CHAPTER 2: Q AS A DOCUMENT

2.1 ~ THE DOCUMENTARY STATUS OF Q

According to Kloppenborg [Verbin] (1987a:89-95; 2000a:66-72), the existence and nature of the double tradition can be best accounted for and explained by the positing of only one source, as opposed to two or more. In the first place, the content of Q represents a number of common themes, with a unique style and form, when compared to the rest of the New Testament (cf. Catchpole 1993:5, 59). Despite the varied application of formal characteristics and rhetorical method, Q undoubtedly displays a distinctive profile over and against Mark. Moreover, Q deliberately attempts to unify the material by relating disparate elements scattered across the double tradition. Secondly, the relative similarity in the sequence of Q, as it is found in Matthew and Luke respectively, is not only an argument for its written status, but also for its unity (cf. Catchpole 1993:5). Despite similarity in the overall sequence, there are further similarities in the sequences of independent sayings, even though they might be clustered together by one gospel and spread out in the other. Disagreements in sequential order, both on the macro- and micro-structural levels, can more often than not be explained on account of the redactional tendencies of the two evangelists.

According to Kloppenborg, these two observations – i.e. the similarity in content and relative sequence – compel the scholar to regard Q as a single document. Kloppenborg further applies Ockham’s razor – otherwise known as the principle of parsimony – to Q, as a controlling principle. In view of our current theme, Ockham’s razor requires that persuasive and undeniable evidence be given for positing two or more sources behind the double tradition. The lack of such evidence obliges the positing of one single document. Very few scholars today would deny the Semitic character of Q under the Greek surface.

30 Take, for example, the mention of the “Coming One” in Q 3:16, Q 7:18-23, Q 10:13-15 and Q 13:34-35; the motif of judgment throughout Q; the relationship between Jesus and the Baptist in Q 3:7-9,16-17, Q 6:27-42, Q 7:24-26,31-35 and Q 17:3-4; the relationship between Jesus and his followers in Q 6:39-40, Q 10:16 and Q 22:28-30.
However, despite the presence of Semitic features at the level of syntax, style and idiom (see Bussby 1954), the close-to-verbatim agreement between Matthew and Luke in some pericopae demands a Greek Q, especially if Q is to be considered a single document (see Kloppenborg 1987a:51-64; see also Tuckett 1996:83-92). There seems to be relative agreement today, especially among scholars of the Renewed Quest, that the Q used by the two writers of the double tradition was a Greek document (cf. Vaage 1994:8; see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:72-80). Several quotations derive unmistakably from the Septuagint, and Q 13:35 cites the Septuagint version of Psalm 117:26 word for word (cf. Allison 1997:47). Furthermore, the Septuagint version of Genesis 7:7 might be reflected in Q 17:27 (cf. Allison 1997:47).

These arguments are seen by most, Q scholars and critics alike, as the most important arguments for Q’s documentary status. They have presently been recounted in only a very summarised form both because these arguments have been hulled over extensively in other studies, and because the present author does not see them as all-important. There is another factor, mostly overlooked in disputes about the documentary status of Q, that is much more persuasive of the probability that Q was a document. When Q was “discovered,” it was seen as remarkable and very telling that it consisted almost exclusively of sayings, to the exclusion of other types of tradition. This smidgen of awe all but disintegrated as people got used to the idea of a Q source in subsequent years. To the present writer, it remains “awe-fully” telling that the double tradition agrees almost exclusively about the sayings of Jesus, and not much else. The morsels of narrative in Q all function to set the stage and paint the background for the sayings and speeches that then follow (cf. Q 3:7a; 6:20a; 7:1, 3, 6-8, 9a, 18, 24a; 9:57, 59; 11:14-15, 16; 17:20a). This amazing “coincidence” is most explicable if both evangelists made use of the same written source. If the double tradition was dependant on oral tradition, or a number of isolated written sources, one would expect there to be more than only sayings of Jesus. One would at least expect the double tradition to also contain various deeds of Jesus, as well as more narrative content.

31 The temptation narrative quotes Deut 6:16, Deut 8:3 and Ps 91:11.
Mainly two factors prevented some scholars from history to see Q as a single document. The first was the temptation story, which differs from the rest of Q in that it is a narrative with one or two sayings, not a saying or speech introduced by a short narrative. This oddity has in recent years been explained as a normal and expected feature of these types of literature, which are prone to being introduced by short narrative sections (see section 2.4.5 below). Thus, the presence of the temptation narrative is not an argument against the documentary status of Q, but entirely explicable as an expected feature of a writing that deals only with sayings. The second factor historically preventing certain individual scholars from seeing Q as a single document was the fact that there were no other documents of this sort available in antiquity. This changed when the Gospel of Thomas was discovered, providing comparative proof of a single document containing only the sayings of Jesus (cf. Boyd 1995:53). Some scholars had long believed that Q was a single document containing almost entirely the sayings of Jesus. That this hypothesis was subsequently supported by a physical document is no less telling or astounding than the fact that the double tradition is almost exclusively made up of Jesus’ sayings (see Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:82-84). Both elements point in the same direction, namely that Q was a single document. A great deal of imagination is required if one attempts to explain these two (astonishing) elements by means of oral tradition or a multiplicity of written sources.

To the astonishing feat of discovering an actual sayings document could be added the similarly astonishing reality that other examples of sayings-documents have also been “uncovered” in the early Church, including the parables and sayings collection behind Mark 4, the sayings tradition behind the Epistle of James, the logia collection mentioned by Papias (cf. Hist. Eccl. 3.39.16), the sayings of Jesus in the first six chapters of the Didache, and the sayings in the apocryphal agrapha (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:93; Meyer 2003:20). Whether or not “Sayings of the Wise” (ΛΟΓΟΙ ΣΟΦΩΝ) is an acceptable genre designation for Q (see section 2.4.1 below), it is certainly significant that pupils have been collecting the sapiential sayings of noteworthy sages in all ancient cultures, including Jewish, Persian, Egyptian and other Mediterranean
cultures (see Patterson 1998b:36-37). Examples of such collections are embedded in Jewish works such as Proverbs, the Wisdom of Solomon, and Sirach.

2.2 ~ THE STRATIFICATION OF Q

2.2.1 Introduction

Whether or not you agree with the practice of stratifying Q, and notwithstanding all the contributions made up to the present day, Q scholarship can be divided into the time before and the time after John S. Kloppenborg. Even some of his most notable opponents can not help but sing his praises and appreciate the quality of his work (cf. e.g. Sato 1995:140; Horsley 1995b:41; Tuckett 1996:69, 73; Allison 1997:3). To be sure, Kloppenborg built on the Q scholarship that predated him, but his 1987 monograph, *The Formation of Q*, changed the face of Q scholarship (cf. Kirk 1998:35; cf. also Tuckett 1996:69). The impact of his hypothesis was (and is) extensive and farreaching. For the first time since the “discovery” of Q, one theory on its composition and genre had gained wide acceptance, frequently forming the basis for other studies (cf. Tuckett 1996:69, 70; Horsley 1999:62; Freyne 2000:227; cf. e.g. Vaage 1994:7, 107; Cotter 1995b:117; Arnal 2001:5). Another impact of *The Formation of Q* was to divide Q scholarship more clearly into two groups, those for and those against the stratification of Q – each with its own arguments within the current debate.

Furthermore, Kloppenborg laid to rest *Kleiliteratur* conceptions of Q (cf. Kirk 1998:35). These conceptions had enabled past scholars to postulate an array of tradition history and redactional models without any attempt to control their own methodologies (cf. Kirk 1998:64). Such a lack of literary-critical controls made it possible for scholars to apply just about any analytical model to Q in support of their tradition- and redaction-histories (cf. Kirk 1998:65). Kloppenborg’s *Formation* also marked the end of the undervaluation of Q’s redactor (cf. Kirk 1998:35). The disappearance of *Kleiliteratur* conceptions enabled Kloppenborg to do away with the idea that Q was created *sui generis*, which, in turn, further enabled him to make large-scale comparisons with ancient literature (cf.
Kirk 1998:35-36, 64). Such comparative studies have, since then, become a programmatic hallmark of Q research. Former disregard for the structural features of Q, and the literary contexts of individual sayings, was nipped in the bud by Kloppenborg (cf. Kirk 1998:36, 64). Contemporary Q research grants primary importance to the literary, compositional and rhetoric features within the framework structure of Q (cf. Kloppenborg 1995:2).

### 2.2.2 Kloppenborg’s proposed stratification

Kloppenborg’s analysis of Q, building on the methodologies and work of James Robinson, Dieter Lührmann, Helmut Koester, Arland Jacobson, Dieter Zeller et al, was fourfold. First, based on literary considerations, he attempted to determine “the compositional principles which guide the juxtaposition of originally independent sayings and groups of sayings” (Kloppenborg 1987a:98). These results were then utilised further to determine “the order in which sayings were added to one another and the method by which the association was accomplished” (Kloppenborg 1987a:98). Thirdly, these results were then applied to determine the compositional or redactional activities in Q (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:99). The result of this investigation was the stratification of Q into Q¹, Q² and (to a lesser extent) Q³, each stratum differing from the other with regard to implied audience, characteristic forms and characteristic motifs (see Kloppenborg 1987a:166-170, 238-262). Finally, in an attempt to determine the genre of each Q stratum, Kloppenborg compared the different strata he identified with literary material from antiquity, arriving at the conclusion that Q¹ displayed most similarities to the Instructional genre, while Q² could appropriately be identified as a *chreia* collection (see Kloppenborg 1987a:263-328). Similarity between Q¹ and the Instructional genre is indicated by the naming of the sage, the abundance of imperatives (especially with regard to where these appear within the structure of each wisdom speech), the careful concern with which the sayings are organised and structured, and the projected *Sitz im Leben* of the Q people as a community of believers.
In the process, Kloppenborg (1987a:244-245) had also managed to make a case for identifying Q¹ as the formative stratum and Q² as the main redaction, although he was cautious not to draw conclusions concerning the chronological priority or tradition history of either stratum based on his stratification model (cf. Vaage 1995a:75; Crossan, in Miller 2001:119; see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:150-151; Freyne 2000:227-228; cf. also Tuckett 1996:68; see Allison 2010:120-125). His main reason for identifying Q² as redaction was its position within the Sayings Gospel (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:143). Firstly, Q² appears at the beginning and end of Q. Secondly, Q² seems to function as the organising principle in four, perhaps five, blocks of material. Finally, Q² interrupts the flow of Q¹ speeches (cf. Cotter 1995a:135). The characteristic motifs of Q² could therefore be seen as *redactional* themes, which included judgment, polemic against “this generation,” a Deuteronomistic concept of history, and – a motif added only later by Kloppenborg [Verbin] (2000a:118-121, 143) – allusions to the story of Lot (cf. Cromhout 2007:261). The remaining material seemed to be untouched or minimally influenced by such themes. Instead, these traditions displayed concerns that were internally similar, having to do mainly with legitimising “a somewhat adventurous social practice – including debt forgiveness, the eschewing of vengeance, and the embracing of an exposed marginal lifestyle” (Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:144). Mack (1993:108) extended this argument by also pointing out that Q² betrays a knowledge of Q¹, whereas Q¹ betrays absolutely no knowledge of Q². These observations pointed to a compositional direction from Q¹ to Q². Mack, however, went further than Kloppenborg in applying these findings to the Q people, and postulating a sequential tradition history of the Q group. Although two layers were distinguished, Kloppenborg [Verbin] (2000a:120-121, 128, 147-150) identified several interpolations, commentaries or glosses (which were added to Q¹) adhering more to the redactional than the formative stratum (cf. Q 6:23c; Q 10:12, 13-15; Q 12:8-10; Q 13:26-29, 34-35; Q 14:16-24; cf. Tuckett 1996:70, 72). The two strata were further distinguishable in terms of their rhetoric. Q¹ uses a hortatory rhetoric of persuasion, whereas Q² utilises a defensive, rhetorical strategy of prophetic pronouncement and declamation (cf. Kloppenborg 1995:12; Cromhout 2007:263). Lastly, the sub-collections identified as Q¹ appeared to follow a fairly set structure, being introduced by programmatic sayings, followed by second person
imperatives, and concluded by a saying emphasising the importance of the instruction (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:145).

In the end, Kloppenborg had managed to separate two layers within Q, based on considerations of its overall structure, implied audience, characteristic (literary) forms, characteristic motifs, rhetorical strategies, and structural concerns of individual pericopes (see McLean 1995:333-334). The same considerations enabled him to determine the genre of each stratum. Based on the positioning of the two layers within Q, Kloppenborg was also able to determine that Q² represents the main redaction of the Sayings Gospel. Mack (1993:131-132) fully agrees with Kloppenborg and sees a definite shift from Q¹’s aphoristic style (characterised by imperatives, exhortations, and indirect address) to a style more representative of dialogue, narratives, controversy stories, warnings, descriptive parables, apocalyptic pronouncements, warnings, and examples from Judean history (characterised by pronouncements, direct statements and direct address). All in all, Kloppenborg’s analysis began with the final form of Q, and worked its way “downwards” or “backwards” in order to determine its compositional layers (see McLean 1995:333-334). Observations of the final text’s continuity (in terms of theme, audience and form), as well as its discontinuity (in terms of redactional seams or disruptions of literary “flow”), formed the basis of Kloppenborg’s analysis. The strengths of such an analysis are that it frees the interpreter from unqualified assumptions about Q’s origins and genre, and that it takes serious the literary context of each individual saying within the structure and rhetoric of Q (cf. McLean 1995:334, 340).

Q³ mainly consists of the temptation narrative (Q 4:1-13), separated from Q¹ and Q² for nine reasons (see Kloppenborg 1987a:247-248; Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:152-153). Firstly, the narrative genre of the temptation story shows a stark contrast with the genres of the other two layers. Secondly, the form of the temptation story, having a three-part debate and mythic motif, is unparalleled in Q. Thirdly, the presence of explicit Biblical quotations introduced by a citation formula (γὲγραπται) is unique to the temptation story, with the only parallel in Q 7:27. Fourthly, the title “Son of God” appears nowhere else in Q (cf. Mack 1993:173). Fifthly, the theme of “miracle” is used differently with
regards to the rest of Q. Sixthly, the devil is here called ὁ διάβολος and not βαλζαβοῦλ, as in the rest of Q. Seventhly, Jesus is opposed directly to the devil, and not “this generation,” as in the rest of Q. In the eighth place, the temptation narrative’s positive view of Jerusalem and the Temple is severely opposed to Q’s otherwise negative valuations of Jerusalem (cf. Mack 1993:173). Lastly, the assumption that the Torah is an appropriate basis for rhetorical appeal is, according to Kloppenborg, unmatched by the rest of Q, apart from Q 11:42c and Q 16:17. Mainly because of the centrality of the Torah and nomistic piety evident in the latter two texts, both of them are seen as interpolations that, together with the temptation story, constitute Q³ (cf. Mack 1993:173; Cromhout 2007:264).

2.2.3 Kloppenborg’s supposed assumptions

In what follows, I will discuss the validity of Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy of Q by addressing each of the arguments against it, starting with the assumptions he is said to have held when stratifying Q. Some argue that Kloppenborg simply assumed that all of Q could be reconstructed. This line of attack seems more concerned with the absence of the crucifixion in Q than with the impact of such an assumption on his methodology for stratifying Q (see Ingolfsland 2003:219-224). In reality, the impact of the extent of Q on Kloppenborg’s stratification model is minimal, since the differences between the identified strata (i.e. form, audience and motif) would still prevail even if we couldn’t reconstruct all of Q.

Kloppenborg has also been said to assume that the individual sayings and small sayings-clusters in Q were originally independent (see Horsley 1999:62-63, 65). Kloppenborg does indeed hold such a view, not least of all because of the influence on him of previous Q scholarship and their preoccupation with form-criticism. Kloppenborg (1987a:98) stated in no uncertain terms that he presupposed, adopted and built upon the results of form-critical analyses that predated him, including the works of Lührmann, Zeller and

Jacobson. However, Kloppenborg does not simply and uncritically assume the genesis of Q. Rather, he is compelled by internal evidence to take up this perception of Q. Not only are many of the sayings in Q juxtaposed arbitrarily, but they are also joined via an array of quite varied methods – i.e. by using catchwords, by thematically joining sayings with common structures or formal elements, by syntactical devices, by rhetorical composition, or by including disparate sayings within the same communicative event (see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:124-128). No wonder a previous generation of scholarship saw them as haphazardly combined sayings with no apparent order whatsoever. Furthermore, Kloppenborg’s analysis of Q does not start with form-criticism, and neither does it end there. Instead, he works from the final form “downwards” to single clusters and (only then) to individual sayings. Form-criticism is not the only weapon in his arsenal. Kloppenborg applies redactional, compositional and rhetorical analyses to Q. In as much, he goes above and beyond previous form-critical analyses of Q. In the end, Kloppenborg’s “assumption” is warranted by the evidence and his method is not controlled, dictated, restrained or inhibited by this assumption.

Ingolfsland (2003:222-223) claims that Kloppenborg assumes the Bultmanian theory that Q should be regarded as “a transitional stage between the un-messianic preaching of Jesus and the fully self-conscious kerygma of the Hellenistic churches” (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:21; see Bultmann [1948-53] 1951-55:1.3). Ingolfsland (2003:223) then says that if Jesus’ preaching was messianic, Bultmann’s postulation of Q as a transitional document fails, and that, if this happens, the case for redaction within Q is weakened or eliminated. But Ingolfsland fails to show how the concept of Q as a transitional document has any impact on the assumption or case for or against redaction within Q. I would suggest that it doesn’t. Kloppenborg’s case for stratification is built on literary considerations, not assumptions on the nature and place of Q within tradition history. In fact, Kloppenborg [Verbin] (1987a:244-245; 2000a:150-151) warns against confusing his proposed stratification in any way with tradition history, or with the chronological prominence of any of these strata. According to Horsley (1999:63), Kloppenborg takes for granted that “there must have been different strata in Q.” Yet, without such assumptions, no study or analysis would be possible at all. A redaction-critical study of Mark also presupposes
that redaction took place. With Kloppenborg’s analysis, the proof is in the pudding. Regardless of what he assumes, proving his assumption(s) to be accurate is another story altogether. What makes Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy so compelling is not that he puts forward a comfortable hypothesis, but that he corroborates his hypothesis with in-depth analysis of the text. If his assumption that Q must have had different layers could not be corroborated by the Q text itself, then it would simply have been an assumption. However, Kloppenborg “proves” his assumption by employing a meticulously literary examination of the text, something his critics do not do (see esp. Piper 1995b:3-4; McLean 1995:333-334; cf. also Tuckett 1996:73, 345).

A host of scholars have accused Kloppenborg of assuming that wisdom and apocalyptic material are incompatible and that he uses this presupposition to separate Q¹ from Q² (cf. Allison 1997:4; see Tuckett 1996:327-328; Horsley 1999:25-26, 77; Ingolfsland 2003:224-226; see also Casey 2002:29-30). The objection is, in other words, that Kloppenborg treats Q as if apocalyptic and wisdom traditions are incompatible (cf. Kirk 1998:41). Hence, he feels the need to separate the two traditions by manufacturing two layers (cf. Allison 1997:4). Horsley (1999:19) claims that Kloppenborg stratified Q in order to separate prophetic material in Q from non-prophetic material. Kloppenborg [Verbin] (2000a:145-146 n. 61, 150-151 n. 71) denies that he sees wisdom literature as being incompatible with apocalyptic or prophetic material, and even mentions that there are ancient writings with the propensity to inextricably combine the two (cf. Arnal 2001:5). However, the objection is valid, since Kloppenborg did indeed use the presence of apocalyptic themes in individual Q¹ pericopae as evidence for redaction. Yet, he only does this after initially determining and identifying the two primary strata within Q. In other words, Kloppenborg does not simply presuppose two strata and then “prove” his theory by separating the two on the basis of redaction-criticism. Rather, he first identifies the two strata and then analyses the redactional activity within Q based on the results of the first investigation. In any case, if Kloppenborg was mainly concerned with the separation of sapiential and apocalyptic material, he would probably have done a better job of it. As it stands, Kloppenborg’s two strata both contain sapiential and apocalyptic (as well as prophetic) material, something he himself points out (cf. Kloppenborg
Kirk (1998:41) is correct in asserting that such criticism will not be entirely successful unless these scholars start engaging in the literary-analytical aspect of Kloppenborg’s hypothesis, which they do not.

### 2.2.4 Kloppenborg’s supposed methodological deficiencies

We now turn to arguments against Kloppenborg’s method. Some scholars question the plausibility and feasibility of stratification in the first place. Meier (1994:179) typically argues that by attempting to determine the location, possible redaction and theology of Q, “exegetes are trying to know the unknowable.” (But is this not the goal of science – to know the unknowable?) These objections usually start with noting that Q is the result of a hypothesis. As such, attempts to discern Q’s documentary status, written language, sequential order, theology, audience, or compositional history, are all built and dependant upon the Two Source Hypothesis in the first place (see Tuckett 1996:1-2; Horsley 1999:61-62). It is thus a case of building one hypothesis on top of another. However, these scholars are simply wrong about at least three of these endeavours. The very same arguments made to postulate the Two Source Hypothesis were also put forward with regard to Q’s documentary status, its language of composition, and its sequential order (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:111). In other words, these three aspects of Q were based not on the Two Source Hypothesis as such, but were rather determined by appealing directly to the patterns of agreement and disagreement between Matthew and Luke in the double tradition. What concerns us, however, is Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q, which was indeed based on an acceptance of the hypothesis that Q was the written document used as a source by both Matthew and Luke.

First off, if the hypothesis of Q is widely accepted, then attempting to discern its compositional history is warranted (see Arnal 2001:2-3). Should we think it legitimate and acceptable to posit the Q document as a solution to source-critical issues, but illegitimate and unacceptable to investigate the very same document for its compositional or socio-historical value? This is not how science works! Most contemporary biological, natural, astronomical and palaeontological sciences are based on the theory of evolution.
There is no need for these scientists to defend or justify the evolutionary theory or their assumption thereof, seeing as it is commonly accepted as the best theory available. The reason it is the best theory out there is because it is corroborated time and again by the data. Individual sciences, like genetics and zoology, for example, also corroborate each other consistently in substantiating the theory of evolution. Is the same not true of the two-source theory? This theory is accepted by an overwhelming majority of New-Testament scholars as the best theory available, because it is corroborated time and again by the data. As such, it is not only legitimate to survey the evidence in search of Q’s compositional history, but also necessary, and even compulsory, to do so – that is, if New-Testament science is indeed interested in gaining and generating knowledge, which is supposed to be the chief goal of any scientific undertaking, and does not have any hidden agendas, like authenticating biblical historicity or safeguarding faith, for instance. Critics of stratification, whether it be the theory posited by Kloppenborg or not, tend not to engage these theories at all, but rather tend to dismiss them from the outset (cf. Arnal 2001:4). A closer look reveals the (veiled) reasons behind such condemnations. Largely, these reasons have nothing to do with research methodology or scientific approach. Instead, they seem to be motivated by an unwillingness and/or inability to abandon former conclusions contested by Q (cf. Arnal 2001:4, 7). Thus, the prime unease with Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q is that it could be used in reconstructions of the historical Jesus or Christian origins that call former conclusions about the historical Jesus and the genesis of Christianity into question – not to even mention the historical reliability of the Bible and the canonical portraits of Jesus.

Casey (2002; 2010:78-86), among many others, prefers a “chaotic Q,” by which he means that Q was not a single Greek document, but rather consisted of a number of loose traditions that circulated on their own. Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q is only possible or legitimate if it is accepted that Q was a single document. In other words, this objection by Casey is similar to (but not the same as) the previous objection, since it questions one of the theories on which Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q was built. Casey (2002; 2010:81-83) agrees that there are passages with strong verbal agreement and that these passages must have reached Matthew and Luke in Greek, but he argues that the passages
with little verbal agreement represent separate translations from Aramaic. If this could be shown conclusively, then a more chaotic understanding of Q would surely be preferable. Indeed, in his 2002 monograph, Casey devotes most of his space to reconstructing Aramaic sources for the double tradition with little verbal overlap. His knowledge of the Aramaic language is impressive, and his reconstructions elucidate much of the interpretation of these individual passages in their original social contexts.

However, Casey (2002:189; 2010:82) concludes his painstaking efforts by putting forward only one passage that might have reached both Matthew and Luke in Aramaic, namely the woes against the Pharisees and scribes. He admits that all the other passages considered by him reached Matthew and Luke in Greek, but that they all originally had Aramaic substrata. One would think that an argument mostly based on demonstrating that parts of Q were Aramaic when they reached Matthew and Luke would have had more evidence to substantiate this claim. One would also imagine such an argument to put forward the best pieces of evidence. If, then, the best and only piece of evidence for the claim that some of Q reached Matthew and Luke in Aramaic is the singular passage in Q 11:11-51, the suggestion of a chaotic understanding of Q rests on a frail foundation indeed. Moreover, the verbal disagreements between the two gospel versions of the woes against the Pharisees and scribes can plausibly be explained as representing the editorial activities of the two evangelists. Thus, Casey’s main argument against Kloppenborg, and for a chaotic Q, rests on a singular passage that can also be explicated in other ways. The cumulative weight of the arguments for a single Greek Q by far outweighs Casey’s most important argument for a chaotic Q. In any case, it is not sure that both evangelists could speak Aramaic, let alone translate an Aramaic source into Greek. What we do know with absolute certainty is that much of Q reached the two evangelists in Greek. This can not be denied. For this reason, it is highly likely that the passages with little verbal agreement were in Greek when Matthew and Luke got hold of them. Since both gospel authors were undoubtedly fluent in Greek, and since it is undeniable that at least some of Q was transmitted in Greek, the burden of proof falls on opposite arguments, including the argument that the two evangelists received some Q material in Aramaic. One passage is not enough proof of this, especially if it is possible to explain that passage differently.
If evidence of Aramaic portions of Q is dismissed, then evidence of a chaotic Q vanishes with it.

