Chapter 3

Theoretical Framework

A theoretical framework can be viewed as scaffolding on which analysis can be built. The role of theory is to provide generalisations...powerful abstractions...create the links and frameworks that can connect and interlink studies...” (Wellington et al., 2005:57). One of the objectives of the theoretical framework is to provide existing theories as a foundation on which to build research relevant premises and submissions. The body of literature in this work will come largely from literature on European integration. This will be explained subsequently. However, the first task in the chapter will be to inspect Public Administration as a concept and area of study. The aim of this exercise will, firstly, be to define public administration within the context of the current study and, secondly, to show how the study of institutions as actors affecting outcomes within the political ties into Public Administration discourse. Thirdly, the theoretical framework will be based on scholarship which has given foundation to the regional phenomenon that is the European Union.

The framework will provide an avenue to locate the relevance of the PAP within the African Union by broadly examining grand theories of integration, middle-range theories of functions and processes in regional entities and, more specifically, theories that examine regional integrative institutions as research variables. Thus, examining neo-functionalist and neo-institutionalist theories along with those relevant arguments that have developed in scholarly circles on these subjects will be central to the discourse. This is especially due to the role that institutions of integration have played in regionalism in Europe and the potential that institutions have in driving regionalism within Africa's regional system. Therefore the relationship between institutions and public administration, as well as those grand and middle-range theories of regional integration will be used as a basis for inquiry.
Major world historical events have at different times placed regionalism at the centre of scholarly discourse and analysis – the end of the cold war in particular –, opening up the concept of new regionalism. It is expected that a careful assessment of relevant theories that underline regional development as well as international political economic studies may provide theoretical foundation to examining the global nature of regionalism and Africa’s place within this context. Moreover, it must be noted that, while, with European integration, there has been a succession of theories directed at understanding the factors that explain European integration, there has been little theoretical inquiry into the nature of African integration.

Thus, it is submitted that the time-tested and -developed theories of European integration, in particular the study of institutions as central integrative actors, if not applicable to the African situation, are at least significant in interrogating the nature as well as the future of the Pan African Parliament and African regionalism. This is especially recommended due to the observed institutional nature of African regionalism. However, the most important
question that this chapter needs to answer is the issue of how the study of institutions of integration ties into Public Administration, as well as how Public Administration defines the entirety of this thesis.

### 3.1 Public Administration

In considering a definition for public administration, the concept of administration ought to be explored. MacRae and Pitt (1980:7) define administration as “the co-ordination of men and materials within organisations for the accomplishment of identifiable purposes”. Administration has been defined as the “execution of public affairs, by persons jointly engaged in working toward common goals” (Cutchin, 1981:6), and as “activities of groups co-operating to accomplish common goals” (Simon, Smithburg & Thompson, 1971:3). Administration has been defined even from the point of view of the activities thought to be associated with it, “work of bookkeeping, registration, accounting and other internal communication of record, clerical work…collective noun for persons engaged in such work (Dunsire, 1973:229). Administration has also been characterised within a generic context which makes it “an ingredient of all social activities and therefore universal, operating… wherever a few persons are associated to achieve some objective” (Gladden, 1972:4).

From the foregoing, Administration cannot be confined to a particular definition, but rather should be seen as a totality of all those activities that are undertaken by members of an organised unit to achieve goals. However, two points need to be highlighted here. The first is that, for there to be Administration, there has to be a collective goal or an objective understood by the actors involved. This is related to the social functionality question of need. As pointed out by early functionalist Herbert Spencer (Turner & Maryanski, 1979:12), “to understand how an organisation originated and developed, it is requisite to understand the need subserved at the outset and afterwards”. The second point is the universal application of administrative functions (policy making/planning, finance, control, work procedures, personnel and organising) in any work situation. This
generic application is irrespective of those specialised functions or work that an
organisation undertakes. For instance, a building firm will have architects, engineers,
surveyors and even financial specialists; however, the thread that provides a smooth
system of operation for all these activities within the firm will be administration’s generic
functions.

With the above in mind, a definition for public administration can possibly be negotiated.
There is a plethora of definitions of public administration by different scholars; however,
for the purpose of clarity in terms of this paper, public administration will be defined
within the context of administration that has already been put forward. In this case it will
be logical to consider the word ‘public’. The common sense definition of the word will
refer to a group of people, a community, a nation or citizenry of a nation. It also connotes
something that is open to all and not hidden from anyone. The Oxford Advanced Learner
Dictionary (1995) defines public as “of or concerning people in general...; provided by
government for the use of people in general; not private”. It then follows that public
administration consists of administration that has its goals open and targeted towards the
whole community.

Some scholarly definitions of public administration, however, are not as simplistic and
have wide-ranging dimensions. Balogun (1983:11), for instance, views public administration
as having to do with the marshalling of human and material resources in order to achieve
the objectives of public policy. Public administration has also been characteristically
deefined as comprising public policy formulation, policy execution, as bureaucracy, public
and usually large-scaled (Fesler, 1980:2). Other authors have defined Public
Administration in the context of theory and practice (Henry, 1975:5); as both “the
activities concerned with the management of government business and the study of these
activities... as practice and as knowledge” (Adamolekun, 1983:1). With so many thrusts
in meaning and definition, attempting a concise definition is a challenging task.

Nevertheless, public administration can be viewed as the sum total of the activities of the
different levels of governance systems aimed at meeting the goals of policy and the needs
of the citizenry. In this sense, the study of public administration will cover all levels of sub-national, national and supranational governance (regional institutions) and straddle a whole range of social science disciplines like politics, sociology and economics. Thus, the next section will deal with the interdisciplinary nature of Public Administration, with particular reference to two social science disciplines, Politics and Sociology.

### 3.1.1 Interdisciplinary perspectives of Public Administration

The social sciences deal with the methodological study of social phenomena as a route to understanding their consequences for the broader society. Social science has been defined as those mental or cultural sciences which deal with the activities of the individual as a member of a group (*Encyclopaedia Americana*, 1971). Moreover, in what he terms the natural science of society, early sociologist AR Radcliffe-Brown (1948:55) views social science as “the sum total of all social relationships of all individuals at a given moment in time...”. Social science is a study of social structure, which examines tangible models of social relations among individuals.

Public Administration is a social science. However, the history of Public Administration as a science, unlike other social sciences like philosophy, political science and sociology, is a recent one. It has thrived as a part of the whole study of social phenomena, thus sharing inter-dependence with other social sciences. Bain (1986:19) refers to Public Administration as having an “interdisciplinary heritage”. Marini (2000:8) contends that Public Administration as a discipline thrives on its reliance on the social science disciplines. There is a strong interdisciplinary context to the study of public administration. Additionally, over the years the scope of the study of public administration has expanded. Since Woodrow Wilson’s postulations on Public Administration as a legitimate discipline separate from political science (Van den Bos, 1988:62; Thorsen, 1988:140), the world has experienced two World Wars, the Cold War, major economic and structural adjustments in the developing world, globalisation, regionalisation, new perspectives on governance, with the protection of human rights and
dignity and the advancement of democracy as governance imperatives. Thus contemporary Public Administration has developed, to a large extent, a “more or less regular set of subfields, approaches and topical interests” (Marini, 2000:9). In terms of topical interest areas and foci, the environment and context of public administration and the level at which public administration occurs is growing as an area of research interest. These environments and contexts draw from other disciplines such as history (traditions and value paths) and sociology (structures and functions of social institutions). Additionally, the focus of research can fall on anything from the local to the international level of administration.

**Public Administration and Political Science**

It can be argued that the plurality in definitions of public administration can be traced back to its development as an academic discipline. For instance, it took almost a century from the groundbreaking article by Woodrow Wilson, *The study of Administration*, for Public Administration to come to its own as a discipline. Having its roots in the political sciences, in 1887, Public Administration was first advanced as a distinct science in Woodrow Wilson’s article “The study of Administration”. Wilson proposed “a science of administration… to strengthen the paths of government and ...crown its duties with dutifulness (Van den Bos, 1988:62). Be that as it may, for many years public administration was practised and studied as a part of politics, with policy formulation and the struggle for power and governance identified as parts of politics and administration seen as a means to execute state policy. These arguments reflect the political science/public administration dichotomy and what has been aptly termed the continuum between public administration and politics (Thorsen, 1988:120). This reference to a continuum between public administration and political science is significant because, although public administration was taught as a separate discipline in the United States in the late 1920s, the 1930s identified key areas for debate, such as the issues of separation of politics from administration and the principles of administration and the place of policy making. It was disputed that policy making was not the exclusive reserve of
politics and that administrators, far from what was previously advocated, were also involved in policy making and using discretionary power, and generally involved in the political process.

In Africa and Southern Africa in particular, public administration and its relationship to politics has been thoroughly debated by scholars. For instance, Hanekom and Thornhill (1986:16) describe as a “myth” the view that the public administrator is a politically neutral force. Pauw (1999:23) argues that dichotomy is integral in defining public administration, where the exclusion of politics from public administration should be seen as a moral or prescriptive imperative. Pauw’s argument to view the separation of politics from administration as a moral point may augur well for accountability and transparency in African government structures. Nevertheless, the liberal democratic ideology behind it fails to take into consideration the partisanship culture of politics in Africa. For instance Nigeria experimented with the idea of ‘neutrality’ by establishing the Public Service Commission under the Parliamentary government in the 1960s to handle the appointment, promotion and discipline of public servants (Adedeji, 1968:7), however, partisan factors determined appointments and the structure of the public service in general (Adedeji, 1968:6). Furthermore Balogun (1983:18) argues that politics/administration interaction rather than dichotomy defines Nigerian public administration, based on a number of factors, one being the biases of career public servants and their “prejudices as human beings and political animals”. This research argues that there is a huge question mark regarding the so-called independence of public administration. Thus, public administration cannot be divorced totally from politics for several reasons, one being that policy making is an activity that falls within the confines of the study and practice of public administration. Public administration is ever evolving, as a practice or as a study area, changing with changing times. Moreover, society, politics, economics, globalisation and regionalisation, and other factors, will continue to impact on the study and practice of public administration.

These views are important in this research in as much as it studies the same politics/administration interaction at the continental level. African views are particularly
significant as the relationship between African integrative institutions and their designers are explored in the context of the relationship between the highly intergovernmental environment of African integration and its almost contradictory path of institutionalised regionalism.

The sociology of public administration

The Encyclopaedia Americana (1971:207) defines sociology as “the science of social relationships (structures), the consequences (functions) of those relationships for ongoing social systems and the process of social change”. In the eighteenth century, French Philosopher Auguste Comte, known as the father and founder of sociology (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:22; Turner & Maryanski, 1979:2) saw a society in perpetual turmoil and thus sought a reorganisation of society that would result in stability and social equilibrium. To achieve this, Comte attempted to open to the world a new positive hope in its social and moral crisis, through science (Ple, 2000:424). He proposed that society examines itself through experience based on a logical and objective pursuit of science to explain its problems and solve them (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:22). Comte’s sociology was based on empirical inquiry and experimentation, and conceived social phenomena as subject to natural laws and thus to be studied like the natural sciences. Thus, Comte identified sociology with biology, viewing society as a social organism, referred to as organismic thinking by Herbert Spencer (Turner & Maryanski, 1979:9). This organismic thesis of sociology is aimed at the search for social cohesion. This notion of sociology stipulates that all parts of the society perform specific functions, yet are integrated as part of a whole system, just like all parts of a living organism.

Early sociologists like Auguste Comte (Ple, 2002:424), Emile Durkheim (Babbie & Mouton, 2000) and Herbert Spencer (Turner & Maryanski, 1979:9) sought to empirically explain social issues and their functions in society with the overall objective of achieving social equilibrium. Their efforts gave rise to the first theoretical perspective of sociology.
which is functionalism. Comte, Herbert and Durkheim’s contributions resulted in the development of the theory of society on collectivism, structure, needs and causes. Functionalism deals with the effect of the social phenomena on society, as well as the normative values of society; what a good society should comprise. These normative prescripts of societal values and social cohesion are the two main arguments of functionalism. In the course of searching for these goals, society creates institutions. Weber’s bureaucracy theory draws largely from sociological and functionalism discourse by stressing the relevance of organisational formal structures to a complex society (Hill, 1972:16). This by implication means that the character and role of institutions in society emerged from functionalism discourse. In this case, the interrogation of the need for institutions in society and the study of origin of institutions grew.

