

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: A MODEL FOR PUBLIC
POLICY ANALYSIS**

by

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
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Co-promotor: Prof. Dr. C. Thornhill

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SUMMARY

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BY

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DOCTOR ADMINISTRATIONIS (PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION)

SUMMARY

The primary objective of this research was to develop and apply a scientifically reliable model, for the purpose of foreign policy analysis, that would elucidate and assist the development of South Africa's bilateral relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and which might also be applied universally to include other inter-state foreign relations. An important mutually supportive and interdependent secondary objective was to identify the most favourable available foreign policy choice that South Africa, in pursuance of its perceived best interests, could adopt in order to effectively promote its bilateral relationship with the People's Republic of China.

In seeking to attain these objectives it was argued that foreign policy, as a form of public policy, could be effectively subjected to public policy analysis and that through such analysis, it would be possible to identify the most advantageous or *best* foreign policy formula that South Africa could apply in its diplomatic relationship with the PRC. It was also hypothesised that the employment of a research model, in the form of a proposed linkage model of foreign policy analysis, would facilitate an effective and comprehensive policy analysis of the bilateral relationship between South Africa and the PRC and that such a model could provide a framework for the future analysis of foreign policy, not only South African foreign policy.

In developing the proposed linkage model of foreign policy analysis the foreign policy inter-action of states was explored at the *geographical* domestic, regional and international environmental levels as well as at the *communicational* bilateral and multilateral environmental levels. Decision making leadership *relationships* and foreign policy *imperatives* were also identified as relevant components of the specially developed model. The influence upon foreign policy decision making of the respective *world views* of South Africa and the PRC, whereby each state is perceived to exhibit a particular perception of the international system and its

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individual role therein, was also explored. In this regard, examination of particularly the decision making structures of South Africa and the PRC, and the various historical, political, economic or other *imperatives* that may drive the respective foreign policies of these states, resulted in the necessary development of *world view* matrices in respect of South Africa and the PRC.

The research found that whereas South Africa and the PRC exhibit many similarities there are also fundamental differences that may sometimes be clouded in the euphoria of perceived friendships and confusion between party political and national interests. It also identified organisational and leadership weaknesses, particularly in the case of South Africa, that make it problematic for South Africa to engage the PRC in a manner that is likely, in the absence of a changed foreign *policy* strategy, to favour South Africa's perceived best interests.

The study found that South Africa needs to be constantly aware that the PRC, although generally regarded as a developing country, is really in a category of its own and needs to be engaged with caution and with due cognisance that the interests of South Africa and the PRC do not naturally, and will not invariably, coincide; and that South Africa should be more assertive in its endeavours to add substance to the relationship while constantly ensuring that it does not find itself *kow-towing* to the needs and interests of the PRC. The research also found that South Africa's leaders, in sometimes confusing party political interests with national interests, may have effectively weakened their ability to engage the PRC, particularly in regard to moral issues pertaining to human rights.

Although this research has undoubtedly raised many unanswered questions it has also laid the groundwork for a viable scientific method of public policy analysis. It has also effectively identified aspects of foreign policy analysis that invite further study, research and analysis. More specifically, it has identified several alternative foreign policy approaches that could be applied to South Africa's relationship with

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the PRC and, from such alternatives, has identified what is believed to be the most advantageous approach for the advancement of South Africa's perceived best interests. This research thereby contributes specifically to knowledge about South Africa's relationship with the PRC and, in the more general sense, to the field of public policy analysis, including foreign policy analysis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I was fortunate to have the opportunity to live and work in the People's Republic of China (PRC) from February 1997 to February 2001 as a member of South Africa's Diplomatic Service. It was a time of ongoing transition in South Africa and great changes in China, as first Hong Kong and subsequently, Macao, became re-absorbed under the sovereignty of the PRC. Four years are certainly not enough to be able to understand China, its people or its languages. Therefore, in order to conduct my research, during extremely busy and difficult years in Beijing, I relied heavily on the services, the kindness, the patience, the expertise and the assistance of others, both in the PRC and in South Africa.

Without the encouragement of my promotor, Prof. Nico Roux, I might never have embarked on this four-year journey of exploration and research. I certainly owe him a great debt of gratitude for his infinite patience and scholarly advice, both in person during my periodic journeys back to South Africa and per email communication from Beijing. In addition, the experience of my co-promotor, Prof. Chris Thornhill, has not only added polish to the finished text but also saved me from the futility of trying to produce a research dissertation as up-to-date as last week's news; a virtually impossible undertaking where the foreign policy dynamics of states undergoing transformation and transition are concerned, as in the case of the PRC and South Africa.

In Beijing, at our Embassy, at the PRC Foreign Ministry, and at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, I met and worked with a number of people who contributed in a variety of ways to the eventual completion of my research. I would therefore like to thank the First Secretary at the SA Embassy, Ms Anneli Ahlers; Minister Counsellor at the SA Embassy, and former Deputy Director at the China Desk, DFA, Mr Jacques de Vos; Assistant Director, China Desk, DFA, and former First Secretary at the SA Embassy, Mr Izak Human; colleagues in the Department of Foreign Affairs who provided useful information during interviews and

(v)

conversations, but who requested that they not be mentioned by name; Prof. Yang Li Hua of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who kept the Embassy and myself well-supplied with a steady stream of very useful Chinese research material; xiao Hu (Ms Hu Jiaqiang), Embassy Secretary and former Embassy Translator, xiao Zhang (Ms Zhang Yunqiao), former Embassy Secretary, xiao Wei (Ms Wei Shu Hua), Embassy translator, and Stephen Jin, who helped me understand through their patient translations of relevant Chinese language texts, and the meticulous filing of the growing volume of Embassy news clippings, a little more about the subject of my research. I would also like to thank my Chinese language teacher, Li Keqian, for teaching me some Mandarin against all odds and for also teaching me to play Chinese Chess which I regard as essential for anyone aspiring to understand the Chinese people. The personnel of the Africa Division of the PRC Foreign Ministry changed several times during my years in Beijing and I shall therefore not mention those individuals by name. However, I am appreciative of the professional working relationship we enjoyed and grateful for the assistance afforded me in my ongoing attempts to learn as much as I could about decision making and the structures of government, particularly in regard to foreign policy, in the PRC.

The Department of Foreign Affairs graciously made a Public Service Bursary available to me for the purposes of carrying out my research and I would like to thank the Department for its valued role in this regard. I would also like to emphasise that the views and arguments expressed in this research are mine alone. Although I am a serving official of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, my views do not necessarily represent the views of the South African Government or, by implication, the official views of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Arguments advanced in this research are intended for the greater good of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Republic of South Africa; in this regard, differences of opinion that are motivated by seeking after the truth can therefore only be beneficial.

Finally I would like to thank my dear wife Patricia for her encouragement and continual support, and for reminding me from time to time that what is worth doing is usually also worth completing.

ANC	African National Congress (ANC)
APCC	Asia Pacific Chamber of Commerce
ARMSCOR	Armaments Corporation of SA
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AUD	Australian Dollar
AZAPD	Association of Professional Designers (AZAPD)
ENG	English
EU	European Union
COCCO	Central Office for Co-operation
GD	Good
GM	General Manager
GO	Government
COGATI	Central Office for Co-operation
CITC	Central Intelligence Task Committee
CYC	Cycle
CW	Commonwealth
DO-G	Department of Government
D-G	Department of Government
RPA	Republic of Poland
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DO	Department of
GCI	Global Communications Initiative
GEA	Global Environmental Agency
GND	Global Network Development
GSD	Global Strategy Development
IKS	International Knowledge Society
ISPC	International Security and Peace Council

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired-immune-deficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress (SA)
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Conference
ARMSCOR	Armaments Corporation (SA)
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organisation (SA)
BNC	Binational Commission (sometimes quoted as Bi-National Commission)
CCCPC	Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
CJO	Chief of Joint Operations (SA)
CMC	Central Military Commission (PRC)
COS	Commission of Supervision (PRC)
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions (SA)
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CPC	Communist Party of China
CW	Commonwealth
DD-G	Deputy Director-General
D-G	Director-General
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs (SA)
DMC	Departmental Management Committee (SA)
DOD	Department of Defence (SA)
GCIS	Government Communication and Information System (SA)
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GNU	Government of National Unity (SA)
GSD	General Staff Department (PRC)
HKSAR	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council (SA)

IFP	<i>Inkatha</i> Freedom Party (SA)
ILD	International Liaison Department (PRC)
IWAAS	Institute of West Asian and African Studies (PRC)
LSG	Leading Small Group (PRC)
MAP	Millenium Africa Recovery Programme (SA)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SA)
MOD	Ministry of Defence (PRC)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC)
MOFTEC	Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (PRC)
NAI	New African Initiative
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCACC	National Conventional Arms Control Committee (SA)
NDR	National Democratic Revolution (SA)
NGO	Non-government Organisation
NPC	National People's Congress (PRC)
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PMC	Programme Management Committee (SA)
PLA	People's Liberation Army (PRC)
PLAN	PLA Navy (PRC)
PRC	People's Republic of China
SA	South Africa
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SAISS	South African Institute of Strategic Studies
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SC	State Council (PRC)

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1. Introduction

This thesis is an analysis of South Africa's existing foreign policy relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC). It is an attempt to assess and identify the *best* (*vide* paragraph 1.6 *infra*; MacRae and Wilde, 1985: 6) foreign policy formula that South Africa's foreign policy decision makers need to implement in order to establish and maintain a diplomatic relationship with the People's Republic of China that will be maximally advantageous for South Africa now and in future years. In this sense it is also an attempt to scientifically develop foreign policy perspectives and options that may be useful to the makers of South Africa's foreign policy. Consequently, a particular methodology will be followed to scientifically analyse South Africa's China policy by means of a policy analysis.

In order to better understand what drives the foreign policies of South Africa and the PRC and, more specifically, what events and ideas shaped those policies during the final decade of the second millennium, it is necessary to identify and examine a variety of factors. Such factors may be classified in three broad categories that collectively, it is argued, identify and describe the respective *world view* perspectives of these two states. Firstly, they include the *internal* or domestic environments of the two countries, their *bilateral*, *regional* and *multilateral* environments, and their respective roles and expectations within the greater *international* environment; secondly, they include the relationships, specifically decision maker or *leadership relationships*, within and between environments, which have helped to shape the foreign policies of the two states; and thirdly, they include specific *imperatives* that have determined, and may continue to determine, the nature of the relationships and environments identified. Much of the research procedure relevant to this study pays necessary regard to the historical, social and cultural *milieux* in which the basic tenets of foreign policy, in the case of each of these countries, were shaped and nurtured.

This information is necessary because it helps to explain issues and imperatives, the nature of particularly the domestic and regional environments, and the kind of leadership that came to the fore in a particular era or under particular circumstances.

1.2. Introductory overview

At the conclusion of a workshop on foreign policy, which took place in Randburg from 9 to 11 September, 1996, Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo (^{1}SA.1996: *Speech*) said that the ultimate responsibility for South Africa's foreign policy resided with the President; and that the primary task of South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs was to identify and develop foreign policy perspectives and options that could be useful to the President. He had also stated, in September, 1995, that "... it is imperative to make an ongoing analysis of important international matters to enable South Africa to take independent positions consistent with the country's commitments" (^{2}SA. 1996: *Draft Discussion Document*. paragraph 7.2). He again referred to this foreign policy workshop, months later, when he said he wished to "... repeat an invitation to parliamentarians, the media, academics, business, trade union and religious leaders and other interested parties, to engage in a constructive interaction with the Department (of Foreign Affairs)" (SA. 1997: *DFA Budget Speech*). Such constructive interaction should also include policy analysis.

It has been argued (Hanekom. 1992: 71) that the policy analyst, when conducting policy analysis, should:

*be provided with policy-relevant information, as far as possible
without constraints;*

*be conversant with the history and peculiarities of the policy
he is analysing;*

*bear in mind that good policy analysis is a rigorous dissection of
information and entails the application of the scientific model of*

enquiry (what, where, when, by whom, how and why);

remember that a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approach, incorporating different skills and different backgrounds from different disciplines working together, is always more fruitful than attacking policy problems from a single perspective;

not be a passive, disinterested researcher; he must articulate his findings, which implicitly entails the articulation of his opinion, projecting him into the arena of prescriptive policy analysis.

Dunn (1981: 35) has defined policy analysis as "... an applied social science discipline which uses multiple methods of enquiry and argument to produce and transform policy-relevant information that may be utilised in political settings to resolve policy problems." For MacRae and Wilde (1985: 4), policy analysis is "... the use of reason and evidence to choose the best policy among a number of alternatives."

The concept of "best" as used in this thesis in regard to policy therefore refers to what is perceived to be the most advantageous (Neilson *et al.* 1953: 258) policy out of a range of alternatives. A more detailed definition of this concept is set out in paragraph 1.6 *infra*.

According to Quade (1975: 4), policy analysis is,

any type of analysis that generates and presents information in such a way as to improve the basis for policy-makers to exercise their judgement. ... In policy analysis, the word analysis is used in its most general sense; it implies the use of intuition and judgement and encompasses not only the examination of policy by decomposition into its components but also the design and synthesis of new alternatives. The activities involved may range from research to illuminate or provide insight into an anticipated

issue or problem to evaluation of a completed program. Some policy analyses are informal, involving nothing more than hard and careful thinking whereas others require extensive data gathering and elaborate calculation employing sophisticated mathematical processes.

In regard to the PRC, such research often necessarily drew on the enduring impact of events which took place hundreds and thousands of years ago. In the case of South Africa, events of hundreds of years ago also contributed to the shaping of latter-day domestic and foreign policy (*vide* Mandela. 1997: 142 and 339). The period from the late 'forties, when both *apartheid* in South Africa (Mandela. 1997: 127) and communism in the PRC (Roberts. 2000: 219) took root, as official government policy, is particularly significant in terms of the development of the contemporary foreign policies of these states.

Since World War II, the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of China have both undergone far-reaching political and social change; during this period their foreign policies, in relation to the international system generally (SA. 1996. *Profile* 1/96: 11; Kim. 1998: 24-27), toward key states within the international system, and toward each other, have changed substantially. In addition, each country is a core-state within its own geographical region (Cantori and Spiegel. 1970: 21 and 370-372) and is committed to playing an influential role in multilateral politics within the international system. During this period the regional environments of both states have experienced cycles of military, political and economic stability and instability; the domestic environments of both states have also become economically and politically more amenable to the impact of *globalisation* and penetration (Lam. 1999: 307; Mills. 2000: 59-63) from the external international environment, particularly in the diplomatic, cultural, economic, academic, scientific, social and telecommunications fields.

China and South Africa effectively fought on the same side during the Second World War and on opposite sides during the Korean War (Moore and Bagshawe. 1991: xvii).

During World War Two, South Africa was mainly concerned with combating German and Italian forces (Brown. 1990: 48; Leigh. 1992: 2) in the European and North African theatres of the war. However, China was pre-occupied with the need to defeat Japan, as evidenced by the decision of the Chinese communists to join the ruling *Guomindang* in fighting against their common enemy (Roy. 1998: 12). South Africa's National Party achieved power and introduced *apartheid* in 1948. Subsequently, in 1949, when the Communist Party came to power in China (Ch'en. 1967: 312) and established the PRC, the South African government of the time was denouncing communism and "communistic activities" (De Klerk. 1991: 6). The two states were ideological opposites and exhibited a hostile relationship toward one another for more than forty years. However, for much of this period the international status of Taiwan and South Africa's association, and subsequent diplomatic relationship, with Taiwan (Mills. 2000: 232, 269 and 275) effectively determined relations between South Africa and the PRC. During the early stages of this era of mutual enmity the South African Air Force's Flying Cheetah squadron, fighting on the side of UN and American forces, engaged both PRC and North Korean forces in the Korean War (Moore and Bagshawe. 1991: 36-37 and 79-80; Helfrich. *Pretoria News*. 18 April, 2000: 11). Little more than a decade later, South Africa established diplomatic relations with Taiwan; and the People's Republic of China offered military assistance to South African exiled guerrilla groups such as the African National Congress and the South West African People's Organisation (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 301). Members of another South African liberation organisation, the Pan Africanist Congress, also received PRC military training (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 311-312). Subsequently, toward the end of the 'eighties, members of the Communist Party of China (CPC) began to visit South Africa officially for the first time (Delpont. *Sunday Tribune*. 10 December 1989).

After the demise of *apartheid* South Africa achieved increased stature as a regional player, particularly in Africa. Simultaneously, the increasing economic and political influence of the PRC, even within highly developed countries such as the United States (Burstein and de Keijzer. 1999: 83-89), made the absence of diplomatic

relations mutually disadvantageous. Consequently, the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Africa and the PRC become both feasible and desirable.

The PRC's approach to its socialist ideals appears, at this stage, to be sustained by a fine blend of Marxist-Leninist ideology, home-grown Chinese Communist ideology, and Chinese historical and cultural tradition (Lam. 1999: 16 and 276-277). For example, the preamble of The Constitution of the People's Republic of China implemented on 4 December, 1982 ({{1}}PRC. 2000. *Constitution*: preamble) refers specifically to Dr Sun Yat-Sen, Mao Zedong, the Communist Party of China and Marxism-Leninism. Certainly, undiluted ideology appears less prominent than it was during the days of Mao Zedong (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: x). While adherence to Marxism and "the socialist road" continues to shape the progress of the Chinese state, Deng Xiaoping explained on June 30 1984 (PRC. 1991. *Major Documents*: 2) that, by Marxism he meant "Marxism that is integrated with Chinese conditions" and that, by socialism he meant "... socialism that is tailored to Chinese conditions and with Chinese characteristics." In contrast, South Africa's grass-roots communists, still largely influenced by the imported Marxist-Leninist ideology (*vide* Phahlane in *Cape Argus*. 31 July 2000: 2) of the former Soviet Union, remain an important segment of the power-base of the ruling African National Congress ({{2}}ANC. 1997 *Mandela report*) in South Africa and cannot be discounted as far as the development of future South African domestic and foreign policy is concerned ({{1}}ANC. 1997. *Umrabulo*: 6).

The relationship between the CPC and the African National Congress-South African Communist Party (ANC-SACP) alliance is an important factor in the existing diplomatic relationship between the two states (Mills. 2000: 269; {{2}} 2001. *Interview*). It is no coincidence that the first South African ambassador to the PRC is a member, and served on the executive, of the South African Communist Party (Hayes. 1997: 180). Nonetheless, despite opportunities for South Africa and the PRC to strengthen bilateral ties, the desire to use their newly-established diplomatic relationship to achieve mutually beneficial goals, and the need to avoid future conflicts that can threaten or harm their relationship, there may also be inherent

obstacles which create conditions for disagreement and discord. Initially, differences occurred on issues such as human rights (Mills. 2000: 265) and the abolition of anti-personnel mines. Such issues are a reflection of the domestic environment in each state, prevailing attitudes toward such issues as expressed within the pertinent environments of the international system, and the impact of those attitudes upon relationships between relevant actors. The imbalance in trade in favour of the PRC ({{2}} 2001. *Interview*), illegal PRC aliens entering South Africa (Sono. *The Star*. 27 April 1999) and the abuse of intellectual property rights by PRC nationals ({{2}} 2001: *interview*), are also potential areas of discord.

There continues to be a degree of confusion and concern among the general South African population concerning the significance and importance of South Africa's existing and future relations with the People's Republic of China. In some quarters, doubt has been expressed about the desirability of the relationship (SAIIA and FGD. 1995 *Conference*: 190-191). In the South African business community and within government itself, at every level, there is also confusion. Sometimes, there is exasperation about South Africa's inconsistency. Consequently, after Deputy President Mbeki's 1998 visit to the PRC a South African journalist wrote (Hartley. *Sunday Times*. 19 April 1998: 16) that South Africa's

... maverick human rights agenda (had) given way to a more mundane pragmatism ... Behind the decision to keep well away from the thorny matter of human rights in Chinese-ruled Tibet and the lack of political freedom in Beijing was a belief that South Africa needed the Chinese markets more than it needed to be a global human rights watchdog.

More recently other commentators ({{2}} *Sunday Independent*. 18 March 2001: 7) have stated that trade, and not the human rights issue, is South Africa's foreign policy goal.

Among South Africa's foreign policy decision makers, decisions involving the PRC are also often delayed or postponed indefinitely (eg the establishment of a new

Consulate-General in Shanghai) (2} 2001: *interview*). In addition, decisions that are taken, or not taken, such as South Africa's failure to raise human rights concerns with the PRC Government (Rademeyer. *The Star*. 27 April 2000: 3; *South China Morning Post*. 27 April 2000: 10; Mills. 2000: 265), do not seem to be part of any identifiable, coherent and focused China policy. There is also the concern that some of South Africa's foreign policy decision makers are allowing their decisions to be shaped by conflicting party political interests (Hadland. *The Sunday Independent*. 14 July 1996: 2; 2} 2001: *interview*). In this regard it is considered that the African National Congress, as had occurred previously with other states (Mills. 2000: 274-275), had sought funding from the PRC Government (4}2000. *Conversation*; 2} 2001. *interview*). There is also direct party-to-party communication between the Chinese Communist Party and the South African Communist Party (SACP) (IDSA. March 1998 *vol. XXI, no. 12*: 1833; 2} 2001: *interview*); and there is evidence that some South African Government leaders who are also members of the South African Communist Party, are allowing perceived Communist solidarity to override their judgement in matters pertaining to potentially divisive foreign policy considerations, such as human rights issues (Mills. 2000: 268; 1}SA.1998: *Nzo speech*). Members of the news media, academics, parliamentarians, public servants, including personnel of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the public are among those who are impatient to learn whether South Africa's approach to its relationship with the People's Republic of China is the *best* that South Africa can expect to pursue in its relations with that country, now and in the future; whether South Africa's foreign policy in regard to the PRC is being conducted in a manner that has the *best* interests of the nation in mind; if not, what alternative policy should South Africa adopt in regard to the PRC that would be in South Africa's best interests; and whether a generic foreign policy formula ought to be adopted to serve as a guideline for all South African foreign policy decision making that would also apply to relations with the PRC? This thesis attempts to find answers to these questions.

There has also been much criticism, in recent times, about South Africa's approach to foreign policy in general and about some perceived failings of respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Barrell. *Mail & Guardian*. 26 November 1999: 2-3), the Department

of Foreign Affairs and its officials. For example, it has been stated (Holiday in *Mail & Guardian*. 4 September 1998: 25) that,

... the Ministry of Foreign affairs has failed to generate ideas which might have served as the founding principles of a coherent foreign policy. Short of these ideas - concepts to help our diplomats grapple with a dispensation in which the most basic terms of reference governing their craft have either changed or lost their meaning - even the richest supply of intelligence (information) would be almost useless.

Nobody would know what to do with it, how to make sense of it, how to employ it as a guide to action. ... instead of a foreign policy, we have a hopeless mix of so-called 'pragmatism', so-called 'realism' and general ad hocery that prevents us from taking our own initiatives.

Therefore, although this research specifically examines South Africa's bilateral relations with the PRC it also attempts, in a broader sense, to provide a practical method whereby South Africa's general foreign policy options and decisions can be scientifically tested, considered and, if necessary, re-formulated in a manner that may effectively promote a coherent, consistent, dependable and predictable (O'Leary in{2}Rosenau. 1969: 334-335) South African foreign policy.

1.3. Frame of reference

The decision making *milieux* of contemporary foreign policy in both South Africa and the People's Republic of China will be examined with specific reference to the influence, on the decision making process, of political, technical, academic and socio-economic role-players in both countries. In addition an historical overview will be presented of the development of South African and Chinese foreign policy during the past decade with particular emphasis on the linkage between environments, leadership relationships and imperatives. World view perspectives of each state will

be identified, described and utilised as the crucibles that may ultimately help to determine and explain the foreign policies and foreign policy decision making conducted by the leaders of these states. The *environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model* has been developed which focuses on five *environments*, four categories of decision making leadership *relationships* and a wide variety of *imperatives*; historical, political, economic, social, strategic and moral imperatives, among others, which have determined, and may ultimately continue to determine, the course of foreign policy in regard to South Africa and the People's Republic of China.

Apart from references to historical factors which influenced the development of foreign policy, both prior to and under the influence of communism in China and the influence of *apartheid* in South Africa, for the purposes of projection and prediction, this research focuses mainly on the period from 1989 to the end of February, 2001. The year 1989 was the year of the fall of that symbol of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall, and the year of the pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 568); it was also a year when *apartheid* in South Africa was in irreversible decline (Mandela. 1997: 661-662; De Klerk. 1991: 29) and the People's Republic of China was already exploring ways to achieve a diplomatic relationship with South Africa (Delport. *Sunday Tribune*. 10 December 1989).

1.4. Objective of study and problem statement

Quade (1989: 361) has pointed out that,

... the statement, early in the analysis, of the possible conclusions or recommendations is sometimes regarded as a pitfall. This is in itself a mistake. Once we realise that the analysis is an iterative process and that a single cycle of formulation, data collection, and model building is unlikely to give the final answer, we should realise that setting forth hypotheses and possible conclusions early in the study is essential to guiding the study that follows. ... A set of tentative conclusions or

hypotheses helps to guide the analysis; it tells us what we are looking for while we are looking. In addition, it offers something concrete for others to probe.

1.4.1. Objective of study

The primary objective of this research is to develop and apply a scientifically reliable model for the purpose of foreign policy analysis that will elucidate and assist the development of South Africa's bilateral relationship with the PRC, and which may also be applied universally, to include other inter-state relations.

The secondary objective is to identify the "best" available foreign policy choice that South Africa can adopt in order to effectively promote its relations with the People's Republic of China, with a view to the advancement of South Africa's best interests. By implication, the successful attainment of this objective is dependent upon policy analysis, given the fact that policy analysis implies a choice among a range of alternatives (MacRae and Wilde. 1985: 4).

1.4.2. Problem statement

South Africa needs to develop a broad foreign policy strategy with regard to its future relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC); a policy that is consistent, predictable (Mills. 2000: 300) and dependable; a policy that reflects the values expressed in the South African Constitution (SA. 1996. *Constitution*: chapter 2) and that is ultimately advantageous to South Africa. In this regard, South African foreign policy decision makers might need to identify a generic foreign policy formula that will not only facilitate consistency, predictability and dependability but also *flexibility* to choose from a range of alternative courses of action in order to promote South Africa's *best* interests. Obviously, the identification of such a formula would depend upon whether it is considered preferable to base foreign policy decisions on realistic concerns which subordinate moral considerations in favour of pure national interest; on the pre-eminence of ideological considerations; or on a

combination of both realistic and idealistic concerns, or strategic concerns, in the form of constructive engagement. It might also be feasible, and desirable, to consider whether South Africa can, or should, premise its foreign policy decisions on the concept of regional interest as opposed to pure national interest. There is also a question as to whether South Africa's foreign policy approach toward the PRC, or the Asian region, can or should differ from its approach to other regions or states of the international system; or whether South Africa ought to develop a single generic foreign policy formula to apply in its relations with all the individual states and diplomatic entities of the international system; or whether *ad hoc* foreign policies should be applied in the case of particular states in accordance with individual circumstances.

A choice between alternatives is not as obvious as it might seem at first glance because the relationship between South Africa and the PRC is in most respects unequal. The PRC, after all, is a nuclear power and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 129-130 and 348); it also has potentially the world's largest economy (Lardy. 1994: 106-110; Zhao. 1996: 5). South Africa's foreign policy decision makers, therefore, must select a foreign policy strategy, in relation to the PRC, that will be capable of producing maximum advantages for South Africa, within a situation of relative weakness. At the same time, in the interest of national sovereignty, such a strategy should enable South Africa to grow stronger and more influential, both in relation to the PRC and more generally within the international system, and in a manner that does not create unnecessary diplomatic obstacles for South Africa. There is also the very relevant and important question of whether South Africa's diplomatic relationship with the PRC, or any individual state or region, ought to be formulated on principles that differ from those generally and regularly applied in regard to South Africa's foreign policy relationships with other diplomatic entities.

Is it possible, or even desirable, for South Africa to base its foreign policy on the concept of different principles for different states? Can and should South Africa premise one diplomatic relationship on ideological considerations and another

relationship on perceived national interests? Can and should South Africa apply a foreign policy formula to one region of the world that differs fundamentally from the foreign policy formula applied to any other region of the international system? Can and should South Africa's foreign policy *in regard to the PRC* determine the formula or pattern of South Africa's diplomatic relations *with any or all other states* or vice versa.

Given these many questions, and the proposed research framework, it is hypothesised:

that the employment of a research model, in the form of the proposed environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis, will facilitate an effective and comprehensive policy analysis of the bilateral relationship between South Africa and the PRC that will provide a framework for the future analysis of foreign policy, not only South African foreign policy.

1.5. Research method and design

As previously stated (paragraph 1.3 *supra*), an environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis has been developed which focuses on five basic environments of the international system; several key leadership or decision making relationships that may shape and be shaped by those environments; and a range of perceived salient imperatives which may drive and be driven by such relationships, and which may often be shaped by the environments in which they attract most attention.

In this model, where an individual state's domestic environment could be represented by the symbol D, South Africa might be designated Country D1 and the PRC might be designated Country D2. Each state is affected by or relates closely to at least five environments which, for the purposes of the linkage model referred to, are classified as the domestic, regional, international, bilateral and multilateral environments. The first three are *geographical* environments; and the latter two are *institutional*

environments. A component of this model (*vide* Addendum three: paragraph 9.3 *infra*) will show that states D1 and D2 are only certain to share the same environment in the case of the bilateral and international environments although it is possible for them to also simultaneously share the multilateral and regional environments. However, of these four (two certainties and two possibilities) the bilateral environment is specially useful in the sense that it is conducive to a high level of direct action and intense communication; membership of the international environment is a largely passive categorisation which includes pariah states and maverick organisations with reduced access to any substantive foreign policy relationship. The domestic environment is particularly important as a reservoir of historical causes and effects translated over time into many complex and dynamic social and political relationships, deep-rooted traditions and national characteristics. The nature of government and society, in general, is such that leadership relationships within the domestic environments of individual states take precedence over all other environmental relationships; the domestic environment is the incubator of a nation's psyche and *world view*. In contrast to this situation, bilateral environmental relationships between states need not necessarily take precedence over the regional or multilateral relationships of those states. However, in the case of the bilateral environmental relationship between South Africa and the PRC this relationship should be the main focus of attention in any analysis of their foreign policy relationship.

In researching the salient general features of the respective foreign policies of South Africa and the PRC an empirical comparative approach has been followed, with information drawn largely from historical research, official documents and interviews with key foreign policy decision makers and implementers. The research method also utilises a normative approach, based on available empirical data, to identify and isolate the projected anticipated consequences of the selection of each of the available foreign policy choices with a view to selecting and proposing the best or most valuable course of action. The techniques employed in this research project therefore represent a combination of several methods which include the quantitative, comparative and analytical methods of scientific analysis.

1.6. Definition of key concepts

In order to avoid any misunderstanding in regard to the terminology used in this research it is necessary to define key concepts. Definitions utilised in this research that are not directly attributable to other sources reflect the independent views of the researcher.

“Actor” refers to “one who acts” or a “doer” (Hanks, 1971: 48). In regard to this research it refers specifically to decision makers, role-players, institutional structures and active participants, including states, multilateral organisations and non-government organisations, within the international system.

“*Apartheid*” refers to the official policy of legislated race-based segregation and discrimination championed, implemented and practised by the South African National Party Government (Mandela, 1997: 140-141) during the period 1948 to 1994.

“*Apparatchik*” means, “...an employee of the *Apparat*, ... best translated into English by the use of the modern Marxist term ‘State Apparatus’, that is, any institution involved in the running of the state, whether formally part of the state or not. In the communist countries where the word is used, it means in practice a member of the Communist Party who is in some intermediate position in the bureaucracy... The term is sometimes used pejoratively in the West of administrators and bureaucrats who bully those in their power and truckle to their superiors” (Robertson, 1985: 10).

“Basic Law” or “The Hong Kong Basic law” refers to the constitutional legal framework presently delimiting the administration of Hong Kong as a quasi-autonomous Special Administrative Region (SAR) within the sovereign jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and in terms of the concept of “one country, two systems.” In terms of the Basic Law, which anticipates a limited duration of fifty years from 1 July 1997, the PRC determines Hong Kong’s foreign policy and is responsible for the defence of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (PRC, 1998. *Yearbook 1997 1998*: 157-159).

“Best” as a descriptive concept, as in “best policy,” “best alternative,” “best interests” or “best solution” is defined in *Webster's New International Dictionary* (Neilson *et al.* 1953: 258) as “... superlative of good ... most productive of good; most beneficent; most advantageous, serviceable, etc.; as, what were best to do?” “Advantageous,” which is the term utilised to define “best” is, in turn, defined (Neilson *et al.* 1953: 258) as “... being of advantage; conferring advantage; favourable; profitable; useful; beneficial; as an advantageous position; trade is advantageous to a nation.” *Webster's Third International Dictionary* (Gove *et al.* 1961: 208) defines “best” as “excelling or surpassing all others of its kind as inherent quality or according to some standard; most productive of good; providing or offering the greatest advantage, utility or satisfaction ... (what is the best thing to do?).” In the context of this policy analysis it may be deduced that the objective of the researcher, as policy analyst, is to identify and recommend the best or most advantageous foreign policy, in South Africa’s diplomatic relationship with the PRC, from a range of alternatives, with a view to obtaining the greatest possible benefit for South Africa.

“Bilateral environment” refers to the institutional communicational and transactional environment that links any two states at the government-to-government level and within which all official, but particularly diplomatic, relations, including transactions, exchanges, communications and actions, take place.

“Bilateral relations” refer to the diplomatic relations conducted between any two states at the government-to-government level, and encompassing all aspects of government, by means of transactions, exchanges, communications and actions that are in accordance with the respective foreign policies of the states concerned.

“Cathay” is the ancient name under which China was known to the Europeans in the time of Marco Polo. It is derived from “Khitai” which referred specifically to North China (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 170).

“China,” in the context of this research, and except where the term is quoted from related source references which may intend a different meaning, refers collectively to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), Macau and the island of Taiwan (also recognised by some states as the Republic of China), and includes the separate administrations of these territories. China shares a boundary of over 20,000 km. with North Korea, Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikstan (Tajikistan), Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam and has a coastline of more than 18,000 km. With a surface area of 9.6 million sq. km., China is the world’s third largest country after Russia and Canada ({{3}}PRC. 1998. *Yearbook 1997/1998*: 26).

“Chinese mainland,” sometimes also termed “mainland China,” refers to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and excludes Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.

“Confucius” was a “Chinese philosopher and teacher of principles of conduct. His highest standards of conduct were treating others as you wish to be treated, loyalty, intelligence, and the fullest development of the individual in the five chief relationships of life: ruler and subject, father and son, elder and younger brother, husband and wife, friend and friend” (Hanks. 1971: 351).

“Confucianism” is defined by Zhang (1999: 74) as,

a philosophy of social organisation, of common sense and practical knowledge. It stresses the need for proper behaviour of and for harmonious relationships among various social actors. It values order, hierarchy, and tradition and assigns the central role of maintaining social control and regulation to the extended family. It gives pre-eminent status to the family and promotes filial piety, ancestor worship and collective responsibility. Confucius conceived of individuals and the state as an organic whole. What the state secures is the individual’s ability to fulfil his role in society. It is only when the whole is

*healthy that it is possible for people to perform their functions
and dwell in an efficient and secure state.*

“Consistency” means constant adherence to the same principles (Hanks. 1971: 356) as, for example, in the case of a consistent foreign policy.

“Constructive engagement” represented what its architect, US Assistant Secretary for Africa, Chester Crocker (1993: 75), described as “... an ambitious regional strategy linked to a purposeful and interventionist bilateral strategy toward the region’s dominant state ...” Crocker had stated (1993: 79) in 1981: “Only if we engage constructively in Southern Africa as a whole can we play our proper role in the search for negotiated solutions, peaceful change, and expanding economic progress ...”

“Constructive Engagement” represented a policy strategy intended to enable the United States to engage in ‘quiet diplomacy’ or the use of ‘dialogue and persuasion’ rather than pressure or sanctions (Crocker. 1993: 79) with a view to promoting ‘negotiated solutions’ to the problems of Southern Africa, more specifically South Africa (Crocker. 1993: 78). As employed in the context of this research, “constructive engagement” is not intended to refer only to American policy toward *apartheid* South Africa but, rather, as a policy option with a view to diplomatic engagement that may be applied to any and every state in a specific manner and with specific objectives in mind.

“Cybernetics”, derived from the Greek word meaning steersman (Shafritz. 1988: 530) “... was used by (Norbert) Wiener to mean the multidisciplinary study of the structures and functions of control and information-processing systems in animals and machines. The basic concept behind cybernetics is self-regulation ... systems that can identify problems, do something about them, and then receive feedback to adjust themselves automatically (Shafritz. 1988: 530).”

“Deng Xiaoping Theory” refers to a body of principles articulated by Deng Xiaoping and which has been enshrined in the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) as the Party’s “guiding ideology” in company with Marxism-Leninism and

Mao Zedong Thought. Deng Xiaoping Theory argues that China must build “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (CPC. 1997: 9 and 17). The basic principles of Deng Xiaoping Theory or building socialism with Chinese characteristics are as follows:

- The principle of seeking truth from facts, following China’s “own path” and not being ideologically dogmatic (“emancipate our minds”) (CPC. 1997: 9);
- the principle of understanding “what socialism is and how to build it” (CPC. 1997: 18);
- the principle of proceeding from “the realities of a primary stage of socialism” (CPC. 1997: 25);
- the principle of concentrating on “developing productive forces” (CPC. 1997: 31);
- the principle of “modernisation in three stages” (CPC. 1997: 38);
- the principle that “reform is China’s second revolution” (CPC. 1997: 47);
- the principle that “China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world” (CPC. 1997: 54);
- the principle that China “can develop a market economy under socialism” (CPC. 1997: 59);
- the principle that it is necessary to “develop socialist democracy and improve (the) socialist legal system” (CPC. 1997: 66);
- the principle of nurturing “a new kind of socialist citizen, one with high ideals, more integrity, a better education and a strong sense of discipline” (CPC. 1997: 74);
- the principle of “upholding the four cardinal principles (keep to the socialist road, uphold the people’s democratic dictatorship, uphold the leadership of the Communist Party, and uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought)” (CPC. 1997: 82);
- the principle that China must “oppose hegemonism and safeguard world peace” (CPC. 1997: 87);

- the principle of advancing the peaceful reunification of the Chinese nation through the concept of “one country, two systems” (CPC. 1997: 94);
- the principle that the successful building of socialism with Chinese characteristics is dependent “on the people” (CPC. 1997: 101);
- the principle that it is necessary for China to “build a strong, modern and revolutionary standardised army” (CPC. 1997: 110); and
- the principle that “the key to (the solution of) China’s problems lies with the Party” (CPC. 1997: 118).

“Dependability,” as used in the context of this thesis, refers to the reliability and trustworthiness (Hanks. 1971: 439) of a state’s foreign policy in that expectations, duties, obligations, and the conventions of normal diplomatic practice and international law can be expected to be honoured consistently.

“Domestic environment,” following an idea advanced by Cantori and Spiegel (1970: 3), is synonymous with the environment of the nation-state’s internal system, which is “... the totality of relations of the organisations (and individuals) which compose its domestic politics.”

“Environment” has been defined as “the aggregate of surrounding things, conditions or influences” (Hanks. 1971: 536). As applied to the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis utilised in this study, “environment” refers specifically to environments of the international system in which diplomacy is initiated, formulated and, or, implemented. The list of environments identified (domestic, bilateral, regional, multilateral and international) is by no means exhaustive but is intended to represent the minimum number of identifiable environments that can be expected to influence the formulation of foreign policy. Each of these environments also has systemic qualities and can be explored as a regional or communicational system. However, the term “environment” is preferred because it allows more flexibility. The definition of a system, advanced by McClelland (1966: 20; *vide* Cantori and Spiegel. 1970: 3), could also be utilised to describe “environment” as employed in this research. “Any system (environment) is a

structure that is perceived by its observers to have elements in interaction or relationships and some identifiable boundaries that separate it from its (other) environment (or environments).”

The “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” were re-stated by Zhou Enlai (PRC. 1999) at the Bandung Conference. Kong Minghui (IWAAS. 1998: 389) has listed the five principles as follows:

- ◆ *mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;*
- ◆ *mutual non-aggression;*
- ◆ *non-interference in each other's internal affairs;*
- ◆ *equality and mutual benefit; and*
- ◆ *peaceful coexistence*

The “Five principles of Sino-African cooperation” refer to the principles that govern the PRC’s relations with African and Arab countries. Kong Minghui (IWAAS. 1998: 389) describes these five principles as follows:

- ◆ To support the African and Arab peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and to win and safeguard national independence;
- ◆ To support the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the governments of the African and Arab countries;
- ◆ To support the desire of the African and Arabic peoples to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of their own choice;
- ◆ To support the African and Arabic countries in their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful consultation;
- ◆ To hold that the sovereignty of the African and Arabic countries should be respected by all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarters should be opposed.

The “Eight Principles for China’s aid to foreign countries” were first elaborated by Zhou Enlai (IWAAS. 1998: 379) and have been listed by Kong Minghui (IWAAS. 1998: 389-391) as follows:

- ◆ *The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual;*
- ◆ *In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges;*
- ◆ *The Chinese Government provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for the repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible;*
- ◆ *In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development;*
- ◆ *The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital;*
- ◆ *The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese government agrees to replace them;*
- ◆ *In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such techniques;*
- ◆ *The experts dispatched by the Chinese Government to help*

in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of these countries. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.

“European” and “non-European” are terms utilised in this research to distinguish between South Africans of European, as opposed to African, Asian and Chinese ancestry, for the purposes of cultural identification.

“Flexibility,” when applied to foreign policy indicates adaptability (Hanks. 1971: 611) as in the ability to “adapt ... easily to new conditions” (Hanks. 1971: 49).

“Foreign policy” is defined in the *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* (Gove. 1961: 889) as “... the underlying basic direction of the activity and relationships of a sovereign state in its interaction with other sovereign states typically manifested in peace, war, neutrality and alliance, or various combinations of or approaches to these.” Therefore, “foreign policy” can be said to encompass a deliberate course of action requiring skill, prudence and wisdom, directed toward the establishment and observance of rules of procedure with a view to achieving, usually long-term, political or diplomatic advantage in relations between states. It should be understood, though, that “... states can have many separate and not necessarily coordinated foreign policies toward particular states or groups of states. .. A state has no single foreign policy; instead policies can be distinguished in terms of subject area and in terms of other participants in the international system” (Legg and Morrison. 1971: 34).

“Foreign policy doctrines” are “... above all declarations of purpose ...” (Merritt. 1975: 151) and the concept of such a doctrine has been defined by Merritt (1975: 149) in the following terms:

Doctrines are typically unilateral declarations of policy designed to elicit domestic public support, to serve as

axiomatic policy guidelines for domestic decision-makers and bureaucrats, and to announce basic policy to foreign governments.

Some examples of foreign policy doctrines include the Monroe Doctrine, the Nixon Doctrine and the Brezhnev Doctrine.

“Generic foreign policy formula” is a term utilised in reference to a genus or “class” (Hanks. 1971: 665-666) of foreign policy whereby certain salient principles are applied in related circumstances and under related conditions and, in the context of this research, refers specifically to the development of a new South African foreign policy formula that is clearly identifiable as South African.

“Groupthink” has been defined as, “... a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (’t Hart. 1990: 7). *Groupthink* is said (’t Hart. 1990: 11) to involve “(excessive) concurrence-seeking ... (particularly) ...when it takes place too early and in too restrictive a way...”

“Han” refers to:

- (1) “a Chinese dynasty, 206 B.C. - A.D. 220, with an interregnum, A.D. 9-25, known as the Earlier or Western Han before the interregnum and as the Later or Eastern Han afterwards. The Han was distinguished for the revival of letters and the beginnings of Buddhism; its bureaucracy became a model for later dynasties” (Hanks. 1971: 720); and
- (2) the Han Chinese ethnic group, which constitutes the majority of the current population of China.

“Hegemony” refers to what Aron (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. 1971: 97) describes as “...the incontestable superiority of one political unit ... acknowledged by other

members of the international system” It has also been described (Hanks. 1971: 738) as, “... leadership or predominant influence exercised by one state over others, as in a confederation. ... leadership; predominance... .” In Marxist terms (Marshall. 1998: 272), hegemony “...refers to the ideal representation of the interests of the ruling-class as universal interests ...” Consequently, the Marxist view (Marshall. 1998: 272) is that the proletariat “... really does represent the universal interest.”

“Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” or “HKSAR” refers to Hong Kong island, Kowloon, the New Territories and some 230 islands and islets covering a total land area of 1,095 sq. km. On 1 July 1997 the HKSAR came into existence as Hong Kong and exchanged British colonial rule for a return to Chinese sovereignty. In terms of the Basic Law of the HKSAR the basic policies of the PRC Government toward Hong Kong are to remain unchanged for a period of fifty years ({{3}}PRC. 1998 *Yearbook 1997 1998*: 156-157).

“Ideology” has been described as “the body of doctrine, myth, and symbols of a social movement, institution, class, or large group” and as “... a body of doctrine ... with reference to some political and cultural plan ... together with the devices for putting it into operation” (Hanks. 1971: 787). According to Plano and Olton (1969: 105-106) it is,

the articulation of basic political, economic and social values as a body of ideas that serves as the basis for an ideal social system or ‘way of life’. An ideology is concerned with the nature of the political system, the exercise of power, the role of the individual, the nature of the economic and social system, and the objectives of society.

“Imperative” has been defined as that which “is not to be avoided or evaded” (Hanks. 1971: 795). “Imperative,” as applied to the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis utilised in this study, refers specifically to a collective category of issues, factors or considerations which over a period of time, will help determine the form which a particular foreign policy response to a perceived

threat or opportunity must assume. Only a modest selection of what are perceived to be the more important imperatives that can be expected to influence the shape of foreign policy decisions, has been identified for the purposes of this policy analysis. The list of imperatives identified for the purpose of this study is, therefore, by no means exhaustive.

“Institutional environment” describes the bilateral and multilateral environments of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis and distinguishes between these two environments, in which institutions, not only diplomatic institutions, predominantly interact with one another, as contrasted with the remaining three environments (domestic, regional, international) which are largely geographical in nature. In terms of its function it serves as a linkage environment whereby foreign policy communications and transactions are able to link individual environments.

“International environment” refers to the largest of the five environments of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model and encompasses all other environments and systems including the perceived international system. The international environment is similar in extent to the boundaries of planet Earth and is unique; there is no other known equivalent. Singer ({1}Rosenau. 1969: 22) refers to the “total international system” as “...the most comprehensive of the levels (of analysis) available, encompassing the totality of interactions which take place within the system and its *environment* ...” (my emphasis). In reference to the “global system,” Singer ({1}Rosenau. 1969: 30) comments as follows:

*it can, of course, be compared with its various sub-systems,
but for the moment there is no known system at the same level or
echelon against which it might be compared, or with which it
might experience relationships or interactions.*

“Kowtow” or “Kotow” (Hanks. 1971: 883) in practical contemporary terms means *to defer to or acknowledge the leadership of another*. Originally the *kotow* required

“...three prostrations and nine head knockings...” (Roberts. 2000: 18) to be performed by visiting envoys before the Chinese emperor.

“Leadership” is a “... situation process in which a person (or persons) because of his actual or supposed ability to solve problems in the field of current group interest, is followed by others in the group and influences their behaviour ...” (Fairchild. 1977: 174). In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model the “current group interest” would be reflected in the direct making of foreign policy, as associated with the governmental foreign policy decision making process, as well as activities that indirectly, or peripherally, result in the making of foreign policy. As Johnson (1995: 156) has noted, “... in most cases, leadership is based on some form of legitimate authority associated with a social position such as manager or president, but this is not necessarily the case ...” A “leader” has been defined (Fairchild. 1977: 174) in the broadest sense as, “... one who leads by initiating social behaviour; by directing, organising or controlling the efforts of others; or by prestige, power or position. The effective stimulus-giver in social behaviour ...”

“Macao Special Administrative Region” is situated 61 km. west of Hong Kong and refers to the Macao peninsula and two adjacent islets, Dangzai and Luhuan, which together total a little more than 36 sq. km. Formerly under Portuguese administration, Macao reverted to PRC sovereignty on 20 December 1999 ({{2}}PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 170-171).

The “Mandate of Heaven” (*tien-ming*) refers to the authority which entitles Chinese leaders to rule ({{2}} Yang. 1999: 157 and 207-209). The Chou kings, who ruled earlier than 1000 BC (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 21), referred to themselves as “Son of Heaven” and justified their conquests (and defeats of rival claimants to power) on the grounds that they had received the “Mandate of Heaven” (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 32). According to *Meng-tzu* (Mencius) the Mandate of Heaven, “manifests itself only through the acceptance of a ruler by his people; if the people kill or depose him it is clear that he has lost heaven’s support” (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 52).

“... heaven does not speak, but shows its intention through acts and events” (Yang. 1999: 157 and 207-209).

“Matrix” refers to “...that which gives origin or form to a thing, or which serves to enclose it ...” It has also been described as “...a rectangular array of logical elements acting as a selection system ...” The plural form is “matrices” or “matrixes” (all definitions extracted from Hanks. 1971: 978).

The term “Middle Kingdom” (*Zhong Guo*) reflects the Chinese perception of China as being the “... centre of the world ...” (Yap and Leong Man. 1996: 25).

Milieu and *milieux* as used throughout this thesis, refer to all environments other than the five environments of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model. For example, the political environment and public administration environment are referred to as the political *milieu* and the public administration *milieu* respectively.

Mu is a Chinese agricultural measure and one *Mu* is equivalent to 674.5 square metres or 807 square yards (Tung. 1991: 243).

“Multilateral environment,” for the purpose of this research includes all international governmental organisations having a permanent secretariat and a membership of at least three member-states (see the definition of “regionalism” *infra*).

“National interest,” in this thesis, unless otherwise stated, refers to the perceived, priority responsibility of the government of the day, of any and every state, to defend by any means, the sovereign existence of the state and the wider collective interests of the national community that underpin and guarantee the continuing existence and peaceful evolution of that state and that community. Hans J Morgenthau indicated long ago that there are many categories of national interest and Thomas W Robinson’s analysis of Morgenthau’s work (Rosenau. 1969: 184-185) identified six specific “national interests” as follows:

- a) *Primary interests* include protection of the nation's physical, political and cultural identity and survival against encroachment from the outside; Primary interests can never be compromised or traded. All nations hold these same interests and must defend them at any price;
- b) *Secondary interests* are those falling outside of (a) but contributing to it. For example, protecting citizens abroad and maintaining proper immunities for a nation's diplomats are secondary interests;
- c) *Permanent interests* are those which are relatively constant over long periods of time; they vary with time, but only slowly. For instance, Great Britain, for many centuries, has had an interest in the freedom to navigate the seas and in a narrow definition of coastal waters;
- d) *Variable interests* are those which are a function of all the cross currents of personalities, public opinion, sectional interests, partisan politics, and political and moral folkways, of a given nation. In other words, they are what a given nation at any particular time chooses to regard as its national interests. In this regard the variable interest may diverge from both primary and permanent interests. For example, Great Britain in 1938 chose to regard certain events bearing on the security of Czechoslovakia as not being within its interest;
- e) *General interests* are those which the nation can apply in a positive manner to a large geographic area, to a large number of nations, or in several specific fields (such as economics, trade, diplomatic intercourse, international law). An example would be the British interest in maintaining a balance of power on the European continent; and
- f) *Specific interests* are those positive interests not included in (e). Specific interests are usually closely defined in time and/or space and often are the logical outgrowth of general interests. For instance, Britain historically has regarded the continued independence of the Low Countries as an absolute prerequisite for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.

The term, "national interest" as used in this thesis encompasses the concepts of primary, secondary, permanent, variable, general and specific national interests.

“One country, two systems” refers to Deng Xiao Ping’s “concept of solving the issues of Taiwan and Hong Kong This means that within the People’s Republic of China, the mainland will produce a socialist system, while Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan will (each) maintain a capitalist system” (PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998/1999*: 157).

Origination, as in the “origination of a state’s foreign policy”, is the term developed and used to describe deep-rooted historical, philosophical and cultural factors that are believed to have given rise to that state’s current foreign policy and, in the context of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, refers to the linkage between contemporary foreign policy and the perceivable historical and cultural origins of such policy.

“People’s Republic of China (PRC),” unless otherwise stated, refers to the Chinese mainland and excludes the Macao and Hong Kong Special Administrative Regions and Taiwan, due to the fact that these three regions fall outside the total political, economic and social control of the central government of the PRC.

“Policy” is described in the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* (Sykes. 1976: 854) as a “... course or general plan of action (to be) adopted by government, party, person ...” whereas *The Oxford English Dictionary* (Simpson and Weiner. 1989: 26-27) defines “policy” as “... political sagacity; prudence, skill or consideration of expediency in the conduct of public affairs; statecraft, diplomacy ... prudent, expedient or advantageous procedure ...” *The Hamlyn Encyclopedic World Dictionary* (Hanks. 1971: 1215) refers to “policy” as “... a definite course of action adopted as expedient or from other considerations” and refers to “foreign policy” as “a course or line of action adopted and pursued by a government, ruler, political party or the like.”

“Policy analysis” has been described as “... an attempt to measure the costs and benefits of various policy alternatives or to evaluate the efficiency of existing policies; in other words, to produce and transform information relevant to particular policies into a form that could be used to resolve problems pertaining to these policies” (Hanekom 1992: 65). It has also been termed “... client-oriented advice

relevant to public decisions” (Weimer and Vining 1989: 1). MacRae and Wilde (1985: 4), refer to policy analysis as “... the use of reason and evidence to choose the best policy among a number of alternatives.” Policy analysis is, in fact, a social or human science discipline in its own right and may serve as a useful objective means for public policy makers to assess existing policies or to plan new policies, including those which direct a state’s foreign policy.

In explaining the purpose of policy analysis, Quade (1989: 4) has stated as follows:

Policy analysis is a form of applied research carried out to acquire a deeper understanding of sociotechnical issues and to bring about better solutions. Attempting to bring modern science and technology to bear on society's problems, policy analysis searches for feasible courses of action, generating information and marshalling evidence of the benefits and other consequences that would follow their adoption and implementation, in order to help the policy-maker choose the most advantageous action.

For the purpose of this research, it is also important to note the direct relationship between policy analysis and Public Administration, as explained by Rhodes (1979: 36) who contends that, “... if Public Administration is policy-making then policy analysis is also Public Administration.” The dual relationship of policy analysis to administration and politics is also significant, as pointed out by Weimer and Vining (1989: 7) who argue:

Although policy analysts must concern themselves with questions of organisational design and administrative feasibility, they seek to influence the choice of programmes by the political process. One focuses exclusively on doing well what has been chosen; the other also considers the choice of what is to be done.

“Predictability,” in reference to the nature of foreign policy, implies that such a policy or course of diplomatic action can be known beforehand or shrewdly inferred from facts or experience (Hanks. 1971: 1235). “Predictability” refers to the “... degree of probability to which a phenomenon (e.g. foreign policy) is capable of prediction ...” (Fairchild. 1977:228). The consistency and dependability of a state’s foreign policy practice would, of course, make predictability more feasible.

“Realism” is “the taking of a practical rather than a moral view in human problems” (Hanks. 1971: 1305). Hans Morgenthau advanced the following six principles of realism (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. 1971: 75-77):

political relationships are governed by objective rules deeply rooted in human nature ... ;
... statesmen ‘think and act in terms of interest defined as power’ ... ;
... the meaning of ‘interest defined as power’ is an unstable one ... ;
... ‘universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract, universal formulation, but ... must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place’ ... ;
... political realism does not identify the ‘moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe’ ... ;
... political actions must be judged by political criteria. ‘... The moralist asks: ‘Is this policy in accord with moral principles?’ And the political realist asks: ‘How does this policy affect the power of the nation?’

According to Plano and Olton (1969: 133), “The realist approach to policy-making is fundamentally empirical and pragmatic... The realist school starts with the assumption that the key factor prevalent in all international relationships is that of *power*. The wise and efficient use of power by a state in pursuit of its national interest is, therefore, the main ingredient of a successful foreign policy.”

“Regional environment,” within the context of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis, refers to a discernible

geographical region, or discernible geographical regions, usually contiguous and within which a specific state or domestic environment, say South Africa or the People's Republic of China, is likely to focus and project its diplomatic and economic interests as major, if not priority, regional concerns.

“Regionalism,” according to Plano and Olton (1969: 296), refers to the “... concept that nations situated in a geographical area or sharing common concerns can cooperate with each other through a limited-membership organisation to meet military, political, and functional problems. Regionalism provides a middle-level approach to problem solving, between the extremes of unilateralism and universalism. ... Regional organisations include: (1) military-alliance systems, such as NATO ... ; (2) economic arrangements , such as the European Community (European Union) ... ; and (3) political groupings, such as the Organisation of American States, ... the Commonwealth ... and the Organisation of African Unity.” In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, “regionalism” is included within the concept of the “multilateral environment.”

“Regional interest” refers to that which is “... on the side of what is advantageous to ... (a geographical area) ... of considerable extent; not merely local” (Hanks. 1971: 828 and 1319). Such a geographical area would normally include a number of individual states, usually more than two such as, for example, the regions of the North Atlantic Community, Western Europe, Southern Africa, South Asia, East Asia, the Asia-Pacific or the developing region. In the context of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, “regional interest” and “regional environment” would also encompass what Rosenau (1969: 61) terms the “contiguous environment.”

“Relationship” has been defined as “an existing connection; a particular way of being related... the various connections between peoples, countries ...the various connections in which persons are brought together, as by common interests” (Hanks. 1971: 1322). “Relationship,” as applied to the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis utilised in this study, refers specifically to the actions of key individual decision makers in government; key

institutional decision makers in government; key individual and institutional decision makers outside, and critical toward, government; key individual and institutional leaders within the economic sector; and the impact or cause and effect relationship of the decisions and actions of such leaders on the formulation of foreign policy. The types of relationship identified are by no means exhaustive but are intended to cover a broad range of possible decision or action categories that can be expected to influence the nature of foreign policy.

Revolutionism is the term used, in the context of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, to refer to the national experience of revolutionary war, including civil war, wars of liberation and rebellion, national insurrection and sustained guerrilla or terrorist activity, whereby a large number of the population, particularly the ruling echelon, have engaged in a successful revolution or insurrection. It is argued that the experiences of *revolutionism*, particularly among developing states since the end of the Second World War, may prompt individual leaders and their governments to seek closer diplomatic and personal links with other leaders and governments having similar experiences, particularly when those leaders and governments also share common value systems and revolutionary ideological beliefs.

“Socialism with Chinese characteristics” refers to the theory advanced by Deng Xiao Ping that advocates applying the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism to the reality of present-day China and the special features of existing times (PRC 1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 4).

“South Africa” refers to the sovereign state of the Republic of South Africa, a member of the United Nations, comprising nine provinces and located at the southernmost extremity of the African continent, and encompasses for the purpose of this analysis, the territory, laws, government and people of South Africa. It shares common borders with Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho.

“State” refers to a “...demarcated area of land, on which living (human) beings with permanent citizenship live, and which is ruled according to sovereign constitutional frameworks which enjoy international recognition. The term also refers to the government machinery of the state...” (Roux *et al.* 1997: 268).

“System” has been described (Fairchild. 1977: 315) as “... an aggregate of related interests or activities. There is the assumption of an organisation of parts or phases in orderly arrangement.” It has also been described (Marshall. 1998: 659) as “... any structured or patterned relationship between any number of elements, where (the) system forms a whole or unity. It is assumed that a system has an environment and thus there is the requirement of boundary maintenance. There is an interchange between a system and its environment ...”

“Systems theory” considers the interchanges between a system and its environment and has been described (Marshall. 1998: 659) as employing “... a cybernetic approach (which) considers these interchanges in terms of the storage and control of information. It is further assumed that systems will tend towards an equilibrium state or homeostasis.”

“Taiwan” refers to the island off the south-east coast of the Chinese mainland which became the refuge of Guomindang forces under General Chiang Kai Chek after world war II and which is regarded by the PRC as a renegade province. The authorities who rule over Taiwan are recognised by fewer than thirty states as the legitimate government of China. In 1971 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 unequivocally recognised that the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China were the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations. Such recognition implies that the Government of the PRC is the sole legitimate representative of China, including Taiwan.

“*Three kingdoms*” refers to the period 220 AD to 280 AD when China became divided into the three kingdoms of Wu, Wei and Shu Han (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: chronological chart) and is also the name of an epic Ming dynasty historical

novel, attributed to Luo Guanzhong, which, "...despite its length and chronologically remote subject matter, commands a universal audience in China; thus the novel has become an integral part of Chinese culture" (Roberts. 1995: 1460).

"Third state" refers, in the context of this research, to any state having an interest in a particular bilateral relationship, of which the relevant third state is not part, but is capable of influencing, usually to its own advantage. It follows that third states can be expected to have, at their disposal, substantial diplomatic, political, economic or military power, or a combination of these, in order to be able to influence the relationships of relatively less-advantaged states. Due to their super power status, their military capability (which includes nuclear arsenals) and economic influence, and global diplomatic influence, the five Permanent Member states of the United Nations Security Council are among the more likely third states of the international system, more specifically in those regions where they have interests. Partners to bilateral relationships in a regional context, can be expected to keep a wary eye on their region's core domestic environment; the most likely third state. Third states, relative to the domestic environments of the bilateral relationships they seek to influence, will conceivably be more powerful, in terms of access to relevant resources.