Casey (2002:25; 2010:83-84) also pounces on the argument of common order, claiming both that Kloppenborg’s compilation of such material is highly selective, and that he constantly has to supply reasons why some individual pericopes are not in common order. First off, Kloppenborg is indeed selective in compiling individual pericopes that betray a common sequence internally, but his main argument is not concerned with the internal sequence of individual pericopes. Instead, his main argument has to do with the rather substantial degree of correspondence between Matthew and Luke in the sequencing of the double tradition as a whole. Only after indicating this, does Kloppenborg move on to the internal sequencing of selected individual pericopes as supporting evidence. It is only to be expected, given the editorial techniques employed by both evangelists, that some pericopes would not be in common order, both internally, and with regards to their placement in the double tradition as a whole. These individual cases require explanation, something attempted by Kloppenborg. These explanations are, for the most part, rather convincing. Unable to convincingly refute the relative common order of the double tradition as a whole, Casey (2010:84-85) puts forward an alternative explanation for this occurrence. He argues that the relative agreement between Matthew and Luke in the sequencing of the double tradition is explicable even if they did not both have access to a similar Greek document: “If they both [Matthew and Luke] inherited the ‘Q’ material in pieces, written on wax tablets or single sheets of papyrus, it would be entirely natural that they should insert some pieces in the appropriate places of Mark’s narrative” (Casey 2010:84). Casey continues: “Moreover, some places are so obviously appropriate that they would occur naturally to two authors who were independent of each other.” He cites Q 3:7-9 as an example of this. This is a very convenient example, however, and one of the few cases where this holds true. The placement of most of the double tradition are in fact not “obviously appropriate.” Much of the double tradition are not placed in the same Markan positions by Matthew and Luke respectively, but in spite of this still follow the same relative sequence. The best way to explain this happenstance is to put forward a single source for both evangelists.
The distinction between Q² and Q³ has occasionally been called into question. Tuckett (1996:73-74) holds that a nomistic outlook is more widespread in Q than allowed for by Kloppenborg. In fact, Allison (2000:25-73) has convincingly shown that the Moses image, and allusions to a new exodus, are indeed thematically evident throughout Q – something denied by Kloppenborg. Since Kloppenborg uses references to the Torah to delineate Q³, the need for a Q³ is questioned. According to Cromhout (2007:283), “the material assigned to Q³ fits very well with the rhetorical character of the material found in the main redaction.” He mentions, as an example, the importance of the temptation story in Q’s overall Christology. He also sees continuity between the polemic and apologetic strategies of Q² and Q³. Tuckett (1996:419-421) offers an array of textual examples to indicate that, thematically, the temptation narrative is closely connected to the rest of Q. He does this to argue that the temptation narrative should not be seen as a subsequent or final stage of redaction. However, the only thing Tuckett (and Cromhout) accomplishes to “prove” is that the temptation story shows thematic continuity with the rest of Q, something that is to be expected in any case (cf. Arnal 2001:5).

Tuckett (1996:421-422) acknowledges that there are formal discontinuities between the temptation narrative and the rest of Q, but dismisses them as being explicable on the grounds that the temptation story is an introduction or prologue to the rest of the document. He holds up the prologues in the Gospels of John and Mark as examples. These are not legitimate comparisons, however. The gospels are complete narratives and their prologues are in touch with the remainder of their writings. The Sayings Gospel, on the other hand, is a compilation of sayings, and its narrative prologue is at odds with the remainder of this document. Lastly, Tuckett (1996:423) attempts to disprove the argument that the temptation story was added later by pointing out that this narrative is not alone in referencing scripture. He provides a few examples of other Q texts that implicitly refer to scripture. However, Kloppenborg’s argument (see section 2.2.2 above) was never that Q does not reference scripture at all, but that the temptation story is unique in quoting scripture directly, and even using a citation formula (γέγραπται) to introduce the quotation.
I agree with Allison, Tuckett and Cromhout that Kloppenborg underestimates the widespread presence of, and important roles attributed to, the Torah and Moses throughout Q. However, I disagree with them that it requires doing away with a third compositional layer, particularly when it comes to the temptation story. As we have seen in section 2.2.2 above, references to the Torah was not Kloppenborg’s only reason for identifying the temptation story with a third stratum. Other reasons included appeals to the temptation story’s genre, form, vocabulary, content, Christology and positive stance towards the Temple and Jerusalem. Besides, Kloppenborg (1987a:247) was not the first to notice the anomalous character of the temptation story, with some scholars seeing it as a Fremdkörper, others excluding it from Q altogether (see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:246-247, 152), and yet others going as far as to change their initial theories because of it (cf. Tuckett 1996:43).

However, Kloppenborg’s suggested interpolations (Q 11:42c and Q 16:17) do not, in my view, necessarily belong with the third stratum. Tuckett (1996:73) also objects to removing these texts from Q, but for reasons quite different from mine. He maintains that passages should not be excised from a text simply because they do not reflect the same concerns as other parts of that text. I agree with this statement and (I am guessing) so would Kloppenborg. Tuckett, however, misunderstands Kloppenborg’s reasons for wanting to add those interpolations to Q³. These interpolations are extrapolated from Q² on literary grounds, since they interrupt the flow of their immediate literary contexts (see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:152-153). I agree with Kloppenborg that the flow might be interrupted by these texts, at least in the case of Q 11:42c, but this still does not allow for these interpolations to be added to Q³ (per se). The issue here is not whether these clauses are interpolations or not. They clearly are. The issue is whether or not this justifies them being added to Q³.

Kloppenborg Verbin’s (2000a:153) primary reason for assigning these texts to the third layer is their “common perspective on the centrality of the Torah.” But, as we have seen, the centrality of the Torah is not a theme or viewpoint alien to Q². If the mentioned passages were added by a redactional hand, there is not enough evidence to assume that it
was the \text{Q}^3 \text{hand} that did this. It could also have been part of the “complex prehistory” of \text{Q}^2 (Tuckett 1996:71), particularly if nomism and the importance of the Torah are features inherent to \text{Q}^2. The fact that these redactional clauses only modify individual sayings, and do not seem interested in the overall structure or redactional activity of \text{Q}, probably points to their inclusion at an earlier stage (cf. Tuckett 1996:418-419). In other words, their presence within larger units probably indicates that they were part of the development of individual sayings during the prehistory of \text{Q}, and did not play any part in the subsequent composition of \text{Q}. The literary history of Q 11:42c and Q 16:17 is perhaps then better determined by form-criticism than by redaction- or composition-criticism. In summary, I agree that the temptation story was added later to an existing \text{Q} document, but I disagree that Q 11:42c and Q 16:17 represent the same compositional activity.

According to some, Kloppenborg’s distinction between \text{Q}^1 and \text{Q}^2 on the grounds of implied audience is perhaps not as thoroughgoing as he claims. Horsley (1995b:40; 1999:64) identifies only one cluster in \text{Q}^2 (Q 11:14-26, 29-32, 39-52) directed at the out-group, with the remainder of \text{Q}^2 directed at the \text{Q} people (cf. also Tuckett 1996:72). Although Horsley uses the terms “projected audience” and “implied audience,” he seems to be missing the point that much of the \text{Q}^2 material are directed at the opponents of \text{Q} indirectly, as part of their polemic against them. Naturally, the actual audience of \text{Q}^2 is the \text{Q} people. However, the projected audience are outsiders opposed to the \text{Q} people (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:167). The general orientation of \text{Q}^1 is directed (either directly or indirectly) at insiders. The general orientation of \text{Q}^2 is directed (either directly or indirectly) at outsiders (see Mack 1993:134-135). Put differently, the mentioned audience or recipients of Jesus’ words do not necessarily represent the projected audience. The latter sometimes need to be inferred and not extrapolated.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{33} For example, the mentioned audience in Q 7:9 is “the crowd who followed him” (τῷ ἄκολουθοντι αὐτῷ ὄχλῳ). The word “followed” (ἀκολουθοντι) could also be translated “accompanied” and has strong semantic connotations with “discipleship” (see Kingsbury 1978). As such, a strong argument could be made for seeing the mentioned audience as early followers or disciples of Jesus. This is probably also the intention of the passage, i.e. to portray Jesus as speaking to his followers. The \text{Q} group would then apply this saying as if Jesus were directly speaking to them, the in-group. However, such an understanding does not take full cognisance of the whole saying on a semantic level. The content of the saying is: “Not even in Israel have I found such faith.” This is the response Jesus gave to the Centurion after he requested that
Horsley lists the following Q² clusters that are, according to him, directed at the in-group: Q 7:18-23, 24-28; Q 12:39-46, 51-53, 57-59 and Q 17:23-35. Horsley, however, does not analyse these texts to prove his statement. On face value, Q 7:18-23, for example, speaks to John’s disciples. It is not at all clear that these disciples should necessarily be seen as forming part of the in-group. The text further lists the miracles of Jesus and his benefit to the poor in order to legitimise his public career and authority. The authority of Jesus is accepted by the Q people without question. They arrange their whole lives around Jesus’ authority, sometimes with devastating results (see sections 2.3 & 2.5.4 below). Rather, the need to legitimise Jesus’ public career and authority arises in relation to their polemic against outsiders. In other words, Q 7:18-23 functions to legitimise Jesus in opposition to claims from outsiders directed against him. This becomes evident in verse 23, where those not “offended” by Jesus are seen as being blessed. The projected audience, therefore, comprises those who are indeed offended by Jesus. The named audience in Q 7:24-28 are the ὀχλοῦς. Although these crowds came to listen to Jesus, it is once again not clear that they necessarily represent the Q people. Just like Jesus was legitimised in the previous text, John is legitimised in the current text. If John were understood by the Q people as being the messenger who prepared the path for Jesus (verse 27), then John’s legitimacy is inseparably connected with that of Jesus. Whether or not the historical John actually foretold Jesus’ appearance and ministry is not important currently. What is important is that the Q people thought that this was John’s purpose. If John’s prophecy about Jesus was illegitimate for any reason, doubt would fall on the authenticity of Jesus himself. Q 7:24-28, therefore, is an attempt to legitimise John in order to indirectly legitimise Jesus. As such, this text forms part of Q’s polemic against outsiders, who probably had their suspicions about the legitimacy of both John and Jesus.

Jesus heal his son by simply saying a word. The Centurion should probably be seen as a Gentile, otherwise the saying of Jesus (“Not even in Israel”) would not make sense. In other words, gentile faith in Jesus is contrasted with the lack thereof shown by the rest of Israel. The theme of non-repentance is directed at wider Israel. Sometimes this theme appears in contexts where Jesus addresses these outsiders directly (cf. e.g. Q 10:13-14). Therefore, Q 7:9 is an example of a Q saying indirectly directed at outsiders. So, although Jesus speaks to the in-group, he has the out-group and their fate in mind.
The apocalyptic and prophetic nature of Q 12:39-46 can not be denied. The whole text is about being ready when the Son of Man comes. The actual audience is not mentioned, but one can presume it was either the crowds or his disciples. If those who will not be ready for the Son of Man are to be equated with those who did not heed the words of Jesus, then the outsiders’ fate is declared in no uncertain terms in verse 46. The projected audience, therefore, is probably outsiders, since they are the ones who will not be ready when the Son of Man comes. Their judgment is put alongside the fortuitous fate of the Q people (cf. verse 44). Q 12:49, 51, 53 is obviously directed at the Q people themselves, but speaks to the consequences of their choice to become members of the group. As such, it puts the opposition they experience into perspective. The text clearly delineates insiders from outsiders, a line of distinction that runs through patriarchal families. Similarly, Q 12:58-59 speaks directly to the Q people, directing each individual on how to deal with ἀντιδίκου σου. Its proximity to Q 12:53 makes it probable that outsiders are intended with ἀντιδίκου σου. If this interpretation is correct, the Q people are coached on how to deal with outsiders that seek legal retribution – perhaps as a result of the impact their abandonment of the patriarchal family had on such families. Q 17:23-35 is obviously apocalyptic. Outsiders are clearly meant by the third person plural of εἴπωσιν in verse 23. The same is true of ἐκείνας and ἀπαντας in verse 27. Q 17:34-35 clearly distinguishes between those who παραλαμβάνεται and those who ἀφίεται, i.e. between insiders and outsiders. Thus, although Q 17:23-35 (on face value) warns the in-group about the coming Son of Man, it serves a similar function as Q 12:39-46 above. The outsiders’ fate are polemically described as being fatal (cf. verses 24, 27, 37, 34-35). The passage is thus indirectly directed at outsiders, warning them of their imminent demise in the face of apocalyptic judgment. Four out of the six texts thought by Horsley to be directed at the in-group are, in fact, indirectly aimed at the out-group. The actual and projected audiences in the remaining two texts (Q 12:49, 51, 53 and Q 12:58-59) might be the Q people themselves. Nevertheless, all six passages have one thing in common: they all programmatically address the polemic and apologetic concerns of the Q people over against their opponents.

34 The “coming of the Son of Man” should not necessarily be interpreted as referring to the parousia of Jesus (see Horsley 1999:70-71).
Some scholars maintain that Kloppenborg’s distinction between Q¹ and Q² on the grounds of characteristic forms is perhaps not as thoroughgoing as he claims. Regarding Kloppenborg’s second common feature (i.e. that of form), Horsley (1999:65) counts only one (Q 11:29, 31-32) of the chreia listed where “this generation” is (expressly) criticised for not responding to the kingdom message. Horsley here confuses content with form. Kloppenborg has literary reasons for identifying Q² with comparative chreiai. This objection should rather be made against the motifs Kloppenborg identifies within the main redaction. Although “this generation” is not everywhere overtly mentioned or criticised for not responding to the kingdom message, the harsh judgmental language and apocalyptic pronouncements in Q² are directed against them. Whether directly or indirectly, Q² polemically and apologetically targets outsiders, and, according to the Q text, these outsiders are best identified with “this generation.” Thus, the term “this generation” names the outsiders identified in the foregoing discussion as the projected audience.

Horsley (1999:65) only identifies one saying (Q 17:23-24) that could form-critically be classified as “apocalyptic.” This is simply not true. There are many forms in Q² that should rightfully be classified “apocalyptic” (cf. Q 3:9, 16-17; Q 7:22, 35; Q 10:12, 13-15; Q 11:19-20, 23, 26, 30, 31-32, 49-51; Q 12:8-9, 10, 39-40, 44, 46, 49; Q 13:25-27, 28-29, 30, 35; Q 14:23; Q 17:20-21, 24, 26-27, 30, 34-35; Q 19:26; Q 22:28, 30 – to list only the most obvious examples). The principal aim of the main redaction is to voice its polemic against “this generation.” The authors of Q² do this by drawing on all the tools at their disposal, at times using prophetic forms and themes, and at other times utilising apocalyptic forms and motives. They use whatever tool seems most applicable at the time (and in that specific literary context). Horsley’s apprehension in calling these sayings “apocalyptic” might stem from the fact that he views them as referring to the present, and not to the future. His argument might therefore be based on the semantics of the word “apocalyptic.” Regardless of whether we call these sayings apocalyptic or not, they are still prophetic, and mainly concerned with polemic against outsiders. Horsley (1999:67) further asserts: “[I]n fact, much of the material in both strata would be described as prophetic according to traditional form-critical criteria of form and
function.” He doesn’t continue to prove this statement, however. Kirk (1998:152-403) has conclusively demonstrated that the prophetic forms in Q¹ act as incentives for the framework genre’s wisdom imperatives. These prophetic motive clauses are even delivered in sapiential idiom (cf. Kirk 1998:270). Kloppenborg (1987a:168-169) has shown that *chreiai* predominate in Q², with much of the prophetic sayings being imbedded in, and presented as, *chreiai*. Kloppenborg (1987a:170) never denied the presence of prophetic sayings in Q². The existence of these prophetic forms makes all the more sense if the aphoristic and subversive nature of Q’s wisdom is fully comprehended (see Kirk 1998:306, 333-336).

Jacobson (1989:152) discovers possibly some *chreiai* in Q¹ (cf. Q 6:23, Q 9:57-62; Q 12:11-12; cf. Kirk 1998:41). Kloppenborg (1987a:240) knew from the beginning that Q¹ contained *chreia*, but saw thematic and literary continuity between these *chreiai* and the wisdom material in the rest of Q¹. Kirk (1998:152-403) illustrates that the *chreiai* in Q¹ are integrated into a format that is characteristic of Instructions. The formative layer employed *chreiai* in support of the overall argumentation of its framework genre (cf. Kirk 1998:270). Allison (1997:6-7) notes that Q 6:20-23 alludes to Isaiah 61, something rather more distinctive of Q² (cf. Q 3:16-17; Q 7:18-23; Q 13:35). However, Allison (1997:6) is wrong in seeing this as evidence that “there are literary and editorial techniques that cut across [Kloppenborg’s] proposed layers.” Allison confuses “literary and editorial techniques” with common themes. Allusions to the same Old Testament text within different literary contexts is not a literary or editorial feature to be distinguished. It is a case of the author of Q¹ and the redactor of Q² drawing upon a common theme and, as a result, belongs rather to our next discussion.

A case could also be made for identifying wisdom forms in Q² perhaps more at home in Q¹ (cf. point 7 below). However, the haphazard style of *chreia* collections, and the way in which it tended to absorb other sayings into its overall structure, renders such an objection invalid (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:323). Casey (2002:31) objects that it is possible to reconstruct some of Kloppenborg’s identified *chreiai*, like Q 9:57-58, in their original Aramaic forms. Casey (2002:31) is probably correct, not only in his Aramaic
reconstruction of this and other Q passages, but also in claiming that these Q sayings “were originally Jewish and transmitted in Aramaic, and [...] were not originally examples of Greek chreiae.” However, the prehistory of Q is inconsequential for the conclusion that the second layer was made up of *chreiai by the time the document reached the two evangelists*. Once again, the tendency of *chreiai* to absorb other sayings into their overall structures accommodate both Casey’s theory that some of them were originally not *chreiai* and Kloppenborg’s theory that Q² consisted mostly of *chreiai* when Q received its final redaction. Tuckett (1996:353) seems to be in agreement with Kloppenborg when it comes to form, although he is reluctant to admit this: “[I]t would seem that any sapiential elements in the tradition have been overlaid by a powerful eschatological / prophetic element … In one sense this might support Kloppenborg’s thesis of a prophetic Q² succeeding a sapiential Q¹.” However, he downplays the wisdom element, and sees it as both undervalued by Q and supportive of the prophetic element (see also Boring 1991:232-233). Nonetheless, Tuckett, perhaps unwittingly, supports Kloppenborg’s compositional theory in as far as it estimates that pre-existing polemic and prophetic traditions were incorporated into a more wisdom-type document.

According to some, Kloppenborg’s distinction between Q¹ and Q² on the grounds of *characteristic motifs* is perhaps not as thoroughgoing as he claims. This objection must be distinguished from the objection encountered earlier, i.e. that Kloppenborg assumes that wisdom and apocalyptic material are incompatible. The two objections are similar, but the former attacks his *assumption* of incompatibility, whereas the current objection tries to invalidate his *method*. The two objections contradict and nullify one another. Let me explain. If wisdom and apocalyptic traditions are not incompatible, then there should not be a concern with the presence of apocalyptic motifs in the sapiential layer of Q. In other words, it does not undermine Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy. The opponents of Kloppenborg betray their own inability to make peace with the compatibility of wisdom and apocalypticism by pointing out the latter within the formative layer. Within the current objection, we must distinguish further between arguments pertaining to the content of Q¹ and arguments concerned with the content of Q². I will start with the former.
One of the criticisms of Kloppenborg’s thesis is the presence of judgment and apocalyptic themes in the proposed sapiential layer (cf. Horsley 1999:67, 81; see Hoffmann 1995:187-188; Tuckett 1996:160-163; cf. also Sato 1995:140; Casey 2002:29). This apparently undermines his whole hypothesis. Jacobson (1989:152) discovers some possibly prophetic sayings in Q¹ (e.g. Q 6:23, Q 9:57-62; Q 12:11-12). However, these are subordinate to the sapiential framework genre of the formative layer. We have already seen Allison’s argument based on the common allusions to Isaiah 61 within both strata. Based hereupon, Allison (1997:7) concludes that the relevant texts should be assigned “to the same redactional stage.” But why? Allusions to the same text, even if they contain Christological implications, simply indicate continuity between Q¹ and Q², and says nothing about redaction (cf. Arnal 2001:5). To use the possibility of allusions to the same Old-Testament text as evidence for redaction is preposterous. Allison (1997:4-5) is further concerned over the fact that Kloppenborg has the need to view all Deuteronomistic themes in Q¹ as interpolations. Horsley (1999:66) has a similar concern over Kloppenborg’s need to see prophetic and outsider-directed passages occurring in the sapiential stratum as interpolations (cf. also Casey 2002:29). However, the interpolations are identified on literary grounds by Kloppenborg (1987a:240, 242-244) and only thereafter added to Q² because of their strong similarities with the implied audience, forms and themes of the redactional layer. Allison (1997:7) also feels that a Deuteronomistic theology can be found in other “authentic” Q¹ texts, especially the idea of “rejection.” These observations are curious in light of Allison’s (1997:27-30) discussion on Q 12:35-Q 17:37, where he states that “the section remains transparently practical wisdom with a strong eschatological component.” Why would Allison see the need to undermine Kloppenborg’s thesis in light of the presence of certain themes in both layers if he himself admits that such thematic overlap is indeed possible?

Tuckett (1996:160-161) argues that the motif of a futuristic eschatology is not only evident in Q², but in Q¹ as well, listing the beginning and end of the inaugural sermon, the mission charge and even the teaching on cares and prayer as examples. As we have seen,

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36 He lists: Q6:22-23b; Q 9:58; Q 10:3, 10-11, 16; Q 12:4-5, 11-12.
37 Quotation from page 28. See also page 42.
the previous argument betrays Tuckett’s own incapability to make peace with the fact that wisdom and apocalyptic (or prophetic) material were not incompatible in ancient literature. In any case, Kloppenborg did not separate the two strata on thematic and theological grounds, but on literary and rhetorical grounds, after which he extrapolated certain common themes. It would seem that Tuckett (et al) confuses the results of Kloppenborg’s analysis with its original criteria (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:151). The presence of prophetic material within Q¹ or the reshaping of Q¹ in line with a more eschatological and/or prophetic outlook does not disprove Kloppenborg’s theory – on the contrary, it only adds to the idea that a Q² redactor had a hand in the reshaping of Q¹. Wisdom literature of the Hellenistic age tended to be more eschatological and futurist in their approach (cf. Kirk 1998:52). Furthermore, Q’s aphoristic nature qualifies its appropriation of prophetic material.

A similar, but different, objection is that the so-called “sapiential layer” seems to discuss topics dissimilar to the admonitions that are characteristic of Q¹, such as mission, discipleship and the Holy Spirit (cf. Tuckett 1996:72; see Horsley 1999:66, 88-89). However, if wisdom is concerned with the right behaviour before God, then discipleship is wisdom in that it views the following of Jesus’ example as the correct conduct before God. Furthermore, mission, as Q understands it, is merely the act of informing others about this new wisdom. Also, the mission instruction uses wisdom forms to deal with sapiential themes, such as equipping, provisioning, table manners, hospitality, labouring, and the responsibilities of messengers (see Kirk 1998:346-350, 358-359). Moreover, the mission instruction is inaugurated in verses 2 and 3 by small forms most at home with the genre of wisdom Instruction (cf. Kirk 1998:346).38 If Q 9:57-60 is seen as part of the missionary discourse, the whole pericope is cast in the mould of a chreia elaboration (cf.

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38 The reference to “harvest” in verse 2 does not in and of itself pre-suppose apocalyptic judgment (à la Joel 4:9-17; Isa 9:2-3; 27:12; Jer 51:33; Hos 6:11; Rev 14:15-20; 2 Esdras 4:26-37). A literal reading of this verse as a proverb would rather suggest that agricultural labour is intended (compare Prov 6:8; 10:5; 20:4; 26:1; Job 5:5; Sib. Or. 3:24-245; 2 Baruch 10:9; Pseudo-Phocylides 163-170; cf. Piper 1989:133). A literal understanding of the word “harvest” not only appears in wisdom literature, but in some apocalyptic literature as well (cf. e.g. Jer 5:17; Qumran Scroll 4Q285 1-2:4-8; see e.g. the Treatise of Shem). If the agricultural labour in Q 10:2 is indeed symbolic of something, it is, in this Q context, symbolic of the mission itself, not apocalyptic judgment (compare Prov 25:13; cf. Piper 1989:134; cf. also Allison 1997:14; contra Edwards 1976:102; Catchpole 1993:164). There are also some intertextual examples of the “harvest” metaphor being symbolic of wisdom itself (cf. e.g. Sirach 6:18-22; 24:25-26).
Kirk 1998:359). Apart from the announcement of judgment in Q 10:12-15, and the thanksgiving in Q 10:21, there is nothing in the mission instruction that could be equated with prophetic texts, and even those two texts are explicable within the sapiential framework genre of the mission instruction (see Kirk 1998:358-363). Lastly, despite not being a thoroughgoing theme, the Holy Spirit could easily be afforded some significance within this new wisdom described above.

Jacobson claims that the motifs in Q¹ are not consistent throughout (cf. Horsley 1999:67). Conversely, Kirk (1998:270) argues for the cohesion and coherence of Q¹. Allison (1997:5) claims that the beatitudes in the inaugural sermon betray little sapiential content or formulation (cf. Hoffmann 1995:188). However, Kloppenborg (1987a:173) knew that the beatitudes were concerned with eschatological reversal and reward when he developed his stratification model, and pointed it out then already, which just shows that he does not allow themes to dictate his stratigraphy, but literary features (see also Van Aarde 1994:151-179, esp. 170, 174-175). It also shows that Kloppenborg is not uneasy with the presence of eschatological themes in his so-called wisdom layer. In other words, he does not presuppose the incompatibility of wisdom and prophetic, or apocalyptic, material. Allison’s claim that the beatitudes betray little sapiential content is based on the erroneous assumption that eschatological themes are not indicative or characteristic of wisdom material. He simply fails to realise the tendency of contemporary wisdom literature to incorporate eschatological themes (cf. Kirk 1998:52). In fact, beatitudes also appear in wisdom texts from Qumran (cf. Kirk 1998:391). Eschatology is not always a good designator for genre. In the end, Q¹ treats wisdom topoi (Kirk 1998:271), with the prophetic and/or apocalyptic themes supporting and motivating the rhetoric of those topoi within the framework genre. The beatitudes are indeed wisdom forms that betray and develop eschatological themes (cf. Patterson, in Miller 2001:77).

