

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1948-1998

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORIOGRAPHY

Due to the complexity of the Republic of China's (ROC) history and its relations with the Republic of South Africa (RSA), the secretive nature of ROC–RSA military and nuclear co-operation programmes, and the difficulty in obtaining official documents, to date no detailed account of the many-faceted co-operative relations between the ROC and the RSA during 1976-1998 has been published in Chinese. Nor has any in-depth study or historical publication ever been produced from South Africa's official records and governmental archives in English.¹ The existing relevant published and unpublished academic works in English and Afrikaans either focus on the progression and prospects of the general ROC–RSA bilateral relations, or on the pariah politik, foreign policy and economic relations of the two countries.² The historical conditions, the evolution and overall implementation, as well as the impact of ROC–RSA alignment, especially in the aspects of military and nuclear collaborations during the 1980s, have not been extensively examined.

Generally speaking, the historical interactions between the ROC and the RSA, and the development of the various dimensions of ROC–RSA bilateral relations, have been largely neglected, not only in the West and in South Africa, but also in the ROC itself. This is despite the fact that the ROC and the RSA share the similar historical experience of Dutch colonial rule. For nearly four decades, from 1624 to 1662, the Dutch occupied Taiwan. In fact, Jan Anthoniszoon van Riebeeck, the first Dutch Commander of the Cape, visited the castle Zeelandia in the southern part of Taiwan

(formerly called Formosa) in 1642 when he was a junior merchant of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Nederlandsche Oost Indische Compagnie, VOC).³

The reasons for South African historians' and academics' lack of interest in exploring the RSA's historical relations with the ROC are not difficult to understand. This disinterest and the scarcity of published works concerning the development of ROC–RSA relations can be attributed to the following five factors. Firstly, compared to mainland China and other major countries, the ROC is relatively small and unimportant. The second contributing factor is the great cultural divide and geographic distance between the two countries, as well as the absence of a sizeable number of Chinese immigrants in South Africa.⁴ Thirdly, before the emergence of the new South Africa in 1994, the RSA was basically a Western-orientated society and its academic, cultural and political focus was on the West and peripheral southern African issues. Fourthly, this situation is partly due to the racial attitudes of white South Africans, their lack of a “sense of adventure” and the previous policy of long-time segregation.⁵ The fifth factor is the difficulty of an equable data collection of both South African and Chinese research materials. The ROC's scholars are mostly only proficient in Chinese, and would find it difficult to pursue academic research in English or Afrikaans. The converse is also true. It would be an arduous task for Western or South African academics to pursue this subject without a basic knowledge of the Chinese language, and an understanding of Taiwan's history and present circumstances.

Due to the above factors, very few studies in the field of ROC–RSA relations have been undertaken. If we look at the studies and research work available on this aspect, most either deal with one of the following: the RSA's apartheid-imposed international isolation; the People's Republic of China's (PRC) foreign relations with Africa; the close ties between the pariah states and the nature and extent of the enforced isolation of the various pariah states such as Taiwan, Chile, Israel and South Africa; or the debate about “South Africa and the two Chinas” dilemma.⁶ These four categories do not, however, cover the various aspects the present thesis intends to address.

In the first category of studies, there are numerous books, articles and scholastic works on South Africa's foreign relations, pariah status, the historical development and impact of apartheid, international sanctions, boycotts and both governmental and non-governmental disinvestment. There are also works that focus on the activities of the South African liberation movements and international organisations.⁷

In the second category of works, a large number of books, dissertations, articles and other studies have appeared. These pertain largely to the PRC's ideology, revolution, domestic politics, support of liberation movements, foreign policy and other aspects of the whole spectrum of Sino-African relations. These have been produced by African, Western and Chinese scholars, either in English or Chinese, and are too numerous to cite in full in this introduction. However, these academic works mainly concentrate on the PRC and its relations with Africa, not on relations between the ROC and the RSA.⁸

In the third category of publications, a number of distinguished scholars, both in South Africa and overseas have researched certain aspects of ROC–RSA bilateral relations, and a few scholarly works have been published. The articles and books published by academics such as Peter Vale, Deon Geldenhuys, Koos van Wyk and Robert E. Harkavy fall into this category.⁹ However, they generally focus on specific dimensions, so that the full extent of ROC–RSA interactions has not been investigated by these scholars.

In this third category of works, Deon Geldenhuys has made a particularly significant contribution and has published two books and one essay on ROC–RSA relations.¹⁰ However, Geldenhuys' work focuses mainly on the RSA's diplomacy of isolation and the respective pariah status of the RSA and the ROC. Herein, he places special emphasis on the detailed comparison of the international ostracism experienced by the four pariah states, namely the ROC, the RSA, Chile and Israel during the period 1949 to 1988. His work is concerned with foreign relations, rather than with history. However, Geldenhuys has made a worthy contribution by devising a set of indicators to gauge the causes and extent of the isolation of the said four countries. There is no denying that through his

comparative analysis, his work has given us a better understanding of the ostracised countries' isolation in political/diplomatic, economic, military and socio-cultural terms.¹¹ In addition, Geldenhuys' article also provides an enlightening review of the political background and possible reasons for former president Nelson Mandela's volte-face on the RSA's China policy.¹² Nevertheless, Geldenhuys' works do not explore the history of the formation of the ROC–RSA close links, basic differences and commonalities between the two, or interactions and co-operations between the ROC and the RSA. Nor does he consider the effects of pressure from the PRC or the inevitable parting of ways of the ROC–RSA partnership and the subsequent adoption of interest-driven substantive and pragmatic diplomacy by the ROC and the RSA after the change of relations in January 1998. This important development awaits further scholarly research.¹³

As for the fourth category, apart from the above-mentioned studies, there are also a few articles, theses and papers that have partial relevance to this study. Some works analyse the ROC's economic investments in South Africa and ROC–RSA trade relations; some focus on the three options available to the RSA to deal with its post-1994 relations with the ROC; while others analyse the triangular relationship between the RSA, the PRC and the ROC, and the ROC's pragmatic diplomacy.¹⁴

Regarding the ROC's investments in South Africa, John Pickles and Jeff Woods made a relatively biased assessment of Taiwanese investments in the RSA's former "homelands" areas.¹⁵ They approached the subject from a predominantly Western viewpoint and the stance of the black trade unions. The authors omitted reference to Taiwanese investments in other parts of the RSA, including the metropolitan areas. According to the findings of this particular article, the RSA government's decentralisation policy – while initially appearing beneficial to both the RSA and the ROC – was not only detrimental to the black workforce and increasingly costly to the South African government, but also "entrench[ed] the territorial structure of apartheid and raises yet further questions about post-apartheid democratic industrial and urban policies."¹⁶ The allegations made by Pickles and Woods became the common belief of

the African National Congress (ANC) elite, the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) and even the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).¹⁷ It created a negative attitude on the part of black leaders towards the ROC, when they were faced with the question of whether or not the RSA should retain its relations with the ROC. The allegations made by Pickles and Woods are considerably one-sided. Their article failed to include the Taiwanese viewpoint or include reference to Taiwanese documents, which would have made the article more balanced and objective.

With regard to ROC–RSA trade relations and bilateral ties, although there are a few articles which touch on the issue of trade and diplomatic relations between the ROC and the RSA, none overlap with the focus of this thesis. Among these articles, Geldenhuys and Alden briefly analyse the development of ROC–RSA diplomatic relations and the RSA’s switching of diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.¹⁸ In addition to these articles, the other partially related research works which have been completed are Peter Leonard Copping’s unpublished MBA thesis entitled “South Africa–Republic of China Trade Barriers and Export Incentives”¹⁹ and Martyn J. Davies’ MA thesis entitled “South Africa’s Relations with the PRC and the ROC, 1949-1995: the Question of Diplomatic Recognition” and his working paper entitled “South Africa and Taiwan: Managing the Post-Diplomatic Relationship.”²⁰ Copping’s thesis analyses the ROC’s foreign trade policy, trade and investment opportunities between the RSA and the ROC, and how to conduct business with Taiwan. Davies’ thesis traces the general triangular relationship between the RSA, the PRC and the ROC, with special appraisal on the issue of the recognition of the PRC. Davies gives only minimal attention to the various ROC–RSA co-operation programmes and his thesis does not shed light on the nature of the mysterious nuclear and military collaborations between the two countries. Nor does he analyse the underlying historical factors of the formation of the special relationship between the ROC and the RSA during the 1980s, or the turn of the tide in the 1990s.²¹

On the issue of the implications of the “Two Chinas” and the RSA’s China policy, many scholars, politicians and officials have presented papers or published articles in journals or newspapers regarding South Africa’s handling of the “Two Chinas” dilemma. These include Raymond Suttner, John Barratt, Greg Mills, Richard L. Grant, Temba Sono, Marthinus Havenga, John Daniel, Lee Lai To, Marie Muller, Adrian Gueke, Deon Geldenhuys, Jeff Radebe, WJ Breytenbach and Nitesh Dullabh,²² as well as Garth Shelton, Chris Alden, Garth le Pere and Antoni van Nieuwkerk.²³ These works mostly present general descriptions of the RSA’s relations with the ROC and the PRC, and weigh up the RSA’s options in the conduct of its China policy. The debate that ensued on this issue was so intense that two separate symposiums were held. The first was held on August 26th, 1995 at the University of South Africa, and the second took place on August 30th, 1995 at Jan Smuts House in Johannesburg.²⁴ These two symposiums heralded the arrival of a new era in ROC–RSA relations. The papers, essays and articles published by international analysts and experts on foreign relations pertaining to South Africa’s “Two Chinas” dilemma are largely contentious opinions on the issue of the three options available, namely whether to recognise the PRC, or to recognise the ROC or to take a middle position to adopt dual recognition of both. These articles may have proved of some value for the South African government, general public and certain foreign policy makers to understand the RSA’s relations with the “Two Chinas”, especially at a time when South Africa was trying to readjust its relations with the ROC and had opted for diplomatic relations with the PRC. However, these papers did relatively little to examine the evolution of ROC–RSA relations as a whole within the complex issue of the “Two Chinas”. Considering this incompleteness there is a definite need to fill this void in terms of the historical development of ROC–RSA relations.

Having reviewed all the published works and research in this field, it is not difficult to appreciate that several shortcomings in the existing published works, literature and research have justified the need for the author to pursue the present research project. There are five major areas and aspects that require attention:

1. The overall historical development of ROC–RSA relations and the interactions of these two countries during the period 1948-1998.

2. The problem that many of the published works on ROC–RSA relations tend to be relatively biased and oversimplified, lacking objectivity, balanced appraisal and historical insight. The one-sided aversion to Taiwanese investments in South Africa does not necessarily mean that the authors are pro-COSATU or pro-South African Communist Party (SACP), or too close to the ANC. The weaknesses in these articles arise because their findings are primarily based on research by South African sources or Western data. This data is available in English, and the studies exclude Taiwanese official documents as they are in Chinese, although these would help to balance the research. The general oversimplification of most scholars and international relations experts on ROC–RSA relations during the period of their isolation is, to a certain extent, also a result of their inability to obtain Taiwanese information and official documentation. Moreover, the constraints of the language barrier makes it difficult for Western scholars to interpret Taiwanese research materials written in Chinese.
3. It is necessary to address the number of common misconceptions which have been created in studies of ROC–RSA relations, pertaining to the causes, factors and nature of co-operation between the two countries. Many scholars found it convenient to argue by analogy that the close relationship between the RSA and the ROC arose simply “resulting from a shared isolation during the apartheid years.”²⁵ Willie Breytenbach gives the same rationalisation: “Previously, South Africa was one of the four most isolated Western-orientated states worldwide – the others were Chile, Israel and Taiwan. As a result of their isolation, some of these pariahs developed close ties with one another, often in fields as controversial as military and even nuclear co-operation.”²⁶ Robert E. Harkavy also expounds a similar analogy to the “pariahtude” and “isolation” of the pariah states.²⁷ Even Geldenhuys alludes to the collaboration of the isolated states within the context of international ostracism, rather than the complementary need of economy and trade, as he reasons that “an isolated country may seek to strengthen ties with others in the same predicament and [try to] acquire nuclear weapons, among other things” so as to “confront its isolation head-on.”²⁸

4. It will be argued that the factors in the formation of ROC–RSA ties are manifold. Pariah status and international ostracism are only part of the array of complex factors. In the final analysis, contrary to common belief, one of the most important reasons for the cordial ROC–RSA association is the economic/trade factor. It should be noted that from 1970 onwards, the ROC, just like other Pacific Rim countries such as South Korea and Japan, had already developed export-orientated industrialisation. Therefore the ROC needed to export electronics, textiles, electric appliances and automobile parts to South Africa, and to import coal, uranium, gold and other mineral ores from the RSA. Consequently, basic economic requirements drew the two isolated states together.²⁹ Nevertheless, scholars tend to overlook these important economic factors as well as the factors of national security and the RSA's strategy of utilising Taiwan "as a bridgehead for Pretoria to expand its contact and collect information about the Far East."³⁰ The possible reason for this is that at the time, the ROC was the only East Asian country which had full diplomatic ties with the RSA before the normalisation of South Africa's foreign relations in the international community.³¹
5. Related to the afore-said misconceptions, many published works have also created a myth regarding the alignment of the ROC and the RSA. This myth is centred around two contending schools of thought. In the first, some observers presume that the ROC and the RSA had secret nuclear and military co-operation, and that they intended to form an alliance together with other outcast countries, such as Israel and Paraguay.³² It is alleged that the ROC and the RSA aligned with each other to counter their domestic and external isolation without any divergence.³³ The second school of thought, as advocated by Harkavy, believes that there are severe limitations to "pariah states" alliances' and that they are generally flawed and problematic.³⁴ These two schools of thought offer opposing views, and thus far this question has never been fully investigated.

1.2 AIM AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

From the above evaluation, we can conclude that until recently, there are many questions that remain unanswered. The reasons for the close linkage between the ROC and the RSA are far too complex to be simplified into a single explanation. To date, no work can lay claim to being a comprehensive account of the development of ROC–RSA relations.

As the ROC–RSA diplomatic ties drew to a close at the end of 1997, it is timely for the author, in his capacity as a witness to the events as well as a senior ROC diplomat, who was personally involved with the implementation of ROC diplomacy in the RSA for two decades (1981-2001), to present a more comprehensive study on this subject. This position will allow for the presentation of an insider's account of the related events, the evolution of the historical process, its achievements and setbacks, and its benefits and costs during the period 1948-1998. By doing so, this study hopes to present a fuller understanding of the wider range of causes and the forces of history that compelled the two countries to band together, as well as their eventual parting of ways. An endeavour is also made to understand the operations and reactions of both countries and the reasons for the relevant successes and failures of the co-operation of these isolated states during a time-span of just under half a century.