Summarily, institutional emergence was precipitated by function and need. Some of the theories that have emerged in the study of the phenomena of regional integration are drawn from sociological theories, the most prominent being functionalism and its offshoot theories like institutionalism. This is a study on how institutions affect society. The current study is a study of the function of the Pan African Parliament in the African Union, and the implications of this function for regionalism in Africa.

3.1.2 The Public Administration/Institutionalism interface

Haralambos and Holborn (1995:8) describe an institution as a structure made up of interconnected roles or interrelated norms. In fact, Thelen and Steinmo (1991:2) model institutions as those “formal organisations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct”. Institutions, according to early groundbreaking anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowsky (Turner & Maryanski, 1979:49) are organised activities among humans revealing a definite structure. What is more, Malinowsky (Turner & Maryanski, 1979:49-50) models all institutions as having universal elements such as personnel, defined goals, rules, activities, material implements for operations and functioning. Incidentally, in the struggle to attain a level of definition as a discipline, the universality
of public administration as put forward by Cloete’s (1981:3) generic functions of policy making, financing, organising staffing, work procedures and control) also reinforce the connection between public administration and institutions in the study realm. Indeed Hanekom and Thornhill (1986:7) pinpoint the core activities of public administration, such as the determination of goals and the provision and utilisation of money, as being bound within an institutional framework consisting of rules on procedure and control.

Going further, bureaucratic agents of governments are described as the loci of public administration. These centres of government policy making and implementation are seen by new institutionalist scholars as political institutions (March & Olsen, 1984:738). In fact, in expressing certain South African viewpoints on public administration, Bain (1986:13) models public administration from an institutional standpoint as executive government institutions and the whole body of legislation and functions. These points beg an assessment of the universal functions of public administration (activities) and the general elements of institutions. In so doing it can be noted that Public Administration studies universal set rules that govern the administration and outcome of policy.

Attentive to this, one may venture to argue that, within the very premise of Public Administration is the study of government administrative institutions as social changers. This is because government as an institution represents administration in its co-ordination and control of activities, the marshalling of human and material resources, as well as the systems and processes used in achieving its goal of service delivery.

Early theorists, as well as some Public Administration studies, have come from institutionalist standpoints. For instance Gladden (1961:12) presents public administration as the “management of affairs by public bodies”, studying the design and growth of government institutions. It is also significant that Gladden proceeds in his discourse on public administration to centre on government administrative institutions, by focusing on the origin/design, functions and growth of central government departments in England (Gladden, 1961:45). This old institutionalism was more of grand theorising and, according to Thelen and Steinmo (1991:3), did not encourage the development of middle-range concepts that will facilitate explanations.
In making a case for this study which focuses on institutions as actors in the development and progress of the state or, in this case, the regional state, a conceptual and theoretical framework that embraces new institutionalist views will most likely see a convergence of Political and Public Administration viewpoints. This is because new institutionalists reject the idea that politics can be separated from public administration (Bulmer, 1998:370). This is so, as new institutionalism considers the process of governance as encompassing the political and administrative aspects of policy enactments and outcomes. In the case of regionalism, new institutionalist discourse emphasises institutions as the principle actors of integration. From an analytical standpoint, Bulmer (1998:368) presents new institutionalism as a methodological approach in comparative social sciences. New institutionalism is also considered in as much as it interprets institutions from a wider perspective (Bulmer, 1998 367-369; Kato, 1999:554), a broader aspect of governance that goes beyond issues of formal, constitutional and legal approaches to institutions, but encompasses policy connectedness and networks, as well as being inclusive of all policy actors. New institutionalism also emphasises the issue of institutional value or, as March and Olsen (1984:738) put it, the centrality of meaning and symbolic action. This entails codes, culture, beliefs and identities, as well as knowledge embedded in institutions. These central premises of institutionalism are integral to governance and public administration because it is difficult to separate formal arrangements from the normative context within government formal structures. Institutions therefore can be:

- formal and informal institutions,
- conventions,
- norms and symbols embedded in them,
- policy instruments and procedures.

Institutions have been described as the “irreplaceable backbone of the state” (Roy, 2005:77). Gladden (1961:15-16), models public administration from different levels: international administration (supranational), central administration (national), regional administration (state or provincial) and local administration (local government). The
administration of international government can be co-operative (intergovernmental) or supranational (institutional). Discussing Public Administration within an international polity framework will focus on the design and evolution of institutions, intergovernmental forums and policies of international entities. The definitions of administration and public administration discussed earlier in particular, reflect certain considerations which make this study of the role of the Pan African Parliament in African regionalism, not only of public administration relevance, but entrenched in the universal principles of public administration.

Finally, it will be difficult, from the foregoing, to separate the study of public administration from the study of institutions (social, political). Additionally, some key areas of debate in public administration studies, such as the issue of separation of politics from administration, the principles of administration and the place of policy making in politics, cannot exist outside the context of institutions. From the above arguments, there begins to emerge the interdisciplinary nature of social inquiry. Thus, just as public administration cannot be divorced from politics and policy making, Public Administration, sociology, politics and policy studies cannot be considered in a vacuum. Institutions thus become not only the locus of study but also are being seen as intervening variables in the determination of policy outcomes. Having attempted to represent an initial connection between public administration and institutions, it can be stated in summary that the realm of institutional studies is not only a crucial part of Public Administration, but an indispensable part of the totality of its practice.

3.1.3 Multi-disciplinary perspectives of Institutionalism

Like public administration, institutions have been studied from multi-disciplinary perspectives in the social sciences, the central logic being that institutions are seen as solutions to whatever problems the disciplines deem paramount. Institutionalism is hinged on how institutions shape social life. This section makes a cursory investigation of four disciplinary theses on institutionalism: history, sociology, economics and politics. It
is suggested that this inquiry into various disciplinary conceptual frameworks of institutionalism will provide the background from which to draw inferences as to the place of institutions in Public Administration. It is also expected that drawing these inferences will provide the conceptual justification for institutionalism in this thesis.

**History**

Some of the foundations of historical studies are centred on the examination of institutions. The history of kingdoms, wars and conquests essentially was the history of institutions personified with courts as kings and military structures as the history of conquering heroes or generals. Goodin (1996:3) traces the evolution of institutionalism in historical studies from the study of principally political institutions, to the shift of focus on life histories of the individual, then, recently, a shift again to institutions and their impact on people’s lives. The idea that history has a tendency to influence and reshape the present and the future is one of its strongest claims in social studies and, by relation, social institutions. Thus, historical institutionalists subscribe to social causation being path dependent, with contextual influences changing results of these operative factors (Hall & Taylor, 1996). These contexts are based on a past, most significantly, institutional in nature. In the present case, institutions are seen as a persistent component of history, which, as a result, pushes historical developments along a certain path. In essence, historical perspectives of institutionalism have to do with the examination of particularity (Goodin, 1996:4). This means the study of a particular story surrounding a particular institution at a particular point in history.

**Sociology**

Very early sociologists undertook the study of social institutions from an almost non-existent theoretical standpoint, preferring rather to present studies on social institutions that tended more towards the indexing or cataloguing of institutions. However, studies on social collective structures and how they submerge individual action in sociology began
to produce some of the foundational theories that have become the basis of institutionalism studies, both old and new. Goodin (1996:5) traces an enquiring history of institutionalism in sociology from the emphasis on structural functionalism theories of Pareto, Weber and Mosca, inter alia, to the mid-20th century paradigm shift to more behavioural studies targeted at emphasising the role of individual and collective choice in social outcomes. This approach thus underplayed the role of institutional determinism (old institutionalism) as the precursor to social outcomes.

Lately, the sociological conceptualisation of the new institutionalism has been viewed from the standpoint of individual “embeddedness” (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996). Thus, rather than the subsuming and subordinating power of institutions over individuals, embeddedness subscribes to a moderate standpoint which sees individual action as the outcome of being part of a network, rejecting the structuralist idea of individual action as a product of institutional imposition. Basically, sociological conceptualisation of institutionalism (old or new) emphasises how individuals are shaped or altered by collective social action or structure.

Additionally, Hall and Taylor (1996: 947), advance the argument that sociological institutionalists break down the conceptual divide between institutions and culture put up by many political scientists. In this case, institutional explanations that are based on organisational dynamics and cultural explanations, which are perceived from issues of shared values, are not distinctly separate. There is also a whole conceptual departure concerning what ‘culture’ entails, in which case culture moves from values and attitudes to becoming an ‘institution’ where symbols and routines provide a template for behaviour. From the foregoing, the sociological perspective of institutions involves the structural or functional manifestations of collective action and agreements, which have the ability to train or shape individual decision making and action.
An economics standpoint of institutionalism operates basically from the general idea of how institutions (this time economic institutions) shape individual choice. However, ‘classical liberal’ economic theorist like Adam Smith and David Ricardo, argued that a capitalist economy is largely self-regulating through the action of market forces (Kotz, 2003:15). The institutionalist perspective has been a hotly debated topic, especially so within a realm of study that has so been saturated with the dominant tradition of neoclassical ideals of free market systems. In the present case, micro economic viewpoints, which focus on individual choice and preferences as the central route to economic outcomes, were highlighted to the detriment of macro economic values.

However, the shift recently has begun towards a more integrative approach to economic studies which incorporates the institutionalisation of economic trade. While individual choice ensures that trade preferences are maximised in the light of limited resources, institutions are equally vital in that they facilitate trade, through laying guidelines which are necessary for mutually beneficial exchanges. Although this constrains individual choice, Goodin (1996:11) asserts that, within economics, this element of ‘choice’, how it is shaped by past preferences and how they link and crystallise to collective ones, could be the basis for providing perspective on the origins and evolution of institutions in economics.

Politics

The rise to prominence of behavioural theses in politics and public administration was precipitated by the questioning of the premise that organisational form translated logically to organisational behaviour or function. For instance, Herbert Simon (1957:3) argued that “in the study of organisation, the operative employee must be at the focus of attention, for the success of the structure will be judged by his place in it”. To this end, theorists of the human relations approach, such as Elton Mayo – as seen in his book The
human problems of an industrial civilization – (Mayo, 1946:117-137), and behavioural scientists such as Herbert Simon (1957), emphasised individual (rational, non-rational) behaviour as critical in the functioning of the organisation and in some way played down the role of forms and the formal character of institutions in logically determining individual action.

The argument that institutions can be used to explain narrowly individual choices and broadly social outcomes continues to grow within Political Science circles. This is because, while individualistic arguments of behavioural models provide certain psychological and rational-choice explanations to individual choices and social outcomes, these cannot exist without the interrogation of the institutional context from where these premises originate. Thus, a Political Science perspective of new institutionalism can be derived from the central focus of the discipline, which is power. In this case, new institutionalism in Political Science will focus on ‘institutionalised power resources’ (Goodin, 1996:15) as a causal factor and the accessibility of these resources to certain social actors to the disadvantage of others.

3.2 Perspectives in regionalisms

Taking a themed view of the two concepts of regionalism and globalisation would produce some relationships, especially as they both focus on the subject of international relations and international political economy studies. There have been studies that have attempted to study the interrelationships between these concepts, and how these two phenomena impact on each other.

Globalisation, for instance, dictates the character and forms of what should be done or not done at national levels. It escapes governance. This dictation of character and forms ultimately impacts on issues of regionalism, giving countries little or no choice in this case. Changes in industry dynamics, availability of information and capital flows have made even communist countries like China open to change. Ohamae (1995:80) paints the
picture of young Chinese girls who have their whole existence focused on the opportunities available to them through the global market as they from go door to door selling beauty products. Globalisation is thus integral to this thesis, in as much as its dictates have impacted on the way regions, nations and communities view development. Africa and African regionalism is certainly not exempt.