I now turn to arguments based on the content of Q². According to Horsley (1999:65), the motif of judgment against Israel and a positive attitude towards Gentiles is not a thoroughgoing common feature within Q². Horsley (1995b:40; 1999:65) counts only two short passages (Q 11:29-32 and Q 11:39-52), neither of which display apocalyptic motifs,
exhibiting all three common features utilised as criteria for separating Q² from Q¹. “It seems unwarranted, therefore, to believe that a whole redactional layer of Q was directed against Israel and to proceed with a redactional judgmental stratum as a working hypothesis about Q” (Horsley 1995b:40). However, his reasons for discounting the other judgmental discourses are arbitrary. Horsley (1995b:40) admits that the purpose of Q 7:1-10 is to “challenge Israel to fuller response,” but “not to exemplify a mission to Gentiles.” The latter statement is an entirely separate matter and irrelevant to the stratification discussion. The former statement conforms to Kloppenborg’s more comprehensive understanding of the main redaction’s apologetic nature. Horsley further asserts that Q 11:31-32 should not be seen as evidence for a gentile faith, and, as a result, holds that there is no reference to the condemnation of Israel in that passage. Once again, Horsley conflates separate issues. Gentile faith is irrelevant for a determination of redactional activity in Q. Moreover, gentile faith is not the primary reason for understanding Q 11:31-32 as a passage directed against Israel. The point, rather, is that the author attempts to polemically shame Israel by comparing her unfavourably with Gentiles. Horsley also claims that John’s preaching (as well as other critical Q² passages) is both positively and negatively apocalyptic, and therefore not explicitly judgmental. This is an illogical argument. The fact that both negative and positive aspects can be extracted from John’s preaching does not automatically mean that it is “not explicitly judgmental.” All it means is that it might not be solely judgmental. In any case, Horsley admits that John’s sermon is “a vindication of Jesus and John vis-à-vis outside critics.” As such, Horsley, perhaps unwittingly, admits that John’s sermon is polemic in nature.

That Jesus is equated with Sophia in the second stratum (and not in the first sapiential stratum) has led some to argue against Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy on the grounds that the second stratum is supposed to represent apocalyptic judgment and not wisdom (cf. Tuckett 1996:351-352; Allison 1997:4; Horsley 1999:67; cf. also Jacobson 1989:152). They miss the point of Kloppenborg’s designation of Q¹ as “sapiential” and Q² as “prophetic” or “apocalyptic.” These are not designations of genre, but of the most central and characteristic themes of these layers. Once again, these opponents betray their own incapability to accept that wisdom and apocalyptic themes are not incompatible. At any
rate, that Jesus is only at the redactional stage identified with Sophia confirms the continuity between the two layers (see section 2.4.4 below; cf. Mack 1993:147, 151).\(^{39}\)

The main purpose of the introduction of the Sophia-theme was polemical, functioning in combination with the deuteronomistic view of history to charge “this generation” with killing the prophets (see Hartin 1995:158-159). However, the deuteronomistic theme was sufficient in and of itself to serve this polemical purpose, without having to be conflated with the Sophia-theme. If Jesus was the last in a long line of prophets murdered by “this generation,” then the accusation is complete. It could simply have been God (and not Sophia) who sent the prophets. When compared to other Jewish texts of the time, Q is unique in adding Sophia to the deuteronomistic theme (see Horsley 1999:117-118; \textit{contra} Jacobson 1992:257) As such, the introduction of Sophia probably had its conception in something authentic, like the sapiential nature of the teachings of Jesus. The identification between Jesus and Sophia probably functioned to legitimise and authorise the teachings of Jesus, who was now privy to divine wisdom (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:324; Mack 1993:152). In the early church, wisdom traditions generally tended to develop in a Christological direction (cf. Schottroff 1995:356). The beginnings of such a development can already be seen in Q¹ (cf. Q 10:16). This development could be explained by the possibility that, although Jesus was already seen as a teacher of wisdom in Q¹, he was only identified with Sophia by the time of redaction. Analyses of Proverbs 1-9 have indicated that a similar development occurred there, with the teachings on practical wisdom preceding the personification of Wisdom in Proverbs 9:4 (cf. Hartin 1995:152).

Allison (1997:5) points to Q 11:31-32, where Jesus is compared to both a wise man (Solomon) and a prophet (Jonah). But, as we have seen, the presence of both prophetic and wisdom themes within one layer is not an argument against Kloppenborg. The reference to wisdom (Solomon) indicates thematic continuity with Q¹, as can be expected

\(^{39}\) There is evidence to suggest that Jesus is not at all \textit{equated} with Sophia in Q, but that he is only \textit{portrayed} as the last and most important emissary, messenger and/or prophet of Sophia (cf. Horsley 1999:3; see Tuckett 1996:218-221; cf. also Hartin 1995:159; Jacobson 1995:376; see also Piper 1989:165-170; cf. Q 7:35; Q 11:31, 49-51). It is perhaps only later, in the Gospel according to Matthew, that Jesus is identified with divine Sophia (cf. Hartin 1995:159). It is also possible that Q represents traditions that depict Jesus as being both a messenger of Sophia (cf. Q 7:35) and Sophia herself (cf. Q 10:22) (cf. Schottroff 1995:356). Whatever the case, both views substantiate continuity between Q¹ and Q².
from a document composed by the same group. On the other hand, the prophetic reference (Jonah) indicates Q²’s distinctiveness as a separate compositional layer. Sato (1995:140) struggles to see how one redactional layer could discuss both salvation and disaster. Yet, biblical material – not to even mention modern Christianity – is bursting with examples of apparent contradictions by the same author. Sato’s concern is ironic if it is considered that Horsley (1995b:38-40, 92) notices a “positive-salvific” and a “negative-judgmental” aspect to the isolated instance of John’s preaching, not to mention Q as a whole. Even more ironic is the fact that Horsley notices a harmony between the two sides of the coin, and uses this as part of his argument against Kloppenborg. As far as all of the previous is concerned, arguments based upon the motifs apparent in each layer do not substitute, and are never superior to, thoroughgoing literary analyses (cf. Kirk 1998:55).

A number of scholars would plainly prefer a simpler compositional activity. Hoffmann (1995:187) mentions the possibility that the same author might actually have put disparate material together, simply because he found them already in such multiplicity in the Jesus tradition. Tuckett agrees and gives three reasons for preferring a unitary compositional happening (cf. also Horsley 1999:67). Firstly, Q² has a more complex prehistory than simply being viewed as the redactional material added to Q¹. Secondly, Tuckett (1996:71-72) questions whether the “wisdom sayings” in Q¹ ever belonged together in a literary whole before being redacted by Q². According to him, evidence rather points to the fragmentary and multi-faceted nature of Q¹. Thirdly, it is not sure that the six blocks of Q¹ material ever belonged together before being redacted by Q². Tuckett (1996:72-74) further maintains that there are other possibilities, and perhaps more justifiable possibilities, to account for the development of Q into a final form. Dunn (2003:156-157) agrees and maintains that Kloppenborg fails to illustrate that Q¹ “ever functioned as a single document or stratum.” He also, while maintaining an oral or written Q, proposes a single compositional act. Tuckett postulates the possibility that Q²

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40 Tuckett (1996:72) talks about the “five” collections of sayings identified by Kloppenborg. However, Kloppenborg [Verbin] (1987a:238; 2000a:146) identified six sapiential blocks in Q¹.
made use of independent collections of sayings when creating the final Q form. Tuckett’s concerns are valid and can be summarised in the following quotation:

If, as I have tried to argue, it is unnecessary to postulate a Q³ subsequent to Q², and if the pre-Q² material is perhaps rather more disparate, and the alleged ‘Q¹’ stratum not necessarily capable of being shown to have existed as a literary unity in its own right before Q², then we may have a rather simpler model, viz. a Q-editor taking up and using (possibly a variety of) earlier materials.

Despite these objections, Q¹ betrays internal evidence of sophisticated composition (cf. Kirk 1998:38). Apart from similarities in audience, forms and motifs, certain structural and rhetorical features also seem to indicate that the wisdom blocks were probably redacted together (see Kloppenborg 1987a:242-243; Piper 1989:35-36, 61-63, 72-73, 139; Kirk 1998:61-62, 269). It even seems as though the structuring techniques, genre patterns and stylistic devices betrayed by the formative stratum were quite conventional when compared to Instructions of the time-period, like Sirach and Pseudo-Phocylides (cf. Kirk 1998:269). The methods by which Q² material were interpolated into Q¹ material suggest that the wisdom blocks were probably already written down before the Q² redactor got to them (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:244; Kirk 1998:269). Such evidence points towards two different redactors for Q¹ and Q² respectively, as well as towards a single redactor for all the Q¹ material. That Q² has a complex prehistory, and that the sayings in Q¹ are rather loosely connected, do not invalidate the compositional activity betrayed by the Sayings Gospel and identified by Kloppenborg. As far as the disparity of Q¹ is concerned, Tuckett seems not to take the very nature of wisdom collections into account. Unrelated and dissimilar sayings often appear side by side in many wisdom texts known to have existed as a unity. The book of Proverbs is a good example of this. On the surface, sayings might appear unorganised and disparate, but careful composition is betrayed when analysing stylistic, rhetorical and thematic commonalities within the corpus (see esp. Loader 2006:1177-1199, esp. 1197; cf. also Allison 2010:90). Disparity is therefore not a good indicator of composition, particularly in wisdom texts. Identifying a prehistory for Q² does not take away that this layer was added subsequently, and that it
should therefore be regarded as the main redaction, mainly because of its positioning, its function in organising the text, and its proclivity to disrupt the flow of Q¹.

2.2.5 Findings

Most objections to Kloppenborg’s proposed stratification reiterate aspects thereof that had been noted by Kloppenborg from the very beginning. Some of the arguments against Kloppenborg’s supposed assumptions are not able to prove that these assumptions even existed. In the cases of those that did exist, none of the arguments are able to show how these assumptions impacted either Kloppenborg’s analysis or his ultimate results. Objections to Kloppenborg’s method are equally unconvincing. Arguments against implied audience seem to be a simple case of misunderstanding. Both the presence of prophetic and apocalyptic forms and motives in Q¹ and the occurrence of wisdom forms and motives in Q² were already identified by Kloppenborg in his original analysis. These features do not invalidate Kloppenborg’s stratification, but only go to show that he did not allow content to dictate his literary analysis. It also indicates that he did not regard prophetic and wisdom material to be incompatible or mutually exclusive. Critics of Kloppenborg appear to be nitpicking. They tend to draw upon certain isolated examples when building their cases against him. Yet, they all fail to engage in a similarly literary-critical examination of the text. Finally, Tuckett’s preference for a simpler compositional activity fails to convince, simply because he does not engage the text in a comprehensive and literary-critical manner. Evidence of disparity in Q¹ and of a prehistory for Q² do not refute Kloppenborg’s proposed compositional history. Arnal (2001:5) is thus correct when he says that no one has been able to successfully refute Kloppenborg’s theory of stratification, arguably because none of them have addressed Kloppenborg’s detailed literary arguments.
2.3 ~ FAMILY FEUDS

This section is not central to the current discussion, but will prove to be indispensable as an interpretive framework for upcoming arguments, judgments and text-analyses. Some time ago, Blasi (1986:246) had recognised a tension between Q 9:57-60 and Q 10:2-16 (cf. Horsley 1995b:43-44; cf. also Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:182). The former indicates that the Q people were socially disruptive by breaking up families in the name of the kingdom. The latter indicates that the Q people expected support from households, and promoted reconciliation, prayer and ethical virtuosity within such households. Blasi explains this by proposing that the tension was between itinerants, who disrupted traditional families, and the rest of the Q people, who continued to operate as traditional households. It is unlikely, however, that households and household disrupters existed side by side in idyllic harmony. Surely, a better explanation would be that biological families were disrupted, but that new fictive families were created when the Q group was formed. The establishment and configuration of fictive families was a well-known feature of village life, usually occurring during times of economic hardship as a direct reaction to pressures from above (see Oakman 2008:252-253). Fictive families were sanctioned by strong religious beliefs, and emerged in both villages and coalitions as attempts to reclaim some form of power in the face of oppression. Such fictitious families historically tended to emphasise new social orders, where domestic economics would replace political economics. The Q people did not make use of existing family structures, but substituted patriarchal families with fictive kinship structures. Thus, by the time Q¹ was written, the Q people were probably a settled group, operating as a “new family” on a household system.41

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41 Vaage (1994:38-39) claims that the origins of the Q people might have been similar to the radical lifestyles of Cynics. Apart from the ambivalent references in Q 10:4 and the deliberately Cynic readings of the Mission Discourse, there is no direct evidence for Cynic-like beginnings of the Q people. Even if such a possibility is accepted, the Q document as it stands is concerned with community life, not a lifestyle based on anti-civilisation praxis. The complimentarily of itinerancy and community has been a matter of some debate.
Establishing “new families” would undoubtedly have caused major disruptions in traditional family life. Family division is already evident from Q¹. Although it might not have been the intention of the Q mission to divide families (cf. Q 10:5-7), families were divided (cf. Q 9:58, 59-60; Q 12:51, 53; Q 14:26; 16:18; cf. Jacobson 1995:366-367). This rift seems to have occurred mostly between young adults and their parents (see Destro & Pesce 2003:217-222). Most of these young recruits were probably married with children (see Destro & Pesce 2003:217-222). The whole extended family, first generation (grand)parents included, would have lived together in the same dwelling. Q 9:59-60 clearly preaches against the Decalogue’s commandment to honour thy father and mother (cf. Schottroff 1995:354; Jacobson 1995:361-362; cf. Acts 5:6, 7-10; 8:2). The same saying probably also advocates forsaking (ἀφες) one’s family, which is described as being “dead” (τοῦς νεκρούς), so that one can join the Q movement (ἀκολουθήσω σοι) (cf. Moxnes 2003:54-55). Q 14:26 is even more in your face, advocating hatred (μισεῖ) between children and parents. Filial respect, submission and obedience were demanded and expected in ancient Judean culture (cf. Jacobson 1995:363). “Stubborn and rebellious” children were to be stoned to death (cf. Deut 21:18-21). Both of these sayings (Q 9:59-60 & Q 14:26) would have been entirely insensitive and extremely offensive to ancient Judean ears (see Jacobson 1995:361-364).

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42 Arnal (2001:174-177) reads these Q sayings as general statements about either the cost of discipleship (Q 9:59-60) or the fate of humanity (Q 9:58), not to be taken literally. Generally in Q, Arnal (2001:183) reads references to the poor metaphorically, as part of Q’s rhetoric of social inversion “to communicate the repudiation of social hierarchy.” Yet, the social programme described by Arnal would undoubtedly have been welcomed more by the poor than the wealthy and would have found better support among underprivileged than privileged individuals. Arnal’s aim is to refute the theory of itinerancy. However, a literal reading of these texts do not necessarily promote itinerancy, as will become clear. In keeping with the nature of the Q document as a whole, it is our current intention to read all Q texts as if they reflect the social location of the Q people in some way or another.

43 The word hate (μισεῖ) refers here not to a feeling or emotion such as “dislike intensely,” but to an orientation or action such as not to “recognise one’s responsibility toward someone” (Jacobson 1995:364), which is the direct opposite of love or honour (τίμα) in the LXX version of Exodus 20:12 and זファン in the MT. In terms of group orientation and responsibility, the word denotes abandonment of, distancing from, separation from, alienation from or forsaking of the group in question, in this case the traditional family (cf. Moxnes 2003:58). See also Josephus’s Ant. 6.255, 324; 7.254.

44 It is doubtful that such commandments were actually practiced.
Besides the division between children and parents, Q 16:18 probably also reflects a situation where husbands and wives were divided, ultimately ending up in divorce (see Schottroff 1995:354-355; Jacobson 1995:371-373). Q members who had divorced as a result of joining the movement were not allowed to remarry. Individuals from both genders appear to have left their families in exchange for Q membership (cf. Jacobson 1995:363; Destro & Pesce 2003:220; see also Freyne 2000:271-272, 282-283). If Q 9:58 is read in conjunction with Q 9:59-60, the actual situation in which many Q people found themselves comes to the fore. Because of their abandonment of the patriarchal family, many of the Q people were probably homeless and, even worse, family-less. Since ancient Mediterranean households were the nucleuses and sources of all social, economic, religious and cultural identity and activity, such schisms must have had a tremendous impact on the Q people (see esp. Destro & Pesce 2003:212-213; cf. Jacobson 1995:378-379; cf. also Horsley 1995a:195-196; 1999:297). The Q people were seen as being “poor” (Q 6:20), probably because they no longer enjoyed family support, among other reasons (cf. Schottroff 1995:360; Moxnes 2003:62-63, 114). Fidelity towards the Jesus movement was regarded to be more important than belonging to a patriarchal family (cf. Jacobson 1995:364; Arnal 2001:175; see Mack 1993:136, 139-141).

Jewish villages behaved corporately, and family networks made decisions together (cf. Draper 1999:33; Horsley 1999:52-53, 297). Abandoning one’s family invariably meant abandoning the larger groups that were constituted by networks of families, resulting in an honour-shame ripple effect (see Destro & Pesce 2003:212-213; cf. Douglas 1995:123; Moxnes 2003:52). According to ancient views, the extended family and/or household structure in which an individual found him- or herself controlled and determined his or her behaviour, activity and social position (cf. Oakman 2008:249). If a child leaves, the father is perceived as being unable to control the actions of his children, bringing shame to the abandoned family. The child who leaves is also shamed by the family and the larger community, not least of all for dishonouring his or her parents and “not knowing his or her place” within the family and community (cf. Moxnes 2003:52). Moreover, young males who forsook their families “represented a provocation to the very order of the community” (Moxnes 2003:72). Young men were expected to succeed their fathers
as *paterfamilias*. With the father-child relationship severed, the traditional source of honour and identity is broken, and the young individual is left honour-less (cf. Moxnes 2003:95-96). Apart from the impact on the *honour* of both parties, abandonment also had an impact on the *sustenance* of both parties. The child who had left had, in effect, robbed the abandoned family of a pair of hands to work the fields. Conversely, the child who had left could no longer expect support from his or her family. However, if the father is the one who decides to abandon societal structures, the entire family would in most cases likely follow – although not in all cases, as is apparent from Q 16:18. The father would typically then be shamed by the greater community, and such shame would spread to the whole family. Fathers who joined the movement would have severed their ties with community-based, agricultural (or other vocational) networks, rendering them unable to provide, and thereby endangering the well-being of their entire families. Wives who left their husbands would have been shamed for dishonouring their husbands, “not knowing their place,” and giving up their virtuousness and purity (cf. Moxnes 2003:52). Joining the Q community would have left women husbandless and children fatherless, placing them in a particularly vulnerable socio-economic position. Women’s abandonment of patriarchal families would not only have had an impact on *them*, but also on the families left behind, seeing as women’s contribution to agricultural labour could sometimes be extensive, and could include, among other things, fruit gathering, animal tending and vine tending (cf. Horsley 1995a:200-201; Freyne 2000:284; Arnal 2001:114). Since economy at the lower levels of society was primarily a family endeavour, Q 16:13 might effectively represent a choice between family support and the kingdom – or Q membership, in other words (cf. Jacobson 1995:369).

Rebellious individuals and families who broke away from the community proper were faced with constant challenges from the greater community, with regard to both honour and subsistence (cf. Douglas 1995:123; Destro & Pesce 2003:215). Joining the Q movement meant being shamed, rejected and ostracised by the larger community (cf. Moxnes 2003:61, 114). Missionaries historically preached the kingdom to their co-ethnics, but not only was their kingdom-message rejected, they themselves were also
For most of the individual Q members, self-definition was no longer to be found from the most important group that traditionally served to provide a sense of self (cf. Moxnes 2003:43, 48-49). Abandoning one’s family must have been very unsettling, seeing as it implied cutting loose from the most important, and sometimes the only, location where personal identity was found (cf. Horsley 1995a:195-196; Moxnes 2003:68, 151). The fear that accompanied leaving family and abandoning self-identity is reflected in Q (see Moxnes 2003:49-51; cf. Q 9:58). As a result, fictive kinship patterns were created (cf. Freyne 2000:206; see Jacobson 1995:374-376). That the Q movement did not just advocate abandoning one’s family, but also constituted new fictive families, is clear from Q 11:11, where it is taken for granted that the men in the audience (τίς ἔστιν ἐξ ὑμῶν ἄνθρωπος) would have children (ὁ γιος αὐτοῦ) in need of support (cf. Arnal 2001:174). Since all ancient life and self-identity was rooted in, and determined by, the group, Moxnes (2003:57-58) is probably correct in claiming that the saying in Q 17:33 reflects the abandonment of patriarchal family as the locus of identity in favour of the Q movement as the new locus of personal identity.

In order to effectively replace patriarchal family as the primary locus of identity, the Q movement had to establish a new social structure, and support such a structure ideologically by means of a substitutive symbolic universe (cf. Moxnes 2003:91). An alternative symbolic universe was created by projecting a new kind of family, with God acting as the Father, Q members acting as children, and other Q members acting as siblings (cf. Q 6:36; Q 11:2-3, 13; Q 10:21-22; Q 12:22-31 for God as Father; cf. Q 6:35 for members as sons; cf. Q 6:41-42; Q 17:3 for other members as brothers). For the Q people, God replaced the traditional patriarch as the source of protection, identity, sustenance and honour (see Moxnes 2003:115-121, 152; cf. esp. Q 11:11-13). There are suggestions that common meals might have been important occasions for group and/or “family” assemblies (cf. Jacobson 1995:375; cf. e.g. Q 7:34; Q 10:7; Q 12:42; Q 13:29; Q 14:21-24). By the time Q² was composed, kinship divisions were already an established

45 Apart from all the Q passages pointing to rejection, the absence of a significant Jesus movement in Galilee during the second Century CE also indicate that the Q missionaries were largely unsuccessful in convincing their co-countrymen of the kingdom message (cf. Freyne 1988:271). If Q 10:5-15 is authentic, the failure of the Q missionaries might be continuous with Jesus’ own failure in Galilee.
fact, but still happening as the movement grew (cf. Q 12:49-53; cf. Mack 1993:204; Jacobson 1995:364). It was now held that Jesus actually intended family division when he inaugurated the kingdom of God (cf. Jacobson 1995:366; Horsley 1995b:44; Cotter 1995b:127; Moxnes 2003:58-59). Family division is now legitimised by prophetic tradition (cf. Micah 7:6), and seen as a necessary evil for the investiture of the kingdom. Jesus is associated with the tradition of the rebellious son when called a “glutton and a drunkard” (Q 7:34; cf. Qumran Scroll 11Q19 LXIV:4-6). Also at the Q² level, the greatest division is apparently between parents and children, or parents-in-law and children-in-law. These traditions might denote a situation where younger people, including the middle generation, were more attracted to the Q movement than older people (see esp. Destro & Pesce 2003:217-222; cf. also Jacobson 1995:365; Moxnes 2003:59). If Q 12:51, 53 alludes to Micah 7:6, which is highly likely, it provides further evidence of the Q group’s appeal and attractiveness for young people (cf. Jacobson 1995:365; cf. Destro & Pesce 2003:219). Nevertheless, it is very credible that at least some older people were also attracted to the movement (cf. Luke’s version of Q 12:51-53). In Q 11:19-20, Jesus reflects on the negative impact of his kingdom on family honour. Q 12:51, 53 describes the impact of the Q movement in dividing and destroying the patriarchal family (cf. Moxnes 2003:58).

Apart from those who had left their families behind in order to join the Q movement, there were probably also others who joined the Q movement because they were already without family and/or land (see Freyne 2000:284-286). In the first half of the first century CE, some families and individuals were forced off their lands, giving rise to a growing “landless class,” which constituted beggars, bandits, prostitutes and others (cf. esp. Freyne 2000:205; Arnal 2001:139-140, 146; Oakman 2008:21, 25, 224; cf. also Horsley 1995a:60, 215-216, 219; 1995b:43; Moxnes 2003:150; cf. Q 19:12-26; Mark 12:1-11; Luke 12:16-20; 16:1-17; Mat 6:12; 18:23-34; 20:1-15; Thom. 21; War 2.427; Ant. 17.271). The rise of brigandage and popular rebellions meant not only that males left their families behind, but also that many men lost their lives, both of which must have had an impact on women, either by widowing them prematurely, or by depriving them of opportunities for marriage (cf. Horsley 1995a:219-220; 1996:36, 123; Oakman 2008:13,
Seeing as marriage was the primary means through which women were able to ensure economic stability and future sustenance, a sizable group of desperate, poor and marginalised women must have lived in Galilee. With the break-up of extended families due to economic pressures, the age-old roles and honour of traditional patriarchs were considerably weakened (cf. Moxnes 2003:42). The extended and household family units were also under increasing economic pressure from the outside, rendering it less and less capable to support all its members. While the economic inability of family structures to provide for all its members motivated individuals, particularly younger individuals, to leave their homes, the diminished importance of family patriarchs and fathers must have eased the decision to leave tremendously.

The very same economic developments that weakened family structures also created profitable opportunities for young individuals outside the family structure, such as day-labouring or getting involved in village-level industries, like the fishing industry in Capernaum (cf. esp. Destro & Pesce 2003:225; Moxnes 2003:43, 149-150; cf. also Horsley 1995a:194, 201; 1996:116; Arnal 2001:109, 111, 126, 150; Chancey 2002:164; Weber 2007:460; see Freyne 2000:101-103, 110, 169-170, 188; Moreland 2007:143-157; Edwards 2007; Savage 2007). We may thus speak of both a pushing and a pulling factor motivating young people to abandon their homes. For these individuals, particularly women and younger adults, the Q movement might indeed have seemed like an attractive alternative to a patriarchal family (see Freyne 2000:285-286; Moxnes 2003:42-43). The Q movement offered a social network similar to, but different from, patriarchal families, which could fill the social vacuum created when these individuals left home or lost their husbands. The “new family” represented by the Q movement promised to elevate and accept the marginalised and those without honour, particularly women and children, as well as men who were perceived as weak by the greater community (cf. Moxnes 2003:94-95). The parable in Q 13:18-19, about the impure mustard seed sown illegally into a house garden, suggests that the Q movement was mostly made up of marginalised, impure and “displaced” people (cf. Moxnes 2003:112). The “new family” was not simply an emulation or imitation of traditional families, but crossed its borders, discarded its hierarchy and comprised a different compositional and social structure (cf. Moxnes
Although another male image, that of God as Father, replaced the traditional *paterfamilias* image, there are no indications that this new image perpetuated male supremacy (cf. Moxnes 2003:121-122, 152). Rather, the providential and protective attributes of God are emphasised, not the authoritarian aspect of his role as Father. Moreover, God’s position as *paterfamilias* was seemingly not transferable to other males in the Q group. That the Q people operated on *egalitarian* ideals is doubtable (see Elliott 2003), but that they were fictive siblings living under the imagined providential care of God is indisputable. In the end, the Q movement provided a household with a new family to those who were homeless and alone.