The main purpose of this thesis is, therefore, to give a full account of the historical development of ROC–RSA ties and the nature of the bilateral relations in the years 1948-1998. An attempt is made to examine how these ties developed over time and to present a comprehensive analysis of ROC–RSA bilateral links. The origins of isolation, the historical forces in action, the decline of the diplomatic situation, the respective diplomacy, domestic and foreign policies, inter-state relations, the formation of alignments, the divergence of national interests and strategies, countermeasures to break out of isolation, the limits of alignments, the successes and failures, and the benefits and costs of inter-pariah alliances, will also be explored. In addition, efforts are made to trace the roots of the political and social problems, to compare the historical

process of the economic developments of the two countries, as well as the impact and effect of the change in South Africa's domestic policies on ROC–RSA relations. With the aim of presenting the historical process and evolution of the ROC–RSA association from a relatively wider view, the ROC official records and an insider's account of the various myths will be furnished and combined with South African documents and sources, so as to transcend the trap of a partial and patriotic narrative of historical events.³⁵

The time-span of this study covers the fifty year period of 1948 to 1998, and the scope of the research is confined to the historical events pertaining to the ROC and South Africa. The then independent “homelands” are treated as a part of the RSA, not as internationally recognised independent states.³⁶ The relations with Mainland China, which is under the effective jurisdiction of the PRC government, is excluded from the scope of the present work.

The study is limited to the period 1948 to 1998 because these years were historical turning points for both the ROC and the RSA in terms of their respective internal development and foreign relations. In the RSA, 1948 heralded the election victory of the National Party (NP) and the beginning of the colossal social and political engineering of apartheid policies.³⁷ The gradual implementation of the morally indefensible and politically repugnant apartheid policies led the RSA onto the road of steady deterioration in her stature in the international community. In the same year, the ROC's ruling Kuomintang (Nationalist Party; KMT), led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, were on the verge of being defeated in a raging civil war by the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) People's Liberation Army (PLA), under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Half of mainland China was under CCP control, and one year later the KMT government and its army were compelled to relocate from the mainland to the island of Taiwan.³⁸ The year 1998 has been chosen as the cut-off point of this study because it was from January 1st, 1998 that the RSA switched diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC and that a new phase in ROC–RSA relations emerged.

1.3 APPROACH AND METHOD

The structure of this study comprises an introduction, a body of six chapters, a conclusion and an epilogue.

The present chapter (the introduction) considers the historiography on ROC–RSA relations, explains the aim and scope of the thesis, as well as the approach and methodology of the research. Lastly, this chapter also reviews the early history of the island of Taiwan and its relations with the Chinese mainland.

Chapter II analyses the historical background of ROC–RSA relations (1948-1971), the basic differences in the domestic and external milieus, as well as the most significant events that occurred in the two countries during the period 1948 to 1971, prior to the establishment of full diplomatic ties between the ROC and the RSA in 1976. The commonality, similarity and differences of the two interacting states, as well as their reluctance to embrace one another before 1971 are also examined in this chapter.

Chapter III focuses on the historical developments of the forging of ROC–RSA political and diplomatic ties during 1971-1994. It also considers the nature of the ROC–RSA diplomatic relations, as well as the divergence of national interests and the limits of the diplomatic alignment of the two countries' attempts to break out of isolation.

Chapter IV is an in-depth study of the development of ROC–RSA economic and financial ties (1948-1998), including bilateral relations in the spheres of trade, technology, investment, tourism, fishing, banking, loans, development aid, technical co-operation, and air and sea links.

Chapter V explores the myth of nuclear co-operation (1976-1990) between the two countries. The motivation, achievements and setbacks are assessed.

Chapter VI deals with other aspects of ROC–RSA relations (1948-1998), in particular the bilateral military co-operation, academic, sport and socio-cultural interchanges between the ROC and the RSA. The implementation, results and impact of these co-operative agreements on the ROC–RSA bilateral relations are appraised in this chapter.

Chapter VII focuses on the final phase of ROC–RSA diplomatic links from 1994 to 1998. This includes the severance of diplomatic relations; the continuance of substantive relations; an examination of the reactions of the respective governments, people and press of the ROC and the RSA; the repercussions of the ending of ROC–RSA diplomatic ties on the future of ROC–RSA relations; as well as the cross-Straits relations between the PRC and the ROC. Hong Kong’s reversion to the PRC and the implications of this hand-over in regard to ROC–RSA relations is also examined, as the Hong Kong factor was an important driving motive behind the South African government’s switch of recognition to the PRC.³⁹

Chapter VIII is comprised of a conclusion and an epilogue. The conclusion assesses the eventuality of the RSA’s normalisation of relations with the PRC and the limits of the ROC’s “cheque-book diplomacy”.⁴⁰ The epilogue examines the adoption of pragmatic diplomacy by the two governments to maintain bilateral substantive relations and the prospects of the future relations between the ROC and the RSA.

To many South African and Western scholars, the complicated issues of ROC–RSA relations and the “Two Chinas” problem are an unpenetrable puzzle, just like the inscrutable ancient Chinese culture. This is because most of the published work in this field has relied heavily on overt sources such as general literature, speeches, documents, statements, policy pronouncements, official figures, and media reports. Much of the contents of these sources are intended for the consumption of the general public or for propaganda purposes. The real substance is hidden under a smokescreen. The important part involves concealed and invisible factors, such as hidden decisions and actions, intelligence operations, behind the scene negotiations and tacit understandings, as well as the role-players’ basic motives, their values,

ideology, long-term goals, interests, world view and historical perceptions. These covert factors are sometimes more important than overt factors. But because of sensitivity and security considerations, the relevant governments tend to hide these covert factors from the public. Hence, the visible and quantifiable empirical data are only the tip of the iceberg.

Therefore, the approach adopted in this dissertation is to avoid following a rigid empirical model and using merely overt sources, quantifiable and empirical data. Instead the author will also use available covert sources and non-empirical, non-quantifiable and non-observable data, as well as information in respect of clandestine activities, secret diplomacy, mutual betrayal and even psychological tactics to analyse what were the real happenings during the years under discussion.⁴¹ Covert sources include role-players' personal recollections, unpublished diplomatic documents, minutes of secret meetings and interviews. Other primary sources and references are drawn from mainly English and Chinese sources, and translations of Afrikaans sources have also been utilised.

1.4 RESEARCH PROBLEMS

In pursuing this study, the following difficulties were encountered:

Firstly, as a senior career diplomat in the ROC foreign service,⁴² the demanding responsibilities, arduous workload, and frequent diplomatic transfers made the continuity of this research project very difficult. Official duties and state affairs often disrupted the collection of primary sources, the arrangement of the academic framework and even the writing of the dissertation.⁴³

Secondly, some of the covert sources and intelligence information that the author obtained in his diplomatic service in regard to this thesis are extremely sensitive and cannot be made public. Some of this information is still barred from publication by the

related governments due to the 50 year embargo, and some of the political leaders discussed are still in power. The exposure of certain situations, sources and clandestine dealings will inevitably result in political controversy and diplomatic friction. Therefore certain valuable information and sources have been omitted in this study, so as to avoid this arising.⁴⁴

Thirdly, the inability of the author to understand the Afrikaans language has to a certain extent, constrained the availability of information published in Afrikaans, although the author has acquired the most relevant sources in translations, where possible.

1.5 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND—THE SEPARATION OF THE CHINESE MAINLAND AND TAIWAN

The ROC, commonly known as Taiwan, has probably never been comprehensively understood in a balanced and objective manner by the international community, nor by many people in the RSA. As history does not develop in a vacuum, in order to understand the ROC, there is a need to first understand the unique history of the island of Taiwan and its bittersweet relations with the Chinese mainland.

Taiwan's indigenous people are proto-Malayan aborigines, belonging to the Malayan-Polynesian family of Indonesia.⁴⁵ Although Chinese settlement in Taiwan dates back to the 12th century, large-scale Chinese migration to the island only began during the 17th century.⁴⁶ Towards the end of the 16th century, Portuguese navigators sailed around the coast of Taiwan and named the island "Ilha Formosa" which means "beautiful island."⁴⁷ Formosa (the Chinese called the island "Taiwan") did not come under Chinese imperial administration during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). In 1623, the Dutch East India Company took over the island, and from 1624 to 1662, the Dutch ruled the southern part of the island,⁴⁸ while the Spanish occupied the northern part for some time. In 1644, Manchu tribesmen invaded China, overthrew the Ming dynasty, and established the Ching dynasty (1644-1912). A Ming loyalist, Cheng Ch'eng-kung (also

known as Koxinga) invaded Taiwan and ousted the Dutch in 1662. Cheng and his successors set up their own autonomous government and ruled Taiwan between 1662 and 1683. However, Cheng's government surrendered to the Ching dynasty when faced with an imminent invasion by the Ching navy in 1683. Taiwan was then formally incorporated by the Ching Empire.⁴⁹

Before 1683, the rulers of mainland China had by and large ignored Taiwan and Chinese contact with Taiwan was minimal.⁵⁰ The rule of the Ching dynasty over Taiwan was short-lived and resisted by the Taiwanese population. The Ching dynasty had to contend with sixty-eight Taiwanese popular uprisings during 1683-1894.⁵¹ In 1895, Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese war, and Taiwan was ceded to Japan. Japan ruled Taiwan for fifty years until the Japanese were defeated by the Allies at the end of World War II. In 1945, the Allies returned Taiwan to the Kuomintang or Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek.⁵²

On the Chinese mainland, the Ching dynasty was overthrown in 1912 and Asia's first democracy, the ROC, was established by the Kuomintang at Nanking under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen. Chiang Kai-shek, the then commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang army, succeeded Sun Yat-sen in the late 1920s. In the early 1930s, while Chiang was in power, the Chinese civil war began. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was established in 1921.⁵³ In 1931, led by Mao Tse-tung (also spelt Mao Zedong), the CCP began its armed rebellion and established its own government (the so-called "Chinese Soviet Republic") in Juichin, Kiangsi province.⁵⁴ As the Kuomintang government and its forces were preoccupied with repelling the Japanese invasion during 1937-1945, the CCP was able to expand its influence and territory.⁵⁵ At the end of World War II, civil war between the Kuomintang and the CCP once again broke out on the Chinese mainland in 1945. Following defeat by the CCP in early 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang government relocated from mainland China to Taiwan. Chiang's retreat to Taiwan and his struggle against the odds to recover the mainland parallel Koxinga's resistance to the Manchus. In October 1949, the CCP established the People's Republic of China (PRC) at Beijing.⁵⁶

In brief, as a result of the Chinese civil war, China has been divided into two contending political entities since 1949: these are the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland (seated in Beijing, formerly called Peking), and the Republic of China (ROC), which relocated its seat of government from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan (seated in Taipei). Both the ROC and the PRC exist simultaneously on each side of the Taiwan Strait with different political systems. The ROC, a democracy, maintains territorial jurisdiction over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu and other islets. The PRC, a one-party communist state, has control over the Chinese mainland. Although the PRC government claims to represent the whole of China, including Taiwan, and insists that the ROC should be treated as part of China without the status of a state, each government has effective jurisdiction over its respective territory. In international affairs, both sides claim to be sovereign independent states, neither being subject to the other.⁵⁷

Under Chiang and his successors' rule, martial law was imposed on Taiwan for the next forty years. Nevertheless, the Chiang's martial law could not stop the Taiwanese people's quest for political freedom and democracy. In 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is composed of mostly non-mainlanders, was formed.⁵⁸ The DPP was in the forefront of the democratic movement in the 1980s. In his final years, the ROC's former president, Chiang Ching-kuo (the eldest son of Chiang Kai-shek), instituted some domestic political reforms during the 1980s. Upon the foundation laid by the Chiangs, the ROC was able to move rapidly towards democracy. From 1987, as the restrictions of the emergency decree were lifted, the ROC's citizens are allowed to visit the Chinese mainland. In 1988, Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo after Chiang's death. Lee was formally elected president by the National Assembly in 1990. Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwan-born leader, continued his predecessor's policies of liberalisation and the reformation of the ROC's ossified political system and made great contributions to greatly deepen the democratisation process.⁵⁹ Under the Chiangs, the ROC government claimed to be the sole legitimate government of the whole of China. Despite the imposition of martial law, the Chiangs allowed local elections for county

magistrates, city mayors, provincial assembly members and county and city council members. Supplementary elections for the members of the three parliamentary bodies – the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly and the Control Yuan – were also held regularly in the ROC.⁶⁰

However, because the ROC government was not in effective control over the mainland, before 1987 it was asserted that wholesale general elections and presidential elections by direct popular vote were impossible, since the election could only be held in Taiwan, and not on mainland China as well. In 1991, Lee formally renounced the ROC's claim to be the only legitimate government of China and repealed the so-called Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. By doing so, the ROC government intended to end the state of hostility and peacefully resolve the differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The PRC has not responded in good faith and has consistently refused to renounce the use of force against the ROC. Lee's renouncement was a significant turning point, and paved the way for further political reform and the adoption of a more flexible foreign policy, as well as general elections for MPs and the first direct popular election of the ROC's President in March 1996. In many ways, Lee was the architect of the ROC's democracy.⁶¹ It was under Lee's presidency (1988-2000), that the ROC was transformed from a one-party state to a full democracy and free country. As of 1996, there were 82 different political parties registered in the ROC.⁶² The Kuomintang, the DPP, the People First Party and the New Party are the major political parties. Freedom of speech and the freedom of the press are fully respected, and no subject is off-limits. It was also under Lee's presidency that Taiwanization and Taiwan's identity emerged as the main focus of the ROC's politics.⁶³ In March 2000, the ROC's democratic process reached its peak with the election of Chen Shui-bian from the DPP as president. On May 20th, 2000, Lee transferred power peacefully to Chen. Chen's inauguration marks the completion of the ROC's democratisation.⁶⁴

In contrast to the ROC's remarkable stable economic development and political reforms, the Chinese mainland under the PRC government has gone through three decades of

turbulent upheaval and revolutionary turmoil prior to 1978. These decades witnessed the land reform and socialist transformation (1949-1957), the Great Leap Forward (1958-1959), natural disasters in 1959-1961 and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).⁶⁵ These socialist experiments greatly horrified the Taiwanese people and cost the PRC three decades of national development. The differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits widened during 1949-1978. As the ROC was isolated internationally, its government chose liberalisation and democratisation as a course of action to solicit international support. Although the mainland started to embark upon economic reforms in 1979, the PRC's former paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, and his successor, Jiang Zemin, chose to "stick with the socialist road" and suppress "bourgeois liberalisation" in the face of political liberalisation and ideological tightening.⁶⁶ The brutal crushing of the pro-democracy protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in June 1989, and the PRC's recent suppression of various religious groups, including the Tibetan Buddhists, Xinjiang's Muslims and members of the Falun Gong spiritual movement, are the hallmarks of Beijing's anti-liberalisation crackdown.⁶⁷ The Tiananmen Square killings had "demonstrated the limits to his [Deng's] political courage and vision by moving in the opposite direction."⁶⁸ The Taiwanese people's "mainland fever" and their aspirations to reunify were totally shattered by the brutality of the June 4th, 1989 Tiananman Square crackdown.⁶⁹

