CHAPTER FOUR

INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MAKERS, INFLUENCERS AND IMPLEMENTERS OF FOREIGN POLICY WITHIN AND BETWEEN THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

4.1. Introduction

The main focus of this chapter is on individuals and institutions, governmental and non-governmental, that appear to directly influence and give shape to foreign policy making within and between the domestic environments of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China. In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model this chapter examines aspects of the leadership relationships sub-model (vide figure 3/3 supra), specifically the decision-milieux of D1, D2, Dn and B, and the pertinent decision making, policy making and leadership relationships of the domestic environment.

Some governmental organisational structures, in respect of each state, will be described and compared with a view to identifying the main foreign policy individual and institutional actors or role players. Non-governmental actors will also be identified, described and compared with a view to examining their respective roles in the foreign policy making process, particularly in regard to the influence they exert, if any, in determining the course of foreign policy; and their role, if any, in monitoring the impact of such policy.

Governmental role players include individual authoritative foreign policy decision makers and authoritative decision influencers; foreign policy implementers; and the institutions in which they normally function and act. Political parties, in so far as they are able to take or influence decisions that determine foreign policy, are also included in the category of governmental role players.
Government foreign policy makers include politicians who have the power to make, and usually do make, a direct contribution to the formulation of foreign policy. Such policy makers are also likely to include executive presidents, deputy presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers and deputy foreign ministers, other cabinet ministers, chairpersons and members of specialist committees, and other politicians and chief executives with similar powers, bearing in mind that the impact of their individual personality traits and characteristics upon decisions may be tempered, to some degree, by the type of constitutional and decision making institutional mechanisms within which decisions are made; and by the effectiveness of whatever monitoring or supervisory arrangements are in place. Sometimes such monitoring arrangements are part of the machinery of government, as in the case of parliamentary mechanisms, and sometimes they are non-governmental, as in the case of public opinion and the news media.

4.2. Foreign policy role players

In terms of the leadership relationships component (see figure 3/3 supra) of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of policy analysis, foreign policy, leadership and decision making relationships pertaining to the making of foreign policy originate in the domestic environment. The impact of such leadership relationships, in the form of authoritative decisions, may then extend to the external environments, usually through the bilateral or multilateral transactional environments as foreign policy linkages between domestic environments.

The relevant foreign policy role players involved in the decision making or policy making process may be individuals or institutions and include the makers of foreign policy; actors who are in a position to decisively influence foreign policy; and also the implementers of such policy. The influencers of foreign policy can be found within the hierarchy of the ruling political party, within the higher echelons of government, and also in the non-government sector (vide 13) WS. 1996). The decision makers of foreign policy are more usually to be found within the executive branch of
government, as are the implementers of such policy. According to Merritt (1975: 4), decision makers,

... operate within a decision system that has its own dynamics. At the centre of it stands a bureaucracy, a major function of which is to process relevant information from the external and domestic environments as well as that stored within the bureaucracy itself - to bring it to bear upon a current issue.

Foreign policy role players therefore include those top public servants who are required to translate foreign relations in the form of policy directives into a practical, more tangible, form. These implementers (vide Mills. 2000: 328) of foreign policy are also indispensable to foreign policy makers as foreign policy advisors because when foreign policy, or an aspect of such policy, becomes problematical or unworkable, the initial indications of a need for revised policies usually show themselves first to the implementers of policy, which includes diplomatic personnel serving abroad or even military personnel in the field.

Although the political and bureaucratic components of the foreign affairs portfolio of government are collectively entrusted, in large measure, with managing the state’s foreign policy concerns, other governmental portfolios also have substantial foreign policy interests and concerns. For example, trade, defence, customs and immigration, and tourism concerns are all likely to exhibit a foreign affairs aspect. Diplomatic personnel serving abroad will, therefore, often include personnel drawn from government ministries and departments other than the relevant foreign affairs component (vide {1} 2001. Interview). Consequently an embassy’s military attaché would be drawn from the military establishment and a trade or economic representative may be expected to be drawn from the department (or ministry) responsible for trade or economic activities (vide DFA. 20010806).

The manner in which policy decisions are determined, and the nature of such decisions, will depend in part on the nature of the governmental institution in which
the relevant decision maker must operate. Some countries exhibit similar institutions of government whereas others reflect institutions that are quite different from one another. Some governmental institutions, like those of South Africa, reflect a separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government (vide 4) SA. 1996. Constitution: paragraph 43 and chapters 4, 5 and 8) whereas others, as in the People's Republic of China, exhibit no discernible separation or division (PRC. Undated. NPC booklet: 27-28). In some states, regular multi-party elections ensure regular peaceful changes of leadership; in other states a single party retains power (Davies: 2000. 6) and any changes in leadership are determined, in fact, not by the people but by that leadership. Some states reflect a centralisation of power, as in a unitary system of government, and others reflect a decentralisation of power, as in a federal system of government. Some legislatures are bicameral, as in South Africa (4) SA. 1996. Constitution: paragraph 42), and others, as in the PRC (PRC. Undated. NPC booklet: 23; Davies. 2000: 5), are unicameral.

Different systems reflect different cultures, often quite different historical experiences, and differing value systems; and in all likelihood, a different world view. However, even differing value systems and differing constitutional structures may reflect some similarities in the way states communicate within the international and external environments. Consequently, most states maintain the equivalent of a foreign ministry, engage in international trade and have a military (vide 5) WS. 2002: 7) capability.

For the purposes of this research, the most important institutions of government in both South Africa and the PRC are the executive branches of government, which in the case of the PRC should justifiably also include the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC) because of its overriding influence in public policy decision making in the PRC (Lu. 1997: 9). The Standing Committee of the Politburo is the real focus of power (Davies. 2000: 6) and is arguably a presidential cabinet in its own right as it effectively wields far greater decision making power than the actual cabinet, the state council, presided over by the Premier (who is also a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo). Although party
issues and government issues, in South Africa, remain separate in theory, they have often merged in practice as, for example, when presidential visits abroad are used to collect funds for party political purposes (Mills. 2000: 274-275). Consequently, and for the sake of consistency, the political parties in government in South Africa are also categorised, for the purpose of this research, as being part of the executive branch of government. Apart from the need for consistency, however, it has been argued in recent years that there is, in South Africa, a blurring of party-government lines (Mills. 2000: 274), which lends added justification for this categorisation.

There is a special focus on the ministries and departments that are responsible for international trade and defence matters because of their actual and potential influence upon foreign policy issues, not only in regard to the PRC (Lu. 1997:13) and SA (vide Mills. 2000: 331-336), but in regard to virtually all bilateral relationships. Other important institutions of government are the legislature and the judiciary. Of the two, however, the legislature is more likely to become directly involved in foreign policy matters, particularly in regard to monitoring or oversight responsibilities (vide {1}PRC. 2000. Constitution: articles 62 and 67; {4} SA. 1996. Constitution: chapters 11 and 14).

4.2.1. South Africa’s foreign policy role players

South Africa’s main foreign policy making individuals would conceivably include the President, Deputy President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as other Cabinet ministers, whereas deputy ministers, directors-general and advisors would be more likely to contribute to decisions as influencers of foreign policy. In the realm of international relations, when travelling abroad officially, South African leaders might also be expected to consult closely with South Africa’s diplomatic representatives in the countries that they visit. Nonetheless, there is not always clear evidence that such consultations have taken place (vide Barber in Business Day. 30 March 2001: 4; also Mulholland in Sunday Times. 8 April 2001: 2).
The main individual implementers of South African public policy, which often includes foreign policy, are likely to be the Director-General and personnel of the Office of the President; directors-general of relevant government departments; and relevant or related departmental and diplomatic personnel serving abroad. However, influencers of public policy, including foreign policy, may also comprise individuals and institutions drawn from outside the public policy milieu, outside the political party in power and the government of the day. In this regard, the news media, public opinion (vide Dye. 1995: 298-300), lobby and pressure groups, the business sector, and academic institutions all have the capacity to influence public policies, including foreign policy. Consequently, although South Africa’s foreign policy role players are mainly governmental institutions and individuals, such role players also include non-governmental institutions and individuals acting, or having the potential to act, in an advisory, monitoring or lobbying role that may influence the direction and character of such policies (vide Mills. 2000: 26-27). Party political actors who are capable of influencing public policy (Business Day. 26 June 1998: 4) may therefore also be capable of influencing foreign policy.

