Chapter six

Conclusion and Recommendations

I chose this research topic based on my observations on the struggle of institutions of African integration for growth and relevance. I was especially attracted to the challenge that faced both the creators and technocrats of the African Union and regionalism in general. These challenges ranged from internal politicking and technical shortcomings, to the threats represented in a rapidly globalising world. Moreover, the perennial failure of the OAU efforts in the past to pursue regionalism, led me to take up the challenge to investigate institutional regionalism in light of the AU with its new institutions. A growing objective from the beginning of this thesis was to find out if this new African regionalism held a fundamental departure from the African regionalism of the 1960s-1990s. I also felt that there was a need to see the role of AU institutions as part of the new African regional integration effort in strengthening and deepening African regionalism.

I singled out one of the new institutions of the AU, the Pan African Parliament as my unit of analysis. I wanted to find out the definitive role of the PAP in African regionalism. My research question was thus: “to what extent could the definitive role of the Pan African Parliament influence decision-making in the African Union?” My study approach was to study PAP from an institutionalism angle, which meant examining regional integration from the point of view of how institutions originate and persist, consequently acquiring supranational authority. I examined applicable theory which developed from the study of the European Union’s institutional regionalism over the years. At the macro level, I examined the overall nature of African integration by matching up grand theories of integration like intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. Establishing that African regionalism is a largely intergovernmental arena, I sought to examine the role of a potentially supranational organ like the PAP within this landscape. It meant investigating the middle-range theoretical schools which examine the processes of regional integration. In particular neo-institutionalism provided the avenue to show how regional institutions
acquire power and political clout. So, in further pursuit for the best approach to the question, I considered some of the arguments of the social science research premise of functionality, which attempts to link an institution’s existence to the functions it serves. If I could find out why continental designers decided to establish the PAP, I would have an idea of the role they intend for it to play in African Union and thus be able to answer my research question. But in order to best answer the functionality question, I had to examine the structural, policy and historical environment of decision making in African integration. This in turn will help in pin pointing the collective action problem that may have led to the decision to establish PAP. Thus, functionality served as a base for analysis in answering the research question. In essence while functionalists try to show the relationship between politics and administration, by positioning institutional arrangements as a function of designers intents, neo-institutionalists attempt to show how rules, past legacies and policies (institutions) affect choices in the design and growth of new institutions. So while, neo-institutionalism provided a theoretical launching pad to investigate and functionality provided the tool for analysis.

Having established a theoretical and analytical basis for my study, the methodology of the thesis was important in order to answer the research question, which was: “to what extent could the definitive role of the Pan African Parliament influence decision-making in the African Union?” I chose a case study approach. The contextual richness that a case study provides enabled the unveiling of dominant analytical themes emerging from the research question. This led to a full interrogation of the three dominant themes which are the existence of a collective choice problem, institutional designers’ intents and institutional arrangement. Having done this, the thesis showed that:

1. The emergence of the PAP was premised on the attempt of African leaders to tackle globalisation and previous failed integration effort.
2. This definitive role of PAP is manifested in the political, legislative and administrative arrangements in the PAP. In this sense one sees that African leaders still prefer the intergovernmental approach in regionalism and view
supranational tending institutions as threat to sovereignty and thus the OAU code of non-interference. This translates to the following:

a. PAP’s legislative role exists in rhetorical limbo.

b. PAP’s definitive role is its practiced role

c. This practiced role originates from a conscious calculation motivated by short term political interests and the legacy of intergovernmentalism in African integration to limit the powers of the PAP.

3. As a result of the above, the Pan African Parliament which is supposed to have an important input in AU decision making is struggling to be relevant, and perhaps if left unchecked may be tethering on the brink of institutional inertia. This is the beginning of the struggle of the PAP and complacency may prove detrimental to African regionalism.

With its present consultative and advisory assignment, the Pan African Parliament functions more like a talk shop, struggling even with the lack influence it possesses in any decision making in the AU. Accordingly, there seems to be confusion on what the PAP is. However, neo-functional and institutionalism schools in regional integration studies argue that institutions have the ability to take advantage of gaps, tasks and policy expansion (unintended consequences) in the decision making system, to acquire more powers from the centre. From this viewpoint, the preceding recommendations will focus on where these opportunities lie and how PAP can harness these opportunities to grow. My recommendations will also consider viewpoints for future research.