There have been intense debates on the relationship between globalisation and regionalisation or, in this case, regionalism in terms of whether globalisation and regionalisation complement or contradict each other. The reason for this is that there seems to be no empirical research or refined theory that explains this relationship (Kim & Shin, 2002:446). Kacowicz (1999:18-21) however, premises three angles to the relationship:

• convergent (where regionalism is seen as a component of globalisation),
• divergent (where regionalism is seen as a response or challenge to globalisation),
  with Hettne (2002:30), in support of this view, contending that regionalism would not exist if globalisation was a neutral and uncontroversial phenomenon; and as
• overlapping (where, rather than as reacting to each other, they are seen as parallels).

Kim and Shin (2002:464-465) suggest that globalisation and regionalisation, are processes that do not contradict, their research results showing that interregional density increased concurrently with intraregional density. Some arguments show how preferential trade agreements between countries in regional blocs sometimes in principle and practice undermined multilateral arrangements or other structures (Lahiri, 2001:xvii). Historically, it can also be argued that regional relationships may have existed, albeit ill defined, before the phenomenon of globalisation and that globalisation may indeed have been a response to the growth of regionalisation. For instance, the end of the Second World War brought to light the importance of regional economic integration and its necessity in the promotion of economic development and interregional trade. Moreover, the United Nations urged regional and sub regional integration among developing countries in many
resolutions at the time, making efforts at trade expansion and economic growth through regional economic bodies like the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), in 1947, and the Economic Commission for Africa in 1958. Whatever the case, there is no doubt that the rise of new regionalism in the 1990s was catalysed by rapid growth of globalisation around the world.

These arguments are important to this thesis in that the reform of the AU began in earnest at the dawn of the new millennium, and its study is relevant to understand the role that globalisation and growing regionalism around the world played in this reform. More so as the decision by member states to reform introduced democratic and good governance institutions in the African regionalism sphere for the first time. The next section considers the concept of regionalism, especially how it is conceptualised for the purposes of this thesis.

3.2.1 Regionalism

Regionalism has been termed “a political slogan… ideological data that the student of integration must use” (Haas, 1970:612). Later scholars disagree (Wyatt-Walter, 1997:77; Breslin & Hook, 2002:4), describing regionalism in terms of existing models of integration like the APEC, ASEAN, EU and so on. It has been described as a largely economic phenomenon and as both political and economic integration. It has been studied within the context of integration and co-operation and from supranational, institutional, as well as intergovernmental and sovereignty viewpoints.

As will be seen from the literature, regionalism has been distinctly divided into two waves. This is because the reasons for renewed regionalism in the 80s and 90s are found to be very different from those of the 60s, this owing to the greatly changed global context. Regionalism in this paper will be analysed from the ‘new regionalism’ stance. This is because the old regionalism has no relevance to this paper, as the idea of ‘new
regionalism’ posits a response to a new world order. New regionalism has been coined as a response (Hurrell, 1995:50) and an alternative (Joffe, 2001:xiv) to hegemonic power within the regional and even global community.

According to Gamble and Payne (1996b:250), there can be no logical analysis of regionalism without clarifying the difference between regionalism and regionalisation. In advancing a definition for regionalism best adapted to differentiating it from regionalisation, six different definitions from different analytical viewpoints ranging between international political economics, the north-south divide and global politics will be considered in the thesis. Gamble and Payne (1996a:2) define regionalism as a “state-led project designed to re-organise a particular regional space along defined economic and political lines”. Grugel and Hout (1999:4) submit that regionalism is state action in response to the following: societal change and demands; the external environment’s demand; and visions of relatively autonomous states within a region. Wyatt-Walter (1997:77) points out that regionalism is a conscious policy of states or sub-state regions to co-ordinate activities and arrangements in a greater region. Ravenhill (2001:6) continues this line of definition by surmising that regionalism is the construction of intergovernmental collaboration on a geographically restricted basis. Finally, Breslin and Hook (2002:4) seem to integrate all the above definitions by defining regionalism as a conscious, deliberate, purposive top-down attempt by national states to create formal mechanisms for dealing with common trans-national issues. Within this framework one sees the emergence of two broad approaches in literature to regionalism, the institutional and the intergovernmental approaches. This will be discussed in detail later.

3.2.2 Regionalisation

Lorenz (1991:3) defines regionalisation as a process. In defining this concept, the author notes that regionalisation is the process whereby interactions such as trade within a geographical area increase more rapidly than those between states within the area and those outside it.
Regionalisation is not necessarily a state project, but a historical and emergent structure of complex social interactions and institutions and rules between non-state actors (Gamble & Payne, 1996b:250). According to Grugel and Hout (1999:10), it is a de-facto process, which does not comprise state-initiated projects but is the “regional expression of the global processes of economic integration and the changing structures of production and power”. The authors also argue that regionalisation drives regionalism, by shaping, influencing and constraining the regionalist policies that states undertake. According to Breslin and Hook (2002:4) regionalisation refers to “processes which rather than resulting from predetermined plans of national or sub-national governments, primarily emerge from the actions of non-state actors”.

From the foregoing, regionalisation is a response to the interaction between history and evolution. It recognises historical structures and institutions whilst embracing change, resulting in an inevitable, uninhibited move towards social, ideological and economic restructuring. Thus, regionalisation, according to Hurrell (1995:40), is “commonly conceptualised in terms of ‘complexes’, flows, networks or mosaics”. It escapes the state. In contrast regionalism is seen as a deliberate state project, the result of interstate negotiations and bargaining in response to societal change and demands. Although there seems to be a tendency to analyse regionalisation from a purely economic standpoint (Grugel & Hout, 1999:10; Lorenz, 1991:3) regionalism studies are now queried from a political economic viewpoint. This is because, while some authors like Grugel and Hout (1999:10) argue that regionalisation by its very nature drives regionalism, others, like Hveem (1999:87), contend that regionalism may in fact drive regionalisation.

Although there is logic to these lines of discourse, it should be noted that regionalisation as a process can be uninhibited, while the decision-behaviour of state actors may trigger social and economic processes. It is not possible to investigate regionalism issues without acknowledging regionalisation principles like the role of non-state social and economic actors, like non-governmental organisations and multinationals. As noted by Breslin and Hook (2002:5), the point of departure of the new regionalism is that there is a balance in
the importance of inter-state actors and institutions and non-state actors such as civil society, and national and international nongovernmental organisations.

Finally, while acknowledging theoretical and, possibly, practical differences between regionalisation and regionalism, new regionalism has become a multidimensional phenomenon blurring the lines between the economic and political dimensions of regionalisation and regionalism respectively. In this research therefore, regionalism will be used in the broader context to express state action in recognition of historical and emergent structural changes, thus blurring the distinction between the two concepts. There is a noted interweaving of certain region-focused concepts such as regionalism, regionalisation, regional integration, regional co-operation and economic integration in the literature. The subsequent sections will attempt to unpack these terms for analytical purposes.

### 3.2.3 Regional integration versus regional co-operation

There is a noticeable interchanging of the terms regional co-operation and regional integration in regionalism studies (Asante, 1986:9). Sometimes regional integration is used to mean economic integration, regional co-operation and even regionalisation and regionalism. However, an analytical investigation of all these terms reveals differences, especially in relation to regionalism. Although some writers may choose to interchange the terms for the purposes of analyses, it will be important to conceptualise these terms within a frame of reference for this thesis.

Bourenane (1997:50) submits that “the notion of integration is often used contiguously with that of co-operation and the latter is often considered to be the instrument of the former”. This view is particularly reflected in Ernst Haas’ analyses of European integration (Haas, 1970:610-611) where, in practice, regional co-operation was concerned with the ‘steps along the way’ taken to get to regional integration and, in theory, is seen
as a vague term for interstate activities – activities which are sources of information for the study of regional integration.

Bourenane (1997:50) uses the term ‘collaboration’ in positing a definition tending towards more intergovernmental thought. By this, the author contends that regional co-operation does not always lead to regional integration and is characterised by agreements between two or more countries and negotiations which are contractually time bound and reversible. Hurrell (1995:42), prefers to define regional co-operation in terms of regimes. The term regime was first coined by John Gerard Ruggie as “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organisational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states” (Ruggie, 1975:570). Krasner (1983:2) defines regime as a set of “principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations”. From this analytical viewpoint, co-operation connotes loosely structured and intergovernmental arrangements.

3.2.4 Regional integration versus economic integration

Regional integration is sometimes confused with economic integration in literature. In international political economy studies, the term has become more of fashionable speak. Asante (1986:7) contends that no single definition has gained widespread acceptance, as social integration and other forms of international co-operation sometimes are subsumed in this concept of economic integration. Hurrell (1995:43), for instance, goes ahead to describe regional integration as regional economic integration, arguing that “regional integration involves specific policy decision by governments designed to reduce or remove barriers to mutual exchange of goods, services, capital…” Bourenane (1997:51) cautions against this misconception, arguing that geographical proximity is not a precondition for economic integration, while spatial proximity cannot be detached from the notion of regional integration.
While geographical proximity is put forward by many scholars as a prerequisite for economic integration (Ethier, 2001:3), others dispute this geographical criterion (Ravenhill, 2001:231), especially considering regional structures like the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) made up of geographically distant countries like Japan and Australia. This is perhaps where Bourenane’s (1997:51) argument fits in, as his notion of economic integration deals with the pursuit of economic advantage through economic activities between sectors and sub sectors and thus may escape geographical proximity. This notion of geographical distinction in differentiating the two terms (regional integration and economic integration), is still largely subject to debate.

Considering this, the notion of economic integration will be taken as a part of the whole, whereas regional integration is seen as the study of why and how “states cease to be wholly sovereign, why and how they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves” (Haas, 1970:610). Although this view of Haas’s observes the European approach to regional integration, Bourenane (1997:51) also recognises similar integrative characteristics which define regional integration, like community building, negotiation, irreversibility and a pre-established politico-institutional framework based on a strategic vision of their common future.

From the foregoing, regional integration, regional co-operation and economic integration are seen as different but equally important analytical components of regionalism. This is because they for all intents and purposes are largely state driven. Of particular significance is the concept of economic integration, which, in this study, intersects with the concept of regional integration in as much as conscious, irreversible negotiations go with trade liberalisation and the removing of trade barriers.

For the purposes of this study, regional co-operation will be seen as a process to regional integration, having its end as a regional phenomenon which utilises intergovernmental agreements rather than supranational arrangements in achieving regionalism objectives. Regional integration will be conceptualised as a process which involves spatially
compromised states constructing supranational linkages within an institutional framework to achieve common economic, social and/or political goals. In this light, the two concepts thus subscribe to different theoretical foundations and operational interpretations, which will be explored in this study.

3.2.5 The geography of regionalism

In an attempt to produce a universal theory for regionalism, theoretical discourse has oscillated from using geographical proximity as a basis for theory building, to disregarding the idea of restricted geography as a component of regionalism. However, it must be noted that variations in the definition of regions and regionalisms are predicated upon factors such as economic, social, historical, political, ideological and, sometimes, geographical standpoints. Hurrell (1995:38) makes the point that indicators of ‘regionness’ vary according to the particular regional problem or question under investigation. This should not take away from the geographical proximity factor, which, to a large extent, distinguishes regionalism from other forms of non-global arrangements.