### 2.4 ~ THE GENRE OF Q

#### 2.4.1 Introduction

According to Kirk (1998:69), “[g]enres are patterns for structuring communication acts.” As such, genres create templates for the implementation of communicative and rhetorical strategies (cf. Kirk 1998:69). However, genre is not only invested in the form of a communication event. Genre and meaning also go hand-in-hand (cf. McLean 1995:342). Most literary theorists would agree that determination of genre is invaluable and absolutely necessary for the interpretation and understanding of any text (see Tuckett 1996:103-104; cf. also Van Aarde 1994:151). Genre does not only serve the heuristic purpose of classification for and in texts. Perhaps more importantly, it also serves a hermeneutic purpose (cf. Vorster 1981:28; Kloppenborg 1987a:2). Modern literary critics speak of “genre conception” when emphasising the importance of genre to the understanding of a text (see Hirsch 1967:78ff.). Genre conception enables one not only to understand the text as a whole, but also each of its constituent parts in relation to the whole (cf. Hirsch 1967:86; Kirk 1998:70, 71). Genre conventions determine and direct the writer’s (or speaker’s) mode and content of communication, while also guiding the reader’s (or hearer’s) interpretation and understanding of said communication (see Kirk 1998:69-70). While text producers integrate genre conventions into a text to guide readers or listeners as to the correct reading of said text, recipients engage inculcated
genre knowledge when they decipher texts (cf. Kirk 1998:71). The latter is not only guided by genre conception, but also restricted by it. Certain understandings of a text are out-rightly prohibited by the genre conception of that text. When these prescriptive conventions are ignored, misunderstanding is bound to follow. Hence, the determination of Q’s genre is indispensable for interpreting the meaning of either the document as a whole or of any constituent part thereof. Although genre is not entirely determinative of the production, reception and presentation of a text, it still plays such an irreplaceable role that any study of Q which disregards or undervalues inquiries of genre is at risk of generating untrustworthy results (cf. Kirk 1998:72).

In 1971, Robinson suggested “Sayings of the Wise” (ΛΟΓΟΙ ΣΟΦΩΝ) – referring to the Mediterranean wisdom collections customarily collected under that title (see section 2.1 above) – as a possible designation of Q’s genre (see Patterson 1998b:36-37). Perhaps because of the differences between Q and these collections, the proposed title did not catch on. Subsequent scholars, including Robinson himself, have preferred either “Sayings Source” or “Sayings Gospel” as a proper title for Q. As you would have noticed, I prefer the latter. Both designations communicate the (correct) idea that Q was a single written document, and not a number of loose-standing oral traditions (see section 2.1 above). However, the title “Sayings Source” describes Q only in relation to something else. In other words, the name “Sayings Source” could convey the idea that Q is only valued as the “source” of Matthew and Luke, and not as a free-standing document in its own right (cf. Robinson 1990:viii; see Robinson 1997). On the other hand, the designation “Sayings Gospel” confers the (correct) notion that Q is its own document, and existed as such before the canonical gospels came into being.

Furthermore, describing Q as a “gospel” is not inappropriate. The evangelists did not refer to their own literary works as “gospels” (cf. Vorster 1981:7-8). Mark does indeed begin his gospel with the opening phrase “The beginning of the gospel (τοῦ εὐαγγελίου) of Jesus Christ,” but the word “gospel” (εὐαγγέλιον) is not used (anachronistically) here as an indication of genre. “Gospel” was not yet seen as a genre at that time. Instead, Mark simply meant that this was the beginning of the “good news” of Jesus Christ, which
is what the word εὐαγγέλιον literally means (cf. Robinson 1990:vii; cf. also Newman 1993 s.v. εὐαγγέλιον). This is evidenced by the fact that neither Matthew nor Luke took over from Mark the word “gospel” to describe their literary creations – whether it be as its genre, its theme, its style or something else. Matthew introduces his gospel with the term βίβλος γενέσεως (genealogical book), which probably refers only to the first seventeen verses, and not the whole gospel. Luke (1:1) calls his gospel a διήγησις (narrative account). It was only much later that the church fathers first used the word “gospel” as a way of identifying the genre of the canonical gospels (cf. Vorster 1981:8). Still, not all the church fathers used the word “gospel” as a designation for (the genre of) the canonicals gospels. Justin, for example, called the canonical gospels ἀπομνημονεύματα (memories of the apostles) (cf. Apo. 66.3). The unique content, structure and composition of each canonical gospel even convinced some scholars that each of these texts should be seen as a different genre. Schulz (1964:138, 141, 143), for example, held that Mark should be seen as a gospel, Matthew as a homology, Luke as a vita or historia (biography or history), and John as a composition of revelatory speeches and semeia (miracle stories).

In view of all this, it is perhaps not even justified to speak of the canonical gospels as “gospels” (cf. Gundry 1974:114; Vorster 1981:26). However, seeing as we are in all probability stuck with this designation, we might as well continue using it – as long as we do not then claim that the literary works of the evangelists have “sole custody” of, and exclusive entitlement to, this designation. The happenstance that a certain text is conveyed in a narrative structure or form is not supportive evidence that it might be a gospel. Conversely, the lack of a narrative framework or structure does not mean that the text in question can not be classified as a gospel (cf. Meyer 2003:39). As far as our earliest sources, including the canonical gospels, were concerned, a “gospel” (εὐαγγέλιον) was any text, written or oral, that purported to be telling people about the “good news” of Jesus and/or the “good news” of the kingdom of God (cf. e.g. Mat 11:5; 26:13; Mark 1:15; 8:35; 10:29; 13:10; 14:9; 16:15; Luke 4:18; 7:22; 9:6; 20:1; Acts 8:25; 14:7, 21; 15:7; 16:10; 20:24; Rom 1:1, 9, 15, 16; 2:16; 10:15, 16; 11:28; 15:16, 19, 20, 29; 16:26). The exact content of the good news differs from one text to another. Some
may tell about the “good news” of Jesus’ sacrificial death and/or resurrection, while others may convey the “good news” of his miracles. Still others may proclaim the content of Jesus’ teachings and message as “good news.” Jesus himself is often described as preaching the “gospel,” usually not about himself, but about the kingdom of God (cf. e.g. Mat 4:23; 9:35; 24:14; Mark 1:14).

Crossan (1998:31-40) distinguishes between four “types” of gospels, of which “sayings gospels” (like Q) is one, and “biography gospels” (like the canonical gospels) is another (cf. also Meyer 2003:39; Van Aarde & Dreyer 2010:4 n. 14). That Q purports and desires to preach (or rather “teach”) the “good news” is without any doubt. Q 7:22 claims that Jesus “brought the good news” (εὐαγγελίζονται) to the poor (cf. Robinson 1990:vii; Meyer 2003:40) – a task that Q took over from Jesus, and ran with (cf. Q 6:20, 29-30; 10:24; 11:2-4, 9-13, 39-52; 12:6-7, 22-31, 33-34; 13:30, 34-35; 14:11, 16-23; 15:4-10; 16:13; 22:28, 30). The evangelists even seem to realise that the content of Q was “good news.” The Sermon on the Mount, which Matthew took over from Q, is described by him as “the good news of the kingdom” (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς βασιλείας) (cf. Mat 4:23; 9:35; cf. Robinson 1990:vii; Meyer 2003:40). Lastly, that ancients could see a document containing only the sayings of Jesus as a “gospel” is specifically evidenced by the Coptic version of the Gospel of Thomas, which opens with the (appended) heading “The Gospel according to Thomas” (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:90). For all these reasons, an ever-increasing number of scholars, especially in North America, are now, as a matter of course, referring to Q as the “Sayings Gospel” (see Neirynck 1995b:421-430; cf. Neirynck 2001:57, esp. n. 14).

Much more important than the semantic question of what to label the Q document is the literary question of which genre from antiquity Q best resembles. Q is arguably one of the most difficult texts when it comes to determining its genre – an issue that has led to widespread disagreement and controversy among scholars. Ever since Q’s “discovery,” scholars have been struggling to determine its genre, not least of all because it contains small forms of more than one type of genre. As with the rest of the historical-Jesus debate, the main rift was between those who advocated an (imminent) eschatological
understanding of Q and those who promoted an ethical and/or sapiential understanding of Q (see section 1.3.7 above). In the meantime, scholarship had realised that the themes of apocalypticism, prophecy and wisdom were not antithetical, mutually exclusive or incompatible for the authors of antiquity (cf. esp. Tuckett 1996:334; Horsley 1999:77; cf. also Edwards 1976:46; Piper 1989:159; Frey 2011:22). On the contrary, some obvious examples of ancient literature that mix apocalyptic and wisdom material, are: Proverbs 8, 1 Isaiah, Matthew, the Didache, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, 4 Ezra, Tobit, the Similitudes of Enoch, and the Wisdom of Solomon (cf. esp. Allison 1997:4; cf. also Kloppenborg 1987a:37; see Theissen & Merz 1998:372-374). Ancient writers even attributed some individual sayings to both genres (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:37). This accords well with the tremendous diversity of early Christian texts, views and movements (cf. Tuckett 1996:66). The inclusion of both apocalyptic and sapiential material in the same document was not only a feature of early Christian writings, but also of other ancient writings, like, for example, the foundational sources about Mohammed, including the Qur’an (cf. Allison, in Miller 2001:111).

In general, ancient genres were not as exclusive as modern genres, and ancient writings sometimes mixed genres freely (cf. Allison 1997:41; contra Oakman 2008:3). This phenomenon occurred in both directions. Prophetic or apocalyptic material would employ sapiential forms and vice versa (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:380; see Edwards 1976:71-73; Sato 1995:141-142; Piper 1989:137-155). However, this occurrence does not turn prophetic and apocalyptic genres into wisdom, or wisdom material into prophetic or apocalyptic books (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:37; 2000a:181; see Edwards 1976:44-46). The ancient rationale behind the incorporation of apocalypticism into sapiential writings is explained concisely and effectively by the pseudepigraphical Jewish writing 4 Maccabees (1:16): “Wisdom, I submit, is knowledge of things divine and human, and of their causes.” The Judaism of the first century was the heyday of both apocalypticism and wisdom (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:373). Both traditions were seen as a way to bypass the Jerusalem cult and the Torah in gaining direct access to God.46

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46 However, Torah obedience was always reinforced by apocalypticism and only sometimes reinforced by wisdom.
Apocalypticism did this by claiming to have glimpsed the next world, while wisdom did this by claiming to have direct access to Sophia. Both traditions produced a never-before-seen wealth of Jewish literature.

**2.4.2 Wisdom, prophecy or apocalypticism?**

If wisdom and apocalyptic (and/or prophetic) material are not incompatible, one question still remains: Should Q be seen as being part of the prophetic, apocalyptic or wisdom genre? In other words, is Q a wisdom collection that contains some (albeit important) apocalyptic and prophetic themes, or is Q an apocalyptic and/or prophetic book containing some (albeit important) wisdom material? With regard to apocalypticism, most scholars would agree that the eschatological and/or apocalyptic nature of Q (specifically) is subsidiary to and in service of its prophetic and/or sapiential function as a genre (cf. Horsley 1999:72, 74; see Kloppenborg 1987b:292-303). For the most part, previous views of the intrinsic and all-encompassing nature of apocalypticism as a category of Q’s genre have recently been abandoned (cf. Horsley 1999:72). The current debate is rather concerned with choosing between prophetic and sapiential designations for Q’s genre. This does not mean that the apocalyptic character of Q is discarded. On the contrary! Identifying Q as a prophetic genre would accommodate an apocalyptic view of the historical Jesus, since apocalyptic content was often formally advocated by means of prophetic writings (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:249). Thus, if Q is demonstrated to be a prophetic writing, Jesus could be seen as an apocalyptic prophet, particularly if themes of apocalypticism predominate. There have been proponents on both sides of the spectrum, claiming either sapiential or prophetic predominance (see Tuckett 1996:327-329). There have also been those in the middle, who refuse to choose between the two genres, claiming that the two are not mutual rivals (see Tuckett 1996:328-329).

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47 Although such debates are still alive and well as far as the whole of the Jesus tradition is concerned (cf. Oakman 2008:103).
Most scholars opting for a prophetic designation do so because of the sheer bulk of prophetic material in Q, not least of all the overwhelming presence of the “judgment” theme (cf. Tuckett 1996:342; see e.g. Edwards 1976:50-54). Boring (1991:231) takes this criterion to its logical extreme by calculating the percentages of prophetic material within Q. This line of argumentation is inherently flawed. Percentages of small genres say nothing about the framework genre of Q (see Kirk 1998:46-47). Tuckett (1996:346-354) claims that a lot of Q¹ material is blatantly “un-sapiential” and determined more by futuristic eschatology than wisdom as such.48 Boring (1991:323) makes a similar point, claiming that the immediacy of revelation characteristic of Q coheres more with the prophetic genre, which is immediate, than the wisdom genre, which is timeless (cf. also Horsley 1999:66; see Sato 1995:141-142, 150). However, Boring is simply wrong, as there are many intertextual examples of wisdom material typified by revelatory wisdom (see Kirk 1998:45-46; see e.g. Sirach 24, Wis. Sol. 7-9, Pseudo-Phocylides 1-2, Golden Verses 46-48; Hesiod’s Works and Days). Tuckett’s “evidence” for calling texts within Q¹ “un-sapiential” is that some of the sayings teach ideas which are contradictory to conventional wisdom traditions – like, according to Tuckett, Q 12:22-31 (see also Horsley 1999:88-89). In other words, although the structure and form of much of Q¹ cohere with the Instructional genre, the content does not. However, this is not evidence that something is not wisdom, it is simply evidence that it might represent subversive and/or aphoristic wisdom (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:320; Kirk 1998:306). The same kind of “evidence” could be used against the genre designation of Qohelet, which also calls traditional wisdom into question, but no serious scholar today would consider Qohelet to be anything else than wisdom literature (cf. Kirk 1998:46).49 Q (10:21) itself admits that the content of its wisdom is not in line with that of traditional sages, but based on the unconventional teachings of Jesus (cf. Horsley 1999:118).

49 Tuckett (1996:332-334) does make mention of these internal shifts in wisdom literature and even refers to Qohelet, but still goes on to argue that traditional wisdom should be seen as the only proper definition of what wisdom really is. This narrow understanding of “wisdom” permeates his whole argument against the sapiential nature of Q.
Although some of the literary forms of wisdom were remarkably stable for more than a millennium, the content of wisdom was not stagnant, but forced to change and adapt according to new insights, situations, contexts and paradigms (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:382, 385; Kirk 1998:93; see Mack 1993:45-46). Tuckett’s definition of wisdom is simply far too narrow.\(^{50}\) He sees wisdom simply as a genre of material that tries to “explain” the world, and make “general observations about life in general” (Tuckett 1996:334, 342; cf. also Sato 1995:141). The wisdom genre, however, lends itself to, and contains, very broad applications and references (cf. Vorster 1999:312). Apart from instruction on ethical behaviour and lifestyle choices, wisdom is also concerned with matters such as intelligence, practical skills, craftsmanship and governance. Tuckett maintains that a definition of wisdom should not include elements of apocalypticism or prophecy, for this would stretch the category so much that “wisdom” could include almost anything and become useless as a designation of genre (see Tuckett 1996:333-337). This conviction is unconvincing, however, in view of the fact that Tuckett (1996:335, 349-354) admits that a lot of Q should be seen as wisdom, but then wisdom shaped by prophetic themes and eschatological concerns (cf. also Edwards 1976:42). If the category of “wisdom genre” loses its heuristic appeal when it is shown to contain elements of prophecy and apocalypticism, then, by the same token, the category of “prophetic genre” should lose its heuristic appeal if it is shown to contain elements of wisdom. One can not help but wonder why “prophecy” is not in danger of becoming useless as a designation of genre with the discovery of sapiential elements within it. As a genre, wisdom has historically been much more inclusive of other genres than has been the case with prophecy (cf. Crenshaw 1976:953).

\(^{50}\) It is perhaps interesting to note that, according to Tuckett (1996:161-163), Kloppenborg’s definition of “apocalypticism” is too narrow and restrictive. Tuckett does, however, agree with Kloppenborg’s overall analysis of the nature of Q’s apocalypticism: “Q’s ‘apocalyptic’ language is at times unusual in relation to other contemporary uses of such language in being somewhat negative, and also being generated within a rather more world-affirming ethos than some other apocalyptic language.” So, we have here a case of Tuckett and Kloppenborg agreeing both that Q contains wisdom and apocalypticism and that the content and nature of those two elements in Q differ from other contemporary wisdom and apocalyptic texts.
2.4.3 Kloppenborg and Sato

Kloppenborg (1987a) argued convincingly that $Q^1$ should be seen as part of the Instructional genre, and that $Q^2$ must be seen as a *chreia* collection. Such internal shifts were somewhat common in wisdom literature and a relevant example is the Gospel of Thomas, which shifted from aphoristic instruction to another distinctive style of instruction (cf. Mack 1993:182). The manner in which the formative stratum was redacted – i.e. by catchword and thematic connections – also conforms to the compositional techniques employed by the wisdom genre (see Kloppenborg 1987a:322-323). Overall, Q exhibits minor peculiarities when compared to other wisdom material. Firstly, in the formative stratum, the author does not speak in the voice of the parent, like in most other Instructions (cf. Horsley 1999:81). However, the unconventional ethic promoted by Q, especially its relative and contemptuous view of the patriarchal family, explains its apprehension to draw upon parental instruction (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:318-319; 2000a:159; cf. Q 9:59-60; Q 14:26-27; see section 2.3 above). As such, Q forms part of a larger movement within wisdom literature that tended to relativise the conventional importance placed on family bonds (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:319; Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:159). *Chreia* collections almost entirely lacked any references to parental instruction (see Kloppenborg 1987a:313-314).

Secondly (and subsequently), Q does not convey conventional wisdom, but aphoristic or subversive wisdom (see Horsley 1999:81-82). The usual truisms, principles and proverbial wisdom characteristic of Instructions in particular make way for imperatives, injunctions, extreme examples, and evocative imagery more characteristic of aphoristic wisdom (cf. Mack 1993:45). These observations, however, are not a designation of a framework genre shift (from wisdom to prophetic, for example), but of an internal genre shift (from one type of wisdom genre to another). Thirdly, the mention of John the Baptist and Jesus is not, according to Tuckett (1996:342), a characteristic feature of wisdom collections, which apparently tended to be anonymous. This may be true of the more tradition wisdom collections, but certainly not of later developments. Attributing a saying to a particular sage was not only the territory of *chreiai*, but also a distinctive
feature of the Instructional genre (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:265, 277, 306, 317). In any case, the authority afforded Jesus by the Q people more than validates his name appearing in their principal faith document. Lastly, the regular use of the second person plural is discontinuous with the more usual use of the second person singular in wisdom literature (cf. Tuckett 1996:343). The high probability that Q is addressed to a faith community of sorts (see sections 2.5.4 & 2.3), and not just to people in general, explains its use of the second person plural. In other words, unlike most other Instructions and chreia collections, Q is not just wisdom for wisdom’s sake, but wisdom promoting a particular life practice for a specific community.

In the end, these “peculiarities” can all be explained if the specificity of Q, among other comparable wisdom material, is accounted for. Genre was never stagnant, but fluctuated. Genres were adapted and transformed to address particular (and changing) circumstances within particular (and changing) communities. Furthermore, producers of literary texts had tremendous freedom to work with when applying genre conventions to their compositions, with genre conventions supplying the raw parameters within which such innovation could be applied (cf. Kirk 1998:70, 77). As such, none of these “discrepancies” invalidate Kloppenborg’s stratification model, or his attribution of genre to the various Q layers. Q is still a wisdom genre, regardless of whether or not it displays every single traditional characteristic of that genre (see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:382-383). Although there have been objections to these results, which we shall consider in detail later, no one to my knowledge has proposed an alternative genre(s) for Q which was based on a similarly detailed, thoroughgoing literary and rhetorical exposition of the Q text (cf. Tuckett 1996:73, 345; see also Piper 1995b:3-4; McLean 1995:333-334).

Migaku Sato (1988), however, is an example of difference (cf. Tuckett 1996:329). Like Kloppenborg, he also gives literary considerations precedence, and works from the final macro-text “downwards” to its constituent sayings and clusters (cf. Catchpole 1993:60). Sato compares Q to prophetic books, distinguishing three formal and structural features evident in both. Firstly, he claims that the divine origin of sayings is a feature of Q comparable to other prophetic books. Sato sees evidence of this feature in Q 10:16, Q
10:22, Q 11:49 and Q 11:51b. However, he ignores the fact that Q lacks the most important literary formula of that genre, namely “thus says the Lord” (τάδε λέγει ὁ κύριος), or, in fact, any reference to divine speech whatsoever (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:321; Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:142; Kirk 1998:51, 88). In Q, God never speaks. There are none of the usual visions, oracles or framing formulas one would normally attach to the prophetic genre. Furthermore, associating the sage with divine Sophia was also a regular feature of Instructional wisdom genres (cf. Kirk 1998:51; see e.g. Prov 1-9; Sirach; Shube-awilum). As with Boring (see above), Sato is simply wrong in thinking that the wisdom genre does not contain revelatory material (cf. Kirk 1998:51).

The second feature identified by Sato is that Q, similar to other prophetic material, names the human tradent of the divine sayings. However, if Q is a prophetic book, it is the only one with two prophets operating alongside one another. Sato’s claims that John has no independent relevance for Q, and that Jesus is the actual prophet, do not convince. Furthermore, naming a human figure is not a distinctively prophetic feature. To the contrary. Wisdom traditions are often attributed to named sages (see Kloppenborg 1987a:263-316). This is especially true of Instructions and chreia collections, with the latter sometimes even naming the collector (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:306). In fact, the chreia is predicated upon the significance of the sage (cf. Kirk 1998:46). Aphoristic wisdom, by calling traditional wisdom into question, necessarily needs to be associated with the individuality of the sage (cf. Kirk 1998:46). Thirdly, Sato extrapolates prophetic micro-genres from Q, including call narratives, doom oracles, visions, woes, eschatological correlatives, admonitions, makarisms and proclamations of salvation and

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51 Edwards’ (1976:48-49) attempt to define the occurrences of the emphatic introductory formula “[Truly,] I say to you” ([ἀμὴν / ἁληθῶς] λέγω ὑμῖν) in Q as prophetic formulas comparable to “Thus says the Lord” should not be accepted. Plainly, these two formulas are not the same thing. Whereas the former emphasises the content of a statement, whether that be a sapiential or prophetic statement, the latter invokes divine authority. The formula “[Truly,] I say to you” could indeed be appealing to the authority of Jesus, but would that be his authority as sage or as prophet? It is certainly not his authority as God. Q betrays absolutely no knowledge of Jesus as the second person in the Trinity. Such Christological elaboration antedates Q. Appealing to the authority of Jesus is not the same as appealing to the authority of God! In a discussion of Q 12:22-23, Edwards (1976:124) says: “Although it opens with the prophetic introduction (Therefore I tell you), the saying itself is a wisdom admonition.” Should this not be evidence enough that the so-called “prophetic introduction” was not intended by Q as a prophetic formula at all? This saying rather supports the idea that the phrase “[Truly,] I say to you” was intended to emphasise and legitimise Jesus’ wisdom?
condemnation. As for the first of these micro-genres, it is doubtful whether the baptism of Jesus should be seen as a prophetic call story, even if it is accepted to be part of Q. When we first meet Jesus (Q 6:20), there is an obvious lack of any prophetic formulas. Even if Sato succeeds in indicating that all these micro-genres are prophetic in nature, it still says nothing about the framework genre of Q (cf. Kirk 1998:51). Individual units of a literary document should always be interpreted in relation to their larger literary contexts (cf. Horsley 1999:84). In addition, Sato also illustrates that Q lacks important elements also absent in prophetic material, like parables, miracle stories (for their own sake) and an account of the prophet’s death. Sato, however, has to divorce Luke 14-19 from Q in order to eliminate any possibility of the presence of parabolic material in Q. Furthermore, the death of the sage is not always expressed by wisdom books either (see Kirk 1998:50-51). Despite these methodological flaws, the whole of Sato’s last argument is an argument *ad silencium*.

Overall, the rhetoric of the Sayings Gospel, like that of other wisdom documents, appeals to nature and ordinary human transactions (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:321). Most notably lacking from Q are rhetorical appeals to God’s authority, an integral feature of all prophetic literature. In other words, Q’s rhetoric tries to convince in a manner more at home with a wisdom document than a prophetic document. Kloppenborg Verbin (2000a:141) agrees with Sato both that Q contains substantial portions of prophetic speech patterns and that Q as a whole should not be seen as sapiential. Nonetheless, Sato’s compositional analysis is flawed in that it requires him both to divorce large chunks of material from Q, and to render significant blocks of material as “unmotivated” additions. In the end, Sato’s compositional analysis fails to prove perhaps the most important element of his analysis, i.e. that Q is *framed* as a prophetic book (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:142). Sato (1988:4) does attempt to show that the inaugural sermon is framed by prophetic material, namely Q 6:20-23 and Q 6:47-49 (cf. also Hoffmann 1995:188). However, he expressly states that Q 6:20-23 is a wisdom text, which only infiltrated prophetic material secondarily (cf. Kirk 1998:51).