The above historical development shows clearly that long-standing animosity and political divergences are existent in Taiwan–Mainland relations, and that the assertion that Taiwan has always been an integral part of China is a myth, not a fact.⁷⁰ Taiwan's complex history reflects that although Taiwan was incorporated with mainland China for short periods at different times (1683-1894 and 1945-1948), for far greater periods, Taiwan has been separate from the Chinese mainland polity. It was only during the period 1885-1895 and in the years immediately after the end of World War II that Taiwan was a province of China.⁷¹ John Bryan Starr, a Yale scholar, rightly affirms that "at all other times, Taiwan has been largely independent to the control of a mainland Chinese government."⁷² It is evident that Taiwan is not part of the PRC governed by

Beijing. The ROC is effectively an independent sovereign state, and unlike the PRC, it is a vibrant multi-party democracy. Politically, the ROC and the PRC are drifting apart.⁷³

Many scholars are of a similar opinion. Weiqun Gu, a Harvard-trained Chinese scholar, considers China after the end of World War II as one of the “divided nations”, similar to Germany, Vietnam and Korea.⁷⁴ Michael Yahuda, a Reader at the University of London School of Economics and Political Science, also indicates that “Taiwan is a de facto independent and sovereign Chinese state that is neither unified with the mainland, nor a separate state.”⁷⁵ John Daniel, a professor at the University of Durban-Westville, concludes that “there is no real historical validity to the mainland’s claim that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and always has been.”⁷⁶ Daniel further points out that, as the majority of the ROC’s residents were born in Taiwan, not in mainland China, “they see themselves first and foremost as citizens of Taiwan.”⁷⁷ However, culturally and ethnically the ROC’s citizens are still Chinese. Daniel points out that “they are Chinese, yes, in the same way as South Africa’s Indians are still Indians, but that does not make them feel or yearn to be citizens of India.”⁷⁸

The two sides’ political cultures and the prevalent values of their respective societies are also different. The well-known Victorian writer and philosopher, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) pointed out that due to its intolerance of the spirit of liberty and individuality, the Chinese culture had become despotic and stationary.⁷⁹ This view reflects the Taiwanese perspective of the PRC. The PRC government is seen as an authoritarian, brutal and oppressive regime. From this point of view, Chinese history is perceived as “a sad chronicle of advance and decline recurring again and again” and mainland China is once again “caught in the vicious circle of its stagnant history.”⁸⁰ The animosity of the majority of native-born Taiwanese people to the Chinese communist regime is reflected by the following remarks made by the ROC former President, Lee Teng-hui:

What did the Communist revolution accomplish? It did not bring the continent out of stagnation or free the people of stifling, oppressive

tradition; what it did do was resurrect “hegemony” and imperialism. Economic production appears to have increased under the “socialist market economy,” but the thinking behind it has not changed. Mainland China’s economy may be growing, but political reform has not progressed at all. The situation in the mainland now leads me to believe that Taiwan is the one to provide a model for all China in the future.⁸¹

In addition to their aversion to the PRC’s despotism and its suppression of political freedom, the Taiwanese feel repugnance towards Beijing’s frequent intimidation and threat of an armed invasion of Taiwan, the PRC’s coercive diplomacy and the international community’s unfair treatment of the ROC. A statement made by Lee mirrored this antipathy and revealed “the pathos of being born Taiwanese.”⁸² He was saddened by the fact that “for centuries the people of Taiwan were denied the opportunity to govern themselves; [and] no matter how hard they might strive, their homeland was not their own.”⁸³ Lee’s remarks reflect the feelings of the majority of the ROC’s people. Most Taiwanese are unhappy with the ROC’s diplomatic isolation as well as the manner in which the ROC has been victimised in the international political arena. An official at the ROC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) stated: “We have been unfairly treated by the world. We are not the IRA or the PLO, but are regarded as untouchables.”⁸⁴ Many Taiwanese are upset that San Marino is a member of the United Nations, while the ROC, an economic giant, is not.⁸⁵

The ROC former Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Chang, expressed similar sentiments while addressing the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy of the European Parliament at Brussels, Belgium, on May 27th, 1997. Chang commented that it had taken more than 25 years for the ROC government to be given an important international forum such as the European Parliament to have the ROC’s voice heard, to relay the ROC’s views and to tell the ROC’s side of the story. Chang stated:

It is sad to point out that our freedom of speech as a sovereign state, has long been deprived of from almost all international organisations since

1971, the year we were forced out of the UN, simply because of mainland China's untrue position that there is but one China on earth, which is the People's Republic of China, and that the Republic of China on Taiwan is one of their provinces. The sheer existence of one able, prosperous, vigorous and democratic government called the Republic of China, has been for nearly a quarter-century, veiled in [the] thick political fog of world politics. The truth about my country, and the truth about my people have all been flagrantly distorted and badly twisted. And the rights of my government as a sovereign state have subsequently been brutally neglected, ignored and even totally denied in the world affairs arena for decades.⁸⁶

As a result of this, there is a great deal of residual bitterness and distrust amongst the Taiwanese towards mainland China. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait have had no official contact since 1949; however private exchanges have grown steadily since 1987, particularly in the aspects of culture, science, education, visits and business. There is also a strong determination for the Taiwanese to control their own destiny and maintain their very existence.⁸⁷ The ROC's relations with the RSA is the story of the ROC's long struggle to devise a diplomatic strategy to reduce its economic vulnerability and dependence on the USA for its national security, and to ensure sovereign control over its own existence.⁸⁸

1.6 A NOTE ON ROMANIZATION

There are two ways to transliterate Chinese individual names and places into English: the older "Wade-Giles" system and the "pinyin" (phonetic spelling) system. In the ROC, the "Wade-Giles" method is still mostly used. This is the system that has been used for more than a century by Western scholars and the media in the past. For example, the name of the former leader of the CCP is spelt "Mao Tse-tung" according to the "Wade-Giles" system, but "Mao Zedong" according to the "pinyin" system. A second example

is the name of the ROC former President Chiang, which is spelt “Chiang Ching-kuo” and “Jiang Jinguo” according to the two systems, respectively. Similarly, according to the “Wade-Giles” method, the former paramount leader of the PRC is known as “Teng Hsiao-ping”, not “Deng Xiaoping”.

In mainland China, the PRC uses the “pinyin” system, e.g. “Beijing”, not “Peking”; “Mao Zedong”, not “Mao Tse-tung”; “Deng Xiaoping”, not “Teng Hsiao-ping”; and “Guomindang”, not “Kuomintang”. This system has become the internationally favoured method of transliterating Chinese into Roman characters, and the “Wade-Giles” system has been gradually phased out. Although the spelling of the two systems differs, the original Chinese characters and the pronunciation of these terms are basically the same. However, the ROC uses the traditional regular Chinese characters, and the PRC has adopted a simplified form of Chinese characters. This means that the Chinese characters used in the ROC and the PRC are now written differently.

As the author was born and bred in Taiwan, he has opted to follow neither system consistently in this thesis, but rather to use what seems to him to be the most familiar spelling to Western readers; e.g. “Mao Tse-tung”, not “Mao Zedong”; “Chiang Kai-shek”, not “Jiang Jiehsih”; “Chiang Ching-kuo”, not “Jiang Jinguo”; “Kuomintang”, not “Guomindang”; “Beijing”, not “Peking”; and “Taipei”, not “Taibei”. To put it simply, a combination of the “Wade-Giles” and the “pinyin” systems has been used throughout the thesis.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

Introduction

1. The most relevant paper pertaining to the bilateral relations between the Republic of China (ROC) and the Republic of South Africa (RSA) is the official document prepared by the RSA's Department of Foreign Affairs, entitled "Background paper for discussion with Foreign Minister John Chang of the Republic of China on January 1997". This paper analyses mainly the ROC's negotiating strategy, the RSA's interests, what the RSA could offer the ROC, and what would the ROC like to secure in the RSA. This paper never touches upon the historical evolution of ROC–RSA relations, nor was it published.
2. The notable academic works are D. Geldenhuys' Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis and his article "The Politics of South Africa's China Switch" in Issues & Studies, Vol.33, No.7, July 1997; C. Alden, "Solving South Africa's Chinese Puzzle: Democratic Foreign Policy Making and the 'Two Chinas' Question", in the South African Institute of International Affairs' (SAIIA) South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol.5, No.2, Winter 1998; and the unpublished MA thesis written by M. J. Davies, entitled "South Africa's Relations with the PRC and the ROC 1949 to 1995: The Question of Diplomatic Recognition." None of these studies overlap this thesis.
3. C.F.J. Muller (ed.), Five Hundred Years: A History of South Africa, p.19.
4. The Chinese community in South Africa numbered around 20,000 people in 1996, which constituted 0.04% of the RSA's total population. See M. Yap & D. L. Man, Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa, p.1 of the Introduction.
5. D.F.S. Fourie, "South Africa and the East", in A. J. Venter (ed.), Foreign Policy Issues in a Democratic South Africa, p.153.
6. See the SAIIA Research Group, South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma; as well as W. Breytenbach, "The Chinese Dilemma: Dual Recognition is the Ultimate Solution", in The South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol.2, No.1, Summer 1994.
7. See G. Mbeki, The Struggle for Liberation in South Africa: A Short History; I. Liebenberg (ed.), The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa; R. Kasrils, Armed and Dangerous; and J. Slovo, The Unfinished Autobiography.
8. See B. D. Larkin, China and Africa; A. Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa, 1958-1971; W. Pfeifenberger, "The South African Policy of the People's Republic of China" in Journal for Contemporary History, Vol.6, No.1, July 1981, pp.1-11; C. Maritz, "Pretoria's Reaction to the Role of Moscow and Peking in Southern Africa" in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.25, No.2, 1987, pp.321-344; and the Ph.D. thesis presented to the Rand Afrikaans University in 1976 by D. S. Prinsloo entitled "China's Foreign Policy and Southern Africa, 1949-1973."
9. See P. Vale's paper entitled "South Africa and Taiwan – Pariahs, International Redemption and Global Change." The paper was presented at a conference in Taipei organised by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1993 called "Taiwan's Expanding Role in the International Arena: Entering into the United Nations." This 19-page paper focuses mainly on both the practical and ideological issues concerning the pariah status of the RSA and the ROC. Also see D. Geldenhuys' Isolated States; K. van Wyk, "Elite Perceptions of South Africa's International Options", in International Affairs Bulletin, Vol.11, No.3, 1987, pp.51-76; R. E Harkavy, "The Pariah State Syndrome", in Orbis, Vol.21, No.3, Fall 1977, pp.627-631.
10. D. Geldenhuys, Isolated States: South Africa and the China Question: A Case for Dual Recognition, March 1995; and "The Politics of South Africa's 'China Switch'" in Issues & Studies, Vol.33, No.7, July 1997, pp. 93-131.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. See M. J. Davies, South Africa and Taiwan: Managing the Post-Diplomatic Relationship, East Asia Project (EAP), International Relational Department, University of the Witwatersrand, November 1998; G. Mills & W. Mabena, "One China, Two Nations – Chen's Dilemma", in The Sowetan, May 19th, 2000; W. Mabena, "A New Chapter in Cross-Straits Relations" in SAIIA's South African Yearbook of



- International Affairs 2000/1, pp.377-383; C. Alden, "China and South Africa: The Dawn of a New Relationship" in SAIIA's South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1998/9, pp.89-91; C. Alden & G. Shelton, Cross-Straits Relations: A Study of Chinese Interaction Across Political and Economic Barriers; and G. Shelton, "China's Africa Policy and South Africa: Building New Economic Partnerships", in SAIIA's South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2000/1, pp.385-392.
14. See G. Mills, "Sowing Investment" in Business Africa, October 2000, pp.75-77; M. Glinzer, "Not a Zero-sum Game: SA, Taiwan and China", in the SAIIA's Intelligence Update, 24/2000, pp.1-3; the SAIIA Research Group, South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma; and M. J. Davies, South Africa's Relations with the PRC and the ROC 1949 to 1995: The Question of Diplomatic Recognition, MA thesis submitted to the University of the Witwaterstrand, October 1995.
 15. J. Pickles & J. Woods, "Taiwanese Investment in South Africa", in African Affairs, Vol.88, No.353, October 1989, pp.515-529.
 16. *Ibid.*, p.528.
 17. Personal interviews, held on March 18th, 1996, with Mr Paulos Ngcobo, COSATU Regional Secretary in KwaZulu-Natal, and Mr Jabu Ngcobo, General Secretary of SACTWU.
 18. D. Geldenhuys, "The Politics of South Africa's 'China Switch'" in Issues & Studies, Vol.33, No.7, July 1997, pp. 93-131; and C. Alden, "Solving South Africa's Chinese Puzzle: Democratic Foreign Policy Making and the 'Two Chinas' Question", in SAIIA's South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol.5, No.2, Winter 1998, pp.80-93.
 19. P. L. Copping, South Africa–Republic of China Trade Barriers and Export Incentives, MBA thesis, University of the Witswaterstrand, 1984.
 20. M. J. Davies, South Africa and Taiwan: Managing the Post-Diplomatic Relationship, pp.1-13.
 21. Davies' thesis neither explores ROC–RSA relations during 1995-1998, nor provides a detailed examination of the historical forces leading to the RSA's severance of diplomatic ties with the ROC.
 22. See the SAIIA Research Group, South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma.
 23. G. le Pere & A. van Nieuwkerk, "Making Foreign Policy in South Africa", in P. Nel & P. J. McGowan (eds.), Power, Wealth and Global Order: An International Relations Textbook for Africa, pp.196-215.
 24. See the SAIIA Research Group, South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma.
 25. R. Suttner, "Dilemmas of South African Foreign Policy: the Question of China", in South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma, p.4.
 26. W. Breytenbach, "The Chinese Dilemma: Dual Recognition is the Ultimate Solution", in The South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol.2, No.1, Summer 1994.
 27. Harkavy, "The Pariah State Syndrome", pp.627-631.
 28. Geldenhuys, Isolated States, p.669.
 29. H. Kobayasi, "The Economic Development of Pacific Rim Countries and Southern Africa", in The South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol.2, No.1, Summer 1994, pp.40-43.
 30. Wen-jen Hu, The Strategic Significance of the Republic of China on Taiwan, Ph.D. thesis, University of Pretoria, 1988, p.351.
 31. *Ibid.*
 32. G. St.J. Barclay, "Strategy of Despair: South Africa and the Alignment of the Alienated, 1974-82", in Journal for Contemporary History, Vol.7, No.2, December 1982, pp.2-5.
 33. *Ibid.*, pp.2-5, 10.
 34. Harkavy, "The Pariah State Syndrome", pp.644-645.
 35. The official documents from the archives of the former Embassy of the Republic of China (from January 1998 named the "Taipei Liaison Office in the RSA") and the RSA's Department of Foreign Affairs are simultaneously utilised to present a relative objective historical account of the period under study (1948-1998).
 36. The government of the Republic of China (ROC) did not recognise the four independent homelands, i.e. Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.
 37. D. Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 1948-1961, pp.1-5.
 38. P. Johnson, Modern Times, p.446.
 39. Geldenhuys, "The Politics of South Africa's 'China Switch'" in Issues & Studies, Vol.33, No.7, July 1997, p.115.
 40. Le Pere & van Nieuwkerk, "Making Foreign Policy in South Africa", in P. Nel & P.J. McGowan (eds.), Power, Wealth and Global Order, p.213.

