CHAPTER 3: APOCALYPTIC-JUDGMENT
AND SON-OF-MAN LOGIA IN Q

3.1 ~ SON-OF-MAN LOGIA IN GENERAL

3.1.1 Authenticity

As a term and an expression, “Son of Man” is highly likely to be authentic (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:542, Müller 2008:1; Owen 2011a:vii; see Witherington III 1995:95-97; Hurtado 2011:168-172; 545-546, 548-550; Bock 2011:90-92; cf. also Wink 2002:19, 198, 255; Casey 2010:116, 358). Apart from Acts 7:56, John 12:34 and Revelation 1:13 and 14:14, all the Son-of-Man sayings appear on the lips of Jesus, implying that it was unique and typical of the way in which Jesus spoke. Jesus is not once in the canonical gospels called the Son of Man by anyone but himself. Moreover, apart from two instances where Jesus implicitly (not explicitly!) calls himself “prophet” (i.e. Mark 6:4 par.; Luke 13:33), the gospels depict Jesus as using only the phrase “Son of Man,” and nothing else, in reference to himself. In the New Testament, it appears only in literary works by the gospel writers – i.e. the four gospels, Acts and Revelation – meaning that it is entirely absent from the New-Testament epistles, including all the Pauline letters. Despite

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90 Burkett (1999:56) does not believe that this peculiarity serves as evidence that the Son-of-Man expression is authentic. His counter-argument is that other inauthentic titles, like Son of God, also appear on the lips of Jesus. True as this may be, the current argument is not that the term “Son of Man” sometimes appears on the lips of Jesus, but that it always appears on the lips of Jesus in the canonical gospels. This is indeed a remarkable phenomenon that can not simply be shrugged off. While other Christological titles appear mostly in confessions about Jesus and only rarely on his own lips, the Son-of-Man expression occurs only on the lips of Jesus and never in confessions about him (cf. Owen 2011a:vii; Hurtado 2011:169; Bock 2011:90).

91 Both these texts are probably well-known first-century Jewish proverbs (cf. Wink 2002: 275 n. 2). Furthermore, Jesus probably rejected the title “prophet” as a designation for himself in John 1:21.

92 As was indicated in a footnote in section 1.3.2, the pre-Pauline formula (τὸν οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ [ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν]) in 1 Thessalonians 1:10 might be an allusion to the Son of Man. Wink (2002:207-211) argues that Paul was aware of the term “Son of Man,” but deliberately chose not to use it in order to accommodate his gentile audiences. Apart from the fact that there is no direct evidence of Paul’s familiarity with this expression, it is highly unlikely that a theologian so obsessed with Christology would have ignored one of the most attested titles for Jesus had he known about it. However, if Paul did deliberately ignore this term, it adds to out argument of its futility for the early church and its likely authenticity on the grounds of the
having a *Sitz im Leben* in early confessions about Jesus (cf. Mark 8:38; Acts 7:56; John 9:35ff.), the term is absent from the confessions, creeds and liturgy of the early church. Neither does it occur in the predicative form: “Jesus is the Son of Man,” or “Jesus, the Son of Man.” It seems as though the early church did not have much Christological use for the term. An argument of dissimilarity (or “distinctiveness”) is applicable here, seeing as the term’s presence in the Jesus tradition, and its absence as a confessional title in the early church, renders it highly likely that Jesus made use of the term. And although the term “son of man” was well-known in first-century Judaism, the specific form “the son of the man,” employed by Jesus, was highly unusual for the time (cf. Owen 2011b:29-30; Shepherd 2011:50; see Owen & Shepherd 2001). Thus, we have a case of “double dissimilarity.” The term was of no confessional value to the early church, and it was formulated in an atypical way if compared to contemporary Judaism.

That does not, however, disqualify an appeal to historical plausibility. Although the specific form was unusual, the term itself formed an integral part of many Jewish traditions, being well-attested in both Aramaic and Hebrew writings before and during the ministry of Jesus. It follows that Jesus, who was an Aramaic-speaking Jew, in all likelihood did make use of the term. The term further appears in every single complex of the Jesus tradition, including the four canonical gospels and the Gospel of Thomas (86), summoning the criterion of multiple independent attestation. Within the four canonical gospels themselves, the criterion of multiple independent attestation could also be applied, since the term occurs in independent traditions like Mark, Q, Matthew’s *Sondergut*, Luke’s *Sondergut* and John. Lastly, the tendency by all the canonical gospels criterion of dissimilarity. On the other hand, if a traveller like Paul, who came into contact with numerous branches of early Christianity, was ignorant of this title, it also attests to its unpopularity in the early church, thereby also summoning the criterion of dissimilarity. Burkett (1999:123) argues that the term “Son of Man” is absent from the remainder of the New Testament simply because, although it was important for the “Palestinian Christianity” of the gospels and the early chapters of Acts, it was not useful at all for the “Hellenistic Christianity” of the rest of the New Testament. However, to suggest that the gospels were particularly interested in preserving “Palestinian Christianity” is dubious (cf. Hurtado 2011:170). Also, Burkett’s suggestion does not explain why John would use the title in his Gospel, but not in his epistles. John’s writings were all intended for the exact same Christian community. In his Gospel he faithfully recounts the use of the expression “Son of Man,” while in his epistles he chooses not to make use of the expression at all. The only conclusion to be drawn from this is that, for John, the term “Son of Man” had historical value, but not confessional value. Finally, it is curious that the term “Son of Man” does not appear before the seventh chapter of Acts, seeing as the first few s deal specifically with the emergence of “Palestinian Christianity” (cf. Hurtado 2011:170).
to translate the Aramaic term literally, with the inelegant Greek form ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἄνθρωπον, could also be held up as an argument for its authenticity (cf. Hurtado 2011:160). Why else would all the evangelists do this if not to remain faithful to the authentic words of Jesus (cf. Hurtado 2011:170)? In light of all this, we have to conclude that even if all the individual Son-of-Man sayings were created by the early church, the expression “Son of Man” was in all probability authentic.

The extreme likelihood that the term “Son of Man” is authentic does not necessarily imply that all of the Son-of-Man logia are authentic. Seeing as the “suffering Son-of-Man” sayings are not in Q (cf. Sim 1985:233), we shall leave them aside in our present discussion. In my overview of Son-of-Man scholarship (see section 1.3.2 above), I tried to indicate that, regarding the authenticity of these logia, scholars have routinely felt obliged to choose between one of four possibilities: (1) all the Son-of-Man sayings are authentic; (2) all the Son-of-Man sayings are inauthentic; (3) only the future Son-of-Man sayings are authentic; (4) only the present Son-of-Man sayings are authentic (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:550; Burkett 1999:44). Naturally, proponents of an apocalyptic Jesus tend to support the first or third positions, while proponents of a sapiential Jesus tend to support the second or fourth positions (cf. esp. Theissen & Merz 1998:245; cf. also Borg 1994a:8, 51; Borg, in Miller 2001:41; see e.g. Crossan 1991; Van Aarde 2004b; also see e.g. Witherington III 1995:95-97). It follows that scholars who defend a sapiential understanding of the historical Jesus and those who defend an apocalyptic interpretation can readily appeal to this term. All they need do is support their choice by arguing for the authenticity of preferred logia. Arguments appealing to authenticity abound, and have in the past (and present) supported any one of the four positions noted. The wide range of proposals of authenticity put forward – ranging from the one extreme that all Son-of-Man sayings are authentic to the other extreme that none of these sayings are authentic, with no shortage of positions in between – testifies to the inadequacy of this approach in reaching reliable results. The same is true of arguments about (in)authentic Son-of-Man expressions in Q, specifically (cf. Burkett 1999:79-80 n. 25; see Müller...

What is needed is a more objective means by which authenticity could be gauged. Some believe that philological research into the linguistic roots of the expression “Son of Man” will provide such a handle on arguments pertaining to authenticity. Using Aramaic as a criterion of authenticity is not legitimate in all cases, but seeing as Jesus used the term “Son of Man” in Aramaic, it remains, for these scholars, the best criterion for determining the authenticity and original meaning of these sayings in particular (cf. Casey 2009:61). Recently, the most influential philological proposal of exactly how the Aramaic idiom functioned at the time of Jesus is the one made by Maurice Casey (cf. Müller 2008:313; Hurtado 2011:172; Owen 2011b:28). It is therefore worthwhile for our purposes to take a quick look at his philological offering.

### 3.1.2 Maurice Casey

In 1976, Casey proposed that Vermes’ idiomatic examples from ancient sources had two levels of meaning (cf. Müller 2008:314). According to Casey (1976:147-154), the term (א) vn (א) rb could be employed to make a general statement (first level of meaning) that was in effect applicable to the speaker herself, albeit indirectly (second level of meaning). As many scholars before him had recognised, the general level of meaning often contrasted people with animals. Thus, the general level of meaning often identified an aspect of humanity that was unique if compared to animals. By paying particular attention to research done by other scholars on translation theory, Casey was able to

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93 Schürmann (1975:146-147) believes that all the Son-of-Man sayings in Q developed after the earliest layer was penned down and before the final redaction was made (i.e. in the second of his four layers). Both Schulz (1972:481-489) and Vaage (1991) distinguish between the coming Son-of-Man sayings and the earthly Son-of-Man sayings in Q. Yet, whereas Schulz believes the former to be more authentic, Vaage believes the latter to be more authentic. Schulz here follows Tödt’s (1959) original proposal, while Vaage agrees with Polag’s (1977) original position. Tuckett (1993) sees Son-of-Man logia in both tradition and redaction, implying that both sapiential and apocalyptic Son-of-Man logia are authentic. Tuckett here follows the initial proposal of Collins (1989). These views on the authenticity of Son-of-Man sayings in Q specifically overlap completely with the four general positions on authenticity noted above.
argue that the translation of (א) בַּר (א) with ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου was both natural and practically inevitable (see Müller 2008:314-315). was both natural and practically inevitable (see Müller 2008:314-315). The latter term is both an example of what Casey calls “translationese,” and the best option available to the ancient translators. In the same year (1976b), Casey looked at the Ge’ez version of the Similitudes of Enoch, and found that the term (א)bn(א) was used to reference Enoch specifically. As such, Casey was able to make a case for disregarding the Similitudes-of-Enoch text as evidence for a Son-of-Man concept in first-century Judaism.

Casey took this incentive further in his 1980 monograph on the relation between Daniel 7:13 and the Son-of-Man difficulty, arguing that the Son-of-Man concept was a scholarly construct, and not a feature of first-century Judaism at all. According to Casey, Daniel 7:13 did play a role in some Son-of-Man texts, but these instances were too few to be authentic, or to explain how the term had originated. Casey believed that the early church had invented the small number of Son-of-Man sayings that were influenced by Daniel 7:13. All this work by Casey led him to the conviction that only those Son-of-Man sayings that were derived from the Aramaic expression (א)bn(א) could possibly have been authentic. At the end of his book, Casey (1980:236) put forward a table that illustrated how the Son-of-Man logia developed in line with the gospel traditions. Son-of-Man logia derived from the Aramaic term (א)bn(א) were almost exclusively from the most authentic sources, particularly Mark and Q. Casey then attributed all the other Son-of-Man sayings, including those derived from the early exegesis of Daniel 7:13, to the early church, and demonstrated how well these sayings fitted into the theologies and Sitze im Leben of the respective gospel writers.

Casey continued his investigation in 1987 by arguing that (א)bn(א), when used idiomatically, may occur with or without the prosthetic definite article א, without changing the meaning or reference point of the idiom at all. Another piece of the puzzle was fitted when Casey (1994) surveyed the utilisation of (א)bn(א) in both the Peshitta and the Targums. This survey confirmed his 1976 proposal that the Aramaic term (א)bn(א), when used idiomatically, was oftentimes used in generic statements with
specific reference to the speaker. However, he also found that רַבּ could be utilised in generic statements with particular reference to someone other than the speaker. This person could be any specific (well-known) individual, like Joseph or Moses. As such, רַבּ did not have any “messianic overtones” in and of itself, but could indeed be referring to the Messiah when he is expressly mentioned in the (con)text. Moreover, the Aramaic term could be referencing the speaker and one or more other persons.

In 1995, Casey appealed to brand-new evidence from various related fields, including bilingualism, translation studies, and recent research on translation techniques in the Septuagint. Former scholars had struggled to understand why the translators would have kept υ/ος in their translations, as well as why they would have used the article before υ/ος so consistently if they were translating רַבּ. At times, these scholars even accused the ancient translators of making either deliberate or unintentional mistakes, and proposed better alternatives (cf. Van Aarde 2004b:433; cf. e.g. Collins 1987:399; 1989:14; 1990:190; Hare 1990:249-250; Ross 1991:191). In reaction to these anachronistic suggestions, Casey (1995) maintained, firstly, that many bilingual translators suffered from transference, and, secondly, that translators of sacred texts often operated with a hefty degree of literalism. It followed for him that the translators acted within the norm when they translated רַבּ with υ/ος το/ον άνθρώπου (cf. Müller 2008:315). In Casey’s opinion, the article before υ/ος, as well as the use of υ/ος itself, was understandable within the contexts of transference and literalism. Moreover, by keeping the article and υ/ος, the translators ensured that the references to Jesus was obvious in the Greek versions of these sayings. Also, Casey opined, translators suffering from transference would inadvertently have noticed both the generic and the specific references of these sayings in the Greek text. Continuing his interest in translation theory, Casey (1998; 2002a) subsequently paid particular attention to the translation strategies used by ancient authors. This focus allowed Casey to offer an explanation not only for why the term υ/ος το/ον άνθρώπου never occurred in reference to someone other than Jesus, but also why the term almost never occurs in the plural. According to Casey, the strategy of the translators of רַבּ was to use the Greek term υ/ος το/ον
When it referred to Jesus, and not to translate the term otherwise. In the same year that his 2002 monograph on Q appeared, Casey (2002b) also argued that generic nouns may interchangeably appear in either the definite or indefinite states, without affecting their meaning or function.

All of Casey’s efforts on the Son-of-Man problem converge in his 2007 monograph (cf. Müller 2008:316). After providing a selectively focused overview of Son-of-Man scholarship in chapter one, Casey continues in chapter two to explain and justify his methodological approach in uncovering the idiomatic use of the term “Son of Man” in the Aramaic language. He argues four points that underlie, and are fundamental to, his method: (1) The Aramaic language remained surprisingly stable for centuries. This allows one not only to uncover the idiomatic usage of the expression “Son of Man” from a wide chronological range of Aramaic sources, but also to reconstruct the Aramaic Vorlage of certain Greek sayings from just as wide a range of sources. (2) When Aramaic nouns function in a generic way, they could occur in either the definite state or the indefinite state, without any difference in meaning. Seeing as the term \(\text{ανθρώπου}\) is a generic term for “man,” it could appear in either state without causing a change in meaning. (3) The expression \(\text{ανθρώπος}\) could reference humanity in general or a more restricted grouping of people. When appearing in the singular, it could also imply an individual, “whether anonymous, generic or specific” (Casey 2009:67). (4) When used idiomatically, the speaker would employ the term \(\text{ανθρώπος}\) in a general statement, only to say something indirectly about either himself, himself and others, or someone else indicated by the literary context. Casey concludes that Jesus used the term in this way. Chapter three of Casey’s book is entirely devoted to persuasively dispelling the Son-of-Man concept.

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94 In the present study, all references to and quotations from this monograph stem from its Second Edition, printed in 2009.
95 Casey appeals to Aramaic sources as early as 750 BCE and as late as 1200 CE (cf. Lukaszewski 2011:10).
96 Also known as the “emphatic state” or “determined state.”
97 Also known as the “absolute state.”
These three chapters lay the foundation for the rest of the book, which argues for the authenticity of those logia that can be reconstructed in their original Aramaic forms, and the inauthenticity of those logia that “clearly” did not originate from the \textit{lingua franca} of Jesus. Casey provides cumulative support for his distinction between authentic and inauthentic sayings by appealing to historical plausibility, which is undoubtedly Casey’s favourite criterion after the use of Aramaic reconstructions. As such, he argues that the sayings with Aramaic underlays all have plausible \textit{Sitze im Leben} in the life of the historical Jesus, while the sayings without such underlays all have plausible \textit{Sitze im Leben} in the early church. Casey’s “solution” naturally relegates all the Son-of-Man sayings based on Daniel 7:13 to the early church. Surprising about Casey’s work is that the suffering Son-of-Man sayings, which are generally in the Renewed Quest regarded as inauthentic, are shown to stem from the Aramaic language, and to have plausible \textit{Sitze im Leben} in the life of Jesus (cf. also Wink 2002:256). Particularly relevant in our case, is Casey’s proposal that the Son-of-Man sayings developed from their Aramaic-idiomatic usage in the ministry of the historical Jesus to their titular-apocalyptic usage (with reference to Daniel 7:13) in the early church. If this division is accepted, Q would contain both the earlier Son-of-Man logia that stem from the Aramaic, and the later Son-of-Man logia that allude to Daniel 7:13 (cf. Edwards 1976:35; Müller 2008:318).

