CHAPTER 1: THE RESEARCH GAP: THE IDENTITY OF Q’S JESUS

1.1 ~ JACK T. SANDERS

In his monograph, *Ethics in the New Testament*, Jack T. Sanders aims to demonstrate conclusively that Jesus did “not provide a valid ethics for today” (Sanders 1975:29). Underlying this conviction is his steadfast commitment to imminent eschatology: “That Jesus held an imminent eschatology will have to be considered a fact” (Sanders 1975:5). Sanders (1986:xii; xiii) confirmed this view in a preface to the second edition of his book: “It is the main thesis of this book that imminent eschatology was the necessary framework for the selfless ethics of Jesus and of Paul…” and: “In any case, there is in my mind still no question that whatever ethical principle Jesus acknowledged or proposed are integrally tied to his imminent eschatology.” Hence, the ethics of Jesus are inextricably bound up with his overarching framework, which is imminent eschatology. However, the integrality of Jesus’ ethics with his imminent eschatology is only the first part of the argument. The second part of Sanders’ (1975:13, 23) argument is that modern man does not believe in an imminent eschatology anymore:

> For modern man knows that, however imminent his own judgment may always be, the world and its problems will continue. [...] It is after all, then, the continual pressure of the *continuous existence of the world and its problems* that finally breaks apart the existentialist attempt to render Jesus’ ethics valid. [...] In other words, the ethical implications of the new quest of the historical Jesus would appear to be inappropriate to the modern understanding of “world.”

There is another part of the argument not expressly stated by Sanders, namely that the ancient and modern worldviews are incompatible; and so are their ethics (cf. Allison 2010:88). Ancient Judaism, of which Jesus was part, looked at the Torah for ethical

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1 Italics original.
guidance. Yet, their ethical behaviour was essentially \textit{motivated} not by the Torah itself, but by both wisdom and eschatology (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:348, 372). The difficulty is that there exists a tension between these two motivations for ethical behaviour (cf. Piper 1989:77). An ethic motivated by and based on wisdom believes that the physical world will keep on existing more or less the way it is, while an ethic motivated by and based on eschatology expects the world to change, most commonly within the near future. The former ethic is based on the observation of both the created world and the typical conduct of people. The latter ethic is based on the expectation that the world (as we know it) is about to end. These are two opposing points of view that we as modern scholars (not modern people in general), because of our obsession with classification and taxonomy, struggle to integrate (see Allison, in Miller 2001:89-93, 110; 2010:88). As will become clear in the course of this study, ancient people did not have this problem and oftentimes held both positions simultaneously (cf. Piper 1989:159). The modern view of ethics, as described by Sanders, overlaps extensively with the ancient view of sapiential ethics, not least of all because both views imagine that the world will continue more or less as it is. A fundamental element of Sanders’ argument is that an ethic based on imminent eschatology is entirely incompatible with a modern ethic or an ethic based on wisdom (cf. Allison 2010:88).

Hence, Sanders’ argument is deductive and may well be summarised as follows: (1) Jesus held an imminent eschatology; (2) Jesus’ ethics were motivated by and based on his imminent eschatology, and are therefore inseparable from it; (3) the modern world does not subscribe to an imminent eschatology and neither does its ethics; (4) the ancient and modern worldviews are foundationally different and essentially conflicting; (5) thus, the ethics of Jesus are insignificant, irrelevant, inappropriate and inapplicable for modern society. The current study will attempt to address two aspects of this argument. The first is whether or not Jesus held an imminent eschatology. The second is whether or not sapiential and eschatological worldviews are incompatible. These topics will be addressed by appealing to the Sayings Gospel Q,\textsuperscript{2} and more specifically, the Son-of-Man

\textsuperscript{2} For my description of Q as a “Sayings Gospel” and not a “Sayings Source,” see section 2.4.1 below.
and apocalyptic-judgment logia within Q. However, before a theory can be presented, it is first necessary to give a brief overview of historical-Jesus research.

1.2 ~ A FOCUSED OVERVIEW OF THE OLD AND NEW QUESTS

1.2.1 Liberal Theology

It is well known that Hermann Samuel Reimarus started the quest for the historical Jesus when his private thoughts were published post-humously in 1778 (cf. Telford 1994:55; Martin 1999:29-30, 35; Wright 1996:16; 2002:6). Reimarus thought of Jesus as an eschatological prophet (cf. Martin 1999:36; McKnight 2005:271; Theissen & Merz 1998:3). This is true even though Reimarus, influenced by the rationality of the Enlightenment period, attempted to strip the gospels of their miraculous aggrandizements, including the resurrection story (cf. Patterson 1998a:30). According to Reimarus, the disciples and gospel writers invented these tales after Jesus’ death so that they could renovate the moral teachings of Jesus and turn them into a supernatural religion (cf. Martin 1999:35; Frey 2011:9; Wright 1996:17; 2002:7). Jesus himself was not interested in offending or abolishing the Torah (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:349-350). It was the disciples of Jesus who had removed themselves from the Torah and who had left early Judaism behind. Thus, both claims – that the historical Jesus should be seen as an eschatological figure and that he was a teacher of simple moral truths – have been with us since the very beginning. In Reimarus’s opinion, Jesus pleaded with people to change their lives radically in light of the imminent eschatological event.

Thanks to Heinrich Julius Holtzmann’s solution to the Synoptic problem and the emergence of the Two Source Hypothesis in 1863, researchers started feeling that they had a sure footing when it came to the historical Jesus (see Den Heyer 2002:43-45). Attention could now be paid to the most reliable source, historically: Mark (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:5; Martin 1999:42). However, Holtzmann’s solution to the Synoptic problem was not universally accepted and many scholars continued drawing on all four gospels in their descriptions of the historical Jesus (cf. Frey 2011:11). Q, the other source
behind Matthew and Luke, was mostly overlooked and ignored during this time, sufficing only to supplement the Markan sketch of the historical Jesus (cf. Edwards 1976:3, 10-11, 14). For almost a century (1860’s to 1950’s), scholars believed that Q was of a lesser import than Mark, primarily because it was seen as didache (teaching) and not kerygma (preaching), but also because Mark seemed to be of greater importance to both Matthew and Luke. According to scholars of this period, the didache could only ever be a supplement to the kerygma.

“Rational” interpretations of the gospels, and Mark in particular, held that Jesus had experienced an intimate relationship with God and that he gave expression to this familiarity with the term “son of God.” He did not attempt to establish a new religion, but proclaimed the speedy arrival of the kingdom of God. In order to make rational sense of this proclamation, “enlightened” theologians of the second half of the nineteenth century had to do away with the apocalyptic language and imagery of the gospels (cf. Den Heyer 2002:45-46; see Patterson 1998a:27-29). According to these liberal theologians, “the Jesus behind the gospels” did not proclaim that God would intervene dramatically with fire and brimstone, but rather proclaimed that God’s kingdom would come within the confines of history. By means of a slow process of evolution, the kingdom of God was establishing itself on earth. No longer was the kingdom to be seen as a mythical and surreal utopia. Rather, the kingdom of God was an ideal to be aimed for through human progress and reason – an ideal that is slowly but surely cementing its place within the world. By stripping the gospels of their supernatural elements, liberal theologians believed that they could discover the essence of Jesus: the ethical or moral message enclosed in his teaching and preaching (see esp. Patterson 1998a:4, 27-32; cf. also Koester 1992:3; Mack 1993:30-32; Borg 1994a:4; Miller 2001:6; Wright 1996:18; 2002:9; Tuckett 1996:45-46; Martin 1999:36; Horsley 1999:19; Dunn 2005:187). The Q saying in Luke 17:21, about the kingdom of God being “within” (ἐντὸς) us, was arguably the most important proof text for liberal theology (cf. Frey 2011:11). Likewise, John’s brand of realised eschatology was preferred over apocalyptic and futuristic types of New-Testament eschatology (cf. Wink 2002:198; see section 1.2.3 below).
Thus, the “liberal” search for the historical Jesus progressively shifted away from Reimarus’s intuition that Jesus was a Jewish, apocalyptic prophet and towards his suspicion that Jesus was a teacher of morality. The moral teachings of Jesus were not only superior to Jewish obsession with the letter of the Law, but also timelessly and universally valid (cf. e.g. Baur 1847, esp. 585; see Theissen & Merz 1998:349-350). Liberal theology reached its zenith at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, with Adolf von Harnack arguably being its most prolific proponent (see Den Heyer 2002:63-69). Motivated by an apologetic attempt to defend the Christian faith, Harnack stripped the tradition of all its naive fabrications, like the miracle stories and the resurrection, in order to salvage its essence. That essence was Jesus’ ethical preaching and message about the kingdom of God. The core of Christianity was not, in Harnack’s view, the person of Jesus, but rather the Father-God proclaimed by Jesus. Like his “liberal” partners, Harnack also believed that the kingdom of God was unfolding within history. Jesus was portrayed by him as a teacher of ethical ideals, a prophet of progress in the Western world, and an advocate for the establishment of God’s kingdom on earth and within history.

1.2.2 Albert Schweitzer

In an effort to reconstruct a biography of the historical Jesus behind the gospels, most importantly the gospel of Mark, liberal theology produced a sea of literature and many different pictures of Jesus. In 1892, one of these pictures of Jesus was put forward by Johannes Weiss, who went against the tide by focusing only on the Synoptic gospels and proposing that Jesus was, above all else, an apocalyptic prophet, who had expected the end of the world within his own lifetime (cf. esp. Koester 1992:4; Patterson 1998a:33-34; Miller 2001:7; cf. also Edwards 1976:33; Martin 1999:40; Dunn 2005:187; Frey 2011:12). According to Weiss, Jesus spoke of the kingdom of God as an event that would be ushered in via the apocalyptic agency of the Son-of-Man figure, an emissary who would return on the heavenly clouds and bring about a period of unthinkable violence and misfortune, ultimately ending in the judgment of everyone on earth (cf. Patterson 1998a:165-166). The ethical demands of Jesus were the preparatory conditions
not only for entering into God’s future kingdom, but also for side-stepping ultimate judgment (cf. Edwards 1976:33; Theissen & Merz 1998:143, 350; Miller 2001:8). Since this view was so atypical for the time, and since there was so much literature out there, Weiss’s proposal was mostly overlooked.

In a classic study, Albert Schweitzer (1906) pointed out the failings and shortcomings of liberal theology and the Old Quest. Schweitzer illustrated convincingly that each author had constructed, not the historical Jesus, but his or her own subjective projection of Jesus (cf. esp. Den Heyer 2002:52-53; cf. also Witherington III 1995:9; Theissen & Mertz 1998:5-6; cf. Casey 2010:3). Many pictures of Jesus had seen the light, but none of them were historically reliable. All these studies suffered from the same fundamental flaw: they thought of and described Jesus as if he were living in their own time. They had failed to take the chronological, geographical and ethnic discontinuity between Jesus and themselves into account (see Miller 2001:6-7). This was true of every study except one: that of Johannes Weiss. Schweitzer revived the unpopular and unnoticed proposal of Weiss and judged it to be the best portrayal of the historical Jesus out there (cf. Koester 1992:4; Patterson 1998a:34, 166; Martin 1999:40-41; Miller 2001:7). According to Schweitzer, Jesus can and should not be modernised. Jesus is, and will always be, a stranger to both modernity and contemporary society (cf. Miller 2001:8-9). For Schweitzer, this included not only his person, but his ethics as well (see Sanders 1975:2-3). Unlike the liberal theologians, Schweitzer believed that the ethics of Jesus were alien and illogical for today’s society. Liberal theologians had watered down Jesus’ world-condemning imperatives to fit modern ethical ideals (cf. Patterson 1998a:35). Whoever ignores the strangeness of Jesus, constructs (and projects) an anachronistic Jesus. Only in embracing the discontinuity between Jesus and ourselves are we able to reconstruct a reliable picture of the historical Jesus.

In reaction to the many images of Jesus presented by liberal theology, Schweitzer (1913) constructed his own image of Jesus, one that would have a lasting influence, reaching into the present (cf. Tuckett 1996:45-46; Horsley 1999:69-70; Vorster 1999:307-308). More than anything else, the Jesus proposed by Schweitzer (à la Weiss) was inspired and
shaped by “consistent” or “thoroughgoing eschatology” (konsequente Eschatologie). Schweitzer used the word “consistent” or “thoroughgoing” (konsequente) to indicate that eschatology determined every aspect of the teachings, deeds and message of the historical Jesus. However, what Schweitzer understood as “eschatology” would in modern research rather be seen as apocalypticism (cf. Crossan 1998:274; Miller 2001:9; cf. also Den Heyer 2002:54). In a word, Schweitzer saw Jesus as a person who was completely controlled and consumed by his belief that the kingdom of God would appear very soon (cf. Borg 1994a:53; cf. also Casey 2010:3). This explains why he believed that Jesus’ ethics were irrelevant for modern society, a belief consequently adopted and argued by Sanders, among others (see section 1.1 above; cf. Kloppenborg 2005:8-9; Allison 2005:106). In Schweitzer’s view, the ethical programme espoused by Jesus was an “interim ethics,” valid only until the imminent end of the world (cf. Sanders 1975:3; Edwards 1976:33; Theissen & Merz 1998:143, 350-351; Casey 2010:311). It did not have, nor was it intended to have, any lasting significance. Rather than being timelessly valid, Jesus’ ethics were (in accordance with the view of Weiss) the conditions for becoming part of God’s kingdom. The ministry of Jesus, which included his ethical message, was principally determined by an imminent eschatology. This explained the strange extremism of some of his moral instructions.

As his ministry unfolded, Jesus became increasingly convinced that he had a fundamental role to play in the apocalyptic end that was unfurling. Matthew 10-11 (esp. 10:23) was a crucial (and historically reliable) text for Schweitzer (cf. esp. Den Heyer 2002:54-55; cf. also Borg 1994a:52; Miller 2001:9). These two Matthean chapters describe how Jesus sent his disciples on a mission to proclaim the kingdom of God. According to Schweitzer, Jesus must have been severely disappointed when the kingdom failed to arrive after the return of his disciples – the first delay of the parousia (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:143). From that moment on, Jesus was thoroughly convinced that he would have to sacrifice his own life in order to enforce the arrival of God’s kingdom (cf. Miller 2001:9). Jesus believed that, through his own suffering and death, he could compel and force the apocalyptic event to take place (cf. Wright 1996:19; 2002:10). Jesus was wrong, he failed and history continued as per usual, as if nothing had changed. Yet, in
Schweitzer’s view, the “fact” that Jesus was mistaken does not render his whole life meaningless. This strange man may still have meaning for us today. The more we accept his strangeness and his separateness from modern society, the more meaningful his life becomes for today. Even though the kingdom had not arrived, Jesus lived as though it had and allowed his expectation thereof to rule every aspect of his life (cf. Kloppenborg 2005:9-10). In this way, Jesus’ life and attitude takes on great significance for people of all times. Schweitzer is left unable to continue believing in the Christ of dogma, but finds it possible to be inspired by the man who lived and died as an apocalyptic prophet (cf. Patterson 1998a:34).

Initially, Schweitzer’s Jesus did not convince everyone (cf. Frey 2011:13). Liberal portraits of Jesus continued to be published. Eventually, however, Schweitzer’s Jesus came out victorious and remained the dominant paradigm for most of the twentieth century (cf. esp. Patterson 1998a:167-168, 171; cf. also Martin 1999:41; Miller 2001:10; Chilton 2005:115; Dunn 2005:187). The reason for this was not only Schweitzer’s compelling argumentation, but also the progressive evaporation of evolutionary ideals and historical positivism in the face of two world wars. An apocalyptic Jesus seemed to fit this situation of devastation and pessimism much better than the liberal Jesus. However, Schweitzer’s Jesus did not just persist because it was historically and contextually “convenient.” The three documents that were chronologically closest to Jesus – i.e. Mark’s gospel, Paul’s letters and the Q tradition behind Matthew and Luke – all portrayed him as being thoroughly immersed in and motivated by apocalypticism. After Schweitzer, an apocalyptic depiction of Jesus became synonymous with a historically-reliable image of Jesus (cf. Miller 2001:10).

1.2.3 Rudolf Bultmann and the “No Quest” period

The search for the historical Jesus was dealt a critical blow when William Wrede (1901) discovered the theological motif of the messianic secret in the gospel according to Mark (cf. Wright 1996:20; 2002:12; Bock 2002:144). This discovery, among others, led to the inescapable realisation that even the gospel of Mark was not historically reliable, and that
it could not function as a solid foundation upon which a biography of Jesus could be reconstructed (cf. esp. Den Heyer 2002:74; cf. also Theissen & Merz 1998:6; Martin 1999:42; Bock 2002:144). Wrede believed that not much could be said about Jesus, beyond that he was a teacher or prophet of some kind who lived a memorable life and was eventually executed (cf. Wright 1996:20; 2002:12). The views that the gospels were historically unreliable and that a historically trustworthy picture of Jesus could not be achieved were already expressed in 1892 by Martin Kähler, who had a huge influence on Rudolf Bultmann (cf. Patterson 1998a:35-37). Kähler argued that the historical Jesus was insignificant to the church, but that the “historic Jesus” remained significant for all time. With the word “historic,” Kähler meant the Christ of faith, who had died and had risen again. The gospels intended to evoke faith in the death and resurrection of Jesus (cf. Martin 1999:42-43). Their chief intention was not to be historical documents that relay the moral teachings of Jesus or promote his ethic. Instead, the canonical gospels present us with the historic Jesus – and it is all but impossible, in Kähler’s opinion, to separate this figure from the historical Jesus by means of the canonical evidence (cf. Witherington III 1995:10). Progressively over time, scholars started realising that the gospels were all subjectively written after Easter and that an objective reconstruction of the life of Jesus was perhaps an impossible task. On the other hand, Holtzmann’s solution to the Synoptic problem was confirmed and elaborated in 1924 by Streeter (cf. Casey 2010:4). Holtzmann’s solution had been gaining more and more support over the years. Streeter’s contribution in 1924 ensured that just about all subsequent scholars would favour Mark and Q in their lives of the historical Jesus.

It was in this atmosphere that Rudolf Bultmann entered the scene in 1921 with his Die Geschichte der Synoptischen Tradition, which was primarily concerned with tracing the history of the gospels’ genesis and evolution through form criticism (cf. Den Heyer 2002:78). According to Bultmann ([1921] 1963:371-372), the overriding majority of material in the gospels addressed the situation of the early church, which meant that the gospels had “no historical-biographical interest,” and had “nothing to say about Jesus’ human personality, his appearance and character, his origin, education and development.” The results of Bultmann’s form-critical approach also indicated that very little of the
teachings of Jesus recounted in the gospels actually go back to the Jesus of history (cf. Borg 1994a:4; Theissen & Merz 1998:6; Kloppenborg 2005:12). Despite these findings, the little that could be known about the teachings and message of Jesus prompted Bultmann to write a Jesus book in 1926 (simply entitled Jesus) in search of the historical person. In the introduction to this work, Bultmann ([1926] 1958:14) reiterates his belief that almost nothing can be known about the “life and personality” of Jesus, but continues to state that enough of his teachings is available to enable a relatively consistent picture of his message.

Bultmann’s work on the historical Jesus is interesting, not only because he was undoubtedly the most prolific New-Testament scholar of the twentieth century (see Van Aarde 2011b), but also because he was influenced by, and tried to stay true to, both the Schweitzerian and the liberal paradigms. Influenced by liberal theology, Bultmann (1921) moved aside all metaphysical and “unscientific” references to Jesus, including his pre-existence, virgin birth, miracles, passion predictions, resurrection and ascension (see Den Heyer 2002:78-79). These should, according to Bultmann, all be attributed to the early church. Like Schweitzer, on the other hand, Bultmann ([1926] 1958:27f., 124) believed that Jesus acted as a messianic prophet, advocating “the coming of the kingdom of God” (cf. Borg 1994a:48, 71; Kloppenborg 2005:12). However, Bultmann ([1926] 1958:39) refused to see Jesus as an “apocalypticist” who was fundamentally concerned with speculation over the signs and specific nature of the end-time. Bultmann attributed also these passages to the early church (cf. Chilton 2005:115; see Den Heyer 2002:80-81). Rather, Jesus’ expectation of the coming kingdom should be described as “eschatological.” In Bultmann’s opinion, Jesus emphasised the conduct and behaviour of people when proclaiming the coming kingdom. Jesus tried to persuade people to change their ways in light of the coming kingdom of God. In other words, the proclamation of the kingdom had essentially an ethical motivation and goal. Thus, Bultmann did not deny that Jesus preached imminent eschatology and also largely agreed that, although Jesus preached an ethic of “radical obedience” to the will of God, this was based on imminent

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3 When Jesus spoke of the Son of Man, he always did so in the third person, implying that he was referring, not to himself, but to someone else (cf. Van Aarde 2004b:425-426).
eschatology (see Sanders 1975:11-13). Nevertheless, as we will see, this futurist eschatology had an existential meaning and application for the present: it called for a final decision in the here and now (cf. Kloppenborg 2005:13).