The "two what evers" refer to the statement that "we will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made , and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave." This statement was contained in a joint editorial entitled "Study the documents well and grasp the key link," published on 7 February, 1977 in *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), the journal *Hongqi* (Red Flag) and *Jiefangjun Bao* (Liberation Army Daily) (PRC. 1991. *Major Documents*: 887).

"World view" refers to the particular perception of the international system or the world which any state, particularly its political leaders, whether at party or governmental level, may exhibit at any particular time in its historical development. A state's world view may be deeply affected by historical experience, geography, religion, ideology, ethnicity and a full range of other factors. In the German language

“*world view*” is termed *weltanschauung* which has been described (Dushkin. 1974: 310) as “...the distinctive outlook of the members of a region, class, group or historical period based on common experiences that express common structural conditions. Groups look at the world in different ways because their societies are organised differently. ... Various groups usually include (their) views in a complex, fairly consistent network of ideology.”

“Yin and Yang” refer to the two fundamental principles of the universe, “yin” being “feminine, passive and yielding” and “yang” being “masculine, active and assertive” (Hanks. 1971: 1828 and 1831).

1.7. Structure of research

This research takes the form of a policy analysis and covers eight chapters. Chapter one delineates the time frame in which the research takes place and defines the relevant research perimeter. It explains and defines key concepts and terminology used in the research and identifies the research problem, the approaches adopted and the scientific methods and techniques employed. It also explains what is being researched, why it needs to be researched, how such research will be carried out and with what objective in mind.

Chapter two establishes the relevance of this policy analysis and its supportive research within the field of Public Administration. This chapter describes the relationship between public administration, public policy and foreign policy and looks at the *milieux* in which public policy and foreign policy take place. It explains why an analysis of foreign policy can justifiably be undertaken within the context of research methods that are already well-established in the field of Public Administration.

Chapter three investigates, empirically, the perceived causal determinants of foreign policy. An environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis is employed, both as a framework for analysis that will ensure consistency of focus and as a research instrument, to assist in enhancing understanding of the

processes that help to shape foreign policy. Special emphasis is placed on the perceived environments in which foreign policy takes place, decision makers who may influence the development of foreign policy, and selected imperatives that may influence the foreign policies of states; in this case, specifically, the bilateral diplomatic environment of South African and Chinese foreign policy.

Chapter four considers the individual and institutional makers, influencers and implementers of foreign policy within the domestic environment, as identified by means of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model. It focuses on the political foreign policy decision maker and his or her institutional environment. It also examines the role of professional diplomats and technical experts, academic advisors, public officials and civil society in general, in both South Africa and the PRC, and ways in which foreign policy is initiated and implemented in each country. The focus of research in this chapter is on the domestic environment and ways in which domestic policies are projected into the external bilateral, regional, multilateral and international environments as foreign policy.

Chapter five investigates the *origination* of foreign policy - world view and formative influences on the making of national foreign policy - in South Africa and the People's Republic of China. In addition it utilises much of the content of chapter four to construct an "ideal" systemic model of the foreign policy decision making process as well as individual models of such processes as they become manifest in the foreign policy decision making processes of South Africa and the People's Republic of China.

Chapter six concerns the initiators and influencers of foreign policy within the external environments of South Africa and the PRC, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model. It focuses on foreign policy decision making actions and causal-determinants in the external environments of South Africa and the PRC. Four external environments, drawn from the linkage model are identified and explored; the regional, international, multilateral and bilateral. The roles of third states, international organisations, non-contiguous regions, and other individual and institutional entities within the international system are also explored.

In addition, the development of separate foreign policy matrices is explored, in respect of South Africa and the PRC, based on the concept of the world view perspective. The intention is to create world view profiles of these two states that can be compared and contrasted in order to achieve a more accurate, more precise foreign policy analysis.

Chapter seven examines South Africa's available foreign policy choices with regard to the PRC. In accordance with the primary objective of policy analysis, an attempt is made to identify the *best* available alternative policy based on the anticipated future consequences of such a choice. The chapter recommends procedures for implementing such a policy and evaluating its consequences. The chapter also investigates the significance of South Africa's existing diplomatic relationship with the PRC. In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model the focus is on the bilateral environment.

Chapter eight provides a research summary and conclusion, proving the hypotheses advanced in paragraph 1.4 *supra*.

1.8. Conclusion

This chapter has articulated *what* research is to be undertaken as well as *how* it will be conducted, *why* it is being pursued and what time frame it will focus upon. In addition, the hypothesis to be proven has been identified and the basic concepts of the research model to be utilised have been elucidated. Furthermore, a comprehensive list of definitions has been included to assist in understanding unfamiliar concepts, particularly those concerning China, as well as original concepts that relate specifically to the research models employed, including related aspects of the research itself.

It now remains to proceed to chapter two which will present arguments to the effect that foreign policy is also public policy; and that, consequently, foreign policy can also be subjected to public policy analysis.

CHAPTER TWO

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY

2.1. Introduction

This chapter will advance arguments that seek to prove that because foreign policy is also public policy it can justifiably and effectively be subjected to public policy analysis. The approach will be to distinguish between *public administration* (the function) and *Public Administration* (the scientific discipline) and to show that attendance to the functional needs of society (the role of public administration; and a primary function of public policy) includes attendance to the foreign policy needs of society.

It will be argued that not all public policy needs to be made public although it should certainly be for the public good; and should be formulated and implemented within the *milieu* of public institutions. It will be shown that public policy formulation and implementation in its most basic form is a systemic series of inputs and outputs that includes feedback and monitoring; and that such public policy includes foreign policy. It will also be shown that individuals, whether acting individually or in concert, are the makers of foreign policy and that the institutional *milieu* in which they operate, as well as personal characteristics and perceptions, and the *world view* perspective of the domestic environment in which they function, will determine the nature of their public policy decisions, including decisions about foreign policy. Finally, it will be shown that without factual knowledge about key issues, effective decisions about public policies cannot be taken; and policies cannot be implemented effectively.

2.2. Policy analysis

As a number of writers (*vide* Cloete and Wissink. 2000: 5; Weimer and Vining. 1989: 7) have stated, Public Administration includes policy analysis among its professional

activities. This is recognition of the distinction between the “old” Public Administration that insisted that administrative questions are not political questions and the “new” Public Administration that has abandoned this notion (Weimer and Vining. 1989: 7; Coetzee. 1991: 39-40).

Not surprisingly, much of the available literature about policy analysis, emanating from researchers and writers in the Public Administration field, tends to concentrate on the analysis of public policy within the domestic environment of the international system. Quade (1989: 374), Dunn (1981: 48), Cloete (1994: 92) and Hanekom (1992: 85) are among those writers and researchers. Nonetheless, Cloete (1994: 58), in describing “functions performed in an administrative executive institution” has included “foreign affairs” as an example of a “line function” or “...functional activity... .” Dye (1995: 2) also includes foreign affairs within the scope of public policy. The focus, though, is usually on questions about domestic policy as opposed to questions about foreign policy (MacRae and Wilde 1985: 3), the latter being left almost exclusively to the attention of those who specialise in the Political Science field. In this regard, Richard L. Merritt (1975: 1-11) and Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1971: 312-344) have provided several examples of the decision making theories of social scientists, drawn from a variety of disciplines, who have conducted research in various aspects of foreign policy analysis. Yet, as Dunn (1981: 36) has argued,

... these disciplines (economics, sociology, political science and psychology) are often limited in several ways: Complex policy problems do not recognise traditional disciplinary boundaries; general theories are seldom applicable to specific policy contexts; and such theories frequently fail to provide information that permits policy makers to control or manipulate policy processes. ... Policy analysis goes beyond traditional disciplinary concerns with the explanation of empirical regularities by seeking not only to combine and transform the substance and methods of several disciplines, but also to produce policy-relevant information that may be utilised to resolve problems in specific policy settings. Moreover, the aims of

policy analysis extend beyond the production of 'facts'; policy analysts seek also to produce information about values and preferable courses of action. Policy analysis therefore includes policy evaluation as well as policy advocacy.

Consequently, there are good reasons why an analysis of *foreign policy*, which is also public policy, should be conducted according to some of the analytic procedures and practices that are now well established in the field of Public Administration; a field of study which encompasses the study of both public policy making and public policy analysis (Roux *et al.* 1997: 144-152; Williams. 1971: xi). A few researchers, such as MacCrae and Wilde (1985: 21), have utilised examples from the foreign policy domain in order to facilitate understanding of public policy issues within the domestic environment. Others, like Robin Lee (Cloete, Schlemmer and van Vuuren. 1991: 8; *vide* Dye. 1995: 2), have made specific references to “foreign policy” when writing about public policy and the political process, when their primary focus was on domestic policy. Therefore, if the relevant policy analysis can benefit thereby, there is every reason why a foreign policy (public policy) analysis may be conducted within the ambit of Public Administration, even when some of the analytic practices and procedures that are utilised, are drawn from the Political Science field (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. 1971: 382-383). In this regard, Ripley (1985: 5) states that “...political scientists, *among others*, can be good policy analysts precisely because they can enrich their analysis with the insights, theories, and techniques of their home discipline...”

In regard to an analysis of foreign policy and its development, which is a primary objective of this thesis, it will be argued that it is essential to explore the basis of all foreign policy actions and aspirations of individual states (in this case, South Africa and the PRC) and how they perceive themselves within the international system, and as part of the international environment (Merritt. 1975: 3), in order to be able to effectively analyse and understand their respective foreign policies toward each other. If this assertion is accepted, it follows that an accurate understanding of a state's *world view* should constitute a crucial element of foreign policy analysis; if not as

part of a decision making or systems model, or other model, of public policy (including foreign policy) formulation, then certainly as part of a framework for further research in this direction.

It is also essential to be able to understand the relationship and distinction between Public Administration as a discipline, public administration and public policy, and the relationship and distinction between domestic and foreign policy.

2.3. Public Administration

Coetzee (1991: 42) has distinguished between Public Administration as an academic pursuit and public administration as a profession. Consequently, whereas *Public Administration* (with capital letters) refers to the discipline or branch of instruction in regard to *public administration* (with lower case letters), the latter is the process or function normally assigned to the public administrator, civil servant or public official. One teaches *Public Administration* but one performs or carries out *public administration*. According to Botes and Roux (Botes *et al.* 1997: 257),

Public Administration is concerned with the study of all the scientific disciplines that have a bearing on the contemporary administrative and managerial practices in the public sector. ... Administrative and managerial practices that are presently to be found in public institutions comprise a comprehensive series of activities that require knowledge of virtually all sciences. The subject in which the intrinsic and interdependent aspects of the state institutions are studied exclusively is called Public Administration.

Clearly, Public Administration is a science that has produced, and continues to produce, knowledge that can be analysed and applied universally in the context of enhancing theories, knowledge and understanding of public administration in the practical and theoretical sense. Botes and Roux (Botes, *et al.* 1997: 260; *vide* Pfiffner

and Presthus. 1967: 4-6; *vide* Cloete. 1967: 35-40) have identified four essential qualities that firmly establish the qualifications of Public Administration as a discipline in its own right.

- (a) *Public Administration is a science because there exists a corpus of knowledge which has repeatedly been proven to be valid, can be analysed systematically and contains aspects of universal applicability*
- (b) *Public Administration is an academic discipline which can be dissected in systematic steps of study and research*
- (c) *Public Administration is a university subject which enjoys universal acknowledgement*
- (d) *Public Administration finds a field of application in the public administration.*


Coetzee also identifies similar aspects or “relevant areas” (1991: 96-98), including Public Administration as an academic discipline, an activity, a subject for teaching at university level, an applied science to be taught at academic level, and an opportunity to educate and train civil servants.

In contrast to Public Administration (the discipline), public administration (the activity) refers to the activities of public officials, also known as civil servants or public servants, on behalf of the public. According to Nicolas Henry (Fox and Meyer. 1995: 105), public administration has three cornerstones: “organisational behaviour and the behaviour of people in organisations; the technology of management; and the public interest concerning individual ethical choices and public affairs.” In more simple terms, public administration is essentially a series of actions carried out by people in public institutions on behalf of other people (*vide* Rosenbloom *et al.* 1994: 7; Botes *et al.* 1997: 257). It is essentially an activity inspired by the need to apply the policies and deliver the services and outputs of those policies as determined by the executive and approved by the legislature; or, one might argue, as directed by the

supreme authority of the state. Where South Africa is concerned the supreme authority is the Constitution (SA. 1996. *Preamble*).

Drawing on the work of David Easton (Easton. 1957; Easton. 1965), Botes and Roux (Botes, *et al.* 1997: 261; *vide* Anderson. 1997: 26-27; Fesler. 1980: 31) have illustrated the place of public administration within the domestic environment of the international system (the state) by means of a simplified systems model, as replicated below:

Figure 2/1 Simplified Systems Model



Source: Botes PS and NL Roux (in Botes PS, PA Brynard, DJ Fourie and NLRoux. *Public Administration and Management*, 2nd ed. 1996, Pretoria: Kagiso Tertiary, p. 261)

Aristotle said (Strong. 1970:17) that the State existed not merely to make life possible but to make life good. This notion was also shared by the founders of the American republic (Rossiter. 1961: 231) who referred to *the public good*. In terms of this model (figure 2/1, *supra*), the needs, desires and demands of society (the people) are *inputs* which will make life good if these needs, desires and demands are translated into efficient, effective and just *outputs* in the form of decisions, budgets and laws that will create the prerequisite conditions to “make life good” (*vide* Dye. 1995: 38-39; Hanekom *et al.* 1986: 91).

Examples of needs, desires and demands provided by Botes and Roux (Botes, *et al.* 1997: 262), and referred to by writers such as Weimer and Vining (1989: 4-5), are taken from the domestic environment and not the international or external

environment. Therefore, they focus on issues such as the need to fight crime, plan urban development, provide water and electricity, replace gravel roads with asphalt roads and improve traffic control and pest control. However, in the context of foreign policy, the need for the defence and advancement of perceived national interests, the desire for regional stability and world peace, and the demand for greater and more equitable access to world markets, are among the inputs that might need to be translated into outputs in the form of bilateral and multilateral agreements, and other diplomatic arrangements, intended to make life good for the people of a particular state or particular states. In this regard it should be noted that, in some states, for example totalitarian and other non-democratic states, outputs may reflect the dominant inputs (needs, desires and demands) of the leadership (*vide* Pye in Shambaugh. 1995: 4) as opposed to the inputs of the citizenry. This situation would be likely to prevail in both the context of domestic policy and foreign policy, where such states are concerned. For example, the advocacy of “group rights” by South Africa’s *apartheid* government was seen by many black South Africans (Mandela. 1997: 664) as a ruse to preserve white domination.

Although all public policies of a particular state are derived from the inputs which originate in the domestic environment of that state and are expressed in the form of outputs within the domestic environment of that state, such inputs may be a response to the foreign policy outputs of other sovereign states (e.g. a state may institute a policy to develop its navy or coast guard service in response to another state’s policy to enlarge its fishing fleet). Similarly, the domestic policy outputs of a state (e.g. a policy aimed at down-sizing its state institutions) can result in responsive domestic policy inputs within the domestic environments of its neighbouring states (e.g. demands for more stringent immigration policies). When this happens, domestic public policy begins to affect the foreign policy relationship of the states concerned. In effect, what Rosenau ({2} 1969: 45) terms a *linkage* between systems (in these examples, the domestic systems of the states concerned) takes place.

Many public policies, despite their potential and, from time to time, actual influence on a state’s foreign policy relationships, are mainly active in that state’s domestic

environment. Nevertheless, many government ministries and departments, and their equivalents at provincial and local levels of government, are active in the international environment (Cloete. 1994: 122-123; *vide* Anderson. 1997: 13). Where South Africa is concerned, they include foreign affairs, playing the leading role; defence, customs, immigration and trade, playing mainly supporting roles; and tourism, finance, science and technology, transport, agriculture, security, justice, culture and sport, among other state institutions, playing supporting roles from time to time. However, in the case of powerful states with wide-ranging global interests, other categories of public policy, for example military policy (Dye. 1995: 221-222), are likely to be closely merged with foreign policy (Anderson. 1997: 64). In this regard, the PRC Minister of Defence has specifically referred (*Chi Haotien. Beijing Review. 26 January-1 February 1998: 7*) to the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the PRC's international diplomacy.

In terms of the above model (figure 2/1) the process whereby inputs are converted into outputs is dependent upon the actions and activities of role players or actors, and the influence and impact of existing structures and the (prevailing) political culture (*vide* Scott. 1998: 86-87). As Botes and Roux elucidate (Botes *et al.* 1997: 263; *vide* Hanekom *et al.* 1986: 158-159):

Although public servants (or civil servants) are not the servants of the political party in office, they must execute the prevailing political culture. In the event of a change of government, the officials must follow the new direction of the succeeding party in office. ... When the role players (public servants, ministers and Parliamentarians) turn their attention to satisfying needs, desires and demands, the political culture will determine the nature of the ultimate legislation, budget and decisions. ... In this way the principle actions of public servants are channelled and directed by the political processes of the state.

Where organisational structures are concerned, government institutions must process the needs, desires and demands (inputs) of society or a particular community into practical solutions or actions that will result in the required policy and service outputs (Fesler. 1980: 30-31). Similarly, Lynn (1980:10) views the output of the (institutional) policy making system, comprising "...actors ... and their *interests*, and *the rules and practices* governing the...relationships among actors," as policy. These institutions might include government departments such as the Department of Water Affairs and the Department of Agriculture or their equivalent institutions. By implication, the Department of Foreign Affairs, as an institution of government, would also be part of this processing mechanism (*vide* Cloete. 1994: 122-123). However, institutions in themselves merely provide the organisational and operational framework for the processing of policy inputs into policy outputs. The actual work is carried out by officials (Hanekom. 1986: 83-84), role players or actors (*vide* Lynn.1980: 10-11).

Whereas some writers (Botes *et al.* 1997: 262) have used examples of role players such as magistrates, passport control officials and state veterinary surgeons it follows that, in regard to foreign policy, role players would include a state's diplomatic and consular representatives serving abroad; its international civil servants, serving in international governmental institutions (Cloete. 1994: 120); its complement of civil servants within the Department or Ministry of Foreign Affairs, particularly those serving in the top and middle management echelon and in the political and consular sections of that department; and role players in other government departments that may have roles to play in matters affecting or determining foreign policy.

The simplified systems model (figure 2/1 *supra*), makes allowance for *feedback*, a cybernetic process whereby outputs are fed back into the system as inputs. Although feedback may take place in the form of elections (Botes *et al.* 1997: 261), which is a legitimate way for democratic societies to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the public policies of their respective governments (*vide* Cloete. 1994: 218-219), there are many other ways whereby societies may articulate their views. For example, a revolution or rebellion (*vide* Norbu in Barnett and Akiner. 1994: 188-189) against a perceived unjust and totalitarian regime would also constitute feedback. Public

debate, commissions of inquiry, referenda, letters to newspapers, public demonstrations (*vide* Nathan and Link. 2001: xxxiv) and public opinion polls are further examples of the feedback mechanism.

Until now, the focus has been on the difference between Public Administration and public administration and the contribution of the latter to the facilitation of policy formulation, the processing of policy inputs into policy outputs, and the implementation of policy as output. The next step is to examine the nature of public policy itself.

2.4. Public policy

What is particularly important to grasp, in the context of the relationship between public administration and public policy, is that public policy is essentially an institutional output and that the relevant institutions concerned are *government* institutions. Government is also able to win or command wide domestic support for its public policies; it is able to ensure that the domestic impact of its public policies apply universally within the domestic environment; and it is able to employ national measures to ensure universal enforcement of its public policies within the domestic environment over which it has jurisdiction. Thomas R. Dye (1981: 20-21) has stated as follows:

Political activities generally centre around particular government institutions. ... Public policy is authoritatively determined, implemented, and enforced by governmental institutions. ... The relationship between public policy and governmental institutions is very close. Strictly speaking, a policy does not become a public policy until it is adopted, implemented, and enforced by some governmental institution. ... (G)overnment lends legitimacy to policies. ... (G)overnment policies involve universality. ... Finally, government monopolises coercion in society.

Public policy is essentially a guide or plan of action initiated and authorised by government and intended to achieve whatever is necessary *to make life good* (see paragraph 2.3 *supra*). Whereas some writers (*vide* Cloete and Wissink. 2000: 15; Barber. 1983: 59-60; Cloete. 1981: 71-77; Gladden. 1964: 72-74) have identified three levels of public policy (political, executive and administrative), others (Botes *et al.* 1997: 311-313) have identified four practical levels, adding departmental policy to the three categories listed above as well as six characteristics of public policy. The four policy levels comprise political party policy, government policy (executive or cabinet policy), departmental policy and administrative policy. It is at the level of party policy (Cloete and Wissink. 2000: 16) that party ideology, the party's value system, the *world view* of its leadership, and the party's *raison d'etre* first seek to direct discussion and debate and ultimately influence the shape of public policies at all levels (*vide* ANC. 1998: *strategic perspective*).

Where Western democracies are concerned, party political influence is probably most keenly felt shortly before an election (*vide* Mandela. 1997: 736), when voters are interested in knowing what policies they are being asked to support. However, after the government has been elected, party influence will often defer to the influence of government (Cloete. 1994: 94). The government of the day may even find it expedient, sometimes, to avoid discussing key decisions with the party. In fact this situation occurred on 2 February, 1990, when former President F.W. de Klerk rescinded the banning of South Africa's liberation movements. Only the Cabinet was consulted (De Klerk. 1991: 28). In this regard, President de Klerk was subsequently asked: "...Were the contents of the speech first cleared, so to speak, with other concerns, for example the ANC? ..." De Klerk responded: "... No, it was a government secret. We consulted only within our own ranks. It was not even submitted to the National Party Caucus ..." (De Klerk. 1991: 28).

In totalitarian and non-democratic states, however, party influence can be dominant and practically continuous. Shirk describes the formal relationship between the Communist Party and government in the PRC (Lieberthal and Lampton. 1992: 61), as an "angry relationship" in which the Communist Party is the "principal" and the government is the "agent"... "The party has formal political authority over the

government, which does the actual work of administering the country...” For example, in the People’s Republic of China the Chinese Communist Party formulates and modifies party policy during its annual meetings and what the party decides is introduced and accepted as official government thinking. According to Joffe (Schell and Shambaugh. 1999: 143), “... the party effectively makes policy and oversees its implementation...” However, the mechanics of a specific policy would normally be worked out by the relevant government department or ministry, submitted to the responsible minister, discussed in the State Council (the cabinet), possibly presented to other ministries for comment, and ultimately approved at ministerial level.

Generally, irrespective of the system of government, there is close contact between government and party, the main reason being that government, except in the case of military coups, is usually the party in power. However, as Cloete (1967: 72) points out, executive and other government officials cannot make any substantive contribution at this level of policy making as it is effectively beyond their reach. (*vide* Botes *et al.* 1997: 311).

The next level of public policy is government policy or cabinet policy; what Cloete (1994: 96) terms “political implementation policy.” This is the policy level where “...political idealism must be transformed into workable realities...” (Botes *et al.* 1997: 311); where party political ideas, the party world view and party ideology will become part of practical expressions of policy as required by the government of the day. Although senior public servants will be involved in developing this level of policy the overriding decisions will invariably be taken at the political, usually ministerial or cabinet, level, often in close consultation with senior public servants (directors-general, permanent under secretaries or their equivalents) in charge of government departments. A feature of the Mbeki administration is that many of these directors-general are *political* rather than professional or career appointments (*vide* Forrest. *Mail & Guardian*. 14-19 December 2001: 6).

Departmental policy is concerned specifically with the implementation of the relevant government policy. For example, in the case of South Africa, the Department of

Foreign Affairs would be required to implement the policy articulated by government in regard to foreign policy. The departmental policy of the Department of Foreign Affairs would need to be harmonised with cabinet policy, as articulated by the President, Deputy President, Minister or Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the primary responsibility for ensuring that this is attended to would normally reside with the Director-General (Cloete. 1994: 121) of Foreign Affairs. As Botes and Roux (Botes *et al.* 1997: 311) have explained, the head of a department, usually a director-general,

... would formulate ... policy which is capable of execution, both functionally and administratively, and embody this in the budget. The departmental policy should be a proper reflection of the aims of the department.

This type of policy is also known as “administrative executive implementation policy” (Cloete. 1994: 96).

Administrative policy (Botes *et al.* 1997: 311) is regarded as the fourth level of public policy. This level of policy, termed “operational policy” by Cloete (1994: 97), falls squarely into the realm of public administration and therefore has more to do with public policy implementation than with public policy making or public policy analysis. According to Botes and Roux (Botes *et al.* 1997:312), administrative policy encompasses five of the seven generically related functions of public administration (policy analysis and policy making are excluded); departmental staff policy, departmental financial policy, departmental organisational policy, departmental procedural policy and departmental control policy (*vide* Cloete. 1967: 2 and 1994: 58-59). Apart from the four levels of policy identified *supra*, public policy exhibits particular characteristics that may serve to distinguish it from being a mere collection of goals and administrative actions. In this sense, public policies are said (Botes *et al.* 1997: 312-313) to be authoritative, enforceable, flexible and adaptable, feasible, clear and public.

According to Botes and Roux (Botes *et al.* 1997: 312), for a policy to be authoritative it must be,

determined by an authorised government institution or representative such as a head of department. Speculations and opinions are not regarded as being policies, which means that a policy must be defined explicitly and all interested parties must be informed in writing

Although this characteristic is easily identifiable with public policy in the domestic environment, such as a housing or educational policy, it may require qualification in the case of foreign or military policy, or any kind of public policy requiring a degree of security or secrecy. In fact, in terms of the definition of public policy advanced by Hanekom (1992: 8), public policy needs to be “...decided upon and *made publicly known* by the legislator...” (my emphasis). Coetzee (1991: 17) has sought to clarify the essential nature of *public* policy, in part by contrasting it with *private* policy, and concludes that it “...affects...people at large...is open to all, not secret or concealed, and is ... the opposite to private...” There is, nonetheless, much ambiguity (Rosenbloom *et al.* 1994: 465) in the word “public” when used in the context of public policy and it is therefore important to define its meaning in the interests of the objective of this research.

Should “public policy” refer to publicised policy? If so, should it refer *only* to publicised policy? Should “public policy” not mean policy on behalf of or in the interest of the public? Alternatively, should policy not simply refer to the policies of public institutions? Perhaps the best way to resolve the ambiguity is to accept that public policy is *always made by public institutions*, that it is *usually made public* (*vide* Anderson. 1997: 237) and that it is policy that is *always made on behalf of the public or the state*. This definition would make allowance for all policies that are made by public institutions (e.g. Department of Foreign Affairs), public policies that are not made public (e.g. secret alliances); public policies that are made in the public interest (i.e. the general population); and public policies that are harmful to the public

but considered advantageous to the lawgivers or a select segment of the population (e.g. *apartheid* legislation). From the foregoing, if it is accepted that public policy does not have to be publicised (Anderson. 1997: 236) and that interested parties can, therefore, sometimes be excluded from knowledge about the details of specific policies, then it can be accepted that foreign policies also exhibit the authoritative characteristic.

The second characteristic of public policy, identified by Botes and Roux (Botes *et al.* 1997: 312), is that it is enforceable. In other words, those responsible for implementing such public policy would need to be made specifically aware of their responsibility by means of a clear policy directive. Failure to comply could then result in possible charges of misconduct (Cloete. 1994: 232), the implication being that the implementers of the relevant policy, and not the clients or service recipients, should be subject to penalties in the event of non-implementation. In the case of foreign policy this would mean that one's own public officials and diplomats could be compelled to implement specific foreign policy directives. On the other hand, foreign governments and foreign diplomats, obviously, cannot be compelled to serve or observe the same directives. Nevertheless, it can be accepted that foreign policies also exhibit the enforceable characteristic, as elucidated *supra*.

The third characteristic of public policy, is that it is flexible and adaptable (Botes *et al.* 1997: 313). In view of the many variable influences that may affect a state's foreign policy, this characteristic appears particularly suited to the concept of an ideal foreign policy. Botes and Roux (Botes *et al.* 1997: 313) have stated that,

... the aim must be regarded as fixed, while the policy (the route adopted to achieve an aim) must still allow for change as circumstances vary. The rigid and inexorable implementation of an unsuitable or obsolete policy is worse than applying no policy at all.

The characteristic of flexibility and adaptability is what makes policy analysis possible because this characteristic implies the need to be able to consider alternative policy options when required. The nature of foreign policy is such that it undoubtedly shares, with other public policies, the characteristic of being both flexible and adaptable. Even when foreign policies appear to be inflexible it is axiomatic that, in the long term, some changes will always occur. As William H. Overholt and Marilyn Chou remind us (Merritt. 1975: 150),

... all enduring (foreign policy) doctrines are subject to serious reinterpretation and variation of emphasis as domestic and foreign exigencies change.

It has been argued (Botes *et al.* 1997: 313) that the fourth characteristic of public policy is that it is feasible. Simply put, this means that public policy must be "...capable of being done, effected or accomplished" (Hanks. 1971: 584). As Botes and Roux (Botes *et al.* 1997: 313) have elaborated, "...policy makers must continuously take the realities of the environment into consideration when they formulate policy... ." It is precisely this characteristic which precludes some crucial aspects of foreign policy from being made public because the very act of publication can make a sensitive policy decision unworkable or unfeasible in practice. On the other hand, if a policy decision is not made known to all those who are expected to implement the relevant policy, then effective implementation would be impossible (it is not necessary to know why a policy is being implemented but it is essential to know what the policy entails). The policy would then also be unfeasible.

The fifth essential characteristic of public policy is that it is clear. If the syntax and semantics of policy directives, instructions, rules, regulations and legislation are unclear or ambiguous, then the policy itself will be unclear or ambiguous. Consequently, the policy concerned may also lack feasibility and enforceability. In the case of foreign policy, or military policy, a lack of clarity (Karnow. 1983: 15-17) could be disastrous and might even precipitate war or defeat in war.

Finally, according to Botes and Roux (Botes *et al.* 1997: 313), public policy is public. As has already been pointed out, the term “public” can be ambiguous (Rosenbloom *et al.* 1994: 465; Anderson. 1997: 97) in the context of public policy if there is no certainty as to whether it refers to the publication (making it known to the public) of policy, public society (whom the policy is intended to affect), or the public sector (the public or governmental *milieu*, as opposed to the private sector, in which public policy is formulated). Botes and Roux (Botes *et al.* 1997: 313) appear to expand slightly on Hanekom’s narrower interpretation of the term “public” when they state as follows:

*When a policy concerns the public, it must be publicised as clearly as possible. Most government departments function through a network of district offices situated throughout the country, which ensures that policy **be made known as widely as possible** (my emphasis).*

Nonetheless, the interpretation appears restrictive, particularly in view of the assertion by some writers (Dye. 1981: 20) that (authoritative) public policy must have its origin in a public institution in order to be termed public policy. In this regard it is useful to keep in mind that departments of defence, national security and foreign affairs are all public institutions but their policies are not necessarily always made public (Anderson. 1997: 237). In this regard Reedy (Wilcox and Frank. 1976: 65), writing about American foreign policy, has suggested that, “the ultimate question ... is not secrecy but the extent to which foreign policy should be isolated from public policy issues ...” Of course, the occasional need for secrecy has been acknowledged by Botes and Roux (Botes *et al.* 1997: 313). However, their clear focus on making public policy *public* as opposed to emphasising the public institutional *milieu* in which it originates, tends to create artificial divisions between those public policies that remain largely confined to the domestic environment and those public policies that deliberately extend into the external, or foreign, environment of the state. Authoritative foreign policy does always originate in the public institutional *milieu*, but (Wilcox and Frank. 1976: 23) it is not always made public.

2.4.1. Public policy *milieu*


In order to fully understand why public policy, such as foreign policy or military policy, can claim the status of public policy, even when it is not made public, it may be helpful to also think of such policy as comprising a series of decisions taken and choices made, within a public institution, for and on behalf of the perceived public good (see paragraph 2.3 *supra*), or community, or national interest. Dunn (1981: 61; *vide* Rose. 1976: 9-10), has defined public policy as a, "... long series of more or less related choices, including decisions not to act, made by government bodies and officials." According to Dunn (1981: 46; *vide* Dye. 1995: 7), public policies are made within an "institutional pattern" that he terms a "policy system" which comprises "policy stakeholders" (e.g. policy analysts, citizen's groups, parties), "public policies" (e.g. law enforcement, economic, welfare) and a "policy environment" (e.g. crime, inflation, unemployment).

The *milieu* in which public policy takes place is a systemic *milieu*, encompassing societal inputs and imperatives, public institutions, decision makers, public policy outputs and feedback mechanisms (*vide* Anderson. 1997: 301-303). In terms of the proposed environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model for the analysis of foreign policy the main decision making components of the systemic public policy *milieu* would always be located in the domestic environment because it is in this environment that virtually all public policy decision making ultimately takes place. However, when public policy is also foreign policy, relevant decision making is likely to take place in both the domestic environment and the various external environments of the states concerned.

Societal inputs and imperatives might include the demands of the business community (e.g. reciprocal market access for traders); the main public institution, in the case of foreign policy, would probably be the Ministry or Department of Foreign Affairs, or equivalent institutions; the main decision makers would be likely to come from the state's top echelon of political power (e.g. the President, Prime Minister or Foreign Minister); policy output would be the relevant public policy itself; and

feedback would be the impact of the policy concerned and the impact of such feedback on successive policy inputs. The systemic public policy *milieu* (which also includes foreign policy), in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis, can ideally be illustrated as follows:


Figure 2/2 Systemic public policy *milieu*



Source: Original concept based upon ideas advanced by David Easton (Easton. 1957)

Dunn (1994: 71) has illustrated his concept of a policy system by means of the following model which he has adapted from Thomas R. Dye (1978: 9):

Figure 2/3 Three elements of a policy system



Source: Dunn, William N. *Public Policy Analysis*, 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978, p. 9.

Although Dunn's model (figure 2/3 *supra*) utilises examples drawn from domestic public policy, as opposed to foreign policy, the concept of a policy system is equally applicable to foreign policy, which is also public policy (see figure 2/2 *supra*). In regard to foreign policy, stakeholders might include policy analysts, parties, arms manufacturers, business groups and human rights groups; the policy environment might constitute foreign policy issues of a domestic (i.e. internal departmental policies), bilateral, regional, or multilateral nature; and public policy would be likely to fall squarely in the realm of foreign policy, under the operational, policy-formulating and policy-implementing jurisdiction of the Department of Foreign Affairs in the case of South Africa, and the equivalent governmental institution where other states are concerned.

In terms of the policy system concept illustrated by figure 2/3 *supra*, there is a continual interaction between policy stakeholders, governmental departments and officials responsible for formulating and implementing public policy, and those members of society who are directly affected by, and sometimes responsible for, the policy issue concerned. The three components of this model, the stakeholders, policy environment (policy *milieu*) and public policies, continually affect, shape and influence one another (Dunn.1981: 47).

The systemic public policy *milieu*, illustrated by figure 2/2 *supra*, is therefore the environment in which public policy, including foreign policy, takes place. It is largely equivalent to the policy system elucidated by figure 2/3 *supra* and includes the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government that, together, provide the institutional structures in which public policy decision makers normally operate.

2.4.2. Structures of government

At a time when the American and French revolutions were yet to take place, Montesquieu (1751: 185) wrote that,

in every government there are three sorts of power: the

legislative; the executive, in respect of things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive, in regard to things that depend on the civil law. By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those that have already been enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions. By the third he punishes crimes, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the state.

Although all states may exhibit differences in the functional practices and institutional structures of these three organs of government, some major and some minor, this generic trinity remains true of most constitutional states (Roux *et al.* 1997: 269), whether they have unicameral or bicameral legislatures; whether they are unions, federations or confederations; whether they are monarchies, autocracies or democracies; whether they are capitalist, socialist or communist-led states; and whether they are predominantly Protestant, Catholic, Islamic, Jewish, Buddhist or atheistic states. This is true for the following reasons:

All states have political leaders who are required to guide the people of their respective countries toward specific goals and objectives in the interest of the perceived greater good, as identified by Aristotle (Botes, *et al.* 1997: 261; Strong, 1970:17). The identification and implementation of these goals and objectives is usually carried out by the executive branch of government, normally comprising, in its most basic manifestation, the executive authority (head of state), political leadership (head of government and government ministers) and public service.

According to Botes *et al* (1997: 109; *vide* {4}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: Chap. 5, paragraphs 84 and 85) the powers of the executive branch of government can generally be categorised as *diplomatic, administrative, military, judicial* and *quasi-*

legislative. Two of these, the diplomatic and military powers of the executive, have specific relevancy to foreign policy because, as Botes *et al.* (1997: 109) point out, *diplomatic powers* comprise “...the authority of the government to enter into any foreign relations and to enter into agreements with international institutions...” and *military powers* refer to “...the powers vested in the head of state as part of the executive to declare war and to enter into peace agreements... .”

In South Africa, the *Cabinet*, as part of the executive branch, is the institution of government which acts as a link between the legislative and executive branches of government (Cloete. 1994: 50) and is composed of *ministers* selected by the head of government (*vide* {4}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 91), usually from elected members of the legislature belonging to his own party. In the People’s Republic of China the equivalent of the Cabinet is the State Council (Brahm. 1998: 114).

Botes *et al* (1997: 121) argue:

As liaison mechanisms between the legislative and executive authorities, ... (ministers) ... can interpret the will and wishes of the community and launch correct administrative actions. All initiatives on policy making, financing, provision of personnel, organising, procedure planning, control and management originate (in theory) from the ministers. In practice, the ministers are continuously assisted by heads of departments and institutions.

The various departments of state over which ministers exercise responsibility are also an extension of the executive branch of government. The relevant department of state that has the function of administering a state’s foreign policy is, in the case of South Africa, the Department of Foreign Affairs and, in the case of the People’s Republic of China, the *Waijiao bu* (Lu. 1997: 20) or Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

All states have legislatures which are required to make those laws that are perceived to be necessary for the creation of the kind of peaceful and stable domestic environment that will enable the state concerned to achieve the goals and objectives established by the executive branch of government. As Botes and Roux (Botes *et al.* 1997: 261) have suggested, "... all goals such as the creation of order, prosperity and welfare services, are actually the instruments for achieving a higher goal ...". All states also have judiciaries which are required to implement and enforce the laws identified, developed and promulgated by the legislative branch of government.

The policy *milieu* in which domestic policies come into being is essentially no different from the policy *milieu* in which foreign policy comes into existence (see figure 2/2 *supra*). The major distinction that can be made between the two types of public *policy*, in this regard, is that foreign policy does not rely, as much, on the legislative and judicial branches of government; it takes place mainly as a result of deliberations and implementation by the executive branch, usually by the head of government, minister of foreign affairs, diplomatic corps and civil service. These deliberations may include the "... more or less related choices (including decisions not to act) made by governmental bodies and officials, ..." referred to by Dunn (1981: 47).

This does not mean that the legislature and the judiciary can be excluded from foreign policy formulation and implementation. On the contrary, when bilateral or multilateral agreements are negotiated and signed they often need to be subsequently ratified by the legislatures of some of the signatory states, the National Assembly and National Council of Provinces ({{4}} SA. 1996: *Constitution*. Paragraph 231) in the case of South Africa and the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress ({{4}}PRC. 1998: 6) in the case of the PRC. The judiciary also usually has a potential role to play. This is because, in most democratic countries subject to the rule of law, legislation is subject to review by the courts. This, in turn, means that any aspect of public domestic policy, likely to affect foreign policy and which has been cast in law, has a possibility of being challenged, particularly if it is thought to contravene the constitution of the state concerned. In the PRC this situation would not arise as the judiciary ({{4}}PRC.1998: 6) falls under the supervision of the legislature.

Consequently, where most international agreements are concerned subsequent transactional disputes would need to be dealt with bilaterally; and the national judiciary, *where applicable*, would only be involved in an advisory capacity. Therefore, neither the legislature nor the judiciary are normally as involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation as is the executive branch of government. In this regard, Botes *et al* (1997: 75) have observed that, "...society can depend on the legislature to make laws and to approve the annual budget in order to enable the executive organs to pursue the political goals of society."

2.5. Foreign policy as public policy

Foreign policy, as already alluded to, is also an example of public policy. It is policy that can be made public, albeit more restrictively than in the case of public policies active mainly in the domestic environment. It is also policy that emanates from the public institutions of government. In this respect, Plano and Olton (1969: 127) have clarified the institutional origins of foreign policy as follows:

The foreign office of any state (... an executive agency charged with the formulation and implementation of foreign policy...) is the vehicle through which the bulk of relations with other countries is conducted. Other names for the foreign office include foreign ministry, ministry of foreign affairs, and department of state.

A major focus of the activity of foreign policy is directed at preserving the security and sovereignty of the state by peaceful means through the practice of diplomacy (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. 1971: 79-80) . While noting that states may have different foreign policy objectives, Plano and Olton (1969: 127) have pointed out that some common foreign policy objectives

...tend to involve such abstract goals as self-preservation, security, national well-being, national prestige, the

protection and advancement of ideology, and the pursuit of power.

Consequently, foreign policy is policy that can also be assumed to be always motivated by public interest considerations, often defined as national interest. Legg and Morrison (1971: 143) have stated as follows:

The most fundamental source of foreign policy objectives is perhaps the universally shared desire to insure the survival and territorial integrity of the community and state.

This would be equally true of the pre-world war two foreign policies of Germany and Japan, and the later foreign policy of *apartheid* South Africa, because foreign policy, like all public policy, is motivated by perceived objective considerations interpreted subjectively by the government of the day; subjectively interpreted objective considerations that also determine national interest. In the case of Germany and Japan, foreign policy failed because it was overwhelmed by military policy, war ensued, and both states were subsequently occupied by victor states. In the case of South Africa, foreign policy succeeded in preserving national sovereignty and national security, and assisted in making a negotiated, peaceful, legally-based transition to democracy possible (*vide* Mandela. 1997: 742-745).

Plano and Olton (1969:127) have referred to foreign policy as, "...a strategy or planned course of action developed by the decision makers of a state *vis a` vis* other states or international entities aimed at achieving specific goals defined in terms of national interest... ." Foreign policy has also been described as public policy comprising a "...long series of more or less related choices, including decisions not to act ..." (Dunn. 1981: 61). Foreign policy is intended to articulate, defend and promote a state's national interests (Robinson in {1}Rosenau. 1969: 184-185) and national concerns in the international environment. Consequently, the foreign policy of a state should also be sensitive to the interests and objectives of other government departments and agencies of that state (Legg and Morrison. 1971: 143-147). There

should be close collaboration (Kim. 1998: 38 and 49; Mills. 2000: 298) and consultation between government decision makers, departments and agencies at all levels from national to local government level to ensure that the foreign policy of the state concerned remains consistent, unambiguous and largely predictable. However, this could be a difficult undertaking in view of the fact that not all aspects of foreign policy are made public, particularly where sensitive security issues are concerned (Wilcox and Frank. 1976: 23). It should also be kept in mind that foreign policy is not always written down in the form of diplomatic agreements, legislation or policy speeches. Sometimes, as Dunn (1981: 61) has stated in reference to public policy, foreign policy may simply evolve out of a "...long series of more or less related choices...by governmental bodies and officials..." Foreign policy may also be made on the spur of the moment by a verbalised high-level political decision, as may have occurred when President Mandela announced South Africa's intention to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (1996: *Interview*; IDSA. March 1998: 1832).

According to Plano and Olton (1969: 127),

foreign policy involves a dynamic process of applying relatively fixed interpretations of national interest to the highly fluctuating situational factors of the international environment to develop a course of action, followed by efforts to achieve diplomatic implementation of the policy guidelines. Major steps in the policy process include (1) translating national interest considerations into specific goals and objectives; (2) determining the international and domestic situational factors related to the policy goals; (3) analysing the state's capabilities for achieving the desired results; (4) developing a plan or strategy for utilising the state's capabilities to deal with the variables in pursuit of the goals; (5) undertaking the requisite actions; and (6) periodically reviewing and evaluating progress made toward the achievement of the desired results.

The above steps are not necessarily sequential, logical or chronological. They are part of a foreign policy process that is continuous and which is likely to have grown out of past policies and related events (Millar in {1}Rosenau. 1969: 61) in much the same way as domestic public policies are affected by feedback and new demands, or inputs (Anderson 1997: 26-27), as indicated by figure 5/1 *infra*.

In considering the relationship between foreign policy and public policy it is important to note that although foreign policy is "...often used in a generic sense to encompass all foreign programs carried on by a state, the term 'foreign policy' can be applied more precisely to describe a single situation and the actions of a state to accomplish a limited objective... ." (Plano and Olton. 1969: 129). Consequently agreements between states and strategies toward individual states or groups of states may be components of a state's foreign policy.

2.5.1. Decisions and foreign policy

Brynard (Roux *et al.* 1997: 120) has argued that, "...decision making is no more than a choice made between alternatives... ." and that when a choice is made between two objectives the result is an objective; when a choice is made between policies the result is a policy. This view is also expressed by Hanekom (1992: 13). Of course, this argument can be expanded through analogy to show that individual decisions, like individual logs, when multiplied with a particular goal or objective in mind, can constitute a policy or a log cabin respectively. The result of a choice between policies is indeed a policy but the chosen policy itself may be composed of a series of decisions. Put another way, decision making is an essential component of policy making.

Because public decisions are made by human actors and not by states or institutions, which merely provide the *milieux* or settings in which decisions are made, it is extremely difficult to predict what decisions will be made by individuals under specific circumstances. However, if it is possible to discern the foreign policy concerns and objectives of a particular state it should also be possible to identify

some, and sometimes all, of the alternatives available in the course of alleviating those concerns or pursuing such objectives. It is these decisions, amounting to choices between alternatives, that are crucial components of foreign policy formulation. On the other hand, when a series of decisions over a short period of time, hours, days or weeks rather than months or years, leads to a particular foreign policy development, particularly one that has negative results, it is helpful to be able to examine, in the context of policy analysis, the individual decisions that resulted in the relevant policy.

The decision makers who normally make foreign policy are drawn from all quarters of the foreign policy institutional *milieu*. According to Plano and Olton (1969: 126), foreign policy decision makers are,

those individuals in each state who exercise the powers for making and implementing foreign policy decisions. Official decision makers may be influenced - sometimes decisively - by private individuals and groups that serve as consultants or function as unofficial members of the nation's 'establishment.' Opinion elites and the general public may also affect foreign policy actions by setting limits on the decision makers through support for some policies and rejection of others. In most states, the chief of government - whether his title is president, prime minister, premier, or chairman - plays the key role in the decision process. In others, the highest decision maker may be the leader of the single party that controls power, as in many Communist states, or the dictator or oligarchs who hold no official position but control the decision process, as in some Fascist states. Others, who function as high-ranking decision makers in most states include the minister of foreign affairs, sometimes called secretary of state, and the bureaucracy that functions under his direction in the state's foreign office. Other ministries, particularly defence, and high military officers contribute to decision making. In many democratic states, key legislators of the majority party or coalition

*also play a role in making foreign policy decisions, and in some ...
leaders of the opposition party or parties may also participate.*

Even when terms such as *national interest* are used to justify or explain foreign policy decision making it should be kept in mind that national interest is a *subjective* consideration of the government of the day. Therefore, it should not be treated as an objective assessment of a state's priority responsibilities and interests even though this may be the perception of the decision makers themselves. All decisions, for that matter, are based on the subjective considerations of the decision maker. In this regard, Harold and Margaret Sprout ({1}Rosenau. 1969: 48-49) remind us that,

*environmental factors become related to the attitudes and
decisions which comprise a state's foreign policy only by being
perceived and taken into account in the policy forming process.
The statesman's psychological environment (his image, or estimate,
of the situation, setting, or milieu) may or may not correspond to the
operational environment (in which his decisions are executed). But in
policy making ... what matters is how the policy maker imagines the
milieu to be, not how it actually is.*

The problem of subjectivity (that is, being aware of the subjective considerations that may influence or shape particular decisions) may be more difficult for the observer (including the researcher) to overcome when contemplating the decisions of decision makers who have developed in open democratic societies. For example, information about specific decisions and specific decision makers ought to be more accessible in democratic states due to factors such as public discussion and debate and a free press. By contrast, personal information about specific decision makers who have developed in less free states may be more difficult to acquire; and knowledge about specific decisions may be sparse due to official restrictions on public commentary and debate (Nathan and Link. 2001: xiii-xiv). Consequently, decision makers from democratic states could be expected to be influenced by many more factors than their non-democratic counterparts. For example, decision makers in democratic states might

need to respond to the views of special interest groups within their community whereas decision makers in non-democratic states may be fettered by established ideological principles or procedures which compel them to respond accordingly.

Brynard (Roux *et al.* 1997: 129-130) has identified a number of “human factors” in decision making. These include the decision maker’s personal value system, perceptions and limitations, the influence of political power and time constraints. Pfiffner and Presthus (1967: 46), while acknowledging the “theoretical” objectivity of public servants, note that they may also hold political opinions which influence their decisions. Although the human factors identified are concerned particularly with decision making at the administrative or policy implementation level, they can also influence decision making at the level where public policy is formulated, including the formulation of foreign policy. In regard to a decision maker’s personal value system, Brynard (Roux *et al.* 1997: 129), states that,

each decision is influenced by the public manager’s (decision maker’s) attitude, prejudice and personal point of view.

Furthermore it is based on what the community considers to be ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, as well as on the interaction between the various minicultures and values. The content of a decision therefore comprises both factual and ethical elements.

Variations in political culture and even the time orientation of decision makers - their perceptions of the relative importance of past, present and future - can have significant implications for policy formation. As Karl W. Deutsch (Anderson. 1997: 53) has suggested, political cultures that are more oriented toward the past than the present or the future, may be more inclined to the preservation of monuments than the making of future-oriented policy. If time-orientation can play a significant role in policy making it follows that some cultures and their governments may also dwell too much on past injustices or past successes to be able to plan effectively for the future oriented needs of society from a present-day perspective (*vide* Jervis in {1}Rosenau.

1969: 249). Therefore, the historical imperative tends to direct the course of the present and the future and not merely contribute to it.

On the question of perception, Brynard (Roux *et al.* 1997: 129) argues that the decision maker's individual perception, which determines qualities such as discernment and discretion in identifying problems and deciding upon appropriate courses of action, is

... influenced by his value system, experience and ability to interpret what is occurring in his environment ... each person perceives what he would like to perceive , based on his individual background.

Human beings, as decision makers, are also often handicapped or limited by inadequate or inaccurate information upon which to base their various decisions. Harold and Margaret Sprout ({1}Rosenau. 1969: 49) have used, among others, the example of the Battle of New Orleans which was fought in 1815 between American and British forces whose governments, unbeknown to the adversaries in the field, had already officially ended hostilities. This was clearly an event in which inadequate information (about the cessation of hostilities) resulted in an incorrect decision (to engage in battle).

In regard to such limitations on information Brynard (Roux *et al.*1997: 130) has pointed out that the decision maker "...gathers from the environment the information he considers to be important, but it remains limited to or bounded by that particular area" He also cautions (Roux *et al.* 1997: 130) that decision makers must invariably rely on information supplied by subordinates and, consequently, that "...since not all information can be checked, the administrator (or decision maker) must make decisions based on filtered information... ." In circumstances where decisions have to be taken quickly time constraints would add to the handicap of inadequate information by denying any opportunity to confirm the limited information that is available. Access to information is therefore crucially important to

the ultimate success of the decision maker's choices among alternatives; an argument that will be taken further in sections of this chapter (*infra*) dealing with the impact of time constraints on access to information and information about the *milieux* in which policy decisions are made.

The influence of political power upon decision making, as identified by Brynard (Roux *et al.* 1997: 130), acknowledges the temptation of political decision makers to abuse or misuse their power, and the pressures exerted on managers to support and implement wrong decisions. Brynard (Roux *et al.* 1997: 130) also points out that decision makers are unlikely to want to take (correct) decisions that might jeopardise their own positions, which "...maybe one reason why many officials are opposed to change..." If, for example, a political decision maker in a liberal democratic society were to take a policy decision to establish diplomatic relations with a state because that state had agreed to make large financial contributions (Mills. 2000: 274-275) to his political party, he would be taking that decision for the wrong reason. He would, thereby, be putting party interest above the interest of the state. Similarly, if a political decision maker were to take a decision to promote trade with a particular country in a particular field of economic activity, and if the relevant decision maker were to have a personal financial interest in such an enterprise, this too could be an example of an abuse of political power. These examples, of course, also have to do with ethics and therefore are closely related to the decision maker's personal value system, as previously elucidated. In fact, where non-political decision makers abuse or misuse their authority, their actions would obviously be due to failure in the ethical domain and not to abuse of power in the political domain unless they were also responding to a political imperative.

Finally, as has already been alluded to, decision makers often have to take decisions quickly and therefore must use the information available to them at the time without being able to confirm either its accuracy or its continued relevance to the problem concerned. As Brynard (Roux *et al.* 1997: 130) explains, "...decisions are often taken on the grounds of partial information only (*vide* the Sprouts in Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 378). In ... most cases, this is the result of the time constraint that is placed on managers."

In the case of foreign policy decision making, time constraints are particularly problematical during crisis situations when decisions have to be taken quickly. For example, when the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was bombed by NATO warplanes the PRC Government reacted with emotion and hostility against the United States and actively encouraged the Chinese people to do the same. There were obvious short term political benefits for the Chinese leadership in choosing to adopt this course of action but in view of China's quest for membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) it would appear that the PRC may have taken a hasty, and potentially self-damaging, decision as a result of inadequate information and constraints imposed by a lack of time in which to formulate and implement the most advantageous response to the bombing of their embassy.

In addition to the human factors in decision making, referred to above, Brynard (Roux *et al.* 1997: 130-131) also notes the importance of the *milieu* of decision making, comprising the governmental superstructure (including the approaches, points of view and preferences of individual ministers), controlling institutions and domestic service departments (which institutions do what, and their relationships with one another and with other departments), and other functional departments and institutions (ways in which institutions may collaborate to achieve mutually beneficial goals).

Although Brynard does not specifically categorise information about the decision making *milieu* as an example of the type of information that limits human ability to make decisions it clearly does fall into this category. In the case of purely domestic public policy it is conceivable that the decision maker would need to have adequate information about the institution of which he is part, or which he represents, as well as the *milieu* in which the impact of his policy decision will be felt. He will need to have information about costs and effects, benefactors, malefactors and interest groups, political and social consequences, and additional information about a range of other related and pertinent factors. In the case of foreign policy, perhaps military, financial and economic policies, or domestic policies with foreign policy implications, decision makers would need access to similar information. However, in some cases, access to still further categories of information would be required.

Foreign policy decision makers, for example, may need to look at the foreign policy *milieux* of other states in order to have access to the kind of pertinent information required for foreign policy decision makers to choose correctly among alternative courses of action. In pursuit of this aim - the acquisition of pertinent information to assist foreign policy decision makers to make the right choices, and therefore the right decisions - an understanding of the respective *world view* perspectives of other states may be an appropriate point of departure.

2.6. Conclusion

From the foregoing it is clear that Public Administration is a discipline in its own right which has as its primary focus the study of public administration and research associated with public administration, including the use of policy analysis. It has also been shown that all public policy is a product of public institutions but that not all aspects of public policy are publicised.

In addition, all public policies of a state are systemic in nature. They result from inputs in the form of societal demands and needs, which influence policy makers to produce policies in the form of policy outputs which, in turn, produce feedback through public opinion, elections, or even rebellion, which would be the new societal inputs aimed at producing new outputs in the form of subsequent changes to public policy. It is also clear that public policy includes foreign policy. Therefore, not all public policy outputs and public policy feed back are restricted to the domestic policy environment of the initiator of such policy. In the case of foreign policy, or other policies having an effect within the initiating state's external environment, policy outputs may extend beyond that state's domestic environment, with feedback also originating beyond its domestic environment. Finally, it has been shown quite clearly that it is the executive branch of government that includes the most important political foreign policy decision makers as well as the most important foreign policy administrators and secondary bureaucratic decision makers. There is therefore ample justification why this foreign policy analysis can and should be conducted within the field of study of Public Administration in terms of academic research criteria that

could normally be applied to any other public policy analysis of a state's public policy or public policies.

Knowing that foreign policy is, in fact, a form of public policy, it is possible to scientifically analyse the public policies that govern the bilateral (foreign policy) relationship between South Africa and the People's Republic of China. In this regard, a model is employed to both explain the foreign policy making process and render it more easily susceptible to analysis. The following chapter describes and explains this model which is a linkage model for an analysis of foreign policy.

CHAPTER THREE

LINKAGE MODEL FOR AN ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter explores the need for, and development of, a model for the analysis of foreign policy. A basic core model of foreign policy is advanced, which allows for the *environments* (internal, external and communicational) in which foreign policy may be expected to take place, as well as the concept of *imperatives* that motivate and affect foreign policy decision making, and the *leadership relationships* (ultimately between states in the form of foreign policy) that exert their influence bilaterally or multilaterally in the form of foreign policy.

In this chapter, the three components of the basic core model (environments, leadership relationships, and imperatives) are expanded and examined separately. In all, five environments (the domestic, regional and international *geographical* and bilateral and multilateral *communicational or transactional* environments), four leadership relationships (individual and institutional *governmental* and individual and institutional *non-governmental*) and some eight selected imperatives, *historical, political, economic, social, strategic, legal, moral and scientific and technological* will be examined.

3.2. Model for policy analysis

According to Quade (1989: 137),

... the heart of any policy analysis is the creation of a clear, precise, manageable process designed to produce information about the consequences of any action that might be proposed. This process uses one or more models, devices that range from no more than an image of the situation in the mind of the analyst to an elaborate

simulation involving human beings and computing machines. Models are fundamental to policy analysis. Although they cannot predict the consequences with the assurance of the best scientific models, policy models tell us what the possibilities are, based on various assumptions about the factors of concern, and thus produce information that helps to understand the situation more clearly. In fact, the analysis of a problem might be defined as the search for a solution with the aid of one or more models.

The primary model utilised in this policy analysis is therefore a *policy model*, which Fox and Meyer (1995: 97) define as, "...a simplified representation of selected aspects of a problematic situation constructed for particular purposes... ." It is intended to depict the basic components and processes whereby the actors of the international system contribute toward the making of foreign policy. It is also a type of *linkage model* but does not focus specifically on the linkages of *systems* (Rosenau.1969: 44-45). Instead, it identifies *environments* in which foreign policy is formulated and applied and focuses on the perceived decision making/policy making relationships as well as the perceived imperatives that shape and *link* these environments and give form and direction to foreign policy.

The focus on *environments* as opposed to *systems* does not imply that systems theory (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. 1971: 102) has been excluded entirely from the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model. What this focus does mean, however, is that components, processes or influences that supposedly link environments and shape foreign policy should not be interpreted solely from a systemic perspective. The environmental concept tends to be less restrictive and focuses attention on both the static and the dynamic. Its boundaries also invariably exceed the boundaries of whatever system, or systems, it may encompass, as inferred from Platig's observation (*vide* Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 20) that,

*... each multinational political system - even the all-inclusive,
global international political system - exists within an environment*

that influences the system and the actors and interactions within it.


Consequently, environments, relationships and imperatives are the major components of this linkage model of foreign policy analysis.

More than three decades ago, Rosenau (1969: 2) wrote that,

almost every day incidents are reported that defy the principles of sovereignty. Politics everywhere, it would seem, are related to politics everywhere else. Where the functioning of any political unit was once sustained by structures within its boundaries, now the roots of its political life can be traced to remote corners of the globe. Modern science and technology have collapsed space and time in the physical world and thereby heightened interdependence in the political world. ... As technology shrinks the world and heightens the interdependence of nations, linkage phenomena are too plentiful and too influential to be ignored.

Rosenau (1969: 45) has defined “linkage” as “any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another.” In terms of this definition it seems clear that foreign policy decisions originating in one environment and initiating a reaction in another, constitute a linkage that is wholly in harmony with the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis. The model assumes that actors, in varying degrees, both make and experience the effects of policy and policy decisions; that they do so within a plurality of systems and environments; and that all policies or policy decisions, or responses to them, are unavoidably shaped by the impact of a variety of factors, both quantitative and qualitative, termed *imperatives*. The basic core model envisages the interaction of any two domestic or internal environments (sovereign states) within the wider international environment and may be depicted as follows:

Figure 3/1: Core model



Although the core model concept was not consciously derived from an existing source it is in harmony, to a limited degree, with the basic pattern of interaction between actors advanced by McClelland (*vide* Pfaltzgraff, 1972: 112). Because of the multidimensional nature of the basic core model (figure 3/1 *supra*), and for greater clarity, the three components of the model have been depicted separately. Each component reflects the related perceived factors of concern. The environmental component, which includes the domestic environments of individual states (D1 and D2) and external environments (E) , explores the dimension *where* foreign policy comes into being, is articulated as foreign policy, and initiates a foreign policy response. The leadership-relational component (R) examines the dimension that deals with *who* makes, and *who* helps to make, foreign policy. The imperative component (I) investigates *what* factors prompt and shape a particular type of foreign policy. The ultimate function of the total model is to discover *how* and *why* a particular foreign policy action results and *how* the best foreign policy course of action can be selected from a range of alternatives. The model is intended to facilitate the construction of foreign policy profiles of individual states with a view toward planning South Africa's most effective foreign policy strategies in regard to such states. These profiles will also facilitate the determination of the individual *world view* perspectives of such states.


