5.5.8. Legal imperative

South Africa's legal system can be traced back to the classical Roman era and the Dutch and British legal systems of the 17th and 18th centuries. Today the supreme law of South Africa is the South African Constitution, which embodies a Bill of Rights (vide [4]SA. 1996. Constitution: preamble and chapter two). South Africa's adherence to the rule of law is an implied guarantee of its continued respectability within the international system. However, as globalisation begins to exert demands upon sovereignty, South Africa's laws, and their implementation, may increasingly be measured against the laws of other states, and the manner of their implementation, and no doubt, vice versa.

It may be difficult for some European and American observers, representing well-established democracies, to reconcile the vision of a dedicated South African professional foreign service comprising diplomats who have served time in prison for crimes that include murder and acts of terrorism against civilians (Pigou in Mail & Guardian. 26 April to 3 May 2001: 32). The legal imperative demands the application of reason and judgement and justice to the problems of injustice; not the violent remedies of the vigilante or terrorist, as may be viewed by external critics of the African experience of democracy.

The legal imperative therefore demands greater adherence than ever before, particularly in regard to relations between states, to concurrence, consistency, reciprocity and dependability; and ought certainly to be consistent with what is considered to be in the best interests of South Africa. This requirement goes further than the law itself, the point being that all those who formulate and implement foreign policy, as in the case of all public policy, ought to be legally accountable for the decisions they take and the policies they implement on behalf of the South African people (vide Botha in Hanekom et al. 1986: 173-174).

In South Africa's domestic environment to date, the legal imperative appears to have become bogged down in the need to ensure that laws are fair and just (vide [4]SA.
1996. *Constitution*: paragraphs one and two) whereas there is an added need to ensure that they are also enforced. Externally, international agreements are usually adhered to in the manner of gentlemen’s agreements in the knowledge that failure to comply, particularly in the absence of a compelling reason to do so, would bring international dishonour to the country concerned (*vide* Cohen. 1981: 8-9).

5.6. World view foreign policy matrix applicable to the PRC

5.6.1. Historical imperative

Any clear understanding of China’s foreign policy will be impossible in the absence of at least an equally clear understanding of China’s history. The Chinese view themselves, their traditions, their culture and their achievements in terms of their history; they are both the creatures and the creators of their country’s history. The history of China cannot ever be divorced from the national psyche of the people of China and *vice versa*. As Fairbank and Reischauer (1990: 2) have explained,

... the Chinese ... are strongly aware of their heritage. To approach them through their history is to look at them as they see themselves. ... Only as one looks at the long flow of Chinese history can one perceive the direction of motion and have some understanding of what is happening in China now.

According to Fairbank and Reischauer, the Chinese people have traditionally viewed history as “change within tradition” (1990: 178). This concept implies that change was expected to take place within the parameters of what was known and what was traditionally acceptable.

The Preamble to the Constitution of the PRC, adopted on 4 December, 1982, refers to China as “one of the countries with the longest histories in the world” (*3*)PRC. 1998. *Yearbook 1997* 1998: 1) and draws a deliberate link between feudal China,
semi-colonial China, nationalist revolutionary China and Communist revolutionary China in the form of the People’s Republic of China, whereby “the Chinese people took State power into their own hands and became masters of the country” (3 PRC. Yearbook 1997 98: 1). In this sense, the mandate of heaven (or acceptance by the people) (2 Yang. 1999: 157 and 207-209), which had been denied the last Chinese emperor in 1911, and which had passed briefly to Sun Yatsen and then Chiang Kai Chek, was transferred to the PRC Government when it took power in 1949 under Mao Zedong (Ch’en. 1967: 312), and recognised as such by the people of the PRC.

*China’s leaders dwelt so much upon tradition, and the experiences of the past, that anything that happened in the present was perceived and understood in terms of historical experience; the lessons of the past were expected to be learned in order to make the present more manageable* (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 178).

Instead of the Westerner’s ideal of progress, and his continuing fascination with the future, the Chinese, for much of their history, drew on the distant past for their models of perfection (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 178; vide Roberts. 2000: xiv). An intrinsic theme of China’s history is the political and geographical cycle of unification and division (Jian et al. 1986: 17). The theme of cyclical unification and division is also deeply ingrained in the national culture, through the impact of popular classical novels such as *Three Kingdoms*, which begins with the words: “The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide. Thus it has ever been” (Roberts. 1995: 5). The cycle began in 221 BC when China was unified for the first time by the King of Ch’in, China’s “First Emperor”. Although his dynasty did not endure long after his death, “the imperial system he created was to continue, though with occasional breaks, proving to be the world’s most durable political system” (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 6 and 59).

The historical imperative necessarily includes China’s national political imperative towards unification whenever it experiences division, as in the case of the country’s early feudal history, the foreign occupations during the concessions of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, the Japanese invasion and occupation, the civil war, pre-unification Hong Kong and Macao, and the current estranged status of Taiwan. In the PRC Constitution it is stated that, “it is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of re-unifying the motherland” (3)PRC. 1998. Yearbook. 1997 1998: 2). Consequently, it is entirely in keeping with the historical imperative of a unified motherland that all the major wars fought by China throughout its long history have been about sovereignty and the related strategic imperative to attempt to either defend or re-claim Chinese territory.