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“eschatologisation” of the beatitudes in Q 6:20-23 is not evidence of them having been transformed into prophetic material (see Kirk 1998:51-52; cf. Patterson, in Miller 2001:77). Sato (1988:208) himself acknowledges the eschatological tendencies of wisdom literature conceived during the Hellenistic period. Also, it is not at all clear that Q 6:47-49 should necessarily be read as a prophetic passage, if at all. Sato (1988:79-85, 94-95) further acknowledges that there are certain crucial discrepancies between Q and other prophetic material. Jesus is not just a prophet, but a more exalted figure, indispensable for individual salvation. The themes of discipleship and mission are foreign to prophetic material. The way in which John and Jesus are juxtaposed does not have an equivalent in prophetic material. Lastly, the abundance of parables and blessings is unusual for a prophetic book. The difference between these peculiarities noted by Sato and the discrepancies of Kloppenborg’s genre determination is that the former transgresses beyond the parameters of prophetic genre conventions, whereas the latter applies innovation within the boundaries of wisdom literature. In any case, Sato (1995) seems to have readjusted his earlier contentions to align somewhat substantially with those of Kloppenborg.

2.4.4 Scholarly confusion

Scholars are not confused about the fact that Kloppenborg sees the formative stratum as a wisdom layer. However, many of them are confused about the (literary and rhetorical) reasons why Kloppenborg assigns Q¹ to the Instructional genre. This is true even though Kloppenborg Verbin (2000a:159) explains his reasons for doing so:

To argue that Q¹ conforms to the genre of an “instruction” is to assert a “family resemblance” between Q and other documents typically designated “instructions.” This is asserted in the first place on the basis of Q¹’s dominant grammatical forms, then the nature of argumentation (its warrants and methods), then the nature of the authorial “voice,” and finally, its typical idioms and tropes. The designation “instruction” does not rest on a subjective judgment about its theological orientation – that is, that it is “sapiential” rather than “prophetic” or “apocalyptic.”
Moreover, Q¹ reflects on the instructional process itself, contemplating master-student relationships, the importance of good guidance, the value of good speech, the need for exemplary behaviour, and the process of (re)searching what is hidden but knowable (cf. Q 6:40-49; Q 10:16; Q 14:26-27; Q 17:1-2; Q 12:2; see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:197-198). Jesus and God are put forward as mimetic ideals (cf. Q 6:35-36; Q 9:58; Q 11:13; Q 12:3; Q 14:26-27; cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:198). The framework genre of the formative layer treats wisdom topoi (cf. Kirk 1998:271). Within the genre-argument, scholars constantly ignore another important reality, probably sidetracked by the titles “sapiential” and “prophetic” bestowed upon each layer respectively. Regardless of the content or titles given to the two layers, both genres put forward by Kloppenborg (i.e. Instruction and chreia) are instructional wisdom genres (cf. Catchpole 1993:60; Kirk 1998:78). Fair enough, content is perhaps just as important as form and structure when it comes to genre determination (see Kirk 1998:75-76). However, the ambiguous nature of Q’s content urges Kloppenborg (1987a:38) to give precedence to framing devices and formulae over content when determining Q’s genre.

The innovation and flexibility afforded producers of individual texts, referred to earlier, included the mixing of genres (cf. Kirk 1998:77). This (partly) explains why ancients did not see prophetic and wisdom material as being mutually exclusive. In such cases, when genres are mixed, it is critical to determine the framework genre, since it is the framework genre (Makrogattung) that organises constituent small genres (Mikrogattungen) into a coherent whole (cf. Vorster 1981:25-26; Catchpole 1993:60; Kirk 1998:77; cf. also Horsley 1999:84). The framework genre structures a text into a hierarchy of sorts, by placing certain small genres in predominant positions, and other small genres in subordinate positions (see Kirk 1998:77-78). The former informs the recipients as to the rhetorical intent of the text as a whole, whereas the latter lends support to the overall argument by strengthening or amplifying it. After analysing a number of Instructions, Kirk (1998:149) shows that one of the recurrent features of the genre is an “implicit or explicit threat of divine sanction.”53 The latter coheres unsurprisingly with the essential deed-consequence reasoning of much sapiential rhetoric,

53 Emphasis original.
which places the consequences of behaviour within a divinely-sanctioned cosmic order (cf. Kirk 1998:149). As such, it is easy to see how Instructions would utilise prophetic forms, such as pronouncements of judgment and woes, in support of its framework genre. The assimilation of prophetic material makes even more sense for aphoristic wisdom, which attempts to subvert the current social structure in exchange for a different one (see Kirk 1998:335-336).

In his genre-criticism of Q, Kirk (1998:88, 152-403) managed to demonstrate (rather conclusively) that wisdom comprises the framework genre of Q, with prophetic micro-genres employed to support the framework rhetoric. By contrast, Sato’s (1995:157) best explanation for the presence of sapiential blocks in Q is that they “can rightly co-exist with the prophetic sayings.” Q is a wisdom text comparable to other wisdom texts of the time, including Sirach, Wisdom of Solomon, Pseudo-Phocylides and the Pythagorean Golden Verses (cf. Kirk 1998:399). In his third chapter, Hirsch (1967), a literary theorist, distinguishes between levels of genre. The first level is the broadest. Each level thereafter becomes more and more specific. It is at the lowest level that texts show their individuality. At the highest level, Q should probably be seen as a wisdom text. At the lower levels, the importance of prophetic and apocalyptic themes start to become important. It is at these lower levels that one can see Q as a specific kind of wisdom collection, namely one that includes a lot of futuristic, eschatological, apocalyptic and prophetic themes. These types of themes were indeed characteristic of wisdom literature composed during the Hellenistic period (cf. Kirk 1998:52). The main redaction of Q shows continuity with Q¹ when it comes to its genre, as determined by literary and rhetorical considerations.

Q² contains deliberate structuring devices and purposeful pragmatic unities, both adhering to the genre known as a chreia collection (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:209).\footnote{According to Sato (1995:140), the genre of chreia collections is “too formal and abstract” to say anything about the content of Q. He maintains that many prophetic books could also be seen as chreia collections, simply because they are introduced by introductory remarks. These are two separate objections. The latter doesn’t value the specificity of chreia collections over against other genres with introductory remarks.} Much of the prophetic sayings in Q are presented as reactions to specific
situations, meaning that they are structured as *chreiai* (see Q 3:7-9, 16-17; Q 11:14-26; Q 11:16, 29-32, 33-36; see Kloppenborg 1987a:168-169). When compared to other *chreia* collections from antiquity, Q² (and Q as a whole) is one of the more sophisticated example of the genre (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:323-324; Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:209). To be sure, it is a different sub-genre than that of Q¹. Nevertheless, as a genre, it still attempts to be wisdom. *Chreiai* were collected, serialised and attributed to *sages* – experts in *wisdom* (see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:160-161, 306-307). This is what most opponents of Kloppenborg fail to acknowledge or comprehend. Although Q² displays prophetic and apocalyptic *themes*, it still attempts to be wisdom by fashioning such themes within a wisdom mould (or framework genre). *Chreia* collections were, as a matter of fact, very adaptable to different sorts of contents (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:163). Once again, scholars fail or refuse to understand the *literary* and *rhetorical* reasons why Kloppenborg relates Q² to the genre of a *chreia* collection:

Whereas at the formative stratum the dominant grammatical form was the hortatory imperative buttressed with a variety of programmatic statements, motive clauses, and concluding warnings, the main redaction contains woes, warnings of judgment, and prophetic correlatives. It also includes chriae occasioned by a healing (7:1-10), a question from John the Baptist (7:18-23, 24-28, 31-35), and two challenges to Jesus (11:14-23, 29-32). The presence of prophetic sayings does not, however, turn Q into *chresmologoi* – an oracle collection. For although prophetic forms are present and the examples of prophets are invoked (6:22-23; 7:26; 10:23-24; 11:32, 49-51; 13:34-35), and while an Elijah-like figure is described in 3:16-17; 7:22, most of the sayings of Q² are framed as chriae rather than as direct oracles. Q employs the technique of extending or elaborating an initial chria by appending additional chriae, or by attaching further sayings to the initial chria.

(Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:202)

*Chreia* collections sandwiched a wisdom saying within a context to highlight the innovation and originality of the sage. The purpose was to show that the sage practiced what he preached, not simply to provide some kind of abstract background. The former objection fails to detect the literary and rhetorical reasons for the genre identification.
In other words, although there are isolated examples of prophetic forms in individual Q units, the compositional framing of the document coheres to that of the wisdom genre (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:381). Form criticism might be able to isolate prophetic forms within Q, but it will also be obliged not to ignore the existence of sapiential forms within Q. It is redaction- and composition-criticism that identifies Q as a wisdom book, by taking serious the literary features, rhetorical strategies, structuring tendencies, and compositional modus operandi of the macro-structure (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:381). A futurist eschatology is not evidence for determination of genre. Neither does it disprove the determination of Q as a wisdom book (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:385). Although older wisdom collections tended to focus on the present, later developments, like the sapiential Qumran texts and the Wisdom of Solomon, entertained hopes and expectations for the future (cf. Kirk 1998:52; see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:385-386).

According to Mack (1993:153-159), the framers of Q introduced John into the narrative in order to align Jesus’ former role as wisdom teacher with his supplementary role as apocalyptic prophet. Seeing as ancients did not perceive an incongruity between the two identifications, this is unlikely. John’s presence in Q is perhaps better explained as a component of Q’s prehistory, necessitated by its authenticity (cf. Tuckett 1996:109). Narratively, John’s introduction also functions to prepare the audience for what is to come (cf. Edwards 1976:55; see Cotter 1995a). Comparable to other ancient literature, John’s anticipatory sermon programmatically introduces themes for the rest of Q (see Kirk 1998:395-396). Whether Q² was chronologically second or not is inconsequential with regard to the fact that it undeniably displays literary features of a wisdom genre, and, inasmuch, shows continuity with Q¹. The Sayings Gospel Q as a whole should therefore be seen as a wisdom collection displaying themes and micro-forms of prophetic judgment and apocalypticism. These latter themes are much more pertinent in Q², but still conveyed in the overall literary composition and structure that is wisdom. Even if the redactional stratum came chronologically second, it still attached enough worth to the “more sapiential” stratum to retain it as part of their fundamental “faith” document. The wisdom element of their “faith” remained important, even if they were at a later stage.
consumed with apology and boundary-related concerns (cf. Mack 1993:164). It might even have been *more* important at this stage (cf. Mack 1993:164).

Sophia herself also features in the main redaction and forms an integral part of the apocalyptic-prophetic themes encountered in Q². The prophetic themes and the Sophia theme are inseparably conflated, and equally important, for Q²’s theology. This last statement is evident in the fact that each of the prophetic themes *and* the Sophia theme receive redactional emphasis at various points in Q² (see Tuckett 1996:195-196). Tuckett (1996:351) claims that Q uses the Sophia image to emphasise the prophetic aspect of the Sayings Gospel. This remains to be shown, however. If anything, the Sophia concept is perhaps afforded *primary* importance on a semantic level. *She* is the agent who sends the prophets and announces judgment on their persecutors (Q 11:49-51). Sophia is thus superior to the prophets in that she sends them to deliver *her* message to Israel. Jesus is seen as the final prophet and messenger of Sophia (see Tuckett 1996:220-221, 281-282). In a way, then, Sophia is even superior to Jesus as the Agent who sends him – that is if Jesus is not to be wholly identified with Sophia (see section 2.2.4 above).

### 2.4.5 The temptation story

On its own, the temptation story (Q 4:1-13) should be seen as a narrative (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:246). However, the function of the temptation story within the context of Q is to demonstrate and legitimate the hero’s virtue (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:261, 326). A heroic career is projected for Jesus. His teachings must then subsequently validate this claim. Conversely, Jesus’ teachings are put in a mythical context by the temptation story, and thereby legitimised before they are even taught. Jesus’ particular ethic is illustrated paradigmatically by the temptation story, and thereafter further developed and justified by his teachings (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:327). The hearers are assured that their attention to what follows will not be in vain. The temptation story is not dissimilar to Greco-Roman ordeal stories found at the beginning of such biographies (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:261). Also common was the ordeal or temptation of the wise man at the beginning of wisdom Instructions (see Kloppenborg
1987a:260, 278-279; see e.g. prologues of Amenemhat I; Aesop; Ahikar; Ankhsheshonq; Sentences of Secundus; Demonax). The “testing”, “temptation” or “ordeal” of the sage is a prominent theme at the beginning of many wisdom texts (see Kloppenborg 1987a:279, 326-327; see e.g. Prov 1:10-11, Sirach 2:1, 4-5; Wis. Sol. 1:16-2:20). *Chreia* collections are also preoccupied with the biographies of their sages (cf. Kirk 1998:400). If the formative and redactional strata of Q should be seen as wisdom, then the narrative prologue of Q should be seen as an attempt to legitimise that wisdom. The temptation story is thus in service of the macro-genre, and should therefore also be seen as part of the deployment of wisdom in Q. It serves to legitimise not only the sage, but his Q teachings as well. Although the temptation story is a step in the narrative direction, the purpose it served in Q, just before Matthew and Luke used it, was subordinate to, and in service of, the overall wisdom genre. The nature of Q as a wisdom collection is not violated or discontinued by the introduction of a narrative prologue (see Kloppenborg 1987a:327-328). Attaching a legitimising prologue to the beginning of a sayings collection was simply an option available to wisdom collections of antiquity.

2.5 ~ ETHNICITY AND Q

2.5.1 Introduction

At the very beginning of Greek civilisation, the word ἔθνος, from whence the English word “ethnicity” originates, could refer to just about any type of group, including, among others, flocks of birds, bands of warriors, a trade association, or the inhabitants of a village, town, city or region (see Duling 2012:297-298). Yet, at the commencement of the Hellenistic period, and throughout its duration, the word ἔθνος became increasingly used as a way of referencing “other,” meaning non-Greek, groups of people. Ancient Jews used the Greek word ἔθνος and the Hebrew equivalent יָּעָם exclusively in reference to groups of “other” people (see Duling 2012:299-300). These terms were used either in a neutral manner or in a negative manner. The latter usage emphasised the oppositional “otherness” of the outsider group.
Ethnic identity is achieved and maintained through boundary formation and maintenance. The latter happens in two ways simultaneously: (1) Like-minded individuals and groups come together to form a larger ethnic group – a process and stance that is called the “us” aggregative self-definition. (2) Ethnic groups demarcate themselves from “others” who are different – a process and stance that is called the “us-they” oppositional self-definition. Five key approaches to the social-scientific idea of “ethnicity” can be identified (see Duling 2012:292-294). The first, Primordialism, which was first introduced by Shils (1957) and Geertz (1963), maintains that “natural affections” hold ethnic groups together. Hence, internal bonds between individuals and smaller groups (like families and clans) are so powerful, compelling and passionate that they are cemented into the very fibre of an ethnic group. These bonds are indescribable and are maintained involuntarily, being deeply rooted in language, territory, custom, family and religion. These foundations determine group behaviour, group norms and group values. Two noteworthy factions constitute this first approach. Socio-biological Primordialists explain ethnic group formation and solidarity as an evolutionary strategy intended to increase the chances of survival during natural selection. Conversely, Cultural Primordialists, who constitute the majority, explain ethnic group formation and solidarity as both “natural” and culturally generated. The second social-scientific approach to “ethnicity,” Constructionism, was first introduced by Frederik Barth (1969). It argues that ethnic identity and solidarity is not natural, fixed or inherent, but freely chosen and fluid. According to this view, boundaries are constantly and perpetually being constructed and reconstructed. These social-scientists argue that, although the “cultural stuff” of any ethnic group (like place of origin, eating habits and dress codes) are important for boundary formation and maintenance, the act itself of forming and maintaining boundaries is all-important. Whereas the Primordialists focus on ethnic features, Constructionists focus on understanding the reasons behind and methods of boundary formation and maintenance.

The remaining approaches to “ethnicity” are all rooted in Constructionism. The third approach to “ethnicity,” Instrumentalism, argues that ethnic groups construct identities consciously and out of self-interest. Ethnic identity and boundary formation are
motivated by political and economic agendas. The fourth is known as the Social Psychological approach and takes Instrumentalism further. It holds that the creation of kinship myths, the establishment of ethnocentricity and the tendency to stereotype outsiders are all based on the economic, political and social advantages enjoyed by ethnic groups. The last approach is known as the Ethno-symbolic approach. It argues that, even though ethnic groups constantly change and adapt, they are able to endure because of their nostalgic attachment to the past, which finds expression in various myths and symbols. Today, the Constructionist approach is upheld by most social scientists, although these scholars still disagree about whether ethnic identity is involuntary or self-interested (see Duling 2012:293-294). Duling (2012:294-296) constructs a model of ethnic identity out of nine aspects of “cultural stuff,” or “cultural features of ethnicity.” These aspects are: (1) an ethnic group’s name; (2) common ancestral myths; (3) shared “historical” memories; (4) “phenotypical features,” meaning traits that result from genetic predisposition and environmental influence, including genetic traits, physical traits and behavioural traits; (5) an ethnic group’s (home)land, both local and regional; (6) their language, including features such as dialect and accent; (7) “kinship,” which includes all the smaller groups that make up the larger ethnic group, like family, tribe and nation; (8) ethnic customs, such as eating habits, dress codes and preferences in music; (9) religion, which encompasses ancient politics as well. In keeping with the Constructionist approach, Duling’s model allows for change and adaptation of the “cultural stuff.” These “cultural features of ethnicity” are not only shaped by an ethnic group’s norms, values and behaviour, but also influence such norms, values and behaviour. Such “cultural stuff” further serves the purpose of constructing and maintaining ethnic boundaries (cf. Duling 2012:327). Duling (2012:296) sees this model of ethnicity as a heuristic tool that could enable researchers to arrange, classify and describe the data available. Although this model will not be mentioned directly, it serves as the underlying foundation and heuristic paradigm for just about everything that follows in this section (2.5).
2.5.2 The geographical location of Q

Seeing as the Jewishness of Jesus became an important factor in the Renewed Quest (see sections 1.3.1 & 1.3.5 above), a section on the ethnicity of Q and its authors is presently justified. Allison (1997:52-53) bases his argument for a Palestinian origin on a few textual indicators: (1) His Q1 lacks any indication of a gentile mission; (2) Q 13:29 addresses the inhabitants of Israel and Jerusalem as if these places were the centre of their world; (3) Luke (Q?) 12:54-56 betrays and presents climatologic knowledge of Palestine; (4) Q 17:23 speaks of the kind of sign prophets concentrated, to our knowledge, in Palestine. That Q originated somewhere in Palestine is accepted as a truism by virtually all Q scholars today. Most of these scholars also feel that it is possible to home in on even further, and locate Q, with a fairly high level of certainty, in Galilee. For the most part, this judgment is based on the mention of three Galilean villages, Capernaum, Chorazin and Bethsaida, in Q 10:13-15. Although Tuckett (1996:102) is correct when he says that the latter is hardly conclusive evidence for placing the whole of Q in Galilee, it remains the most likely point of origin. A number of corroborating indicators seem to confirm such a provenance. Q’s Jesus seems much more stagnant than, for instance, Mark’s Jesus. Jesus’ sedentary activity in Q is based in and around Capernaum (cf. Reed 1995:21). After his temptation and inaugural sermon, Jesus enters Capernaum, after which none of the verbs referring to him denote movement (see Reed 1995:20-21). In all of Q, it is only in Q 7:1 that a place (Capernaum) is specifically named to locate a saying or act of Jesus (cf. Reed 2000:139; Arnal 2001:161). Moreover, apart from Tyre and

55 Distinctions between the terms “village,” “town” and “city” tend to be very imprecise and blurred in ancient sources (see Horsley 1995a:191-192). Freyne (1988:145-146) is very helpful in this regard. Physical characteristics are apparently not sufficient to distinguish between them. Unlike today, population size or had very little to do with attributing terms like “city,” “town” or “village” to a particular settlement (cf. Reed 2000:70, 167). Features of internal organisation and political (in)dependence are much more telling around the turn of the Millennium. Cities tended to be politically and socially organised around Greek democratic ideals, whereas towns and villages tended to be organised around kinship, seniority and prosperity. Furthermore, cities tended to be much more cosmopolitan, whereas the inhabitants of villages and towns were prone to homogeneity. These distinctions are not always helpful and some towns or villages might be very large and rather prosperous. Distinctions between the terms “town” and “village” are almost impossible to draw. In most cases, the two terms are used interchangeably by ancient writers. In the current study, Freyne’s definitions of “city” and “town” or “village” will suffice. As an attempt not to evoke anachronistic ideas of modern towns, the current study will prefer the term “village” for all settlements deemed not to qualify as cities (in the way Freyne understands the term “city”). This includes Capernaum, even though the Gospels tend to refer to it as a polis (see Reed 2000:166-169).
Sidon, the three villages by the Sea of Galilee seem to be the only places treated by Q as if they were real places, known by the author(s) (cf. Arnal 2001:159). These indications strongly suggest a geographical provenance for the Q people in or around Capernaum.

Reed (1995:21-24; 2000:170-196) developed this argument further by considering the geographical position and social characteristics of all the settlements mentioned in Q. Using this information, Reed allocated each of these cities and towns to one of three concentric circles. Moving in a centrifugal direction (from the centre outwards), the three villages mentioned above, in addition to Nazara and Gath-Hepher, belong to the first circle. Jerusalem, Tyre and Sidon belong to the second circle. Nineveh and Sodom find themselves in the third circle. Reed concludes that Q was probably penned somewhere in the central circle, possibly the hub thereof, Capernaum. The cities of the second and third circles are not real prospects for consideration. Q’s distanced and disinterested tone towards Jerusalem takes this city off the table as a possibility. Regarding the (mythical) cities of the third circle, neither of them existed at the time Q was conceived. Capernaum is further suggested as a real possibility by some additional factors. Firstly, this village is at the heart of the woes in Q 10:13-15, directed at unrepentant cities (cf. Reed 1995:21-22; 2000:183). Secondly, Q 10:15 addresses the village directly (σύ), after addressing Chorazin and Bethsaida indirectly in Q 10:13 (σοί). The intensity of their condemnation differentiate these three villages from the other six places mentioned by Q, designating them to be most significant to the Q people, with Capernaum at the nucleus of the equation (cf. Reed 1995:21). Out of the three, “Capernaum in particular is singled out for special condemnation” (Cromhout 2007:286). It is therefore very likely that Capernaum was an important and central hub for the Q people (cf. Reed 2000:184).

Kloppenborg Verbin (2000a:174-175) has further argued that Q’s protests and rhetoric against the Pharisees and scribes “presume quite specific knowledge of the practices of Pharisees on the part of the audience.” Such knowledge would indicate a Palestinian home for Q, but not a principally Judean home. Apparently, Q’s rhetoric fits the assumed situation of Lower Galilee before 70 CE, particularly with regard to Pharisaic activity within that region (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:175). Not too much weight should be
put on this argument by Kloppenborg, given the shortage of incontestable knowledge we have about the Pharisaic movement before the temple was destroyed in 70 CE. The probability that Q originated somewhere near Capernaum is further supported by the general insignificance of Capernaum (as well as Chorazin and Bethsaida) in biblical tradition, outside of Q (see esp. Reed 1995:21-22; 2000:140-141, 183-184; cf. Arnal 2001:160; cf. also Tuckett 1996:102; Allison 1997:53). Yet another supporting factor is the strong textual connection between Capernaum and the origins of Jesus. Finally, Q shares important references to Capernaum with the Signs Source behind the Gospel of John (see Robinson 1995:267-268). The only miracle in all of Q – the healing of the Centurion’s son – is corroborated by the Signs Source to have occurred in Capernaum (compare John 4:46-54 & Q 7:1-10). Q’s condemnation of Capernaum might also have a parallel in the Signs Source (compare John 6:24 & Q 10:15). In general, Q’s pervasive and particular use of rural, agricultural and natural imagery, as well as its specific usage of urban imagery, fits a Galilean context very well (see Reed 2000:189-195). All the evidence viewed thus far strongly suggest Lower Galilee as a real possibility for the location of Q’s conception, with Capernaum and its surrounding district at the heart of the equation. These results cohere with the relative consensus among contemporary scholars that Q did indeed originate in Galilee (cf. Horsley 1999:46).

56 Before Jesus appeared on the scene, Capernaum is not mentioned even once. Shortly after the time of Jesus, Josephus (cf. Life 72; War 3:519) and rabbinic sources (cf. Midr. Qoh. 1:8; 7:26) only mention it by the way. Capernaum only starts being referenced more frequently with the subsequent rise of Christianity. 57 The gospels all agree in placing and confining Jesus’ public ministry in Galilee (cf. Freyne 1988:143; Reed 2000:10). Despite Luke’s rather loose application of the term πολίς, the Gospels further agree that Jesus’ career was directed at Galilean villages (cf. Freyne 1988:143). Capernaum was within walking distance of most of the villages and cities Jesus is said by the Gospels to have visited during his public ministry (cf. Vorster 1999:296). In Mark 1:21-28, Jesus preaches at the local synagogue in Capernaum, where his first miracle also takes place. Other miracles also occur in Capernaum (see Mark 1:32-34; 2:1-12). Mark 1:29 also sees Capernaum as the hometown of Andrew, John, Simon and James. Mark places Jesus in a house in Capernaum in Mark 2:1 (ἐν οίκῳ) and Mark 9:33 (ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ) (cf. Reed 2000:139). Matthew (4:13-16) likewise mentions that Jesus “lived” or “settled” (κατῴκησεν) in Capernaum after leaving Nazareth (cf. Moxnes 2003:48). Matthew 9:1, 7 calls Capernaum “his [Jesus’] own city” (τὴν ἴδιὰν πόλιν), where he went to “his house” (τὸν οίκον αὐτοῦ). Luke 4:23 recognises Capernaum as an important centre for Jesus’ miracles. After starting his public career in Nazareth and facing rejection there (Luke 4:16-23), Jesus turns to Capernaum (see Luke 4:31-32; cf. Moxnes 2003:48). According to John 2:12, Jesus “stayed” or “remained” (ἦμεραν) in Capernaum for a few days with his biological family (ἡ μήτρα αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ ἄδελφοι [αὐτοῦ]). John 6:24 describes Capernaum as the place where people would go looking (ζήτησαν) for Jesus if they could not find him. Significantly, four (out of a possible five) Johannine references to Capernaum are from the Signs Source (cf. Reed 2000:139).
2.5.3 Galilean ethnicity

Earlier scholarship simply assumed that first-century Galilee was inhabited by numerous Gentiles and perhaps a few Judeans. Typically, these scholars would point out Galilee’s “long history of conquests by ancient near eastern empires” (Mack 1993:56). This “long history” supposedly “proved” that Galilee held mixed peoples, including many Gentiles. Some scholars have also claimed that the inhabitants of Galilee were not Judeans – meaning the southern tribes of Israel – but, for the most part, Israelites – meaning the northern tribes of Israel (see e.g. Mack 1993:52-54, 59; Horsley 1995a:39-40). According to this view, many Israelite populations had escaped Assyrian deportation, and were still occupying the region when Jesus lived (cf. Horsley 1999:50, 55). Horsley (1995a:26-27; 1996:22-23) believes that the Assyrians deported only the upper classes and left the peasantry behind. With the advent of Hasmonean colonisation, these Israelites were joined by Judeans from the South (cf. Horsley 1995a:243). The implication of assuming such a Galilean group was that Galilee had been cut off from Jerusalem and the temple for more than six hundred years (cf. Horsley 1995a:50-51; 1999:50, 102). With such a view of the Galileans, it was reasonable to assume that the time period spent outside Judean control made Galileans anything but observant and devout to the Torah or the temple (cf. Mack 1993:59; see Horsley 1995a:51, 281; 1995b:39; 1999:55-58; see also Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:229-234). The Assyrian conquest happened more than a hundred years before the high priest, Hilkiah, supposedly discovered Deuteronomy (cf. 2 Kings 22:3-13), and the Pentateuch received its final edit.

