CHAPTER THREE

LINKAGE MODEL FOR AN ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter explores the need for, and development of, a model for the analysis of foreign policy. A basic core model of foreign policy is advanced, which allows for the environments (internal, external and communicational) in which foreign policy may be expected to take place, as well as the concept of imperatives that motivate and affect foreign policy decision making, and the leadership relationships (ultimately between states in the form of foreign policy) that exert their influence bilaterally or multilaterally in the form of foreign policy.

In this chapter, the three components of the basic core model (environments, leadership relationships, and imperatives) are expanded and examined separately. In all, five environments (the domestic, regional and international geographical and bilateral and multilateral communicational or transactional environments), four leadership relationships (individual and institutional governmental and individual and institutional non-governmental) and some eight selected imperatives, historical, political, economic, social, strategic, legal, moral and scientific and technological will be examined.

3.2. Model for policy analysis

According to Quade (1989: 137),

...the heart of any policy analysis is the creation of a clear, precise, manageable process designed to produce information about the consequences of any action that might be proposed. This process uses one or more models, devices that range from no more than an image of the situation in the mind of the analyst to an elaborate
simulation involving human beings and computing machines. Models are fundamental to policy analysis. Although they cannot predict the consequences with the assurance of the best scientific models, policy models tell us what the possibilities are, based on various assumptions about the factors of concern, and thus produce information that helps to understand the situation more clearly. In fact, the analysis of a problem might be defined as the search for a solution with the aid of one or more models.

The primary model utilised in this policy analysis is therefore a policy model, which Fox and Meyer (1995: 97) define as, "...a simplified representation of selected aspects of a problematic situation constructed for particular purposes...". It is intended to depict the basic components and processes whereby the actors of the international system contribute toward the making of foreign policy. It is also a type of linkage model but does not focus specifically on the linkages of systems (Rosenau.1969: 44-45). Instead, it identifies environments in which foreign policy is formulated and applied and focuses on the perceived decision making/policy making relationships as well as the perceived imperatives that shape and link these environments and give form and direction to foreign policy.

The focus on environments as opposed to systems does not imply that systems theory (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. 1971: 102) has been excluded entirely from the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model. What this focus does mean, however, is that components, processes or influences that supposedly link environments and shape foreign policy should not be interpreted solely from a systemic perspective. The environmental concept tends to be less restrictive and focuses attention on both the static and the dynamic. Its boundaries also invariably exceed the boundaries of whatever system, or systems, it may encompass, as inferred from Platig's observation (vide Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 20) that,

...each multinational political system - even the all-inclusive, global international political system - exists within an environment
that influences the system and the actors and interactions within it.

Consequently, environments, relationships and imperatives are the major components of this linkage model of foreign policy analysis.

More than three decades ago, Rosenau (1969: 2) wrote that,

almost every day incidents are reported that defy the principles of sovereignty. Politics everywhere, it would seem, are related to politics everywhere else. Where the functioning of any political unit was once sustained by structures within its boundaries, now the roots of its political life can be traced to remote corners of the globe. Modern science and technology have collapsed space and time in the physical world and thereby heightened interdependence in the political world. ... As technology shrinks the world and heightens the interdependence of nations, linkage phenomena are too plentiful and too influential to be ignored.

Rosenau (1969: 45) has defined "linkage" as "any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another." In terms of this definition it seems clear that foreign policy decisions originating in one environment and initiating a reaction in another, constitute a linkage that is wholly in harmony with the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model of foreign policy analysis. The model assumes that actors, in varying degrees, both make and experience the effects of policy and policy decisions; that they do so within a plurality of systems and environments; and that all policies or policy decisions, or responses to them, are unavoidably shaped by the impact of a variety of factors, both quantitative and qualitative, termed imperatives. The basic core model envisages the interaction of any two domestic or internal environments (sovereign states) within the wider international environment and may be depicted as follows:
Although the core model concept was not consciously derived from an existing source it is in harmony, to a limited degree, with the basic pattern of interaction between actors advanced by McClelland (*vide* Pfaltzgraff: 1972: 112). Because of the multidimensional nature of the basic core model (figure 3/1 *supra*), and for greater clarity, the three components of the model have been depicted separately. Each component reflects the related perceived factors of concern. The environmental component, which includes the domestic environments of individual states (D1 and D2) and external environments (E), explores the dimension *where* foreign policy comes into being, is articulated as foreign policy, and initiates a foreign policy response. The leadership-relational component (R) examines the dimension that deals with *who* makes, and *who* helps to make, foreign policy. The imperative component (I) investigates *what* factors prompt and shape a particular type of foreign policy. The ultimate function of the total model is to discover *how* and *why* a particular foreign policy action results and *how* the best foreign policy course of action can be selected from a range of alternatives. The model is intended to facilitate the construction of foreign policy profiles of individual states with a view toward planning South Africa’s most effective foreign policy strategies in regard to such states. These profiles will also facilitate the determination of the individual *world view* perspectives of such states.

If individual states, like individual human beings, are partially products of their respective environments (i.e. their external environments), their life experiences and histories, and the natural talents and resources available to them, including access to information, they may be expected to exhibit a wide variety of individual characteristics, some of which may set them apart and some of which may draw them
together. These characteristics, together, can be said to constitute the system or *milieu* in which a state's political decision makers help to shape the development of a national view of the world; a view of their state's place in the international environment, and its relationship to other states; a *world view*.

The advantage of the core model, and the various ways in which it or its core components are depicted, is that it focuses attention on a specific but broad range of relevant factors and categories that can be applied universally. In this way a bilateral relationship, say between states D1 and D2 or a relationship between states D3 and D4, can be examined and compared using exactly the same standards and procedures, and the same types of measure. The model not only helps to explain cause and effect, in the *milieu* of foreign policy, but also aspires toward the establishment of standards of assessment and measurement in that field.

3.3. Environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model.

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**Figure 3/2. The environments component**

- **E1** (Portion of the total international environment “E” which includes all states and political, economic and social entities, governmental and non-governmental, that have diplomatic or other relationships with domestic environments D1 and D2, separately or jointly).

- **E2** (Remainder of the international environment “E” which includes all states and political, economic and social entities, governmental and non-governmental, that lack diplomatic or other relationships with domestic environments D1 and D2, separately or jointly).
### KEY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International environment</th>
<th>E (E1 and E2)</th>
<th>Bilateral environment</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic environment</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Multilateral environment</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional environment</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>State 1</td>
<td>D1</td>
<td>State 2</td>
<td>D2</td>
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<tr>
<td>All other states</td>
<td>Dn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region 1</td>
<td>R1</td>
<td>Region 2</td>
<td>R2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Portion of the international environment which includes state 1 and state 2 and related institutional and state actors of the international system: E1
- Remainder of the international system which includes those institutional and state actors that lack relations with state 1 and state 2: E2

### 3.3.1. Environments involving individual states

All states of the international system are composed of internal, or domestic, environments within the greater global international environment (Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 20) and most, if not all, are part of bilateral (Plano and Olton. 1969: 214) policy environments in which their foreign relations, negative and positive, may be conducted with other individual states. Many individual states are also part of larger multi-state environments, encompassing foreign policy relationships with at least two other states, in the form of regional geographical environments and multilateral institutional environments (Cantori and Spiegel. 1970: *Table 8-1*. 368-373).