According to Casey (2009:270-272), the following Son-of-Man sayings in Q are authentic: Q 7:31-35; Q 12:8-10; Q 9:57-60. Conversely, Casey regards the following Son-of-Man logia in Q as inauthentic: Q 6:22; Q 11:30; Q 12:40; Q 17:24, 26, 30.\footnote{In Q 22:30, the term “Son of Man” occurs only in the Matthean version of the saying and was very likely added by him to the Q material he inherited. The theme of the Son of Man sitting on a throne is particular to Matthew (cf. Mat 25:31) and absent from the rest of Q and the New Testament. Moreover, Matthew’s introduction of the term “Son of Man” into this context makes perfect sense in light of his midrashic use of Daniel 7:13-14. Verse 14 of the latter text specifically describes the glory, power and authority of the Son of Man at the apocalyptic end, when he will have dominion over everyone and everything. Hence, Q 22:30 probably never had the term “Son of Man.”} A particular difficulty concerns Q 6:22. In Luke, the saying ends with “Son of Man” (τοῦ Ἵνα τοῦ ἄνθρωπου), but in Matthew the saying simply ends with “me” (ἐμοῦ). The saying itself is probably authentic, seeing as it can be reconstructed in its original Aramaic without much difficulty (cf. Casey 2009:239-240). Its multiple attestation in the Gospel of Thomas (68-69) augments its probable authenticity. According to Casey, the
reconstructed Aramaic only makes proper sense if the Matthean version (without the term “Son of Man”) is followed, suggesting that, although the saying is probably authentic, the inclusion of the term “Son of Man” is not. At any rate, the saying probably did have the phrase “Son of Man” by the time Q received its final redaction, seeing as the deliberate exclusion thereof by Matthew makes more sense than its deliberate inclusion by Luke (cf. Catchpole 1993:93; cf. also Wink 2002:274 n. 3; 305 n. 111; Casey 2009:239). Matthew probably disliked the fact that the term failed to reference either the apocalyptic role of Jesus at his second coming, or anything significant about Jesus’ public career. Matthew was probably also displeased with the fact that “Son of Man” could here be interpreted as a reference to someone other than Jesus. Thus, on the one hand, Q 6:22 is authentic, but, according to Casey, the term “Son of Man” is not. On the other hand, Q 6:22 appeared with the term “Son of Man” when the two evangelists made use of Q.

A feature that inadvertently pops up when one considers Casey’s division between authentic and inauthentic Son-of-Man logia in Q is that they cut across Kloppenborg’s two layers. The formative layer contains both authentic (Q 9:57-60) and inauthentic (Q 6:22) Son-of-Man sayings. The main redaction, too, holds authentic (Q 7:31-35; Q 12:8-9, 10) and inauthentic (Q 11:30; Q 12:40; Q 17:24, 26, 30) Son-of-Man traditions. This feature supports the case made by Kloppenborg (and myself) that the redaction history of Q should not be directly translated into the tradition history of the historical Jesus (cf. sections 1.3.6, 2.2.2 & 2.2.4 above). In other words, Q’s formative stratum (as a whole) is not automatically closer to the historical Jesus than its main redaction (cf. Koester 1994:540-541; see Allison 2010:120-125). Some traditions in Q¹ are close to the historical Jesus, while other traditions in Q¹ are further removed. The same is true of Q². Each Q pericope should be assessed independently as to whether or not it actually goes back to the Jesus of history (cf. Casey 2010:84). A second feature of Casey’s proposed division between authentic and inauthentic Son-of-Man logia is that it cuts across the separation between sapiential and apocalyptic material. At least two of Casey’s authentic Son-of-Man logia address intrinsically apocalyptic themes (cf. Wink 2002:178). In other words, there are authentic (Q 7:31-35; Q 9:57-60) and inauthentic (Q 6:22) sapiential Son-of-Man sayings. Similarly, there are authentic (Q 12:8-9, 10) and inauthentic (Q
apocalyptic Son-of-Man sayings. In both authentic sayings just noted (Q 12:8-9, 10), it is not the expression “Son of Man” that is necessarily apocalyptic, but the whole saying. In each case, the term “Son of Man” could be interpreted non-apocalyptically, but the saying in toto could not.

Q 12:10 is not only authentic because of Casey’s ability to reconstruct an Aramaic underlay, and his ability to invoke the criterion of historical plausibility. The authenticity of this logion is corroborated by two other criteria, namely that of multiple independent attestation (Mark 3:28-29 // Q 12:10 // Gos. Thom. 44) and that of dissimilarity. Regarding the latter, Jesus here refrains from the early church’s tendency to have him demonise his adversaries (cf. e.g. Mat 23; cf. Wink 2002:83). Moreover, Jesus permits the act of “speaking against” the Son of Man, something the early church would never have permitted – or invented (cf. e.g. 1 Cor 12:3; cf. Wink 2002:83). Like Q 12:10, the authenticity of Q 12:8-9 is also corroborated by criteria other than Aramaic and historical plausibility. Although Q 12:8-9 does not appear in the Gospel of Thomas, it is attested independently by Mark in 8:38, and perhaps even by Paul in Romans 10:9 (cf. Wink 2002:207). Additionally, this logion refrains from the tendency in the early church to identify Jesus with the Son-of-Man figure, thereby summoning the criterion of dissimilarity (cf. Wink 2002:178). Thus, both of these logia adhere to no less than four historical-Jesus criteria, putting their authenticity beyond serious doubt.

99 In fact, Mark (3:28) changes the phrase “Son of Man” to the plural “sons of men” for this very reason (cf. Wink 2002:83, 274 n. 3; Casey 2009:117).

100 There have been two main objections to the authenticity of Q 12:8-9 (see Burkett 1999:38-39). Käsemann (1954) argued that the saying looks like a prophecy uttered by Christian prophets (see section 1.3.2 above). Käsemann’s hypothesis that Christian prophets were responsible for the secondary Son-of-Man sayings is no longer valid. Vielhauer’s (1957) argument, on the other hand, is still valid today. It entails that the pressure put on Christians by outsiders to deny their faith in Christ reflects a post-Easter situation, not a conceivable situation in the ministry of Jesus. As a counter-argument it could be stated that such a situation is in fact conceivable during the ministry of the historical Jesus (cf. Allison 1997:100). Jesus ended up being crucified, indicating a measure of political and religious pressure on both him and his followers. By mentioning “synagogues,” Q 12:11 specifically mention the threat against Jesus and his followers as one emanating from Jewish authorities. This is in line not only with the situation in the early church (see Acts 4:1-22; 5:17-42; 7:54; 8:1-3; 17:5-8, 13; 20:3; 21:11, 27-36; 23:1-35; 24:1-27; 25:1-27), but also with the situation in the lifetime of Jesus (see Mark 14:10-11, 43, 47, 53-65; 15:1-15 par.). The failure to mention the Roman Empire as an additional threat is perfectly in line with the ministry of Jesus, probably more so than it is in line with the situation in the early church, where the Roman Empire increasingly became more and more of a threat. We have to conclude that Vielhauer’s subjective argument is unconvincing. Our more objective criteria of multiple independent attestation, dissimilarity, Aramaic
high probability that these two apocalyptic Son-of-Man sayings in Q are authentic supports my overall theory that Q’s memory of the historical Jesus as someone who made use of apocalypticism in his teachings is authentic. Ironically, then, the very same development that caused so many scholars to abandon the apocalyptic Jesus – i.e. the search for the Semitic roots of the expression “Son of Man” – currently supports the idea that apocalypticism, in some way or another, formed part of Jesus’ ministry and message.

3.1.3 Casey criticised

However, there are some difficulties with Casey’s methodological approach, which has been criticised by a number of scholars. Here are some of the main objections:

- Contrary to what Casey claims, the Aramaic language did not remain stable for such a long period of time (cf. Hurtado 2011:173; Łukaszewski 2011:11, esp. n. 50). In fact, the development of the Aramaic language can be divided into different epochs, each with its own dialect and grammar. The examples Casey provide to demonstrate that the language remained stable are trivial and of no use. Owen (2011b:29) dubbed his appeal to specific examples “an extended exercise in obfuscation.”

- It follows from the previous objection that the Aramaic construction (bhr, סנה) is anachronistic and grammatically ambiguous (cf. Shepherd 2011:51; see Owen 2011b:30-31; Łukaszewski 2011:10-12, 20-21). It neither represents the particular dialect (like Middle Aramaic) of a specific people (like the Galileans), nor does it fit into any specific time period (like the first century AD). Rather, it represents four divergent Aramaic terms (bhr, סנה & bhr, סנה, אנה, אנה, בַּר, אנה) each of which may have had a different meaning. Casey uses this problematic and ambiguous term not only to discover the original idiomatic usage of the term, but also to “reverse-translate” the Aramaic Vorlage of Greek sayings.

and historical plausibility seem more determinative. Wink (2002:64) also believes that Q 12:8-9 is probably authentic.
The definite singular form “the son of man” (בראשית אָדָם) – which is necessary to translate the Greek term ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἄνθρωπος – appears only twice in all of the Aramaic literature from Palestine contemporary with Jesus (see esp. Owen & Shepherd 2001; cf. Owen 2011a:viii; 2011b:29-30; Shepherd 2011; Hurtado 2011:172; cf. also Müller 2008:2). In neither case does it function to make a generic reference. Moreover, the almost complete absence of this form in Middle Aramaic utterly contradicts the idea that it was a familiar idiom when Jesus lived (cf. Hurtado 2011:173). The indefinite singular form “a son of man” (בראשית אָדָם) appears more frequently in Middle Aramaic, but never in the generic way Casey proposes. Rather, this generic application is always achieved either by the plural form “the sons of men” (בראשית אָדָמוֹת) or plainly by “man” (בראשית אָדָם). These observations apply not only to Aramaic, but also to Hebrew and Greek, and are representative of the term’s usage in the Old Testament, including both the Masoretic Text and the Septuagint (see Hurtado 2011:160-162, 173).

The definite and indefinite states of nouns had not yet coalesced in Western Aramaic of the first century CE (cf. Owen 2011b:29; Shepherd 2011:51-52; Lukaszewski 2011:12; see Owen & Shepherd 2001; Williams 2011:72-77). This means that the expression בראשית אָדָם had not yet lost its determinative force at that time, and could therefore not have been used in generic expressions by Jesus (cf. Owen 2011b:31-32).

It is not a given that an Aramaic phrase, whether it be the one proposed by Casey or not, lies behind the Greek expression ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἄνθρωπος (see Lukaszewski 2011:17-20, 25-27; Williams 2011:68-69). The term might be a Greek original. It might also have originated from Hebrew, from one of the pre-Arabic dialects, or from another Semitic language.

Casey appeals to studies of translation theory that concentrate on modern languages (cf. Lukaszewski 2011:18). The few times that he does appeal to ancient translation techniques, particularly of the Septuagint, he tends to oversimplify the modus operandi. Particularly, the Septuagint’s consistent refusal to translate the expression “son of man” with a definite article speaks against the
suggestion that translators (quite naturally) added or kept the definite article when translating this term in the sayings of Jesus (cf. Hurtado 2011:162).

• Throughout the argumentation of his hypothesis, Casey almost entirely ignores secondary scholarship devoted to the grammar of the Aramaic language (cf. Owen 2011b:32-33).

• According to Owen (2011b:34-35), the examples put forward by Casey to substantiate the particular idiomatic use of בֵּית בֶּן proposed by him are not discussed adequately. In his view, the literary context of these examples are consistently ignored. For example, the literary context of Sefire 3:14-17 – a text Casey (2009:81) puts great stock in “because it establishes the use of this idiom long before the time of Jesus” – clearly identifies the term בֵּית בֶּן there as a specific reference to a future heir of the kingdom. In fact, these examples only accomplish to illustrate that the form (בֵּית בֶּן) required to translate the Greek ὥστε τοῦ ἀνθρώπου is consistently avoided by these ancient authors.

• As was the case with his examples of the idiomatic use of בֵּית בֶּן, Casey does not spend enough time or effort trying to understand the actual use of the term ὥστε τοῦ ἀνθρώπου in its various literary gospel contexts before reconstructing the Aramaic Vorlage (see Williams 2011:65-66). As a result, attempts to construe certain Son-of-Man logia as generic have been forced (cf. Burkett 1999:94).

• One can not simply assume, as Casey does, that only those sayings capable of being reconstructed into their (supposed) Aramaic originals are authentic (cf. Williams 2011:73; see Owen 2011b:48-49). Apart from the possibility that Jesus might at times have spoken another language, the translators might also at times have paraphrased Jesus’ sayings – not to even mention the complicated process of their oral and written transmission.

• One should only appeal to the phenomenon of transference as a last resort, when all other attempts at understanding the text have been ruled out (see Williams 2011:71-72). Given the infrequent appearance and “detectability” of this phenomenon, Casey’s appeal to it in supporting his hypothesis is highly suspect.
• The suggestion that all ancient translators succinctly made use of the same translation strategy – only translating (Ἑ)ᾶμ(α) ἡμᾶς with ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου when it referred to Jesus – goes against the evidence (see Williams 2011:70-71). Such consistency among translators never occurred spontaneously, only deliberately. Also, there is no evidence from antiquity of translators intentionally rendering the same expression in two or more different ways.

• Casey’s “corporate” reading of Daniel 7 is not accepted by all, neither is his assumption that a messianic reading of this text is inherently erroneous and inauthentic (see Owen 2011b:35-38).

• According to Burkett (1999:92-96), Casey’s approach leads to “implausible results” – results that can not be applied to most of the gospel sayings themselves (see also Owen 2011b:38-39). His “solution” forces us to believe that only a handful of sayings are authentic, and that, out of these, not a single one survived with its original meaning intact, while the overwhelming majority of them were created by the early church.

• When Casey utilises the criterion of historical plausibility, he assumes a priori not only that Jesus himself could not have appealed to Daniel 7, but also that Jesus himself could not have preached an apocalyptic message (see Owen 2011b:39-45). Thus, all apocalyptic sayings are “naturally” attributed to the early church as references to the parousia of Jesus.

These objections are noteworthy and legion enough to cause concern. Hence, although Casey’s “solution” is currently the most influential and best argued philological study on the Son-of-Man problem, and although it (unexpectedly) supports the idea that the historical Jesus made use of the expression “Son of Man” in an assortment of apocalyptic contexts, his hypothesis is fundamentally and methodologically problematic (cf. Hurtado 2011:176). In such circumstances, one might be pressed to appeal to one or more of the other philological “solutions” to the Son-of-Man problem. Most scholars in this field now agree on three fronts: (1) Jesus used the expression “Son of Man” in a circumlocutional, generic and/or indefinite sense, thereby referring to himself, either directly or indirectly. (2) Sayings are only authentic if they can be “reverse-translated”
into Aramaic. (3) The early church added the titular Son-of-Man logia, particularly those where the expression itself refers to Daniel 7:13. Lindars (1980; 1983), for example, argues that ṣnrb was an Aramaic idiom by which the speaker could refer to a selected class of individuals, among whom the speaker self was included, translating the term “a person / someone in my position.” Bauckham (1985) believes that Jesus used the Aramaic term ṣnrb in the indefinite sense – meaning “someone” or “a man” – as an intentionally ambiguous self-reference (see also Fuller 1985). Kearns (1988) proposes that the term was used by Jesus in a generic, non-titular sense. Chilton (1996; 1999) argues that Jesus employed the expression “Son of Man” generically, as a reference to himself and others, as well as distinctively, as a reference to an apocalyptic angel other than himself.

Unfortunately, these “solutions” suffer difficulties similar to those of Casey (see Burkett 1999:92-96). These scholars are all faced with the same fundamental predicament, which is that the grammatical form needed to understand the expression “Son of Man” in its original Aramaic is almost entirely absent in Middle Aramaic (cf. Shepherd 2011:51). Unless and until first-century Galilean sources are excavated containing the exact Aramaic form needed, Aramaic reconstructions and philological “solutions” will remain unconvincing (cf. Shepherd 2011:60; Hurtado 2011:174; Lukaszewski 2011:26-27). The proposals that suggest an indefinite meaning, like those by Bauckham, Fuller and Lindars, all suffer from an additional difficulty. Regardless of what the original Aramaic term might have meant, the Greek term ὁ νικός τοῦ ἀνθρώπου could not under any circumstances have been translated with “a man” (cf. Burkett 1999:92-93). Suggestions of transference or mistranslation do not explain away this difficulty. The proposal by Lindars, in particular, was met with widespread disapproval and refutation (cf. Lukaszewski 2011:9, esp. n. 40). Kearns’ suggestion that ṣnrb derives from Ugaritic is problematic for a variety of reasons (cf. Casey 2009:48). Also, his suggestion that the

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101 Lindars (1985:35) denies that he understands “Son of Man” as an indefinite term, claiming rather that he interprets it as a generic term in which the definite article is used idiomatically to communicate an indefinite statement. Yet, his translations and applications of the term do betray the former understanding (see esp. Bauckham 1985:23-33; cf. also Müller 2008:318). Burkett (1999:92) agrees and also categorises him with other scholars who prefer the indefinite interpretation.
term מַלְאָךְ (38תָּכָר) has multiple meanings (like citizen or Lord) is erroneous (cf. Casey 2009:48-49). Kearns here confuses the term’s idiomatic point of referral with its denotative meaning.

What is particularly relevant to our topic is that these scholars mostly agree that the early church added the titular Son-of-Man logia, particularly those where the expression itself refers to Daniel 7:13. Despite such a relative consensus, this belief ultimately remains an assumption. It has not been proven with any degree of persuasiveness. There need not have been an existing Son-of-Man concept in order for Jesus to have used the term in an apocalyptic way or context. Apocalyptic texts dating to the first century all interpret Daniel 7:13 as a reference to a specific individual figure (cf. Burkett 1999:118). Although a few rabbinic texts did interpret Daniel 7:13 as a corporate reference to all of Israel, most of these writings viewed the “one like a son of man” in Daniel 7:13 as a specific figure (cf. Burkett 1999:118-119). Whenever Daniel 7:13 was seen as a reference to a specific figure in the first century – which was almost all the time – that figure was associated with the Messiah. It follows that even if there were no unified Son-of-Man concept in the first century – which there wasn’t! – it was still natural at the time to see the “one like a son of man” in Daniel 7:13 as a specific messianic-apocalyptic figure (cf. Bock 2011:90, 94). In fact, the absence of a specific Son-of-Man concept was probably conducive to Jesus’ (and Q’s) intent with the expression, not least of all in allowing him to fill this term with meaning and content as he used it (cf. Bock 2011:89, 96-97). As such, there is no real reason to doubt that Jesus himself could have used the expression “Son of Man” in reference to Daniel 7:13 (cf. Bauckham 1985:28, 29-30).

