” Here, God’s other-worldly judgment is pertinently mentioned, and the degree thereof expressed in term of weight. To be sure, this ancient Jewish text uses each of the images of
“measure,” weight” and “scale” as a shorthand-symbol for God’s judgment, not only in this world, but also the world to come.

We find a similar saying to the one in the Wisdom of Solomon (12:26) in the apocryphal writing called the (Wisdom of Jesus ben) Sirach: “To him [meaning God] belong both mercy and wrath, and sinners feel the weight of his retribution.” Also here, God’s judgment is pertinently mentioned, and the degree thereof expressed in terms of weight. The present tense of this maxim implies that this-worldly judgment is meant. Another saying from Sirach (37:8) uses the same imagery in reference to God’s other-worldly judgment. After advising his audience to be wary of a man who offers advice, the author says: “His advice will be weighed in his favour and may tip the scales against you.” The future tense implies apocalyptic judgment in the next world. Ancient people saw the act of offering advice (with the right intention) as a virtue, which explains why this act will be weighed in someone’s favour when the future judgment takes place. However, if the one who received said advice ignores it, and, in doing so, transgresses against God, the scales will be tipped against that person when the future judgment takes place. The impact of the advice depends on the reaction of the person who receives it, which is why the text says that it may (or may not!) tip the scales against that person.

Sirach 47:23-25 explains the exile of Israel as the inevitable result of her sins against God. Verse 24 starts with the statement: “Their sins increased beyond measure, until they were driven into exile from their native land.” Verse 25 reiterates the same idea in different words: “...for they had explored every kind of wickedness, until retribution came upon them.” In this context, the retribution can be nothing other than the exile itself. The mention of the word “measure” implies that the sins of Israel were so numerous that no man could measure it. The twofold use of the word “until” implies that God could and did indeed measure Israel’s sins (cf. also 2 Macc. 6:14-16; 4 Macc. 5:19-25). The direct result of this measuring act was God’s this-worldly judgment in the form of an exile. As with the other apocryphal texts, Sirach uses the words “measure,” “weight” and “scale” to speak about God’s judgment. Also like the other apocryphal

167 Also on rare occasions referred to as “Ecclesiasticus.”
works, the subject of the judging action is consistently God, and the judgment in question happens either within the confines of history, or thereafter.

There is one text in Sirach (9:14), however, that applies the language of psychostasia to the moral judgment of one human being upon another: “Take the measure of your neighbours as best you can, and accept advice from those who are wise.” Like Sirach 37:8, this text is about taking advice. Unlike the latter text, however, this text has a human being, and not God, as the subject of judgment. Although the word “judgment” is absent, to “take the measure of your neighbour” certainly here implies judging his moral integrity and sapiential expertise.

We will now turn to pseudepigrapha of the Second-Temple period. On more than one occasion, Pseudo-Philo (26:13; 36:1; 41:1; 47:9) speaks of people’s sins “reaching full measure (against them).” Elsewhere, Pseudo-Philo (45:3) speaks of people’s sins being “multiplied against them.” These texts suggest that people’s sins are measured during their lives on earth, and that the sum-total will at some stage be held against them (cf. also 2 Macc. 6:14-16; 4 Macc 5:19-25; Manasseh 9-10). These notions are supported by Pseudo-Philo 33:3, which describes the finality of death as a time or state during which “the measure and the time and the years have returned their deposit.” It is not absolutely certain what the word “measure” refers to in this text. It could have something to do with apocalyptic judgment, seeing as the subject matter of verse 2 is people’s earthly deeds. However, it could just as well refer to the measured time span of one’s life. The association in verse 3 of the word “measure” with the words “time” and “years” strongly suggests the latter interpretation. Nevertheless, the use here of the word “deposit” supports the deduction made above, that people’s sins are measured during their lives on earth, and that the sum-total will at some stage, whether it be in this world or the next, be held against them. The noun “deposit” is repeated twice more in verse 3, and used in a similar fashion.

168 All current translations of Jewish pseudepigrapha come from Charlesworth’s two volumes entitled The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha (1985).
The idea that people “store up credit” with God, who measures and counts people’s daily (good and bad) deeds is also expressed elsewhere by Jewish texts, which tend to use words and terms like “account,” “credit,” “debt,” “store up,” “record,” “count,” “write down,” “treasure in heaven,” “heavenly tablets,” “heavenly book,” “preserved,” “kept” and “recompense” in apocalyptic contexts. This idea is developed even further in some texts, which declare that God “tests” people in their daily lives on earth in order to provide a fair balance of good and bad deeds (cf. e.g. Wis. Sol. 11:8-9; Pseudo-Philo 40:5; Test. Abr. 12:14; 1QS V:24; 1QM XVI:15; XVII:1-2, 8-9; 4QM² 11, II:12). Some light may further be cast by two other texts from the same pseudepigraphical document. In Pseudo-Philo 40:1, Jephthah asks the following rhetorical question to his daughter after returning home from a victorious battle: “And now who will put my heart in the balance and my soul on the scale?” Jephthah does not seem to associate this imagery with any kind of judgment. Instead, he seems to use it as a metaphor for measuring his own joy, as the rest of verse 1 suggests: “And I will stand by and see which will win out, whether it is the rejoicing that has occurred or the sadness that befalls me.” Be that as it may, this text still illustrates familiarity with the imagery of weighing one’s “heart” and “soul” with “balances” and “scales.” This imagery is indeed pertinently linked to God’s judgment in Pseudo-Philo 63:4, where David explains the consequences of killing Goliath: “And would the judgment of truth be placed in the balance so that the many prudent people might hear the decision.” Whereas the first cluster of texts from Pseudo-Philo made notion of a future judgment, during which measured sins will be held against their perpetrators, the current text overtly connects the imagery of “balances” with God’s this-worldly judgment.

The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides (9-21) exhorts the powers that be to judge fairly and impartially. Words like “justice,” “injustice,” “just,” “judge” and “judgment” permeate this pericope, occurring no less than 9 times, if combined. In the midst of this exhortation (verses 14-15), the following admonitions appear: “Give a just measure, and

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an extra full measure of all things is good. Do not make a balance unequal, but weigh honestly.” There is an outside chance that these admonitions are speaking of honesty during everyday barter exchanges, but given the subject matter of the literary context, this seems unlikely. It is much more likely that, in this text, the phrases “make a balance unequal” and “weigh honestly” symbolise, respectively, unjust and just acts of judgment by mortal judges. Likewise, the most natural reading of verse 14 is that a judge should be fair and merciful in his judgments. Thus, images of “measure,” “weight” and “balance” are used to symbolise the procedure of judicial judgment. Unlike the other texts in this section, the subject of judgment is not God, but a human judge.

One of the most direct and unambiguous references to psychostasia appears in the Psalms of Solomon. The first three verses of the fifth psalm praises God for his “righteous judgments” and mercy. Verse 4 continues with this statement: “For an individual and his fate [are] on the scales before you; he cannot add any increase contrary to your judgment, O God.” In this sapiential saying, images of psychostasia are straightforwardly, undeniably, and inextricably linked to God’s judgment. The phrase “before you” also reminds one of the courtroom. It is not clear from this quotation whether the reference is to this-worldly or other-worldly judgment, but verses 8-19 certainly suggest that the former is in view here (cf. Brandon 1969:99). Another pseudepigraphical writing that speaks just as openly and unequivocally about psychostasia is the apocalyptic work 1 Enoch (cf. Brandon 1969:100). In Enoch 41:1, which forms part of the Similitudes of Enoch, it says: “And after that, I saw all the secrets in heaven, and how the actions of the people are weighed in the balance.” Clearly, the apocalyptic event, during which God will judge the people of this world, is in view here. 1 Enoch 61:8-9 is just as unequivocal and deserves to be quoted in full:

He placed the Elect One on the throne of glory; and he shall judge all the works of the holy ones in heaven above, weighing in the balance their deeds. And when he shall lift up his countenance in order to judge the secret ways of theirs, by the word of the name of the Lord of Spirits, and their conduct, by the method of the righteous judgment of the Lord of Spirits, then they
shall all speak with one voice, blessing, glorifying, extolling, sanctifying the name of the Lord of the Spirits.

2 Enoch (44:5) continues in the same vane, and also deserves to be quoted in full. The following quotation comes from manuscript J:

> Because on the day of the great judgment [text missing]. Every weight [text missing] and every measure and every set of scales will be just as they are in the market. That is to say, each will be weighed in the balance, and each will stand in the market, and each will find out his own measure and each shall receive his own reward.

Like the previous text from 1 Enoch, this text from 2 Enoch has the apocalyptic, future judgment of God in mind. What is interesting about this text is that an overt association is made between the measuring of goods in the marketplace and the event of being measured at the future judgment. This association implies that there was no contradiction in Jewish thought between the two points of referral. In fact, in this text, the two ways of understanding the imagery are deliberately combined in such a way that they compliment one another. 2 Enoch elaborates further in 49:2-3 and 52:15 (manuscript J):

> And I make an oath to you – ‘Yes, Yes!’ – that even before any person was in his mother’s womb, individually a place I prepared for each soul, as well as a set of scales and a measurement of how long he intends him to live in this world, so that each person may be investigated with it. […] For all these things [will be weighed] in the balances and exposed in the books on the great judgment day.

Like the books of Enoch, the Apocalypse of Zephaniah also describes an apocalyptic journey through heaven. In chapter 8, Zephaniah is surrounded by a host of angels (cf. Pearson 1976:250-251). Verse 5 has the following to say: “Now, moreover, my sons, this is the trial because it is necessary that the good and the evil be weighed in a balance.” Another work of this nature is the Book of the Apocalypse of Baruch, The Son of Neriah,
more commonly known as 2 Baruch. In chapter 41 of this work, Baruch asks about the ultimate fate of the proselytes, seeing as they lived in sin before converting to Judaism (cf. Klijn 1985:633 n. 41b, c). In verse 6, Baruch formulates the question like this: “Their time will surely not be weighed exactly, and they will certainly not be judged as the scale indicates?” In other words, Baruch is concerned that the proselyte Jews’ former sinful lifestyles will be counted and weighed against them at the final judgment. The use of the verb “judged” with the verb “weighed” and the noun “scale” indicates a deliberate and necessary relationship for the author between the final judgment and the imagery of psychostasia.

The most vivid and detailed description of psychostasia in Jewish literature of the Second-Temple period, reminding one of the Egyptian Book of the Dead, comes from the Testament of Abraham (see Brandon 1969:104-105; Pearson 1976:251-252). The document describes the scene of the final judgment in chapters 12-14 (Recension A). Because of its elaborate description of psychostasia, as well as its testimony to how it was adopted, understood and transformed by contemporary Jews, it is worthwhile to quote significant portions from these chapters:

And between the two gates there stood a terrifying throne with the appearance of terrifying crystal, flashing like fire. And upon it sat a wondrous man, bright as the sun, like unto a son of God. Before him stood a table like crystal, all of gold and byssus. On the table lay a book whose thickness was six cubits, while its breadth was ten cubits. On its right and on its left stood two angels holding papyrus and ink and pen. In front of the table stood a light-bearing angel, holding a balance in his hand. [On his] left there sat a fiery angel, altogether merciless and relentless, holding a trumpet in his hand, which contained within it an all-consuming fire [for] testing the sinners. And the wondrous man who sat on the throne was the one who judged and sentenced the souls. The two angels on the right and left recorded. The one on the right recorded righteous deeds, while the one on the left [recorded] sins. And the one who was in front of the table, who was holding the balance, weighed the souls. And the fiery angel, who held the
fire, tested the souls. And Abraham asked the Commander-in-chief Michael, “What are these things which we see?” And the Commander-in-chief said: “These things which you see, pious Abraham, are judgment and recompense. And behold, the angel who held the soul in his hand brought it before the judge. And the judge told one of the angels who served him, “Open for me this book and find for me the sins of this soul.” […] And the sunlike angel, who holds the balance in his hand, this is the archangel Dokiel, the righteous balance-bearer, and he weighs the righteous deeds and the sins with the righteousness of God. And the fiery and merciless angel, who holds the fire in his hand, this is the archangel Purouel, who has authority over fire, and he tests the work of men through fire. And if he burns up the work of anyone, immediately the angel of judgment takes him and carries him away to the place of sinners, a most bitter place of punishment. But if the fire tests the work of anyone and does not touch it, this person is justified and the angel of righteousness takes him and carries him up to be saved in the lot of the righteous. And thus, most righteous Abraham, all things in all people are tested by fire and balance.

(Test. Abr. 12:4-17; 13:10-14)

Despite all the obvious images of both the judicial courtroom and psychostasia, the idea that people build up credit with God during their daily lives is also expressed in this passage. Particularly noteworthy in this respect are words like “record,” “recompense” and “book.” Similarly, the idea that people are “tested” also finds expression here.

Our attention now turns to the Dead Sea Scrolls. Much of the rules and regulations of this sectarian Jewish community are expounded in a writing entitled The Rule of the Community. 1QS IX:12ff. deals particularly with the regulations for the so-called Instructor. One of the tasks of this individual was to judge and determine whether the Qumran priests – often in the Dead Sea Scrolls referred to as the sons of Zadok or the sons of justice – were righteous and virtuous enough for their duty. It is in this context that we find the following text from the Rule of the Community: “…he [the Instructor] should separate and weigh the sons of Zadok / justice according to their spirits; he should
keep hold of the chosen ones of the period according to his will, as he has commanded; he should carry out the judgment of each man in accordance with his spirit” (1QS IX:14-15; idem. 4QS e III:10-12).\(^{170}\) The last of the three instructions could be interpreted as referring either to all community members or to the priests in particular. Regardless, it is clear that this Qumran document understood the verb “weighing” as a shorthand for the concept of “judging.” This could be seen as evidence of psychostasia being applied to a process of moral judgment.

The sons of Zadok, in turn, formed part of the so-called Community Council, which oversaw a number of community matters, including the implementation of “truth, justice, judgment, compassionate love and unassuming behaviour” (1QS VIII:2) within the community. 1QS VIII:3-4 (idem. 4QS e II:10-11) describes this practice and its purpose as follows: “…doing justice and undergoing trials in order to walk with everyone in the measure of truth and the regulation of time.” In this way, the implementation of justice and judgment filters down from the top of the social hierarchy to the bottom. According to this text, the most important goal of “doing justice” and “undergoing trials” is to ensure that the whole community “walks in the measure of truth.” In other words, “truth” is something that can be measured, and it is measured by means of a process of judicial judgment. Thus, it would seem as though the Qumran community had adopted images from psychostasia, and had applied them to their own internal juridical process. Hence, words like “measure” and “weigh” were employed to express the processes and acts of both moral and judicial judgment within the community. The rationale behind this association is expressed clearly in 4Q424 3:4: “Do not send the hard of hearing to investigate the judgment, for he will not weigh up the men’s dispute.”