If individual states, like individual human beings, are partially products of their respective environments (i.e. their external environments), their life experiences and histories, and the natural talents and resources available to them, including access to information, they may be expected to exhibit a wide variety of individual characteristics, some of which may set them apart and some of which may draw them

together. These characteristics, together, can be said to constitute the system or *milieu* in which a state's political decision makers help to shape the development of a national view of the world; a view of their state's place in the international environment, and its relationship to other states; a *world view*.

The advantage of the core model, and the various ways in which it or its core components are depicted, is that it focuses attention on a specific but broad range of relevant factors and categories that can be applied universally. In this way a bilateral relationship, say between states D1 and D2 or a relationship between states D3 and D4, can be examined and compared using exactly the same standards and procedures, and the same types of measure. The model not only helps to explain cause and effect, in the *milieu* of foreign policy, but also aspires toward the establishment of standards of assessment and measurement in that field.

3.3. Environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model.

Figure 3/2: The environments component



KEY:			
International environment	E (E1 and E2)	Bilateral environment	B
Domestic environment	D	Multilateral environment	M
Regional environment	R		
State 1	D1	State 2	D2
All other states	Dn		
Region 1	R1	Region 2	R2
Portion of the international environment which includes state 1 and state 2 and related institutional and state actors of the international system			E1
Remainder of the international system which includes those institutional and state actors that lack relations with state 1 and state 2.			E2

3.3.1. Environments involving individual states

All states of the international system are composed of internal, or domestic, environments within the greater global international environment (Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 20) and most, if not all, are part of bilateral (Plano and Olton. 1969: 214) policy environments in which their foreign relations, negative and positive, may be conducted with other individual states. Many individual states are also part of larger multi-state environments, encompassing foreign policy relationships with at least two other states, in the form of regional geographical environments and multilateral institutional environments (Cantori and Spiegel. 1970: *Table 8-1*. 368-373).

Although all the environments of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model have a geographical aspect or component, the domestic, regional and international environments are more easily discerned in terms of tangible generally well-defined and internationally accepted geographical borders and boundaries. The domestic environments of national states are bounded by their national borders; the regional environment, although not always determined by geographical considerations, invariably exhibits a definite geographical aspect; and the international environment which encompasses all existing domestic, bilateral, regional and multilateral environments, is inevitably bounded by the natural geographical extent of our planet. Cantori and Spiegel (1970: 2; *vide* Singer in

{1}Rosenau. 1969: 21) focus only on these three environments as subjects for analysis of the international system when they argue that “a delineation of (these) three arenas of international politics - the globe, the region, and the nation-state - provides us with the basis of an analytical structure for the consideration of international politics.”

By contrast, the bilateral and multilateral environments are largely intangible and place less emphasis on the geographical location of their participants. Being institutional and transactional, rather than geographical environments, they tend to focus, instead, on the individual participants or members of their environments and applicable organisational structures within which foreign policy transactions and communications take place. They are, in effect, *linkage environments*.

Henry Kissinger has elucidated very clearly the relationship between domestic structure and foreign policy ({1}Rosenau.1969: 261-275). David Bachman makes the same point about Chinese foreign policy (Kim.1994: 44; *vide* Roy. 1998: 225) when he states:

Because foreign policy is likely to be the product of many of the same decision-making structures as domestic policy, Chinese foreign policy is an extension of Chinese domestic politics.

The bilateral and multilateral policy environments of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, clearly, are extensions of the policies of the domestic environment into the wider external environment: the bilateral environment processes domestic policy transactions between any two states; and the multilateral environment processes domestic and regional policy transactions between any three, or more, states. Each of the five environments identified in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model has the capacity to affect and be affected by the foreign policy concerns of any particular individual state.

3.3.1.1. Domestic environment

For the purposes of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, the domestic or internal environment of a state (see D1, D2 and Dn of figure 3/2 *supra*) necessarily excludes that state's foreign or external environment (see E, B, R1, R2 and M of figure 3/2 *supra*). It concerns only those public decision making and public policy relationships that involve domestic actors inter-acting within the domestic environment and which create benefits or hardships within the internal environment, whose repercussions are mainly experienced within, but not necessarily limited to, that internal environment.

The domestic environment encompasses a state's national value system, its ideological base, the national character and spirit of its people. It has been said that "... a nation or a country would lose its soul, cohesion and vitality without a spirit to sustain it. A national spirit is an important measurement of a country's overall national strength... ." (PRC. 1998: 10). The domestic environment is also the enduring reservoir of a state's historical experience. The form and character of a state's system of government and its government institutions, and the manner in which power is exercised and decisions are taken by its leaders, continuously conspire to reflect all these and perhaps other factors in the form of public policies, including foreign policy, that are unique to such a domestic environment.

The domestic environment is a crucial determinant of a state's foreign policy. For example, Kissinger (*vide* Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 385) has noted that,

... if domestic structures are based on commensurable notions of what is just, a consensus about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy develops. ... When the domestic structures are based on fundamentally different conceptions of what is just, the conduct of international affairs grows more complex ... When domestic structures - and the concept of legitimacy on which they are based - differ widely, statesmen can still

meet, but their ability to persuade has been reduced for they no longer speak the same language.

Therefore, it seems likely that difficulties could arise in the pursuit of bilateral relationships between states having domestic structures founded on significantly different value-systems, or differing *world views*.

3.3.1.2. Bilateral environment

The bilateral policy environment (see B of figure 3/2 *supra*) of any specific state involves its existing or potential external relationship with a second state and is an expression of the extent of the foreign policy relationship between the separate domestic environments (see D1 and D2 of figure 3/2 *supra* and B of figure 3/3 *infra*) of the two states. It should be kept in mind that even a state that might deliberately seek to avoid relationships with other states would still be part of a number of bilateral environments on the strength of its bilateral non-relationships. Therefore, an environment in which a negative relationship exists between two states, or where no relationship exists, formal or informal, is still a bilateral environment, albeit with negative or few or no linkages. There is, after all, a distinction between a bilateral environment and a bilateral relationship. A bilateral environment alone is like a blank page whereas a bilateral relationship is more like a page with something drawn or written on it. A bilateral environment must therefore harbour two-way communication within, in order to reflect evidence of a bilateral relationship. As explained, the bilateral environment may exhibit no relationship or interaction (Legg and Morrison. 1971: 32) at all. Where a relationship does exist it may be positive (good or beneficial) or negative (bad or detrimental); it might be stable or unstable (erratic); it might exhibit a specially close relationship; it might also be neutral.

Any research which focuses on the foreign policy relationship between two states, for example the foreign policy relationship between South Africa and the PRC, must necessarily examine the bilateral environment of the two states because it is in this

environment that their direct mutual foreign policy transactions and exchanges, including a variety of authoritative policy making decisions, are likely to be reflected. Although foreign policy is made and ratified within the domestic environment, and is often *originated* (*vide* paragraph 1.6 *supra*) and initiated in that environment, the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model assumes that it is continually and predominantly monitored, assessed and re-shaped within the bilateral environment. Whereas foreign policy is merely one of many types of policy within the domestic environment, in the bilateral environment it is *the* dominant policy, encompassing trade policies, immigration policies and cultural policies, among others. Foreign policy is, in effect, an extension of the domestic policies and interests of individual states into the external environment (see B of figure 3/3 *infra*), that is, the bilateral, multilateral, regional or international environment, with a view to interacting, preferably but not always peacefully with the domestic policies and interests of other states, for maximum national self-benefit. The bilateral environment, precisely because it encapsulates all direct diplomatic and foreign policy activity between two states, is usually fragile, often sensitive and always alert for words, actions and nuances (*vide* {2}WS. 2002: 1-4) that may convey indirect messages that are perceived to be hostile, unfriendly, indifferent, untrustworthy or insincere. Consequently, it has been stated (Cohen. 1981: 32) that “... a diplomatic communication should say neither too much nor too little because every word, nuance and omission will be meticulously studied for any possible shade of meaning ...”

Diplomacy has been described as “... the science of the external relations, or foreign affairs of states, and, in a more limited sense, the science, or art, of negotiation ... the sum of the knowledge and the principles necessary for the good conduct of public affairs between states... (and) the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states ... (it is about) ... the means or methods by which ..(foreign) policy is executed.” (Nicholson in Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 425).

In the practical sense, diplomacy is about inter-governmental communication founded on vigilance, perception, sensitivity and good judgement. States sometimes “send”

official messages they do not intend to send (WS. 2002: 1), through failure to meet the basic requirements of diplomacy. When this happens, the bilateral relationship is likely to be the first to reflect the relative failure of diplomacy between the states concerned. Such failure may be due to a noticeable deterioration in the bilateral relationship or it may be due to a missed opportunity to improve the relationship (*vide* IDSA. 1998: 1835). For example, did South Africa miss an opportunity to demonstrate its true regard for peace in the Middle East and its respect for a peace maker and respected leader such as the late King Hussain of Jordan, when no South African leader of note attended his funeral (SA. 1999: *Parliamentary Media Briefing*)? When South Africa accepted a Grant-in-Aid from the PRC during the visit of Vice President Hu Jintao and chose not to raise human rights concerns with the PRC leader (2001. *Interview*) what message did this behaviour send to the other actors of the international system? What message did South Africa send to the PRC in appearing to *kowtow* to Beijing's sensitivities?

3.3.1.3. Regional environment

As some writers (Taylor and Groom. 1978: 63-65; Rosenau. 1969: 61-62; Cantori and Spiegel. 1970: 2) have shown, regions are notoriously difficult to define (EAP. 1995: 7-8). Some regions are distinguished by religious or geographical factors; others may be denoted by historical, cultural (*vide* Deng and Wang. 1999: 184) or economic characteristics. The concept of "region" is therefore flexible and largely subjective.

For the purposes of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, the regional environment of any specific state (see R1 and R2 of figure 3/2 *supra*) is determined by its geographical location and involves that state's external relationship with its regional neighbours which may be promoted both multilaterally and bilaterally. The regional environment of any state would always include contiguous neighbouring states and might also include non-contiguous states whose actions and interests regularly affect or are affected by other activities or interests within that regional environment.

Every individual state is automatically part of a geographical region. The region may be designated in terms of the hemisphere the state occupies (northern, southern, eastern or western); it may be designated according to the continent or ocean where it is situated (African, Asian or Pacific); and it may be part of a political, economic, military or ideological grouping of individual states (the developing world, the “West”, the Islamic world, the communist world, the nuclear states) that can be clearly (geographically) discerned, among other possibilities. Sometimes these regions comprise states that are, geographically, largely contiguous or proximate, the African continent and Europe being suitable examples, and sometimes their membership is geographically dispersed, such as the developing or Islamic worlds, or the Southern Hemisphere. Some states belong to many, often overlapping, regions and some belong to relatively few. Some regions are very large, in membership or geography or both, and others are relatively small.

A regional environment, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, is any segment of the international environment that is usually no smaller in membership and geographical area than three domestic environments (McLaren, 1980: 1) or their territories (a single domestic environment would be a nation-state whereas two domestic environments in a perceived regional context would conceivably exhibit a mutual bilateral environment) that are either contiguous to one another, bound by a common sea, ocean or waterway, or linked by shared values, interests and goals within a discernible geographical region. What Rosenau (1969: 61) identifies as a separate “contiguous environment” is included in the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model’s regional environment.

Archer (1992: 47) reminds us that Bruce Russett approached the problem of categorising regions by focusing on five aspects: “regions of social and cultural homogeneity; regions sharing similar attitudes or external behaviour; regions of political interdependence; regions of economic interdependence; and regions of geographic proximity.” However, the environmental-relationships-imperatives model merely requires a distinction between regions that can be identified through their institutional (multilateral) or non-institutional (geographical) characteristics. South

Africa, for example, is arguably part of several regions, including the African region, the Southern African region, the South Atlantic Region, the Indian Ocean Region, the Sub-Saharan Region and the Developing Region, among others. The People's Republic of China may be regarded as being part of the Asia-Pacific region, the Asian Region, the Far Eastern or East Asian Region, the Confucian region (*vide* Deng and Wang, 1999:184; Zhang, 1999: vii-viii) and the Developing Region, among others.

3.3.1.4. Multilateral environment

In addition to regional groupings of states functioning within the regional environment there are also multilateral institutions, comprising individual member states, which function within the multilateral environment. The multilateral institution performs a specific function as opposed to the region which is largely a descriptive geographical term. The regional environment is capable of encompassing the multilateral environment and being encompassed by it. In reality it is not difficult to contemplate a regional environment such as the Northern Hemisphere hosting a variety of multilateral environments, such as NATO, the European Union and the Nordic Council. The opposite situation whereby a multilateral environment includes, either wholly or partially, more than one regional environment may appear less common, but does occur in the case of large multilateral organisations such as the United Nations, Organisation of African Unity, Commonwealth, Group of 77 (G-77) and Non-Aligned Movement. The bilateral environment, of course, extends between any two states within the international environment or within a specific regional environment or even a number of regional environments. For example, the South African-Zimbabwean bilateral environment extends within the African, Southern African and sub-Saharan regional environments.

Instead of referring to a "multilateral environment" James Rosenau (1969: 63) employs the term, "organisational environment" which he describes as follows:

The proliferation and growth of international organisations has required polities to devote increased attention to institutionalised

patterns of activity that transpire in their environment. ... It encompasses all those organisations that have structure and personnel apart from the politics belonging to them, such as the United Nations, the Organisation of American States, and the International Court of Justice. It does not include, however, the many alliances and agreements in which elaborate specifications for interaction and cooperation are not accompanied by the establishment of implementing machinery that has an identity of its own.

Rosenau's (1969: 63) linkage model incorporates a contiguous environment, a regional environment and a resource environment, among others, which exhibit some of the characteristics and concerns (e.g. boundary disputes, historic rivalries, disarmament, race relations, trade and economic development) (Rosenau. 1969: 61-63) to be explored within the context of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model.

In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, the multilateral environment of a state (see M in figure 3/2 *supra*) involves its external institutional foreign policy relationships with other states, usually through international governmental institutions having a permanent secretariat and with a membership of at least three states (McLaren. 1980: 1; Taylor and Groom. 1978: 30), such as the United Nations (UN), Organisation of African States (OAU) or the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Although, in some cases, a particular multilateral environment may appear to overlap a particular regional environment it should be kept in mind that regions are determined by geographical location whereas multilateral organisations are dependent on membership. Consequently, not all the states of a particular region will necessarily be members of the applicable multilateral organisation, if such an organisation exists, which oversees the specific interests of that region. For example, *apartheid* South Africa, although part of the Southern African region, was never part of the multilateral Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) (SA. 1995. *Profile* 3/95: 15) whereas, today,

South Africa and even Mauritius, an Indian Ocean island-state, are members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) ({{2}}SA. 1995. *Profile 3/95*: 14). However, Madagascar, an Indian Ocean island that is much larger and geographically closer to Southern Africa than Mauritius, is not a member of the SADC ({{2}}SA. 1995. *Profile 3/95*: 14-15).

3.3.1.5. International environment

The international environment (see E in figure 3/2 *supra*) is the “sea” in which the domestic environments of all the world’s states “float” and interact. Therefore, every foreign policy activity and every domestic policy activity takes place within the greater global boundary of the international system and its environment. For the purposes of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model the international environment has been divided into two segments. One segment encompasses those states and political entities (interacting through their bilateral, regional or multilateral environments) that have a direct foreign policy relationship with at least one of the two domestic environments featured in the model; and the remaining segment encompasses those states that do not have any direct foreign policy relationship with either one of these two domestic environments.

According to Quincy Wright, (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. 1971: 17) “... international relations include relations between many entities of uncertain sovereignty.” Not all political entities are sovereign states. They may be colonies, protectorates, trusteeships, partitioned states, and other states with an extraordinary status; they may also be inter-governmental organisations such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or Arab League (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. 1971: 16). Consequently, where individual states interact through such organisations they would, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, be part of the multilateral environment but such individual multilateral organisations would also be political entities within the wider international environment.

3.3.2. Leadership relationships involving individual states


For the purposes of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model the term “leadership relationship” refers to public policy decisions and actions taken by individuals or institutions of government, as well as policies and actions of individuals and institutions outside the public policy or governmental sector. It is argued that these decisions and actions determine, or have the potential to determine, the nature and direction of a state’s foreign policy. Individually and collectively such actions and policy decisions represent the transactions and communications that link and shape the various environments that have been identified (see figure 3/2 *supra*).

According to Snyder, Bruck and Sapin ({{1}} Rosenau. 1969: 203), there are “...non-governmental effects of state action ...” and decision makers who act upon and respond to conditions and factors “...outside themselves and the governmental organisation of which they are a part” If it is accepted that non-governmental actors may influence public policy, including foreign policy (*vide* Mills. 2000: 190), then it follows that, within any foreign policy environment (five environments have been identified), there are also non-governmental actors in the form of institutions and individuals, who may influence foreign policy. This being so, there are at least four categories of leadership relationships (two governmental and two non-governmental) whereby foreign policy may be *influenced, formulated, implemented, or changed*, directly or indirectly. Broadly, these relationships may be categorised as individual governmental, institutional governmental, individual non-governmental and institutional non-governmental leadership relationships. Furthermore, it is possible to conceive of some or all of these four categories of leadership relationships occurring in each of the five foreign policy environments in ways that have the potential to affect the direction or nature of foreign policy.

Despite this potential, however, the main reservoirs of decision making leadership relationships that are most likely to influence foreign policy will be the domestic environments of individual states and the bilateral and multilateral environments in

which the relevant foreign policy transactions and communications take place and become manifest.

Figure 3/3: The leadership relationships component



KEY:	International environment: I	Bilateral environment: B
	Domestic environment: D	Regional environment: R
	State 1: D1	Region 1 (state 1): R1
	State 2: D2	Region 2 (state 2): R2
	All other individual states: Dn	Multilateral environment: M
	Policy makers: P	Multilateral organisations: Mn
	Policy makers (state 1): P1	Multilateral policy makers: MPn
	Policy makers (state 2): P2	Relationships \longleftrightarrow
	Policy makers (others) Pn	Imperatives filter \perp

In figure 3/3 *supra* the ovals, P1, P2, Pn and MPn, represent authoritative individual and institutional decision making leadership components (*individual governmental* and *institutional governmental*) interacting with one another and with other leadership components (*individual non-governmental* and *institutional non-governmental*) of the non-governmental type.

Within any of the foreign policy environments identified, the individual public policy decision maker's actions, the institutional public policy decision maker's actions, the individual non-governmental decision maker's actions and the institutional non-governmental decision maker's actions may encompass the individual actions and decisions of individual government leaders, cabinet ministers, senior public servants, key advisors and politicians; the institutional actions and decisions of the executive, legislative and even judicial branches of government; the individual actions and decisions of opposition politicians, student leaders and academics, journalists, labour leaders, business leaders and private citizens; and the institutional actions and decisions of opposition political parties, student and academic organisations, newspapers, trade unions, banks and corporations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

With a view to utilising the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model for the purpose of an analysis of foreign policy, the various leadership relationships (see figure 3/3 *supra*) that have been identified as being most relevant to the research objective will need to be examined. In this regard, it is necessary to properly identify decision makers and actors, as well as decisions, that may have a role in shaping a state's foreign policy.

The various leadership relationships in figure 3/3 above are depicted by double-arrow single lines (\longleftrightarrow). The double arrows indicate that the relationship path is one of two-way communication and interaction between those who take decisions and those who are affected by them. This interactive situation applies whether the relationship path is between the governors and the governed in a particular country or between two sovereign independent states. The short single lines that intersect the double-arrow lines at right-angles represent the imperatives that have influenced, and may continue to influence, the various leadership relationships sufficiently to determine the eventual direction and shape of foreign policy.

3.3.2.1. Domestic leadership relationships

Singer (Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 101) has pointed out that the national state (domestic environment) is "... our primary actor in international relations..." and Rosenau (1969: 72-73) has also alluded to the primary decision making role of the nation-state in matters of foreign policy:

To speak of Germany wanting this, or France avoiding that, is to run the risk of oversimplifying, of ascribing human characteristics to non-human, abstract entities. On the other hand, many individuals act on behalf of governments, which in turn, represent units called nation-states that for centuries have been the focal point of man's highest loyalties and thus are the political agencies that supersede all others in their capacity to make binding decisions for their members.

Therefore, although a state's domestic environment cannot simultaneously be its own foreign or external environment, the domestic environment is the indisputable source of a state's foreign relations and its foreign policy.

It has been said that a state's foreign policy is a reflection of its domestic policy (Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 385-388). Consequently the actions and decisions of practically any and every category of decision maker and actor (Cantori and Spiegel. 1970: 126) capable of influencing a state's public policy, either directly or indirectly, may originate in the domestic environment yet find expression in any one of the external environments as that state's foreign policy.

From a foreign policy perspective the actions and decisions of non-governmental decision makers can influence public policy but such actors do not actually take the policy decisions that may shape public policy, including foreign policy. Although the impact of non-governmental actors upon foreign policy appears largely peripheral and incidental there have been occasions when non-governmental actors decisively

influenced the direction of a state's foreign policy as when American public opinion, represented in part by "... media commentators, business executives, educators, clergymen ... (in 1967) had already begun to express misgivings about the (Vietnam) war ..." (Karnow. 1983: 546). As Richard Merritt (1975: 2) has pointed out,

... in certain, rather narrowly circumscribed circumstances, the public at large can have a direct impact upon the foreign policy-making process as well as, through its elected representatives and other mediators, a more indirect influence.

The type of "direct impact" upon public policy alluded to by Merritt (1975: 2) would, however, be classified as an *indirect* impact in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model which assumes that only authoritative decisions involving public policy can be regarded as direct impacts upon such policy. Consider, for example, the anti-*apartheid* campaign which successfully pressured many American multinational companies into withdrawing their investments from South Africa and which had the added impact of causing some foreign legislators to introduce domestic laws designed to prevent their nationals from investing in *apartheid* South Africa. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) which became law in the United States during the 'eighties (*vide* Suzman. 1993: 273-274), is undoubtedly an example of a direct impact (the authoritative actions of US legislators) upon US-SA foreign policy. However, the *pressure* upon US legislators by US public opinion in favour of anti-*apartheid* legislation only exerted an *indirect* influence upon the CAAA in that the direct actors were the legislators themselves.

Of course, the actual impact of non-governmental actors upon public policy, including foreign policy, will depend on the type of political institutional arrangements that exist within a state's domestic environment. As Merritt (1975: 2) postulates,

... the very structure of ... (the internal) environment conditions the decisions made by the duly authorised decision-making bodies.

A fragmented society ... may pose vastly different considerations (such as freedom of action) than one that is highly mobilised and attuned to political outcomes.

Furthermore, a state having a strong operational legal base and a bill of rights, such as South Africa, the United States or the United Kingdom, is more likely to tolerate the influence, upon its public policies, of non-governmental entities ({{1}}SA. 1998). In fact, the previous Director-General of Foreign Affairs ({{3}}SA. 1999: *JS Selebi speech*) stated that,

... there is a need to develop a broader base of people working in and on foreign policy related matters. This includes academia, journalists, business people and the NGO community.

States such as the People's Republic of China or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would be unlikely to acknowledge the influence of individuals or institutions that are not recognisably part of, or closely allied to, their respective governments, even if such influence were present (*vide*. Nathan and Link. 2001: 313).

Domestic concerns, especially those involving strategic, economic and social issues, are often likely to have an impact upon a state's foreign relations and consequently, the actions and decisions of government leaders and government institutions, particularly in these crucial areas of concern, would require close examination in any attempt to analyse a state's foreign policy. In this regard, the South African Foreign Minister ({{4}} SA. 1999: *Dlamini Zuma speech*) has declared:

Our approach is that foreign policy should be firmly embodied in our domestic policy. For a developing country like ours, faced with daunting challenges of economic upliftment and inequalities, our foreign policy priorities should, above all else, be determined by our domestic needs.

This approach makes sense, of course, particularly if foreign policy is directed toward the enhancement of domestic resources and the achievement of the means to make life good for the citizenry of the state. However, there is a mutual responsibility for foreign policy and domestic policy to support one another; and for the state's domestic public institutions to create a climate within the domestic environment that will facilitate effective foreign policy transactions with other states.

3.3.2.2. Bilateral leadership relationships

At the bilateral level the head of government, foreign minister and deputy foreign minister, key civil servants, usually in the department of foreign affairs (*vide* Mills. 2000: 217) or foreign ministry, and key politicians entrusted with foreign affairs portfolios are likely to take and shape decisions affecting a state's foreign policy. Government institutions that may be expected to shape a state's foreign policy would be likely to include the cabinet, key foreign policy organs within the legislature, such as a foreign affairs portfolio committee or senate committee on foreign affairs, and key government departments and agencies such as the departments of foreign affairs, trade, defence, finance and relevant budget committees.

Because the formal bilateral foreign policy relationship is usually directly driven by government decision makers and implementers of policy, the role of the non-governmental individual tends to exert a more peripheral influence on the shaping of foreign policy. The individual actions of business, labour, ethnic, civic, religious, and student leaders, among others, may indirectly or peripherally affect the course of foreign policy (*vide* Mills. 2000: 206). Similarly, the institutional actions of business, political, religious, labour and student organisations, among others, may also indirectly or peripherally affect the course of a state's foreign policy.

Although writers such as Richard Merritt (1975: 2) refer to the "... *direct impact upon the foreign policy process* ..." (my emphasis) of certain interest groups, including many of those categorised above, he is referring specifically (1975: 2) to "... foreign policy-makers .. in the *domestic political arena* ..." (my emphasis).

However, for the purposes of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model the *bilateral* environment makes a necessary distinction between actors who function in an authoritative capacity, as instruments of the state who make foreign policy, and those whose influence upon foreign policy decisions are necessarily indirect, peripheral and non-authoritative.

3.3.2.3. Regional leadership relationships

Whereas there are specific mutual and reciprocal responsibilities inherent in the relations between citizens and government within the domestic environment, the regional environment evinces similar responsibilities; individual governments and national communities, having a specific interest in the well-being of their common regional environment, will usually be committed to regional political stability, regional security, and economic development for mutual benefit. However, perceived national or domestic interests of individual states within a specific region may sometimes create regional instability (*vide* Roy. 1998:170) as has occurred in regions such as the Middle East (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 333-35), the Balkans (*vide* {35}WS. 1996. *USA Today*. 14 February 1996), Africa (DFA. 19961220; DFA. 19970805), and South, Central and East Asia (DFA. 20000523; Deng and Wang. 1999: 188), among others.

A common geographical region does not imply common political or economic ideologies, common languages, religions or ethnic groups, or common levels of economic development or military strength. The individual member states of a particular region can exhibit great differences in virtually all these categories (EAP. 1995: 7-8). The newly independent Balkan states that were born from the Yugoslavian break-up exemplify such differences (*vide* {35}WS. 1996. *USA Today*. 14 February 1996). Positive bilateral relationships within regions, particularly those which are capable of creating understanding, trust and mutual respect between diverse cultures and ideologies, are therefore crucial components of any strategy to achieve peace and stability within the international system.

At the regional level, in the absence of any formal regional multilateral organisational structure, the bilateral leadership relationship pattern is the main one available for the conduct of foreign policy between individual states in the same region. However, in the absence of formal multilateral structures, three or more states may still meet in a regional context to try and find solutions to common regional problems which may range from peace making initiatives to a search for effective ways to address common regional needs. The major difference in the conduct of bilateral relations between states in a regional context, as opposed to a non-regional context, is likely to be affected by the imperatives which drive such bilateral relations; regional imperatives, because of their often complex nature due to an increased number of variables, are generally perceived to require more urgent responses or solutions to problems than non-regional imperatives, where variables are likely to be fewer.

3.3.2.4. Multilateral leadership relationships

Multilateral leadership relationships are generally driven by government decision makers acting directly within or directly through international government organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or its agencies, the Commonwealth, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Organisation of American States (OAS). Heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers, trade ministers, ambassadors, diplomats and technical experts and advisors are likely to feature prominently in this type of governmental leadership relationship.

Although non-governmental individual and institutional actors and decision makers may also influence the development of multilateral foreign policy, their contribution is likely to be indirect and peripheral, such as occurred when NGOs (W.S. 2002) were permitted to make limited contributions to the deliberations and policy decisions of the Ninth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IX) under the chairmanship of South Africa (Mills. 2000: 325).

3.3.2.5. International leadership relationships

In comparison with the more *direct* influences of foreign policy leadership relationships within the domestic or internal geographical environment, the external geographical environments are the crucibles of largely *indirect* or peripheral foreign policy influences. In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, the peripheral foreign policy initiators and influencers within the external environments of individual states include individual and institutional role players, both governmental and non-governmental, within the international environment which exert formative influences on the bilateral relationships of states. They help to shape the bilateral environment which is the environment in which domestic environments contribute to the conduct of foreign policy.

Sometimes, the *precipitators* of authoritative foreign policy decisions, or the *influencers* of foreign policy, may conceivably act within the international environment without obviously being part of any other specific geographical environment or acting through either one of the two transactional environments, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model. For example, a random act of air piracy or a terrorist assassination, or a boatload of illegal immigrants in international waters, may precipitate a foreign policy response or may influence a new direction in existing foreign policy, particularly in regard to states directly affected by such events. At the institutional level, non-government organisations such as *Green Peace* can and do operate within the international system in ways that may precipitate or influence foreign policy, specifically in the realm of environmental issues (WS. 1995). Although former Foreign Minister Nzo's reference (SA. 1998: *Nzo Speech*) to civil society and the business community as "... non-state actors ..." was directed at the domestic environment of South Africa, such actors could also conceivably qualify as precipitators or influencers of foreign policy within the external environments.

The international environment includes the four environments referred to above. However, for the purposes of this research, international leadership relationships are those leadership relationships that do not occur or cannot be categorised, or are

difficult to categorise in any of the other four environments. In this regard, Legg and Morrison (1971: 258) have referred specifically to,

individuals without official roles or over and above their official roles can also be considered international actors in certain contexts. Such individuals have an international stature and influence derived from personal commitment or charisma.

For example, the Pope, the Dalai Lama (*Sowetan*. 29 November 1999: 3), Nelson Mandela, some international terrorist groups and their leaders, particular international non-governmental organisations such as *Green Peace* and influential international personalities such as George Soros (*vide* {30}WS. 2002: 1-4) and Bill Gates (Bernstein and Munro. 1998: 101) might feature in this category. Leadership relationships in the international environment, in the absence of governmental institutions that do not also belong to one of the other four environments, will necessarily be found in only two categories; *individual non-governmental* and *institutional non-governmental*.

3.3.3. Selected imperatives

Imperatives are factors or circumstances that derive from previous actions or behaviour or experience and which have the effect of determining the course of future actions or behaviour. For example, a country that has been engaged in wars against hostile neighbours for much of its history, or which exists perpetually under threat of war or hostile attack could be expected to pursue a foreign policy strongly determined by strategic concerns and national interest. Similarly, countries that have experienced colonial exploitation and race discrimination may still harbour deep resentment and distrust of their former colonial rulers. They may therefore deliberately reject many of the values and practices of those states, including their political, economic and social systems, even though colonial exploitation and race discrimination are constitutionally no longer part of those systems.

The imperatives component (I) of the core model (figure 2/1 *supra*), it is argued, provides the incentive for a particular foreign policy decision or course of action. It also acts as a filter mechanism that influences the direction and shapes the content of foreign policy. Rosenau (1969: 173) has referred to “cultural compulsions” which might be expected to affect individual decision makers. Such compulsions are included within the concept of imperatives. However, Rosenau’s reference would seem to be directed toward individual decision makers under the influence of an all-embracing “cultural compulsion” whereas the imperatives component of the model (figure 2/1 *supra*) looks at a variety of unique and separate “compulsions” which may separately or collaboratively affect decision makers.

The various leadership relationships illustrated by arrow lines in figure 2/3 *supra* have been intersected by short straight lines (———) which represent the filter mechanism. The relevant imperatives, either collectively or independently, represent this filter mechanism. Although by no means an exhaustive list of possible imperatives, the following have been identified as imperatives that are most likely to influence the responses of foreign policy decision makers toward perceived foreign policy threats or opportunities: historical, political, economic, social, strategic, scientific and technological, moral, and legal imperatives. The eight imperatives have been selected on the basis of comprehensiveness, universality and relevance. All countries can be studied from the perspectives of history; political, economic or social development; strategic considerations; scientific and technical development; legal institutions and legal *milieu*. Although issues such as human rights and ethics might well be included under the social or legal imperatives it is argued that human rights issues and ethical issues, particularly in the international arena, have begun to assume a degree of prominence that warrants their inclusion in a separate category, the *moral* imperative, that is capable of encompassing both *ethics* and *human rights*, while recognising their distinctiveness.

According to Robinson (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 555-600) Chinese foreign policy from the 1940s to the 1990s passed through various stages, each one driven or

affected by a combination of domestic and international factors, including, among domestic factors, those pertaining to politics, history, ideology (555-561; 570-575; 588), economics (557; 568-574; 579; 590-591; 598-599), military strategy (561; 577-579; 581-583; 594-598), technology (569; 572-574; 579; 584-585; 594-597), culture (570-572; 580; 588) and certain moral issues such as human rights (599).

Richard Merritt, in reference to the environments of foreign policy decision makers (Merritt. 1975: 1-2), or the *milieux* of such decision makers in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, refers to,

*...varying levels of **technology**, enduring patterns of **trade** and other transactions, perceptions, norms of individual and state behaviour, and, more particularly, **religion** and other **cultural** components (my emphasis).*

Merritt also identifies (1975: 2) *morality, international law* and *national security* as issues that are also relevant topics for consideration by foreign policy decision makers. It is interesting to note that the Report on the Commonwealth Seminar held in Singapore in 1970 (CW. 1971: 17- 23) reflects the following specialist divisions as having been included within the foreign services of Australia, People's Republic of China (PRC), France, Ghana, Britain (UK), USA, and the USSR:

Legal: Australia, PRC (treaties), France, Ghana, UK, USSR.

Defence: Australia, UK, USA (arms control/disarmament), USSR.

Economic: Australia, PRC, France, Ghana, UK, USA, USSR.

Historical: Australia, UK.

Cultural: Australia (social), PRC, France (*culturelle*), UK, USA, USSR.

Political: Australia, PRC (foreign affairs), France, Ghana, UK, USA, USSR.

Science and Technology: UK, USA.

Although the moral imperative apparently did not feature in the organisational considerations of any of the above foreign services at the time when the Report on the

Commonwealth Seminar was written (CW. 1971: 17-23) the remaining seven categories appear to be well-represented if allowance is made for some differences in terminology. For example *defence* considerations are included in the strategic imperative whereas *cultural* considerations are encompassed by the social imperative.

Currently, scientific and technological needs, increased awareness of human rights issues, and ongoing concerns about corruption (an ethical and legal concern), particularly in developing states, suggest such needs, issues and concerns ought to be included among the eight selected imperatives that are capable of shaping a state's foreign policy. Consequently the *scientific and technological imperative* and *moral imperative* have been included among the imperatives identified. Although there is a necessary distinction between concepts such as *human rights* and *ethics* (which also focuses on value systems, honour and trust) it is conceivable that both these concepts can be logically accommodated within the *moral imperative*.

The imperatives matrix makes it possible to identify and record *linkages* between environments (three geographic and two institutional transactional diplomatic environments), leadership relationships (the actions and impact of specific decision makers), and imperatives (specific types of compulsive influence) in respect of individual states (in the case of this thesis, the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of China).

3.3.3.1. Historical imperative

The events and experiences of history are what shapes a nation's values, ambitions and concerns; determines a states allies and enemies; and sets in motion the succeeding experiences and events that will undoubtedly help to shape that state's future foreign policy and related decisions. Key decisions and events that resulted in, often traumatic, social, political or economic changes, need to be identified wherever possible so that, where significant, they can be taken into account when examining the perceived causes of specific foreign policy choices and the anticipated impact of such decisions and events upon the future foreign policy of those states.

Where communist states are concerned the Marxist concept of *historical inevitability* (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 488) remains a significant factor. Cantori and Spiegel (1970: 92) describe it as follows:

A philosophy of history by which Marx posited the preordained necessity and scientific certainty for the replacement of capitalism by socialism. Historical inevitability, according to Marx, results from the contradictions embedded in society's mode of production, which, under capitalism and preceding primitive, slave, and feudal patterns, has pitted the servile class against the exploiting class producing an automatic movement from one stage to the next. To an orthodox Marxist, free will and individual initiative are insignificant in the broad sweep of the historical development of mankind.

Non-Marxist great powers like the United States, may prefer the concept of *manifest destiny* (Ranney. 1971: 572), which implies that a nation's actions are determined less by its past than by its perceived future; by the goals its leaders determine and its people demand; and by its envisioned role in determining its own future history if not the future history of the world.

3.3.3.2. Political imperative

The political views and programmes of individual states and the ideologies adhered to and expounded by the governments of those states exert a significant influence on their foreign policies. The political imperative is inherently shaped by the historical imperative in that non-political as well as political historical events often give subsequent political events their shape and form; nevertheless the political imperative deserves to be treated separately because political events, experiences, programmes and ideologies can be identified and separated from their non-political equivalents. Political acts and experiences are capable of a separate historical existence and it is argued that any clear understanding of the foreign policy of any particular state

requires a thorough understanding of the political imperative that helps to drive that state's foreign policy. Value and belief systems, a state's *world view* or the world view of its leaders, the political structure and the institutions of government are specially relevant factors that can and do shape and influence a nation's foreign policy.

3.3.3.3. Economic imperative

In regard to the economic imperative, South Africa's foreign policy approach has sometimes been referred to as "trade-driven" (Kornegay. *Business Day*. 7 February, 2000: 9). The economic imperative may also involve a particular economic system such as capitalism, communism or socialism (Plano and Olton. 1969: 81-95; 111); it might involve directed trade, protectionism or open markets (Plano and Olton. 1969: 23-24; 29-30; 39-40). The economy of the state concerned may be developed or developing; and it may be in recession or in a condition of sustained growth. The relationship between government and labour may be mature and healthy, poor and combative, or relatively non-existent.

Economic divisions between rich and poor, and between advantaged and disadvantaged, will often determine domestic and foreign policies. The distribution of land and urban-rural economic divisions may also influence the shaping of such policies.

3.3.3.4. Social imperative

The social imperative covers a wide variety of issues, including education, health, sport, culture and crime. Issues such as the fight against contagious diseases, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, corruption and smuggling are all capable of shaping a state's foreign policy. The social imperative is also determined by such factors as the role of women in society, the role and structure of the family, clan, tribe or community, the role of religion, the *source* of ethics and values, and the way in which children, the elderly, the poor, the disadvantaged and the sickly are treated and cared

for by the community and the state. These factors also help to determine how states may relate to one another in terms of “... the whole range of normative restraints by which states .. regulate their conduct ...” (Cohen. 1981: v) within the international environment.

3.3.3.5. Strategic imperative

The predominant goal of any state’s foreign policy is the defence and maintenance of its independence and sovereignty. In this regard it has been stated (Legg and Morrison. 1971: 143) that,

...the most fundamental source of foreign policy objectives is perhaps the universally shared desire to insure the survival and territorial integrity of the community and the state. Military security against invasion or bombardment is the minimum objective of every state’s foreign policy.

Therefore, the strategic imperative is fundamental to the foreign policy of any and every state. Any action by an ally or a perceived enemy, or a regional neighbour, which is likely to upset the stability of the international system or a crucially important region, and which may threaten the stability, and perhaps the existence, of a particular state may cause that state to respond or react to the strategic imperative.

3.3.3.6. Scientific and technological imperative

The scientific and technological imperative provides an incentive for states to collaborate on joint projects and to engage one another in trade, commerce and industry with a view to developing their expertise in the field of science and technology. Because of the role that science and technology may play in ensuring military superiority (Legg and Morrison. 1971: 308) this imperative is capable of attracting competition as well as cooperation.

Most of the states of the international system, including many developing states such as South Africa and the PRC (Lam. 1999: 58-59), are aware that their future successes are likely to depend on their respective abilities to function competitively, and therefore effectively, in an increasingly highly-technological and scientific era. The quest for access to new scientific and technological advances also poses new threats and concerns that may need to be taken into account by policy makers. In the field of nuclear technology, for example, Merritt (1975: 146) has noted that,

because of the international commercial trade in nuclear reactors and fuels, the transportation of radioactive and toxic nuclear materials across national boundaries and on the high seas, the disposal and storage of waste materials, and the movement of nuclear-powered vessels in and out of foreign ports, foreign offices have been drawn into this entirely new genre of interstate relations.

Additional concerns faced by many states, developed as well as developing countries, in the realm of science and technology, include the need to secure their technology against misuse. A South African manufacturer of road construction equipment has already had its technology misappropriated in the People's Republic of China (2001: interview).

3.3.3.7. Moral imperative

The moral imperative focuses on the ethics and values of states and their governments and how they treat, or are likely to treat, other states. This imperative encompasses, in large measure, what Raymond Cohen (1981: 8) terms "the rules of the game". Cohen's *rules* are "... expectations of right conduct in defined circumstances ..." (1981: 8) and therefore exhibit a moral aspect in that they represent a code of behaviour between states that is enforced, not by law (Cohen. 1981: 9) but by *principle*. As Cohen relates, "... commitment to maintain a rule is like undertaking a promise ..." Consequently, it can be argued that human rights, ethics, values and trust

are qualities that may determine the extent of the moral imperative of individual states. It is important to examine, on the one hand, the way in which a particular state articulates its future commitments in regard to the moral imperative; on the other hand, the way in which such a state has actually responded to moral issues, as demonstrated by past actions, is also significant.

According to Cohen (1981: 54), (1981: 155),

(the) rules of the game ... serve to reduce .. dangerous uncertainty by prescribing a system of normative principles prohibitions, permissions, and obligations - to guide states in their conduct. Such principles ... act as a focal point around which states are able to coordinate their expectations of others' behaviour and hence harmonise their mutual actions.

Because such norms do not always possess “legal force” (Cohen. 1981: 158) their integrity and value must reside, in large measure, in a *moral* commitment, by the actors of the international environment, to maintain and uphold these norms, wherever possible. Failure by an individual state to honour or uphold an accepted international norm can be expected to bring forth negative consequences. As Cohen (1981: 115) points out, “... infringement of a promise casts doubt on the credibility of the one who gave his word...”, a circumstance which is clearly a moral issue.

The moral imperative also implies a concern and respect for human rights. South Africa’s Constitution includes a bill of rights ({{4}}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: chapter two) and, in view of the often-expressed linkage between domestic policy and foreign policy ({{4}}. SA. 1999: *Dlamini Zuma speech*), it would seem that South Africa’s human rights concerns, even in the external environments, cannot avoid being driven by the moral imperative (*vide* Mills. 2000: 360-361).

3.3.3.8. Legal imperative

The legal imperative contemplates the commitment of a particular state toward the law, both international law and domestic law. A state's regard for, and interpretation of, international law will invariably affect the practical outcome of its international disputes. Its regard for, and application of, its domestic law may impact upon the stability of that state's domestic environment with political and diplomatic implications for the regional and perhaps the international environment. The manner in which laws are formulated, implemented and adhered to evidences a quantifiable and qualitative commitment to the particular value system that gave rise to those laws. In both the bilateral and multilateral environments, particularly, individual states are likely, at some stage or other, to find themselves contemplating the possibility of negotiating or signing a bilateral or multilateral diplomatic agreement or similar international instrument. Despite the fact that such agreements, in practice, are often not enforceable in terms of law (Cohen. 1981: 82) it has been argued that, "... states much prefer to go with, rather than against, the grain of the law, if only to provide internal (domestic) and external (foreign) justification for their actions ...” (Cohen. 1981: 82).

3.3.4. Foreign policy matrix

If five environments are identified as I, D, B, R and M and four leadership relationships are identified as 1,2,3,and 4, eight imperatives might be identified as S, T, U, V, W ,X ,Y and Z to produce a matrix which focuses on the foreign policies of a specific state (in this case either South Africa or the PRC) or, if two separate matrices are created, of both these states. The imperatives matrix provides useful opportunities for identifying and monitoring, on the one hand, decision making patterns and, on the other, for constructing and analysing the *world-view* profiles of individual states.

It is important to decide at the outset on the intended purpose of the relevant matrix. Is the matrix intended to facilitate an analysis of decision making or is the primary intention to develop a *world view* perspective with a view to further analysis? Ideally,

the use of modern computer technology and appropriate computer-programmes specially developed for the task of processing and ordering the data required to create the envisaged imperatives matrices of individual states, could conceivably facilitate accuracy, consistency, dependability and speed of analysis, but only if the relevant computer programmes are indubitably capable of consistently performing the tasks required. This is a subject for further research, by those who also have expertise in the field of computer science. In the meantime, the more labour-intensive approach toward the construction of a matrix or matrices would be to gather the required data in terms of the various categories (figure 3/4 *infra*) and record the relevant information in a form that is brief, yet sufficiently comprehensive to ensure that any omission of words does not obscure meaning.

The development of a matrix for the purpose of analysing the world view or *weltanschauung* (Dushkin. 1974: 310) of a particular state would be more likely to focus on the clearly identifiable characteristics of a state, its leaders and its people, than on specific policy decisions and the perceived motivations for such decisions, as would be the case in the development of an appropriate decision making matrix. For example, in the case of a world view matrix, the main decision makers, decision influencers, and decision making institutions would be identified and categorised as would the relevant imperatives in terms of appropriate environments. In isolation much of the data reflected in the various matrices can be expected to appear arbitrary and relatively inconsequential. However, it must be kept in mind that a major focus of this research is to analyse the foreign policies of two individual states, specifically the foreign policies of South Africa and the People's Republic of China, and that the bulk of foreign policy *activity* (irrespective of the origins of such activity) can be expected to occur within the *bilateral* environment. Therefore a major function and objective of the imperatives matrix is to bring coherence and, hopefully, understanding to those foreign policy linkages reflected in the bilateral environment.

An environmental-relationships-imperatives matrix might take the form illustrated in figure 3/4 *infra*:

Figure 3/4: The imperatives component

1	Individual governmental leadership relationship	1	1	1	1	1
2	Institutional governmental leadership relationship	2	2	2	2	2
3	Individual non-governmental leadership relationship	3	3	3	3	3
4	Institutional non-governmental leadership relationship	4	4	4	4	4
		Domestic environment.	Bilateral environment.	Regional environment.	Multilateral environment.	International environment.
		D	B	R	M	I
S	Historical imperative	SD	SB	SR	SM	SI
T	Political imperative	TD	TB	TR	TM	TI
U	Economic imperative	UD	UB	UR	UM	UI
V	Social imperative	VD	VB	VR	VM	VI
W	Strategic imperative	WD	WB	WR	WM	WI
X	Scientific & technological imperative	XD	XB	XR	XM	XI
Y	Moral imperative	YD	YB	YR	YM	YI
Z	Legal imperative	ZD	ZB	ZR	ZM	ZI

The envisaged decision making matrix should now be considered. From the above matrix (figure 3/4 *supra*) it should be possible to develop a profile that will facilitate an analysis of identifiable linkages between, for example, institutional leadership actions in the domestic environment that are influenced by strategic considerations and which influence the shape of a state's foreign policy. The decision by India to detonate five nuclear devices in the space of a few days, during May, 1998 (*Asian Wall Street Journal*. 15-16 May 1998: 2), is a practical example of such a linkage (this linkage would be reflected as 2-W-D in a matrix applicable to India).

The decision by the Australian government to recall its ambassador from New Delhi for consultations (DFA. 19980512), in response to India's nuclear tests, demonstrated possible linkages between the actions of an individual political leader in the bilateral environment that were influenced by political considerations or individual political leadership actions in the domestic environment aimed at moral considerations (such a linkage might be reflected as either 1-T-B or 1-Y-D in a matrix applicable to Australia).

Although the Chinese reaction (*Asian Wall Street Journal*. 15-16 May 1998: 2) to India's actions was considered by some observers to be relatively mild it seems clear that China's traditional adherence to the five principles of peaceful coexistence made a more strident approach unlikely. Therefore, it would seem that there was a linkage involving the institutional political leadership in the bilateral environment in terms of strategic considerations (such a linkage might be reflected as 2-W-D in a matrix applicable to China). Pakistan's more aggressive decision to respond to India's action, by detonating its own nuclear devices (DFA. 1998), exhibited an obvious bilateral strategic concern, and possibly a domestic political concern (*vide Asian Wall Street Journal*. 15-16 May 1998), which could be reflected as 2-W-B or 2-T-D.

By comparing matrices in respect of any two states it should be possible to isolate the primary formative influences on specific foreign policy decisions during a given time frame and, thereby, to identify foreign policy decision patterns in respect of individual states. Thereafter, through logical progression from the identification of specific

decision patterns, it may be possible to discern a reliable method that can be applied practically and constructively to the field of foreign policy analysis.

3.4. Conclusion

From the foregoing it has been shown that the use of a model can help us to understand some of the factors that may determine foreign policy as well as the inter-relationships and linkages between those factors. The environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model is therefore capable of recording and providing sufficient information to make a scientific policy analysis both feasible and real. The model helps to identify and isolate the salient factors that influence foreign policy and seeks to provide a credible explanation of how foreign policy, and foreign policy decisions, come into existence. In order to fully explore the relationships component of the model, the next step is to develop and utilise organisational models that help elucidate how the specific foreign policies of the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of China actually come into existence.

Thereafter, the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model can be utilised to comprehensively select and apply relevant data and information about the shaping and implementation of South African and Chinese foreign policy in a manner that will facilitate the formulation of individual world view and foreign policy profiles. These profiles could, in turn, be utilised to identify the perceived most compatible bilateral foreign policy environment in which South Africa can best advance its foreign policy relationship with China.

The next chapter will therefore give attention to decision making leadership relationships, comprising individuals and institutions within the domestic environment, that contribute directly or indirectly to the making of foreign policy.

CHAPTER FOUR

INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL *MAKERS, INFLUENCERS* AND *IMPLEMENTERS* OF FOREIGN POLICY WITHIN AND BETWEEN THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

4.1. Introduction

The main focus of this chapter is on individuals and institutions, governmental and non-governmental, that appear to directly influence and give shape to foreign policy making within and between the domestic environments of South Africa and the People's Republic of China. In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model this chapter examines aspects of the leadership relationships sub-model (*vide figure 3/3 supra*), specifically the decision-*milieux* of D1, D2, Dn and B, and the pertinent decision making, policy making and leadership relationships of the domestic environment.

Some governmental organisational structures, in respect of each state, will be described and compared with a view to identifying the main foreign policy individual and institutional actors or role players. Non-governmental actors will also be identified, described and compared with a view to examining their respective roles in the foreign policy making process, particularly in regard to the influence they exert, if any, in determining the course of foreign policy; and their role, if any, in monitoring the impact of such policy.

Governmental role players include individual authoritative foreign policy decision makers and authoritative decision influencers; foreign policy implementers; and the institutions in which they normally function and act. Political parties, in so far as they are able to take or influence decisions that determine foreign policy, are also included in the category of governmental role players.

Government foreign policy makers include politicians who have the power to make, and usually do make, a direct contribution to the formulation of foreign policy. Such policy makers are also likely to include executive presidents, deputy presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers and deputy foreign ministers, other cabinet ministers, chairpersons and members of specialist committees, and other politicians and chief executives with similar powers, bearing in mind that the impact of their individual personality traits and characteristics upon decisions may be tempered, to some degree, by the type of constitutional and decision making institutional mechanisms within which decisions are made; and by the effectiveness of whatever monitoring or supervisory arrangements are in place. Sometimes such monitoring arrangements are part of the machinery of government, as in the case of parliamentary mechanisms, and sometimes they are non-governmental, as in the case of public opinion and the news media.

4.2. Foreign policy role players

In terms of the leadership relationships component (see figure 3/3 *supra*) of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of policy analysis, foreign policy, leadership and decision making relationships pertaining to the making of foreign policy originate in the domestic environment. The impact of such leadership relationships, in the form of authoritative decisions, may then extend to the external environments, usually through the bilateral or multilateral transactional environments as foreign policy linkages between domestic environments.

The relevant foreign policy role players involved in the decision making or policy making process may be individuals or institutions and include the makers of foreign policy; actors who are in a position to decisively influence foreign policy; and also the implementers of such policy. The influencers of foreign policy can be found within the hierarchy of the ruling political party, within the higher echelons of government, and also in the non-government sector (*vide* {13}WS. 1996). The decision makers of foreign policy are more usually to be found within the executive branch of

government, as are the implementers of such policy. According to Merritt (1975: 4), decision makers,

... operate within a decision system that has its own dynamics. At the centre of it stands a bureaucracy, a major function of which is to process relevant information from the external and domestic environments as well as that stored within the bureaucracy itself - to bring it to bear upon a current issue.

Foreign policy role players therefore include those top public servants who are required to translate foreign relations in the form of policy directives into a practical, more tangible, form. These implementers (*vide* Mills. 2000: 328) of foreign policy are also indispensable to foreign policy makers as foreign policy advisors because when foreign policy, or an aspect of such policy, becomes problematical or unworkable, the initial indications of a need for revised policies usually show themselves first to the implementers of policy, which includes diplomatic personnel serving abroad or even military personnel in the field.

Although the political and bureaucratic components of the foreign affairs portfolio of government are collectively entrusted, in large measure, with managing the state's foreign policy concerns, other governmental portfolios also have substantial foreign policy interests and concerns. For example, trade, defence, customs and immigration, and tourism concerns are all likely to exhibit a foreign affairs aspect. Diplomatic personnel serving abroad will, therefore, often include personnel drawn from government ministries and departments other than the relevant foreign affairs component (*vide* {1} 2001. *Interview*). Consequently an embassy's military attaché would be drawn from the military establishment and a trade or economic representative may be expected to be drawn from the department (or ministry) responsible for trade or economic activities (*vide* DFA. 20010806).

The manner in which policy decisions are determined, and the nature of such decisions, will depend in part on the nature of the governmental institution in which

the relevant decision maker must operate. Some countries exhibit similar institutions of government whereas others reflect institutions that are quite different from one another. Some governmental institutions, like those of South Africa, reflect a separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government (*vide* {4}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 43 and chapters 4, 5 and 8) whereas others, as in the People's Republic of China, exhibit no discernible separation or division (PRC. Undated. *NPC booklet*: 27-28). In some states, regular multi-party elections ensure regular peaceful changes of leadership; in other states a single party retains power (Davies: 2000. 6) and any changes in leadership are determined, in fact, not by the people but by that leadership. Some states reflect a centralisation of power, as in a unitary system of government, and others reflect a decentralisation of power, as in a federal system of government. Some legislatures are bicameral, as in South Africa ({4} SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 42), and others, as in the PRC (PRC. Undated. *NPC booklet*: 23; Davies. 2000: 5), are unicameral.

Different systems reflect different cultures, often quite different historical experiences, and differing value systems; and in all likelihood, a different world view. However, even differing value systems and differing constitutional structures may reflect some similarities in the way states communicate within the international and external environments. Consequently, most states maintain the equivalent of a foreign ministry, engage in international trade and have a military (*vide*{5}WS. 2002: 7) capability.

For the purposes of this research, the most important institutions of government in both South Africa and the PRC are the executive branches of government, which in the case of the PRC should justifiably also include the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC) because of its overriding influence in public policy decision making in the PRC (Lu. 1997: 9). The Standing Committee of the Politburo is the real focus of power (Davies. 2000: 6) and is arguably a presidential cabinet in its own right as it effectively wields far greater decision making power than the actual cabinet, the state council, presided over by the Premier (who is also a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo). Although party

issues and government issues, in South Africa, remain separate in theory, they have often merged in practice as, for example, when presidential visits abroad are used to collect funds for party political purposes (Mills. 2000: 274-275). Consequently, and for the sake of consistency, the political parties in government in South Africa are also categorised, for the purpose of this research, as being part of the executive branch of government. Apart from the need for consistency, however, it has been argued in recent years that there is, in South Africa, a blurring of party-government lines (Mills. 2000: 274), which lends added justification for this categorisation.

There is a special focus on the ministries and departments that are responsible for international trade and defence matters because of their actual and potential influence upon foreign policy issues, not only in regard to the PRC (Lu. 1997:13) and SA (*vide* Mills. 2000: 331-336), but in regard to virtually all bilateral relationships. Other important institutions of government are the legislature and the judiciary. Of the two, however, the legislature is more likely to become directly involved in foreign policy matters, particularly in regard to monitoring or oversight responsibilities (*vide* {1}PRC. 2000. *Constitution*: articles 62 and 67; {4} SA. 1996. *Constitution*: chapters 11 and 14).

4.2.1. South Africa's foreign policy role players

South Africa's main foreign policy making individuals would conceivably include the President, Deputy President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as other Cabinet ministers, whereas deputy ministers, directors-general and advisors would be more likely to contribute to decisions as influencers of foreign policy. In the realm of international relations, when travelling abroad officially, South African leaders might also be expected to consult closely with South Africa's diplomatic representatives in the countries that they visit. Nonetheless, there is not always clear evidence that such consultations have taken place (*vide* Barber in *Business Day*. 30 March 2001: 4; also Mulholland in *Sunday Times*. 8 April 2001: 2).

The main individual implementers of South African public policy, which often includes foreign policy, are likely to be the Director-General and personnel of the Office of the President; directors-general of relevant government departments; and relevant or related departmental and diplomatic personnel serving abroad. However, influencers of public policy, including foreign policy, may also comprise individuals and institutions drawn from outside the public policy *milieu*, outside the political party in power and the government of the day. In this regard, the news media, public opinion (*vide* Dye. 1995: 298-300), lobby and pressure groups, the business sector, and academic institutions all have the capacity to influence public policies, including foreign policy. Consequently, although South Africa's foreign policy role players are mainly governmental institutions and individuals, such role players also include non-governmental institutions and individuals acting, or having the potential to act, in an advisory, monitoring or lobbying role that may influence the direction and character of such policies (*vide* Mills. 2000: 26-27). Party political actors who are capable of influencing public policy (*Business Day*. 26 June 1998: 4) may therefore also be capable of influencing foreign policy.

4.2.1.1. Presidency (President and Deputy President)

South Africa's Head of State and Head of Government is the President (SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 83), currently Thabo Mbeki, elected for a term of five years. The President presides over a cabinet that includes a number of ministers whose portfolios extend often or occasionally into the realm of international relations. The ANC Presidency, particularly in the era of Thabo Mbeki, is said to have accumulated considerable power - "... more than was exercised by his predecessor ..." (Parsons. 1999: 82-83).

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Trade and Industry and Minister of Defence are among those ministers more often charged with duties that extend into the external environments but, other than the routine or specific delegated duties of cabinet ministers, the president has final responsibility for all policy decisions, including foreign policy decisions. Therefore, he may be expected to keep a close

watch on all major foreign policy issues that are relevant to South Africa's perceived interests and to make, or give approval for, decisions and policies associated with those major foreign policy issues.

In theory, major foreign policy decisions are made by the President, in consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, other members of the President's Cabinet and senior civil servants in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and other relevant departments and key advisors, depending on the nature of the decision. Such decisions might be as dramatic as the severing of diplomatic relations; or as important as involvement in a peace-keeping or mediation exercise, in which case the Minister of Defence and top military advisors would also be involved ({1} DOD. 1998. *White Paper on Defence*. Chapter 2: p. 9; {2} DOD. 1998. *South African Defence Review*. Chapter 5: paras. 22.1 and 22.3). Sensitive high profile issues such as arms sales or human rights might not necessarily be decided upon directly by the President but he would expect to be consulted or at least kept well informed about such developments. The President would also be kept well informed about all key policy issues, foreign and domestic, through the mechanism of the routine weekly Cabinet meetings.

President Mbeki is, reportedly, a hands-on chief executive, who has surrounded himself with officials and advisors who have his personal trust and are perceived to be personally loyal to him. Dr Adam Habib (Lund. *Pretoria News*. 25 January, 2001: 19) has said:

Mr Mbeki is like an imperial president. The Office of the President is now the nexus of government policy and decision making.

As President of South Africa and as President of the ANC, he wields considerable power. For example, he has the power to choose his Deputy President, Cabinet ministers, deputy ministers (Parsons. 1999: 82), directors-general, advisors, and senior officials; his party's provincial premiers and provincial ministers (Parsons. 1999: 97-98) and ANC candidates for mayoral elections. He also wields great influence over

ANC parliamentarians (Parsons. 1999: 98) and even the judiciary, in regard to “... the selection and promotion of judges ...” (Parsons. 1999: 98; {4}SA.1996. *Constitution*: chapter 8 paragraph 174). As Parsons (1999: 98) has pointed out,

... the Presidency has none of the constitutional obligations to act out its role in the public gaze ... the Presidency is exempt from procedural requirements to receive or respond to stakeholder representations. It is thus removed from any form of public participation ... The general danger is that ... the fortunes of the country, a sector or whole region, may come to depend too much on the foresight and the judgement of a single centre of decision-making.