41. Part of the covert sources used in this thesis include interviews with the relevant ambassadors, officials, leader of organisations, such as COSATU, SACTWA and the SACP, as well as their personal revelations of confidential information and the two governments' unpublished minutes of various internal meetings.
42. The author was Chargé d'Affaires of the ROC diplomatic missions in Grenada and St. Lucia, Consul-General and Dean of Consular Corps in Durban, RSA and the Deputy Chief of Mission in South Africa. He was appointed as the ROC Ambassador to the Republic of the Marshall Islands with effect from March 16th, 2001, and took up his Ambassadorial post as from June 5th, 2001.
43. As a highly competent diplomat, the author was transferred frequently to different places to implement the ROC's foreign policy: South Africa (1981-1984), Swaziland (1984-1989), Grenada (1989-1990), St. Lucia (1990-1992), Taipei (1992-1994), Durban (1994-1998), Pretoria (1998-2001) and the Marshall Islands (2001 to date). As a result of this, the writing of the thesis was disrupted from time to time, and as the thesis took a long time in completing, the political situation changed during the process of this study.
44. In order to avoid diplomatic controversy and legal implications, the details of the ROC's "chequebook diplomacy", sensitive behind-the-scene dealings between certain political leaders and related governments, and allegations of a RSA-Israel nuclear connection, as well as the details of the RSA's destruction of its six nuclear devises, are deleted from this thesis.
45. The Republic of China Yearbook, 1996, p.53.
46. *Ibid.*, pp.55-56.
47. *Ibid.*, p.54.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*, p.57.
50. C. Attix, "Between the devil and the deep blue sea: are Taiwan's trading partner's implying recognition of Taiwanese statehood?" in California Western International Law Journal, Vol.25, 1995, p.359.
51. *Ibid.*, pp.359-360.
52. *Ibid.*, p.361.
53. The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), The Republic of China on Taiwan and the United Nations, August 1995, p.3.
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Ibid.*
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Ibid.*, p.5.
58. Republic of China Yearbook, 1996, P.99.
59. Republic of China Yearbook, 1997, pp.68-69.
60. *Ibid.*, pp.102-103.
61. See Lee Teng-hui, The Road to Democracy, p.10. Lee continued to focus his efforts for democracy during the 1990s.
62. Republic of China Yearbook, 1997, p.99.
63. J. B. Starr, Understanding China, p.276. Also see Lee Teng-hui, The Road to Democracy, pp.51-52.
64. S. Breslin, "China's response to democratization in Taiwan" in Global Dialogue, September 2000, Vol.5.2, p.27.
65. See M. Seldon (ed.), The People's Republic of China: A Documentary History of Revolutionary Change, pp.95-111.
66. Deng Xiaoping's remarks made at the CCP Central Politburo Standing Committee meeting on June 16th, 1989 and its enlarged meeting on June 19th, 1989, while he met with the CCP's third generation leadership, including Jiang Zemin and Li Peng. See A. J. Nathan & P. Links (eds.), The Tiananmen Papers, pp.428, 432.
67. See Newsweek, July 10th, 2000, pp.26-41 (Dreams as big as the West) and pp.41-42 (Trouble in 'Turkestan': Beijing's crackdown on the Uighurs of Xinjiang); and The Star, March 19th, 2001, p.4 (Falun Gong fire victim dies).
68. Starr, Understanding China, p.286.
69. Chong-pin Lin, "Beijing and Taipei: dialects in post-Tiananmen interactions" in David Shambaugh (ed.), Greater China: The Next Superpower?, p.119.
70. Starr, Understanding China, p.267.

71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. See Newsweek, July 10th, 2000, p.43 (Getting to 'One China': the G8 should urge Taiwan and Beijing to resume talks about their most sensitive issue).
74. See Weiqun Gu, Conflicts of Divided Nations: The Case of China and Korea, p.1.
75. M. Yahuda, "The foreign relations of Greater China" in D. Shambaugh (ed.), Greater China: The Next Superpower?, p.35.
76. J. Daniel, "Discussant", in SAIIA (ed.), South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma, p.17.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. J. S. Mill, "On Liberty", collected in The Norton Anthology of English Literature, 1968, Vol.2, pp.1272-1273.
80. Lee Teng-hui, The Road to Democracy, p.53.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. See The Economist, November 12th, 1994 (Defending Taiwan). Also see the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter referred to as MOFA), The ROC—Precious Jade: Selected Articles from the World News Media on the Republic of China, July 1995, p.41.
85. Ibid.
86. J. Chang's speech, "We, the Republic of China on Taiwan, shall rise up again", delivered at the European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium, on May 22nd, 1997, published in Hungdah Chiu (ed.), Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol.15, 1996-1997, pp.1-2.
87. Lee, The Road to Democracy, pp.51-52.
88. See the minutes of the 189th meeting of the Central Standing Committee of the Kuomintang, held at Taipei, on October 22nd, 1980.

CHAPTER II

THE PERIOD OF RELUCTANT RELATIONS, 1948-1971

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The year 1948 marked a watershed in the history of the ROC and the RSA in terms of their internal historical development and external relations. It heralded not only the end of the high-profile era for the national leaders of both the ROC and the RSA, but also the beginning of a period of dramatic change in the domestic situation as well as the decline of the international stature of both countries.

Before 1948, the then Union of South Africa was one of the most prestigious members of the international community. Despite sporadic criticism levelled at the it over its administration of South West Africa and the treatment of its Indian population, South Africa enjoyed a highly respected international position and pursued normal interactions with other countries. The Union of South Africa was one of three independent states in Africa and the most economically developed country on the continent. As a member of the Commonwealth, South Africa was fully integrated with the mainstream of international society. She was also regarded as an important link of the Commonwealth defence network in Africa.¹ At the time, her internal racial policies rarely met any significant challenge. Large parts of Africa and Asia were still under white colonial rule as it was the last phase of European colonialism, and white domination over the non-white peoples was generally the order of the day. The long practised policy of racial segregation and white minority rule in South Africa seldom became a conspicuous focus of world condemnation. South Africa's internal racial policy did not expand into an internationalised issue, as would be the case in the second half of the twentieth century. As it was still in the era of the *Pax Britannica*, the British connection – notwithstanding Britain's criticism of South Africa's domestic policies – was one of the beneficial factors for South Africa to facilitate its close association with the Western powers, which in turn enhanced South Africa's international standing.

Apart from its links with Britain, the pre-eminent role played by the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, Field Marshal Jan Smuts, and the Union's significant role in the war effort of the Allies, also contributed to South Africa's esteemed position in the international community. Smuts' personal charisma, his international prestige and active role in the Allies' defeat of the Axis powers certainly boosted South Africa's image and international standing. As a result, South Africa not only enjoyed unproportionate international influence, but also played a leading role in important international activities such as the formation of the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN). Smuts' prestige and international stature reached a pinnacle during his second term (1939–1945) as Prime Minister when he attended meetings of the War Cabinet in London.²

On the Chinese mainland, the development of events during the same period manifested a similar trend. In the inter-war years, the Kuomintang (Nationalist) government was considered one of the major Allied Powers as it played an important role in resisting Japanese aggression in Asia. The leader of the Kuomintang government, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces of the China Theatre in the war years. At the time, Chiang was comparable to Smuts in terms of international stature. From the year 1937 – when the Sino-Japanese war broke out – until 1948, Chiang stood at the zenith of his international prestige and political power as he dominated a large and populous country. At the height of his career, he attended the summit meeting of the leaders of the Allied powers in Cairo in 1943 as one of the Big Four, together with Josef Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt. He was heralded as “the greatest soldier-statesman of our time on the Continent of Asia.”³

However, in the wake of the Second World War, a gradual process of international isolation set in for both the Kuomintang and the South African governments, and the year 1948 became an important turning point for the deterioration of these two countries' international status. After 1948, both countries were to face unprecedented adversity with sweeping changes of the internal and external milieu. Both were heading

towards isolation and a decline of international status; both were confronted with a looming threat to national security; both were accused of illegitimate governance and both suffered the diminishing stature of the respective political leaders in the international community. The turn of the tide against these two countries was largely due to fundamental changes in their external environment as well as their domestic situations.

In the international environment, the end of the Second World War did not bring any further grandeur and acclaim to Smuts or Chiang Kai-shek. On the contrary, the end of the war was actually “the concluding phase of one of the most historic and dramatic developments of our time.”⁴ The process of decolonisation was set to change the old international political map. The post war era saw the swift dismantling, in the time-span of one generation, of the Western colonial system which had developed over five centuries.⁵ The decline of the Western European colonial powers was partly the consequence of the unleashing of powerful nationalism, a sense of national awakening and anti-colonialism unseen before among the colonised Asian and African peoples. Pan-Africanism, which gave a sense of solidarity and sentiment of a common group heritage to the black people of African origin, was one of the said new forces to unite African people for liberation and decolonisation. The large scale prolonged war had also exhausted and weakened the European colonial powers, especially Britain, which survived the war, but was in a much weaker position compared to the pre-war era.⁶ As a result of the decline of the old European system, a brand new post-war world order emerged to replace that which existed before the war. Decolonisation and self-determination became an internationally accepted norm. Consequently, the process of decolonisation produced many newly-independent countries which were to emerge in Africa, Asia and other Third World areas. The composition of the Third World community and that of international organisations also changed. The old European-centred world order was replaced by a new bi-polar international system of Cold War. The pivot of world power was thus shifted from Western Europe to the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union (USSR).⁶

Furthermore, in the post-war era an increasing number of people in the West, except Spain and Portugal, gradually took a more progressive view on their colonies. It was felt that colonialism was morally indefensible and financially too costly. Most people in Western Europe were concerned about the reconstruction, social welfare and economic lot at home, rather than the vanity of maintaining remote colonies with taxpayers' money. Many conservative governments, including that of Churchill, were brought down. There was a general swing to the left in Western European politics. This can be seen from the election victory won by the British Labour Party in 1945, as well as the rise of Christian Socialist Parties in West Germany, Italy, and France and strong Communist parties in France and Italy.⁷

2.2 THE TURN OF THE TIDE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

The various changes impacted directly on South Africa's international position and foreign relations. For example, Churchill's defeat by the Labour Party at the election on July 25th, 1945 was an unexpected blow to South Africa's post-war foreign relations. The new Labour government, obsessed with home problems and Britain's financial plight, was more inclined to relinquish the British colonies towards self-government rather than defend the white settlers or retain the British Empire at great cost. The leader of the Labour Party, Clement Attlee, did not maintain such a cordial friendship with the leader of South Africa as that which had existed between Churchill and Smuts. The former Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa (RSA), Brand Fourie, recalled:

Na die beeindiging van die oorlog het dinge in Londen vinnig verander. Die geallieerde regerings wat daar gevestig is, is terug na hulle eie lande en tot die buitewêreld se verbasing verloor Mnr. Churchill die algemene verkiesing in Brittanje in Junie 1945. Geleidelik verdwyn die leidende politieke figure met wie Suid-Afrika, deur generaal Smuts, sulke goeie verhoudings gehandhaaf het. Daar heers 'n nuwe atmosfeer en prioriteite

verander geweldig. Vinniger as verwag begin die nuwe wêreldorganisasie sy vlerke toets en sy eie invloedseer uitbrei. Intussen het die ou Volkebond homself ontbind.⁸

In addition to the decline of the Western colonial powers, the upsurge of African and Asian nationalism, the shift of world power, decolonisation and the changes of Western political leaders with which South Africa maintained close relations, there were other factors that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War which had an unfavourable bearing on South Africa's foreign relations. The first and foremost factor was the rise of the new post-war international notion of universal human rights and racial equality. This new norm which favoured black majority rule was in direct conflict with South Africa's domestic order erected on white domination and racial inequality. From the standpoint of Deon Geldenhuys, an authoritative scholar on South Africa's diplomacy of isolation at the Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg, this was the main cause of South Africa's isolation: "a new post-war international morality that created an inhospitable external environment for a domestic order built on racial discrimination and domination."⁹

The founding of the UN in 1945 added further momentum to the international concern with human rights. From its very inception, the UN has been "acutely conscious of its obligation to promote the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination."¹⁰ The General Assembly of the UN at its very first session unanimously adopted Resolution 103(1) on November 19th, 1946 to call on all of the governments and responsible authorities to conform both to the letter and the spirit of the Charter of the UN.¹¹ It was during this first session of the UN General Assembly that South Africa stood condemned for its domestic racial policies, and in particular about its mistreatment of its Indian population and its administration of South West Africa. This was the beginning of South Africa's friction with the UN, and these two issues later developed into the prelude of the international outcry against South Africa. With the establishment of the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1947, chaired by Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt, wife of President Roosevelt, a bill of rights was drafted. With the subsequent adoption of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights on December 10th, 1948, the UN had become the embodiment of the lofty ideals of human rights. Human rights were sanctified as one of the important post-war codes of ethics and moral yardsticks used to measure the conduct of a sovereign member state. Most members of the UN, in which the Afro-Asian-Arab and Communist bloc formed a majority, tended to use the UN platform as an international forum to chastise and condemn South Africa's racial policies and white minority rule. In this regard, as the former Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros Ghali, had indicated that it not only played a central role in assisting South Africa to transform into a non-racial democracy, but also "provided a forum for the liberation movements and undertook an international campaign against apartheid."¹²

The Cold War gave the Afro-Asian states a unique opportunity of "playing the Communist bloc off against the West."¹³ In order to win the support of the Afro-Asian nations in the rivalry for world leadership, both the USA and the USSR openly supported the African liberation movements. Both superpowers strongly denounced colonialism and white racism. The ideology of the anti-colonial revolutionaries was publicly endorsed, and the emerging Afro-Asian countries, due to common interests, soon grouped into blocs with collective organisations co-ordinating their external policies. These countries, particularly the African states, formed the backbone of the Third World. Uncommitted as they were, Afro-Asian countries were to make full use of the situation of rivalry between the two competing superpowers and to wield great bargaining influence quite out of proportion to their real strength.