The words “measure” and “judgment” (repeated three times) appear within the same literary context in 1QH\(^a\) IV:1-6. Unfortunately, the text is extremely damaged, making it impossible to determine either the larger literary context or the specific internal

\(^{170}\) All translations of the Dead Sea Scrolls are from Martínez (1996).
relationship between the words in question.\textsuperscript{171} 1QH\textsuperscript{a} XI:27-29, on the other hand, has remained intact: “When the measuring line for judgment fails, […] then the torrents of Belial will overflow their high banks…” Here, apocalyptic judgment is delivered with the assistance of a “measuring line.” The exact meaning of this metaphor is not entirely transparent. It could refer to a line of string or rope, used as a measuring implement during construction, and functioning to ensure that walls and rows of bricks were absolutely straight and level. It could just as easily refer to something else entirely. The exact purpose of a “measuring line” is not as important for our purposes as acknowledging the fact that a measuring implement of some kind is linked to apocalyptic judgment. That this poem deals with and expounds a future apocalypse should not be questioned. Hence, there is a slight notion in this apocalyptic poem that the final judgment would involve some or other measuring act.

These hints at the act of being measured at the final judgment find full expression in a fragment from Qumran’s poetic texts (4Q418 126, II:3-4): “And with the scales of justice God measures all [text missing] he separates them in truth. He positions them and examines their delights” (cf. also 4Q418 127:5-6). The verbs “position” and “examine” remind one of the judicial courtroom. Although this sentence is in the present tense, there should be no doubt that the future, apocalyptic judgment is in view. The present tense is probably due to the gnomic nature of the statement. That futuristic judgment is meant is made clear by verses 6-8, which continue to describe the apocalyptic judgment: “[text missing] judgment to carry out vengeance on all the evildoers and the visitation [text missing] to confine the wicked for ever and to lift up the head of the weak [text missing] with eternal glory and perpetual peace, and the spirit of life to separate [text missing].” The mention of “all” the evildoers, as well as the usage of words like “for ever,” “eternal glory” and “perpetual peace,” leave no question marks behind the exact meaning and intention of this passage. The description is of an apocalyptic and universal judgment – one that will result in a new and everlasting status quo. In verse 10, the text continues to describe this post-apocalyptic condition with future tense verbs: “They will

\textsuperscript{171} The same applies to 4Q434 1, I:5-11, where the words “judge” and “judgment” occur together with the words “measure” and “scales.” Although more of the text is available here, pieces of text crucial to our inquiry are missing.
bow down the whole day, they will always praise his name.” Thus, the Qumran community was familiar with symbols from psychostasia, and applied these symbols, specifically, to describe not only judicial judgment by men on earth, but also apocalyptic judgment by God in heaven.

The significance of these Jewish texts for our study depends largely on the date and provenance of each of them. It is therefore worth our time to briefly look at the date and provenance of each non-canonical Jewish text encountered in this section. The book of 4 Ezra, which constitutes chapters 3-14 of 2 Esdras, was probably written somewhere in Palestine, around 100 CE, in reaction to the fall of Jerusalem (cf. Metzger 1983:520). The Wisdom of Solomon was almost certainly written somewhere in Egypt, likely Alexandria, and could have been conceived at any stage between the second century BCE and 70 CE. The date and provenance of the Wisdom of Jesus ben Sirach (or Ecclesiasticus) have been determined with a greater degree of confidence. Although the Greek translation of this writing was made in Alexandria, the Semitic original was composed in Judea, most probably in Jerusalem, during the second century BCE. Even though some scholars have dated Pseudo-Philo to a time just after 70 CE, it seems much more likely that it was composed in Palestine before the Temple was destroyed, perhaps even as early as 135 BCE (cf. Harrington 1985:299-300). Proposed dates for the origin of Pseudo-Phocylides have varied widely, but the most probable dating seems to be between 30 BCE and 40 CE (cf. Van der Horst 1985:567-568). Conversely, there is widespread agreement that its place of origin was Alexandria. Internal evidence indicates that the individual Psalms of Solomon were most likely formulated for the first time in Jerusalem, during the first century BCE (see Wright 1985:640-642).

1 Enoch was familiar to the Qumran community, and was almost certainly composed in Judea (cf. Isaac 1983:7-8). The same provenance probably applies to the Similitudes of Enoch as well. It was indicated in section 1.3.2 above, however, that the Similitudes should be dated to a period after 70 CE, even if the rest of 1 Enoch predates the destruction of the Temple (contra Brandon 1969:100). No measure of agreement exists regarding either the date or the provenance of 2 Enoch (see Andersen 1983:94-97).
could possibly predate 70 CE, and might have been written in Palestine, but neither of
these claims can be made with any degree of certitude, or even probability. The
Apocalypse of Zephaniah was probably written in Egypt, some time between 100 BCE
and 175 CE, with slight internal evidence suggesting a date before 70 CE (cf. Pearson
1976 250 n. 66; Wintemute 1983:500-501). 2 Baruch can be dated fairly accurately to
the beginning of the second century CE, and can be placed somewhat confidently in
Palestine (cf. Klijn 1983:616-617). Recension A of the Testament of Abraham was likely
Lastly, it is widely accepted today that all the Dead Sea Scrolls were composed before 70
CE at Khirbet Qumran, which is on the north-western shore of the Dead Sea in Judea (see

In order to establish that the concept of psychostasia existed in Palestine around the time
when Q was written, it is necessary to carefully weigh in the balance, and narrow down,
our list of non-canonical Jewish sources. Only those texts dating to a period before 70
CE should rightly be considered. Moreover, the probability of Egyptian influence on
local Jewish traditions forces one to refrain from considering any texts that originated in
Egypt, regardless of their date of conception. Despite this cutback, we are still left with
four independent witnesses to a familiarity with the concept of psychostasia in Palestine
before the destruction of the Temple by the Romans. These witnesses are Sirach,
Pseudo-Philo, Psalms of Solomon, and the Dead Sea Scrolls. Although these witnesses
most frequently describe God as the subject of judgment, the Rule of the Community also
links images of psychostasia with both moral and judicial forms of judgment. Sirach
9:14 also associates the word “measure” with both mortal and moral judgment. Where
God is the subject, the imagery and vocabulary of psychostasia are associated
indiscriminately with either this-worldly or other-worldly judgment. Nevertheless, God’s
apocalyptic role as judge at the final judgment seems to be the preferred application of
the concept of psychostasia by these sources. If this evidence is combined with evidence
from the Old Testament – especially the evidence presented by Proverbs 16:2, 21:2,
24:12, Job 31:6, and Daniel 5:27 – we are left with a very strong cumulative argument,
emphatically confirming that the concept of psychostasia existed in Palestine before 70
The Old-Testament evidence, in fact, strongly suggests that this concept was already a feature of Jewish mythology long before the birth of Jesus. Brandon (1969:99) believes that the Jewish expression of the idea can be traced back as far as the second century BCE.

The texts that provide proof of familiarity with the concept of psychostasia before 70 CE can all be placed either in Judea specifically or in Palestine generally. It follows that there is no direct evidence of familiarity with this concept in Galilee before 70 CE. This is to be expected, however, given the general and pervasive scarcity of extant literature from Galilee for the time before 70 CE. Two additional considerations support the likelihood that Galileans were also familiar with the concept of psychostasia. The first is the historical association of rabbinic Judaism with Galilee (cf. Horsley 1995a:94). Tannaitic literature, like the Mishnah and Tosefta, apply images of psychostasia, similar to the ones encountered above, to their descriptions of judgment scenes (cf. e.g. t. Kidd. 1:13-14; t. Sanh. 13:3; see Sanders 1977:128-147). Although these texts are from a much later period, they do provide evidence, slight as it may be, of Galilean familiarity with the concept of psychostasia. Granted, this evidence is not determinative, but it is, nonetheless, highly suggestive. The second consideration is more much more decisive. It was shown in section 2.5.3 above that Galilee was completely destroyed and depopulated during the Assyrian invasion, only to be repopulated by Judeans from the South during the Hasmonean period. Some Judeans were still uprooting themselves and moving to Galilee at the turn of the millennium. Now, seeing as the great majority of Galileans were ethnically and religiously Judean, it is extremely likely that inhabitants of Galilee shared religious and mythological customs and traditions with Judea, including the concept of psychostasia. If these Galileans were ignorant of certain Judean traditions, whether it be as a result of moving away or as a result of intentional disregard, they could easily re-familiarise themselves with such traditions during one of their pilgrimage visits to Jerusalem (see Freyne 1988:178-187; 2000:130, 154; Reed 2000:57-58; cf. Luke 2:41, 44; Ant. 2.280; 17.254-258; 20.118, 123; War 2.237). Hence, even though we have no literary proof that Galilee knew about psychostasia before 70 CE, the existence of such
knowledge has to be accepted, given the historical and archaeological information we have about the region.

In both the sapiential and the apocalyptic streams of Jewish tradition, psychostasia offered a means by which the judgment of God could be explained more vividly. The apocalyptic literature from Israel used images from psychostasia to describe either God’s this-worldly or his other-worldly judgment. In the latter case, God was described as judging individuals or nations in heaven at the end of history, which correlates best with the original Egyptian descriptions of psychostasia (see Brandon 1969:91-99). In the former case, God was described as judging individuals or nations on earth within the confines of history. In both cases, however, the judgment of God was part and parcel of a universal apocalyptic event that brought finality, and that separated the old era from the new era. The sapiential literature from Israel also used images from psychostasia to describe either God’s this-worldly or his other-worldly judgment. The latter usage was similar to the way in which apocalyptic literature applied this imagery. The former use, however, differed from apocalyptic literature in that it described God’s judgment of the individual within the causal schema of day-to-day life. In other words, there was absolutely no indication that God’s judgment (1) was part of a universal apocalyptic event (2) that brought any type of finality (3) and separated an old era from a new era. Rather, the causal consequences of daily choices was equated with the judgment of God (cf. Brandon 1969:99). In both its apocalyptic and its sapiential application, the this-worldly judgment of God was experienced only indirectly, as the consequences of something or someone else. Nevertheless, God ultimately directed and controlled this process behind the scenes (cf. e.g. Qumran Scroll 1QS X:17-18; cf. Casey 2010:289-290). Thus, there was no conceptual contradiction between God’s judgment and man’s judgment, seeing as the latter was a direct result of the former. Being wronged by another individual ultimately stemmed from God’s judgment of the one being wronged. The differentiations between the sapiential and the apocalyptic applications of psychostasia became increasingly slimmer as these genres moved closer to one another, ultimately becoming almost indistinguishable around the time of Jesus.
4.4.3 Back to Q

That the author(s) and audience of Q were very familiar with courtroom images as metaphors for God’s judgment should be accepted without question. Q 12:8-9 takes a very similar scenario to the one in Daniel 7:13 for granted (cf. Kirk 1998:209; cf. also Wink 2002:178; Casey 2009:181). Words like “judge,” “court,” “judgment,” “courtroom” or “case” are all entirely absent from this Q pericope. Yet, a heavenly courtroom undeniably forms the interpretive background setting. The author(s) feel(s) no need to explain this. Rather, it is taken for granted that the audience would be able to infer such a setting from the little information given. The repeated use of the preposition ἐπὶ προσθεν ("[standing] before"), plus the references to the “Son of Man” and “angels,” seem to provide sufficient clues that the image of an apocalyptic courtroom is being presupposed (cf. Kirk 1998:209). Also, the ease with which the sapiential parable in Q 12:58-59, about settling out of court, was transformed into a saying about apocalyptic eschatology points to familiarity with images of apocalyptic courtrooms. In fact, all that had to be done to award this parable an apocalyptic application was for the compilers of Q to place it within such a literary context. Even the exclamation in verse 59 need not point to apocalypticism. Yet, the compiler(s) had enough faith in their audience to recognise the allusions to apocalypticism without any need to add straightforward apocalyptic images. The mention of a “judge,” the image of a courtroom, and the reference to “prison” were enough to indicate the thematic presence of apocalyptic eschatology.

Such familiarity with the concept of heavenly courtrooms would strongly suggest that the author(s) of Q also knew about the concept of psychostasia. It was argued that Galileans were, in all probability, familiar with the latter concept. As a sapiential document, the Sayings Gospel was sure to know formative wisdom sayings from renowned Jewish books, like Job and Proverbs, very well. The possibility that the authors of Q were not familiar with the sayings in Proverbs 16:2, 21:2, 24:12 or Job 31:6, where images from psychostasia are on the foreground, is slim enough to be omissible. Q 12:8-9 certainly
indicates that the Sayings Gospel knew the apocalyptic book of Daniel. It necessarily follows that the imagery of Daniel 5:27 must also have been known to the authors of Q.

There are a few additional clues suggesting that the Sayings Gospel had knowledge of psychostasia-imagery. In Q 11:4, the author petitions God to “cancel our debts,” and to “not put us to the test.” This choice of words reminds one not only of the tradition that God keeps score of good and bad deeds, but also of the tradition that God tests our commitment during our lives on earth. The phrase “settling of accounts” in Q 11:50, and the phrase “An accounting will be required” in Q 11:51, provide further evidence that the Q people imagined God keeping an account of our deeds on earth. The parable in Q 19:12-13, 15-24 could also be read in a way that recalls this tradition. Whereas Q 11:4 provides evidence to the sapiential application of this tradition, Q 11:50-51 provides evidence of its apocalyptic and futuristic application. The parable in Q 19:12-13, 15-24 could be understood in terms of both applications (see section 3.2.11 above). As in other literature, the heavenly record of good deeds is symbolised in Q (12:33-34) as “treasure in heaven.” Also the idea that God counts the souls of the righteous and the sinful alike finds expression in the parables about the lost sheep (Q 15:4-5, 7) and the lost coin (Q 15:8-10). In light of all this, we have to accept that Q 6:37-38 used the term “measure(ment)” to evoke the concept of psychostasia. The combination in this Q text of the word “judge” (repeated twice) with the word “measure(ment)” (repeated thrice), would have made this association inevitable.

Given that the concept of psychostasia was most often, and most naturally, applied to the apocalyptic judgment of God, this type of judgment must have been foremost in the minds of the audience when they heard the admonition not to judge for the first time. This conclusion would only have been strengthened by the suggestive use of the divine passive for both the verbs in question (see section 4.3.1 above). However, the imagery, vocabulary and grammar employed in this saying did not exclude, or preclude, either

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172 This reading of the text does not necessarily turn it into a text that deals with futuristic eschatology (cf. section 2.6.1 above). The focus is here on the account God keeps in the present and not the ultimate consequences of said account. The literary context (Q 11:9-13) indicates that we have to do here with the sapiential understanding of God’s causal, this-worldly judgment.
judicial judgment by an authoritative person, like a human judge, or moral judgment by a peer. Firstly, the concept of psychostasia was traditionally applied to all these forms of judgment. The current text, as it stands, could be understood as referring to any one these types of judgment. Secondly, the distinction between the three types of judgment was not definitively precise. If a person was judged by someone else, whether it be a peer or an elected official, that judgment was the inevitable result of God’s own judgment. God was in control, and He directed everyone’s life according to his will.