4.2.1.1. Presidency (President and Deputy President)

South Africa’s Head of State and Head of Government is the President ((4)SA. 1996. Constitution: paragraph 83), currently Thabo Mbeki, elected for a term of five years. The President presides over a cabinet that includes a number of ministers whose portfolios extend often or occasionally into the realm of international relations. The ANC Presidency, particularly in the era of Thabo Mbeki, is said to have accumulated considerable power - “... more than was exercised by his predecessor ...” (Parsons. 1999: 82-83).

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Trade and Industry and Minister of Defence are among those ministers more often charged with duties that extend into the external environments but, other than the routine or specific delegated duties of cabinet ministers, the president has final responsibility for all policy decisions, including foreign policy decisions. Therefore, he may be expected to keep a close
watch on all major foreign policy issues that are relevant to South Africa’s perceived interests and to make, or give approval for, decisions and policies associated with those major foreign policy issues.

In theory, major foreign policy decisions are made by the President, in consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, other members of the President’s Cabinet and senior civil servants in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and other relevant departments and key advisors, depending on the nature of the decision. Such decisions might be as dramatic as the severing of diplomatic relations; or as important as involvement in a peace-keeping or mediation exercise, in which case the Minister of Defence and top military advisors would also be involved ( {1}DOD. 1998. *White Paper on Defence*. Chapter 2: p. 9; {2} DOD. 1998. *South African Defence Review*. Chapter 5: paras. 22.1 and 22.3). Sensitive high profile issues such as arms sales or human rights might not necessarily be decided upon directly by the President but he would expect to be consulted or at least kept well informed about such developments. The President would also be kept well informed about all key policy issues, foreign and domestic, through the mechanism of the routine weekly Cabinet meetings.

President Mbeki is, reportedly, a hands-on chief executive, who has surrounded himself with officials and advisors who have his personal trust and are perceived to be personally loyal to him. Dr Adam Habib (Lund. *Pretoria News*. 25 January, 2001: 19) has said:

*Mr Mbeki is like an imperial president. The Office of the President is now the nexus of government policy and decision making.*

As President of South Africa and as President of the ANC, he wields considerable power. For example, he has the power to choose his Deputy President, Cabinet ministers, deputy ministers (Parsons. 1999: 82), directors-general, advisors, and senior officials; his party’s provincial premiers and provincial ministers (Parsons. 1999: 97-98) and ANC candidates for mayoral elections. He also wields great influence over
ANC parliamentarians (Parsons. 1999: 98) and even the judiciary, in regard to “...the selection and promotion of judges ...” (Parsons. 1999: 98;{4}SA.1996. Constitution: chapter 8 paragraph 174). As Parsons (1999: 98) has pointed out,

... the Presidency has none of the constitutional obligations to act out its role in the public gaze ... the Presidency is exempt from procedural requirements to receive or respond to stakeholder representations. It is thus removed from any form of public participation ... The general danger is that ... the fortunes of the country, a sector or whole region, may come to depend too much on the foresight and the judgement of a single centre of decision-making.

There are also historical and cultural factors that should be noted. For example, it should be kept in mind that the African cultural milieu may exert a powerful impact on the way that government is practised and the manner in which public policy decision making takes place. Despite the impact of imported values (vide paragraph 5.3 (g) infra) in regard to the development of contemporary governmental structures, including those that uphold democracy and civil liberty, in the case of South Africa the impact of traditional African political structures, at the tribal level, should not be underestimated. In this regard Tyrrell and Jurgens have written (1983: 46) as follows:

The traditional chief was given a fairly liberal mandate to wield power in his realm and over his people. The precise meaning of this was dependent on the particular group. However, he was strictly controlled by a system of restraints and the need to retain the loyalty and allegiance of his subjects. Bearing in mind the importance of the group as opposed to the individual in traditional thought, it may be said that the chiefdom, in its true sense, was the African democracy. Nevertheless, this system of government is as vulnerable to tyranny and other political perversions as the various European systems have proved to be.
The impact of the chiefdom upon political leadership in South Africa today bears some parallels in that decision making is often accompanied by much consultation at practically all levels of government. However, an unfortunate consequence of a power core comprising an all-powerful imperial president (Pretoria News, 25 January, 2001: 19), when surrounded by sycophants, is that groupthink decision making, as described by Janis (’t Hart. 1990: 7), and which involves a quest for concurrence or consensus (Business Day, 1 February, 2000: 11), may deny any rational opportunity to re-assess, or avoid, inappropriate or bad policies. Groupthink (’t Hart. 1990: 7) refers to,

...a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.

The Deputy President (currently Jacob Zuma), as an important component of the Presidency and in terms of the South African Constitution, is intended to support the President (SA.1996. Constitution: paragraph 91) However, he reportedly has few policy making responsibilities (Parsons. 1999: 82). At times when both the President and Deputy President are simultaneously away from South Africa an Acting President is appointed by the President (1996. Constitution: paragraph 90; DFA. 19980923). On one such occasion, the Acting President (M.G. Buthelezi, leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party and Minister of Home Affairs) sent SA troops into the neighbouring Kingdom of Lesotho to help quell a rebellion (WS. 1998) but did so at the request of the Prime Minister of that country and in consultation with South Africa’s President and Deputy President (DFA. 19980923).

The once separate Offices of the President and Deputy President have now been merged into a single Office of the President (or Presidency) with the following principal role players (Pretoria News, 25 January, 2001: 19):
President Thabo Mbeki: Head of State; Head of government; and President of the ANC;

Deputy President, Jacob Zuma: Deputy President (assists the president and is responsible for functions which include traditional, religious, cultural, and linguistic affairs, and the National AIDS Council; represents South Africa on relevant Binational Commissions); head of government business in the National Assembly;

Dr Essop Pahad: Minister in the Office of the President; (responsible for areas of transformation assigned to him by the President. These include National Youth Commission, Office on the Status of Women, Office on the Status of Disabled Persons, Office on the Status of the Child); Oversees the Government Communication and Information System.

Other important officials in the Office of the President are two parliamentary counsellors, one serving the President and one serving the Deputy President. Members of Parliament would “... communicate with the President and his deputy through these counsellors ...” (Pretoria News. 25 January, 2001: 19). In addition, the following key officials serve in the Office of the President (Pretoria News. 25 January, 2001: 19):

The Rev. Frank Chikane: Director-General, Office of the President; Secretary to the Cabinet;

Mr Bheki Khumalo: Presidential spokesman (media liaison officer).
4.2.1.2. Cabinet


A Cabinet Secretariat has been established in the Office of the Presidency "... with a policy coordination branch to check ministerial proposals to make sure they (are) in line with policy ..." (*Pretoria News*. 25 January, 2001: 19). Effectively this means that the Presidency has the final say on all policy matters, including foreign policy. In addition five cabinet clusters have been created "...to bring together overlapping functions ..." (*Pretoria News*. 25 January, 2001: 19; GCIS. 2000: 21-29) clustered as follows:

- **International Affairs**: Foreign Affairs; Environmental Affairs and Tourism; Defence; and Office of the Presidency;

- **Economic**: Trade and Industry; Communications; Transport; Finance; and Public Enterprises;

- **Social**: Housing; Welfare and Population Development; Water Affairs and Forestry; Education; Health; Arts, Culture, Science and Technology; and Sport and Recreation;

- **Investment and Employment**: Labour; Agriculture and Land Affairs; Minerals and Energy; and Public Works;
Governance and Administration: Safety and Security; Intelligence; Justice and Constitutional Development; and Correctional Services.

4.2.1.3. Professional and technical role players

Generally, because foreign policy decisions are political in nature, professional and technical role players usually perform mainly advisory and implementation functions. Within the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), policy may originate at a relatively low level of the Department’s organisational hierarchy but will require approval at the political level before professional and technical proposals become translated into actual policy. For example, a decision to establish diplomatic relations with a particular state, might be initiated at the level of Desk Officer ([2] 2001. Interview) In such an event the Desk Officer would prepare a written submission for the attention of the Minister, which would be transmitted upward for perusal and approval in sequence by the relevant Director and Chief Director, the Deputy Director-General, Director-General, and Minister. It would then be left to the Minister to introduce the relevant policy proposal at Cabinet or Presidency level.