There are also historical and cultural factors that should be noted. For example, it should be kept in mind that the African cultural *milieu* may exert a powerful impact on the way that government is practised and the manner in which public policy decision making takes place. Despite the impact of imported values (*vide* paragraph 5.3 (g) *infra*) in regard to the development of contemporary governmental structures, including those that uphold democracy and civil liberty, in the case of South Africa the impact of traditional African political structures, at the tribal level, should not be underestimated. In this regard Tyrrell and Jurgens have written (1983: 46) as follows:

The traditional chief was given a fairly liberal mandate to wield power in his realm and over his people. The precise meaning of this was dependent on the particular group. However, he was strictly controlled by a system of restraints and the need to retain the loyalty and allegiance of his subjects. Bearing in mind the importance of the group as opposed to the individual in traditional thought, it may be said that the chieftdom, in its true sense, was the African democracy. Nevertheless, this system of government is as vulnerable to tyranny and other political perversions as the various European systems have proved to be.

The impact of the chieftdom upon political leadership in South Africa today bears some parallels in that decision making is often accompanied by much consultation at practically all levels of government. However, an unfortunate consequence of a power core comprising an all-powerful imperial president (*Pretoria News*. 25 January, 2001: 19), when surrounded by sycophants, is that *groupthink* decision making, as described by Janis ('t Hart. 1990: 7), and which involves a quest for concurrence or consensus (*Business Day*. 1 February, 2000: 11), may deny any rational opportunity to re-assess, or avoid, inappropriate or bad policies. *Groupthink* ('t Hart. 1990: 7) refers to,

... a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.

The Deputy President (currently Jacob Zuma), as an important component of the Presidency and in terms of the South African Constitution, is intended to support the President ({{4}}SA.1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 91) However, he reportedly has few policy making responsibilities (Parsons. 1999: 82). At times when both the President and Deputy President are simultaneously away from South Africa an Acting President is appointed by the President ({{4}} 1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 90; DFA. 19980923). On one such occasion, the Acting President (M.G. Buthelezi, leader of the *Inkatha* Freedom Party and Minister of Home Affairs) sent SA troops into the neighbouring Kingdom of Lesotho to help quell a rebellion ({{1}}WS. 1998) but did so at the request of the Prime Minister of that country and in consultation with South Africa's President and Deputy President (DFA. 19980923).

The once separate Offices of the President and Deputy President have now been merged into a single Office of the President (or Presidency) with the following principal role players (*Pretoria News*. 25 January, 2001: 19):

- President Thabo Mbeki: Head of State; Head of government; and President of the ANC;
- Deputy President, Jacob Zuma: Deputy President (assists the president and is responsible for functions which include traditional, religious, cultural, and linguistic affairs, and the National AIDS Council; represents South Africa on relevant Binational Commissions); head of government business in the National Assembly;
- Dr Essop Pahad: Minister in the Office of the President; (responsible for areas of transformation assigned to him by the President. These include National Youth Commission, Office on the Status of Women, Office on the Status of Disabled Persons, Office on the Status of the Child); Oversees the Government Communication and Information System.

Other important officials in the Office of the President are two parliamentary counsellors, one serving the President and one serving the Deputy President. Members of Parliament would "... communicate with the President and his deputy through these counsellors ..." (*Pretoria News*, 25 January, 2001: 19). In addition, the following key officials serve in the Office of the President (*Pretoria News*, 25 January, 2001: 19):

- The Rev. Frank Chikane: Director-General, Office of the President; Secretary to the Cabinet;
- Mr Bheki Khumalo: Presidential spokesman (media liaison officer).

4.2.1.2. Cabinet

The South African Cabinet comprises the President, Deputy President and twenty-seven Ministers ({4}SA. 1996. *Constitution: annexure B*; {1}SA. 2000. *South African Yearbook* 2000/01: 69). The President appoints the Deputy President and Ministers, assigns their powers and functions and may dismiss them ({4}SA. 1996. *Constitution: paragraph 91*). The ministers of the current Cabinet include members drawn from the ANC, SACP, COSATU and the IFP (GCIS. undated: *Faces of Government; vide Mills. 2000: 284*).

A Cabinet Secretariat has been established in the Office of the Presidency "... with a policy coordination branch to check ministerial proposals to make sure they (are) in line with policy ...” (*Pretoria News. 25 January, 2001: 19*). Effectively this means that the Presidency has the final say on all policy matters, including foreign policy. In addition five cabinet clusters have been created "...to bring together overlapping functions ...” (*Pretoria News. 25 January, 2001: 19; GCIS. 2000: 21-29*) clustered as follows:

International Affairs:

Foreign Affairs;
Environmental Affairs and Tourism;
Defence; and
Office of the Presidency;

Social:

Housing;
Welfare and Population Development;
Water Affairs and Forestry;
Education;
Health;
Arts, Culture, Science and Technology; and
Sport and Recreation;

Economic:

Trade and Industry;
Communications;
Transport;
Finance; and
Public Enterprises;

Investment and Employment:

Labour;
Agriculture and Land Affairs;
Minerals and Energy; and
Public Works;

*Justice, Crime Prevention
and Security:*

Governance and Administration:
Public Service and Administration;
Home Affairs; and
Provincial and Local Government;

Safety and Security;
Intelligence;
Justice and Constitutional
Development; and
Correctional Services.

4.2.1.3. Professional and technical role players

Generally, because foreign policy decisions are political in nature, professional and technical role players usually perform mainly advisory and implementation functions. Within the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), policy may originate at a relatively low level of the Department's organisational hierarchy but will require approval at the political level before professional and technical proposals become translated into actual policy. For example, a decision to establish diplomatic relations with a particular state, might be initiated at the level of Desk Officer (2001. *Interview*) In such an event the Desk Officer would prepare a written submission for the attention of the Minister, which would be transmitted upward for perusal and approval in sequence by the relevant Director and Chief Director, the Deputy Director-General, Director-General, and Minister. It would then be left to the Minister to introduce the relevant policy proposal at Cabinet or Presidency level.

Not all professional and technical role players need be part of the organisational hierarchy of DFA. Departments such as the Department of Trade and Industry or the Department of Defence may also have a role to play in the determination of foreign policy. All ministerial visits abroad are, however, subject to prior authorisation by the President, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs (2002. *Interview*).


The second and third tiers of government usually do not have the responsibility or the authority to engage in foreign policy that binds the central government (*vide* 1996. *Constitution*: chapter 14). However, an increasing number of international

transactions take place at this level that can exert an impact, positive or negative, upon the foreign policy relationship between states (*vide* DFA. 20010720).

a) Ministry and Department of Foreign Affairs

South Africa's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the political component of the foreign policy institutional structure and comprises the Minister and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and ministry personnel. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) is the bureaucratic, administrative and functional component of the institutional structure and is headed by its most senior civil servant, the Director-General of Foreign Affairs who, in turn, is supported by a hierarchical top management structure comprising five deputy directors-general and a number of chief directors and directors. Most of the advisory authority within DFA currently resides, at least in theory, with the Director-General and his deputy directors-general, each of whom has a particular area of responsibility, as elucidated in the following organisational diagram:

Figure 4/1: Foreign Affairs Ministerial and Departmental top structure (December 2000)



Source: Based on Department of Foreign Affairs Organisational plan

MFA and DFA are also able to draw upon the on-the-spot experience and expertise of more than ninety South African foreign missions and their diplomatic and consular personnel serving abroad ({{1}}*Sunday Independent*. 18 March, 2001: 7).


The Minister of Foreign Affairs is appointed by the President and is a member of the Cabinet ({{4}}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 91). The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs is also appointed by the President but is not a member of the Cabinet ({{4}}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 91). Both the Minister and Deputy Minister are Members of Parliament (National Assembly) and can be subjected to questions in parliament by opposition parliamentarians ({{4}}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 92). They are both also subject to questioning by the Foreign Affairs Portfolio Parliamentary Committee. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is required, each year, to present the Foreign Affairs budget to the National Assembly for approval (*vide* {{4}}SA. 1996 *Constitution*: paragraph 56).

As previously stated *supra*, the most senior civil servant responsible for the overall management of the Department of Foreign Affairs is the Director-General. This official is appointed by the President and links DFA at the highest possible level with the political echelon in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Whereas the Minister bears overall responsibility for the consequences of the actions and operations of DFA, or failure to act, the Director-General of the Department has the duty to ensure that required actions and operations are carried out and that established policies and procedures are properly implemented. Traditionally, the Director-General was always drawn from the most senior ranks of the foreign service. However, under the Mbeki presidency, this senior diplomatic role has become more “political” and less home-grown. The present incumbent, Siphosiso Pityana, was drawn from the labour *milieu* (*vide* Forrest. *Mail & Guardian*. 14-19 December 2001). Pityana’s predecessor, Selebi, had served as South Africa’s Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva; and Selebi’s predecessor as DFA Director-General had been a career diplomat who had served as DFA Director-General during the De Klerk and Mandela administrations.

The Director-General may also be subjected to questioning in Parliament. The Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, for example, would be unlikely to take any major foreign policy decision without the prior approval of the President or Deputy President or, in some situations, the Foreign Minister or Deputy Foreign Minister. The Director-General could also expect to be consulted, beforehand, about any pending political decisions on major foreign policy issues although, in practice, this has not always occurred. For example, the South African President's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC by-passed the Director-General, reportedly (*Conversation* {3}: 2001) because of vigorous opposition to the decision from that source (also *vide* Mills. 2000: 283-284).

The organisational structure of South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs, particularly the top structure and the division entrusted with overseeing South Africa's relationship with states located in the Middle East and Asia, the region which includes China, is as follows:

Figure 4/2: DFA organisational structure pertaining to East Asia (December 2000)



Source: Based on the Department of Foreign Affairs organisational plan relating to responsibilities in East Asia, including the PRC.

Within the organisational structures of DFA there are procedures, recently set in motion, to enable foreign policy advisors, influencers and implementers to coordinate their activities and keep abreast of crucially important policy issues. For example, in February, 2000 (DFA. Cable 0162: 20000214) the following six new management structures were introduced for implementation at DFA headquarters in Pretoria:

The *Executive Management Committee* comprises the Minister, Deputy Minister, Director-General and the five deputy directors-general, and meets fortnightly to deliberate on strategic issues, DFA programmes and plans, international crises, and foreign affairs matters likely to be raised in Cabinet or in Parliament about which the Minister requires further information. These meetings are deliberately linked to accord with the schedule of Cabinet Committee Meetings on Foreign Affairs.

The *Directors-General Committee* comprises the Director-General of Foreign Affairs and his deputy directors-general either meeting together (D-G + 5) as the *Directors-General Forum* or individually (D-G + 1) as a *Director-General's Bilateral*. Both types of meeting take place fortnightly. The Forum is an administrative and management tool intended to oversee the implementation of DFA programmes within the various branches of the Department, respond to branch inputs, and provide strategic leadership in the management of DFA programmes. The Bilateral is intended to cover all matters not attended to by the Forum and which do not require inputs from the other deputy directors-general. The Bilateral is intended to focus only on issues relating to the particular deputy director-general and the branch that he or she manages.

The *Departmental Management Committee* (DMC) is a monthly meeting comprising the Director-General, the five deputy directors-general and all chief directors of DFA. The DMC is intended to facilitate consideration of all DFA programmes and plans, make policy recommendations, consider budgetary and human resources requirements, and attend to DFA administration and management issues.

The *Branch Management Committee* (BMC) meeting is convened by the deputy director-general of the branch concerned and comprises the deputy director-general and all chief directors and directors of that branch. Deputy directors (Desk Officers) only attend these meetings when circumstances require their attendance. Meetings take place on, at least, a monthly basis and with a view to considering policy proposals that are likely to be topics of discussion at the monthly DMC meetings. The Branch Management Committee meeting is intended to discuss implementation of, and assess and evaluate, branch programmes and plans, and make policy recommendations to the DMC. This Committee also approves and submits chief directorate budgets with regard to their agreed upon programmes and plans and, in fact, discusses and approves all branch matters before their submission to the DMC.

The *Programme Management Committee* (PMC) is convened by DFA's respective chief directors (or directors where there is no serving chief director) and comprises the chief director, directors and deputy directors; and assistant directors and others as and when required. PMCs are intended to take place, at least, on a monthly basis with a view to developing, managing, administering, evaluating and monitoring the plans of the respective chief directorates, as well as new issues and concerns arising within those chief directorates or at relevant South African diplomatic missions falling under the responsibility of those chief directorates. The PMC is intended to function as a Business Unit (BU) within DFA.

Every chief directorate is expected to operate in terms of, and in accordance with, an annual "Business Plan" comprising the consolidated annual business plans of the various individual South African foreign missions abroad and individual DFA directorates and sub-directorates falling under its overall jurisdictional responsibility. All individual DFA employees, including line function personnel and contract employees, are expected to subject themselves to Performance Contracts, entered into with their respective supervisors, whereby they become obligated to meeting specified performance targets in terms of responsibilities and objectives identified in the Business Plan pertaining to their particular sub-directorate, directorate and chief directorate.

The *Departmental Budget Committee* comprises the Director-General of DFA and all chief directors. Deputy directors-general may also attend. Chief directors, as the coordinators of their respective Business Units (PMCs), are necessary and obvious components of the Departmental Budget Committee. Each chief director is also required to appoint a budget programme Responsibility Manager, responsible for the compilation and day-to-day management of the budget of the relevant chief directorate.

Heads of Mission meetings provide useful opportunities for heads of mission to discuss and exchange views about common regional problems and to brief ministers, deputy ministers and senior officials about complex bilateral and regional issues. They provide valuable opportunities for heads of mission to bring individual bilateral and common regional policy issues to the direct attention of the political and departmental leadership in the hope of resolving difficulties and clarifying issues sooner rather than later. The Asian and Austral-Asian Chief Directorate is one of several chief directorates within South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs that participates in heads of mission meetings (2001. *Interview*). Such regional meetings are scheduled throughout the year and take place in Africa, Asia, Europe, North America and Latin America.

Usually, at least once per year but sometimes more frequently, a Heads of Mission Meeting, involving personnel from the Asian and Austral-Asian Chief Directorate (see figure 4/2 *supra*) as well as the various South African heads of mission from the Asian and Austral-Asian region, will take place at a venue somewhere in that region. For example, regional heads of mission meetings took place in Beijing in March, 2000 and in Singapore in September, 2000 (2001. *Interview*). A much larger Heads of Mission Conference, recently designated a Global Repositioning Conference (DFA. 20001222), involving all South African heads of mission, from all the regions referred to above, takes place in South Africa every year, usually in the first quarter of the year. This is essentially an opportunity for the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, other cabinet ministers and senior officials to address senior diplomats on matters of policy and policy direction and for foreign affairs officials to

exchange views with, and receive country reports from, heads of mission, including those located in the China region.

The heads of mission regional meeting and heads of mission annual conference are, of course, not unique to the South African foreign service. These are well-tested mechanisms for ensuring regular briefings and de-briefings, and a semblance of control over policy implementation. Consequently, the Africa Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China also regularly convenes heads of mission meetings for PRC heads of mission serving in the African region ({{1}} 2001. *Interview*).

b) Ministry and Department of Trade and Industry

During the decade of South Africa's physical representation in the PRC, and *vice versa*, total trade volume has increased from some US \$14 million in 1992 to US \$1.7 billion per annum in 2000 ({{2}}2001: *interview*). With both the PRC and South Africa making independent efforts to grow their individual economies it is understandable that the promotion of bilateral trade between the two states, as well as mutually beneficial inward investment, is a major priority of the current bilateral relationship.


c) Ministry and Department of Defence and SA National Defence Force (SANDF)

The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the SANDF ({{4}}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 202) and appoints the Minister, Deputy Minister, Chief of the SANDF and Secretary for Defence. Although a major aim of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) at the international level is to defend South Africa's "...sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence ..." ({{1}} DOD. 1998. *White Paper on Defence*: Chapter 2: p. 3) there are also several other priority international goals and some domestic goals with international implications, to consider, such as collaboration with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the adoption of a common security approach within Southern Africa ({{2}} DOD. 1998.

South African Defence Review. Chapter 4: paragraph. 8); adherence to international arms control regimes and treaties ({{1}}DOD. 1998. *White Paper on Defence*. Chapter 7: p. 31); participation in international peace support operations ({{2}} DOD. 1998. *South African Defence Review*. Chapter 5: paragraphs. 8-13); non-military tasks such as maritime law enforcement against smuggling, piracy and illegal plundering of SA marine resources ({{2}} DOD. 1998. *South Africa Defence Review*. Chapter 7: paragraph. 9); intelligence gathering ({{1}} DOD.1998. *White Paper on Defence*. Chapter 2: p. 8); and acquisition of military equipment, sometimes from foreign sources ({{2}} DOD. 1998. *South African Defence Review*. Chapter 13: paragraphs. 2.4 and 110).

The general organisational and reporting structure of South Africa's defence component of government is as follows:

Figure 4/3: Ministerial, Departmental and operational organisational and reporting structure of SANDF



Source: Adapted from 1998 South African Defence Review (Diagram 1: chapter 9)

The SANDF is effectively under civilian direction and control (DOD.1998. *South African Defence Review*. Chapter 9: paragraph. 2.1.2) and its activities tend to be governed by a combination of foreign policy and national security interests (DOD. 1998. *South African Defence Review*. Chapter 1: paragraph. 4; Chapter 13: paragraph. 124).

The Joint Standing Committee on Defence is the multi-party parliamentary oversight body that monitors and supervises the activities of the SA military establishment, as prescribed by the South African Constitution (SA. 1996. *Constitution*: Chapter 11; DOD. 1998. *White Paper on Defence*. Chapter 2: 7).

d) Other ministries and departments of state

A number of bilateral agreements have already been entered into between various South African government departments and their PRC equivalent institutions. From the establishment of diplomatic relations on 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2000, a period of 36 months, some 18 bilateral agreements, involving more than a dozen institutions in each state, were negotiated between South Africa and the People's Republic of China (SA. 2001: *Treaties*).

Consequently, although perhaps not as conspicuously involved in the bilateral relationship between SA and the PRC, all the state departments concerned (South African and Chinese) are contributors to, and participants in, the foreign policies of their respective countries.

e) Second and third tiers of government

Unlike the provincial and local governmental organisational structure within the PRC, which is well established to engage South Africa in international commerce and two-way investment, local and provincial government in South Africa has appeared relatively unprepared to effectively engage the PRC in international trade and inward investment promotion. In the past there has been a lack of coordination among public

policy decision makers, particularly at the provincial and local governmental levels ({{2}} 2001. *Interview*), with regard to actions and policies that impinge on South Africa's foreign policy process. This lack of coordination has persisted despite the existence of a DFA provincial liaison desk specifically intended for the purpose of coordinating, with the relevant South African embassies and consulates abroad, the programmes and requirements of provincial and local government delegations that intend embarking on overseas visits.

Since January, 1998, a number of city-to-city and province-to-province twinning agreements or sister city and sister province agreements have been negotiated ({{2}}2001: *interview*). However, in terms of South African constitutional ({{4}}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 231) and legal requirements, local and provincial governments lack the authority to enter into international agreements. Therefore, these agreements appear to be merely expressions of goodwill and friendship, enforcement being dependent more upon the spirit of the agreement and less upon law.

4.2.1.4. Parliament

The President, Deputy President, cabinet ministers and deputy ministers are also Members of Parliament. In terms of the South African Constitution, the President may, alternatively, also select a small number of Cabinet Ministers from outside Parliament ({{4}}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 91 (3) c.).

There are a number of portfolio committees in Parliament ({{4}}WS. 2001: 2), comprising parliamentarians from different political parties ({{6}}WS. 2001: 1-2), and particularly those from smaller parties are often required, by their party leadership, to serve on more than one committee. In regard to foreign policy, and in view of arguments already advanced (para. 3.3.2.2. *supra*), the most important parliamentary portfolio committees are those concerned with matters pertaining to foreign policy, trade and industry, and defence ({{4}}WS. 2001: 2).

Although the Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Portfolio Committee is able to question the Minister, Deputy Minister and Director-General of Foreign Affairs, or any other DFA official that is able to provide the information it requires, the Committee has only limited ability to influence the direction of foreign policy (*vide* Mills. 2000: 276). The Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee cannot, for example, hold hearings to ascertain whether the government's intended ambassadorial appointments are suitable candidates to represent South Africa in the countries where they are expected to serve as heads of mission. They also have no specific powers to question appointments to the top management echelon of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Committee can therefore not operate as an effective oversight committee to ensure that SA foreign policy is underpinned by professional competence and expertise or that the best foreign policy options have seriously been considered and implemented.

4.2.2. PRC's foreign policy role players

The PRC's major foreign policy role players today comprise individual and institutional political leaders; professional and technical personnel in relevant government ministries, such as foreign affairs, trade and economic cooperation, and defence (*vide* {1} 2001. *Interview*); academic councils and institutions specialising in foreign policy matters; and socio-economic individual and institutional actors (*vide* Lu. 1997: 135; *vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 89-93), whose activities may have the capacity to influence PRC foreign policy.

The main institutions of government are the Communist Party of China (CPC), the Central Military Commission (CMC), the National People's Congress (NPC), and the State Council (SC). Another major institution of government, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), functions mainly in an advisory and monitoring role (Xin. *China Daily*. 3-4 March, 2001: 1; PRC. 2001. *CPPCC Work Report*: 16). It is a constitutional vehicle for the PRC's 55 ethnic minority groups and the eight so-called democratic parties (2000/01: *Interviews a-g*) to inject their opinions into the policy debates of the CPC. Its primary effect, however, is to give many non-CPC members the opportunity to be part of the decision making processes

in the PRC. Some of the senior office bearers of the “Democratic Parties” are also office bearers in state institutions such as the NPC and CPPCC (2000/01: *Interviews a-g*). The judiciary also lacks independence and falls under the NPC. The CPC’s main decision making organisational structure is embodied within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC). The CCCPC comprises the General-Secretary, Political Bureau (or Politburo) and Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Secretariat, Central Military Commission (CMC) and Commission of Supervision (COS); the NPC encompasses the President, Vice President and Chairman of the NPC, and the Standing Committee of the NPC; the State Council encompasses the Premier, Vice Premiers, State Councillors, Ministries and offices of state.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) is the ruling party in China and has been in existence since 1921. Its current membership (*China Daily*. 30 June 1999: 2) is 61 million, or 5.1 percent of China’s population. The CPC achieved power in China in 1949 and established the People’s Republic of China in that year. Since its founding the CPC has convened 15 national congresses (eight of these as the governing party of the PRC) and the most recent of these, held in September, 1997, was considered to be of special significance because it enshrined Deng Xiao Ping Theory in the Constitution, together with Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism-Leninism, as the guiding ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) PRC. 1998: 1). However, some earlier congresses were also great watershed events in terms of their impact on policy and ideology. For example, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was described by Jiang Zemin, President, chairman of the Central Military Commission and General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, (*China Daily*. 19 December 1998. 1-2) as,

... a watershed event, marking the beginning of a new era for China’s socialist cause. ... a major turning point of far-reaching significance in the history of the Party since the founding of new China. It served as the prologue to the great socialist reform and opening up. ... As a result of that meeting, the Party began to bring order out of chaos in ideological, political and organisational fields. And the meeting

opened a new road to building socialism with Chinese characteristics.

In effect the CPC is the guardian and fountainhead of state political power. It appears even to be above the constitution and the law, as indicated by Jiang Zemin (Lam. 1999: 121-122) when he declared in 1995 that, "... the party leads the people to establish the constitution and the law ... it also leads the people to implement the constitution and the law..." Clearly, the CPC permits no opposition in the form of any credible challenge to its leadership or paramount status (*South China Morning Post*. 26 October 1998: 7). As President Jiang Zemin reportedly confirmed (*Beijing Wan Bao*: 15 January, 2000) in a keynote address to the Party's Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection,

... the Party enjoys the absolute dominance over everything, regardless of workers, peasants, PLA men, intellectuals and businessmen.

Consequently, the Standing Committee of the Politburo functions as a presidential cabinet in that it is effectively, if not constitutionally, the supreme decision making political body within the PRC governmental system and is presided over by the General-Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC, in the capacity of Chairman. The General-Secretary is also the President of the PRC. Jiang Zemin is the current General-Secretary and was elected to this position in 1997.

From a practical diplomatic perspective, the Communist Party of China often functions as a separate diplomatic instrument (*vide* {2}PRC. 2000. *Speech by Dai Bingguo*), in addition to the PRC bureaucracy and including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consequently, the CPC will focus on states with strong ruling political parties such as, for example, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Nigeria, with a view to making party-to-party links as strong as possible and to neutralise the bureaucracies of those states, when necessary (*vide* Mills. 2000: 269). There is nothing sinister in this strategy, in that it derives largely from the period of the Cold war when party relations often took precedence over state relations ({3}2002. *Interview*).

4.2.2.1. Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC

The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Politburo) currently comprises the following seven members (*vide* Brahm. 1998: 116):

- Jiang Zemin: General-Secretary of the CPC
Chairman of the Politburo
President (or Chairman of State)
Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC)
- Li Peng: Chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC)
- Zhu Rongji: Premier of the State Council
- Li Ruihuan: Chairman of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
- Hu Jintao: Vice President (or Vice Chairman of State)
Vice Chairman of the CMC
- Wei Jianxing: Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection
- Li Lanqing: First Vice Premier of the State Council

It is a significant indication of the extent of the core leadership's influence that fifteen of the twenty two members of the full politburo, including the members of the Standing Committee listed *supra*, hold powerful positions in all key governmental institutions. Every week the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau meets to discuss matters of importance. President Jiang will cast one of the seven votes. Li Peng and Zhu Rongji each has one vote (DFA. Cable: 20000530). During a meeting with former President, Nelson Mandela, on 25 April, 2000 (DFA. Cable: 20000530), President Jiang Zemin provided some useful insights into the workings of the Politburo:

*When we have to discuss some major issues it will
be put up for discussion before the Political Bureau. The
Political Bureau meets once every month and in that*

bigger group, Vice Premier Qian also has one vote. Madam Wu Yi is still an alternate member of the Political Bureau, so she may participate in the discussion, but does not have a vote. Frankly speaking, voting is very seldom used, either in the Political Bureau or Standing Committee meetings. What is most important is for the thorough exchange of views and consideration prior to the meeting.

It has been reported (Lam in *South China Morning Post*. 4 May, 2000: 1) that Jiang Zemin has already informed senior CPC members that he will not seek a third term as Party General Secretary in 2002 and that only two of the existing Politburo Standing Committee members, Hu Jintao and Li Ruihuan, should remain.

4.2.2.2. Central Military Commission

Jiang Zemin was elected Chairman of the CMC in 1998. The CMC "... directs the armed forces of the country ... (and) .. the Chairman ... has overall responsibility for the Commission ..." (PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 71; vide PRC. 2000. *Constitution*: article 93). Unlike previous holders of this office Jiang does not have a military background. His credibility, at least among the powerful military establishment, is therefore largely dependent upon his ability to satisfy the PLA that he will keep the PRC militarily strong and relevant.

It has been stated (Roy. 1998: 136; Bodansky. 1997: 12) that,

... a March 1997 report prepared for the CCP Central Committee General Office and the State Council General Office concluded that "China and the United States will eventually go to war".

Commenting on China's reaction to the effectiveness of American weapons systems during the 1991 Gulf War, Shambaugh (Bernstein and Munro. 1998: 67) noted that,

“...this was the PLA’s first exposure to a high-tech war, and they were stunned...” Jiang Zemin, as Chairman of the JMC, is therefore committed to modernising the PLA both as a perceived necessary defensive need and in order to further enhance his personal power base among the military establishment. The Chairman of the Central Military Commission is constitutionally responsible to the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee (PRC. 2000. *Constitution*: article 94). However, as the Chairman of the CMC is also the General Secretary of the Communist Party and President of the PRC, and as the Chairman of the NPC (Speaker of the legislative organ) is politically subordinate to both these offices the CMC Chairman is unlikely to incur any serious challenges to his authority.

Vice President Hu Jintao is also Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, a post he was elected to at the behest of President Jiang. He is therefore, effectively understudying Jiang Zemin for both leadership of the state and leadership of the CMC. However, indications are that Jiang may attempt to hold on to the Chairmanship of the CMC after he steps down as President in 2002.

4.2.2.3. President and Vice President

Jiang Zemin was elected President by the NPC (*vide* PRC. 2000. *Constitution*: article 79) in 1998. Hu Jintao became Vice President in 1998, having been elevated to this position by President Jiang (Lam. 1999: 391) who, in seeking to anoint his successor, followed the lead of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping who had previously named *their* successors.

4.2.2.4. State Council (Premier’s Cabinet)

The current Premier of the State Council of the PRC is Zhu Rongji (Brahm. 1998: 116). The State Council presides over the administrative component of government (PRC. 2000. *Constitution*: articles 86 and 89) and is therefore equivalent to the Premier’s Cabinet. It has been speculated that when, Zhu Rongji retires in 2003, Jiang Zemin would prefer Guangdong party chief, Li Changchun, to succeed Zhu as

Premier (Lam in *South China Morning Post*. 4 May, 2000: p.1). The State Council currently comprises the following office bearers:

Zhu Rongji:	Premier;
Li Lanqing:	Vice Premier;
Qian Qichen:	Vice Premier;
Wu Bangguo:	Vice Premier;
Wen Jiabao:	Vice Premier;
Chi Haotien:	State Councillor;
Luo Gan:	State Councillor;
Madam Wu Yi:	State Councillor;
Ismail Amat:	State Councillor;
Wang Zhongyu:	State councillor;
	Secretary General (concurrently);

There are currently twenty-nine departments under the State Council, classified into four categories (Brahm. 1998: 153), as follows:

<i>State Political Affairs:</i>	<i>Macro-control:</i>
Foreign Affairs;	Development Planning Commission;
National Defence;	Finance;
Culture;	People's Bank of China; and
Health;	Economic and Trade Commission;
Family Planning Commission;	
Ethnic Affairs Commission;	<i>Specialised Economic Administrative:</i>
Justice;	Railways;
Public Security;	Communications;
State Security;	Construction;
Civil Affairs; and	Agriculture;
Supervision.	Water Resources;
	Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation;
	Information Industry; and

Culture, Resources and

Social Protection:

Science and Technology;

Education;

Labour and Social Security;

Land and Natural Resources; and

Personnel.

Specialised, Economic, Administrative

(Continued):

Commission of Science Technology and

Industry for National Defence.

Unlike the South African organisational arrangement there is no specific international cluster although foreign affairs and defence are, like South Africa's categorisation, included in the same category. The PRC approach tends to confirm the influence of the CCP, specifically the Standing Committee of the Politburo (*vide* CPC.1997: 87-100) and the Central Military Commission, on the really important military and foreign policy decisions of the PRC. Apart from the various ministries resorting under the State Council there are also a number of other important institutional mechanisms ({{2}PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 67; Brahm. 1998: *organisational chart*) comprising mainly organs, offices and institutions. For example, organs include the National Tourism Administration, Civil Aviation Administration of China, State Intellectual Property Bureau and General Administration of Customs; offices include the Foreign Affairs Office, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs and Taiwan Affairs Office; and institutions include *Xinhua* News Agency, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Chinese Academy of Sciences.

4.2.2.5. Professional and technical role players

As a consequence of the dominance of the Communist Party and the centralisation of authority within the overall structure of government, professional and technical role players are mainly implementers of policies already initiated, debated, developed and authorised by the most senior state leaders ({{1}2001. *Interview*). Whereas foreign policy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) also have important roles to play in the field of foreign policy.

According to Lu Ning (1997: 165; *vide* Swaine. 1995: 50), the growing influence of MOFTEC has eroded, to some extent, the power of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whereas the emergence of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and more particularly the expanded operations of the PLA Navy (PLAN), on the international scene, can be expected to introduce new dynamics to the PLA's foreign policy role in future. The diplomatic and military establishments have sometimes disagreed strongly in regard to arms sales. For example, Roy (1998: 75) has pointed to differences of opinion between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PLA, concerning sales of advanced missiles to Saudi Arabia, that had to be personally resolved by Deng Xiao Ping.

Despite having to compete with an increasing number of domestic bureaucracies that have entered the field of foreign affairs, MOFA remains the primary institution responsible for the conduct of the PRC's diplomacy. Its role in the management of foreign policy has suffered, however, as a result of the PRC leadership's requirement that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must serve the nation's economic interests (Lu. 1997: 164).

a) Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of the PRC is divided into two main categories, domestic policy and foreign policy. There are twenty-six departments whose functions are divided into the following three categories (Lu 2000. *Interview*):


- **professional functions, regions and countries;**
(e.g. Africa: *Africa, SADC, South Africa*; and
Asia: West Asia and North Africa)
- **characteristics (of professional work); and**
(e.g. Multilateral levels;
Treaty and Law; and
Arms control)

- **administrative functions.**

(e.g. General office;
Department of personnel;
Administration; and
Finance).

The Africa Department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the specialist division that has responsibility for PRC bilateral relations with South Africa and other African states. The organisation of the Africa Department is as follows:

Figure 4/4: MOFA organisational structure with regard to Africa, including South Africa (December 2000)



Source: MOFA Protocol Department

Key:	MOFA:	PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	D-G:	Director-General

NOTE: PRC Vice Minister is equivalent to SA Deputy Minister
PRC Assistant Minister equivalent to SA Director-General
PRC Director-General equivalent to SA Deputy Director-General

The leading personalities within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ({{1}} Interview, 2001) are the foreign minister, the five vice foreign ministers and the five assistant foreign ministers as well as senior officials at the level of director-general, deputy director-general, director and deputy director. There is also a functional department dealing with the appointment of ministers and ambassadors under the discretion of the

National People's Congress (the legislature) ({} 2001. *Interview*). In contrast with the South African institutional structures, however, it should be kept in mind that the PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs and all foreign service personnel are *civil servants* (*vide* {} 2001. *Interview*).

b) Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation

As David Bachman has pointed out:

As with all major states, in China the realm of foreign policy is not limited to diplomacy and national security policy ... International economic relations are a salient element of China's foreign relations, one that is growing in importance as China's relationship with the world deepens (Kim. 1998: 36).

The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) is empowered to undertake the following responsibilities (Brahm. 1998: 173):

- formulate strategies and plans for foreign trade and economic cooperation;
- undertake the macro-administration and economic regulation of China's foreign economic relations and trade; and
- sanction foreign investment projects at national level and supervise the approval activities of its own branches at regional levels.


According to Brahm (1998: 173), MOFTEC "... puts the final stamp of approval on the contracts, articles of association and technology-transfer agreements for foreign investment projects..." There is thus close control and coordination to ensure that PRC economic and investment policy is closely aligned to foreign policy and, particularly where technology transfers are concerned, military policy objectives.

c) Ministry of Defence

As Brahm (1998: 186) reminds us, the main function of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) "... is to serve as the window of China's military complex to the outside world, as real power within the PLA falls under the Communist party apparatus, not the State council..." The MOD is empowered (Brahm. 1998: 186) to undertake the following responsibilities:

- deal with national defence affairs in cooperation with the Central Military Commission as well as the Communist Party; and
- receive military leaders from other countries and handle all international liaison functions on behalf of the PLA.

Figure 4/5: Structure of Military Leadership Under the Communist Party of China



Source: modified diagram extracted from Brahm (1998: appendices)

Source: based on Brahm. 1998. *Zhongnanhai*. Chart: *Structure of Military Leadership*.

d) Other ministries and departments of state

Unlike many of their South African counterparts, PRC ministries and departments of state tend to coordinate their foreign policy activities through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The activities of PRC representatives, whether at the political level of minister or at senior and even relatively junior non-political levels of the civil service, are invariably focused on specific well-planned and well-conceived objectives that are in accordance with national objectives.

The PRC's many departments of state have been categorised (Brahm. 1998: Organisational Chart) as macro-control departments; specialised economic administrative departments; education, technology, cultural resources, and social protection departments; and state political affairs departments. In regard to South Africa, PRC departments of state that have not already been referred to, and which aspire to achieving some economic, social or strategic advantage for the PRC, are also likely to feature prominently in the PRC-SA bilateral relationship.

e) Second and third tiers of government

The PRC comprises thirty-three provincial-level administrative areas ({{2}}PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 2-3), including twenty-three provinces (including Taiwan which the PRC regards as a renegade province), five Autonomous Regions (Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Guangxi), four municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) and two Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macao).

As Lu (1997: 16) has noted,

... foreign affairs offices exist in all provincial governments and governments of major municipalities that are open to foreigners... Corresponding offices of foreign economic relations and trade, overseas Chinese affairs, Taiwanese affairs, etc., also exist in

most of the provincial and municipal governments.

The PRC is therefore adequately prepared to conduct foreign relations at city and regional level in a coordinated and focused manner, subject of course to the approval, supervision, direction and guidance of the central government. The primary focus of such relations is directed at trade and investment, cultural activities, tourism and the promotion abroad of a positive image of China.

4.2.2.6. National People's Congress (Legislature)

In terms of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted on 4 December, 1982, the National People's Congress (NPC) "is the highest organ of state power" ({{1}}PRC. 2000. *Constitution*: Article 57; *vide* paragraph 4.2 *supra*; also Davies. 2000: 6), being responsible for exercising the "legislative power of the state" ({{1}}PRC. 2000. *Constitution*: Article 58). It has also been described (Liu. *China Daily*. 2 December 1999: 4) as "... the core of the State power structure" Among the functions and powers of the NPC, that may directly influence the PRC's foreign policy ({{1}}PRC. 2000. *Constitution*: Articles 62 and 63), are the following:

*... to elect (and, if necessary, remove) the President and Vice President of the PRC; to decide on the choice of the Premier of the State Council **upon nomination by the President of the PRC** (my emphasis), and on the choice of the Vice Premiers, State Councillors, Ministers in charge of ministries (including the Foreign Minister) or commissions, the Auditor-General and the Secretary General of the State Council upon nomination by the Premier (and remove them if necessary); to elect (and, if necessary, remove) the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and, upon nomination by the Chairman, to decide on the choice of all other members of the Central Military Commission (and, if necessary, remove them); and to decide on questions of war and peace.*

The NPC has also been described by some non-PRC Government sources (O'Neill in *South China Morning Post*. 21 February, 2000: 4) as a subject for satire and an institution in which,

... the delegates are chosen by the party not the people. If they make a fuss and criticise something, they will not be invited back next year, so they keep silent and enjoy a good time in Beijing at the expense of the state. They have no contact with ordinary people.

As described by some Chinese mainlanders (O'Neill. *South China Morning Post*. 21 February, 2000: 4), the NPC is a form of theatre (intended) for foreigners. However, pro-government sources (Liu. *China Daily*. 2 December 1999: 4) argue that the role of the NPC is to "... ensure (through constant supervision) the enforcement of the Constitution and laws and to monitor the work of other State organisations" Such organisations would presumably also include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this regard, a useful role in regard to foreign policy is the supervision or monitoring of ambassadorial appointments (*vide* {1} 2001. *Interview*).

It has been stated (Du Xichuan *et al.* 1990: 46) that the NPC "upholds the principle of democratic centralism" which implies that all the powers of the NPC should be collectively exercised by the NPC. However, the NPC meets only once per year (PRC 1990. *Constitution*: article 61). Therefore, when it is not in session it leaves many affairs to the NPC Standing Committee, comprising a chairman, vice-chairman, a secretary-general and a number of members elected from the NPC deputies by the NPC (Du Xichuan *et al.* 1990: 46).

When the NPC is not in session, powers of the NPC Standing committee include the following:

Upon nomination by the premier of the State Council, it may select ministers ... as well as the auditor-general, and

secretary-general of the State Council; upon nomination by the chairman of the Central Military Commission it may select members to be appointed to the commission; it may decide on the appointment and recall of plenipotentiary representatives abroad; it may decide on the ratification and abrogation of treaties and important agreements concluded with foreign countries; ... it may decide on the institution of systems of titles and ranks for military and diplomatic personnel; and it may decide on the declaration of war, general or partial mobilisation, or on the enforcement of martial law (Du Xichuan et al. 1990: 48).

Apart from its task of making and amending laws (*vide Xu. China Daily. 1 February 1999: 7*), ensuring their enforcement and monitoring the work of other state organisations (*Liu. China Daily. 2 December 1999: 4*), the NPC also has the task of supervising the Supreme People's Court. Consequently, the PRC judiciary is effectively subject to the legislature, the NPC. This situation was confirmed (*China Daily. 26 September 1998*) when, "...the Supreme People's Court ... announced ... it (would) take a series of measures to put itself under the supervision of the National People's Congress..." and the President of the Supreme People's Court (*China Daily. 26 September 1998*) subsequently declared that,

... judicial organisations should subject themselves to supervision to guarantee justice in the judicial system.

The current Chairman of the NPC is Li Peng, the adopted son of a former premier and foreign minister, Zhou Enlai. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Ching. 23 April 1998: 32) records that, in March, 1998 the NPC elected Jiang Zemin to a second term as president and elected Hu Jintao as vice president. "Zhu Rongji was elected premier, succeeding Li Peng who ...(became) ... the chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC. ...". The office of Premier is equivalent to that of Prime Minister whereas the NPC Standing Committee Chairman is equivalent to a

parliamentary speaker. Li Peng is the most senior member of the CPC, second only to Jiang Zemin, and as he had already served a maximum of two terms as Premier the only senior position available to him was as NPC Chairman. Despite assuming a lesser position within the PRC governmental structure, Li Peng retains his influential leadership role in the PRC decision making apparatus (Lu. 1997: 9) by virtue of his senior position within the CCP. This is further evidence of the dominant position of the Communist Party within the PRC.

The NPC also has a number of Special Committees including a Committee of Foreign Affairs and a Committee of Overseas Chinese Affairs. "...These special committees examine, discuss and draw up relevant bills and draft resolutions, and carry on day-to-day work of legislation and supervision ..." (PRC. 1999. *Yearbook* 1998/1999: 41).

4.3. Monitors and supervisors of public policy

The monitors of public policy include political parties, usually other than the dominant party in power, as well as the news media and the general public. Monitors can also include foreign governments and foreign news media and may also find expression in international public opinion. Supervisors may include judicial mechanisms, parliamentary committees and other forms of oversight and supervision. Probably the most effective monitors of foreign policy are the people whom it benefits or injures. The monitors referred to here may therefore be found in all five of the environments identified (chapter three *supra*). Monitors may be individuals, groups, institutions or organisations; they may be formal or informal.

Although political parties in power may monitor whether party policy has been correctly interpreted and applied, political parties in opposition may monitor foreign policy from a variety of more critical viewpoints, including anticipated and actual consequences, and morality; and the citizenry, the news media and lobby groups may monitor foreign policy from the perspective of personal, public or national interest.

In a state such as the PRC, for example, the most effective monitors, and critics, of policy, are likely to be found within the higher echelons of the Party and Government structure (*vide* {1} 2001. *Interview*). However, criticism of the power core, the Politburo members, is unlikely and where such criticism does occur it is unlikely to become public knowledge. In South Africa, this type of internal monitoring does occur and does sometimes become public as indicated by President Mbeki's (DFA. Cable: 19980703) rebuke of critics of his government within the SA Communist Party, when he said:

None of us should go around carrying the notion in our heads that we have a special responsibility to be a revolutionary watchdog over the ANC.

Although not restricted to the foreign policy *milieu*, the monitoring function does exist as a practical concept within the PRC governmental structure (*vide* {1} 2001. *Interview*), where the term *supervision* is more commonly (*vide* Brahm. 1998: 194), if less accurately, used. For example, the PRC's eight democratic parties are expected to "supervise" the activities of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) but clearly this would only be a realistic possibility if the CCP were actually subordinate or subject to the democratic parties. This is certainly not the case (2000/01: *Interviews a-g*). However, it is possible to envisage a monitoring role for these eight parties, whereby they monitor the actions of the ruling party and respond in terms of domestic constitutional procedures available to them. As the vice chairman of the China Democratic League (2001: *Interview d*) explained,

... what we call 'supervision' in China is ... multi-channel supervision. There's legislative ... judicial ... press ... and democratic supervision. The relationship between ... parties, especially between the democratic parties and the party in power is constructive, not destructive or in opposition. All supervision and criticism is also constructive.

By contrast, in South Africa, the news media and public opinion are often vociferous critics and useful monitors (Mthombothi. *Financial Mail*, 16 June, 2000: p. 16) of

the government's actions and public policies. Within the multiparty democratic system, parliamentary procedure and debate also provide opportunities to monitor public policies, including foreign policy (*vide* {4}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraphs 57, 59 and 92). Despite the relative absence of effective non-governmental public monitoring mechanisms within the PRC's domestic environment, however, foreign-based or non-mainland monitoring mechanisms can effectively fulfil this monitoring role from the vantage point of the PRC's external environments. Foreign governments, international non-governmental organisations, the foreign or non-mainland news media, multilateral organisations such as the United Nations and its agencies, and other observers and monitors based both inside and outside the PRC, are all actual or potential monitors of PRC foreign policy. However, such monitoring activities occur mainly within the external environments of the PRC. South Africa and all other states are, of course, also vulnerable to such monitoring.

4.3.1. Monitoring and supervision in South Africa

Among the most effective supervisors of government practice are the Constitution, the South African legal system and judiciary, particularly the Constitutional Court, and the Auditor-General and Public Protector({4}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraphs 167, 182 and 188). However, the quality of public policy does not necessarily concern these institutions, and is essentially the concern of those who monitor public policy.

Within the governmental and party political milieu the most important and effective monitors of public policy, including foreign policy, are politicians, either as critics from outside of government or as participants in the parliamentary process, including debates, question time and membership of the various parliamentary portfolio committees, particularly those dealing with foreign policy issues. In South Africa, parliamentarians are able to put questions to President Mbeki only once every three months (*Pretoria News*. 13 March, 2001: 4).

In South Africa important monitors of public policy are to be found in the economic and news media fields. This is so because, on the one hand banking, commerce,

industry and labour unions provide the economic measures of how successful or unsuccessful the government's policies are perceived to be, particularly in the domestic environment; and, on the other hand, editors, columnists and journalists are able to critically examine such policies and articulate the kinds of questions that need to be asked of the South African Government in order to ensure that poor policies (*vide* Mseteka in *Cape Times*: 4 April, 2001; *vide* *Pretoria News*: 6 November, 2000), which cannot survive critical enquiry, are discarded in favour of sound policies that are largely immune to criticism. The effectiveness of such monitors is dependent upon the relative absence of government control.

In the labour field it is crucial to keep in mind the dependence of South Africa's legislators and public policy makers upon the approval and support of South Africa's trade unions, particularly COSATU which is the third partner in the politically dominant ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance (*vide* Makhanya. *Sunday Times*. 20 May, 2001: 17). The COSATU constitution, for example, makes it clear that the organisation aspires to political as well as economic leadership and that its activities are not restricted to the domestic environment. The preamble to the COSATU constitution states that:

We ... firmly commit ourselves to a unified democratic South Africa, free of oppression and economic exploitation. We believe that this could be achieved under the leadership of a united working class. Our history has taught us that to achieve this goal we will have to...encourage democratic worker organisation and leadership in all spheres of our society together with other progressive sectors of the community... (and)...reinforce and encourage progressive international worker contact and solidarity so as to assist one another in our struggle (COSATU. 1991: preamble).

4.3.2. Monitoring and supervision in the PRC

In a society that is dominated by a single political party, where the cult of personality still prevails (*vide* Lu. 1997: 8); where academic thought and literary expression remain restricted and controlled, despite some indications of positive changes (Forney in *Far Eastern Economic Review*: 2 April 1998); where big business is usually PRC Government business (*vide* *South China Morning Post*: 26 October 1999: 9); and where effective trade unions do not exist, there is only limited opportunity for meaningful and effective monitoring of PRC public policies outside the ambit of Communist Party control.

Although there are eight “democratic parties” in addition to the Communist Party (Lam. *South China Morning Post*. 26 October 1998: 7) they “... are mainly financed by the (Chinese) Communist Party and are supposed to provide advice to the top leadership on important matters of state ...” (2000/01: *Interviews a-g*; Lam. *South China Morning Post*. 26 October 1998: 7). The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, in which the eight democratic parties are included, has both monitoring (“supervisory”) and advisory roles, mainly in regard to the development of economic and social policy (Xin. *China Daily*. 3-4 March, 2001: 1).

By contrast, the establishment of independent, credible, opposition parties such as the China Democracy Party and China Labour Party (*Hong Kong Standard*. 3 January 1999: 1) is not permitted (Lam. *South China Morning Post*. 26 October 1998: 7), even though members of President Jiang Zemin’s personal think tank have reportedly recommended (Lam. *South China Morning Post*. 26 October 1998: 7) lifting the ban on the formation of independent parties. The perceived need to ensure that reforms do not create social instability is reflected by Jiang’s statement (*South China Morning Post*. 19 November 1998: 12) that,

... before we test out a political reform measure, we must ask the question: “Can it be taken back if it proves to contribute to social chaos and dissension?”.

4.4. Foreign policy advisors in South Africa and the PRC

Any individual or organisation that aspires to improve and develop requires the very best advice available. If professional advice is not sought continually, as standard practice, then certainly it ought to be obtained on those specific occasions when new challenges arise for which neither experience nor intrinsic knowledge seems adequate. Political leaders and political organisations also fall into this category. Therefore, all political leaders and political parties are dependent on the best available advice if they are to meet the foreign policy challenges of their times in ways that enable them to attain the greatest benefits possible on behalf of their respective countries.

Formal advice to political party policy planners comes from think tanks, consultants, academics and sources such as writers and journalists who cover foreign policy issues. These same individuals and organisations, as well as public servants in key advisory and technical positions, may also provide advice to governmental policy makers. For example, during South Africa's *apartheid* years it is known that the South African Department of Foreign Affairs made extensive use of consultants in an attempt to counter the effects of the anti-*apartheid* campaign. An important and usually indispensable source of advice to governmental foreign policy decision makers is the category denoting governmental foreign policy implementers; the civil servants and public officials, serving predominantly in the foreign ministries and foreign relations departments of governments, who actually implement and practise foreign policy. It is this branch of government, relating to foreign policy, which oversees the requirements of predictability, reliability, dependability and consistency, in the quest for advantageous and successful implementation of a state's foreign policy.

4.4.1. Public policy advisors in South Africa

Public policy advisors in South Africa may be drawn from a variety of sources, both governmental and non-governmental. Advisors may be senior civil servants or

political appointees; academics, consultants and experts drawn from the private sector; scientific and academic institutions; or specialised think tanks.

Think tanks, consultants, academics and others can be sources of valuable advice to both political parties and government decision makers. Before a political party achieves power as the governing party it can expect to benefit from professional advice as to how to project its image and plan its campaign; it may also identify key election topics and gauge the electoral strength of its opponents on specific election issues. It may, however, simply require ready access to researchers and writers who can plan the most effective way to gain electoral support and produce the most effective campaign speeches.

When a political party already holds power, the focus of these advisors may shift toward assisting government decision makers. It is in the role of advising government that think tanks, consultants, academics and others, sometimes by conducting a policy analysis, can assist government decision makers and policy makers to select and implement the best and most effective policy, from a range of available alternatives. The Office of the President includes the following advisors to President Mbeki who have been appointed on contract (*Pretoria News*, 25 January, 2001: 19):

Prof. Wiseman Nkulu:	Economic advisor;
Mr Titus Mfolo:	Political advisor;
Advocate Mojanku Gumbi:	Legal advisor;
Ms Bongani Khumalo:	advisor on HIV/AIDS and integrated social development;

In the absence of designated foreign policy or military advisors, such policy issues can expect to be dealt with in direct collaboration with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

The line-function diplomatic personnel of DFA, for the greater part of the Department's existence, have tended to comprise a well-educated, socially competent,

career-oriented professional group of civil servants that were essentially distinguishable from most other South African civil servants (*vide* Mills. 2000: 212-213). Apart from requiring the instinctive behavioural qualities of a diplomat the DFA line-function official was generally required to be well-informed about international relations and current events and, at all times, capable of functioning as a public relations officer. Such officials were often expected to use their initiative and take independent decisions when the situation required such action. Add to this formula the necessary benefit of diplomatic experience at home and abroad and the DFA line function official was generally well-suited to the role of political advisor, particularly in a specialist field of diplomatic or international expertise. The benefit of advice from experienced senior diplomats serving at SA missions abroad can be particularly useful to visiting ministers and officials, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The perceived need to make DFA more representative of South Africa's demography in terms of ethnicity and gender (*vide* Forrest. *Mail & Guardian*. 14-19 December 2001: 6; Mvoko. *Business Day*. 4 October 2000) has, however, undone much of the professional strength and competence of South Africa's foreign service contingent. As neither the Minister of Foreign Affairs (a medical doctor who was formally Minister of Health) nor the Director-General (formerly Director-General of the Department of Labour) had any prior expertise or experience of the nature of diplomacy (*vide* Forrest. *Mail & Guardian*. 14-19 December 2001: 6) it is not surprising that DFA line-function personnel have lately begun to resemble all other civil servants in South Africa. By measuring the requirements for representivity against South Africa's total population instead of against, say the number of South Africans with a university degree applicable to the diplomatic *milieu*, or with proven diplomatic experience, DFA has jettisoned a much higher volume of white expertise and professional competence (*vide* Mvoko in *Business Day*. 4 October 2000) than was necessary in the short term, and arguably to the detriment of South African foreign policy (*Pretoria News*. 14 December 2001. *editorial*: 19).

The Department of Foreign Affairs has conducted a few foreign policy workshops to provide an opportunity for academic and general public inputs into the formulation of

policy on a variety of issues. The intention, expressed during President Mandela's term of office, was that a government Green Paper on South Africa's foreign policy, to be followed by an eventual White Paper, would be produced and that opportunities for public discussion and debate would contribute to such papers. To date no White Paper on South African foreign policy has been produced or published.

Among the think tanks and institutes that can be called upon for advice on military-strategic issues, economic and foreign policy concerns, are the following:

South African Institute of Strategic Studies (SAISS);
South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA);
Africa Institute; Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC); and
Economic Research Council.

However, South Africa's diplomatic missions abroad, and the relevant political desks at the Department of Foreign Affairs, given adequate resources and capacities, are also capable of serving as think tanks for the benefit of South Africa's foreign policy makers (2001. *Interview*).

4.4.2. Public policy advisors in the PRC

In the PRC, foreign policy decision makers may be found among the high echelons of the CPC hierarchy but technical advisors will be drawn from relevant departments, agencies and specialist research institutes and academic institutions, as well as the senior levels of the government military-political bureaucratic establishment (Hamrin in Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 90-92).

Relevant institutional mechanisms which assist foreign policy decision makers in the PRC have been categorised (Lu. 1997: 106) as follows:

Policy consultation, coordination and supervision:

- Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (LSG); and
- Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council.

Policy recommendation and implementation:

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA);
- Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation;
- CPC Central (Committee) International Liaison Department (ILD); and
- Second Directorate of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD).

Information and Research:

- Xinhua News Agency;
- Third Directorate of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD); and
- Academic foreign affairs research institutes.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on leadership relationships involving individuals and institutions that make, or help to make, foreign policy and which link domestic environments in the form of foreign policy. It has been further argued that political parties and political office bearers can be and often are, effectively if not constitutionally, part of the executive branch of government.

In the case of South Africa, the primary focus has been on the executive and legislative branches of government where, as has been argued, most foreign policy making, influencing and monitoring, takes place; and, in the case of the PRC, the Communist Party of China, the executive and legislative organs of government have been the main focus of attention. Consequently, only limited attention has been paid to the judicial organs of government and the second and third tiers of government.

In the broader sense, this chapter has touched upon the decision making and policy making process, which, as has been argued, also includes the influencing of policy, the implementation of policy, and the monitoring of policy. The main intent has been devoted to the question, “who makes, or influences the making of, foreign policy?”

This chapter has identified the main actors or role players, and their related institutions, in the foreign policy and public policy decision making process, that shapes and guides the foreign policy bilateral relationship between South Africa and the People’s Republic of China.

The next chapter will attempt to reformulate this information in the context of decision making systems models that seek to explain who makes, or assists in the making of, foreign policy; how such policy might best be made, implemented and monitored; and how foreign policy actually is made, monitored and implemented in South Africa and the People’s Republic of China.

CHAPTER FIVE

ORIGINATION AND MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY: A SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE OF THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING PROCESS

5.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on how foreign policy decision making takes place in South Africa and the People's Republic of China. Three systemic models of foreign policy making have been developed, the first of which is intended to represent a *normative* ideal system, that allows for policy imperative inputs, policy outputs, feedback and monitoring mechanisms; the remaining two systemic models are intended to represent what actually takes place in South Africa and the PRC respectively, in regard to foreign policy decision making.

In view of their demonstrable ability to influence the present South African and PRC leadership's world view, and thereby affect the form and direction of their respective foreign policies, relevant selected ideological sources, belief systems, historical events and trends, for the purposes of this study, are regarded as influencers of foreign policy that give rise to the *origination* of a state's foreign policy formulation and implementation. The concept of *origination* (paragraph 1.6 *supra*), as explored in this chapter, refers to the linkage between a state's contemporary foreign policy and the perceivable historical and cultural origins of such policy and is, in the larger sense, the manifestation of that state's particular *world view*, as articulated by its government; and supposedly shared by its people.

In addition, it is argued that the eight selected imperatives (*vide* paragraph 3.3.3. *supra*) may also exert their impact, separately or collectively, on SA and PRC foreign policy decision makers. Consequently, this chapter also looks at these various imperatives and the way in which they help shape the respective foreign policies of South Africa and the People's Republic of China.

5.2. Originators of foreign policy

It is argued that every state has a *world view* (Dushkin. 1974: 310) - an idea or particular way in which its leaders perceive the world (*vide* {12}WS. 2001) - and that a state's world view may influence both the dominant political group (political party organisation) and the dominant political authority (government of the day) toward particular actions, decisions or responses. In this context, *state* refers to the decision makers who are responsible for directly influencing or making public policy or, more specifically, foreign policy. In this regard the world views and perceptions of state leaders (Roy. 1998: 36) (who also are, or have been, party leaders) may be specially relevant.

World view originators, traumatic historical, cultural and ideological influences that have left a deep imprint on the national leadership and the national psyche over a long period of time, may also act as the originators of foreign policy. China, for example, appears to have a long history of cyclical unification and disintegration (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 70). Currently Taiwan symbolises disintegration. Consequently, the PRC Government remains steadfastly committed to the reunification of China, even after the return of Hong Kong and Macao. Foreign domination and colonialism facilitated the disintegration of China and for this reason respect for the concept of sovereignty (IWAAS. 1998: 389) is a cornerstone of PRC foreign policy. South Africa, too, has experienced colonialism and foreign occupation and a lasting by-product of such domination was the experience of racism and *apartheid* and the effective spiritual genocide of the African people (*vide* Mbeki. 1999: 299). World view originators may drive a nation's leaders toward a particular choice of foreign policy and may cause that nation's citizens to support, or at least not oppose, such policy. Consequently, perceived world view originators which are also often the originators of foreign policy should, it is argued, not be omitted from an analysis of a state's foreign policy relationships. By identifying some of the ideological and traumatic origins of the main themes that appear to drive contemporary South African and PRC foreign policy, it is anticipated that an individual world view, in respect of each state, will be clearly discernible (*vide* chapter seven *infra*). Although

Hodgkinson does not refer specifically to a *world view* he does conceptualise (1982: 108),

... a realm of behaviour and action with its incommensurable affinity of possibilities. Behaviours manifest as observable facts connected by inference through chains of cause and effect to the psychological phenomena of attitudes, value orientations, value, motives, and self-concept.

The psychological phenomena referred to by Hodgkinson are closely related to the *world view* concept. Party ideology, traumatic historical experience, and individual and national value systems, are also among core initiators that may shape a particular world view.

5.3. South Africa's World View

South Africa's world view, as articulated by the African National Congress (ANC), South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (*vide. Makhanya. Sunday Times. 20 May 2001: 17*), the ruling alliance of political, social, economic and labour interests, has not escaped the influence of ideology, more specifically Marxism-Leninism (*vide Mbeki. 1999: 10-11*), but is arguably far more affected by the trauma of historical experience. *Apartheid*, racism, colonialism, imported values and the experience of revolutionary warfare, have all helped to shape South Africa's world view (*vide. {2}SA. 2000 speech*).

The ideological sources of South Africa's current domestic and foreign policy, as articulated by the ruling ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance, can be traced to the historical experiences of *apartheid*, racism, slavery and colonialism, and a determination to continue to oppose both racism and colonisation; the ideological influence of Marxism-Leninism and socialism (*{2}ANC. 1997*); the historical influence of capitalism (*{1}SA. 1999: Black Management Forum Speech*) and free market economic principles; revolutionism or the revolutionary experience; and

African nationalism, Pan-Africanism and the more recent emergence of a vision championed and articulated by President Thabo Mbeki as the *African Renaissance* (Hadland and Rantao. 1999: 178), a term first used by Nelson Mandela in a speech to the Organisation of African Unity's meeting of heads of state on 13 June 1994 (Mills in SAIIA. 1998: 39).

South African society remains, for the most part, divided between Euro-centric and Afro-centric political and cultural affiliations and preferences that are perceived (Mbeki. 1999. *Parliamentary speech*, 29 May 1998: 71-72) by some in economic and racial terms (*vide* Uys. *The Sunday Independent*. 22 April 2001: 7; DFA. 20000822). A consequence of this division is that the *world view* articulated by the government may not be wholly representative of the *world views* of other segments of South African society (*vide* Leon. *The Sunday Independent*. 20 August 2000), including the relatively small but powerful (in terms of intellectual, economic and material resources) South African *European* community. President Mbeki, himself, alluded to this division (Hadland and Rantao. 1999: 188) in his May 1998 address to the National Assembly on *reconciliation and nation building*.

a) *Apartheid*, racism and slavery

The current ANC-led government of South Africa came into existence as a result of a long-lasting political, diplomatic, economic and military battle against the forces of the *apartheid* government which was, itself (from 1948 to 1994), the ideologically motivated political product of an anti-colonial war which the forces of colonialism (Britain) had won during the first decade of the twentieth century. Although Afrikaners, like Americans before them, had been predominantly white victims of British colonialism (Pakenham. 1993: 287), *apartheid's* victims were black. *Apartheid*, therefore, tended to be perceived as a unique form of South African colonialism (DFA. 20000822), enshrined in law and aimed predominantly at exploiting the labour resources of the black community for the general benefit of South Africa's white community, particularly the Afrikaner community. Although the *apartheid* system had originally been directed toward the survival of Afrikanerdom,

all white South Africans benefited (*vide* Suzman. 1993: *prologue*). Ultimately black South Africans had to contend with the enormous obstacle of *apartheid* being deliberately placed between them and their own social, economic and political advancement. Consequently, *apartheid* served to polarise South African society at practically all levels along racial and ethnic lines. *Apartheid* has left a deep imprint on the national psyche, as reflected in numerous statements by leaders of post-*apartheid* South Africa as well as in legislation of the post-*apartheid* years (*vide* Hadland and Rantao.1999. *Parliamentary speech*. 29 May 1998: 184-187).

Slavery, although officially abolished in the British-ruled Cape Province in 1833 (WS. 2002: 1), has also left a deep and lasting impression on the people of South Africa. Slavery's abolition in the colonies facilitated the creation of the independent *Boer* republics and thereby extended the territory of the future South Africa; and arguably led to the introduction of new non-European ethnic groups and cultures from Asian lands, including India and China. Slavery's existence contributed to the future course of race relations through the *apartheid* era; and the economic disparity between white and non-white races in South Africa that is still in evidence today. An unfortunate consequence of its impact on South Africa's *world view* is that slavery is incorrectly (Ronay. 1978: 96-98; Fukuyama. 1992: 62 and 217) perceived as an institution whereby the only victims were black people and the only slave-traders and slave-owners were white (*vide* SA. 2000; *vide* WS. 2002: 2). There is even a concept of neo-slavery in which the developing world is portrayed as being enslaved by the developed world (*vide* DFA. 19980831. Mbeki *speech*: 31 August 1998).

b) Marxism-Leninism and Socialism

The South African Communist Party (SACP) has been in existence for some eighty years (*vide* statements by SACP Secretary General quoted in the *Cape Argus*. 31 July, 2000: 2) and has been allied to the African National Congress (ANC) for some forty years. It also has a strong relationship with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) which is, in many respects, the labour arm of socialism in South Africa. South Africa's current Government of National Unity (GNU) comprises the

ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance as well as its coalition partner, the *Inkatha* Freedom Party (IFP).

Marxism-Leninism is founded on principles that are atheistic and anti-religious, in direct contrast to the *apartheid* government which subscribed to Calvinistic Christian principles and was for most of its existence vehemently anti-Communist. In fact, most South Africans, regardless of race, ethnicity or political views, claim adherence to a religious belief (*vide* {25}WS. 2002: 3). Consequently, members of the black liberation movements were themselves initially hesitant about forming alliances with communists because they did not want to be allied with atheists and apparently only changed their opinions after Zhou Enlai ({1}PRC. 1999: *speech*) assured them that the PRC permitted religious worship in China (President Mandela confirmed this during a conversation with Premier Zhu Rongji in Beijing in 1999) (*vide* DFA. 19990511).

Despite the small number of SACP members in South Africa, reportedly (*Cape Argus*. 31 July, 2000: 2) thirteen thousand paid up members, the party is very effective in placing its leading members in positions of influence and its current leadership includes ministers, deputy ministers, premiers, ambassadors and trade union leaders, among others, in key government positions ({2} 2001: Interview; *vide* Mills. 2000: 284).

In addition, as Parsons (1999: 3) points out,

... certain groups apparently remain fixed in the ideological cast of collectivism, or socialism. But an added problem in South Africa has been the perception by many blacks that capitalism and apartheid are identical. Socialism is seen by many blacks as the true harbinger of economic security, freedom and prosperity.

Thus there appears to be a natural familial political relationship between South Africa's leadership echelon and the CPC leaders of the PRC; a relationship that, due to the South African leadership's uncritical admiration of the PRC, tends to make the possibility of an equal and mutually beneficial bilateral relationship less certain, to the possible enduring detriment of South Africa.

c) Colonialism

In terms of white, particularly Afrikaner, South African history, South Africa was once an amalgam of British colonial territories, occupied by British military forces and subsequently subject to the sovereignty of the British monarch. In terms of black South African history, black South Africans were colonised first by the Dutch, then by the British and finally by white South Africans (*vide* DFA. 20000822; *vide* {25}WS. 2002: 1). The subject of colonialism has therefore never been far from the thoughts of South African leaders, and for most of the twentieth century was an important factor in determining the world view of the South African leadership. The leaders of the various *apartheid* administrations were, themselves, victims of British colonialism and their ultimate anti-colonial goal, achieved in 1961, was to establish South Africa as a sovereign republic outside what was then the British Commonwealth. Unfortunately, in successfully rejecting British sovereignty and dominance, white South Africans imposed what has been perceived as a form of neo-colonial rule or "... colonialism of a special type ..." (DFA. 20000822), over black South Africans in the form of *apartheid*. In this regard, President Thabo Mbeki has (DFA. 20000822) stated that,

... in our situation, because of the colonialism of a special type, the victory of the national liberation struggle did not result in the departure of the foreign ruling class Any honest person will also understand that in six years of national emancipation, it is impossible to wipe out a legacy of over 300 years of colonial domination and to transform ours into a truly non-racial society.

Party political publications routinely refer to the legacy of colonialism: For example the African National Congress publication, *Umrabulo* (ANC. 1997: 3) has stated that “... the legacy of colonialism and minority rule ...” has identified the goals and motivated the social forces that aspire to those goals in their quest to transform South African society.

d) Capitalism and free market economic principles

South Africa’s political and economic institutions have largely been shaped by the political and economic experiences, expertise and influence of Western states, particularly Britain and Holland, and the United States. Despite the race-based exclusivism of *apartheid*, South Africa never experienced dictatorship and Marxist socialism was never able to displace the power of capitalism or usurp the role of existing free market economic principles within the South African market place. As President Mbeki has confirmed, South Africa is a capitalist country (SA. 1999: *Black Management Forum Speech*).

e) Revolutionism

At a time when the de-colonisation of Africa had begun, and the Cold War divisions between East and West, or between capitalism and communism, were well advanced, liberation movements in some African states, including South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, had already found it necessary to take up arms against perceived (DFA. 19980929) “... slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism ...” in order to win their independence. The influence of the revolutionary experience is still reflected in SA’s political leadership, as acknowledged by President Thabo Mbeki (SA.1999) who declared:

Because racism lives, the struggle continues! Because of that, the ANC must remain what it has been for many decades, a movement for the elimination of the legacy of the system of racism, in the interest of all South Africans.

During preparations for the ANC's Conference held in December, 1997, it was made clear to South Africans that the ANC still considered itself to be in the midst of an ongoing revolutionary struggle.

The character of the ANC must be determined by the nature of the core tasks that confront the national democratic revolution (NDR) in our country in any specific historical time. The democratic breakthrough of April 1994 was an important moment in our liberation struggle. ... Even with the ... enormous transformation that is underway, the legacy of centuries of colonial oppression, and decades of white minority rule, continue to be the reality that defines our society. The character of the ANC is informed by the over-riding, strategic imperative of overcoming the consequences of this legacy. (ANC. 1997. *Umrabulo*: 3).

Even when discussing such topics as the African Renaissance South Africa's President sometimes draws on revolutionary analogies to inspire support for his vision when he compares African Renaissance activists to militants and revolutionaries (DFA. 19980929). Further reminders of *revolutionism*, or the revolutionary experience, occur when, even the Minister of Foreign Affairs (DFA. 20001222) occasionally chooses to refer to her diplomatic personnel, in military (Hanks. 1971: p. 243) revolutionary terms, as "... cadres of the Department ..."

f) Pan Africanism, African Nationalism and the African Renaissance

At the beginning of the de-colonisation era, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was Africa's champion of the cause of Pan Africanism which envisioned an African community championing African causes, protecting African interests and projecting African unity (*vide* Kornegay in *The Star*. 7 June 2000: 15). The Pan African Congress (PAC) in South Africa reflected some of these themes. African nationalism was more narrowly defined in that it was more directly linked to the immediate process of de-colonisation. African Nationalism's message was that African states were to be

governed directly by Africans and found a popular rallying cry in the slogan, “Africa for the Africans” (*vide* {26}WS. 1996). In South Africa the Black Consciousness movement (*vide* Suzman. 1993: 224) was part of this political culture as were organisations like the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO).

The concept of an African Renaissance articulates the view that Africa is ready to renew itself and to develop economically, politically and socially (Mbeki *speech* in Hadland & Rantao. 1999: 170-183). The concept envisages Africans working together for the common good of Africa and the people of Africa; and aspires to the common, and global, recognition and appreciation of Africa’s cultural heritage and achievements. The African Renaissance aims, ultimately, to ensure that Africa is treated with respect by the rest of the world. Interestingly, the universal desire for recognition is a primary theme of Francis Fukuyama (1992: xvii) who, borrowing from Hegelian philosophy, contends that,

... the desire for recognition, and the accompanying emotions of anger, shame, and pride, are parts of the human personality critical to political life. According to Hegel, they are what drives the whole historical process.

In South Africa today, the theme of an African Renaissance has been vigorously developed and promoted by President Thabo Mbeki, who has stated:

As every revolution requires revolutionaries, so must the African Renaissance have its militants and activists who will define the morrow that belongs to them in a way which will help to restore to us our dignity (DFA. 19980929).

The impact of the African Renaissance concept on SA foreign policy is reflected in The African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund Bill (DFA. 20001013) which is the first Bill, for a number of years, to be presented to Parliament by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). The Bill’s main aims are to provide

development funds for use in Africa in accordance with the African Renaissance concept, and under the supervision and control of DFA (DFA. 20001013).

A branch of the Botswana-based African Renaissance Institute has also been established in South Africa (DFA. 20000822) with a view to the further study and promotion of the African Renaissance. This reflects on the one hand the seriousness with which South Africa is approaching the task of translating the concept of an African Renaissance into reality, although it should be pointed out that the establishment of the Institute emanated from Botswana; on the other hand, the establishment of the South African branch of the Institute symbolises, in practical terms, the permanency of the vision of African rejuvenation as an ongoing goal of the Mbeki administration (2000: *Interview*).

g) Imported values

Despite the quest for an African Renaissance South Africa's historical and cultural development has been deeply and unalterably affected by its European colonial experience which brought with it the influences of Roman-Dutch and English law; the Judeo-Christian value system; the Christian religion; sophisticated political institutions; and two of the eleven official languages (English and Afrikaans). The potential and actual influence of these imported values upon the world view of the South African leadership may be specially significant in South Africa's bilateral relationships with states that do not share similar experiences or similar values. In this regard it is worth noting that the PRC has relatively little in common with South Africa. Although the Christian religion has, over a period of more than three centuries, deeply influenced the lives of South Africans across the ethnic and political spectrum, other religions, such as Islam (*vide* {27}WS. 2002: Itano in the *Christian Science Monitor*. 10 January 2002) and Hinduism, particularly since the demise of the *apartheid* state, are also competing to help shape South Africa's evolving *world view* (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh.1997: 307).

In contrast to the situation pertaining to the Chinese mainland, South Africa's leaders often argue in favour of an African renaissance while conversing in an imported language and quoting, at length, the words of (the non-African) William Shakespeare (*vide* DFA. 20000822). Clearly, the impact of imported values has made South Africa what it is today and, for this reason, the world view exhibited by South Africa's leadership, under the country's existing constitution, is likely to reflect a balance between some imported non-African influences and the indigenous influences of Africa, such as the concept of *Ubuntu* (Mbigi and Maree. 1995: 1). There are some imported values, however, that have left their mark in both the PRC and South Africa, albeit in the latter case to a far less spectacular extent. These were the values of Marx and Lenin that gave rise to communist parties in both countries.

5.4. PRC's World View

The PRC's major public policy ideological sources, including foreign policy ideological sources, constitute a combination of Chinese classical philosophical thought, as reflected, for example, in the teachings of Confucius (Kim. 1998: 259) and the military tactics and strategies of Sun Zi (Roy. 1998: 121; 207); the nationalism of Sun Yat-Sen (*vide* De Crespigny. 1992: 59); and the Marxist-Leninist theory and Marxist derivative philosophies and theories as developed by Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiao Ping (PRC. 2000. *Constitution: Article 12 as revised: 15 March 1999*) and, more recently, Jiang Zemin (*vide* Ching in *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 28 December 2000-4 January 2001: 29).

In the historical sense there is the experience, extending throughout China's history, of unification and greatness off-set by division and chaos (*vide* Jian *et al.* 1986: 17), occupation by foreign forces, foreign domination and humiliation (CPC. 1997: 137), enduring pride in past magnificent accomplishments, a deep sense of history (Jian *et al.* 1986: 242-243) and a belief in the historical inevitability of China's greatness and future success. Culturally, Confucianism, respect for education and the need for self-improvement, still exert profound influences on the people of the PRC (De Bary.

1998: 134-135). The PRC's world view is undoubtedly a product of these and many other influences.

a) Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiao Ping and Jiang Zemin

An examination of the contributions of particularly Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai (Lu. 1997: 155) and Deng Xiaoping (Lu. 1997: 157) toward the PRC's past and present foreign policy, may be a useful way to gauge how the PRC perceives the outside world. As Swaine (1995: 3) points out,

China remains a country governed by personalities, not laws or institutions. In the history of modern China, individual leaders such as Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping have exerted an inordinately high level of influence over the course of events, especially in the foreign policy realm.

Mao's influence on the foreign policy of the PRC extended from 1949 to 1976 (Zhao. 1996: 4). According to Zhao (1996: 46), in 1949 Mao established three principles as the basis for PRC foreign policy:

- *Lingqi luzao*: literally "to start up the fire in a new stove" meaning that the new China should initiate diplomatic relations with every country on a new basis;
- *Dasao ganjing wuzi zai qingke*: "to clean house first and then invite guests" meaning to consolidate the regime internally and then develop foreign relations;
- *Yibiandao*: "leaning to one side" meaning (under Mao) to favour the Soviet Union.

It can be argued that Mao's three principles are still much in evidence today. For example, the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Africa appears to have followed the principle of *lingqi luzao*; the quest to join the World Trade Organisation and successful bid for the 2008 Olympic Games have arguably proceeded in terms of *dasao ganjing wuzi zai qingke*; and the PRC's reliance on third world support

(2001. *Interview*; Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 293) to counter perceived United States hegemony, isolate Taiwan, and avoid international censure for perceived human rights abuses, appears to be a manifestation of the principle of *yibiandao* whereby the anticipated third world response is predicated upon expectations by developing states that the PRC will continue to lean in their direction.

In the realm of foreign policy, as Lu Ning (1997: 2) has described,

...by the end of the first decade of the communist victory a strong man model emerged in China's foreign policy decision making. Together with high level appointments and military affairs, foreign policy decision making became one of the three most centralised areas in China's political system. Mao, as Chairman of the Communist Party and its Military Commission, dominated foreign policy decision making until his death in 1976.

The era of Mao, the revolutionary, was also an era of revolutionary foreign policy. In 1965 an editorial in the People's Daily (Zhao: 1996 : 48) specifically called for "world revolution" as a guide for Chinese foreign policy. "...Mao's idea that China was a revolutionary power and that it must support revolutionaries in other countries prevailed among the top leadership in Beijing..." (Zhao. 1996: 48). Mao's enduring influence was confirmed soon after his death by the principle of the "two whatevers" (*vide* paragraph 1.6 *supra*) which declared that his instructions and decisions were to be adhered to without question.

Zhou Enlai's contribution to PRC foreign policy took place during the era of Mao Zedong, whom he assisted with all the important decisions (Lu. 1997: 94). There is some evidence (Lu. 1997: 155) that Zhou's contribution was, up until his illness in 1974, more in the role of influencer and implementer of policy that was effectively decided by Mao. Nevertheless, Zhou's expertise helped give shape to China's foreign policy in ways that are relevant today. For example, during a visit to India in 1954 as Premier (he was also the PRC foreign minister), Zhou Enlai and the Indian prime

minister issued a joint statement (India-PRC.1954: *Joint Statement*) setting out what have since become known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.

- mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- non-aggression;
- non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- equality and mutual benefit; and
- peaceful co-existence.

These five principles still form the basis upon which PRC foreign policy is constructed.

Deng Xiaoping's impact on PRC foreign policy commenced in 1978 (Zhao. 1996: 4). It was in that year, in a speech (Zhao. 1996: 51) making modernisation the priority for both domestic and foreign policy, that Deng Xiaoping (1984: 102) declared:

Only if we make our country a modern, powerful socialist state can we more effectively consolidate the socialist system and cope with foreign aggression and subversion.

In the beginning of 1980 Deng established three tasks (Zhao. 1996: 51) for the PRC to focus on during the decade ahead:

- to “oppose hegemonism” and to “preserve world peace”;
- to work on “China's re-unification” with Taiwan; and
- to “step up the drive for China's four modernisations”.

A consequence, for developing countries, of Deng's determination to replace Mao's revolutionary foreign policy with his own modernisation or development-focused (Zhao. 1996: 51) foreign policy, was that although “...the Third World rhetoric continued, ... Deng was no longer preoccupied with trying to build alliances among the have-nots, but rather sought to join the haves as quickly as possible by making a

separate peace with the global status quo...” (Kim. 1998: 156). Deng was very much a pragmatist. For example, in commenting on the requirements of *patriotism*, with regard to the administration of Hong Kong, Deng Xiaoping (Evans. 1997 :270) also revealed a degree of tolerance for the concept of *slavery* that, on the African continent and elsewhere, would be extremely unpopular, when he said:

*The qualifications for a patriot are respect for the Chinese nation, sincere support for the motherland's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and a desire not to impair Hong Kong's prosperity and stability. Those who meet these requirements are patriots, **whether they believe in capitalism, or feudalism or even slavery.** (my emphasis).*

Jiang Zemin has already begun to make his mark on PRC domestic and foreign policy. While his domestic focus has reflected the importance he attaches to the preservation of economic, social and political stability, economic growth, and the continued dominance of the Communist Party, his main military, foreign economic and foreign policy concerns have focused on the following:

- defending China' sovereignty;
- re-unification of China (re-incorporation of Taiwan);
- strengthening of the United Nations;
- opposing perceived United States hegemony;
- joining the World trade Organisation (WTO); and
- strengthening and modernising the PLA;

b) Marxism-Leninism and Socialism

As Denny Roy (1998: 14) emphasises,

... the CCP regime came to power with a Marxist world view. A class struggle, a conflict between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', was thought to be the driving force of history, not only in individual

states but also in international relations. World history was moving through stages; it was inevitable that capitalism would give way to socialism and eventually the utopia of communism. Capitalist states would therefore see the rise of socialist states as a mortal threat and strive desperately to repress and destroy them. Imperialism by the capitalist states was considered the principal cause of war.

The influence of Marxism-Leninism in the PRC is not only reflected in all facets of the institutions of government but is also enshrined in the country's Constitution, as reflected in the preamble of that document (*vide* {1}PRC. 2000. *Amendments to the Constitution*: article 12).

Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist road...

This article of the Constitution, amended only to include reference to Deng Xiaoping, reflects yet again the political supremacy of the Communist party of China; the focus of PRC leadership, at any given time, upon a single individual; and long-term commitment to the socialist economic and political system.

c) Imperialism, colonialism and invasion

As David Landes (1999: 422-423) points out, although terms such as *imperialism* and *colonialism* are often used interchangeably, they can also have distinctive meanings. *Imperialism* may denote the system, principle or spirit of empire, “... the dominion of one country over others ...” (Landes. 1999: 423) whereby subject peoples are absorbed or dispersed. *Colonialism*, however, particularly in the modern sense, may be taken to mean any economically or politically dependant condition, regardless of whether it leads to the displacement of the indigenous population. In the history of

China, *invasion*, “... the act of invading or entering as an enemy ...” (Hanks. 1971: 835), has invariably accompanied *imperialist* designs. For example, the Mongol invasion of China established the *Yuan* dynasty that ruled over all of China during the period 1271-1368 A.D. (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 153). The *Yuan* were followed by more foreign invaders, in the form of the *Manchus* who established the *Ming* dynasty during the period 1368-1644 (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 177). Remarkably, however, China absorbed and survived these invasions and resultant imperialism, which lasted almost four centuries, without losing the essence of its Han Chinese identity. As Fairbank and Reischauer explain (1990: 152):

The stability of the Chinese political order lay partly in its capacity to let non-Chinese, when they were strong enough, rule over it without changing its fundamental features.

Subsequently, in the late nineteenth century, China was confronted by Japanese imperialism, which saw the invasion of the north-eastern region of the Chinese mainland (Hunt. 1996: 39; Roy. 1998: 11) as well as the occupation and subjugation of *Formosa* (present-day Taiwan) (Jian *et al.* 1981: 110; Roy. 1998: 130). By 1931 (Jian *et al.* 1981: 186), Japan had succeeded in establishing a puppet *Manchukuo* (Manchuria) government to rule over more than 30 million Chinese and two million square kilometres of territory that they had successfully conquered. It was the Japanese occupation, probably more than any other event, that set China on the road of Communism and Socialism because it was in reaction to Japanese imperialism (Jian *et al.* 1981: 140) that the May 4th Movement (of 1919) came into being and, together with Russia’s October revolution, helped spawn the Communist Party of China. Consequently, it has been stated (Jian *et al.* 1981: 143) that:

The October Socialist Revolution and the May 4th Movement radically changed the course of Chinese history. The Chinese revolution became part of the world proletarian socialist revolution. The Chinese democratic revolution became a revolution led by the working class, and China passed from

the era of the old democratic revolution (Which overthrew traditional dynastic rule) into that of the new democratic revolution (which aimed to establish a new China), which was ushered in by the May 4th Movement (My additions in regular type).

But what of the impact of *colonialism* on the future of China? British Hong Kong (Jian *et al.* 1964: 89 and 112), Portuguese Macao (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 329), and Japanese *Formosa* (Taiwan) (Roy. 1998: 167; Hanks. 1971: 1597), were all colonies of these various states. There were once, in the nineteenth century, also a number of mainland Chinese cities, or *treaty ports*, that came under the influence and jurisdiction of various great powers (Roberts. 2000: 34-35). These cities very much resembled *colonies* and became a source of national humiliation and impotence (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 210) for successive generations of Chinese.

Following the first *Opium War* of 1839-1842, directed against the *Qing* government by foreign states, the victorious countries received extensive economic, political and social privileges within China through a series of treaties that effectively impaired Chinese sovereignty (Jian *et al.* 1964: 90) and which the Chinese, ever since, have regarded as unequal in substance and mean of spirit. According to Jian Bozan *et al* (1964: 103) "... after its defeat in the Opium Wars, China began to acquire the characteristics of a semi-colonial country."

d) Confucius and other classical Chinese thinkers

Apart from some negative perceptions about Confucianism during the first half of the twentieth century (Ding. 1997: 213; Zhang. 1999: 14), including influential elements of the PRC leadership during the Maoist era (Burstein and de Keijzer. 1999: 314), Confucianism exerted a profound influence on Chinese thought from 140 B.C. when it was first adopted officially.

Throughout this long period the thinking and behaviour of people from all levels of society, from emperors and ministers to peasants

and craftsman, were invariably permeated with Confucianism. Whether in court politics or in the daily life of the common people, signs of his influence could be seen everywhere (Ding. 1997: 214).

In recent years the influence of Confucianism has been increasingly acknowledged by the PRC's Communist leaders, among them President Jiang Zemin (Burstein and de Keijzer. 1999: 314). However, as some observers (Lam. 1999: 279) have noted, Confucian teachings are only selectively being utilised in the PRC to bolster the primacy of the Communist Party as, for example, in relation to "... obedience to elders (particularly party elders); and knowing and sticking to one's station in life (particularly as it was determined by the party) ...". As far as relations between states are concerned, and between individual statesmen, it is also useful to keep in mind that China is more than 5000 years old and that the PRC's senior leaders tend to be of advanced age. The leaders and people of the PRC therefore expect to be treated with a pre-eminent degree of respect (Roy. 1998: 37), sometimes to a point of perceived unreasonableness, as occurred during President Nelson Mandela's State Visit to the PRC in 1999 when he was expected to (and did) call on the Chairman of the NPC, Li Peng. In terms of protocol, Chairman Li (equivalent to South Africa's parliamentary Speaker) should have called on President Mandela.

In the realm of Chinese foreign policy a fundamental objective (as opposed to an incidental by-product of some other objective) is for the PRC and its leaders to learn, and gain information and knowledge, from other states. In this approach, there is also a Confucian element because, as Yang Muzhi (1999: 10) has noted, Confucius believed that wherever three people would come together, at least one of them would be able to teach the others something; and that this maxim encompasses a principle that the Chinese people have always followed in their dealings with others, including at the level of state-to-state relations. In similar vein, Griffith (1971: 178) has noted that the view of Mencius (*Ming Ze*), a disciple of Confucius, that a small state cannot successfully oppose a large state, that few people cannot successfully oppose many, and that the weak cannot defeat the strong (Yang. 1999: 21), is a maxim that is taken seriously by the Chinese and can be discerned in the world view of the PRC, in

regard to its own self-image. For example, in the wake of ineffective post-Tiananmen sanctions against the PRC, Qiao Shi, a leading member of the Central Committee of the CPC, declared (Roy. 1998: 38) in 1993:

China, as a large country with more than one billion people, cannot be isolated. We ourselves are a world and not a small one. There is nothing to be afraid of.

The writings of Sun Zi on the art of war have also exerted considerable influence on Chinese decision makers in the military, political and business sphere. For example, Griffith (1971: 45) states that Mao Zedong was “... strongly influenced ... by Sun Zi’s thought. This is apparent in his works which deal with military strategy and tactics and is particularly evident in *On Guerrilla Warfare*, *On the Protracted War*, and *Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War...*”

Former General Secretary of the CCP, Hu Yaobang, had the following to say about Sun Zi:

Since Marxism-Mao Zedong Thought is the crystallisation of the cultural and scientific riches of humanity and the ideological weapon for perceiving and transforming the world, and Sun Zi has been a brilliant gem in the treasure house of China’s ancient culture to be worked to serve the development of China’s new national culture, wouldn’t it very well accord with the basic demands of Marxism-Mao Zedong Thought to explore Sun Zi’s rich legacy under the guidelines of Marxism-Mao Zedong Thought to help improve our business management and promote China’s modernisation drive?

The acknowledged ({{1}} 2001. *Interview*) influence of Confucius, Sun Zi and other classical Chinese writers and thinkers is apparent at many levels of government within the PRC today.

e) Revolutionism

The People's Republic of China has a system of government that, after fifty years, still resembles a revolutionary party (the Communist Party of China) in a governing role, that may be best described as government by committee. The first significant revolution of the twentieth century took place in China when Dr Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Qing Dynasty in 1911 (De Crespigny. 1992: 55) and founded the Republic of China (PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998/1999*: 22). Thus began China's long period of revolutionism which encapsulated the May 4th movement (Roberts. 2000: 154), the founding of the Communist Party of China (Hunt. 1996: 85), the Northern Expedition, the anti-Japanese War (De Crespigny. 1992: 145) and the Civil War, which culminated in the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 (Ch'en. 1967: 312). The entire Mao Zedong era which lasted from 1949 to 1976 was a radical revolutionary period (Zhao. 1996: 40-41); an era which included the Cultural Revolution which lasted from May 1966 to October, 1976 and which was initiated and led by Mao Zedong (PRC. 1999. *Yearbook. 1998 1999*: 27).

(Mao's) .. principal theses were that ... representatives of the bourgeoisie and counter-revolutionary revisionists had sneaked into the Party, the government, the army ... and leadership ... was no longer in the hands of Marxists and the people; that Party persons in power taking the capitalist road had formed a bourgeois headquarters inside the Central Committee ...; that the power usurped ... could be recaptured only by carrying out a great cultural revolution, by openly and fully mobilising the broad masses from the bottom up ...; and that the cultural revolution was .. a great political revolution in which one class would overthrow another... a revolution ... waged time and again. ... These theses were incorporated into a general theory - the "theory of continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat."

Although Mao's theses were subsequently adjudged by the Communist Party to be "...erroneous ..." (PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 27) the Cultural Revolution was nevertheless a product of *revolutionism* that left deep and enduring effects on the PRC and its people.

f) Chinese nationalism

China's rulers have always sought to protect their country - the Middle Kingdom - from unwanted non-Chinese influences. Traditionally, the Chinese did not think in terms of other countries and civilisations. As Ching has pointed out (*Far Eastern Economic Review*. 9 July 1998: 32), "... their view was that there was China and then there were uncivilised barbarians. There was no notion of other countries that were China's equal." China's long history is full of unhappy encounters with foreign states, including wars fought against such states (Deng and Wang. 1999: 243); conquest, occupation and humiliation by such states (Roberts. 2000: 115-116); and destruction and theft of its historical and cultural treasures (Shen. 1997: 339) by such states. For most of its history, China also did not deliberately seek to export its culture although its arts, crafts and inventions did ultimately become known to the West through the activities of travellers, traders and European missionaries (Shen. 1997: 292-297). Even Admiral Zheng He's epic voyages into the Indian Ocean (*vide* Levathes. 1996: 173-174), which were aimed at commerce, not conquest, and which resulted in the commencement of trade between China and East Africa, proved far less spectacular in terms of their consequences than the subsequent voyages of the European discoverers. The voyage of a Chinese sailing ship around Cape Agulhas to the Atlantic ocean in 1420 (Shen. 1997: 191) might well have changed the course of South African, European and Chinese history, had these intrepid mariners been more curious about the land nearby.

Nationalism and xenophobia (Landes. 1999: 345), during most of China's history, served to lessen the impact of potentially disruptive imported values by either curtailing those influences, rejecting them entirely, or by absorbing and overwhelming them. Nonetheless, the former colonies of *Xianggang* (Hong Kong) and *Aomen*

(Macao) (Roberts. 2000: 276-277), and the territory of Taiwan (Roberts. 2000: 278), were penetrated by imported values and continue to be influenced by those values.

g) Imported values

The *globalisation* process may be perceived by some PRC leaders as politically threatening to the PRC because of the increasing difficulty of curtailing, controlling or rejecting the influences of imported values. Expressed objections to perceived American hegemony also include an implied objection to imported American values (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 601). Deng Xiaoping reportedly (Hunt. 1996: 217) stressed that, “if China were going to open its doors, it needed to fit them with a socialist screen to keep out the pests, above all ‘*bourgeois liberalism*’ in all its troubling variety...” However, China has not rejected all non-Chinese values or non-Chinese ideas. Marxism-Leninism is an example of an enduring non-Chinese value system of economic practice and political ideology but even this imported political philosophy has been modified in China into a form now referred to as “... socialism with Chinese characteristics ...” (in much the same way as the imported Dutch language was modified in South Africa into the indigenous Afrikaans language). There are those (Chen. 1999: 86) who argue, however, that Marxism is not a purely foreign culture to China.

As a theory concerning the proletariat of the world, Marxism is of international significance. Although Marx and Engels were German, Marxism is not just a German cultural element belonging only to Germans. Rather it belongs to the proletariat and progressive people throughout the world. ... More importantly, for the Chinese people, Marxism embodies their own creation and development, ... Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping's Theory ... This is Marxism that ... is itself ... the core and soul of modern culture in China.

Important manifestations of western capitalism, legal practices, and political freedoms were also imported into China, but for the most part remained confined to

the former colonial territories (Roberts. 2000: 276-277). Taiwanese agriculture, as well as the island's railway transportation system, also benefited as a result of the Japanese colonial experience (Roberts. 2000: 278).

Religion, particularly Buddhism, described by Fairbank and Reischauer (1990: 83) as, “.. an alien religion ..(that).. menaced the ideological basis of Chinese society...” is another imported value that has left an imprint on the culture of China although, even before the communist triumph in 1949, atheism was quite well-established. Official PRC sources ({{2}}PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 370) list the main religions in the PRC as Buddhism, Taoism, Islam and Christianity. There are no reliable figures regarding the number of adherents but PRC authorities have provided some statistics reflecting the number of recognised places of worship and registered clergy ({{2}}PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 371) as follows:

	Buddhism	Taoism	Islam	Christianity	
				Catholics	Protestants
Places of worship:	9 500	600	26 000	4 000	28 000
Clergy:	170 000	6 000	40 000	2 700	18 000

Islam and Christianity and Judaism are among a few religions that are tolerated by the Chinese authorities; tolerated but not necessarily encouraged. All religious organisations in the PRC, as in the case of the eight recognised political parties (PRC. 2000/2001: *interviews a-g*), must acknowledge the supremacy of the Communist Party of China and can only exist if they are willing to make that acknowledgement. Consequently, the true Roman Catholic Church is not permitted to function in the PRC. Catholic Bishops who do operate in the PRC have therefore not been ordained by the Pope ({{3}}2002. *Interview*).

Buddhism, has been a part of China's culture for 2000 years ({{2}}PRC.1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 371). Among the branches of Buddhism that have prevailed in China, the

Tibetan form of Buddhism, known as Lamaism, may be specially relevant, because of the impact of the concept of the living Buddha and the actual and potential influence, political and spiritual, of the exiled Dalai Lama.

In the Tibet Autonomous Region and Xinjiang Autonomous Region, particularly, many among the Tibetan and Uighur ethnic minority groups (Roberts. 2000: 275-276) are devout practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism and Islam, respectively. Nevertheless, in a population of 1.2 billion even 100 million faithful followers of Islam and Lamaism would represent a relatively small percentage of the total population. It has been argued by Fairbank and Reischauer (1990: 110) that Buddhism's "... lasting contributions tend to be additions to traditional Chinese culture rather than fundamental alterations of native values ...". Therefore, perhaps the major Buddhist contributions to the PRC's world view are their reinforcement of concepts such as the value of self-discipline, self-improvement and patience (Brahm. 1996: xi) that are also essentially Confucian, in which case, if this view is correct, religion in the PRC probably does not contribute significantly to the country's perceived world view as interpreted by the leadership of the PRC.

5.5. World view foreign policy matrix applicable to South Africa

5.5.1. Historical imperative

The historical imperative that appears to drive contemporary South Africa has important international significance arising from bondage imposed by history; those historical factors from which many South Africans, and their leaders, simply cannot escape and which collectively compel distrust of the former colonial powers and wealthy industrial states, particularly the United States and the states of the European Union. For example, South Africa's leaders exhibit fewer expressions of "friendship" (*vide* DFA. 2001 *Background*: 30) or "shared values" (*vide* Barber in *Business Day*. 30 March 2001: 4) toward the predominantly white-ruled Anglo-Saxon Protestant democracies. In addition, those states that were perceived as having been close to the

apartheid government of South Africa, such as Israel and Taiwan (which the *apartheid* government and the first ANC administration both recognised as The Republic of China), have increasingly been kept at a distance by the South African Government. Although history is often used very selectively as a stimulus to political action, as in the case of arguments against colonialism and the quest for compensation in regard to slavery, it is the interpretation of history (*vide* Roberts. 2000: xiv) and not necessarily its accuracy, that gives rise to the historical imperative.

South Africa, unlike the United States and the People's Republic of China, does not appear to exhibit any recognisable affinity for the concepts of manifest destiny (*vide* Ranney. 1971: 571-572) or historical inevitability (*vide* Roy. 1998: 14). The closest that South Africa comes to reflecting on its place in history, from a future perspective, is its apparent recognition that it is capable of playing a leading role in the multilateral environment of regional international relations, particularly in the context of African politics; and that it ought to do so with a view to promoting world peace, respect for human rights and advancing black economic, political and social upliftment (*vide* SA. 2001. *Strategic Plan 2000-2005*: 29-30).

5.5.2. Political imperative

The political imperative necessarily includes what would otherwise be described separately as the "ideological imperative" because, in the case of states such as the People's Republic of China and even the Republic of South Africa, Marxist ideology and the "ideology" of *apartheid*, respectively, have played, and continue to play, significant roles in the determination of the foreign policies of these states. The rejection of political and social discrimination in all its forms, particularly racial discrimination, is a manifestation of the traumatic *apartheid* experience; and the public displays of admiration for some Marxist states, such as Cuba, by South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs (*vide* Barber in *Business Day*. 30 March 2001: 4; *Sunday Times*. 8 April 2001: 2), among others, leave little doubt that Marxist ideology and practice is still much admired within the ranks of the current government of South Africa (*vide* WS. 2000. Kindra in *Daily Mail & Guardian*. 17 May 2000).

The ANC government, however, has generally given formal ideology a low profile, preferring instead to stay well away from the ideological rhetoric of the revolutionary era that, among other demands, called for the nationalisation of banks and mining houses (*vide* Mandela. 1997: 642). Instead, ideology has in a sense been replaced by the projection of a vision for Africa, in the form of the envisaged *African Renaissance* (*vide* Mbeki. 1999: *speech* in Hong Kong, 17 April 1998: 224). As a guide for South Africa's future this vision is drawn from a somewhat inflated historical record of African cultural achievement; a *renaissance* aimed at recapturing an African civilisation that some suggest may never have existed. As Huntington (1997: 47) points out, "... most major scholars of civilisation except Braudel do not recognise a distinct African civilisation. Historically, Ethiopia constituted a civilisation of its own. Elsewhere, European imperialism and settlements brought elements of Western civilisation ..."

The South African leadership's optimistic perception of Africa's historical achievements has been articulated most conspicuously by President Mbeki, and represents a very necessary foundation for his conception of an *African Renaissance*. Although it is essentially a vision, the importance attached to it by President Mbeki, and therefore the Government of South Africa, with additional support from a few other African leaders, has raised the *African Renaissance* to the level of a political imperative. As Mbeki (Hadland and Rantao. 1999: 178) has stated,

in the political sphere, the African Renaissance has begun. ...
*... Our **history** demands that we do everything in our power to defend the gains that have ... been achieved... Such are the **political imperatives** of the African Renaissance which are inspired ... by our painful history ... and the recognition ... that none of (Africa's) countries is an island which can isolate itself from the rest, and that none of us can truly succeed if the rest fail (my emphasis).*

Apart from ideology and political vision, however, there are important factors that have to do with the maintenance of political power; and contribute substantially to the essential nature of the political imperative. Contemporary South Africa's political imperative has been effectively demonstrated by the successive administrations of the ANC government of the new South Africa; achievement and preservation of black political power in South Africa and the search for international assistance (Mills. 2000: 274-275) that will, in a variety of manifestations, support this domestic agenda. Thus the political imperative has an important domestic aspect which feeds and sustains its international aspect and *vice versa*.. Domestically the political imperative's objectives are as follows:

- the preservation of national security and sovereignty (as a means to the avoidance of future subjugation and in order to preserve constitutionally agreed civil liberties) (*vide* {4}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 83 {b});
- delivery on promises made, and expectations raised, during the revolutionary anti-*apartheid* era (as a means to retaining political leadership and control) (SA. 2001. *Strategic Plan:2000-2001*: paragraph 2); and
- maintenance of control of the political leadership of South Africa (as a means to ensure the continuation of the political and ideological direction of the state) (*vide* Hadland and Rantao. 1999: 108).

Internationally, South Africa's political imperatives seem directed toward making South Africa and Africa relevant within the international environment. The battle fought against white overlordship by the liberation movements in *apartheid* South Africa, is being continued internationally by the Government of South Africa, most noticeably in the diplomatic multilateral arena (*vide* Mbeki. 1999: 275-281), in order to empower itself and other African states within the international environment; and to avoid being re-colonised or enslaved, through perceived or actual economic domination or diplomatic entanglement, by the world's big powers, particularly those predominantly white-ruled Anglo-Saxon Protestant countries that were once colonial

or slave-owning states. Among these political imperatives the concept of an *African renaissance* can be a significant inspirational force.

5.5.3. Economic imperative

The economic imperative has been encapsulated in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme (Hadland and Rantao.1999: 95-96) which is essentially a domestic plan of economic action that must also draw upon resources emanating from the international or external environmental *milieu* if the programme is to be successful (*vide* DFA. 19980706). In this regard some of the following economic objectives are complementary to the GEAR programme.

- economic advancement of, particularly, black South Africans;
- the growth of the South African economy, inclusive of the promotion of foreign trade, incoming investment, increased export productivity and increased incoming international tourism;
- effective preparation for the impact of globalisation upon the South African economy; and
- making South Africa and the Southern African region more economically competitive.

However, for GEAR to have any chance of success South Africa needs to maintain positive, mutually beneficial, relations with the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands because these countries account for a substantial volume of South Africa's total trade (SARS. *Statistics*. 1998; *vide* Mills in SAIIA. 1998: 43).

5.5.4. Social imperative

There appears to be a deep-rooted need to project an African culture within South Africa and to shake off some of the trappings of European culture that, during the *apartheid* years, made South Africa seem more Western than African. A

manifestation of the social imperative is that, in the rush to project South Africa's *African* face to the outside world, the country's diplomatic service has chosen to fill South Africa's embassies and consulates with men and women of colour, sometimes at the expense of suitability or experience. There is an abundance of political appointments, as ambassadors and high commissioners, often with no diplomatic or managerial experience. One South African Ambassador is a boiler-maker by profession (SA. 2001. *Parliamentary question*).

An important component of South Africa's social development is derived from African cultural tradition in the form of the concept and practise of *Ubuntu*. As Mbigi and Maree (1995: 1) point out, *Ubuntu*, which may also be described as *brotherhood* or *collective security*, is a universal concept that can be applied to all poor communities.

The cardinal belief of Ubuntu is that a man can only be a man through others. In its most fundamental sense it stands for personhood and morality. ... The key values of Ubuntu are: group solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity and collective unity (Mbigi and Maree. 1995: 2)
(Authors' emphasis).

Although the *Ubuntu* concept appears suited to the tribal, communal or collectivist mind-sets, and the economically poor, it appears to hold little, if any, value for individualism, leadership, and the economically successful.

5.5.5. Strategic imperative

South Africa's perceived strategic interests have focused on the need for peace and stability in Southern Africa, on the African continent and in the world. As the only country within the international environment to voluntarily give up its military nuclear capability (Rajghatta. *Indian Express*, 11 May 1995), South Africa has also demonstrated a commitment to nuclear non-proliferation (SA. 1995: 10). As a

major arms manufacturer, South Africa has attempted, outwardly at least, to follow policies of responsibility by not selling arms to belligerents. However, states under threat from insurgents and revolutionaries have been the recipients of sensitive major significant military equipment provided by South Africa (DFA. 20000328). The Department of Foreign Affairs plays an important role in vetting all arms sales and preventing such sales where necessary through recommendations to the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) (DFA. 20000328).

The strategic imperative also necessarily demands that sovereignty and territorial integrity must be protected but, in the absence of any credible military threat, other defensive needs come to mind. For example, illegal immigration, poaching of land and sea resources, smuggling (*South China Morning Post*. 22 April 2000: 5) and drug trafficking, require law enforcement capabilities that may be best suited to improved coastal patrol services, immigration and customs services, border guards and anti-poaching units.

5.5.6. Scientific and technological imperative

On the question of science and technology there is an indubitable need to acquire new technologies and the latest scientific expertise, if South Africa is not to fall behind, in terms of scientific achievement, in a wide range of scientific endeavour and scientific progress. South Africa has entered into an Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperaton with the PRC (*vide* paragraph 9.4 *infra*: Addendum 4) and although each country seeks to benefit from this agreement South Africa remains vulnerable in the absence of guaranteed safeguards against the loss of intellectual property rights ({2}2001. *Interview*).

5.5.7. Moral imperative

It has been suggested by some that the government of the new democratic South Africa has never actively pursued a human-rights-driven foreign policy agenda, “always placing its trade and party political priorities before human rights” (Hartley.

Sunday Times. 19 April 1998: 19). In view of South Africa's past history of human rights abuse, particularly during the *apartheid* era, the inclusion in the country's new democratic constitution of a bill of rights designed to curb future similar abuse, is a logical reflection of past, present and future concerns. When South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs (SA 1998: *Nzo speech*) referred to the ending of human rights abuses as an objective of South Africa's foreign policy he articulated a commitment to extend domestic policy, derived from national domestic values, into one or more of the external environments:

We will continue to oppose terrorism, exaggerated ethnicity, chauvinism and xenophobia in all their forms. We will continue to fight for the transformation of international relations so as to eradicate aggression, the usurping of power, unilateral coercive measures and unfair economic practices, foreign occupation and the use of force. We will focus on ensuring justice for the oppressed, equality for women and protection of children everywhere.

Quoting from the Durban Declaration tabled by South Africa as Chair of the 1998 Non-Aligned Movement Summit and adopted by acclamation, Foreign Minister Nzo also said:

*We must seek a world order of compassion for the weak, of human rights and development for all (SA 1998: *Nzo speech*).*

Although the Minister was speaking in a multilateral forum it would seem logical to conclude that he also accepted the need for South Africa to seek the envisaged world order through bilateral as well as multilateral endeavours within the international environment.

5.5.8. Legal imperative

South Africa's legal system can be traced back to the classical Roman era and the Dutch and British legal systems of the 17th and 18th centuries. Today the supreme law of South Africa is the South African Constitution, which embodies a Bill of Rights (*vide* {4}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: preamble and chapter two). South Africa's adherence to the rule of law is an implied guarantee of its continued respectability within the international system. However, as globalisation begins to exert demands upon sovereignty, South Africa's laws, and their implementation, may increasingly be measured against the laws of other states, and the manner of their implementation, and no doubt, *vice versa*.

It may be difficult for some European and American observers, representing well-established democracies, to reconcile the vision of a dedicated South African professional foreign service comprising diplomats who have served time in prison for crimes that include murder and acts of terrorism against civilians (Pigou in *Mail & Guardian*. 26 April to 3 May 2001: 32). The legal imperative demands the application of reason and judgement and justice to the problems of injustice; not the violent remedies of the vigilante or terrorist, as may be viewed by external critics of the African experience of democracy.

The legal imperative therefore demands greater adherence than ever before, particularly in regard to relations between states, to concurrence, consistency, reciprocity and dependability; and ought certainly to be consistent with what is considered to be in the best interests of South Africa. This requirement goes further than the law itself, the point being that all those who formulate and implement foreign policy, as in the case of all public policy, ought to be legally accountable for the decisions they take and the policies they implement on behalf of the South African people (*vide* Botha in Hanekom *et al.* 1986: 173-174).

In South Africa's domestic environment to date, the legal imperative appears to have become bogged down in the need to ensure that laws are fair and just (*vide* {4}SA.

1996. *Constitution*: paragraphs one and two) whereas there is an added need to ensure that they are also enforced. Externally, international agreements are usually adhered to in the manner of gentlemen's agreements in the knowledge that failure to comply, particularly in the absence of a compelling reason to do so, would bring international dishonour to the country concerned (*vide* Cohen. 1981: 8-9).

5.6. World view foreign policy matrix applicable to the PRC

5.6.1. Historical imperative

Any clear understanding of China's foreign policy will be impossible in the absence of at least an equally clear understanding of China's history. The Chinese view themselves, their traditions, their culture and their achievements in terms of their history; they are both the creatures and the creators of their country's history. The history of China cannot ever be divorced from the national psyche of the people of China and *vice versa*. As Fairbank and Reischauer (1990: 2) have explained,

*... the Chinese ... are strongly aware of their heritage. To approach them through their history is to look at them as they see themselves.
... Only as one looks at the long flow of Chinese history can one perceive the direction of motion and have some understanding of what is happening in China now.*

According to Fairbank and Reischauer, the Chinese people have traditionally viewed history as "change within tradition" (1990: 178). This concept implies that change was expected to take place within the parameters of what was known and what was traditionally acceptable.

The Preamble to the Constitution of the PRC, adopted on 4 December, 1982, refers to China as "one of the countries with the longest histories in the world" (PRC. 1998. *Yearbook 1997 1998*: 1) and draws a deliberate link between feudal China,

semi-colonial China, nationalist revolutionary China and Communist revolutionary China in the form of the People's Republic of China, whereby "the Chinese people took State power into their own hands and became masters of the country" (3} PRC. *Yearbook 1997 98*: 1). In this sense, the *mandate of heaven* (or acceptance by the people) (2} Yang. 1999: 157 and 207-209), which had been denied the last Chinese emperor in 1911, and which had passed briefly to Sun Yatsen and then Chiang Kai Chek, was transferred to the PRC Government when it took power in 1949 under Mao Zedong (Ch'en. 1967: 312), and recognised as such by the people of the PRC.

China's leaders dwelt so much upon tradition, and the experiences of the past, that anything that happened in the present was perceived and understood in terms of historical experience; the lessons of the past were expected to be learned in order to make the present more manageable (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 178).

Instead of the Westerner's ideal of progress, and his continuing fascination with the future, the Chinese, for much of their history, drew on the distant past for their models of perfection (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 178; *vide* Roberts. 2000: xiv). An intrinsic theme of China's history is the political and geographical cycle of unification and division (Jian *et al.* 1986: 17). The theme of cyclical unification and division is also deeply ingrained in the national culture, through the impact of popular classical novels such as *Three Kingdoms*, which begins with the words: "The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide. Thus it has ever been" (Roberts. 1995: 5). The cycle began in 221 BC when China was unified for the first time by the King of Ch'in, China's "First Emperor". Although his dynasty did not endure long after his death, "the imperial system he created was to continue, though with occasional breaks, proving to be the world's most durable political system" (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 6 and 59).

The historical imperative necessarily includes China's national political imperative towards unification whenever it experiences division, as in the case of the country's early feudal history, the foreign occupations during the concessions of the nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries, the Japanese invasion and occupation, the civil war, pre-unification Hong Kong and Macao, and the current estranged status of Taiwan. In the PRC Constitution it is stated that, “it is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of re-unifying the motherland” (PRC. 1998. *Yearbook. 1997 1998*: 2). Consequently, it is entirely in keeping with the historical imperative of a unified motherland that all the major wars fought by China throughout its long history have been about sovereignty and the related strategic imperative to attempt to either defend or re-claim Chinese territory.

For most of China’s history there have been those who challenged the *status quo*. Therefore, leaders were invariably also curtailed from embarking upon foreign campaigns of conquest and adventure by the need to either put down rebellion at home or by the likely necessity of preparing to do so later. Consequently, the people of China, unlike many other peoples in the Americas, Europe and even parts of Asia and Africa have roots in the land they presently occupy that go back not hundreds but thousands of years. They did not migrate to the region; they were always part of China, as was the prehistoric Peking Man who lived and died in China 400 000 years ago (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 5). “The neolithic peoples of north China and possibly their paleolithic predecessors appear to have been the direct ancestors of the modern Chinese” (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 18). Therefore, an important and largely unique characteristic of the Chinese is that the people as a nation, the “people of heaven”, have never been completely colonised and thereby have never lost control of their cultural development, and have also never lost physical contact with the land of their ancestors.

The ideal of political unity has been nurtured throughout China’s history. Unaware for much of their existence of the great cultures of the West, the Chinese considered their domain to be the unique land of civilisation, surrounded by barbarians. They therefore called their land “*Chung-kuo*” (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 20) or “*Zhong Guo*” which means “central country” or, more commonly, “middle kingdom”. Underlying this devotion to the Chinese way of life was the fact that the whole Middle Kingdom remained an administrative unit under a central government. As

Fairbank and Reischauer point out, such unity owes far more to the habits of thought of the Chinese people than to mere geography (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 179). It has been argued that the unique and complicated writing system of China, which goes back thousands of years, was an important unifying influence in the early creation and preservation of the Chinese nation (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 27). Although China's vast geographical size could have been expected to have made government relatively more difficult, the Chinese state was regarded as coterminous with Chinese culture. There was such a close identification of the entire way of life with the unified empire that the one implied the other (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 179). Consequently, in the People's Republic of China, unity of political thought is encouraged, as the country's constitution (PRC. 2000. *Constitution: preamble*) makes clear.

In the long years of revolution and construction, there has been formed under the leadership of the Communist Party of China a broad patriotic united front that is composed of democratic parties and peoples' organisations and which embraces all socialist working people, all patriots who support socialism and all patriots who stand for reunification of the motherland.

Coupled with the quest to re-achieve and preserve the unity of China, however, is the ongoing objective of modernisation (*vide* Salisbury. 1993: 332-333), an economic imperative which is also closely related to the need to ensure the political survival of the People's Republic of China through and beyond the twenty-first century.

5.6.2. Political imperative

The political imperative that appears to have driven most Chinese rulers has been the quest for power legitimised by the Mandate of Heaven (Yang. 1999: 157 and 207-209). Although some prominent imperial administrations such as the *Han* dynasty devoted attention primarily to the lavish support of the emperor and his relatives and the defence of the dynasty; not to any particular concern for the people except as

taxpayers, labour and potential rebels (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 61), it would be wrong to assume that the welfare of the subject peoples of China's successive dynasties and governments was not also a concern, albeit not a particular concern. This view is given substance by Mencius's observation that the Mandate of Heaven, "the basic justification for the ruler's power, manifests itself only through the acceptance of a ruler by his people; if the people kill or depose him it is clear that he has lost heaven's support" (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 52; *vide* {2} Yang. 1999: 157 and 207-209).

According to Fairbank and Reischauer the traditions and techniques of centralised rule in China had become so ingrained and strong by the tenth century that a lengthy multiple division of the country was no longer possible and, with the exception of foreign conquest, China would not for any significant length of time re-experience division between competing Chinese factions until the twentieth century. Thus, it was from the time of the *Tang* dynasty, which ruled China from 608 AD until 907 AD, that "China became a virtually indestructible political unit" (1990: 123). The political imperative that has driven China's foreign policy during much of the existence of the People's Republic of China has been the ideology of Marxism-Leninism as influenced by the ideas of, particularly Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping (CPC. 1997: 1). On 25 April, 1956 Mao Zedong produced a report entitled, "On the ten major relationships" (PRC. 1991. *Major Documents*: 882) during a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. He identified the ten major relationships as follows:

- The relationship between heavy industry and light industry and agriculture;
- The relationship between industry in the coastal regions and industry in the interior;
- The relationship between economic construction and defence;
- The relationship between the state, the units of production and the producers;
- The relationship between central and local authorities;

- The relationship between the Han and the minority nationalities;
- The relationship between the Party and the non-Party members;
- The relationship between revolution and counter-revolution;
- The relationship between right and wrong; and
- The relationship between China and other countries.

The continuing focus on these basic relationships is manifested in current PRC domestic and foreign policy, either through campaigns such as, for example, economic development of the western regions of the PRC and the anti-corruption campaign; emphasis on the perceived contributions of the United Front and the eight democratic parties; the *four modernisations*, envisioned by Zhou Enlai and subsequently championed by Deng Xiaoping, that focused on the need to modernise agricultural methods, industry, science and technology, and defence needs (Salisbury. 1993: 332-333); and the PRC's foreign policy relationships in terms of the five principles of peaceful coexistence (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 402-403).

The influence of Marxism-Leninism, the Communist Party of China and the individual core leaders, predominantly Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping ({{1}}PRC. 2000. *Constitution*: preamble), and more recently Jiang Zemin, is omnipresent in PRC public policy, including foreign policy. In order to survive, however, the CPC seems obliged to keep re-inventing itself (*vide* {{2}}Brahm. 1996: 12-13) in the face of, particularly, economic changes that are shaping the modern PRC. For example, in April, 1998, the secretary of the Beijing University Committee of the Communist Party of China told a forum on communism's past, present and future that Marxism had entered a new stage of development because of Deng Xiaoping Theory (*vide* CPC. 1997: 1), which is known as "contemporary Marxism". He said that the theory, as applied by the CPC, would rejuvenate China and that a modernised China in the 21st century would further "prove the correctness of Marxism" (*China Daily*. 21 April 1998: 4).

5.6.3. Economic imperative

The economic goals determined by the 15th Congress of the CPC were aimed at a three-phase transformation of China into a developed industrialised state by the middle of the twenty-first century.

In the first decade, the GDP will double that of the year 2000, people will enjoy an even more comfortable lifestyle, and a more or less ideal socialist market economy will come into being... when the party celebrates its centenary in 2021, the economy will be more developed and systems will be further improved... when the People's Republic celebrates its centenary in 2049, modernisation will have been accomplished, and China will have become a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and modern socialist country. The average per capita income will have soared to US 4,000 Dollars (PRC.1998: 5).

Underpinning these ambitious domestic economic goals are the domestic goals of peace and stability and the diplomatic and foreign policy goals of defending China's sovereignty, opposing hegemonism and creating a new international political order (CPC. 1997: 87-89).

5.6.4. Social imperative

The geography of China is such that, for much of their history, the Chinese people were relatively isolated from the rest of the known world.

Separated by great distances and formidable mountains and deserts ... East Asian civilisation ... developed distinctive cultural patterns that have been retained in large part until today (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 3).

5.6.5. Strategic imperative

Whether 3000 or 5000 years ago, or even during more recent times, the forbidding surrounding terrain and continual threat of instability and warfare within the Greater China region, made the very thought of political or military expansion beyond the Tibetan Plateau or the Gobi desert, or the mountains of the north and north-west, imprudent and unrealistic. (Ronay. 1978: 203). The Chinese were prepared to defend their region against all invaders but, in the space of more than three thousand years of recorded history, would rarely go in search of conquests beyond the limits of those forbidding natural barriers. Some foreign campaigns did take place, though, such as the conquest of territory in Korea, Vietnam and Sogdiana, during the early part of the Han dynastic period which lasted from 206 BC to 220 AD (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 59-65). Important conquests also took place in the seventh and eighth centuries, when China's political and military power encompassed a vast area from Southern Siberia to Southeast Asia and westward through Tibet and Central Asia to the Caspian sea (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 98-99).

The Chinese have also known domination and humiliation by foreigners, including Mongolians, at various times during their history. Consequently, Marco Polo recorded that,

... the Great Khan (the Mongolian, Ghengis Khan) had not succeeded to the domination of Cathay by hereditary right, but held it by conquest; and thus, having no confidence in the natives, he put all authority into the hands of the Tartars, Saracens, or Christians, who were attached to his household and devoted to his service, and were foreigners in Cathay (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 168).

During the early decades of the Maoist era the PRC Government elucidated a strategy (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. 1971: 194-195) aimed at isolating and defeating the United States and capitalism. In terms of this strategy the industrialised states (the countries of North America and Western Europe) were analogous to cities and could

be isolated by gaining control of the undeveloped third world states (the countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia) which were analogous to the rural countryside. This was classic guerrilla strategy and was articulated by the (subsequently disgraced) PRC Vice Premier and Defence Minister of the time, Lin Biao (Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 297; Plano and Olton. 1969: 78-79), although the concept may have come originally from the mind of Mao Zedong (*vide* Mao's *three world's theory* in Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 294). In some respects this strategy is still practised, but with a view to gaining economic, political and diplomatic, rather than military, advantage for the PRC *vis a vis* the developed world, particularly African states (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 294). Thus the underdeveloped and developing countries are seen as opportunities, for the PRC, to seek and promote economic partnerships as well as mutually beneficial trade and investment. A fundamental driving force behind the strategic imperative is the re-unification of China, the main focus being on the re-incorporation of Taiwan (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 299); the defence of Chinese sovereignty; and the prevention of perceived American hegemonic ambition (*vide* Roy. 1998: 31) in and around the China region.

During the history of the PRC, wars have been fought against United Nations forces in Korea, the United States (in defence of South Korea and Taiwan), and Russia, India and Vietnam (in connection with various territorial disputes). In all these wars the PRC was motivated by the perceived need to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

5.6.6. Scientific and technological imperative

The PRC's commitment to progress in the field of science and technology was stressed very clearly in the *Four Modernisations* campaign of Deng Xiao Ping, which focused specifically on " ... agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defence ..." (Henderson. 1999: 25). In the post-Deng era of Jiang Zemin a facet of the scientific and technological modernisation became joined to the modernisation of national defence with a view toward preparing to fight future "...regional limited war under high tech conditions ..." (You. 1999: 1). The Gulf War

The social structure of China developed over thousands of years and, as Fairbank and Reischauer (1990: 15-16) explain,

the family rather than the individual, the state or the church, has formed the most significant unit in Chinese society... The family system was both hierarchic and authoritarian. The status of each person depended on his position by birth or marriage. ... The patriarchal father was the centre of authority.

During the Communist period of the People's Republic of China, however, and the introduction of the *one child family policy* (Roberts. 2000: 272) initiated in 1979, which reportedly (Roberts. 2000: 273) encouraged "... abortion, sterilisation and female infanticide ...", the traditional extended and hierarchical family structures were gradually broken down. Consequently, in the twenty-first century there will, presumably, be a large mass of only-children, predominantly males, who will never have nieces or nephews and whose own children will never have aunts or uncles or cousins; a self-centred generation that will one day contribute to the leadership echelon of the PRC. Nevertheless, the concept of *brotherhood*, as reflected in the African concept of *Ubuntu*, also has deep roots in Chinese cultural tradition. According to Wang Tai Peng (1994: 102),

... a belief in universal brotherhood was old in Chinese life. A very old Chinese saying, probably as old as ancient Greek stoicism, was that within all the corners of the earth every man is a brother.