Two factors have contributed to dispelling these erroneous views, namely a critical rereading of ancient texts, and the emergence of new archaeological evidence (see Freyne 2000:176-182). In short, both brands of evidence indicate that Galilee was almost completely depopulated after the Assyrian campaign (see esp. Gal 1992; Reed 2000:29-31; Chancey 2002:32-33; cf. also Freyne 2000:11, 177, 219-220; Edwards 2007:359; Savage 2007:194; Cromhout 2007:234-235). Galilee was then sparsely repopulated during the Persian and Hellenistic Periods, probably by Syro-Phoenicians (see esp. Reed 2000:35-39; Chancey 2002:34-36, 43; see also Edwards 2007:359-361; Moreland
The Hasmoneans subsequently recovered the region (see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:215, 221-222). Not only were Judeans repopulating Galilee during this time, but they were also driving out whoever had thinly repopulated Galilee during the Persian and Early Hellenistic periods (see esp. Reed 2000; Freyne 2000:67-77, 179-182; 2007; Chancey 2002; 2005:37-38; 2007:91; see also Aviam 2004; 2007; Edwards 2007:361, 371-372; Cromhout 2007:231-256; Cappelletti 2007; cf. Moxnes 2003:42). Hence, archaeological and textual evidence corroborate each other in depicting first-century Galilee as a region inhabited primarily by Judeans (cf. Wright 1996:37 n. 32). The Judean repopulation of Galilee was extensive and embraced both urban and rural areas, as well as all socio-economic levels. Urban and rural private spaces betray Judean presence, while urban public spaces reveal Hasmonean administration and rule before the introduction of Roman client-kingship. These archaeological findings, combined with a critical rereading of the literary texts, have led Freyne (2004:62-82) to abandon his former position that Galilee continued to be populated by Israelites after the Assyrian campaign (cf. Freyne 1988:144, 170). Reed (2000:34), Freyne (2000:117; 2007:22), Chancey (2002:34) and D. R. Edwards (2007:359) all conclude that Horsley’s position of an Israelite village culture surviving...

58 Moreland (2007) has recently contested these results. Although he agrees that the archaeological evidence supports the idea that some Judeans occupied Galilee, he does not agree that they necessarily constituted the majority. He has mainly three counter-arguments. Firstly, he points to the fact that the majority of Galileans were agrarian villagers, who left very little archaeological remains indicative of ethnicity. As such, Moreland argues that we should not simply assume their Judean ethnicity. Secondly, Moreland reminds one of the probability that miqva’ot were mostly restricted to wealthier homes. He then goes further to suggest that the same might have been true of stone vessels as well. In other words, the material remains are indicative of purity concerns among the elite, not necessarily the majority. Thirdly, Moreland points to the general lack in first-century Galilee of ossuaries associated with secondary burial customs. All three arguments are ad silencium. More importantly, the first two arguments are simply misguided. As it stands, stone vessels (as well as bone profiles lacking pork!) were not only discovered in wealthy (urban) homes, but also in poor (village) homes, like those excavated at Capernaum. This bolsters both of Moreland’s first two arguments. On the one hand, the majority was not silent in expressing their Judean ethnicity in the material remains. On the other, Judean ethnicity was not only a feature of the elite. Moreland’s third argument is simply based on the lack of ossuaries for secondary burial. Even if this is accepted, it still does not void the other three indicators of Judean ethnicity. Moreland fails to indicate from the archaeological profile who else could have inhabited Galilee. He does argue for a continued Syro-Phoenician occupation of Galilee, but his fallacious arguments are based both on the politico-economic relations between Galilee and the coastal cities, which are undeniable, but has no bearing on Galilean ethnicity, and on archaeological evidence of Galilee being thinly repopulated during the Persian and Early Hellenistic Period, which are similarly undeniable, but inconsequential for the first century. The only “evidence” of a first-century Galilee being populated by Syro-Phoenicians is the presence of Syro-Phoenician cities on the Northern and Western border regions of Galilee, once again an undeniable situation, but one that has no bearing on the ethnicity of “Galilee proper.”
and continuing in Galilee throughout the third Iron Age is hard to maintain, and has to be abandoned. In his groundbreaking study, Chancey (2002) has also comprehensively refuted any notions that Galilee might have held a significant number of Gentiles.

Thus, it would seem that Galilee “operated within the exclusive realm of covenantal nomism” and also “shared the same symbolic universe as those Judeans that lived within Judea” (Cromhout 2007:255). They seem to have practiced circumcision, obeyed the Torah and observed the Sabbath (cf. Cromhout 2007:255; see Freyne 1980:309-318; 1988:155; 2000:52-54, 80-85; contra Horsley 1995a:152-157; see Life 65-66, 74, 112-113, 134-135, 148-154, 158; Ant. 13.337; 18.261-288; War 2.184-203, 591-593, 634).

The archaeological evidence signifies a direct cultural and religious continuity between Judea and Galilee. This can be explained as part of the Hasmonean colonisation of Galilee, which was seen as part of the ancestral “promised land” (cf. Cromhout 2007:256). Inhabitants of both provinces reminisced over the same memories and stories from history. Galileans also perceived the temple and Jerusalem to be central to their centripetal cultic belief and practice, even occasionally making pilgrimage visits to the site (see Freyne 1988:178-187; 2000:130, 154; Reed 2000:57-58; contra Horsley 1995a:144-147; cf. Luke 2:41, 44; Ant. 2.280; 17.254-258; 20.118, 123; War 2.237). Although there were occasional Galilean (and Judean!) criticisms of Jerusalem and the temple, these were not representative of Galilean views generally (see Freyne 1988:187-190). Rather, Galileans continued bringing tithes to the temple, or offering them up

59 It is highly unlikely that the cultic centres of Mount Gerazim and Dan had any religious pull or influence on local Galileans whatsoever (see Freyne 1988:182-184).

60 The fact that Galileans undertook pilgrimages to Jerusalem is particularly significant given the dangers such travels entailed, which included possibly coming face-to-face with life-threatening bandits and robbers (cf. Luke 10:30; 22:35-37), facing Samaritan hostility (cf. Luke 9:26; Ant. 20.123; War 2.237) and facing brutal Roman officials in Jerusalem (cf. Luke 13:1). Not only were the travels dangerous, they also had economic implications. Pilgrimages to Jerusalem probably entailed a period of three weeks away from home (cf. Cromhout 2007:242). Peasants and craftsmen had to leave their farms and work stations behind when leaving for Jerusalem. They had to carry enough foodstuffs and the like for the journey. Finally, they gave up portions of their livelihood to the Temple. In light of all these factors, the little tradition must have had good religious reasons for embarking on such pilgrimages. The religious reward must have outweighed even these potentially lethal dangers and economic implications. The only explanation is a deep-seated conviction that the Temple really is the centre of their religious universe, from where God blesses his children.

61 Cf. 1 Enoch 14:18-22; 15:3-4, the Testament of Levi 2-7 and War 6.300-309 for evidence of Galilean criticisms of the Temple. Sepphoris’ pacifistic attitude during the Great Revolt was not indicative of its religious views of Jerusalem and its Temple, but of its general neutrality with regard to the aspirations of
willingly to priestly representatives, until the Temple was destroyed in 70 CE (cf. Freyne 2000:154). Galilee was seen by all Judeans – those living in Galilee, as well as those living in Judea – as part of the ancestral promised land, given to them by the very same God who resides in the Jerusalem temple (see Freyne 1988:190-198). God’s providence motivated their innate connection, and their pilgrimages, to the cultic centre. For Jews, the Torah legitimised the link between temple and land, and provided stipulations applicable to both. The production of oil lamps and stone vessels indicate that Galilee had not only cultic, but also economic, ties with Jerusalem (cf. Aviam 2004:23). Torah observance was generally accepted by Galileans as the proper way in which to express gratitude for, and faithfulness towards, the covenant, represented by both symbols of land and temple (see Freyne 1988:198-213).

Texts such as John 6:52 and John 7:49-53, among others, should not allow scholars to erroneously conclude that Galileans were lax in observing the Torah. These texts rather reflect the views of Jerusalemites, who saw themselves as religiously superior to those from Galilee, who were cut off from the temple by the province of Samaria (see Freyne 1988:208-212). Such social divisions should not be misinterpreted as evidence for cultural or religious discontinuity between Galilee and Judea. Although Judea might have judged Galileans for their perceived ignorance, as well as their proximity to neighbouring Gentiles, they still thought of Galileans as co-ethnics. For the most part, the Galileans, including the peasantry, were not deterred or distressed by Jerusalem’s expectations of them concerning Torah observance. However, Galileans, particularly those from the countryside, resisted rigorist, and painfully strict, interpretations of the Torah, being concerned, rather, with day-to-day activities, such as craftsmanship, farming and survival (cf. Freyne 2000:154). They were dissatisfied with, and opposed to, movements like Pharisaism, which tended to expound the Torah so rigorously that it became impractical for day-to-day living, and a hindrance for survival. Such fanatic
movements were sure to emanate from Jerusalem (cf. Acts 9:1). All in all, historical sources tend to portray Galileans as observant of the Sabbath, loyal to the pilgrimage, faithful to tithe payments, concerned with the purity of the temple, and anxious about the presence of uncircumcised Gentiles among them.

As we have seen, Capernaum should be seen as a very probable location for the origin of Q. A closer look at what we know of Capernaum is therefore warranted. Archaeology indicates only slight hints of occupation for the Middle Bronze and First Iron Ages (2,200 BCE-1,000 BCE), and a lack of occupation for the latter two of the Iron Ages (1,000 BCE-587 BCE), with the first signs of occupation dating to the Late Hellenistic Period (167 BCE-63 BCE) (see Reed 2000:144-145). As with the rest of Galilee, this occupational history corresponds to Hasmonean colonisation, pointing to Capernaum’s Judean ethnicity. The Judean ethnicity of Capernaum is corroborated by archaeology (see Reed 2000:50, 156-161; cf. Chancey 2002:103). If Bethsaida is located at et-Tell, which it probably should be, then this village also shows clear signs of Judean occupation (see Savage 2007). There is possible evidence of an earlier synagogue structure in Capernaum, underneath the limestone synagogue from the fifth century. That this earlier structure was a synagogue is not unlikely, given the ancient custom of building holy sites on top of one another (cf. Chancey 2002:104). The general lack of evidence for first century synagogue structures anywhere else in Galilee has convinced Reed (2000:154-155) that this earlier structure in Capernaum does not date to the first century. Reed’s reasoning might be circular here. Moreover, a first-century synagogue has been discovered at Gamla (cf. Aviam 2007:121). Although this structure falls outside the formal boundaries of Galilee in the first century, its relatively close proximity to Capernaum might indicate that Jews from this fishing village were being exposed to a

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62 As with all settlements excavated along the shore of the lake, Miqva’ot were lacking, probably because the lake would have replaced a need for immersion pools (see Reich 1990; Reed 2000:50, 157-158). Besides, Miqva’ot were not a feature of rural homes, but could rather be found near important public areas like synagogues or olive presses (cf. Oakman 2008:259; see Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:231-234). The presence of miqva’ot in the domestic sphere was a feature restricted to wealthier urban homes (cf. Moreland 2007:140; Cromhout 2007:246).

63 If the earlier structure in Capernaum is not a synagogue building, then there is no evidence that such buildings were in Galilee during the first century. If there is no evidence of synagogue buildings in Galilee during the first century, then the one in Capernaum could not very likely have been a synagogue.
variety of Diaspora-type customs and praxes, including the use of synagogues. Chancey
(2002:104) states that “[c]eramic evidence clearly dates the construction of the pavement
to the first century CE at the latest” (cf. Runesson 2007:239). There appears to be a
rising consensus among scholars not only that the structure at Capernaum was a
synagogue, but also that it should indeed be dated to the first century CE (see Runesson
in Capernaum. Reed (2000:154-155) has contested these Biblical references by arguing
that the ones by Mark and John probably refer to a gathering or assembly, not an actual
building (see also Horsley 1995a:222-227; 1996:131-132, 146-148). However, the verbs
and prepositions in the Markan pericope all connote movement in relation to an actual
structure. Reed admits that Luke 7:5 refers to a building, but has argued that Luke’s
reference might be tainted by his Sitz im Leben in the Diaspora, where synagogue
buildings were more prominent. This is a fairly weak argument, especially if seen in
conjunction with the Markan reference to an actual building. In this instance,
archaeological and literary sources overlap in placing a synagogue building in
Capernaum during the first century CE. The basalt synagogue confirms the Judean

64 Verse 21 says: εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὴν συναγωγήν. The verb εἰσέρχομαι is placed by Louw & Nida (1993 s.v.
εἰσέρχομαι) in the semantic domain 15.93, which is defined as: “to move into a space, either two-
dimensional or three-dimensional.” This “space” is then described by them as an “area or structure.” The
use of the preposition εἰς with the verb εἰσελθών only adds to the understanding that movement “into” a
physical structure is implied, especially since εἰς is followed by the Accusative noun τὴν συναγωγήν (cf./Newman 1993 s.v. εἰσέρχομαι). The definite article before συναγωγή strengthens the current case even
further, seeing as an article would not usually be used in reference to a general assembly, especially not
when that assembly enters into the narrative or discourse for the first time as in Mark 1:21 (compare James
2:2). The phrase ἐν τῇ συναγωγῇ αὐτῶν in Mark 1:23 might refer to either a general assembly or a
specific structure, with the verb ἐν and the preposition ἐν lending themselves to both interpretations.
However, the use of αὐτῶν probably designates a general gathering. The context (ἂν ἐν τῇ συναγωγῇ
αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπος ἐν πνεύματι ἀκαθάρτῳ) also validates such an understanding. If so accepted, this verse
simply refers to the assembly who had already been described as being gathered in the synagogue building.
Verse 29 states: ἐκ τῆς συναγωγῆς ἐξελθόντες. Louw & Nida (s.v. ἐξέρχομαι) places the verb within
semantic domain 15.40 and goes on to define it as such: “to move out of an enclosed or well-defined two or
dimensional area.” Semantically, the verb denotes movement “out of” or “from within,” the direct
opposite movement of εἰσελθών in verse 21. Furthermore, as in verse 21, the current context also repeats
the compound verb’s equivalent preposition, namely ἐκ. Moreover, the definite article τῆς is once again
used before συναγωγῆς. If the phrases εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὴν συναγωγήν (verse 21) and ἐκ τῆς συναγωγῆς
ἐξελθόντες (verse 29) are read in conjunction with one another, they leave no doubt that an actual structure
is in mind here. Lastly, not only does the whole of verse 29 concern itself with physical movement (cf.
ἐξελθόντες, ἠλθον), but also with movement from one physical structure (συναγωγῆς) to another (οἰκίαν).
The idea that Mark has a general gathering, as opposed to a physical building, in mind when he uses the
noun συναγωγή in verses 21 and 29 of his first chapter does not hold up against close scrutiny. The
Johannine phrase ἐν συναγωγῇ and its context is unclear about the implied use of “synagogue” there.
ethnicity of Capernaum during the first century CE, and the limestone synagogue attests to a Judean ethnic continuity into later periods.

2.5.4 Ethnicity and Q

Despite claims of a lack of references to Israel’s past, very few scholars would disagree that Q was written for a Jewish audience (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:256; see also Horsley 1999:95-96; Cromhout 2007:267-268). Q alludes to, references and assumes important texts, personages and sites from Israel’s traditions (cf. Cotter 1995b:124; see Horsley 1995b:41-42). Q’s Jesus more than once directly quotes scripture. References and allusions to scripture are undoubtedly also present throughout Q. Apart from referencing scripture directly, more subtle allusions to generic Jewish traditions feature throughout Q. Jerusalem is put forward as the ruling nucleus. The Pharisees and the scribes are the only formal groups overtly mentioned and are depicted as rival analysts of Jewish tradition. Aramaic words, like γεβηνα in Q 12:5 and μαμωνας in Q 16:13, are used without any need to translate them or explain their meanings. Gentiles are referred to as being part of the out-group, and this is done in such a way that it functions to strengthen internal self-definition (cf. Q 6:33-34; Q 12:30). Referring to the rest of the world as “the nations” is also a distinctively Jewish feature (cf. Cotter 1995b:118-119; cf. Q 12:30). Israel’s epic history is referenced numerous times. Q takes the audience’s


66 Cotter (1995b:125) lists the following possibilities: Q 3:7-9, 16-17 alludes to the Mosaic covenant and “harvest” as a symbol of judgment; Q 4:1-13 references 40 years in the wilderness, the agency of the Holy Spirit and the title “Son of God”; Q 9:57-62 alludes to Elijah and Elisha; Q 10:21-24 contrasts Jesus’ mission with past experiences; Q 11:2-4 appeals to the Law of Moses; Q 11:14-15, 17-20 contextualises Israel’s dualistic view of the struggle between God and Satan; Q 12:39-40 mentions the Son of Man; Q 16:16-18 references the Mosaic Torah; Q 17:23-37 alludes to the sudden acts of judgment in the times of Noah and Lot; Q 22:28-30 mentions the twelve tribes of Israel and alludes to the traditions of God’s justice being effected for widows and orphans, but also for the whole of Israel.
knowledge of Solomon’s wealth for granted (cf. Cotter 1995b:118; cf. Q 12:27). Other Jewish heroes are also expressly named.68 A knowledge of the traditional stories of these heroes, on the part of the audience, is taken for granted. The prominence of Jewish cities and villages is apparent. Gentiles function apologetically in Q to shame a predominantly Jewish audience (cf. Q 7:1-10; Q 10:12-15; Q 11:31-32; Q 13:28-29; see Reed 2000:135-136). Shaming one’s own group by comparing them to other ethnic groups was a common topos at the time (cf. Reed 2000:188). Q uses the Torah as a basis for polemic and rhetorical argumentation, and affirms the continued validity of the Torah (cf. Q 4:1-13; Q 11:39, 41, 42, 46; Q 16:16-17; cf. Horsley 1999:115).

Earlier contentions of a (northern) Israelite ethnicity for Galilee seemed to fit the content of Q like a glove. Throughout Q, arguments are not based on the temple, the priesthood, purity distinctions, or the Torah, even in instances where such references could substantially have validated their case. Many terms, references and themes in Q draw upon northern, pre-monarchic traditions (see esp. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:199, 203-206; see also Mack 1993:143-144; Horsley 1996:122-123, 174; 1999:120).69 Traditional Israelite themes, however, do not necessarily point to Israelite ethnicity or genealogical continuity (cf. Reed 2000:60). These traditions and stories were assimilated by Judeans before the Assyrian conquest, and were cultivated by them throughout the Babylonian, Persian and Hellenistic periods. Although Moses and David are not expressly mentioned, Allison (2000:25-73) has shown convincingly that allusions and references to these heroes are prevalent throughout Q (see also Cromhout 2007:310-311). According to Reed (2000:59, 204-208), Jonah was probably venerated and re-applied as an indigenous hero by Galileans in and around Gath-Hepher. Likewise, the centrality of the prophetic theme in Q is not an indication of Israelite ethnicity, but simply a theme that fitted Q’s


69 These include: The word “Israel” in Q 7:9 and Q 22:30; the centrality of prophetic themes throughout Q; nostalgic ideals for tribal equality (Q 22:30); references to pre-Monarchic patriarchs like Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Noah (Q 3:8; Q 13:28-30; Q 17:26-27); the reference to Jonah in Q 11:29-31; allusions to Elijah and Elisha in Q 7:21-23 and Q 9:57-62; the lack of direct references to kings and priests, particularly David and Moses (Solomon is either remembered for his wisdom or used as a negative example of wealth and kingship); the lack of any reference to Judeans (Ἰουδαῖοι); the lack of a Zionist theology.
specific message aptly, particularly as a means by which to both justify their persecution and legitimate their critique of Jerusalem (see Reed 2000:209-210). Galilee was not opposed to Judean influence. In fact, they were Judeans themselves.

Seeing Galilee as inhabited by Israelites also had an impact on the interpretation of Q. Q’s reaction to Jerusalem and its temple – as the symbolic nucleus for southern interests, both cultic and political – was traditionally explained as reflecting general “Galilean” (Israelite) sentiments. Every aspect of Q’s opposition to Jerusalem, the temple and the Pharisees could thus be explained as a reflection of general “Galilean” animosity towards Judean influence (see Horsley 1995b:38-39, 42; 1999:55-58, 89, 99, 101). Pharisees were seen as the embodiment of Judean influence in Galilee (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:205; see Mack 1993:141-144; see also Horsley 1995a:149-151; 1995b:42; 1999:56). Judean interests were physically represented by the Pharisees, and symbolically represented by Jerusalem, as the destination of local goods and produce. Q was seen to be negative towards purity distinctions (cf. Q 11:39-41), tithing (cf. Q 11:42), and the social, religious and economic roles of Jerusalem and the Temple in Galilean society (cf. Q 11:49-51; Q 13:34-35).

Q’s negative stance towards the Pharisees, Jerusalem and “this generation” cannot be denied (cf. Q 3:8; Q 7:9, 31-35; Q 11:29-30, 31-32, 39-44, 46-52; Q 13:34-35; Q 22:28, 30; cf. Hoffmann 1995:191; see Horsley 1995b:46; 1999:120-121, 277), and Jerusalem’s geographical distance from Capernaum might still have had an impact (cf. Tuckett 1996:439; see Reed 1995:22-23). However, these attitudes must be interpreted as a result of Q’s own polemic, and not of Galilean sentiments in general (see Reed 2000:60-61). In other words, the Q people had their own reasons for detesting the Pharisees, Jerusalem and “this generation.” Reasons for such abhorrence must be extrapolated from Q itself, not attached to its ethnicity, which was Judean. In fact, throughout Israel’s history, but particularly around the turn of the common era, various southern groups also (at times brutally) criticised and opposed the high priesthood, the temple and Jerusalem (see 1 Enoch 92-105; Lam 2:13-17; Qumran Scrolls; see Horsley 1999:57-58, 99-100, 113). Popular prophetic and messianic movements, not only in the countryside, but also in
Jerusalem itself, were expressly and decidedly against the temple and its city. As a breakaway movement, Q must have shown signs of both continuity and discontinuity with traditional Judaism (see Tuckett 1996:426-427). After a thorough internal analysis of the two strata, Cromhout (2007) reconstructs Judean ethnicity in Q. He focuses on the continuities and discontinuities between the Q people and Judaism of the time. Much of what follows is indebted to his analysis of ethnicity in Q.

I will start with *continuities* between the Q people and their co-ethnics at the Q¹ level. The Q people saw themselves as part of Israel, and coveted the cultural and symbolic identity that goes with such an identification (cf. Tuckett 1996:427). In other words, they were part of a privileged people, occupying an ancestral “promised land.” The proximity within which the Q people and other Judeans lived almost necessitated some “degree of social overlap and relationship” (Tuckett 1996:427). The Q people clearly distinguished themselves from Gentiles, who were disapproved of, and seen as outsiders (cf. Q 6:33-34; Q 12:30; cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:241; cf. also Horsley 1999:95; see Tuckett 1996:202, 402-403). The Gentiles clearly (and matter-of-factly) formed part of “them” in an us-them distinction (cf. Tuckett 1996:403, 426). Q’s mission was aimed at Jews (see Tuckett 1996:425-426). The Q people did not abandon covenantal concerns completely (see Horsley 1999:115-116). Q¹ also shares historical memories with broader Judea. References and allusions are made to Moses (Q 6:27-35; Q 10:4), the prophetic tradition (Q 6:20-21), Elijah and Elisha (Q 9:61-62), the story of Lot (Q 9:61-62) and Solomon (Q 12:27). Tuckett (1996:435-436) finds it noteworthy that Q says nothing about the Eucharist, and sees this as an indication that Q did not actively try and form boundaries between themselves and their co-ethnics by way of a new cultic act.

The *discontinuities* between the Q people and the rest of Israel had, on the Q¹ level, primarily to do with their radical understanding of God’s kingdom. Israel is not yet what it is supposed to be. Only when Israel assimilates the kingdom of God will it really be

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70 Cromhout sees Kloppenborg’s Q³ as part of Q².

71 Tuckett (1996:435) admits, though, that this argument is an argument *ad silencium*. It is still interesting, especially tradition-historically. The rite of Baptism could possibly have its origin with the Q people in Galilee, while the Eucharist might have its origin with the Jerusalem movement in Judea. The two most important Christian rites (from a Protestant perspective) might have two quite separate origins.
what it is supposed to be. The Q people believe that they will play a determining role in restoring and aligning Israel with the kingdom. The content of Q¹ suggests that purity concerns played second fiddle to matters concerning the kingdom of God (cf. Q 10:7-8; Q 7:34). The covenant must be renewed in light of the kingdom. The Q sermon (Q 6:27-45) tries to renew the covenant by redefining relationships between Judeans, who should strive for love, mercy, justice, forgiveness, and the like (see Horsley 1995b:43-44). As we argued in section 2.3 above, immersion into the Q movement often resulted in a rift between members and their families and co-ethnics, who seem to insult and oppose them (cf. Mack 1993:136; cf. also Horsley 1995b:44). The Jesus movement experienced ongoing “violence and exploitation,” viewing local judicial systems with suspicion (see Q 6:22-23, 27-36; Q 12:2-12, 22-31, 58-59; Q 14:27; Q 16:16; Q 17:33). The elitist Pharisees particularly seem to target them with rapacity (cf. Q 10:3; Q 11:39; Q 16:16; cf. Horsley 1999:270). Regardless of their exact Christology, the Q people saw the person of Jesus as integral to the inauguration of the kingdom. The reception or rejection of Jesus was tantamount to the reception or rejection of God himself (cf. Q 10:16). Their high regard for Jesus and his kingdom thus separated the Q people from their co-ethnics (cf. Tuckett 1996:426). The Torah is ruthlessly reconstructed and reinterpreted in light of the kingdom. The holiness codes of Leviticus 19, the importance of the patriarchal family, and divorce law, are all altered to align with the kingdom, which is believed to have replaced the old era of the Torah and the prophets (see Q 6:27-45; Q 9:59-60; Q 14:26; Q 16:16, 18). Given all this, it is clear that the message and conduct of the Q people betray high levels of discontinuity with the rest of Israel, placing Jesus and his kingdom in the centre of their ideology.

Even at the Q² level, there were some aspects of continuity with Israel. The Q people still saw themselves as being part of Israel, and continued to nurture the cultural and symbolic identity that goes with such an identification (cf. Tuckett 1996:427). In other words, they were still part of a privileged people occupying an ancestral “promised land.” Q had a positive attitude and relationship with territorial Israel (i.e. the land). Particularly significant in this regard is their expectation of an eschatological ingathering of scattered
Jews, or the twelve tribes (cf. Horsley 1995b:38; 1999:65, 69, 283; cf. Q 13:28-29).\textsuperscript{72} Ironically and paradoxically, Q’s polemic against greater Israel betrays its connection with her (cf. Tuckett 1996:427, 434). “[T]he very existence of hostility reflects an element of social identity between the two groups” (Tuckett 1996:427). One can almost say, the harsher the polemic language, the closer the cultural connection. Q² is preoccupied with the future of territorial and ethnic Israel, with Gentiles operating as part of a past or future perspective (see Tuckett 1996:196-197, 399; cf. Horsley 1999:95). Gentiles are only referred to as part of a rhetorical device in the polemic of the main redaction to shame Israel (see Q 7:1-10; Q 11:31-32; Q 10:12-14). Although a gentile mission might have existed, it was very much subordinate to the Q people’s mission to greater Israel (see Q 10:2, 7-8; Q 13:18-19; Q 14:16-24; cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:241; Hoffmann 1995:197; see also Tuckett 1996:403-404).\textsuperscript{73} The ἐκατοντάρχος of Q 7:2 should probably not be seen as a Centurion, but as a public official managing Antipas’ military apparatus (see Reed 2000:161-162). “Overall, Gentiles do not belong to Q’s symbolic universe” (Cromhout 2007:377). Q still feels that it properly belongs to the Judean symbolic universe. As such, previously held notions, that Q’s polemic is so strong that the Q people must have given up all hope for Israel, must be abandoned (see Tuckett 1996:196-207; Horsley 1999:94-95). Similarly, former convictions that “this generation” refers to all Israel, past, present and future, must be abandoned (see Tuckett

\textsuperscript{72} This text was historically seen as referencing Gentiles. However, the main comparative texts (Ps 107:3; Isa 27:12-13; 43:5-6; Hos 11:11; Zech 2:10; 8:7-8; 10:10; Baruch 4:4, 37; 5:5; 1 Enoch 57:1; Ps. Sol. 11:2-3) refer rather to the ingathering of scattered Jews.

\textsuperscript{73} Scholarly opinion is much divided on the issue of a gentile mission (see Tuckett 1996:393-404). As we’ve seen, the Q people must’ve had some contact with Gentiles and Hellenisation must also have had some, albeit small, impact on the Q people. Those who want to believe that a gentile mission existed point to Q texts exhibiting a remarkably positive attitude to them (cf. e.g. Cotter 1995b:126). Others note that a “remarkably positive attitude” toward Gentiles doesn’t even begin to prove a gentile mission (cf. e.g. Hoffmann 1995:197; Horsley 1999:64-65). In general, the textual evidence seems ambiguous and inconclusive (cf. Tuckett 1996:394, 401). Q’s treatment of Gentiles as instruments with which to shame greater Israel and Q’s view of Gentiles as “them,” however, makes it unlikely that a gentile mission had occupied the Q people to any large extent, if at all (cf. Hoffmann 1995:197; Tuckett 1996:403). Furthermore, the polemic is aimed exclusively at Israel. In general, Q seems unconcerned with the fate of Gentiles. Q is probably aware of a gentile mission, but not actively engaged in it (cf. Tuckett 1996:403). Kloppenborg (1987a:241) sees a development, with Q¹ not fully engaged in a gentile mission, but Q² developing some kind of sympathy for Gentiles (perhaps over and against greater Israel). Cotter (1995b:126) believes that the Q people were at the Q² stage at least open to gentile membership. According to Hoffmann (1995:197), the Gospel of Matthew represents the first programmatically stated, conscious movement toward a gentile mission or membership, with Q only standing at the start of this new direction.
Rather, the term probably refers to unresponsive Judeans contemporary with the Q people (see Tuckett 1996:199-201). The Q people are in many respects presented as normal Judeans. They accept tithing and ritual purity as integral to the Torah (see Q 11:39-44). Q 11:39-41 does not explicitly condemn or affirm the practice of purity rites, since the emphasis is on (or against) the Pharisees (see Tuckett 1996:412-413). Yet, the passage could be interpreted as a condemnation of purity rites. Redactional activity is obvious in the inclusion of Q 11:42c, but that does not automatically place the interpolation on par with Kloppenborg’s Q³ (see section 2.2.4 above). This emendation clearly guards against any interpretation of Q 11:39-44 that would lead to the abolishment or abandonment of the tithing praxis (cf. Tuckett 1996:410). Abstract ideals, like justice and mercy, emphasised by the Q people’s interpretation of the Torah, must not undermine or illegitimate the more visible rites of tithing and purity observance. The Q people further show concern for the future of the temple (cf. Q 13:35). In ritual and covenantal praxis, therefore, the Q people show strong continuity with the rest of Israel. They explicitly dissociate themselves from those messianists who have forsaken covenantal praxis (cf. Q 13:27). They further affirm their

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Horsley (1995b:38-40; 1999:64-65) suggests that the term “this generation” could have Gentiles in mind, as opposed to Israel. His “evidence” for such a suggestion is that Q 7:1-10 is the only text that overtly mentions Israel. However, there is absolutely no positive evidence for seeing “this generation” as referring to Gentiles. From the overall picture of Q’s attitudes toward Israel and Gentiles respectively, it seems much more likely that “this generation” refers to Israel. In the same article, Horsley (1995b:46-51; 1996:182-183; 1999:69, 89, 299) also makes a case for viewing “this generation” as referring only to the ruling elite in Q 11:16, 29-32 and Q 11:39-52. Although these texts occur in contexts where the scribes and Pharisees are overtly mentioned, the term “this generation” itself implies a broader application. In this literary context, it probably refers to those committed to the teachings of the Pharisees and scribes, perhaps meaning the rest of Israel. That greater Israel itself is also targeted (and not just the Pharisees and scribes) is obvious from other texts (cf. e.g. Q 3:7-9; Q 7:9, 31-35; Q 10:10-16; Q 11:14-15, 17-20; Q 11:23; Q 12:49, 51, 53; Q 13:24-27; Q 14:26; Q 17:26-30, 34-35; Q 22:28, 30). The most hostile language and the greatest severity of Q’s polemic is perhaps reserved for the ruling elite, but that does not disqualify its general negativity toward greater Israel as well. In further support of his argument, Horsley (1999:298-299) also claims that “this generation” was not condemned for its rejection of Jesus and his (or the Q people’s) message, but for killing the prophets and loading burdens on the people. Apart from the fact that other texts (beside Q 13:34-35; Q 11:49-51 & Q 11:39-52) do indeed condemn greater Israel for rejecting Jesus and the Q message, Horsley betrays a very superficial reading of even those texts he selected to further his argument. Although it is true that those texts selected by Horsley condemns “this generation” for killing the prophets, these condemnations should be read as part of the Q people’s rhetoric and polemic against their opponents, not as representative of the actual reasons such polemic was necessary in the first place. As indicated by other Q passages, the Q people were rejected by their co-ethnics. As a result, they had to come up with some kind of polemic to justify their position and establish group boundaries against former co-ethnics. The content of their polemic was the killing of the prophets, but their reason for needing a polemic in the first place had nothing to do with the killing of the prophets.
allegiance to the Torah (cf. Q 16:17). In contrast to Matthew or Luke, Q does not entertain thoughts of future Torah nullification, but simply accepts its present validity (cf. Tuckett 1996:406). Q 16:16 is put into perspective by the following verse, which guards against any interpretation that would render the Torah invalid or irrelevant (cf. Tuckett 1996:407). The kingdom supersedes the Torah, but the latter does not surrender its purpose in the process. Redactional activity cannot be denied here, but, once again, that does not automatically place Q 16:17 on par with Kloppenborg’s Q³. Q 16:18 continues by illustrating that, if anything, the Q people’s interpretation of the Torah is even more rigorous, not leaving any wiggle room or grey areas (cf. Tuckett 1996:408). Both redactional clauses (Q 16:17 & Q 11:42c) attempt to safeguard against a qualitative distinction between the ceremonial and ethical interpretations of the Torah – interpretations, in other words, that would inevitably yield the Torah redundant and superfluous (cf. Tuckett 1996:410). Jesus himself is held up as a prime example of Torah obedience (cf. Q 4:1-13). Q tries to explain, within its apologetics, that the Q people have not abandoned the Torah: “By recognising the everlasting validity of the Law, Q reclaims or affirms the Judean ethnic identity of the community and of its hero, Jesus” (Cromhout 2007:373). The Q people still hope for solidarity with their co-ethnics (cf. Mack 1993:141; see Tuckett 1996:201-207; Horsley 1999:94-95). Although their Christology separates them from other Judeans, it also betrays their Judean ethnicity in as far as Q² identifies Jesus with the prophetic tradition in general, with prophets like Elijah and Elisha, with the eschatological Son of Man (see sections 3.2 & 3.3 below), with Sophia, and perhaps even with Moses and the Exodus (see Mack 1993:141-142). Q² affirms common ancestry with broader Israel and accepts the presence of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the post-apocalyptic world (cf. Q 13:28; cf. Horsley 1999:283).

As a result of the Q people being ignored or opposed, Q² shows much discontinuity with the rest of Israel, as is also evident from their polemic against Jerusalem, the Pharisees, the scribes and greater Israel, sometimes referred to as “this generation” (cf. Reed 2000:61; see Q 3:8; Q 7:9, 31-35; Q 11:29-30, 31-32, 39-44, 46-52; Q 13:34-35; Q 22:28, 30). The temple is criticised for being “forsaken” (cf. Q 13:35). According to Q² (3:7-9), “covenantal status is no longer a birth right” (Cromhout 2007:368). Q²’s strong polemic
against unrepentant Jews, referred to as “this generation,” points to a situation where opposition had intensified (cf. Mack 1993:204; Tuckett 1996:201). Much of the polemic against “this generation” must have come from frustration with constantly facing challenges to individual and group honour from the larger community. The rhetoric against opponents of Q focuses on shaming them, threatening them with a coming judgment, and complaining about their lack of repentance. The latter of these should probably be understood as a failure on their part to accept and validate the Jesus movement represented by the Q people (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:204). The rhetoric of Q² thus represents a stage in the development of Q where the Q people were obliged to legitimise their existence and ethos by defending themselves against those who were either unwilling to acknowledge their claims, or who out-rightly opposed the movement. Q² represents a struggle for legitimacy within Galilean society. Their opponents, however, seem to already be in a place of legitimacy and influence (cf. Kloppenborg Verbin 2000a:205). The Pharisees enjoy social prominence (cf. Q 11:43), and the ἀνθρώποι are able to impose burdens (cf. Q 11:46b, 52).

There is evidence in Q² of active opposition and repression, sometimes presented in the form of apathy and neutrality (cf. Q 11:23, 39, 49-51; Q 12:8-10, 58-59; Q 17:33; see Tuckett 1996:283-323). From the vantage point of the Q people, this rejection might have been experienced as direct persecution. This “violent rejection” convinced the Q community that they were associated with, and symbolic descendents of, the prophets of old (cf. Tuckett 1996:165, 195, 300, 322). This deuteronomistic view of history is conflated with the concept of (rejected) Sophia – a combination that led to the conviction that Sophia sends out the prophets, who ultimately suffer rejection and even murder (cf. Tuckett 1996:195, 322; see Horsley 1995b:50-51; Hartin 1995:157-159; see e.g. Jer 7:25-34; 25:4-14; Neh 9:5-37; Dan 9:4-19; Jub. 1:7-26). In reality, this opposition was probably not systematic or physically violent in nature, but restricted to verbal abuse, taunts and social ostracism (see Tuckett 1996:322-323). The apathy shown by greater

75 However, there might be enough evidence to suggest that the Pharisees, in particular, didn’t exert much political or social authority in the period before the Jewish War in 70 CE (see Tuckett 1996:438-447).
76 However, such violent persecution also refers to oppression of the people by the ruling elite (see Horsley 1999:272-273).
Israel and their failure to “repent” provokes the strongest language from Q (cf. Tuckett 1996:322). This is perhaps understandable. If the Q people were physically or systematically opposed, it would at least have shown that they mattered to the rest of Israel. They and their message are just ignored, though. This might have hurt more than actual, direct, confrontational opposition. Q members are alienated from their co-ethnics, and respond with severe polemic, and intense apologetics, which included pronouncements of judgment and destruction, doom oracles, and ridicule (see Mack 1993:140-141, 204). According to some scholars, the Q people fostered a glimmer of hope (cf. e.g. Tuckett 1996:434). Should Israel accept Jesus, and join the Q group, Jerusalem, the temple and “this generation” will be saved. The Q people’s hope for the restoration of Israel is probably one of the reasons why it made use of such strong polemic against “this generation.” The polemic might be aimed at converting Jews to the Q movement, in order to “save” them (see Tuckett 1996:201-207; cf. Horsley 1999:69, 95). Q² demonstrates a strong consciousness of difference between themselves and other Judeans (cf. Tuckett 1996:426). Although the polemic against “this generation” might have intended the conversion of broader Israel, its primary function was undoubtedly inward, serving mainly to redefine group boundaries, to re-impose group identity, to increase internal solidarity, to legitimise the Q people’s beliefs, and to rationalise opposition from broader Israel (see Kloppenborg 1987a:167-177; Piper 1995a:53-54; cf. Hoffmann 1995:196).

Whereas Christology is assumed in Q¹, it is explicitly used as part of Q²’s apologetic and polemic. The status of Jesus is defended and explained explicitly. The person of Jesus serves as a delineating factor separating the Q people from other Judeans (cf. Mack 1993:204; Tuckett 1996:426). The Q people has reconstructed the traditional sacred canopy, defined by covenantal nomism (cf. Mack 1993:143). Jesus now represents the essence of their sacred canopy. This has implications for their use of the Torah. Jesus is held up as the new Moses, and as qualitatively more important than Moses. Although they affirm and claim Torah obedience, this obedience applies to the Torah given by Jesus. They claim correct interpretation of the Torah (cf. Q 11:46b, 52), emphasising ethical aspects such as justice, mercy and faithfulness, as opposed to the less important
ritual aspects (see Q 11:39-44). Compared to Q¹, historical memories are even more prevalent in Q². They share these memories to affirm and explain the status of Jesus. Some positive allusions and references are made, connecting John to Elijah (cf. Q 3:7-9, 16b-17; 7:27) and Jesus to Isaiah (see Q 7:18-23) and Elijah (see Q 7:18-23). However, past traditions are predominantly used negatively to denounce broader Israel (cf. Mack 1993:144). Q²’s polemics show little or no sentimental connection with the past. Israel’s privileged status is not overtly affirmed. Historical memories are used in the service of eschatology and prophecy. Jesus’ activities are interpreted as the fulfilment of long-standing Judean expectations (cf. Horsley 1995b:39; see e.g. Q 7:18-23; Q 10:21-24; Q 11:14-20; Q 12:51-53). The kingdom qualifies the meaning and usefulness of past events. We have seen that common ancestry is affirmed, but the presumption of privilege attached to such ancestry, including divine election, is denied (cf. Q 3:8). Ancestry is rather linked to the killing of the prophets (cf. Q 11:47-48). Compared to Q¹, the focus has shifted to the consequences for broader Israel, should they refuse to accept Jesus and his kingdom.

The formative stratum is preoccupied with kinship, and the tension between the kingdom of Jesus and the “old” system, dominated by the Torah and the prophets. Ethnic identity receives more attention in the main redaction. In Q¹, the Q people are finding themselves and trying to digest the impact of the kingdom on traditional covenantal nomism. In Q², the Q people are defending themselves and trying to legitimise their existence and practices against traditional covenantal nomism. In both strata, however, ethnic continuity with broader Israel is restricted to a common name (Israel), a common place

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77 According to Cromhout (2007:375), the term “this generation” recalls “the primordial sins of the generation in the wilderness and the time of Noah (Q 7:31-35; Q 11:29, 31-32, 50-51).” Other negative allusions and references are the gentile cities of Sodom, Tyre and Sidon (Q 10:12-14), the Ninevites and the Queen of the South (Q 11:16, 29-32), Noah and Lot (Q 17:34-35; cf. Q 3:3), a Deuteronomistic theology (Q 6:23c; Q 11:47-51; Q 13:28-29; Q 14:16-24), Abel and Zachariah (Q 13:28-29), Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (Q 13:28-29; 22:28-30).

78 Although it can be agreed with Horsley (1999:119, 284) that references to Abraham function to repudiate elitist (great tradition) claims to privileged ancestry, we do not agree that such references to Abraham serve this purpose exclusively. Rather, references to Abraham repudiate both general Jewish claims of privileged ancestry and specific great-tradition claims of such privileged ancestry. The polemic is thus aimed both at “this generation” and the great tradition represented by Jerusalem, the Temple, the Pharisees and the scribes. Both understandings is permitted by Q 13:28-29. However, only the former understanding is allowed by Q 3:8, regardless of what Horsley claims.
(the promised land), common historical memories, a common ancestry, and a common us-they perception of Gentiles. They try to put Torah observance forward as an aspect of continuity, but, in reality, Torah observance plays second fiddle to kingdom observance. All other aspects of ethnic Judean identity were reconstructed in light of Jesus and his kingdom. The Q people did away with elements traditionally believed to be crucial for Judean ethnicity and self-identity. Purity concerns, Torah obedience, covenantal nomism, the patriarchal family, and a high, positive regard for the shared ancestral past, were all aspects that made a Judean inherently and noticeably Judean. The Q people abandoned these elements, all of which were crucial to ethnic identity-formation.

This void had to be filled with new identity markers. A high regard for the person of Jesus, as well as participation in the kingdom of God, replaced these traditional elements. The Q movement represented their new family (see Jacobson 1995:374-376). Their initiation into this family was probably effectuated by the new rite of water immersion. All previous practices and beliefs had to be re-evaluated in light of Jesus and his kingdom. Although the Q people saw themselves as part of a reform movement within traditional Judaism (cf. Tuckett 1996:436), they were destined, from the very beginning, to be a movement outside of Judaism (cf. Cromhout 2007:380). The Q people tried their utmost to bridge their differences with greater Israel, and to remain part of her (see Tuckett 1996:438, 449-450). However, they undermined Judean ethnic identity and, as a result, failed to convert broader Israel to their cause – or even to have other Judeans sympathise with their ideologies. The main difference between the Q group and other Judean sects was that the latter tried to renew traditional covenantal nomism, whereas the former (and other messianist movements) reconstructed covenantal nomism (cf. Cromhout 2007:380; contra Horsley 1995b:39). The Q people might have thought that they were busy renewing Israel, but they were actually reconstructing core Jewish beliefs to such an extent that those core beliefs became unrecognisable to broader Israel (see Horsley 1999:296-297). So, as far as the Q people were concerned, they were Judeans, but as far as the rest of Israel were concerned, they were Judeans no longer. Although the Q people might still see themselves as being authentically Judean, at the Q² level (or stage?) they are in actual fact a separate religious and social grouping, with an entirely
distinct identity (cf. Hoffmann 1995:196). The Q people stand in opposition to their former compatriots, who are scorched as “this generation.”

2.6 ~ THE ESCHATOLOGY OF Q

2.6.1 Futuristic eschatology in Q

Very few scholars would deny that Q 3:7-9, 16b-17 references a futuristic eschatology, and likely also an imminent eschatology (see e.g. Sim 1985:177-178). These texts expound the Baptist’s eschatology, however, and not the eschatology of Jesus (cf. Sim 1985:181, 213-214). Since we are mainly interested in the Q community’s memory of Jesus, these texts will be pushed aside for the moment. The following Q texts indisputably place a futuristic eschatology in the mouth of Jesus: Q 6:21-23; Q 10:12-15; Q 11:19, 29-32, 50-51; Q 12:4-5, 8-10; Q 13:28-29; Q 17:23-24, 26-30; Q 22:28, 30. Not only is the future tense repeatedly employed, but the imagery in each of these texts recalls familiar apocalyptic images. All these texts speak straightforwardly and

For apocalyptic imagery, consider μελλούσης ὑπῆρξε, μετανοιάς, ἁξίνη, ἁξίνη πρὸς τὴν ρίζαν τῶν δέντρων κεῖται, ἐκκόπτεται, πῦρ, βάλλεται, πτῶν, διυκάθαρσι, ἠλώνα, συναγαγεῖν, σῖτον, ἀποθῆκην, ἀχθον, κατακαῦσαι, πυρὶ and ἀφεδρῶν. For indications of immincence, consider ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ, ἡδὲ and ἁξίνη πρὸς τὴν ρίζαν τῶν δέντρων κεῖται. John’s symbolic instruments of judgment are poised and ready to strike at any moment. The pericope as a whole leaves the impression of heightened urgency in the face of the coming wrath. It is not certain whether or not Q 17:28-29 should be included in Q. Its inclusion or exclusion does not, however, have any impact on our current exegesis. See χειρασθήσεται and γελάσετε in Q 6:21-23; ἔσται in Q 10:12; ἔσται, ύψωθησθαι καὶ καταβῆσθαι in Q 10:14-15; ἔσονται in Q 11:19; δοθῆσαι, ἔσται, ἐγερθῆσαι, κατακρίνει, ἀναστήσονται καὶ κατακρινοῦντα in Q 11:29-32; ἐκζητηθῆσαι in Q 11:50-51; ὄμολογησεῖ / ὄμολογησόμεθα / ἀπαρνηθῆσῃ, ἀφεθῆσαι καὶ σῦ ἀφεθῆσαι in Q 12:8-10; ἐκβληθῆσαι (Matthew only), ἔσται, ἥξουσιν καὶ ἀνακληθῆσαι in Q 13:28-29; ἔσται in Q 17:23-24; ἔσται (x2) in Q 17:26-30; καθῆσθε in Q 22:28, 30.

See κλαιόντες / πενθοῦντες, γελάσετε / παρακληθῆσαι, ὀνειδίζονται, διώξονται / ἐκβάλλονται, χαίρετε and ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς in Q 6:21, 23 (cf. Isa 60:14; 61:2-3, 10); Σοδόμοις and ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἑκείνῃ in Q 10:12; Τύρῳ καὶ Σιδώνιι, ἐν τῇ κρίσει, οὐρανοῦ, ύψωθησθῆναι, ἧδον καὶ καταβῇ in Q 10:14-15; κρίται in Q 11:19; Ἰωνᾶ, σημεῖον (x 4), ἐγερθῆσαι, ἐν τῇ κρίσει (x 2), κατακρίνει, ἀναστήσονται, κατακρινοῦντα, μετενόησαν and Ἰωνᾶ in Q 11:29-32; ἐκζητηθῆσαι καὶ ἐκζητηθῆσησαι in Q 11:50-51; ἐμπροσθεν τῶν ἀγγελῶν καὶ ἐνώπιον τῶν ἀγγελῶν in Q 12:8-10; ὁ κλαυμός καὶ ὁ βρυγγός τῶν ὀδόντων, ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν, ἐκβαλλομένους, ἀνακληθῆσονται καὶ τὸ σκότος τὸ ἔξοτερον (Matthew only) in Q 13:28-29; ἀστραπῆς, ἀστράπτουσα / ἐξέφρασαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀξεύοντος εἰς τὴν ἐπὶ οὐρανῶν (Luke only), λάμπει (Luke only), ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ αὐτοῦ (Luke only, with text-critical difficulties), ἀνατολῶν (Matthew only), φαίνεται (Matthew only) and δυσμῶν (Matthew only) in Q 17:23-24; Νῦν (x 2), κιβωτῶν, κατακλυσμῶς
unequivocally about a future event. More importantly, it is impossible to interpret any of these texts purely and exclusively as wisdom texts. In other words, these texts are futuristic and apocalyptic by their very nature, and any attempt to explain them as non-eschatological texts would be unwarranted and unjustified. What is blatantly missing in all of these texts is any reference whatsoever to the imminence of the predicted apocalypse (see esp. Sim 1985:206-223; see also Borg, in Miller 2001:42-43 on Q 11:31-32 & Q 10:13-14; contra Kloppenborg 1987a:153; Catchpole 1993:passim, esp. 251 on Q 17:26-30). Rather, we get the impression from these texts that the apocalyptic event will occur at an undetermined time in the future. The references to Noah, Jonah, Tyre and Sodom suggest that the apocalyptic event will be devastating, and that it will take place unexpectedly (cf. Sim 1985:233; Catchpole 1993:251; see Casey 2009:226-228). The time can not be predicted, only the fact of its happening. Q 17:27, in particular, contrasts the everydayness of life, where people eat, drink, get married and go about their daily business, with the suddenness, devastation and unexpectedness of the primeval flood (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:157; Kirk 1998:261; Catchpole 1993:250; cf. also Allison 2010:35). Suddenness should not be confused with imminence (see Allison 2010:40-41)!