For most of China’s history there have been those who challenged the status quo. Therefore, leaders were invariably also curtailed from embarking upon foreign campaigns of conquest and adventure by the need to either put down rebellion at home or by the likely necessity of preparing to do so later. Consequently, the people of China, unlike many other peoples in the Americas, Europe and even parts of Asia and Africa have roots in the land they presently occupy that go back not hundreds but thousands of years. They did not migrate to the region; they were always part of China, as was the prehistoric Peking Man who lived and died in China 400 000 years ago (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 5). “The neolithic peoples of north China and possibly their paleolithic predecessors appear to have been the direct ancestors of the modern Chinese” (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 18). Therefore, an important and largely unique characteristic of the Chinese is that the people as a nation, the “people of heaven”, have never been completely colonised and thereby have never lost control of their cultural development, and have also never lost physical contact with the land of their ancestors.

The ideal of political unity has been nurtured throughout China’s history. Unaware for much of their existence of the great cultures of the West, the Chinese considered their domain to be the unique land of civilisation, surrounded by barbarians. They therefore called their land “Chung-kuo” (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 20) or “Zhong Guo” which means “central country” or, more commonly, “middle kingdom”. Underlying this devotion to the Chinese way of life was the fact that the whole Middle Kingdom remained an administrative unit under a central government. As
Fairbank and Reischauer point out, such unity owes far more to the habits of thought of the Chinese people than to mere geography (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 179). It has been argued that the unique and complicated writing system of China, which goes back thousands of years, was an important unifying influence in the early creation and preservation of the Chinese nation (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 27). Although China’s vast geographical size could have been expected to have made government relatively more difficult, the Chinese state was regarded as coterminous with Chinese culture. There was such a close identification of the entire way of life with the unified empire that the one implied the other (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 179). Consequently, in the People’s Republic of China, unity of political thought is encouraged, as the country’s constitution (1PRC. 2000. Constitution: preamble) makes clear.

In the long years of revolution and construction, there has been formed under the leadership of the Communist Party of China a broad patriotic united front that is composed of democratic parties and peoples’ organisations and which embraces all socialist working people, all patriots who support socialism and all patriots who stand for reunification of the motherland.

Coupled with the quest to re-achieve and preserve the unity of China, however, is the ongoing objective of modernisation (vide Salisbury. 1993: 332-333), an economic imperative which is also closely related to the need to ensure the political survival of the People’s Republic of China through and beyond the twenty-first century.

5.6.2. Political imperative

The political imperative that appears to have driven most Chinese rulers has been the quest for power legitimised by the Mandate of Heaven (2 Yang. 1999: 157 and 207-209). Although some prominent imperial administrations such as the Han dynasty devoted attention primarily to the lavish support of the emperor and his relatives and the defence of the dynasty; not to any particular concern for the people except as
taxpayers, labour and potential rebels (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 61), it would be wrong to assume that the welfare of the subject peoples of China’s successive dynasties and governments was not also a concern, albeit not a particular concern. This view is given substance by Mencius’s observation that the Mandate of Heaven, “the basic justification for the ruler’s power, manifests itself only through the acceptance of a ruler by his people; if the people kill or depose him it is clear that he has lost heaven’s support” (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 52; vide 2 Yang. 1999: 157 and 207-209).

According to Fairbank and Reischauer the traditions and techniques of centralised rule in China had become so ingrained and strong by the tenth century that a lengthy multiple division of the country was no longer possible and, with the exception of foreign conquest, China would not for any significant length of time re-experience division between competing Chinese factions until the twentieth century. Thus, it was from the time of the Tang dynasty, which ruled China from 608 AD until 907 AD, that “China became a virtually indestructible political unit” (1990: 123). The political imperative that has driven China’s foreign policy during much of the existence of the People’s Republic of China has been the ideology of Marxism-Leninism as influenced by the ideas of, particularly Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping (CPC. 1997: 1). On 25 April, 1956 Mao Zedong produced a report entitled, “On the ten major relationships” (PRC. 1991. Major Documents: 882) during a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. He identified the ten major relationships as follows:

- The relationship between heavy industry and light industry and agriculture;
- The relationship between industry in the coastal regions and industry in the interior;
- The relationship between economic construction and defence;
- The relationship between the state, the units of production and the producers;
- The relationship between central and local authorities;
• The relationship between the Han and the minority nationalities;
• The relationship between the Party and the non-Party members;
• The relationship between revolution and counter-revolution;
• The relationship between right and wrong; and
• The relationship between China and other countries.

The continuing focus on these basic relationships is manifested in current PRC domestic and foreign policy, either through campaigns such as, for example, economic development of the western regions of the PRC and the anti-corruption campaign; emphasis on the perceived contributions of the United Front and the eight democratic parties; the *four modernisations*, envisioned by Zhou Enlai and subsequently championed by Deng Xiaoping, that focused on the need to modernise agricultural methods, industry, science and technology, and defence needs (Salisbury. 1993: 332-333); and the PRC’s foreign policy relationships in terms of the five principles of peaceful coexistence (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 402-403).