Not all professional and technical role players need be part of the organisational hierarchy of DFA. Departments such as the Department of Trade and Industry or the Department of Defence may also have a role to play in the determination of foreign policy. All ministerial visits abroad are, however, subject to prior authorisation by the President, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs ([3] 2002. Interview).

The second and third tiers of government usually do not have the responsibility or the authority to engage in foreign policy that binds the central government (vide [4] 1996. Constitution: chapter 14). However, an increasing number of international
transactions take place at this level that can exert an impact, positive or negative, upon the foreign policy relationship between states (vide DFA. 20010720).

a) Ministry and Department of Foreign Affairs

South Africa’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the political component of the foreign policy institutional structure and comprises the Minister and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and ministry personnel. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) is the bureaucratic, administrative and functional component of the institutional structure and is headed by its most senior civil servant, the Director-General of Foreign Affairs who, in turn, is supported by a hierarchical top management structure comprising five deputy directors-general and a number of chief directors and directors. Most of the advisory authority within DFA currently resides, at least in theory, with the Director-General and his deputy directors-general, each of whom has a particular area of responsibility, as elucidated in the following organisational diagram:

Figure 4/1: Foreign Affairs Ministerial and Departmental top structure (December 2000)

Source: Based on Department of Foreign Affairs Organisational plan
MFA and DFA are also able to draw upon the on-the-spot experience and expertise of more than ninety South African foreign missions and their diplomatic and consular personnel serving abroad (\{1\}Sunday Independent. 18 March, 2001: 7).

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is appointed by the President and is a member of the Cabinet (\{4\}SA. 1996. Constitution: paragraph 91). The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs is also appointed by the President but is not a member of the Cabinet (\{4\}SA. 1996. Constitution: paragraph 91). Both the Minister and Deputy Minister are Members of Parliament (National Assembly) and can be subjected to questions in parliament by opposition parliamentarians (\{4\}SA. 1996. Constitution: paragraph 92). They are both also subject to questioning by the Foreign Affairs Portfolio Parliamentary Committee. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is required, each year, to present the Foreign Affairs budget to the National Assembly for approval (vide \{4\}SA. 1996 Constitution: paragraph 56).

As previously stated supra, the most senior civil servant responsible for the overall management of the Department of Foreign Affairs is the Director-General. This official is appointed by the President and links DFA at the highest possible level with the political echelon in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Whereas the Minister bears overall responsibility for the consequences of the actions and operations of DFA, or failure to act, the Director-General of the Department has the duty to ensure that required actions and operations are carried out and that established policies and procedures are properly implemented. Traditionally, the Director-General was always drawn from the most senior ranks of the foreign service. However, under the Mbeki presidency, this senior diplomatic role has become more “political” and less homegrown. The present incumbent, Sipho Pityana, was drawn from the labour milieu (vide Forrest. Mail & Guardian. 14-19 December 2001). Pityana’s predecessor, Selebi, had served as South Africa’s Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva; and Selebi’s predecessor as DFA Director-General had been a career diplomat who had served as DFA Director-General during the De Klerk and Mandela administrations.
The Director-General may also be subjected to questioning in Parliament. The Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, for example, would be unlikely to take any major foreign policy decision without the prior approval of the President or Deputy President or, in some situations, the Foreign Minister or Deputy Foreign Minister. The Director-General could also expect to be consulted, beforehand, about any pending political decisions on major foreign policy issues although, in practice, this has not always occurred. For example, the South African President’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC by-passed the Director-General, reportedly (Conversation {3}: 2001) because of vigorous opposition to the decision from that source (also vide Mills. 2000: 283-284).

The organisational structure of South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs, particularly the top structure and the division entrusted with overseeing South Africa’s relationship with states located in the Middle East and Asia, the region which includes China, is as follows:

Figure 4/2: DFA organisational structure pertaining to East Asia (December 2000)

Source: Based on the Department of Foreign Affairs organisational plan relating to responsibilities in East Asia, including the PRC.
Within the organisational structures of DFA there are procedures, recently set in motion, to enable foreign policy advisors, influencers and implementers to coordinate their activities and keep abreast of crucially important policy issues. For example, in February, 2000 (DFA. Cable 0162: 20000214) the following six new management structures were introduced for implementation at DFA headquarters in Pretoria:

The *Executive Management Committee* comprises the Minister, Deputy Minister, Director-General and the five deputy directors-general, and meets fortnightly to deliberate on strategic issues, DFA programmes and plans, international crises, and foreign affairs matters likely to be raised in Cabinet or in Parliament about which the Minister requires further information. These meetings are deliberately linked to accord with the schedule of Cabinet Committee Meetings on Foreign Affairs.

The *Directors-General Committee* comprises the Director-General of Foreign Affairs and his deputy directors-general either meeting together (D-G + 5) as the *Directors-General Forum* or individually (D-G + 1) as a *Director-General’s Bilateral*. Both types of meeting take place fortnightly. The Forum is an administrative and management tool intended to oversee the implementation of DFA programmes within the various branches of the Department, respond to branch inputs, and provide strategic leadership in the management of DFA programmes. The Bilateral is intended to cover all matters not attended to by the Forum and which do not require inputs from the other deputy directors-general. The Bilateral is intended to focus only on issues relating to the particular deputy director-general and the branch that he or she manages.

The *Departmental Management Committee* (DMC) is a monthly meeting comprising the Director-General, the five deputy directors-general and all chief directors of DFA. The DMC is intended to facilitate consideration of all DFA programmes and plans, make policy recommendations, consider budgetary and human resources requirements, and attend to DFA administration and management issues.
The Branch Management Committee (BMC) meeting is convened by the deputy director-general of the branch concerned and comprises the deputy director-general and all chief directors and directors of that branch. Deputy directors (Desk Officers) only attend these meetings when circumstances require their attendance. Meetings take place on, at least, a monthly basis and with a view to considering policy proposals that are likely to be topics of discussion at the monthly DMC meetings. The Branch Management Committee meeting is intended to discuss implementation of, and assess and evaluate, branch programmes and plans, and make policy recommendations to the DMC. This Committee also approves and submits chief directorate budgets with regard to their agreed upon programmes and plans and, in fact, discusses and approves all branch matters before their submission to the DMC.

The Programme Management Committee (PMC) is convened by DFA’s respective chief directors (or directors where there is no serving chief director) and comprises the chief director, directors and deputy directors; and assistant directors and others as and when required. PMCs are intended to take place, at least, on a monthly basis with a view to developing, managing, administering, evaluating and monitoring the plans of the respective chief directorates, as well as new issues and concerns arising within those chief directorates or at relevant South African diplomatic missions falling under the responsibility of those chief directorates. The PMC is intended to function as a Business Unit (BU) within DFA.

Every chief directorate is expected to operate in terms of, and in accordance with, an annual “Business Plan” comprising the consolidated annual business plans of the various individual South African foreign missions abroad and individual DFA directorates and sub-directorates falling under its overall jurisdictional responsibility. All individual DFA employees, including line function personnel and contract employees, are expected to subject themselves to Performance Contracts, entered into with their respective supervisors, whereby they become obligated to meeting specified performance targets in terms of responsibilities and objectives identified in the Business Plan pertaining to their particular sub-directorate, directorate and chief directorate.
The Departmental Budget Committee comprises the Director-General of DFA and all chief directors. Deputy directors-general may also attend. Chief directors, as the coordinators of their respective Business Units (PMCs), are necessary and obvious components of the Departmental Budget Committee. Each chief director is also required to appoint a budget programme Responsibility Manager, responsible for the compilation and day-to-day management of the budget of the relevant chief directorate.

Heads of Mission meetings provide useful opportunities for heads of mission to discuss and exchange views about common regional problems and to brief ministers, deputy ministers and senior officials about complex bilateral and regional issues. They provide valuable opportunities for heads of mission to bring individual bilateral and common regional policy issues to the direct attention of the political and departmental leadership in the hope of resolving difficulties and clarifying issues sooner rather than later. The Asian and Austral-Asian Chief Directorate is one of several chief directorates within South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs that participates in heads of mission meetings (\cite{2} 2001. Interview). Such regional meetings are scheduled throughout the year and take place in Africa, Asia, Europe, North America and Latin America.