Although all the environments of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model have a geographical aspect or component, the domestic, regional and international environments are more easily discerned in terms of tangible generally well-defined and internationally accepted geographical borders and boundaries. The domestic environments of national states are bounded by their national borders; the regional environment, although not always determined by geographical considerations, invariably exhibits a definite geographical aspect; and the international environment which encompasses all existing domestic, bilateral, regional and multilateral environments, is inevitably bounded by the natural geographical extent of our planet. Cantori and Spiegel (1970: 2; *vide* Singer in
Rosenau. 1969: 21) focus only on these three environments as subjects for analysis of the international system when they argue that “a delineation of (these) three arenas of international politics - the globe, the region, and the nation-state - provides us with the basis of an analytical structure for the consideration of international politics.”

By contrast, the bilateral and multilateral environments are largely intangible and place less emphasis on the geographical location of their participants. Being institutional and transactional, rather than geographical environments, they tend to focus, instead, on the individual participants or members of their environments and applicable organisational structures within which foreign policy transactions and communications take place. They are, in effect, *linkage environments*.

Henry Kissinger has elucidated very clearly the relationship between domestic structure and foreign policy (Rosenau 1969: 261-275). David Bachman makes the same point about Chinese foreign policy (Kim 1994: 44; *vide* Roy. 1998: 225) when he states:

*Because foreign policy is likely to be the product of many of the same decision-making structures as domestic policy,*

*Chinese foreign policy is an extension of Chinese domestic politics.*

The bilateral and multilateral policy environments of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, clearly, are extensions of the policies of the domestic environment into the wider external environment: the bilateral environment processes domestic policy transactions between any two states; and the multilateral environment processes domestic and regional policy transactions between any three, or more, states. Each of the five environments identified in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model has the capacity to affect and be affected by the foreign policy concerns of any particular individual state.
3.3.1.1. Domestic environment

For the purposes of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, the domestic or internal environment of a state (see D1, D2 and Dn of figure 3/2 supra) necessarily excludes that state’s foreign or external environment (see E, B, R1, R2 and M of figure 3/2 supra). It concerns only those public decision making and public policy relationships that involve domestic actors interacting within the domestic environment and which create benefits or hardships within the internal environment, whose repercussions are mainly experienced within, but not necessarily limited to, that internal environment.

The domestic environment encompasses a state’s national value system, its ideological base, the national character and spirit of its people. It has been said that “...a nation or a country would lose its soul, cohesion and vitality without a spirit to sustain it. A national spirit is an important measurement of a country’s overall national strength...” (1)PRC. 1998: 10). The domestic environment is also the enduring reservoir of a state’s historical experience. The form and character of a state’s system of government and its government institutions, and the manner in which power is exercised and decisions are taken by its leaders, continuously conspire to reflect all these and perhaps other factors in the form of public policies, including foreign policy, that are unique to such a domestic environment.

The domestic environment is a crucial determinant of a state’s foreign policy. For example, Kissinger (vide Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 385) has noted that,

...if domestic structures are based on commensurable notions of what is just, a consensus about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy develops. ... When the domestic structures are based on fundamentally different conceptions of what is just, the conduct of international affairs grows more complex ... When domestic structures - and the concept of legitimacy on which they are based - differ widely, statesmen can still
meet, but their ability to persuade has been reduced for they no longer speak the same language.

Therefore, it seems likely that difficulties could arise in the pursuit of bilateral relationships between states having domestic structures founded on significantly different value-systems, or differing world views.

3.3.1.2. Bilateral environment

The bilateral policy environment (see B of figure 3/2 supra) of any specific state involves its existing or potential external relationship with a second state and is an expression of the extent of the foreign policy relationship between the separate domestic environments (see D1 and D2 of figure 3/2 supra and B of figure 3/3 infra) of the two states. It should be kept in mind that even a state that might deliberately seek to avoid relationships with other states would still be part of a number of bilateral environments on the strength of its bilateral non-relationships. Therefore, an environment in which a negative relationship exists between two states, or where no relationship exits, formal or informal, is still a bilateral environment, albeit with negative or few or no linkages. There is, after all, a distinction between a bilateral environment and a bilateral relationship. A bilateral environment alone is like a blank page whereas a bilateral relationship is more like a page with something drawn or written on it. A bilateral environment must therefore harbour two-way communication within, in order to reflect evidence of a bilateral relationship. As explained, the bilateral environment may exhibit no relationship or interaction (Legg and Morrison. 1971: 32) at all. Where a relationship does exist it may be positive (good or beneficial) or negative (bad or detrimental); it might be stable or unstable (erratic); it might exhibit a specially close relationship; it might also be neutral.

Any research which focuses on the foreign policy relationship between two states, for example the foreign policy relationship between South Africa and the PRC, must necessarily examine the bilateral environment of the two states because it is in this
environment that their direct mutual foreign policy transactions and exchanges, including a variety of authoritative policy making decisions, are likely to be reflected. Although foreign policy is made and ratified within the domestic environment, and is often originated (vide paragraph 1.6 supra) and initiated in that environment, the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model assumes that it is continually and predominantly monitored, assessed and re-shaped within the bilateral environment. Whereas foreign policy is merely one of many types of policy within the domestic environment, in the bilateral environment it is the dominant policy, encompassing trade policies, immigration policies and cultural policies, among others. Foreign policy is, in effect, an extension of the domestic policies and interests of individual states into the external environment (see B of figure 3/3 infra), that is, the bilateral, multilateral, regional or international environment, with a view to interacting, preferably but not always peacefully with the domestic policies and interests of other states, for maximum national self-benefit. The bilateral environment, precisely because it encapsulates all direct diplomatic and foreign policy activity between two states, is usually fragile, often sensitive and always alert for words, actions and nuances (vide \[2\] WS. 2002: 1-4) that may convey indirect messages that are perceived to be hostile, unfriendly, indifferent, untrustworthy or insincere. Consequently, it has been stated (Cohen. 1981: 32) that “… a diplomatic communication should say neither too much nor too little because every word, nuance and omission will be meticulously studied for any possible shade of meaning …”

Diplomacy has been described as “… the science of the external relations, or foreign affairs of states, and, in a more limited sense, the science, or art, of negotiation … the sum of the knowledge and the principles necessary for the good conduct of public affairs between states… (and) the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states … (it is about) … the means or methods by which ..(foreign) policy is executed.” (Nicholson in Pfältzgraff. 1972: 425).

In the practical sense, diplomacy is about inter-governmental communication founded on vigilance, perception, sensitivity and good judgement. States sometimes “send”
official messages they do not intend to send (WS. 2002: 1), through failure to meet the basic requirements of diplomacy. When this happens, the bilateral relationship is likely to be the first to reflect the relative failure of diplomacy between the states concerned. Such failure may be due to a noticeable deterioration in the bilateral relationship or it may be due to a missed opportunity to improve the relationship (vide IDSA. 1998: 1835). For example, did South Africa miss an opportunity to demonstrate its true regard for peace in the Middle East and its respect for a peace maker and respected leader such as the late King Hussain of Jordan, when no South African leader of note attended his funeral (SA. 1999: Parliamentary Media Briefing)? When South Africa accepted a Grant-in-Aid from the PRC during the visit of Vice President Hu Jintao and chose not to raise human rights concerns with the PRC leader (2001. Interview) what message did this behaviour send to the other actors of the international system? What message did South Africa send to the PRC in appearing to kowtow to Beijing’s sensitivities?

3.3.1.3. Regional environment

As some writers (Taylor and Groom. 1978: 63-65; Rosenau. 1969: 61-62; Cantori and Spiegel. 1970: 2) have shown, regions are notoriously difficult to define (EAP. 1995: 7-8). Some regions are distinguished by religious or geographical factors; others may be denoted by historical, cultural (vide Deng and Wang. 1999: 184) or economic characteristics. The concept of “region” is therefore flexible and largely subjective.

For the purposes of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, the regional environment of any specific state (see R1 and R2 of figure 3/2 supra) is determined by its geographical location and involves that state’s external relationship with its regional neighbours which may be promoted both multilaterally and bilaterally. The regional environment of any state would always include contiguous neighbouring states and might also include non-contiguous states whose actions and interests regularly affect or are affected by other activities or interests within that regional environment.
Every individual state is automatically part of a geographical region. The region may be designated in terms of the hemisphere the state occupies (northern, southern, eastern or western); it may be designated according to the continent or ocean where it is situated (African, Asian or Pacific); and it may be part of a political, economic, military or ideological grouping of individual states (the developing world, the “West”, the Islamic world, the communist world, the nuclear states) that can be clearly (geographically) discerned, among other possibilities. Sometimes these regions comprise states that are, geographically, largely contiguous or proximate, the African continent and Europe being suitable examples, and sometimes their membership is geographically dispersed, such as the developing or Islamic worlds, or the Southern Hemisphere. Some states belong to many, often overlapping, regions and some belong to relatively few. Some regions are very large, in membership or geography or both, and others are relatively small.

A regional environment, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, is any segment of the international environment that is usually no smaller in membership and geographical area than three domestic environments (McLaren. 1980: 1) or their territories (a single domestic environment would be a nation-state whereas two domestic environments in a perceived regional context would conceivably exhibit a mutual bilateral environment) that are either contiguous to one another, bound by a common sea, ocean or waterway, or linked by shared values, interests and goals within a discernible geographical region. What Rosenau (1969: 61) identifies as a separate “contiguous environment” is included in the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model’s regional environment.

Archer (1992: 47) reminds us that Bruce Russett approached the problem of categorising regions by focusing on five aspects: “regions of social and cultural homogeneity; regions sharing similar attitudes or external behaviour; regions of political interdependence; regions of economic interdependence; and regions of geographic proximity.” However, the environmental-relationships-imperatives model merely requires a distinction between regions that can be identified through their institutional (multilateral) or non-institutional (geographical) characteristics. South
Africa, for example, is arguably part of several regions, including the African region, the Southern African region, the South Atlantic Region, the Indian Ocean Region, the Sub-Saharan Region and the Developing Region, among others. The People’s Republic of China may be regarded as being part of the Asia-Pacific region, the Asian Region, the Far Eastern or East Asian Region, the Confucian region (vide Deng and Wang 1999:184; Zhang, 1999: vii-viii) and the Developing Region, among others.

3.3.1.4. Multilateral environment

In addition to regional groupings of states functioning within the regional environment there are also multilateral institutions, comprising individual member states, which function within the multilateral environment. The multilateral institution performs a specific function as opposed to the region which is largely a descriptive geographical term. The regional environment is capable of encompassing the multilateral environment and being encompassed by it. In reality it is not difficult to contemplate a regional environment such as the Northern Hemisphere hosting a variety of multilateral environments, such as NATO, the European Union and the Nordic Council. The opposite situation whereby a multilateral environment includes, either wholly or partially, more than one regional environment may appear less common, but does occur in the case of large multilateral organisations such as the United Nations, Organisation of African Unity, Commonwealth, Group of 77 (G-77) and Non-Aligned Movement. The bilateral environment, of course, extends between any two states within the international environment or within a specific regional environment or even a number of regional environments. For example, the South African-Zimbabwean bilateral environment extends within the African, Southern African and sub-Saharan regional environments.

Instead of referring to a “multilateral environment” James Rosenau (1969: 63) employs the term, “organisational environment” which he describes as follows:

The proliferation and growth of international organisations has required policies to devote increased attention to institutionalised
patterns of activity that transpire in their environment. ... It encompasses all those organisations that have structure and personnel apart from the polities belonging to them, such as the United Nations, the Organisation of American States, and the International Court of Justice. It does not include, however, the many alliances and agreements in which elaborate specifications for interaction and cooperation are not accompanied by the establishment of implementing machinery that has an identity of its own.

Rosenau's (1969: 63) linkage model incorporates a contiguous environment, a regional environment and a resource environment, among others, which exhibit some of the characteristics and concerns (e.g. boundary disputes, historic rivalries, disarmament, race relations, trade and economic development) (Rosenau. 1969: 61-63) to be explored within the context of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model.

In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, the multilateral environment of a state (see M in figure 3/2 supra) involves its external institutional foreign policy relationships with other states, usually through international governmental institutions having a permanent secretariat and with a membership of at least three states (McLaren. 1980: 1; Taylor and Groom. 1978: 30), such as the United Nations (UN), Organisation of African States (OAU) or the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Although, in some cases, a particular multilateral environment may appear to overlap a particular regional environment it should be kept in mind that regions are determined by geographical location whereas multilateral organisations are dependent on membership. Consequently, not all the states of a particular region will necessarily be members of the applicable multilateral organisation, if such an organisation exists, which oversees the specific interests of that region. For example, apartheid South Africa, although part of the Southern African region, was never part of the multilateral Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (SA. 1995. Profile 3/95: 15) whereas, today,
South Africa and even Mauritius, an Indian Ocean island-state, are members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (2)SA. 1995. Profile 3/95: 14). However, Madagascar, an Indian Ocean island that is much larger and geographically closer to Southern Africa than Mauritius, is not a member of the SADC (2)SA. 1995. Profile 3/95: 14-15).

3.3.1.5. International environment

The international environment (see E in figure 3/2 supra) is the “sea” in which the domestic environments of all the world’s states “float” and interact. Therefore, every foreign policy activity and every domestic policy activity takes place within the greater global boundary of the international system and its environment. For the purposes of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model the international environment has been divided into two segments. One segment encompasses those states and political entities (interacting through their bilateral, regional or multilateral environments) that have a direct foreign policy relationship with at least one of the two domestic environments featured in the model, and the remaining segment encompasses those states that do not have any direct foreign policy relationship with either one of these two domestic environments.

According to Quincy Wright, (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. 1971: 17) “... international relations include relations between many entities of uncertain sovereignty.” Not all political entities are sovereign states. They may be colonies, protectorates, trusteeships, partitioned states, and other states with an extraordinary status; they may also be inter-governmental organisations such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or Arab League (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. 1971: 16). Consequently, where individual states interact through such organisations they would, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, be part of the multilateral environment but such individual multilateral organisations would also be political entities within the wider international environment.
3.3.2. Leadership relationships involving individual states

For the purposes of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model the term “leadership relationship” refers to public policy decisions and actions taken by individuals or institutions of government, as well as policies and actions of individuals and institutions outside the public policy or governmental sector. It is argued that these decisions and actions determine, or have the potential to determine, the nature and direction of a state’s foreign policy. Individually and collectively such actions and policy decisions represent the transactions and communications that link and shape the various environments that have been identified (see figure 3/2 supra).

According to Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1 Rosenau. 1969: 203), there are “…non-governmental effects of state action …” and decision makers who act upon and respond to conditions and factors “…outside themselves and the governmental organisation of which they are a part …” If it is accepted that non-governmental actors may influence public policy, including foreign policy (vide Mills. 2000: 190), then it follows that, within any foreign policy environment (five environments have been identified), there are also non-governmental actors in the form of institutions and individuals, who may influence foreign policy. This being so, there are at least four categories of leadership relationships (two governmental and two non-governmental) whereby foreign policy may be influenced, formulated, implemented, or changed, directly or indirectly. Broadly, these relationships may be categorised as individual governmental, institutional governmental, individual non-governmental and institutional non-governmental leadership relationships. Furthermore, it is possible to conceive of some or all of these four categories of leadership relationships occurring in each of the five foreign policy environments in ways that have the potential to affect the direction or nature of foreign policy.

Despite this potential, however, the main reservoirs of decision making leadership relationships that are most likely to influence foreign policy will be the domestic environments of individual states and the bilateral and multilateral environments in
which the relevant foreign policy transactions and communications take place and become manifest.

Figure 3/3: The leadership relationships component

KEY:  International environment: I  Bilateral environment: B  
Domestic environment: D  Regional environment: R  
State 1: D1  Region 1 (state 1): R1  
State 2: D2  Region 2 (state 2): R2  
All other individual states: Dn  Multilateral environment: M  
Policy makers: P  Multilateral organisations: Mn  
Policy makers (state 1): P1  Multilateral policy makers: MPn  
Policy makers (state 2): P2  Relationships  
Policy makers (others): Pn  Imperatives filter

In figure 3/3 supra the ovals, P1, P2, Pn and MPn, represent authoritative individual and institutional decision making leadership components (individual governmental and institutional governmental) interacting with one another and with other leadership components (individual non-governmental and institutional non-governmental) of the non-governmental type.
Within any of the foreign policy environments identified, the individual public policy decision maker’s actions, the institutional public policy decision maker’s actions, the individual non-governmental decision maker’s actions and the institutional non-governmental decision maker’s actions may encompass the individual actions and decisions of individual government leaders, cabinet ministers, senior public servants, key advisors and politicians; the institutional actions and decisions of the executive, legislative and even judicial branches of government; the individual actions and decisions of opposition politicians, student leaders and academics, journalists, labour leaders, business leaders and private citizens; and the institutional actions and decisions of opposition political parties, student and academic organisations, newspapers, trade unions, banks and corporations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

With a view to utilising the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model for the purpose of an analysis of foreign policy, the various leadership relationships (see figure 3/3 supra) that have been identified as being most relevant to the research objective will need to be examined. In this regard, it is necessary to properly identify decision makers and actors, as well as decisions, that may have a role in shaping a state’s foreign policy.

The various leadership relationships in figure 3/3 above are depicted by double-arrow single lines (→←). The double arrows indicate that the relationship path is one of two-way communication and interaction between those who take decisions and those who are affected by them. This interactive situation applies whether the relationship path is between the governors and the governed in a particular country or between two sovereign independent states. The short single lines that intersect the double-arrow lines at right-angles represent the imperatives that have influenced, and may continue to influence, the various leadership relationships sufficiently to determine the eventual direction and shape of foreign policy.
3.3.2.1. Domestic leadership relationships

Singer (Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 101) has pointed out that the national state (domestic environment) is "... our primary actor in international relations..." and Rosenau (1969: 72-73) has also alluded to the primary decision making role of the nation-state in matters of foreign policy:

To speak of Germany wanting this, or France avoiding that, is to run the risk of oversimplifying, of ascribing human characteristics to non-human, abstract entities. On the other hand, many individuals act on behalf of governments, which in turn, represent units called nation-states that for centuries have been the focal point of man’s highest loyalties and thus are the political agencies that supersede all others in their capacity to make binding decisions for their members.

Therefore, although a state’s domestic environment cannot simultaneously be its own foreign or external environment, the domestic environment is the indisputable source of a state’s foreign relations and its foreign policy.

It has been said that a state’s foreign policy is a reflection of its domestic policy (Pfaltzgraff. 1972: 385-388). Consequently the actions and decisions of practically any and every category of decision maker and actor (Cantori and Spiegel. 1970: 126) capable of influencing a state’s public policy, either directly or indirectly, may originate in the domestic environment yet find expression in any one of the external environments as that state’s foreign policy.

From a foreign policy perspective the actions and decisions of non-governmental decision makers can influence public policy but such actors do not actually take the policy decisions that may shape public policy, including foreign policy. Although the impact of non-governmental actors upon foreign policy appears largely peripheral and incidental there have been occasions when non-governmental actors decisively
influenced the direction of a state’s foreign policy as when American public opinion, represented in part by “… media commentators, business executives, educators, clergymen … (in 1967) had already begun to express misgivings about the (Vietnam) war …” (Karnow. 1983: 546). As Richard Merritt (1975: 2) has pointed out,

… in certain, rather narrowly circumscribed circumstances, the public at large can have a direct impact upon the foreign policy-making process as well as, through its elected representatives and other mediators, a more indirect influence.

The type of “direct impact” upon public policy alluded to by Merritt (1975: 2) would, however, be classified as an indirect impact in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model which assumes that only authoritative decisions involving public policy can be regarded as direct impacts upon such policy. Consider, for example, the anti-apartheid campaign which successfully pressured many American multinational companies into withdrawing their investments from South Africa and which had the added impact of causing some foreign legislators to introduce domestic laws designed to prevent their nationals from investing in apartheid South Africa. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) which became law in the United States during the ‘eighties (vide Suzman. 1993: 273-274), is undoubtedly an example of a direct impact (the authoritative actions of US legislators) upon US-SA foreign policy. However, the pressure upon US legislators by US public opinion in favour of anti-apartheid legislation only exerted an indirect influence upon the CAAA in that the direct actors were the legislators themselves.

Of course, the actual impact of non-governmental actors upon public policy, including foreign policy, will depend on the type of political institutional arrangements that exist within a state’s domestic environment. As Merritt (1975: 2) postulates,

... the very structure of ... (the internal) environment conditions the decisions made by the duly authorised decision-making bodies.
A fragmented society ... may pose vastly different considerations (such as freedom of action) than one that is highly mobilised and attuned to political outcomes.

Furthermore, a state having a strong operational legal base and a bill of rights, such as South Africa, the United States or the United Kingdom, is more likely to tolerate the influence, upon its public policies, of non-governmental entities ([1]SA. 1998). In fact, the previous Director-General of Foreign Affairs ([3]SA. 1999: JS Selebi speech) stated that,

... there is a need to develop a broader base of people working in and on foreign policy related matters. This includes academia, journalists, business people and the NGO community.

States such as the People’s Republic of China or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would be unlikely to acknowledge the influence of individuals or institutions that are not recognisably part of, or closely allied to, their respective governments, even if such influence were present (vide. Nathan and Link. 2001: 313).

Domestic concerns, especially those involving strategic, economic and social issues, are often likely to have an impact upon a state’s foreign relations and consequently, the actions and decisions of government leaders and government institutions, particularly in these crucial areas of concern, would require close examination in any attempt to analyse a state’s foreign policy. In this regard, the South African Foreign Minister ([4] SA. 1999: Dlamini Zuma speech) has declared:

Our approach is that foreign policy should be firmly embodied in our domestic policy. For a developing country like ours, faced with daunting challenges of economic upliftment and inequalities, our foreign policy priorities should, above all else, be determined by our domestic needs.
This approach makes sense, of course, particularly if foreign policy is directed toward the enhancement of domestic resources and the achievement of the means to make life good for the citizenry of the state. However, there is a mutual responsibility for foreign policy and domestic policy to support one another; and for the state’s domestic public institutions to create a climate within the domestic environment that will facilitate effective foreign policy transactions with other states.

3.3.2.2. Bilateral leadership relationships

At the bilateral level the head of government, foreign minister and deputy foreign minister, key civil servants, usually in the department of foreign affairs (vide Mills. 2000: 217) or foreign ministry, and key politicians entrusted with foreign affairs portfolios are likely to take and shape decisions affecting a state’s foreign policy. Government institutions that may be expected to shape a state’s foreign policy would be likely to include the cabinet, key foreign policy organs within the legislature, such as a foreign affairs portfolio committee or senate committee on foreign affairs, and key government departments and agencies such as the departments of foreign affairs, trade, defence, finance and relevant budget committees.

Because the formal bilateral foreign policy relationship is usually directly driven by government decision makers and implementers of policy, the role of the non-governmental individual tends to exert a more peripheral influence on the shaping of foreign policy. The individual actions of business, labour, ethnic, civic, religious, and student leaders, among others, may indirectly or peripherally affect the course of foreign policy (vide Mills. 2000: 206). Similarly, the institutional actions of business, political, religious, labour and student organisations, among others, may also indirectly or peripherally affect the course of a state’s foreign policy.

Although writers such as Richard Merritt (1975: 2) refer to the “... direct impact upon the foreign policy process ...” (my emphasis) of certain interest groups, including many of those categorised above, he is referring specifically (1975: 2) to “... foreign policy-makers .. in the domestic political arena ...” (my emphasis).
However, for the purposes of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model the bilateral environment makes a necessary distinction between actors who function in an authoritative capacity, as instruments of the state who make foreign policy, and those whose influence upon foreign policy decisions are necessarily indirect, peripheral and non-authoritative.

3.3.2.3. Regional leadership relationships

Whereas there are specific mutual and reciprocal responsibilities inherent in the relations between citizens and government within the domestic environment, the regional environment evinces similar responsibilities; individual governments and national communities, having a specific interest in the well-being of their common regional environment, will usually be committed to regional political stability, regional security, and economic development for mutual benefit. However, perceived national or domestic interests of individual states within a specific region may sometimes create regional instability (vide Roy. 1998:170) as has occurred in regions such as the Middle East (vide Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 333-35), the Balkans (vide {35}WS. 1996. USA Today.14 February 1996), Africa (DFA. 19961220; DFA. 19970805), and South, Central and East Asia (DFA. 20000523; Deng and Wang. 1999: 188), among others.

A common geographical region does not imply common political or economic ideologies, common languages, religions or ethnic groups, or common levels of economic development or military strength. The individual member states of a particular region can exhibit great differences in virtually all these categories (EAP. 1995: 7-8). The newly independent Balkan states that were born from the Yugoslavian break-up exemplify such differences (vide {35}WS. 1996. USA Today. 14 February 1996). Positive bilateral relationships within regions, particularly those which are capable of creating understanding, trust and mutual respect between diverse cultures and ideologies, are therefore crucial components of any strategy to achieve peace and stability within the international system.
At the regional level, in the absence of any formal regional multilateral organisational structure, the bilateral leadership relationship pattern is the main one available for the conduct of foreign policy between individual states in the same region. However, in the absence of formal multilateral structures, three or more states may still meet in a regional context to try and find solutions to common regional problems which may range from peace making initiatives to a search for effective ways to address common regional needs. The major difference in the conduct of bilateral relations between states in a regional context, as opposed to a non-regional context, is likely to be affected by the imperatives which drive such bilateral relations; regional imperatives, because of their often complex nature due to an increased number of variables, are generally perceived to require more urgent responses or solutions to problems than non-regional imperatives, where variables are likely to be fewer.

3.3.2.4. Multilateral leadership relationships

Multilateral leadership relationships are generally driven by government decision makers acting directly within or directly through international government organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or its agencies, the Commonwealth, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Organisation of American States (OAS). Heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers, trade ministers, ambassadors, diplomats and technical experts and advisors are likely to feature prominently in this type of governmental leadership relationship.

Although non-governmental individual and institutional actors and decision makers may also influence the development of multilateral foreign policy, their contribution is likely to be indirect and peripheral, such as occurred when NGOs (10) were permitted to make limited contributions to the deliberations and policy decisions of the Ninth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IX) under the chairmanship of South Africa (Mills. 2000: 325).
3.3.2.5. International leadership relationships

In comparison with the more direct influences of foreign policy leadership relationships within the domestic or internal geographical environment, the external geographical environments are the crucibles of largely indirect or peripheral foreign policy influences. In terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model, the peripheral foreign policy initiators and influencers within the external environments of individual states include individual and institutional role players, both governmental and non-governmental, within the international environment which exert formative influences on the bilateral relationships of states. They help to shape the bilateral environment which is the environment in which domestic environments contribute to the conduct of foreign policy.

Sometimes, the precipitators of authoritative foreign policy decisions, or the influencers of foreign policy, may conceivably act within the international environment without obviously being part of any other specific geographical environment or acting through either one of the two transactional environments, in terms of the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model. For example, a random act of air piracy or a terrorist assassination, or a boatload of illegal immigrants in international waters, may precipitate a foreign policy response or may influence a new direction in existing foreign policy, particularly in regard to states directly affected by such events. At the institutional level, non-government organisations such as Green Peace can and do operate within the international system in ways that may precipitate or influence foreign policy, specifically in the realm of environmental issues (11)WS. 1995. Although former Foreign Minister Nzo’s reference (1)SA. 1998: Nzo Speech) to civil society and the business community as “... non-state actors ...” was directed at the domestic environment of South Africa, such actors could also conceivably qualify as precipitators or influencers of foreign policy within the external environments.

The international environment includes the four environments referred to above. However, for the purposes of this research, international leadership relationships are those leadership relationships that do not occur or cannot be categorised, or are
difficult to categorise in any of the other four environments. In this regard, Legg and Morrison (1971: 258) have referred specifically to,

*individuals without official roles or over and above their official roles can also be considered international actors in certain contexts. Such individuals have an international stature and influence derived from personal commitment or charisma.*

For example, the Pope, the Dalai Lama (*Sowetan*. 29 November 1999: 3), Nelson Mandela, some international terrorist groups and their leaders, particular international non-governmental organisations such as *Green Peace* and influential international personalities such as George Soros (*vide* {30}WS. 2002: 1-4) and Bill Gates (Bernstein and Munro. 1998: 101) might feature in this category. Leadership relationships in the international environment, in the absence of governmental institutions that do not also belong to one of the other four environments, will necessarily be found in only two categories; *individual non-governmental* and *institutional non-governmental*.

3.3.3. Selected imperatives

Imperatives are factors or circumstances that derive from previous actions or behaviour or experience and which have the effect of determining the course of future actions or behaviour. For example, a country that has been engaged in wars against hostile neighbours for much of its history, or which exists perpetually under threat of war or hostile attack could be expected to pursue a foreign policy strongly determined by strategic concerns and national interest. Similarly, countries that have experienced colonial exploitation and race discrimination may still harbour deep resentment and distrust of their former colonial rulers. They may therefore deliberately reject many of the values and practices of those states, including their political, economic and social systems, even though colonial exploitation and race discrimination are constitutionally no longer part of those systems.
The imperatives component (I) of the core model (figure 2/1 supra), it is argued, provides the incentive for a particular foreign policy decision or course of action. It also acts as a filter mechanism that influences the direction and shapes the content of foreign policy. Rosenau (1969: 173) has referred to “cultural compulsions” which might be expected to affect individual decision makers. Such compulsions are included within the concept of imperatives. However, Rosenau’s reference would seem to be directed toward individual decision makers under the influence of an all-embracing “cultural compulsion” whereas the imperatives component of the model (figure 2/1 supra) looks at a variety of unique and separate “compulsions” which may separately or collaboratively affect decision makers.

The various leadership relationships illustrated by arrow lines in figure 2/3 supra have been intersected by short straight lines (---) which represent the filter mechanism. The relevant imperatives, either collectively or independently, represent this filter mechanism. Although by no means an exhaustive list of possible imperatives, the following have been identified as imperatives that are most likely to influence the responses of foreign policy decision makers toward perceived foreign policy threats or opportunities: historical, political, economic, social, strategic, scientific and technological, moral, and legal imperatives. The eight imperatives have been selected on the basis of comprehensiveness, universality and relevance. All countries can be studied from the perspectives of history; political, economic or social development; strategic considerations; scientific and technical development; legal institutions and legal milieu. Although issues such as human rights and ethics might well be included under the social or legal imperatives it is argued that human rights issues and ethical issues, particularly in the international arena, have begun to assume a degree of prominence that warrants their inclusion in a separate category, the moral imperative, that is capable of encompassing both ethics and human rights, while recognising their distinctiveness.

According to Robinson (Robinson and Shambaugh, 1997: 555-600) Chinese foreign policy from the 1940s to the 1990s passed through various stages, each one driven or
affected by a combination of domestic and international factors, including, among domestic factors, those pertaining to politics, history, ideology (555-561; 570-575; 588), economics (557; 568-574; 579; 590-591; 598-599), military strategy (561; 577-579; 581-583; 594-598), technology (569; 572-574; 579; 584-585; 594-597), culture (570-572; 580; 588) and certain moral issues such as human rights (599).

Richard Merritt, in reference to the environments of foreign policy decision makers (Merritt. 1975: 1-2), or the milieu of such decision makers in terms of the environmental-relationships-impertatives linkage model, refers to,

...various levels of **technology**, enduring patterns of **trade** and other transactions, perceptions, norms of individual and state behaviour, and, more particularly, **religion** and other **cultural** components (my emphasis).

Merritt also identifies (1975: 2) **morality**, **international law** and **national security** as issues that are also relevant topics for consideration by foreign policy decision makers. It is interesting to note that the Report on the Commonwealth Seminar held in Singapore in 1970 (CW. 1971: 17-23) reflects the following specialist divisions as having been included within the foreign services of Australia, People’s Republic of China (PRC), France, Ghana, Britain (UK), USA, and the USSR:

- **Legal**: Australia, PRC (treaties), France, Ghana, UK, USSR.
- **Defence**: Australia, UK, USA (arms control/disarmament), USSR.
- **Economic**: Australia, PRC, France, Ghana, UK, USA, USSR.
- **Historical**: Australia, UK.
- **Cultural**: Australia (social), PRC, France (culturelle), UK, USA, USSR.
- **Political**: Australia, PRC (foreign affairs), France, Ghana, UK, USA, USSR.
- **Science and Technology**: UK, USA.

Although the moral imperative apparently did not feature in the organisational considerations of any of the above foreign services at the time when the Report on the
Commonwealth Seminar was written (CW. 1971: 17-23) the remaining seven categories appear to be well-represented if allowance is made for some differences in terminology. For example defence considerations are included in the strategic imperative whereas cultural considerations are encompassed by the social imperative.

Currently, scientific and technological needs, increased awareness of human rights issues, and ongoing concerns about corruption (an ethical and legal concern), particularly in developing states, suggest such needs, issues and concerns ought to be included among the eight selected imperatives that are capable of shaping a state’s foreign policy. Consequently the scientific and technological imperative and moral imperative have been included among the imperatives identified. Although there is a necessary distinction between concepts such as human rights and ethics (which also focuses on value systems, honour and trust) it is conceivable that both these concepts can be logically accommodated within the moral imperative.

The imperatives matrix makes it possible to identify and record linkages between environments (three geographic and two institutional transactional diplomatic environments), leadership relationships (the actions and impact of specific decision makers), and imperatives (specific types of compulsive influence) in respect of individual states (in the case of this thesis, the Republic of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China).

3.3.3.1. Historical imperative

The events and experiences of history are what shapes a nation’s values, ambitions and concerns; determines a states allies and enemies; and sets in motion the succeeding experiences and events that will undoubtedly help to shape that state’s future foreign policy and related decisions. Key decisions and events that resulted in, often traumatic, social, political or economic changes, need to be identified wherever possible so that, where significant, they can be taken into account when examining the perceived causes of specific foreign policy choices and the anticipated impact of such decisions and events upon the future foreign policy of those states.
Where communist states are concerned the Marxist concept of *historical inevitability* (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 488) remains a significant factor. Cantori and Spiegel (1970: 92) describe it as follows:

*A philosophy of history by which Marx posited the preordained necessity and scientific certainty for the replacement of capitalism by socialism. Historical inevitability, according to Marx, results from the contradictions embedded in society’s mode of production, which, under capitalism and preceding primitive, slave, and feudal patterns, has pitted the servile class against the exploiting class producing an automatic movement from one stage to the next. To an orthodox Marxist, free will and individual initiative are insignificant in the broad sweep of the historical development of mankind.*

Non-Marxist great powers like the United States, may prefer the concept of *manifest destiny* (Ranney. 1971: 572), which implies that a nation’s actions are determined less by its past than by its perceived future; by the goals its leaders determine and its people demand; and by its envisioned role in determining its own future history if not the future history of the world.

3.3.3.2. Political imperative

The political views and programmes of individual states and the ideologies adhered to and expounded by the governments of those states exert a significant influence on their foreign policies. The political imperative is inherently shaped by the historical imperative in that non-political as well as political historical events often give subsequent political events their shape and form; nevertheless the political imperative deserves to be treated separately because political events, experiences, programmes and ideologies can be identified and separated from their non-political equivalents. Political acts and experiences are capable of a separate historical existence and it is argued that any clear understanding of the foreign policy of any particular state
requires a thorough understanding of the political imperative that helps to drive that state’s foreign policy. Value and belief systems, a state’s world view or the world view of its leaders, the political structure and the institutions of government are specially relevant factors that can and do shape and influence a nation’s foreign policy.

3.3.3.3. Economic imperative

In regard to the economic imperative, South Africa’s foreign policy approach has sometimes been referred to as “trade-driven” (Kornegay. Business Day. 7 February, 2000: 9). The economic imperative may also involve a particular economic system such as capitalism, communism or socialism (Plano and Olton. 1969: 81-95; 111); it might involve directed trade, protectionism or open markets (Plano and Olton. 1969: 23-24; 29-30; 39-40). The economy of the state concerned may be developed or developing, and it may be in recession or in a condition of sustained growth. The relationship between government and labour may be mature and healthy, poor and combative, or relatively non-existent.

Economic divisions between rich and poor, and between advantaged and disadvantaged, will often determine domestic and foreign policies. The distribution of land and urban-rural economic divisions may also influence the shaping of such policies.

3.3.3.4. Social imperative

The social imperative covers a wide variety of issues, including education, health, sport, culture and crime. Issues such as the fight against contagious diseases, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, corruption and smuggling are all capable of shaping a state’s foreign policy. The social imperative is also determined by such factors as the role of women in society, the role and structure of the family, clan, tribe or community, the role of religion, the source of ethics and values, and the way in which children, the elderly, the poor, the disadvantaged and the sickly are treated and cared
for by the community and the state. These factors also help to determine how states may relate to one another in terms of "... the whole range of normative restraints by which states .. regulate their conduct ..." (Cohen. 1981: v) within the international environment.

3.3.3.5. Strategic imperative

The predominant goal of any state's foreign policy is the defence and maintenance of its independence and sovereignty. In this regard it has been stated (Legg and Morrison. 1971: 143) that,

...the most fundamental source of foreign policy objectives is perhaps the universally shared desire to insure the survival and territorial integrity of the community and the state. Military security against invasion or bombardment is the minimum objective of every state's foreign policy.

Therefore, the strategic imperative is fundamental to the foreign policy of any and every state. Any action by an ally or a perceived enemy, or a regional neighbour, which is likely to upset the stability of the international system or a crucially important region, and which may threaten the stability, and perhaps the existence, of a particular state may cause that state to respond or react to the strategic imperative.

3.3.3.6. Scientific and technological imperative

The scientific and technological imperative provides an incentive for states to collaborate on joint projects and to engage one another in trade, commerce and industry with a view to developing their expertise in the field of science and technology. Because of the role that science and technology may play in ensuring military superiority (Legg and Morrison. 1971: 308) this imperative is capable of attracting competition as well as cooperation.
Most of the states of the international system, including many developing states such as South Africa and the PRC (Lam. 1999: 58-59), are aware that their future successes are likely to depend on their respective abilities to function competitively, and therefore effectively, in an increasingly highly-technological and scientific era. The quest for access to new scientific and technological advances also poses new threats and concerns that may need to be taken into account by policy makers. In the field of nuclear technology, for example, Merritt (1975: 146) has noted that,

> because of the international commercial trade in nuclear reactors and fuels, the transportation of radioactive and toxic nuclear materials across national boundaries and on the high seas, the disposal and storage of waste materials, and the movement of nuclear-powered vessels in and out of foreign ports, foreign offices have been drawn into this entirely new genre of interstate relations.

Additional concerns faced by many states, developed as well as developing countries, in the realm of science and technology, include the need to secure their technology against misuse. A South African manufacturer of road construction equipment has already had its technology misappropriated in the People’s Republic of China (2001: interview).

3.3.3.7. Moral imperative

The moral imperative focuses on the ethics and values of states and their governments and how they treat, or are likely to treat, other states. This imperative encompasses, in large measure, what Raymond Cohen (1981: 8) terms “the rules of the game”. Cohen’s rules are “... expectations of right conduct in defined circumstances ...” (1981: 8) and therefore exhibit a moral aspect in that they represent a code of behaviour between states that is enforced, not by law (Cohen. 1981: 9) but by principle. As Cohen relates, “... commitment to maintain a rule is like undertaking a promise ...” Consequently, it can be argued that human rights, ethics, values and trust
are qualities that may determine the extent of the moral imperative of individual states. It is important to examine, on the one hand, the way in which a particular state articulates its future commitments in regard to the moral imperative; on the other hand, the way in which such a state has actually responded to moral issues, as demonstrated by past actions, is also significant.


(\textit{the} rules of the game ... serve to reduce .. dangerous uncertainty by prescribing a system of normative principles prohibitions, permissions, and obligations - to guide states in their conduct. Such principles ... act as a focal point around which states are able to coordinate their expectations of others' behaviour and hence harmonise their mutual actions.

Because such norms do not always possess "legal force" (Cohen. 1981: 158) their integrity and value must reside, in large measure, in a moral commitment, by the actors of the international environment, to maintain and uphold these norms, wherever possible. Failure by an individual state to honour or uphold an accepted international norm can be expected to bring forth negative consequences. As Cohen (1981: 115) points out, "... infringement of a promise casts doubt on the credibility of the one who gave his word...", a circumstance which is clearly a moral issue.