Within the PRC, this belief has been reinforced, somewhat, by the political-military structure of the state which is dependent upon patriotic (*vide* PRC. Undated: 108) citizens viewing one another as brothers and sisters under the paternal authority of the Communist Party (*vide* PRC. Undated: 82) leadership core.

brought home to the PRC that the scientific and technological imperative demanded the development of a more high-technology military component, particularly in regard to the use of air power (You. 1999: 15).

An off-shoot of the military modernisation programme is the PRC's space programme (You. 1999: 78) which, in 1989, was identified by The Chinese Academy of Aerospace Technology, as "... an overriding project for upgrading China's level of science and technology ..." (You. 1999: 80). In order for the PRC to catch up and, where possible, surpass the scientific and technological achievements of rival states China made use of technology transfers from the Russians (You. 1999: 79); made extensive use of published information about American technological achievements (You. 1999: 81) and reportedly also engaged in espionage activities to gain access to unpublished information ({{17}WS. Cox Report). China's scientific and technological imperative, apart from long-term military considerations, is also aimed at short-term information gathering (You. 1999: 82) and scientific and technological spin-offs.

China should make its space programme the overriding one in relation to other high-tech development programmes... we already have the capabilities to design and implement a comprehensive space programme to launch manned satellites, space shuttles and space stations (Wu. 1987: 7-8; You. 1999: 79).

The PRC's space programme is aimed, not only at enhancing Chinese prestige within the international environment and scientific *milieu* but also at ultimately challenging and eclipsing the leadership of, particularly, the United States (*vide* Bernstein and Munro. 1998: xviii-xix). The PRC space programme is also likely to be driven by the need to secure China's territorial integrity and sovereignty against perceived threats (*vide* You. 1999: xvi-xvii and 79) emanating from United States space-based weapons systems in the form of the envisaged Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) initiative ({{15}WS. 2000 *vide* paper by Wang: 1).

5.6.7. Moral imperative

In October, 1998 the PRC authorities initiated a clamp-down on China Democracy activists because the activists wanted to register a political party that was intended to operate outside the ambit and control of the ruling Communist Party (*vide* Bezlova in{16}WS. 1998: 1). The actions of the PRC Government in arresting, charging and sentencing the activist leaders to lengthy prison terms, evinced official public responses from several states, among them, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Norway. South Africa did not respond ({2}2001. *Interview*). By not responding publicly or privately it became clear that South Africa was prepared to regard the clamp-down on China Democracy activists by the PRC Government as a PRC domestic matter. Even though the PRC Vice President visited South Africa officially during the period 31 January to 4 February, 1999, and met with both President Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki, no mention was made of the human rights clamp-down in the PRC, in bilateral discussions, and the issue therefore never entered the bilateral environment of the two states at the official political or diplomatic level ({2}2001. *Interview*).

5.6.8. Legal imperative

In the absence of a strong legal code the moral tenets of Chinese society remained firmly anchored to Confucian ethics. Law was a necessary tool of administration but personal morality was the foundation of Chinese society (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 16). As has already been explained the imperative of personal morality exerted a greater influence on the actions of the Chinese people throughout the greater part of their history than the requirements of law. For thousands of years China was a feudal state and the Chinese themselves freely acknowledge that, “lacking a democratic tradition and without a developed concept of a legal system, many Chinese citizens lack familiarity with the law and have not developed a sense of reliance on the law” (Du Xichuan *et al.* 1990: 146). “Unlike most Western countries, China does not have a state system that separates legislative, executive, and judicial functions. Instead, it

builds one on the basis of the National People's Congress by combining the functions of parliament and government" (Du Xichuan *et al.* 1990: 30).

International exchanges, in the legal or judicial sphere, between China and other states of the international system only became commonplace from as recently as 1980 when, for the first time, "the Chinese judicial administration delegation attended the United Nations Sixth Conference on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Criminals held in Caracas, Venezuela" (Du Xichuan *et al.* 1990: 150). Since 1983 Chinese delegations have attended and participated in international conferences of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Du Xichuan *et al.* 1990: 150) and this has provided useful opportunities for China and other states to exchange views and ideas on a range of legal issues, including contentious human rights issues, and in some cases learn from one another. This is a point well understood by the Chinese authorities (Du Xichuan *et al.* 1990: 151-153).

5.7. Foreign policy decision making process:

Decision makers acting in authoritative leadership roles within the domestic and bilateral environments, and policy initiators, implementers, advisors and monitors, together with their institutions and support structures, are the main focus of attention here. The act of foreign policy making is a dynamic process involving ongoing monitoring and re-assessment. As some writers (Legg and Morrison.1971: 134) have elucidated,


... foreign policy execution is the process of implementing the foreign policy in the real world, analysing the results of the actions taken, and modifying the strategy and tactics as needed.

If it is accepted, as these writers have stated, that foreign policy involves a process of continuous re-assessment and modification then, it is argued, an organisational model or organisational models of such a process ought to allow for appropriate monitoring

mechanisms. Such models ought to also reflect such a process as being adaptive and self-regulating, at least to the extent that human decision makers are able to introduce and implement actions and decisions that facilitate such adaptation. The dynamic nature of the foreign policy decision making process is well-suited to the use of a systems organisational model. Norbert Wiener's model of an organisation as an adaptive system as elucidated by Shafritz and Ott (Shafritz. 1988: 530) is therefore useful as a core concept model (figure 5/1 *infra*) of the foreign policy organisational process.

Figure 5/1:

Norbert Wiener's Model of an Organisation as an Adaptive System



Source: Jay M. Shafritz and J. Steven Ott, *Classics of Organization Theory*, 2d ed. (Chicago: Dorsey, 1987), p. 235.

Wiener's model shares essential characteristics (inputs, outputs, feedback) with the Eastonian derivative (Shafritz .1988: 530) adapted by Botes and Roux (see figure 2/1 *supra*).

The making of foreign policy, according to Ranney (1971: 574), also comprises a three-stage process involving first choosing the nation's general and specific international objectives, then deciding how to achieve them, and finally to assess whether the nation has the capability to achieve its goals in terms of its own available resources and the capabilities of the other state, or states, involved. Charles F. Hermann's elaboration (Merritt. 1975: 121) of the "stages of policy" corresponds closely with Ranney's three stages. Hermann argues that the first phase involves identification and elaboration of information, the second phase involves decision

making or choice, and the third phase involves the method of carrying out the preferred option.

It should be kept in mind that the nature of the relevant institutional *milieu* is likely to influence the form of the decisions themselves and that those decisions will also be shaped by the personality and character traits of the individuals who influence or take the decisions concerned (Merritt. 1975: 4). The personality and character traits of state leaders may be expected to be of special significance when articulating a national vision or political doctrine, or acting in terms of a perceived *world view* (vide Kim. 1998: 10). Somewhere, within a state's world view, national goals wait to be discerned. Austin Ranney (1971: 570-573) has stated that national foreign policies originate in national goals and that the most common goals comprise quests for security, markets and prosperity, territorial expansion, defending and spreading ideology, and peace.

According to Ranney (1971: 570),

... the prime goal of every nation ... is security. It has two aspects: first, the preservation of the nation's legal status as an independent sovereign nation and its practical ability to rule its own affairs and, second, creation of an atmosphere in which the nation can be relatively free of fear for its survival and independence.

In regard to markets and prosperity, Ranney states (1971: 571) that all nations hope to improve the lives of their citizens and that foreign policy goals may include a wide variety of means to achieve this goal, including giving or receiving economic aid, technical assistance, and so on. Ranney (1971: 571-572) also notes that,

... just about every nation at one time or another has pursued ... expansionist - sometimes called 'imperialist' - policies for one or more reasons: to obtain more

lebensraum for overcrowded national populations; to obtain economic advantages expected from controlling new mineral and other resources ... ; and to realise the sheer expansive force of 'manifest destiny' to rule.

On the goal of defending and spreading ideology, Ranney (1971: 572) takes the view that "...both ideology and other national interests are goals of every nation's foreign policy" With regard to the goal of peace, Ranney (1971: 573-574) points out that, "... judging by what their spokesmen say, all nations and all peoples of the world cherish peace, regard war as the greatest of evils, and condemn those who cause war as the greatest of villains" He also cautions (1971: 573-574) that,

... sometimes the desire for peace comes into sharp conflict with other desires, like that for the preservation of national independence. Then men and nations must choose which goals they want most and (must) be prepared to sacrifice those that they want less. Such choices are the very essence of foreign-policy formulation.

Although decisions are made by individuals, each with a distinctive personality (Merritt.1975: 4), and an individual world view, the actual impact of individual personality traits and characteristics upon decisions may be tempered, to some degree, by the type of constitutional and decision making institutional mechanisms within which such decisions are made; and by the effectiveness of whatever monitoring or supervisory arrangements are in place. Sometimes such monitoring arrangements are part of the machinery of government, as in the case of parliamentary mechanisms (SA. 1996. *Constitution: vide* paragraph 92), and sometimes they are non-governmental, as in the case of public opinion and the news media.

Ideological beliefs have conceivably influenced the individual world views of South Africa and the PRC, as well as their foreign policies and other public policies. For example, the Communist Party of China (CPC) undoubtedly takes its form and

character from the ideology of Marxism-Leninism (Hunt. 1996: 4) as modified and influenced by the thoughts of past Chinese leaders (PRC. 2000: *Constitution*: preamble) such as Mao Zedong (Hunt.1996: 219) and Deng Xiaoping (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 46) (see figure 5/5 *infra*). Therefore, ideology (also identified as a political imperative in the environmental-relationships-imperatives matrix), as articulated by the CPC, has played a major role in determining the PRC's world view since 1949. More traumatic historical factors (also identified as an imperative) that have contributed to the PRC world view would include experiences of foreign occupation, domination and perceived national humiliation (CPC. 1997: 137; *vide* Roberts. 2000: 115-116).


It is to be expected that the influence of ideology and historical trauma would be more intensely experienced at the party political level (*vide* ANC. 1998: *introduction*) than at the government level, where competing ideological interests, perhaps from lobby and pressure groups and other political parties, would be likely to divine a more national interest. In order to gain a clearer understanding of what ideological and historical factors may determine a state's world view and drive its foreign policy, it is therefore necessary to also include those factors that drive political party policy and influence the shaping of the leadership's world view at the level of party politics. Chapter 6 *infra* takes a closer look at these factors.

5.8. Foreign policy making as a systemic process

The relationships component of the environmental-relationships-imperatives model has to do with the relevant institutional and individual actors of the foreign policy *milieu*. It seeks to examine how and by whom foreign policy is made. Consequently, relevant political organisations and government structures are identified, examined and compared. By virtue of its dynamic nature, the decision making and policy making process, is therefore explored, in part, from a systemic perspective. In order to more easily comprehend how the various initiators and implementers of foreign policy coexist and interact within the domestic environment's foreign policy making *milieu*, the following foreign policy making systems-model has been developed to

represent an ideal (not necessarily *the* ideal) generic foreign policy making organisational process:

Figure 5/2: Model of a proposed ideal foreign policy making organisational process



As illustrated by model 5/2 *supra*, outputs in the form of foreign policy are subjected to feedback through monitoring of the effects of, and responses to, such policy; such feedback then gives rise to new, modified or additional inputs in the form of imperatives that give shape and direction to improved foreign policy. This accords with the view (Legg and Morrison. 1971: 166) that the foreign policy process encompasses “...foreign policy making, implementation, feedback and policy revision ... (as a) ... continuous and interrelated process.”

Figure 5/2 *supra* attempts to illustrate how foreign policy might to be made and implemented within a systemic concept that provides for ideas and actions of decision makers, access to information, implementation of decisions, monitoring of the effects

of decisions, and continual re-assessment and adjustment of such decisions, in order to facilitate the adaptation, where necessary, and continuing survival of the relevant domestic environment that such a foreign policy decision making system is intended to preserve and protect. It therefore remains to be discovered whether this proposed ideal system can be applied to the actual foreign policy decision making systems of, for example, South Africa and the People's Republic of China.

Although only four categories of decision maker have been developed for this policy analysis (individual, institutional, governmental, non-governmental), such classifications are intended to be broadly representative of all possible initiators, implementers and monitors of foreign policy decisions. A categorisation that focuses more specifically on the differing characteristics, including detailed psychological traits, of foreign policy makers could conceivably yield many more categories. However, by focusing on political, professional and technical, academic and socio-economic role players such as politicians and political parties, civil servants and governmental institutions, academics, academic institutions and think tanks, private citizens and organisations, business institutions and the news media, all of which are covered by the four categories of leadership identified, it is believed that all the major types of foreign policy maker are provided for in this study. The categories referred to could also be sub-categorised in terms of ideological policy sources, political party foreign policy decision makers, governmental foreign policy decision makers, governmental foreign policy implementers, governmental foreign policy advisors, non-governmental foreign policy advisors and foreign policy monitors. This categorisation has been employed in developing systems models (see figures 5/3 and 5/4 *infra*) that are intended to illustrate and compare the foreign policy processes of South Africa and the People's Republic of China. Such models may prove useful (see also figure 5/2 *supra*) in reflecting, among other possibilities, the sources of foreign policy inputs, the manner in which a variety of actors contribute toward the production of foreign policy outputs and how such policy outputs, in turn, result in further policy inputs. In addition, such models ought to be capable of being applied universally to all possible foreign policy relationships between states. The foreign policy responses component of figure 5/2 *supra* is the linkage point between two or

more domestic environments. It reflects the point where domestically made policy incurs a reaction that takes both domestic policy and foreign policy into the foreign policy orbit, either as bilateral or multilateral foreign policy.

5.8.1. Systemic representation of South Africa's foreign policy making process

Having looked at some of the sources as well as the institutional and individual role players that may be expected to contribute to the formulation, implementation and monitoring of South Africa's foreign policy, it appears that the distinction between political party and government of the day have become increasingly blurred (Mills. 2000: 274). The roles of the respective members of the tripartite alliance are also unclear as they often appear to work against one another, particularly where domestic economic issues are concerned. No doubt due to its federalist philosophy, which advocates a high degree of provincial autonomy, the role of the IFP also often appears ambiguous; on the one hand it supports its alliance partners nationally and on the other hand it opposes the ANC at provincial and local government level (*vide* {24}WS. 2001: 1). However, on foreign policy issues the IFP has supported the alliance, as part of the Government of National Unity ({1}WS. 1998).

Although public policy is generally monitored by the parliamentary process it would seem that the monitoring of foreign policy takes place mostly after policies are implemented and that inadequate measures are in place to ensure that proposed policies are the *best* policies. As indicated, most of the important foreign policy decisions are left to an exclusive group within the Presidency, with possible selective consultation involving politicians and senior officials who owe their respective positions to the President. The apparent unwillingness, or inability, of senior officials and ministers to engage in forceful debate with the President about contentious issues (Mthombothi. *Financial Mail*, 16 June, 2000: p. 16) of public policy (e.g. AIDS) compounds the opportunity for faulty, or ineffective, policy making (*vide* {21}WS. 2000: 1). The situation also indicates the potential vulnerability of South Africa's foreign policy to ill-considered decisions by the few in the absence of what might


otherwise prove to be well-reasoned dissent by the many, when such dissent becomes necessary. If it is accepted that much foreign policy deliberation is conducted in confidence and away from the public eye, which maybe necessary to ensure desired results, the best monitors in such circumstances may be the implementers of policy; career officials and technical experts within the Department of Foreign Affairs and related departments, including the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Defence.

In the case of foreign policy decisions relating to politically appointed ambassadors and other heads of mission, decisions that are not required to be highly classified in terms of security considerations, there would seem to be good reason (*vide The Star*. 4 February 1999: 12) to argue in favour of subjecting such appointees to close scrutiny by their peers, the multi-party Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee, the news media and the general public. It might also be argued that the appointment of the Director-General of Foreign Affairs should also be subject to scrutiny because of his pivotal role in influencing foreign policy appointments; and his crucial role in the actual implementation of foreign policy.

Although there is now an effort to coordinate public policy, including foreign policy, through regular meetings at the Director-General level, in terms of the designated clusters, directors-general do not always attend such meetings in person. They are often represented by subordinates who either have no authority to take required decisions or by subordinates who have not been sufficiently well-briefed to enable them to contribute meaningfully to the ensuing exchanges of information and resultant decisions, if any (*Conversation*{2}. 2001). Although it might be expected that broad foreign policy guidelines would be clearly set out by the presidency, either directly or through the foreign ministry, the absence of a White Paper on foreign policy, the absence of clear foreign policy doctrines, and inconsistency on important foreign policy issues, such as human rights, have left most of the practical aspects of foreign policy making to the initiative and ingenuity of the relatively lowly desk official (*Conversation* {1}: 2001). It now remains to illustrate the dynamics of South Africa's foreign policy making organisational structure by means of the systems

model referred to previously (figure 5/2 *supra*). Such sources and role players having an impact on South Africa's foreign policy might be ideally depicted as follows:

Figure 5/3: Primary SA foreign policy initiators in the domestic environment



KEY	D-G: Director-General	DFA: Department of Foreign Affairs
ANC:	African National Congress	SACP: South African Communist Party
	<i>World View</i>	DTI : Department of Trade and Industry
IFP: Inkatha Freedom Party	COSATU : Congress of South African Trade Unions	FPPPC : Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Portfolio Committee
		SACP : South African Communist Party

Whereas the flow of information, advice and decision making is much in accordance with the proposed ideal model (Figure 5/2 *supra*) it is likely, in reality, that a substantial amount of South African foreign policy making is driven by officials

(usually desk officers at the Department of Foreign Affairs) and serving South African diplomats abroad (acting through their relevant desk officers) and that the foreign policy proposals of such officials are then presented to political public policy (including foreign policy) decision makers to either reject, accept or modify and accept, the policy proposals of such officials (*Conversation* {1}: 2001). However, policy doctrines and grand visions, such as the concept of an *African renaissance* for example, invariably originate in the very top structures of government and politics.

Although there are, in South Africa, a number of research institutions and think tanks specialising in foreign policy and subjects that are representative of, or closely associated with, international relations, the South African Government does not appear to make much use of them. This could have to do with the perceived need for secrecy; it might also have to do with an unwillingness to trust those without “struggle” credentials; or it might relate to a general unwillingness to risk revealing policy shortcomings or internal failings. Although the Presidency has begun to wield considerable decision making power, the continuing existence of a multi-party system that permits opposition politics; the continuing adherence to a system of government under law; and continuing respect for, and adherence to, democratic principles, which includes respect for individual human rights enshrined in domestic law, has imposed limits on the power of the Presidency. In South Africa, a far less monolithic society than the PRC, the leadership’s *world view* is less likely to be deeply felt among critically-minded academia, representatives of the news media, and the opposition political *milieu*. However, this does not mean such a *world view* will not leave its impact on South African public policy. Although the possibility of national-group-thinking disasters taking place in South Africa, such as occurred in the PRC during the time of the Cultural Revolution (*vide* Salisbury. 1993: 236), is probably less likely precisely because of the monitoring and public criticism of public policy that is allowed to take place in South Africa, leadership-group-thinking may still hold unpleasant consequences for South Africa. The failure of government ministers to question the Presidency’s AIDS policy, within the cabinet, (Mthombothi. *Financial Mail*. 16 June 2000: 16) at an early date, is an example of such a consequence.

Where the People's Republic of China (PRC) is concerned, the unchallenged supremacy of the Communist Party of China (CPC) implies that the leadership's world view, termed *shijie guan* (Kim. 1998: 10) in the realm of foreign policy making, casts a much larger shadow within the PRC than does the world view of the South African leadership within South Africa. Consequently there are no actual domestic checks on the vast power of the Politburo of the CPC which is a collective leadership whose power is effectively represented, utilised and articulated by the seven-member Standing Committee of the Politburo.

The PRC is ruled by the CPC and although the Party's authority is guaranteed constitutionally by the Constitution of the PRC it is the military power of the People's Liberation Army that *effectively* guarantees the continuing existence of the CPC. As General-Secretary of the Communist Party of China and as Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Jiang Zemin therefore is able to garner continued support for his own constitutional political leadership, as President, as well as the continued loyalty of those entrusted with preserving the political status quo.

The main organs of government of the PRC are headed by members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. With the powers of the State Presidency, CPC, and CMC firmly in his grasp, Jiang Zemin's only perceived threat to his power base is his age and the Constitutional requirement that nobody can serve more than two terms in the office of President (PRC. 2000. *Constitution*: Article 79).


5.8.2. Systemic representation of the PRC's foreign policy making process

Clearly, as far as political decision making power is concerned, the top leadership of organs such as the State Council, National People's Congress, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Central Military Commission, and Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party are all encapsulated within the power structure of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Everyone else in government, including ministers under the State Council, are likely to be policy advisors,

facilitators or implementers of policy; or supervisors (monitors?) of policy. In view of the lack of opportunity for public dissent and public criticism of government policies, the impact of the leadership's *world view* is also more likely to be accommodated among a relatively wide range of actors, including policy implementers, policy advisors and policy monitors. Of course, an obvious pitfall for any organisation that chooses to limit the existence or effectiveness of its critics is that it has no way of perceiving the quality of its decisions until disaster strikes.

Schematically, the PRC's foreign policy role players might be depicted as follows:

Figure 5/4: Primary PRC foreign policy initiators in the domestic environment.



KEY	CPC: Communist Party of China	FALSG: Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group
	G-S: General-Secretary	PRC: People's Republic of China
		CPPCC: Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee
		MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
		MOFTEC: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Development
	NPC: National People's Congress	
	MOD/PLA: Ministry of Defence/ People's Liberation Army	

World View

Although not indicated as such in the model (figure 5/4 *supra*) the CPC and the Eight Democratic Parties collectively constitute what is known as the United Front, which in practice means that all these parties, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, strive toward common goals in fulfilment of common ideals and policies. There is therefore no substantive opportunity or even incentive for critical evaluation and appraisal, by the Eight Democratic Parties, of CPC policy proposals.

Given that the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) tends to function as a supervisor of foreign policy implementation (Lu. 1007: 11), it would also appear that think tanks play no decisive role, if any, in influencing the decisions of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. In this regard, Communist Party Elder, Li Xannian, during the events of the 1989 Tiananmen Square student rebellion, reportedly (Nathan and Link. 2001: 313) declared:

Our Communist Party doesn't have think tanks - never has.

This is pure bourgeois stuff.

Nonetheless, the activities of institutions such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences are not totally irrelevant to the decision making process. As Lu points out (1997: 135), although academic institutes specialising in research on international issues tend to play the role of information providers, and have little direct impact on foreign policy decisions, academics at such institutions, who have individual access to the top leadership, may have a far greater impact on the decision making process.

5.9. Conclusion

This chapter has sought, on the one hand, to identify some of the core factors responsible for the origination of foreign policy within the leadership hierarchies of South Africa and the People's Republic of China; and, on the other hand, to reflect on the foreign policy making process, itself. A basic systems model, comprising inputs, outputs and feedback, was utilised to develop a more complex model that reflects the dynamic nature of the perceived foreign policy making process. The model also allows for the influence of world view perspectives in the formulation of foreign policy. From this model, information relating to foreign policy makers, influencers, implementers and monitors, in South Africa and the People's Republic of China, was used to construct two further systems models, each reflecting the perceived foreign policy making process applicable in each state. With regard to the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis the systems models are useful indicators of key processes and key role players, particularly in regard to the leadership relationships component.

This chapter has identified what has been termed the *origination* process of foreign policy and has shown how particular foreign policy imperatives, in collaboration with origination experiences and characteristics, may influence the course of the decision making process. In addition, systems models of the foreign policy decision making processes in South Africa and the PRC have been constructed to facilitate an understanding of this crucially important aspect of their foreign policy relationship.

The main focus of this chapter has been on foreign policy making processes within and between domestic environments. It now remains to reflect on the initiators and implementers of foreign policy that have their origins in the non-domestic (external) environments as identified by the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis.

CHAPTER SIX

INITIATORS AND INFLUENCERS OF FOREIGN POLICY WITHIN THE EXTERNAL (NON-DOMESTIC) ENVIRONMENTS

6.1. Introduction

In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis, the external environment, in the wider generic sense, includes *transactional* or *communicational* environments such as the bilateral and multilateral types; and it also includes the *geographical* international and regional environments. In the context of the international environment, the concept of the *third state* (see paragraph 6.2.1.4. *infra*), because of the impact its decision makers may have on specific transactional relationships (bilateral and multilateral) within the international *milieu*, may be specially relevant.


In comparison with the more *direct* influences of foreign policy within the domestic or internal geographical environment, it is argued that the external geographical environments serve as crucibles of largely *indirect* or peripheral foreign policy influences. In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, peripheral foreign policy initiators and influencers within the external geographical environments of individual states include regional actors or role players. Such foreign policy actors may be specific *third states*, international organisations (a focus of the multilateral environment), individual, organised or institutional entities (also a multilateral focus) within the all-encompassing international environment; and may exert formative influences on the bilateral and multilateral policies of individual states. Their actions and influences help to shape the bilateral environments of individual states, the *communicational* environments in which domestic environments contribute to the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. The ways in which these actions and influences are dealt with by top decision makers of the domestic and transactional environments are dependent, in part, upon the nature of their leadership. Consequently, the leadership factor, a crucial component of the environmental-

relationships-imperatives linkage model, is also addressed in this chapter. Finally, world view foreign policy matrices in respect of South Africa and the PRC will be developed from salient information already recorded and national characteristics previously identified.

6.2. External environments

As referred to previously, the external environments, two of which are *geographical* and two of which are *communicational* or *transactional*, are external to the domestic environment, which is also the state's internal environment.

Figure 6/1: Representation of the external environments



Source: Original depiction based on the environmental component of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model (Figure 3/2 *supra*)

Figure 6/1 *supra* describes the situation, and also allows for the place of the *third state* (D3), a concept that will be explained further during the course of this chapter. Figure 6/1 *supra* contrasts the domestic environment (D) with those environments,

geographical and transactional (bilateral {B}, regional {R}, multilateral {M} and international {I}), that extend beyond the territorial and national political boundaries of the nation-state. The concept of a *third state* capable of affecting the bilateral relationship between states D1 and D2 is represented by D3. Figure 6/1 *supra* also illustrates the fact that the international environment {I} is all-encompassing, in that any and every foreign policy action that takes place within any of the other environments (domestic {D}, bilateral {B}, regional {R} or multilateral {M}) automatically also takes place within the greater international environment {I}; and, conversely, that any and every foreign policy action, requiring an authoritative decision, that takes place in the international environment also takes place simultaneously in at least two other environments; the domestic and bilateral, domestic and multilateral or domestic and regional.

6.2.1. Geographical external environments

The geographical external environments help to focus on questions of *who*, *where* and *what*? Who is involved (which countries)? What is happening in the region? Where is it happening (which region)? Where the international environment is concerned, there is no dispute about its extent (it covers the globe) and its membership includes every state and every individual and political entity. However, regions are much more difficult to define or identify (Rosenau, 1969: 61-62). Consequently, definitions or descriptions of regions are, for the most part, subjective considerations (Cantori and Spiegel, 1970: 2), based on factors such as proximity, association or common interests. In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, geographical regions that are organised institutionally are treated separately as part of the multilateral communicational external environment.

6.2.1.1. Regional foreign policy influences

South Africa is arguably part of the Southern African region, the African region, the Indian Ocean region, the South Atlantic region, the developing world and the Southern Hemisphere region. In these regions South Africa normally pursues its

foreign policy regional interests through multilateral institutions, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (*vide* {1} SA. 2001. *Strategic plan*: 26; {2} DFA. 1998: 40 and 134) within the multilateral environment. During the period of the Mbeki presidency, South Africa has been mooted the idea of forming a *Group of the South*, that would include, among others, strategically important states such as Brazil, Egypt, India and Nigeria (DTI. *Global Economic Strategy*. Undated: 10); and has also actively pursued the related concepts of an African *Renaissance* and *Millennium Africa Plan* (MAP), which have since been supported by other African states in the practical form of the New African Initiative (NAI) (*vide* {1} SA. 2001. *Strategic plan*: 14). Consequently, the African region, Southern Hemisphere and Developing World are the areas most likely to attract South Africa's attention in the realm of regional foreign policy concerns.

The relatively high number of armed conflicts taking place in Africa ({28}WS. 2002: 1-2), as well as ongoing regional problems concerning illegal arms trafficking, illegal immigration, drugs-trafficking, the spread of disease across international boundaries, and cross-border crime (*vide* {2} DFA. 1998: 166-178), have placed additional pressures on African states, including South Africa, to seek diplomatic and foreign policy solutions to these mounting concerns. Despite a stated commitment to a respect for human rights and democracy (*vide* Mills. 2000: 262) South Africa has been relatively silent, in the face of implied contempt for human rights and democracy by some of its Southern African neighbours (*vide* Southall in DFA. 20000619). For example, when Zimbabwe's President allows mobs to attack and kill white Zimbabwean farmers ({18}WS. 2000: 1) South Africa is expected to respond promptly, publicly and unambiguously; first to reassure its own white farmers; and secondly, to reassure the states of the international system that South Africa respects the rule of law, continues to uphold the principles of democratic government, and can be relied upon to consistently demonstrate respect for human rights (*vide* Mills. 2000: 308-309; also {2} DFA. 1998: 156-162). The danger of not responding appropriately may be felt economically when potential investors become disillusioned or nervous about spending their money in a state that seems so easily intimidated by its less

powerful neighbour. The increase in illegal immigration into South Africa (He Wenping. 1996: 6), including illegal Chinese immigrants, through the porous borders of neighbouring states, is an additional regional problem that, in the long term, cannot avoid exerting an impact on South Africa's foreign and domestic policy .

Of course, not all peripheral foreign policy influences emanate from neighbouring or proximate states because not all regions are contiguous; they may also be non-contiguous or dispersed; and whether contiguous or non-contiguous, they may also sometimes include the multilateral environment in the form of the international regional organisation. The non-contiguous region that is of particular importance to South Africa is the region known as the developing world. Many developing states are part of multilateral organisations such as the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity, the Non- Aligned Movement, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), or the Southern African Development Community. Mention is also often made of South-South cooperation (Mbeki. 1999. *speech* at Gallagher Estate, Midrand, 26 March 1996: 167) or South-North economic disparity (*vide* {2}SA. 1998: Mbeki *speech*) but as many of the world's developing states are in the northern hemisphere these terms tend to distort their messages if "south" is intended to mean "developing", "under-developed" or, merely, "poor". For example, Australia which is geographically part of the "south" has a highly developed "northern" economy (*vide* {14}WS. 2001: 1).

Another non-contiguous "region" or grouping that appears to be of special interest to South Africa is the thus far nameless region encompassing the socialist, communist and revolutionary "friendships" forged between the African National Congress, and some of the governments and revolutionary movements that supported them during the *apartheid* years. This region includes states such as Cuba (*vide* Barber in *Business Day*. 30 March 2001: 4), Algeria (Mandela. 1997: 355) and the People's Republic of China (*vide* Randall. *Sunday Independent*. 6 August 2000: 4); and actively supportive sub-Saharan African states such as Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Hadland and Rantao. 1999: 31), among others.

Some of the wealthier countries, political parties and individual leaders appear to have exploited such “friendships” with their South African counterparts by providing funds for party political purposes (Mills. 2000: 274-275), sometimes upon request of the South African leadership on behalf of the ANC (2001: *interview*; *vide* Brummer and Blatt. *Mail & Guardian*. 22-27 March 2002: 4), with the result that South Africa’s foreign policy has effectively been held ransom to the party political interests of the ANC-SACP alliance.

South Africa’s external environment has had a particularly important role in shaping post *apartheid* South Africa; states of the Southern African region gave sanctuary to guerrillas of South Africa’s liberation movements (*vide* SA.1995. *Opening address by President Nelson Mandela*: 5); bilateral relations with many individual states became strained as economic sanctions were imposed against South Africa, such as the economically crippling Congressional Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) legislation introduced against the *apartheid* government by the United States (Suzman. 1993: 274; Mills. 2000: 249); and, of course, states such as the former Soviet Union and Cuba supplied arms, ammunition, military equipment and personnel to fight the South African Defence Force in Southern Africa during the *apartheid* era. The PRC, like the former Soviet Union and some other states, also provided sanctuary and training for ANC and PAC exiles (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 301 and 311-312; WS. 2001).

Dramatic and far-reaching changes in the external environment, such as the decolonisation of Africa, the universal condemnation of race discrimination, the international isolation of South Africa, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, the independence of Namibia and the rising influence of the People’s Republic of China, preceded political change in South Africa; such external changes undoubtedly influenced the course of events in South Africa. For example, the termination of Soviet arms supplies to the liberation movements coupled with continuing international sanctions (*vide* Suzman. 1993: 274) against the South African Government created a political stalemate; a situation that could only be resolved by the South African Government and the liberation movements, particularly the African

National Congress and its allies, foregoing the military option for the peaceful option of negotiation (Suzman. 1993: 290).

The People's Republic of China is part of the Greater China Region (which includes Taiwan), the East Asian Region, the Asian Region, the Asia-Pacific Region and the developing world. Clearly the PRC is geographically part of the Northern Hemisphere but in the political, diplomatic and ideological sense it has sought, with notable success, to align itself with the south. Since the communist take-over of the Chinese mainland in 1949 (Ch'en. 1967: 312) the external environment of the PRC has undergone considerable change (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 370-372). The Soviet Union has disappeared; major wars have been fought in Korea and Vietnam; the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has not only come into being but has expanded to include some communist states; new states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union have arisen on China's borders; Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have since risen to be among the world's most successful economic and financial centres; Hong Kong and Macao have been returned to China by their former colonial rulers; North and South Korea have begun to seek rapprochement; and Western culture, specifically American and British culture, has left its impact on a number of Asian states and territories (*vide* Lam. 1999: 386-387) that are neighbours or near neighbours of the Chinese mainland.

The PRC's main focus in terms of the regions of which it is part, tend to be two-fold (*vide*. Lu. 1997: 155). First there is an over-riding concern for security, which includes opposition to perceived US hegemonic policies (Kim. 1998: 159); and second, there is a dedication to economic issues, aimed at ensuring regional economic stability and maximum benefits for the PRC (Kim. 1998: 171). Nevertheless, security policies have sometimes appeared to dilute the achievements of Beijing's economic policies by encouraging regional political and military instability. For example, William Tow, (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 151) writes of the PRC's sale of arms to third world states such as North Korea and Pakistan.

Security considerations have led the PRC to focus on trying to settle territorial disputes through generally peaceful means, particularly in recent years (*vide* Sun. *China Daily*. 6 July 1998), and to devote considerable attention to ensuring good relations with neighbouring states. There have been exceptions to the peaceful approach, however, as when the PRC has perceived threats to its sovereignty. For example, wars against the Soviet Union and India (De Crespigny. 1992: 261), US forces in Korea, US and Taiwanese forces in defence of Taiwan, and Vietnam; and even the invasion of Tibet (Barnett and Akiner. 1994: 239; *vide* Goldstein. 1994: 92), have all been in defence of Chinese sovereignty. Clashes between PRC and Filipino forces in the South China sea have also been about sovereignty over the Spratley islands, claimed by the PRC and several ASEAN member states (Kim. 1998: 295).

The PRC, within the wider international context, sees itself as a great power (in small letters) by virtue of its long history, its acclaimed culture, its extensive territory, its vast population, its acknowledged leadership within the developing world (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 156 and 317), its diplomatic influence and power as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, its military strength which includes a nuclear arsenal (You. 1999: 85-87), its scientific potential (*vide* You. 1999: 78), and its impressive economic growth and economic potential. Yet it is by no means a Great Power (in capital letters) by the economic or military standards of the United States (*vide* Bernstein and Munro. 1998: 218), Britain or France. Whereas Britain, during the eighties, was able to fight and win a war against Argentina (1982: 1-9), the PRC was unsuccessful in its 1979 three-week war against its neighbour, Vietnam. As De Crespigny (1992: 297) has noted in this regard,

the chief lesson of the ... affray was that China possessed only limited capacity for wielding military force at a distance.

For this reason, perhaps, the People's Republic of China habitually, and deliberately, describes itself as a developing country. In effect, as argued above, the PRC is less than a developed state but is also, arguably, much more than a developing state. It falls somewhere in between, in a category of its own. For convenience, no doubt, the

world appears willing to treat the PRC as a developing country. Consequently, the non-contiguous developing region is of special importance to the PRC because this region offers opportunities for Chinese political, diplomatic, economic and military influence, also in the multilateral context (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 156). A further non-contiguous region, is the Chinese *Diaspora*, numbering more than 50 million people (World Bank. 2000: 40; Roberts. 2000: 279-280), which is to be found throughout the world, not only in Asian states such as Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand, but also in Russia, Britain, the United States, Australia and South Africa, among others. The importance that is attached to the overseas Chinese *Diaspora*, by the PRC Government, is evidenced by the existence of an Overseas Chinese Affairs Office that resorts directly under the State Council (Brahm. 1998: *Organisation Chart*). According to Brahm (1998: 151) the office "...coordinates activities involving overseas Chinese around the world ..." State institutions such as the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference also devote much attention to maintaining "...extensive expanding friendly contacts with compatriots in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and with overseas Chinese..." (PRC. 2001: 9).

6.2.1.2. International foreign policy influences

As one of the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, the PRC has a special interest in the United Nations. Apart from the Organisation's diplomatic and peace-enhancing role as an arbiter of dispute and facilitator of debate, it is also the multilateral vehicle that gives to China its opportunity to actively, and often conspicuously, participate in the governance of the international environment, with a view to protecting its own broader interests within that environment (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 316-318).

Two important regional organisations, both with a predominantly economic focus, are the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), at which the PRC has observer status, and the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) which has a membership of twenty-one Pacific rim states, including the PRC, United States, Japan, Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) and Australia. In more recent years, the

Shanghai Five Mechanism, comprising the PRC, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, has also become a regional grouping of some strategic importance to the PRC (DFA. 20010521).

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is another organisation that is specially important to the PRC, and which it aspires to join as a necessary prerequisite for the envisaged success of its future economic policies. PRC membership of the WTO (Mills. 2000: 347) will also affect Taiwan as the latter also aspires to membership of this organisation but may only join after the PRC becomes a WTO member (Kim. 1998: 257). Hong Kong became a member of the WTO prior to the territory's return to the Chinese mainland in 1997 and will remain a member after the PRC joins the organisation, in accordance with the rights and powers conferred upon Hong Kong SAR by the *Basic Law* (PRC. 1998. *Yearbook 1997/1998*: 157-159).

6.2.1.3. Other individual and institutional role players

Apart from regional groups and multilateral organisations there are individuals and non-governmental institutional entities that may have an impact upon, and are therefore relevant to, South Africa's foreign policy. For example, former president, Nelson Mandela, still has the ability to influence the direction of South Africa's foreign policy, particularly in regard to human rights, as evidenced by his mediating role in Burundi (*Pretoria News*. 27 February, 2001: 12). Archbishop Desmond Tutu also has this ability. There are also significant non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (*vide* Deng and Wang. 1999: 101) that are capable of influencing the direction of a state's domestic and foreign policy.

Among the more obvious non-state actors that may influence foreign policy in the regional (non-multilateral) context are international criminals, terrorists, guerrilla armies, smugglers, poachers and drug-traffickers. Invariably the cross-border or international influence of such individuals and groups is sufficiently negative or threatening to the requirements of good government that effective foreign policy

measures must be employed to negate such influence (*vide South China Morning Post*, 22 April 2000: 5). The regional and international activities of political dissidents, lobbyists, business organisations, human rights activists (*vide* {32}WS, 1998: 1-2), news media journalists and NGOs, among others, can also encourage changes in foreign policy.

On the economic front it is known that the South African government makes regular use of the economic and financial expertise of a group of influential international entrepreneurs, which includes Bill Gates (*vide* Bernstein and Munro, 1998: 101) and George Soros. However, in the context of contemporary South African foreign policy, individuals no longer loom as large as when Nelson Mandela and activists such as Alan Boesak, Desmond Tutu (Mandela, 1997: 660) and Peter Hain ({22}WS, 2001: 1), among others, individually and collectively added to the woes of the declining *apartheid* state and forced South Africa's foreign policy makers to focus their attention on finding ways to combat the mounting onslaught of political, diplomatic and social ostracism. Unfortunately, some public policies, such as those intended to deal effectively with the AIDS crisis (which may yet do irreparable damage to the concept of an *African Renaissance*) (*vide* Mills, 2000: 104-105), have also been badly compromised by the unconventional and scientifically disputed views of a few non-governmental individuals (Mbeki, 1999: 99; *vide* {20}WS, 2000: 1).

Possibly the most prominent non-governmental individual associated with the People's Republic of China is the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibetan Lamaists in China, and those in exile in India and elsewhere. His concern for the preservation of the Tibetan culture and freedom of worship for Tibetans in China, and his status as Tibet's "...secular and religious king ..." (Sperling, 1994: 277) has also made him something of a political leader of the Tibetan people. The failure of the South African Government to respond positively to some prominent and internationally influential individuals, such as the Dalai Lama (*Pretoria News*, 10 December 1999: 15), while welcoming other individuals with less impressive qualities or credentials ({31}WS, 1996: 1-3), betrays an absence of consistency that reflects, often negatively, on South African foreign policy.

There are a number of non-government organisations such as Amnesty International, and internationally dispersed groups and communities such as the Chinese *Diaspora*, previously alluded to, and China Democracy activists in exile; and numerous sister socialist and communist parties, that are capable of generating support for, or opposition to, the PRC's foreign policy; and thereby possibly influencing such policy. The activities and status of the *Falun Gong* (*vide* Rademeyer in *Pretoria News*, 27 April 2000) religious sect, as well as the activities of Christians and other religious communities in China, also have the potential to affect PRC foreign policy or PRC relations with other states of the international environment.

6.2.1.4. Influence of third states

In the context of the international environment, the concept of the *third state* (*vide* paragraph 6.1 *supra*), because of the impact its decision makers may have on specific transactional relationships (bilateral and multilateral) within the international *milieu*, is specially relevant. For the purpose of this research, third states (see D3 in figure 6/1 *supra*) are those individual states that together with, or in isolation from, the specific regions or blocs to which they belong, may exert substantial influence on the bilateral relationships of other states, directly or indirectly. The influence of individual third states upon a bilateral relationship between any two states (including South Africa's relationship with the PRC) can be due to bilateral, regional or multilateral actions initiated by them. The Permanent Member states of the United Nations Security Council, in view of their individual military, economic, political and diplomatic influence within the international environment are, effectively, all *third states*.

Since the demise of *apartheid*, third states that may act upon the foreign policy relationships of South Africa are somewhat easier to identify, as the pressures of economic, cultural and diplomatic isolation, and insurrection, are no longer factors for consideration. Now it is more a question of diplomatic influence and pressure, for considerations other than ostracism and rebellion; and states with the ability to effectively exert such diplomatic pressure and influence must arguably include all five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

Third states of particular relevance to South Africa during the *apartheid* years included Britain, the United States and the former Soviet Union. Britain and, subsequently, the United States, were major bases for the organisation and growth of the anti-*apartheid* movement, which sought and successfully achieved the political, diplomatic and economic isolation of South Africa; and the former Soviet Union and its surrogates provided the military training and *materiel* to make war on the *apartheid* state, with somewhat less successful results (Suzman. 1993: 290). However, it is not their contribution to the ending of *apartheid* but their impact on many of South Africa's bilateral relationships with other states that deserves the relative pre-eminence of Britain, the United States and the former Soviet Union as notable *third states*.

Britain's status and position within the Commonwealth in 1960 gave it the power to determine the fate of South Africa in relation to every other Commonwealth state. Britain could arguably have saved South Africa from early isolation but chose not to do so. On the other hand, the United States may have successfully pressured South Africa into abandoning its developing nuclear relationship with Israel (*vide* Mills. 2000: 288). The Soviet Union's contribution was to weaken South Africa's relationship with the United States and particular European States by a combination of direct and surrogate military pressure, emanating from Cuba, the former East Germany and the former Czechoslovakia, among other states (*vide* {29}WS. 2001: 1-2), in the form of weapons, troops, technical experts, trainers and advisors. A consequence of the pressure against South Africa was America's policy of constructive engagement (*vide* Crocker. 1993: 75; *vide* Suzman. 1993: 269). In more recent years, the People's Republic of China also acted as a *third state* to successfully pressure post-*apartheid* South Africa to abandon diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favour of the PRC (Mills. 2000: 269).

The fact that the PRC is itself a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, and therefore a powerful and influential state in its own right, makes it more difficult for other third states to successfully exert any impact on its current bilateral relationship with South Africa. Therefore, South Africa, *in its relations with the PRC*, appears

relatively immune from third state pressures emanating from other UNSC Permanent Members. Nonetheless, the United States is certainly capable of influencing South Africa's relationship with the PRC. On this point, Paul Kennedy (1987: 535) comments as follows about the relative power of the United States:

*Because it has so much power for good or evil, because it is the linchpin of the western alliance system and the centre of the existing global economy, what it does **or does not do**, is so much more important than what any of the other Powers decides to do (Author's emphasis).*

The PRC is also capable of acting as a third state in terms of South Africa's bilateral relations with other states, including relations with the United States of America. For example, despite an expressed commitment to respect human rights, South Africa did not support the resolution introduced by the United States at the UN Human Rights Commission debate in Geneva, condemning human rights abuses in the People's Republic of China, because South Africa did not wish to compromise its developing relationship with China (*vide* Mills. 2000: 265).

Because the People's Republic of China, itself, qualifies as a third state for the purposes of this research, only the other four Permanent Members of the UN Security Council ought to have the potential to shape or affect some of China's own foreign policy decisions or concerns. In reality this would be rare. However, the United States does have this capability (Kim. 1998: 100; *vide* Kennedy. 1987: 535), particularly in the military and economic spheres. For example, in the wake of the Tiananmen incident of 4-5 June 1989 (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 587-589), US-led economic sanctions pushed the PRC into a brief period of isolation, thereby affecting its bilateral relations with many other states (*vide* Roy. 1998: 136). The United States, reportedly (DFA. 20000714), also successfully pressured Israel into cancelling an arrangement to equip PRC-owned Ilyushin-76 aircraft with the advanced *Phalcon* early warning radar system. In addition, the United States has applied consistent and sustained pressure on the PRC in regard to the latter's sale of advanced weapons to

perceived rogue states, including particular Middle Eastern states, with mixed success (Robertson and Shambaugh. 1997: 463-464). It is conceivable, nonetheless, that the close critical attention of this supremely powerful third state, the United States, has discouraged some sales of weapons and weapon technology, to prospective recipients, by the People's Republic of China (Johnston. 1998: 76).

Although the five UN Security Council Permanent Members have all been identified as obvious *third states* for the purposes of this research, in the context of SA foreign policy it is conceivable that states such as India might also qualify as *third states* capable of influencing South Africa's bilateral relations with other states.

6.2.2. Communications and transactions within external environments

The external communicational or transactional environments, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, include the multilateral and bilateral environments. These are the environments in which foreign policy takes place. Of course, the focus in this study is on bilateral and not multilateral foreign policy. Nevertheless, some attention will be paid to the role of multilateral foreign policy in so far as it identifies the major multilateral foreign policy interests of South Africa and the People's Republic of China.

6.2.2.1. Multilateral communicational environment

Since the demise of *apartheid*, which was itself a victim of a variety of international pressures, South Africa's diplomatic relationships have expanded and its membership of multilateral organisations within the international system has increased dramatically. Within the context of the multilateral environment, international organisations that are particularly important to South Africa, politically and economically, are the United Nations (UN) and its agencies, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Commonwealth, the Group of Seventy-seven (G-77), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and, reputedly, the Indian Ocean Rim

Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). It should be kept in mind that multilateral organisations such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth (Suzman, 1993: 54 and 264), the Organisation of African Unity and the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) (SA, 1995, *Profile 3 95*: 9) gave important support in bringing an end to *apartheid*.

South Africa's commitment to its immediate region and to the African continent has resulted in organisations such as SADC and the OAU becoming specially important vehicles for South Africa's multilateral objectives in Africa (SA, 2001, *Strategic plan 2001/2005*: 26). However, these organisations may also have tended to hobble South Africa's ability to take the lead in foreign policy matters by virtue of their organisational and political emphasis on consensus, solidarity and the concept of *Ubuntu*. Consequently, states such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and Swaziland, within the SADC context, or Sudan within the OAU context, have drawn no substantial pressure from South Africa that would effectively and publicly distance South Africa from human rights abuses in Zimbabwe, power-abuse and human rights abuses in Namibia (WS, 2001: 1-2), labour abuses in Swaziland (WS, 1996: 1), and religious intolerance and civil war in Sudan (WS, 2001: 1-2). SADC member states initially agreed that governments of member states that changed government through unconstitutional means (e.g. *coups d'etats*) would not be recognised by other member states. However, when such a situation arose in Lesotho, member states, including South Africa, chose the military option (*vide* Mills, 2000: 279; WS, 1998) rather than the more peaceful option of imposing sanctions on the illegal government that had come to power in Lesotho. South Africa and other SADC member states also did not wait for responses from either the OAU or the UN, before resorting to military intervention in Lesotho; and when the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo fell, several African states, including SADC countries, became involved (Mills, 2000: 278-279) in an opportunistic civil war that, at times, resembled imperialist ambitions.

The Commonwealth, of course, has a history of taking strong and effective stands against member states that are found wanting in terms of human rights and good

government. During the *apartheid* years, South Africa voluntarily left the Commonwealth (*vide* Suzman. 1993:54) to avoid expulsion, and suffered under a variety of sanctions measures that included social, economic, strategic and political isolation. Nigeria also had sanctions imposed after the legally elected government was deposed in a military *coup*. More recently, Pakistan and Fiji felt the weight of Commonwealth sanctions after their legally elected governments were deposed in *coups d'état*.

Unlike SADC and the OAU, the Commonwealth is composed of developed industrial states such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand and the world's largest democracy, India; all states that can generally be relied upon to take the lead in censuring member states that fall short of Commonwealth ideals that include good government, the rule of law and respect for human rights. South Africa's leaders have demonstrated a capacity to get elected to chair a number of international organisations but, nevertheless, have yet to display consistent and effective individual leadership (*vide* Mills. 2000: 278-280; *vide* {2}Fabricius. *The Star*. 7 July 2000: 15).

After the end of the Cold War some observers expressed doubts about the relevancy of the NAM which South Africa joined soon after the country's first post-*apartheid* elections in 1994. South Africa hosted the NAM in 1998 and, as Chair, has sought to find ways to direct the organisation's energies toward new goals that could best benefit the countries of the developing world which, as Paul Kennedy (1987: 393) noted more than a decade ago, is "... still economically dominated by white men ...". Unlike the United Nations and the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement is an inter-regional organisation with no white leaders. Although the People's Republic of China has observer status at NAM it is not a member. As Robertson and Shambaugh (1997: 407) have noted, "...China's membership policy (toward international organisations) has been its consistent refusal to join Third World organisations ...". This stance indicates the PRC's perception that Third World organisations, including NAM, with their usually wide ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, ideological and political disparities; their mixture of very poor, medium level and wealthier economies; and the often disparate objectives and priorities of their member states,

are probably too unwieldy and unstable to be effective except as potential voting blocs at the United Nations and in other multilateral forums. South Africa, too, appears to recognise some of the weaknesses in NAM, given its lack of success in re-shaping and re-focusing the organisation, hence the proposed formation of a G-South group of developing states (DTI. Undated. *Global Economic Strategy*: 8-10).

Post-apartheid South Africa, like the PRC, has stressed the importance of the United Nations (UN) in dealing particularly with the global impact of war, global peace-keeping needs, and support for the economic development of Africa, a continent that currently hosts the world's twenty-five poorest and least developed states (*vide*{14}. WS. 2001). South Africa has also embarked on a campaign for the restructuring of the United Nations with a view to making the organisation more representative of the interests of the developing world, particularly Africa. In this regard South Africa appears to aspire to a change in the structure of the UN Security Council representation and the closed shop veto powers of the five UN Security Council Permanent Members, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and the PRC; veto powers that were, ironically, originally introduced to reassure a cautious Stalin (Kennedy. 1987: 393). Other possible Permanent Members in an enlarged UN Security Council include Japan and Germany but South Africa and other countries such as Egypt, Nigeria and India all envisage an enlarged UN Security Council that would include developing states such as themselves. South Africa appears to be thinking in terms of a democratic Security Council in which all UN Security Council members will have equal powers. In contrast, the PRC is unlikely to want an enlarged number of UN Security Council Permanent Members ({2}2001. *Interview*), particularly those from the developing world, as such an enlargement would imply equal status with the PRC; and would make consensus more difficult to achieve.

6.2.2.2. Bilateral communicational environment

As has previously been alluded to, the bilateral environment, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, is the communicational or transactional environment in which foreign policy takes place; the environment

joining two domestic environments that have given rise to, and engaged in, a specific foreign policy linkage.

As reflected in chapters four and five *supra*, foreign policy is formulated and implemented by individuals, acting separately, collectively or collaboratively within an institutional *milieu* that is hierarchical and dynamic; a *milieu* that must constantly respond to external forces and influences with a view to protecting the integrity and stability of the core environment, which is the domestic or internal environment; a *milieu* that relies on effective leadership and decision making to advance the best foreign policy interests of the state.

The transactions and communications that take place in the bilateral environment include all authoritative foreign policy decisions and actions that contribute to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy; and that are coordinated through the Department or Ministry normally entrusted with the foreign affairs portfolio of government. In South Africa the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), and in the PRC the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) are responsible for the foreign affairs portfolio. However, as pointed out in Chapter five *supra*, other governmental ministries and departments, such as those responsible for economic and trade affairs, and also the military establishment, as well as other institutions, may also *initiate*, participate in, or *influence* the direction of, the formulation of foreign policy. Sometimes their impact and influence on foreign policy is due to their independent involvement and sometimes their impact is coordinated by the governmental institution responsible for foreign affairs.

6.2.2.3. Leadership and decision making

On the question of decision making and the way in which foreign policy is formulated and implemented by the South African leadership and the leadership of the PRC there appear to be vast, and sometimes surprising, differences in method, style and overall results. Despite the existence in South Africa of sophisticated Western-style democratic institutions of government, a developed legal system and a sophisticated

written Constitution and Bill of Rights (SA. 1996. *Constitution*: chapter two), foreign policy decision making is often *ad hoc*, unfocused, inconsistent, ineffective and unorthodox. Mills (2000: 298) described it as follows:

(South Africa's) ... foreign policy (under President Mandela and Foreign Minister Nzo) was at times weak, vacillating in its principles and lacking both in conceptual clarity and follow-through. There was too little process and too much personality ... (It was) ... a policy which was prone to bow to African sensitivities, eager to pursue party interests, and insufficiently geared to a clear understanding of the needs of both the South African economy and social development beyond just the solicitation of aid. It was, in a sense, rather like the foreign policy of old - royalist and elitist rather than informed by more popular sentiment and process.

The fact that neither of the two foreign ministers appointed since the ANC administration assumed power in 1994 was formally schooled in international foreign policy matters and professional diplomacy, may have contributed to the lack of professional orthodoxy; Foreign Minister Dlamini Zuma acknowledged her lack of diplomatic skills during an address to the SA Institute of International Affairs (Chetty. *The Sowetan*, 3 November 1999: 8). Another reason may be ascribed to the fact that the foreign service's most senior civil servant, the Director-General of Foreign Affairs, also has no professional diplomatic or foreign policy experience (Forrest. *Mail & Guardian*. 14-19 December 2001: 6). A third factor that bears noting is the profusion of ambassadors and other heads of mission that have been sent abroad to serve South Africa as senior diplomatic representatives and who also have had no professional foreign policy or diplomatic experience (Mills. 2000: 293). Normally, a lack of professional experience could be overcome, or at least counteracted, by the close-at-hand presence of professional advisors whose advice on diplomatic and foreign policy matters is at least digested and seriously considered before relevant foreign policy decisions are taken. However, in the light of current affirmative action policies (Chetty. *The Sowetan*, 3 November 1999: 8) that require questions of race

and gender to take precedence over questions of foreign policy and diplomatic experience, there appears to be little opportunity for leaders to benefit from such advice. As Mills (2000: 272) has noted, former Foreign Minister Nzo also perceived DFA as being “too white” and therefore untrustworthy. Consequently, South Africa’s foreign policy appears in some danger of being hobbled by an over-riding concern with race and gender at the expense of the greater diplomatic and national interest (*vide* Myburgh in *Sunday Independent*. 1 April 2001: 7).

Other factors which may hamper and harm South Africa’s ability to project effective foreign policies include a consolidation of power in regard to foreign policy decisions within the Presidency and the practical ineffectiveness and contrasting lack of power accorded to the Foreign Policy Parliamentary Portfolio Committee (*vide* Suttner in Mills. 2000: 276). For example, if the Portfolio Committee was afforded the opportunity to question and approve South Africa’s ambassadorial appointments prior to them taking up their foreign policy and diplomatic responsibilities, it is possible that the President’s selections for appointment would be more suited to the important diplomatic tasks ahead of them (*vide* Mills. 2000: 292). There are reportedly more than a dozen South African heads of mission under internal investigation for unprofessional conduct. DFA has even sought to appoint some heads of mission with questionable qualities of professional judgement, responsibility and honesty (*vide* Mills. 2000: 292; {2}SA. 1999: *Parliamentary media Briefing*).

Where the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry are concerned, the problem arises that where sycophants and party political loyalists serve their leaders as advisors, the only advice given will be supportive of the relevant leader’s own views; and where those views are wrong-headed or based on inadequate information, wrong foreign policy decisions will be taken. In such circumstances, even if the decision is correct in the larger sense, in that it attains the required objective, professional advice, if taken, might well have produced a more cost-effective result. As one journalist has written (Mthombothi. *Financial Mail*, 16 June, 2000: p. 16):

(Mbeki) ... needs much more robust and vigorous debate around

the Cabinet table, and people who will challenge him. That makes for better judgement and, thus, decision-making. Who knows, with more astute minds around him, the Zimbabwe and AIDS controversies, probably the two most embarrassing missteps of his presidency, may have been avoided.

It is due, in part, to the inexperience of South Africa's foreign policy and diplomatic leadership, particularly in the political echelon of power, that the People's Republic of China is consistently able to determine the direction and pace of its foreign policy relationship with South Africa (2001. *Interview*).

By contrast with South Africa's governmental and foreign policy institutions and the approach of South Africa's leaders, the PRC leadership, specifically Deng Xiaoping, showed itself willing to be pragmatic (Yang. 1995: 48) and effective rather than politically and ideologically hidebound (Whyte. 1995: 115). This was not always the case, however, and for some fifteen years, commencing in the early sixties (and encompassing the period of the *cultural revolution*), the PRC foreign service suffered the debilitating effects of policies that valued party loyalty above expertise (*vide* Lu. 1997: 47-52). However, Deng was able to focus on doing what was perceived to be economically, socially and strategically advantageous for the PRC and managed to satisfy the ideologues as well through the ingenious device of re-forming socialism to accommodate Chinese conditions. In this sense he modified ideology to support good policies in preference to introducing poor policies to accommodate ideology. As long ago as 1956, Deng Xiaoping had boldly argued against discrimination involving membership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Whyte: 1995: 114):

The difference between workers and office employees is now only a matter of a division of labour within the same class ... The vast majority of our intellectuals have now come over politically to the side of the working class ... what is the point, then, of classifying these social strata into two different categories?

As Whyte (1995: 115) has pointed out, Deng's ideas encapsulated the pragmatic view that the basis for evaluating and advancing individuals should focus on their contributions to society and not on their (ideological) thinking and political virtue.

What is important is how hard you work, how much special training you acquire, whether you introduce useful innovations, and whether you take on extra responsibilities. Later Deng's ideas on this issue were revealed in his less formal but more famous 1961 statement: "White cat, black cat, what does it matter as long as it catches mice?"

From the establishment of the PRC government in 1949, foreign policy was formulated at the highest level of political power. Major foreign policy decisions were made by Mao Zedong (Lu. 1997: 150) but, because of his lack of foreign affairs experience, he relied on the competent and experienced Zhou Enlai to manage and conduct the foreign affairs (Lu. 1997: 150) policies of the PRC. However, the dangers of cultivating too small a resource base of foreign policy expertise, particularly at the higher echelons of foreign policy decision making power, were effectively demonstrated after the incapacity and deaths of both Zhou and Mao because during the subsequent period, April 1976 to 1978 (Lu. 1997: 155),

Beijing's diplomacy lacked clear direction ... Beijing's foreign relations were put on auto pilot with the foreign affairs bureaucracies following ... previously established policy guidelines.

In the late eighties, during the era of Deng Xiaoping, it was made crystal clear that the apex of public policy decision making in the PRC resides within the cult of personality; and the individual who holds the supreme leadership position in the echelon of PRC political and military power, including power to formulate foreign policy. As Lu (1997: 8-9) explains,

... in the Chinese political system the ultimate power rests in the hands of a single paramount political leader. Foreign Affairs has always been one of the key areas where the ultimate decision making power is retained by the paramount leader. This paramount leader may or may not be the Chairman or General Secretary of the Party or State President, but most often he controls the military as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

According to Lu Ning (Lu. 1997: 9), "... the paramount leader and leadership nuclear circle wield the ultimate foreign policy decision making power in China as they can veto or ratify decisions made by the Politburo ...". The nuclear circle of power, in the broader sense, is the Standing Committee of the Politburo, with whom "... real foreign policy decision making power rests ...". (Lu. 1997: 9). Usually, the Standing Committee member having the most experience in the field of foreign policy, takes charge of the foreign affairs sector, as Head of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), the *Zhongyang Waishi Lingdao Xiaozu* (Lu. 1997: 10).