According to Owen (2011b:30), in fact, the most natural philological explanation of Jesus’ use of the Aramaic expression “Son of Man” is that he used it in reference to Daniel 7:13. Likewise, Williams (2011:75) believes that “the linguistic evidence is compatible with the idea of a defined [Son-of-Man] concept, if that concept could be established in pre-Christian sources on other grounds.” Thus, the Aramaic roots of the expression “Son of Man” do not necessarily contradict the idea that Jesus made use of this expression in reference to an apocalyptic figure, be it himself or someone else. We
have seen that, according to Casey’s “solution,” the Aramaic-idiomatic term “Son of Man” appears in two *authentic* logia (Q 12:8-9, 10) that are *apocalyptic* in nature and theme. One or both of these two sayings are also considered authentic by Lindars, Bauckham, Fuller and Chilton. Added to these two sayings, some other, intrinsically apocalyptic, sayings are also believed to be authentic by Lindars (Q 11:30), Bauckham (Q 11:30; Mark 14:62 par.), Fuller (Q 11:30; 12:40; 17:24, 30) and Chilton (Mat 19:28). Hence, all these scholars (perhaps inadvertently) agree that Jesus was not averse to apocalyptic themes, and that he discussed them on occasion. According to Burkett (1999:93), the only occurrence of “Son of Man” that can with any degree of confidence be said to have a generic *Vorlage* is the one that appears in the apocalyptic saying in Q 12:10. Given everything that has so far been said in this chapter, it is no surprise that the two views currently predominating Son-of-Man scholarship are the (messianic-) apocalyptic view and the idiomatic-non-titular view (cf. Burkett 1999:5, 122). The current division between scholars like Casey, Lindars, Bauckham, Fuller, Kearns and Chilton, on the one hand, and scholars like Owen, Lukaszewski, Shepherd, Williams and Bock, on the other, mirrors an almost identical division at the end of the nineteenth century between scholars like Wellhausen, Eerdmans and Lietzmann, on the one hand, and scholars like Dalman and Fiebig, on the other (cf. Müller 2008:315; see section 1.3.2 above). This division is further not only a cause, but also a result, of the current schism between historical-Jesus researchers on whether Jesus was primarily a wisdom teacher or an apocalyptic prophet (see section 1.3.7 above).

### 3.2 ~ A FOCUSED EXEGESIS OF Q

#### 3.2.1 A synchronic approach to the Son-of-Man sayings

Theissen and Merz (1998:542) summarised the state of scholarship on the Son-of-Man problem with the following statement: “Unfortunately the two linguistic and literary traditions which could give us a clear understanding [i.e. “Son of Man” as an apocalyptic figure and “Son of Man” as a generic expression] provide no clear information about how the term is to be understood” (cf. also Borsch 1992:144, in Burkett 1999:121). Our
foregoing investigation has confirmed this pessimism. Decades of discussing and debating the authenticity of individual Son-of-Man sayings have ended in a cul-de-sac. Although philological research has some promise, we unfortunately do not currently have nearly enough extant texts, from either the right period or the right region, that would enable us to put forward a “solution” with any degree of confidence.

All that is left, then, is to consider Q’s synchronic treatment of the term “Son of Man.” Diachronic questions of authenticity must retreat to the background, so that room can be made for synchronous questions of literary context. Given the wide range of concurrent opinions on which Son-of-Man sayings (in Q) are in fact authentic (see section 3.1.1 above; cf. Burkett 1999:79-80 n. 25), the time has perhaps come to give precedence to a synchronous study of (Q’s) Son-of-Man logia (see Schenk 1997). Bock (2011:89) maintains that “any ‘son of man’ remark [will] be ambiguous unless it is tied to a specific passage or context.” Actually, a synchronic approach is more in touch with our current intention – stated at the outset – which is to uncover how the Q people “remembered and described Jesus.”

Our synchronic investigation will mostly concentrate on what Burkett (1999:32-42) calls “the question of reference.” In other words, the following investigation will mainly concern itself with discovering what each occurrence of the expression “Son of Man” in Q refers to. These results should assist us in our overall quest to determine the relationship between wisdom and apocalypticism in Q. In answering “the question of reference,” we must first determine whether a saying refers to Jesus or not. If it refers to Jesus, we must determine whether it is used as a title or as a straightforward self-reference. If, on the other hand, it does not refer to Jesus, we must determine who (or what) it does in fact refer to. Lastly, if Jesus did use it as a reference to himself in the third person, we must decide whether or not other people were also implied by the term. The sequence in which these questions are discussed will be determined by each individual saying.
3.2.2 Two sapiential Son-of-Man sayings

The first Son-of-Man saying we will consider is the one in Q 7:34. Theoretically, the idiomatic use of ὁ ὤν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου could, in this literary context, imply more than one person by means of the masculine singular. The masculine singular of the participles ἐσθίων (eating) and πίνων (drinking) may be explained as an extension of that Aramaic idiom. As such, the masculine singular forms of these two participles may be referencing a group or class of people. The same can, however, not be said of the response by “this generation,” since the idiom is concluded beforehand. These opponents are not speaking in idiomatic terms when they describe the Son of Man as “a person (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) who is a glutton (φάγος) and a drunkard (οἶνοπότης), a friend (φίλος) of tax collectors and sinners.” The Son of Man is clearly portrayed here as a single, individual person (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) (cf. Wink 2002:89). In this instance, the four nouns referring to the Son of Man are in the nominative masculine singular because they refer to no more than a single person. If the response by “this generation” was an extension of the foregoing idiom, it would also have featured ὁ ὤν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Instead, it features ἄνθρωπος only. If the response did not refer to more than one person, neither did the initial statement. In other words, although it is theoretically possible to read the two participles (ἐσθίων & πίνων) as an extension of an Aramaic idiom that implies more than one person, the literary context renders such a reading extremely unlikely (cf. Wink 2002:89). Just like the four nouns in the response, these two participles are in the masculine singular form because they refer exclusively to a single individual. Thus, in the case of Q 7:34, we may rule out any “corporate” or generic interpretation of the term “Son of Man.”

It seems very probable that the expression in this case refers to Jesus. The larger literary context (Q 7:18-35) is preoccupied with establishing the relationship between John the Baptist and Jesus (cf. Piper 1989:124; Kirk 1998:366, 377; cf. also Allison 1997:8). In

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102 Casey (2009:137) observes: “Everyone does come eating and drinking, otherwise they die!” However, it does not necessarily follow from such a general observation that Q 7:34 was intended to be understood in such a generic way. Clearly, the Greek text refers specifically and solely to Jesus himself. As a result of his commitment to the generic level of meaning, Casey is obliged to put forward a novel interpretation of this text and introduce backgrounds not explicit or implicit in the text itself (cf. Owen 2011b:45).
all probability, this theme is carried forward in Q 7:33-34 by comparing not only the two personages and their respective lifestyles with one another, but also the responses extorted by each of them (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:111). Whereas the Baptist refrained from eating and drinking, the Son of Man did not. However, both received a negative response from “this generation” (cf. Kirk 1998:376). What is more, both received a positive response from tax collectors and sinners (compare verses 29 and 34). This comparison would only make sense if the term “Son of Man” did indeed here refer to Jesus (cf. Wink 2002:89). Such a conclusion is confirmed by the consistent use of the masculine singular form, which appears no less than eight times in verse 34 alone.

This leaves us with a choice between understanding the term “Son of Man” here as a self-reference or a title. Since Jesus is not making a Christological or soteriological statement about himself, but simply mentioning his mundane habit of “eating” and “drinking,” it seems unlikely that the expression was meant as a title for Jesus. The word “came” has no titular significance in this context, but simply indicates vocation, implying that Jesus saw it as his duty to eat and drink with sinners (cf. Wink 2002:88-89). It is possible that the expression “Son of Man” here connotes the lowliness and/or shamefulness of Jesus, who is being accused of the shameful behaviour – typical of lower-class people – of acting as a glutton and a drunkard (cf. Kirk 1998:380; cf. also Casey 2009:137). The potential generic and corporate interpretations have already been refuted. We have also seen in section 3.1.3 above that the indefinite interpretation would never be an appropriate or acceptable explanation of the Greek form ὁ νηστ ο ἀνθρώπου. Besides, the memorable actions of Jesus are specifically in view here. By process of elimination, we have to conclude that Jesus used the term “Son of Man” in Q 7:34 as a mere reference to himself, and only himself, in the third person (cf. Wink 2002:89). It might be worthwhile, in view of our topic, to just mention that the term “Son of Man” here features in a sapiential passage (see Kirk 1998:381-383), and that it does not allude or refer to an apocalyptic figure of any kind.
The next Son-of-Man saying to be discussed is the one in Q 9:58. This logion does not make sense as a reference to some specific entity other than Jesus, whether it be an apocalyptic emissary, an expected Messiah, or something else. There is absolutely no indication of apocalypticism in the saying itself, its utilisation of the expression “Son of Man,” or its literary context. Q 9:58 does not make a Christological or soteriological statement, indicating that it was probably not employed as a title for Jesus. Both the opening statement in verse 57 and the greater literary context (Q 9:57-60; Q 10:2-9) indicate that we have to do here with the (sapiential) topic of discipleship (cf. Edwards 1976:101; Kloppenborg 1987:190; Kirk 1998:347; cf. also Allison 1997:11). The word “follow” (ἀκολουθέω) – a usual indicator that discipleship is in view – appears not only in verse 57, but is also repeated in verse 60 (see Kingsbury 1978). In both cases, Jesus is the one potentially being followed. As many have noticed before, this probably implies that the Son-of-Man saying purports to elucidate the potential cost, harshness and difficulty of discipleship. This makes it unlikely that the term “Son of Man” could here imply someone or something other than Jesus.

However, the term “Son of Man” does not necessarily exclude others from participating in Jesus’ fate, meaning that it could be read as a non-exclusive reference to Jesus and others (see Casey 2009:168-178). A non-exclusive idiomatic interpretation is perhaps supported by the fact that the animals “foxes” (ἀλώπεκες) and “birds” (πετεινά), with which the Son of Man is compared in verse 58, appear in the plural. Also, logical reasoning leads to the realisation that discipleship by its very nature implies more than the person being “followed.” However, the number of animals featuring in the comparison may have absolutely no bearing on the interpretation of the term “Son of Man.” Furthermore, even though the undertaking of discipleship implies more than one person, the Son-of-Man reference may exclusively be to the lifestyle of Jesus himself, while the saying in toto implies a degree of participation in that lifestyle (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:192). It is rather unlikely that the term “Son of Man” here represents or alludes to humanity in general, even though the present text compares (a) human(s) to animals. Discipleship was not something shared by all people. Neither can the statement that “the Son of Man does not have anywhere to lay his head” be logically applied to all of
humankind (*contra* Edwards 1976:101; Wink 2002:82). Both verbs of which Son of Man is the subject (ἐχει & κλίν) appear in the third person singular, suggesting an individual person. Yet, this is completely compatible with the idiomatic use of the expression “Son of Man.” Finally, verse 58 is Jesus’ answer to the anonymous comment in verse 57 (cf. Edwards 1976:101). The fact that Jesus is in view in verse 57 suggests that Jesus is also meant with the expression “Son of Man” in verse 58.

Hence, in Q 9:58, the expression “Son of Man” is probably used by Jesus as a self-reference in the third person (cf. Meyer 2003:21). This self-reference may or may not include a group of disciples sharing in Jesus’ lifestyle. If it does imply participation, it is the saying and the literary context that allow this implication, not the expression “Son of Man” (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:192). Thus, the saying may be paraphrased something like this: “Remember before you commit to following me that, unlike many animals, I often do not have shelter or refuge.” The unstated implication is that if you follow Jesus, you will share in his hardship (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:191; cf. also Allison 1997:13; cf. further Casey 2009:170). The reading of Q 9:58 that is most natural, and that remains most faithful to the literary context, is one that has Jesus use the term “Son of Man” as an exclusive self-reference (cf. Casey 2009:178). It is possible that the expression “Son of Man” here *connotes* the lowliness of Jesus not having a permanent residence, and/or the humility or embarrassment of Jesus not being able to provide refuge for his disciples (cf. Kirk 1998:340, 341; cf. also Casey 2009:175). Once again, we should probably just add that this reference to the Son of Man occurs in a sapiential text, and does not refer or allude to an apocalyptic figure at all (cf. Meyer 2003:21).

3.2.3 A synchronic approach to the apocalyptic-judgment sayings

In the remainder of this section, we will focus on the apocalyptic-judgment material in Q, some of which include apocalyptic Son-of-Man sayings. The reason for this choice is twofold. Firstly, judgment is one of the most prominent themes in Q. Secondly, final judgment is one of the most integral and significant features of both wisdom and apocalypticism, not only as an image, but also as a theme (cf. Allison, in Miller 2001:26-
Although authenticity and diachronic development will not be ignored, the main purpose will once again be to analyse the *synchronic* relationship of these apocalyptic traditions with the sapiential material in Q. As the hypothesis in section 1.4 clearly states, the primary objective is to determine how the Q document *remembered* and *described* Jesus, not to search for the Jesus of history or to unlock the developmental prehistory of Q. Whenever the expression “Son of Man” appears in a saying, it will be examined within its literary context, and with special attention to “the question of reference.” If we remove from our list the sapiential Son-of-Man sayings (Q 7:31-35; Q 9:57-60) that have already been discussed, we are left with the following *apocalyptic judgment* sayings, some of which contain the expression “Son of Man”:  


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103 Once again, our interest is with the traditions about Jesus, not John the Baptist. So, Q 3:7-9, 16b-17 will not form part of our investigation.

104 Although Q 6:22 is clearly sapiential, the apodoses of this and the previous two beatitudes discuss the flipside of apocalyptic judgment, which is apocalyptic salvation (or alleviation, rather). Therefore, the last three beatitudes will be included in our discussion. Regarding a separate matter, Q 6:37-38 will form the crux of a subsequent discussion and will therefore be overlooked in the present analysis.

105 The Pharisees and scribes of Q 11:39b, 41-44, 46b-48, 52 are criticised for their treatment of the “little people,” but unlike the woes against the Galilean towns, they are nowhere expressly threatened with apocalyptic judgment. Resultantly, these texts will not receive any treatment currently.

106 Although some have interpreted the parables in Q 12:42-46, 58-59 non-eschatologically, its proximity to Q 12:39-40 and its comparable application makes it extremely likely that an apocalyptic judgment is being suggested (cf. Kirk 1998:238-239). Concerning Q 12:49, 51, 53, it is not at all clear that verse 49 should be added to Q. If this verse is excluded from Q, an eschatological interpretation of verses 51 and 53 is not obviously apparent (compare Pseudo-Phocylides 42-47; *contra* Kloppenborg 1987a:151-152). This text could just as well be referencing the public ministry of Jesus, which resulted in family division and inter-familial feuds (see section 2.3 above). Moreover, even if verse 49 were to be included in Q, it remains uncertain that it references apocalyptic judgment per se. There is no doubt that verse 49 has apocalyptic eschatology and the apocalyptic event in view (see section 2.6.1 above), but there are no direct references to the aspect of judgment specifically. General uncertainty regarding the acceptance of Q 12:54-56 into the Sayings Gospel has also prevented me from discussing this saying here (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a n. 219).

107 As should be obvious at this point, I have taken a conservative approach in my selection of the relevant logia by restricting myself to only those logia that undeniably and indisputably (1) belong in Q (2) as the apocalyptic judgment sayings (3) of Q’s Jesus.
3.2.4 The beatitudes

The Lukan version of Q 6:20-23 commences with the comment that Jesus raised (ἐπάρας) his eyes to his disciples (τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ) before he started speaking. This image, in no uncertain terms, recalls a Jewish rabbi and sage (cf. Casey 2009:169-170). Firstly, it was common for Jewish rabbis to be seated when instructing their followers. Secondly, the pupils of ancient wisdom teachers were distinctively referenced by the term “disciple” (μαθητής). The Matthean version is even more explicit in this regard, and expressly states that Jesus sat down (καθίσαντος) before he started teaching (ἐδίδασκεν) his disciples (οἱ μαθηταί αὐτοῦ). The verb ἐδίδασκεν leaves no doubt that a traditional, wisdom-teaching scenario is imagined. The Lukan version should probably be followed in this case, but the allusion to a sage instructing his disciples remains clear, nonetheless. Notably missing is the prophetic formula “thus says the Lord” (τάδε λέγει ὁ κυρίος) or, in fact, any reference to God whatsoever (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:140; Kirk 1998:51).

Besides introducing Jesus as a sage in Q 6:20, the sapiential nature of the inaugural sermon is also indicated by the structure of Q. It was customary for Jewish wisdom literature to introduce a sapiential argument with one or more beatitudes (cf. Van Aarde 1994:174). As was common in wisdom literature of the time, the two passages appearing directly before and after the inaugural sermon were most likely intended to identify and legitimise both the sage and his message (see Kirk 1998:388-390, 396-397). Formally, the inaugural sermon corresponds best with the wisdom genre, not only because of all the imperatives and motive clauses, but also because of the reproduction of common sapiential themes, and the utilisation of cause-and-effect reasoning (see Edwards 1976:61, 84-93; Kloppenborg 1987a:187-188). Ceresko (1999:31) maintains that parallelism is probably the most basic and fundamental building block of wisdom sayings. The parallelism of Q 6:20-23 is more than apparent. Each beatitude is

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108 It should perhaps be mentioned at this stage that the use of motive clauses to substantiate commands and prohibitions was a characteristic feature of wisdom literature (cf. Edwards 1976:59). This realisation is important for and integral to everything that follows in the remainder of the current work.
paralleled by the other three, and each subsequent causal clause is paralleled by the other three causal clauses.¹⁰⁹

The sapiential message of Jesus commences with four beatitudes. The protasis¹¹⁰ of each beatitude should be seen as the content of Jesus’ sapiential message. The sapiential message that the poor, hungry, mournful and persecuted are blessed in the present moment was fairly radical and subversive for the time (see Kloppenborg 1987a:188-189). Although these beatitudes allude to Isaiah 61 (see section 2.6.1 above), they differ from Isaiah in precisely this way. Whereas the content of Isaiah’s good news was that the unfortunate could look forward to deliverance in the future, the content of Jesus’ good news was that the poor were already blessed in the present. Each apodosis is an attempt at providing supportive proof for the unorthodox wisdom teachings, as is clearly indicated by the use of the conjunction ὅτι in each case. In other words, each wisdom teaching is supported by its own causal clause. We have already seen in section 2.6.1 above that the causal clause in Q 6:20 is sapiential in nature. The remaining three causal clauses¹¹¹ are eschatological, as is made perfectly clear by the future-tense verbs in verse 21, and the mention of “heaven” in verse 23 (cf. Edwards 1976:62).¹¹² Although the causal clauses of the last three beatitudes discuss eschatological themes, they are nonetheless part and parcel of the pericope’s wisdom genre (see Kloppenborg 1987a:188-189; cf. also Patterson, in Miller 2001:77). Hence, each of these causal clauses is “a wisdom statement about a condition of the future” (Edwards 1976:62). In sum, Q 6:20-

¹⁰⁹ The unorthodox and subversive content of the inaugural sermon is not evidence that there is a prophetic “undertone” or “foundation” beneath this wisdom teaching (contra Edwards 1976:87). Neither does the radical nature of the sermon even begin providing proof that imminent eschatology lies beneath this extended piece of wisdom (contra Edwards 1976:86).