Some authors (Grugel & Hout, 1999:10; Gamble & Payne, 1996a:2) identify geographical restriction as a part of their definition for regionalism. However, Ohamae (1995:6) argues that definition of region states is not the “location of their political borders but the fact that they are the right size and scale to be the true, natural business units in today’s global economy”. Hennte and Soderbaum (Breslin et al., 2002:33-46), in their New Regionalism Theory (NRT), propound that the notion of geographical proximity should be underplayed or even rejected and social processes accepted as basis for analysing and defining regionalism. It is a bold attempt at trying to solve the theoretical lapses and ambiguities associated with regionalism. Ohamae, Hennte and Soderbaum seem to incorporate all sub-global multilateral arrangements into the regionalism discussion.
To make a case for geographical proximity as a criterion for regionalism, Ethier’s (2001:14) theoretical explanations as to why regional integration will most likely feature geographical neighbours is relevant. This especially, if explored, is based on the recent African Union search for global significance and integration through regional collaboration and partnerships (NEPAD, 2002:7). This is because Ethier’s theories (2001:14), although also clearly positioned in a positive rather than normative light, are relevant not merely as constituent themes of the new regionalism (which seem to be relevant and significant today in terms of studies on regionalism), but for the factor of geographical proximity which is an underlying theme of this thesis.

3.3 Theories of regional integration

In discussing the theories of regional integration, it will be important to first acknowledge that regional integration can be initiated in different ways – through intergovernmental agreements between nations or through policy networks as seen in Asian integration efforts and through institutions set up for the purpose of integration. Intergovernmental and policy networks as processes are loosely based and do not impose character or a certain collective behaviour on national governments. This is different in the case where integration processes are facilitated by institutions given certain levels of power by national governments. These institutions tend to develop their supranational identity and thus become the base for initiating integration processes. However, this view is strongly contested by intergovernmentalists who see regional institutions as places where different governments assign “responsibilities for monitoring and implementing inter-governmental agreements…as a means of locking one another into commitments” (Puchala, 1999:319).

The study of the nature of European integration has been one that has engendered controversy. Different schools of thought see the EU from different teleological angles. However, the debate on whether intergovernmental agreements or institutional arrangement should be credited for Europe’s broadening and deepening integration is
seen as important in examining the role that new institutions of African regionalism like the PAP possibly can play in the African Union. It must be noted that debates supporting neo-functionalism evoke the concepts of unintended consequences and spillover, which undoubtedly position institutions at the helm of integration, irrespective of the initial intentions of their designers. The theoretical context of regional integration will be examined with particular attention to grand and middle-range theories of integration that have engendered scholarly inquiry over the years.

### 3.3.1 Grand theories of Integration

The institutions of the European Union, as an example, have emerged through negotiated compromises (Sitter, 2005:53), driven by the need to create international alliances to contain several ‘threats’ that emerged from post-war Europe and the United States. The greatest of these threats, according to Nugent (1999:9), were political and economic. Grand theories of regional integration emerged in an attempt to explain European efforts at containing these ‘threats’. The theories attempt to explain the overall system of integration and can be seen from two broad perspectives: the intergovernmentalist perspective and neo-functionalism.

Before investigating these theories, it must be noted that there has been scepticism about the neo-functionalist explanation of European integration over the years; even Ernst Haas, its architect, at a time declared it outdated (Haas, 1975:2001). Its relevance to this thesis, however, is based on the premise that functional processes drive integration, which augurs well as a theoretical starting point in interrogating the function of integrative institutions. It is significant in the sense that the thesis sees this theory as the backbone of many new approaches to integration studies, metamorphosing into new theoretical ideas (historical institutionalism, constructivism): one principle, different name. Some authors remain cognisant of the contribution of neo-functionalist thought (Schmitter, 1969:2002; Sandholtz & Stonesweet, 1998; McGowan, 2007). The next section discusses the intergovernmental approach to regionalism. Its premise will be
discussed later in the thesis to weigh up whether parallels can be drawn in terms of African regionalism.

**Intergovernmentalism**

The debate about the best theory to explain European Union (EU) integration has been going on for decades. Although sometimes acerbic, this debate is a crucial one for comparative regionalism studies. This is because regionalism scholarship was given impetus largely due to the nature of European integration. There have been wide-ranging debates on the institutional driving force behind the integration of the EU. For intergovernmental proponents, this driving force is observed in the role of government influence through the Council of Ministers, whereas neo-functionalists point to the role of the elite through the Commission.

Intergovernmentalists (Moravcsik, 1993; Puchala, 1999; Pollack, 1997; Hix, 2002), regard regional integration movements as an outcome of nation state interests (in most cases economic), which, in turn, are fuelled by national political pressures. In this case, no European polity has emerged or is emerging for intergovernmentalists; there is an “ongoing struggle of give and take between member states” (Eliassen & Arnesen, 2001:116). Early integration efforts were loosely based “nationalist” (Sitter, 2005:53) strategies which focused on co-operation with the sole aim of solving political problems. It was political pressure that informed the pooling of defence resources, through US and Canadian efforts to form NATO along with ten other European states (Nugent, 1999; Archer, 2000). This was because Europe had been the centre of two world wars in the 20th century, with Germany as the precipitator of the war (Goodman, 1996:35). The threat of communism, with the division of Europe into the East and West, made Russia a threat (Messenger, 2006:41). In an effort to prevent and counter wars through a self-defence treaty, the five countries of Western Europe, led by France and the UK, joined together with the USA and Canada to form the NAT (North Atlantic Treaty), later NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) in 1949.
Intergovernmentalist Prescripts

Rather than abnegate sovereignty, intergovernmentalists see nations as “delegating” sovereignty for effectiveness and efficiency (Puchala, 1999:313). For intergovernmentalists, the rules and institutions that support regional integration are indicative of national bargaining powers. For the proponents of intergovernmentalism, the landscape of regional integration becomes the playground for policy bargaining, gaming and differing long-term interests.

Pierson (1996:128) identifies three main features of intergovernmentalist arguments. First is a preoccupation with sovereignty, then a depiction of institutions as instruments and third, a focus on grand bargains. This will be the basis for the main issues to be discussed. These issues are the preservation of sovereignty, institutions as regimes of regional agreements and the importance of macro level bargaining.

Preservation of Sovereignty

The gradual progression towards integration that started from the 1950s had been resisted at different levels by different countries for different reasons. To begin with, France, even as one of the founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), took particular exception to the supranational decision-making powers of the community, which undermined national sovereignty (Nugent, 1999). Moreover, in the teething days of the European Union in the 1950s, the United Kingdom did not see any value in being part of a system based on the visions of integration of the EEC at the time (Messenger, 2006:39; Goodman, 1996:30). Economically, joining the ECSC was out of the question at the time as the UK’s steel capacity was larger than that of the countries put together. Politically, the UK was the number one world power and allied to the USA. It therefore did not see any reason for giving up this sovereignty to weaker states. Moreover, the idea of being part of the
European Defence Community was also not appealing, due to the United Kingdom’s already stretched defence commitments around the World.

Nevertheless, things began to change in the late 50s and 60s when many British colonies began to gain independence and the political might of Britain began to give way to that of the United States of America (Goodman, 1996:30). Moreover, the cold war seemed to strengthen the power enigma that was the USSR and crucial World issues were now debated by the US and the USSR. Economically, the EEC was growing successfully and Britain sought to identify economically with the Community. Despite its membership, the issue of sovereignty still weighs heavily with Britain, as it tends to resist moves towards more integrationist policies within the community and proposes more market-related intergovernmental co-operation.

However a study of papers on the nature of European integration (Puchala, 1999; Tsebelis & Garret, 2001; Tsebelis, 2000; Taylor, 1982; Bulmer, 1998; Pierson, 1996) shows that the dominant approach to integration varied at certain times in the history of European integration. For instance in the 1970s the integration policy arena was dominated by increasing intergovernmentalism (Taylor, 1982:742) with the status of European institutions like the Commission declining. During this time, the integration of Europe was rocked on account of community members’ lack of commitment to the integration process and the threat of national interests leading to the disregard of European Community decisions.

**Institutions as regimes**

Although European integration was largely negotiated in intergovernmental forums like the Council, the play of national interest and short- and long-term attitudes about issues such as sovereignty resulted in the empowering of European institutions in later years. The 1970 and 1976 treaties amending the budgetary and financial provisions of the treaties was particularly significant for the European Parliament, which was weak in
terms of policy decision making (Jacobs et al., 1990). These treaties allocated certain powers to the Parliament.

The significant point of departure here is that, while neo-functionalists see this gradual empowerment of institutions as pointing to loss of national sovereignty, intergovernmentalists view it as a rational and conscious choice of member states through negotiations to solve a collective choice problem (Pierson, 1996:129). Significantly, this ties in with institutional functionalism which identifies institution outcomes as the conscious, rational, long-term intentions of their designers. For instance, the Single European ACT (SEA) of 1986 introduced provisions that relate to the Community’s decision-making system (Nugent, 1999; Goodman, 1996). Noteworthy was the extension of the legislative powers of the European Parliament and the co-operation procedure in decision making. The aim of the co-operation procedure was to improve efficiency in decision making in the Council of Ministers and to strengthen the legislative powers of the European Parliament (Jacobs et al., 1990:167; Tsebelis, 1994). The SEA co-operation procedure was later abolished with the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties of 1992 and 1997 respectively, which deepened the institutional base of the EU by giving the European Parliament the veto in some legislative proposals and introducing the co-decision procedure (Goodman, 1996:95). It is important to observe that there still is disagreement about whether the deepening of the institutional base of EU structures came about as a result of intergovernmental bargaining, which will be termed macro-level bargaining, or through institutional pressure coming from integration elite.

**Grand bargaining**

Treaties are the fundamental focus of argument of intergovernmentalists. This is because treaties spell out the design and features of institutions and the policy-making procedures within the polity (Moravesik, 1993, 1995). Treaties are negotiated at the intergovernmental level. In the case of the EU, government influence is through the European Council, the equivalent of the Assembly of the Heads of State of the African
Union (Ludlow, 2006:225). It is important to note that, although the EU as a regional arrangement has been time tested, the mild influence and control of the European Parliament over the European Council in terms of treaties reveals a strong intergovernmental component in Europe’s regionalism, as argued by some authors like Moravcsik (1993) and Ludlow (2006:227). The European Council works outside the framework of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) and takes decisions concerning the contents of treaties.

Furthermore, according to Nugent (1999:218), council members individually and as a collective have been set up to be answerable to no one but individual national Parliaments. The strong pull of intergovernmental factors when it comes to decision making on issues of Foreign and Security policies, Police and Judicial co-operation and the European Monetary Union has also largely reduced the access of certain institutions like the European Parliament to the Council in terms of supervision.

Throughout the history of the EU, different treaties have contributed to the strengthening of decision making within EU institutions, which have, in turn, contributed to the deepening of Europe’s integration. For instance, the Single European Act (1986) introduced the Qualified Majority Vote, which reduced the pressure on consensus building (Goodman, 1996:85). The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 created a new entity, the European Union, establishing three pillars as the basis of the European Union (Goodman, 1996:7). These pillars consist of the communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and co-operation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs. This treaty further made far-reaching institutional changes in terms of the decision-making processes within the EU by extending the legislative powers of the European Parliament through introducing the co-decision procedure between the EP and the European Council. It seems that member state interests eventually spur bargaining, which produces grand treaties that create and empower regional institutions.
Limitations

Despite the arguments for seeing regional integration as an intergovernmental effort, there are limitations to this viewpoint as an explanation for the integration process in terms of theory and in the area of practice. Some of these limitations have led several scholars of regional integration to explore other arguments to explain deepening integration as evidenced in the European experience. Some of these limitations are touched on below.

Narrow perception of member interests/preferences

Intergovernmentalists tend to view interests in the long term and thus perceive institutions as rational choice outcomes. However, this view does not take into consideration the potential for unintended consequences (Smith, 2004, Pierson, 1996) and the “assumptions on complete information” (Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000:387) which, according to the authors, has a very high threshold in treaty bargaining. The extent of rational thinking can go only as far as the ability of decision makers to systematically and absolutely process all issues relating to the decision. This is impossible because complexity and unpredictability in social and political behaviour makes it impossible for actors to anticipate all consequences. As a result, institutions have the ability to develop a life of their own, subsuming a designers’ intentions for them and carving a trajectory of growth different from that initially intended. According to integration scholars, the expansion of autonomy and authority of an integration entity is the result of what Haas terms “accommodation” (Haas, 1961:367). This is some sort of resolution of differences or conflict pursuant to a specific shared goal, a compromise to consider an alternative, through an institutionalised mediator, usually a board of experts or spokespersons for interest groups, parliaments and political parties (Haas, 1961:368). In his treatise, “The path to European integration”, Pierson (1996) shows how integration administrators or technocrats can sometimes influence integration even with institutional constraints placed on them by political office bearers or members. This can be achieved when member states are unable to maintain full control over the development of policies as decision
making expands (Pierson, 1996:137). This issue overload is due to time constraints and scarcity of information at grand bargaining levels. Accordingly, the need emerges to delegate decisions to experts.