According to Lu (1997: 11-12), the FALSG, as part of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and, therefore, as an agency of the Communist Party of China,

*... supervises policy implementation and coordination of the foreign affairs sector ... (waishi kou) ... The LSG consists of key members of the Politburo Standing Committee and .. top bureaucrats of government and party foreign affairs agencies ... (and) ... also includes a senior member of the military ... However, this body is **NOT** a standing **institution** and has no permanent staff... The Foreign Affairs LSG ... plays a pivotal role in the decision making process (Author's emphasis).*

The inclusion of top bureaucrats of government is particularly significant and important because of the expertise, experience and *continuity* that they bring to the PRC public political decision making process, particularly in the realm of foreign

policy. In this regard it is interesting to note that PRC ambassadorial appointments are monitored by the PRC legislature (*vide* {1} 2001. *Interview*) and that the current PRC ambassador to South Africa is a professional diplomat with a professional knowledge of South Africa and Africa (*vide* {2} 2001. *Interview*). By contrast, neither South Africa's current Ambassador nor his designated successor, who was previously Ambassador to Denmark, are professional diplomats or have the benefit of long-standing expertise concerning the China region ({2} 2001. *Interview*). South Africa appears to have approached the PRC with a view to party-political interests, primarily those of the ANC and SACP, rather than as a destination for the professional promotion of foreign relations with one of the world's most powerful states. Lack of attention to a sustained long-term Mandarin-language training programme for SA diplomats serving in the PRC, the absence of any recognisable attempt to create a permanent and growing diplomatic team of sinologists or China-specialists, and tardiness in opening a Consulate-General in Shanghai, indicate a lack of awareness of China's importance ({3}2002. *Interview*), among SA foreign policy decision makers. The PRC is arguably too important for South Africa to conduct foreign policy in a manner that appears unprofessional and ill-prepared. Where the PRC is concerned, it can obviously be advantageous whenever its professional bureaucrats and ministry officials find themselves negotiating with South Africans who are unfamiliar with the China region and who appear more than willing to allow their Chinese hosts to guide them in their deliberations. The potential pitfalls awaiting some of South Africa's ministers, even when dealing with countries such as the United States, have reportedly been recognised by President Mbeki, himself (Mills. 2000: 284-285). Consequently, when negotiating with China it is essential for South Africa to utilise its available expertise (*vide* Gittings in *South China Sunday Morning Post*. 2 May 1993). As Laurence Brahm suggests ({1}1996: xiii), negotiating in China, without some attempt to acquire knowledge about the way in which the Chinese people approach the strategy of negotiation practice, "... is like walking into a mine-field without a map ..."

South Africa's President Mbeki, like the PRC leadership despite obvious contrasts in constitutional systems of government, has moved to develop his own leadership

nuclear circle (*vide Pretoria News*, 25 January, 2000: 19), in the form of the Presidency which, according to Parsons (1999: 96),

... includes administrative machinery to vet legislation coming from ministers before they have an opportunity to submit it to Cabinet. ... The South African President personally selects those surrounding him. That includes the deputy president (who need not be the party's deputy leader previously elected by the rank-and-file), ministers, senior officials and advisors.

As Mbeki's decision making powers extend to all public policy decisions, they also include decisions about important foreign policy matters, as confirmed by Foreign Minister Dlamini Zuma (DFA, 20001222: *Christmas Message Speech*), who said:

The President, myself, as Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Minister have spearheaded a series of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activities that have had a symbiotic benefit for South Africa, Africa and the developing world.

A crucial point to be kept in mind, however, is that all decision makers need good advice and information upon which to base their decisions (*vide Asiaweek*, 26 June 1998; 50). The quality of the advice will depend on the advisors; but the quality of the information will usually depend on the time available to acquire the necessary information and verify its accuracy. Wrong information or bad advice can lead to bad decisions (*vide the Sprouts in* {1}Rosenau, 1969: 50-51).

6.2.2.4. Contrasting world views: SA and the PRC

As previously alluded to, the non-domestic external environment, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis, comprises the bilateral and multilateral transactional environments; and the regional and international geographical environments. The transactional environments of a state are, in effect, a mirror image of that state's domestically-based world view. For

example, if the PRC leadership's world view perceives the United States or Japan as an enemy, or rival, then the transactional environments will reflect policies, emanating from within the domestic environment, that respond to this perception by seeking to combat the perceived threats posed by those states. PRC opposition to perceived American hegemony and the envisaged American Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system exemplify an important aspect of the PRC world view. Similarly, if South Africa's world view perceives other African states as potential allies, or as having a common enemy or rival, then South Africa's policies, as reflected in the transactional bilateral and multilateral environments, will be tailored accordingly.

As has already been argued, the diplomatic interaction between South Africa and the PRC takes place in the external environments of these states, in the realm of foreign policy. The way in which they relate to one another is determined in large measure by their respective views of the world (their external environments) and their respective places within that world (their respective self-images as well as the way in which, in terms of their own perceptions, the rest of the world regards them; and they regard one another). On the one hand, the PRC is a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and is therefore part of that select core group of supreme power within the international and multilateral environments; on the other hand, like South Africa, the PRC regards itself as a developing nation and is treated as such by South Africa and the rest of the world. In truth, however, as has previously been argued, the PRC is more than a developing state (*vide* Philip Snow in Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 316). As a member of the elite Security Council Permanent Member states, the PRC is also the only Permanent Member that is neither European nor American; and has no religious base traceable to Judeo-Christian roots.

South Africa and the PRC have shared the experience of *revolutionism*, or what the Chinese may term the struggle for national liberation (He. 1998: 393), albeit from vastly different perspectives. The revolutionary heroes of the PRC were very much leaders and innovators who burst onto the international scene with spectacular and heroic success, and accomplished their revolutionary goals without significant external alliances or assistance. South Africa's ANC and PAC revolutionaries, in

contrast, were remarkably unsuccessful in military terms (*vide* Suzman. 1993: 290), despite an abundance of foreign assistance. Nevertheless, years of close collaboration with revolutionary sponsors in the former USSR and the PRC, as well as other states, have left their impact on South Africa's leaders, and in this sense, both the PRC and South Africa appear to share a revolutionary bond which is more likely to surface during contact at the party political level (*vide* Randall. *The Sunday Independent*. 6 August 2000: 4).

South Africa's view of the world, and its place within the international environment, tends to be a projection of its own domestic environment, in which black underdevelopment is viewed as a consequence of white exploitation. For South Africa, the developed industrialised states of the North Atlantic Community (the United States, Canada, the European Union and certain non-EU member states of Western Europe) represent the privileged exploitative and predominantly "white" communities of the international environment (Australia and New Zealand might arguably also be included as part of this category) whereas all other states, including the PRC and South Africa, as part of the developing world or Third World (Kim. 1998: 152), belong to the exploited and predominantly "non-white" members of the international environment. This is not necessarily a *consciously* racist interpretation of the international environment by South Africa's leadership echelon but it is arguably an interpretation born of the racist experience.

Perhaps as a consequence of its own feeling of Chinese cultural superiority, and as a result of China's perceived historically-founded and internationally recognised status within the world, the PRC does not appear (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 312-313) to view the international environment from an ethnic or racial perspective. Instead, the PRC's focus, in line with its ideological base and historical experience, is on economic development and international inequities in this regard. The perception that the PRC does not regard Africa or Africans in racist terms may explain why Pretoria is reluctant to engage Beijing about human rights; because in the absence of racism, as far as South Africa is concerned, there are no human rights issues. As in the case of South Africa, the PRC's view of the international environment and its own

place in the world, is a projection of its domestic history and its domestic experience. Consequently, the developed industrialised states of the international environment still appear as the “cities” of the world whereas the under-developed and developing states of the external geographical environments are perceived as the “rural areas” of the world (De Crespigny. 1992: 260). This is no longer a predominantly military perspective of Mao’s “guerrilla theory of revolution” (De Crespigny. 1992: 260) but appears ever-increasingly to represent the PRC’s economic perspective of itself as a “rural” area that has become a large “town” and that is determined to become one of the world’s great and important “cities”.

With an annual economic growth rate in excess of seven percent, the PRC is developing at an impressive pace. At present the PRC has close to seven hundred cities and its agricultural land is diminishing (CASS.1999: 19-21) as a result of urbanisation, vast irrigation projects such as the Three Gorges Dam and structural readjustments in agriculture. It has been estimated that the PRC will face a shortfall of agricultural land amounting to 150 million *mu*, equivalent to 25 million acres or 10 million hectares (Tung. 1991: 243; Hanks. 1971: 1847), by 2010. This may explain why the PRC is currently exporting its workers and surplus goods to developing states and why it is purchasing vast tracts of agricultural land in some of these states, including South Africa. This view has credence in the light of an article by Yu Guoqing in a Chinese language publication (IWAAS. 2000: 17-24) that set out very clearly some of the achievements and intentions of the PRC Government, with regard to agricultural policies, in its relations with African states. There is clear acknowledgement, for example, that, a “basic characteristic” of economic aid is to make a profit (IWAAS 2000: 17) and that “...economic and political benefits are closely linked...” (IWAAS. 2000: 17). However, the PRC tended to move away from aid-programmes toward programmes of “...mutual benefit and cooperation...” (IWAAS. 2000: 19). For example, there are reportedly (IWAAS. 2000: 20) 23 projects on fishery with 13 African countries, utilising 233 fishing vessels and personnel of nearly 10 000, and producing 300 000 tons of fish and marine resources at a total value of US\$150 million per year. Another project, reportedly (IWAAS. 2000: 20-21) in Zambia, involves the leasing of some 667 hectares of farmland, including 630

hectares of arable land, for a period of 99 years, for the purpose of crop production and the breeding of livestock. All the management personnel are from the PRC. Another farming project, apparently north of Lusaka (IWAAS. 2000:20), concentrates on cattle, pig and poultry farming. The main intent of the PRC's agricultural policies in Africa is directly linked (IWAAS. 2000: 20) to its overall targets for economic development in the 21st Century. As Yu (IWAAS. 2000: 21) has stated,

... the fundamental aim of China's agricultural aid to Africa is to make it serve the medium and long-term purpose of China's economic construction, therefore it should be intended to strive after economic benefit and to put emphasis on long-term strategic tasks. Looking ahead to the 21st Century, China's usable natural resources are getting smaller in size, urging China to depend on the international market. It is known to all that Africa is a treasure house with ample natural resources. China should, on the one hand, make the most of its own resources, and on the other hand, utilise the resources in Africa.

An article in the English-language PRC Government newspaper, *China Daily* reported (Wu. 23-29 April, 2000: 1) that 401 PRC state-owned enterprises had been established in Africa as at the end of June 1999 with a committed investment of US \$671 million. The same article also stated that,

... high profitability awaits Chinese entrepreneurs (who) set up factories, open mines or energy joint ventures, or ...engage in grain production (in Africa).

Although the PRC is aiming to become a developed state, and despite professed continuing commitment to the developing world, the PRC remains focused on its own national interests of security, access to mineral and other natural resources (*vide* Huang. *People's Daily*. 20 February 2001), economic development, unification,

domestic and regional peace and stability, and ensuring for itself an internationally recognised leadership role within the international environment.

As previously alluded to, both South Africa and the PRC are major core states within their respective geographical regions (Cantori and Spiegel. 1970: 21 and 370-372) and both are members of a variety of multilateral organisations, often separately, sometimes coincidentally. South Africa's focus on the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and to a lesser extent, the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) reflects a commitment to Africa and non-white organisations of the Third World (*vide* Kim. 1998: 153), as does the interest in forming a proposed G-South group of states that could include states such as South Africa, Brazil, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Thailand (DTI. Undated. *Global Economic Strategy*: 8-10). As a strategically important country of the "South" (*vide* {3}2001: *treaties*), Algeria may also be a possible candidate for membership of the proposed G-South. In contrast, South Africa's membership of organisations such as the UN, the Commonwealth and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) reflects a more international view of the world, honed more by necessity than by preference, particularly in view of the international influence, and financial and technical contributions toward economic development, that those organisations have made, and can yet make, toward the economic advancement of Africa.

The focus of the PRC is in Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. The PRC, despite its developing status, is not a member of either NAM or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) although it does have observer status at both organisations. The PRC prefers to remain politically unencumbered and non-aligned or, as stated by Kong Minghui (IWAAS. 1998: 387),

...China does not enter into alliance with any big power or group of countries.

However, the PRC is a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) and the Shanghai Five Mechanism (DFA. 20010521), which reflects its abiding interests in, and concerns for, economic and security issues (*vide* Sun in *China Daily*. 6 July 1998). At the global international level, as has been mentioned previously, the PRC is a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and, as such, is one of the most powerful and influential states in the world. Consequently, South Africa is at a decided disadvantage in seeking to promote a foreign policy relationship with the PRC on the basis of equality, reciprocity and mutual respect.

6.3. Proposed world view foreign policy matrices: SA and the PRC

The purpose of a matrix is to provide origin or form (Hanks. 1971: 978). It may also act as a selection system (Hanks. 1971: 978). The envisaged matrices of the respective world views of South Africa and the People's Republic of China are therefore also intended to give origin or form to the respective foreign policies of these states through careful selection of factors that may enhance understanding of what drives their individual foreign policies; and may also serve to elucidate in what manner world view considerations are linked to foreign policy events and excitations in the external environments of states. Such matrices would also encapsulate useful summaries of what has thus far been explored. A basic foreign policy matrix would be divided in terms of the five (domestic plus four external) environments and would be expected to accommodate the four types of leadership or decision making relationships and the most relevant imperatives. By constructing a matrix that reflects as far as possible the salient aspects of a state's foreign policy imperatives, its main foreign policy decision makers, and the distinction between its perceived domestic, regional, bilateral and multilateral priorities, as well as an indication of its world view sensitivities and concerns, it is possible to discern the most advantageous way to approach South Africa's foreign policy relations with the PRC. Based on the research carried out thus far, a world view foreign policy matrix focusing on the three geographical environments, selected imperatives and crucial leadership relationships in respect of the People's Republic of China, would reflect the following data:

Figure 6/2 : PRC world view foreign policy matrix utilising geographical environments

PRC World View Foreign Policy Matrix		
Geographical environments	Leadership relationships (decision making)	Imperatives
DOMESTIC i. supremacy of CCP ii. economic reform iii. PLA modernisation iv. civil stability v. re-unification vi. Chinese socialism	i. governmental institutional a) Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo b) Central Military Commission ii. governmental individual a) Jiang Zemin b) CCP Standing Committee members	i. historical a) strong central government b) cycles of unification and disintegration ii. strategic iii. economic iv. social
REGIONAL i. security ii. peace iii. stability iv. PRC pre-eminence v. border states vi. Asia-Pacific vii. developing world viii. Confucian region	i. governmental institutional a) as per i. (a) and (b) above b) other regional governments ii. governmental individual a) as per ii. (a) and (b) above b) other regional leaders iii. non-governmental institutional a) foreign press/NGOs/parties iv. non-governmental individual a) regional activists/commentators	i. historical a) invasion/colonialism/war b) past greatness/regional dominance ii. strategic a) territorial disputes b) fear of US hegemony iii. social (cultural) a) middle kingdom perception
INTERNATIONAL i. globalisation concerns ii. multi-polarity versus uni-polar world order iii. communal rights iv. quest for recognition v. progress in science and technology vi Chinese Diaspora vii Chinese exiles viii non-alignment ix Chinese cultural primacy x middle kingdom	i. governmental institutional a) as per i. (a) and (b) above b) other governments ii. governmental individual a) as per ii. (a) and (b) above b) other foreign leaders iii. non-governmental institutional a) foreign press/NGOs/parties iv. non-governmental individual a) foreign activists/commentators b) Dalai Lama c) Chinese political dissidents in exile	i. economic a) developmental ii. strategic a) world order security iii. moral a) civilisational legitimacy iv. legal a) dependability v. historical a) historical inevitability vi. Social vii. political a) national interest viii. Science & technology

The PRC data compilation in respect of the bilateral and multilateral transactional environments is a continuation of the matrix depicted in figure 6/2, but for reasons of space and convenience is reflected hereunder in a separate matrix as figure 6/3.

Figure 6/3 : PRC world view foreign policy matrix utilising transactional environments

PRC World View Foreign Policy Matrix (continued)		
Transactional environments	Leadership relationships (decision making)	Imperatives
<p>BILATERAL</p> <p>i. PRC-South Africa</p>	<p>i. governmental institutional</p> <p>a) as per <i>International</i> above</p> <p>b) State Council</p> <p>c) MOFA/MOFTEC/MOD</p> <p>ii. governmental individual</p> <p>a) as per <i>International</i> above</p> <p>b) advisors</p> <p>c) MOFA/MOFTEC/MOD ministers/senior personnel</p> <p>iii. non-governmental institutional (peripheral role)</p> <p>a) as per <i>International</i> above</p> <p>iv. non-governmental individual (peripheral role)</p> <p>a) as per <i>International</i> above</p>	<p>i. historical /legal/moral</p> <p>a) five principles of peaceful coexistence</p> <p>ii. scientific & technological/strategic</p> <p>a) access to technology and energy/strategic resources</p> <p>iii. economic</p> <p>a) trade/FDI and economic development</p> <p>iv. social/legal/economic</p> <p>a) access to new employment opportunities, agricultural resources and markets</p> <p>b) <i>Guangxi/</i> connections</p> <p>c) focus on bilateral agreements</p> <p>v. political/strategic/historical</p> <p>a) isolation of Taiwan</p> <p>b) defence of sovereignty</p>
<p>MULTILATERAL</p> <p>i. UNSC P/Member</p> <p>ii. WTO aspirant member</p> <p>iii APEC member</p> <p>iv. NAM observer</p> <p>v. Shanghai five member</p> <p>vi. ASEAN observer</p> <p>vii China-Africa Conference convenor</p>	<p>i. governmental institutional</p> <p>a) as per <i>Bilateral</i> above</p> <p>b) International institutions</p> <p>ii. governmental individual</p> <p>a) as per <i>Bilateral</i> above</p> <p>iii. non-governmental Institutional; and</p> <p>iv. non-governmental individual</p> <p>a) both as per <i>Bilateral</i> above</p>	<p>i. political/strategic/historical</p> <p>a) security</p> <p>b) leadership/prestige/respect</p> <p>ii. economic/social</p> <p>a) development</p> <p>b) <i>Guangxi/</i> connections</p> <p>c) modernisation needs</p> <p>iii. historical/strategic</p> <p>a) isolation of Taiwan</p>

The foreign policy matrices in respect of South Africa are depicted by figures 6/4 and 6/5 *infra*.

Figure 6/4 : SA world view foreign policy matrix utilising geographical environments

SA World View Foreign Policy Matrix		
Geographical environments	Leadership relationships (decision making)	Imperatives
DOMESTIC i. preoccupation with race ii. black empowerment iii. economic development iv. centralisation of political power v. crime problem vi. AIDS problem	i. governmental institutional a) ANC/SACP/COSATU b) The Presidency c) Cabinet d) parliament e) judiciary ii. governmental individual a) Thabo Mbeki and advisors iii. non-governmental institutional a) opposition parties/press/NGOs b) private business sector iv. non-governmental individual a) Nelson Mandela b) Desmond Tutu c) activists/commentators	i. historical/economic/legal a) <i>apartheid</i> /racism/slavery b) colonialism/ <i>revolutionism</i> c) democratisation ii. scientific & technological/economic/strategic a) economic under-development b) security concerns iii moral/legal/social/historical/political a) human rights concerns b) racial representativeness
REGIONAL i. African commonality ii. collective security iii. common enemies iv. African region v. developing world vi. South-South region vii. Indian Ocean rim viii. G-8 of the South	i. governmental institutional a) as per i. (a), (b) and (c) above b) other regional governments ii. governmental individual a) as per ii. (a), (b) and (c) above b) other regional leaders iii. non-governmental institutional a) regional press/NGOs/parties iv. non-governmental individual a) regional activists/commentators	i. historical/social/economic a) racism/slavery b) colonialism/ <i>revolutionism</i> ii. strategic a) regional multilateral approach iii. social a) <i>ubuntu</i> / poverty/disease iv. Political/economic/social a) regional dominance b) economic exploitation
INTERNATIONAL i. African marginalisation ii. access to developmental resources (continued on next page)	i. governmental institutional a) as per i. (a), (b) and (c) above b) other governments (continued on next page)	i. economic a) developmental (continued on next page)

SA World View Foreign Policy Matrix (<i>Figure 6.5</i> continued)		
Transactional environments	Leadership relationships (decision making)	Imperatives
MULTILATERAL i. SADC ii. OAU iii. Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) iv. Commonwealth v. NAM vi. UN vii. Third World causes viii. collective decision-making ix. relative anonymity x. resentment of the success of developed states xi. WTO	i. governmental institutional a) as per <i>Bilateral</i> above b) international institutions ii. governmental individual a) as per <i>Bilateral</i> above iii. non-governmental institutional; and iv. non-governmental individual a) as per <i>Bilateral</i> above	i. political/strategic/social/economic/historical/moral a) security b) wealth creation c) African recognition d) consensus politics e) peace and stability ii. political/economic a) African empowerment iii. strategic/political a) UN re-structuring b) opposition to American unilateralism iv. scientific & technological/legal

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the peripheral influences on foreign policy, more specifically the foreign policies of South Africa (SA) and the People's Republic of China (PRC), within the external geographical and communicational environments. It has sought to identify the major regional interests and concerns of SA and the PRC and has identified some of the individuals and institutional entities within the wider international system that may conceivably influence the foreign policies of these states. The concept, characteristics and role of the *third state* have also been articulated and explained in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model. The roles of the transactional and communicational environments, the bilateral and multilateral environments, have been more clearly articulated and explained in terms of their peripheral influence and impact on foreign policy; and the leadership characteristics that motivate foreign policy decision making in SA and the

PRC, and find expression in the bilateral and multilateral environments, have also been explored.

Finally, this chapter has sought to explain and articulate the role of world view foreign policy matrices that, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, may reflect, as far as possible, those factors that conceivably affect the formulation and implementation of a state's foreign policy, including the foreign policy decision making acumen of its leaders. Only a few of the more fundamental factors, influences and imperatives that may affect the foreign policies of these states have been included and are not intended or assumed to be a comprehensive list encompassing all possibilities. However, they are considered sufficient for the purpose of this policy analysis and may also serve as a guide for further, more comprehensive, research not only on the subject of South African-Chinese foreign relations but also in the field of foreign policy analysis in general. It now remains, in the next chapter of this research paper, to begin the task of discerning, from among a range of alternatives, the most advantageous way to serve the best interests of South Africa's bilateral foreign policy relationship with the PRC.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CHOOSING THE “BEST” ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

7.1. Introduction

This chapter will consider some of the implications involved in planning and attempting to anticipate foreign policy needs and requirements. It will also examine a variety of foreign policy approaches that focus on concepts such as national interest, ideology, morality and constructive engagement; and will consider the alternative between a standardised generic approach and a country-specific approach to foreign policy. Furthermore, it will contrast the advantages and disadvantages of a regional approach to foreign policy as opposed to an independent domestic approach. This chapter will examine the current status of South Africa’s foreign policy relations with the People’s Republic of China. It will explore foreign policy options and alternative foreign policy approaches that are available to South Africa’s foreign policy decision makers and influencers of foreign policy, both generally and specifically. It will also advance arguments in support of the perceived *best* alternative approach to the conduct of relations with the People’s Republic of China, with due regard to the information reflected by the respective world view matrices of the two states. Finally, this chapter will consider the anticipated consequences of specific policy choices with regard to South Africa’s bilateral foreign policy relations with the People’s Republic of China.

7.2. Planning limitations in regard to foreign policy and the need for options

In the declining years of the *apartheid* era South Africa’s foreign policy had been reactive in terms of the attempts of the government of the day to counter economic, political and social sanctions and combat anti-*apartheid* rhetoric from politicians, activists, academics and journalists. It had also been proactive in attempting to

establish an environment that would make the inevitable demise of *apartheid* as painless and peaceful as possible. The relative clarity of foreign policy objectives was due, in no small measure, to the paucity of high priority foreign and domestic public policy issues. *Apartheid* was *the* issue. There was simply nothing else, in terms of policy, that could possibly take up so much attention. The only questions that required answers were *how* and *when*? How could the transition from *apartheid* take place and when?

In contrast, the years since the democratic elections of April 1994 have been filled by a plethora of new domestic policies aimed at ending all vestiges of the impact of the *apartheid* years, including economic, political, social, cultural and legal disparities and inequalities. Foreign policy, as public policy, has not escaped the impact of these changes. A consequence of change is that South African foreign policy has sometimes become detached from the pursuit of diplomacy and the world of foreign policy. For example, the *practical* aspects of tourism promotion (DFA. 2000: 14) and sustainable development (DFA. 2000: 12) have begun to displace what ought to have been a *facilitatory* role on the part of South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs.

South Africa's foreign policy decision makers periodically appear to ignore the fact that foreign policy, because of the enormous number of players in the international environment, and the infinite number of variables affecting any individual state in relation to all others political entities, means that *foreign policy* cannot easily be subjected to five and ten year plans. Although foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy and although it also qualifies as public policy it is certainly *not* domestic policy. Foreign policy is about alternative choices and courses of action *outside* the domestic environment; it is about predictability in terms of the rational decision maker's responses and may also be about educated guesses concerning the irrational decision maker's responses; it is about dependability and consistency in terms of diplomatic and international legal norms. Foreign policy is also usually relatively short-term in respect of its articulation and formulation, although its effect may have long-term consequences. In this respect, its implementation may endure for several decades, as in the case of the Cold War, United States isolation of Cuba

(38}WS. 1997: 3-5), India's policy toward *apartheid* South Africa (41}WS. 1999: 1) or the bilateral relationship between China and *apartheid* South Africa (*vide* 40}WS. 1972: 5 and 42}WS. 1998: 1). However, foreign policy also needs to allow for flexibility and change when such change appears necessary. Lamentably, foreign policy outcomes are more often uncertain, and can never aspire to be more than highly probable in terms of their anticipated success.

Consequently, South Africa needs to be constantly aware of the need for foreign policy options and alternatives so that decisions can be made relatively quickly and with maximum beneficial results; so that policies will be advantageous for South Africa to the point where they can either be terminated when major disadvantages appear likely or modified to ensure that advantages continue. There is also no conceivable reason why bilateral agreements and arrangements should be entered into, or continued, if they do not promise the likelihood of substantial material or diplomatic benefits for South Africa and thereby contribute to making life "good" for the people of South Africa.

In the broadest sense, the purpose of entering into a foreign policy relationship with another state is to enhance a state's own position within the international environment; either for security reasons or for economic advantage. If ideology or like-minded opinions over human rights or religious issues, or "friendships" were the over-riding determinants of diplomatic relationships, the United States and the PRC may never have established diplomatic relations with one another. South Africa, too, was probably driven less by "friendship" than by economic concerns (the certain loss of consular representation in Hong Kong and the certain loss of landing rights in Hong Kong for South African Airways) when it switched its diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the PRC (1996: *Interview*).

Despite difficulties in planning for actions and policies in a dynamic and constantly changing environment, some medium and long-term foreign policy planning is necessary. It cannot be dispensed with entirely. Clearly there needs to be medium and long-term planning in terms of the budgets and resources needed to be able to

conduct normal diplomatic and foreign policy functions; and there needs to be preparation and planning in terms of the deployment and utilisation of these resources. There will probably also need to be planning in terms of the implementation of known foreign policy objectives; and, naturally, such policy implementation planning would need to be accomplished in accordance with the financial, human and material resources that are available. However, long-term foreign policy planning, in the context of South African bilateral foreign policy, would probably be no more certain than an educated guess or a hopeful wish. The Director General of South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs is not unaware of some of the difficulties (DFA. 2000: 6), as indicated by his statement that,

... not all goals lend themselves to specific time frames as there are variables often beyond our influence which makes it difficult to work within set time frames.

The DFA Strategic plan 2000-2005 is intended to be a planning document and lists five "key strategic (domestic) priorities" (SA. 2001: 9) that South Africa's foreign policy is intended to support and that "... inform and direct the work of the Department of Foreign Affairs ..." (SA. 2001: 9). They are as follows:

- speeding up delivery of basic needs and developing human resources;
- building the economy and creating jobs;
- combating crime and corruption;
- transforming the state; and
- building a better Africa and a better world.

Clearly, many of these objectives (SA. 2001: 9) fall within the province of other government departments, such as the Department of Justice and the South African Police Services; or the Department of Labour and the Department of Trade and Industry; or the Department of Education. Surprisingly, particularly as a traditional function of practically any foreign service is to *protect and defend* the sovereignty and integrity of the state, DFA is expected to assist in the *transformation* (SA.

2001: 9) of South Africa. The more traditional function is, in fact, specifically mentioned ({{1}}SA. 2001: 18) as one of DFA's intended "priorities, strategies and activities" ({{1}}SA. 2001: 11). It would be useful to know what is intended by the concept of *a better world* ({{1}}SA. 2001: 9) as this would undoubtedly depend on the respective world views of the architects involved. Finally, it might be seen as presumptuous of South Africa to assume the role of building a "...better Africa .." ({{1}}SA. 2001: 9) without specific reference to the other states of Africa, who might also expect to be consulted in such an endeavour. If the United States were to declare its intention to create a better world as a matter of US foreign policy doctrine, it might be accused of imperialism and hegemonic pursuits. After all, the United States is a global super power. Consequently, for South Africa to aspire to such a lofty foreign policy pursuit might merely serve to highlight perceptions of an over-reaching South African ambition against the background of limited capacity. Few countries, if any, can realistically plan to *individually* change the African continent or the world. At best the individual states of the international environment, including South Africa, may plan to do so *collectively*, as acknowledged by Foreign Minister Dlamini Zuma in her opening remarks contained in the *Minister's Forward to the Strategic Plan 2000-2005* ({{1}}SA. 2001: 3). The question also arises, if South Africa aspires to build a better Africa, how may the achievement of such an objective contribute to making life good for the people and citizens of South Africa?

Although DFA has made a valiant effort to develop a five year foreign policy plan it would appear that it has been driven as much by the perceived need to *plan* as by the need to *achieve* foreign policy results. In some respects the DFA strategic plan is a plan about planning. For example, in regard to the "operationalisation" of the African Renaissance, the *Strategic Plan 2000-2005* declares ({{1}}SA. 2001: 10) that "...South Africa ... is in the process of elaborating a programme of action for its practical implementation ..."

DFA promotes a *vision* ({{1}}SA. 2001: 8) that declares "South Africa shall strive for peace, stability, democracy and development in an African continent ..." without also declaring what DFA intends to do for South Africa; describes its *mission* ({{1}}SA.

2001: 8) without clarifying how it intends to serve South African citizens abroad; and also promotes *values* (SA. 2001: 8) such as “loyalty” without specifying what is meant by loyalty. The danger of using words carelessly is that they could be misinterpreted.

In terms of the *DFA Strategic Plan 2000-2001* (SA. 2001: 10),

... the Department of Foreign Affairs engaged in an extensive strategic planning process to ensure that its policies, programmes and activities promote South Africa's national interests internationally. This process culminated in the adoption of a cluster of four high-level objectives with eighteen elements, which form the basis of the organisation's strategies, activities and outputs. These priorities have been arranged according to four clusters (calabashes) ... The calabashes are the following: Security, Stability, Development (economic and social) and Cooperation (author's emphasis in bold).

A major shortcoming of the five and ten year economic plans of the former Soviet community (*vide* WS. 1992: 1-2) was that the plans became ends in themselves; planning tended to take up so much time that opportunities for actual achievement in terms of economic and social progress became casualties of the planning process. Unfortunately the *apparatchiks* (*vide* paragraph 1.6 *supra*; *vide* Myburgh in *Sunday Independent*. 1 April 2001: 7) of the new South African foreign policy *milieu*, with relatively limited experience in diplomacy and foreign policy, have tended to ignore the lessons of Soviet history by over-managing to a degree where the process has become a goal in itself. As Henry Kissinger observed decades ago (Kissinger in Rosenau. 1969: 263-264),

... bureaucracy becomes an obstacle when what it defines as routine does not address the most significant range of issues or when its prescribed mode of action proves irrelevant to the problem. When this occurs, the bureaucracy absorbs the

energies of top executives in reconciling what is expected with what happens; the analysis of where one is overwhelms the consideration of where one should be going. Serving the machine becomes a more absorbing occupation than defining its purpose.

Consider, then, the implementation and monitoring process as set out in the DFA *Strategic plan 2000-2005* (SA. 2001: 36-37), which is described as follows:

... the implementation of the strategic plan and government foreign policy and the monitoring of these takes place at three levels. At the political level, the Minister and Deputy Minister and the Director-General monitor the implementation of policy and the strategic plan by Ambassadors and Missions abroad and by senior officials of the Department. At the next level, Branches of the Department and the Programme Managers at Chief Director level determine regional priorities and objectives, which are aligned to the Department's strategic plan and priorities. At the third level, Directorates and Missions abroad implement business plans, which are country and region-specific. This operational level monitors implementation performance through a system of quarterly reports to Head Office on progress, supported by weekly and regular interaction and reports on the substance of the set objectives. The monitoring of progress is further enhanced by the following systems:

- *Head Office Business Unit business plans and quarterly reports;*
- *Mission business plans and quarterly reports;*
- *Six-monthly reviews of the Operating Environment and priorities;*
- *Performance Management System at all levels;*
- *Departmental in-house six monthly annual strategic review; and*
- *Management Consultancy Unit which monitors and improves mission performance;*

These systems are then integrated and coordinated by a process involving Departmental Management Committees to ensure what has been termed "...a coherent and focused approach ..." (SA. 2001: 36-37).

One might ask, when do South Africa's diplomats have an opportunity in their busy days of standardised managerial report-writing, report-reading and attendance at meetings, to give attention to the South African missions abroad that look to them for support; to give attention to the missions of their host countries stationed in South Africa; to attend to their many diplomatic duties; to meet with their colleagues in other government departments to discuss issues of common diplomatic concern; and to attend to the many urgent matters, sometimes of crisis proportion, pertaining to their respective countries of responsibility, particularly when events occur that could not realistically have been planned for or anticipated. This situation is equally frustrating to South Africa's diplomats abroad (2001. *Interview*). One has only to consider incidents involving the kidnapping of South African citizens abroad (*vide* WS. 2000. Donaldson in *The Sunday Times*. 20 August 2000), or an outbreak of rebellion in a neighbouring state, or a natural disaster in a neighbouring state, the hijacking of an airliner, or the assassination of a world leader, to appreciate that these are not situations that can be anticipated in the deliberations of a five year plan. In the realm of foreign policy, opportunities for effective long-term planning are quite limited. At best they may lead to no more than hopeful wishes or educated guesses.

As alluded to previously, foreign policy may take a variety of forms, some realistic and some idealistic. However, in seeking the most advantageous base, whether philosophical or practical, upon which to premise its general approach to foreign policy, South Africa's options are probably no more and no less than those available to other states of the international environment. Regardless of differences, though, each state, including South Africa, may ultimately be expected to respond to its own peculiar needs and circumstances; an observation that is in line with the view expressed by Schlesinger (1986: 51) that,

... *the aim (of foreign policy) is the same for all states - the*

protection of national integrity and (national) interest. But the manner in which a state conceives and conducts its foreign policy is greatly affected by national peculiarities.

This is also the premise upon which the PRC bases its public policies, which would logically include foreign policy; the premise that national or domestic circumstances and *characteristics* (*vide* CPC. 1997: 9) must be taken into account when formulating policy.

7.3. Current status of South Africa's bilateral relationship with the PRC

The current status of South Africa's foreign policy relationship with the People's Republic of China must necessarily focus on the practical achievements, advantages and disadvantages, and existing problems and benefits, that have accrued to one or both parties during their relatively short practical foreign policy relationship since 1992 and more recent diplomatic relationship which commenced on 1 January, 1998.

By the end of February 2001, South Africa and the PRC had entered into twenty-two bilateral agreements (*{2} SA. 2001: treaties*), twenty-one of which were signed after the decision to establish diplomatic relations between the two states. These agreements may be categorised as four Exchanges of Notes, three Memoranda of Understanding, twelve Agreements, one Letter of Intent, one Joint Communique and one Declaration (The Pretoria Declaration). During the first year of this new diplomatic relationship (1998) only one agreement, an Exchange of Notes regarding funding of a low cost housing project, took place (*{2} SA. 2001: treaties*). During the following year (1999) six agreements were signed and during the State Visit of PRC President, Jiang Zemin, during 2000, seven agreements were signed on one day. In total, ten agreements were signed in the year 2000 (*{2} SA. 2001: treaties*). However, as has been pointed out (*{3} 2002. Interview*), the Chinese do not necessarily sign agreements in order to implement them immediately but regard them as frameworks for future action. It is therefore largely up to South Africa to ensure that implementation takes place.

During the period 1992 to 1997 total annual trade volume grew from US\$14 million to US\$1.4 billion dollars. During the three years of the new diplomatic relationship from January 1998 to December 2000, SA-PRC annual total trade volume grew to US\$1.6 billion. In 1999 the PRC was South Africa's 20th most important export market; one year later, in 2000, the PRC was South Africa's 10th most lucrative export market (DFA. 2001 *Background*: 21). However, although trade growth during the almost ten-year SA-PRC foreign policy relationship has been positive, there are also aspects of the relationship that have exhibited some difficulties. For example, despite repeated attempts by South Africa to try and obtain an Approved Destination Status (ADS) tourism agreement, the PRC has steadfastly stalled on this issue (2001. *Interview*). The proposed ADS Agreement would open South Africa as an approved travel destination for tour groups comprising up to ten thousand (2002. *Interview*) PRC nationals during the first year of implementation. By the end of December 2000, ADS approval had already been granted to a number of other countries by the PRC, none of which was in Africa (2001. *Interview*). There is some hope in this direction, however, as the Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development, agreed to by the PRC and African participating states, including South Africa, during the China-Africa Conference of October 2000, contained the following statement (DFA. 2001 *Background*: 25):

*The Ministers acknowledge that tourism is an important activity
... they agree to cooperate in promoting tourism and undertake to
encourage investment in the development of tourism infrastructure
and capacity.*

It is essential, however, that if ADS is granted to South Africa, it should be implemented for mutual benefit and that the South African tourism industry should be seen to benefit from such a concession.

Another sticking point in the SA-PRC relationship is on the question of agricultural products. Although South African agricultural products are available in the European

and American markets the Chinese have tended to be cautious in regard to South African agricultural products entering their market ({{3}} 2002. *Interview*). There has been limited success in the export of live game animals to the PRC as well as some agricultural stock such as *Boer* goats (*Citizen*. 28 June 2000). Outbreaks of animal and plant diseases in South Africa, although contained and reportedly of no threat to potential export markets, including the PRC, have also been an obstacle in attempts to improve agricultural trade between the two states ({{3}} 2002. *Interview*). The unwillingness of the PRC to take into account positive European and American responses (to SA agricultural products) has been an added source of frustration for SA agricultural exporters ({{2}} 2001. *Interview*). The South African agricultural bureaucracy has reportedly ({{3}}2002. *Interview*) also been at fault. Significantly, ignorance of the PRC cultural and operational *milieu*, on the part of both the South African public and private sectors, has resulted in lost agricultural opportunities for South Africa, particularly in the ostrich industry ({{2}}2001. *Interview*). After six years, and the benefit of South African expertise and fertilised eggs from South Africa, the PRC today has a larger ostrich population than South Africa ({{2}}2001. *Interview*).

During October 2000 the first China-Africa Conference, the brainchild of PRC President Jiang Zemin, took place in Beijing. South Africa was one of a large number of African countries invited to participate and most African delegations were led at the level of foreign minister, including South Africa's delegation. South Africa's Minister of Trade and Industry and the Director-General of Foreign Affairs also participated. The President of Togo, the President of Algeria and the President of Zambia also attended the conference, the only Heads of State invited to attend ({{2}}2001. *Interview*).

On the one hand, the conference provided an opportunity for the PRC to display its solidarity with and support for Africa ({{2}} 2001. *Interview*); on the other hand, it threatened to create the impression of China holding court over its lesser African minions ({{2}}2001. *Interview*; {{3}} 2002. *Interview*) ; including those who helped the PRC become a Permanent member of the UN Security Council and who would no doubt be ready to defeat any unpleasant censure of the PRC's human rights record,

during deliberations at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. From the PRC perspective, African states are seen as an increasingly important potential reservoir of support to counter perceived United States hegemony (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 293) and to support the resource needs of the growing PRC economy.

Africa also had an opportunity to derive some benefit from the China-Africa Conference. However, the PRC had always had the advantage of being able to speak with a single voice whereas the African states were confronted by the disadvantage of having to compress the aspirations and needs of African states having different languages and colonial experiences, different religions, different economies and different political and social structures, into a common African endeavour ({{2} 2001. *Interview*). In this daunting undertaking the African delegations sought to impress upon the Chinese the need for a substantive and mutually beneficial relationship between the PRC and African states to be defined in the two resulting conference documents ({{3}2002. *Interview*; {{2}2001. *Interview*), the Beijing Declaration and the Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development (DFA. 2001 *Background*: 25).

Although the China-Africa Conference was essentially a hybrid bilateral-multilateral aspect of diplomacy and foreign policy it also holds important bilateral implications for South Africa in that the conference represented an invaluable opportunity to present and project the envisaged *African Renaissance* ({{2}2001. *Interview*). This was also an opportunity to advance the idea of a mutually beneficial trade regime involving the PRC and African states, including South Africa, and to address problems involving the dumping of PRC goods, arms trafficking in areas of conflict, illegal immigration, international crime and traffic in narcotics (DFA. 2001 *Background*: 26) and environmental concerns.

The more promising aspect of the SA-PRC relationship, however, resides in the substance of the Pretoria Declaration, entered into on 25 April 2000 ({{2}SA. 2001: *treaties*), during the PRC President's visit to South Africa, which articulated the concept of a South Africa-PRC Binational Commission that would be established to

take the bilateral relationship between the two states forward in a positive and substantive manner. The Pretoria Declaration is based upon the Five Principles of Sino-African Relations (DFA. 2001 *Background*: 30) which are as follows:

- Sincere Friendship;
- Equality and Sovereignty;
- Common Development on the basis of Mutual Benefit;
- Increased Consultation and Cooperation in International Affairs; and
- Cooperation in the Establishment of a New International Political and Economic Order.

In terms of the Pretoria Declaration, South Africa again felt compelled to assure a seemingly distrustful PRC (DFA. 2001 *Background*: 30-31) that “...there is but one China in the world and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China ...” and, in exchange, received the assurance of the PRC President’s “... appreciation for the noble ideals embodied in the philosophy of the African Renaissance...” On a more substantive note, the Pretoria Declaration also formalised the following undertakings (DFA. 2001 *Background*: 30-31) on the part of South Africa and the PRC:

Firstly, the establishment of a “... high level Bi-National Commission ...” that would meet regularly and would aim to “...guide and coordinate all government-to-government relations between South Africa and China, and to consult on matters of mutual interest in the bilateral and multilateral spheres ...” ; Secondly, South Africa and the PRC agreed “... within the context of South-South cooperation ... to endeavour to advance their economic relationship “... by removing obstacles that impede negatively on bilateral trade and investment, and service and commercial relations ...”. The two states also agreed to support closer cooperation in the development of natural resources, “...especially in the areas of mining and manufacturing ...”; Thirdly, the parties agreed to cooperate “...constructively and effectively ...” to promote their new relationship “... on the basis of equality and mutual benefit ...” by supporting Africa’s efforts to seek peace, stability and development and by promoting the continent’s interests through multilateral

organisations such as the United Nations and its agencies, and the Group of 77 (G-77) plus China. Fourthly, South Africa and the PRC agreed to support one another,

... in efforts to create a new international political and economic order... (predicated upon the mutual assumptions that) ... the diversity of the world should be respected; the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries should be upheld; no country should dominate others; the negative effects of globalisation - especially on developing nations - should be reduced and restricted; and harmony, democracy, justice and equality in international relations should be actively pursued and fully promoted (DFA. 2001. *Background*: 30-31).

The terms of the Pretoria Declaration, apart from specific commitments such as the status of Taiwan, are open to subjective interpretation by either side. Nevertheless, if the spirit of the agreement is upheld there are obvious opportunities for both sides. South Africa, for example, may hope to pursue the request for ADS status on the basis of the anticipated removal of obstacles that impede negatively on bilateral ... service and commercial considerations; and may also hope to remove obstacles concerning agricultural exports to the PRC (2001. *Interview*)

The PRC having hosted the China-Africa Conference in Beijing, it might be prudent for South Africa to consider hosting the first Binational Commission (BNC) in South Africa as this would allow South Africa to influence the future direction of this bilateral mechanism, in terms of substance and quantifiable results. Although the concept of a South African-PRC Binational Commission was initially proposed by the Chinese, their motivation may also have had to do with a quest for recognition on equal terms with other countries that operate binational commissions with South Africa, such as the United States (2001. *Interview*). The PRC, in fact, has little experience in the functional operation of binational commissions (2001. *Interview*) and it would therefore be essential for South Africa to ensure that effective interaction takes place between the two countries at the first meeting of the SA-PRC

BNC. It would also be cheaper, as South Africa's various Cabinet ministers, and their numerous advisors and officials involved in these discussions (2001. *Interview*), would not need to travel to the PRC until such time as a follow-up meeting is held, by which time there would be clarity on exactly which Ministers are likely to be involved as well as the preferred size of their respective delegations.

Despite much progress in the SA-PRC relationship, however, South Africa cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that the PRC has its own interests to consider and that this very powerful and influential state is also in competition with South Africa. For example, South African companies and individuals are as vulnerable to copyright infringement and theft of intellectual property rights by PRC citizens and PRC companies as are the states and citizens of the developed world (2001. *Interview*). However, South Africa's major vulnerability, as a developing African country, is the vulnerability of allowing its natural resources to be exploited in a manner that, in the long term, may be detrimental to the country's environment and its economy. South Africa should be wary of selling land to a state that does not recognise the right to private ownership of land (Liu. *China Daily*. 27 September-3 October 1998: 7); and should take care that foreign mining, farming, forestry and fishing activities meet its own resources and environmental needs. On the question of trade, South Africa needs to ensure that products emanating from the PRC meet stringent safety and quality control requirements. These are all concerns that should be properly addressed by means of agreements and diplomatic mechanisms such as the Binational Commission. On the question of how best to approach the SA-PRC bilateral relationship at the strategic policy level, however, one needs to look at what choices and opportunities are available.

7.4. Available foreign policy choices

South Africa, like most other states of the international environment, has a number of foreign policy choices. South Africa might, for example, consider adopting a generic approach that is uniquely South African and which can be universally applied in its foreign policy relations with all other states, separately or collectively. It might also

be feasible to think in terms of such an approach that would only apply in regard to regional and multilateral relationships. There is also the question of whether to premise foreign policy on realistic national interest considerations or on ideological or idealistic human rights considerations. Furthermore, there is the realistic idealistic hybrid alternative approach of constructive engagement. In addition, South Africa might consider whether to adopt an idealistic approach in regard to regional and multilateral issues and a more pragmatic and realistic approach in regard to bilateral issues. Finally, South Africa might wish to pursue an individual-state foreign policy approach which depends primarily on the issues and circumstances and personalities of the moment.

7.4.1. Generic global foreign policy formula

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is probably the best-known exponent of this type of approach to foreign policy. The five principles of peaceful coexistence which have formed the basis of all PRC bilateral foreign policy relationships since first enunciated in 1955 (PRC, 1999) set clear and logical parameters whereby PRC leaders may conduct, and bureaucrats may implement, foreign policy. The qualities of consistency and predictability and dependability are natural by-products of this approach.

Because the People's Republic of China developed and implemented the five principles of peaceful coexistence almost five decades ago, the changing nature of the international environment may make it difficult for the PRC to continue functioning as it would like to do without re-thinking some of these principles. For example, as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council the PRC may need to fill an active military role either in a peacekeeping situation or in support of a UN-sponsored military campaign against an agreed threat to international peace. The latter possibility, in the absence of a perceived threat to PRC sovereignty, would conceivably violate all the five principles, which are as follows:

- mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;

- mutual non-aggression;
- non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- equality and mutual benefit; and
- peaceful coexistence.

A possible way around this contradiction may be for the PRC to consider developing a different generic foreign policy strategy in regard to its multilateral foreign policy relationships, while retaining the five principles of peaceful coexistence as a sure guide for its bilateral foreign policy relationships. The PRC has, in fact, embraced this concept in so far as its hybrid bilateral-multilateral relations with Africa are concerned. For example, the Five Principles of Sino-African Relations (DFA. 2001 *Background*: 30) differ from the Bandung Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and both of these differ from the Five Principles of Cooperation enunciated in the Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development (DFA. 2001 *Background*: 64).

South Africa could possibly learn from the PRC example, not so much in regard to the variety of principles themselves but in regard to the PRC's general approach to foreign policy; an approach that allowed for the need to present consistent, predictable and dependable foreign policy, and which ensured, in the very early history of the PRC, that even relatively unsophisticated, inexperienced and unskilled makers and implementers of foreign policy, and foreign policy advisors, would be capable of doing so. It also kept the leadership relatively focused and unencumbered by costly political and military alliances (CPC. 1997: 88).

Assuming that the foreign policy matrix in respect of South Africa accurately reflects the country's primary foreign policy concerns, a generic approach upon which to base South Africa's foreign policy might draw from this matrix as well as the existing PRC example to identify principles such as the following:

- equality;
- mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;

- mutual economic benefit;
- development of the Southern African region;
- collaboration for peace; and
- an agreed basis for human rights dialogue.

In some respects, these proposed principles encapsulate the ideals expressed in the Pretoria Declaration, although concern for human rights issues was not a prominent feature of that agreement. There was, however, a commitment to “... constructive dialogue ...” (DFA. 2001 *Background*: 31).

As indicated above there may, of course, be any amount of principles depending on the needs identified. In the above examples, assurance of respect for sovereignty and equality are necessary to ensure that South Africa is taken seriously by its foreign policy partners and would also affirm the independent nature of South African foreign policy; mutual economic benefit would require fair and equitable commercial transactions and agreements; development of the Southern African (SADC) region would also presumably still be in line with the needs of the African Renaissance; collaboration for peace would confirm South Africa’s commitment in this regard; and an agreed basis for a bilateral human rights dialogue would be consistent with South Africa’s stated commitment to respect for human rights (SA. 1998: *Nzo speech*).

A principle such as *development of the Southern African region* is probably not a principle to which all other states might agree. For example, could one realistically expect Iceland or Fiji to contribute to the development of Southern Africa? However, the remaining principles might well be mutually agreed upon, even the one relating to human rights. South Africa might therefore have an opportunity to pursue a new diplomatic relationship by negotiating that new relationship on the basis of *all*, or merely *some*, of these principles.

What seems likely, from the foregoing, is that a generic foreign policy approach, if followed, would have enabled South Africa’s foreign policy toward the PRC to become more focused, less susceptible to domination by the PRC and other powerful

states, more substantively helpful to the African renaissance, and less contradictory and ineffectual in terms of previously recorded important human rights issues. Whereas these arguments have focused on a global generic foreign policy encompassing all possible South African foreign policy and diplomatic relationships, a generic regional foreign policy approach, although theoretically possible, is arguably infinitely more complex and difficult to achieve.

7.4.2. Generic regional foreign policy formula

If a regional foreign policy approach is to be considered as a viable option for South Africa then it need not be limited to the organised institutional region or multilateral environmental approach. Bilateral relations would still be feasible, and in fact desirable, but in the manner of an agreed coordinated regional strategy. Such a strategy, from South Africa's perspective, would probably work best in the context of Africa's regional organisations. In terms of this approach the member states of these regions, including South Africa in the case of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), would seek to coordinate their individual bilateral relationships with selected developed and developing states, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, the European Union states, the PRC, Russia, Japan and India, with a view to Africa's developmental needs.

A regional foreign policy approach might include several variations; for example, it might refer to multilateral and bilateral relations between individual states within a specific region; or regions engaging regions, multilaterally and bilaterally; or individual states engaging regions, collectively, and *vice versa* (*vide* EC. 1998); or individual states adopting a specific foreign policy approach toward the individual states of a specific region. With regard to the first variation, influence in the multilateral arena, apart from providing an opportunity to exert an impact on the direction of multilateral international foreign policy, is particularly useful for networking and lobbying purposes. In a sense South Africa has already focused on these opportunities with a notable amount of success in that South Africa, since 1994, has chaired the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (*vide* {2}SA. 1999: *Parliamentary media briefing*); and is scheduled to host and chair the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) during 2001; and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) and first meeting of the African Union (AU), successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), during 2002 (*vide* DFA. 20001009: *Backgrounder*).

The PRC has also utilised lobbying and net-working opportunities within the multilateral environment (e.g. NAM) very effectively in the past (*vide* Kim. 1998: 108 and 233). The PRC managed to become a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council with the help of mainly African and Asian diplomatic support, at the expense of Taiwan (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 293). One of the reasons why South Africa and other selected developing states appear so important to the PRC is because of their perceived and actual multilateral and regional influence. In recent years the PRC has relied on the support of developing states to successfully counter attempts by developed states, such as the United States, to publicly censure the PRC for its human rights transgressions and abuses.

On a more positive note, South Africa's participation and influence in multilateral forums provides an excellent opportunity to garner substantive support for developmental programmes among, particularly, developed states; and to encourage developing states, particularly African states, to make greater strides toward democratisation, rule of law, self-development, social justice, and respect for human rights and environmental needs. Opportunities are often wasted, however, if not translated into action.

In regard to the second variation, there may be opportunities for a region such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to engage other regional organisations such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) or the European Union (EU) with a view to mutually advancing regional foreign policy interests. The third type of variation might allow a regional organisation such as SADC to consider

engaging an economically powerful state such as the PRC, including the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Macao Special Administrative Region, with a view to advancing the economic aspects of the foreign relations of all these states and territories in ways that are mutually beneficial. On the other hand, South Africa might foresee an opportunity to follow the example of the PRC, as displayed in planning the China-African Conference and collectively engaging a large number of African states, by identifying a regional community, whether institutionally organised or not, and engaging its individual states collectively with a view to advancing diplomatic, economic and commercial interaction in a mutually beneficial manner.

Finally, the fourth variation would encourage individual states to seek out opportunities to engage other individual states, that are part of a specifically identifiable region, in terms of their perceived regional commonalities and characteristics, so that a specific regional foreign policy approach would be clearly discernible.

If South Africa were to follow this approach it would be necessary to closely examine its *bilateral* relationships with other states of the international system with a view to categorising such states in terms of the anticipated most advantageous way to pursue the relevant relationship. For example, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, including the PRC, represent a specific categorisation that ought to be different from all other relationships simply by virtue of the enormous amount of influence and power, in a variety of manifestations, wielded by these states and the contributions they are capable of making toward the improvement of living conditions within South Africa and the developing world. The core states of the developed and developing regions, which also include the PRC, might also be identified and categorised accordingly.

Although this approach would, again, tend to direct South Africa's bilateral relations toward regional and multilateral pursuits it would be in line with South Africa's established foreign policy practices in the African and developing regions. However, despite obvious regional implications, the approach itself would be bilateral.

At this stage, particularly in regard to the second and third variations of this approach, as previously described *supra*, it would be premature to consider this type of regional foreign policy formula. From South Africa's perspective, for a regional foreign policy to be viable there would need to be a region comprising individual states, which can successfully implement and sustain a regional foreign policy; and South Africa would have to be one of those states. At present, in terms of organisations in which South Africa participates, only the Southern African Development Community (SADC) provides a foundation for the mere possibility of developing such a regional foreign policy approach. There are, however, serious obstacles. Firstly, Swaziland and Malawi do not have diplomatic relations with the PRC and a regional foreign policy would be dependant on unanimity of purpose in an organisation, such as SADC, which takes decisions on the basis of consensus ({{39}}WS. 2001: *SADC Constitution*: Article 8, (3) [c] {f}). Secondly, SADC has not yet reached the stage of cohesiveness necessary to sustain unity of action in the form of a regional foreign policy. Like many other regional organisations, particularly in the developing world, SADC comprises members which are diverse in terms of language, political systems and ideology, cultures, history, population, economic development, and many other factors, and would appear to be a long way from developing the kind of political, social and economic system that would be able to develop, implement and sustain a common regional foreign policy such as the European Union (EU) is able to apply, within certain defined parameters, in its relations with China. The European Union's approach was initiated in 1995 when it "... responded to the economic and political challenges posed by the changes in China by drawing up a comprehensive policy for the future developments of the EU's relations with China (EU. 1998. *European Communities*: 3).

The European Union's foreign policy approach toward China offers a useful concept for SADC to consider emulating in the distant future, and one which South Africa ought to consider promoting, but only after fundamental changes in SADC take place to eliminate the disparities and differences within and between the organisation's member-states that would otherwise make such a foreign policy impossible to

implement. On the question of human rights, for example, the European Union has been able to engage China "... in a serious and results-oriented dialogue. All subjects of concern, even the most sensitive ones, have been addressed during ... discussions and the prospect of continued, regular dialogue has now been established" (*European Communities*. 1998: 9).

For SADC, or any other regional organisation in which South Africa has membership, to be able to credibly and effectively engage China on a sensitive foreign policy concern, such as human rights, in the manner of the European Union, a necessary prerequisite would be for individual regional-member states to reach agreement on human rights concepts and human rights practices. Clearly, this is not happening at the present time when, for example, South Africa and Zimbabwe differ fundamentally on such issues as press freedom and freedom of speech (*vide* {36}WS. 2001: 1-2).

There is, of course, the question of national sovereignty. Any move in the direction of pursuing a regional foreign policy approach would need to give due consideration to precisely what parameters would apply. What aspects of foreign policy would be dealt with regionally and what aspects would be applied collectively as regional foreign policy in the "bilateral" context; for example, between SADC member states and the PRC. To some extent this situation has already arisen in reverse, a result of the China-Africa Conference whereby the PRC engaged African states, collectively, on the basis of the five principles enunciated by PRC President Jiang Zemin, during a visit to Africa in 1996; and at the same time, still engages those individual African states in terms of individual foreign policy requirements.

7.4.3. Individual-state foreign policy formula

South Africa's current foreign policy has been described as constituting an *ad hoc* approach to foreign policy; an approach apparently specific to the moment and to the state concerned but that may be directed by caprice; and, by implication, could be viewed as lacking consistency, reliability, dependability and predictability.

In examining its bilateral relationships with individual states, South Africa might consider a number of indicators that, on the one hand, are inclined to reflect the status and relative success of the relationship; and, on the other hand, demand attention with a view to possibly improving the relationship. For example, the number and type of bilateral agreements signed and implemented; the number of high-level political visits in each direction; the volume of tourism traffic in each direction and current trends; statistics and trends in respect of the volume of trade, development aid and investment; size and population of each country; number of missions established, and where, in each of the two countries; types of political systems in place in each country; and multilateral organisations to which each country belongs or has access to as an observer or dialogue partner.

Apart from quantitative aspects of a foreign policy relationship, however, it might also be necessary to take into account the need for specialisation in terms of language requirements, as well as knowledge and insight into the cultural, political and historical *milieux*, of the state concerned. With regard to the PRC, for example, it has been stated (2002. *Interview*) that it is simply not possible to function effectively in the PRC in the absence of fluency in Mandarin and that without an ability to read Mandarin it would be equally impossible to understand Chinese society. In order to promote an effective diplomatic relationship with the PRC it would seem that South Africa's foreign policy needs demand a more specialised approach. As has been pointed out (2002. *Interview*):

*If you do not understand Chinese they (the PRC Government)
will assume you are not serious about (your relationship with) China.*

Consequently, the need for specialisation skills, in regard to South Africa's diplomatic service, should not be overlooked or discounted.

The above proposals do not constitute a comprehensive list but merely suggest possible indicators that may help assess the nature and strength of specific bilateral relationships with a view to improving such relationships where possible. The

individual-state foreign policy formula assumes that a close examination that qualifies and quantifies the extent of the existing relationship, with a view to its improvement, will also be capable of reflecting some of those considerations dealt with separately elsewhere, such as generic global and regional; national interest; and human rights, ideological and moral considerations.

A further important consideration is the following. If it is accepted that individual states exhibit often unique combinations of individual characteristics, then it follows that individual foreign policy relationships are equally unique; and that the best way to advance these relationships would be to do so individually.

7.4.4. Ideology and moral issues: policies of idealism

Ideology has been described as an “economising device” by which individuals come to terms with their environment and are provided with a “world view” so that the decision making process is simplified (North. 1981: 48; Gore. 1998: 20). According to North, incomplete information forces individuals to construct subjective models to decipher the world around them (North. 1990: chapter 3; Gore. 1998: 20) and, as Gore (1998: 20) has noted, such “diverse subjective models ... could prevent people from even realising that existing institutions are inefficient.”

This view could, of course, represent a valid criticism of the way in which the PRC utilises the five principles of peaceful coexistence to construct its foreign policy (*vide* paragraph 7.4.5. *supra*); and, by implication, also challenges the supposed validity of proposals in favour of a possible generic foreign policy approach by South Africa. As already pointed out, the world has changed and the PRC approach might well be in need of revision, in which case the observations by North and Gore are pertinent and probably correct. However, this is not to suggest that the PRC’s foreign policy approach has not been effective during the past forty-five years of its use. What is being suggested is that the approach may need to be updated to bring it into line with the expectations and requirements of the modern era of the third millennium, particularly if the PRC intends to play a more effective leadership role in world

affairs; and has been shown, the PRC has already demonstrated a willingness to use a variety of “five principles” combinations (*vide* paragraph 7.4.1 *supra*).

It has become clear that the PRC is increasingly torn between its international ambition to become the equal of the United States, the world’s only global power in terms of military and economic might (*vide* Lam. 1999: 391 & 394) and its national ambition to ensure domestic tranquillity, economic and political stability, and security at home (*vide* Lu. 1997: 155). However, as Kissinger (1972: 388) has pointed out,

... (it may be) ... *that increased control over the domestic environment is purchased at the price of loss of flexibility in international affairs.*

Consequently, the very fact that the PRC exercises such close control, even allowing for its acknowledged moves toward a more open society, over its domestic environment, makes its activities and actions within the external international environment less spectacular and less global than those of the United States. Its lack of certainty at home often makes it less certain abroad. However, the time will surely come when the PRC is ready to take a more active international role and, in order to do this, it may need to adapt its approach to circumvent those foreign policy constraints currently imposed by the existing five principles (PRC. 1999) which include specific reference to mutual non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful coexistence and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

There are other aspects of ideology that must also be taken into account. For example, the PRC’s ideological base, although rooted in Marxism-Leninism (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 31-32), has been elevated to its modern foundation of Socialism with Chinese characteristics, which allows for the important substantive contributions of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In terms of its politics the PRC views itself as being on course for its socialist goal - the secondary stage of socialism - some fifty years in the future, in or around the year 2049 (PRC. 1991: 644); and in terms of PRC economics it views itself as a developing state that will utilise a peculiarly Chinese form of socialist economic practices to attain and eventually surpass the

economic achievements of the world's most developed states by demonstrating "...the superiority of socialism..." (PRC. 1991: 648). These points were made by Zhao Ziyang (*vide* paragraph 9.2: Addendum two {13}): in an address to the 13th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 1987 (PRC. 1991: 635-702) and they remain valid PRC policy objectives today. Part of the PRC economic plan involves learning from economically developed, as well as developing, states wherever possible, particularly in the fields of science and technology, managerial techniques, military technology, agricultural sciences, mining and industrial technology.

Marxism-Leninism, the Communist Party of China, and the evolutionary concept of Socialism with Chinese characteristics, provide useful opportunities for PRC leaders and officials to meet and collaborate with like-minded individuals and political groupings in other parts of the world, including the South African Communist Party (SACP) (*The Sunday Independent*. 6 August, 2000: 4). There is a potential opportunity here for South Africa to utilise these ideological connections to benefit its relationship with the PRC. However, this is a potential two-way street and the CPC is also very likely to seek advantages for the PRC by means of this less formal communication channel ({3}2002. *Interview*).

The closest appeal to ideological policy within South Africa at present is in the form of the African Renaissance and the general Afro-centric approach to all forms of public policy, including important aspects of foreign policy. Ideology, as a policy of idealism, is closely linked, in the South African context, to questions of morality and human rights considerations. South African leaders have continually referred to the linkage between domestic and foreign policy (*Sowetan*. 3 November 1999: 8); and have stressed the importance of human rights commitments in South Africa's foreign policy ({1}SA. 2001: *Nzo speech*). This is not surprising, given South Africa's *apartheid* and colonial history, and the existence of a Bill of Rights entrenched within the country's Constitution ({4}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: chapter two). What is disappointing, if not surprising, is the lack of consistency among South Africa's leadership echelon in expressing concerns for human rights abuses in countries that

are politically and diplomatically close to South Africa; and the failure of South Africa's leaders to meet with prominent Nobel Peace Prize recipients, such as the Dalai Lama (*Pretoria News*. 10 December 1999: 15).

Although it would be unrealistic, and probably self-defeating, for South Africa to base its foreign policy on human rights considerations, human rights issues should be accommodated in a pragmatic way within the broader constraints of South African foreign policy, in accordance with the stated intentions of its leaders and the natural influences of the country's domestic environment. Schlesinger, who argues that human rights cannot be the exclusive goal of foreign policy, has stated as follows (1986: 102):

A nation's supreme interest is self-preservation. When national security and the promotion of human rights come into genuine conflict, national security must prevail (which is not at all to accept the national security bureaucracy as the infallible judge of national security). Because in the nature of foreign policy, human rights can only be one of several competing interests, principle must be tempered by prudence. In short, a state cannot apply the human rights standard consistently. This does not mean, however, that the standard should be abandoned.

Others, including former British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, and former U.S. President, Jimmy Carter, who learned from experience, have also commented (Schlesinger. 1986: 98) on the pitfalls of striving to project policies founded on human rights imperatives.

There are many hard working and effective individuals and organisations outside of government that are committed to the elimination of human rights abuses. Churches and religious organisations, the news media, writers, academics, teachers and universities, business organisations and trade unions, as in the case of the anti-*apartheid* movement are also all capable of exerting pressure on individual governments that are known human rights abusers. If South Africa is serious about its

human rights commitments then it does not need to base its total foreign policy on human rights concerns in order to remain committed and reasonably effective. As Schlesinger (1986: 107) has written,

...moral obligations of human rights rest more strongly on non-governmental than on governmental bodies.

South Africa can and should play a far more effective active role in support of human rights everywhere but such actions will need to display impartiality and consistency if South Africa expects to earn and retain respect in this endeavour. There needs to be a balance between the requirements for good diplomatic relations and the requirements for unambiguous condemnation of human rights abuses where and when they occur.

7.4.5. National interest: a policy of realism

A number of South African foreign policy statements have been made which reflect an interest, and possibly a commitment, to the pursuit of a foreign policy in support of the national or domestic interest. Interestingly, in the *Department of Foreign Affairs Strategic Document 2000-2005*, Foreign Minister Dlamini Zuma referred to *national interest* (SA. 2001: 5) whereas the Director-General, Siphosiso Pityana, referred to *domestic interest* (SA. 2001: 7).

A policy of realism, according to Morgenthau (Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 50), would require that national interest be conceptualised in terms of power:

... if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to them all. And we are able to do justice to all of them in a dual sense: We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own. Moderation in policy

cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgement.

Unfortunately, Morgenthau's theory does not allow for the irrational decision maker or the poorly advised decision maker. Morgenthau (Pfaltzgraff, 1972: 45) assumed that statesmen would automatically distinguish between the nation's need " ... to think and act in terms of the national interest, and their *personal* wish ... to see their own moral values and political principles realised throughout the world ..." Clearly, not all leaders expect their personal moral values and political principles to be imposed on the rest of the world but many of them seem to expect the rest of the world to understand and accept those values and principles, even when they are widely regarded as morally reprehensible and abhorrent.

If South Africa is to pursue a policy of national interest, that aspires to be effective, then South Africa's decision makers will need to subordinate its perceived regional and multilateral interests to a strong and focused national interest driven by a deliberate emphasis on its many bilateral foreign policy relationships. This would certainly enhance South Africa's opportunities to display leadership within the international environment, particularly in Africa, because decision makers would be able to focus on the requirements of national interest, involving a single decision making institution within a single domestic environment, and not regional interest, involving a relatively large number of decision making institutions within an equally large number of domestic environments. However, as Robinson (Rosenau, 1969: 185) implies, the effectiveness of a national interest approach would rest on the power available to the state employing such an approach; and the essential nature of the foreign policy goals themselves.

Foreign policy goals must not range beyond the power available, for although national desires for good and for evil are infinite, the resources for obtaining them are strictly limited. It is therefore necessary to distinguish desirable goals from essential goals. The list of essential national goals is called the total national interest.

A national interest approach would, in some respects, exhibit characteristics of the PRC's generic approach, in that its success depends on a useful reserve of power and influence; it would also exhibit limited similarity to the United States and Russian approaches as regards the foreign policy doctrines of these countries, as expounded by their top executive decision makers. Foreign policy doctrines are unilateral policy statements that are premised on national interest considerations and include the Monroe Doctrine (Plano and Olton. 1969: 155), whereby the United States declared that it would oppose any foreign (military) intervention in the Western Hemisphere; the Brezhnev Doctrine (Karnow. 1983: 637), whereby "... the Soviet Communist Party boss ... (warned) that the Soviet Union might intervene in any (communist) country whose policies deviated from its standards ..."; and the Nixon Doctrine (Karnow. 1983: 594), whereby countries receiving American money and *materiel* to protect themselves against communism would have to supply their own troops. South Africa, of course, is not in the same league as these countries in terms of the relative power at their disposal, and would need to tailor its own foreign policy declarations to its available resources.

A national interest foreign policy approach by South Africa can therefore be expected to work best in selective and relatively limited circumstances; as when practised against the interests of a weaker state, at least in terms of the circumstances that are being contested. As far as the SA-PRC bilateral relationship is concerned the PRC is well-placed to conduct its foreign policy in terms of purely national interest considerations because of its extensive and varied power base. South Africa does not have this advantage and its national interest considerations, in terms of its foreign policy approach, would only be expected to arise in regard to primary interests, (Robinson in {1}Rosenau.1969: 184) such as,

... protection of ... physical, political, and cultural identity and survival against encroachment from the outside. Primary interests can never be compromised or traded. All nations hold these same interests and must defend them at any price.

In regard to national interest considerations there is a need to also be aware, as Robinson (Rosenau.1969: 183-185) observes, that national interest can take many forms. It is axiomatic, of course, that a total national interest approach would be individualistic and nation-centred. Of course, South Africa cannot afford to be seen to turn its back on its regional and multilateral responsibilities and concerns, and is unlikely to do so. There is, therefore, a perceived need to explore the possibility of finding a middle way between the realist national interest approach and those approaches that might allow more flexibility in terms of South Africa's ideological and moral commitment to Africa and the developing world.

7.4.6. Mutual strategic interest: a policy of constructive engagement

It may be possible to find a middle way between the ideological and moral approach to foreign policy on the one hand and the realistic approach on the other. The United States originally attempted such an approach when it embarked on a policy of constructive engagement with *apartheid* South Africa (Crocker. 1993: 79).

Constructive engagement, as an approach to foreign policy, may provide an opportunity for South Africa to combine its national interest concerns with its moral concerns and ideological preferences; and at the same time advance its regional and multilateral priorities. It could be construed as morally irresponsible as well as diplomatically, and perhaps economically, self-defeating for South Africa to continue to engage certain countries of the international environment more favourably than others in spite of mal-administration, mis-government, mis-guided economic policies, and fundamental and blatant abuses of human rights. The moral justification for engaging such states would ideally arise if communication and contact were seen as a means to effectively facilitate increased respect for human rights, no matter how small; and to create a climate of rational discourse about sensitive diplomatic topics with a view to elevating the bilateral relationship, morally and beneficially. Deputy President Zuma (DFA. 1999:1203. *Foreign Correspondents Association dinner*: 2 December 1999) has already declared that *engagement* is a means whereby South

Africa and other states can seek *common ground ...and ... speak with one voice on issues of common interest.*

While recognising the economic and social transformation that has taken place in the People's Republic of China, particularly since the commencement of the era of Deng Xiaoping (*vide* Naughton in Shambaugh. 1995: 106) and as continued under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, South Africa may find it increasingly difficult to ignore some of the less palatable facts about the PRC that must, inevitably, impact on South Africa's relations with that country. On the question of human rights there is a fundamental generic difference between South Africa and the People's Republic of China in that the PRC focuses on community or group rights (Pye in Hook. 1996: 17) whereas SA focuses on individual rights (SA. 1996. *Constitution*: chapter two).

In the very broadest sense, on the fundamental question of personal freedom, laws in South Africa usually focus on what the law forbids whereas, in the PRC, the focus is usually on what the law permits. In other words, in South Africa the individual *may do* anything he or she wants to do unless the law forbids it; in the PRC the individual *may not do* anything that the law does not expressly permit him or her to do.

In the PRC the news media are strictly controlled by the state. In March 1988, Li Peng, in an address to the First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress, declared (PRC. 1991: 748),

... governments at all levels (in the PRC) should pay close attention to the development of such enterprises as broadcasting, television, film production, the press and publishing, and let the mass media play an active part in publicising policies, keeping in touch with the masses and developing consultation and dialogue.

Today there are still no privately owned newspapers. Foreign TV channels, such as CNN, BBC TV and *Deutsche Welle* are available to foreigners, foreign embassies, selected government agencies and selected international hotels, but the Chinese

people normally do not have access to these facilities. Nevertheless, the fax machine and the internet are increasingly ensuring that some uncontrolled foreign news does reach the Chinese people.

Although religion has not been stamped out in the officially atheistic PRC, it is strictly controlled. The state-backed Catholic Church in the PRC (DFA. 2001 *Background*: 81) is not recognised by the Vatican and its bishops have not been ordained by the Pope. Article 36 of the PRC Constitution, states ({{1}}PRC. 2000. *Constitution*) that, "... religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination ...", which makes it effectively impossible for the official Catholic Church or any other organised foreign Church to operate within the PRC. Christians may not hold religious meetings in their homes but must attend a registered meeting place, usually a Church building invariably constructed before the Communist take-over. As recently as October 2000, a nineteen year old Christian, reportedly (DFA. 2001 *Background*: 81) arrested after attending a church service in a private home, died in prison.

There are no "opposition" political parties in the PRC. However, there are eight so-called democratic parties ({{2}} PRC. 1999: *Democratic Parties*) which collaborate closely with the ruling CPC to which they are all subordinate. These eight parties are also financed by the PRC Government. They function very much in the manner of political guilds in that they represent specific occupational, intellectual and social groups within Chinese society. The *Democratic Parties* are an important factor in the membership of the pro-government *United Front* grouping of "... non-party intellectuals, business people, overseas Chinese, (Communist Party-approved) religious leaders and other people of influence ..." (Lau. *South China Morning Post*. 9 December, 2000: 9). Although the survival of these parties is assured by virtue of their creation during the formative era of the PRC, and their unfailing support for the ruling CPC, the China Democracy Activists (CDA) were not permitted to form a new political party (Lam. *South China Morning Post*. 26 October 1998: 7) because of its stated intention to be an opposition party; one that would be prepared to challenge the

supremacy of the CPC. The leaders of the CDA were arrested, tried and imprisoned and some fled into exile (Bezlova in {16}WS. 1998: 1).

South African decision makers may also exhibit fundamental differences with their PRC counterparts on the question of justice because the PRC practices capital punishment. However, despite obvious differences that threaten to divide the PRC and SA on human rights issues, both South Africa and the PRC have strategic interests in developing their diplomatic and foreign policy relationship. Although the need to preserve and build on this diplomatic relationship appears to be a fundamental reason why human rights issues have not been raised at high level, these differences need to be addressed in diplomatic terms so that there is no confusion about where South Africa stands on the question of human rights. It should be made clear, sooner rather than later, as to how South Africa is likely to respond to a PRC request for extradition of a PRC national accused of a capital crime in his or her country. Is South Africa prepared to enter into an extradition agreement and, if so, with what provisos, if any? South Africa may also need to clarify its stance in regard to official meetings with the Dalai Lama, an important religious leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate.

Despite its differing approach to human rights questions, the PRC is a signatory to the United Nations Conventions on Human Rights (Ma. *China Daily*. 8 October 1998: 1). In addition the PRC has demonstrated a willingness to engage with other states in dialogue about human rights issues and considerations.({2}2001. *Interview; vide* {23}WS. 1999: 1). Therefore, the question of human rights need not be a cause of dissension between South Africa and the PRC. Instead, human rights issues may provide a useful and fruitful dialogue whereby South Africa and the PRC can be made aware of sensitivities; and may be better prepared to try and resolve differences when they occur in a manner that will facilitate a constructive approach to resolving these differences. As pointed out previously, the Pretoria Declaration makes provision for constructive dialogue between South Africa and the PRC. There is no reason why such constructive dialogue should not include dialogue about human rights issues.

The European Union, for example, “is committed to a strategy of comprehensive engagement with China .. (which focuses on) .. “a renewed and upgraded EU-China bilateral political dialogue, as well as through the greater involvement of China in both regional and multilateral initiatives of global interest” (EC. 1998: 5). Consequently, the European Union has established an EU-PRC partnership (EC. 1998) that pursues aims such as,

- engaging China further, through an upgraded political dialogue, in the international community;
- supporting China’s transition to an open society based upon the rule of law and the respect for human rights;
- integrating China further in the world economy by bringing it more fully into the world trading system and by supporting the process of economic and social reform underway in the country; and
- raising the EU’s profile in China.

The EU-PRC partnership also aims at strengthening its trade dialogue through the conclusion of specific bilateral agreements (EC. 1998: 16-17) that relate to maritime transport, air transport, nuclear trade and safety, customs and science and technology. Although these types of agreement also have relevance for South Africa, few have been negotiated and none have been fully implemented (2001. *Interview*).

The United States, too, has been able (albeit from the advantageous perspective of being the world’s only global super power) to engage the PRC in a mutually beneficial manner, despite long-standing differences on a number of issues, including human rights and military policy. Although not specifically termed constructive engagement (*vide* Roy. 1998: 137) this is the type of foreign policy that is effectively being practised with the PRC by states that either have, or envisage reason for, a realistic and morally defensible foreign policy relationship with the PRC. This is an approach that might also be well-suited to the SA-PRC bilateral relationship.

7.5. Alternative policy choices

In considering various types of foreign policy approaches that are generally available to decision makers it is now necessary to identify the *best* of these alternative approaches, and consider their anticipated consequences if applied to the bilateral foreign policy relationship between the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of China. For example, could a generic foreign policy approach, by South Africa, be expected to prove viable and effective?

If the proposed six principles, recorded in chapter seven, paragraph 4.1 *supra*, are retained and if these principles are steadfastly reflected in South Africa's foreign policy approach, there can be little doubt, if any, that human rights considerations, respect for peace and stability, African developmental priorities, mutual economic advantages, equality and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, could establish a solid basis for an honourable, predictable, dependable, consistent foreign policy. With particular regard to the relationship with the PRC it might be useful to consider incorporating, as far as possible, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, in an agreed manner that would avoid negating the principles advanced by South Africa. The PRC insistence, for example, on *non-interference in each other's domestic affairs* should not be allowed to eclipse a possible South African requirement (hypothetical in this example) for *an agreed basis for human rights dialogue*.

The use of declared principles as a foundation for a generic South African foreign policy approach could also be expected to serve as an invaluable quick reference guide to keep South African diplomats consistently on track as far as the basic tenets of foreign policy are concerned; and could provide the leeway necessary to make effective and focused foreign policy decisions outside the restrictions imposed by the present DFA administrative and management structure. However, a determining factor must be the resources and employable power available to South Africa and a willingness to utilise that power and those resources.

In examining the possibility of employing a generic regional approach to foreign policy it became clear that the SADC region (*vide* Mills, 2000: 278) would not be capable of effectively and consistently projecting this type of approach to foreign policy relations with the PRC. Apart from the disparate views of member states on particular aspects of human rights (DFA, 20000619) the region includes member states that do not have diplomatic relations with the PRC due to their continuing diplomatic support for Taiwan. There are, of course, other regions besides SADC but none in which South Africa has membership that could be considered a suitable vehicle for the pursuit of a collective or coordinated foreign policy toward the PRC.

Even though the China Africa Conference 2000 effectively created an excellent opportunity for a large number of African states to promote their continent with a single diplomatic voice this did not happen. The conference favoured the PRC organisers from the outset and resulting developmental and economic gains for Africa may be slow to materialise in substantive terms (2001. *Interview*).

Clearly, the pursuit of a national interest foreign policy approach is best suited for use in regard to weaker states and South Africa would be at a clear disadvantage if it were to promote such a policy in regard to powerful developing states such as the PRC or India, or any of the developed states. The use of the unilateral doctrinal approach, as an important aspect of political realism, would also only prove feasible when directed in relation to weaker states but might be worth pursuing as an aspect of multilateral diplomacy; a situation where small and developing powers could combine to increase their access to collective power and collective resources. For example, African maritime states might collectively consider a doctrinal foreign policy approach to the protection of their marine and coastal resources.

It has been shown that the ideological approach to foreign policy can be restrictive and may impact negatively on the need for flexibility in decision making whereas too strong a focus on moral issues, including human rights concerns, would be impractical because primary high priority realistic concerns, such as the preservation of society and the state, would always tend to over-ride moral issues (Schlesinger.

1986: 102). Nevertheless, if *ideological* issues such as the African Renaissance philosophy, are promoted within the framework of a less rigid, yet focused, approach there is some hope of success. Moral issues, too, can be incorporated in approaches to foreign policy, other than the proposed policies of idealism; for example, the generic approach, the individual state approach and the constructive engagement approach.

The individual state approach, as indicated, may appear to be an *ad hoc* and rather directionless approach if not well secured by principles of dependability, predictability, reliability and consistency. An advantage of this approach, however, resides in the opportunity to tailor South Africa's individual foreign policy relationships according to its needs and, one might add, the perceived accepted norms of the international *milieu*. There is some resemblance to the PRC's *lingqi luzao* approach of initiating diplomatic relations with every country on a new basis (*vide* Zhao. 96: 4). The approach does not require that all states should be treated equally as not all states will be of equal importance or relevance to South Africa. In fact it would be appropriate to categorise states of the international environment in terms of their relative importance to South Africa so that foreign policy objectives can be determined and implemented accordingly. In a sense, South Africa has already embarked on this course through the establishment of binational commissions and equivalent mechanisms with several states of the international environment (SA. 2001). For example, binational commissions help coordinate South Africa's relations with the United States, India and Australia, among others (*vide* SA. 2001: 1-3). Since the national elections of 1994 some 18 states, five of them in sub-Saharan Africa and seven (including four North African states) from the Islamic region, have either established, or are in the course of establishing, binational commissions (or equivalent mechanisms) with South Africa (*vide* SA. 2001: 1-3). A binational commission will soon also help coordinate the SA-PRC bilateral relationship. Too many binational commissions, however, might tend to reduce the value of this mechanism in its symbolic sense as a benchmark for diplomatic excellence; too many commissions might also tax South Africa's ability to give the proper amount of time, energy and resources to keeping them in proper operational order.

The constructive engagement approach appears to offer some limited possibilities for South Africa. Since 1994, South Africa has stated, time and again, that human rights considerations are an important aspect of its foreign policy approach (SA. 1998. *Nzo Speech*). Yet, to date, it has hesitated to raise this topic with the PRC (Rademeyer. *The Star*. 27 April 2000: 3). In some cases it has been intimidated into silence and inaction (*vide* Mills. 2000: 265). It has also been slow to raise questions of human rights abuses with its neighbours in the SADC community (*vide* DFA. 20000619). If South Africa is to retain some semblance of a reputation for its professed commitment to human rights it will need to be prepared to risk unpopularity with transgressor states, in the interests of its own international reputation and expressed foreign policy commitments. In this regard, a constructive engagement foreign policy approach, whereby a frank human rights dialogue takes place at high level on a regular basis, may provide a useful opportunity to engage the PRC and other states. Clearly, South Africa is not the United States and the PRC is not South Africa. Therefore, a constructive engagement approach on the lines of the American regional model, whereby the United States could and did apply enormous pressure against the South African Government and other Southern African states (Crocker. 1993: 76), during the latter days of the *apartheid* era, would not be feasible for use by South Africa.

From the foregoing, and given that this research focuses primarily on South Africa's *bilateral* foreign policy relationship with the People's Republic of China, proposed multilateral regional approaches can be discounted. It is also quite clear that approaches that would require access to extensive resources and power capabilities would be inappropriate in regard to South Africa's foreign policy toward the PRC. In addition, it is desirable that South Africa should adhere to its stated foreign policy commitments, including its commitment to support for human rights (SA. 2001. *Strategic plan 2000-2005*: 11), and that its foreign policy relationships should be seen to be consistent, dependable, reliable and predictable. Therefore, it is argued that, in regard to the SA-PRC bilateral relationship, the generic approach and the individual state approach have most to offer. A combination of these two approaches could

conceivably lead to the perceived *best* way to promote the SA-PRC bilateral relationship.

7.6. Implementation of the proposed alternative

At the outset it must be stated that the proposed foreign policy approaches are unlikely to be implemented, or even considered, given the nature of foreign policy decision making in South Africa and given the nature of the decision making *milieu* in which foreign policy is formulated. Therefore, the question of actual implementation only arises in the purely hypothetical sense.

The process of public policy implementation, including foreign policy implementation, would normally commence after the relevant decisions are taken to adopt the recommended course of action and the policy implementation process would terminate when the intended goals applicable to those decisions have been achieved; and when it is clear that the costs relating to those decisions, in terms of time, money and other resources, will be largely in accordance with expectations. The required human and material resources would also need to be readily available. In the case of foreign policy, however, goals are often ongoing, and not all could be expected to be achieved within the anticipated time frame; and sometimes the failure to achieve some goals might be due to organisational failings on the part of South Africa's bureaucracy (2002. *Interview*), rather than intransigence or obstructionism on the part of the PRC.

It is necessary to consider, in a hypothetical sense, some of the foreign policy goals identified and proposed, in regard to South Africa's bilateral relationship with the PRC: the need for Approved Destination Status for PRC tourists to SA (2001. *Interview*; 2002. *Interview*); the need to open the way for the export of SA agricultural products to the PRC (2002. *Interview*); the need to establish a Consulate-General in Shanghai (2001. *Interview*); the prevention of illegal immigration from the PRC into SA (Sono. *The Star*. 27 April 1999), which is estimated to exceed 70000 mainly mainland Chinese (2002. *Interview*); and the

need to enter into a human rights dialogue with the PRC. The first goal depends on the PRC; the third depends on South Africa; and the second, fourth and fifth goals depend on both South Africa and the PRC.

In view of the government's often-stated commitments to human rights, South Africa is morally and ethically obliged to find a way to raise this issue with the PRC. The PRC, of course, is under no similar bilateral obligation. However, if South Africa wishes to honour its expressed commitment it will need to find a mutually beneficial and acceptable foreign policy mechanism for doing so and it would seem that the proposed Binational Commission, established under the terms of the Pretoria Declaration (DFA. 2001: 30), would provide such a mechanism. Furthermore, in order to avoid appearing to single out the PRC (not the only state to receive international criticism for its response to human rights issues) (*vide* Kennedy. 1987: 410) for special treatment, in regard to human rights concerns, South Africa might consider establishing similar bilateral dialogues with all states that are known to have questionable human rights records. South Africa could also benefit from the experience of other states that have successfully developed, bilaterally or multilaterally, coherent foreign policy approaches toward the PRC, such as the member states of the European Union (EC. 1998). Of course, South Africa should not expect to faithfully duplicate the objectives of other states in regard to the PRC but, at the same time, should not be afraid to be guided by the diplomatic strategies and techniques of states that have more expertise and experience, than South Africa, in forging a mutually beneficial and successful relationship with the PRC.

On the question of SA agricultural exports and Approved Destination Status, these are issues that have already received some attention in terms of agricultural-related bilateral agreements already signed (2001. *Interview*); and a signed commitment at the China-Africa Conference to promote, among other priorities, service industries, which would include tourism. These issues can also be resolved, wholly or partially, through the Binational Commission. However, there is a need to ensure that South African agricultural land and fishing resources are not exploited in ways that are ultimately not beneficial to South Africans. Environmental needs, correct farming

methods, labour needs and practices, and any other concerns that fall within the province of good government, need to be addressed. Although the PRC has reportedly (2002. *Interview*) made some progress in addressing environmental concerns there are inherent dangers in regard to over-fishing, due in part to questionable PRC statistics and that country's belief that there are more fish available in some waters than actually exist. A further troubling aspect of the bilateral relationship between South Africa and the PRC relates to illegal immigration (2001. *Interview*; *vide* Sono. *The Star*. 27 April 1999) but before real progress can be made in this regard South Africa will have to improve its immigration policies and ensure that it has the necessary resources to effectively police the country's borders and coastline; it will have to ensure maximum cooperation from SADC states, particularly neighbouring states such as Lesotho, Namibia and Botswana (2002. *Interview*); and it will have to combat corruption, both at the Department of Home Affairs in South Africa and at South Africa's embassies abroad (2001. *Interview*; 2002. *Interview*).

South Africa also needs a Consulate-General in Shanghai in order to support South African business interests there and in order to encourage investment into South Africa from this very wealthy and influential city (2001. *Interview*; 2002. *Interview*). During the period since South Africa established diplomatic relations with the PRC, South Africa has established embassies in Kingston, Jamaica and Kampala, Uganda, among others, and the PRC has established Consulates-General in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg (2001. *Interview*). Given that the PRC is eight times the geographical area of South Africa, a Consulate-General in Shanghai is a necessity that only the South African Government can turn into reality.

Finally, South Africa has to consider using competent and well-trained diplomatic personnel (*vide* Mills. *The Star*. 4 February 1999: 2) who can read and speak Mandarin fluently. The inability to converse in or read Mandarin will automatically deny the opportunity to perform effectively and efficiently in the PRC (2002. *Interview*; 2002. *Interview*). The Department of Foreign Affairs should be aware that when anything appears in English in the PRC it is because the PRC Government wants to get a particular message across to the Developed and English-speaking

worlds. What appears in Mandarin is intended for the Chinese (2002. *Interview*). Therefore, it is not possible to effectively work in, and understand, the PRC without first understanding Mandarin (2002. *Interview*). The Department of Foreign Affairs and other relevant government departments might also consider recruiting members of the South African Chinese community, particularly those who have retained a commitment to their Chinese cultural and linguistic traditions and who would therefore be able to function effectively in the PRC and other Chinese-speaking states and territories. However, it has also been suggested (2002. *Interview*) that Chinese South Africans would tend to function more effectively in Hong Kong and Taiwan than on the Chinese mainland.

It is appreciated that racial and gender representativeness is a major focus of South African governmental policy. However, there are ways to accomplish this objective without diminishing the needs for competency and experience. For example, experienced diplomatic personnel (Landsberg. *Sowetan*. 7 July 1998: 12), can still serve a very useful mentoring and training role, in specialist capacities, both at Head Office and at overseas missions, and should be utilised with a view to assisting new appointments, Heads of Mission, and Heads of Departments, *where necessary*, to gain experience and competence. This would do far more to establish a team spirit and collaborative approach than the current ongoing exclusivist (*vide* remarks by Colin Eglin in Hadland and Rantao. 1999: 144), and covertly discriminatory (*vide* Mvoko. *Business Day*. 4 October 2000), approach that has been introduced into the DFA's operational *milieu*.

From the foregoing it is clear that South Africa's current foreign policy approach is long on planning and relatively short on focus, and that in regard to its SA-PRC policy, it has only made progress at the pleasure and direction of the PRC (2001. *Interview*). If South Africa intends to show leadership, no matter how modest, in the international environment (not only Africa) it will need to choose its own course and demonstrate its independence (*vide* Landsberg. *Sowetan*. 7 July 1998: 12) by giving expression to its own needs and values through a foreign policy approach that adds moral and material value to its international pursuits. And whatever planning takes

place should focus on making the necessary resources available to achieve the broad goals, hopefully realistic goals, that the government has determined. As to the *best* foreign policy approach, a subtle combination of the generic and individual state approaches would, it is argued, help to create focus with regard to South Africa's foreign policy relationship with the PRC. Such a combination of approaches would free top decision makers to take important decisions in a consistent, reliable, dependable and predictable manner; and would subordinate planning and micro-management to a supportive role that would allow South Africa's professional policy advisors to get on with the business of advising decision makers. It would also give South Africa's diplomatic personnel the freedom to implement policy without foregoing the opportunity to also influence its direction from time to time by recommending changes to policies that prove ineffective or inappropriate.

The obvious monitors of policy, of course, are those who implement it, both within the DFA and at South Africa's Missions abroad. However, it is argued that the Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Portfolio Committee should play a much more high-profile role in this regard because there is a perceived need for public policy, including foreign policy, to be publicly debated when not of such a nature as to jeopardise national security if made public. It is also proposed that the Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee should have the right to publicly question, and veto if necessary, proposed new appointments of all ambassadors and heads of mission who would serve South Africa's interests abroad. This procedure, it is argued, would give added import to the proper and effective implementation of South African foreign policy.

Finally, it remains to point out that in order to be effective, and of practical benefit, a policy analysis needs to be comprehensible and timely (Hogwood and Gunn. 1984: 269). How timely it is perceived to be may depend on the response of the reader; whereas its comprehensibility depends essentially on the researcher.

7.7. Conclusion

This chapter has explored some of the practical limitations of foreign policy long-term planning and has also examined the current status of South Africa's relations with the People's Republic of China. The chapter has identified and explored a variety of approaches to foreign policy and has recommended a proposed "best" choice from a range of possible courses of action, whereby South Africa may pursue a more effective foreign policy relationship with the PRC. The chapter also demonstrates that in order for foreign policy to be effective, in regard to the PRC, proper professional skills and competencies must be available to members of the South African diplomatic contingent performing service in the People's Republic of China. Finally, it remains to summarise this thesis in the following and final chapter, and draw conclusions based on the elaborated body of research.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It was stated at the commencement of this thesis that its primary purpose and objective was the development and application of a reliable model for the purpose of foreign policy analysis that would assist, not only in an analysis of the foreign policy relationship between South Africa and the People's Republic of China but also in all other bilateral foreign policy relationships pursued by South Africa. The hypothesis was stated as follows:

that the employment of a research model, in the form of the proposed environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis, will facilitate an effective and comprehensive policy analysis of the bilateral relationship between South Africa and the People's Republic of China that will provide a framework for the future analysis of foreign policy, not only South African foreign policy.

A secondary objective was to assess and identify the *best* foreign policy formula that South Africa's foreign policy decision makers would need to implement in order to establish and maintain a maximally advantageous diplomatic relationship with the PRC.

Chapter one of this thesis elucidated the frame of reference and problem statement as well as the research hypothesis and also described and explained the research methodology and key concepts utilised within the context of the thesis. The chapter elaborated the hypothesis that the employment of a research model, in the form of the proposed environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis, will facilitate an effective and comprehensive policy analysis of the bilateral relationship between South Africa and the People's Republic of China that will provide a framework for the future analysis of foreign policy, not only South African foreign policy.

Chapter two described and explained the difference between Public Administration as a field of scientific study and public administration as a function of the executive branch of government. Chapter two concluded that foreign policy is also public policy that can be subjected to public policy analysis. The chapter also explained the decision making process as a dynamic systemic process of inputs, outputs and feedback, and demonstrated that individual actors and their decision making institutional *milieu*, as well as the personal characteristics and perceptions of such foreign policy decision makers, will help determine the nature and effectiveness of their decisions. The chapter also elucidated the importance of accurate factual information in the decision making process.

Chapter three advanced a basic core model (figure 3/1 *supra*) of the foreign policy process, comprising internal, external and communicational environments, in which foreign policy transactions take place and imperatives exert their influence upon foreign policy decisions. The chapter described and explained the individual components of the core model.

The environmental component (figure 3/2 *supra*) of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model showed that individual states may occupy a variety of different and sometimes overlapping external geographical regional environments, as well as multilateral communicational environments. This component also showed that the domestic environments of states are essentially unique as are the bilateral communicational relationships between states. The component showed that although foreign policy is made and ratified in the domestic environment, the bilateral communicational environment is the environment where *mutual* foreign policy transactions and exchanges, including a variety of authoritative policy making decisions, take place. The environmental component showed that foreign policy is an extension of domestic public policies into the external environments, within the ambit of diplomacy and diplomatic practice.

The chapter explained the leadership relationships component (figure 3/3 *supra*) of the core model and showed that all leadership relationships that may exert a decisive impact on public policy can be reduced to four. The chapter provided examples of the various types of decision makers who may make, shape or influence foreign policy and explained how leadership decision making relationships occur in all of the environments relative to the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis. The linkage between domestic policy and foreign policy was clearly elucidated. The chapter explained that although non-governmental organisations and individuals do not make foreign policy they may certainly influence the authoritative decisions of foreign policy decision makers within the domestic and communicational environments. The chapter identified key foreign policy decision makers and advisors within the bilateral environment and explained that there is a necessary distinction between actors who function in an authoritative capacity, as instruments of the state, and those non-governmental actors who may exert a peripheral or indirect influence on policy decisions.

Chapter three described and explained the imperatives component of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis and how this component provides the incentives for particular foreign policy decisions or courses of action. The chapter described and explained the development of an imperatives matrix (figure 3/4 *infra*), with a view to constructing world view profiles of South Africa and the People's Republic of China, and bringing coherence to foreign policy linkages reflected in the relevant bilateral environment.

The research concluded that the use of a model can facilitate an understanding of some of the factors that may determine the course of foreign policy as well as the inter-relationships and linkages between these factors. The research also concluded that the use of the proposed environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis can be utilised to comprehensively select and apply relevant data and information about the shaping and implementation of South African and Chinese foreign policy; and that the proposed model will facilitate the formulation of individual world view and foreign policy profiles that can in turn be utilised to

identify the most advantageous foreign policy strategy whereby South Africa can advance its foreign policy relationship with the People's Republic of China.

In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, chapter four described and explained the decision making *milieux* of the domestic and bilateral environments with specific reference to pertinent decision making, policy making and leadership relationships of the domestic environments of South Africa and the People's Republic of China. The research showed that leadership and decision making relationships originate in the domestic environment and then extend into the external environments, usually through the bilateral and multilateral communicational environments as foreign policy linkages between domestic environments. The research concluded that the decision makers of foreign policy are to be found in the executive branch of government, as are the implementers of such policy, whereas influencers of policy can be found in the hierarchy of the ruling political party, the higher echelons of government, and also in the non-governmental sector. The implementers of foreign policy within the public service, including diplomats serving abroad, were also identified as having an indispensable advisory role in the formation of foreign policy. The research also showed that, apart from departments or ministries of foreign affairs, a number of government departments, particularly those responsible for defence and trade, are involved in foreign policy concerns. The research showed that despite different domestic constitutional arrangements and different value systems, there are similarities whereby states communicate within the external environments and that most states maintain the equivalent of a foreign ministry, engage in international trade and have a military capability. The research also showed that in some domestic structures of government, irrespective of constitutional provisions to the contrary, there is an effective blurring of party-political and governmental divisions and responsibilities.

Chapter four described and explained the roles and functions of individual and institutional makers, influencers and implementers of foreign policy within the domestic and bilateral environments of South Africa and the People's Republic of China. The research showed that in both countries the president, as executive leader

of the government and leader of the ruling political party, have a decisive role in the foreign policy process. The research concluded that whereas, in the PRC, real executive power resides in the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, in South Africa relative equivalent power resides in the Presidency. Chapter four identifies the primary decision makers and influencers of policy within South Africa's Presidency and within the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China. It also records the cabinet portfolios relating to each country and observes that both South Africa and the PRC have resorted to the institution of cabinet clusters. The research showed that whereas South Africa includes the portfolios of foreign affairs, defence, environmental affairs and tourism, and the Office of the Presidency under the cluster of International Affairs the PRC includes foreign affairs and national defence under the cluster of State Political Affairs, together with nine other portfolios of a more domestic nature. The research found that in the case of the PRC the trade and defence portfolios are salient elements of PRC foreign policy. The research found that PRC ministries and departments of state routinely coordinate their foreign relations activities through the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs unlike their South African counterparts who often by-pass the Department of Foreign Affairs when communicating with foreign governments. The research also showed that foreign policy transactions sometimes originate at the local government or provincial levels of government, both in South Africa and the PRC, but that proper coordination of such transactions through the respective foreign affairs departments is less certain and more problematic in the case of South Africa.

Chapter four elucidated the hierarchical organisational structures (figures 4/1 and 4/4 *supra*) within the foreign affairs ministries and departments of South Africa and the PRC and described and explained the roles and responsibilities of their respective foreign ministers and most senior public officials. The chapter also elucidated the organisational structures of the foreign affairs departments of each country, with specific reference to the respective bureaucratic responsibilities pertaining to South Africa (figure 4/2 *supra*) and the PRC. It was found that officials in both foreign services are mainly implementers of policy and that major foreign policy decisions tend to be taken at the highest political level. The research found that contributions to

foreign policy formulation by think tanks and professional institutes were more likely to take place in the PRC than in South Africa. The research also concluded that the monitoring of public policies, including foreign policy, was potentially more effective in South Africa than in the People's Republic of China, due mainly to the existence in South Africa of a free press and an opposition political system. The research found that the eight democratic parties of the PRC are effective extensions of the ruling Communist Party and that all news media sources in the PRC are controlled by the state. The research also found that monitoring does take place within the PRC where it is termed *supervision* but that it is unlikely to affect the power core within the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The research found that the foreign media and foreign governments are the most effective monitors of PRC public policies, including foreign policy. The research also found that, in the case of South Africa, the monitoring role of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs is too limited, in its present form, to contribute to the improvement of South African foreign policy, either in its formulation or its execution.

Chapter five considered the *origination* of foreign policy within South Africa and the People's Republic of China and the development of proposed systemic models of the foreign policy making processes in both countries. The research showed that traumatic historical, cultural and ideological influences that have left a deep imprint on the national leadership and national psyche of a country over a long period of time, may also determine the nature of its foreign policy. The chapter concluded that *apartheid*, racism, slavery; the influence of Marxism-Leninism and socialism; colonialism, capitalism and free market principles; the experience of revolution; Pan-Africanism, African Nationalism and the concept of the African Renaissance; and imported values, had all contributed to South Africa's foreign policy perspective. The chapter also concluded that the PRC's foreign policy perspective had been shaped by the thoughts, theories and contributions of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin; Marxism-Leninism and socialism; imperialism, colonialism and invasion; Confucius and other classical thinkers; the revolutionary experience; Chinese nationalism; and imported values.

Chapter five also explored the contributions of the eight imperatives, identified in chapter three *supra*, in regard to the foreign policy making process. The research concluded that South Africa and the PRC are both deeply affected by perceived past injustices and that both are suspicious of the motives of the developed world, particularly the United States. The research concluded that whereas South Africa tends to perceive the developing world as its natural ideological ally the PRC has been careful to avoid becoming tied to any region or group of states on ideological grounds. The research found that both states have tended to focus on playing leading roles in the multilateral environment and that this activity has tended to compliment their mutual interests at the bilateral level. The research concluded that although formal ideology enjoys a relatively low profile in South Africa, ideology has, in a sense, been replaced by the projection of a vision for Africa in the form of the African Renaissance. The research concluded that South Africa's political and historical experience has resulted in an expressed commitment to human rights as well as a dedicated campaign to make the South African foreign service more representative of the country's racial composition, by appointing more black heads of mission and senior diplomats serving abroad. The research also concluded that the PRC's foreign policy is dedicated to the preservation of Chinese sovereignty, the reunification of China, opposition to perceived American hegemonic pursuits, the focus on economic pursuits, and the advancement of China under the leadership of the Communist Party.

The research concluded that public policy decisions are affected not only by the personal value systems of decision makers but also by the nature of the constitutional and institutional decision making mechanisms available to them. The research also concluded that South Africa's important foreign policy decisions are dependant upon an exclusive group within the Presidency and that the monitoring of foreign policy usually takes place after policy has been implemented. The research found that few measures are in place to ensure that proposed policies are the *best* policies. Chapter five also explored the decision making process as a systemic process and elaborated an ideal decision making model (figure 5/2 *supra*) that incorporates information contained in chapters three, four and five *supra*. The model incorporates imperatives

as inputs, foreign policy as outputs and foreign policy responses as feedback. The research concluded that systemic representations of the foreign policy making processes pertaining to South Africa (figure 5/3 *supra*) and the PRC (figure 5/4 *supra*), based on research reflected in chapters four and five *supra*, would accurately reflect the dynamics of foreign policy making in those countries.

Chapter six focused on the initiators and influencers of foreign policy within the external environments, in accordance with the ideas advanced in chapters three and four *supra*. The research concluded that as direct foreign policy making takes place in the domestic geographical environment, external geographical environments are largely responsible for indirect or peripheral influences that may act upon the policy making process. The chapter described and explained the primary regional and international concerns of South Africa and the PRC. The research concluded that “revolutionary friendships” concluded between South Africa’s liberation movements during the *apartheid* years have formed a basis for improved bilateral relationships in the post-*apartheid* era and that the PRC has also derived benefits from these earlier “friendships.” The research concluded that although the PRC is officially a developing country its available power and economic potential makes it effectively more than a developing state and somewhat less than a developed state. The research concluded that the PRC belongs in a category by itself.

The concept of the *third state*, whereby another state may exert an impact on the bilateral relationship of two other states, was described in paragraph 6.2.1.4. *supra*. The research showed that whereas during the *apartheid* years a number of third states were able to affect the direction of South Africa’s foreign policy, including neighbouring African states and the former Soviet Union, current third states are likely to be limited to the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. The research concluded that the PRC is, itself, capable of acting as a third state and has, in fact, done so in regard to South Africa’s former diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. The research found that the PRC is relatively immune from the impact of third states with the possible exception of the United States. The research also concluded that the PRC had effectively acted as a third state, albeit in a multilateral context, when South

Africa failed to support the United States-sponsored resolution condemning human rights abuses in the People's Republic of China.

Chapter six concluded that South Africa's regional priorities reside in Africa and the developing world whereas the People's Republic of China's regional priorities reside in the Asian-Pacific region with specific attention to the resolution of territorial claims and frontier disputes. Nonetheless, the research has also shown that the PRC considers Africa and the developing world as strategically important resources areas. The research has shown that although South Africa is committed to the restructuring of the United Nations in order to achieve equal representation for developing states, the PRC is unlikely to agree to any form of restructuring that diminishes its own influence and prestige.

The research concluded that South Africa's foreign policy, with regard to the People's Republic of China, requires a strengthening of its professional competence at the political and senior bureaucratic levels and more experience in political and diplomatic negotiations, and language skills. The research concluded that affirmative action policies have been applied extensively in the Department of Foreign Affairs, which may result in insufficient capacity to advise Government on foreign policy. The research also concluded that the appointment of South African heads of mission should be re-considered with a view to providing for a parliamentary procedure whereby all candidates nominated for appointment by the President could be questioned in public hearings by the Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Portfolio Committee. The research found that the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs has appointed professional diplomats, including those serving as heads of mission, to serve in South Africa. The research also concluded that, at the higher levels of foreign policy making, the PRC has shown itself to be pragmatic and effective rather than politically and ideologically hidebound, as exemplified by the inclusion of top bureaucrats in the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) which is an important foreign policy making instrument of the Communist Party of China. The research found that South Africa's president, by contrast with the PRC, apparently relies heavily on the loyalty of advisors to the detriment of expertise. The research

also concluded that South Africa and the PRC share a revolutionary bond that reveals itself at the party political level and is capable of influencing their foreign policy relationship.

The research also concluded that South Africa's historical experiences of racism and colonialism have tended to persuade South Africa's top decision makers to view the world in terms of their own experiences within the domestic environment and that, consequently, the developed world is seen as wealthy and white whereas the developing world is seen as poor and non-white. The research also concluded that the PRC does not view the world from a racial or ethnic perspective and that, in line with its ideological base and historical experience, its focus is firmly on economic development and related inequities. Chapter six utilised the information reflected in chapters four and five and much of chapter six *supra*, to construct matrices based upon the linkage model elucidated in chapter three *supra*, that would reflect the respective world views of South Africa and the People's Republic of China. The research reflected that it is possible to identify salient characteristics pertaining to South Africa and the PRC in terms of the five environments, four leadership relationships and eight imperatives identified in chapter three *supra* and that the resultant matrices are capable of isolating factors that may affect the formulation and implementation of a state's foreign policy, including the policy making acumen of its leaders.

Chapter seven described and explained particular limitations in regard to the planning of foreign policy. The research found that South Africa's foreign policy planners have, in some respects, treated foreign policy not merely as an extension of domestic policy but as domestic policy itself. The research concluded that although there is a clear need for long term planning in terms of financial and other resources, foreign policy requires planning for alternative choices in order to resolve what is foreseeable in the relatively short term; and that a lack of focus in this regard, may explain the current status of South Africa's subordinate relationship with the PRC. The research reflected that South African foreign policy makers tend to think in terms of

“friendships” with other states, as opposed to “interests” that tend to provide a more sure indication of foreign policy motives.

The research concluded that the Strategic Plan 2000-2005 of South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) is unrealistic and tends to confirm the notion that DFA is being utilised as a domestic department, similar to the Department of Labour or the Department of Public Works. The research concluded that the wording of the Strategic Plan *supra* is insufficiently precise to be useful and is open to subjective interpretation. The research also concluded that existing monitoring mechanisms within DFA threaten to displace foreign policy considerations due to an emphasis on bureaucratic planning, so that such planning becomes an objective in itself.

The research concluded that the current status of South Africa’s relationship with the PRC is reflected by the number of bilateral agreements signed between the two states during their relatively short diplomatic relationship, as well as the extent of their trade volume, and the number of high-level visits between the two states. The research also found that there are a number of actual and potential problem areas, concerning South Africa’s relationship with the PRC that need to be addressed, particularly in regard to tourism, agriculture, environmental concerns, protection of intellectual property rights, illegal immigration, human rights concerns, crime and the dumping of surplus goods.

Chapter seven identified a number of foreign policy approaches, namely a generic approach, a regional approach, an individual-state approach, an idealistic approach, a realistic approach, and a constructive engagement approach. The research concluded that the realistic and constructive engagement approaches would be inappropriate given the vast disparity in available power between the two states, in favour of the PRC. Research also concluded that an idealistic approach would create conditions for inconsistency and contradiction, whereas a regional approach would be premature in the context of African regional organisations.

Chapter seven described and explained the PRC's generic approach to foreign policy on the basis of clearly defined principles whereby that country conducts its foreign relations with other states. The chapter also described and explained the individual-state approach. The research concluded that, in terms of the numerous binational commissions entered into with other states, including the PRC, South Africa has already embarked upon this course but that it would be prudent for South Africa to also employ the generic approach by setting out particular principles that clearly elucidate South Africa's foreign policy concerns. The research concluded that, in view of the PRC's willingness to discuss human rights issues with the United States, Hungary and the European Union, and in view of South Africa's stated commitment to human rights causes, it would be appropriate for South Africa and the PRC to engage in bilateral dialogue on this issue on a regular basis. The research therefore concluded that a combination of the generic approach and the individual-state approach would provide the *best* alternative approach whereby South Africa ought to pursue its foreign policy relationship with the People's Republic of China.

Although classification and categorisation are recognised as essential tools of scientific analysis it is important to let the facts create their own categories. In this particular policy analysis three categories of factors were identified which may influence a state's foreign policy; environments; leadership relationships; and imperatives. Specific sub-categories were also identified, in which foreign policy exchanges take place and leadership decision making relationships occur; and specific issues were identified which may drive a state's foreign policy in a particular direction.

The concept of *world view* features prominently in this thesis, more specifically in chapter five *supra*, and forms an integral part of the decision making systems models also referred to in chapter five *supra*. The research concluded that the relevant *world views* of South Africa and the PRC are manifest in their respective foreign and domestic policy approaches, as reflected in this policy analysis.

The environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis, described and explained in chapter three *supra*, assisted in keeping the research focused on three components of the foreign policy *milieu* that may best describe and explain the nature of foreign policy; and the relevant factors that may determine the nature and direction of a specific foreign policy relationship as exists between South Africa and the PRC. Consequently, as the foregoing research has demonstrated, the use of the environmental-relations-imperatives linkage model is a valid and viable model for foreign policy analysis. It follows, therefore, that the hypothesis advanced in chapter one, paragraph 1.4 *supra* has been proven correct.

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9. ANNEXURES

9.1. ADDENDUM ONE (PRC. 1997. appendix: 99-114)

NATIONAL CONGRESSES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
(CPC)

1. The First National Congress of the CPC

Date: July 23-31, 1921

Place: Convened in Shanghai and moved to a yacht on Nanhu Lake, Jiaxing, Zhjiang Province, on the final day.

Number of delegates: 12

Party membership: 50+

2 The Second National Congress of the CPC

Date: July 16-23, 1922

Place: Shanghai

Number of delegates: 15

Party membership: 195

3 The Third National Congress of the CPC

Date: June 12-20, 1923

Place: Guangzhou

Number of delegates: 30+

Party membership: 432

4 The Fourth National Congress of the NPC

Date: January 11-22, 1925

Place: Shanghai

Number of delegates: 20

Party membership: 994

5 The Fifth National Congress of the NPC

Date: April 27-May 9, 1927

Place: Wuhan

Number of delegates: 80

Party membership: 57 967

6 The Sixth National Congress of the NPC

Date: June 18-July 11, 1928

Place: Moscow

Number of delegates: 84 full delegates and 34 alternate delegates

Party membership: 40 000

7 The Seventh National Congress of the NPC

Date: April 23-June 11, 1945

Place: Yan'an

Number of delegates: 544 full delegates and 208 alternate delegates

Party membership: 1.21 million

8 The Eighth National Congress of the CPC

Date: September 15-27, 1956

Place: Beijing

Number of delegates: 1 026 full delegates and 107 alternate delegates

Party membership: 10.73 million

9 The Ninth National Congress of the CPC

Date: April 1-24, 1969

Place: Beijing

Number of delegates: 1 512

Party membership: 22 million

10 The Tenth National Congress of the NPC

Date: August 24-28, 1973

Place: Beijing

Number of delegates: 1 249

Party membership: 28 million

11 The Eleventh National Congress of the NPC

Date: August 12-18, 1977

Place: Beijing

Number of delegates: 1 510

Party membership: 35 million

12 The Twelfth National Congress of the CPC

Date: September 1-11, 1982

Place: Beijing

Number of delegates: 1 600 full delegates and 149 alternate delegates

Party membership: 39.65 million

13 The Thirteenth National Congress of the NPC

Date: October 25-November 1, 1987

Place: Beijing

Number of delegates: 1 936 full delegates and 61 specially invited delegates

Party membership: 46 million

14 The Fourteenth National Congress of the NPC

Date: October 12-18, 1992

Place: Beijing

Number of delegates: 1989 full delegates and 46 specially invited delegates

Party membership: 51 million

15 The Fifteenth National Congress of the NPC

Date: September 12-18, 1997

Place: Beijing

Number of delegates: 2 048 delegates and 60 specially invited delegates

Party membership: 58 million

9.2. ADDENDUM TWO (PRC. 1997. *Appendix: 99-114*)

LEADERSHIP AND CHANGING EXECUTIVE STRUCTURES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CPC)

1) 1921-1922	SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CPC	MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CPC
	Chen Duxiu	Chen Duxiu Zhang Guotao Li Da
2) 1922-1923	CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CPC	MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CPC
	Chen Duxiu	Chen Duxiu Zhang Guotao Cai Hesen Gao Junyu Deng Zhongxia
3) 1923-1925	CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL BUREAU OF THE CPC	MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL BUREAU OF THE CPC
	Chen Duxiu	Chen Duxiu Mao Zedong Luo Zhanglong Cai Hesen Tan Pingshan
4) 1925-1927	GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CPC	MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPC
	Chen Duxiu	Zhang Guotao Peng Shuzhi Cai Hesen Qu Qiubai

5) 1927-1928 GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPC MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CPC

Chen Duxiu

Chen Duxiu
Zhang Guotao
Li Weihan
Cai Hesen
Li Lisan
Qi Qiubai
Tan Pingshan

6) 1928-1945 SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPC MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CPC

Xiang Zhongfa

Xiang Zhongfa
Zhou Enlai
Su Zhaozheng
Xiang ying
Qu Qiubai
Zhang Guotao
Cai Hesen

7) 1945-1956 CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPC MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CPC

Mao Zedong

Mao Zedong
Zhu De
Liu Shaoqi
Zhou Enlai
Ren Bishi
Chen Yun
Kang Sheng
Gao Gang
Peng Zhen
Dong Biwu
Lin Boqu
Zhang Wentian
Peng Dehuai

MEMBERS OF THE
SECRETARIAT OF THE CPC

Mao Zedong
Zhu De
Liu Shaoqi
Zhou Enlai
Ren Bishi

8) 1956-1969 CHAIRMAN OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE CPC

Mao Zedong

VICE CHAIRMEN OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
CPC

Liu Shaoqi
Zhou Enlai
Zhu De
Chen Yun

GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
CPC

Deng Xiaoping

MEMBERS OF THE
STANDING
COMMITTEE OF THE
CENTRAL POLITICAL
BUREAU OF THE CPC

Mao Zedong
Liu Shaoqi
Zhou Enlai
Zhu De
Chen Yun
Deng Xiaoping

9) 1969-1973 CHAIRMAN OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE CPC

Mao Zedong

VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE CPC

Lin Biao

MEMBERS OF THE STANDING
COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL
POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CPC

Mao Zedong
Lin Biao
Chen Boda
Zhou Enlai
Kang Sheng

10) 1973-1977 CHAIRMAN OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE CPC

Mao Zedong

VICE CHAIRMEN OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
CPC

Zhou Enlai
Wang Hongwen
Kang Sheng
Ye Jianying
Li Desheng

MEMBERS OF THE
STANDING COMMITTEE OF
THE CENTRAL
POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE
CPC

Mao Zedong
Wang Hongwen
Ye Jianying
Zhu De
Li Desheng
Zhang Chungqiao
Zou Enlai
Kang Sheng
Dong Biwu

11) 1977-1982 CHAIRMAN OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE CPC

Hua Guofeng

VICE CHAIRMEN OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE CPC

Ye Jianying
Deng Xiaoping
Li Xiannian
Wang Dongxing

MEMBERS OF THE STANDING
COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL
POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CPC

Hua Guofeng
Ye Jianying
Deng Xiaoping
Li Xiannian
Wang Dongxing

12)1982-1987 GENERAL SECRETARY
OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE
CPC

Hu Yaobang

CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL
MILITARY COMMISSION

Deng Xiaoping

CHAIRMAN OF THE
CENTRAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION

Deng Xiaoping

SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMISSION FOR
DISCIPLINE INSPECTION

Chen yun

MEMBERS OF THE
STANDING
COMMITTEE OF THE
CENTRAL POLITICAL
BUREAU OF THE CPC

Hu Yaobang
Ye Jianying
Deng Xiaoping
Zhao Ziyang
Li Xiannian
Chen Yun

13) 1987-1992 GENERAL SECRETARY
OF THE CENTRAL
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CPC

Zhao Ziyang

CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL
MILITARY COMMISSION

Deng Xiaoping

CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION

Chen Yun

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL
COMMISSION FOR DISCIPLINE
INSPECTION

Qiao Shi

MEMBERS OF THE STANDING
COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL
POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CPC

Zhao Ziyang

Li Peng

Qiao Shi

Hu Qili

Yao Yilin

14) 1992-1997 GENERAL SECRETARY
OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE
CPC

Jiang Zemin

CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL
MILITARY COMMISSION

Jiang Zemin

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL
COMMISSION FOR DISCIPLINE
INSPECTION

Wei Jianxing

MEMBERS OF THE STANDING
COMMITTEE OF THE POLITICAL
BUREAU OF THE CPC

Jiang Zemin

Li Peng

Qiao Shi

Li Ruihuan

Zhu Rongji
Liu Huaqing
Hu Jintao

15)1997-2002 GENERAL SECRETARY
THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE
CPC

Jiang Zemin

CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL
MILITARY COMMISSION

Jiang Zemin

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL
COMMISSION FOR DISCIPLINE
INSPECTION

Wei Jianxing

MEMBERS OF THE STANDING
COMMITTEE OF THE POLITICAL
BUREAU OF THE CPC

Jiang Zemin
Li Peng
Zhu Rongji
Li Ruihuan
Hu Jintao
Wei Jianxing
Li Lanqing

9.3. ADDENDUM THREE

STATES AND THEIR ENVIRONMENTS.

TYPES OF ENVIRONMENT	SHARING THE SAME ENVIRONMENT	NOTES AND COMMENTARY
DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT	NO	Each individual state has its own domestic environment
BILATERAL ENVIRONMENT	YES	Any two individual states would share a unique bilateral environment
REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT	YES and No	Although SA and the PRC do not share the same regional <i>geographical</i> environment many states do
MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTS	YES and No	SA and the PRC share some multilateral environments and do not share others. Both situations are possible for all states of the international environment.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT	YES	All states and political entities are part of the international environment.

KEY: SA: SOUTH AFRICA
 PRC: PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

9.4. ADDENDUM FOUR

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) LIST OF TREATIES BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA (SA) AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

DATE	TITLE
19911218	Exchange of Notes regarding the Establishment of Informal Offices in Pretoria and Beijing
19971230	Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
19971230	Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
19971230	Agreement concerning the Maintenance of the Consulate-General of the Republic of South Africa in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China
19971230	Agreement concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments. (Entry into force: 1 April, 1998)
19981215	Exchange of Notes regarding Funding of the Edenvale/Modderfontein Low-Cost Housing Project
19990202	Agreement relating to Civil Air Transport
19990202	Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Economic and Trade Commission
19990202	Letter of Intent on Consultations (between the SA and PRC foreign services)
19990202	Agreement on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation
19990330	Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation
19990414	Exchange of Notes regarding Participation in the Integrated Fish Farming Technology Training Course
20000323	Exchange of Notes concerning the Provision of Water Supply Materials
20000425	Agreement on Phytosanitary Cooperation

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