Bultmann also touched upon a separate, but related, aspect of historical-Jesus research – not addressed thus far in this chapter – namely, the annoying difficulty of the presence of sapiential traditions in authentic Jesus material. His form-critical approach had convinced Bultmann that many (if not most) of the Jesus traditions about morality were contained in sapiential genres (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:353). He proposed two solutions to this complexity (see Mack 1993:32-34). Both solutions reaffirmed eschatological priority, but tried to account for the presence of wisdom amongst eschatological material. The first solution by Bultmann ([1921] 1963:108) was simply to give eschatological sayings in the Synoptic tradition priority and explain the presence of wisdom sayings as secondary interpolations. According to Bultmann, these traditions were introduced to construct an ethic for the time before the end of the world – something Schweitzer had already suggested (cf. Vorster 1999:307-308). The inauthenticity of the wisdom material was substantiated by two arguments (cf. Borg 1994b:19). Firstly, they could not be easily harmonised with an eschatological view of Jesus, which was historically most reliable. Secondly, Bultmann believed that the wisdom sayings stemmed from common and traditional folk wisdom, not from Jesus himself. The second solution by Bultmann ([1926] 1958:89-92) was to place the two traditions side by side and to claim that both called for “radical obedience.”

In 1935, C. H. Dodd proposed another solution to the (problematic) presence of wisdom material within the authentic Jesus material. As an eschatological prophet, Jesus had initiated a new age that was in continuity with his eschatological pronouncements. This new age simultaneously underscored the urgency of Jesus’ wisdom sayings. The proclaimed kingdom was an eschatological image, but then one that had been realised in the present by Jesus and his ministry (cf. Vorster 1999:308). The “real” message of Jesus was that all eschatological expectations had been and were being fulfilled in his person (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:243). Thus, the historical Jesus proclaimed a “realised
eschatology” and understood the kingdom of God as a present, not a future, reality that was being initiated by his person (cf. Borg 1994a:71; Frey 2011:16). The early church then corrupted this message by proclaiming an apocalyptic, futurist eschatology. Moreover, New-Testament descriptions of the future coming of the kingdom referred not to the ministry of Jesus or a future event within history, but to an otherworldly reality beyond space and time (cf. Edwards 1976:34). Parables about the theme of judgment were not about the final judgment, but about the present crisis caused by the introduction of God’s rule. It followed for Dodd (1935:109) that Jesus’ ethics were not interim ethics at all, but rather “a moral ideal for men who have accepted the Kingdom of God, and live their lives in the presence of his judgment and grace, now decisively revealed.”

In 1941, Bultmann published *Offenbarung und Heilsgeschehen*, a study where he pleaded for the “demythologising” of the New Testament (see Den Heyer 2002:86-89). Bultmann was not the first to recognize the mythical character of the Bible, but he differed from most of his predecessors by not rendering these myths utterly useless and insignificant for modern man. He firmly believed that by removing the mythical skin from these biblical stories, one is time-and-again left with a message that is not time-bound, but remains surprisingly relevant. This applies also to apocalyptic passages in the New Testament. Despite the obvious falsehood of apocalyptic language – viewed from the vantage point of modern science and reason – Bultmann claimed to be able to extract the *kerygma* of these passages by demythologising them (cf. Martin 1999:43). The apocalypticism and eschatology of the New Testament, when demythologised and “existentialised,” called for a (con)current decision that would bring about radical change in the here and now (cf. Martin 1999:43; see Edwards 1976:36-37; Frey 2011:13-14). The “existential eschatology” of Bultmann denoted “a dramatic internal change within an individual so that one may speak of the world (as the ground of identity and security) having come to an end for that individual” (Borg 1994a:71). Notably missing from this understanding of eschatology are the concepts of change in the external world and futurity.
These findings were then further transposed to the historical Jesus, who was not an apocalypticist concerned with the future, but who preached an eschatological message in order to radically influence and alter people’s lives in the present. This authentic core of Jesus’ preaching could also be demythologised by means of an existentialist interpretation (cf. Borg 1994a:4). Thus, the ethics of Jesus, although tainted by eschatology, could be demythologised, removed from their eschatological skins, and interpreted existentially (cf. Kloppenborg 2005:13). The existential interpretation of Jesus’ ethics took on a contextual flavour in Bultmann’s work (cf. Sanders 1975:11-14). Accordingly, Bultmann spoke of the “eschatological ethic” of Jesus, which is an ethic that calls for radical obedience to the laws of God, especially the love-command, in the present moment, as demanded by the context of each situation (and not by the Torah).

Another attempt to preserve the eschatological essence of Jesus, but still argue for the continued relevance of his ethics, was made by Amos Wilder (1950). According to Wilder, the imminent eschatology of Jesus functioned merely as “sanctions” for his ethical prerogative (see Sanders 1975:9-11). Yet, these sanctions were only “formal” in nature. The “fundamental” sanctions (thereby implying the actual sanctions) were Jesus’ message of God’s innate nature, his appeal to Jewish Scripture and his appeal to his own authority and example.

In 1945, Werner Georg Kümmel illustrated that the authentic Jesus material contained both present and future sayings about the kingdom of God (cf. Frey 2011:16; see Edwards 1976:34-35). These sayings appeared side by side in the tradition and any attempt to separate them and to dismiss one group as inauthentic would be subjective and unwarranted. Thus, the authentic Jesus material – as well as the inauthentic church traditions – simultaneously supported both reigning views of a “realised eschatology” (à la Dodd) and a “consistent eschatology” (à la Schweitzer). In Kümmel’s opinion, the person of Jesus merged the present with the future. The content of the future kingdom was already present in Jesus. This result became the consensus view among scholars from the middle of the previous century onwards (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:53; cf. also Theissen & Merz 1998:244; Frey 2011:16). This consensus has at times been referred to as the “great synthesis” of historical Jesus research (cf. Borg 1994a:53). To be sure,
however, scholarly emphasis remained with the *future* aspect of the kingdom of God (cf. Borg 1994a:53-54). The present aspect of the kingdom was typically added as an afterthought to discussions of its future aspect. The future dimension of God’s kingdom remained its fundamental and defining quality.

Despite putting his own image of the historical Jesus forward, Bultmann declared the search to be unimportant and trivial for Christian faith. As one of the main advocates of dialectic theology, Bultmann deliberately chose against the historical Jesus for the *kerygmatic* Christ, as he was proclaimed by the early church (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:6; see Den Heyer 2002:81-82). Here, the influence of Kähler is clear (cf. Patterson 1998a:37). Yet, this choice was not meant to be an attack on, or a dismissal of, the relevance of historical-Jesus research. His own work on form criticism and his book on the historical Jesus, among others, serve as evidence of his commitment to the historical scrutiny of the biblical texts (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhäuser 1990:115). Bultmann’s point in opting for the *kerygmatic* Christ was that historical-Jesus research is irrelevant, not as a means of historical enquiry or biblical exegesis, but when it comes to matters of *kerygma* and *faith* (see Van Aarde 2011b; 2012:7-8). In other words, historical-Jesus research, and especially form criticism, was legitimate and relevant as an investigative tool for historians and biblical scholars, but could never substitute or validate “raw” faith in the post-Easter Christ – nor could it ever serve as a foundation for the *kerygma*. Bultmann (1965:9) distinguished between the “that” (Daß) and the “what” (Was) of Jesus (cf. Van Aarde 2012:8-9 n. 17). Stories about Jesus – the “Was” of his life and ministry – were (and are) the result of faith in him, not the foundation of such faith. These stories were (and are) a way of asserting one’s faith and expressing the *kerygma*. The foundation for *kerygma* and faith, rather, is the belief that (Daß) God somehow became human in a historic person named Jesus. This partly explains why Bultmann held that historical-Jesus enquiries – which deal exclusively with the “Was” of Jesus’ life and work – were exercises in futility when it came to faith and *kerygma*. 
Conceivably, most scholars (and laypeople) would agree with Bultmann on these matters, but unfortunately many from his own time (and thereafter) misunderstood Bultmann to mean that historical-Jesus research was wholly and utterly irrelevant. Bultmann’s focus on “demythologising” and “existentialising” the New Testament only ended in affirming these misconceptions. Ironically though, these exegetical processes were thoroughly rooted in critical and historical research. Bultmann’s dialectic theology never disposes of historic (historisch) inquiry or research, but employs it in search of the existential relevance (geschichtlich) of both the mythological bible and the historical Jesus (see Van Aarde 2011b; 2012). Additionally, Bultmann’s comments that nothing could be known of the “life and personality” of the historical Jesus led many to misconstrue Bultmann as declaring that nothing at all could be known about him. As we saw, this was not Bultmann’s position. Instead, he held that rather much could be known about the teachings of Jesus – so much so that a relatively consistent picture could be drawn of his overall message (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:115).

While Schweitzer’s unassailable critique demolished and ended the First Quest, thereby inaugurating a period of No Quest, Bultmann’s perceived (!) pessimism over both the feasibility and relevance of historical-Jesus research affirmed and prolonged the No-Quest period (cf. Telford 1994:33-34, 56; Witherington III 1995:9-10; Wright 1996:21-22; 2002:14-15; Martin 1999:41-42, 43; Bock 2002:144). The designation “No Quest” is a misnomer, since historical-Jesus research did not stall into a period of hiatus during this time (cf. Telford 1994:60; Bock 2002:144-145). Liberal theology and their ethical portraits of Jesus continued to exist alongside eschatological portraits of Jesus (cf. esp. Casey 2010:4, 12; cf. also Wright 1996:23; 2002:16; Allison, in Miller 2001:111-112). Nonetheless, this period was marked by a general pessimism over the feasibility and relevance of a search for the Jesus of history (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:3-4; cf. also Telford 1994:56; Martin 1999:42). After the Second World War, the results of form criticism were confirmed by redaction criticism (cf. Borg 1994a:4). Not only the supernatural and mythical aspects of the gospels, but also the ethical teachings of Jesus, were

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4 It should be noted that neither Schweitzer nor Bultmann ever used the term “No Quest,” or intended to eradicate historical research of either the bible or the person of Jesus (see Van Aarde 2011b).
manufactured by the church. It was generally believed by New-Testament scholarship that only a minimalist sketch of Jesus could be recovered behind the gospels. For the most part, the only historically reliable tradition about Jesus was that he was an apocalypticist who expected and preached the sporadic end of the world (cf. Martin 1999:41).

1.2.4 The New Quest

A student of Bultmann, Ernst Käsemann, is generally thought to have initiated a new era of Jesus research, commonly known as the New Quest (see esp. Patterson 1998a:38-42; cf. Koester 1992:5; Casey 2010:12; cf. also Telford 1994:56-57; Wright 1996:23; 2002:16). With a lecture on the subject in 1953 – published as an academic article in 1954 – Käsemann defended the opinion that historical-Jesus research could indeed be done properly and lead to trustworthy results (cf. Den Heyer 2002:96). Käsemann believed and argued that ignoring the historical Jesus would lead to a docetic disregard for the humanity of Jesus (cf. Martin 1999:44). He held that the historical Jesus could under no circumstances be made theologically irrelevant (cf. Borg 1994b:12). Käsemann further pointed to certain gospel pericopes that are indisputably and undeniably authentic (cf. Witherington III 1995:11). The gospels themselves built their theologies not only on the death and resurrection of Jesus (à la Kähler), but also on the historic works and words of an authentic, historical person. Käsemann defended certain aspects of continuity between Jesus and the early church (cf. Telford 1994:57). Regarding eschatology, Käsemann argued that the main difference between Jesus and John the Baptist was that the latter proclaimed an imminent and apocalyptic eschatology, while the former proclaimed the imminence of God and his kingdom in all aspects of life (cf. Sanders 1975:4; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70; Kloppenborg 2005:15; see Wink

5 Käsemann believed that his insistence on the theological relevance of the historical Jesus, as well as the continuity between this personage and the early church, was diametrically opposed to Bultmann’s preference for the kerygmatic Christ. Such a view of Käsemann’s relation to Bultmann can still be found among scholars today (cf. e.g. Borg 1994b:12; Telford 1994:57). Yet, Käsemann’s original valuation of his relation to Bultmann might actually rest on a gross misunderstanding of the intricacies and nuances of Bultmann’s theology (see Bultmann 1965:190-198; Schmithals 1968:262; 1988:149-158; Van Aarde 2011b).
Jesus played down the apocalyptic element in John’s teaching, but the early church resurrected John’s apocalyptic views, which then became paramount. A few of Bultmann’s other students, like Philipp Vielhauer and Hans Conzelmann, also advocated a (quasi) non-apocalyptic Jesus (cf. Boyd 1995:55; Patterson 1998a:174-175; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70-71).

Käsemann’s main contribution was not in his views on eschatology, however, but in optimistically validating and starting the New Quest. Yet, despite this new optimism in some quarters, the New Quest still continued in the footsteps of the No Quest period (cf. Borg 1994a:4-5). Jesus was still largely believed to have preached an essentially eschatological message, which was then made relevant by interpreting it existentially (cf. Borg 1994b:11-12). This was despite the views of many of Bultmann’s students that the message of Jesus was not essentially apocalyptic or eschatological. The essential difference between the No-Quest and New-Quest periods was not so much methodological, but theological (cf. Borg 1994a:4-5; Patterson 1998a:39-40; Theissen & Merz 1998:7). Answers to historical questions remained largely the same. Instead, it was the theological relevance of these answers that changed. The New Quest was largely concerned with validating the historical roots of the kerygma by determining the extent of continuity between the Jesus of history and the Jesus of the gospels, as well as determining the significance of Jesus for both ancient and modern human existence (cf. Koester 1992:5; Borg 1994b:12-13). As such, theological questions and concerns, as opposed to historical ones, largely governed the New Quest for Jesus (cf. Charlesworth 1988:26).

In order to circumvent the mistakes made by earlier researchers, proponents of the New Quest focused their attention on historical-critical methods and various criteria of authenticity (see esp. Patterson 1998a:40-41; Den Heyer 2002:177-178; cf. also Telford 1994:57; Witherington III 1995:11; Bock 2002:146). The use of Aramaic to reconstruct authentic words of Jesus was put forward by Joachim Jeremias (1947; 1971) as one criterion for the search (cf. Bock 2002:147). Another criterion was already suggested by Bultmann and paid particular attention to the uniqueness of Jesus (see Van Aarde
2004b:427). It held that something was historically reliable if it did not derive from the early church. Ironically, this “criterion of dissimilarity” in a sense undermined the New Quest’s prerogative to discover aspects of continuity between the historical Jesus and the early church. Another criterion that was similarly suggested by Bultmann also focused on the supposed uniqueness of Jesus by being suspicious of any material that had close parallels in contemporary popular culture, especially the Jewish writings of antiquity. The belief was that the early church had probably attributed popular sayings and established wisdom to their hero, Jesus. The more unorthodox, intelligent and problematic sayings of Jesus were probably more authentic. This criterion also became known as the “criterion of dissimilarity.” Käsemann was the first not only to explicitly identify and describe these criteria of dissimilarity, but also to suggest that they be used together when determining the authenticity of single traditions (cf. Kloppenborg 2005:14). Together, these became known as the criterion of “double dissimilarity,” meaning that the tradition in question was dissimilar from both popular (Jewish) culture and the early church (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:7; Blomberg 1999:21-22). Out of all the criteria, the criterion of double dissimilarity reigned supreme during the New Quest (cf. Borg 1994b:15-16).

The import of the “double-dissimilarity” criterion, as well as the consensus that Jesus was an apocalyptic prophet, ensured that the wisdom material continued to be judged inauthentic (cf. Borg 1994b:19). Since the time of Bultmann, scholars simply accepted, on the one hand, that these sayings could not be harmonised with the reigning apocalyptic view, and, on the other, that they were little more than traditional folk wisdom attributed to Jesus by the early church. Another important criterion was that of “multiple independent attestation,” according to which a tradition is more likely to be authentic if it is independently attested in more than one source. The application of these criteria led to the inevitable realisation that only fragmentary glimpses of the historical Jesus could be reconstructed. What is more, these reconstructions were just as subjective as those done during the Old Quest, notwithstanding the rigorousness of the methodological approach (cf. Patterson 1998a:41-42). This realisation was disappointing and only succeeded in confirming the scepticism of the No-Quest period. Once again, the New Testament text
became paramount, as is clear in the replacement of form criticism with redaction criticism and the eventual replacement of both with literary and narrative criticism. Even though a New Quest had started, pessimism over the relevance and feasibility of historical-Jesus research carried over from the No Quest period and persisted (cf. Koester 1992:5). For most New Testament scholars (as well as systematic theologians), the “thoroughgoing pessimism” of Kähler remained (cf. Borg 1994b:13). Historical-Jesus research was mostly viewed as an academic cul-de-sac (cf. Telford 1994:33). Even those who were initially optimistic and enthusiastic about the New Quest started doubting the viability of the search, finally abandoning such efforts completely in the early seventies (cf. Witherington III 1995:11).

1.3 ~ THE THIRD AND RENEWED QUESTS

1.3.1 A revival of Jesus studies

The 1980s saw a renewed interest and revival in historical-Jesus research (cf. esp. Borg 1994b:16-17; cf. also Charlesworth 1988:26; Telford 1994:38, 47; Boyd 1995:46; Witherington III 1995:12; Wright 1996:29; 2002:23; Martin 1999:45). Up to and until the end of the New Quest, most historical-Jesus research was concentrated in Germany (cf. Borg 1994b:10-11). Scholars from other countries listened intently and sometimes even participated, but it was Germany that showed the way. English-speaking scholars, notably from the United States of America, should be credited with initiating and sustaining the revival of the 1980s (cf. Boyd 1995:50-51). In most European countries, pessimism over the reliability of our sources, particularly the gospel accounts, for a reconstruction of the historical Jesus increased as time marched on and is still the most prevalent stance. American and English scholars, however, became much more positive about both the viability and relevance of the search during the eighties (cf. Charlesworth 1988:25; Telford 1994:57; Witherington III 1995:12-13; Martin 1999:45; Wright 2002:38). This has led to a situation where the dominant voices in historical-Jesus research no longer came from Germany, but from the United States and England (cf. Borg 1994b:29).
A few features enabled this positive stance in the English-speaking world and distinguished the revival in Jesus studies from earlier searches. The first was a brand new appreciation for the importance of non-theological sciences, most notably cultural anthropology, archaeology, social history, feminist studies, linguistics, the social sciences and history of religions (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:7, 19; see 1994b:21-24; cf. also Charlesworth 1988:25; Telford 1994:52, 58; Witherington III 1995:247; Boyd 1995:57-58; Theissen & Merz 1998:10). This appreciation has led to an inter-disciplinary approach to historical-Jesus research, which has allowed scholars to discover new truths about Jesus and his world (cf. Martin 1999:45). One of the outcomes of an inter-disciplinary approach is that the historical Jesus has increasingly been described in terms of his socio-political significance and contribution (see Borg 1994b:24-25). The second feature that enabled a renaissance of Jesus studies was a newfound appreciation for non-canonical sources from antiquity (cf. Charlesworth 1988:25; Boyd 1995:52; Theissen & Merz 1998:11; Bock 2002:146-147; see Telford 1994:47-49) – an appreciation that was both fuelled and assisted by archaeological discoveries, like the Qumran scrolls and Nag Hammadi manuscripts, among others (see esp. Charlesworth 1988:30-172; cf. Borg 1994a:10-11, 19; cf. also Witherington III 1995:12; see Casey 2010:120-132). These findings have enabled scholars to reconstruct the period and world in which Jesus lived much more accurately than before (cf. Charlesworth 1988:9, 27). If these two features are used together, it enables researchers to draw a fairly authentic picture of the world in which Jesus operated (cf. Wright 2002:31-32). Such a picture has become essential for understanding Jesus himself (cf. Telford 1994:49; Boyd 1995:57). As a result, scholarship has increasingly favoured approaches that place Jesus within his wider Jewish and/or Hellenistic contexts (cf. Telford 1994:52, 58). In general, we could therefore say that the revival of Jesus research began an orientation that was (and still is) more directly interested in history than theology (cf. Charlesworth 1988:9, 26-27; Telford 1994:57). Partly due to the revived interest in the Jewish world of Jesus, the belief slowly but surely gained support that research on the historical Jesus should take as its starting point the Jewish Sitz im Leben and identity of Jesus (cf. Telford 1994:49, 52; Wright 1996:5-6; 2002:31-32; Bock 2002:141, 147; cf. also Koester 1994:541; Kloppenborg 2005:2; Fredriksen 2005:55). This development should be seen as one of
the most important features of the revived quest (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:10-11; Casey 2010:13).