**Tends to view integration in moments**

It is significant that intergovernmentalist theories would have sufficed as an explanation for integration at different moments in the growth of the EU. Nonetheless, Pierson (1996:126) cautions that a snapshot of social processes may augur well for intergovernmentalists where inter-state bargaining looms large at any given time, whereas this large image is mitigated by interventions of non-state actors when seen from a historical process point of view. Historical path dependence will necessitate the development of unintended consequences, which may be usurped by non-state actors. Taylor (1982:759) exemplifies this snapshot argument in discussing the role of a Commission diminishing in the seventies with regard to mediating and persuading governments to develop spillover solutions to those pressing issues which were guided by national self-interests.

**Does not posit explanation for deepening integration**

Intergovernmental theorists are ambiguous in terms of teleological arguments about integration, which is to say that intergovernmentalists have not offered much in terms of the prediction or explanation of the course of European integration (Pollack, 2001:222; Taylor, 1982:743; Pierson, 1996:124). Intergovernmentalists do not consider integration as an evolution into a new polity in terms of its point. Rather this school of thought is content to view the EU as a site for diplomatic exchanges, where member states are concerned with power, survival and domestic concerns.

In Africa, the intergovernmental bargaining space is even more complicated, as state interests are only matched with power struggles within, between and beyond African states. These competing interests and power struggles are unravelling in terms of the
regional agenda of African states. This is especially evident in regionalism developments in Africa and beyond since the turn of the century. Before looking deeply into the theoretical landscape of regional processes, it is relevant to briefly capture the nature of intergovernmental bargaining in a broad investigation of models of international bargaining relations.

The environment of intergovernmental bargaining

The choice to explore these models of international relations and political economy is based on the fact that, although there are numerous benefits to the regionalism phenomenon in Africa, especially, the issues of who leads and who follows, who benefits in the bargaining process and who doesn’t has always been at the centre of the global debate on regionalism and globalism. In the intergovernmental setting, power becomes important because, according to Smith (2004:102), “the largest and most powerful states often have the most impact”. It is suggested that theories like regime theory and hegemony stability theory will attempt to explore these questions in the intergovernmental bargaining space of African regionalism.

Multilateralism

Gill (1997:7) defines multilateralism as a political means that involves partly international organisations through which processes of structural change are articulated and projected, on the one hand, and potentially channelled and institutionalised on the other. Ruggie (1992:571) defines multilateralism as “an institutionalised form, which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalised’ principles of conduct”. It is the institutionalisation of global governance. Gill (1997:7) notes, however, that multilateralism can be further understood as a process or means of promoting global co-operation, and as a “site of political and ideological struggle for the forces of an emerging global political and civil society”.

Despite the many tilts in definitions, a critical reflection on Gill’s perspective on multilateralism evokes probable questions with institutional consequences for Africa. Gill’s definition firstly connotes a strong intergovernmental component. Secondly, it also introduces a collective choice dilemma and, possibly, its implications for an “institutionalised form”. Additionally, these questions have to do with the key constituents and entities of the African regional political economy, in this case the political and the technocratic, relationships between them, and if or how these relationships change over time. African regional institutions are the arena for multilateral relations and negotiations. The interconnectedness between change and multilateralism should not be swept under the carpet, especially with the divergent pull between globalisation and regionalism. It therefore begs the question of what the role of international organisations is in mediating these adverse effects.

**Regimes**

The regime theory has so far provided the most widely accepted answer to the challenges of international co-operation. It was first coined by John Gerard Ruggie as “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organisational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states” (Ruggie, 1975: 570). From Ruggie’s definition, regimes provide a useful beginning to the study of international organisations because regimes can be conceived as factors around the environment of international organisations, which can improve, limit or even stop state action. Krasner (1983:2) defines regime as a set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedure around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.

According to William (1994:27), a regime analysis helps one to see that conformity in international relations need not arise solely though coercion or fear of sanction, it may arise through agreement with or attachment to an internationally agreed set of values. Scholastic inquiry into how these regimes develop is linked to the theory of hegemony.
It may provide one explanation for the creation, maintenance, and eventual dissolution of regimes.

**Hegemonic stability**

Assumptions and premises that anchor this theory is that the “presence of a single dominant actor in the international system leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all states” (William, 1994:30). It also is assumed that the absence of a hegemony will lead to disorder in the global system, bringing harmful consequences for nation states (Lipson, 1982:417). This is the domain for political realists (intergovernmentalists) who hold the view that power in international relations is equivalent to political and military power vested in one or more hegemonic states. These states are seen as powers that alone can provide leadership to bring international economic order through providing a regime.

The best examples of hegemonies that come to mind are Britain and the United States. These theories developed from the British experience in the nineteenth century, from 1815 to 1870 (Gamble, 1992:21) which was largely made possible by British colonial networks. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century, rivalry between Britain and other European powers (especially the two World Wars) led to the rapid rise of the United States. After 1945, the United States of America emerged as the “undisputed hegemonic power of the world” (Gamble, 1992:22). This made it possible for the United States to impose a liberal trading order.

Be that as it may, the relationship between the periods of hegemony and world system periods of expansion and stability have made it imperative that issues of hegemonic power are not swept under the carpet in international relations. However, political and economic analysts have pointed to the emergence of Japan and other Asian states as leading world economies (Gamble, 1992:30), and the mounting momentum behind the growing integration of Europe as factors that would heavily influence the forms that globalisation and regionalisation will take in future.
Finally, the central argument for this section on grand theories of integration is that the explanation of European regionalism is not cast in stone. This suggests that intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist views of integration should be seen as the totality of theorising European regionalism and not as a sole explanation for regionalism. To this end Haas (1961:368), in theorising European integration, surmises that integration “combines intergovernmental negotiation with the participation independent experts… a combination of interest and institutions…”. Therefore the European Union in its very structure is an amalgam of the intergovernmental (the Council), the neo-functional or elitist (The Commission) and the institutional or supranational (The Parliament and European Court of Justice).

**Functionalism and neo-functionalism: an evolution of integration theories**

Before discussing neo-functionalism, it is important, for theoretical purposes, to distinguish between the two terms functionalism and neo-functionalism. The very character of functionalism in integration draws from analytical functionalism in sociology as it deals with the achievement of regional cohesion through the creation of institutions which are largely unobtrusive and incremental in decision making. In the early years of integration it was predicted that European integration would be a gradual spill-over process from non-political aspects of social life, like common markets, which would eventually result in the deepening of political aspects of integration (Bock, 1968:537; Claude, 1961:373). Connectedly, early functionalists like Radcliffe-Brown theorised that the emergence of any social institution stems from the “necessary conditions of existence” of that social group (Turner & Maryanski, 1979:41). Thus, the concept of spillover in regional integration means that, as commitments to regional transactions are intensified, tasks are expanded and thus institutions emerge because they serve a certain function. From this view, sociological functionalist and integrative functionalists arguments meet in that theoretical space where the existence of institutions can be explained by the need they fulfil in forging social integration. Nevertheless, the
conceptualisation of functionalism may differ in regionalism studies, for analytical purposes.

Functionalism in regional integration tries to explain process and outcome. It is characterised by its relation to all other matters (social, technology, economic and even human rights) that are non-controversial (Bock, 1968:537) and non-political (Claude, 1961:373). This involves nations integrating systems of production and administration (Brenner, 1969:5). In this case, sovereignty concerns can be eroded by internationalising, firstly, tasks which do not present an immediate threat to national sovereignty. A conceptual framework of integration as espoused by Kyambalesa and Houngnikpo (2006:1) shows what can be termed a functionalism continuum, which can be expressed as ranging from ‘shallow integration’ (preferential trade agreements, free trade area, customs union and common market) to ‘deep integration’ (economic union, monetary union, political union).

For instance, in the early stages of European integration, economic more than political interdependence was the driving force behind the integration of Western Europe. For instance, the promotion of free trade became an objective after the Second World War and there was an international drive towards economic co-operation between countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were established to provide short-term and long-term loans, on top of alleviating currency instability and undertaking major investments respectively (Messenger, 2006:57). The General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was also mooted when 23 countries came together to lower international trade barriers. In this way, economic considerations and negotiations resulted in the design and establishment of regional institutions.

On the 25th of July 1952, the Treaty of Paris established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and was signed by six states: Germany, France, Italy, the Benelux states Belgium and Luxemburg, and The Netherlands (Martin, 2006:127). The treaty spelt out principles of merging common interests, commonality of markets and the consideration of the interests of the community versus the independent demands of
member states, which can be argued is one of the most controversial aspects of regional integration (Nugent, 1999:9-10). Thus, it will suffice to argue that economic considerations of integration can be explained through functionalist approaches to integration, which have the long-term effect of supranationality, thus posing a threat to national sovereignty.

Other characteristics of functionalism as espoused by Caporaso (1972:27-28) and evidenced in certain aspects of European integration are as follows:

1. Functionalism employs a problem-solving rather than political approach to decision making through an incremental decision-making style.
2. There is a tendency for proponents of functionalism to view federalism or political integration as its end goal. Early integrationists like Jean Monnet (Haas, 1970:625; Roy, 2005:78-80) were also considered functionalists due to their view of a patient and slow approach to federalism through the initiation of common policies and a reliance on institutional expansion of tasks and client base.
3. This end goal of federalism is a slow unobtrusive process which avoids political ideology.
4. Experts and technocrats are the central actors and authority in functionalist integration discourse.
5. Functionalism eventually achieves a ‘lock-in’ effect (Caporaso, 1972:28) in which state disentanglement from the integration process becomes unattractive and even possibly detrimental, in which case nations may find a greater need to delegate the power of decision making to the supranational bodies.

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that functionalism has the building of the nation state through regional agreements as its short- and medium term goals, with the long-term goal of political integration. Sitter (2005:54) argues that functionalism differs from neo-functionalism in the sense that, while functionalism holds no immediate threat to nation states, neo-functionalism has certain pre-requisites in trying to resolve conflict, which
pose a direct threat to state autonomy. In the following section, these neo-functionalist prerequisites and prescriptions will be discussed.

**Neo-functionalism**

Neo-functionalism received much criticism in its lifetime, suffered death at the hands of its creator (Haas, 1975) and was resurrected (Schmitter, 2002:1) into what this thesis views as new appellations and modified forms such as institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996) and constructivism (Smith, 2004). It is because of its seeming ‘non-death’ as evidenced from the work of new and old scholars like Philippe Schmitter (1969:2002), McGowan (2007) and Sandholtz and Stonesweet (1998), as well as its innovative insight into the possibilities of an emerging super-entity endpoint in regional integration, that it evokes study interest.

Neo-functionalism arguments began to take root in the mid 1950s with scholars assessing and bringing in new discourse to old functionalist thinking. Neo-functionalism is a grand theory of integration which developed through the study of the overall nature of European integration. It is important to this thesis because, in terms of theories of regional integration, the purpose of neo-functionalism is to use observable trends in the relationship between national character and emerging regional communities to predict the possible trajectory of regional transformation (Haas, 1970:628; Schmitter, 1969:164). As this study is premised on virgin territory, neo-functionalism will particularly serve for the purpose of studying the nascent and emerging African regional structure. The objective of this thesis is to observe and possibly understand the potential that the Pan African Parliament possesses in driving regionalism in Africa. It is suggested that examining the trajectory of growth of the African Union and the Pan African Parliament so far and contrasting this growth pattern with the neo-functionalist viewpoint will possibly reveal some useful insights as to the future of the Pan African Parliament.
Three hypotheses of neo-functionalism

Pursuant of the key elements of Haas’ (1958:1961) and his own and Haas’ (Haas & Schmitter, 1964) regional integration scholarship, Schmitter (1969) in 1969 set out three hypotheses of neo-functionalism. These three concepts, which are pertinent to the discussion, are the concepts of spillover, externalisation and politicisation. Spillover as a concept has qualities which are relevant in pursuing research of this nature which is ultimately explorative, with predictive objectives. The two hypotheses of externalisation and politicisation have umbilical relations to the spillover hypothesis, in that they are conditions that may not occur without the spillover process.