The influence of Marxism-Leninism, the Communist Party of China and the individual core leaders, predominantly Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping (*vide* {1}PRC. 2000. *Constitution*: preamble), and more recently Jiang Zemin, is omnipresent in PRC public policy, including foreign policy. In order to survive, however, the CPC seems obliged to keep re-inventing itself (*vide* {2}Brahm. 1996: 12-13) in the face of, particularly, economic changes that are shaping the modern PRC. For example, in April, 1998, the secretary of the Beijing University Committee of the Communist Party of China told a forum on communism’s past, present and future that Marxism had entered a new stage of development because of Deng Xiaoping Theory (*vide* CPC. 1997: 1), which is known as “contemporary Marxism”. He said that the theory, as applied by the CPC, would rejuvenate China and that a modernised China in the 21st century would further “prove the correctness of Marxism” (*China Daily*. 21 April 1998: 4).
5.6.3. Economic imperative

The economic goals determined by the 15th Congress of the CPC were aimed at a three-phase transformation of China into a developed industrialised state by the middle of the twenty-first century.

In the first decade, the GDP will double that of the year 2000, people will enjoy an even more comfortable lifestyle, and a more or less ideal socialist market economy will come into being... when the party celebrates its centenary in 2021, the economy will be more developed and systems will be further improved... when the People’s Republic celebrates its centenary in 2049, modernisation will have been accomplished, and China will have become a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and modern socialist country. The average per capita income will have soared to US 4,000 Dollars (PRC.1998: 5).

Underpinning these ambitious domestic economic goals are the domestic goals of peace and stability and the diplomatic and foreign policy goals of defending China’s sovereignty, opposing hegemonism and creating a new international political order (CPC. 1997: 87-89).

5.6.4. Social imperative

The geography of China is such that, for much of their history, the Chinese people were relatively isolated from the rest of the known world.

Separated by great distances and formidable mountains and deserts ... East Asian civilisation ... developed distinctive cultural patterns that have been retained in large part until today (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 3).
5.6.5. Strategic imperative

Whether 3000 or 5000 years ago, or even during more recent times, the forbidding surrounding terrain and continual threat of instability and warfare within the Greater China region, made the very thought of political or military expansion beyond the Tibetan Plateau or the Gobi desert, or the mountains of the north and north-west, imprudent and unrealistic. (Ronay. 1978: 203). The Chinese were prepared to defend their region against all invaders but, in the space of more than three thousand years of recorded history, would rarely go in search of conquests beyond the limits of those forbidding natural barriers. Some foreign campaigns did take place, though, such as the conquest of territory in Korea, Vietnam and Sogdiana, during the early part of the Han dynastic period which lasted from 206 BC to 220 AD (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 59-65). Important conquests also took place in the seventh and eighth centuries, when China’s political and military power encompassed a vast area from Southern Siberia to Southeast Asia and westward through Tibet and Central Asia to the Caspian sea (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 98-99).

The Chinese have also known domination and humiliation by foreigners, including Mongolians, at various times during their history. Consequently, Marco Polo recorded that,

... the Great Khan (the Mongolian, Ghengis Khan) had not succeeded to the domination of Cathay by hereditary right, but held it by conquest; and thus, having no confidence in the natives, he put all authority into the hands of the Tartars, Saracens, or Christians, who were attached to his household and devoted to his service, and were foreigners in Cathay (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 168).

During the early decades of the Maoist era the PRC Government elucidated a strategy (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. 1971: 194-195) aimed at isolating and defeating the United States and capitalism. In terms of this strategy the industrialised states (the countries of North America and Western Europe) were analogous to cities and could
be isolated by gaining control of the undeveloped third world states (the countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia) which were analogous to the rural countryside. This was classic guerrilla strategy and was articulated by the (subsequently disgraced) PRC Vice Premier and Defence Minister of the time, Lin Biao (Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 297; Plano and Olton. 1969: 78-79), although the concept may have come originally from the mind of Mao Zedong (vide Mao’s three world’s theory in Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 294). In some respects this strategy is still practised, but with a view to gaining economic, political and diplomatic, rather than military, advantage for the PRC vis a vis the developed world, particularly African states (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 294). Thus the underdeveloped and developing countries are seen as opportunities, for the PRC, to seek and promote economic partnerships as well as mutually beneficial trade and investment. A fundamental driving force behind the strategic imperative is the re-unification of China, the main focus being on the re-incorporation of Taiwan (vide Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 299); the defence of Chinese sovereignty; and the prevention of perceived American hegemonic ambition (vide Roy. 1998: 31) in and around the China region.