The above adverse factors converged to contribute to the deterioration of South Africa's external environment and the change of the world situation. These unfavourable external changes were further compounded by the rise of an ever-growing number of hostile Afro-Asian countries, which were either granted independence from 1947 onwards or on the threshold of self-government. Among these newly-independent countries, the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 had a direct impact on South Africa due to South Africa's large population of Indian descendants. Many other Afro-Asian nations were also to attain their independence. South Africa's racial policies,

particularly the ill treatment of South African Indians, were frequently raised by India and other newly-independent countries in the various international forums. The problem of South Africa's racial policies thus became the focal point of the international community, highlighting the injustice meted out to South Africa's Indian population and black majority. This political problem would not go away automatically until the political logjam was done away with completely. The rising tide of liberation, colonial revolution and internal non-white opposition was turning against the established order on the continent of Africa and Asia. These changes posed great challenges to white South Africa's dominance.¹⁴

It was against this background that the National Party (NP) of DF Malan was elected by the South African white voters to take over the government of Smuts in the general election of May 26th, 1948. The election of the NP underlined the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and the determination of the whites to maintain South Africa as a white country in the face of a black majority challenge. After 1949, the newly-elected NP government was determined to curb the trends towards inter-racial integration and to regulate African urbanisation. At a time when the outside world was heading towards decolonisation and the abolition of racial discrimination, South Africa was navigating a passage in the opposite direction. A series of statutes was enacted to implement apartheid policies in political, residential, social and cultural spheres. Although apartheid (literally 'Apartness') was an old practice which could be traced back to South Africa's earlier history,¹⁵ the codification, legalisation and systematic implementation of blatant racial discrimination and rigid segregation on the basis of race was widely regarded as offensive to the conscience of mankind. Apartheid was often equated with oppression, injustice and immorality. In Mandela's words, "Apartheid is the embodiment of the racialism, repression and inhumanity of all previous white supremacist regimes."¹⁶ In his Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela stated that "it represented the codification in one oppressive system of all the laws and regulations that had kept Africans in an inferior position for centuries."¹⁷ At a time when human rights and non-racism were the moral norm, the implementation of apartheid policies was out of tune with the rest of the world.

The parting of the ways with the rest of the world was the beginning of South Africa's isolation in the international community.

On the home front, South Africa's white government was also confronted with unprecedented serious challenges and rising African nationalism. The government's embarkation upon the enacting of political/social engineering of apartheid policies was met with the escalation of black resistance. South Africa's 'non-whites' were increasingly dissatisfied with the racial discrimination, and black resistance to white supremacy became more militant. Black trade unions re-emerged and the major political organisation, the African National Congress (ANC), was revitalised. As from 1948 onwards, the ANC began moving away from its relatively peaceful nature of resistance to militant mass action. From 1949 to 1952, the ANC Youth League under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu, guided the ANC to "a more radical and revolutionary path".¹⁸

This was reflected by the adoption of the Youth League's Programme of Action at the ANC annual conference in Bloemfontein in 1949. The Programme of Action called for boycotts, strikes, stay-aways from work, protest demonstrations and other forms of mass action to "strike at racial oppression."¹⁹ The mass action further developed into the Defiance Campaign in the 1950s to resist the unjust apartheid laws. The resistance of the black nationalist movements intensified, while the NP chose to legalise and codify the apartheid system. The demands of the ANC were basically one man, one vote, to eradicate race discrimination in all its forms and to build South Africa as a unitary, democratic and non-racial state.²⁰ As the black population in South Africa outnumbered the white population, this was tantamount to black majority rule. Therefore, the South African government refused to submit to black demands and outside dictation and, on the contrary, it decided to defend the survival and the status quo of white dominance at all costs and against world opinion. The consequence was direct confrontation between the South African government and the black nationalist movements in the decades of the 1950s and 1960s.

In short, South Africa had entered a period of changing relations with the outside world in the wake of the NP's assumption of power in 1948. Between the 1950s and the beginning of the 1970s, South Africa gradually fell into the abyss of international isolation. To analyse the root causes of the RSA's isolation, there are three different perspectives. The first school of thought is led by Gerrit Olivier, a well-known South African scholar of international relations. He is of the opinion that the major cause of South Africa's isolation was largely due to the refusal of the South African government to adapt its internal policies to overseas demands [for black majority rule].²¹ But according to Deon Geldenhuys, apartheid was the real inimical factor to South Africa's normal internal and external relations. Geldenhuys observed that "apartheid [had] developed into the world's number one moral issue, uniting the international community in a way few other issues [could]." He further pointed out that "apartheid [had] made South Africa the world's moral sitting duck at which virtually all governments, regardless of their own moral virtues, [felt] obliged to fire criticism".²²

The third school of thought was propounded by Colin Legum, the former Associate Editor of The Observer (London) and an outstanding South African born journalist specialising on international sanctions against South Africa. He regarded international moral protest against the racial segregation policy as the main cause of South Africa's isolation in the world community. He indicated that South Africa was not the only country which practised racism, nor the only oppressive regime in the world.²³ Nevertheless, from his point of view, "its offence in the eyes of [the] world community [was] that it [was] the only one which [had] institutionalised racism, and which [sought] to maintain the status quo by an undemocratic form of government that exclude[d] the majority of its population from any kind of participation in the central Parliament where all its laws are made."²⁴ Legum pointed out that, to make matters worse, "this institutionalized discrimination against black people exist[ed] on the African continent itself."²⁵ Therefore, "the moral protest against apartheid [had] been the major reason why South Africa [had been] ostracised as a pariah state, a skunk among nations."²⁶ The apartheid policies thus became the major stumbling block of South Africa's normal foreign relations with the rest of the world, including the ROC at the time.

2.3 THE TURN OF THE TIDE AGAINST THE KUOMINTANG GOVERNMENT

In the meantime, the tidal waves of civil war between the Kuomintang government army and the Chinese Communist forces raging in mainland China after the end of the Second World War was turning against the Kuomintang government by 1948. With newly acquired Japanese arms, handed to the Chinese Communists by Soviet troops which had declared war against Japan near the end of Second World War,²⁷ the Chinese Communist forces, in January 1948, seized the vast industrial heartland of Manchuria and launched an all-out general offensive in other parts of China.

The Kuomintang government troops, under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, suffered a series of defeats on the battlefields of Manchuria and North China. The Kuomintang's military debacles were so alarming that Chiang Kai-shek conceded in his diary:

On all fronts, our troops have met with reverses. Yulin in Shensi and Yungcheng in Shansi have been under siege for some time, yet we have no reserves to reinforce these beleaguered towns. The loss of Shihchiachuang on the 12th [of November, 1947] has dealt a serious blow to the morale of both the troops and the civilian population in North China.... This is indeed the most critical moment for the country.²⁸

The setback of the Kuomintang government troops on the battlefield of the post-World War II civil war in China was exacerbated by the mismanagement of the economy and alienation of public support.²⁹ The currency reform initiated by the Kuomintang government in 1948 was a disastrous failure and inflation got out of control. In Shanghai, the major commercial centre of mainland China, the price of rice (the staple food for the Chinese) increased from 300 Chinese dollars per picul (133 pounds) in the morning of November 8th, 1948 to 1000 at noon and 1800 by the dusk of that day.³⁰ Between August 19th and November 8th, 1948, commodity prices escalated twenty times.³¹ In six months, prices rocketed 85000 times.³² Starvation, corruption, hoarding and profiteering were widespread in many areas. Despite the efforts made by the

Kuomintang government to enforce requisitioning of grain at bayonet-point, as reported by the American Consul-General in Mukden, the economic situation was chaotic.³³ The hyper-inflation became uncontrollable and industrial production virtually stopped.

By December 1948, all Manchuria and most of North China had been seized by the Chinese Communists. Tientsin fell in January 1949 and Peking (presently called Beijing) surrendered to the Chinese Communists. In the same month, the Chinese civil war had culminated in the great battle of Hsuechow with 300 000 casualties of Chiang's elite troops.³⁴ In April 1949, the Chinese Communist forces crossed the Yangtze River and took the then capital of the Kuomintang government, Nanking. On May 6th, 1949, Chiang Kai-Shek left Shanghai for Taiwan with a view to using Taiwan as a base to continue his anti-Communist campaign in alliance with the neighbouring Southeast Asian countries, such as the Philippines and South Korea, to "combine their resources to fight the Communist menace."³⁵ On May 25th, 1949, Shanghai, the most important commercial metropolis, was taken by the Chinese Communist forces virtually without a fight. Prior to his arrival in Taiwan, Chiang had deployed a force of 300 000 troops in Taiwan with the support of a few gunboats and some planes. During the period from July to October 1949, although Chiang did pay a few short visits to the remaining Kuomintang-controlled cities such as Canton and Chungking in Southeast China to explore possibilities of a last stand against the advancement of the Communists,³⁶ the process of Chinese Civil War was drawing to its conclusion. On September 21st, 1949, the victorious Chinese Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), declared in Peking (Beijing) that "at present, several million troops of the field armies of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) are already striking at areas close to Taiwan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan and Xinjiang."³⁷ On October 1st, 1949, Canton had been lost and the Chinese Communists had almost completed the conquest of the Chinese mainland.

On October 1st, 1949, Mao proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) at Peking (Beijing) and declared to the international community that "this government is the sole legal government representing all the people of the People's

Republic of China.”³⁸ In his official proclamation, Mao stated that the PRC government was willing to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government that was willing to observe the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty.³⁹ By the end of 1949, Communist control extended over almost all of mainland China.

Having lost control over mainland China to the Chinese Communists, Chiang was compelled to relocate the Kuomintang government and its army with a total of approximately two million people (both soldiers and civilians) from mainland China to the island of Taiwan in December 1949. However, they were not the first people to occupy the island. Before the influx of newly arrived migrants from the Chinese mainland, there was a population of 6.59 million native Taiwanese already living on the island.⁴⁰ Among the native population, some 160 000 were proto-Malayan indigenous aborigines,⁴¹ and the remaining majority were native-born Taiwanese originating from the Chinese coastal provinces of Fukien (about 75% of the population) and Guangdong (Kwantung) (about 20% of the population). The latter group is known as the Hakka. The name Hakka means “Guest People” (Settlers). This term was given by the natives to distinguish these settlers from the local Cantonese and other natives. The Hakka people had originally migrated from North China to South China, especially Kwangtung and Fukien provinces, during 1127-1279, when Inner Asian tribesmen invaded North China. After the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), many Hakka migrated from South China to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Sabah, Sarawak, and even Jamaica. They speak a dialect of the ancient Chinese language, but the pronunciation is different from the modern Chinese Mandarin and Cantonese.⁴²

Ethnically, the majority of native Taiwanese do not have striking differences from the new immigrants from mainland China. However, in terms of language, culture, history, education, colonial background, duration of settlement, development level and self-perceived identity, there are great differences between them. In the aspect of language, the said two native dialects commonly spoken in Taiwan, namely Fukien and Hakka, are

quite distinct from Mandarin, the common language of mainland China. Due to a period of Japanese rule in Taiwan (1895–1945), many older Taiwanese, including former President Lee Teng-hui, still speak Japanese. Taiwanese culture is strongly influenced by Japan and the West. A few Taiwanese elites are Christians, not Buddhists or Confucianists.⁴³

Unlike the Chinese mainland, Taiwan had been successively colonised by colonial powers including the Dutch (in the south of Taiwan) and the Spaniards (in the north of Taiwan) from 1624 till 1662. At the end of Dutch colonial rule, the Ming Dynasty of mainland China was overthrown by the Manchu troops who established the Ch'ing dynasty. One of the Ming loyalists, Cheng Ch'eng-kung (also known as Koxinga), son of a famous Chinese pirate Cheng Chih-lung and his Japanese mistress, repelled the Dutch in 1662 and set up his own de facto government on Taiwan until 1683. When his grandson was defeated by the Ch'ing dynasty of the Manchus in 1683, Taiwan was brought under the rule of mainland China. But the official provincial status of Taiwan as one of China's provinces only commenced in 1885. From 1895 until 1945 the Japanese ruled Taiwan and tried to develop Taiwan as a showcase of modern economic growth so as to serve as a stepping stone for Japan's southward aggression.⁴⁴ As a result of this background, Taiwan's economic development and infrastructure were relatively more advanced and modernised compared with those of the Chinese mainland.⁴⁵ By contrast, the effective Chinese mainland government's rule over Taiwan from 1885 to 1894, and from 1945 to 1949 was comparatively short-lived. Colonial heritage and long-time separation from the Chinese mother polity led Taiwan to differ from the Chinese mainland in many ways.

The influx of large numbers of immigrants from the Chinese mainland into the small island of Taiwan stoked acute tension between the native-born islanders and the Chinese mainlanders. Being separated from China for a long time, the native Taiwanese had very little respect for their new Chinese rulers. The tension was further aggravated by the prevalent corruption brought about by the new rulers. The officials assigned by the Kuomintang government to take over Taiwan from Japan after the

Second World War were mostly brutal and oppressive.⁴⁶ The native Taiwanese were shocked by the corrupt Chinese bureaucratic system, the lack of discipline of the Kuomintang government troops, the squatting of filthy mainland Chinese soldiers in the railway stations of the island and their often blatant lootings of privately owned properties and commodities.⁴⁷ Before moving its seat from mainland China to Taiwan, the Kuomintang government troops and Chiang's cohorts, in particular the Kuomintang Governor Chen Yi, "had prepared their entry two years earlier by terrorising the islanders into submission."⁴⁸ Taiwanese riots broke out on February 28th, 1947 throughout the island, and the Kuomintang army massacred 5000 to 20 000 native Taiwanese elites.⁴⁹ Those who survived the massacre either went into exile or went underground to organise political opposition. This historical '2-28-Incident' had lasting negative effects on the future relations between the native Taiwanese islanders and the so-called "mainlanders", including the descendants of Chiang Kai-shek's followers from the Chinese mainland.⁵⁰

After the brutal suppression of the Taiwanese rioting, Chiang relocated his government from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan in December 1949. He officially resumed his presidency in Taipei in March 1950 after his tentative stepping down as the President of China at the beginning of 1949. Under the rule of the Kuomintang government, Taiwan had once again been separated from its parent body politic, the Chinese mainland, by the consequences of the Chinese civil war. However, despite taking refuge in Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang government never declared the establishment of the "Republic of Taiwan." He still called the political order in Taiwan, the "Republic of China" (ROC) or the "ROC on Taiwan." The Kuomintang was the ruling party of Taiwan for 51 years from 1949 until March 18th, 2000 when Chen Shui-bian, a native son of a Taiwanese peasant and former Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Mayor of Taipei, won the presidential election.