Spillover

Neo-functionalism cannot be discussed without an understanding of the concept of spillover. Spillover is a “Haasian” coinage first made reference to by Ernst Haas, who can be viewed as the luminary of the neo-functionalist school. Here are two definitions of spillover as proposed by two integration scholars: Ernst Haas (1961:368) theorises spillover as:

“policies made pursuant to an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded, as reflected in the compromises among the states interested in the task”.

Schmitter (1969:162) refers to spillover as:

“…the process whereby members of an integration scheme, agreed on some collective goals for a variety of motives but unequally satisfied with their attainment of these goals, attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction either by resorting to collaboration in another, related sector…or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector…or both”.

These two definitions have been used because two conditions which are important for spillover to occur, namely issue density and unintended consequences, can be isolated from them. They are discussed subsequently.

**Issue density:** According to the Haas (1961:368) definition, spillover occurs when there is an expansion in tasks and powers in decision making. It can result from an excessive demand from state and non-state actors, in what Pierson (1996:137) refers to as issue density. This highlights the role that pluralism plays in Haas’s theory (McGowan, 2007:6). At the European Union level, decision making becomes more complex and demanding, thus there may be likelihood of cracks in member state control in decision making due to time constraints, scarcity of information or knowledge about issues. This will necessitate that member states delegate decision making to experts or institutions. It is possible that this will create unanticipated consequences. Accordingly, issue density may result in unintended consequences and the likelihood of member states control being compromised may grow, resulting in spillover.

**Unintended Consequences:** In terms of the definition by Schmitter (1969:162), the integration process consists largely of an upgrading of common interests (Haas, 1961:368). Spillover in this sense is the tendency for an integration transaction to have important consequences outside the intended realm. These consequences could generate dissatisfaction and even conflict hinging on each member’s interests. Such unintended consequences have a tendency to empower regional actors (experts) who, in turn, generate demands and pressure for new policy extensions and interventions. This implies that a re-definition of conflict is achieved at a higher level, in which case solutions rely on the services of an “institutionalised mediator” (Haas, 1961:368). In this way, conflict is resolved by expanding the scope or level of central institutions (Schmitter, 1969:164). From the foregoing, one can isolate certain dynamics which could contribute to the natural expansion of spillover:

1. A defined policy area or transaction (scope)
2. Collective agreement from members (level)
3. Play of interests/disagreements/conflict
4. Issue density
5. Unintended consequences
6. Role of regional political elite

Firstly, there has to be a defined policy area or transaction. The wider the scope of the policy area in terms of number and importance of policy actors involved, the greater the likelihood of expansion of tasks (Schmitter, 1969:163). There has to be mutual commitment to collective agreement by members. The higher the level of commitment by members in terms of renegotiations and review of policy areas, the greater the likelihood of assigning control of a policy area to a supranational body (Schmitter, 1969:163). This has to be matched with an underlying inter-reliant current of functional tasks and issue areas (Schmitter, 1969:163) which had been idle or ignored during the original collective agreement by members. This current could be brought to the surface through the play of interests from governmental and non-governmental agencies, resulting in issue density and unintended consequences. Then there is the tendency for the regional political elite (administrators of regional institutions) to take advantage of these crises or disagreements to change or expand tasks at the centre, resulting in growing supranationality of institutions.

It follows, then, that spillover as a thesis of neo-functionalism attempts to explain theoretically the cross sectoral transition of integration from unobtrusive decision making (economic/humanitarian issues) to the more controversial (political issues). Here, conflict can result in the conscious ingenious interventions of regional administrative and political elites to make power more centralised in institutions possessing “jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1961:367). This cross-sectoral transition of integration is further elucidated and rationalised in two complementary hypotheses, externalisation and politicisation, as espoused by Schmitter (1969:163). They are discussed below.
Externalisation

Externalisation occurs when a collective agreement has been reached by members on an external position in terms of a transaction (Schmitter, 1969:165). This convergence is sometimes motivated by the wish of these nations to increase the collective bargaining power of the region in relation to other regional blocs or globally. Due to the discriminatory nature of these transactions, there is a likelihood of response from outsiders who are adversely affected. Moreover, whether or not there is a satisfactory attainment of transactional goals, these reactions from outsiders treat the regional experiment as a viable project by:

1. Threatening action against the regional formation as a whole
2. Taking steps to join the regional formation.

As a result of these reactions, regional actors tend to close ranks by adopting a common foreign policy as a defence against external challenge. Nevertheless, in this case, according to Schmitter (1969:165), two types of hypothesis can be entertained in terms of externalisation, a null hypothesis where there is indifference from members to the formation of these new policies and a negative hypothesis where countries in the regional formation indulge in a scramble for advantage. This is what Taylor (1982:759) refers to as a “larger notion of their own self interest”. In effect, externalisation induces movement toward deeper integration and, by implication, a cross-sectoral transition from economic issues to political issues when regional agreements externalise themselves.

Politicisation

This hypothesis explores the cumulative end of the spillover process. It engages the issue of the terminal position of integration, which is a core area of debate in neo-functionalist thought. Schmitter (1969:166) refers to politicisation as “a process whereby the controversiality of joint decision making goes up”. At this juncture it will be relevant to remember the earlier discussions on functionalism and the principal theses of integration
as a gradual progression from unobtrusive to more controversial decision making. In considering this, politicisation in terms of a neo-functional thesis occurs when controversiality, due to the attainment, over-performance or irrelevance of a particular transaction translates into a collective agreement to shift allegiance to a new regional centre. The rise in the controversiality of decision making within a regional entity (politicisation) will most likely result in an upward shift or what Haas (1961:368) refers to as upgrading of common interests in decision making to supranational institutions, through the expansion of the scope and/or level of these institutions. For this reason, integration deepens.

**Limitations of the neo-functionalist discourse**

It must be said from the outset that neo-functionalism theoretically has several limitations. Two limitations which are relevant to this discussion are proposed by Ernst Haas (1970:628).

**Source of theoretical construct**

The first limitation has to do with the Eurocentric origin of the neo-functional approach, in that it emerged from the “pluralistic-industrial democratic polity” (Haas & Schmitter, 1964; Hansen, 1969). This has resulted in predictions which only unearth difficulties and failures in the developing world regionalism efforts, without proposing the nature of African integration. As such, for Africa in particular, a theoretical basis for African regionalism is almost non-existent. The result of using variables from a source extraneous to the African context and history can only predict difficulties. This is compounded by the teleological difficulties in the much developed theoretical landscape of EU integration. It can only mean that theory development in terms of the nature and the terminal point of African regionalism has a long way to go.
Although one of the objectives of this study, especially this theoretical framework, is to identify gaps in literature in terms of African regionalism, this aim does not of itself entail the development of theory. Consequently, this study will go ahead and locate parallels between available regional integration literature and the African experience, which may help in producing findings and logical conclusions in terms of the research problem.

**Elements of successful prediction**

Despite the laudable progress in terms of theory building in neo-functionalism, the attendant problem of what constitutes the terminal condition of the regionalism effort remains. There seems to be two phases of neo-functionalist studies: those focused on process, and those focused on outcome. However, it seems that neo-functionalism in recent times has taken to explaining the European Union as an outcome. For instance, the EU has been described as multilevel governance with three tiers, supranational, national and sub-national, with particular focus on the role of sub-national interest groups as concierges between national and European policy areas (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Others see the EU inclined towards a state-like structure subject to the same expectations of accountability and representativeness accorded to individual countries (Wallace & Wallace, 1996). Then there is the supranational view of the EU according to which the nation state is seen as having lost control of the policy process to the institutions at the centre (Pierson, 1996).

Nonetheless, ascribing an outcome to the EU phenomenon is rather debatable as the European Union is a community in constant reform. Haas (1970:628) more than three decades ago identified this terminal condition of integration as a challenge in neo-functionalist thought; it seems to still be a challenge today. The reason is not altogether different from that espoused by Haas (1970:628), which is that neo-functionalists do not agree on a dependent variable and thus cannot pinpoint a time when successful integration has occurred.
There is no doubt that integration in Europe has been deepening and that, so far, no other regional formation has achieved functioning supranationality outside the processes contained in the neo-functional theory. In consideration of this, it will be logical to study African integration, which seems to be producing institutions that have supranational potential, with due consideration to neo-functionalist arguments.

To round up this discussion, one must not forget the one salient point in neo-functionalist theory, which is the non-intrusiveness of decision making and the gradual process of decision making from the unobtrusive to the more controversial or political. The crucial issue is that it seems that the emergence of institutions of integration in Africa have not followed an incremental process but rather were and still are driven directly by political objectives. In fact, regional integration scholars (Hansen, 1969; Nye, 1965), called for a review of neo-functionalism as applied to developing nations (Africa in particular) due to the “over-politicisation” accruing from the distribution of the benefits of integration. The table below represents some theoretical points in intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist reasoning as drawn from the discussions so far. It represents the epistemic value attached to each theory, the limitations in epistemology, as well as the recognised areas of convergence and divergence in terms of their theoretical contents.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Theory</strong></th>
<th><strong>Features</strong></th>
<th><strong>Limitations</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmentalism</td>
<td>Pre-occupation with sovereignty</td>
<td>Snapshots of social processes</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Sees institutions as instrumental outcomes</td>
<td>Gaps in member state control</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Grand bargaining</td>
<td>Has not explained or predicted the course of Europe’s deepening integration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sees institutions as dependent variables</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neo functionalism</td>
<td>Unobtrusive, incremental decision making</td>
<td>Source of theoretical construct</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>spillover(unintended consequences/collective action dilemma)</td>
<td>Is vague on the characteristics of successful prediction</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tends towards predictions: the evolution of a new polity</td>
<td>Lack of micro foundation</td>
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<td>Sees institutions as independent variables</td>
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<tr>
<td>Convergence</td>
<td>Institutions matter</td>
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<td>Divergence</td>
<td>The end point of integration</td>
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<td>The role of institutions in regional integration</td>
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Table 3.1: Grand theorising regional integration (configuration mine: 2008©)


3.3.2 Middle-range theories of Integration

Middle-range theories of integration consider the processes of integration and include neo-institutionalism (rational choice, historical and sociological) and policy networks. This study will focus on the neo-institutionalism middle-range theory of regional integration.

Neo-Institutionalism

In regional integration studies, neo-institutionalism tries to explain integration processes. Put simply, neo-institutionalism as a theory tries to explain emergent activities en route to the regional outcome. In political and sociological studies, new institutionalism is a middle-range theory as opposed to grand theories and behavioural theories (micro theorising) that attempts to explain political outcome through institutions. Neo- or new institutionalism has developed along three schools of thought. The first approach to new institutionalism is rational choice institutionalism, the second, the historical institutionalism model, and the third is the sociological approach. From these approaches come different arguments which range from functionalist arguments which show institutional designers as long-terms strategists who make utilitarian decisions (March & Olsen, 1984:735), to arguments which model institutions as methodically growing a life of their own, thus developing unanticipated consequences (spillover) and influencing regional outcomes (Miller, 2000; Bulmer, 1998), a view captured by the neo-functionalist school.