During the history of the PRC, wars have been fought against United Nations forces in Korea, the United States (in defence of South Korea and Taiwan), and Russia, India and Vietnam (in connection with various territorial disputes). In all these wars the PRC was motivated by the perceived need to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

5.6.6. Scientific and technological imperative

The PRC’s commitment to progress in the field of science and technology was stressed very clearly in the Four Modernisations campaign of Deng Xiao Ping, which focused specifically on “... agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defence ...” (Henderson. 1999: 25). In the post-Deng era of Jiang Zemin a facet of the scientific and technological modernisation became joined to the modernisation of national defence with a view toward preparing to fight future “... regional limited war under high tech conditions ...” (You. 1999: 1). The Gulf War
The social structure of China developed over thousands of years and, as Fairbank and Reischauer (1990: 15-16) explain,

the family rather than the individual, the state or the church, has formed the most significant unit in Chinese society... The family system was both hierarchic and authoritarian. The status of each person depended on his position by birth or marriage. ... The patriarchal father was the centre of authority.

During the Communist period of the People’s Republic of China, however, and the introduction of the one child family policy (Roberts. 2000: 272) initiated in 1979, which reportedly (Roberts. 2000: 273) encouraged “... abortion, sterilisation and female infanticide ...”, the traditional extended and hierarchical family structures were gradually broken down. Consequently, in the twenty-first century there will, presumably, be a large mass of only-children, predominantly males, who will never have nieces or nephews and whose own children will never have aunts or uncles or cousins; a self-centred generation that will one day contribute to the leadership echelon of the PRC. Nevertheless, the concept of brotherhood, as reflected in the African concept of Ubuntu, also has deep roots in Chinese cultural tradition. According to Wang Tai Peng (1994: 102),

... a belief in universal brotherhood was old in Chinese life. A very old Chinese saying, probably as old as ancient Greek stoicism, was that within all the corners of the earth every man is a brother.

Within the PRC, this belief has been reinforced, somewhat, by the political-military structure of the state which is dependent upon patriotic (vide PRC. Undated: 108) citizens viewing one another as brothers and sisters under the paternal authority of the Communist Party (vide PRC. Undated: 82) leadership core.
brought home to the PRC that the scientific and technological imperative demanded the development of a more high-technology military component, particularly in regard to the use of air power (You. 1999: 15).

An off-shoot of the military modernisation programme is the PRC’s space programme (You. 1999: 78) which, in 1989, was identified by The Chinese Academy of Aerospace Technology, as “... an overriding project for upgrading China’s level of science and technology ...” (You. 1999: 80). In order for the PRC to catch up and, where possible, surpass the scientific and technological achievements of rival states China made use of technology transfers from the Russians (You. 1999: 79); made extensive use of published information about American technological achievements (You. 1999: 81) and reportedly also engaged in espionage activities to gain access to unpublished information (17)WS. Cox Report. China’s scientific and technological imperative, apart from long-term military considerations, is also aimed at short-term information gathering (You. 1999: 82) and scientific and technological spin-offs.

*China should make its space programme the overriding one in relation to other high-tech development programmes... we already have the capabilities to design and implement a comprehensive space programme to launch manned satellites, space shuttles and space stations (Wu. 1987: 7-8; You. 1999: 79).*

The PRC’s space programme is aimed, not only at enhancing Chinese prestige within the international environment and scientific *milieu* but also at ultimately challenging and eclipsing the leadership of, particularly, the United States (*vide* Bernstein and Munro. 1998: xviii-xix). The PRC space programme is also likely to be driven by the need to secure China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty against perceived threats (*vide* You. 1999: xvi-xvii and 79) emanating from United States space-based weapons systems in the form of the envisaged Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) initiative (15)WS. 2000 *vide* paper by Wang: 1).
5.6.7. Moral imperative

In October, 1998 the PRC authorities initiated a clamp-down on China Democracy activists because the activists wanted to register a political party that was intended to operate outside the ambit and control of the ruling Communist Party (vide Bezlova in{16}WS. 1998: 1). The actions of the PRC Government in arresting, charging and sentencing the activist leaders to lengthy prison terms, evinced official public responses from several states, among them, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Norway. South Africa did not respond (t2001. Interview). By not responding publicly or privately it became clear that South Africa was prepared to regard the clamp-down on China Democracy activists by the PRC Government as a PRC domestic matter. Even though the PRC Vice President visited South Africa officially during the period 31 January to 4 February, 1999, and met with both President Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki, no mention was made of the human rights clamp-down in the PRC, in bilateral discussions, and the issue therefore never entered the bilateral environment of the two states at the official political or diplomatic level (t2001. Interview).

5.6.8. Legal imperative

In the absence of a strong legal code the moral tenets of Chinese society remained firmly anchored to Confucian ethics. Law was a necessary tool of administration but personal morality was the foundation of Chinese society (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 16). As has already been explained the imperative of personal morality exerted a greater influence on the actions of the Chinese people throughout the greater part of their history than the requirements of law. For thousands of years China was a feudal state and the Chinese themselves freely acknowledge that, “lacking a democratic tradition and without a developed concept of a legal system, many Chinese citizens lack familiarity with the law and have not developed a sense of reliance on the law” (Du Xichuan et al. 1990: 146). “Unlike most Western countries, China does not have a state system that separates legislative, executive, and judicial functions. Instead, it
builds one on the basis of the National People’s Congress by combining the functions of parliament and government” (Du Xichuan et al. 1990: 30).