The criteria developed during the New Quest were not totally abandoned, but were refined (cf. Witherington III 1995:12). In light of the attention paid to the first-century Jewish world of Jesus, the all-important criterion of double dissimilarity came under fire (cf. Casey 2010:13; see Den Heyer 2002:178-181; Borg 1994b:25-27). If this criterion is consistently applied, Jesus will as a matter of course be stripped of his Jewishness, on the one hand, and end up not having had any impact on the early church whatsoever, on the other (cf. Telford 1994:58; Witherington III 1995:46; Theissen & Merz 1998:8; cf. also Kloppenborg 2005:16; Casey 2010:104). Scholars now believe that to deny any continuity between Jesus and his Jewish world, on the one hand, or between Jesus and the early church, on the other, is anachronistic, unhistorical, unscientific, illogical and irresponsible. In view of our current theme, the consistent application of the criterion of double dissimilarity would result in a Jesus that is neither a wisdom preacher nor an apocalyptic prophet. Yet, the criterion of (double) dissimilarity did not disappear altogether (cf. Wright 1996:86; 2002:33-34). Researchers agree that it still has a (more limited) application. More specifically, if utilised correctly, the criterion of double dissimilarity points to those aspects that made Jesus unique, without stripping him of his Jewishness or his value for the early church (cf. Telford 1994:67; cf. also Casey 2010:104). At Jesus-Seminar meetings, Funk referred to this new application of the older criterion as the criterion of “(double) distinctiveness” (cf. Miller 1999:75). Applied to the ethics of Jesus, it indicates that he was both completely obedient to the Torah and creative enough to interpret these commandments in his own way, which brought him in conflict with certain Jewish groups, like perhaps the Pharisees. Despite his piety, he dined with sinners. The ethics of the historical Jesus might indeed be found in these unique aspects of his teaching. On the other hand, the ethics of the historical Jesus must always be understood and interpreted in light of their Jewishness. Apart from Aramaic, ethnicity and double dissimilarity, other criteria have also stood the test of time (see Telford 1994:67-68). Most important out of these are arguably the criterion of multiple independent attestation and the criterion of embarrassment (cf. Casey 2010:13, 102-105).
A brand new criterion was created, commonly referred to as the criterion of “historical plausibility” (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:11; Van Aarde 2004b:428; see Casey 2010:106-108). This criterion takes as its starting point not the uniqueness of Jesus, but his rootedness in Jewish culture of the time. It does this by asking two simple questions: “Given his environment, is it historically plausible that Jesus did or said this or the other within his lifetime?” and: “Is it possible to explain and clarify the rise of the early church from this tradition?” In a sense, this criterion is the polar opposite of the criterion of double dissimilarity.

New methodologies invariably lead to new results. The general consensus that Jesus was an eschatological prophet, which had governed historical-Jesus studies since the time of Schweitzer, started to wane (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:7, 18-19, 69; Borg, in Miller 2001:31; cf. also Miller 2001:10; Frey 2011:17; see Patterson 1998a:164-184; Patterson, in Miller 2001:69-70). The belief that Jesus’ eschatology was not future-oriented began gaining a lot of ground. This idea was not new. As we saw, Dodd had already held such a view, expressed by the term “realised eschatology.” Also the idea that Jesus’ eschatology was not temporal at all was expressed long ago by a number of scholars, most notably by Hans Conzelmann (cf. Patterson 1998a:174-175; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70; Den Heyer 2002:100-102). These a-temporal and non-futurist interpretations of Jesus’ eschatology started receiving a lot of support in the 1980’s. Recent polls of American historical-Jesus scholars indicate that a great majority of them have left behind the older consensus of an apocalyptic Jesus (see Patterson 1998a:170-171). This trend is the result of both deconstructionist and re-constructionist developments within New-Testament studies. Regarding the former, the material on which the eschatological Jesus was traditionally based came under fire. More precisely, the authenticity of the apocalyptic traditions in Q, Mark and Paul was increasingly approached with suspicion (cf. Patterson 1998a:172). These results were part of a movement in historical-Jesus studies called the Renewed Quest, which should be differentiated from another movement called the Third Quest (see section 1.3.7 below). Before distinguishing between these two quests, let us first look at the developments that led to the Renewed Quest’s abandonment of the eschatological Jesus.
1.3.2 The Son of Man

The older consensus of an apocalyptic Jesus was essentially based on four aspects (cf. Borg 1994a:8): (1) The general atmosphere of crisis betrayed by the gospels; (2) The Son-of-Man sayings, all of which were thought to predict the imminent coming of the Son of Man; (3) The sayings about the kingdom of God; (4) The expectation by the early church that the eschatological end would occur within their lifetimes. Out of these, the logia about the Son of Man were most central and foundational for an eschatological image of Jesus (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:52; cf. also Wink 2002:164; Van Aarde 2004b:424). Just before and especially during the Renewed Quest, it became increasingly accepted by American (and a few other) scholars that the futuristic and apocalyptic Son-of-Man logia were not authentic, but were created by the early church after Easter in expectation of the second coming of Christ (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:8, 51, 52, 84-86; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70-71; cf. also Theissen & Merz 1998:245; cf. e.g. Burkett 1999:124; see e.g. Crossan 1991:254-256; Van Aarde 2004b). This development is clearly demonstrated by noting that the coming and suffering Son-of-Man logia consistently received eighty percent grey or black votes at the 1988 spring meeting of the Jesus Seminar (cf. Borg 1994a:15 n. 13; 1994b:18; Miller 1999:24; Burkett 1999:80). Some scholars believe that the inauthenticity of the apocalyptic Son-of-Man logia is evidenced by their apparent absence in the earliest stage of the Sayings Gospel Q (see Burkett 1999:79-80). With the Son-of-Man logia and the futurist aspects of Jesus’ eschatology moved aside, the way was cleared for scholars to interpret the kingdom-of-God logia non-eschatologically, particularly because the respective terms “Son of Man” and “kingdom of God” do not appear together in the same sayings (cf. Borg 1994a:8, 53-57, 86-88; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70-71; see Wink 2002:161-163). Likewise, the early church’s expectation of an imminent end (point 4 above) could now be explained as a consequence of the Easter event, as opposed to the preaching of Jesus (cf. e.g. Borg 1994a:57-59, 78-79; Borg, in Miller 2001:38). Lastly, the atmosphere of crisis in the Synoptic gospels (point 1 above) could now be attributed to the effect of the subversive wisdom of Jesus, as opposed to an expectation of an imminent end (cf. e.g. Borg 1994a:59, 89). Thus, the four pillars on which the apocalyptic Jesus was built started to collapse.
In order to fully appreciate these developments, it is necessary to take a very brief look at the history of Son-of-Man research. Throughout the patristic and Medieval periods, three interpretations of the term “Son of Man” persisted (mostly) unchallenged (see esp. Burkett 1999:3, 6-12; Müller 2008:9-31, 53-92; cf. also Lukaszewski 2011:1): (1) The term “Son of Man” was a title for Jesus that expressed his human nature (cf. e.g. Adv. Prax. 2; Adv. Haer. 3.19.1; cf. Wink 2002:19). (2) The term implied that Jesus was the genealogical son of a historical figure, most commonly Adam and/or Mary (cf. e.g. Against Eunomius III, I, 91; On the Incarnation Against Apollinarus I, 8; Oration 30, 21). Regardless of his or her actual identity, the notion that the term implied a historical figure provided additional support to the idea that the human nature of Jesus was being conveyed by the term “Son of Man.” (3) The term was derived from Daniel 7:13, which, it was believed, predicted the parousia of Jesus and his role as apocalyptic judge (cf. e.g. Adv. Mc. IV, 10, 9; Dial. 31, 1; 76, 1; Adv. Mc. IV, 10, 12; Hippolytus’ Commentary on Daniel IV, 10, 2). Thus, the term “Son of Man” was believed to denote the human nature of Christ and to connote his role as apocalyptic judge at the parousia (see Epistle to Rheginos 44:11-33; 46:14-18; see Vorster 1986:211-228, esp. 218).

After the Reformation, some interpreters sought to uncover the Semitic phrase that lay “underneath” the Greek ὄ ἴνθρωπον, appealing mostly to Semitic idioms like “son of man” (נָכָר), “son of Adam” (נָהָר) and “that man” (נָהָר אֱלֹהִים) (see esp. Burkett 1999:4, 13-21; Müller 2008:93-114; cf. also Lukaszewski 2011:2). These interpreters soon realised that the Semitic expression “son of” denoted membership in a group and that whatever followed specified the group. The Semitic term “son of man,” therefore, merely meant “man.” It followed that the term, as it appeared in the New Testament, did not refer back to a specific individual like Mary or Adam, but nonetheless expressed the humanity of Jesus (see e.g. Bucer 1527; Zwingli 1531; Beza 1559; Grotius 1641). As an expression of Jesus’ humanity, most interpreters also saw an element of lowliness in the term, whether it be lowliness of social class or of human nature in

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6 A fourth interpretation could be added: Gnostics believed that the term portrayed Jesus as the divine son of the god Anthropos (Ἀνθρώπος) (cf. Burkett 1999:6; see Müller 2008:32-52). This view died out with the death of Gnosticism and was not fundamental to later interpretations.

7 As opposed to the term “Son of God,” which expressed his divine nature (cf. Burkett 1999:7; Müller 2008:13).
general (cf. Müller 2008:99; see Burkett 1999:14-17). Conversely, other scholars believed that the initial article in the term stressed the Son of Man’s superiority, uniqueness and/or idealness (see Burkett 1999:17-19). In different ways, both of these views would go on to become a perfect fit for philosophers and liberal theologians of the Old Quest, who saw Jesus as the ideal example and perfect representative of history’s and humanity’s ultimate goal (see section 1.2.1 above; see Burkett 1999:18-20; Müller 2008:130-152). Despite these linguistic efforts, some scholars continued the tradition that the term “Son of Man” referenced Daniel 7:13 (cf. Müller 2008:101, 106). The main divergence from earlier interpretations was that “Son of Man” now became a messianic title that Jesus had applied to himself (see e.g. Chemnitz 1586). Although there was no shortage of novel interpretations after the Reformation, only three became widespread (see Müller 2008:93-114): (1) The term does not refer back to a particular individual, but still expresses the humanity of Jesus. (2) The term derives from Daniel 7:13 and functions as a messianic title for Jesus. (3) The term is not a title for Jesus at all and conveys a Semitic idiom by which someone could refer back to her- or himself. A few less-popular interpretations appealed to the use of the term “son of man” in Ezekiel and Psalms (cf. Müller 2008:99).

The most popular view of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries continued to be that the term “Son of Man” expressed the humanity of Jesus. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, an ever-increasing number of scholars began supporting the theory that the term “Son of Man” was a messianic title for Jesus, based on Daniel 7:13 (see Müller 2008:120-127, 140-176, 207-215; see e.g. Scholten 1809). By the end of the nineteenth century, this was the dominant view (cf. Burkett 1999:24, 69; see e.g. Holtzmann 1897). A host of scholars were hard-pressed to relinquish the previous view that focussed on Jesus’ humanity (see Müller 2008:128-130). Some of these latter scholars simply combined the emerging consensus with the former view that concentrated on the humanity of Jesus (cf. Burkett 1999:25; see e.g. Harnack 1907). For some of them, like Beyschlag (1891-92), “Messiah” and “Son of Man” were synonymous, both designating a human, earthly Messiah (see Müller 2008:120-127, 156). Like earlier, either the lowly or the superior connotations of the term could be
emphasised, only this time in specific reference to the Messiah (see e.g. De Wette 1836; Neander 1837).

After translations of 1 Enoch had become available in 1821, apocalyptic interpretations of the term “Son of Man” started gaining momentum (see Burkett 1999:26-31; Müller 2008:152-189). The Similitudes of Enoch, an ancient writing contained in 1 Enoch (chapters 37-71), also featured the term “Son of Man” and described this figure as a pre-existent, heavenly creature whose main function was to act as judge at the apocalyptic event (see Hannah 2011). Since the writing was generally thought to pre-date Christianity, scholars started believing that such an idea of the Son of Man was prevalent in the Judaism of Jesus’ time and that Jesus had adopted this idea and had applied it to himself (see Burkett 1999:4, 22-31; Müller 2008:177-189, 250-262, 273-268). This is sometimes called the “Son-of-Man concept” (*Menschensohnbegriﬀ*), which Casey (2009:16) defines as the modern scholarly view that “Jews at the time of Jesus expected the coming of a glorious figure, the ‘Son of man’.” The Son-of-Man concept was built primarily on the Similitudes of Enoch, but once established, it was read into other works as well, especially 4 Ezra 13 and Daniel 7:13 (cf. Burkett 1999:27; see e.g. Beyschlag 1866:9-34). Thus, Daniel 7:13 was understood by many scholars of this period as the end result of an emerging Son-of-Man concept in Judaism (see Müller 2008:349-351). Some scholars even went so far as to extract a long list of traits from various non-Jewish sources and use these traits to construct a supernatural, apocalyptic, composite Son-of-Man character underlying Daniel 7:13 (see Müller 2008:237-262, 276, 345-348, 351-354; see e.g. Mowinckel 1951).

The inevitable effect of all this was that the mortal Son of Man gave way to an apocalyptic Son of Man (cf. Burkett 1999:4). The Son of Man was still primarily seen as the Messiah, only now this expected Messiah was an apocalyptic judge instead of a this-worldly saviour (cf. Müller 2008:261-262, 418). Thus, the notion became established that Jesus had used the expression “Son of Man” in order to associate himself with the heavenly Messiah of contemporary apocalyptic texts, who would visit earth at the apocalypse not only to judge humanity, but also to substitute the current world-order with
God’s transcendent kingdom (cf. Burkett 1999:27, 70). This interpretation became increasingly popular from the 1850s onward and established itself as the predominant view among scholars throughout the first sixty years of the twentieth century (see Müller 2008:177, 182, 261-262, 272-286, 418; Burkett 1999:4, 29, 97). The influence of this line of interpretation on historical-Jesus research is nowhere more obvious than in the fact that both Johannes Weiss (1892) and Albert Schweitzer (1906) adopted it (cf. Burkett 1999:28, 30-31, 33, 45; Müller 2008:177, 186-187). It also became the assumption on which Son-of-Man scholarship after Schweitzer was built (cf. Burkett 1999:70; Müller 2008:262; see below). During this time, it became customary to distinguish between apocalyptic and non-apocalyptic Son-of-Man logia.

Bultmann ([1921] 1968:112, 122, 128, 150-152) followed earlier suggestions and voiced the opinion that Jesus did not have himself in view when he spoke of the Son of Man (see Burkett 1999:37-38; Müller 2008:142, 166-168, 212-215; 287; cf. also Van Aarde 2004b:425-426). He expected the coming of another figure, seeing as he always spoke of the Son of Man in the third person. Bultmann also followed previous proposals when he divided the Son-of-Man logia into three distinct groups: (1) those that speak of the Son of Man as “coming;” (2) those that speak of the Son of Man as suffering, dying and rising again; and (3) those that speak of the Son of Man as being at work now already (cf. Edwards 1976:35; Sim 1985:233; Burkett 1999:43; Wink 2002:63; Müller 2008:264). From the first group of sayings, only those that differentiated between Jesus and the apocalyptic Son of Man were authentic. These sayings contained Jesus’ own apocalyptic predictions of the future coming of someone else, namely the Son of Man (cf. Burkett 1999:45). The early church then appropriated these sayings to Jesus himself. This valuation of the first group of sayings betrays Bultmann’s approval of the Son-of-Man concept (cf. Müller 2008:249, 346-347; Casey 2009:27). According to Bultmann, the second group of sayings was entirely created by the early church, seeing as (1) they could be distinguished from the first group, (2) they were absent from Q, and (3) they only made sense as retrospective theological assertions. The third group of sayings might have been authentic, but operated in a non-titular sense. The early church later turned these idiomatic occurrences of the Semitic expression “Son of Man” into a title for Jesus.
In other words, even though these *sayings* might be authentic, their *usage* of “Son of Man” as a title for the earthly Jesus was not. Ultimately, the only sayings that were deemed authentic in their titular usage of the expression “Son of Man” were apocalyptic in nature. After Bultmann’s 1921 proposal, most scholars agreed that only (some of) the apocalyptic sayings were authentic (see e.g. Tödt 1959; Jeremias 1967; cf. Burkett 1999:38; Wink 2002:193; see Müller 2008:284-291). A few scholars accepted the apocalyptic consensus without discarding the present or suffering Son-of-Man logia (see Burkett 1999:33-34, 46-50). In other words, these scholars argued for the authenticity of all the Son-of-Man logia, but seen through the apocalyptic paradigm. They achieved this by suggesting (1) that the earthly Jesus used the phrase proleptically; (2) that Jesus combined Daniel 7:13 with Isaiah 53 and revised the term to include his earthly ministry and his suffering; (3) that Jesus stayed true to Daniel 7:13, in which the Son of Man is both an apocalyptic and a suffering figure; or (4) that Jesus used all the Son-of-Man sayings with the same unifying theme in mind, like, for example, his authority.

From the middle of the twentieth century, many scholars started abandoning the apocalyptic consensus just described (cf. Müller 2008:326; see Burkett 1999:75-76). This was the result of three developments. The first of these was the research done on the idiomatic usage of the term in Aramaic (see Burkett 1999:82-96). As we have seen, the Semitic usage of the term “Son of Man” had already received attention during the Reformation, leading some scholars to argue that it was not a title, but simply a generic or indefinite term that meant “man” or “someone” (see e.g. Grotius 1641). Other scholars of that period argued that the Semitic expression was the way in which Jesus spoke of himself in the third person (see e.g. Camerarius 1572). Thus, the term was plainly used as a circumlocution for “I” or “myself.” Bolten (1792) was the first scholar to propose that the Syriac term “Son of Man” could simultaneously be used in a generic sense, meaning “man” or “humanity,” and in an indefinite sense, meaning “a man” or “someone” (cf. Müller 2008:118). In 1894, Eerdmans (1894:153-176) revived older views, but this time with more knowledge about the Aramaic term וֹאָם at his disposal.

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8 Tödt’s acceptance of Bultmann’s position had a profound impact on subsequent Q scholarship (see below). Tödt divided the Q Son-of-Man sayings into “coming” and “present” logia and argued that the latter group was secondary (see Müller 2008:403).
On linguistic grounds, he was able to argue, firstly, that the Aramaic term אֲנָמָוָה simply meant “man,” secondly, that Jesus used it as a circumlocution for “I,” and, thirdly, that it could not have been a messianic title in either Daniel 7:13 or the teachings of the historical Jesus (cf. Müller 2008:191). In the same year, Wellhausen (1894:312 n. 1) made the very same argument independently of Eerdmans, pointing out that Jesus spoke Aramaic and that the Aramaic term אֲנָמָוָה could not mean anything other than “der Mensch,” which Jesus used to reference himself in the third person (cf. Müller 2008:191; Lukaszewski 2011:2).