¹¹⁰ In other words, the following: (1) Μακάριοι ο/πτωχοί; (2) /ακάριοι ο/πειν/πενθο/πενθο/κλαίοντες / πενθο/πενθο/κλαίοντες; (3) μακάριοι οί κλαίοντες / πενθο/πενθο/κλαίοντες; (4) μακάριοι οί κλαίοντες / πενθο/πενθο/κλαίοντες. The fourth protasis is my own reconstruction from the varying Matthean and Lukan versions.

¹¹¹ They are: (1) ὅτι χορτασθήσονται / χορτασθήσεσθε; (2) διὶ παρακληθήσονται / γελάσετε; (3) χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλάσσετε / σκιρτήσατε, διὶ / γὰρ ὁ μισθὸς ύμων πολὺς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς / τῷ οὐρανῷ. Technically, the third example is not a causal clause, but a double command, followed by its own motive clause. However, if read in conjunction with the beatitude in verse 22, the whole sentence in verse 23a (two commands plus motive clause) fulfils the same semantic function as a causal clause (cf. Edwards 1976:84). Verse 23b is yet another motive clause, functioning in this case to substantiate the double command in verse 23a. The latter is a sapiential micro-genre that explores a prophetic theme (cf. Edwards 1976:63).

¹¹² Cf. (1) χορτασθήσονται / χορτασθήσεσθε; (2) παρακληθήσονται / γελάσετε; (3) ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς / τῷ οὐρανῷ.
23 as a whole should be seen as a wisdom teaching of Jesus. This teaching is supported and motivated by eschatological themes in three out of the four causal clauses (cf. Piper 1989:77). More specifically, Jesus’ wisdom is motivated by the eschatological reversal of the fortunes of the poor, hungry, mournful and persecuted (cf. Edwards 1976:84). Here is a table of our current findings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sapiential statement / command</th>
<th>Apocalyptic motivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>μακάριοι οί πεινώντες</td>
<td>ὑμᾶς ἀρτιοῦσθε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μακάριοι οί πενθουντες</td>
<td>ὑμᾶς παρακληθῆσθε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μακάριοι ἐστε ὅταν ὄνειδίσωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ διώξωσιν καὶ ἐξωσιν πᾶν πονηρὸν καθ’ ὑμῶν καὶ ἔνεκεν τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ</td>
<td>ἕρηστε καὶ ἄγαλλιᾶσθε ὑμᾶς τοῦ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολὺς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In section 3.1.2, it was noted that Matthew probably removed the phrase “Son of Man” from the saying in verse 22 when he copied it, implying that it was originally part of Q 6:22. According to most scholars, the Son of Man is put forward here as the reason why (ἔνεκεν) the followers of Jesus are being persecuted (cf. Piper 1989:61; Catchpole 1993:94; Kirk 1998:391, 392; Wink 2002:101; cf. also Allison 1997:101; Hurtado 2011:164). If that is indeed the case, then there is no sign of the influence of Daniel 7:13, and the term “Son of Man” acts as either a title for Jesus, or a self-reference in the third person (cf. Casey 2009:239). The term can not in this case be viewed as inclusive of other people besides Jesus (cf. Catchpole 1976:94; Casey 2009:240; cf. also Williams 2011:75; contra Wink 2002:101). In support of a titular understanding, it could be argued that Jesus does not speak of himself in the same mundane way he did in Q 7:34 or Q 9:58. Rather, he puts himself forward as the reason for persecution, which betrays a somewhat swollen sense of self-regard and self-interest. However, Jesus is not making any Christological or soteriological claim. He is simply stating that those who follow his lead might be subject to persecution. In other words, the mortal Jesus, and his earthly ministry, is the cause of persecution. The expression “Son of Man” could in this case easily be replaced by the proper noun ‘Jesus’ without changing the logia’s meaning. As such, the best understanding of the present logia is probably that Jesus used it as a non-titular self-reference.
It is, however, also possible that the Son of Man is put forward as the reason why (ἐνεκέν) the persecuted are blessed. If such a reading is followed, it implies that the persecuted are blessed because of their reward at the apocalyptic court, where the Son of Man will confess them before the angels (cf. Q 12:8-9; cf. Catchpole 1976:94; Allison 1997:101). The second interpretation is supported by the fact that it coheres with the other beatitudes in having an apocalyptic apodosis follow the sapiential protasis. This would indicate that verse 23 is not to be read in sole conjunction with verse 22, but as a summary statement of all the beatitudes in verses 20-22. Thus, we may need to amend our discussion above, which would result in the following table of the sayings in verses 21-23:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sapiential statement / command</th>
<th>Apocalyptic motivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>μακάριοι οἱ πεινώντες</td>
<td>ὅτι χροτασθήσεσθε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μακάριοι οἱ πενθόντες</td>
<td>ὅτι παρακληθήσεσθε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μακάριοι ἔστε ὅταν ὀνειδίσωσιν ύμᾶς καὶ διώξωσιν καὶ εἴπωσιν πάν πονηρόν καθ’ ύμων</td>
<td>ἐνεκέν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χάρητε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε</td>
<td>ὅτι ὁ μισθὸς ύμῶν πολὺς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If this interpretation is accepted, it follows that the expression “Son of Man” is here neither a title for Jesus nor a self-reference in the third person. If it does in any way refer to Jesus, it refers to his role as an agent of the apocalyptic event. However, it is not a given that Jesus should in this text be seen as the apocalyptic agent. The Son of Man could easily here be viewed as someone other than Jesus. In summary, Q’s Jesus uses the expression “Son of Man” in Q 6:22 either as a reference to himself in the third person, or as an allusion to an apocalyptic agent, who may or may not be Jesus himself. If the former is accepted, nothing of value can be added to our greater discussion, apart from noting that the expression once again, like in Q 7:34 and Q 9:58, occurs in a sapiential saying and pericope. If the latter option is preferred, we have evidence of the Son-of-Man expression functioning in an apocalyptic sense, so as to motivate a wisdom teaching of Jesus with apocalyptic eschatology. There are five reasons for preferring the former interpretation: (1) The preposition ἐνεκέν follows directly after the phrase καὶ

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113 As reconstructed in the Critical Edition of Q.
εἰπώσιν πάν πονηρόν καθ’ ὑμῶν, and not after μακάριοι ἐστε. (2) The former explanation results in a fine parallelism, wherein four beatitudes starting with μακάριοι are followed by four causal clauses containing ὅτι. (3) Both Matthew and Luke understood the term “Son of Man” here as a mundane, non-eschatological reference to Jesus (cf. Casey 2009:239). (4) For the most part, the second interpretation is not even mentioned or discussed by scholars as an option. (5) 1 Peter 4:14 betrays knowledge of this tradition, and presents it in accordance with the second interpretation (cf. Wink 2002:207).

3.2.5 The mission discourse

In section 2.2.4, it was argued that the mission discourse (Q 10:2-16) is not alien to the wisdom teachings of Jesus. In fact, the thematic content and linguistic forms of the mission discourse are in perfect harmony with Jesus’ overall sapiential message. In section 2.6.1, it was argued that Q 10:2-9 betrays no signs of promoting an apocalyptic and/or futuristic eschatology. To be fair, the threefold use of the word “harvest” (θερισμός) in verse 2 could be recalling an eschatological image intentionally (cf. Edwards 1976:102; Catchpole 1993:164; cf. Joel 4:9-17; Isa 9:2-3; 27:12; Hos 6:11; Rev 14:15-20). As I argued in a footnote in section 2.2.4, however, such is not the only possible reading of that image. In my view, seeing the “harvest” reference as a symbol of the mission itself fits much better with the literary context of the missionary discourse. All the same, even if the “harvest” reference is viewed as a deliberate apocalyptic image, it does not harm or quash our current argument, but actually supports it. Both the individual saying in verse 2 and the whole mission discourse is introduced with the phrase “He said to his disciples (μαθηταῖς).” The mention here of “disciples” is a deliberate attempt to introduce the mission discourse, including verse 2, as a piece of wisdom. The core of the wisdom saying in verse 2 is the sapiential admonition to ask (δεήθητε) (cf. Edwards 1976:102). Syntactically, this admonition is an inferential

114 Luke has the personal pronoun ἀρχόμενος in place of the direct reference to “disciples.” Nevertheless, this personal pronoun still refers to the (seventy or seventy-two) followers or disciples of Jesus mentioned in verse 1. In Matthew, Luke and Q, the content of what Jesus says is clearly directed at his “disciples.”
command, as is made obvious by the conjunction οὖν. As such, the semantic and rhetorical function of the preceding maxim is to substantiate the subsequent admonition. In other words, if the threefold reference to “harvest” is indeed an allusion to apocalyptic eschatology, an eschatological theme is here presented within a sapiential micro-genre as a piece of wisdom (cf. Edwards 1976:102). Verse 9 might allude to the so-called “realised eschatology” of Jesus, which is simply another way of saying that Jesus introduced a new age by fulfilling the prophecies of old.

The mission discourse ends in verses 10-11 with the wisdom instruction for the “workers” (ἔργαται) to “shake the dust off their feet” (ἐκτινάξατε τῶν κοινορτῶν τῶν ποδῶν ὑμῶν in Matthew) if any town does not welcome them (cf. Catchpole 1993:174, 187). This instruction is followed by the prophetic comment that this inhospitable town will fare worse than Sodom at the apocalyptic judgment (cf. Edwards 1976:49, 104; Catchpole 1993:174). Most scholars agree that Q 10:12 is a transitional verse between Q 10:2-11 and Q 10:13-15 (cf. e.g. Kloppenborg 1987a:196; cf. Kirk 1998:353). Luke’s version of Q 10:12 only has “that day” (ἡμέρα ἐκείνη), while Matthew is clearer with his designation “day of judgment” (ἡμέρα κρίσεως). Matthew probably felt the need to explain which day was meant, suggesting that Luke’s version is likely to be more original at this point. Even so, it is absolutely apparent that “this day” refers to the apocalyptic judgment (cf. Allison 2010:34). Not only is “Sodom” mentioned, a town routinely associated with apocalyptic judgment in the Old Testament, but there is also no other explanation that would make sense of ἡμέρα ἐκείνη in this context (cf. Edwards 1976:104; Catchpole 1993:175; Kloppenborg 1987a:196; see Kirk 1998:350-358). This is indeed how Matthew understood Q.

Luke’s version has the conjunction ὅτι, but Matthew’s version does not. It is difficult to determine whether the conjunction was in Q originally. Unlike the beatitudes, ὅτι does not in this case function to introduce a causal clause. Rather, it functions to introduce direct speech after λέγω. Regardless, verse 12 still acts as an explanatory justification of the sapiential instruction in verses 10-11 (cf. Catchpole 1993:175, 187). Verse 12
explains and gives a reason why the workers must “shake the dust off their feet.” Hence, the outcome of the apocalyptic judgment has an impact on how to live and act in the present (cf. Edwards 1976:104). It supports and motivates present action. Although the prophetic theme of apocalyptic judgment figures strongly in verse 12, it should still be viewed as a sapiential micro-genre, most likely an aphorism (see Kirk 1998:353-354; contra Edwards 1976:104). Compositionally, verses 13-15 are little more than an elaboration and amplification of the reason given in verse 12 (cf. Edwards 1976:104-105). As such, the (prophetic) woes against the Galilean towns mainly function to strengthen the case for the directive in verse 10 (see Kirk 1998:351-352, 359-361). Thus, the apocalyptic eschatology of Q 10:12-15 provides motivation and justification for the wisdom of the missionary discourse, particularly verses 10-11.

3.2.6 The Beelzebul accusation

The short story in Q 11:14 contextualises and sets the stage for the subsequent interaction between Jesus and his opponents. As such, this pericope (Q 11:14-15, 17-20) should probably be seen as a sapiential *chreia* of challenge and riposte (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:168; Kirk 1998:184, 328). The sapiential character of this pericope is also indicated by the repeated use of conditional clauses and rhetorical questions, as well as the overall argumentative nature of the passage (cf. Edwards 1976:111). In verse 15, Jesus is accused of casting out demons in the name of Beelzebul. Verse 17 represents both the crux of Jesus’ sapiential lesson, and the heart of his rhetorical argument against the sceptics (see Kirk 1998:185-186). There Jesus makes the assertion that it is impossible for a divided kingdom or household to prevail. The conditional-clause-plus-rhetorical-question construct in verse 18 is intended to provide added support to the statement made in verse 17, and to strengthen its overall case. The construct achieves this not only by *concretising* the open-ended maxim in verse 17, but also by *applying* the maxim to the initial accusation (cf. Kirk 1998:187). Verses 17-18 imply that if Jesus is

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115 Explaining and arguing statements or commands are signature attributes of the wisdom genre (cf. Edwards 1976:45; see section 2.3 above). Prophetic genres are more interested in basing their pronouncements on divine authority, not logical reasoning. This distinctive characteristic of wisdom will be crucial to the reasoning of the remainder of this work.
casting out demons with the aid of Beelzebul, then Satan’s kingdom is divided, and will come to a fall (cf. Mat 12:26).

Jesus then continues with a slightly different argument in verses 19-20 (contra Kirk 1998:187), where he, once again, makes use of two conditional clauses (cf. Edwards 1976:111). The first takes a negative answer to the Beelzebul accusation to its logical extreme (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:125), while the second takes a positive answer to the Beelzebul accusation to its logical extreme. In the first sentence, the conditional clause is followed by a rhetorical question. In the second sentence, it is followed by a statement. We are mainly interested in the first conditional sentence. In the rhetorical question, the term ο/υἱοί ύμων probably intended to recall the patriarchal families’ younger generation, and the rupture Jesus’ ministry caused between younger and older generations (see section 2.3 above). The conditional sentence, therefore, argues that if Jesus is working with Beelzebul, so are the sceptics’ children, or at least those who follow Jesus. In order to defend their families’ public honour, the sceptics must have vehemently denied the implied accusation that members of their own families were in cahoots with Beelzebul.

This denial enabled Jesus to make the following statement: “This is why they will be your judges” (διὰ τοῦτο αὐτοί ύμων κρίται ἐσονται). The reference to “judges” (κριταί), and the fact that ἐσονται is in the future tense, indicate that this statement refers to apocalyptic judgment. The standard conjunctional construction διὰ τοῦτο should be translated with “therefore” or “for this reason” (cf. Newman 1993 s.v. διά; Edwards 1976:111), thereby indicating that we are dealing with an inferential statement. This means that the apocalyptic statement forms part of Jesus’ overall argument. As in the rest of verses 19-20, the second-person personal pronoun ύμων here refers to the sceptics of verse 15 (τίνες δὲ ἔξι αὐτῶν). The third-person personal pronoun αὐτοί can only be referencing ο/υἱοί ύμων from the foregoing sentence. In other words, in response to the sceptics’ denial that their own biological children are working with Beelzebul, Jesus claims that the sceptics will for this very reason be judged by their own sons at the apocalyptic judgment. Thus, the sceptics’ children are working with God and will
therefore be afforded the privilege of judging the rest of Israel, their own parents included, at the apocalyptic judgment (cf. Q 22:28, 30; cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:125).

Both conditional sentences, by the way, end up denying that Jesus was working with Beelzebul when he healed the mute. The argumentative and rhetorical nature of the pericope, as well as its formal characteristics, strongly suggest that it should be read as a sapiential passage (cf. Kirk 1998:188, 327). The introductory story in verse 14 supports this, and renders the wisdom genre to be that of a *chreia* (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:168). In this passage, the apocalyptic sentence is part and parcel of the sapiential argument. Jesus employed his own beliefs about the apocalypse to strengthen his sapiential argument and message. Hence, apocalyptic eschatology was utilised in the service of Jesus’ overall wisdom message. This was the main purpose of the apocalyptic statement in this pericope. However, the apocalyptic statement was also a natural and logical consequence of Jesus’ sapiential argument and message. Thus, Jesus made an important conclusion about the nature of the apocalypse, and based this conclusion on his wisdom teachings. Said differently, Jesus made use of his wisdom to deduce and explain important aspects of the apocalypse. His wisdom was the *base* from which he speculated about the end times.