Usually, at least once per year but sometimes more frequently, a Heads of Mission Meeting, involving personnel from the Asian and Austral-Asian Chief Directorate (see figure 4/2 \textit{supra}) as well as the various South African heads of mission from the Asian and Austral-Asian region, will take place at a venue somewhere in that region. For example, regional heads of mission meetings took place in Beijing in March, 2000 and in Singapore in September, 2000 (\cite{2} 2001. Interview). A much larger Heads of Mission Conference, recently designated a Global Repositioning Conference (\cite{1}DFA. 20001222), involving all South African heads of mission, from all the regions referred to above, takes place in South Africa every year, usually in the first quarter of the year. This is essentially an opportunity for the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, other cabinet ministers and senior officials to address senior diplomats on matters of policy and policy direction and for foreign affairs officials to
exchange views with, and receive country reports from, heads of mission, including those located in the China region.

The heads of mission regional meeting and heads of mission annual conference are, of course, not unique to the South African foreign service. These are well-tested mechanisms for ensuring regular briefings and de-briefings, and a semblance of control over policy implementation. Consequently, the Africa Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China also regularly convenes heads of mission meetings for PRC heads of mission serving in the African region (1) 2001. Interview).

b) Ministry and Department of Trade and Industry

During the decade of South Africa’s physical representation in the PRC, and vice versa, total trade volume has increased from some US $14 million in 1992 to US $1.7 billion per annum in 2000 (2) 2001: interview). With both the PRC and South Africa making independent efforts to grow their individual economies it is understandable that the promotion of bilateral trade between the two states, as well as mutually beneficial inward investment, is a major priority of the current bilateral relationship.

c) Ministry and Department of Defence and SA National Defence Force (SANDF)

The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the SANDF (4) SA. 1996. Constitution: paragraph 202) and appoints the Minister, Deputy Minister, Chief of the SANDF and Secretary for Defence. Although a major aim of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) at the international level is to defend South Africa’s “...sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence ...” (1) DOD. 1998. White Paper on Defence: Chapter 2: p. 3) there are also several other priority international goals and some domestic goals with international implications, to consider, such as collaboration with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the adoption of a common security approach within Southern Africa (2) DOD. 1998.

The general organisational and reporting structure of South Africa’s defence component of government is as follows:

Figure 4/3: Ministerial, Departmental and operational organisational and reporting structure of SANDF


d) Other ministries and departments of state

A number of bilateral agreements have already been entered into between various South African government departments and their PRC equivalent institutions. From the establishment of diplomatic relations on 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2000, a period of 36 months, some 18 bilateral agreements, involving more than a dozen institutions in each state, were negotiated between South Africa and the People’s Republic of China (SA. 2001: *Treaties*).

Consequently, although perhaps not as conspicuously involved in the bilateral relationship between SA and the PRC, all the state departments concerned (South African and Chinese) are contributors to, and participants in, the foreign policies of their respective countries.

e) Second and third tiers of government

Unlike the provincial and local governmental organisational structure within the PRC, which is well established to engage South Africa in international commerce and two-way investment, local and provincial government in South Africa has appeared relatively unprepared to effectively engage the PRC in international trade and inward investment promotion. In the past there has been a lack of coordination among public
policy decision makers, particularly at the provincial and local governmental levels (2) 2001. Interview), with regard to actions and policies that impinge on South Africa’s foreign policy process. This lack of coordination has persisted despite the existence of a DFA provincial liaison desk specifically intended for the purpose of coordinating, with the relevant South African embassies and consulates abroad, the programmes and requirements of provincial and local government delegations that intend embarking on overseas visits.

Since January, 1998, a number of city-to-city and province-to-province twinning agreements or sister city and sister province agreements have been negotiated (2)2001: interview). However, in terms of South African constitutional (4)SA. 1996. Constitution: paragraph 231) and legal requirements, local and provincial governments lack the authority to enter into international agreements. Therefore, these agreements appear to be merely expressions of goodwill and friendship, enforcement being dependent more upon the spirit of the agreement and less upon law.

4.2.1.4. Parliament

The President, Deputy President, cabinet ministers and deputy ministers are also Members of Parliament. In terms of the South African Constitution, the President may, alternatively, also select a small number of Cabinet Ministers from outside Parliament (4)SA. 1996. Constitution: paragraph 91 (3) c.).

There are a number of portfolio committees in Parliament (4)WS. 2001: 2), comprising parliamentarians from different political parties (6)WS. 2001: 1-2), and particularly those from smaller parties are often required, by their party leadership, to serve on more than one committee. In regard to foreign policy, and in view of arguments already advanced (para. 3.3.2.2. supra), the most important parliamentary portfolio committees are those concerned with matters pertaining to foreign policy, trade and industry, and defence (4)WS. 2001: 2).
Although the Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Portfolio Committee is able to question the Minister, Deputy Minister and Director-General of Foreign Affairs, or any other DFA official that is able to provide the information it requires, the Committee has only limited ability to influence the direction of foreign policy (vide Mills. 2000: 276). The Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee cannot, for example, hold hearings to ascertain whether the government’s intended ambassadorial appointments are suitable candidates to represent South Africa in the countries where they are expected to serve as heads of mission. They also have no specific powers to question appointments to the top management echelon of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Committee can therefore not operate as an effective oversight committee to ensure that SA foreign policy is underpinned by professional competence and expertise or that the best foreign policy options have seriously been considered and implemented.

4.2.2. PRC’s foreign policy role players

The PRC’s major foreign policy role players today comprise individual and institutional political leaders; professional and technical personnel in relevant government ministries, such as foreign affairs, trade and economic cooperation, and defence (vide {1} 2001. Interview); academic councils and institutions specialising in foreign policy matters; and socio-economic individual and institutional actors (vide Lu. 1997: 135; vide Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 89-93), whose activities may have the capacity to influence PRC foreign policy.

The main institutions of government are the Communist Party of China (CPC), the Central Military Commission (CMC), the National People’s Congress (NPC), and the State Council (SC). Another major institution of government, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), functions mainly in an advisory and monitoring role (Xin. China Daily. 3-4 March, 2001: 1; PRC. 2001. CPPCC Work Report: 16). It is a constitutional vehicle for the PRC’s 55 ethnic minority groups and the eight so-called democratic parties (2000/01: Interviews a-g) to inject their opinions into the policy debates of the CPC. Its primary effect, however, is to give many non-CPC members the opportunity to be part of the decision making processes
in the PRC. Some of the senior office bearers of the "Democratic Parties" are also office bearers in state institutions such as the NPC and CPPCC (2000/01: Interviews a-g). The judiciary also lacks independence and falls under the NPC. The CPC's main decision making organisational structure is embodied within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC). The CCCPC comprises the General-Secretary, Political Bureau (or Politburo) and Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Secretariat, Central Military Commission (CMC) and Commission of Supervision (COS); the NPC encompasses the President, Vice President and Chairman of the NPC, and the Standing Committee of the NPC; the State Council encompasses the Premier, Vice Premiers, State Councillors, Ministries and offices of state.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) is the ruling party in China and has been in existence since 1921. Its current membership (China Daily. 30 June 1999: 2) is 61 million, or 5.1 percent of China's population. The CPC achieved power in China in 1949 and established the People's Republic of China in that year. Since its founding the CPC has convened 15 national congresses (eight of these as the governing party of the PRC) and the most recent of these, held in September, 1997, was considered to be of special significance because it enshrined Deng Xiaoping Theory in the Constitution, together with Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism-Leninism, as the guiding ideology of the Chinese Communist Party ([2] PRC. 1998: 1). However, some earlier congresses were also great watershed events in terms of their impact on policy and ideology. For example, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was described by Jiang Zemin, President, chairman of the Central Military Commission and General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, (China Daily. 19 December 1998. 1-2) as,

... a watershed event, marking the beginning of a new era for China's socialist cause. ... a major turning point of far-reaching significance in the history of the Party since the founding of new China. It served as the prologue to the great socialist reform and opening up. ... As a result of that meeting, the Party began to bring order out of chaos in ideological, political and organisational fields. And the meeting
opened a new road to building socialism with Chinese characteristics.

In effect the CPC is the guardian and fountainghead of state political power. It appears even to be above the constitution and the law, as indicated by Jiang Zemin (Lam. 1999: 121-122) when he declared in 1995 that, "... the party leads the people to establish the constitution and the law ... it also leads the people to implement the constitution and the law..." Clearly, the CPC permits no opposition in the form of any credible challenge to its leadership or paramount status (South China Morning Post. 26 October 1998: 7). As President Jiang Zemin reportedly confirmed (Beijing Wan Bao: 15 January, 2000) in a keynote address to the Party's Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection,

... the Party enjoys the absolute dominance over everything, regardless of workers, peasants, PLA men, intellectuals and businessmen.