Wellhausen and Eerdmans managed to win over a few scholars (see e.g. Lietzmann 1896; Meyer 1896; Schmidt 1896), but the apocalyptic consensus still reigned supreme. Those who accepted the Aramaic explanation argued either for the generic-indefinite or the circumlocutional usage of the term by Jesus, although some scholars did combine the two (cf. Burkett 1999:89-90; see Lukaszewski 2011:2-6). What almost all these scholars had in common were the views that the original term could not have meant “Messiah” and that the early church had created the sayings that use the term “Son of Man” in a titular, messianic-apocalyptic sense (cf. Burkett 1999:45). These results were contested by Dalman (1898) and Fiebig (1901), who both argued from the original Aramaic that the term “Son of Man” often referred to a single individual and that it was used by Jesus as a self-designation in specific reference to Daniel 7:13 (see Müller 2008:197-199, 202-204; Lukaszewski 2011:4-5). Most scholars of the time were convinced by the results of Dalman and Fiebig, possibly because it gave additional support to the reigning apocalyptic consensus (see Müller 2008:205-206). As a result, suggestions that the term “Son of Man” originally operated in a circumlocutional, generic or indefinite sense disappeared almost entirely. For more than sixty years, the conclusions by Dalman and Fiebig prevailed as the mainstream philological solution to the Son-of-Man problem, contributing hugely to the proposals of both Weiss and Schweitzer (cf. Lukaszewski 2008:5; see Müller 2008:207-212).
This status quo was “rectified” in 1967 by an academic article of Geza Vermes, which caused a watershed in Son-of-Man scholarship (cf. Müller 2008:264, 311). He surveyed the utilisation of אֲנָבָר בַּד in a much broader range of ancient texts than anyone before him had done (cf. esp. Casey 2009:33; cf. also Burkett 1999:86; Müller 2008:311; Lukaszewski 2011:7). This survey convinced him not only that the Aramaic term בַּד אֲנָבָר functioned as a circumlocution for the personal pronoun “I,” but also that it had no titular usage or significance before the emergence of Christianity (cf. Borg 1994a:53; Theissen & Merz 1998:9; Wink 2002:252; Van Aarde 2004b:425; see Müller 2008:311-313). The most important result of Vermes’ study for our purposes was that it convinced a great number of scholars that the expression “Son of Man” originated from a non-titular, Aramaic term and that it was not used by Jesus in an apocalyptic manner (cf. Müller 2008:317). Instead, these scholars agreed that all the gospel texts that reference or allude to Daniel 7:13 are inauthentic. The “circumlocution theory” was taken over, modified and presented anew by a number of prominent scholars in the field, including Müller (1984), Schwartz (1986) and Hare (1990). However, not all scholars were convinced by Vermes’ suggestion that אֲנָבָר בַּד simply meant “I,” instead preferring a generic and/or indefinite explanation (see e.g. Colpe 1969). Nonetheless, other aspects of Vermes’ investigation did indeed convince almost every scholar in this field and are still accepted today (cf. Borg 1994a:53; Lukaszewski 2011:8-9). Casey (2009:33-34), for example, agrees not only that most of his examples are indeed working examples of the idiomatic use of the term בַּד אֲנָבָר, but also that the definite and indefinite forms of the expression are interchangeable (cf. Lukaszewski 2011:7; Müller 2008:264, 314; see section 3.1.2 below). Also, many scholars still accept his understanding of the circumstances under which this idiom was most commonly used in Aramaic texts: “In most instances the sentence contains an allusion to humiliation, danger, or death, but there are also examples

9 Colpe (1969) took the investigation of Vermes further by expanding the base of ancient Aramaic texts even more and surveying the entire Son-of-Man problem. This colossal investigation led Colpe (1969:406) to the following important conclusion: “A speaker could include himself in אֲנָבָר בַּד as well as אֲנָבָר, whose generic sense was always apparent, or he could refer to himself and yet generalise at the same time.” This is an almost identical proposal to the one made by Grotius in 1641 (cf. Müller 2008:103). Unfortunately, Colpe bought into the Son-of-Man concept and therefore failed to make much use of this important discovery in his attempts to explain the teachings of Jesus. Nonetheless, the realisation that the Aramaic term אֲנָבָר could, and usually did, simultaneously present both levels of meaning convinced a number of scholars, including Casey.
where references to the self in the third person is dictated by humility or modesty” (Vermes 1967:327; cf. Casey 2009:33-34; cf. also Lukaszewski 2011:7). Lindars (1980; 1981; 1983; 1985), Bauckham (1985), Casey (1987; 2009), Kearns (1988) and Crossan (1991) are among the scholars who took Vermes’ study further, but replaced his “circumlocution theory” with explanations that focused on the generic and/or indefinite use(s) of the term (see esp. Burkett 1999:90-92; Müller 2008:317-325; cf. also Lukaszewski 2011:8-9; Williams 2011:62; see sections 3.1.2 & 3.1.3 below). Thus, we still have this division today between scholars who prefer the “circumlocution theory” and those who prefer the “generic and/or indefinite theory.” At the moment, the latter seems to have the upper hand (cf. Burkett 1999:86-87; Wink 2002:252; Müller 2008:322). Despite this division, these scholars all tend to regard the future, apocalyptic Son-of-Man logia as inauthentic.

The second (concurrent) development that led to the rejection of the apocalyptic Son-of-Man consensus by numerous scholars was that the Son-of-Man concept started receiving severe criticism during the 1960s (cf. Müller 2008:264-265; see Burkett 1999:68-81). Already in the nineteenth century, a number of scholars had criticised the Son-of-Man concept on mainly two fronts: (1) The term “Son of Man” was not a fixed title in contemporary Judaism and did not feature as such in Daniel, 1 Enoch or 4 Ezra 13. Rather, it only became a title with the emergence of Christianity. (2) The canonical gospels consistently give the impression that the term “Son of Man” was not a known title at the time of Jesus or shortly thereafter. In the nineteenth century, the first objection was successfully challenged by contesting the non-titular interpretation of the Son-of-Man expression in 1 Enoch. The second objection was challenged by suggesting that the title was only known in a few limited circles. The 1960s criticism against the Son-of-Man concept was more successful (see Burkett 1999:70-76). The discovery of 1 Enoch at Qumran had a huge impact on the dating of the Similitudes of Enoch. Eleven copies of 1 Enoch were found, some in Greek and other in Aramaic, but not one of these included the Similitudes of Enoch (cf. Müller 2008:337). Resultantly, there was no other choice but to date the Similitudes of Enoch to a period no earlier than 70 CE (cf. Burkett 10 These works represent a major change of mind from his earlier views (see Lindars 1975-76).
Supporting this later date was the fact that not one Jewish or Christian work before the fifth century referenced or alluded to the Similitudes of Enoch, even though they do reference the rest of 1 Enoch with great regularity. Thus, the key text on which the Son-of-Man concept was constructed could no longer support it. A later dating of the Similitudes of Enoch meant that this text must have been dependent on Daniel 7:13 (cf. Müller 2008:339). In turn, such dependence indicated that the Similitudes of Enoch did not provide independent attestation of a Son-of-Man concept alongside Daniel 7:13.

The Son-of-Man concept was further criticised in an article by Perrin (1966), which convincingly demonstrated that the Son of Man was not a title in any of the three key writings used to validate the Son-of-Man concept (cf. Wink 2002:21; Van Aarde 2004b:426). Both the texts of 4 Ezra 13 and the Similitudes of Enoch were dependent upon Daniel 7:13 and, like the latter, did not use the term in a titular sense (cf. Wink 2002:53, 56-57, 59). Rather, the apocalyptic imagery of Daniel 7, which included the symbolic Son of Man, was used creatively and unreservedly by subsequent authors (cf. Burkett 1999:97; Müller 2008:355). It followed for Perrin that even if the Similitudes of Enoch could be dated to a time before the rise of Christianity, it would still not provide any evidence for a widely-known, cohesive Son-of-Man concept at the time of Jesus or the evangelists. Rather, the apocalyptic material based on Daniel 7:13 all attest to a wide range of divergent ideas. In his 1968 article entitled “Der apocalypticische Menschensohn ein theologisches Phantom,” Leivestad independently came to the same results as Perrin, thereby rejecting the Son-of-Man concept and affirming that the main texts utilised to develop this concept did not use the term “Son of Man” as a title (cf. Burkett 1999:75; Müller 2008:357). Perrin and Leivestad managed to convince a great number of scholars (cf. Müller 2008:356, 358-359). The final nail in the Son-of-Man concept’s coffin was when Geza Vermes (1967) indicated that the wide range of Aramaic sources he had inspected never use the expression “Son of Man” as a title for some kind of apocalyptic or messianic figure (cf. Müller 2008:311). This usage first appears in the writings of the early church. All these factors contributed to the abandonment of the Son-

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11 The English translation of this article received a title that subsequently became just as well known as the initial German title: “Exit the Apocalyptic Son of Man” (see Leivestad 1971-72).
of-Man concept by most scholars of the time (cf. Müller 2008:342-343; cf. e.g. Dodd 1966:475; Winter 1968:784). Yet, not all scholars have discarded the idea and a few continue to defend it even to this day (cf. Müller 2008:355, 363-364; see Burkett 1999:76-78, 97, 109-114). Moreover, the rejection of a Son-of-Man concept does not necessarily mean the rejection of an apocalyptic understanding and application of the term “Son of Man” by Jesus (see Burkett 1999:78-79). Some scholars argue that Jesus himself used the term in reference to Daniel 7:13 and created a title either for himself or for another apocalyptic figure (see Müller 2008:369-372).

The third development that led to the widespread rejection of the apocalyptic Son of Man was that a number of scholars had started doubting the authenticity of the Son-of-Man sayings in toto. Some such voices had already appeared sporadically before the 1960s (see Burkett 1999:50-56). Volkmar (1876:197-200), for example, had noticed that the expression “Son of Man” was entirely absent from Paul’s writings and concluded that they were not authentic.¹² Wrede (1904) argued that the peculiar use of the third person in Son-of-Man logia would make most natural sense if it were the early church that spoke about Jesus on his behalf (see Burkett 1999:39-42). In 1927, Case argued that it would make much more historical sense of the data if Jesus had not used the term at all, neither in reference to himself nor to someone else. In 1940, Grant argued that for Jesus to have seen himself as the type of apocalyptic figure described by Enoch, he could not have been of sound mind. For the most part, however, these suggestions fell on deaf ears. It was mentioned in section 1.2.4 above that Käsemann argued for a discontinuity between the non-apocalyptic message of Jesus, on the one hand, and the apocalyptic messages of John the Baptist and the early church, on the other. This view convinced Käsemann (1954:125-153) that Jesus never proclaimed or awaited a figure like the Son of Man – amidst other apocalyptic images. In Käsemann’s opinion, the Son-of-Man sayings betrayed the Christological considerations of the early church after Easter and infiltrated the Jesus tradition by way of Christian prophets speaking on Jesus’ behalf (cf. Burkett 1999:53).

¹² Although the pre-Pauline formula (τῶν υἱῶν αὐτοῦ [ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν]) in 1 Thessalonians 1:10 might indeed be an allusion to the Son of Man.
The first genuine threat to the authenticity of all the Son-of-Man sayings appeared in the works of Vielhauer (1957:51-79; 1963:133-177). He realised that the term “kingdom of God” and the term “Son of Man” did not appear together in sayings that could realistically be considered authentic (cf. esp. Borg 1994a:54; 64 n. 25; Patterson 1998a:174; Patterson, in Miller 2001:71; cf. also Edwards 1976:108; Theissen & Merz 1998:549-550; Burkett 1999:53-54; Müller 2008:292). According to Vielhauer, this was because these traditions did not originally or naturally belong together in contemporary Jewish thought. The Son-of-Man concept had to do with a future ideal that someone would come and save the day, while the kingdom sayings had to do with a present ideal that God was the king of our daily lives. Since Vielhauer, like most, held that the kingdom of God was central to the preaching of the historical Jesus, the Son-of-Man tradition was logically approached with suspicion. Consequently, Vielhauer (1957:51-79) surgically removed all but one (Mat. 24:37-39) of the Son-of-Man logia from the preaching of the historical Jesus in his tradition-historical analysis of the sources (cf. esp. Burkett 1999:54; cf. also Wink 2002:21; Van Aarde 2004b:426; see Patterson, in Miller 2001:70-71). Perrin (1966:17-28) agreed with Vielhauer that all the Son-of-Man sayings were inauthentic and sought to illustrate how the early church created the term through the midrashic exegesis of Jewish texts – which was not dissimilar to the “pesher” methodology of text analysis employed at Qumran (cf. Hurtado 2011:168-169; see Burkett 1999:54-56).

It was mentioned that Conzelmann argued for an a-temporal view of Jesus’ eschatology (see sections 1.2.4 & 1.3.1 above). This conviction compelled also Conzelmann (1957, esp. 281-288) to dispose of the “redundant” Son-of-Man figure (cf. Patterson 1998a:174-175; Van Aarde 2004b:425). We have seen that Leivestad (1968:49-105) came to the same results as Perrin in rejecting the Son-of-Man concept. However, as a response to Vielhauer, Leivestad argued that at least some of the Son-of-Man sayings must be authentic, seeing as they are only found in the mouth of Jesus himself in the gospels and they are absent from both Acts (bar 7:56) and the canonical epistles. Why would the term “Son of Man” appear in such a large number of logia attributed to Jesus (and only Jesus) if it had almost no real significance as a title or designation of Jesus in the early
church (cf. Wink 2002:21)? Perrin (1967:164-206) took this as his queue and made a suggestion that would prove to be of lasting influence. He suggested that the coming and the suffering Son-of-Man sayings (i.e. Bultmann’s first two groups) were not authentic, since they represented the conviction by the early church that the crucified and resurrected Jesus would come again to vindicate his followers and judge their opponents (cf. Borg 1994a:52; Wink 2002:255). Resultantly, only the logia that speak of the Son of Man as being at work in the present (i.e. Bultmann’s third group of sayings) should be regarded as authentic words of Jesus. The arguments of Vielhauer, Conzelmann, Leivestad and Perrin were subsequently adopted by many scholars of the Renewed Quest and contributed hugely to the abandonment of not only the apocalyptic Son of Man, but also the apocalyptic Jesus of history (cf. Burkett 1999:56, 79, 124; see Patterson, in Miller 2001:70-71; Wink 2002:164-165; cf. e.g. Borg 1994a:8, 52).

1.3.3 The parables of Jesus

The developments in Son-of-Man research represent the greatest “deconstructionist” reason why the apocalyptic Jesus started losing headway before and during the Renewed Quest. The “re-constructionist” reason why the eschatological portrait of Jesus started losing ground was the fact that a new picture of Jesus – one that could replace the eschatological picture – started to emerge (see Miller 1999; see also Frey 2011:17-18). The emerging picture of Jesus was that of a wisdom teacher (see Borg 1994b:17-19). This new picture was a direct result of the new methodology in Jesus research (described above), as well as new developments and discoveries in mainly four separate, but interdependent, fields of New-Testament research. The first of these was the research done on the parables of Jesus (cf. Borg 1994b:19; Patterson, in Miller 2001:71; see also Allison 2010:116-117). As early as the time when the gospels were written, the parables of Jesus had been interpreted allegorically. Although some individuals, like Tertullian and Martin Luther, had protested against this hermeneutical practice, the tradition of interpreting them in this way continued throughout the patristic period, the Middle Ages

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13 Crossan is an example of a scholar that, although firmly placed within the Renewed Quest, leaves enough room for (some form of) eschatology in the life and message of Jesus (see section 1.3.7 below).
and the Reformation (see Snodgrass 2005:248-250). This practice made the parables vulnerable to a number of illegitimate interpretations.

Adolf Jülicher was the first to present a systematic, well-argued case against the allegorical interpretation of the parables, with great success (cf. Laughery 1986:2; Patterson, in Miller 2001:71; see Snodgrass 2005:250-252). Jülicher (1888; 1899) argued that Jesus did not make use of allegory at all; neither did his parables include any features that could be defined as being allegorical. Rather, Jesus told stories with direct comparisons from every-day life that were easy to understand and self-evident. Whenever the gospel parables contained allegory or allegorical features, the evangelists had, according to Jülicher, invented them. In his view, each parable enunciated only one generally-valid maxim – a pious moralism revealing some or other feature about God’s involvement in the world. C. H. Dodd (1935) believed that the parables were essentially about a “realised eschatology” (see section 1.2.3 above). Influenced by the work of Jülicher, Dodd argued that the evangelists had at times reoriented and reapplied the original parable message of a “realised eschatology” to either a message centred on futuristic eschatology or a message centred on an ethical application. Dodd (1935:16) also put forward a very handy definition of a parable: “At its simplest the parable is [1] a metaphor or simile [2] drawn from nature or common life, [3] arresting the hearer by its vividness or strangeness, and [4] leaving the mind in sufficient doubt about its precise application to tease it into active thought.” A number of subsequent scholars have found this definition useful in their individual discussions of the parable enigma (see Funk 1966:133-162; Patterson 1998a:120-131).

Joachim Jeremias (1947) built and expanded upon Dodd’s work by applying form-critical techniques to the parables and illustrating how they grew in stages from the time of Jesus onwards (cf. Edwards 1976:13). During the period of No Quest, Jeremias believed that the way forward was to find the Aramaic sayings of Jesus hidden beneath the gospel accounts. He claimed to have found the original words of Jesus specifically in the parables, the Marcan texts that speak about the sporadic coming of God’s kingdom (cf. Mark 1:14-15), and in Jesus’ use of the words “abba” and “amen.” With regards to the
parables, the Aramaic Urtext behind the gospel accounts were reconstructed to reveal earlier versions that were not tainted by allegorical features or Christological reflections. Jeremias believed, like most scholars of the time, that the parables were predominantly about the imminent coming of God’s kingdom (cf. Borg 1994b:19; cf. also Allison 2005:101). These parables were not about an eschatology that had already been realised (as per Dodd). Rather, the eschatology proclaimed by the parables was in the process of realisation as the parables were being delivered (cf. Edwards 1976:35). By means of his parables, Jesus had, according to Jeremias, placed people in front of a crisis that demanded a decision to be made. The decision was either for or against the mercy of God, which was disclosed anew in the content of the parable itself. One can easily notice the affinities of Jeremias’ parable research with Bultmann’s overall paradigm. The parables were mainly about the imminent coming of God’s kingdom, but called for a decision for or against that kingdom in the moment of delivery. Despite his rootedness in the mindset of the No-Quest period, Jeremias’ suggestion that the parables were in the process of realisation as they were being delivered would have a major impact not only on subsequent parable research, but eventually also on the Renewed Quest.

Since about the sixties of the previous century, parable scholars started finding the historical and/or eschatological method of interpretation of former academia insufficient (see Snodgrass 2005:254-256). These latter approaches were thought to have disregarded the attractiveness and force of the parables. In order to prevent this tragedy, scholars diverted their attention to aesthetic and hermeneutical aspects of parable interpretation. These scholars approached the parables with interpretive tools from existentialism and linguistics. Amos Wilder (1964), for example, highlighted the poetic dimensions of the parables and emphasised their use of language (cf. Patterson 1998a:124-125, 175; Patterson, in Miller 2001:71). In his view, Jesus made use of parables to create a world that depicted his vision of reality so vividly that it could be enacted and experienced through imagination. These stories did not simply point towards another reality, but made that reality tangible through imagination and vivid language. Ernst Fuchs (1964) similarly saw parables as language events that had the power to effectuate the realities to which they pointed. By making use of parables, Jesus was able to apply God’s love to
sinners, make God’s kingdom present, and open his audience up to God’s reality (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:320). Yet, this collection of scholars were not principally important because of their analysis of any one parable. Rather, their significance lies in their general application of language to the analysis of Jesus’ parables.