International exchanges, in the legal or judicial sphere, between China and other states of the international system only became commonplace from as recently as 1980 when, for the first time, “the Chinese judicial administration delegation attended the United Nations Sixth Conference on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Criminals held in Caracas, Venezuela” (Du Xichuan et al. 1990: 150). Since 1983 Chinese delegations have attended and participated in international conferences of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Du Xichuan et al. 1990: 150) and this has provided useful opportunities for China and other states to exchange views and ideas on a range of legal issues, including contentious human rights issues, and in some cases learn from one another. This is a point well understood by the Chinese authorities (Du Xichuan et al. 1990: 151-153).

5.7. Foreign policy decision making process:

Decision makers acting in authoritative leadership roles within the domestic and bilateral environments, and policy initiators, implementers, advisors and monitors, together with their institutions and support structures, are the main focus of attention here. The act of foreign policy making is a dynamic process involving ongoing monitoring and re-assessment. As some writers (Legg and Morrison 1971: 134) have elucidated,

\[ \text{... foreign policy execution is the process of implementing the foreign policy in the real world, analysing the results of the actions taken, and modifying the strategy and tactics as needed.} \]

If it is accepted, as these writers have stated, that foreign policy involves a process of continuous re-assessment and modification then, it is argued, an organisational model or organisational models of such a process ought to allow for appropriate monitoring
mechanisms. Such models ought to also reflect such a process as being adaptive and self-regulating, at least to the extent that human decision makers are able to introduce and implement actions and decisions that facilitate such adaptation. The dynamic nature of the foreign policy decision making process is well-suited to the use of a systems organisational model. Norbert Wiener’s model of an organisation as an adaptive system as elucidated by Shafritz and Ott (Shafritz. 1988: 530) is therefore useful as a core concept model (figure 5/1 infra) of the foreign policy organisational process.

Figure 5/1:
Norbert Wiener’s Model of an Organisation as an Adaptive System

Environment

Inputs

Process

Feedback

Outputs


Wiener’s model shares essential characteristics (inputs, outputs, feedback) with the Eastonian derivative (Shafritz. 1988: 530) adapted by Botes and Roux (see figure 2/1 supra).

The making of foreign policy, according to Ranney (1971: 574), also comprises a three-stage process involving first choosing the nation’s general and specific international objectives, then deciding how to achieve them, and finally to assess whether the nation has the capability to achieve its goals in terms of its own available resources and the capabilities of the other state, or states, involved. Charles F. Hermann’s elaboration (Merritt. 1975: 121) of the “stages of policy” corresponds closely with Ranney’s three stages. Hermann argues that the first phase involves identification and elaboration of information, the second phase involves decision
making or choice, and the third phase involves the method of carrying out the preferred option.

It should be kept in mind that the nature of the relevant institutional *milieu* is likely to influence the form of the decisions themselves and that those decisions will also be shaped by the personality and character traits of the individuals who influence or take the decisions concerned (Merritt. 1975: 4). The personality and character traits of state leaders may be expected to be of special significance when articulating a national vision or political doctrine, or acting in terms of a perceived *world view* (*vide* Kim. 1998: 10). Somewhere, within a state’s world view, national goals wait to be discerned. Austin Ranney (1971: 570-573) has stated that national foreign policies originate in national goals and that the most common goals comprise quests for security, markets and prosperity, territorial expansion, defending and spreading ideology, and peace.

According to Ranney (1971: 570),

> ... the prime goal of every nation ... is security. It has two aspects: first, the preservation of the nation's legal status as an independent sovereign nation and its practical ability to rule its own affairs and, second, creation of an atmosphere in which the nation can be relatively free of fear for its survival and independence.

In regard to markets and prosperity, Ranney states (1971: 571) that all nations hope to improve the lives of their citizens and that foreign policy goals may include a wide variety of means to achieve this goal, including giving or receiving economic aid, technical assistance, and so on. Ranney (1971: 571-572) also notes that,

> ... just about every nation at one time or another has pursued ... expansionist - sometimes called 'imperialist' - policies for one or more reasons: to obtain more
l**ebeschraum** for overcrowded national populations; to obtain economic advantages expected from controlling new mineral and other resources ...; and to realise the sheer expansive force of 'manifest destiny' to rule.

On the goal of defending and spreading ideology, Ranney (1971: 572) takes the view that "...both ideology and other national interests are goals of every nation's foreign policy ... ." With regard to the goal of peace, Ranney (1971: 573-574) points out that, "... judging by what their spokesmen say, all nations and all peoples of the world cherish peace, regard war as the greatest of evils, and condemn those who cause war as the greatest of villains ... ." He also cautions (1971: 573-574) that,

... sometimes the desire for peace comes into sharp conflict with other desires, like that for the preservation of national independence. Then men and nations must choose which goals they want most and (must) be prepared to sacrifice those that they want less. Such choices are the very essence of foreign-policy formulation.