Another feature of these texts is that the apocalyptic event is not described in terms of the phrase “kingdom of God.” The latter term is absent from all but one of these texts. Although the term “kingdom of God” occurs in Q 13:28, which is clearly an apocalyptic and futuristic passage (see Kirk 1998:251-252), it is not utilised there as a description or sign of the eschatological event (contra Sim 1985:204; Kirk 1998:253). Rather, the text takes for granted that the kingdom of God will already be in existence by the time the future event takes place. It does not specify when the kingdom comes into being, only that it is already there when the fortunate recline with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Notably absent from Q 13:28 is any reference to the kingdom “coming” or “happening” or “being brought into existence.” The apocalyptic event of Q 13:28-29 is ultimately the
eschatological ingathering of the Diaspora (and/or the Gentiles), who will subsequently be fortunate enough to recline in the already-existing kingdom of God (see Allison 1997:176-191). In this text, the kingdom of God is neither a sign nor a result of the apocalyptic event described (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:236).

These are not the only texts that might refer to a futuristic, eschatological event. There are a number of texts that could be read either exclusively as present wisdom texts, or exclusively as future apocalyptic texts. These include: Q 6:20, 37-38, 47-49; Q 11:2b, 21-22; Q 12:31, 33-34, 39-40, 42-46, 49, 51, 53, 54-56; Q 13:24-27, 30, 35; Q 14:11, 16-23; Q 17:34-35, 37 and Q 19:12-13, 15-24, 26. Out of these, only Q 6:20, Q 11:2b and Q 12:31 are highly unlikely to have a futuristic eschatology in mind. Even though Q 6:20 appears with the beatitudes that are undeniably future-oriented (i.e. Q 6:21-23), it neither puts forward a single apocalyptic image, nor does it have a single verb in the future tense. Scholars tend to read it as an eschatological text because of its appearance with Q 6:21-23, and because of its possible allusion to Isaiah 61:1 (cf. e.g. Catchpole 1993:86; Allison 2010:42). In the latter text, the prophet claims to have been anointed by God “to preach good news to the poor.” Although the content of the good news is eschatological in the rest of Isaiah 61, the proclamation thereof in verse 1 happens in the present. In Q 6:20, the announcement happens in the present, and the content of that announcement also refers to the present, as is demonstrated by the present tense of ἐστίν (cf. Wink 2002:161-162). Some interpreters have argued that the latter verb should be read as a futuristic present (cf. Sim 1985:183; cf. e.g. Catchpole 1993:86). For a number of reasons, such an interpretation is highly unlikely. Firstly, whenever the present tense refers to a past or future action in the New Testament, this is usually made obvious by the immediate context. In other words, the sentence in which the verb occurs will characteristically indicate in some way or another that the present tense actually refers to a past or future action. In Q 6:20, there is no such indication. Secondly, it is much more probable that ἐστίν here fulfils the function of a gnomic present. Whereas the latter three beatitudes motivate the μακάριοι assertion with a future event in their respective apodoses, the first beatitude motivates it with a gnomic, timelessly-valid maxim. Thirdly, there are no other examples of the futuristic present in Q, and the utilisation thereof is plainly not a feature
of Q. Q prefers to make use of the future tense when denoting a future action, and does so readily and repeatedly throughout the document (cf. Sim 1985:184). If this Q logion had a future action in mind, it would very likely have used a future-tense verb. This is particularly applicable in the current case, where the saying is followed by three beatitudes with future verbs in their apodoses. Thus, we have to conclude that Q 6:20 does not refer to a future event.

The second text that in all probability has nothing to do with a futuristic eschatology is Q 11:2b (cf. Borg, in Miller 2001:42; contra Catchpole 1993:185; Allison 2010:36-38). A small number of indicators have led scholars to view this text in futuristic terms. The verbs ἀγαθήσθω and ἔλθέτω both appear in the aorist imperative, which usually means that the action is simply mentioned as a once-off event, and not as a continuing or repetitive event. As with all imperatives, the action is commanded, and, as a result, can only be fulfilled in the future (cf. Sim 1985:204). Moreover, the fact that the realisation of the actions denoted by the two verbs need to be prayed for indicates that these actions have not yet occurred. Thus, Q 11:2b does seem to refer to the future (cf. Edwards 1976:107). The future it refers to, however, is not an eschatological future, but the survivalist future of tomorrow (cf. Kirk 1998:324; contra Sim 1985:204-205). There are a few reasons for preferring such an interpretation. Firstly, there is an absence in this text of unambiguous apocalyptic imagery. True enough, verse 4 could be seen as a request in view of the eschatological judgment, but the fulfilment of the request is intended for the present and/or immediate future of daily subsistence. The request to “let your kingdom come” is expressed with an aorist imperative verb (ἔλθέτω), which means that there is no focus on the time of the event. If futuristic eschatology were at play, one would have expected the author to make this clear by means of a future verb or a temporal particle. The reference to “bread” (ἄρτος) in verse 3 may remind one of the eschatological reward in the second beatitude. Yet, for a number of reasons, an eschatological rendering of ἄρτος is unlikely in this context (cf. Catchpole 1993:224): (1) The beatitude in question does not contain the word ἄρτος. (2) In this context, such a view does not fit the use of the possessive personal pronoun ἡμῶν. (3) In the rest of Q, ἄρτος does not refer to an eschatological meal, unless this is expressly and unambiguously so qualified (cf. e.g. Q
4:2-4; Q 11:11). (4) The presence of both ἐπιούσιον and σήμερον in verse 3 almost necessitates a non-eschatological reading of ἥρτον. The possible eschatological references are unconvincing. Rather, verse 3 in toto “appears to be a wisdom-like assumption that God does assist his people by means of the regularity of his creation” (Edwards 1976:108).

Secondly, although the exact meaning of the word ἐπιούσιον in verse 3 is in doubt (cf. Catchpole 1993:223), it should probably be translated as “for today,” “for the coming day,” or “necessary for existence” (cf. Newman 1993 s.v. ἐπιούσιος, ὄν). This means that the imperative in verse 3 refers to either the present or the immediate future of daily existence. This view is reinforced by the simultaneous presence of the word “today” (σήμερον / ἡμέραν) in the sermon (cf. Catchpole 1993:224). Seeing as ἐπιούσιον and σήμερον are the only temporal indicators in the whole passage, they probably apply to verse 2b as well. Thirdly, the Lord’s prayer was very likely followed by Q 11:5-8, 9-13, which takes up the theme of daily existence in the present world (cf. Piper 1989:20, 23, 24; see Catchpole 1993:201-223, 225; Kirk 1998:177-180; Robinson 1997; see also Allison 1997:13-15). Fourthly, seeing as the author(s) of Q preferred using future verbs when denoting eschatology, the absence thereof in the Lord’s Prayer renders an eschatological reading of it improbable. It is possible that verse 4 has an eye on the eschatological judgment, but this is not certain. Lastly, if Kirk (1998:310-311, 319-327) is correct in his presentation of the macro-genre of Q 10:23-Q 13:35, it follows that the need for daily sustenance in the Lord’s Prayer was deliberately and compositionally contrasted with the wealth and oppression of the religious authorities in Q 11:39-52. For all these reasons, the most likely exposition of the Lord’s Prayer is that the βασιλεία σου has something to do with daily existence. Daily subsistence always applies to both the present and (concerns over) the immediate (non-eschatological) future.

The same explanation applies to Q 12:31, our third text that should probably not be read as an expression of futuristic eschatology (contra Catchpole 1993:185). As a whole, Q 12:22b-31 assumes the continued existence of the world as we know it. It is certainly a wisdom text, offering advice for daily survival in a tough world (cf. Edwards 1976:124;
Catchpole 1993:35; see Kloppenborg 1987a:216-221; Piper 1989:24-36). The audience is advised not to worry about subsistence in the present or the immediate future. God will provide! The only future-tense verb in the whole passage occurs in verse 31 (προστεθήσεται). The remainder of the passage deals in the present and aorist. The few subjunctive verbs\(^{84}\) connote the uncertainty of the immediate future, which is the cause of anxiety. The adversative conjunction at the beginning of verse 31 (πλ/υν / δέ) has a dual function. Linguistically and structurally, it ties verse 31 to verse 29 (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:218). Semantically and rhetorically, it indicates that the “kingdom of God” should be sought instead of, or rather than, the foodstuffs, fluids and clothes of verse 29. The latter three items are present realities of daily existence. Now, if God’s kingdom must be sought instead of these present realities, it logically follows that the kingdom in question can be nothing other than a present reality itself (cf. Sim 1985:184). Moreover, the present imperative verb (ζητε/τε) in verse 31 indicates that the kingdom must be sought from the present moment on. This strongly suggests that the kingdom is an existing reality, able of being found in the present moment (cf. Sim 1985:184). Lastly, verse 31 explains the “more” (πλε/όν) of verse 23 (cf. Catchpole 1993:32; Kirk 1998:226). Verse 31, therefore, states that a life in pursuit of the kingdom is “more” than a life in pursuit of necessities (cf. Catchpole 1993:32). This contradiction between a necessity-oriented life and a kingdom-oriented life indicates that the “kingdom” is seen here by Q as an entity capable of being sought in the present (cf. Piper 1989:76). Hence, if the future verb in verse 31 is read in conjunction with the rest of the verse and passage, as it should be, then an eschatological interpretation is taken off the table.

The future verb προστεθήσεται denotes the immediate future of normal, run-of-the-mill existence.\(^{85}\) This is the future that Jesus’ audience worried about, and this is the future being addressed in the current pericope (see Kloppenborg 1987a:219-220; contra Sim 1985:205). Moreover, there is a notable lack of any unmistakable apocalyptic imagery. Those who want to read a futuristic eschatology into the text could point to the correlation between φάγητε and the second beatitude, or to the possible apocalyptic

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\(^{84}\) Cf. φάγητε (x 2), ἐνδύσησέ, πίπτε.

\(^{85}\) Compare the future verb προστεθήσεται in Q 12:31 with the future verbs in Q 11:9-13. In both texts, the future verbs apply to the immediate future of normal, run-of-the-mill existence.
connotations of the words σπείρουσιν, θερίζουσιν, αὐριον, κλίβανον and βαλλόμενον (cf. Piper 1989:31). This goes beyond the text, however, and these Greek words make perfect sense in their immediate sapiential contexts as references to daily existence (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:220). The lack of verbs in the future tense – apart from προστεθήσεται, which references the immediate future of daily survival – and the further lack of any unequivocal apocalyptic imagery makes it extremely unlikely that Q 12:22b-31 even alludes to futuristic eschatology (contra Piper 1989:31, 33; Catchpole 1993:34). This conclusion is further supported by both Luke’s and Matthew’s (varied) interpretations of the kingdom saying in verse 31. Luke 12:32 states that the Father took pleasure (εὐδόκησεν) in granting his flock the kingdom. The fact that εὐδόκησεν is in the aorist tense indicates that, by the time Luke wrote his gospel, he understood the giving of the kingdom as a completed action in the past. Matthew 6:34 summarises the Q pericope by encouraging his audience not to worry about the physical needs of tomorrow (αὐριον). In other words, Matthew also understood the future tense of προστεθήσεται in Q 12:31 as a reference to the immediate future of daily survival.

If we remove the foregoing three texts from the list of texts that could justifiably be interpreted either by means of an exclusively sapiential paradigm or an exclusively eschatological paradigm, we are left with the following: Q 6:37-38, 47-49; Q 11:21-22; Q 12:4-5, 33-34, 39-40, 42-46, 49, 51, 53, 54-56; Q 13:24-27, 30, 35; Q 14:11, 16-23; Q 17:34-35, 37 and Q 19:12-13, 15-24, 26. Let us accept, for the moment, that every one of these texts exclusively denote a futuristic eschatology. Remarkably, they all display the same two features as our first grouping of apocalyptic texts, namely, they all lack any reference to either the kingdom of God or the imminence of the eschatological event (see Sim 1985:206-223; contra Kloppenborg 1987a:153). To start with the latter, the current list of texts seem to confirm the belief that the apocalyptic event would occur unexpectedly at an uncertain and indeterminable time in the future. The bulk of these texts simply mention the apocalyptic event, without elaborating about the time of its

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86 This is not my actual position. I hold, firstly, that at least some of these texts (most notably Q 11:21-22 and Q 12:33-34) should probably not be read in an eschatological sense at all and, secondly, that none of them are “eschatological” to the exclusion of wisdom. However, it is unnecessary for our current purpose to make these arguments.
occurrence. This strongly suggests that Q could, for the most part, take this piece of information for granted on behalf of the audience. Nonetheless, there are a small number of texts that address the temporal question directly. Out of these, Q 12:39-40 is the most straightforward, stating in no uncertain terms that the apocalyptic event will occur “at an hour you do not expect” (＼ newsletters＼ δοκετε) (cf. Sim 1985:234). The point of the subsequent parable (Q 12:42-46), as it currently stands in Q, is to underline the unexpectedness of the eschatological event, as is made clear by the phrase ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἦν οὐ προσδοκη in verse 46 (cf. Casey 2009:220). Apart from its unexpectedness, verse 46 further reveals that another aim of the parable is to highlight the impossibility of knowing when the future event will take place. These two features complement one another. If it were possible to calculate when the apocalyptic event will take place, then the event would not occur at an unexpected time. The use of χρονίζει in verse 45 should not be seen as a concern over the delay of the apocalypse (contra Kloppenborg 1987a:150). This description forms part of the narrative framework of the parable, not of its application. When the parable is applied in verse 46, the focus is on the unexpectedness of the apocalypse, not its delay.

In Q 12:54-55, the apocalyptic imagery is apparent. These images are followed by the lucid statement in verse 56 that, although people are able to read meteorological and natural phenomena to determine physical time, they are not able to read the same phenomena to predict metaphysical time (cf. Kirk 1998:237). The sombre scene of Q 17:34-35 is comparable to Q 17:27 (cf. Kirk 1998:261; see above). In Q 17:34-35, everyday, run-of-the-mill activities (literally! - ἀλήθουσαι ἐν τῷ μῦλῳ) are unexpectedly interrupted by what can only be assumed to be the apocalyptic event. These activities are contrasted to the unexpectedness of the apocalypse. If the parable in Q 19:12-13, 15-24, 26 is exclusively read from an eschatological viewpoint, it corroborates the other texts we have looked at. What is particularly interesting is the phrase “after a long time” (μετὰ δὲ

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88 If all aspects of the parable could be directly applied, it would logically follow, for example, that the Q people saw themselves as Jesus’ slaves.
89 Cf. πυρράζει (x 2), ὁ σύρανης (x 2), χειμών and στυγνάζων.
πολλόν χρόνον) in verse 15. This phrase suggests the exact opposite of an imminent eschatology. However, it is uncertain that this phrase goes back to Q, seeing as it only occurs in the Matthean version of the parable. Given Matthew’s habit of adding comments about the parousia’s delay to his parables (cf. Sim 2005:151), it is highly likely that this phrase originated not with Q, but with Matthew. Moreover, Q as a whole leaves the impression that it is impossible to know anything about the time of the apocalyptic event. If it were known that the apocalypse would not happen in the immediate future, some knowledge of the time of the apocalypse is indeed betrayed. Such knowledge goes against the grain, and contradicts the rest of Q, which claims total ignorance of the point in time when the apocalyptic happening would occur. The only piece of knowledge they seem to have is that it would occur suddenly, unexpectedly and without warning. Thus, the temporal phrase that opens Q 19:15 was probably invented by Matthew, and not originally part of Q. Even if it were originally part of Q, the temporal phrase forms part of the parable proper, and not its application in verse 26 (see my comments on Q 12:45 above). It follows that Q betrays no concern over the postponement or delay of the apocalypse.

Comments in Q about judgment on “this generation” should also not be seen as implying an imminent judgment (see Sim 1985:211-213). The fact that “this generation” will be judged at the final judgment does not mean that this apocalyptic judgment will occur within the lifetimes of “this generation” (contra Allison 2010:33). This is not what Q says. “This generation” is the object of judgment, not an indication of the time of judgment. Q 11:31-32 makes this explicit when it says that “this generation” will be raised from the dead (ἐγερθήσεται) before they are judged. In other words, the apocalyptic judgment will occur at least after everyone from “this generation” have passed away. “This generation” will be raised at the same time (μετά + genitive) as the Queen of the South and the Ninevite men. These people had already passed away by the time this logion was uttered, indicating that the general resurrection is probably implied (cf. Borg 1994a:54; cf. also Allison 2010:39). Far from supporting imminent eschatology, this text explicitly denies it.
As we saw (section 1.3.6 above), Tödt (1959) was the father of reading imminent eschatology into Q. This proposal was extremely influential, and many scholars after him simply took an imminent eschatology for granted when they approached Q. Yet, the evidence upon which Tödt based his theory was surprisingly weak (see Sim 1985:208-211). In fact, it rested on the shoulders of only one text: Matthew 10:23. This text has no Lukan parallel, and no serious scholar today would accept it as part of Q. Thus, Tödt’s whole argument for eschatological imminence was based on a text that actually falls outside the scope of Q. One scholar could be held up as a prime example of how convincing Tödt’s argument was for the time, and of how scholars uncritically followed his lead. R. A. Edwards (1971) elaborately described the impending nature of the parousia as a feature of Q’s theology, without once providing any support for his position. On more than one occasion, Edwards explicitly and excitedly utters his approval of Tödt’s theory, and then continues to describe the Q people’s heightened anticipation of the rapidly-approaching end. What is most curious about Edwards’ approval is that he excludes Matthew 10:23, the very text upon which Tödt’s theory was based, from his own version of Q. Many scholars have made the same mistake. All subsequent efforts to “prove” that Q proclaimed an imminent eschatology have, as a matter of course, been read into the text.

2.6.2 Realised eschatology in Q

Proposals of a “realised eschatology” in Q have traditionally been based on the “present” kingdom-of-God logia. We have already handled three of these texts. It was argued that Q 6:20, Q 11:2b and Q 12:31 indeed refer to the present, but that a lack of apocalyptic imagery makes it highly improbable that these texts refer to the predicted apocalyptic happening (contra Allison 2010:38-39). This does not mean that Jesus failed to proclaim a realised eschatology in the sense that his historical ministry introduced a new age, during which a number of Old-Testament prophecies were realised. It does mean, however, that Jesus did not, according to these three Q texts, speak of the “kingdom of God” in an apocalyptic or imminent sense. The remaining texts that could be employed to argue for a realised eschatology, are the following: Q 6:21-23; Q 7:1, 3, 6-9, 18-19, 22-
23, 28; Q 10:5-9; Q 11:14, 20, 21-22, 52; Q 13:18-21; Q 16:16 and Q 17:20-21. It cannot be denied that these Q texts understood the historical ministry of Jesus as fulfilling the prophecies of old, and as introducing a new era (see Sim 1985:179-197; cf. Wink 2002:118; cf. also Allison 2010:42). This new era could indeed have been interpreted as forming part of the eschatological age. If this is so, then it is understandable that Jesus, according to Q, at times incorporated such views about his ministry into his sapiential argumentation and rhetoric.

None of these texts, however, betray any indubitable references to imminence or apocalypticism (cf. Wink 161-162; contra Allison 2010:42). In fact, there does not seem to be any sense of (temporal) urgency whatsoever. If Catchpole (1993:60-70) is correct in viewing the Q passages about John the Baptist (esp. Q 7:24-27) as “editorial statements designed to define the person of Jesus by reference to his eschatological function,” then it is Jesus’ role in relation to “realised eschatology” that is specifically in view here, not his prophetic role in relation to “apocalyptic eschatology” (cf. Q 7:18-19, 22-23; see Sim 1985:177-192; contra Edwards 1976:55). In Q 12:49, Jesus wishes that the apocalyptic fire had already been hurled upon the earth, which is an indication that the predicted apocalyptic event had not yet occurred during his ministry. Hence, the ministry of Jesus could indeed be seen as the fulfilment of certain prophecies, and could even in some sense be described as “realised eschatology,” but the latter should not be confused with the apocalyptic eschatology that Q clearly also held. Whether or not he saw his ministry as some type of fulfilment of Jewish expectations, Q’s Jesus, in no uncertain terms, predicted the occurrence of a future, apocalyptic event. Although they overlap, and although they are not incongruent, these are two separate matters that should not be confused.

Furthermore, that Q prescribes to a realised eschatology should not be taken as evidence that the apocalyptic event was expected soon thereafter (see Sim 1985:206-208). Q 17:20-21, if it were part of the Sayings Gospel, stated that the kingdom of God was not coming visibly (μετὰ παρατηρήσεως), but that it was within or among (ἐντὸς) his audience (cf. Wink 2002:162). Regardless of whether ἐντὸς should be translated
“within” or “among,” the point is that Q’s Jesus possibly told his followers that the kingdom of God was not an expected future event (cf. Casey 2009:223; contra Allison, in Miller 2001:111-112; 2010:98-116). In this pericope, he does not go on to explain what the kingdom actually is, but the rest of Q leaves the impression that it was inseparably connected to his earthly ministry, during which he fulfilled the Old-Testament prophecies by healing the sick, raising the dead, and bringing good news to the poor (cf. esp. Q 6:20; Q 7:22, 28; Q 10:9; Q 11:2b-4, 14, 20 and Q 12:22b-31). The time of the appearance of God’s kingdom is specifically identified with the ministry of Jesus in Q 16:16 (see Sim 1985:188-192; contra Catchpole 1993:234). However, Q 16:16 implies, together with Q 10:9, that the kingdom of God, although it was initiated by Jesus’ earthly ministry, did not discontinue at the consummation of that earthly ministry (cf. Sim 1985:196). Thus, the earthly ministry of Jesus marked the beginning, but not the end, of the kingdom of God. Whenever and wherever the humanitarian conduct of Jesus is continued by others, the kingdom of God is manifesting itself on earth. Moreover, Q 13:28-29 indicates that the kingdom of God would extend into, and continue after, the apocalyptic event. This logion should not be used as proof texts to argue that the “kingdom of God” represented some kind of eschatological reality separate from the earthly “kingdom of God,” but should rather be seen as evidence of continuity between this age and the one to come. Whatever the phrase “kingdom of God” might have denoted and/or connoted to the Q people, it certainly did not refer to a futuristic, imminent or apocalyptic reality per se. An apocalyptic understanding of the term “kingdom of God” has traditionally been read into the text.

2.6.3 Findings

In sum, it must be stated that Q did not advocate or adhere to an imminent eschatology (see Sim 1985:206-223). Q did, nonetheless, promote and believe in both a futuristic and an apocalyptic eschatology. The term “kingdom of God” is not used in Q to refer to this apocalyptic or futuristic eschatology (cf. Robinson 2007:127; contra Allison 2010:38-39). This finding is in accord with the usage of the term “kingdom of God” in the Gospel of Thomas (see Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:99-100, 119-120).
At most, God’s kingdom referenced the realised eschatology that was Jesus’ historical ministry (see Sim 1985:181-197). Specifically, it had the humanitarian acts that Jesus performed during his public ministry in mind. In a way then, the “realised eschatology” of Q’s Jesus is comparable to and compatible with Crossan’s proposed “ethical eschatology” (see section 1.3.7 above). This so-called “realised eschatology” should be clearly distinguished from Jesus’ apocalyptic eschatology. The former implies that Jesus fulfilled a number of Old-Testament prophecies, thereby inaugurating a new this-worldly era during his public ministry. The latter denotes a future event of divine intervention that would terminate history – or history as we know it – and bring about a new this-worldly or other-worldly order. Whether or not Q understood the ministry of Jesus in terms of a realised eschatology is not central to our purposes. We are mainly interested in how Q recounts the relationship between his sapiential and apocalyptic messages.

### 2.7 ~ FINDINGS

In sum, this chapter has produced the following results:

- Q was most likely a single document that was written in Greek.
- Unless and until Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy of Q can be successfully refuted, it remains the best proposal of its editorial development, and should be upheld.
- As a whole – and in all three redactional layers – Q was a sapiential document, albeit one that contained apocalyptic and prophetic micro-genres.
- Those responsible for Q were from Galilee, but they were nonetheless ethnically, politically and religiously Judean.
- The eschatology of Q was thoroughly apocalyptic, but not imminent.

In view of the overall intention of this study, these results would suggest that Q remembered and described Jesus primarily as a wisdom teacher. Significantly, this conclusion is not drawn from Q’s stratigraphy, but from its genre. The results of this chapter further suggest that Q remembered and described the person, message and mission of Jesus as firmly rooted in apocalypticism. This is true even if the stratification
of Q is upheld, as it is in this study. Suggestions, mostly by Renewed Questers, that Jesus was not in any way, shape or form apocalyptic are hard to reconcile with this memory of Jesus. The Q people clearly remembered Jesus as such. Nonetheless, the usage of apocalyptic and prophetic micro-genres suggest that Q’s Jesus used apocalypticism in support of his sapiential message. The Judean ethnicity of Q proves, to state the obvious, that “wisdom” and “Judaism” were not mutually exclusive ideas. Suggestions, mostly by Third Questers, that a sapiential Jesus equals a non-Jewish Jesus are therefore refuted. Another consequence of the abovementioned results is worth mentioning at this point: Taking the documentary status and stratification of Q seriously confirms the sapiential Jesus of the Renewed Quest, but confutes the non-apocalyptic Jesus of the Renewed Quest.

True enough, Q’s memory and the historical Jesus might be two completely opposite entities. Yet, such scepticism about Q’s mnemonic abilities seems altogether unjustified given Q’s chronological and geographical proximity to the historical Jesus. If anything, Q is one of the best sources – if not the best source – to exploit when looking for authentic memories and information about the historical Jesus. The latter is true because the Q people lived closer to the time and the place of this elusive historical figure than anyone else we have access to in the historical record. If Q’s memory of Jesus turns out to be inherently and substantially flawed, it would stand to argue, like many scholars during the No-Quest period did, that nothing at all can be known about Jesus. Once again, such pessimism seems wholly unfounded and unrealistic. This study (and student) holds that it is not only legitimate, but also desirable and necessary to reach conclusions about the historical Jesus from the Sayings Gospel Q and our knowledge thereof. There is a difference between equating results about Q to results about the historical Jesus and pondering the relevance of results about Q for our knowledge and understanding of the historical Jesus. The first is illegitimate, while the second is vital. The significance of Q’s specific brand of eschatology will receive attention in chapter five. These conclusions were based on a bird’s-eye-view analysis of Q as a document. What remains now is to determine whether or not these findings are supported by individual traditions within Q. It is to this endeavour that we now turn.