All the parable scholars mentioned thus far laid the foundation for Robert Funk’s (1966) highly influential work on the parables of Jesus (see Snodgrass 2005:256-258). Funk saw parables as metaphors that only receive meaning when the audience is drawn into them. It logically follows that parables can not be reduced to just one specific meaning. Therefore, it is impossible to reduce all parables to either pious moralisms (as per Jülicher) or a solitary eschatological point (as per Dodd and Jeremias). According to Funk, a parable can never be discarded once its meaning has been extracted. The parable itself is the message. Funk (1966:161) defined parables as “pieces of everydayness [that] have an unexpected ‘turn’ in them which looks through the commonplace to a new view of reality.” This “new view of reality” is what Jesus understood as the kingdom of God. It follows that the kingdom of God is not something that is expected in the near future, but is something that comes into being as the parable is being heard for the first time (cf. Sanders 1975:5). According to Funk, the parables did not only point towards a new reality (i.e. the kingdom of God), but also created that alternative reality as they were being told (as per Wilder and Fuchs).

Similarly, Norman Perrin (1967) interpreted the parables of Jesus as describing a non-temporal, symbolic kingdom of God. Crossan (1973; 1977) also adopted and expanded Funk’s understanding of the parables (see esp. Laughery 1986; see also Patterson 1998a:176-177; Snodgrass 2005:257-258, 261-262). According to Crossan (1977, esp. 106), a parable is a “polyvalent narration,” by which he means that it is a “paradox formed into narrative.” As such, parables become metaphors for their own “hermeneutical multiplicity.” One can see the influence of Funk here, especially in Crossan’s insistence that parables are by their very nature polyvalent and paradoxical – so much so that any clear-cut summary of a parable’s supposed moral message would by definition miss the mark (cf. Laughery 1986:5). The subversive and paradoxical nature
of parables precludes the distillation of timeless truths from them. The parables are so
subversive that they completely shatter reality, leaving almost no room for reconstruction
(cf. Laughery 1986:6). Since parables do not point to alternative realities, with which to
replace the one that has been shattered, the audience is left clueless and in the dark. The
parables disorient their hearers, without any promise of reorienting them again. This is
left up to the hearers themselves. Each parable that begins with the phrase “the kingdom
of God is like…” ultimately fails in describing the kingdom, but succeeds in making
people think for themselves (cf. Laughery 1986:7). In his 2012 monograph, Crossan
brings many strands of earlier publications on the parables together. In this work,
Crossan distinguishes between three types of parables: (1) “riddle parables;” (2)
“example parables;” and (3) “challenge parables.” According to Crossan, Jesus’ parables
are examples of “challenge parables.” These functioned as a “participatory pedagogy,”
meaning that the audience actively participated in their own education – if you could call
it that (cf. Crossan 2012:95). The purpose of Jesus’ “challenge parables,” Crossan
(2012:134) reasons, was not only to subvert (for the sake of subverting), but ultimately
also to shift paradigms and overturn fossilised views without the use of violence. The
second part of his book is focused on making the case that the canonical gospels are
themselves “megaparables” about Jesus (see Crossan 2012:6, 157-252, esp. 246). Over
the years, Crossan’s work, in particular, on parables has had an enormous impact, not
only on our understanding of these literary forms, but also on our understanding of the

There have also been scholars who have travelled in the opposite direction. Schmithals
(1997b; 2008), for example, argued, on the one hand, that not all parables necessarily
(just because they are parables), originated with the historical Jesus, and, on the other
hand, that the earliest parables – those that are most likely to go back to Jesus – make use
of apocalyptic and imminent eschatology, as opposed to wisdom (see also Allison
2010:117-118). Nonetheless, the developments of parable interpretation traced so far
allowed scholars of the Renewed Quest not only to divorce the parables of Jesus from
their eschatological and Christological contexts within the gospels, but also to interpret
them as stories about a transcendent reality called the kingdom of God (cf. Patterson, in
Miller 2001:71). Thus, the historical Jesus made use of parables when he wanted to teach people about God’s other-worldly realm. Parables could be seen as weapons in the arsenal of a wisdom teacher. Scott (1989), for example, attempted to reconstruct the original structures of Jesus’ parables in order to discover how these parables challenge and subvert conventional wisdom (see Snodgrass 2005:263-264). Moreover, the parables actually bring the kingdom of God into existence as they are being narrated – the kingdom can not be more immediately present than that! The influence of this trajectory of parable interpretation on the sapiential view of Jesus can be seen most directly in Funk’s 1996 monograph, *Honest to Jesus*, which is a direct result of his parable studies and portrays Jesus as a Galilean sage. Crossan’s view of Jesus is also a direct result of his research on parables, among other things. One aspect that all of these sapiential readings of the parables have in common is a high regard for the authenticity of some of the non-apocalyptic parables in the Gospel of Thomas (see Meyer 2003:24-26) – a writing to which we currently turn.

### 1.3.4 The Gospel of Thomas

The second field of research that led directly to a sapiential understanding of Jesus was the research done on the Gospel of Thomas (cf. Koester 1992:7; Patterson, in Miller 2001:72; Meyer 2003:7; cf. also Telford 1994:73). In December of 1945, the Nag Hammadi manuscripts were discovered (see Den Heyer 2002:137-145; see also Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:79-85; Patterson 1998b:33-37; Hedrick 2010:3; see further DeConick 2008:13-15). Scholars of the time were in agreement that the Coptic manuscripts had derived from the fourth century CE and that they were Gnostic in nature. Apart from offering a description of the world in which the New Testament came into being, these Gnostic texts had little value for uncovering the historical Jesus. There was one exception, though: the Gospel of Thomas, sections of which were only starting to be published from 1957 onwards (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:82). The full text was finally published in 1959 (cf. Hedrick 2010:3). Some of the sayings betrayed remarkable similarity to the Oxyrhynchus papyri discovered in the period 1897-1905, which also contained only
sayings of Jesus (see DeConick 2008:14-15). Not much attention was paid to these papyri when first discovered, but their importance had now become paramount (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:84-85). It was soon discovered that a few of these Oxyrhynchus fragments were portions of the Gospel of Thomas. From internal evidence, it was determined that these fragments should be dated to no later than 140 CE (see esp. Turner 1962a:16-19; cf. also Hedrick 2010:2). This indicated not only that the Coptic Gospel of Thomas had been translated from Greek (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:81-82, 85; Hedrick 2010:3),¹⁴ but also that its roots could be traced back to no later than the first half of the second century CE, perhaps even as early as the first century. This valuation was buttressed by the realisation that, long before the fourth century, certain church fathers were well aware of a gospel supposedly written by the apostle Thomas (see esp. Turner 1962a:14-16; cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:78; see Hedrick 2010:1-2).

Before its publication, Quispel (1957:189-207) investigated the Gospel of Thomas by making use of source-critical methods and by relying on certain linguistic features. His findings would be very influential in subsequent research. He maintained that the Gospel of Thomas had no literary association with the canonical gospels, but represented an independent tradition of Jesus’ early logia. He also looked at certain apocrypha as possible sources. It did not take long for scholars to start doubting the results offered by Quispel (cf. DeConick 2008:16). In the early sixties, scholars became increasingly convinced that Quispel’s position was untenable. In its stead, they proposed that the gospel, like most of the findings at Nag Hammadi, was thoroughly Gnostic. From this they concluded that the gospel must be dated to a later time, and that it must have been dependent on the canonical gospels (see e.g. Turner 1962a:11-39, esp. 31-39; 1962b:79-116, esp. 113-114; cf. Robinson 1990:viii; see Patterson 1998b:65-66). A number of scholars tried to prove that the Gospel of Thomas could be compared to, or even identified with, one of the ancient Gnostic communities known to scholars – most notably the Naassene Gnostics (see e.g. Schoebel 1960) or the Valentinian Gnostics (see e.g. Gärtner 1961). When it became apparent that the Gospel of Thomas could not be made

¹⁴ Although this is not a given (cf. Hedrick 2010:7).
to cohere with these Gnostic movements, scholars changed their approach and started asking whether the gospel embodied a generic type of Gnosticism (cf. DeConick 2008:16-17). As they compared the Gospel of Thomas to other Gnostic texts, these scholars became increasingly aware of the “complication” that a number of important Gnostic themes, like that of the Demiurge, were entirely missing from the document (cf. Patterson 1998b:54; Meyer 2003:4). It became all the more apparent, on the one hand, that the Gospel of Thomas, although undoubtedly Gnostic in nature, was “less Gnostic” than the other Nag-Hammadi texts, and, on the other, that the gospel contained some sayings that were clearly not Gnostic at all, being influenced, rather, by other traditions.

Koester (1971) addressed this difficulty by arguing that the Gospel of Thomas was only in the early stages of becoming a Gnostic text. The document could be seen as a type of “precursor” to so-called “full-blown Gnosticism.” Koester argued further that the Gospel of Thomas was made up of at least two layers, one of which is undoubtedly Gnostic in nature, and another of which derives from the first century. Moreover, he argued that the original gospel was neither composed much later than the New Testament, nor in any way dependent on the canonical gospels. Koester (1971:139) realised that when individual sayings from the Gospel of Thomas are compared to their counterparts in the New Testament, many of them lack the secondary elaborations often found in the New Testament (see Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:86-87). Somewhat astonishingly, the parables contained in the Gospel of Thomas showed remarkable agreement in wording and content with Joachim Jeremias’ Aramaic reconstructions of the “original” Synoptic parables (cf. Snodgrass 2005:253; see also Patterson 1998b:72-73). In those cases where the traditions from Thomas showed similar signs of secondary elaboration, such development happened independently if compared to the New Testament (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:87; Patterson 1998b:73). Additionally, the Gospel of Thomas represented a genre that antedated the narrative genre of the canonical gospels (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:88; cf. also DeConick 2008:17). The Gospel of Thomas contained only the words of Jesus, and lacked any reference to his birth, life, crucifixion, resurrection and death. In fact, there were no narratives about Jesus at all – only his words (cf.
Patterson 1998a:172). The Gospel of Thomas had this in common with the Sayings Gospel Q.

Koester also found that the two sayings gospels had something else in common: wisdom traditions seemed to underlie both (see Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:88, 94-95, 103). Whereas Q had developed from an original sapiential kernel into an apocalyptic document (see section 1.3.6 below), the Gospel of Thomas had developed from the same, or a very similar, kernel into a proto-Gnostic document.\(^{15}\) Hence, wisdom traditions lay behind both sayings gospels, with each individual document later growing in a different direction – Q became more apocalyptic and Thomas became more Gnostic (cf. DeConick 2008:19). The earlier layer identified by Koester as originating in the first century (see above) could now be equated with these wisdom traditions. Since both Q and Thomas made use of the same, or a similar, sayings tradition, and since the Corinthian community seems to have known some of these sayings (cf. 1 Cor. 1-4; see Meyer 2003:5-6; Hedrick 2010:12-13), Koester held that the earliest sapiential layer in the Gospel of Thomas received its final form in Palestine or Syria around 50 CE. Another factor that contributed to this early dating was the absence of the apocalyptic Son of Man from the Gospel of Thomas, but its presence in Q (cf. DeConick 2008:19).\(^{16}\)

From all this, Koester argued that the historical Jesus was not an eschatological prophet, but a sage who taught with the power and authority of Lady Wisdom (a.k.a. Sophia) (cf. DeConick 2008:18, 19). Koester claimed that, according to the Gospel of Thomas, the salvific role of Jesus was not to be found in his death on the cross, his resurrection or his second coming, but in his wisdom (see Patterson 1998b:55-56; cf. Meyer 2003:4). This

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\(^{15}\) The academic article in which Koester makes these arguments was published in the same journal as Robinson’s influential article on Q, entitled ΛΟΓΟΙ ΣΟΦΙΩΝ (see section 1.3.6 below).

\(^{16}\) The results of Koester were not sui generis, but were foreshadowed by other scholarly investigations from earlier periods. Montefiore (1962:40-78), for example, came to the following conclusion after comparing the synoptic parables with those in the Gospel of Thomas: “Thomas’s divergencies from synoptic parallels can be most satisfactorily explained on the assumption that he was using a source distinct from the Synoptic Gospels. Occasionally this source seems superior, especially inasmuch as it seems to be free from apocalyptic imagery, allegorical interpretation, and generalizing conclusions. The hypothesis that [sic] Thomas did not use the Synoptic Gospels as a source gains strength from a comparative study of the parables’ literary affinities together with an examination of the order of the sayings and parables in Thomas” (quotation from page 78; emphasis added).
brand of wisdom encouraged people to find divinity, destiny and salvation within themselves.

The work done by Koester has convinced a number of scholars, especially in North America (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:85), some of whom were students of him (and of Robinson) (cf. Miller 1999:16; DeConick 2008:17). In 1990, it was seemingly acceptable to claim that Koester’s hypothesis represented the majority opinion of scholarship (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:103). A number of these scholars were and are convinced that the earliest layer of Thomas was a source entirely independent from the canonical gospels, and that it went back to a time either before or contemporaneous with the gospels, thereby bringing us closer to the historical Jesus (see e.g. Robinson 1990:viii-ix; Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:85-90; Patterson 1993:9-110; 1992:45-97; 1998a:173; 1998b:41-45, 66-75; Patterson, in Miller 2001:72; Meyer 2003:5-7, 18, 33; Hedrick 2010:16-17). If so, the significance of the historical Jesus was, according to these scholars, not to be found in his miracles, apocalyptic outlook, crucifixion, death or resurrection, but in his words; and only his words (cf. e.g. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:105; Patterson 1998b:56, 74; Meyer 2003:5, 22; Hedrick 2010:13). According to this branch of scholars, these words, as they are presented by the Gospel of Thomas, are undeniably sapiential and lack any hint of a reference to apocalypticism or eschatology (cf. e.g. Patterson 1998a:173; 1998b:49-51, 74-75; Patterson, in Miller 2001:72; Meyer 2003:21-22, 32; see also Davies 1983). Significantly, they all judge the parables to be non-apocalyptic in nature (see e.g. Meyer 2003:24-26). They also point out that Christological and other titles of Jesus are missing from the Gospel of Thomas, and that Jesus nowhere in Thomas acts as a prophet of the coming kingdom of God (cf. e.g. Patterson 1998b:56; Miller 2003:21, 24-26). Rather, Jesus is consistently depicted as a teacher of wisdom, concerned exclusively with the present (see e.g. Meyer 2003:19-22). The kingdom of God is not, according to their reading of the apocryphal gospel, to be found in some futuristic expectation, but can rather be experienced and witnessed in the here and now. Increased appreciation for the Gospel of Thomas among New-Testament scholars can indeed be noted as one of the
developments of the Renewed Quest (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:78). Other participants of the Renewed Quest have been eager to latch onto the research done by Koester and his disciples.

Yet, as with the other developments traced thus far, not all scholars are so eager to simply accept these conclusions (cf. Kloppenborg; Meyer; Patterson & Steinhauser 1990:85-86). Dunn (1977:286), for example, argued that many of the Thomas sayings were “de-eschatologised.” With the latter term, Dunn means that, by virtue of his own observation, it seems as though many the non-apocalyptic traditions in the Gospel of Thomas were originally apocalyptic, but were subsequently reinterpreted and rewritten in a way that was more this-worldly. In Dunn’s estimation, the Gospel of Thomas betrays signs of stripping the original sayings of their apocalyptic moulds. Instead of going back to earlier traditions, the lack of eschatology in the Gospel of Thomas is a later development. In Dunn’s (1977:286) opinion, Q (and its apocalyptic character) is “almost certainly” closer to the historical Jesus. Other scholars have agreed with Dunn, seeing no reason why the trajectory should necessarily be from wisdom to apocalypticism (cf. DeConick 2008:19). These scholars point to evidence that a trajectory from apocalypticism to wisdom is, in their view, just as plausible (see e.g. DeConick 2005a; Allison 2010:127-134). Moreover, “proto-Gnostic” is not accepted by everyone as a realistic characterisation of the Gospel of Thomas. A number of scholars have even denied the very idea that the Gospel of Thomas has Gnostic tendencies at all (see e.g. Lelyveld 1987:5, 134-135; see also Davies 1983). Even some of Koester’s students, like Meyer (2003:4), have grown wary of calling Thomas a “proto-Gnostic” or “gnosticising” gospel. Meyer (2003:19, 32-33), nevertheless, holds firm to the idea that early Jesus traditions can be extracted from later “gnosticising elements.” Despite the abovementioned concerns and efforts, most scholars cemented in the Renewed Quest refuse to change their minds about the Gospel of Thomas, judging these concerns and efforts to be mostly reactionary (cf. e.g. Meyer 2003:7). There is one recent study, however, that can not be ignored.
Of late, the best counter to the Koester-hypothesis has been that proposed by DeConick. By applying research on the anthropological phenomenon of “communal memory” to the Gospel of Thomas, DeConick (2005a:3-63) concludes that the document is a “rolling corpus” (see also DeConick 2005b:207-211; Kirk 2005:1-24). By this term she means that the document, as it stands, contains traditions from every phase in its tradition-history. DeConick (2005a:64-110) then proceeds to demarcate the sayings that she deems to be kernel sayings, and to separate them from later developments. After completing this procedure, DeConick (2005a:111-155) ends up with five “kernel speeches” – all of which (1) resemble Q to some extent; (2) fit the situation in Jerusalem before 50 CE; (3) present Jesus as God’s truth-speaking prophet; and (4) proclaim an imminent-apocalyptic eschatology. In the remainder of her book, DeConick (2005a:157-249) argues that the people responsible for Thomas were severely disappointed when the apocalypse failed to arrive, and were subsequently forced to adapt their imminent-apocalyptic worldview to an immanent-mystic belief system (see also DeConick 2005b:211-215). In 2010, exactly twenty years after the claim was made that the great majority of scholars follow in Koester’s footsteps (see above), Hedrick (2010:14-15) holds that scholarship has reached an impasse on whether or not the Gospel of Thomas was literarily dependent on the canonical gospels. He maintains that current scholarship can basically be divided into two opposing camps: those who defend and those who deny that the Gospel of Thomas was from the very beginning dependent on the canonical gospels. Meyer (2003:6) divides contemporary scholarship into three separate camps, adding a third category for more complex solutions to this vexing problem of intertextual relationships (cf. also Patterson 1998b:68 n. 37).

1.3.5 The Jewishness of Jesus

The third development within New-Testament academia that led to a sapiential understanding of Jesus was the rediscovery of his Jewish roots, already referred to above. Traditional Christian, and particularly Protestant, caricatures of Jewish, Torah-based ethics at the time of Jesus included the following (cf. esp. Theissen & Merz 1998:348-349; cf. also Casey 2010:3): (1) The Torah was “absolutised” after the Babylonian exile
by making it a constitutive component of the covenant, rather than maintaining it as a
regulative feature within the covenant. (2) The Torah was exclusively construed and
practiced in a casuistic manner. (3) Torah obedience was motivated by recompense and
concentrated on superfluous merits. (4) The Torah was obeyed only formally, because it
was commanded, and the moral essence of the Torah was resultantly overlooked. (5)
Jews saw the Torah as a burden and suffered under the redundant, impossible demands of
the scribes. It naturally followed from such an anachronistic, Christian understanding of
early-Judaic ethics that Jesus was the one who had liberated his people from an
absolutised, casuistic, superfluous, formal and burdensome Torah ethics. Despite
Schweitzer’s plea not to conjure up depictions of Jesus that are mirror-images of oneself,
scholars of the time continued to ignore or relativise the Jewish ethnicity of Jesus (cf.
Casey 2010:3; see Den Heyer 2002:111-118). This tendency reached its pinnacle just
before and during the Second World War. Academic works by Jewish scholars,
highlighting the Jewishness of Jesus, were ignored and belittled as perfidious. In
hindsight, one might say that this trend is inexcusable – and it certainly is! – but it is also
explicable. Moxnes (2011) has argued persuasively that the different portraits of the
historical Jesus that have been put forward by researchers have all been mirror-images, not just of the individual scholars, but also of the political, cultural and social agendas of
their native countries. With Germany, for the most part, dominating the Old and New
Quests, it should come as no surprise that German anti-Semitic ideologies also dominated
these quests (see Moxnes 2011:95-120).