In this thesis, for purposes of analysis, sociological and historical institutionalism will be viewed as dialectically linked or related, as has been used by some authors in using terms such as “socio-historical institutionalism” (Kato, 1996; Smith, 2004). However, historical institutionalism will be the term used in this section to depict this concept. It will be important to assess the merits and/or demerits of these approaches critically as a precursor to putting forward the approach that best serves the purposes of this thesis.
basic premises of rational choice and historical institutionalism will be highlighted for analytical purposes. It will also be important to assess the merits and/or demerits of these approaches critically as precursor to using them as framework for studying the institutional development of African regionalism, especially as it concerns the role of the Pan African Parliament in the new African Union. It should be noted, however, that the fundamental issues that underpin these arguments are those of the place of the institution vis-à-vis individual rationality in political and policy outcomes.

On one hand, historical institutionalism proponents (Pierson, 1996; Bulmer, 1998) argue that institutional analysis should be devoid of individual rational behaviour. This school of thought sees the introduction of a behavioural component to the study of institutions as diluting the institutionalism approach. On the other hand, rational choice theorists (Shepsle & Weingast, 1987; Tsebelis, 1994) turn to institutions in an attempt to explain individual rationality. It assumes that applying a behavioural assumption would help to differentiate institutional effects which may lead to varying outcomes in a political system. Bulmer (1998:370) posits that rational choice institutionalism is a thin application of new institutionalism while the historical institutional is a deeper application as it examines normative preoccupations of institutions rather than just more pragmatic aspects of institutions.

Following from the foregoing, it will be important to address some of the more theoretical aspects of these approaches so as to logically locate discussions on the PAP and African regionalism within the institutionalism framework. It will be significant in particular to examine the premises of these theories in as much as the Pan African Parliament is concerned. This means interrogating rational choice and historical institutionalism frameworks in so far as the origin and institutional building process in PAP and the AU is being addressed. Based on these findings, one may have to address issues of expectations for the PAP based on evidence from research data.
Rational choice institutionalism

The rational choice model originates from economic and policy studies. From the economic standpoint, the rational choice model, according to Kato (1996:560), defines a behavioural pattern that links means to ends. March and Olsen (1984:735) point to utilitarian considerations which view the actions of actors within a polity as driven by calculated self-interest, as opposed to viewing these actions as a response to duties and obligations as imposed by institutions. There is a calculated move towards a choice for the best means for whatever goals individuals approach. In policy and public choice studies, scholars of the United States of America Congress (Riker, 1980; Shepsle & Weingast, 1987; Hall, 1987) began to study congressional decision making from an institutional perspective, which served as theoretical focus, on how the rules of congress affect individual legislators, with an emphasis on the Congressional committee system and the relationship between Congress and regulatory agencies (Hall & Taylor, 1996:944). Shepsle and Weingast (1987:87-90), for instance, attempted to propose mechanisms that explain member behaviour in decision making within the context of the rules and operating procedures of the Congress. The authors, inter alia, tried to explain why parliamentary committees rarely work contrary to committee decisions. In the authors’ words, “in our view the explanation of committee power resides in the rules governing the sequence of proposing, amending and especially of vetoing the legislative process” (Shepsle & Weingast, 1987:86). Over time, this approach in decision making has been applied to other studies from bilateral and regional co-operation to the development of political institutions, an example being the study by Tsebelis (1994) on institutional decision making in the European Parliament (EP).

Features of the rational choice school

According to Hall & Taylor (1996:944-945), the rational choice approach has four notable features. Firstly, rational choice institutionalists employ a characteristic set of behavioural assumptions (Hall & Taylor, 1996:944). Drawing from the work of Kenneth
Shepsle and Barry Weingast (1987:87), deference is propelled by self enforcement, meaning that most committee members are there because they are interested in the aspect of policy jurisdiction, so there is no reason to stir up the status quo.

Secondly, rational choice institutionalism tends to see politics as a series of collective action dilemmas (Hall & Taylor, 1996:945). In international relations (regional, global) in the domain of public policy, the element of international interaction is seen as essential (Nagel, 1991:xiv). The interests and ideas within groups and the differences between them produce opportunities for a wide variety of actors to influence the policy process. The group theory models the various interests and pressures between groups in the policy-making process and the importance role of interest groups within this equation. David Truman described interest groups as "shared attitude group that makes certain claims upon other groups in the society" (Truman, 1951). The policy landscape is shaped by the struggle between groups, and some policy scholars highlight the significance of groups in public policy by going as far as seeing public policy as the equilibrium in this struggle (Dye, 1981:27). Thus, there are strains and stresses, coupled with the push and pull between countries and the competitive levels of governance. Group policy theorists view the point of equilibrium as public policy (Dye, 1981:27), while neo-functionalists view this equilibrium as collective action resulting in spillover (Schmitter, 1969:162). However, it is can be argued that this equilibrium can not be reached with the preclusion of bargaining. According to international relations scholar Alexander George (cited in Lynn, 1980:15), “some kind of bargaining process is likely to operate within the group even if members are unaware of it”. This is not to say that there are not variables that can affect the bargaining process. One such variable is the attitude and behaviour of the authority convening the group. Precisely, the authority may establish certain rules and norms that will affect group behaviour (Lynn, 1980:15). Predictably, if there are institutional arrangements that would guarantee complementary behaviour by others, actors would take a collectively superior course of action. Yet, some scholars highlight a key limitation in rational choice by pointing out that, in pursuing and maximising individual preferences, outcomes produced would be collectively suboptimal (Hall &
Taylor, 1996:945). This means that another outcome could be found which will make at least one of the members better off without any of the other members being worse off.

Thirdly, it emphasises the role of ‘strategic context’ (Thelen & Steinmo, 1991:7) in the determination of political outcomes and the role of the calculus approach to the problem of explaining how institutions affect individual action. In addressing the issue of how actors behave, rational choice theory stipulates that actors’ behaviour is not predicated upon impersonal historical forces, but as a result of strategic calculation, which, in turn, is fed by the actors’ expectations of the likely behaviour of others (Hall & Taylor, 1996:945). This is achieved through institutions creating mechanisms (rules and procedures) that reduce uncertainty in terms of the behaviour of other actors. Miller (2000:538), however, considers strategic calculative rational choice assumptions largely relevant in those policy areas that involve a risk in economic issues, as against more socially sensitive issues.

Finally and most relevant to this thesis, rational choice institutionalism has developed a distinctive approach to the problem of explaining how institutions originate. This is predicated on the premise of functionality. This institutionalism approach logically attempts to determine the functions of the entity by interrogating its origins. It does this by linking the values and functions of the entity to the instrumental choice of its designers. Therefore, according to Hall and Taylor (1996:945), institutions survive as a result of voluntary agreement by actors, agreements which provide more benefit to the actors than the prospect of any other form of institution. Rational choice institutionalists differ from the historical institutionalists, who advocate that historical path dependence provides the total picture in terms of institutional decision making. Rationality cannot be used to explain the nature of decision making within the polity; learned socialisation and culture play the central role, rather.
Historical Institutionalism

According to Hall and Taylor (1996:937), historical institutionalism has its roots in two approaches in Political Science, namely group theory and structural functionalism, and developed during the 1960s and 1970s. The group theory models the various interests and pressures between groups in the policy making process and the important role of interest groups within this equation. Interest groups have been described as “shared attitude group that makes certain claims upon other groups in the society” (Dye, 1981:27). The policy landscape is shaped by the struggle between groups and individuals. Rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism therefore share this theoretical foundation. Like rational choice institutionalists, historical institutionalists agree that at the core of politics is the conflict resulting from rival groups competing for scarce resources.

According to Kato (1996:556), both these schools of thought are distinguishable in the way they interpret and analyse individual behaviour in institutions. Consider that historical institutionalists look for better explanations for the ‘suboptimal’ outcomes of collective action. Rational choice institutionalism, as indicated earlier, looks for these explanations in the link between utilitarian maximisation of self-interest and the role of institutions in placing restraint on or controlling such self-interest. Historical institutionalists contend that these explanations can be found in “the institutional organisation of the polity or political economy as the principal factor structuring collective behaviour and generating distinctive outcomes” (Hall & Taylor, 1996:937). In this case, there is a move away from behavioural assumptions, assigning importance to formal institutions like the state, political parties and social groups as centres of analysis in explaining collective behaviour and political outcomes.

Hall and Taylor stress that historical institutionalism emphasises structuralism, which is entrenched in the institutions of the polity, rather than functionalism, which sees political outcomes as a reaction to the needs of the system (Hall & Taylor, 1996:937). As analytical tool, rational choice institutionalism tends to construct assumptions by making
context-based deductions, while historical institutionalists are prone to inductive comparative research (Kato, 1996:557, Thelen & Steinmo, 1991:8-9). That is to say, while rational choice theorists rely on assumptions from a universal premise of the economic rational model of linking choice to means-end, historical institutionalists draw explanations from an analysis of empirical data.

In governance studies, historical institutionalism shifts attention from society- and individual-centred analysis to how the state as a complex repository of institutions is able to structure the character and outcome of group behaviour or conflict. Bulmer (1998:371) discusses this emphasis on the role of the state in systemic change in European integration. In this case, the author’s work examines the impact of regional institutions as negotiation fora in the reconstruction of the state, building the relationships between the state and organised labour, interest groups, financial systems, the public and the judiciary.

**Four features of historical institutionalism**

Four features of historical institutionalism as espoused by Hall and Taylor (1996:938-942) show, firstly, a tendency to conceptualise the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour in broad terms. Historical institutionalists go further. In determining how institutions affect the behaviour of individuals, historical institutionalists agree with the rational choice premise that individuals are strategic and calculating in making decisions. However, they go further in using historical (Thelen & Steinmo, 1991:9) and cultural (Hall & Taylor, 1996:940) analysis to explain individual action. In the cultural approach, action is determined not by instrumental calculations but by individual interpretation of situations based on familiar routines or patterns. In this case, institutions become the depository of moral or cognitive templates from which the individual constructs an interpretation. So, whereas the institution, as in the calculus approach (rational choice), is also a source of strategically useful information, for historical institutionalists it also affects identities, interests, goals and positions of the actors. Finally, Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, in their treatise on new institutionalisms,
propose that “institutions are resistant to redesign ultimately because they structure the very choices about reform the individual is likely to make” (Hall & Taylor, 1996:940). Thus, for historical institutionalists, institutions persist because they represent learned and conditioned processes.

Secondly, this school sets great importance by power and the disproportionate relations of power play associated with the operation and development of institutions. Historical institutionalists are concerned with how institutions distribute power unevenly across social groups. These theorists assume a system in which institutions such as rules, legislation and courts give some groups or interests a disproportionate access to the decision-making process. This has to do with how state institutions or the political system structures which kind of social interests are more likely to feature in the policy process. Rothstein (1991:33) and Hattam (1991:156), for instance studied the way political institutions allocate or restrict power in labour organisations. In this case, the outcome for the collective good is not emphasised, but rather how some groups gain and others win.

The third argument has to do with the emphasis on path dependence and unintended consequences in viewing institutional development. Path dependence is seen as the way “existing capacities”; “policy legacies” or “past lines of policy” condition subsequent policy choices, by encouraging the organisation of society to cultivate a particular identity or develop interests towards policies that are costly to shift (Hall & Taylor, 1996:941). Sitter (2005:51), in a survey of the design and evolution of European organisations, contends that as much as the design of institutions reflects the preferences of design actors, the design of the first European international organisations shaped the design of subsequent ones. Thus, the emphasis on path dependence also deviates from the functionalist argument that institutions are the intended outcomes of their designers’ decisions. However, Pierson (1996:131) goes further to examine the factors that necessitate gaps in designers’ original intents. There is a branch of scholarship, for instance, that proposes the likelihood of historical paths to be punctuated by crises (Gourevitch, 1986:21-22). Hall and Taylor (1996:942) refer to this as “critical junctures”, echoing Krasner’s (1984:225) discussion of the historical conjuncture where substantial
institutional change takes place, resulting in an intersection from which historical development veers into another path. The end of the cold war and the collapse of communism can be seen as critical intersections in history that significantly changed world events.

Historical institutionalists are particular about integrating institutional analysis with the contribution that those other factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes. It is interesting to note that historical institutionalists do not consider institutions in isolation as the only causal factors in politics and outcomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996:942). For historical institutionalists, in particular, the relationship between institutions and ideas is paramount. For instance, institutional structures developed to handle trade in the US and China will differ based on the impact of their fundamental differences in ideas on trade. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the 1980s did not succeed as an institution in the long term because it failed to take into account localised ideas of poverty alleviation (Deng, 1998:51-52). Thus, accessibility of ideas and the adoption of ideas will differ from country to country, depending on structural differences between state institutions and political systems.

Finally, regionalism scholars, especially scholars of EU integration, have engaged in what can be termed politics of theorising. The hotly debated arena of theorising integration has left little room for compromise. Institutionalists try to topple each other’s claims, be it for rational choice, historical or sociological. They, in turn, attempt to find inconsistencies in intergovernmentalist arguments. Intergovernmentalists themselves are divided into the rational choice and liberal groups and refute the neo-functionalist notions of the path of European integration.

Be that as it may, the aim of this theoretical framework, as pointed out earlier, is to attempt to create theoretical covering for the discussions on the nature of African regionalism and, in particular, the Pan African Parliament’s definitive role as seen through the provisions, both in treaties and history. This will be a difficult task; already, the conceptualisation of European integration remains elusive. Nonetheless, these
theories of International Relations that have made their way into regionalism studies have huge potential as a foundation for analysis. This is because whether one considers one view as better than the other, they all offer genuine epistemological paths. In this sense, debating the nature of African regionalism by virtue of these theories makes research logic. The figure below represents a logical extraction that locates intersections or common characteristics in the relationships between the grand and middle theories discussed for this purpose.

![Figure 3.2: Overlaps in theoretical discourse (configuration mine: 2008©)](image-url)
3. 4 Relevant Development theories

Dependency theory

Dependency theory is currently considered as being relegated to the dustbins of history, for no other reason than the expansion of the globalisation process. However, it still stands as a reference point for how the world has changed rapidly from “keynesianism” (Velasco, 2002:44; Amsden, 2003:33) principles of protectionist theories to the current liberalised, rapid, global integration. This is particularly relevant for Africa, as it is usually seen as one of the most slowly developing countries. The pivotal idea behind the dependency theory is global inequality. Originating largely from the study of Latin American development history (Velasco 2002:44; Uchendu, 1980:6) and embraced by African countries (Owusu, 2003:1655), it was entrenched in the view of underdevelopment of poor countries, sentenced to a marginalised existent by the rich countries at the centre. With reference to Velasco(2002:44) it became a potent brew, which placed all the blame for third-world problems at the door of hegemonic powers. Its proponents therefore strongly advocated a de-linking from the world economy.

In research this, no causal relationship between expansion in the North and recession in the South was found; rather, as is now evident (Kim & Shin, 2002) prosperity in the North spelt prosperity in the South. Today Latin American countries that earlier advanced this theory are implementing far-reaching trade liberalisation, opening themselves to the world, and are calling for more globalisation. Moreover, a longitudinal analysis of globalisation showed that, between 1959 and 1996 (Kim & Shin, 2002:445), the world became increasingly globalised with the structure of the world trade network becoming more decentralised.

This glance at the dependency theory, though almost obsolete, was aimed at giving a targeted, albeit aerial, view of some developing nations’ past foreign economic policies, as a foundation for interrogating the evolution of African regional integration. One of the
new theories that dictate the direction of world economic policies is that of neo-liberalism.

**Neo-liberalism**

The evolution of the neo-liberal philosophy seems to be viewed as a ‘triumph’ over the Keynesian perspectives of international relations. The name neo-liberal derives from the ‘classical liberal’ economic theory of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who argued that a capitalist economy is largely self-regulating through the action of market forces (Kotz, 2003:15). Neo-liberalism, referred to as neo-liberal restructuring by Kotz (2003:15), is centred on transforming the role of the state in the economy through renouncing the use of government spending and taxing to moderate the ups and downs of the business cycle, thus eliminating government regulation of corporate behaviour in both domestic and international spheres. Thus, it advocates little or no meddling of government in the economy, giving room for free market economy, through privatisation, and cutbacks in social programmes, to name but a few.

Gill (1997:5), describes neo-liberalism as the ‘universalization' of a particular set of cultural forms in ways that tend to make for greater social hierarchy and cultural homogeneity on a world scale. Although Gill (1997:5) argues that it promotes politics of dominance rather than its litany of integral hegemony, its proponents see neo-liberalist prescriptions as the panacea for world economic restructuring. Contrary to this however, is evidence which reveals the years after the war (1950-1973) as the ‘golden age’ of capitalism, while the period from 1973 to the 1990s (the years of neo-liberal reform), were years of slow growth and economic instability in these countries. Cheru and Gill (1997:141) also regard neo-liberalism as myopic in terms of social and ecological dimensions of change, which are inevitably vital for the “transnationalisation of capital and the liberalisation of global and national economic structure” (Cheru & Gill, 1997:141), which these countries are trying to achieve.
Be that as it may, the rise of neo-liberal thought and the expanding influence of these ideologies, even in socialist countries like China (Huque & Yep, 2003:131) and in South Africa (Kroukamp, 2000:261), seems to be unabated. The following arguments are made with relation to global policy trends as underlined by the theories discussed above. Mittelman (1997:77) contends that, “of all the great changes in restructuring the world today the single most important force may prove to be globalisation”. Contemporary globalisation processes therefore represent unprecedented market expansion accompanied by widespread structural disruption. These disruptions come in the form of trends in the globalisation of the state through the public-private shift, marketisation of the forms of state. This restructuring is tied to the apron strings of the neo-liberalist ideologies.

On the one hand, global restructuring of economies, especially in advanced economies, has shown indicators such as a shift from manufacturing (as industries relocated to countries of cheap labour) to service-based industries, expansion of poorly paid service jobs and the growth of informal employment and the sector in general (Beer & Forster, 2002:7). On the other hand, concerning less developed economies such as Africa, global restructuring finds its strength in dictating economic liberalisation policies, reduction of trade barriers, privatisation, elimination of government subsidies and deregulation (Tuman, 2000:174), all represented by the term ‘structural adjustment’. Global restructuring in this form is championed by international monetary structures, most prominent of which is the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF (which, along with the World Bank, is a fruit of wartime collaborations between the United States and the United Kingdom (William, 1994:53)) operates on an organisational ideology rooted in the liberal economic paradigm. This neo-liberal stance is based on the principles of free market operation, trade liberalisation and cutting excessive demands through public sector cuts in spending on social welfare (William, 1994:72).

It can already be deduced that the perspective of global restructuring as is seen by many globalisation watchers is actually premised on the neo-liberalist theory and the strong hegemonies of the United States and Britain. It is also deduced that the process of
globalisation and regionalisation, the international systems that govern and arbitrate in these processes, have a general drift towards economic and political principles set out by the hegemonies of the North. This has not escaped the underdeveloped and developing world as once Keynesian countries of the Latin Americas and Africa now embrace, with hope, the come-in or stay-out globalisation trend that is neo-liberalism.

From the theoretical perspectives on international bargaining relations as expounded in this chapter, one observes a notable trend in world leadership in terms of the type of policies that are pursued by the richer north in relation to the poorer south, and those pursued by poor nations in relation to the northern nations. For instance, one of the greater challenges of leadership in Africa is the environment of survivalism and dependence on some super power or entity (Vil-Nkomo, 2002:295). This relationship is mirrored by the dependency theory, which asserts that “a country’s position in an international system of dependent or unequal exchange and political control, conditions its development strategies and achievements” (Uchendu, 1980:6). International dependency therefore spells national subordination for poor countries and fosters international exploitation by rich nations. In view of this circumstance, the socio-economic and foreign policy of poorer countries will tend towards the stipulations and conditions that donor aid countries impose. On the flip side, foreign economic, socio-political policies pursued by developed countries as it relates to underdeveloped and developing countries will, in most cases, be dependent on the expectation of some corresponding rewards (Todaro, 1981:17). Moreover, the issue of key entities in multilateral arrangements and the relationships among them is important; this more so with the dominance of hegemonies such as Britain and the European Union, as well as the United States, and the menu of choices available to them as superpowers in the formulation and the dictation of policy directions for multilateral institutions. This is contrasted directly with the slant towards dictated choice for the smaller countries by the superpowers. This raises questions about the lofty ideologues of the New International Economic Order of the 80s (Laszlo, Kurtzman & Bhattacharya, 1981:1) aimed at correcting the imbalances and inequities between poor and rich countries.
From the characterisations of a regime, it may be suggested that regimes are more or less spoken, unspoken, written, unwritten values and beliefs of facts, standards or behaviour and rules that play between the power structure of an international system or organisation and the economic and political bargaining that takes place between them. Theorists have argued, however, that power resources affect regimes, and though regimes affect bargaining and decision making, these are not held to affect power resources. So the recurring issue here is regime formation and the question of who benefits. Regimes affect policies. In the African situation and within the prescriptions of the African Union and its institutions such as the Pan African Parliament and NEPAD, the issue of regimes is pertinent. This is because, for Africa to remain competitive in a global economy, it is important that all African countries not only buy into the vision of NEPAD and the AU, but that the values and standards that govern the new African vision are understood by and enforced in individual nations through the work of the Pan African Parliament. One such regime that should affect the policies and decisions in the African Union in particular is the principle of collective self-reliance and the commitment to good governance.

Tied to the issue of regime is the subject of hegemonies. With the emergence of the African renaissance, there may also be emerging hegemonic African countries. Although the hegemonic state provides the regime out of self-interest, proponents of the hegemonic stability theory argue that the weak states gain more in the sense that they enjoy full benefits produced by the regime without bearing the cost of providing and maintaining it. A knock on this is the matter of certain regimes not being in the interest of weaker states, and the possibility of payments down the road for weaker states. The interaction between these ‘stronger’ African countries and other ‘weaker’ African states and the role they play in setting and adhering to regimes and therefore deepening regionalism in Africa, may play a significant role in how the so-called African renaissance unfolds.
Conclusion

There is little doubt that studies of regionalism are mostly based on the economic and market-related integrationist trends, while political, institutional and security integrationist issues lag behind. Some schools consider this focus on economic integration as justified, because economic integration can be an unobtrusive vehicle for pursuing other political and security goals. Undoubtedly, modes of production and economic systems can be closely linked to political systems. However, for many late comers to the regionalism arena, the idea of political harmonisation is less tempting than that of economic co-operation.

The EU, so far, seems to present the only cohesive example of institutionalised regionalism. This is because the landscape of regionalism, apart from the EU, is littered with weak, loosely structured regionalism arrangements, where policy networks and co-operation agreements drive regionalism. While the European-styled institutional integration (supranationality, institutionalism, neo-functionalism) has permeated regional integration discourse, an overemphasis on the EU-styled regionalism should be cautiously pursued, as it may prove unsustainable in other contexts where there is serious divergence over other issues. It is important to consider regionalism within all these contexts and reflect on whether or not supranationality provides an explanation for EU success in regional integration and, by some level of implication, provides the answer to successful African regionalism.

Finally, certain challenging areas for the nascent African integrative institutions can be inferred from theoretical discussions. One that stands out is the struggle between the question of sovereignty and the phenomenon of spillover which pushes supranationality. African nations may be unwilling to abnegate any aspect of their sovereignty; this is already evidenced in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) memorandum of understanding which only few nations have signed. This raises the question of how institutions like the Pan African Parliament will fare in this arena. Already, the basic theoretical provisions here show that there will always be that continued struggle between
the strong intergovernmental component of African regionalism and integration institutions in Africa. This is because, based on the concept of spillover, it may be expected that these AU organs will exercise opportunities to grow their powers over time. However, this is equally dependent on historical and institutional forces which will guide institutional development and organisational culture. It will also depend on the policy issues that come up for debate in the plenary and how the PAP is able to take advantage of regional issues to enhance its powers.