6.1 Recommendations

While intergovernmentalists view the empowerment of regional institutions as attributable to the ability of national states to rationally, and consciously abnegate powers to institutions, institutionalists see this process of growth as the triumph of institutions in acquiring power from the centre. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that no matter which school of thought is considered, institutions can escape inertia and encapsulation.
In order for the Pan African Parliament to survive, it will need empowerment pursued by the PAP itself and willingly given by the AU leaders. This section of the recommendation probes the feasibility of this empowerment in light of PAP’s present institutional make up.

### 6.1.1 Growing the PAP: a note on the resilience of institutions

An institution cannot survive without serving a function. Although PAP’s function in the AU is still muddled based on sovereignty concerns and the OAU non-interference legacy, there is still room for PAP’s growth of influence in the AU. Nevertheless, the PAP will need to take advantage of the opportunities for growth in its present constitution to grow its influence in the AU. So, although the powers of the Pan African Parliament has been challenged by the highly statist legacy reposed in the AU, the long term consequences of instituting the PAP can still materialise. This assertion is hinged on unanticipated consequences, like gaps in member states’ control and policy shifts, which institutions can exploit for growth.

**Take opportunity of legislative gaps**

Firstly it is important to note that Articles 9/2 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, gives the Assembly the room to delegate any of its powers and function to any organ of the Union. This means that African heads of state are in a position to abnegate the necessary powers to AU institutions including the Pan African Parliament. Since this is provided for by treaty, it is the duty of the PAP to convince the Assembly that it should have these powers. This is where the growth of PAP hinges and that is the discussion that will be had subsequently.
Take opportunity of expanding tasks

Secondly, a perusal of the strategic plan of the African Union Commission (AUC) and all the decisions made by the Executive Council from 2002-2006 shows the growing responsibility that the African Union Commission (AUC) carries in terms of its role in the AU policy making and implementation process. As the fledgling AU grows, these tasks are likely to grow. The PAP should take opportunity of this expansion to grow its powers in the AU especially playing a bigger role in the AU budgeting process. Additionally, by strengthening its harmonising role in the key policy areas like the economy and migration in the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the PAP can grow its influence especially if it is seen to work better with the RECs. By so doing, the PAP can position itself as a mediator and moderator in those contentious issues of regional harmony on the road to African regional integration. However in order to fully utilise the opportunity of these expanding tasks, PAP within its present mandate has to:

1. Develop committee expertise and establish policy cohesion in committee structure especially in prioritised sectoral areas like peace, security and human rights.
2. Develop strong internal accountability and transparency structure/culture
4. Courting the power nodes: inter-institutional diplomacy.
5. Make the AU ‘shared vision’ workable
6. Maximising PAP’s symbolism

These points are discussed in detail subsequently.

1. Develop committee expertise

For regional integration institutions to be viable, experts and technocrats have a crucial role to play. Functionalists see experts as the drivers and authority in integration. As integration activities grow in the AU, tasks in budgeting, human resources and appointments, planning and organising (harmonisation of policies) will increase with
growing demands from state and non-state actors in African integration. Responsibilities of some AU organs like the Commission will increase. This growth may see varying degrees of disagreements and conflicts develop between technocratic and political entities in the African integration space. The bid to resolve such conflict presents an opportunity for the expansion of scope or level of integration institutions like the PAP. For instance, as the AU intensifies integration through bolder moves in harmonising REC policies, the need for co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation increases. Additionally, conflict requires mediation and thus, the need to provide an avenue to resolve issues that emanate from these processes will grow. The Pan African Parliament represents a legitimate avenue to co-ordinate and address fall outs from these expansions. Already issues like this are beginning are yielding decisions which are likely to help in the deepening African integration.

For instance, several decisions on establishing an integrated migration policy for Africa and free movement of African peoples, created room for the decision to launch the African Union diplomatic passport and establish the African Centre for Study and Research on Migration. Additionally, developments in sectoral policy areas like energy, science and technology, education and culture have also necessitated the need to hasten the establishment of AU organs like the Specialised Technical Committees. As civil unrest, wars and political instability rocks African states like Sudan, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the need for complementary institutions to the Peace and Security Council, has resulted in the establishment and the appointment of Judges for the African Court on Human and People’s right. Despite the presence of the Pan African Parliament, the growing need for Africa’s people to participate in African integration decision making has also resulted in the recent election of representatives to the ECOSOCC. These developments mentioned here, connote a growing need for expert hands-on decision making (from migration to energy to issues of human rights and security) in the integration sphere as integration deepens in Africa. Thus these early stages of the AU also present an opportunity for the PAP to increase its own relevance along with the growing AU. Thus to develop committee expertise the following are key issues.
Specialisation