Therefore, from 1949 onwards, China was divided into the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the Chinese mainland, under the leadership of Mao Tse-Tung, each claiming

to be the sole legitimate government of the whole China. However, the two rival governments agreed that there is only “one China” and that Taiwan is part of China; both sides were opposed to the independence of Taiwan which is a DPP platform.⁵¹ The DPP, formed on September 28th, 1986 by the Taiwanese elites, is opposed to the eventual reunification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland. The DPP’s goal is to seek Taiwan’s independent status as a sovereign state, not as part of China, or as a province of China under Chinese domination.⁵²

In order to differentiate between the period of the Chinese republic prior to 1949 on mainland China and the period of the ROC on the island of Taiwan after 1949 (from 1949 to date), the former is referred to in this thesis as the “Kuomintang government” and the latter as the “ROC”. The different reference does not change the fact that the Republic of China was founded on January 1st, 1912 on the Chinese mainland, and that Chiang Kai-shek relocated the government of the Republic of China and its troops from mainland China to Taiwan in 1949. The purpose is solely for a clear historical overview which has nothing to do with the politics of the present cross-Straits relations.

2.4 STABILITY UNDER THE KUOMINTANG RULE

In the initial stage of the Kuomintang government’s withdrawal to Taiwan, the situation on Taiwan and its offshore islands was very precarious and uncertain. In addition to the internal Taiwanese opposition, the Chinese Communists were prepared to launch an all-out invasion against the ROC and the offshore island of Kinmen (Quemoy) during 1949-1950. As the Chinese communist forces were gathered across the Taiwan Straits for an invasion, the USA government anticipated a final communist victory and the eventual crumble of the Kuomintang government. Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the USA government decided to protect Taiwan against Chinese Communist attack. This decision dramatically changed the military and diplomatic situation in the Taiwan Straits. The USA Seventh Fleet was ordered to cruise along the Taiwan Straits, and military/economic aid was provided to the ROC from the 1950s. In 1954 the ROC-USA Mutual Defence Treaty was concluded. The

USA then regarded the ROC as an important ally in the global strategy of containing communism and a bulwark in the international Cold War against communist expansion. As the ROC was under the protection of the American military shield, the ROC situation began to stabilise from the 1950s. The strong USA support accorded to the ROC for her position in the world community had enabled the ROC to enjoy a period of relative stability and to conduct her normal diplomatic activities in the international arena in the 1950s and 1960s.⁵³

The relative stability in the decades of the 1950s and 1960s also allowed the ROC ruling party Kuomintang to reform itself. The ROC leadership seemed to have learned the lessons of its failures on the mainland. Dismayed by the fall of the Chinese mainland into the hands of the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo started to focus on two main tasks in the 1950s and 1960s: firstly the security of Taiwan and its offshore islands, and, secondly, the recognition of the Kuomintang government as the legitimate government of the entire Chinese people.⁵⁴

To achieve the first objective, the ROC government staged a combination of ruthless security measures and various reforms at home. The Kuomintang purged its corrupt elements and cleaned up its act on Taiwan in the 1950s. A relatively competent civil service was put in place to implement development plans, and an effective fighting force was created to defend the ROC. In order to consolidate its minority rule and to prevent Communist subversion and the political association of the native islanders, the Kuomintang government imposed martial law and subsequent 'Emergency Rule' on Taiwan for thirty-seven years until July 1987 when political liberalisation commenced. From 1949 to 1987, the ROC was virtually a one-party state. Most of the key posts in the Kuomintang and the ROC government were held by the Chinese mainlanders who fled from the Chinese mainland to the island. Until the 1970s, Taiwanese only held one ministerial post in the entire cabinet – the Interior Ministry. Even the Provincial governor was a mainlander. The formation of an opposition party was banned, and the freedom of press and freedom of speech were restricted.⁵⁵

During this period, Chiang and his followers deluded themselves into the false belief that their sojourn on Taiwan would be temporary, and that one day the ROC would recover mainland China. They disseminated the fiction that the Kuomintang representatives who fled to Taiwan were representing all of China. They decreed that until China was unified, no new national election should take place. They also justified the Kuomintang's authoritarian rule by insisting that the ROC government was the sole legitimate government of the whole of China.⁵⁶

Nevertheless, although the Kuomintang regime was authoritarian in nature, it did hold regular local elections and tolerated limited expression of Taiwanese opposition to the Kuomintang through the mechanism of popular elections for local public officials, so long as this did not pose a real threat to the Kuomintang's dominance. Apart from the benign tolerance of the persistent anti-Kuomintang sentiments and the co-opting of the Taiwanese population by means of local elections and the admission of Taiwanese to the Kuomintang membership, access to education and the economy was equal for the native Taiwanese and the mainlanders in the ROC. On the subject of the ROC and Asian economic development, Gustav Ranis, a former Frank Altschul Professor of International Economics at Yale University, wrote over 100 theoretical and policy related articles. The Kuomintang government's egalitarian policy and equal examination system, in Ranis's opinion, was one of the three important elements of the initial success of the ROC. These three elements were: (1) the initial organic nationalism (fear of mainland China); (2) the belief of secularism; (3) the practice of egalitarianism (meritocracy).⁵⁷ Equal opportunity and equal access, especially education, with a competitive examination system, had provided a chance of upliftment to the Taiwanese people. The foundation of social mobility and political stability was thus securely laid down. John K. Fairbank, formerly one of the greatest American Sinologists at Harvard University, endorsed Ranis's arguments. Fairbank indicated that the cleansing of the Kuomintang and the solid education of the Taiwanese population were the two most important factors for the remarkable success of the ROC's national development in the forthcoming years.⁵⁸ Hung-mao Tien, a well-known former professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin and the Chief Advisor of the national policy of the ROC

government, and the present ROC Foreign Minister, stated that the ROC polity prior to 1987 was basically “a modernizing authoritarian regime with strong characteristics of a one-party pluralistic system in transition towards a dominant-party system”.⁵⁹ In pure political science terms, Ranis agrees with Tien’s assessment. Nevertheless, Ranis emphasises that if judging from the point of participation by people in decision-making, the ROC was a fairly democratic state.⁶⁰

Economically, the ROC accomplished great economic success during the period of 1951-1987 through three phases of development. In the first phase of economic development (1950-1955), emphasis was placed on land reform, controlling hyperinflation and the development of import substitution industries. The approach adopted by the ROC government was “growth with equity”, “growth with stability” and “developing agriculture by means of industry and fostering industry with agriculture.”⁶¹ With an abundant skilled labour force, decent work ethics, correct government economic planning, political stability, tame trade unions and a sound economic foundation in its agriculture, the ROC economy soon moved beyond its first phase of economic development.⁶²

From 1956 to 1972, the ROC government embarked upon a strategy of export-oriented growth. In this second phase of economic development, the ROC government adopted various measures to support the labour-intensive industries to expand export and foreign trade. These measures were reflected in the enactment of a comprehensive nineteen point Economic and Financial Reform and the Statute for Encouragement of Investment introduced in 1960 to liberalise trade, to reform the tax system, to provide tax-exemption, investment incentives, tax reduction and rebates, and favourable interest rates.⁶³ To attract foreign investment to Taiwan, the ROC government established a number of Export Processing Zones (EPZs). These EPZs offer various incentives such as tax holidays and waiving of red tape to the investors. The aforementioned policy of export-oriented growth brought about an unprecedented economic boom for the ROC from 1962 to 1971. During this period, industrial output reached 17.3 percent per annum, and per capita income more than doubled from 1965 to 1972.⁶⁴

However, by the mid-1970s, the ROC economy experienced difficulties in the face of rising oil prices and the replication of the labour intensive manufacturing industry by other countries in Asia. To overcome these challenges, there was a need to upgrade the ROC industry. From 1973 onward, the ROC economy transcended to the third phase of economic development, with the promotion of high-technology and capital-intensive industry. Ten major construction projects were launched in 1972. Hsinchu high-tech industrial park, which was modelled on Silicon Valley in California, was established in 1980. The electronics, machinery and communications sectors were the leading industries of the new phase of the ROC economic development.⁶⁵

2.5 THE ROC'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES

The ramification of the ROC's economic development in 1950s-1970s on the ROC-RSA bilateral relations was obvious. During the first phase of its economic development (1950-1955), the ROC "started out with the seeming inevitable inward-orientated, import-substitution phase."⁶⁶ In the early years of the 1950s, as the Chinese Communists increased control of mainland China, the adjacent market of mainland China became inaccessible to the ROC. Separated from China and Japan by the consequences of war, the island of Taiwan was dependent upon its own limited resources for survival. The influx of a large population from mainland China into Taiwan had put a greater strain on rice and other agricultural production. It was therefore necessary for the island to support, not only a provincial government, but also a national government, a large army as well as the refugee population from mainland China. The priority goal of the ROC government during this period was to concentrate on internal consolidation, emphasising agricultural growth and the development of import substitution industries to produce basic consumer goods for the domestic market. The ROC government "kept the domestic economy protected while becoming competitive to the outside first, and then later, and only gradually, reduced domestic protection."⁶⁷ At this stage, foreign trade and, in particular, trade with South Africa did not weigh much in

terms of the ROC government's priority. The bilateral relation with South Africa was still not important as far as the ROC government was concerned. From 1949 to 1971, the ROC was basically struggling for existence and preoccupied with internal consolidation and economic development.⁶⁸

Basking in a false mirage of security and support from the USA, the Kuomintang government's national policy in the twenty years after 1950 was based on anti-Communism and the recovery of mainland China. During this period, despite the anomalous situation and the absurdity from the outside world's point of view, Chiang Kai-shek still steadfastly claimed the ROC's sovereignty over mainland China until his death at the age of eighty-seven on April 5th, 1975. To Chiang, the issue of sovereignty was not negotiable. He was constantly envisaging the eventual recovery of mainland China and the restoration of his seat of power in Nanking. The paramount goal of the ROC's domestic and foreign policies at the time was to realise Chiang's dream. Shortly after his retreat to Taiwan, Chiang pronounced on March 1st, 1950 that his basic national policy was to "consolidate the base on Taiwan in preparation for the eventual recovery of the mainland."⁶⁹ To him and his followers, Taiwan was not a country but a temporary military base to be used to recover mainland China. On August 14th, 1950, Chiang further elaborated his national policy of anti-Communism and recovery of mainland China in a speech by stating:

To build a prosperous Taiwan is a basic pre-condition for the success of our anti-Communist and anti-Russian campaign. No changes on the international scene, nothing the Communists may do, can prevent us from trying to recover the mainland and overthrow the totalitarian Communist tyranny.⁷⁰

Even two years before his death in his 1973 New Year Day Message to the nation, Chiang still clung to the hope that only by destroying the evils of Communism, then "we [Chiang and his followers] can actually return to our ancestral burial grounds and nourish and irrigate anew the fragrant soil of our place of existence and growth."⁷¹

In order to achieve Chiang's national policy of anti-Communism and the recovery of mainland China, the primary objective of the ROC's foreign policy during the period of 1949-1971 was formulated to centre around the formation of an anti-Communist alliance with democratic countries and to solicit the support of the newly-independent Afro-Asian countries to maintain the ROC's seat in the United Nations.⁷² This period of approximately two decades was called "the Stage of Consolidation" in the history of ROC's diplomatic development.⁷³ The focus of the ROC's diplomatic activities was to strengthen relations with the USA and the East-Asian anti-Communist countries, such as South Korea and the Philippines, to prevent the PRC from entering into the UN as well as to keep diplomatic relations with other countries. The ROC was particularly concerned with Afro-Asian states, to prevent them switching sides to recognise the PRC as the sole legitimate government of the whole of China.⁷⁴

Chiang described the PRC as "the Maoist rebel regime" and "traitors and bandits."⁷⁵ The ROC still considered itself the sole legitimate government of all China. During the years from 1949 to 1971, the China seat in the UN was still occupied by the ROC. However, this claim was strongly challenged by the PRC, which in turn was supported by the Soviet Union and the Communist-bloc countries, to oust the ROC from the UN. Both sides viewed the seat in the UN as an important symbol of legitimacy. The rivalry between the PRC and the ROC for legitimacy was thus fought around the representation of China in the UN. Since 1950, the issue of China's representation had been brought to the General Assembly for debate annually, until 1971 when the ROC was compelled to vacate its seat for the PRC to take over.⁷⁶

In this context, from 1949 to 1971, the ROC fought a crucial diplomatic battle against the PRC at the UN for the representation of China. The newly-independent Afro-Asian states, in particular the African countries, became very important to the ROC. This period saw the high tide of the decolonisation of African countries, particularly in the 1960s when more than 17 African states obtained independence. With the increasing numbers of independent African states during the 1950s and 1960s, the African countries constituted the largest block of votes at the UN. In 1961, there were 29

African countries at the UN, 33 in 1962 and in 1971, the figure rose to 43 out of a total of 128 member states. As each of these newly-independent African states was entitled to a vote at the UN – and they tended to stand united on the issues concerning Africa – there was a need for the ROC government to obtain the largest block of black African votes to safeguard the ROC's seat in the UN and thus to distance itself from white South Africa. In the period 1949–1971, the ROC government therefore preoccupied itself with strengthening its relations with the newly-independent black African countries, instead of association with white South Africa. The ROC government dedicated itself to enhance its image in the newly-independent countries of Africa. Whenever there were independence celebrations, special envoys were dispatched to attend the celebrations and to visit the neighbouring nations. In 1960, the ROC's special envoy participated in the independence celebration of Cameroon and then visited nine other African countries. In the 1960s, the ROC made strenuous endeavours in sending an average of eight delegations per year to 26 African countries to negotiate aid projects and various assistance schemes in exchange for these countries' political support.⁷⁷ By 1963, the ROC had established diplomatic ties with 15 of the 33 newly-independent African states.⁷⁸ The ROC's inroads into the African continent at the time were made in the more moderate states, particularly those former French colonies with no left-wing opposition groups or liberation movements, such as Congo (Brazzaville), Chad, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta. The more radical African countries, such as the members of the Casablanca Group which was formed by the more radically-inclined former French colonies such as Guinea and Mali and some of the Arab North African countries, and some English-speaking countries including Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia, opted to recognise the PRC.⁷⁹

During the same period, the PRC also managed to establish diplomatic relations with fifteen African states so as to compete with the ROC in gaining the diplomatic support of the African states in the UN.⁸⁰ The rivalry of the two Chinas in the African continent was so intense that "at the height of its offensive (1964-65), the PRC initiated a major campaign to secure African recognition and support almost indiscriminately seeking relations with the African states."⁸¹ The newly-independent countries of Africa thus

became an important diplomatic battle-field for “a continuation of the four-decade struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung.”⁸² Apart from the rivalry of the two Chinas for diplomatic recognition and support, the PRC’s entry into Africa was also partially due to “its dual objectives of opposing the Soviet Union and the United States, and of creating a new force.”⁸³ To strengthen the Sino-African relations, the PRC launched a sustained drive from all fronts: diplomatic and clandestine; conventional and unconventional; political, economic, social and cultural.

To counter the PRC’s strong thrust into Africa and also to win the support of the Afro-Asian states to enable the ROC to retain its seat in the UN, the ROC initiated the International Technical Co-operation Programmes (previously known as Operation Vanguard) in 1959.⁸⁴ The architect of this Operation Vanguard was Hsi-kun Yang (also known as H.K. Yang) who worked at the UN headquarters in New York for 11 years before 1959. He was later promoted to the ROC’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs (1966-1979) and served as Ambassador of the ROC to the RSA (1979-1989). The initial area of focus of Operation Vanguard was Africa, but this programme was later extended to the developing countries of other regions. The technical assistance rendered to Africa by the ROC during the 1960s was initially concentrated on agricultural development. Subsequently, fisheries, aquaculture, horticulture, handicrafts, industry, animal husbandry, vocational training, engineering and construction were added to the programme. In 1971, at the height of the ROC’s International Co-operation Programme, 28 technical missions were dispatched to the countries in Africa. In the same year, there were 68 countries which maintained full diplomatic ties with the ROC in contrast to 53 countries which recognised the PRC.⁸⁵ Among those countries which recognised the ROC, the majority were Afro-Asian states and Latin American countries. As the composition of the ROC’s diplomatic ties heavily tilted towards the Afro-Asian states, the success of the ROC’s diplomatic battle for representation in the UN largely depended on these newly-independent Third World nations.⁸⁶

2.6 INITIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ROC AND THE RSA

Even during the second phase of its economic development (1956-1972), when the ROC opted for an export-oriented strategy to promote the export of various manufactured goods produced by labour-intensive industries, the ROC relied heavily on the USA for economic aid (until 1965) and as an export market destination. The USA and Japan were the ROC's major economic partners and sources of foreign investment. In 1971, exports to the USA amounted to USA\$8.592 billion in comparison to USA\$48.412 million worth of goods exported to Africa. The whole of Africa constituted a mere 2.1% out of an annual aggregate of USA\$20.6039 billion.⁸⁷ South Africa was not listed as one of the ROC's major trading partners. Exports to South Africa in 1971 were only USA\$2.06 million.⁸⁸ In terms of the direction of the ROC's foreign trade, North America (41%), Asia (31.7%), Europe (10.7%) and the Middle East (7.7%) were the major trading markets.⁸⁹ The importance of the ROC's relation with the Middle East was mainly due to the ROC's diplomatic links with several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and these Arab countries' supply of oil to the ROC. From the above breakdown, it clearly shows that trade links with Africa, including South Africa, were relatively unimportant for the ROC's foreign trade during the 1950s to 1970s. The ROC was overly dependent on the USA for its national security, diplomatic support and economic market in the said decades.⁹⁰

Because the Afro-Asian states were vociferously opposed to South Africa's apartheid policies, the ROC was not in a position to develop full diplomatic relations with South Africa before the 1970s. Its priority at this stage was to avoid offending the Afro-Asian states and to safeguard its position in the UN. In a subsequent confidential document, the MOFA of the ROC frankly admitted that the above consideration was the main obstacle to forming closer links with South Africa prior to 1971.⁹¹

This revelation explains why before 1971 the ROC – while it was still holding its seat in the UN as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council and consistently participating in various activities of the specialised agencies of the UN and inter-

governmental organisations – was reluctant to develop full diplomatic ties with South Africa for nearly two decades. The ROC obviously took recognisance of the inevitability that its growing links with South Africa would surely alienate its friendly relations with Black Africa and jeopardise its seat in the UN. Moreover, to establish alignment with South Africa might also endanger the ROC's relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries in the Middle East, which supplied vital oil to the ROC for its economy.⁹²

It was with these considerations in mind that the ROC was against South Africa's racial policies and repeatedly voted at the UN in favour of sanctions to be imposed against South Africa during the period 1948-1971. For more than twenty years, the ROC was unwilling to be associated with South Africa, or form close links with South Africa.⁹³

When the issue of the treatment of Indian population in the Union of South Africa was raised at the UN in 1946 by the Indian delegation, the Chinese delegate not only supported the position of India, but also attacked South Africa's racial policies.⁹⁴ During the 1946 session of the UN General Assembly, the Chinese delegate strongly criticised the Union's treatment of Indians in South Africa by proclaiming that the question of human rights is fundamental and that the Union's laws were discriminatory in character.⁹⁵ He found it difficult to understand South Africa's contention that the segregation of races was not a violation of human rights. He further pointed out that there were several thousand Chinese nationals in South Africa who were classified as Asiatic and were also subject to the 1946 Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Bill.⁹⁶ Therefore, on behalf of the Kuomintang government, the Chinese delegate expressed the hope that the South African government could find a satisfactory settlement.⁹⁷ A similar stance was reiterated by the ROC representative to the UN in the 1950s and 1960s. The ROC delegates routinely voted in favour of the dismantling of apartheid and sided with the Afro-Asian states.⁹⁸ Although the respective delegates of South Africa to the UN, such as GP Jooste, Eric Louw and Hilgard Muller, often cited Article 2(7) of the UN Charter – outside interference in its domestic racial policies – to argue South Africa's case against the UN, the representative of the ROC, which was one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, nevertheless

saw things in a different light. Following the Sharpeville massacre on March 21st, 1960, the ROC representative reacted by supporting the establishment of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, voting in favour of the adoption of General Assembly's resolution 1761 (XVII) of November 6th, 1962. Furthermore, the ROC delegate also vehemently condemned the South African government with the following remarks:

What has made racial discrimination in South Africa particularly objectionable is that unlike other societies where efforts are directed to rooting out such a phenomenon, South Africa has made it an instrument of national and official policy. It is all too clear that South Africa is moving in a collision course with African nationalism, and as time passes by, the chances for a compromise solution are dwindling. It is not too late for the government of South Africa to face up to the realities of the situation and reverse a policy which is so glaringly out of step with the progress of mankind towards larger freedom, and so clearly contrary to its highest self-interest.⁹⁹

In addition to the ROC government's international political considerations, South Africa's racially-based discrimination against the Chinese in South Africa was another stumbling block to the development of diplomatic relations with South Africa at the time. The Chinese had encountered racial discrimination in South Africa long before the 1948 electoral victory of the NP. From the early eighteenth century, the small number of free Chinese (as opposed to convicts or indentured labourers) in the Cape were classified as 'free blacks' along with those of African or Asian descent.¹⁰⁰ Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the two Boer Republics enacted the first state legislation to segregate Asians in separate areas. The Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (Transvaal) introduced Volksraad Law No.3 of 1885 stipulating that "persons belonging to one of the native races of Asia" were prohibited from being "owners of fixed property in the Republic."¹⁰¹ One year later, this clause was amended to allow Asians to own land, but only in "such streets, wards and locations as the government for purpose of sanitation shall assign to them to live in."¹⁰² In 1891, the Orange Free State passed legislation to forbid "Arabier, Chinees, Koelie of andere Aziatische kleurling" to settle in its territory.¹⁰³

By the turn of the twentieth century, the free Chinese community, which numbered merely 1000, was still subjected to the restrictions of discriminatory racial legislation introduced to curb the influx of Indians, and the community was adversely affected by the 'anti-Indianism' prevalent among the white community throughout South Africa.¹⁰⁴ Anti-Indianism became anti-Asianism. Therefore, the Chinese were regarded as part of the 'Asian menace' and suffered segregationist legislation.¹⁰⁵ Even though the imperial Chinese government presented petitions to the British Secretary of State in 1902 and 1903, objecting to the structural racial discrimination, the discriminatory legislation and stringent restrictions remained unchanged in the pre-1980s period. Legal segregation and blatant racial discrimination had profound implications for the Chinese community and negative effects on Sino-South African relations prior to the 1970s. This was evident from the fact that during the 1920s and 1930s, the main task of the Chinese Consul-General in Johannesburg was to try to resolve this sticky issue. During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, Chinese nationals in South Africa were still strictly restrained in trade, education, public transport, property rights, freedom of movement and hospitalisation. Throughout the 1960s, Chinese were not allowed to participate in sport competitions, refused employment, turned away from white enclosures at turf clubs and denied hospital treatment.¹⁰⁸ It was impossible for a Chinese national to get a meal at a hotel in Durban, and no white hairdresser would cut the hair of a Chinese.¹⁰⁹ During the said period, even the ROC Consul-General and his diplomatic staff were not allowed to have a cup of tea or a simple lunch in Pretoria's restaurants. They were twice chased out of restaurants¹¹⁰ and they were often humiliated. This kind of discriminatory treatment alienated the support of the ROC general public for developing closer links with South Africa. The native-born Taiwanese intellectuals were disgusted with the racial policies of South Africa even more, because of the similar pain of political deprivation that they had suffered at the hands of mainlanders. The NP government was perceived as one of the most oppressive government in the world. Therefore, some Taiwanese scholars were opposed to the establishment of diplomatic links between the ROC and the RSA.¹¹¹

Due to the combination of factors discussed above, the ROC's relations with South Africa were not particularly close until after 1971. During the period 1948 to 1975, the ROC merely maintained a low-level consular relationship with South Africa. The consular relations between South Africa and China dated back to the imperial Ch'ing dynasty when the first Chinese Consul-General, Lew Yuk Lin, was assigned to Johannesburg in May 1905 to look after the interests of the 63695 Chinese labourers contracted to work on the Witwaterstrand gold mines.¹¹² Although the Transvaal colony did not send any reciprocal representation to China at the time, there was a brief appointment of an honorary South African Trade Commissioner in Shanghai on mainland China in 1937, but this was terminated in 1942 when the Japanese army invaded China. The Chinese consular position was vacant from 1910 to 1919 as a result of the repatriation of the Chinese miners in 1910 and the outburst of the 1911 revolution in China which overthrew the imperial Ch'ing dynasty. The Kuomintang government maintained its Consulate-General in Johannesburg since 1920, throughout the Second World War, the civil war period of the 1940s, and even after its retreat to Taiwan in 1949.¹¹³

The RSA also had many of its own reasons to keep its distance from the ROC throughout this period. Although the NP government had been in power for more than two decades by the end of 1960s, as a Eurocentric society, South Africa was still closely linked to the West through economic links, cultural heritage, security/defence needs, family/personal contact and other common interests. The white population was inclined to identify themselves with Western interests and shared Western values. Even in the realm of international relations, the NP government found it necessary to rely on Western powers, such as Britain and the USA, for diplomatic support. Therefore, the links with the West were far more important than the relations with the Far East.

The fear of the NP that large numbers of Chinese would migrate to South Africa to complicate the issue of Asians in the country was another important reason for the South African government to be hesitant to forge diplomatic links with the ROC. At the time when the NP government was attempting to erect the legal framework for apartheid

and to implement segregationist policies, a series of apartheid laws were introduced to prevent rapid African urbanisation and to stem the trends towards racial integration. The most notable apartheid laws were the 1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act, 1950 Population Registration Act, the 1950 Group Areas Act, the 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, 1954 Black Resettlement Act, and the 1957 Extension of University Education Act. In the aspect of South African domestic politics, the non-white racial issue, including the question of the treatment of the people of Indo-Pakistani origin in South Africa, was the most difficult issue to resolve.¹¹⁴

On his return from the Prime Ministers' conference held at London in 1949, the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, DF Malan, debriefed the House of Assembly indicating that the only subject discussed at the conference was the problem of India.¹¹⁵ The white paranoia of Asiatic competition was heightened to such an extent that the then Minister of the Interior, TE Donges, was pressured by some white Members of Parliament, such as JR Sullivan of Berea, Durban, to restrict the entry of Indians and other Asians into South Africa. Donges acceded to the demand by taking measures to prevent "the illegal entry into the Union of the persons who are prohibited immigrants."¹¹⁶ The said restrictions were also applied to the Chinese. For thirty years, from 1953, less than 100 Chinese were admitted to reside in South Africa.¹¹⁷ During this period, the official policy of the South African government was "the strengthening of the European population by immigration of desirable persons."¹¹⁸ It is clear from Donges's statement that the so-called "desirable persons" actually implied "Europeans". The immigration programme stipulated that "immigrants be limited as far as possible to elements which can be assimilated by the South African people and who by their presence would not lower either the material standard of living or the moral level of the European population."¹¹⁹ This was the policy that had been followed since the NP came into power. However, the NP government not only took steps to reduce the numbers of English-speaking immigrants, but also formulated an official policy to control the entry of Asians, so as to protect the political power of the Afrikaners and also to find a solution for the 'Asian problem'. In 1953, Malan officially proclaimed that the protection of the indigenous people of Africa against penetration by the people of Asia was one of the

five main aims of his long- advocated African Charter. The reason why Malan highlighted the protection of Africans against Asian domination was due to the fear that Asians, and in particular Indians, might flood Africa with an enormous Asian population.¹²⁰ As a result of the NP's paranoia of foreign immigrants, the number of immigrants which came from the United Kingdom to South Africa had decreased from 71.6% in 1948 to 65.3% in 1949, and 47% in 1950. Interactions between the ROC and South Africa were also affected.¹²¹

In the economic sphere, from the end of the Second World War to 1974, the RSA entered an era of rapid economic progress and continued prosperity. South Africa's traditional mining sector, agricultural infrastructure, and even its manufacturing industry, experienced an unparalleled boom. During this period, South Africa's real GDP grew at an average rate of 4.9% per annum, and its average annual growth rate peaked at 7.8% in the years of 1971-1974. Many of these new enterprises were run by supporters of the NP. However, despite South Africa's traditional European economic links, and tariff protection of the local industries, goods manufactured by Japan were being offered in South Africa at half the price and were ready for immediate delivery from Japan.¹²² As a result, there was a grave concern expressed by both industrialists and the press with regard to trade competition and the importation of cheap goods from Japan and the Far East.¹²³ The prevailing fear was that as these cheap goods were manufactured by Far Eastern countries with a much lower standard of living than that of the average South African, to allow wholesale imports from Japan and the Far East could in the long run have a disastrous impact on the country. The then Minister of Economic Affairs, EH Louw, was requested by many Members of Parliament to prevent this from happening.¹²⁴ The emergence of a phase of economic growth during the period of 1948-1974 gave confidence to the South African government and diminished the need to diversify its economy and to develop closer links with the ROC. The discrimination against cheap products from the Far East made it even more difficult for the South African government to venture into expanding relations with the East Asian countries, including the ROC.

2.7 THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE TWO COUNTRIES

With regard to national security, both South Africa and the ROC were anti-Communist, and both were faced with the threat of communism and the looming challenge from their own majority people internally. Both were minority ruled countries: in South Africa, the white minority ruled over the black majority, but in the ROC, a minority of Chinese mainlanders dominated the native-born Taiwanese majority – albeit that these two ethnic groups are of Chinese origin and they have no colour distinction. For South Africa, however, its Communist threat was mainly from the Soviet Union and the South African Communist Party (SACP) in alliance with the ANC. For the ROC, its Communist threat was mainly from the PRC, which is the most populous country in the world (with a population of 1,2 billion), with nuclear power, and from 1971 onwards, one of the “Big Five” in the UN Security Council. Ideologically, both governments adopted a strong anti-Communist stance. South Africa’s concern about national security with regard to the PRC was focused on two broad issues: in the first instance, the PRC had provided training and assistance to the black liberation movements, in particular the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), one of the more radical South African black nationalist groups, compared to the ANC which was mainly assisted by the Soviet Union; secondly, in the Southern Africa arena, the PRC chose to support UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola), ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), and the construction of the Tan-Zam Railway to compete with the Soviet Union’s support for the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Liberacao de Angola), ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) and the use of the Soviet Navy in shipping supplies into Angola. In order to stem the Communist infiltration and the insurgence of the African nationalists, South Africa made an effort to build an anti-Communist cordon across the sub-continent from Angola through Botswana, Rhodesia, Malawi to Mozambique in the 1960s. By doing so, it was hoped that South Africa’s national security could be ensured and the Western nations would accept and support South Africa.¹²⁵

In order to meet the challenges posed by the PRC, during the 1950s–1960s, the ROC’s national security primarily depended on the support of the USA and other major powers,

as well as the retention of its seat in the UN Security Council. Therefore, these were the two most important objectives of the ROC's foreign policy from 1949 to 1971. Externally, there was no immediate threat to the ROC's national security, so long as the ROC was under the protection of the Cold War security alliance designed by the USA to contain the Communist bloc and the ROC's legitimacy in UN was secure. To pacify the local Taiwanese's internal dissatisfaction, the ROC would have to develop its economy and create wealth for its majority people as fast as possible. Thus the ROC regarded South Africa as of little importance during the 1950s–1960s. On the whole, before 1971, the ROC attached more importance to the newly-independent black African states than South Africa. This situation would change only after the ROC lost its seat in the UN Security Council in 1971.¹²⁶

2.8 SUMMARY

As a result of the above-mentioned factors, South Africa was not keen to have diplomatic ties with the ROC during the period of 1948-1974. In Charles Dickens's words, "it was the best of times, it was the worst of times... it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair."¹²⁷ To the white South Africans, this was the best of times and the spring of hope as the economy of South Africa entered into a phase of continued growth and progress. The NP not only consolidated its hold on the government, but also overcame the storms of the Sharpeville tragedy and pushed through its apartheid policies. The white-controlled sanctuary cordon of Mozambique, Angola and Rhodesia were still holding out against the escalating onslaught of black guerrillas on the last white citadels in the African continent, while the threat of international sanctions was still in the process of gathering momentum as the major Western powers were reluctant to implement comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa for their own self-interest. This was a period of white confidence and self-assurance. The South African government became so confident that it began to make adjustments to the trend toward the decolonisation of Africa by launching major diplomatic initiatives of dialogue and an outward-looking policy in the late 1960s and

early 1970s. There was no need for South Africa to look to the Far East during this period.

In sum, from 1948 to 1971, both the ROC and the RSA were reluctant to develop full diplomatic ties with each other. As a result of the reluctance to embrace one another, relations between the ROC and the RSA were merely maintained at the relatively low level of consular links for more than two decades. During this period, bilateral relations between the two countries were not very close. Both countries were preoccupied with their respective internal and external priorities. The great cultural divide, geographical distance and South Africa's apartheid policy, as well as its colonial connections with the West, further contributed to the mutual lack of interest in expanding relations with the other side.

Therefore, while South Africa directed its attention to the West and the African continent, not much historical interaction and contact between South Africa and the ROC was recorded prior to 1971. From 1948 to 1967, no permanent South African representative or Consul was dispatched to the ROC, except a Trade Commission was opened by South Africa in Hong Kong in 1962 and it was subsequently converted to a Consulate-General in 1967.¹²⁸ In the same year, as the ROC experienced an export-oriented economic boom and commercial interests with the ROC increased, South Africa established a Consulate in Taipei. Three years later, it was upgraded to the level of Consulate-General, which at times assumed some diplomatic functions. During 1967 to 1976, ROC–RRSA relations were basically on a consular level. It was only in 1976 that the two countries started to exchange ambassadors and strengthen their ties.

However, it is interesting to note that after the division of China in 1949, the RSA continued to recognise the ROC on Taiwan in line with USA's policy. While the ROC was still a member of the UN before 1971, South Africa consistently voted for the ROC to keep its seat in the UN each time the issue was put to a vote. The support granted by South Africa to the ROC was due to the common anti-Communist stance of the two governments.¹²⁹

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II

1. G. Mills & S. Baynham, "South African Foreign policy, 1945-1990" in G. Mills (ed.) From Pariah to Participant: South Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994, p.13.
2. Ibid.
3. B. Crozier, The Man Who Lost China: The First Full Biography of Chiang Kai-shek, p.7.
4. D. W. Wainhouse, Remnants of Empire: The United Nations and the End of Colonialism, p.1.
5. Ibid.
6. Johnson, Modern Times, p.369; H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p.426.
7. See F.A. van Jaarsveld, From Van Riebeck to Vorster, 1652-1974, p.447;
8. B. Fourie, Buitelandse Woelinge Om Suid-Afrika: 1939-1985, p.37.
9. Geldenhuys, Isolated States, p.112.
10. The United Nations (UN), The United Nations and Apartheid, 1948-1994, p.8.
11. Ibid., p.9.
12. Ibid., p.5.
13. F.A. Van Jaarsveld, From Van Riebeeck to Vorster, 1652-1974, p.374.
14. Ibid., pp.401-405.
15. C.F.J. Muller, (ed.), Five Hundred Years: A History of South Africa, p.481.
16. N. Mandela, "Mandela's Call" in Nelson Mandela: The Struggle is My Life, p.190.
17. Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, p.127.
18. Ibid., p.132.
19. Ibid., p.130.
20. African National Congress (ANC), "The Freedom Charter", in ANC Speaks: Documents and Statements of the African National Congress, 1955-1976, pp.12-15.
21. G. Olivier, "South African Foreign Policy", in D. Worrall (ed.) South African Government and Politics, pp.290-291.
22. Geldenhuys, Isolated States, p.113.
23. C. Legum, "The International Protest" in G. M. Carter & P. O'Meara (eds.), International Politics in Southern Africa, p.223.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. K. Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek: His Life and Times, Abridged English Edition by Chun-ming Chang, pp.873-874.
28. Quoted in Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek p.894.
29. J. K. Fairbank, China: A New History, pp.331-334.
30. Johnson, Modern Times, p.446.
31. Ibid.
32. Fairbank, *ibid.*, p.334.
33. Johnson, *ibid.*, p.445.
34. Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek, p.898.
35. Ibid. p.905.
36. Ibid.
37. M. Y.M. Kau & J. K. Leung (eds.), The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976, Vol. I, pp.3-4.
38. Ibid., p.11.
39. Ibid.
40. N. S. Ginsburg, The Economic Resources and Development of Formosa, p.2.
41. Ibid.
42. The Republic of China Yearbook, 1996, p.32.
43. See Lee Teng-hui, The Road to Democracy, pp.35-41; The Republic of China Yearbook, 1997, pp.474-476. As of 1995, there are 422,000 Protestants and 304,000 Roman Catholic believers. The total number of Christians is around 726,000 persons. The former ROC President, Lee Teng-hui and many DPP members are Christians, as is the author and his family.

- number of Christians is around 726,000 persons. The former ROC President, Lee Teng-hui and many DPP members are Christians, as is the author and his family.
44. Hung Chien-chao, A History of Taiwan, pp.230-231.
 45. Fairbank, China, p.339.
 46. W. Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History: US Global Interventions Since World War II, p.17. Also see Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom, pp.51-56.
 47. Peng, *ibid.*, p.50.
 48. Blum, *ibid.*, p.17.
 49. *Ibid.* Estimates of the Taiwanese elites and students which were killed by the mainland Chinese troops range from several thousands to twenty thousand. The exact numbers is not certain. J.K. Fairbank's estimate is around 8000 to 10,000. But the real numbers could be higher than Fairbank's estimation because many Taiwanese were simply taken away by the Chinese troops and disappeared. Therefore, the ROC former president, Lee Teng-hui estimated that "there were probably no less than 30,000 victims", The Road to Democracy, p.36.
 50. The incident of February 28th, 1947 left a lingering legacy of suspicion and distrust between the Taiwanese islanders and the descendents of the Chinese mainlanders. The former mostly prefer the "status quo" (separation or independence) while the latter are mostly inclined to "unification" with mainland China. These are the two opposing dynamic forces of the ROC political arena.
 51. MOFA, 外交報告書; 對外關係與外交行政 (White Paper: Foreign Relations and Diplomatic Administration), December 1992, p.38.
 52. The Republic of China Yearbook, 1997, p.102.
 53. Yu San Wang (ed.), Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan, pp.3,5,7.
 54. Crozier, *ibid.*, p.351.
 55. Hung-mao Tien, "Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan" in H. Feldman, M. Y.M. Kau & I. J. Kim (eds.), Taiwan in a Time of Transition, p.12.
 56. MOFA, White Paper, p.38.
 57. G. Ranis, "Taiwan as a Classic Model of Asian Development Success" in African Development Lessons from Asia, p.29
 58. Fairbank, China, pp.339-340.
 59. Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China, pp. 12-13.
 60. Ranis, *ibid.*, p.34.
 61. S. W.Y. Kuo, Economic Policies: The Taiwan Experience, 1945-1995, p.23.
 62. *Ibid.*; also see The Republic of China Yearbook, 1997, pp.68, 343.
 63. *Ibid.*, pp.57-61.
 64. Tien, The Great Transition, p.20.
 65. Kuo, Economic Policies, pp.155-156.
 66. Ranis, *ibid.*, p.29.
 67. *Ibid.*, p.31.
 68. Wang (ed.), Foreign Policy of the ROC on Taiwan, p.2.
 69. Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek, p.913.
 70. *Ibid.*, p.914.
 71. Chiang Kai-shek, "New Year Day Message, 1973" in Chinese-English Current Documents, 1973-74, p.18.
 72. MOFA, White Paper, p.26.
 73. *Ibid.*
 74. *Ibid.*
 75. Chiang Kai-shek, "New Year Day Message, 1973", *ibid.*, p.16.
 76. Wang (ed.), Foreign Policy of the ROC on Taiwan, p.4.
 77. Liang-tsai Wei, Peking Versus Taipei in Africa, 1960-1978, Asia and World Institute, Monograph Series, No.25, pp.29, 307.
 78. G. T.Yu, "Chinese Rivalry in Africa", in Race, Vol.5, No.4, April 1964, p.37.
 79. *Ibid.*, pp.37, 41-42.
 80. *Ibid.*, p.37.
 81. *Ibid.*
 82. *Ibid.*, p.35; also see L. M.S. Slawecki, "The Two Chinas in Africa" in Foreign Affairs, No. 2, January 1963, pp.398-399.
 83. *Ibid.*, pp.38-41.

84. MOFA, White Paper, p.26.
85. Tien, *ibid.*, p.221.
86. Bih-jaw Lin, "The Republic of China and Africa: A Case of Positive Adaptation", in Yu San Wang (ed.) Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan, p.149.
87. The ROC Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1996; p.194.
88. The ROC Customs Statistics of Foreign Trade, p.188.
89. 1986 Foreign Trade Development of the Republic of China, p.22.
90. *Ibid.*
91. Unpublished MOFA's internal document entitled The Briefing on the Republic of South Africa, p.9.
92. Hsiang Shih-kuei, 外交小卒瑣憶 (A Diplomat's Memoir), pp.69-70.
93. The Dept of African Affairs of the MOFA, ROC, Briefing on the RSA, p.9.
94. The Union of South Africa, White Paper of the Principal Documents Relating to the Consideration by the United Nations General Assembly of the Statement of the Government of the Union of South Africa and the Statement of the Government of India Regarding the Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa 1946, No. A-48, p.30.
95. *Ibid.*, p.41.
96. *Ibid.*, p.49.
97. *Ibid.*
98. *Ibid.*, p.45. Also see 1962 Report on the UN Proceedings, p.46.
99. The Department of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter referred to as DFA) of the Republic of South Africa, White Paper: Reports on the Proceeding in the Security Council and at the Eighteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on questions Affecting South Africa, 1963, p.19.
100. K. L. Harris, "Accepting the Group, but Not the Area: The South African Chinese and the Group Areas Act", in The South African Historical Journal, No.40, May 1999, p.180.
101. *Ibid.*, p.182.
102. *Ibid.*, pp.182-183.
103. *Ibid.*, p.183.
104. *Ibid.*, p.181.
105. *Ibid.*
106. *Ibid.*, p.183.
107. *Ibid.*, p.184.
108. Yap & Man, Colour, Confusion and Concessions, pp.357-360.
109. *Ibid.* 273-274.
110. Interview with the former Consul-General Lo Ming-yuan of the ROC in Johannesburg as cited in Yap & Man (ed.), *ibid.*, p.356.
111. See V. H. Li (ed.), The Future of Taiwan: A Difference of Opinion, p.48.
112. See Yap & Man, Colour, Confusion and Concessions, p.417; and P. Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, p.37; Also see CFJ Muller (ed.), Five Hundred Years, p.365. The three authors record the total number of Chinese labourers slightly differently: Yap estimates "more than 60000 Chinese labourers", Richardson 63695, and Muller 62200. This is possibly due to the fact that, as white miners strongly objected to the importation of Chinese labourers, the first batch of Chinese left the Transvaal in 1907 and the last in 1910.
113. Yap & Man, Colour, Confusion and Concessions, p.417
114. Muller, (ed.) Five Hundred Years, pp.371-372, 457-460.
115. Union of South Africa, Debates of the House of Assembly (hereinafter referred to as "Hansard"), 1949, Vol. 68, col. 5551.
116. *Ibid.*, col. 6672.
117. Yap & Man, Colour, Confusion and Concessions, p.419.
118. Hansard, May 21st-June 22nd, 1951, vol. 75, col. 3968.
119. *Ibid.*
120. Hansard, August 11th, 1953, col. 1327.
121. Hansard, June 21st, 1951, Vol. 75, col. 3973.
122. Hansard, February 26th, 1950., Vol. 70, col. 1027.
123. Hansard, March 24th, 1950, Vol. 71, col. 3681
124. *Ibid.* Vol. 70, Col.1027.



125. J. Barber & J. Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945–1988, pp.175-177.
126. Bih-jaw Lin, "The Republic of China and Africa: A Case of Positive Adaption" in Yu Sang Wang (ed.) Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan, pp.149, 153
127. C. Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities, p.21.
128. D.F. Fourie, "South Africa and the East" in A. J. Venter, (ed.), Foreign Policy Issues In a Democratic South Africa, p.149.
129. DFA, Report on Proceedings at the Twenty-Sixth General Assembly of the UN: on Questions Affecting South Africa, 1971, pp.8-12.