### 3.2.7 The sign of Jonah

Like the previous pericope, Q 11:16, 29-32 is commenced with a short story that functions to contextualise Jesus’ subsequent message. As such, the whole pericope is presented as a challenge-and-riposte *chreia* (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:168; Kirk 1998:195, 328). In this pericope, the main content of Jesus’ sapiential message is that “this is an evil generation” and that “it will not get a sign” (cf. Catchpole 1993:51). There is a likely wordplay here with σημεῖον. Those who asked Jesus for a sign probably implied a miracle, seeing as miracles were commonly called σημεῖα. However, the word

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116 Kloppenborg (1987a:131) denies that the οἱ των were asking Jesus for a miracle, preferring to interpret the request of Q 11:16 as a request for a “legitimation sign.” His argument in support of this view is that Q did not refer to miracles as σημεῖα, but rather as δυνάμεις. However, the only text Kloppenborg is able to provide in support of his argument is Q 10:13. One text is scarcely enough evidence to put forward
σημείον could also denote a “warning sign,” and was just as commonly used in apocalyptic literature to reference the signs that would precede, and warn about, the apocalyptic event. This is the σημείον Jesus continues to address. Thus, a few people asked Jesus for a miracle, but he continued to discuss apocalyptic signs. Moreover, the miracles (σημεία) Jesus had already done are the signs (σημεία) of the apocalypse. So, Jesus refuses to do the former in this circumstance, and continues to speak about the latter (cf. Mark 8:11-12; cf. Wink 2002:90-91).

The allegation that “this generation” will not get a sign to forewarn them against the apocalypse is a sapiential statement about the theme of apocalyptic eschatology. In other words, apocalypticism is in verse 29 a theme that forms part of the content of Jesus’ sapiential message. Verse 30 further develops this theme by means of an apocalyptic micro-genre, sometimes called the “eschatological correlative” (cf. Edwards 1976:41, 114). Verses 31-32 are prophetic micro-genres that further develop the apocalyptic theme of verse 30 (cf. Edwards 1976:50). In toto, verses 30-32 function in the current literary context to support and explain the sapiential claims that “this is an evil generation” and that “it will not get a sign” (cf. Catchpole 1993:243; see Kloppenborg 1987a:133-134; Kirk 1998:195-196). This is made apparent by the use of the conjunction γάρ in verse 30, which turns that assertion into a causal statement. Moreover, verses 31-32 make use of authoritative examples from scripture to validate, support and explain the sapiential assertion in verse 29 (cf. Kirk 1998:197, 198). Thus, apocalyptic forecasts are used to validate Jesus’ wisdom. Apocalypticism was commonly used in such a manner by first-century wisdom texts (cf. Kirk 1998:198). On the one hand, apocalypticism, in this pericope, forms part of the content of Jesus’ wisdom, and, on the other hand, apocalypticism is used to strengthen and support Jesus’ wisdom.

δυνάμεις as the word exclusively used by the compilers of Q – not to mention those responsible for its prehistory – to speak about “miracles.” Be that as it may, defending possible wordplay with σημείον is not really crucial for the current discussion, which is more concerned with the relationship of apocalypticism and wisdom in Q 11:16, 29-32.
With regards to the interpretation of the Son of Man in Q 11:30, scholarship is generally divided between two options (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:132). A number of scholars believe that the Son-of-Man reference is here an allusion to Daniel 7:13 (cf. Kloppenborg 132 n. 134; Kirk 198 n. 182; cf. e.g. Catchpole 1993:246). Other scholars have thought that the term “Son of Man” functions in Q 11:30 as an unmistakable term for Jesus during his this-worldly ministry. In support of the former view, attention could be drawn to both the literary context (verses 31-32), which develops apocalyptic themes, and the future tense of the verb ἐσται in verse 30 (cf. Catchpole 1993:246). There are, however, excellent reasons for preferring the second view.

In this text, one must first determine the meaning of the word “sign” (σημεῖον) before any judgment can be reached on the usage of the term “Son of Man.” One question is fundamental at this point: what exactly was Jonah’s sign? It could not have been the ‘historical’ figure of Jonah himself (cf. Catchpole 1993:245), since Jonah spent a whole day gallivanting in Nineveh, without raising as much as an eyebrow (cf. Jonah 3:4). Yet, when Jonah cried out his apocalyptic message, the people of Nineveh took notice and radically changed their ways (cf. Jonah 3:4-9). This reaction ultimately led to their apocalyptic salvation (cf. Jonah 3:10). It logically follows that “Jonah’s sign” must have been his apocalyptic message (cf. Wink 2002:91; contra Catchpole 1993:246).

This conclusion indicates that the Son of Man could not in Q 11:30 have referenced the apocalyptic agent of Daniel 7:13. Neither in Daniel 7, nor in Q, does this figure bring any kind of message (contra Edwards 1976:114). Instead, he simply appears at the apocalyptic event, when it is already too late for repentance or redemption. In Q 11:30, the referent of the Son of Man must be Jesus (cf. Kirk 1998:198). Once this is accepted, the comparison between Jesus and Jonah becomes clear. The message of both Jonah and Jesus was about apocalyptic destruction and repentance (cf. Jonah 3:4, 10; Q 10:12-15; cf. Wink 2002:91). In both cases, the apocalyptic message represented the only warning sign of apocalyptic doom (cf. Jonah 3:5; Q 11:29; cf. Kloppenborg 1987:133). Both Jonah and Jesus became a sign by means of their this-worldly conduct (cf. Jonah 3:1-4; Q 11:16).
The literary context in Q 11:31-32, which also mentions Jonah, the Ninevites and “this generation,” supports the foregoing conclusion, even if it does develop apocalyptic themes (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:133). The noun “something” (πλε/uni1FD6ον) is in the neuter here because it refers back to the “sign” (ση/uni03BCε/uni1FD6ον) of verse 29, which is the Son of Man’s message (see Wink 2002:91-92; contra Catchpole 1993:242). Like Jonah and Solomon, the one responsible for this “greater message” (πλε/uni1FD6ον) not only has to be flesh and blood, but must also have been on earth at some stage before the apocalypse arrives. It follows that the mysterious figure of verses 31-32 cannot be the eschatological figure of Daniel 7:13, since that figure only arrives on the scene when it is too late (cf. Q 17:23-24). The respective messages of Jonah and Solomon were beacons for their contemporaries. Similarly, the message of the arcane figure in Q 11:29-32 has to be a beacon for his contemporaries, including “this generation” (cf. Wink 2002:90-91). The latter statement is supported by the vocabulary of Q 11:31-32. The interjection “look!” (ἰδοὺ) and the adverb “here” (δε) both indicate that this figure must be a corporeal person that existed when Q 11:29-32 was spoken. As Kloppenborg (1987:133) puts it: “the double saying [in Q 11:31-32] pronounces judgment upon those who refuse to respond to some present reality which is greater than Jonah or Solomon.”

In light of all this, the “something greater than both Jonah and Solomon” has to be the message of the earthly Jesus. It follows that the Son-of-Man reference in verse 30 must be to Jesus during his worldly ministry – that is, if we are to make sense of the explanatory examples in verses 31-32 (cf. Kirk 1998:198). Hence, both the book of Jonah and the literary context in Q support the proposal that Jesus, and not the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13, is the Son of Man in Q 11:30.

When discussing the comparison between Jesus and Jonah, it was argued that the “sign of the Son of Man (or Jesus)” is his apocalyptic message, not his person. Also this conclusion is confirmed by Q 11:31-32, where it is said that the Queen of the South and the Ninevites experienced apocalyptic favour, not because they knew Solomon or Jonah, but because they heeded the wisdom (σοφίαν) of Solomon, and the announcement (κήρυγμα) of Jonah, respectively (cf. Catchpole 1993:242; Kirk 1998:198). Verse 32

117 Italics original.
explicitly states that the Ninevites will experience apocalyptic favour because (ὥτε) they repented (μετένόησαν) when they heard Jonah’s apocalyptic message (κήρυγμα). Likewise, verse 31 explicitly states that the Queen of the South will experience apocalyptic favour because (ὥτε) she listened (ἀκούσαί) to Solomon’s sapiential message (σοφίαν). Although Solomon was primarily known for his wisdom and wealth, he was also admired in the first century for his role as a staunch preacher of repentance in the face of apocalyptic judgment (see e.g. Wis. Sol. 6:1-19; cf. Kloppenborg 1987:133-134; Catchpole 1993:242). In general, contemporary wisdom often included stern messages of repentance (cf. e.g. Wis. Sol. 11:23; 12:10, 19; Sirach 17:24; 44:16, 48). According to Q 11:31-32, both the Queen of the South and the Ninevites will experience apocalyptic salvation, because they took the respective messages of Solomon and Jonah to heart. According to Q 11:29-30, on the other hand, “this generation” will experience condemnation at the apocalypse, because they failed to heed the sign of the Son of Man, meaning Jesus’ message (cf. Piper 1989:167).

If the Son of Man does not in this case refer to the Danielic emissary, what are we to make of the fact that, in verse 30, the verb ἔσται appears in the future tense? Kloppenborg (1987:132) believes that it could be a gnomic future that points to present time. It is much more likely, though, that Q’s Jesus used the future tense because he intended future time (cf. Edwards 1976:114; Catchpole 1993:246). There are two ways to explain the future tense in this case. Seeing as the ‘Son of Man’ here refers to the corporeal Jesus, the future tense could indicate the rest of his earthly ministry, including the immediate future during which Jesus will or will not give a sign. The future tense of the verb δοθήσεται in verse 29 could be held up as evidence in support of this interpretation (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:132). However, such an explanation would exclude the part of his ministry that had already been completed, including his concurrent message of apocalyptic doom. This seems unlikely to have been the intention (cf. Wink 2002:90-91). It is much more likely that the future tense does indeed here point to future time, most likely the predicted time of the apocalypse (cf. Edwards 1976:114; Catchpole 1993:246). When “this generation” stands before God at the apocalyptic court (cf. Q 12:8-9), the “sign of the Son of Man,” meaning Jesus’ message, will have been their only
warning of apocalyptic judgment (cf. Wink 2002:91). Just like the acceptance of Jonah’s message resulted in apocalyptic pardon (cf. Jonah 3:10), Jesus’ message, if accepted, will result in apocalyptic pardon. Just like the respective messages of Solomon and Jonah will result in apocalyptic favour for the Queen of the South and the Ninevites (cf. Q 11:31-32), the message of Jesus, if accepted, will result in apocalyptic favour for “this generation.” Q 11:30 is therefore looking forward at the apocalyptic event, and predicting that “this generation” will regret not heeding the “sign of the Son of Man,” which they had already received during their lives on earth (cf. Piper 1989:167). In dealing with Q 11:29-30, Wink (2002:91) states: “[The Son of Man] will not come in the future to judge; rather, he is the present standard by which one will be judged in the future.” Just like the message of Jonah could only be appreciated after it had resulted in apocalyptic pardon, the message of Jesus – i.e. the sign of the Son of Man – will only be appreciated after it had already resulted in apocalyptic destruction. The beauty of hindsight!

If the expression “Son of Man” here refers to the earthly Jesus, is it possible that Q 11:30 implies more than only Jesus with its use of the expression? If more people are implied, it certainly does not include all of humanity, since only a few individuals throughout history have preached at all. The silent masses are exactly that: silent. The generic and indefinite interpretations of the term “Son of Man” are therefore taken off the table. However, the idiomatic use of the expression “Son of Man” could perhaps imply a selected group of individuals. Jesus was certainly not the only one in Israel’s history to preach a message of repentance. Q 11:29-32 recalls also Jonah and Solomon. The apocalyptic message of John the Baptist also comes to mind (cf. Q 3:7-9, 16-17). Unfortunately, this view goes against the intention of Q 11:29-32, where the Son of Man is compared to Jonah and Solomon. Such comparison with other historical figures naturally excludes these figures from being the Son of Man himself. When dealing with Q 7:34, we concluded that the comparison in that context between Jesus and the Baptist meant that the term “Son of Man” referred there exclusively to Jesus. The same is true in

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118 Koine Greek does not have a perfect-future tense that would enable it to articulate something similar to the English phrase “will have been.” The future tense alone must suffice.
the present (con)text. One entity (the Son of Man) is compared with another entity (Jonah and Solomon respectively), indicating that the two are mutually exclusive.

The elevated role Q 11:30 bestows upon the Son of Man, in view of apocalyptic judgment, opens up the possibility that the term “Son of Man” is here used as a title for Jesus (cf. Edwards 1976:114). However, it is the “sign” – i.e. the apocalyptic message – that carries soteriological weight, not the Son of Man (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:133). Instead, the expression “Son of Man” refers here to the earthly Jesus and his mortal ministry. If the expression “Son of Man” was intended as a title for Jesus, one would have expected the Son of Man himself to be the enforcer of soteriological and apocalyptic salvation, not merely his message. To conclude, as with the other Son-of-Man texts we have looked at, the expression “Son of Man” here refers exclusively to Jesus during his earthly ministry. Even though it appears in a text that handles apocalyptic images and themes, it is neither a title for Jesus, nor a reference to the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13.

3.2.8 Sophia judges “this generation”

Q 11:49-51 is basically a declaration that “this generation,” particularly those in charge of the official Temple cult, will be held accountable at the final judgment for all the prophets and sages who had been killed in the past (cf. Catchpole 1993:270; see Kirk 1998:319-324). According to Luke, this declaration was uttered by ἡ σοφία. Matthew presents it as part of a long monologue by Jesus (cf. Mat 23:1). Matthew’s intention to add Q 11:49-51 to a longer discussion explains why he would remove ἡ σοφία from the text, which means that ἡ σοφία is probably original. Moreover, the fact that Matthew placed these words in the mouth of Jesus means that he understood ἡ σοφία to refer to Jesus (cf. Piper 1989:164). If the current pericope is taken together with the preceding woes against the Pharisees and scribes, the entire section resembles a prophetic micro-genre, commonly found in apocalyptic literature. This micro-genre traditionally

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119 Piper (1989:164-165) adds six additional reasons for accepting the reference to ἡ σοφία as part of Q originally.
consisted of a series of accusations, the messenger formula “Thus says the Lord,” and a subsequent announcement of judgment (cf. Edwards 1976:69; Kirk 1998:316; see Kloppenborg 1987a:143-144). However, the replacement of Yahweh with ἡ σοφία signals a deliberate attempt at presenting this prophetic micro-genre as a piece of wisdom.

There are only two ways of interpreting the occurrence of ἡ σοφία in this Q text (cf. Piper 1989:165). The first is to see it, as did Matthew, as a reference to Jesus, in which case the narrator utters the phrase διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ σοφία εἶπεν, and associates Jesus with the heavenly Sophia. The second is to see ἡ σοφία as a reference to the heavenly Sophia, but not to Jesus. In this case, Jesus¹²⁰ quotes Sophia in this pericope, and the phrase διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ σοφία εἶπεν is spoken by Jesus as part of his wisdom teaching commenced in Q 11:29a. If the first possibility is chosen, and Jesus is associated with ἡ σοφία, then it logically follows that the apocalyptic announcement of this pericope was spoken as part of Jesus’ wisdom message. If the second possibility is chosen, and Jesus is not associated with ἡ σοφία, then it logically follows that the apocalyptic announcement formed part of the chreia introduced in Q 11:29a, and that Jesus quoted ἡ σοφία to grant his sapiential teaching added authority. In other words, no matter which option is chosen, the passage is deliberately cast in a sapiential mould. The content of Jesus’ sapiential message was that “this generation” will be held responsible for the killing of the prophets and sages. In this passage, an apocalyptic theme forms part of the sapiential message of Jesus. All in all, Kirk (1998:333-336) puts forward enough evidence to support the view that the so-called “controversy discourse” (Q 10:23-24, Q 11:2-52, Q 13:34-35) should, in its entirety, be seen as a wisdom text that develops prophetic and apocalyptic themes.

¹²⁰ Although Jesus himself is not expressly mentioned, there are two indicators that Jesus should in this case be seen as the one quoting Sophia. Firstly, Jesus is introduced in Q 11:16 as the “speaker” of the extended wisdom teaching in Q 11:16-51. Secondly, Jesus is implied in the thematic content of this pericope (Q 11:49-51) and depicted as the last prophet killed by “this generation” (cf. Piper 1989:169).
3.2.9 Proclaiming Jesus in public

The wisdom forms and argumentative nature of Q 12:2-12 leave no doubt as to the sapiential genre of this pericope (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:208; Kirk 1998:206, 208-209; Piper 1989:55-56). Additionally, the whole pericope is wrought with parallelism. Q 12:2-12 starts in verse 2 with a general and familiar maxim, based on experience, that all secrets and hidden truths will at some stage be exposed (cf. Edwards 1976:120; Kloppenborg 1987a:206; Kirk 1998:206; Piper 1989:57). This maxim provides the reasoning and justification for the subsequent admonition in verse 3 to proclaim the content of Jesus’ message in public (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:210). It is not clear when the exposure of “all things hidden” will take place. If Jesus were implying that the predicted disclosure would occur during the apocalyptic judgment, as the divine passives seem to suggest, then this is yet another example of an apocalyptic logion providing the justification and motivation for a particular piece of wisdom (cf. Kirk 1998:207). However, it is not clear that verse 2 should in fact be read in an apocalyptic light (cf. Piper 1989:76-77).

The same cannot be said of verse 5, though. The admonition to proclaim Jesus’ message in public is further substantiated by two admonitions: a negative one in verse 4, and a positive one in verse 5 (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:208). Both are concerned with anxiety (cf. Piper 1989:52). The first (negative) admonition reassures Jesus’ audience that they need not fear (μὴ φοβηθῆτε / φοβεῖτε) human beings, who are only able to kill the body, but have no power over the soul (cf. Piper 1989:53). This directive is corroborated in verses 6-7 by reassuring these people that God cares for them, and that God will protect them (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:207; see Piper 1989:52-55). Thus, people are instructed to proclaim Jesus’ message, and are encouraged not to be afraid when doing so, because God will protect them (cf. Kirk 1998:208). Allison (1997:168-172) argues that verses 6-7 are not at all about protection, but about the fact that God is omniscient. To be sure, the followers of Jesus are not promised that they will escape tribulation. The body might still be killed (verse 4), the sparrow still falls to the ground (verse 6), and the hairs might still perish (verse 7). If Allison is correct, which is likely, the consolation of
verses 6-7 are not that God will protect the audience against physical abuse, but that God is in control, and that He is aware of said abuse. Whichever interpretation is preferred, the rhetorical function of verses 6-7 remains the same, which is to argue the case of verse 4. Verse 5 provides quite a different type of rationale for the admonition to proclaim Jesus’ message in public. It admonishes Jesus’ audience to be afraid (φοβηθήτε / φοβεῖσθε) of the one who has the ability to destroy both the body and the soul. That verse 5 refers to the apocalypse is without any doubt (cf. Piper 1989:55; contra Kloppenborg 1987a:208-210). It openly speaks about the soul (ψυχήν), and about Gehenna (γέενναν / γεέννα) – or “hell” (cf. Allison 2010:34). In effect, those who fail to obey the admonition in verse 3 are implicitly threatened with eternal damnation (cf. Kirk 1998:208). If Q 12:4-7 is taken as a whole, the admonition in verse 3 is motivated by juxtaposing one’s fate in the present world with one’s destiny in the future world and proposing a choice for the latter (see Edwards 1976:120-121; cf. Allison 1997:174). The Q people are encouraged to face even certain death in view of the eschatological reward. Once again, a wisdom teaching of Jesus – this time a sapiential directive – is motivated and supported by apocalyptic eschatology (cf. Piper 1989:56; Allison 1997:174).

The positive and negative admonitions in verses 4 and 5, respectively, find their indicative counterparts in verses 8 and 9, both of which are concerned with providing supplementary motivation for the admonition in verse 3 (cf. Kirk 1998:209). That both verses 8 and 9 denote apocalyptic eschatology should be accepted as a matter of course (see Edwards 1976:40-41, 121; see section 2.6.1 above). Verse 8 motivates the admonition in verse 3 by disclosing the apocalyptic reward for such behaviour at the final judgment (cf. Sim 1985:233). Conversely, verse 9 motivates the admonition in verse 3 by revealing the apocalyptic punishment for the opposite behaviour at the final judgment (see Wink 2002:181-182). Whereas verse 8 provides a completely new motivation for the admonition in verse 3, verse 9 states explicitly what was already implied by verse 5, namely that those who deny Jesus in public will be denied at the apocalyptic judgment. The only possible outcome of such denial is eternal damnation, as verse 5 clearly points

121 As is clear from the phrases: Πάς οὖν ὅστις / δς ἄν ὀμολογήσει / ὀμολογήσῃ ἐν ἔμοι ἐμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων and ὁ δὲ / ὅστις δ´ ἄν ἀρνήσηται / ἀρνησάμενός με ἐμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
out. Thus, whereas verse 5 *implicitly* motivates the initial admonition with the threat of eternal damnation, verse 9 motivates it *explicitly* with the very same threat (see Kirk 1998:209-210). In verses 8 and 9, present action is motivated by eschatological reward and punishment (cf. Edwards 1976:121). Q 12:8-9 leaves absolutely no doubt that, in Q, Jesus motivated and justified his wisdom teachings, including his admonitions, with apocalyptic eschatology. The obvious apocalyptic readings of verses 5, 8 and 9, in a backhanded way, render an apocalyptic interpretation of verse 2 highly probable (cf. Piper 1989:56). Thus, in Q 12:2-9, three, perhaps four, *apocalyptic* motivations are supplied for a singular sapiential admonition. Moreover, in all these cases, the apocalyptic motifs were part of the rhetorical fabric of the sapiential argument (cf. Piper 1989:60).

Luke has the phrase “Son of Man” in Q 12:8, but Matthew does not. Most scholars agree that Luke is more original at this point (cf. Piper 1989:58). The phrase “Son of Man” is also attested in a parallel saying at Mark 8:38. Luke had no reason to add the phrase ‘Son of Man’ here (cf. Piper 1989:58). Besides, it is not customary for Luke to add this phrase to his sources (cf. Catchpole 1993:93). Hence, it is very likely that those responsible for the *Critical Edition of Q* are correct, and that this phrase was originally part of Q (see Robinson; Hoffmann & Kloppenborg 2000). Matthew probably replaced it with the typically-Matthean κἀγώ, because the saying, as it stood, could be construed to mean that someone other than Jesus was the Son of Man (cf. Piper 1989:58; Catchpole 1993:93; cf. also Casey 2009:186). Matthew did not overreact in this regard, seeing as this individual saying has been elemental in convincing a large number of prominent scholars throughout history, including Bultmann, that the historical Jesus did not use the term “Son of Man” in reference to himself (cf. Burkett 1999:38; see Casey 2009:186-187; see section 1.3.2 above). In a sense, this view is legitimate, since the text does indeed seem to differentiate between the Son of Man (ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) and the personal pronoun “me” (ἐμοί), which refers to the speaker, Jesus (cf. Piper 1989:58). Such a reading is not a given, though (cf. Burkett 1999:38). It is not *demanded* by the text. Furthermore, Matthew understood the term here as a reference to Jesus. Despite the concurrent
presence of the personal pronoun, Q’s Jesus may still be using the term “Son of Man” in reference to himself.

The saying would not make any sense if we were to translate “Son of Man” with the indefinite term “a man.” The saying demands a more specific referent. The logion would make no more sense if “Son of Man” were to be translated with the generic term “man,” meaning humanity in general (contra Catchpole 1993:93). That would imply that the perpetrator will witness against herself at the apocalyptic judgment. It would also imply that outsiders, like Gentiles and “this generation,” would be witnesses at a trial that does not concern them in the slightest. Casey (2009:179-194) argues that the term “Son of Man” references the multitude of witnesses at the apocalyptic court, among whom Jesus will be the primary witness. The problem with this suggestion in a synchronic reading of the text is that such an interpretation is not possible in Greek. It is, however, possible that a bilingual audience might have been able to recognise an Aramaic idiom underlying the Greek. If so, the main witness will still be Jesus. If Jesus and his message is so essential for both apocalyptic deliverance and apocalyptic judgment (cf. Q 3:16-17; Q 7:23; Q 10:22; Q 11:23, 30-32; Q 13:35; Q 17:23-24, 33), why would there be a need for additional witnesses? These witnesses seem superfluous.

It seems more likely that Jesus is here referring only to himself in the third person (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:212; Kirk 1998:210; cf. also Catchpole 1993:92). In verse 8, the first part of the saying is inverted by the second part (cf. Piper 1989:56, 59; Catchpole 1993:198). The subject of ὁμολογήσει in the protasis becomes the object of ὁμολογήσει in the apodosis. Similarly, in verse 9, the subject of ἀρνηθήσεται in the protasis becomes the object of ἀρνηθήσεται in the apodosis. This inversion is customary in sayings of retribution, of which Q 12:8-9 is a certain example (cf. Piper 1989:58, 59; see section 4.2 below). In turn, it is customary for sayings of retribution to swap the subjects and objects of each leg of the saying. Hence, the structure of this logion more than implies that the personal pronoun “me” in the protasis of verse 8 should be equated with the term “Son of Man” in the apodosis. This indicates that the most natural reading of the text is that Jesus
used the expression “Son of Man” in exclusive reference to himself. As we saw, this is also how Matthew understood this text.

There is, however, another, equally-valid explanation for the use of the term “Son of Man” in this context, namely that it refers to an apocalyptic agent. Q 12:8-9 obviously alludes to Daniel 7:13 (cf. esp. Casey 2009:181; cf. also Burkett 1999:123; Wink 2002:178; Bock 2011:91-92; cf. further Kirk 1998:209). In fact, out of all the Son-of-Man logia in Q, this one employs the most obvious imagery from Daniel 7:13. The repeated use of the preposition ἐπροσθεν (“[standing] before”), plus the references to “angels,” are unmistakable images of an apocalyptic courtroom (cf. Kirk 1998:209; see sections 4.4.1 & 4.4.3 below). It is extremely doubtful that either the author or the audience would have been confronted with Q 12:8-9 without calling to mind the image of Daniel 7:13. This would explain why he used a personal pronoun to speak of himself directly in the first part of the saying, and used the term “Son of Man” in the second part of the saying. The use of the personal pronoun “me” (οί), in the first part of the sentence, allowed Jesus to be absolutely unambiguous about the fact that it was he himself that needed to be confessed in public. On the other hand, the use of the term “Son of Man,” in the second part of the sentence, allowed Jesus to recall the image of Daniel 7:13, while at the same time referring to himself in the third person.

In Daniel’s vision, the “one like a son of man” is an individual being with ultimate power. This does not mean that he could not have been a symbol for some type of corporate entity, like the “saints” of Daniel’s vision or the whole Jewish nation. Unfortunately, however, the phrase “one like a son of man” is not interpreted in Daniel 7:15-28. All we have is the vision itself, where the “one like a son of man” is clearly described as a single figure. The Similitudes of Enoch and 4 Ezra 13 demonstrate that it was customary in first-century Judaism to interpret the “one like a son of man” in Daniel 7:13 as a singular apocalyptic-messianic figure (see Müller 2008:339-343). Moreover, the multitudes of Daniel 7:11 are not judicial witnesses in the court proceeding. In fact, there is no mention of witnesses in Daniel 7 at all. Verse 16 rather gives the impression that the multitude are simply there to observe, not to give witness. Also, the “one like a
son of man” does not form part of the multitude, whether they be witnesses or not, but is distinguished from them as a completely separate entity. It may be able to corroborate Casey’s suggestion from other intertexts, but it is certainly not possible to do so from Daniel 7:13, which is undoubtedly the most important intertext for Q 12:8-9 (see Burkett 1999:122-123).

By employing his usual self-reference (Son of Man) in a saying that recalled Daniel 7:13, Q’s Jesus was probably associating himself with the apocalyptic Son-of-Man figure in that text (cf. Bock 2011:89, 93, 96-97; see Theissen & Merz 1998:552-553; contra Hurtado 2011:171-172). For whatever reason, Q’s Jesus only did so indirectly, in a veiled, ambiguous and oblique manner. Given the high likelihood that this saying is authentic (see section 3.1.2 above), it is very probable that the historical Jesus identified himself with the symbolic figure of Daniel 7:13 (cf. esp. Dodd 1971:112; Allison 2010:39; cf. also Bauckham 1985:28; Wink 2002:64, 178; see France 1971; Nebe 1997:125-131), but only did so indirectly, via ambiguous sayings like these (cf. Bauckham 1985:29-30; Meier 2001:646; see Hengel 1983; Hampel 1990; Nolland 1992:17-28).122 Jesus was certainly smart and innovative enough to use the term “Son of Man” in such a way (see esp. Wright 1996:170-171, 478-479, 632-633; cf. Dunn 2001:547; Bock 2002:151; Tuckett 2003:184; cf. also Chilton 1996:45).123

For those who were familiar with the Sayings Gospel Q (and/or those who knew Jesus personally), the only logical conclusion to draw from this dual (apocalyptic and ordinary) usage of the term “Son of Man” would have been that Jesus himself was claiming to be the symbolic figure described by Daniel (cf. Dodd 1971:112). According to Lindars (1983:87), the “advocate” logion in Q 12:8-9 “paves the way for the identification of the

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122 This is not primarily an attempt at “rescuing” the apocalyptic Son of Man (see Müller 2008:363-374, esp. 374), but the inevitable result of the textual analysis of Q 12:8. The latter text has the term “Son of Man” as both a self-reference by Jesus, and an apocalyptic reference to Daniel 7:13. Moreover, the high probability that this text is authentic leads to the inevitable conclusion that the historical Jesus himself used the term in such an ambiguous manner, thereby implying (but not stating outrightly) that he was to be identified with the Danielic Son-of-Man figure.

123 Opposite proposals seem more absurd, like that the historical Jesus did not know Daniel 7:13 or that he was incapable of using the term “Son of Man” in reference to this text (cf. Bock 2002:151). It was not only scribes who knew the Jewish scriptures and tradition (cf. Wright 1996:64-65).
Son of Man, assumed to be an exclusive self-reference on Jesus’ part, with the Danielic Son of Man figure.” Jesus probably intended this conclusion to be drawn, but also obscured it with the use of a vague term such as “Son of Man” (cf. Bock 2011:89, see Bauckham 1985:28-30). The probability that Jesus only hinted at an association with the figure of Daniel 7:13 suggests that this identification was not fundamental to “his self-understanding and his use of the expression” (Hurtado 2011:171). Of greater importance to Jesus was referring to himself by means of the term “Son of Man,” and having his audience grasp this application. Ultimately, the expression “Son of Man” in Q 12:8 not only contributed to the apocalyptic imagery of this saying, but also assisted in making obvious the allusion to Daniel 7:13. If we take the greater context into consideration, the term “Son of Man” contributed to Q 12:8’s primary function, which was to motivate and support the initial wisdom admonition in Q 12:3 with apocalyptic eschatology.

Q 12:10 is notoriously difficult to interpret (cf. Edwards 1976:121). Since this difficulty is in large part due to the ambiguity of the term “Son of Man” in this particular saying, we will address the “question of reference” before analysing the saying itself. Even though verse 10 follows directly after Q 12:8-9, it is doubtful that this saying also references an apocalyptic figure. What would cause someone to say something bad or derogatory about an imaginary angelic being like the one in Daniel 7:13? Nothing comes to mind! If one believes that the Son of Man is here a reference to an apocalyptic figure (cf. Edwards 1976:122), one would have to explain the existence of a logion that prohibits the unlikely occurrence of someone speaking against a paranormal figure with a singular purpose only to be fulfilled at a future date.

The generic and indefinite uses of the term seem more probable (cf. Wink 2002:85). Both would in this case amount to the same meaning, namely the act of speaking against one’s fellow man (cf. Casey 2009:140, 143). The saying would then maintain that the sin of speaking against one’s fellow man is forgivable, but not the sin of speaking against the holy spirit. Unfortunately, the literary context testifies against such an interpretation. Q 12:2-12 is chiefly about confessing or denying both the person and the message of Jesus (cf. verses 3, 8a, 9a). This means that the current saying is most naturally read, in its Q
context, as referring exclusively to Jesus (cf. Kloppenborg 1987:212; Kirk 1998:210). Thus, we have yet another example of Jesus using the term “Son of Man” as an exclusive self-reference in the third person. He might have used the term in this Q context because he was embarrassed to mention that there were people who “spoke against” him in public, thereby attacking and denigrating his social status (*contra* Wink 2002:85). By allowing this transgression against his person, Jesus could also have been emphasising his lowliness.

Most interpreters who have rejected the “self-referential conclusion” did so because Q 12:10 would then be contradicting Q 12:8-9. And indeed it does (cf. Sim 1985:235-236; Kloppenborg 1987:207-208; 211-212; Kirk 1998:210). Verse 9 promises apocalyptic judgment to those who deny Jesus, while verse 10 claims that those who deny Jesus will be forgiven. This contradiction is no reason to doubt the likelihood that “Son of Man” here refers to Jesus, though. Deliberately placing such direct contradictions side by side was not an unusual or uncommon practice in ancient wisdom literature (cf. Kirk 1998:211, 346; cf. also Allison 2010:90). Although Q 12:10 does not explicitly reference apocalyptic judgment, it is highly likely that the mentioned “forgiveness” (ἀφεθήσεται) refers to that final judgment, not least of all because of the apparentness of apocalypticism in the preceding verses, and the future tense of the verb ἀφεθήσεται (cf. Edwards 1976:122).

This verse should probably be read in conjunction with verses 11-12, where the admonition in verse 3 is further motivated by reassuring Jesus’ audience that the holy spirit (ἅγιον πνεῦμα in Luke) would teach (διδάξει in Luke) them what to say when they are brought before the synagogues (cf. Kirk 1998:213). Understood in combination with verses 11-12, verse 10 implies that it would not be forgiven at the apocalyptic judgment if anyone ignores the instruction of the holy spirit, and refuses to confess Jesus publicly in front of the religious authorities. Such a reading might offer a solution to the

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124 Casey (2009:143) believes this logion originally followed the Beelzebul accusation and therefore proposes a potentially different reason for Jesus’ embarrassment. However, it is very likely that, *in the Sayings Gospel Q*, this saying followed Q 12:9 and not the Beelzebul accusation.

125 It has been suggested that this contradiction might be an indication of changed circumstances in the lives of the Q people (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:212).
contradiction between verses 8-9 and verse 10. To deny Jesus is forgivable, unless it was instructed by the Holy Spirit, in which case it is unforgivable, like in verses 8-9. At any rate, the sapiential reassurance in verses 11-12 is motivated and supported by the apocalyptic warning in verse 10. In the end, apocalyptic eschatology is utilized in the service of the wisdom of Q 12:2-12, most notably to argue the case of the admonition in verse 3, which must be obeyed without fear (see Piper 1989:59-61).

3.2.10 The speed of lightning

Q 17:23 is a dual prohibition not to follow, or go looking for, false prophets, whether they be in the wilderness or indoors (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:159). That verse 23 should be seen as a wisdom text is indicated by two linguistic features. The first indication is the utilization of small forms to introduce two parallel prohibitions, both of which consist of the same construction: negative particle plus subjunctive (μὴ ἀπέλθητε μηδὲ διώξητε in Luke; and μὴ ἔξελθητε […] μὴ πιστεύσητε in Matthew). The second indication is the parallelism of verse 23. Luke’s version has two parallel conditional clauses (καὶ ἔροῦσιν ύμῖν ἰδοὺ ἐκεῖ, [ἡ] ἰδοὺ ὃδε), followed by two parallel prohibitions (μὴ ἀπέλθητε μηδὲ διώξητε). In Matthew’s version, a conditional clause and prohibition (ἐὰν οὖν εἰπωσιν ύμῖν ἰδοὺ ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ ἔστιν, μὴ ἔξελθητε) is followed by a parallel leg of conditional clause plus prohibition (ἰδοὺ ἐν τοῖς ταξείοις, μὴ πιστεύσητε).

The prohibitions not to follow false prophets are motivated and justified by the motive clause in verse 24, as is obvious from the use of the conjunction γάρ (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:163; see Kirk 1998:256-258). Verse 24 is an apocalyptic small form, sometimes called the “eschatological correlative,” or the “prophetic correlative,” and describes the arrival of the Son of Man at the apocalyptic event (cf. Edwards 1976:41, 142; Kloppenborg 1987a:160; Kirk 1998:260). Yet, the use of a natural phenomenon (lightning) in a comparison clause also indicates the sapiential nature of verse 24 (cf. Edwards 1976:142). Moreover, if Matthew’s version is followed, parallelism can also be noted as a feature of the saying in verse 24, with ἡ ἀστρατῆ ἔζηρχεται ἀπὸ ἄνατολῶν being parallel to φαίνεται ἔως δυσμῶν. All these indicators point to the fact that verse
24 constitutes a sapiential argument that makes use of an apocalyptic theme and small form to prove its case. The appearance of the Son of Man is likened to the vividness, suddenness, unexpectedness, finality, and devastating power of lightning and thunder (see esp. Kloppenborg 1987a:163-164; cf. Sim 1985:233; Catchpole 1993:254, 274; Kirk 1998:256; cf. also Casey 2009:215, 227). Be that as it may, the use of γὰρ at the beginning of verse 24 is enough indication that the apocalyptic saying is both a statement in support of the sapiential prohibition in verse 23, and an integral part of its structure.

The Son-of-Man reference is here an obvious allusion to Daniel 7:13 (see esp. Casey 2009:212-228; see also Piper 1989:139-142; Catchpole 1993:78, 246, 250-255; Kirk 1998:257-268; cf. also Bock 2011:91). No other interpretation would make sense of the apocalyptic imagery and language in this logion. The text is completely silent about whether or not Jesus is to be associated with this Son of Man. Whether or not the audience of this logion made such an identification depends not on the text itself, but on whether or not Jesus was already associated with Daniel’s Son of Man prior to them hearing this logion. The obvious allusion to Daniel 7:13 has caused many interpreters to doubt the authenticity of this saying (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:160 n. 257). However, it was argued in section 3.1.3 above that an allusion to Daniel’s vision is not necessarily an indication of inauthenticity. Even if this saying were secondary, the authors of Q probably introduced it, and inserted the term “Son of Man,” because they were influenced to do so by the historical Jesus himself (cf. Q 12:8). In other words, their potential fabrication of this saying does not take away from the likelihood that the historical Jesus had used the term “Son of Man” in reference to Daniel 7:13, and had indirectly associated himself with this figure. Hence, the people responsible for Q operated in complete continuity with the message and person of the historical Jesus when, and if, they created this saying. The term “Son of Man” highlights and polishes the apocalyptic imagery of Q 17:24, thereby doing its part in substantiating the wisdom of verse 23 with apocalyptic eschatology.
The apocalyptic themes of finality, vividness, unexpectedness, suddenness and devastation are taken up and elaborated by verses 26-27, 30, 34-35 and 37, which paint vivid pictures of just how unexpected, sudden, devastating, visible and final the apocalyptic event will be (cf. Edwards 1976:142; Catchpole 1993:254, 274; see Kloppenborg 1987a:162-166; Kirk 1998:259-262; cf. also Allison 2010:35; see also Casey 2009:217-218, 226-228). Verse 26 expresses its apocalyptic theme by means of the same micro-genre as verse 24, namely the “eschatological” or “prophetic correlative” (cf. Edwards 1976:41, 142; Kloppenborg 1987a:160, 164; Kirk 1998:260). Moreover, in these passages, like in verse 24, the Son-of-Man figure acts, in line with Daniel 7:13, as an emissary of the apocalypse (cf. Bock 2011:91; see also Piper 1989:139-142; Catchpole 1993:78, 246, 250-255; see further Casey 2009:212-228). As in verse 24, this figure may or may not be identified with Jesus. For these reasons, these subsequent passages should all be read in conjunction with verse 24, and they all form part of the supportive argument in favour of the sapiential prohibition in verse 23 (see Kirk 1998:259-262). Just like the “sign-of-Jonah” passage, Q’s wisdom is here substantiated by an appeal to authoritative figures from Scripture, traditionally associated, in one way or another, with the apocalyptic event (cf. Catchpole 1993:255). The rhetorical argument of the entire passage is that the apocalyptic Son of Man will appear so suddenly and unexpectedly from heaven that there is no need to go looking for him on earth (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:161; cf. also Casey 2009:215). Put differently, you will not be able to find the Son of Man before he finds you. As in verse 24, the possible inauthenticity of the two Son-of-Man expressions, or the relevant logia for that matter, does not contradict the likelihood that the historical Jesus used this term in reference to Daniel 7:13. As a whole, Q 17:23-37 is a wisdom text that makes use of apocalyptic themes in its sapiential arguments to support the initial prohibition (cf. Kirk 1998:267).

\[1^{26}\text{ As was the case with verse 24, the authenticity of these sayings is doubted by many (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:160 n. 257).}\]
3.2.11 Three parables: Be ready, judgment awaits!

The apocalyptic sayings in Q 12:40; Q 13:24-30, 34-35 and Q 22:28, 30 will be treated together. In all three cases, the statements about the apocalypse follow after one of Jesus’ parables. Parables were used by Jesus to teach and instruct people, indicating that these parables should naturally be classified under the wisdom of Jesus (cf. Edwards 1976:74; see Kirk 1998:234, 246-248). It is extremely likely that these parables originally circulated independently, with their apocalyptic explanations only added later (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:149, 165, 225). This does not automatically mean that the apocalyptic sayings are inauthentic or secondary (cf. Koester 1994:540-541). They probably also circulated independently, and were only added to the parables later on (cf. Casey 2009:219). Moreover, it is just as likely that the relevant parables originally had quite different applications than the apocalyptic ones subsequently added. Despite all this, the redactional activities of the Q compilers remain illuminating for our current theme, particularly since we are mainly interested in how the Q people remembered and described Jesus (see section 1.4 above).

Q 12:40 (artificially) applies the parable in verse 39 to the unexpectedness and “unknowability” of the apocalyptic event (cf. Catchpole 1993:57; Kloppenborg 1987a:149; see Kirk 1998:232-233). The parable is followed by the sapiential admonition to be ready for the apocalyptic event (cf. Edwards 1976:126). This admonition is then supported by a motive clause, initiated by the conjunction ὅτι, foretelling that the Son of Man will come unexpectedly. At this juncture, the term “Son of Man” is an obvious allusion to Daniel 7:13 (cf. esp. Casey 2009:219; cf. also Edwards 1976:126; see Kirk 1998:232-233). As in Q 17:24, this figure may or may not be identified with Jesus, depending on whether or not such an identification had already preceded the delivery of the logion itself. Regarding the use of this term, the same comments as those made about Q 17:24, 26, 30, earlier on, also apply in the current context. The admonition is further supported by the parable in verse 39. In other words, the sapiential instruction to be watchful is supported by the eschatological Son-of-Man
saying that follows (cf. Piper 1989:77). This whole logion is then supported by the preceding parable.

The artificial application of apocalypticism to the parables of Jesus is nowhere more apparent than in Q 13:24-29. The application actually contradicts the sapiential admonition with which the parable began. Whereas verse 24 claims that many (πολλοί) will attempt to enter through the narrow door, but that few (ὀλίγοι in Luke) will succeed, verse 29 claims that many (πολλοί in Matthew) will participate at the apocalyptic feast (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:235; see Kirk 1998:246-247). The admonition in verse 24a, to enter through the narrow door, is supported by the motive clause in verse 24b, as is clear from the use of the conjunction δὲ in the latter. It is possible, but not certain, that this motive clause alludes to apocalyptic eschatology. If so, we have yet another example of a piece of wisdom being motivated by apocalyptic eschatology. The parable in verses 24-27 is seen by the compilers of Q as a story about the eschatological reversal of fortunes (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:379; see Kloppenborg 1987a:235-236). Whatever the original (sapiential) intent of the parable, it has here been recast as a story of one’s eschatological fate (cf. Edwards 1976:132). In this literary context, the parable’s function is to support and legitimise the sapiential admonition in verse 24 (cf. Piper 1989:109, 114). This apocalyptic theme is then elaborated by the three apocalyptic logia in verses 28-30, 34-35 (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:227, 237). These logia are now put forward by the compilers of Q as the application of the parable in verses 25-27.

The crux of these apocalyptic logia is appropriately summarised by verse 30, which may or may not have been in Q (cf. Allison 2010:36). These subsequent logia are not concerned with a specific feature of the apocalyptic event, like its suddenness or unexpectedness, but rather with the reversal of fortunes that will accompany said event. The “many” of verse 29, who will come from East and West to share in God’s kingdom, should probably not be seen as Gentiles, but as Diaspora Jews who were faithful to the message of Jesus (see Allison 1997:176-191). Reserved for apocalyptic condemnation, on the other hand, is greater Israel, specifically those in charge of the Jerusalem cult (cf. Piper 1989:108; see Kirk 1998:313-315). Whether or not verses 34-35 harbour any hope
that Jerusalem will repent and confess Jesus, the text is about that city’s eschatological fate (cf. Allison 1997:192). A case could be made for viewing these two verses as a prophetic micro-genre. Although the lament over Jerusalem reminds one of sapiential small forms, and the image of the protective hen is a well-known wisdom theme, “the prophets” (τοὺς προφήτας) are overtly mentioned, and verse 35 simply looks a lot like a prophetic saying (cf. Edwards 1976:67). Whether this saying is prophetic or sapiential, the text is ultimately about eschatology (see Edwards 1976:132-133). In the end, all the logia in Q 13:28-30, 34-35 undoubtedly contain apocalyptic themes, but they are put forward as the application of the parable in verses 24-27 (cf. Sim 1985:204; see Kirk 1998:248-249, 251-252, 315). 127

Like the previous two apocalyptic sayings, Q 22:28, 30 also follows after one of Jesus’ parables, situated in Q 19:12-13, 15-24, 26 (cf. Allison 1997:35). The parable as a whole, including verse 26, accommodates a non-eschatological interpretation. It should primarily be seen as a sapiential parable that ends with a “gnomic moral” in verse 26 (cf. Kirk 1998:298). As a “purely” sapiential parable, it critiques the elite, and exposes the unfortunate status quo of village peasants for what it really is (cf. Oakman 2008:252). However, the literary context of the parable in Q suggests that it was recast by the framers of Q as a parable that develops apocalyptic eschatology (see Kloppenborg 1987a:164-165). Although the future tense of the passive verbs δοθήσεται and ἀρθήσεται in verse 26 make perfect sense in the context of the wisdom espoused by the parable itself, these future passive verbs eased the way for an apocalyptic application of the parable. Thus, the parable is reapplied as a teaching that describes one or more features of the apocalyptic event.

Q 22:28, 30 then explicates and elaborates upon this apocalyptic understanding of the parable application in verse 26. The Q people are exposed as those to whom “more will be given” (δοθήσεται) at the eschatological reward, seeing as they will sit on thrones and

127 If Catchpole (1993:257-262) and Allison (1997:19, 201-202) are correct and Q 13:34-35 did follow immediately after Q 11:14-52 in the Sayings Gospel, then it is part of the eschatological content of Lady Wisdom’s sapiential message (see above). The message remains sapiential in nature, even though it develops an eschatological theme.
act as judges. Conversely, greater Israel is exposed as those from whom “will be taken away” (ἀρθήσεται), seeing as they will be the object of eschatological judgment. In this new apocalyptic mould, it is possible that the kingdom of God is implied as the object of ἔχοντι in verse 26. If the latter is accepted, the apocalyptic reapplication of verse 26 states that although the Q people already had the kingdom, they will get the added privilege of judging greater Israel at the final judgment. As intended by the framers of Q, the addition of Q 22:28, 30 puts the apocalyptic intent of both the application in verse 26, and the parable as a whole, beyond doubt.

The logion in Q 22:28, 30 is obviously apocalyptic in nature (compare Qumran Scroll 1QpHab V:3-5; cf. Wink 2002:183; Casey 2009:238; cf. also Allison 2010:42; see section 2.6.1 above). Yet, there is a crucial difference between Matthew and Luke at this point. Luke says that “those who remained with Jesus” (οἱ διαμεμενήκότες μετ’ ἐμοῦ) will judge (or establish justice for) the rest of Israel at the final judgment. Matthew says that “those who followed Jesus” (οἱ ἀκολουθήσαντές μοι) will receive said privilege. Matthew’s version should probably be preferred. He places this saying in chapter 19 of his gospel, which is packed with motifs and sayings from Q. The concern placed in Peter’s mouth – that the disciples have left everything behind to follow Jesus, and that Jesus is now disserting them – mirrors in a very real way the concerns of the Q people, and one of the likely reasons why the document was written in the first place (see section 2.3 above). Jesus responds to Peter in Matthew as he probably also responded in Q. The privileged position afforded his followers at the apocalyptic judgment by far outweighs the abandonment and neglect they may experience in the present. Conversely, Luke places the saying in the heart of the last supper as a reassurance that those who remained with him during all his trials will judge (or establish justice for) Israel at the apocalyptic event. In particular, the reference to “remaining” with Jesus anticipates his abandonment during the Passion events (cf. esp. Luke 22:54-62). Luke has obviously adapted this Q saying to fit into his narration of the last supper, and his overall Passion story.

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128 For the possibility that κρίνοντες should here be translated as something akin to “establish justice for,” cf. Horsley (1991:196) and Van Aarde (2011c:1 n. 3).
Regardless of whether Luke or Matthew is preferred at this point, the inner circle of Jesus’ followers is specifically in view. This inner circle could imply the close disciples of Jesus during his earthly ministry, the leaders of the Q people, or both. Luke’s phrase “those who remained with Jesus” (οί δισμεμεληκότες μετ’ ἐμοί) obviously implies those who showed unwavering support for Jesus. Matthew’s “those who followed Jesus” (οί ἄκολουθοι μοί) is even more direct. It is well-known that “following” Jesus was a metaphor for discipleship (see Kingsbury 1978). The specific references to the “twelve” (δώδεκα) thrones – if Matthew is followed – and the “twelve” (δώδεκα) tribes, probably also allude to the twelve disciples of Jesus (cf. Allison 2012:42). Discipleship should indeed be seen as a sapiential theme in Q. Those who “followed Jesus” were those who lived in accordance with his sapiential teachings. If, then, Q 22:28, 30 alleges that “those who followed Jesus” (οί ἄκολουθοι μοί) were going to partake in judging the remainder of Israel, it is actually encouraging the Q people to remain compliant and committed to the sapiential teachings of Jesus in view of the apocalyptic reward. Kirk (1998:294-298) proposes a macro-structure of the so-called “eschatological discourse” (Q 12:2-Q 22:30), and views the current logion about judging Israel as an inversion of Q 12:2-12. If accepted, this proposal provides added support to our current proposition. Q 12:2-12 clearly has the “followers of Jesus” in mind, and instructs them to proclaim the sapiential message of Jesus without fear. If Q 22:28, 30 is indeed an inversion of Q 12:2-12, then it is clear that the former logion also has in mind the followers of Jesus, meaning those who remain faithful to his sapiential message. On the surface, Q 22:28, 30 might seem like a straightforward apocalyptic saying, but beneath the surface it is a piece of encouragement in the service of Jesus’ sapiential message.

In all of these last three cases, the rhetorical functions of the parables were to act as support for the apocalyptic logia that followed. This goes against the pattern we have been able to deduce from the other apocalyptic sayings. In those cases, apocalyptic eschatology was put forward to motivate and justify certain sapiential sayings. The only exception was Q 11:19b, where a characteristic of the apocalyptic judgment naturally followed as a consequence of Jesus’ wisdom. The current logia should be interpreted in a similar light. The framers of Q attempted to interpret Jesus’ parables in order to deduce
from them aspects about the nature of the apocalyptic event. More than any other sapiential form, the parables of Jesus naturally lent themselves thereto, not least of all because of their open endings. The framers’ intention was simply to attach Jesus’ sayings about the apocalyptic end to his sapiential parables. They undoubtedly believed that this attachment would add additional support to individual apocalyptic sayings that circulated independently. The most likely reason for such compositional activity is that the redactors believed that they were acting in continuity and harmony with the manner in which Jesus himself taught. In other words, although these parable applications are very likely secondary (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:149), the practice of deducing from sapiential rhetoric important information about the nature of the apocalypse is probably authentic.

It is rather telling that these logia were added to existing wisdom traditions, probably for added legitimacy.

3.2.12 Two more parables: Be ready, the court awaits!

The remaining two logia, Q 12:46 and Q 12:59, will also be treated together. Like the foregoing logia, these two sayings also acted as the applications of two respective parables. The difference between these two sayings and the previous three, however, is that the former were probably not loose-standing traditions that were subsequently added to the parables (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:150, 153). Rather, they were most likely originally part and parcel of the parables themselves. These parables might not initially have been apocalyptic at all, but they were nevertheless interpreted as such by the Q people later on. Thus, in the two cases we are dealing with now, each sapiential parable as a whole has been applied and interpreted as an apocalyptic teaching. Taken on their own, these two parables should be seen as wisdom texts (cf. Kirk 1998:234, 240).

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129 As parable applications, not necessarily as traditions in their own right (cf. Koester 1994:540-541).
130 The same could be said of Q 19:26, which was originally part of the parable in Q 19:12-26 itself, but subsequently cast in an eschatological mould. As such, this parable could have been discussed together with Q 12:46 and Q 12:59. For the sake of convenience and to guard against unnecessary reiteration, this parable application will not be discussed again presently. Suffice it to bear in mind that it actually also belongs in the current category of parables.
Besides the fact that it represents a *parable*, Q 12:42-46 betrays its sapiential prehistory most noticeably by addressing the traditional wisdom theme of the “faithful and wise servant or house-manager” (ὁ πιστὸς οἰκονόμος / δοῦλος [καὶ ὁ] φρόνιμος). The mere usage of the words “wise” (φρόνιμος) and “faithful” (πιστὸς), both in isolation and in combination, is enough justification for seeing this passage as a wisdom text (cf. Edwards 1976:66). Moreover, the parable is deployed in accordance with didactic convention (cf. Edwards 1976:66). Like Q 12:40, the application of the parable in Q 12:42-46 has to do with the unexpectedness of the apocalyptic event (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:150; Catchpole 1993:57). The proximity of Q 12:42-46 to Q 12:40 strongly implies that, by the time Q was framed, its compilers had already started viewing this parable as an apocalyptic teaching. Similar vocabulary between verses 46 and 39-40 leads to the same conclusion.  