The moral imperative also implies a concern and respect for human rights. South Africa's Constitution includes a bill of rights (\{4\}SA. 1996. Constitution: chapter two) and, in view of the often-expressed linkage between domestic policy and foreign policy (\{4\}. SA. 1999: Dlamini Zuma speech), it would seem that South Africa's human rights concerns, even in the external environments, cannot avoid being driven by the moral imperative (\textit{vide} Mills. 2000: 360-361).
3.3.3.8. Legal imperative

The legal imperative contemplates the commitment of a particular state toward the law, both international law and domestic law. A state’s regard for, and interpretation of, international law will invariably affect the practical outcome of its international disputes. Its regard for, and application of, its domestic law may impact upon the stability of that state’s domestic environment with political and diplomatic implications for the regional and perhaps the international environment. The manner in which laws are formulated, implemented and adhered to evidences a quantifiable and qualitative commitment to the particular value system that gave rise to those laws. In both the bilateral and multilateral environments, particularly, individual states are likely, at some stage or other, to find themselves contemplating the possibility of negotiating or signing a bilateral or multilateral diplomatic agreement or similar international instrument. Despite the fact that such agreements, in practice, are often not enforceable in terms of law (Cohen. 1981: 82) it has been argued that, “… states much prefer to go with, rather than against, the grain of the law, if only to provide internal (domestic) and external (foreign) justification for their actions …” (Cohen. 1981: 82).

3.3.4. Foreign policy matrix

If five environments are identified as I, D, B, R and M and four leadership relationships are identified as 1, 2, 3, and 4, eight imperatives might be identified as S, T, U, V, W, X, Y and Z to produce a matrix which focuses on the foreign policies of a specific state (in this case either South Africa or the PRC) or, if two separate matrices are created, of both these states. The imperatives matrix provides useful opportunities for identifying and monitoring, on the one hand, decision making patterns and, on the other, for constructing and analysing the world-view profiles of individual states.

It is important to decide at the outset on the intended purpose of the relevant matrix. Is the matrix intended to facilitate an analysis of decision making or is the primary intention to develop a world view perspective with a view to further analysis? Ideally,
the use of modern computer technology and appropriate computer-programmes specially developed for the task of processing and ordering the data required to create the envisaged imperatives matrices of individual states, could conceivably facilitate accuracy, consistency, dependability and speed of analysis, but only if the relevant computer programmes are indubitably capable of consistently performing the tasks required. This is a subject for further research, by those who also have expertise in the field of computer science. In the meantime, the more labour-intensive approach toward the construction of a matrix or matrices would be to gather the required data in terms of the various categories (figure 3/4 infra) and record the relevant information in a form that is brief, yet sufficiently comprehensive to ensure that any omission of words does not obscure meaning.

The development of a matrix for the purpose of analysing the world view or weltanschauung (Dushkin. 1974: 310) of a particular state would be more likely to focus on the clearly identifiable characteristics of a state, its leaders and its people, than on specific policy decisions and the perceived motivations for such decisions, as would be the case in the development of an appropriate decision making matrix. For example, in the case of a world view matrix, the main decision makers, decision influencers, and decision making institutions would be identified and categorised as would the relevant imperatives in terms of appropriate environments. In isolation much of the data reflected in the various matrices can be expected to appear arbitrary and relatively inconsequential. However, it must be kept in mind that a major focus of this research is to analyse the foreign policies of two individual states, specifically the foreign policies of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China, and that the bulk of foreign policy activity (irrespective of the origins of such activity) can be expected to occur within the bilateral environment. Therefore a major function and objective of the imperatives matrix is to bring coherence and, hopefully, understanding to those foreign policy linkages reflected in the bilateral environment.

An environmental-relationships-imperatives matrix might take the form illustrated in figure 3/4 infra:
Figure 3/4: The imperatives component

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The envisaged decision making matrix should now be considered. From the above matrix (figure 3/4 *supra*) it should be possible to develop a profile that will facilitate an analysis of identifiable linkages between, for example, institutional leadership actions in the domestic environment that are influenced by strategic considerations and which influence the shape of a state’s foreign policy. The decision by India to detonate five nuclear devices in the space of a few days, during May, 1998 (*Asian Wall Street Journal*, 15-16 May 1998: 2), is a practical example of such a linkage (this linkage would be reflected as 2-W-D in a matrix applicable to India).

The decision by the Australian government to recall its ambassador from New Delhi for consultations (DFA. 19980512), in response to India’s nuclear tests, demonstrated possible linkages between the actions of an individual political leader in the bilateral environment that were influenced by political considerations or individual political leadership actions in the domestic environment aimed at moral considerations (such a linkage might be reflected as either 1-T-B or 1-Y-D in a matrix applicable to Australia).

Although the Chinese reaction (*Asian Wall Street Journal*, 15-16 May 1998: 2) to India’s actions was considered by some observers to be relatively mild it seems clear that China’s traditional adherence to the five principles of peaceful coexistence made a more strident approach unlikely. Therefore, it would seem that there was a linkage involving the institutional political leadership in the bilateral environment in terms of strategic considerations (such a linkage might be reflected as 2-W-D in a matrix applicable to China). Pakistan’s more aggressive decision to respond to India’s action, by detonating its own nuclear devices (*1* DFA. 1998), exhibited an obvious bilateral strategic concern, and possibly a domestic political concern (*vide Asian Wall Street Journal*, 15-16 May 1998), which could be reflected as 2-W-B or 2-T-D.

By comparing matrices in respect of any two states it should be possible to isolate the primary formative influences on specific foreign policy decisions during a given time frame and, thereby, to identify foreign policy decision patterns in respect of individual states. Thereafter, through logical progression from the identification of specific
decision patterns, it may be possible to discern a reliable method that can be applied practically and constructively to the field of foreign policy analysis.

3.4. Conclusion

From the foregoing it has been shown that the use of a model can help us to understand some of the factors that may determine foreign policy as well as the inter-relationships and linkages between those factors. The environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model is therefore capable of recording and providing sufficient information to make a scientific policy analysis both feasible and real. The model helps to identify and isolate the salient factors that influence foreign policy and seeks to provide a credible explanation of how foreign policy, and foreign policy decisions, come into existence. In order to fully explore the relationships component of the model, the next step is to develop and utilise organisational models that help elucidate how the specific foreign policies of the Republic of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China actually come into existence.

Thereafter, the environmental-relationships-imperatives linkage model can be utilised to comprehensively select and apply relevant data and information about the shaping and implementation of South African and Chinese foreign policy in a manner that will facilitate the formulation of individual world view and foreign policy profiles. These profiles could, in turn, be utilised to identify the perceived most compatible bilateral foreign policy environment in which South Africa can best advance its foreign policy relationship with China.

The next chapter will therefore give attention to decision making leadership relationships, comprising individuals and institutions within the domestic environment, that contribute directly or indirectly to the making of foreign policy.