Thus, we end up at more or less the same place we started: The saying in Q 6:37-38 could justifiably refer to three different types of judgment (see section 4.3 above). The only difference between then and now is that this conclusion has subsequently been substantiated by intertextual literature from the relevant period. The sapiential nature of the saying itself, the inaugural sermon, and the document as a whole, as well as the “concreteness” and accessibility of imagery from the marketplace, would suggest moral judgment as the prevalent idea. Yet, the pervasive and thoroughgoing scepticism (and fear) of judicial judgment by authoritative figures in the Sayings Gospel as a whole, as well as the likely mentioning of judicial judgment in the inaugural sermon itself, suggest judicial judgment as the controlling idea of Q 6:37-38. Lastly, the imagery of psychostasia, together with the utilisation of a divine passive, and the apocalyptic content of the beatitudes, not to mention the rest of Q, suggest that apocalyptic judgment is the most prevalent idea behind Q 6:37-38. Hence, independent examinations of the saying itself, the inaugural sermon, the Sayings Gospel as a whole, and Jewish intertexts of the Second-Temple period, have all obliged the same result: The wisdom saying in Q 6:37-38 could imply three types of judgment, and there is no way of knowing which one is pervasive.

In my opinion, this deadlock was intentional. It made the saying general enough to be applicable to just about any situation. The power of the saying lies in its open-endedness, and its general applicability. The saying was most likely retold, committed to memory, and eventually written down, precisely because of its vagueness, elusiveness and equivocation. The creator of Q 6:37-38, whether it be the historical Jesus or a Q author,
was quite masterful in his use of imagery, vocabulary and grammar. With this short admonition, the creator was able to evoke imagery from the marketplace, pictures of an earthly courtroom, depictions of a heavenly courtroom, and mythological images from the ancient idea of psychostasia. This logion’s multiple layers of application and meaning remind one of Jesus’ parables. Blomberg (1999:32) might be on the right track when he says: “Perhaps one needs to recognize multiple lessons and multiple layers of meaning from many forms of Jesus’ teaching, not only from the parables.” Kirk (1998:168) has the following to say about Q 6:37-38: “The opening admonition is a wisdom admonition (prohibition) with motive clauses. Standing programmatically at the beginning, it remains, like most maxims, open-ended, general, and hence in need of specification and application.” Piper (1989:37, 77) concurs in the following statement:

Once again one finds at the outset a remarkably simple and very general and unqualified exhortation [i.e. Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε]. No particular subject, object or situation is specified … Again no agency is specified for the aorist passive subjunctive verbs [in ἵνα μὴ κριθήτε]. No direct appeal to the Law or word of God or coming judgement of God strengthens or validates this statement of retribution. […] In [Q 6:37-38], a remarkable ambiguity is maintained, which it is possible to view these opening sayings as referring either to cause and effect in ordinary life or to End-time events.

Yet, Piper (1989:43-44) continues to say the following:

There may be indirect allusions to eschatological judgment in the retributive maxims [i.e. ἐν δὲ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε κριθήσεσθε and δὲ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθήσεται ύμῖν] or even in the metaphor of falling into a pit, but these remain little more than hints, which receive no elaboration and certainly no application to imminent events. On the contrary, argument rather than eschatological threat dominates the tone of the passage [i.e. Q 6:37-42]. […] Therefore, one must take serious the fact that experiential wisdom itself dominates the thought of this collection of sayings [i.e. Q 6:37-42]. The direct threat of final judgment is avoided in favour of an approach which is
less polemical and less potentially divisive. It seeks to win assent, to encourage an attitude of self-examination, not to specify an offending party.

Piper is indeed correct that this saying is not really polemical, and that it attempts to “encourage an attitude of self-examination” through persuasive argumentation. Our own examination of the saying has found that it is indeed a piece of wisdom. However, Piper is mistaken in his view that the “indirect allusions to eschatological judgment” in this saying are “little more than hints,” and that the “threat of final judgment is avoided.” We have seen that there is a host of reasons to accept that the saying spoke of apocalyptic judgment. To suggest that the author of this saying had no knowledge of the apocalyptic significance of the words “measure(ment)” and “judgment,” or that he was unable to foresee the audience reaching this apocalyptic significance, seems absurd to me. This is particularly true for the time when the saying was conceived – a time when apocalypticism was “in the air” and all-invasive. It seems much more likely that the author knew what he was doing when he combined these words in the same saying. The purpose was undoubtedly to simultaneously evoke images of both the marketplace and psychostasia. These images recalled both sapiential and apocalyptic themes, thereby inviting both types of application.

A few intertexts, not considered thus far, support the conclusion that apocalyptic eschatology is very much an essential part of this logion. The first of these is 2 Samuel 22:26 \textit{idem.} Ps 18:25: “With the merciful thou wilt shew thyself merciful” (KJV). In a context that is very similar to Q 6:37, Sibylline Oracle 2:63 says: “If you judge badly, God will judge you later.” Pseudo-Phocylides 1:11 likewise states: “If you judge evilly, subsequently God will judge you.” A similar saying appears in rabbinic Judaism: “The one who judges his neighbour on the side of innocence is judged favourably by God.” Although apocalyptic motifs are not prevalent in these texts, God is, in all four texts, the subject of the judging action. In the first example, the future tense certainly suggests some type of futuristic judgment. In the next two texts, the words “later” and “subsequently” might also be insinuating futuristic judgment. The sayings of retribution in 2 Enoch [J] 44:3 provide perhaps the best examples of apocalyptic judgment by God in
such type sayings: “He who expresses anger to any person without provocation will reap anger in the great judgment. He who spits on any person’s face, insultingly, will reap the same at the Lord’s great judgment.” Moreover, that the New-Testament authors easily made the association between the word “measure(ment)” and futuristic judgment is clear from a number of texts. In a separate Q context, Matthew (23:32-33), for example, proclaims (NIV): “Fill up, then, the measure of the sin of your forefathers! You snakes! You brood of vipers! How will you escape being condemned to hell?” Another example is Mark (4:24-25), who combines the saying in Q 6:38 with the apocalyptic and futuristic saying in Q 19:26.

Piper’s need to circumcise the apocalyptic imagery from this saying seems to be motivated both by an “either-or” mentality, and by the preconception that apocalypticism does not belong in sapiential material. This is illustrated by the following phrases from the quotation above: “argument rather than eschatological threat,” and “final judgment is avoided in favour of…” In the end, apocalyptic eschatology is an integral and important feature of the sapiential saying in Q 6:37-38. Any attempt to exorcise apocalypticism from this saying will be at one’s own peril. A non-eschatological reading of this logion will necessarily result in an incomplete and deficient comprehension of the text. The saying purposely invoked all three types of judgment – moral, judicial and apocalyptic.

4.5 ~ FINDINGS

Whereas chapter three focused on traditions (mostly from Q²) with apocalyptic content in order to illustrate that this content was in the service of wisdom, chapter four focused on a sapiential tradition in Q¹ to show that it contained apocalyptic eschatology (cf. Allison 2010:123; 136, esp. n. 469). In the process, and on the basis of this single logion, the same conclusion was reached: The Q people remembered and described Jesus as a sage who made use of apocalyptic eschatology to motivate and support his moral message. As earlier, this chapter verified that Q used apocalyptic eschatology primarily to substantiate its wisdom. The qualification to this hypothesis was also demonstrated in the present chapter: Apocalyptic eschatology also formed an integral part of the sapiential message.
of Q’s Jesus. Once again, this qualification does not invalidate Crossan’s or Kloppenborg’s understanding of Q’s wisdom. The integrality of apocalypticism and wisdom in Q 6:37-38 should not lead one to assume that apocalyptic eschatology was used here to inform or direct moral imperatives or sapiential speculation. Rather, we have seen that apocalypticism functions in Q to buttress existing wisdom and morality (cf. Allison 2010:97). What remains now is to spell out the implications of these results for contemporary historical-Jesus research.
CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS: THE SAYINGS
GOSPEL Q AND THE HISTORICAL JESUS

5.1 ~ ACCEPTABILITY OF THE CENTRAL THEORY:
THE IDENTITY OF Q’S JESUS

The hypothesis was confirmed by three levels of analysis. The first level considered the
document Q in its entirety, which led to the unavoidable and necessary conclusion that
the Q people remembered and described Jesus as a sage who made use of apocalyptic
eschatology to motivate and support his moral message. This conclusion was
corroborated on the second level of inquiry with the sayings in Q that deal with
apocalyptic judgment. These specific traditions illustrated how Q’s Jesus would
unfailingly and consistently use apocalyptic themes and images to substantiate his
sapiential message (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:376). Wisdom also operated as the
bedrock from whence Q’s Jesus would speculate about the precise nature of the
apocalyptic end. It was further realised that apocalypticism was so thoroughly enmeshed
with wisdom that we were forced to qualify the hypothesis further: Apocalyptic
eschatology also formed an integral part of the sapiential message of Q’s Jesus. The
apocalyptic Son-of-Man logia fit this general schema. In other words, each and every
time the Son of Man was a reference to an apocalyptic figure of some kind, it functioned
in Q to support the wisdom tradition in question. The third level of analysis homed in on
a single saying in the formative stratum, usually taken by scholars as a straightforward
and clear-cut example of an uncomplicated wisdom saying in Q. The analysis considered
the micro-genre of the saying, its literary context in Q, its intertextual contexts in both the
Old Testament and other Jewish texts of the time, focusing in the last case primarily on
the ancient myth of psychostasia. These different levels of scrutiny all confirmed that
one can not turn a blind eye to the apocalyptic themes that are part and parcel of this
sapiential logion (cf. Allison 2010:123, 136 n. 469), thereby confirming the legitimacy of
the qualification added to the hypothesis. It was also confirmed that, in this particular
saying, Q’s Jesus used an ancient apocalyptic concept to motivate his sapiential directive. In light of all this, it is surely safe to say that the central theory has been verified convincingly, albeit with an important qualification.

5.2 ~ A RESPONSE TO THE RENEWED QUEST

We saw in section 1.3.6 that scholars of the Renewed Quest are fond of holding up the stratification of Q as supporting evidence that Jesus was both chiefly sapiential and fundamentally non-apocalyptic. The Sayings Gospel would now like to say something in response:

The Jesus we remember was certainly a wisdom teacher, but he was also fond of apocalyptic language, using it mostly to substantiate his wisdom. For you modern scholars to suggest that apocalypticism was unimportant for Jesus or wholly absent in his teachings is not only a reduction of his person and message, but also severely mistaken. We should know, because we were much closer to him than you.

Q’s answer to the Renewed Quest operates not only on such a general level. Apart from the Gospel of Thomas, Q has something to say about each of the developments leading up to and keeping alive the non-apocalyptic silhouette of Jesus (see section 1.3 above). The first of these was already noted, namely the advancement in Q studies. Regarding the progress made in Son-of-Man studies, Q remembered and described Jesus as using this term in exclusive reference to himself. It was not a title, but simply a way of referring to himself in the third person. However, Q also remembered and described Jesus as sometimes using the term ambiguously, referring not only to himself, but also to the expected apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13, thereby purposely inviting and obscuring the conclusion that he himself was this figure. This ingenious usage of the Son-of-Man designation illustrates that Q’s Jesus, not unlike other Jews of the time, had affinities with apocalypticism, which was “in the air” at the time when Jesus lived. Even when the Aramaic criterion is used, and even when philological solutions are preferred, the term is
found in *authentic* traditions that deal with apocalyptic eschatology. Hence, the present study found that a discriminatory “illegitimation” and pushing-to-the-side of the apocalyptic Son-of-Man logia is both unfounded and unnecessary. Even if all the apocalyptic Son-of-Man logia were from Kloppenborg’s Q², which they are not, it still would not necessitate, or even suggest, the conclusion that they are inauthentic. In a long list of apocalyptic themes and images, the Danielic Son of Man was yet another used by Q’s Jesus to support his sapiential messages. The probability that the Q author(s) and/or editor(s) continued this tradition by making midrashic use of Daniel 7:13, but still obscured the identification of this figure with Jesus, shows the extent to which they tried to stay true to the Jesus they remembered.

This tendency to remain faithful to the person and message of Jesus is also noticeable in the parables of Jesus that Q preserved. You will recollect that the parables of Jesus signified another development that led to a non-apocalyptic Jesus. It should not be doubted that at least some of these parables were originally wholly sapiential. The editor(s) of Q cast them in an apocalyptic mould not only by attaching apocalyptic applications to them, but also by placing them in literary contexts that deal with eschatological subject matters. However, this process was not incongruous to the person and message of Jesus, but a faithful, direct and inevitable development from his person and message. Jesus himself applied wisdom to speculate about the end times. He used his sapiential wits to make important deductions about the apocalyptic event and its precise nature. By adding apocalyptic applications to the parables of Jesus and by placing them in apocalyptic contexts, the editor(s) of Q was/were basically and essentially doing the same thing as the historical Jesus. They were deducing from the wisdom of Jesus, expressed in this case by means of parables, important aspects about the apocalypse. Thus, to openly voice Q’s response to the Renewed Quest’s parable research, even though some of the parables in Q did not originally contain any hint of eschatology, it still does not lead to the conclusion that the person and message of Jesus was not apocalyptic. In fact, some of the apocalyptic attachments, as individual traditions, have just as much claim to authenticity as the parables themselves. The tradition of attaching apocalyptic applications to Jesus’ parables reaches back a long way.
This tradition was probably already in practice before the canonical gospels were even written. That the people who were geographically and chronologically closest to the historical Jesus remembered and described him speculating about the apocalypse, even in his distinctive and authentic parables, should warn scholars of the Renewed Quest against results that depict Jesus as non-apocalyptic. The examination of Q 6:37-38 has show that every time one tries to lock the front door in an effort to keep apocalypticism out, it creeps in through the backdoor.

The last development that led to a non-apocalyptic Jesus was the increasing consideration of his Jewishness among scholars. We have seen that this very same development also led other scholars to conclude that Jesus was wholly apocalyptic. Q supports this line of reasoning. To state the obvious, a Jewish Jesus does not necessarily equal a non-apocalyptic Jesus. It was demonstrated in section 2.5 that the people behind Q, including both its creator(s) and its audience, were ethnically and religiously Judean. Yet, this document described and remembered Jesus as a sage for whom apocalypticism was central. Despite this piece of criticism, it should also be said that Q proves beyond doubt that, at the time and place Jesus lived, a person who was essentially a teacher of wisdom did not somehow abolish or circumcise his Jewishness. Wisdom teachers had just as much claim to their Jewish heritage and ethnicity as apocalyptic prophets, self-proclaimed Messiah’s and wonderworkers. The Third Quest is therefore mistaken in their allusions and direct assertions that the Renewed Quest fosters a non-Jewish Jesus. Arnal (2005) is perhaps correct in claiming that these attacks obscure the actual political, religious, theological and post-modern agendas hidden beneath the surface.