The end of the Second World War also brought an end to this anti-Semitic tendency. The
Jewishness of Jesus was no longer denied, and neither were the findings of Jewish
scholars. Classic studies by Jewish scholars of a generation gone by were revived. These
included the important study by Klausner (1907), who saw Jesus as the representative of
a remarkable Jewish ethic. There was also the monumental two-volume study by
Montefiore (1909), who described Jesus as a prophet opposing the Jerusalem cult and
externalised rites. Another classic Jewish scholar worthy of mention is Eisler, who
thought of Jesus as a political rebel who wanted to found a this-worldly kingdom (cf.
Theissen & Merz 1998:9). What these latter classic studies had in common was a

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disregard for the apocalyptic and imminent-eschatological features of Jesus’ message and person. Moreover, they also chipped away at the traditional, Christian images of Torah ethics at the time of Jesus. Montefiore (1909), for example, argued that it was anachronistic and unhistorical to separate Jesus’ “ethic of grace” from the rabbinical “ethic of works.” A few years later, Kittel (1924) compared the Sermon on the Mount with rabbinic literature and found that all the individual demands in the former had analogies in the latter. Hence, all Jesus’ moral stipulations were in theory also conceivable in mainstream Judaism of the time. In 1957, Braun discovered that, despite some important differences, the radical ethics of Jesus were comparable to the ethical demands of the Qumran community. In the post-Second-World-War period, Jewish scholars, like Flusser (1968), paid particular attention to the scanty gospel portraits of Jesus’ upbringing, from which they concluded that Jesus was brought up in accordance with Jewish practice, which left him accustomed to, and knowledgeable about, the Torah, and about Jewish tradition. The conclusion seemed inescapable: “Zij [Jezus] leefden serieus, verdiepten zich in de studie van Schrift en traditie, en trachten de geboden van de Torah in het dagelijks bestaan in praktijk te brengen” (Den Heyer 2002:117). This conclusion went against the traditional (Protestant) image of Jesus (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:347). Jesus’ newfound familiarity with, and rootedness within, the Torah eventually contributed to the trend of imagining him as a teacher of Torah morality.

Despite these broad strokes, Jewish scholars were not in agreement about everything. The canonical gospels describe Jesus as someone who had differentiations in attitude towards the Torah (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:347-348, 361). Jesus’ tendency to relativise Torah norms appears alongside his other tendency to accentuate them. In other words, the Jesus tradition reveals both a liberal relaxation of the Torah and a rigorist intensification of the Torah.17 Jewish (and other) scholars are not always in agreement

17 According to Theissen & Merz (1998:348), Jesus’ freedom towards the Torah is more in line with the sapiential manner of developing ethics, while his strictness towards the Torah is more typical of the eschatological manner of developing ethics. Such a deterministic division is not supported by comparative evidence, however. Although it is true that Jewish eschatological models and movements of the first century (like the Qumran community and John the Baptist’s movement) would stress the intensification of Torah obedience in order to bring about the coming age, sapiential traditions are more diverse with regards to the Torah. Traditional wisdom tends to emphasise strict Torah obedience (cf. Proverbs), while dissident
about how to explain this tension. Be that as it may, Jewish scholars tended to emphasise the embeddedness of Jesus within Torah morality. Geza Vermes (1973), for example, believed that the eschatological dimension of Jesus’ message and conduct was invented by the early church, most notably Paul and John. Vermes went against the tide when he described Jesus not as an apocalyptic prophet, but as a charismatic travelling Hassid. In Rabbinic literature, a Hassid is someone who goes beyond the Torah and its requirements for ethical and ritual observance in daily life. The Hebrew word derives from the noun דַּבַּר, which literally means “kindness,” or “love,” and connotes the act of showing or expressing love for God and for one’s neighbour. It follows that Vermes saw Jesus as a travelling charismatic who practiced an ethical lifestyle aimed at applying and preaching the love command in every and all circumstances.

Whether or not they saw Jesus as an apocalyptic prophet, all Jewish scholars had one thing in common. They all held that Jesus lived and preached an ethic of Torah-observance, inalienable from Jewish tradition. These types of views about Jesus seemed to address a certain discrepancy and answer a question that had plagued researchers for some time: If Jesus did not intend to start a new religion or sect within contemporary Judaism, why did he call and entertain an inner circle of followers and a group of disciples? This historically reliable aspect of Jesus’ life did not correspond to an eschatological image of Jesus: If Jesus were so obsessed with the imminent coming of the kingdom, why would he waste any time gathering disciples? The answer to these questions became increasingly clear to some scholars: Jesus acted as a teacher. In many gospel accounts, some of which are very likely to go back to Jesus, Jesus is referred to as “Rabbi,” meaning “teacher” (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:354-355). Some researchers started portraying Jesus as a scribe or a lawyer, or even a Pharisee. Even a cursory glance at these Jewish studies betray a cultural and ethnic reaction against the discrimination, bigotry, violence and brutality experienced during the Second World War. By depicting Jesus as a mortal human being and a “thoroughbred” Jew, these

Wisdom tends to relativise Torah obedience. Thus, Jesus’ attitude towards the Torah should actually not be taken as an indicator of whether his person or message was eschatological or sapiential.

Theissen & Merz (1998:361-372) are probably correct in their explanation that Jesus radicalised ethical norms (in the more narrow sense), particularly the dual love-command, and relativised ritual and cultic norms, particularly purity laws, without abandoning them entirely (cf. esp. Q 11:42 for evidence of both).
scholars could take back what was rightfully theirs: the memory of a Jewish teacher who became an icon for the world. Even if this laudable reaction does not technically qualify as an example of a “nationalistic” reaction, it still represents the same sort of thing Moxnes (2011) describes in his book. At any rate, Jewish scholars like Vermes and Flusser have become formidable supporters, representatives and promoters of the Renewed Quest (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:9).

1.3.6 The Sayings Gospel Q

The fourth development that invariably resulted in sapiential views of the historical Jesus was an increase in the attention being paid to the Q source behind the gospels of Matthew and Luke (cf. Koester 1992:7; Borg 1994b:17; Patterson, in Miller 2001:71-72; cf also Telford 1994:73; Allison 2010:118). Harnack (1907) was the first scholar to comprehensively discuss Q. In his view, Q was simply a compilation of Jesus’ logia with a catechetical function and intent. Q did not represent a separate community with a distinct theology, Christology or soteriology. Rather, Q was a piece of paraenesis that made use of the didache (teachings of Jesus) to instruct those who had already accepted the kerygma (preaching) about the death and resurrection of Jesus (cf. Edwards 1976:3). For this liberal theologian, the eschatological elements in Q were subordinate to its ethical character, which was its essential feature. Q functioned as Harnack’s leading refutation against scholars who tried to subordinate Jesus’ ethics to his eschatology. For more than a generation of scholars, this became the prevailing interpretation of Q (cf. Edwards 1976:3).

As we saw in section 1.2.1 above, this devaluation of Q’s significance meant that it was only deemed useful as a supplement to Mark’s portrait of Jesus. Schweitzer did not pay much attention to Q, and it was Bultmann who first noted the importance of Q’s eschatological dimension (cf. Sim 1985:40). According to Bultmann, Q saw Jesus not only as a teacher of wisdom and the Torah, but also as a preacher of eschatological repentance and salvation. This realisation offered proponents of the dominant Schweitzerian view an opportunity to gain additional support for their arguments by
appealing to the eschatological dimension of Q. Streeter (1924), for example, argued that Q was most comparable to the prophetic books of the Old Testament, notably Jeremiah. Streeter also argued that Q represented a divergent stream within early Christianity. Whereas some early Christians, like Paul, focused on the death and resurrection of Christ as the centre of their faith and theology, other early Christians were embarrassed by Jesus’ inglorious death, preferring rather to focus on his parousia. Yet, Q was still seen as a supplement to the passion *kerygma*, and did not represent a distinct community alongside mainstream Christianity. By comparing Q to prophetic literature and by highlighting the importance of the parousia, Streeter underlined the eschatological character of Q over and above anything else. During the No-Quest and New-Quest periods, when the Schweitzerian paradigm predominated, research on Q continued in the same vein. Manson (1949), for example, also held that Q represented a separate stream within early Christianity, and that eschatology was the most prominent feature of Q. Manson’s chief contribution was highlighting two eschatological themes in Q, namely that the eschatological kingdom of God would appear historically in the person of Jesus, and that the eschatological judgment was imminent (cf. Sim 1985:41).

The most influential scholar on Q during the New-Quest period was undoubtedly Tödt (1959), whose prime interest was the Son-of-Man logia – both in general and in Q (see section 1.3.2 above). Tödt investigated the role and significance of the title “Son of Man” in Q, which led him to the all-important (and brand new) discovery that Q was not a supplement to the passion *kerygma*, but a literary representative of a completely different branch of early Christianity, to be separated from Pauline Christianity (see Edwards 1976:18-21). Whereas Streeter (*et al*) differentiated between divergent *streams within* early Christianity, Tödt ([1959] 1965:235-249) differentiated between opposing *branches of* early Christianity. The reason for Q’s collection and existence is betrayed by its mission instruction, which commissioned the disciples to proclaim the nearness of God’s eschatological kingdom (cf. Sim 1985:42). This message was in continuation with that of the historical Jesus. The Q people did not assume that this message had lost its relevance after the Easter experience. The Easter experience was not supposed to be the content of the proclamation, but its enabler. The Q people’s Christology was centred
around the eschatological Son-of-Man figure (cf. Müller 2008:403). Tödt ([1959] 1965:57-60) followed Bultmann ([1921] 1968:112, 122, 128, 150-152) in his belief that the historical Jesus did not identify himself with the eschatological Son of Man (see section 1.3.2 above). Yet, according to Tödt, the early church *did* make such an identification, and Q expressed as much by creating the so-called “present” Son-of-Man logia (cf. Edwards 1976:19; Müller 2008:403). For the Q people, Jesus could now, in hindsight after Easter, be identified with the Son-of-Man figure, not only at the eschatological event, but also during his earthly career. Despite this association, Q had no concept of a present or realised eschatology (cf. Sim 1985:43). Rather, it supported and professed an utterly futuristic and imminent eschatology. Although Q’s Jesus was already the Son of Man during his earthly ministry, the eschaton would only commence once the Son of Man arrives in the near future. By attaching themselves to the Son-of-Man figure, the Q people had assured their own salvation at the final judgment (cf. Müller 2008:403).

The work by Tödt provided an even firmer foundation for scholars of the New-Quest period to highlight the dominance of eschatology in Q (see e.g. Hoffmann 1972). Davies (1964), for example, argued that a futuristic and imminent eschatology was *the* dominating feature in *all* of the Q material. In his view, the Q document was compiled in order to continue the eschatological crisis initiated by Jesus. The ethical elements of Q provided only the requirements of the crisis. Thus, the ethic of Q was an eschatological ethic. Tödt also influenced Lührmann (1969), and his redaction-critical investigation of Q (cf. Edwards 1976:25). In Lührmann’s view, the Q people played down Jesus’ message of a realised eschatology in favour of a futuristic eschatology (see Sim 1985:45-46). The Q people took over Jesus’ eschatological message of God’s coming kingdom, but emphasised, unlike Jesus, the expectation of apocalyptic judgment. Although Lührmann agreed with Tödt that Q had primarily a futuristic eschatology, he was the first scholar to notice within the content of Q a concern for the parousia’s delay (cf. Edwards

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19 The following quotation, taken from Edwards (1976:43), is also telling and representative of this period of Q studies: “The community which used the Q material was definitely anticipating the arrival of Jesus as Son of Man in the near future. This eschatological orientation is *the* one most distinguishing feature of their theology. It overshadows and influences everything that they say and do.” The italics are original!
According to Lührmann, this delay forced the Q people to defer the point in time when the parousia would occur. The imminence of the Q people’s eschatological message was therefore undermined.

Although two related studies had presented similar results a year prior (see Suggs 1970; Christ 1970), the Renewed Quest’s interest in Q is generally thought to have started with an article by James Robinson (1971), entitled \textit{LOGOI SOFWN}, which means “Sayings of the Wise.” Robinson compared Q to sapiential Jewish sources and found that, according to him, the genre of Q could best be explained as forming part of wisdom literature (cf. Sim 1985:46; Kloppenborg 1987a:27; Lührmann 1995:104; cf. also Tuckett 1996:64-65; Horsley 1999:75-76; see Edwards 1976:23-24). The Q people identified Jesus with Sophia, suggesting that they held, not a Son-of-Man Christology, but a wisdom Christology. Whereas Davies was the first scholar to argue that all the Q material should be interpreted eschatologically, Robinson was the first scholar to argue that all the Q material should be understood in terms of its wisdom element.

These results were very influential and gave rise to a spate of studies on the sapiential element in Q (cf. Sim 1985:46; Tuckett 1996:326). Koester (1971), for example, saw enough justification in the common traditions between Q and the Gospel of Thomas to postulate sapiential roots for both (see Tuckett 1996:66-67; Horsley 1999:76). Since the Gospel of Thomas had no futuristic Son-of-Man logia, Koester argued that neither did the original Sayings Gospel Q (cf. esp. Sim 1985:47; cf. also Boyd 1995:55; Tuckett 1996:67; Horsley 1999:73-74, 76). Patterson (1993) reached similar results when he compared the Gospel of Thomas with Q. He argued that both the apocalypticism in Q and the Gnosticism in the Gospel of Thomas were secondary developments, while the sapiential core to both should be regarded as primary. However, the distinguishing feature between Q and other wisdom material seemed to be the integrality of the themes of apocalypticism and judgment to the document (cf. Edwards 1976:24; Mack 1993:35-36). After Robinson, all the scholars who preferred an exclusively sapiential Q have, in one way or another, struggled with the annoying presence of eschatological themes.
throughout Q. Koester, for example, tried to circumvent this difficulty by simply attributing the apocalyptic Son-of-Man material to the early church.

According to Mack (1993:36-37), Kloppenborg “solved” the problem of the integrality of apocalyptic material within Q in 1987 by distinguishing two principal compositional layers within Q: an earlier sapiential layer and a redactional apocalyptic or judgment layer. Mack is wrong in assuming that Kloppenborg “solved” the problem of the integral presence of both wisdom and apocalyptic material within Q. As we will see later on, motifs of both traditions can be found in both layers. Apocalypticism seems to be integral to the document as a whole, with sayings that are indisputably apocalyptic occurring more frequently than sayings that are clear-cut examples of wisdom. What is more, Kloppenborg [Verbin] (1987a:244-245; 2000a:150-151) has redactional activity in mind when referring to the one layer as being “earlier” and the other as being “later” (cf. Vaage 1995a:75; Crossan, in Miller 2001:119; cf. also Tuckett 1996:68; Freyne 2000:227-228). Redactional activity does not necessarily correspond to the chronology of the Jesus tradition in such a direct way that the earlier layer in Q comes closer to the historical Jesus than the subsequent layer (cf. Koester 1994:540-541; see also Allison 2010:120-125).

Be that as it may, the stratification of Q into an “earlier” wisdom layer and a “later” apocalyptic layer seemed to confirm the idea prevalent among Renewed Questers that eschatology was added to the more authentic Jesus tradition after Easter (cf. Boyd 1995:55; Allison 2010:118). The pre-eminence of wisdom was seemingly further corroborated by the sapiential nature of Thomas’s earliest stratum. Mack’s direct application of the stratification of Q to the historical Jesus is typical of scholars rooted in the Renewed Quest (cf. Wright 1996:36-37, 41; Allison 2010:118-119). Borg (1994a:15 n. 13) provides another example of this tendency: “…the earliest stratum of Q is non-apocalyptic, with apocalyptic elements appearing only in the latest stratum, suggesting that the teaching of Jesus was ‘apocalypticised’ by some in the early church.”

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20 Later on in his book, Borg (1994a:94 n. 46) tries to clarify his view by voicing his own reservations about the layering of both the Gospel of Thomas and Q (cf. also Borg 1999:231). But he then goes on to
views are also expressed by Patterson (1998:171-172): “it has become increasingly clear that Q was not originally an apocalyptic document at all, but – to take the widely accepted view of Kloppenborg – a collection of wisdom speeches…” He continues to assert: “The Q apocalypse (Luke 17:22-37//Mat 24:23-28, 37-42), as well as the sayings of judgment against ‘this generation’ scattered throughout the document, affixed like barnacles to this earlier stratum of wisdom speeches, belong to a later edition of Q” (cf. also Patterson, in Miller 2001:72, 73). Robinson (2007:21) is yet another example, declaring that the earliest layer of Q “does in fact reflect what [the historical] Jesus had to say.” Although most studies on Q since the 1970’s have highlighted the sapiential nature of Q in disregard of its eschatology, a number of scholars have continued investigating its eschatological nature (see e.g. Schulz 1982). Despite Lührmann’s findings, the prevailing view, by far, among these latter scholars is the one put forward by Tödt, namely that Q held and professed an imminent, futuristic eschatology. Schmithals (1997), for example, argues that in Q the sapiential, this-worldly sayings are secondary, seeing as they are incompatible with the interim ethics of the historical Jesus, who was apocalyptic.

1.3.7 A schism in contemporary scholarship

At this juncture, it is necessary to distinguish between eschatology and apocalypticism. The term eschatology was coined in the seventeenth century, and derives from the Greek adjective ἔσχατος, η, ον, which literally means “last” or “final” (cf. esp. Sim 1985:68; Frey 2011:6; cf. also Borg 1994a:70; Crossan 1998:258; Miller 2001:5; Wink 2002:158). As such, in its broadest sense, “eschatology” is the teaching(s) about the last things (cf. Sim 1985:68; cf. also Borg 1994a:70; Patterson 1998a:164). However, the term has been applied variously by different scholars in the past (and present) (see Borg 1994a:70-74; express the same result, as if he does indeed accept the layering of Thomas and Q: “However, regardless of how one views the ‘layering’ of Q and Thomas, it is clear even from their present form that the gospel tradition from a very early stage contained a large component of wisdom material.” This quotation actually says nothing. No one would dispute that there are sapiential traditions in the “more authentic” Jesus material. The real issue is that there are prophetic, apocalyptic and eschatological traditions in this material as well. The central question is how to account for the presence of both in the same authentic material, especially Q.
Not only have systematic theologians and biblical scholars interpreted and applied the term differently, but, within those fields themselves, the term has also met with varying degrees of interpretation and application (cf. Miller 2001:5; Frey 2011:6-7). For our current purposes, the term “eschatology” will refer to “a way of thinking,” common among ancient peoples, “that is centred on the end of the world” (Miller 2001:5). If we therefore state that the teachings of Jesus were eschatological, we imply that they were motivated by, and concentrated on, the end times.

This definition needs immediate clarification. Although eschatology might imagine the end of the physical world, it could also imagine the end of the world “as we know it” (cf. Borg 1994a:8-9, 70-71; Patterson 1998a:164). In other words, the term “eschatology” does not always imply the end of history or the cessation of the material earth, but could also imply the termination of evil forces within the world, like injustice, disease or the Roman Empire. It could, therefore, denote a dramatic, this-worldly change in the history of Israel (cf. Borg 1994b:19). Eschatology might be directed at the physical, social, religious, political or moral status quo, or even a combination of two or more of these aspects. Wright (1996:73) calls this latter type “horizontal eschatology,” and the type that believes in the cessation the space-time continuum “vertical eschatology.” The phrase “imminent eschatology,” used by Sanders in section 1.1 above, is an expression of the ancient view, held by many, that the world will come to an abrupt end in the very near future. It follows that the term “eschatology” does not by its very nature imply imminence (contra Edwards 1976:39; Borg 1994a:9). Whenever imminence is seen as a feature of the eschatology under view, this will be made clear by the term “imminent eschatology.” Lastly, as we have seen in section 1.2.3 above, Bultmann broadened the meaning of “eschatology” by interpreting it existentially (see Edwards 1976:36-37). In contrast, when the word “eschatology” appears in the current work, it will not refer to a drastic change in, or an end to, the subjective world of an individual, but rather to a drastic change in, or an end to, the history of Israel.
“Apocalypticism” is one form or type of eschatology (cf. Crossan 1998:259; Miller 2001:6). Apocalypticism foresees the end of the world as something brought on by divine intervention (cf. Crossan 1998:283). All people will witness and experience this cosmic happening, which will commence with an array of cataclysmic events (cf. Crossan 1991:238; Van Aarde 2008:538 n. 23; 543). Like eschatology, apocalypticism could also envisage this material world being replaced by either a this-worldly or an other-worldly future (cf. esp. Collins 1998:24, 54, 56, 58-59, 171, 176, 236, 280-281; cf. also Allison 1999:129; Crossan 1998:283; Crossan, in Miller 2001:56-57, 138). In fact, first-century Jewish apocalypticism most probably did not envisage an end to the world in the form of a cessation of the space-time continuum (see Wight 1992:280-338; 1996, esp. 202-214; 1999:265). Instead, God was most commonly expected to destroy the world, only so that He could then recreate and renew it (cf. Allison 1999:129). Eschatology tends to have an “open” and undetermined view of the future (see Wink 2002:158-159). People may still change the predicted future by adjusting their behaviour. Conversely, apocalypticism has a “closed” and deterministic view of the future. The behaviour of people has no impact on the predicted future per se, only on their own fate during the final judgment. Generally, it could be said that whereas eschatology lacks any precise idea of how exactly the end will be effectuated, apocalypticism entails a very precise description of how the end is imagined to take place (cf. Frey 2011:20). Van Aarde (2011a:40) explains this distinction more precisely:

All eschatologies, [including] ‘apocalypticism’, advocate that God’s perfect world will be brought about by a termination of the created world which is domesticated by systemic evil. An apocalyptic perspective on the end of the world consists of a cosmic cataclysm and catastrophe expressed by symbolic language pertaining to earthquakes, fallen stars, darkness in daylight, empty tombs, holy wars, etc.

It follows that apocalypticism is not just a worldview, but also a genre. These writings surely had metaphorical and symbolic applications, but they were also seen as literal descriptions of exactly how the world would come to an end (see Wright 1999:262-263; Allison 1999:130-134). Many, but not all, ancient apocalyptic texts sought to describe
the cataclysmic events that would accompany the end of the world (see Collins 1998). “Apocalypticism” fundamentally includes some type of “cosmic catastrophe” that will eradicate the circumstances and conditions of the world as they currently are (cf. Allison 1999:129). Traditional definitions and usages of “apocalypticism” viewed “imminence” as a necessary and integral aspect of apocalyptic eschatology. Recent research of Jewish apocalyptic writings around the time of Jesus has revealed, however, that not all apocalyptic materials were by their very nature imminent (cf. esp. Collins 1998:58, 176, 215, 255, 260; cf. also Borg 1994a:31; Frey 2011:22). Although many apocalyptic writings, including the book of Daniel, advocated that the end of the world would occur sporadically, apocalyptic eschatology was not necessarily imminent (contra e.g. Crossan 1991; Miller 2001:6; Allison, in Miller 2001:93; Wink 2002:159; Van Aarde 2008:543). It could, and quite frequently did, describe the cataclysmic end without any reference to the time of its occurrence. Some apocalyptic writings of the time even contradicted and overtly denied imminence (cf. Collins 1998:58, 176, 215, 255, 260). As we saw in section 1.2 above, participants of the Old and New Quests of the historical Jesus did not make this distinction, but instead saw all apocalypticism (and eschatology) as imminent (cf. Borg 1994b:19-21). In the current work, apocalyptic eschatology will be clearly distinguished from imminent eschatology.

The term “apocalyptic eschatology” will therefore in the present work refer to an eschatology that believes that the end of the world (as we know it) will be brought about by divine intervention and will be accompanied by cataclysmic events – whether or not that end was thought to be imminent. If we define the ministry of Jesus as apocalyptic, we are therefore saying that Jesus believed and taught that God would intervene directly and visibly, thereby bringing an abrupt end to the world, only to replace it with either a this-worldly or an other-worldly reality (cf. Allison 1999:129; 2010:32). To summarise, “apocalyptic eschatology” will denote something rather similar to Borg’s (1994a:73) definition of eschatology, when understood in the “narrow sense” of the word: “(1) chronological futurity; (2) dramatic divine intervention in a public and objectively unmistakable way, resulting in (3) a radically new state of affairs, including the vindication of God’s people, whether on a renewed earth or in another world.” This
definition leaves open whether or not the material earth will discontinue, and whether or not the history of mankind will cease, but closes off interpretations of apocalypticism as a mere event within history, like the destruction of the temple in 70 CE. Although Jews saw such events as “divine intervention,” these events were not effected in a “public and objectively unmistakable way” – to the extent that Israel’s enemies would also have seen it as “divine intervention.” In other words, an event like the destruction of the temple could be described as “eschatological,” but not as “apocalyptic” (see esp. Eddy 1999:43-49; cf. Witherington III 1995:246; Allison 1999:135-136; cf. also Borg 1999:240-241; contra e.g. Wright 1992:280-338; 1996:passim, esp. 202-214; 1999:265-266). This is unless, of course, the historical event in question is brought about via God’s unmistakable and observable involvement. So, for example, if the temple were destroyed by a lightning bolt from heaven or something equally cataclysmic, and not by a historic event, like the Roman War, it would indeed have been an apocalyptic happening.

In North American scholarship, all the developments traced thus far (in section 1.3) progressively led to the abandonment of the apocalyptic portrayal of Jesus, exchanging it rather for a sapiential depiction of him (see esp. Borg 1994b:17-19; cf. also Koester 1992:7; Borg 1994a:9; Patterson, in Miller 2001:69-70; Wink 2002:165; Frey 2011:17; cf. e.g. Patterson 1998a:177). Borg (1994a:82) defines the current consensus of the Renewed Quest accurately: “(1) wisdom is central to the Jesus tradition; and (2) this material suggest that, whatever else also needs to be said about Jesus, he was a teacher of subversive wisdom” (see also Borg 1994b:17-19). Theissen & Merz (1998) claim that: “In most recent North American exegesis, future eschatology is denied.” This brings us full circle. The pendulum of historical-Jesus research has returned to a position very similar to that of the Old Quest (cf. Koester 1992:5). By portraying Jesus as a sage of some kind, the focus has turned away from his eschatological message and back towards his ethical message. Granted the differences between the Old and Renewed Quests, of which there are many, there are also some noticeable similarities (cf. Frey 2011:18).
Be that as it may, the non-eschatological silhouettes of Jesus are directly attributable to the developments outlined above. Many are impressed by these developments and readily adopt an understanding of Jesus that has nothing to do with eschatology, mostly replacing the “outdated” eschatological Jesus with some type of teacher or sage. We have already seen that Funk’s image of Jesus is directly derived from his understanding of the parables of Jesus. Likewise, Stephen J. Patterson’s (1998) depiction of Jesus as a teacher of countercultural wisdom is a direct consequence of his research on the Gospel of Thomas. Similarly, Crossan’s (1991) portrayal of Jesus as a Jewish-Cynic-peasant sage is a direct result of his high regard for the Gospel of Thomas, for Q, for recent research on the parables of Jesus, and for the criterion of multiple independent attestation (cf. esp. Witherington III 1995:64-92; Boyd 1995:55; see esp. Wright 1996:41, 47-51; cf. Borg 1994a:32-36; Crossan, in Miller 2001:51-52; cf. also Casey 2010:18-20, 103-104). Mack’s (1988; 1993) portrayal of Jesus as a Cynic sage flows unswervingly from his high regard for both the parables of Jesus and Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q (cf. Boyd 1995:55; Wright 1996:34-35, 41). The Jesus Seminar’s (1993) selection of authentic Jesus material promotes a subversive, sapiential, fairly Hellenised, non-eschatological Jesus, and is based on all of these developments, especially the “discovery” of the earliest layers of both Q and the Gospel of Thomas (cf. esp. Boyd 1995:62; Wright 1996:39, 41, 81; cf. also Borg 1994b:18; see Miller 1999:16-17, 24, 69-74; 2001:10). In the Jesus Seminar’s publication of their results about the sayings of Jesus, significantly called The Five Gospels, none of his apocalyptic sayings appear in red (cf. Patterson 1998a:170). Conversely, there are more red sayings in the sapiential Gospel of Thomas than in the canonical Gospel of Mark (cf. Casey 2010:21). There is perhaps no stronger defender and promoter of a non-eschatological Jesus than Marcus J. Borg (cf. Frey 2011:17). Borg’s (1984; 1987) fourfold description of Jesus as healer, sage, social prophet and movement founder depends greatly on his acceptance of parable research, and his denial of the authenticity of the Son-of-Man logia. By the term “non-eschatological,” Borg (1994a:9) means a Jesus who did not proclaim “the imminent coming of the kingdom of God and the Son of Man, understood as involving the last judgment and the end of human history as we know it.”

21 Compare this definition with that of Edwards (1976:39).
eschatological aspects of Jesus’ message (cf. Van Aarde 2004:424), but most of them deny the imminent and/or apocalyptic aspects of his eschatology (see e.g. Borg 1994a:82-84; 88-90; 1994b:21; Borg, in Miller 2001:34, 42). They also deny that an eschatological expectation dictated every aspect of his message and conduct (see e.g. Borg, in Miller 2001:43-48, 115-116).

Crossan (1998:257) is an excellent example of the latter, claiming that “[f]rom the very beginning of my own research, I have insisted that the historical Jesus was eschatological but not apocalyptic, although it has always been difficult for me to put a more positive name on that nonapocalyptic eschatology.” For Crossan (1998:259-260), the most definitive aspect and attribute of eschatology is that it is world-negating. Eschatology is born out of a resounding dissatisfaction with the status quo in the world “around us.” Hence, it is a communal defence mechanism against the perceived wickedness of the world (cf. Van Aarde 2008:538 n. 23). The specific form in which such a defence mechanism finds expression varies from group to group. Some might physically, symbolically or mystically withdraw from the physical world, while others might come to expect the destruction of the world (as we know it). According to Crossan, two ancient examples of this are the Gospels of Q and Thomas. Crossan (1998:260-271) argues that the Gospel of Q is an example of “apocalyptic eschatology,” while the Gospel of Thomas is an example of “ascetical eschatology” (compare Patterson 1998b:55). Regarding Q, Crossan (1998:264) differentiates between “primary” and “secondary apocalyptic eschatology.” The former results in a development of certain directives because the end is coming (soon), while the latter coerces, threatens, sanctions or motivates the doing of certain directives that were in place already and would have been expected in any case. In other words, in the former, eschatology is primary and foundational, while in the latter, morality is primary and foundational. In the former, eschatology determines morality. In the latter, eschatology is in the service of morality. Crossan (1998:264) sees Q as an example of “secondary apocalyptic eschatology.”
As Crossan (1998:264) acknowledges, this view of Q’s eschatology was foreshadowed by Kloppenborg’s “symbolic eschatology.” Even though Kloppenborg (1987b:291-292) makes use of different terminology, and prefers not to use the label “apocalyptic” of Q at all, his understanding of Q’s eschatology is very similar to that of Crossan. Kloppenborg (1987b:304) notices and explains that “Q uses threats of judgment and unsettling apocalyptic metaphors, not because it speaks from an ‘apocalyptic situation’ of anomie but because the symbolic character of apocalyptic language could be turned to Q’s particular aims.” Thus, Q makes use of apocalyptic images and language to support, sanction, buttress and motivate that which it holds most dear, namely a particular moral programme communicated by their specific brand of wisdom. These descriptions of Q’s eschatology is very similar to – if not exactly the same as – Bultmann’s understanding of the “eschatological ethics” of the historical Jesus. But Crossan goes further. He argues that the so-called “Common Sayings Tradition” behind Q and the Gospel of Thomas promoted an “ethical eschatology,” which should be separated from the specific eschatologies put forward by either of the individual sayings gospels (see Crossan 1998:282-283; cf. Van Aarde 2008:538, esp. n. 23). Crossan (1998:284) defines this “ethical eschatology” as an eschatology that negates the epistemic evils in the world, neither by projecting apocalyptic judgment upon her, nor by withdrawing from her, but by “actively protesting” and “nonviolently resisting” her. “Ethical eschatology” zooms in on the structural and systematic injustice in the world, and addresses it by both pointing it out and boycotting the process. In Crossan’s view, this is the type of “eschatology” that comes closest to the historical Jesus. Unlike apocalyptic eschatology, God is not violent, and He is not the one who acts (see above; compare Patterson 1998b:56). One can see that, in both Kloppenborg’s and Crossan’s understanding of eschatology, wisdom and morality rule. Eschatology is either made subservient to wisdom, or it is redefined in such a way that it almost – if not completely – seizes to be apocalyptic eschatology.

Not all scholars have been as accepting of the developments described so far, leading to a schism within contemporary historical-Jesus research (cf. Borg 1994a:69; Miller 1999:24; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70; see Van Aarde 2004b:423-424). There remain those who hold firm to a Schweitzerian understanding of Jesus (cf. Patterson, in Miller...
These scholars view the developments that led to a sapiential understanding of Jesus with scepticism, possibly with a fair amount of justification. All the developments described above can indeed be undermined. As these sceptics point out, the whole of the Gospel of Thomas could have been dependent on the Synoptic gospels and should perhaps be dated to the second century CE, in which case, it does not even go back to the historical Jesus at all (cf. Blomberg 1999:21; Arnal 2005:41-42; see e.g. Witherington III 1995:48-50). Even if its early dating is accepted, it is not a given that the original Gospel of Thomas contained only wisdom, or that the Thomas-tradition developed from wisdom to apocalypticism (see Allison 2010:125-134). Secondly, the parables, as they appear in the canonical gospels, are notoriously multivalent, and can be construed as advocating both a present and a future eschatology (cf. Allison 1998:128). Only if they are surgically removed from their gospel contexts do they appear to advocate some sort of wisdom or ethic. In any case, the parables of Jesus do not feature prominently (or at all) in the reconstructions of Jesus offered by these scholars (cf. Miller 2005:121). Also, rediscovering Jesus’ Jewish roots does not necessarily place him squarely within a wisdom tradition. Judaism of the time was complex, and included rich prophetic and apocalyptic traditions. Particularly, apocalypticism was something of a fashionable (and widespread) trait of first-century Judaism (cf. Allison, in Miller 2001:88). Maurice Casey (2010), for example, appealed primarily to the Jewish roots of Jesus (including his lingua franca, Aramaic), when he defended the notion that Jesus was primarily a prophet who preached both the present and the imminently-coming kingdom of God. In this context, it is perhaps ironic that the Jesus Seminar has been criticised by some for stripping Jesus of his Jewishness (cf. Miller 1999:75).

Regarding the latest research on Q – which is the fourth re-constructionist development noted in our overview – the documentary status and stratification of Q is simply rejected by most of these scholars (cf. Blomberg 1999:21; cf. e.g. Allison, in Miller 2001:95; see section 2.2 below). Lastly, there is still a fairly significant number of scholars who give

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22 These scholars tend to refer to their own efforts as the “Third Quest (of the historical Jesus)” (cf. Van Aarde 2002a:425).
precedence to the “coming” Son-of-Man logia and who regard the apocalyptic references to Daniel 7:13 to be authentic. A few scholars even continue to defend the notion that there existed a unified Son-of-Man concept at the time of Jesus (see Burkett 1999:76-78, 97, 109-114). Furthermore, scholars who defend an apocalyptic Jesus typically point to how little we know of the Son-of-Man sayings and how precarious it remains to make any kind of judgment call on their authenticity (cf. e.g. Allison 1998:128; Allison, in Miller 2001:95). It should perhaps be noted that these scholars do not deny that there are wisdom elements in the authentic Jesus material, or that Jesus might also have been a sage, in addition to being an apocalyptic prophet (cf. e.g. Allison, in Miller 2001:91). Rather, they prefer to see eschatology as the all-encompassing framework from which to interpret all the Jesus material, including his wisdom teachings.

The schism between historical-Jesus scholars is presently understood as two extreme points of view, one promoting imminent and apocalyptic eschatology, and the other promoting wisdom (cf. Telford 1994:72-73; Kloppenborg 2005:1). We have seen that there were scholars in the past who had managed to retain both points of view. Werner Georg Kümmel (1945) should probably be credited as the first scholar to demonstrate that the authentic Jesus material contains both present- and future-oriented assertions about the kingdom of God. According to Theissen & Merz (1998:244), there is relative consensus today that both present and future kingdom-sayings appear in the authentic Jesus material (cf. e.g. Wink 2002:165). This may be true formally, but it certainly does not seem to be the case in practice. Typically, scholars who prefer a sapiential Jesus tend to prefer present kingdom-sayings, and discount future kingdom-sayings as additions by the early church (see e.g. Mack 1988:73; Crossan 1991:passim; Borg 1994a:27, 51, 53-57, 86-88; Patterson, in Miller 2001:76). In a similar fashion, scholars who prefer an imminent-apocalyptic-eschatological Jesus tend to emphasise future kingdom-sayings, and interpret present kingdom-sayings as enmeshed in (imminent) eschatology (cf. Miller 2001:3; see e.g. Allison, in Miller 2001:24 on Q 10:9; 2001:96-99). As a result, we tend

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23 Horsley could also be added as one of these examples, was it not for the fact that he describes Jesus, not as a sage, but as a social prophet. Nevertheless, Horsley (1987:170-172, 190-192, 207, 324-325) downplays the eschatological dimension of the term “kingdom of God” (cf. Borg 1994a:30). Wink (2002:161-163) is another example of a scholar who views all the kingdom sayings as referring to the present, but who does not necessarily prescribe to a sapiential view of Jesus.
to get images of Jesus that are either consistently eschatological or fundamentally sapiential (cf. Telford 1994:72-73). Current historical-Jesus researchers by-and-large remain dividable into these two extreme points of view (cf. Miller 2001:1-2; Kloppenborg 2005:1). The cause of this division might be subconscious. In section 1.1 above, we discussed the modern struggle to integrate the two worldviews that motivated ethics in the ancient Jewish world. These were the sapiential and eschatological worldviews, which operated side by side in antiquity. In the course of that introductory discussion, I suggested that it is our modern, scholarly obsession with classification and taxonomy that lies at the root of the struggle to synthesise these two worldviews (see Allison, in Miller 2001:89-93, 110; 2010:88). The sapiential and eschatological frameworks are impossible for some modern scholars to reconcile, which explains the scholarly need to choose between the two in their depictions of Jesus (see e.g. Borg 1994a:82-83; Patterson, in Miller 2001:71, 76, 125-126).

This difficulty can not only be observed in the mentioned schism of the current quests, but is also apparent from the overview of historical-Jesus research given above. In each phase of the history of historical-Jesus research, one of these paradigms reigned supreme. In short, liberal theology preferred an ethical Jesus, the period after Schweitzer preferred an eschatological Jesus, and the current Renewed Quest prefers a sapiential, non-eschatological Jesus (cf. Borg 1994a:48-51, 74; Borg, in Miller 2001:31; Miller 1999:24; 2001:10). Another observation from the survey above also underscores the same point: There tended to be fervent reaction against the dominant position at different times, with the positive case against this dominant position typically being an argument for the opposite paradigm. Let me illustrate this with the two most obvious examples. Schweitzer reacted vehemently against the prevailing liberal image of Jesus, and proposed, in its place, an eschatological image. The Renewed Quest reacted no less vehemently against the century-old eschatological image of Jesus, and proposed, in its place, a sapiential image. After listing a number of English and German scholars who had historically been opposed to Schweitzer, Allison (in Miller 2001:114) makes the following statement: “My estimation is that the state of today’s English-speaking academy is not far from what it has been for a hundred years, that is, pretty much evenly
divided for and against Schweitzer.” Thus, both within the *history* of historical-Jesus scholarship, and within the *current* two-fold separation between historical-Jesus scholars, we can observe a tendency to separate the sapiential-ethical elements of his person and message from the eschatological-apocalyptic elements of his person and message.