Although decisions are made by individuals, each with a distinctive personality (Merritt 1975: 4), and an individual world view, the actual impact of individual personality traits and characteristics upon decisions may be tempered, to some degree, by the type of constitutional and decision making institutional mechanisms within which such decisions are made; and by the effectiveness of whatever monitoring or supervisory arrangements are in place. Sometimes such monitoring arrangements are part of the machinery of government, as in the case of parliamentary mechanisms (§4)SA. 1996. Constitution: vide paragraph 92), and sometimes they are non-governmental, as in the case of public opinion and the news media.

Ideological beliefs have conceivably influenced the individual world views of South Africa and the PRC, as well as their foreign policies and other public policies. For example, the Communist Party of China (CPC) undoubtedly takes its form and
character from the ideology of Marxism-Leninism (Hunt. 1996: 4) as modified and influenced by the thoughts of past Chinese leaders (PRC. 2000: Constitution: preamble) such as Mao Zedong (Hunt.1996: 219) and Deng Xiaoping (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 46) (see figure 5/5 infra). Therefore, ideology (also identified as a political imperative in the environmental-relationships-imperatives matrix), as articulated by the CPC, has played a major role in determining the PRC’s world view since 1949. More traumatic historical factors (also identified as an imperative) that have contributed to the PRC world view would include experiences of foreign occupation, domination and perceived national humiliation (CPC. 1997: 137; vide Roberts. 2000: 115-116).

It is to be expected that the influence of ideology and historical trauma would be more intensely experienced at the party political level (vide ANC. 1998: introduction) than at the government level, where competing ideological interests, perhaps from lobby and pressure groups and other political parties, would be likely to divine a more national interest. In order to gain a clearer understanding of what ideological and historical factors may determine a state’s world view and drive it’s foreign policy, it is therefore necessary to also include those factors that drive political party policy and influence the shaping of the leadership’s world view at the level of party politics. Chapter 6 infra takes a closer look at these factors.

5.8. Foreign policy making as a systemic process

The relationships component of the environmental-relationships-imperatives model has to do with the relevant institutional and individual actors of the foreign policy milieu. It seeks to examine how and by whom foreign policy is made. Consequently, relevant political organisations and government structures are identified, examined and compared. By virtue of its dynamic nature, the decision making and policy making process, is therefore explored, in part, from a systemic perspective. In order to more easily comprehend how the various initiators and implementers of foreign policy coexist and interact within the domestic environment’s foreign policy making milieu, the following foreign policy making systems-model has been developed to
represent an ideal (not necessarily the ideal) generic foreign policy making organisational process:

Figure 5/2: Model of a proposed ideal foreign policy making organisational process

As illustrated by model 5/2 supra, outputs in the form of foreign policy are subjected to feedback through monitoring of the effects of, and responses to, such policy; such feedback then gives rise to new, modified or additional inputs in the form of imperatives that give shape and direction to improved foreign policy. This accords with the view (Legg and Morrison. 1971: 166) that the foreign policy process encompasses "...foreign policy making, implementation, feedback and policy revision ... (as a) ... continuous and interrelated process."

Figure 5/2 supra attempts to illustrate how foreign policy might to be made and implemented within a systemic concept that provides for ideas and actions of decision makers, access to information, implementation of decisions, monitoring of the effects
of decisions, and continual re-assessment and adjustment of such decisions, in order to facilitate the adaptation, where necessary, and continuing survival of the relevant domestic environment that such a foreign policy decision making system is intended to preserve and protect. It therefore remains to be discovered whether this proposed ideal system can be applied to the actual foreign policy decision making systems of, for example, South Africa and the People’s Republic of China.

Although only four categories of decision maker have been developed for this policy analysis (individual, institutional, governmental, non-governmental), such classifications are intended to be broadly representative of all possible initiators, implementers and monitors of foreign policy decisions. A categorisation that focuses more specifically on the differing characteristics, including detailed psychological traits, of foreign policy makers could conceivably yield many more categories. However, by focusing on political, professional and technical, academic and socio-economic role players such as politicians and political parties, civil servants and governmental institutions, academics, academic institutions and think tanks, private citizens and organisations, business institutions and the news media, all of which are covered by the four categories of leadership identified, it is believed that all the major types of foreign policy maker are provided for in this study. The categories referred to could also be sub-categorised in terms of ideological policy sources, political party foreign policy decision makers, governmental foreign policy decision makers, governmental foreign policy implementers, governmental foreign policy advisors, non-governmental foreign policy advisors and foreign policy monitors. This categorisation has been employed in developing systems models (see figures 5/3 and 5/4 infra) that are intended to illustrate and compare the foreign policy processes of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China. Such models may prove useful (see also figure 5/2 supra) in reflecting, among other possibilities, the sources of foreign policy inputs, the manner in which a variety of actors contribute toward the production of foreign policy outputs and how such policy outputs, in turn, result in further policy inputs. In addition, such models ought to be capable of being applied universally to all possible foreign policy relationships between states. The foreign policy responses component of figure 5/2 supra is the linkage point between two or
more domestic environments. It reflects the point where domestically made policy incurs a reaction that takes both domestic policy and foreign policy into the foreign policy orbit, either as bilateral or multilateral foreign policy.