The Pan African Parliament by virtue of its proposed function of facilitating the harmonisation of AU and RECs policies has to function as a repository of expert knowledge. This knowledge repository is in the PAP committees. By their very nature, parliamentary committees represent nodes of specialisation and are composed of specialist members. Generally, MPs will be attracted to committees which are of significant interest to them in achieving their political goals. Hence, MPs from countries like Sudan or Somalia will likely have interests in the Committee on Co-operation, International Relations and Conflict Resolutions. Rule 22 (11) of the PAP Rules of Procedure already allows for this specialisation by virtue of the one-MP one-Committee system. This forces MPs in the face of many potential interest areas to specialise. PAP Rules of Procedures provide that committee membership be decided by PAP Regional Caucuses which designate at least three members per committee. However, the criteria for selection of members by PAP regional caucuses to PAP committees are not clear. This needs to be addressed.

Information

Whether or not PAP committees attract members with special interests, PAP committees need the advantage of information and expertise. As already discussed in this thesis, the PAP committees presently make use of expert consultants in certain areas in order to inform decision making. Although some organisations like the African Capacity Building Foundation have committed technical support for capacity building for both MPs and the secretariat, there is need to increase research competency and specialised knowledge in the PAP. To be viable, the PAP needs to beef up its capacity in terms of knowledge and skills, research capabilities and ICT infrastructure as spelt out in its own strategic plan. By so doing as tasks increase in the AU system, the PAP committees can use this as leverage to draw in tasks and acquire more responsibility. By so doing PAP increases its indispensability status as a stop for proposal and policy input in the AU decision making
cycle. This will give PAP institutional and political leverage in view of the competing sectoral policy proposals and reports that the Assembly and Executive Council receive.

2. Develop strong internal accountability and transparency culture

The PAP is in a struggle to survive. This survival is hinged not just on issues of institutional growth and political influence, but on institutional integrity and transparency and thus should itself be above reproach. This is especially if it has to play an oversight role in the accountability of other AU organs. Since inception, the PAP has tried to make inroads into the AU budgetary process with minimal success. From its second sitting, the PAP recommended that it be actively involved in the budgetary process (as per legislated in the PAP Protocol) and that its work be aligned with the process of preparing the budget of the AU a task which for now is entrusted to the African Union Commission (AUC) and the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC). The PAP also in the same recommendation implied that it is being wedged between the Executive Council and PRC and thus, subordinate to the PRC. It therefore suggested that as far as its own budget goes the PRC should not be involved. These were recommendations made during PAP’s second session (the first after inauguration). Curiously the tone of the recommendations showed a PAP that was willing to be assertive in demanding powers to fulfil its Protocol functions. By later recommendations however, one sees the change of this tone to a more resigned tone.

The Executive Council and Assembly did not consider the proposal. Instead in the audit of PAP in 2006, the PRC submitted an unflattering report tainting the PAP’s accountability and transparency. From the Executive Council’s decisions on the report, it seemed that some MPs defrauded the Parliament by taking funding from the PAP coffers, going against an earlier Executive Council decision that MPs should be funded by their respective countries in the interim. So, rather than contemplate budgetary powers for the PAP, the Executive Council approved the findings of the PRC. Consequently, it froze PAP accounts, deemed MPs in violation of the AU Financial Rules and Regulations and
ordered them to refund monies misappropriated. These reports were the subject of the debate of the PAP during its 8th session in October 2007 in which the Parliament succumbed to the Executive Council decisions. In a finance constrained and centralised AU system, the PAP discredited itself by defrauding the Parliament. In its teething stage in an equally nascent and finance strapped AU the PAP MPs ought to be seen to be above board.

3. Maximising the use of PAP Rules of Procedure to grow influence

Studies on the European Parliament show that the EP has utilised its right to approve its own Rules of Procedure to grow its powers. The PAP Rules of Procedures is the rare instrument that gives the Pan African Parliament an opportunity to grow its status. If the PAP wants to make inroads in its oversight role of the executive arm of the AU as well as grow its influence in decision making, it must strengthen its own internal workings through its Rules of Procedure. An example is how the Rules of Procedure force specialisation by MPs in terms of committee memberships. An important element in PAP’s institutional arrangement and future growth is the dynamic between its committees and the internal organisation. The PAP has been pressing for AU budget oversight role to be enforced. Yet, while the Protocol mentions that the Parliament shall discuss the budget of the Union and make recommendations, apart from making mention of this, PAP’s Rules of Procedure does not elaborate on the modalities for this engagement. In this case, the PAP ought to use its own Rules of Procedure creatively to cover institutional gaps in the budgetary process. This means constant review of the Rules of Procedure as first foundation when introducing new institutional building blocks like new decision making channels and relationships with relevant organs of the AU. For instance, the PAP committees need to cultivate a joint committee with the African Union Commission. As the engine room of the AU, the Commission is responsible for the implementation of Assembly and Executive Council decisions. Thus, the PAP needs the experience and the knowledge of the AUC in developing its own institutional and technical competencies, which will give it the backbone to carry out its political objectives. Developing this
horizontal relationship will benefit the Parliament in terms of information sourcing, building capacities, and provide guidance in the AU integration process.

4. Make the AU ‘shared vision’ workable

The AU has not adopted a formal organogram on responsibility, supervision and reporting within its system. This state of affairs has caused an organising predicament. Yet the African Union talks of a “shared vision” as reflected in the strategic plan of the AU and the strategic plan of the PAP. The idea of “shared vision” connotes complementarity of functions, and an institutional culture that runs through the whole AU system. For instance the relationships between AU institutions are still not clear as there seems to be no agreed organisational representation of AU institutional relationships. There are salient points that should be taken into consideration in the development of effective organisational structure and processes in the PAP. Foremost is need for an inter-institutional co-ordination/reporting mechanism between the PAP and relevant AU organs, as well as a reporting mechanism between the PAP and the other integrative institutions in Africa.

A defined policy thread

PAP is still a new institution. In fact its strategic plan was drawn up in 2005, and it is yet to be approved by the Executive Council. Perhaps this delay in approval is based on the organisational confusion in the AU. This lack of organisation has trickled down to its organs as a perusal of PAP’s draft work plan shows that it is still in the process of providing for appropriate organisational structures and processes. Thus there is a huge gap between the legal provisions for these organs of the AU and what is practiced. There needs to be an organisational thread that links all policy and sectoral nodes in all AU organs, from the commission, to the Parliament, to the Permanent Representatives Committee, the specialised technical committee and the Executive Council. This will open the way for policy cohesion in terms of the respective policy jurisdictions in the AU system. One way of achieving shared policy/programme vision and engendering
meaningful debates and eliciting practicable recommendations is for the PAP to work from information on major decisions taken at AU summits. Logically, parliamentary statements and reports by the Assembly/Executive Council is one way of achieving this goal. But, so far, the likelihood of the PAP President to draw in the AU Executive Council into Parliament to discuss decisions made at summits seems remote. However, PAP committees can enhance communication with sectoral committees in other AU organs to become powerful policy repositories within the AU polity. Additionally, communication between the PAP and other AU organs need to be established and defined this will give the PAP reference points for recommendations based on the decisions, reports, and proposals made by the Executive Council, PRC, AUC and other related policy nodes.

A PAP/PRC/EC communication system

This research itself showed the wide gap between the PAP and the Executive Council and the lack of complementarity between the recommendations of PAP and the decisions of the Executive Council and consequently the Assembly. The research however noted the close relationship between the Executive Council and the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), which does most of the preparatory work for and reports to the Executive Council. The committee set up of the PRC can offer the PAP an opportunity for it to engage closer with the Executive Council through joint committee meetings between the PAP and PRC sectoral committees. Perhaps, this is an area that needs alternative approaches in sharing information, like having a PAP/PRC/EC communication mechanism, perhaps through an electronic information network or through meetings between the PAP sectoral committees and the PRC sectoral committees. One advantage of this PAP/PRC working relationship is that the PAP can exploit the close relationship the PRC has with the Executive Council by having the advantage of the Executive Councils’ early word on decisions and also by having direct access and input on decisions of the Executive Council in the PRC report process.
Additionally, this PAP/PRC/EC working axis can bring greater efficiency to the workings of the AU and PAP as it will minimise duplication and multiplicity of policy perspectives which, otherwise may cost the AU more and put the PAP through the paces of making recommendations which are totally out of line with the Executive Council and Assembly policy path. With the perennial lack of funds, PAP needs synergy with the Executive Council in order to complement and comment on AU policy proposals. The European Parliament and the Council in 1976 established the conciliation committee to attempt to seek agreement between the two institutions. Although the Specialised Technical Committee (STC) of the AU is intended to be closely related to the PAP committees it may serve it well for now to have a working relationship to the relevant committees of the Permanent Representatives Committee.

5. Inter-institutional diplomacy

Parliamentary diplomacy was a chief contribution to European integration. Just as is witnessed from the findings of this thesis, in 1961, the European Parliament had no influence at all in the EU Council as the treaty amending certain financial provisions of the treaties of 1970 and July 1976 had not yet materialised. But integration authors like Ernst Haas argued that the European Parliament was able to inspire and motivate the emergence of voluntary elite groups across European national boundaries which were able to influence EU decision-making. This use of diplomacy and advocacy is crucial to PAP’s institutional growth within the broader AU system.

1. Firstly, with the vague and limited responsibilities and challenges in lines of communication and with the perennial problems of finance and the turn over of MPs, it is suggested that a strong regional parliamentary forum between PAP and the Regional Parliamentary Assemblies (RPA) will put regional Parliaments in a better position to engage the principles of governance and African integration.

2. Secondly, the PAP should establish close working relationship with civil groups like non-governmental organisations represented both within and outside the ECOSOCC for effective advocacy in human rights and peace and security issues.
3. The Parliament will need to make itself relevant or “market” itself to the Executive Council, whose discretionary powers have to a large extent been deposited in the Permanent Representatives Committee. Additionally, while the PAP must continue to exert its rights as provided by the Protocol, it should be stated that there is no replacement to the PAP consciously courting the decision making powers.

Already it can be seen that the traditional decision making organs of the AU don’t know how to approach the concept and practicality of a democratic, legislative and participatory institution like the Pan African Parliament. In this case, the PAP ought to establish a diplomatic corridor with the Executive Council, perhaps as mentioned earlier by instituting a PAP/Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) consultative forum. This will surely augur well for the PAP in entrenching its relevance in the AU especially considering that as already established, the PRC always has the ear of the Executive Council.

6. Maximising PAP’s symbolism

There is no Parliament in the world that has achieved total legislative powers, thus while the PAP needs to evolve, what has to be clear is the level of powers it is looking for. For now, although the PAP struggles in getting anyone in the AU executive to pay attention, using its symbolism to the full may indeed inspire a way forward in its growth. PAP does not carry even an illusion of strength. As a talk shop, reduced to making inconsequential recommendations and resolutions, the Pan African Parliament does not even measure up to such illusions. The PAP has to be seen at least symbolically as an institution of some influence, especially on issues of good governance. For instance the presence of PAP in an African political or conflict situation should carry weight albeit symbolic. Already there are signs that this is happening and it should be exploited by the PAP. For instance PAP’s observer missions to elections and trouble spots within the continent attract media attention. Through media coverage and by interactions with stakeholders during these
missions the PAP can sensitise African people and familiarise them with the existence and role of PAP. Thus, such missions can become a way for the PAP to entrench its relevance in the continental political system. There is no doubt that full legislative influence will be PAP’s challenge of the 21st century. However for now, using technical and administrative leverages in the growing AU and by building alliances with civil society across the continent, the PAP can begin to find a level of influence within the AU decision making system.

6.1.2 Viewpoints for future research

This thesis is an exploratory work, undertaken to give an insight into the nature of the evolving African Union and its organs. So far, the AU institutionally seems to be cloaked in a film of mystery. There is little understanding of the workings of the AU and scholars seem to be presently playing a guessing game. The very fact that there were three different organograms of the AU from three different otherwise dependable sources (Institute for Strategic Studies, the Pan African Parliament strategic plan and the Pretoria University Law Project), shows the little effort that scholars of African Union integration and administration have put into its study. It also shows a low level of interest from students of African integration. Although one can dismiss this dearth in research on the short life span of the AU so far, I argue that this should not be an excuse, as even its teething challenges can be studied as basis for descriptive, exploratory and even predictive research. Thus, it may be time to begin to describe, monitor and evaluate this AU, which is steeped in organisational quagmire as it navigates the process of consolidating and establishing all its organs.

It is quite telling that researchers of the African Union, have done little in harmonising views on the administration of the AU. Academics working together with practitioners should be able to construct a clear picture of what the administration of the AU looks like. There is no work that has done justice to this. In teaching students of Public Administration the administration and governance of the AU, it is vital that the different
processes and structures in administering the AU are understood, like the journey of proposals in the AU, the financing of the AU and more importantly how the RECs which are building blocks of African integration are administered in the AU. Although economists have done some work on African economic integration there is little scholarship on the administration of African integration. The lack of consensus and factual disharmony in the different AU organograms consulted for this thesis are huge indictments on institutions and students of African integration. The following ideas hold research interest:

1. Exploring the possibilities for a co-ordinating system for AU sectoral nodes. This will involve studying the best way to co-ordinate all the policies, programmes and activities of all the AU sectoral nodes starting from the Specialised Technical Committee, sectoral committees in Parliament and at the Commission.

2. Looking for factors that contribute to the ineffectiveness of PAP recommendations. This will explore reasons PAP recommendations get lost in the overall scheme of the Executive Council and Assembly decisions.

3. Searching for how PAP can make its’ recommendations matter in the AU decision making.

4. Further interrogating the idea of an ideal and practiced role of PAP: this will involve taking the ideal/practiced role further to find out if based on designers intentions, institutions can operate based on an ideal and practice standpoint.

5. Examining further if the observed AU incremental strategy for PAP will spell encapsulation?

6. In terms of the more governance aspects of this research it will be interesting to further interrogate those factors if any that resulted in integration apathy after the excitement of the 1999 Sirte declarations?

7. Another area for research emanating from this research will be examining the African Union as an intergovernmental integration experience. This will open the space for debate on whether supranationality is a myth in African regionalism and really challenge the present institutional progression of African regionalism.
These ideas for future research are some of the lingering questions that have emerged at the end of this research. They range from administrative to political issues and will possibly provide insight, dispel the findings of this research or possibly provide openings for the development of an African regionalism theory.

6.2 Conclusion

The thesis studied the struggle of AU institutions for relevance in a highly intergovernmental regionalism space. Tackling the Pan African Parliament as a case as explained in Chapter two, the thesis, largely explored the functionality of this potentially supranational institution in a highly statist regional integration agenda. By so doing, as seen in chapter four, the thesis was able to locate and develop its central argument, which is that given the historical non-interference legacy of the OAU, supranational prone institutions like the PAP, are bound to face an almost insurmountable hurdle in fulfilling their ideal roles as agents for African integration. This central point is seen if one views the path to PAP’s existence from the enthusiastic rhetoric of its premise to the reality of its institutional arrangements as presented in the fourth chapter. While an incremental delegation of power for regional institutions is not new in regional integration as the example of the European Union’s institutions like the European Parliament has shown in discussions in chapter three, the difference for African integration lies in its historical and political legacy, elucidated in discussions on the nature of African regionalism in chapter four. Thus, given its history of failed institutions, the decision to limit the powers of the PAP rather than provide lee-way for growth, may likely spell encapsulation.

However, the point of reviewing institutionalism theories, especially rational prescripts which underline origin and growth of institutions in chapter three was to show that notwithstanding the context of experience, ideology and approach in governance, it is still possible to link institutions to designers. This in turn opens up discussions on the role of unintended consequences, showing that given the right strategy, African integration institutions, can grow. The thesis has managed to give an overview of the political
journey of the PAP and its administrative arrangement as a reflection of this political
journey. By so doing the thesis made some important findings that impact on the
understanding of the African Union and PAP in particular.

The thesis found that the Executive Council’s power in the AU is extremely under-rated.
The thesis also showed some misconceptions on the powers of the PAP. The PAP is not
the legislative organ of the AU and thus does not report directly to the Assembly, as some
scholarly works imply. As a matter of fact, neither does the PAP report directly to the
Executive Council. The Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) plays a central role
in the AU decision making process much more than PAP and the Commission combined.
The PAP plays no effective role in AU decision making despite that its legal importance
in terms of the AU constitutional act rates higher than the PRC. Other findings are that
none of the PAP’s recommendations from inception to 2006 has ever been vetted or
acknowledged in Executive Council decisions. In terms of organisation and
administrative running, the thesis showed the disjointed and fragmented organisational
system of the AU, which in turn has made the PAP vulnerable to redundancy due to lack
of policy cohesion with other relevant AU institutions. In terms of governance, the thesis
has shown that contrary to the highly lauded new direction in African integration with the
emergence of the AU, there seems to be a waning of political will in terms of the spirit
and letter of the AU. This is largely based on the strong tradition of the OAU in terms of
non-interference and the vehement support for sovereignty. Finally, the final chapter has
argued that although historical, political and institutional antecedents do not augur well
for the growth of PAP, evidence as seen in the review of literature and theoretical
framework shows that depending on the growth strategy and goals the PAP sets for itself,
it still has the possibility albeit challenging to grow and find its relevance in AU decision
making.