5.3 ~ A RESPONSE TO THE THIRD QUEST

The most recognisable feature of the Third Quest is their stubborn insistence that Schweitzer’s portrait of Jesus was essentially correct. This is not to say that, in the light of recent scholarly developments, important modifications have not been made to Schweitzer’s overall paradigm. Despite these modifications, however, the Third Quest continues to insist upon a Jesus whose person, conduct and message was completely and
almost exclusively motivated by imminent eschatology and apocalyptic urgency. Q has a lot to say about this:

This is not the Jesus we remember! You are correct in thinking that apocalypticism was an important feature of the message and person of Jesus. However, you are wrong to think that apocalypticism governed everything about him. Jesus was essentially a sage. He used apocalypticism to support and justify his wisdom, not the other way around. Moreover, the Jesus we remember did not believe that the end was necessarily near. In fact, he believed that the time of the apocalyptic end could not be predicted and would happen without warning at an incalculable time in the future. Jesus basically believed that the apocalyptic event would be unexpected, devastating, sudden, vivid, final and irrevocable. He also believed that it would bring about a reversal of fortunes. We do not remember Jesus ever speaking of the kingdom of God in an apocalyptic sense. Instead, Jesus referred to the kingdom of God in reference to his mortal message and conduct on earth. By bringing hope and caring for the sick and the poor, Jesus was inaugurating a heavenly kingdom on earth. This message and conduct was in fulfilment of many Old-Testament prophecies, which is why it could be labelled his “realised eschatology.”

The Third Quest might simply want to dismiss these words, given these scholars’ habitual side-stepping of Q. However, their conventional criticism of the utilisation of Q in Jesus research will not in this case suffice, since these results are not dependent on Q being a document, being stratified or being representative of a whole community. In true Third-Quest fashion, these results came from a synchronic investigation of all the traditions that make up Q. Even if the documentary status and stratification are utterly denied, Q still understood the eschatology of Jesus in the way described above. Investigating the individual traditions that make up Q, whether they were part of a unified document or had a more chaotic prehistory, leads to the unassailable result that sources much closer to the historical Jesus than the canonical gospels, both geographically and chronologically, adamantly recollect a Jesus who did not foster any kind of apocalyptic imminence or urgency. Moreover, investigating these individual traditions also leads to the
unpreventable result that the regulating and driving force behind the person and message of Jesus was not apocalypticism, but wisdom. Jesus made use of the contemporaneous obsession with apocalyptic eschatology to validate some of his ethical appeals (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:376). In other words, an imminent eschatology did not underlie his ethics. This was illustrated most convincingly by the analyses of the apocalyptic-judgment logia and the logion in Q 6:37-38. These logia were investigated at face value as individual traditions, mostly disregarding both the documentary status and the stratification of Q. It was already mentioned in the previous section that the Jewishness of Jesus did not necessarily mean that he was not a teacher of wisdom. Similarly, the Jewishness of Jesus did not necessarily mean that he must have been an apocalyptic prophet, to the exclusion of all other (seemingly contradictory) epithets. Regarding the Jewishness of Jesus, Q’s response to Third Quest’s criticism of the Renewed Quest is that such criticism is wholly unfounded and totally misplaced.

5.4 ~ BUILDING BRIDGES AND CROSSING DITCHES

In order for the Third and Renewed Quests to move closer to one another, in the hope of reconciliation and a more unified scholarly image of the historical Jesus, the Third Quest would have to admit that imminence was not a feature of Jesus’ view of the apocalyptic end, while the Renewed Quest would have to accept that apocalypticism was indeed an integral feature of Jesus’ person and message. I will be the first to admit that any hope of reconciliation, or even a mutual movement towards one another, is wishful thinking. Nonetheless, there might be some motivating factors with the potential of persuading a number of scholars on both sides of the ditch. In section 1.3.7, we saw that not all scholars of the Renewed Quest reject all the eschatological aspects of Jesus’ message. However, all proponents of the Renewed Quest vehemently deny that an eschatological expectation dictated every aspect of Jesus’ message and conduct. This outlook has been affirmed by the present study. Although Q’s Jesus made use of apocalyptic themes and images, he was a wisdom teacher first. Apocalypticism functions in Q to substantiate and support Jesus’ wisdom (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:376). These results are not very far removed from what many of the Renewed Questers believe anyway. For example, it
would seem that Borg’s issue is not really with apocalypticism or eschatology *per se*, but with imminence (see Borg 1994a:82-84; 88-90; Borg, in Miller 2001:34, 42). It seems extremely likely that the antagonism of Renewed Questers was against imminence all along, and not actually against apocalyptic eschatology. Borg’s other issue is the Schweitzerian tendency to view apocalyptic eschatology as the primary *gestalt* for interpreting the Jesus tradition, as if it dictated every aspect of his message and conduct (see Borg, in Miller 2001:43-48, 115-116). According to Borg (in Miller 2001:115-116, 134), Allison’s “millenarian prophet” should not be used as a “shorthand characterisation” of the historical Jesus. This shorthand description of Jesus leaves the impression, erroneous in Borg’s view, that apocalyptic eschatology dictated every other aspect of Jesus’ mission and message. In light of Borg’s two main areas of discomfort, scholars of the Renewed Quest may just welcome Q’s image of Jesus as an apocalyptic-type sage, who was not at all motivated by imminence or urgency. The results of this study may also encourage scholars of the Renewed Quest to make more of eschatology and apocalypticism in their portraits of Jesus, not least of all because such portraits could end up being more convincing to scholars from the opposing camp.

It may prove more challenging to convince scholars from the Third Quest to take a reconciliatory step across the dividing ditch. The fact remains that the canonical gospels, in which the Third Questers place all their trust, describe the eschatology of Jesus as being imminent and urgent. Yet, there are a few motivating factors from this study that might just nudge these scholars onto the bridge and encourage them to take their first reconciliatory steps across it. The first motivating factor regards the parables of Jesus, which have systematically been ignored or moved to the periphery by scholars from the Third Quest (cf. Miller 2005:121). This observation leads Miller (2005:121) to make the following statement: “For whatever reason, the parables have been unhelpful in making the case for the apocalyptic Jesus.” Yet, the current study has indicated that parable research remains just as open as the parables themselves and that a non-apocalyptic Jesus is not a foregone conclusion of such parable research. We have seen that two parables from Q actually went against the stream by motivating apocalypticism with wisdom, and not vice versa, as is normally the case with Q. Another factor that might encourage Third
Questers to start crossing the bridge is the results obtained in this study with regards to the Son-of-Man logia. We have seen that the tendency to discredit the authenticity of the Son-of-Man logia is not supported by Q. The last, and most attractive, motivating factor is the thorn, or rather the log, that imminent eschatology has been in the sides of conservatives since it was introduced by Weiss and Schweitzer. There are no two ways about it: An apocalyptic, Schweitzerian Jesus was plainly wrong about when the end will occur (cf. Miller 2005:113). He was a mistaken, perhaps even deluded, individual. Many conservatives and/or Third Questers have struggled with this inevitable and unassailable consequence of accepting the proposal that Jesus proclaimed a thoroughly imminent eschatology (see Allison 2005:104-105). The discomfort is tangible in Fredriksen’s (2005:63) distressing question: “In what sense could the author of such an emphatically disconfirmed prophecy be ‘god’?” Many year ago, Jeremias asked the same question: “How could God incarnate be mistaken in his eschatological expectations?” (in Allison 2005:107). In a perfect world, similar to the one the apocalypticists imagine, the results of this study will encourage scholars of the Third Quest to make more of wisdom in their portrayals of Jesus, not least of all because such portrayals could end up being more convincing to scholars from the other side of the tracks.

The thorn goes deeper and deeper the more one tries to pull it out. Miller (2005:114) considers the ramifications of this failure on Jesus’ part for his entire ministry and message: “[Jesus’] conviction that the End was imminent is not just one item among others. It is foundational. How much of his message and mission stands or falls with its apocalyptic foundation?” Miller (2005:115) continues to examine this central question in the light of specific traditions. If Jesus’ instructions to sever family ties and become part of a new symbolic family was motivated by imminent eschatology, was Jesus not wrong in subverting patriarchal families in the first place? If people left their homes in the expectation of an imminent reward that never came, suffering severe consequences in the meantime, was Jesus not downright, albeit unwittingly, cruel in manipulating people in this way? Was it not just as cruel to make a number of downtrodden and helpless individuals hope against hope for an imminent reversal of fortunes? A host of examples could be added. The thorn cuts deeper yet. As Schweitzer rightly perceived, the
inevitable result of a thoroughly imminent eschatology is that the moral code and ethical teachings of Jesus become useless. We saw in the opening section of this work that others, most notably J. T. Sanders, as one would expect, came to the same result. This consequence of a thoroughly imminent eschatology has troubled conservatives just as much as the suggestion that Jesus might have been wrong about the time of the apocalyptic event. Allison (2005:106) explains why:

Schweitzer offended a host of Christians when he claimed that Jesus had an ‘interim ethic’, that his moral teaching was inextricably bound up with his belief in a near end. It might be natural to disregard families and money if they are soon to dissipate in the eschaton. But if Jesus promulgated an ethic for the interim, if he did not leave behind a set of general precepts or principles designed for every time and place, what good is his counsel? Not much in the minds of many. Can any moralist, firmly persuaded of history’s imminent dissolution, frame an ethical code adequate for those of us who continue to live in history? Presumption of a negative response explains the vehement resistance to Schweitzer’s claims about an interim ethic.

Scholars of the Third Quest have tried in a number of different ways to sidestep these disconcerting, but inevitable, consequences of imminent eschatology. Wright (1992:280-338; 1996:passim, esp. 202-214; 1999:265-266), for example, has given us a Jesus who expected not the end of the universe, but of the temple in Jerusalem. This suggestion should be ignored for a number of reasons we do not currently need to develop (see esp. Eddy 1999:43-49; cf. Witherington III 1995:246; Allison 1999:135-136; cf. also Borg 1999:240-241). The point is that some Third Questers have tried to sail around the unassailable, mainly because a Jesus who was wrong makes them uncomfortable. The current study offers an attractive solution: Keep the apocalyptic Jesus, but drop imminent eschatology altogether. This would solve not only the problem of Jesus being wrong in his time-keeping, but also the problem of Jesus advocating a moral code that was irrelevant. Moreover, seeing as the Renewed Quest is mainly distressed about imminent eschatology, and not apocalypticism per se, this move would be welcomed by many intellectuals on the other side of the partition. This would mean, though, that, even
though Jesus was correct in his apocalyptic teachings, the canonical gospels were mistaken when they claimed that Jesus would come again soon. But surely a mistake by the early church is the lesser of two evils. In fact, this mistake is explicable on account of the excitement of Jesus’ followers after Easter. It could even be construed as an expression of the longing to be with Jesus - not really a “mistake” in the proper sense of the word.  

5.5 ~ THE RELEVANCE OF JESUS’ WISDOM AND MORALITY

The study was opened with a section on the views of Jack T. Sanders, which were largely ignored in the pages that followed. As we saw in both the opening and the foregoing sections, Sanders claimed that the ethics of Jesus are irrelevant for today. In order to refresh your memory, allow me the inexcusable freedom of repeating the deductive thinking that forced Sanders to make such a claim: (1) Jesus held an imminent eschatology; (2) Jesus’ ethics were motivated by and based on his imminent eschatology, and are therefore inseparable from it; (3) the modern world does not subscribe to an imminent eschatology and neither does its ethics; (4) the ancient and modern worldviews are foundationally different and essentially conflicting; (5) thus, the ethics of Jesus are insignificant, irrelevant, inappropriate and inapplicable for modern society. In light of the results of this study, the first two of these claims can rightly be dismissed: (1) Jesus’ eschatology was apocalyptic, but not imminent; (2) Jesus’ ethics were not motivated by imminent eschatology, but by a type of wisdom that made room for apocalyptic speculation.

Logic and a changing world also allow us to refute the third presumption. Apart from the many apocalyptic and millenarian movements and fanatics alive today, the more sober members of society are also facing apocalyptic destruction. It is an unfortunate fact that we, as a people, have grown strong and clever enough to destroy ourselves and our world.

173 This argument would not be dissimilar to the move that occurred from Reimarus to Strauss. Reimarus convinced a number of scholars that the disciples of Jesus deliberately lied about the nature and content of Jesus’ ministry. Strauss subsequently convinced virtually all scholars that this “mistakes” in the gospels were not due to deliberate deceit, but rather due to the ancient process of “mythmaking.”
Global warming, pollution and a number of other global ills are threatening to destroy our world, unless we change our ways. Just like the apocalyptic disaster Jesus foresaw, this apocalyptic event that will finally put the nail in mother earth’s coffin will be unexpected, devastating, sudden, vivid, final and irrevocable. It might also have as its consequence an ironic reversal of fortunes (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:379). The most powerful of all species, the dinosaurs, were at one point in time wiped from the face of the earth, allowing less powerful mammals to take their place. The remnants of the dinosaurs left alive today, the birds in the sky, are among the most fragile and vulnerable creatures in God’s creation. Conversely, the once powerless mammals gave birth to us, who are presently ruling the universe – or we like to think so. If this is not a pungent example of a reversal of fortunes, I do not know what might be. The same thing could happen to the most powerful beast alive today, humanity. Who is to say that we will not be replaced by something insignificant, like an amoeba or a mustard seed or, God forbid, a cockroach.

This study has shown that sapiential and apocalyptic paradigms are not mutually exclusive – a result that flies in the face of Sanders’ fourth assumption. The eschatological hope that God will intervene unexpectedly and suddenly within history could have an impact on one’s activities in the present, which is the subject matter of wisdom (see Edwards 1976:148, 153-154). Yet, the apocalyptic material in Q does not function to develop an ethical system or to create new moral imperatives. Rather, the Q people (and Q’s Jesus) used apocalyptic eschatology to motivate and buttress their wisdom. Allison (2001:101) claims: “Apocalypse may offer new revelations, but they also seek to get people to do what they already know they should be doing but aren’t” (cf. also Allison 2010:97; cf. further Crossan 2001:61; cf. e.g. 1 Enoch 99:2; 2 Baruch 38:2; Test. Mos. 12:10-11; Test. Lev. 13:2). This quotation points to the inextricable connectedness of ethical wisdom and apocalyptic eschatology. Maxims like: “live every day as if it is your last” are “eschatological ethics” – to use Bultmann’s phrase – that are relevant for today and all time. In the preface to his second edition, Sanders (1986:xiv) claims that the inseparability of Jesus’ ethics and his imminent eschatology is “…not seen merely by modern intellectual reflection, but by an analysis of the progression of ethical thinking among Christians in the first Christian century, as revealed in the
writings of the New Testament.” This is not true. The authors of the New Testament struggled with the daily application and implementation of Jesus’ ethics not because it was based on eschatology, but because it was so radical. It is (post-)modern preoccupation with categories and classification that has caused us to distinguish between eschatology and ethics (cf. Allison 2010:88). Moreover, we as moderns struggle to understand how moral behaviour could remain valid in the face of apocalyptic doom. As we saw, ancients did not have this issue. Piper (1989:182-184) explains the entanglement of wisdom and apocalypticism well and deserves to be quoted in at length:

The connection between deed and consequence in the present is not totally disrupted in the eschatological future, and thus decisions which affect one’s standing in the future age are informed by past and present experience [cf. Q 3:9; 17:37; 19:26]. […] But often the confrontation of the hearer with [apocalyptic eschatology] also concerns the establishment of priorities. In these cases aphoristic wisdom plays a somewhat different role. Here it is often a matter of demonstrating the ‘prudent’ course of action in view of the situation which confronts one. ‘Prudence’ in the light of coming judgement may, however, involve extraordinary commitments [cf. Q 12:2-12, 33-34, 58-59; Q 13:24]. The perspective of [future] judgment does not lead to a denial of normal reasoning or experience; it provides a new frame of reference within which the choice of priorities must take place. The extraordinary and critical nature of that new frame of reference is what results in this-worldly reasoning calling one to go beyond this-worldly securities. There is no suggestion, though, that this-worldly reasoning is itself undermined. Indeed, the design of argument in the aphoristic collections would suggest the very opposite. […] There are, therefore, unifying factors in the way in which aphoristic insights in the double tradition and the more prophetic aspects of Jesus’ message are used. These unifying factors are not based so much upon superficial themes held in common, or upon a radical suspension of the persuasive qualities of aphoristic wisdom, as upon more fundamental convictions about continuities between God as Creator as well as Judge, between present and future
expectations and between man’s decision-making as based on this-worldly experience and his consideration of other-worldly prospects.

Not only are apocalyptic and sapiential paradigms not in direct conflict, but the ancient world is also not reducible to an apocalyptic paradigm, just as the (post-)modern world is not reducible to an ethical or humanitarian paradigm. Apocalypticism is just as alive and well as it was in the time of Jesus. Conversely, wisdom and morality were just as important then as it is now, perhaps even more so. Just as Q’s Jesus could motivate his moral and sapiential teachings with apocalyptic eschatology, we should do the same. Now that we know that we are causing our own end, what are we going to do about it? Our daily conduct should be motivated not by fame or fortune (cf. Q 11:43; 12:33-34, 22-31; 16:13), but by the reality of the earth’s demise. True enough, Jesus did not tell us what to do about global warming and the like, but he did teach us that apocalyptic forecasts should dictate some of our choices in the present. The solutions to these modern issues rest with us, not with some ancient text or personage. We are in a unique situation. For the first time in the history of mankind, we might be the direct cause of apocalyptic annihilation. Also for the first time in history, we are capable of preventing Armageddon ourselves, without the assistance of any type of deity. Looking after the planet is an example of an imperative that is motivated by apocalypticism. Today’s frequent apocalyptic reminders that we are staring into the face of Armageddon do not create a new moral directive – look after the planet! – ex nihilo, but motivates and compels us, in Allison’s words, “to do what [we] already know [we] should be doing but aren’t.”

Yet, putting the earth’s demise aside for now, Jesus did tell us how to live moral and wise lives. In this way, the ethics of Jesus were indeed “interim ethics.” The interim is just a longer period than either the evangelists or Schweitzer had imagined, going on two thousand years now. In essence, these interim ethics are not valid because the end is coming soon, but until the end comes, whenever that may be. Given all this, Sanders is

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174 Israel often felt that they were the indirect cause of apocalyptic annihilation, since they were the ones who disappointed God, but they never saw themselves as the direct cause. God’s anger was always the direct cause of apocalyptic destruction.
wrong in thinking that the ethics of Jesus are misplaced or irrelevant for today. It remains just as valid as when he spoke it for the first time. From Jesus we learn not only how to live good lives in the present, but also how to live with one eye to the future, not only of ourselves, but also of our enemies and of the fourth planet from the sun. Today, as always, the relevance and feasibility of historical-Jesus research is being questioned. Hopefully, this study did its part in refuting these sceptics. Concrete knowledge of the historical person known as Jesus is certainly retrievable. More importantly, though, the moral code and sapiential-apocalyptic message of this historical person named Jesus remains valid for all time and all different types of people, not only Christians.

5.6 ~ SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

There are so many studies about apocalypticism, wisdom, Q and the historical Jesus out there that one is always tentative to suggest future studies. Yet, two lacunas have come to light through this work, recommending potential avenues for future investigation. The first has to do with Kloppenborg’s formative layer. In chapter four, we saw that a logion usually taken at face value as a sapiential teaching should not be read in such a monolithic way. Apocalypticism is as much a part of Q 6:37-38 as it is of the final verse in Q. What remains is to illustrate in a thorough, exegetical, painstaking and detailed manner that other wisdom sayings in Kloppenborg’s first stratum also have apocalyptic eschatology engraved into their flesh. As we know, many scholars have indeed seen apocalyptic themes present in a host of sayings from the formative stratum (cf. Q 6:20-23, 47-49; Q 10:2-3, 9; Q 11:2-4, 9-13; Q 12:2-7, 22-31; Q 13:24; Q 14:11; Q 15:4-5, 7-10; Q 17:33). I have argued that some of these sayings should not be so interpreted (most notably Q 6:20, 47-49; Q 10:2-3, 9-14; Q 11:2-4, 9-13; Q 12:22-31; Q 13:24; see sections 2.2.4, 2.4.3, 2.6, 3.2.11, 4.3.1). Leaving all these logia aside for the moment, there are a few additional sayings in Kloppenborg’s Q¹ that are normally taken to be pure wisdom, but that could quite possibly be alluding to apocalyptic eschatology beneath the surface.
I want to single out Q 9:60, about the dead burying their own dead, as a possible example of such a saying. Regarding this logion, the two central questions are: (1) Who are these dead people? (2) How are they able to bury other dead people if they themselves are dead? I would suggest that these “dead” people are not physically dead, but symbolically dead. They are dead because they do not accept the teachings of Jesus. Their apocalyptic fate is already sealed, even though they have not physically died yet. This is the only interpretation that would make proper sense of verse 59. Jesus is telling this would-be disciple that he must leave behind those who are already dead, meaning his patriarchal family and his community, since they are all part of “this generation.” In light of the apocalyptic end and the concurrent reversal of fortunes, these people are already dead in the present. Jesus is therefore explaining to the would-be disciple that his father is not alone in being dead. His whole family and community are also dead. Since his father was part of greater Israel, he is also part of those who are symbolically dead. Therefore, this saying is dually shocking and insensitive: (1) The dead father of the would-be disciple is associated and grouped in with those who will face apocalyptic punishment (cf. Q 11:31-32; Q 13:28-29). (2) The living loved-ones of the would-be disciple are part of greater Israel and already symbolically dead (cf. Q 10:13-15, 21-24; Q 11:19b; Q 13:24-27; Q 22:28, 30). As such, the would-be disciple must abandon his former ties and leave his dead relatives to bury themselves (cf. Q 12:53; Q 14:26; Q 17:34-35). Such a reading of this logion might cumulatively assist in understanding the troublesome saying in Q 17:37. If this latter saying is read together with Q 9:60, the vultures could be taken to be the Pharisees, scribes, judges and temple priests of Israel who feed off the dead corpse of greater Israel (compare Q 11:39-52; Q 12:58-59; Q 13:34-35). It follows from the suggested reading of Q 9:60 that this saying can not be properly understood if the presence of apocalyptic language is denied. Future research will have to prove or refute such a reading of Q 9:60.

A second lacuna in current research can now be mentioned. It has been suggested that a non-imminent, but still apocalyptic, Jesus would solve many troubling and uncomfortable difficulties for the Third Quest. What now remains is to determine whether or not this Jesus would pass the test of historical enquiry. If we start with the hypothesis that Jesus
was indeed apocalyptic, but did not claim to know when the end would occur, would this hypothesis stand up to the types of questions usually asked by the Third Quest? Wright has suggested five historical questions that must guide any and every Third Quest for Jesus: (1) How does Jesus fit into Judaism? (2) What were Jesus’ aims? (3) Why did Jesus die? (4) How and why did the early church begin? (5) Why are the Gospels what they are? These questions could be answered in turn, albeit briefly. As scholars of the Third Quest know, having an apocalyptic Jesus is one of the best ways of fitting him into his Jewish *Sitz im Leben*. Imminence and urgency are not necessary ingredients for one to end up with an apocalyptic or Jewish Jesus. The question about Jesus’ aims could be answered by appealing to both his sapiential and his apocalyptic teachings. Q’s Jesus intended to direct people’s present conduct in light of both sapiential logic and apocalyptic foreknowledge. Sometimes, these two things are one and the same. Unlike John the Baptist, Jesus did not urge repentance because the end would occur pretty soon, but directed people’s lives because he thought he knew how the end would transpire. Regarding question three, Jesus might have died because of his insistence that both the powers that be and greater Israel as a whole were intrinsically evil. In fact, both the elites and the stubborn commoners would be judged by the disciples of Jesus, experience an unprecedented reversal of fortunes and face apocalyptic punishment. Such an apocalyptic message, albeit not imminent, was sure to ruffle some elitist feathers and stir some political pots.

The fourth and fifth questions are perhaps most important for this type of Jesus. Where did the early church and the evangelists get their notion that the apocalyptic event would occur soon, if not from Jesus? A few suggestions are possible. The excitement of being part of a new community with an apocalyptic message might certainly have evolved into the urgency experienced by the first followers of Jesus. The experiences of resurrection and Easter would certainly have added to this exuberant excitement and could certainly have convinced some that Jesus would soon return. Some of the followers that knew the historical person could simply have missed him and wished that he would return soon. Is it not also possible that the first followers of Jesus could have interpreted the aphorisms and parables of Jesus in such a way that they found, albeit erroneously, evidence of an
imminent return in them? A number of other explanations could be added. The point, though, is that the jump from a non-imminent-eschatological Jesus to an imminent-eschatological faith community is not as far and bothersome as the leap from a non-eschatological Jesus to an eschatological early church. A non-imminent silhouette of the historical Jesus has not been entirely proven by these preliminary suggestions, but such a silhouette certainly is a road worth taking, even if it is presently less travelled in the Third Quest. Could this silhouette of Jesus be synthesised with the knowledge we have of him, particularly the traditions conveyed about him in the canonical gospel? Only time will tell.
### APPENDIX A: THE CRITICAL EDITION OF Q

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Luke/Q</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Greek</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3:2b-3a</td>
<td>&lt;…&gt; John &lt;…&gt; all the region of the Jordan &lt;…&gt;.</td>
<td>&lt;…&gt; Ἰωάννη... &lt;…&gt; πᾶσα... ἡ... περίχωρο... τοῦ Ἰορδάνου &lt;…&gt;.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:7</td>
<td>He said to the [crowds coming to be] bapt[zed]: Snakes' litter! Who warned you to run from the impeding rage?</td>
<td>[ἐίπεν] τοῖς ἔρχομενοι&lt;ὁς ἄγγισθεν εἰς] βαπτίσεως[θηναι]· γεννήματα ἐχθρίων, τίς ὑπεδείξεν ὑμῖν φυγεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς μελλούσης φόρης;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:8</td>
<td>So bear fruit worthy of repentance, and do not presume to tell yourselves: We have as «fore» father Abraham! For I tell you: God can produce children for Abraham right out of these rocks!</td>
<td>ποιήσατε οὖν καρπὸν εἰς τὴν ἡτανοίαν καὶ δόξητε λέγειν οὐκ ἀπαντήσεις· πατέρα ἐν τούτως λέγω γὰρ ὅτι δύναται θεὸς ἐκ τῶν λίθων τούτων ἐγείραι τέκνα τῷ Ἀβραάμ.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:9</td>
<td>And the axe already lies at the root of the trees. So every tree not bearing healthy fruit is to be chopped down and thrown on the fire.</td>
<td>ἢδη δὲ ἡ ἀξίνη πρὸς τὴν ῥίζαν τῶν δέντρων κεῖται· πάν ὑμῖν δένδρον μὴ ποιοῦν καρπὸν καλὸν ἐκκόπτεται καὶ εἰς πῦρ βάλλεται.</td>
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<td>3:16b</td>
<td>I baptize you [in] water, but the one to come after me is more powerful than I, whose sandals I am not fit to [take off]. He will baptize you in [holy] Spirit and fire.</td>
<td>ἐγὼ μὲν ὑμᾶς βαπτίζω· δὲ ὁ διὰβόλου θεός· ὁ δὲ υποδήματα αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀπαντήσεις· πνεύματι [ἄγιῳ] καὶ πυρὶ.</td>
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<td>3:17</td>
<td>His pitchfork «is» in his hand, and he will clear his threshing floor and gather the wheat into his granary, but the chaff he will burn on a fire that can never be put out.</td>
<td>οὐ τὸ πτέρυγ ἐν τῇ θείᾳ αὐτοῦ καὶ διακαθαριέτη τὴν ἄλωνα αὐτοῦ καὶ συνάξει τὸν σίτου εἰς τὴν ἀποθήκην Οὐαῦτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἀχυρὸν κατακαύσει πυρὶ ἀσβέστως.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:21b-22</td>
<td>[Jesus ... baptized, heaven opened ..., and ... the Spirit ... upon him ... Son]</td>
<td>[Ἰησοῦς ... βαπτίσθη ... νεωχθῆ ... ὦ ... ὑπόρον ... καὶ ... τὸ πνεῦμα ... ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ... ὦ... ]</td>
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<tr>
<td>4:1</td>
<td>And Jesus was led [into] the wilderness by the Spirit</td>
<td>[ὁ] δὲ Ἰησοῦς [ἀν]ήχη[θη] [εἰς] τὴν[ν] ἑρμη[σον ὑπὸ] τοῦ[ν] πνεῦμα[τος]</td>
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<td>4:2</td>
<td>[to be] tempted by the devil. And «he ate nothing» for forty days, ... he became hungry.</td>
<td>πειρα[σθηναι] ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου. καὶ ... ἡμέρας τεσσεράκοντα, ... ἐπείνας.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4:3</td>
<td>And the devil told him: If you are God's Son, order that these stones become loaves.</td>
<td>καὶ ἐπεν αὐτῷ ὁ διάβολος· οἱ καρποὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, εἰπὲ ἵνα οἱ λίθοι οὕτωι ἀρτοὶ γένωνται.</td>
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<td>4:4</td>
<td>And Jesus answered [him]: It is written: A person is not to live only from bread.</td>
<td>καὶ ἀπεκρίθη [ὡς ὁ Ἰησοῦς· γέγραμμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀρτῳ μόνῳ ζήσεται ὁ ἀνθρωπός.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4:9</td>
<td>[The devil] took him along to Jerusalem and put him on the tip of the temple and told him: If you are God's son, throw yourself down.</td>
<td>παραλαμβάνει αὐτόν ὁ διάβολος εἰς Ἱερουσαλήμ καὶ ἐστήσεν αὐτὸν ἐπί τὸ πτερύγιον τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ ἐίπεν αὐτῷ· εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ, βάλε σεαυτὸν κάτω.</td>
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<td>4:10</td>
<td>For it is written: He will command his angels about you,</td>
<td>γέγραπται γὰρ ὅτι τοῖς ἁγγέλοις αὐτοῦ ἐντελεστῶσιν περί σοῦ</td>
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<td>4:11</td>
<td>and on their hands they will bear you, so that you do not strike your foot against a stone.</td>
<td>καὶ ἐπὶ χειρῶν ἀρουσάν σε, μήπως προσκόψῃς πρὸς λίθον τὸν πόδα σου.</td>
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<td>4:12</td>
<td>And Jesus [in reply] told him: It is written: Do not put to the test the Lord your God.</td>
<td>καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν αὐτῷ· ὁ θεὸς γέγραπται· οὐκ ἐκπειράσεις κύριον τὸν θεόν σου.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4:5</td>
<td>And the devil took him along to a [very high] mountain and showed him all the kingdoms of the world and their splendour,</td>
<td>καὶ παραλαμβάνει αὐτὸν ὁ διάβολος εἰς ὄρος [ὕψηλον λίαν] καὶ δείκνυσιν αὐτῷ πᾶσας τὰς βασιλείας τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν</td>
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<td>4:6</td>
<td>and told him: All these I will give you,</td>
<td>καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ· ταῦτα σοι πάντα δώσω,</td>
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<td>4:7</td>
<td>if you bow down before me.</td>
<td>εάν προσκυνήσῃς μοι.</td>
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<td>4:8</td>
<td>And [in reply] Jesus told him: It is written: Bow down to the Lord your God, and serve only him.</td>
<td>καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς· ὁ θεὸς εἶπεν αὐτῷ· γέγραπται· κύριον τὸν θεόν σου προσκυνήσεις καὶ αὐτῷ μόνῳ λατρεύσεις.</td>
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<td>4:13</td>
<td>And the devil left him.</td>
<td>καὶ ὁ διάβολος ἀφίησιν αὐτὸν.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4:16</td>
<td>&lt;...&gt; Nazara &lt;...&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;...&gt; Ναζαρά &lt;...&gt;</td>
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<td>6:20</td>
<td>&lt;...&gt; And raising his [eyes to] his disciples he said: Blessed are [«you»], poor, for God's reign is for [you].</td>
<td>&lt;...&gt; καὶ ἔπαρξας τοῖς όφθαλμοῖς αὐτοῦ [εἰς τοὺς] μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ λέγω· Μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοὶ, ὅτι [ὑμετέρα] ἐστίν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ.</td>
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<td>6:21</td>
<td>Blessed are [«you»] who hunger, for [you] will eat [your] fill. Blessed are [«you»] who mourn, for [«you» will be consoled].</td>
<td>μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες, ὅτι χορτασθής, εσθε. μακάριοι οἱ πενθῶντες, ὅτι [παρακληθῆς&lt;εσθε&gt;].</td>
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<td>6:23</td>
<td>Be glad and [exult], for vast is your reward in heaven. For this is how they [persecuted] the prophets who «were» before you.</td>
<td>χαίρετε καὶ [ἀγαλλιάζεθε], ὅτι ὁ μισθός ὑμῶν πολὺς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ· οὕτως γὰρ [ἐδίωξαν] τοὺς προφήτας τοὺς πρὸ ὑμῶν.</td>
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<td>6:27</td>
<td>Love your enemies</td>
<td>ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν</td>
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<tr>
<td>6:28</td>
<td>[and] pray for those [persecuting] you,</td>
<td>[καὶ] προσεύχεσθε ὑπὲρ τῶν [διωκόντων ὑμᾶς,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:35c-d</td>
<td>so that you may become sons of your Father, for he raises his sun on bad and [good and rains on the just and unjust].</td>
<td>ὅπως γένησθε υἱοὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν, ὅτι τὸν ἑλιοῦν αὐτοῦ ἀνατέλλει ἐπί πονηροὺς καὶ [ἀγαθοὺς καὶ βρέχει ἐπὶ δικαίους καὶ ἄδικους].</td>
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[The one who slaps] you on the cheek, offer [him] the other as well; and [to the person wanting to take you to court and get] your shirt, [turn over to him] the coat as well.

[Mat 5:41]

To the one who asks of you, give; and [from the one who borrows], do not [ask] back «what is» yours.

And if you lend «to those» from whom you hope to receive, what <reward do> you <have>? Do not even [the Gentiles] do the same?

Be full of pity, just as your Father .. is full of pity.

.. Do not pass judgment, «so» you are not judged. [For with what judgment you pass judgment, you will be judged.]

Can a blind person show the way to a blind person? Will not both fall into a pit?

A disciple is not superior to the teacher. [It is enough for the disciple that he become] like his teacher.

And why do you see the speck in your brother’s eye, but the beam in your own eye you overlook?

How «can you» say to your brother: Let me throw out the speck [from] your eye, and just look at the beam in your own eye? Hypocrite, first throw out from your own eye the beam, and then you will see clearly to throw out the speck «in» your brother’s eye.

.. No healthy tree bears rotten fruit, nor [on the other hand] does a decayed tree bear healthy fruit.
| 6:44 | For from the fruit the tree is known. Are figs picked from thorns, or grape[s] from thistles? | ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ καρποῦ τὸ δέντρον γινώσκεται. μήτι συλλέγουσιν ἐξ ἀκανθῶν σῦκα ἢ ἐκ τριβόλων σταφυλ[ας]; |
| 6:45 | The good person from «one's» good treasure casts up good things, and the evil [person] from the evil [treasure] casts up evil things. For from exuberance of heart [one's] mouth speaks. | ὁ ἄγαθος ἀνθρώπος ἐκ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ θησαυροῦ ἐκβάλλει ἄγαθα, καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς [ἀνθρώπος] ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ [θησαυροῦ] ἐκβάλλει πονηρά· ἐκ γὰρ περισσεύματος καρδίας λαλεῖ τὸ στόμα [αὐτοῦ]. |
| 6:46 | .. Why do you call me: Master, Master, and do not do what I say? | τί .. καλεῖτε· κύριε κύριε, καὶ οὐ ποιεῖτε ἀ λέγω; |
| 6:47 | Everyone hearing my words and acting on them | πᾶς ὁ ἄκοψτος μου τ... λόγ... καὶ ποιῶν αὐτούς, |
| 6:48 | is like a person who built [one's] house on bedrock; and the rain poured down and the flash-floods came, [and the winds blew] and pounded that house, and it did not collapse, for it was founded on bedrock. | ὁμοίως ἔστιν ἀνθρώπῳ ὃς ὁκοδόμησεν [αὐτοῦ τὴν] οἰκίαν ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν· καὶ κατέβη ἡ βροχή καὶ ἤλθον οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἤπνεσαν οἱ ἄνεμοι καὶ προσέπεσαν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἑκείνη, καὶ οὐκ ἔπεσεν, τεθεμελιωτὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν. |
| 6:49 | And [everyone] who hears [my sayings], and does not act on [them] is like a person who built [one's] house on the sand; and the rain poured down and the flash-floods came, [and the winds blew] and battered that house, and promptly it collapsed, and its [fall] was devastating. | καὶ [πᾶς] ὁ ἄκοψτος [μου τοὺς λόγους] καὶ μὴ ποιῶν [αὐτούς] ὁμοίως ἔστιν ἄνθρώπῳ ὃς ὁκοδόμησεν [αὐτοῦ τὴν] οἰκίαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμμόν· καὶ κατέβη ἡ βροχή καὶ ἤλθον οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἤπνεσαν οἱ ἄνεμοι καὶ προσέκοψαν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἑκείνη, καὶ εὔθες ἔπεσεν καὶ ἦν [ἡ πτώσις] αὐτῆς μεγάλη. |
| 7:1 | [And it came to pass when] he .. ended these sayings, he entered Capernaum. | [καὶ ἐγένετο ὅτε ἔπλήρωσεν ... τοὺς λόγους τούτους, εἰσῆλθεν εἰς Ἐφραίμαν. |
| 7:3 | There came to him a centurion exhorting him [and saying: My] boy [-is] doing badly. And he said to him: Am I], by coming, to heal him? | «HELLAΣCΝΥ ἀντικόνταρχος ὁς παρακάλων αὐτὸν [καὶ λέγων]· ὁ παῖς [μου κακῶς ἔκει]. καὶ λέγει ἀντιφ. ἔγω] ἐλθὼν θεραπεύω[ν] αὐτόν; |
| 7:6b-c | And in reply the centurion said: Master, I am not worthy for you to come under my roof; | καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς ὁ ἐκατοντάρχος ἔρις κύριε, οὐκ εἰμὶ ἴκανός ἕνα μου ὑπὸ τὴν στέγην εἰσέλθης, |
| 7:7 | but say a word, and [let] my boy [be] healed. | ἀλλὰ εἰπὲ λόγῳ, καὶ ἰαθῇ[τῷ] ὁ παῖς μου. |
| 7:8 | For I too am a person under authority, with soldiers under me, and I say to one: Go, and he goes, and to another: Come, and he comes, and to my slave: Do this, and he does «it». | καὶ γὰρ ἔγω ἀνθρώπῳ εἰμὶ ὑπὸ ἔξουσιαν, ἔχων ὑπ’ ἐμαυτὸν στρατιώτας, καὶ λέγω τοῦτώ· πορεύθητι, καὶ πορεύεται, καὶ ἄλλω ἔρχου, καὶ ἔρχεται, καὶ τῷ δούλῳ μου ποίησον τοῦτο, καὶ ποιεῖ. |
But Jesus, on hearing, was amazed, and said to those who followed: I tell you, not even in Israel have I found such faith.

And John, [on hearing about all these things], sending through his disciples, .. ὁ .. Ἰωάννης [ἀκούσας περὶ πάντων τούτων] πέμψας διὰ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ

[said] to him: Are you the one to come, or are we to expect someone else?

And in reply he said to them: Go report to John what you hear and see: The blind regain their sight and the lame walk around, the skin-diseased are cleansed and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised, and the poor are given good news.

And blessed is whoever is not offended by me.

And when they had left, he began to talk to the crowds about John: What did you go out into the wilderness to look at? A reed shaken by the wind?

If not, what did you go out to see? A person arrayed in finery? Look, those wearing finery are in kings' houses.

But «then» what did you go out to see? A prophet? Yes, I tell you, even more than a prophet!

This is the one about whom it has been written: Look, I am sending my messenger ahead of you, who will prepare your path in front of you.

I tell you: There has not arisen among women's offspring anyone who surpasses John. Yet the least significant in God's kingdom is more than he.

[«For John came to you», ... the tax collectors and ... «responded positively».]

[but «the religious authorities rejected» him.]

.. To what am I to compare this generation and what <is it> like?
It is like children seated in [the] marketplace, who, addressing [the others], say: We fluted for you, but you would not dance; we wailed, but you would not cry.

For John came, neither eating nor drinking, and you say: He has a demon!

The son of humanity came, eating and drinking, and you say: Look! A person who is a glutton and drunkard, a chum of tax collectors and sinners!

But Wisdom was vindicated by her children.

And someone said to him: I will follow you wherever you go.

And Jesus said to him: Foxes have holes, and birds of the sky have nests; but the son of humanity does not have anywhere he can lay his head.

But another said to him: Master, permit me first to go and bury my father.

He said to his disciples: The harvest is plentiful, but the workers are few. So ask the Lord of the harvest to dispatch workers into his harvest.

Be on your way! Look, I send you like sheep in the midst of wolves.

Carry no [purse], nor knapsack, nor sandals, nor stick, and greet no one on the road.

Into whatever house you enter, [first] say: Peace [to this house]!

And if a son of peace be there, let your peace come upon him; but if not, [let] your peace [return upon] you.
[And at that house] remain, «eating and drinking whatever they provide», for the worker is worthy of one’s reward. [Do not move around from house to house.]

καὶ εἰς ἑν ἀνὶ πόλιν εἰσέρχοντες καὶ δέχονται υμᾶς, [«ἐσθίετε τὰ παρατιθέμενα υμῖν»]

and cure the sick there, and say [to them]: The kingdom of God has reached unto you.

καὶ θεραπεύετε τὸν αὐτὸντας καὶ λέγετε, «Βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ έγενεν, καὶ εἶπεν οἱ πόλεως έκείνης.

But into whatever town you enter and they do not take you in, on going out from that town.

εἰς ἑν δ’ ἀνὶ πόλιν εἰσέλθησε καὶ μὴ δέχονται υμᾶς, εῇρχόμενοι ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐκείνης.

shake off the dust from your feet.

ἐκτινάξατε τὸν κονιόρτον τῶν ποδῶν υμῶν.

I tell you: For Sodom it shall be more bearable on that day than for that town.

λέγω, ὅτι Σοδομίς ἀνεκτότερον έσται ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ ἢ τῇ πόλει ἐκείνῃ.

Yet for Tyre and Sidon it shall be more bearable at the judgment than for you.

πλὴν Τύρῳ καὶ Σίδωνίς ἀνεκτότερον έσται ἐν τῇ κρίσει ἡμῶν.

And you, Capernaum, up to heaven will you be exalted? Into Hades shall you come down!

καὶ σὺ, Καφαρναοῦ, ἡσαν ἀνεκτότερον έσται ἐν τῷ ἡδύς καὶ ζωῆς καὶ ποδῶν μετενέχονσαν.

Whoever takes you in takes me in, [and] whoever takes me in takes in the one who sent me.

ὁ δεχόμενος υμᾶς ἐμὲ δέχεται, [καὶ] ὁ ἐμὲ δεχόμενος δέχεται τὸν ἀποστειλαντάς με.

At «that time» he said: I thank you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, for you hid these things from sages and the learned, and disclosed them to children. Yes, Father, for that is what it has pleased you to do.

ἐν … εἶπεν· ἐξομολογούμαι σοι, πάτερ, κύριε τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς γῆς, ὅτι ἐκρυψας ταῦτα ἀπὸ σοφῶν καὶ σωτηρίων καὶ ἀπεκάλυψας αὐτὰ νηπίοις· καὶ ὁ πατὴρ, ὅτι οὕτως εὐδοκία ἐγένετο ἐμπροσθέν σου.

Everything has been entrusted to me by my Father, and no one knows the Son except the Father, nor [does anyone know] the Father except the Son, and to whomever the Son chooses to reveal him.

πάντα μοι παρεδόθη ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός μου, καὶ οὐδές γινώσκει τὸν υἱὸν εἰ μὴ ὁ πατὴρ, οὐδὲ τὸν πατέρα [τις γινώσκει] εἰ μὴ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸν υἱὸν βούληται ὁ υἱὸς ἀποκαλύψαι.

Blessed are the eyes that see what you see ...

μακάριοι οἱ όφθαλμοι οἱ βλέποντες ἡ βλέπετε...

For I tell you: Many prophets and kings wanted to see what you see, but never saw it, and to hear what you hear, but never heard it.

λέγω γὰρ υμῖν ὅτι πολλοὶ προφῆται καὶ βασιλεῖς ...ιδεῖν ἡ βλέπετε καὶ οὐκ εἶδαν, καὶ ἀκούσατε ἡ ἀκούσατε καὶ οὐκ ἤκουσαν.
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<tr>
<td>11:2b</td>
<td>[When] you pray, [say]: Father — may your name be kept holy! — let your reign come:</td>
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[θόταν] προσεύχ]ηςθε [λέγετε]: πάτερ, ἀγιασθήτω τὸ ὄνομά σου· ἐλθέτω ἡ βασιλεία σου· |

| 11:3 | Our day’s bread give us today; |

τὸν ἄρτον τὸν ἐποιούσιν δὸς ἡμῖν σήμερον· |

| 11:4 | and cancel our debts for us, as we too have cancelled for those in debt to us; and do not put us to the test! |

καὶ ἄφες ἡμῖν τὰ ὄφειλήματα ἡμῶν, ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀφήκαμεν τοῖς ὄφειλέταις ἡμῶν· καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκης ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν. |

| 11:9 | I tell you: ask and it will be given to you, search and you will find, knock and it will be opened to you. |

λέγω· αἰτεῖτε καὶ δοθήσεται· ζητεῖτε καὶ εὑρήσετε· κρούοντι· καὶ νοικόν ἐνοπόνησεται. |

| 11:10 | For everyone who asks receives, and the one who searches finds, and to the one who knocks will it be opened. |

πᾶς γὰρ ὁ αἰτῶν λαμβάνει καὶ ὁ ζητῶν εὑρίσκει καὶ τῷ κρούοντι ἀνοιγήσεται· |

| 11:11 | .. What person of you, whose son asks for bread, will give him a stone? |

.. τίς ἄνθρωπος, ἐπείοιός τελευταίος ἑξάκης αὐτὸν· μὴ λίθον πιδώσῃ αὐτῷ· |

| 11:12 | Or again when he asks for a fish, will give him a snake? |

καὶ ικθύν αἰτήσει, μὴ ὄψιν ἐπιδώσῃ αὐτῷ· |

| 11:13 | So if you, though evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, by how much more will the Father from heaven give good things to those who ask him! |

eι οὖν ψυχὲς πονηροί οίδατε δόματα ἄγαθα διδόναι τοῖς τέκνοις ὑμῶν, πόσω μᾶλλον ὁ πατὴρ ἐξ ὀρανοῦ δώσει ἄγαθα τοῖς αἰτοῦσιν αὐτόν. |

| 11:14 | And he cast out a demon «which made a person» mute. And once the demon was cast out, the mute person spoke. And the crowds were amazed. |

καὶ ἐξ-βαλ<εν> δαιμόνιον κωφόν· καὶ ἐκβληθέντος τοῦ δαιμόνιου ἑλάλησεν ὁ κωφός καὶ ἐθαύμασαν οἱ ὄχλοι. |

| 11:15 | But some said: By Beelzebul, the ruler of demons, he casts out demons! |

tίνες δὲ εἰπον· ἐν Βεελζεβοῦλ τῷ ἄρχοντι τῶν δαιμονίων ἐκβάλλει τὰ δαιμονία. |

| 11:17 | But, knowing their thoughts, he said to them: Every kingdom divided against itself is left barren, and every household divided against itself will not stand. |

eἰδὼς δὲ τὰ διανοήματα αὐτῶν εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· πᾶσα βασιλεία μερισθείσα [καθ’] ἑαυτή[ν] ἐρημώταται καὶ πᾶσα οἰκία μερισθείσα καθ’ ἑαυτής οὐ σταθήσεται. |

| 11:18 | And if Satan is divided against himself, how will his kingdom stand? |

καὶ εἰ ὁ σατανᾶς ἔφ’ ἑαυτόν ἑμερίσθη, πῶς σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ; |

| 11:19 | And if I by Beelzebul cast out demons, your sons, by whom do they cast «them» out? This is why they will be your judges. |

καὶ εἰ ἔγὼ ἐν Βεελζεβοῖ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαιμόνια, οἱ υἱοί υἱῶν ἐν τίνι ἐκβάλλουσιν· διὰ τούτο αὐτοὶ κρίται ἐσονται υἱῶν. |

| 11:20 | But if it is by the finger of God that I cast out demons, then there has come upon you God’s reign. |

εἰ δὲ ἐν δακτύλω θεοῦ ἔγὼ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαιμόνια, ἀρα ἔφθασεν ἐφ’ υμᾶς ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ. |

| 11:21 | [«A strong person’s house cannot be looted.»] |

[<>] |

| 11:22 | [«but if someone still stronger overpowers him, he does get looted.»] |

[<>] |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verse</th>
<th>Translation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11:23</td>
<td>The one not with me is against me, and the one not gathering with me scatters.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:24</td>
<td>When the defiling spirit has left the person, it wanders through waterless regions looking for a resting-place, and finds none. [Then] it says: I will return to my house from which I came.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:25</td>
<td>And on arrival «it» finds it swept and tidied up.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:26</td>
<td>Then it goes and brings with it seven other spirits more evil than itself, and, moving in, they settle there. And the last «circumstances» of that person become worse than the first.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:29</td>
<td>But .. [he said] ..: This generation is an evil .. generation; it demands a sign, and a sign will not be given to it — except the sign of Jonah!</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>For as Jonah became to the Ninevites a sign, so [also] will the son of humanity be to this generation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:31</td>
<td>The queen of the South will be raised at the judgment with this generation and condemn it, for she came from the ends of the earth to listen to the wisdom of Solomon, and look, something more than Solomon is here!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:32</td>
<td>Ninevite men will arise at the judgment with this generation and condemn it. For they repented at the announcement of Jonah, and look, something more than Jonah is here!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:33</td>
<td>No one light «a lamp and puts it » in a hidden place, but on the lamp stand, [and it gives light for everyone in the house].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:34</td>
<td>The lamp of the body is the eye. If your eye is generous, your whole body [is] radiant; but if your eye is jaundiced, your whole body «is» dark.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:35</td>
<td>So if the light within you is dark, how great «must» the darkness «be»!</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verse</td>
<td>Greek Text</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:42</td>
<td>οὐαὶ ὑμῖν [τοῖς] Φαρισαίοις, ὅτι ἀποδεκατοῦτε τὸ ἰθύσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνθίζον καὶ τὸ κύμινον καὶ [ἀφήγκατε] τὴν κρίσιν καὶ τὸ ἔλεος καὶ τὴν πίστιν· ταῦτα δὲ ἔδει ποιῆσαι κάκεινα μὴ [ἀφιέ]ναι.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:39b</td>
<td>οὐαὶ ὑμῖν, [τοῖς] Φαρισαίοις, ὅτι καθαρίζετε τὸ ἐξωθέν τοῦ ποτηρίου καὶ τῆς παροψίδος, ἐσωθεὶν δὲ γέμουσιν ἔξ [ἀρπαγήσ] καὶ ἀκρασίας.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:41</td>
<td>καθαρίστε τὸντάς τοῦ ποτηρίου, .. κακτός αὐτοῦ καθαρόν ...</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:43</td>
<td>οὐαὶ ὑμῖν τοῖς Φαρισαίοις, ὅτι φιλείτε, τὸν πρωτοκλισίαν τὸς δείπνοις καὶ τὴν πρωτοκαθεδρίαν τὰς συναγωγὰς καὶ τοὺς ἀσπασμοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀγοραῖς.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:44</td>
<td>οὐαὶ ὑμῖν, [τοῖς] Φαρισαίοις, ὅτι στὶς τὰς ἀδήλα, καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι οἱ περιπατοῦντες ἐπάνω οὗκ οἴδασιν.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:52</td>
<td>διὰ τὸ καὶ ἐπιτίθετε τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων]· ὑμεῖς οὖν εἰσήλθατε [οὐδὲ] τοὺς εἰσερχόμενους ἀφίετε εἰσελθεῖν.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:47</td>
<td>οὐαὶ ὑμῖν, οἰκοδομεῖτε τὰ μνημεία τῶν προφητῶν, οἱ δὲ πατέρες ὑμῶν ἀπέκτειναν αὐτοῦς.</td>
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<td>11:48</td>
<td>διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ σοφία .. εἰπὲν· ἀποστελῶ [πρός] αὐτούς προφήτας καὶ σοφοὺς, καὶ ἔξ ἀυτῶν ἀποκτενοῦσιν καὶ διώξουσιν,</td>
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<td>11:50</td>
<td>[Ἰνα] ἐκζητηθῇ τὸ αἷμα πάντων τῶν προφητῶν τὸ ἐκκεχυμένον ἀπὸ καταβολής κόσμου ἀπὸ τῆς γενεᾶς ταύτης,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verse</td>
<td>Text</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:51</td>
<td>From «the» blood of Abel to «the» blood of Zechariah, murdered between the sacrificial altar and the House. Yes, I tell you, «An accounting» will be required of this generation! And the holy Spirit will teach you in that ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:2</td>
<td>Nothing is covered up that will not be exposed, and hidden that will not be known. And whoever may deny me in public .. in Gehenna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:3</td>
<td>What I say to you in the dark, speak in the light; and what you hear «whispered» in the ear, proclaim on the housetops. And whoever says a word against the son of humanity, it will be forgiven him; but whoever [speak] against the holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:4</td>
<td>And do not be afraid of those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul. But whoever may deny me in public .. in Gehenna.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:5</td>
<td>But fear .. the one who is able to destroy both the soul and body in Gehenna. And whoever says a word against the son of humanity, it will be forgiven him; but whoever [speak] against the holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:6</td>
<td>Are not [five] sparrows sold for [two] cents? And yet not one of them will fall to earth without [your Father's] «consent». Anyone who [may] speak out for me in public, the son of humanity will also speak out for him before the angels ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:7</td>
<td>But even the hairs of your head all are numbered. Do not be afraid, you are worth more than many sparrows. And whoever says a word against the son of humanity, it will be forgiven him; but whoever [speak] against the holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him.</td>
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<td>12:8</td>
<td>And anyone who [may] speak out for me in public, [the son of humanity] will also speak out for him before the angels ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:9</td>
<td>But whoever may deny me in public [will be] den[ied] before the angels ..</td>
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</table>
| 12:10 | And whoever says a word against the son of humanity, it will be forgiven him; but whoever [speak] against the holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him. And whoever may deny me in public [will be] den[ied] before the angels ..
<p>| 12:11 | When they bring you before synagogues, do not be anxious about how or what you are to say; And whoever says a word against the son of humanity, it will be forgiven him; but whoever [speak] against the holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him. |
| 12:12 | for [the holy Spirit will teach] you in that .. hour what you are to say. And whoever may deny me in public [will be] den[ied] before the angels .. |
| 12:33 | «Do not treasure for yourselves treasures on earth, where moth and gnawing deface and where robbers dig through and rob,» but treasure for yourselves treasures «s» in heaven, where neither moth nor gnawing defaces and where robbers do not dig through nor rob. «μη θησαυρίζετε υμίν θησαυρούς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ὅπου σής καὶ βρώσις ἀφανίζει καὶ ὅπου κλέπται διορύσσουσιν καὶ κλέπτουσιν» θησαυρίζετε δὲ ὑμίν θησαυρο... ἐν οὐραν[ῳ], ὅπου ὦτε σής ὦτε βρώσις ἀφανίζει καὶ ὅπου κλέπται οὐ διορύσσουσιν οὐδὲ κλέπτουσιν» |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verse</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:34</td>
<td>For where your treasure is, there will also be your heart.</td>
<td>ὅπου γὰρ ἐστίν ὁ θησαυρὸς σου, ἐκεί ἐσται καὶ ἡ καρδία σου.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:22b</td>
<td>Therefore I tell you: Do not be anxious about your life, what you are to eat, nor about your body, with what you are to clothe yourself.</td>
<td>διὰ τούτου λέγω ὑμῖν· μὴ μεριμνάτε τῇ ψυχῇ ὑμῶν τί φάγητε, μηδὲ τῷ σώματι ὑμῶν τί ἐνδύσησθε.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:23</td>
<td>Is not life more than food, and the body than clothing?</td>
<td>οὐχὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πλεῖόν ἐστίν τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἐνδύματος;</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:24</td>
<td>Consider the ravens: They neither sow nor reap nor gather into barns, and yet God feeds them. Are you not better than the birds?</td>
<td>κατανοήσατε τοὺς κόρακας· ὁ οὐκ σπείρουσιν οὐδὲ θερίζουσιν οὐδὲ συνάγουσιν εἰς ἀποθήκας, καὶ ὁ θεὸς τρέφει αὐτούς· οὐχ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον διαφέρετε τῶν πετεινῶν;</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:25</td>
<td>And who of you by being anxious is able to add to one's stature a .. cubit?</td>
<td>τίς δὲ ἐξ ὑμῶν μεριμνῶν δύναται προσθῆναι ἐπί τὴν ἥλικιαν αὐτοῦ πῆχυν ..;</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:26</td>
<td>And why are you anxious about clothing?</td>
<td>καὶ περὶ ἐνδύματος τί μεριμνᾶτε;</td>
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<td>12:27</td>
<td>[Observe] the lilies, how they grow: They do not work nor do they spin. Yet I tell you: Not even Solomon in all his glory was arrayed like one of these.</td>
<td>κατα[μάθε]τε τὰ κρίνα πῶς αὐξάνει· οὐ κοπι[ᾷ] οὐδὲ νήθ· οὐδὲ δύοντι· οὐδὲ Σολομών ἐν πάσῃ τῇ δόξῃ αὐτοῦ περιεβάλετο ὑπὸ ἐν τούτων.</td>
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<td>12:28</td>
<td>But if in the field the grass, there today and tomorrow thrown into the oven, God clothes thus, will he not much more clothe you, persons of petty faith!</td>
<td>εἰ δὲ ἐν ἄγρῳ τὸν χόρτον ὅντα σήμερον καὶ αὔριον εἰς κλίβανον βαλλόμενον ὁ θεὸς οὕτως ἄμφιθαν[ν]νιν, οὐ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς, ὠλιγόπιστοι;</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:29</td>
<td>[So] do not be anxious, saying: What are we to eat? [Or:] What are we to drink? [Or:] What are we to wear?</td>
<td>μὴ [οὖν] μεριμνήσητε λέγοντες· τί φάγωμεν; · τί πίωμεν; · τί περιβαλώμεθα;</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:30</td>
<td>For all these the Gentiles seek; [for] your Father knows that you need them [all].</td>
<td>πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ ἐθνὶς ἐπιζητοῦσιν· οἴδεν γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὅτι χρήζετε τούτων ἀπάντων.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:31</td>
<td>But seek his kingdom, and [all] these shall be granted to you.</td>
<td>ζητεῖτε δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα [πάντα] προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:39</td>
<td>But know this: If the householder had known in which watch the robber was coming, he would not have let his house be dug into.</td>
<td>ἕκεινο δὲ γινώσκετε ὅτι ἐὰν ἤδει οἶκοδεσποτὴς ποῖα φυλακὴ ὁ κλέπτης ἐρχεται, οὐκ ἂν [εἰς] ἐν διορυχθήναι τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ.</td>
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<td>12:40</td>
<td>You also must be ready, for the Son of Humanity is coming at an hour you do not expect.</td>
<td>καὶ ὑμεῖς γίνεσθε ξτοιμοί, ὅτι ἢ οὐ δοκεῖτε ὃ ύπο τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐρχεται.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:42</td>
<td>Who then is the faithful [and] wise slave whom the master put over his household to give [them] food on time?</td>
<td>τίς ἂρα ἐστίν ὁ πιστὸς δοῦλος [καὶ] φρόνιμος ὃν κατέστησεν ὁ κύριος ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκετείας αὐτοῦ τοῦ δο[ῦνα]ν [αὐτοῖς] ἐν καιρῷ τῆς τροφῆς;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Blessed is that slave whose master, on coming, will find so doing.

But if that slave says in his heart: My master is delayed, and begins to beat [his fellow slaves], and eats and drinks [with the] drunk[ards],

the master of that slave will come on a day he does not expect and at an hour he does not know, and will cut him to pieces and give him an inheritance with the faithless.

Do you think that I have come to hurl peace on earth? I did not come to hurl peace, but a sword!

For I have come to divide son against father, [and] daughter against her mother, [and] daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law.

But he said to them: When evening has come, you say: Good weather! For the sky is flame red.

[And at dawn: Today «it’s» wintry! For the lowering sky is flame red.]

The face of the sky you know «how» to interpret, but the time you are not able to?

While you «go along» with your opponent on the way, make an effort to get loose from him, lest [the opponent] hand you over to the judge, and the judge to the assistant, and [the <assistant>] throw [you] into prison.

I say to you: You will not get out of there until you pay the last [penny]!

What is the kingdom of God like, and with what am I to compare it?

I say to you: You will not get out of there until you pay the last [penny]!

What is the kingdom of God like, and with what am I to compare it?
<p>| 13:19 | It is like a seed of mustard which a person took and threw into his [garden]. And it grew and developed into a tree, and the birds of the sky nested in its branches. |
| 13:20 | [And again]: With what am I to compare the kingdom of God? |
| 13:21 | It is like yeast, which a woman took and hid in three measures of flour until it was fully fermented. |
| 13:24 | Enter through the narrow door, for many will seek to enter and few [are those who enter through it]. |
| 13:25 | When the [householder has arisen] and locked the door, [and you begin to stand outside and knock on the door] saying: Master, open for us, and he will answer you: I do not know you. |
| 13:26 | Then you will begin saying: We ate in your presence and drank, and it was in our streets you taught. |
| 13:27 | And he will say to you: I do not know you! Get away from me, [«you» who do lawlessness!] |
| 13:29 | [And many] shall come from Sunrise and Sunset and recline with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of God, but [you will be] thrown out [into the] outer darkness, where there will be wailing and grinding of teeth. |
| 13:30 | [. The last will be first and the first last.] |
| 13:34 | O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, who kills the prophets and stones those sent to her! How often I wanted to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her nestlings under «her» wings, and you were not willing! |
| 13:35 | Look, your house is forsaken! .. I tell you, you will not see me until [«the time» comes when] you say: Blessed is the one who comes in the name of the Lord! |
| 14:11 | [Everyone exalting oneself will be humbled, and the one humbling oneself will be exalted.] | [πᾶς οὗτος ἐαυτὸν ταπεινωθήσεται, καὶ οὗτος ἐαυτὸν ὑψωθήσεται.] |
| 14:16 | A certain person prepared a [large] dinner, [and invited many]. | ἀνθρωπός τις ἐποίει δεῖπνον [μέγα, καὶ ἐκάλεσεν πολλοὺς] |
| 14:17 | And he sent his slave [at the time of the dinner] to say to the invited: Come, for it is now ready. | καὶ ἀπέστειλεν τὸν δούλον αὐτοῦ [τῇ ὑρα τοῦ δείπνου] εἰπέν τοῖς κεκλημένοις ἐρχεσθε, ὅτι ἂν ἔτοιμα ἔστιν. |
| 14:18 | «One declined because of his farm. | ... ἀγρόν, .. |
| 14:19? | «Another declined because of his business. | .. |
| 14:21 | «And the slave, &lt;on coming, said&gt; these things to his master.» Then the householder, enraged, said to his slave: | «καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῷ κυρίῳ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα.» τότε ὄργισθε οὗτος ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης εἶπεν τῷ δούλῳ αὐτοῦ: |
| 14:23 | Go out on the roads, and whomever you find, invite, so that my house may be filled. | ἐξέλθε ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦς καὶ ὅσους ἔδωκας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀναστήσεως, ἵνα γεμισθῇ μοι ὁ οἶκος. |
| 14:26 | [&lt;The one who&gt; does not hate father and mother &lt;can&gt; not &lt;be&gt; my disciple; and [&lt;the one who&gt;] &lt;does not hate&gt; son and daughter cannot be my disciple. | [ὁ δὲ] οὐ μισεῖ τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα οὐ δύναται εἶναι μου μαθητής, καὶ [ὁ] μισεῖ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὴν κόρην οὐ δύναται εἶναι μου μαθητής. |
| 14:27 | .. The one who does not take one’s cross and follow after me cannot be my disciple. | .. οὐ λαμβάνει τὸν σταυρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ ὁπίσω μου, οὐ δύναται εἶναι μου μαθητής. |
| 17:33 | [The one who] finds one’s life will lose it, and [the one who] loses one’s life [for my sake] will find it. | [ὁ] εὑρίσκει τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπολέσει αὐτὴν, καὶ [ὁ] ἀπολέσας τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ένεκεν ἐμοῦ εὑρίσκει αὐτήν. |
| 14:34 | Salt is good; but if salt becomes insipid, with what will it be seasoned? | [καλὸν] τὸ ἅλας ἐὰν δὲ τὸ ἅλας μωρανθῇ, ἐν τίνι ἀρτιθήσεται; |
| 16:13 | No one can serve two masters; for a person will either hate the one and love the other, or be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and Mammon. | οὐδεὶς δύναται δυσὶ κυρίοις δουλεύειν ἢ γὰρ τὸν ἕνα μισήσει καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ἀγαπήσει, ἢ ἐνὸς ἀνθέξεται καὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου καταφρονήσει. οὐ δύνασθε θεῷ δουλεύειν καὶ μαμωνᾷ. |
| 16:16 | .. The law and the prophets «were» until John. From then on the kingdom of God is violated and the violent plunder it. | ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφήται ἕως Ἰωάννου ἀπὸ τότε ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ βιάζεται καὶ βιασται ἀρπάζουσιν αὐτὴν. |
| 16:17 | [But it is easier for] heaven and earth [to] pass away [than for one iota or] one serif of the law [to fall]. | [ἐυκοπῶτερον δέ ἐστιν τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν παρελθῆσαι ἢ ἤλθῃ ἐν ἧν μιαν κεραίαν τοῦ νόμου πεσεῖν]. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verses</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16:18</td>
<td>Everyone who divorces his wife [and marries another] commits adultery, and the one who marries a divorcée commits adultery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:1</td>
<td>It is necessary for enticements to come, but woe «to the one» through whom they come!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:2</td>
<td>It is better for him [if] a millstone is put around his neck and he is thrown into the sea, than that he should entice one of these little ones.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:4</td>
<td>Which person «is there» among you «who» has a hundred sheep, [on losing] one of them, [will] not leave the ninety-nine that did not go astray.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:5a</td>
<td>And if it should happen that he finds it, he will rejoice over it more than over the ninety-nine that did not go astray.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:7</td>
<td>I say to you that he rejoices over it more than over the ninety-nine that did not go astray.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:8</td>
<td>[«Or what woman who has ten coins, if she were to lose one coin, would not light a lamp and sweep the house and hunt until she finds?»]</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:9</td>
<td>[«And on finding she calls the friends and neighbours, saying: Rejoice with me, for I found the coin which I lost.»]</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:10</td>
<td>[«Just so, I tell you, there is joy before the angels over one repenting sinner.»]</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:3</td>
<td>If your brother sins [against you], rebuke him; and if [he repents], forgive him.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:4</td>
<td>And if seven times a day he sins against you, also seven times shall you forgive him.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:6</td>
<td>If you have faith like a mustard seed, you might say to this mulberry tree: Be uprooted and planted in the sea! And it would obey you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:20</td>
<td>[«But on being asked when the kingdom of God is coming, he answered them and said: The kingdom of God is not coming visibly.»]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:21</td>
<td>[«Nor will one say:» Look, here! or: «There! For, look, the kingdom of God is within you!»]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:23</td>
<td>If they say to you: Look, he is in the wilderness, do not go out; look, he is indoors, do not follow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:24</td>
<td>For as the lightning streaks out from Sunrise and flashes as far as Sunset, so will be the Son of Humanity [on his day].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:37</td>
<td>Wherever the corpse, there the vultures will gather.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:26</td>
<td>.. As [it took place in] the days of Noah, so will it be [in the day &lt;&gt;] of the Son of Humanity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:27</td>
<td>[For as in those days, they were] eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, until the day Noah entered the ark and the flood came and took them all,</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:30</td>
<td>so will it also be on the day the Son of Humanity is revealed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:34</td>
<td>I tell you, there will be two «men» [in the field]; one is taken and one is left.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:35</td>
<td>Two «women» will be grinding at the mill; one is taken and one is left.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19:12</td>
<td>.. A certain person, on taking a trip,</td>
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<tr>
<td>19:13</td>
<td>called ten of his slaves and gave them ten minas [and said to them: Do business until I come].</td>
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<tr>
<td>19:15</td>
<td>.. [After a long time] the master of those slaves comes and settles accounts with them.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19:16</td>
<td>And the first [came] saying: Master, your mina has produced ten more minas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:17</td>
<td>And he said to him: Well done, good slave, you have been faithful over a pittance, I will set you over much.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19:18</td>
<td>And the [second] came saying: Master, your mina has earned five minas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:19</td>
<td>He said to [him: Well done, good slave, you have been faithful over little,] I will set you over much.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:20</td>
<td>And the other came saying: Master,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:21</td>
<td>[I knew] you, that you are a hard person, reaping where you did not sow and gathering from where you did not winnow; and, scared, I [went «and»] hid [your &lt;mina&gt;] in [the ground]. Here, you have what belongs to you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:22</td>
<td>He said to him: Wicked slave! You knew that I reap where I have not sown, and gather from where I have not winnowed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:23</td>
<td>[Then you had to invest] my money [with the] money [changers]! And at my coming I would have received what belongs to me plus interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:24</td>
<td>So take from him the mina and give «it» to the one who has the ten minas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:26</td>
<td>[For] to everyone who has will be given; but from the one who does not have, even what he has will be taken from him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:28</td>
<td>.. You who have followed me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:30</td>
<td>will sit .. on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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RESEARCH SUMMARY

This study examines the occurrences of wisdom and apocalypticism in Q, and then draws conclusions from the latter about the historical Jesus. Important questions are addressed: Did Q think of Jesus as a wisdom teacher, an apocalyptic prophet, or both? If Q associated both wisdom and apocalypticism with Jesus, what was the interrelationship between these two? Did either enjoy preference, or were they equally important to the person and message of Jesus? A concerted effort is made to let Q speak for itself. If the latter were possible, how would Q and the people behind it respond to the Renewed and Third Quests for the historical Jesus? This question basically sums up the research gap, which is to provide the Sayings Gospel with an opportunity to respond to these reconstructions of Jesus. Hence, there are two levels to the present work. The first level focuses on Q in order to determine the roles of both wisdom and apocalypticism in Q. This exercise constitutes the focal point and bulk of the study, leading to the central theory: The Q people remembered and described Jesus as a sage who made use of apocalyptic eschatology to motivate and support his moral message. The acceptance or rejection of this theory will naturally have an impact on our understanding of the historical Jesus, which represents the second level of inquiry. The second level focuses on the historical Jesus, and our understanding of him, given the results obtained in this investigation of Q.

The high regard for Q and the propensity to regard Q as a stratified document places this study squarely in the camp of the Renewed Quest. However, there are two aspects of the study that have affinities with the Third Quest as well. The first is the inclination to question the non-eschatological image of Jesus proffered by the Renewed Quest. The second is the synchronic manner in which the study approaches Q. By preferring to ask how Q remembered and described Jesus, Q is approached in a manner reminiscent of the Third Quest’s historical method.

The research gap is addressed in a systematic way. Chapter one provides a focused overview of historical Jesus research from Reimarus to the present – an endeavour that naturally leads in to a discussion of the dissertation’s research gap, focal point and central theory. In chapter two, Q is considered in its entirety, including its documentary status, its stratification, its genre, its ethnic colouring and its eschatology. Chapter three zooms in on Q’s apocalyptic-judgment and Son-of-Man sayings specifically. An exegetical examination of these logia concentrates particularly on the focal point: the interrelationship between wisdom and apocalypticism in Q. Chapter four zooms in further on a single Q saying: Q 6:37-38. The purpose remains to determine the relationship between wisdom and apocalypticism in Q. The study moves in a centripetal direction, from historical-Jesus research in general (chapter 1), to the Q document (chapter 2), to the Son-of-Man and apocalyptic-judgment logia within Q (chapter 3), to one specific logion about judgment (chapter 4).

Chapter five pulls everything together by (1) assessing the central theory, (2) responding to both the Third and Renewed Quests, (3) suggesting ways to reconcile these two currents, (4) commenting on the relevance of Jesus’ wisdom and morality for today, and (5) highlighting avenues for further study. The central theory is ultimately confirmed, albeit with an important qualification: Apocalyptic eschatology also formed an integral part of the sapiential message of Q’s Jesus. In response to the Renewed Quest, it is found that apocalyptic eschatology can not and should not be divorced from the message of Q’s Jesus. In response to the Third Quest, it is found that Q’s Jesus was primarily a sage, and that his apocalyptic eschatology was not imminent in nature. Regarding the wisdom and morality of Q’s Jesus, it is found that the essence of his message remains valid. This is particularly true of the way in which he used apocalyptic eschatology to motivate and buttress his moral message.
LIST OF KEY TERMS

• Apocalyptic eschatology in Q
• Apocalyptic judgment
• Apocalyptic judgment sayings
• Apocalyptic Son of Man
• Apocalypticism and wisdom
• Apocalypticism in Q
• Aramaic Son of Man
• Beelzebul accusation
• Criteria of authenticity
• Do not judge
• Documentary status of Q
• Eschatology in Q
• Eschatology of Q
• Ethnicity and Q
• Form criticism
• Formative layer
• Formative stratum
• Futuristic eschatology
• Genre of Q
• Gospel of Thomas
• Historical Jesus
• Households and Q
• How Q remembered Jesus
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• Son of Man logia
• Son of Man sayings in Q
• Sophia
• Stratification of Q
• Synchronic approach
• Third Quest
• This generation
• Wisdom in Q