In its current form and position, the parable in verses 42-46 encourages the Q people to remain faithful, in view of the apocalyptic event, which will occur unexpectedly (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:150; cf. also Allison 2010:35).

On a surface level, Q 12:58-59 has nothing to do with apocalyptic eschatology. Rather, it is a wisdom admonition that covers the typical and commonsensical sapiential theme of avoiding judicial procedures (compare Prov 6:1-5; 25:7-10; Sirach 8:14; Qumran Scroll 4Q416 2, II:4-6; *idem.* 4Q417 1, II:6-8; *idem.* 4Q418 8:3-5; cf. Edwards 1976:129; Kloppenborg 1987a:152-153; see Kirk 1998:238-239; Piper 1989:105-107). The judge is not God or the Son of Man. The judge has either a human assistant (ὑπηρέτης) or a human officer of the court (πράκτωρ) directly under him, depending on whether you follow Matthew or Luke, but definitely not the celestial being you would expect in an apocalyptic saying. The punishment is prison (φυλακή), not eternal damnation. The moral of the parable is to pay any debts, and repair any broken relationships with your opponents, before you end up in jail, where you will not leave before your obligation has been met (cf. Prov 6:1-5; Piper 1989:106).

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131 Compare γινώσκετε, ὃρα, ἂν, ὃρα, δοκεῖτε and in verses 39-40 with ἂν, ὃρα, ἂν, γινώσκει and προσδοκᾷ in verse 46.
The placement of this parable in the overall structure of Q suggests, however, that it was indeed interpreted apocalyptically by the framers of Q (cf. Kirk 1998:238-239). Also, the formula λέγω ... οὐ μὴ ... ἔως, in verse 59, is much more typical of prophetic and apocalyptic-judgment sayings than of wisdom sayings (cf. Edwards 1976:129; Kloppenborg 1987a:153). It would appear as if verse 59, which could not formerly have been an independent saying, was attached to the original wisdom saying in verse 58 in order to bring out the apocalyptic application (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:153; Piper 1989:106). If Q 12:59 is applied to apocalyptic judgment, it makes a point quite separate from verses 40 and 46. The emphasis is no longer on the unexpectedness of the apocalyptic event, but on its finality and irrevocability.132

In both of these cases, the framers of Q searched the wisdom of Jesus, conveyed via his parables, to speculate about the nature of the apocalyptic event. The most likely explanation for this modus operandi is that the Q compilers wanted to act in continuity with the historical Jesus, whom they remembered as a wisdom teacher, who based his claims about the end of the world on his wisdom. The last four apocalyptic sayings that were discussed all indicate that Jesus based his claims about the nature of the apocalypse on his wisdom. Thus, whereas apocalyptic sayings in Q were primarily used as motive and causal clauses in the service of sapiential arguments, wisdom sayings (especially parables) were sometimes used and reapplied as the ground and foundation for speculating about the specific nature of the apocalyptic event. In both cases, the wisdom of Jesus was superior in function to his apocalyptic predictions. On the one hand, apocalyptic claims were based on wisdom. On the other hand, apocalyptic claims were used to lend additional support to individual wisdom sayings. What Allison (1997:28) says about Q 12:33-Q 22:30 seems applicable to the document as a whole: “[Q] remains transparently practical wisdom with a strong eschatological component.”

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132 Kirk (1998:239) follows Kloppenborg (1987a:154) in reading apocalyptic imminence into the phrase “on the way” (ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ). The purpose of this phrase is rather to prepare the narrative setting of the parable. Deducing imminence from this phrase is a perfect example of how imminent eschatology is oftentimes read into the Q text rather than taken from it.
3.3 ~ FINDINGS

3.3.1 Apocalyptic-judgment sayings

In our discussion of Kloppenborg’s stratification, it was mentioned that there are apocalyptic themes present in both the formative stratum and the main redaction of Q. This statement has currently been corroborated by individual traditions within Q. The apocalyptic-judgment sayings cut across Kloppenborg’s two main strata. There are apocalyptic-judgment sayings in both Q¹ (Q 6:21-23; Q 12:2-7) and Q² (Q 10:12-15; Q 11:19, 29-32, 49-51; Q 12:8-10, 40, 42-46, 58-59; Q 13:28-29; Q 17:24, 26-27, 30, 34-35; Q 22:28, 30). The findings of chapter two are therefore corroborated by chapter three. More precisely, the stratification of Q does not directly translate into a non-apocalyptic silhouette of Jesus. Moreover, an exegetical examination of the apocalyptic-judgment sayings indicated that Jesus was chiefly remembered and described by Q as a wisdom teacher. The apocalyptic images and language function in Q to support the sapiential message of Jesus (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:376). This verifies the proposals by Crossan and Kloppenborg that Q held and promoted a “secondary apocalyptic eschatology,” or a “symbolic eschatology,” depending on whose phrase is to be preferred (see section 1.3.7 above). Additionally, it confirms that the historical Jesus, from Q’s point of view at least, taught something similar to Bultmann’s “eschatological ethics” (see section 1.2.3 above).

On a rhetorical level, Jesus made use of apocalypticism to strengthen and motivate his sapiential message. Wisdom also functioned as the basis from whence Jesus made important deductions about the nature of the apocalyptic end. Thus, we can certainly affirm the hypothesis proposed in chapter one: *The Q people remembered and described Jesus as a sage who made use of apocalyptic eschatology to motivate and support his moral message*. Yet, this hypothesis, although not wrong, lacks a certain aspect that was uncovered during the course of our investigation in this chapter. We have seen that apocalypticism was not only (and flatly) used to substantiate particular pieces of wisdom, but was also an integral part of the content of these sapiential traditions. The apocalyptic
traditions were not merely footnotes to the moral message and sapiential intent of Jesus. Rather, apocalyptic images and metaphors were very much integral and central to the wisdom of Jesus, so much so that they are impossible to extract from his wisdom.

In light of this, the hypothesis suggested in chapter one deserves the following qualification: *Apocalyptic eschatology also formed an integral part of the sapiential message of Q’s Jesus.* This qualification could easily lead one to conclude that Crossan’s “secondary apocalyptic eschatology” and Kloppenborg’s “symbolic eschatology” were off target, but such an appraisal would be wrong. Whenever apocalypticism forms an integral part of the content of Jesus’ wisdom, its *intent* is to warn and slate religious leaders and greater Israel that they will get their punishment in the end. Not once in Q is apocalyptic eschatology used as a basis from whence to introduce, formulate or compose any specific moral directive or piece of wisdom – not even in those cases where apocalyptic eschatology forms an inextricable part of the content of Jesus’ wisdom (cf. Allison 2010:97). The wisdom and ethics in Q are not based on apocalypticism. Instead, either apocalypticism is used in the service of existing wisdom, or aspects of the nature of the apocalypse are deduced from existing wisdom (cf. Allison 2010:97). Whenever apocalyptic themes form part of the wisdom of Q, they should be understood in terms of the latter. That religious leaders and greater Israel will one day be judged is a natural inference to draw from Q’s wisdom.

### 3.3.2 Son-of-Man sayings

Given the almost complete absence (outside the New Testament) of the definite forms אואן בר (Aramaic), בן דוד (Hebrew) and ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (Greek) in Palestine, during and before the first century, the time has perhaps come to stop grasping at non-existent Aramaic straws in trying to determine the meaning behind ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Instead, should we not be looking at how the Greek term ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου is utilised in the New Testament and other documents like Q, and take that as our best indicator of what the underlying Aramaic term אואן בר actually meant? Leivestad had already suggested such a *modus operandi* in 1968 (cf. Müller 2008:358). A growing number of
scholars recently favour such a direction of enquiry (see esp. Müller 2008:375-419, esp. 375, 418-419; cf. also Casey 2009:176; see e.g. Schenk 1997). If we follow this path, we are sure to arrive at the same destination as Hare (1990:246): “Whatever its spelling and pronunciation, the Aramaic underlying ho huios tou anthropou was understood as referring exclusively to Jesus” (see also Smith 1991). The point is that even in the canonical gospels, the expression “Son of Man” is consistently translated as an exclusive self-reference of and by Jesus. Bock (2011:90), for example, states: “The designation Son of Man appears 82 times in the Gospels and is a self-designation of Jesus in all but one case, where it reports a claim of Jesus (Jn 12.34)” (see also Hill 1983:35-51; Müller 1984; Schwartz 1986; Hare 1990; Smith 1991; Hurtado 2011).

Our investigation of Q has found that the term was not only used by Jesus as an exclusive self-reference, but also as a non-titular self-reference. We have found six Q sayings (Q 6:22; Q 7:34; Q 9:58; Q 11:30; Q 12:8; Q 12:10) where Q’s Jesus uses the expression “Son of Man” as a non-titular self-reference (compare Robinson 2007:97-117). This result goes against the assumption by a number of scholars that “in Q […] Son of Man has come to be used as a christological title” (Kloppenborg 1987a:192), or that “Q uses Son of Man as a title of dignity, not to refer to Jesus’ humble guise” (Kloppenborg 1987a:213; cf. also Kirk 1998:341, 380; Edwards 1976:40, 41, 114; Piper 1989:126). Also in this instance, a number of recent studies on the use of the term “Son of Man” in the gospels have produced results similar to ours. Synchronic analyses of the individual canonical gospels reveal a likely diachronic development of the expression “Son of Man” from an exclusive, non-titular and “more or less colourless,” self-reference to a title for Jesus (cf. Müller 2008:419). In other words, although the gospels, on numerous occasions, do use the expression “Son of Man” as a title for Jesus, it seems that its pre-canonical roots are to be found in its use as a non-titular self-expression. Thus, both in terms of it being an exclusive self-reference, and in terms of it being a non-titular self-reference, our current findings are independently corroborated by recent studies on the use of the expression “Son of Man” in the canonical gospels.
There are four additional reasons for preferring the result that the term “Son of Man” was used by Jesus as an exclusive, non-titular self-reference (cf. Hurtado 2011:167, 174): (1) It would explain why Jesus used the term in such a wide variety of seemingly incompatible contexts. (2) It would explain why Matthew and Luke, on certain occasions, felt uninhibited enough to substitute the term “Son of Man” in their sources with “I.” (3) Not only in Greek, but also in Hebrew, and in Aramaic, the definite form of the expression “the son of the man” had a particularising force, meaning that it referred to someone or something in particular. (4) It would explain why the term occurs almost exclusively in the mouth of Jesus. Thus, the proposal by Vermes that the Aramaic expression “Son of Man” was a circumlocution for “I” seems to be corroborated not only by recent synchronic studies of the individual canonical gospels, but also by our present investigation of Q. Vermes was legitimately criticised by a number of scholars, mainly because the examples he put forward of the term’s circumlocutional use were actually examples of its generic and/or indefinite use(s) (cf. Burkett 1999:86-87). Despite this line of criticism, Vermes’ proposal should still be accepted, simply because it provides the best explanation for the translation, utilisation and development of the Greek term ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου in the New Testament. The singular-definite form may still have connoted humility, danger, lowliness, humanity (in contrast to animals), death or something else, but given the almost complete lack of this form in the appropriate sources, we simply can not be sure. For similar reasons as those just noted, Hurtado (2011:159-177) comes to the following conclusion:

I submit that the diversity of sentences/sayings in which ‘the son of man’ is used in the Gospels leads to the conclusion that in these texts the expression’s primary linguistic function is to refer, not to characterize. The expression refers to Jesus […], but does not in itself primarily make a claim about him, or generate any controversy, or associate him with prior/contextual religious expectations or beliefs. ‘The son of man’ can be used in sayings that stake various claims about Jesus […], but it is the sentence/saying that conveys the intended claim or statement, not the ‘son of man’ expression itself. […] Instead, we are to attribute to the referent, Jesus, the import of these sentences.
These comments are true in those cases where the term is an obvious reference to Jesus (Q 6:22; Q 7:34; Q 9:58; Q 12:8; Q 12:10), but not in those cases where someone or something other than Jesus might be the referent. We have seen that some Q sayings (Q 12:8; Q 12:40; Q 17:24, 26, 30) undoubtedly refer to the apocalyptic agent of Daniel 7:13. Thus, Hurtado is still correct in claiming that the function of all Son-of-Man sayings is “to refer, not to characterise,” but in the case of the latter group of sayings, the primary referent has changed. The referent in this second group of sayings is primarily (and most obviously) the apocalyptic agent of Daniel 7:13. It is only after identifying Jesus with the Danielic emissary, and only if this identification is made, that these sayings become indirect allusions to Jesus.

Q 12:8 appears in both groups. It was argued that this saying is likely to be authentic, and that it has two legitimate points of reference, namely the human Jesus and the apocalyptic figure in Daniel 7:13 (cf. Tuckett 2003:184). Most scholars today consider the other sayings in this group to be secondary. Yet, these remaining logia share an important feature with Q 12:8, which is that none of them make the association between Jesus and the Danielic figure obvious. In other words, in all of the apocalyptic Son-of-Man sayings, the association between Jesus and the Son of Man is not a given. Most Son-of-Man scholars believe that the framers of Q made deliberate midrashic use of Daniel 7:13 when they introduced these sayings into Q (cf. Burkett 1999:122-123; cf. e.g. Perrin 1974:33; Mack 1988:71 n. 14; Wink 2002:162; see e.g. Vermes 1973:160-191; Van Aarde 2004b). However, it would seem that, when they did so, they deliberately tried to stay true to the oblique nature of Q 12:8. Hence, those responsible for Q went to great lengths to stay true to the way in which the historical Jesus made use of the term “Son of Man.”

We are now in a position to draw some results from our synchronic study of Q about the diachronic development of the term “Son of Man.” Given the almost complete absence of the forms ענני (Aramaic), נַכְרָה (Hebrew), and ᪱ρ ᦔ (Greek) in Palestine, during and before the first century, it is highly likely that the historical Jesus coined this singular-indefinite form of the term, and applied it as an exclusive reference
to himself. As an uncommon form, this was in all likelihood a highly memorable feature of Jesus’ idiolect: “This would be an example of what competent users of languages often do, adapting idiomatic expressions, either in form or connotation, to serve some new and particular semantic purpose” (Hurtado 2011:175). Jesus went beyond this innovation, though. He also used the novel term on at least one occasion (Q 12:8) as an ambiguous reference to both himself and the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13 (cf. Allison 2010:39). This usage invited (but did not oblige) the conclusion that Jesus was the apocalyptic figure of Daniel 7:13. The framers of Q came to this very conclusion, but tried to stay true to the historical Jesus by both obscuring and inviting this association. Thus, at least six Son-of-Man sayings in Q are authentic (Q 6:22; Q 7:34; Q 9:58; Q 11:30; Q 12:8; Q 12:10). These sayings all refer exclusively to the earthly Jesus. Two of them occur in literary contexts that are completely non-apocalyptic (Q 7:34; Q 9:58), while the remaining four occur in literary contexts that develop apocalyptic themes (Q 6:22; Q 11:30; Q 12:8; Q 12:10). One authentic saying (Q 12:8) implies that Jesus is to be identified with the apocalyptic Son of Man from Daniel 7:13. Two authentic sayings appear in Kloppenborg’s Q¹ (Q 6:22; Q 9:58), while the remaining four appear in Q² (Q 7:34; Q 11:30; Q 12:8; Q 12:10). That leaves another four inauthentic logia that are, nonetheless, in keeping with the essence of Jesus’ apocalyptic-sapiential message, as well as his original usage of the term “Son of Man” (Q 12:40; Q 17:24, 26, 30). Once again, this division between authentic and inauthentic Son-of-Man logia cuts across, not only Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q, but also the synthetic division between apocalyptic and sapiential Son-of-Man logia.

Ultimately, our main aim with the Son-of-Man logia in Q is not to determine authenticity, but to determine how Q remembered and described Jesus using the term “Son of Man.” A synchronic analysis of Q has illustrated that those responsible for the document remembered and described Jesus using the term primarily as a non-titular self-reference in the third person. This usage is remarkably similar to the way the term is used in the Gospel of Thomas (cf. Meyer 2003:21). However, Q also remembered and described Jesus using the term in contexts where the imagery of Daniel 7:13 is called to mind (cf. Allison 2010:39; contra e.g. Robinson 2007:97-117). The latter usage, when combined
with the memory of Jesus using the term in exclusive reference to himself, implied that Jesus should be identified with the apocalyptic figure from Daniel 7:13 (see Theissen & Merz 1998:552-553). According to Q’s memory and description of Jesus, he both intended and obscured this identification with his clever use of the expression “Son of Man.” Even if some of the apocalyptic Son-of-Man texts (Q 12:40; Q 17:24, 26, 30) were added later, which seems likely, these midrashic additions were in line with the intentions of Jesus as remembered by Q in that they both implied and obscured the identification between Jesus and the Danielic Son of Man (cf. Q 12:8). In each one of those cases that refer to the Son-of-Man figure in an apocalyptic sense, the reference, in some way or another, supported and substantiated the sapiential message of Jesus. The apocalyptic references to the Son of Man also formed an integral and vital part of each sapiential message itself. Hence, the Son-of-Man logia in Q not only corroborate the findings about the apocalyptic-judgment logia in Q, but also provide added support to the overall hypothesis of this study: *The Q people remembered and described Jesus as a sage who made use of apocalyptic eschatology to motivate and support his moral message. Apocalyptic eschatology also formed an integral part of the sapiential message of Q’s Jesus.*