Consequently, the Standing Committee of the Politburo functions as a presidential cabinet in that it is effectively, if not constitutionally, the supreme decision making political body within the PRC governmental system and is presided over by the General-Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC, in the capacity of Chairman. The General-Secretary is also the President of the PRC. Jiang Zemin is the current General-Secretary and was elected to this position in 1997.

From a practical diplomatic perspective, the Communist Party of China often functions as a separate diplomatic instrument (vide \{2\}PRC. 2000. Speech by Dai Bingguo), in addition to the PRC bureaucracy and including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consequently, the CPC will focus on states with strong ruling political parties such as, for example, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Nigeria, with a view to making party-to-party links as strong as possible and to neutralise the bureaucracies of those states, when necessary (vide Mills. 2000: 269). There is nothing sinister in this strategy, in that it derives largely from the period of the Cold war when party relations often took precedence over state relations (\{3\}2002. Interview).
4.2.2.1. Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC

The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Politburo) currently comprises the following seven members (vide Brahm. 1998: 116):

Jiang Zemin: General-Secretary of the CPC
Chairman of the Politburo
President (or Chairman of State)
Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC)

Li Peng: Chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC)

Zhu Rongji: Premier of the State Council

Li Ruihuan: Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)

Hu Jintao: Vice President (or Vice Chairman of State)
Vice Chairman of the CMC

Wei Jianxing: Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection

Li Lanqing: First Vice Premier of the State Council

It is a significant indication of the extent of the core leadership's influence that fifteen of the twenty-two members of the full politburo, including the members of the Standing Committee listed supra, hold powerful positions in all key governmental institutions. Every week the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau meets to discuss matters of importance. President Jiang will cast one of the seven votes. Li Peng and Zhu Rongji each has one vote (DFA. Cable: 20000530). During a meeting with former President, Nelson Mandela, on 25 April, 2000 (DFA. Cable: 20000530), President Jiang Zemin provided some useful insights into the workings of the Politburo:

When we have to discuss some major issues it will 
be put up for discussion before the Political Bureau. The 
Political Bureau meets once every month and in that
bigger group. Vice Premier Qian also has one vote. Madam Wu Yi is still an alternate member of the Political Bureau, so she may participate in the discussion, but does not have a vote. Frankly speaking, voting is very seldom used, either in the Political Bureau or Standing Committee meetings. What is most important is for the thorough exchange of views and consideration prior to the meeting.

It has been reported (Lam in South China Morning Post, 4 May, 2000: 1) that Jiang Zemin has already informed senior CPC members that he will not seek a third term as Party General Secretary in 2002 and that only two of the existing Politburo Standing Committee members, Hu Jintao and Li Ruihuan, should remain.

4.2.2.2. Central Military Commission

Jiang Zemin was elected Chairman of the CMC in 1998. The CMC "... directs the armed forces of the country ... (and) .. the Chairman ... has overall responsibility for the Commission ..." (2)PRC, 1999. Yearbook 1998 1999; 71; vide {1}PRC. 2000. Constitution: article 93). Unlike previous holders of this office Jiang does not have a military background. His credibility, at least among the powerful military establishment, is therefore largely dependent upon his ability to satisfy the PLA that he will keep the PRC militarily strong and relevant.

It has been stated (Roy. 1998: 136; Bodansky. 1997: 12) that,

... a March 1997 report prepared for the CCP Central Committee General Office and the State Council General Office concluded that "China and the United States will eventually go to war".

Commenting on China's reaction to the effectiveness of American weapons systems during the 1991 Gulf War, Shambaugh (Bernstein and Munro. 1998: 67) noted that,
“...this was the PLA’s first exposure to a high-tech war, and they were stunned...”
Jiang Zemin, as Chairman of the JMC, is therefore committed to modernising the
PLA both as a perceived necessary defensive need and in order to further enhance his
personal power base among the military establishment. The Chairman of the Central
Military Commission is constitutionally responsible to the National People’s
However, as the Chairman of the CMC is also the General Secretary of the
Communist Party and President of the PRC, and as the Chairman of the NPC
(Speaker of the legislative organ) is politically subordinate to both these offices the
CMC Chairman is unlikely to incur any seriously challenges to his authority.

Vice President Hu Jintao is also Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission,
a post he was elected to at the behest of President Jiang. He is therefore, effectively
understudying Jiang Zemin for both leadership of the state and leadership of the
CMC. However, indications are that Jiang may attempt to hold on to the
Chairmanship of the CMC after he steps down as President in 2002.

4.2.2.3. President and Vice President

Jiang Zemin was elected President by the NPC (vide 1PRC. 2000. Constitution: article 79) in 1998. Hu Jintao became Vice President in 1998, having been elevated to
this position by President Jiang (Lam. 1999: 391) who, in seeking to anoint his
successor, followed the lead of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping who had previously
named their successors.

4.2.2.4. State Council (Premier’s Cabinet)

The current Premier of the State Council of the PRC is Zhu Rongji (Brahm. 1998;
116). The State Council presides over the administrative component of government
(1PRC. 2000. Constitution: articles 86 and 89) and is therefore equivalent to the
Premier’s Cabinet. It has been speculated that when, Zhu Rongji retires in 2003, Jiang
Zemin would prefer Guangdong party chief, Li Changchun, to succeed Zhu as
Premier (Lam in *South China Morning Post*. 4 May, 2000: p.1). The State Council currently comprises the following office bearers:

Zhu Rongji: Premier;
Li Lanqing: Vice Premier;
Qian Qichen: Vice Premier;
Wu Bangguo: Vice Premier;
Wen Jiabao: Vice Premier;
Chi Haotien: State Councillor;
Luo Gan: State Councillor;
Madam Wu Yi: State Councillor;
Ismail Amat: State Councillor;
Wang Zhongyu: Secretary General (concurrently);

There are currently twenty-nine departments under the State Council, classified into four categories (Brahm. 1998: 153), as follows:

**State Political Affairs:**
Foreign Affairs;
National Defence;
Culture;
Health;
Family Planning Commission;
Ethnic Affairs Commission;
Justice;
Public Security;
State Security;
Civil Affairs; and
Supervision.

**Macro-control:**
Development Planning Commission;
Finance;
People’s Bank of China; and
Economic and Trade Commission;

**Specialised Economic Administrative:**
Railways;
Communications;
Construction;
Agriculture;
Water Resources;
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation;
Information Industry; and
Culture, Resources and Specialised, Economic, Administrative
Social Protection: (Continued):
Science and Technology; Commission of Science Technology and
Education; Industry for National Defence.
Labour and Social Security;
Land and Natural Resources; and
Personnel.

Unlike the South African organisational arrangement there is no specific international cluster although foreign affairs and defence are, like South Africa’s categorisation, included in the same category. The PRC approach tends to confirm the influence of the CCP, specifically the Standing Committee of the Politburo (vide CPC.1997: 87-100) and the Central Military Commission, on the really important military and foreign policy decisions of the PRC. Apart from the various ministries resorting under the State Council there are also a number of other important institutional mechanisms (2)PRC. 1999. Yearbook 1998/1999: 67; Brahm. 1998: organisational chart) comprising mainly organs, offices and institutions. For example, organs include the National Tourism Administration, Civil Aviation Administration of China, State Intellectual Property Bureau and General Administration of Customs; offices include the Foreign Affairs Office, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs and Taiwan Affairs Office; and institutions include Xinhua News Agency, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Chinese Academy of Sciences.

4.2.2.5. Professional and technical role players

As a consequence of the dominance of the Communist Party and the centralisation of authority within the overall structure of government, professional and technical role players are mainly implementers of policies already initiated, debated, developed and authorised by the most senior state leaders (1)2001. Interview). Whereas foreign policy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) also have important roles to play in the field of foreign policy.
According to Lu Ning (1997: 165; *vide* Swaine. 1995: 50), the growing influence of MOFTEC has eroded, to some extent, the power of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whereas the emergence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and more particularly the expanded operations of the PLA Navy (PLAN), on the international scene, can be expected to introduce new dynamics to the PLA’s foreign policy role in future. The diplomatic and military establishments have sometimes disagreed strongly in regard to arms sales. For example, Roy (1998: 75) has pointed to differences of opinion between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PLA, concerning sales of advanced missiles to Saudi Arabia, that had to be personally resolved by Deng Xiao Ping.

Despite having to compete with an increasing number of domestic bureaucracies that have entered the field of foreign affairs, MOFA remains the primary institution responsible for the conduct of the PRC’s diplomacy. Its role in the management of foreign policy has suffered, however, as a result of the PRC leadership’s requirement that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must serve the nation’s economic interests (Lu. 1997: 164).

a) Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of the PRC is divided into two main categories, domestic policy and foreign policy. There are twenty-six departments whose functions are divided into the following three categories (11[2000. *Interview*):

- **professional functions, regions and countries;**
  (e.g. Africa: *Africa, SADC, South Africa*; and
  Asia: *West Asia and North Africa*)

- **characteristics (of professional work); and**
  (e.g. Multilateral levels;
   Treaty and Law; and
   Arms control)
• administrative functions.
  (e.g. General office;
   Department of personnel;
   Administration; and
   Finance).

The Africa Department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the specialist
division that has responsibility for PRC bilateral relations with South Africa and other
African states. The organisation of the Africa Department is as follows:

Figure 4/4: MOFA organisational structure with regard to Africa, including South Africa
(December 2000)

![Organisational structure diagram]

Source: MOFA Protocol Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key</th>
<th>MOFA: PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs</th>
<th>D-G: Director-General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

NOTE: PRC Vice Minister is equivalent to SA Deputy Minister
PRC Assistant Minister equivalent to SA Director-General
PRC Director-General equivalent to SA Deputy Director-General

The leading personalities within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interview. 2001)
are the foreign minister, the five vice foreign ministers and the five assistant foreign
ministers as well as senior officials at the level of director-general, deputy director-
general, director and deputy director. There is also a functional department dealing
with the appointment of ministers and ambassadors under the discretion of the
National People’s Congress (the legislature) (1) 2001. *Interview*. In contrast with the South African institutional structures, however, it should be kept in mind that the PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs and all foreign service personnel are *civil servants* (*vide* (1) 2001. *Interview*).

b) Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation

As David Bachman has pointed out:

> As with all major states, in China the realm of foreign policy is not limited to diplomacy and national security policy ... International economic relations are a salient element of China’s foreign relations, one that is growing in importance as China’s relationship with the world deepens (Kim. 1998: 36).

The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) is empowered to undertake the following responsibilities (Brahm. 1998: 173):

- formulate strategies and plans for foreign trade and economic cooperation;
- undertake the macro-administration and economic regulation of China’s foreign economic relations and trade; and
- sanction foreign investment projects at national level and supervise the approval activities of its own branches at regional levels.

According to Brahm (1998: 173), MOFTEC “... puts the final stamp of approval on the contracts, articles of association and technology-transfer agreements for foreign investment projects...” There is thus close control and coordination to ensure that PRC economic and investment policy is closely aligned to foreign policy and, particularly where technology transfers are concerned, military policy objectives.
c) Ministry of Defence

As Brahm (1998: 186) reminds us, the main function of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) "... is to serve as the window of China’s military complex to the outside world, as real power within the PLA falls under the Communist party apparatus, not the State council..." The MOD is empowered (Brahm. 1998: 186) to undertake the following responsibilities:

- deal with national defence affairs in cooperation with the Central Military Commission as well as the Communist Party; and
- receive military leaders from other countries and handle all international liaison functions on behalf of the PLA.

Figure 4/5: Structure of Military Leadership Under the Communist Party of China

Source: modified diagram extracted from Brahm (1998: appendices)

d) Other ministries and departments of state

Unlike many of their South African counterparts, PRC ministries and departments of state tend to coordinate their foreign policy activities through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The activities of PRC representatives, whether at the political level of minister or at senior and even relatively junior non-political levels of the civil service, are invariably focused on specific well-planned and well-conceived objectives that are in accordance with national objectives.

The PRC’s many departments of state have been categorised (Brahm. 1998: Organisational Chart) as macro-control departments; specialised economic administrative departments; education, technology, cultural resources, and social protection departments; and state political affairs departments. In regard to South Africa, PRC departments of state that have not already been referred to, and which aspire to achieving some economic, social or strategic advantage for the PRC, are also likely to feature prominently in the PRC-SA bilateral relationship.

e) Second and third tiers of government

The PRC comprises thirty-three provincial-level administrative areas (2)PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 2-3), including twenty-three provinces (including Taiwan which the PRC regards as a renegade province), five Autonomous Regions (Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Guangxi), four municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) and two Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macao).

As Lu (1997: 16) has noted,

> ... foreign affairs offices exist in all provincial governments and governments of major municipalities that are open to foreigners... Corresponding offices of foreign economic relations and trade, overseas Chinese affairs, Taiwanese affairs, etc., also exist in
most of the provincial and municipal governments.

The PRC is therefore adequately prepared to conduct foreign relations at city and regional level in a coordinated and focused manner, subject of course to the approval, supervision, direction and guidance of the central government. The primary focus of such relations is directed at trade and investment, cultural activities, tourism and the promotion abroad of a positive image of China.

4.2.2.6. National People’s Congress (Legislature)

In terms of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted on 4 December, 1982, the National People’s Congress (NPC) “is the highest organ of state power” (PRC. 2000. Constitution: Article 57; vide paragraph 4.2 supra; also Davies. 2000: 6), being responsible for exercising the “legislative power of the state” (PRC. 2000. Constitution: Article 58). It has also been described (Liu. China Daily. 2 December 1999: 4) as “... the core of the State power structure ....” Among the functions and powers of the NPC, that may directly influence the PRC’s foreign policy (PRC. 2000. Constitution: Articles 62 and 63), are the following:

... to elect (and, if necessary, remove) the President and Vice President of the PRC; to decide on the choice of the Premier of the State Council upon nomination by the President of the PRC (my emphasis), and on the choice of the Vice Premiers, State Councillors, Ministers in charge of ministries (including the Foreign Minister) or commissions, the Auditor-General and the Secretary General of the State Council upon nomination by the Premier (and remove them if necessary); to elect (and, if necessary, remove) the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and, upon nomination by the Chairman, to decide on the choice of all other members of the Central Military Commission (and, if necessary, remove them); and to decide on questions of war and peace.
The NPC has also been described by some non-PRC Government sources (O’Neill in *South China Morning Post*. 21 February, 2000: 4) as a subject for satire and an institution in which,

... the delegates are chosen by the party not the people. If they make a fuss and criticise something, they will not be invited back next year, so they keep silent and enjoy a good time in Beijing at the expense of the state. They have no contact with ordinary people.

As described by some Chinese mainlanders (O’Neill. *South China Morning Post*. 21 February, 2000: 4), the NPC is a form of theatre (intended) for foreigners. However, pro-government sources (Liu. *China Daily*. 2 December 1999: 4) argue that the role of the NPC is to “… ensure (through constant supervision) the enforcement of the Constitution and laws and to monitor the work of other State organisations ….” Such organisations would presumably also include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this regard, a useful role in regard to foreign policy is the supervision or monitoring of ambassadorial appointments (*vide* {1} 2001. *Interview*).

It has been stated (Du Xichuan et al. 1990: 46) that the NPC “upholds the principle of democratic centralism” which implies that all the powers of the NPC should be collectively exercised by the NPC. However, the NPC meets only once per year (PRC 1990. *Constitution*: article 61). Therefore, when it is not in session it leaves many affairs to the NPC Standing Committee, comprising a chairman, vice-chairman, a secretary-general and a number of members elected from the NPC deputies by the NPC (Du Xichuan et al. 1990: 46).

When the NPC is not in session, powers of the NPC Standing committee include the following:

*Upon nomination by the premier of the State Council, it may select ministers ... as well as the auditor-general, and*
secretary-general of the State Council; upon nomination by
the chairman of the Central Military Commission it may
select members to be appointed to the commission; it may
decide on the appointment and recall of plenipotentiary
representatives abroad; it may decide on the ratification
and abrogation of treaties and important agreements
concluded with foreign countries; ... it may decide on the
institution of systems of titles and ranks for military and
diplomatic personnel; and it may decide on the declaration
of war, general or partial mobilisation, or on the
enforcement of martial law (Du Xichuan et al. 1990: 48).

Apart from its task of making and amending laws (vide Xu, China Daily. 1 February 1999: 7), ensuring their enforcement and monitoring the work of other state organisations (Liu, China Daily. 2 December 1999: 4), the NPC also has the task of supervising the Supreme People’s Court. Consequently, the PRC judiciary is effectively subject to the legislature, the NPC. This situation was confirmed (China Daily. 26 September 1998) when, “...the Supreme People’s Court ... announced ... it (would) take a series of measures to put itself under the supervision of the National People’s Congress...” and the President of the Supreme People’s Court (China Daily. 26 September 1998) subsequently declared that,

... judicial organisations should subject themselves to supervision
to guarantee justice in the judicial system.

The current Chairman of the NPC is Li Peng, the adopted son of a former premier and foreign minister, Zhou Enlai. The Far Eastern Economic Review (Ching. 23 April 1998: 32) records that, in March, 1998 the NPC elected Jiang Zemin to a second term as president and elected Hu Jintao as vice president. “Zhu Rongji was elected premier, succeeding Li Peng who ...(became) ... the chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC. ...”. The office of Premier is equivalent to that of Prime Minister whereas the NPC Standing Committee Chairman is equivalent to a
parliamentary speaker. Li Peng is the most senior member of the CPC, second only to Jiang Zemin, and as he had already served a maximum of two terms as Premier the only senior position available to him was as NPC Chairman. Despite assuming a lessor position within the PRC governmental structure, Li Peng retains his influential leadership role in the PRC decision making apparatus (Lu. 1997: 9) by virtue of his senior position within the CCP. This is further evidence of the dominant position of the Communist Party within the PRC.

The NPC also has a number of Special Committees including a Committee of Foreign Affairs and a Committee of Overseas Chinese Affairs. “...These special committees examine, discuss and draw up relevant bills and draft resolutions, and carry on day-to-day work of legislation and supervision …” (2)PRC. 1999. Yearbook 1998/1999: 41).

4.3. Monitors and supervisors of public policy

The monitors of public policy include political parties, usually other than the dominant party in power, as well as the news media and the general public. Monitors can also include foreign governments and foreign news media and may also find expression in international public opinion. Supervisors may include judicial mechanisms, parliamentary committees and other forms of oversight and supervision. Probably the most effective monitors of foreign policy are the people whom it benefits or injures. The monitors referred to here may therefore be found in all five of the environments identified (chapter three supra). Monitors may be individuals, groups, institutions or organisations; they may be formal or informal.

Although political parties in power may monitor whether party policy has been correctly interpreted and applied, political parties in opposition may monitor foreign policy from a variety of more critical viewpoints, including anticipated and actual consequences, and morality; and the citizenry, the news media and lobby groups may monitor foreign policy from the perspective of personal, public or national interest.
In a state such as the PRC, for example, the most effective monitors, and critics, of policy, are likely to be found within the higher echelons of the Party and Government structure (vide {1} 2001. Interview). However, criticism of the power core, the Politburo members, is unlikely and where such criticism does occur it is unlikely to become public knowledge. In South Africa, this type of internal monitoring does occur and does sometimes become public as indicated by President Mbeki’s (DFA. Cable: 19980703) rebuke of critics of his government within the SA Communist Party, when he said:

None of us should go around carrying the notion in our heads that we have a special responsibility to be a revolutionary watchdog over the ANC.

Although not restricted to the foreign policy milieu, the monitoring function does exist as a practical concept within the PRC governmental structure (vide {1} 2001. Interview), where the term supervision is more commonly (vide Brahm. 1998: 194), if less accurately, used. For example, the PRC’s eight democratic parties are expected to “supervise” the activities of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) but clearly this would only be a realistic possibility if the CCP were actually subordinate or subject to the democratic parties. This is certainly not the case (2000/01: Interviews a-g). However, it is possible to envisage a monitoring role for these eight parties, whereby they monitor the actions of the ruling party and respond in terms of domestic constitutional procedures available to them. As the vice chairman of the China Democratic League (2001: Interview d) explained,

... what we call 'supervision' in China is ... multi-channel supervision. There's legislative ... judicial ... press ... and democratic supervision. The relationship between ... parties, especially between the democratic parties and the party in power is constructive, not destructive or in opposition. All supervision and criticism is also constructive.

By contrast, in South Africa, the news media and public opinion are often vociferous critics and useful monitors (Mthombothi. Financial Mail, 16 June, 2000: p. 16) of
the government's actions and public policies. Within the multiparty democratic system, parliamentary procedure and debate also provide opportunities to monitor public policies, including foreign policy (vide {4}SA. 1996. Constitution: paragraphs 57, 59 and 92). Despite the relative absence of effective non-governmental public monitoring mechanisms within the PRC's domestic environment, however, foreign-based or non-mainland monitoring mechanisms can effectively fulfil this monitoring role from the vantage point of the PRC's external environments. Foreign governments, international non-governmental organisations, the foreign or non-mainland news media, multilateral organisations such as the United Nations and its agencies, and other observers and monitors based both inside and outside the PRC, are all actual or potential monitors of PRC foreign policy. However, such monitoring activities occur mainly within the external environments of the PRC. South Africa and all other states are, of course, also vulnerable to such monitoring.

4.3.1. Monitoring and supervision in South Africa

Among the most effective supervisors of government practice are the Constitution, the South African legal system and judiciary, particularly the Constitutional Court, and the Auditor-General and Public Protector(4)SA. 1996. Constitution: paragraphs 167, 182 and 188). However, the quality of public policy does not necessarily concern these institutions, and is essentially the concern of those who monitor public policy.

Within the governmental and party political milieu the most important and effective monitors of public policy, including foreign policy, are politicians, either as critics from outside of government or as participants in the parliamentary process, including debates, question time and membership of the various parliamentary portfolio committees, particularly those dealing with foreign policy issues. In South Africa, parliamentarians are able to put questions to President Mbeki only once every three months (Pretoria News. 13 March, 2001: 4).

In South Africa important monitors of public policy are to be found in the economic and news media fields. This is so because, on the one hand banking, commerce,
industry and labour unions provide the economic measures of how successful or unsuccessful the government's policies are perceived to be, particularly in the domestic environment; and, on the other hand, editors, columnists and journalists are able to critically examine such policies and articulate the kinds of questions that need to be asked of the South African Government in order to ensure that poor policies (vide Mseteka in Cape Times: 4 April, 2001; vide Pretoria News: 6 November, 2000), which cannot survive critical enquiry, are discarded in favour of sound policies that are largely immune to criticism. The effectiveness of such monitors is dependent upon the relative absence of government control.

In the labour field it is crucial to keep in mind the dependence of South Africa's legislators and public policy makers upon the approval and support of South Africa's trade unions, particularly COSATU which is the third partner in the politically dominant ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance (vide Makhanya. Sunday Times. 20 May, 2001: 17). The COSATU constitution, for example, makes it clear that the organisation aspires to political as well as economic leadership and that its activities are not restricted to the domestic environment. The preamble to the COSATU constitution states that:

_We ... firmly commit ourselves to a unified democratic South Africa, free of oppression and economic exploitation. We believe that this could be achieved under the leadership of a united working class. Our history has taught us that to achieve this goal we will have to... encourage democratic worker organisation and leadership in all spheres of our society together with other progressive sectors of the community... (and)... reinforce and encourage progressive international worker contact and solidarity so as to assist one another in our struggle_ (COSATU. 1991: preamble).
4.3.2. Monitoring and supervision in the PRC

In a society that is dominated by a single political party, where the cult of personality still prevails (vide Lu. 1997: 8); where academic thought and literary expression remain restricted and controlled, despite some indications of positive changes (Forney in Far Eastern Economic Review: 2 April 1998); where big business is usually PRC Government business (vide South China Morning Post: 26 October 1999: 9); and where effective trade unions do not exist, there is only limited opportunity for meaningful and effective monitoring of PRC public policies outside the ambit of Communist Party control.

Although there are eight “democratic parties” in addition to the Communist Party (Lam. South China Morning Post. 26 October 1998: 7) they “... are mainly financed by the (Chinese) Communist Party and are supposed to provide advice to the top leadership on important matters of state ...” (2000/01: Interviews a-g; Lam. South China Morning Post. 26 October 1998: 7). The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, in which the eight democratic parties are included, has both monitoring (“supervisory”) and advisory roles, mainly in regard to the development of economic and social policy (Xin. China Daily. 3-4 March, 2001: 1).

By contrast, the establishment of independent, credible, opposition parties such as the China Democracy Party and China Labour Party (Hong Kong Standard. 3 January 1999: 1) is not permitted (Lam. South China Morning Post. 26 October 1998: 7), even though members of President Jiang Zemin’s personal think tank have reportedly recommended (Lam. South China Morning Post. 26 October 1998: 7) lifting the ban on the formation of independent parties. The perceived need to ensure that reforms do not create social instability is reflected by Jiang’s statement (South China Morning Post. 19 November 1998: 12) that,

... before we test out a political reform measure, we must ask the question: “Can it be taken back if it proves to contribute to social chaos and dissenion?".
4.4. Foreign policy advisors in South Africa and the PRC

Any individual or organisation that aspires to improve and develop requires the very best advice available. If professional advice is not sought continually, as standard practice, then certainly it ought to be obtained on those specific occasions when new challenges arise for which neither experience nor intrinsic knowledge seems adequate. Political leaders and political organisations also fall into this category. Therefore, all political leaders and political parties are dependent on the best available advice if they are to meet the foreign policy challenges of their times in ways that enable them to attain the greatest benefits possible on behalf of their respective countries.

Formal advice to political party policy planners comes from think tanks, consultants, academics and sources such as writers and journalists who cover foreign policy issues. These same individuals and organisations, as well as public servants in key advisory and technical positions, may also provide advice to governmental policy makers. For example, during South Africa’s apartheid years it is known that the South African Department of Foreign Affairs made extensive use of consultants in an attempt to counter the effects of the anti-apartheid campaign. An important and usually indispensable source of advice to governmental foreign policy decision makers is the category denoting governmental foreign policy implementers; the civil servants and public officials, serving predominantly in the foreign ministries and foreign relations departments of governments, who actually implement and practise foreign policy. It is this branch of government, relating to foreign policy, which oversees the requirements of predictability, reliability, dependability and consistency, in the quest for advantageous and successful implementation of a state’s foreign policy.

4.4.1. Public policy advisors in South Africa

Public policy advisors in South Africa may be drawn from a variety of sources, both governmental and non-governmental. Advisors may be senior civil servants or
political appointees, academics, consultants and experts drawn from the private sector, scientific and academic institutions; or specialised think tanks.

Think tanks, consultants, academics and others can be sources of valuable advice to both political parties and government decision makers. Before a political party achieves power as the governing party it can expect to benefit from professional advice as to how to project its image and plan its campaign; it may also identify key election topics and gauge the electoral strength of its opponents on specific election issues. It may, however, simply require ready access to researchers and writers who can plan the most effective way to gain electoral support and produce the most effective campaign speeches.

When a political party already holds power, the focus of these advisors may shift toward assisting government decision makers. It is in the role of advising government that think tanks, consultants, academics and others, sometimes by conducting a policy analysis, can assist government decision makers and policy makers to select and implement the best and most effective policy, from a range of available alternatives. The Office of the President includes the following advisors to President Mbeki who have been appointed on contract (Pretoria News. 25 January, 2001: 19):

- Prof. Wiseman Nkulu: Economic advisor;
- Mr Titus Mfolo: Political advisor;
- Advocate Mojanku Gumbi: Legal advisor;
- Ms Bongani Khumalo: advisor on HIV/AIDS and integrated social development;

In the absence of designated foreign policy or military advisors, such policy issues can expect to be dealt with in direct collaboration with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

The line-function diplomatic personnel of DFA, for the greater part of the Department’s existence, have tended to comprise a well-educated, socially competent,
career-oriented professional group of civil servants that were essentially
distinguishable from most other South African civil servants (vide Mills. 2000: 212-
213). Apart from requiring the instinctive behavioural qualities of a diplomat the DFA
line-function official was generally required to be well-informed about international
relations and current events and, at all times, capable of functioning as a public
relations officer. Such officials were often expected to use their initiative and take
independent decisions when the situation required such action. Add to this formula
the necessary benefit of diplomatic experience at home and abroad and the DFA line
function official was generally well-suited to the role of political advisor, particularly
in a specialist field of diplomatic or international expertise. The benefit of advice
from experienced senior diplomats serving at SA missions abroad can be particularly
useful to visiting ministers and officials, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The perceived need to make DFA more representative of South Africa’s demography
in terms of ethnicity and gender (vide Forrest. Mail & Guardian. 14-19 December
2001: 6; Mvoko. Business Day. 4 October 2000) has, however, undone much of the
professional strength and competence of South Africa’s foreign service contingent. As
neither the Minister of Foreign Affairs (a medical doctor who was formally Minister
of Health) nor the Director-General (formerly Director-General of the Department of
Labour) had any prior expertise or experience of the nature of diplomacy (vide
Forrest. Mail " Guardian. 14-19 December 2001: 6) it is not surprising that DFA line-
function personnel have lately begun to resemble all other civil servants in South
Africa. By measuring the requirements for representivity against South Africa’s total
population instead of against, say the number of South Africans with a university
degree applicable to the diplomatic milieu, or with proven diplomatic experience,
DFA has jettisoned a much higher volume of white expertise and professional
competence (vide Mvoko in Business Day. 4 October 2000) than was necessary in the
short term, and arguably to the detriment of South African foreign policy (Pretoria

The Department of Foreign Affairs has conducted a few foreign policy workshops to
provide an opportunity for academic and general public inputs into the formulation of
policy on a variety of issues. The intention, expressed during President Mandela’s term of office, was that a government Green Paper on South Africa’s foreign policy, to be followed by an eventual White Paper, would be produced and that opportunities for public discussion and debate would contribute to such papers. To date no White Paper on South African foreign policy has been produced or published.

Among the think tanks and institutes that can be called upon for advice on military-strategic issues, economic and foreign policy concerns, are the following:

South African Institute of Strategic Studies (SAISS);
South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA);
Africa Institute; Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC); and Economic Research Council.

However, South Africa’s diplomatic missions abroad, and the relevant political desks at the Department of Foreign Affairs, given adequate resources and capacities, are also capable of serving as think tanks for the benefit of South Africa’s foreign policy makers ([2] 2001. Interview).

4.4.2. Public policy advisors in the PRC

In the PRC, foreign policy decision makers may be found among the high echelons of the CPC hierarchy but technical advisors will be drawn from relevant departments, agencies and specialist research institutes and academic institutions, as well as the senior levels of the government military-political bureaucratic establishment (Hamrin in Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 90-92).

Relevant institutional mechanisms which assist foreign policy decision makers in the PRC have been categorised (Lu. 1997: 106) as follows:
Policy consultation, coordination and supervision:

- Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (LSG); and
- Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council.

Policy recommendation and implementation:

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA);
- Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation;
- CPC Central (Committee) International Liaison Department (ILD); and
- Second Directorate of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD).

Information and Research:

- Xinhua News Agency;
- Third Directorate of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD); and
- Academic foreign affairs research institutes.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on leadership relationships involving individuals and institutions that make, or help to make, foreign policy and which link domestic environments in the form of foreign policy. It has been further argued that political parties and political office bearers can be and often are, effectively if not constitutionally, part of the executive branch of government.

In the case of South Africa, the primary focus has been on the executive and legislative branches of government where, as has been argued, most foreign policy making, influencing and monitoring, takes place; and, in the case of the PRC, the Communist Party of China, the executive and legislative organs of government have been the main focus of attention. Consequently, only limited attention has been paid to the judicial organs of government and the second and third tiers of government.
In the broader sense, this chapter has touched upon the decision making and policy making process, which, as has been argued, also includes the influencing of policy, the implementation of policy, and the monitoring of policy. The main intent has been devoted to the question, “who makes, or influences the making of, foreign policy?”

This chapter has identified the main actors or role players, and their related institutions, in the foreign policy and public policy decision making process, that shapes and guides the foreign policy bilateral relationship between South Africa and the People’s Republic of China.

The next chapter will attempt to reformulate this information in the context of decision making systems models that seek to explain who makes, or assists in the making of, foreign policy; how such policy might best be made, implemented and monitored; and how foreign policy actually is made, monitored and implemented in South Africa and the People’s Republic of China.