After separating the two, scholars tend to select only one and regard it as the all-encompassing paradigm for a complete understanding of the historical Jesus (cf. Miller 2001:1-2). These choices then tend to spill over into the way in which sources are approached, not only with regards to which sources and/or traditions are authentic and which are not, but also with regards to how these chosen authentic sources and/or traditions are to be analysed and understood. We have seen, for example, that scholars who prefer a sapiential Jesus would characteristically appeal to Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q, while those from the opposite camp would characteristically argue against Kloppenborg’s stratigraphy, and point out the apocalyptic traditions in Q. Ironically, the authentic Jesus material may underwrite either view of Jesus (apocalyptic or sapiential), depending on the methodologies, criteria and/or sources preferred. Theissen & Merz (1998:261-264) have argued, for example, that ethical (i.e. sapiential) and eschatological interpretations of the Lord’s Prayer may co-exist side by side. In other words, if Theissen and Merz are correct, the content of the Lord’s Prayer justifies both reigning views of the historical Jesus. Witherington III (1995:235) correctly holds that the symbolic “cleansing” of the temple could justifiably be construed as either a moral-sapiential act or a prophetic-apocalyptic act. Likewise, Miller (2005:115-121) lists a number of traditions, taken by most to be authentic, that could legitimately be read either as wisdom teachings or as apocalyptic pronouncements.24 Within this discussion, Miller (2005:118) explicitly states: “A number of Jesus’ words and deeds can be taken in either an apocalyptic or a non-apocalyptic sense […] Both readings are legitimate and the differences in meaning come not from the material itself but from the larger context one uses to interpret it.”

24 Although Miller argues that these traditions, particularly the parables, should preferably be read as sapiential teachings.
Wright should be credited as the first scholar to describe the contemporary schism in Jesus research accurately (cf. Boyd 1995:46-47; cf. also Van Aarde 2002a:425; Craffert 2003:339). Wright (1996:20-21, 28; 2002:12-13, 23) noticed that there was one group of scholars who favoured marching in the *Wredebahn*, while another group of scholars favoured the *Schweitzerbahn*. In other words, whereas some Jesus scholars followed in the footsteps of William Wrede and his “thoroughgoing scepticism,” other Jesus scholars followed in the footsteps of Albert Schweitzer and his “thoroughgoing eschatology.” He labelled the former trend the Renewed Quest, and the latter tendency he called the Third Quest (cf. also Funk 1996:64). Wright (1996:28) immediately qualified his distinction by acknowledging that it is not “hard-and-fast” (cf. Craffert 2003:339). There are scholars who incorporate aspects of both stances (cf. Wright 1996:78). Both sets of scholars also adhere to the broader developments mentioned in section 1.3.1 above, like the feasibility and viability of the search for Jesus, the centrality of Jesus’ first-century *Sitz-im-Leben*, the concentration on his Jewishness, the focus on history rather than theology, and the appreciation for both non-canonical sources and non-theological sciences (cf. Boyd 1995:57; cf. also Kloppenborg 2005:2; Fredriksen 2005:55). Yet, the distinction, according to Wright (and myself), is clearly visible and worth making – if only as a heuristic aid (cf. Craffert 2003:339).

Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede) is more sceptical and cautious about the historical validity of information about Jesus in the gospels, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) is optimistic about the historical reliability of these canonical sources (cf. esp. Wright 1996:28; Bock 2002:147, 150; see e.g. Charlesworth 1988:19-21; cf. also

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25 Craffert (2003) adds a third category, which he dubs “cultural bundubashing.” Bundubashing is the South-African word for the “rough ride of off-road travelling with a 4x4 vehicle” (Craffert 2003:341). This road takes its queue from anthropological studies and tries to understand Jesus in his own cultural world (cf. Craffert 2003:361). According to these questers, every aspect of Jesus’ life and message should be made accessible by means of a real comprehension of the foreign cultural system he lived in. This approach does not start with sifting through Jesus material in search of authentic traditions (Craffert 2003:362). Rather, a determination of the authenticity of individual traditions becomes the final destination. Whether or not something actually happened, it might still be “true” for the culture in which the story or miracle finds expression. In order to interpret this “truth” correctly, a cross-cultural “tool kit” must be used. A thorough understanding of the development and transmission of oral traditions is also indispensable (Craffert 2003:363).

26 Although Marcus Borg has certain affinities with the Third Quest, he should be classified as part of the Renewed Quest (cf. Wright 1996:28, 75 n. 215; 78; *contra* e.g. Boyd 1995:47; Bock 2002:148).
Borg 1999:231). Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede) imagines a great gulf between the historical Jesus and the early church, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) sees much continuity between Jesus and the early church (cf. Charlesworth 1988:15; Bock 2002:148; cf. also Borg 1999:233). Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede) tries to find the most reliable evidence by zooming in on particular traditions, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) tries to synthesise all the canonical evidence in order to form a more holistic view of Jesus’ entire ministry and message (cf. esp. Telford 1994:50, 52; Blomberg 1999:21, 22-23, 31; Bock 2002:151-152; cf. also Craffert 2003:342; Fredriksen 2005:65; cf. e.g. Charlesworth 1988:17-18; Witherington III 1995:247). Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede), regarding method, begins with the text and works its way towards hypothesis, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) begins with hypothesis and works its way through the textual evidence in support of this hypothesis (see esp. Wright 2002:36-37; cf. Eddy 1999:42; cf. also Borg 1999:231). Whereas the Renewed Quest (like Wrede) treats the Jesus tradition more or less diachronically, believing that the establishment of strata is of the utmost importance for a valid silhouette of Jesus, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) treats the Jesus tradition more or less synchronically, with a fair bit of disregard for its layering (cf. Telford 1994:69; Craffert 2003:349; see Borg 1999:231-233).

It follows that sources such as Q and the Gospel of Thomas are indispensable and central for the Renewed Quest, but dispensable and peripheral for the Third Quest (cf. Wright 1996:35; Bock 2002:150; see Boyd 1995:52-55; Witherington III 1995:48-50; cf. also Borg 1999:231; Craffert 2003:342; see also Arnal 2005:41-48). Although both the Third Quest and the Renewed Quest are heavily invested in non-canonical (and quasi-canonical) sources (see section 1.3.1 above), the difference between the two movements is that the Renewed Quest values them not only because they assist in reconstructing Jesus’ world, but also because some of them may contain authentic traditions about Jesus (cf. Boyd 1995:52). The Third Quest, conversely, values non-canonical sources only as tools for reconstructing the world in which Jesus lived. It has been a trend in the Renewed Quest to broaden the criterion of multiple attestation to include a variety of non-canonical sources (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:11). This tendency reached an apex in
the work of Crossan (1991), who has a higher regard for certain non-canonical sources than for the Synoptic gospels (cf. Boyd 1995:52; see Witherington III 1995:77-79, 236). It also follows from the distinctions noted above that both the historical-critical methods and the various criteria of authenticity are central for Renewed Questers, but only slightly useful for Third Questers, who tend to put all their methodological eggs in the basket of historical plausibility (cf. Telford 1994:49-50, 57-58; Witherington III 1995:12, 247; Wright 1996:79, 87; Blomberg 1999:21; Eddy 1999:42; Bock 2002:150). When criteria of authenticity are applied by the Third Quest, they usually function not to determine the authenticity of individual traditions, but to validate a larger historical portrait (cf. Telford 1994:52; Blomberg 1999:22, 31; Wright 2002:34). As one would expect, these different methodological foci also translate into different results. Whereas the Renewed Quest tends to emphasise the sapiential aspects of Jesus’ ministry and message, the Third Quest (like Schweitzer) tends to emphasise the eschatological aspect of Jesus’ ministry and message (cf. Wright 1996:81; Blomberg 1999:21; see Boyd 1995:55-56).

Most of the Third Questers, including, for example, Witherington III (1995:247-248), Wright (1996:43, 58-59, 71, 79, 85-86), Meier (2001:3-4) and Sanders (2002:34), criticise the Renewed Quest for harbouring and advocating a non-Jewish Jesus (cf. Blomberg 1999:21; see Arnal 2005:24-26). Some have even accused or implied that scholars of the Renewed Quest are somehow anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic (cf. Miller 2005:113). Some go as far as to distinguish between the Third and Renewed Quests on the basis that the former “works more seriously with Jewish backgrounds” (Bock 2002:147). This line of critique should be discounted (see Arnal 2005). Virtually all contemporary Jesus scholars, of both the Third and the Renewed Quests, not only affirm the Jewishness of Jesus, but also portray Jesus in all his Jewishness (cf. Kloppenborg 2005:2; Arnal 2005:24-25, 34). What is more, individuals involved with the Renewed Quest have overtly and repeatedly denied these accusations (cf. Arnal 2005:26 n. 6). To these critics from the Third Quest, being a first-century Jew is synonymous with being apocalyptically minded and/or being isolated from Hellenistic influences (cf. Miller 2005:113). Likewise, to these critics, “being Jewish” means to be orthodox, traditional and non-subversive (cf. Kloppenborg 2005:2-3; see Arnal 2005:34-41). The various
Jesuses offered by the Renewed Quest may not be coloured by eschatology, and may in some cases be fairly unorthodox and/or Hellenised, but they are nonetheless thoroughly Jewish (cf. Arnal 2005:28, 34).

The best contemporary case for an eschatological understanding of Jesus is arguably that of Dale Allison (cf. Borg, in Miller 2001:31; Patterson, in Miller 2001:70; Miller 2001:11; cf. also Casey 2010:21). His views are presented most comprehensively in his 1998 book *Jesus of Nazareth: Millenarian Prophet*, and well summarised in his contribution to Miller’s (2001) monograph. Allison (in Miller 2001:17-20) believes that all research is pre-determined by the paradigm of the researcher. In true Third-Quest fashion, he explicitly voices his paradigm before even directing any attention to the literary evidence. The paradigm with which he approaches the Jesus tradition is that of a Jesus concerned primarily with the imminent end of the physical world, described by him as a “millenarian prophet.” Allison (in Miller 2001:20-24) defends this paradigm with five arguments: (1) Both John the Baptist and the early church believed in the imminence and apocalyptic nature of the future kingdom of God. If Jesus was a disciple of John and the early church came into being as a result of Jesus’ teachings, then Jesus, according to Allison, must have proclaimed an apocalyptic eschatology. To deny this is to deny any continuity between John and Jesus, on the one hand, and between Jesus and the early church, on the other. This view was already expressed by E. P. Sanders (1985:91-95) more than a decade before Allison’s *Jesus of Nazareth*. It remains for both authors (cf. Sanders 1985:152), and others (see e.g. Wright 1996:160-162), the most important and compelling piece of evidence of an eschatological Jesus (cf. Crossan, in Miller 2001:122; Borg, in Miller 2001:117; Patterson, in Miller 2001:126; Wink 2002:164). (2) The widespread and deep-seated conviction by the early church that Jesus rose from the dead does not make sense unless they were already expecting, because of Jesus’ message, some sort of eschatological event to take place soon. (3) The early-Christian belief that the eschaton had commenced directly after the death of Jesus, as well

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27 “Millenarianism” could be defined as “the social expression of apocalyptic convictions” (Miller 2001:11). The difference between “apocalypticism” and “millenarianism” is that the former represents certain beliefs, while the latter represents a social group for whom these beliefs are foundational.

28 A couple of years ago, Allison (2010:45-86) added four additional arguments to these five.
as the early-Christian description of his death by means of apocalyptic imagery, can only
be explained by the fact that Jesus himself proclaimed an imminent and apocalyptic end.
(4) Eschatological perspectives (and movements) and apocalyptic literature flourished in
the time of Jesus. Not only was the whole Roman Empire infected by this craze, but the
Jewish people of Palestine were also contaminated by it. (5) In a few gospel texts, Jesus
is explicitly compared to other apocalyptic figures, like John the Baptist, Theudas and
Judas the Galilean. With his paradigm defended, Allison then proceeds to interpret the
Jesus tradition from a perspective of apocalyptic eschatology.

Sanders (1985) follows a similar methodology in his depiction of Jesus as an
eschatological prophet (cf. Borg 1994a:75). He extracts from the Jesus tradition eight
seemingly undeniable “facts” about the historical Jesus, interprets these facts from an
eschatological framework, and then concludes that Jesus must have been eschatological.
The current intention is neither to dissect the views of Allison or Sanders, nor to enter
into a discussion with their respective endeavours. All of their arguments have counter-
arguments (see esp. Borg 1994a:74-84; also see the contributions of Crossan, Borg and
Patterson in Miller 2001). The current intent is simply to hold these works up as
examples of contemporary attempts at defending and re-establishing the view that Jesus
held and taught an apocalyptic and imminent eschatology.

1.4 ~ THE RESEARCH GAP, FOCAL POINT AND CENTRAL
THEORY

At long last, we are in a position to point out the research gap that will form the spool
around which the present work will revolve. There have been attempts in the past to
argue that Q was either a sapiential or an apocalyptic document (see section 2.4 below).
There have also been attempts to try and understand Q’s own view of the historical Jesus
(see e.g. Robinson 1997; 2007, esp. 65-80).29 In the current study, I will bring these two
strands of Q research together in a responsible way. This will be achieved by examining

29 I do not here refer to Q’s Christology, soteriology or theology. Instead, I refer to Q’s understanding,
remembrance and description of the historical person called Jesus.
the occurrences of wisdom and apocalypticism in Q, and then drawing conclusions from this examination about the historical Jesus. Important questions will be: Did Q think of Jesus as a wisdom teacher, an apocalyptic prophet, or both? If Q associated both wisdom and apocalypticism with Jesus, what was the interrelationship between these two? Did either enjoy preference, or were they equally important to the person and message of Jesus? There will be a concerted effort to let Q speak for itself. If the latter were possible, how would Q and the people behind it respond to the Renewed and Third Quests? The latter question basically sums up the current research gap. Q has been used again and again as a source of information about the historical Jesus, resulting in an array of reconstructions of him. The current study intends to provide the Sayings Gospel with an opportunity to respond to these reconstructions of Jesus. This opportunity is the lacuna presently being addressed.

Out of all the sources used to reconstruct an image of the historical Jesus, Q is perhaps in the best position to respond to these reconstructions (cf. Robinson 2007:1, 178), not only because of its chronological and geographical import, but also because it contains both sapiential and apocalyptic traditions. As such, Q is in a perfect position to assess and address the gulf between the Third and Renewed Quests. Hence, there are two levels to the present work. The first level focuses on Q in order to determine the roles of both wisdom and apocalypticism in Q. This exercise will constitute the focal point and bulk of the current study, leading us to the central theory: The Q people remembered and described Jesus as a sage who made use of apocalyptic eschatology to motivate and support his moral message. The acceptance or rejection of this theory will naturally have an impact on our understanding of the historical Jesus, which is the second level of inquiry in the current study. The second level focuses on the historical Jesus, and our understanding of him, given the results obtained in our investigation of Q. The importance of this second focus is difficult to underestimate: “So the question of whether the historical Jesus was an apocalyptic prophet may well be the single most important one about him because it goes directly to the essential nature of his message and mission” (Miller 2001:1; cf. also 2005:111; Kloppenborg 2005:1).
Critics of the purely sapiential Jesus have routinely criticised the use of Q in the first place as a possible source for the historical Jesus. As we have seen, these Third Questers have mostly attacked the documentary status of Q, the possibility of constructing a Q community and Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q (cf. e.g. Wright 1996:81). This study wants to approach the situation differently, and with a distinct line of enquiry. The central question is not whether the documentary status and stratification of Q are convincing, although these questions will also be addressed. The central question is, rather: How legitimate is it to construe a non-eschatological, purely sapiential silhouette of the historical Jesus on the basis of Q as a stratified document? In other words, if the documentary status of Q is accepted, and Kloppenborg’s stratification of Q is not just dismissed out of hand as an exercise in futility, does it automatically translate into an image of Jesus that is purely sapiential and fundamentally non-eschatological? How legitimate is it to say that the documentary status and stratification of Q supports the image of Jesus as a non-eschatological sage? This type of question has indeed been raised before. Koester (1992:7), for example, expresses similar concerns: “It is questionable, however, whether this early stage of Q can really be defined as noneschatological, even more doubtful whether one can draw from such observations the conclusion that the preaching of the historical Jesus had no relation to eschatology.”

As far as I can tell, however, no one has dealt with this concern in any thoroughgoing, systematic, methodical or painstaking manner, which is exactly what the present study wants to achieve.

The high regard for Q and the propensity to regard Q as a stratified document places the current study squarely in the camp of the Renewed Quest. However, there are two aspects of the current study that have affinities with the Third Quest as well. The first is the inclination to question the non-eschatological image of Jesus proffered by the Renewed Quest. Regarding Q, this inclination means that the current study will take the integrality of apocalypticism throughout Q seriously. The second aspect is the synchronic manner in which the present study approaches Q. By preferring to ask how Q remembered and described Jesus, this study approaches Q in a manner that is not at all dissimilar to the way in which the Third Quest approaches the canonical gospels in their
search for the Jesus of history. Although the results of this study will address the
Renewed Quest directly, they promise to also have great value, worth and significance
for the Third Quest.

The research gap will be addressed in a systematic way. Firstly, we will look at Q in its
entirety (chapter 2). Important and integral questions about Q need to be addressed
before we may move ahead. The first question is whether Q should be understood as a
document or as a loose collection of disparate traditions. Secondly, Kloppenborg’s
stratification of Q will come under scrutiny. We have already seen the significance of
this theory on the Renewed Quest’s sapiential Jesus. The genre of Q must also receive
attention. Whether Q is an apocalyptic or a sapiential writing will be very telling of the
memory of Jesus it retains. The next item on the agenda will be to determine the
ethnicity of those who wrote and nurtured Q, which will not only be important for
subsequent arguments, but will also be relevant to the larger historical-Jesus debate,
seeing as the Jewishness of Jesus has become an integral aspect of said debate. The last
theme of discussion in chapter two will be the precise nature of Q’s eschatology, which
could be highly suggestive of Jesus’ own eschatological outlook.

In chapter three, we will zoom in on Q’s apocalyptic-judgment and Son-of-Man sayings
specifically. An exegetical examination of these logia will concentrate particularly on the
focal point of the current study, namely the interrelationship between wisdom and
apocalypticism in Q. Regarding the Q pericopes they appear in, these two (apocalyptic-
judgment and Son-of-Man) traditions overlap extensively, but not completely. Their
appearance in the same pericopes makes perfect sense, given the fact that both traditions
often have to do with the apocalyptic end of the world, during which the Son-of-Man
figure will oversee the final judgment (cf. Theissen & Merz 1998:267). These two
traditions were purposely chosen because both of them have a history of both sapiential
and apocalyptic interpretations. Within this history, either interpretation (sapiential or
apocalyptic) routinely takes place in expense and disregard of the other. Seeing as the
Son-of-Man figure has had such a great impact on historical-Jesus research, these logia
are especially relevant to the present investigation. In chapter four, the study will zoom
in one more time on a single Q saying, namely Q 6:37-38. The purpose will once again be to determine the relationship between wisdom and apocalypticism in Q. This logion appears in Kloppenborg’s first stratum and has historically been viewed almost exclusively as a wisdom saying. Thus, whereas chapter three focuses on apocalyptic sayings in Q (and their relationship to Q’s wisdom), chapter four focuses on a sapiential saying in Q (and its relationship to Q’s apocalypticism). The last chapter will summarise the findings, and expound their impact on our understanding of the historical Jesus.

As is obvious from the overview just given, the current study moves in a centripetal direction, from historical-Jesus research in general (chapter 1), to the Q document (chapter 2), to the Son-of-Man and apocalyptic-judgment logia within Q (chapter 3), to one specific logion about judgment (chapter 4). Throughout this process, the focal point is on the relationship between imminent, apocalyptic eschatology, on the one hand, and wisdom, on the other. All quotations of, and references to, the Sayings Gospel Q will be derived from the so-called Critical Edition of Q, which is a scholarly reconstruction of Q that was overseen and edited by Robinson, Hoffmann and Kloppenborg (see Robinson 1997). This project, to which a number of prominent scholars contributed, is commonly referred to as the International Q Project. Unless otherwise specified, the text put forward by the Critical Edition of Q will be the normative text for this study. Because of its import for the present study, the Critical Edition of Q is reproduced in Appendix A.