5.8.1. Systemic representation of South Africa’s foreign policy making process

Having looked at some of the sources as well as the institutional and individual role players that may be expected to contribute to the formulation, implementation and monitoring of South Africa’s foreign policy, it appears that the distinction between political party and government of the day have become increasingly blurred (Mills. 2000: 274). The roles of the respective members of the tripartite alliance are also unclear as they often appear to work against one another, particularly where domestic economic issues are concerned. No doubt due to its federalist philosophy, which advocates a high degree of provincial autonomy, the role of the IFP also often appears ambiguous; on the one hand it supports its alliance partners nationally and on the other hand it opposes the ANC at provincial and local government level (vide {24}WS. 2001: 1). However, on foreign policy issues the IFP has supported the alliance, as part of the Government of National Unity ( {1}WS. 1998).

Although public policy is generally monitored by the parliamentary process it would seem that the monitoring of foreign policy takes place mostly after policies are implemented and that inadequate measures are in place to ensure that proposed policies are the best policies. As indicated, most of the important foreign policy decisions are left to an exclusive group within the Presidency, with possible selective consultation involving politicians and senior officials who owe their respective positions to the President. The apparent unwillingness, or inability, of senior officials and ministers to engage in forceful debate with the President about contentious issues (Mthombothi. Financial Mail, 16 June, 2000: p. 16) of public policy (e.g. AIDS) compounds the opportunity for faulty, or ineffective, policy making (vide {21}WS. 2000: 1). The situation also indicates the potential vulnerability of South Africa’s foreign policy to ill-considered decisions by the few in the absence of what might
otherwise prove to be well-reasoned dissent by the many, when such dissent becomes necessary. If it is accepted that much foreign policy deliberation is conducted in confidence and away from the public eye, which maybe necessary to ensure desired results, the best monitors in such circumstances may be the implementers of policy; career officials and technical experts within the Department of Foreign Affairs and related departments, including the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Defence.

In the case of foreign policy decisions relating to politically appointed ambassadors and other heads of mission, decisions that are not required to be highly classified in terms of security considerations, there would seem to be good reason (vide The Star. 4 February 1999: 12) to argue in favour of subjecting such appointees to close scrutiny by their peers, the multi-party Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee, the news media and the general public. It might also be argued that the appointment of the Director-General of Foreign Affairs should also be subject to scrutiny because of his pivotal role in influencing foreign policy appointments; and his crucial role in the actual implementation of foreign policy.

Although there is now an effort to coordinate public policy, including foreign policy, through regular meetings at the Director-General level, in terms of the designated clusters, directors-general do not always attend such meetings in person. They are often represented by subordinates who either have no authority to take required decisions or by subordinates who have not been sufficiently well-briefed to enable them to contribute meaningfully to the ensuing exchanges of information and resultant decisions, if any (Conversation². 2001). Although it might be expected that broad foreign policy guidelines would be clearly set out by the presidency, either directly or through the foreign ministry, the absence of a White Paper on foreign policy, the absence of clear foreign policy doctrines, and inconsistency on important foreign policy issues, such as human rights, have left most of the practical aspects of foreign policy making to the initiative and ingenuity of the relatively lowly desk official (Conversation¹: 2001). It now remains to illustrate the dynamics of South Africa’s foreign policy making organisational structure by means of the systems
model referred to previously (figure 5/2 supra). Such sources and role players having an impact on South Africa's foreign policy might be ideally depicted as follows:

Figure 5/3: Primary SA foreign policy initiators in the domestic environment

Whereas the flow of information, advice and decision making is much in accordance with the proposed ideal model (Figure 5/2 supra) it is likely, in reality, that a substantial amount of South African foreign policy making is driven by officials
(usually desk officers at the Department of Foreign Affairs) and serving South African diplomats abroad (acting through their relevant desk officers) and that the foreign policy proposals of such officials are then presented to political public policy (including foreign policy) decision makers to either reject, accept or modify and accept, the policy proposals of such officials (Conversation {1}: 2001). However, policy doctrines and grand visions, such as the concept of an African renaissance for example, invariably originate in the very top structures of government and politics.

Although there are, in South Africa, a number of research institutions and think tanks specialising in foreign policy and subjects that are representative of, or closely associated with, international relations, the South African Government does not appear to make much use of them. This could have to do with the perceived need for secrecy; it might also have to do with an unwillingness to trust those without “struggle” credentials; or it might relate to a general unwillingness to risk revealing policy shortcomings or internal failings. Although the Presidency has begun to wield considerable decision making power, the continuing existence of a multi-party system that permits opposition politics; the continuing adherence to a system of government under law; and continuing respect for, and adherence to, democratic principles, which includes respect for individual human rights enshrined in domestic law, has imposed limits on the power of the Presidency. In South Africa, a far less monolithic society than the PRC, the leadership’s world view is less likely to be deeply felt among critically-minded academia, representatives of the news media, and the opposition political milieu. However, this does not mean such a world view will not leave its impact on South African public policy. Although the possibility of national-group-thinking disasters taking place in South Africa, such as occurred in the PRC during the time of the Cultural Revolution (vide Salisbury. 1993: 236), is probably less likely precisely because of the monitoring and public criticism of public policy that is allowed to take place in South Africa, leadership-group-thinking may still hold unpleasant consequences for South Africa. The failure of government ministers to question the Presidency’s AIDS policy, within the cabinet, (Mthombothi. Financial Mail. 16 June 2000: 16) at an early date, is an example of such a consequence.
Where the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is concerned, the unchallenged supremacy of the Communist Party of China (CPC) implies that the leadership’s world view, termed *shijie guan* (Kim. 1998: 10) in the realm of foreign policy making, casts a much larger shadow within the PRC than does the world view of the South African leadership within South Africa. Consequently there are no actual domestic checks on the vast power of the Politburo of the CPC which is a collective leadership whose power is effectively represented, utilised and articulated by the seven-member Standing Committee of the Politburo.

The PRC is ruled by the CPC and although the Party’s authority is guaranteed constitutionally by the Constitution of the PRC it is the military power of the People’s Liberation Army that *effectively* guarantees the continuing existence of the CPC. As General-Secretary of the Communist Party of China and as Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Jiang Zemin therefore is able to garner continued support for his own constitutional political leadership, as President, as well as the continued loyalty of those entrusted with preserving the political status quo.

The main organs of government of the PRC are headed by members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. With the powers of the State Presidency, CPC, and CMC firmly in his grasp, Jiang Zemin’s only perceived threat to his power base is his age and the Constitutional requirement that nobody can serve more than two terms in the office of President (Article 79).

5.8.2. Systemic representation of the PRC’s foreign policy making process

Clearly, as far as political decision making power is concerned, the top leadership of organs such as the State Council, National People’s Congress, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Central Military Commission, and Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party are all encapsulated within the power structure of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Everyone else in government, including ministers under the State Council, are likely to be policy advisors,
facilitators or implementers of policy; or supervisors (monitors?) of policy. In view of the lack of opportunity for public dissent and public criticism of government policies, the impact of the leadership’s *world view* is also more likely to be accommodated among a relatively wide range of actors, including policy implementers, policy advisors and policy monitors. Of course, an obvious pitfall for any organisation that chooses to limit the existence or effectiveness of its critics is that it has no way of perceiving the quality of its decisions until disaster strikes.

Schematically, the PRC’s foreign policy role players might be depicted as follows:

Figure 5/4: Primary PRC foreign policy initiators in the domestic environment.
Although not indicated as such in the model (figure 5/4 supra) the CPC and the Eight Democratic Parties collectively constitute what is known as the United Front, which in practice means that all these parties, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, strive toward common goals in fulfilment of common ideals and policies. There is therefore no substantive opportunity or even incentive for critical evaluation and appraisal, by the Eight Democratic Parties, of CPC policy proposals.

Given that the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) tends to function as a supervisor of foreign policy implementation (Lu. 1007: 11), it would also appear that think tanks play no decisive role, if any, in influencing the decisions of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. In this regard, Communist Party Elder, Li Xinnian, during the events of the 1989 Tiananmen Square student rebellion, reportedly (Nathan and Link. 2001: 313) declared:

_Our Communist Party doesn’t have think tanks - never has._

_This is pure bourgeois stuff._

Nonetheless, the activities of institutions such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences are not totally irrelevant to the decision making process. As Lu points out (1997: 135), although academic institutes specialising in research on international issues tend to play the role of information providers, and have little direct impact on foreign policy decisions, academics at such institutions, who have individual access to the top leadership, may have a far greater impact on the decision making process.
5.9. Conclusion

This chapter has sought, on the one hand, to identify some of the core factors responsible for the origination of foreign policy within the leadership hierarchies of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China; and, on the other hand, to reflect on the foreign policy making process, itself. A basic systems model, comprising inputs, outputs and feedback, was utilised to develop a more complex model that reflects the dynamic nature of the perceived foreign policy making process. The model also allows for the influence of world view perspectives in the formulation of foreign policy. From this model, information relating to foreign policy makers, influencers, implementers and monitors, in South Africa and the People’s Republic of China, was used to construct two further systems models, each reflecting the perceived foreign policy making process applicable in each state. With regard to the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis the systems models are useful indicators of key processes and key role players, particularly in regard to the leadership relationships component.

This chapter has identified what has been termed the origination process of foreign policy and has shown how particular foreign policy imperatives, in collaboration with origination experiences and characteristics, may influence the course of the decision making process. In addition, systems models of the foreign policy decision making processes in South Africa and the PRC have been constructed to facilitate an understanding of this crucially important aspect of their foreign policy relationship.

The main focus of this chapter has been on foreign policy making processes within and between domestic environments. It now remains to reflect on the initiators and implementers of foreign policy that have their origins in the non-domestic (external) environments as identified by the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis.