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APPENDIX A: ALLEGED EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT
DEMOCRATIC STATES NEVER FIGHT WARS AGAINST
EACH OTHER

1. United Provinces versus England, 1780-1783
2. English versus the French during the French Revolutionary wars, 1792-1802
3. War of 1812
4. Belgium versus Holland, 1830
5. Swiss Civil War, 1847
6. Roman Republic (Papal States) versus France, 1849
7. American Civil War, 1861-1865
8. Spanish-American War, 1898
9. Second Philippines War 1899
10. Boer War, 1899-1902
11. World War I
12. World War II
13. Finland versus Great Britain and the other democratic allies, World War II
14. Israel versus Lebanon, 1848
15. India versus Pakistan, 1948
16. Israel versus Lebanon, 1967
17. Turkey versus Cyprus, 1974
18. Peru versus Ecuador, 1981
19. Various conflicts in the Post-Communist World. (Serbia versus Croatia, Serbia versus
   Bosnia-Herzegovina, Armenia versus Azerbaijan, etc.)

Source: Ray 1993:253
### APPENDIX B: FACTORS POSTULATED AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributing factors</th>
<th>Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Systemic factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International law and norms</td>
<td>Maoz &amp; Russett (1993); Raymond (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediators present in system</td>
<td>Dixon (1993,1994); Raymond (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers of democracies in dispute</td>
<td>Hewitt &amp; Wilkenfield (1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers of democracies in system</td>
<td>Moaz &amp; Abdolali (1989); Parker (1994); Russett (1995); Starr (1991, 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of hegemon</td>
<td>Bremer (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power shifts</td>
<td>Ray (1995); Schweller (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade interdependence</td>
<td>Dixon (1984); Dixon &amp; Moon (1993); Oneal, Oneal, Maoz &amp; Russett (1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disputants members of same international organisations</td>
<td>Hewitt &amp; Wilkenfield (1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic distance</td>
<td>Bremer (1992,1993); Dixon (1993, 1994); Gleditsch &amp; Hegre (1995); Maoz &amp; Russett (1992, 1993); Raymond (1994); Rummel (1983); Small &amp;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
History of co-operation

- Singer (1976); Weede (1984, 1992)
- Dixon (1994); Ostrom & Job (1986); Small & Singer (1976)

Relative military capabilities

- Bremer (1992); Maoz & Russett (1993)
- Raymond (1995)

**Societal factors**

Costs of conflict

- Dixon (1993); Ostrom & Job (1986)

Economic prosperity


Electoral pressure

- Ostrom & Job (1986); Russett (1989)

Independent domestic media

- Van Belle (1995)

Internal stability


Level of economic development


Norms/expectations of political culture


Mass political participation

- Ember, Ember & Russett (1992); Lake (1992)

Mobilised public opinion

- Mintz & Geva (1993); Ostrom & Job (1986); Risse-Kappen (1991); Russett (1990, 1993)

**Governmental factors**

Divided authority/separation of power


Institutional constraints

- Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman (1992); Maoz & Russett (1992, 1993); Morgan
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limited government</th>
<th>Manica (1989); Rummel (1979, 1983); Waert (1994)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political competition</td>
<td>Morgan &amp; Campbell (1991); Morgan &amp; Schwebach (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regularised elections</td>
<td>Babst (1972); Morgan &amp; Campbell (1991); Morgan &amp; Schwebach (1992); Small &amp; Singer (1976)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Kegley & Hermann 1995:513*[^24]

[^24]: The references of the studies in the right-hand column correspond with the bibliography of the original source as referred to and not the bibliography of this dissertation.
Source: Zakon 1999
APPENDIX D: CONCEPTUAL MAP OF CYBERSPACE

Source: Kitchin 1998:4
APPENDIX E: NUMBER OF USERS ONLINE WORLD-WIDE

Source: www.nua.ie/survey/how_many_online/index.html
APPENDIX F: INTERNET USERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World total</td>
<td>304, 36 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2, 5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>68, 9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>83, 35 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East:</td>
<td>1, 90 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>10, 74 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: www.nua.ie/survey/how_many_online/index.html*
SUMMARY

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AS AN APPROACH TO WORLD PEACE IN THE INFORMATION ERA

by

JOELIEN PRETORIUS

SUPERVISOR: PROF. A DU PLESSIS
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DEGREE FOR WHICH THE DISSERTATION WAS PRESENTED: MAGISTER ARTIUM IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The study explores the plausibility of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era by analysing causality and deductive structures associated with the variables world peace, democracy and information technology as found in text. It also pursues a normative objective, namely to propose ways in which information technology can be employed to further democracy and world peace.

The advent of the information era challenges scholars of International Relations to evaluate theories and concepts of International Relations within the framework of information technology. Traditionally placed within the realm of liberal internationalism, the democratic peace contends that democracies are unlikely to wage war with one another because they perceive one another to be constrained by norms and institutions unique to their democratic nature. The spread of democracy will thus enhance world peace. Information technology contributes to the spread and institutionalisation of democratic norms by providing access to abundant information through channels difficult to bring under government control, facilitating the mobilisation and organisation of pro-democracy movements and creating unprecedented opportunities for civil participation in the political process. Through deductive reasoning it can therefore be argued that the democratic peace and thus world peace, are likely to be enhanced in the information era.
This conclusion is based on a neo-liberal definition of world peace, that is, the absence of lethal violence between states amounting to battle fatalities of at least 1 000. In the information era, such a definition is too limited to underlie a comprehensive approach to peace. Most wars are no longer fought between states or at the state level. They are protracted, deeply structural conflicts that involve a mix of state and non-state actors, private interests, professional armies or mercenaries and ethnic or religious factions. World peace is thus better defined along human security as opposed to national security lines, namely to remove the institutional obstacles and promote the structural conditions that will facilitate the growth of socio-cultural, economic and political trends to achieve conditions congruent with peace values such as security, non-violence, identity, equity and well-being.

It is possible to expand the democratic peace approach theoretically to achieve world peace thus defined, by drawing on the Kantian origins of democratic peace theory. Kant emphasised that individuals are citizens of a universal state of mankind governed by universal morality. Such a cosmopolitan interpretation of the democratic peace grasps the interconnectedness and interdependencies of the information era, going beyond the state level and state actors. The approach is plausible because information technology enables global civil society through the help of the global media, to promote and institutionalise democratic norms such as security, freedom, justice and community. Civil society movements expose information about the often hidden interests or structural factors characteristic of wars. By mobilising public opinion and putting pressure on governments, international organisations and the private sector to act in ways congruent with democratic values, they promote global democracy and globalise the democratic peace. The plausibility of this approach to world peace is conditioned on the extent to which Internet governance and civil society are democratised, the digital divide bridged and the global media oriented towards promoting peace.
SAMEVATTING

DIE DEMOKRATIESE VREDE AS ‘N BENADERING TOT WÊRELDVREDE IN DIE INLIGTINGSERWA

deur

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GRAAD WAARVOOR MAGISTER ARTIUM IN
VERHANDELING VOORGELê IS: INTERNASIONALE POLITIEK

Die studie ondersoek die aanneemlikheid van die demokratiese vrede as ‘n benadering tot wêreldvrede in die inligtingsera deur die oorsaalklikhede en deduktiewe structure wat met die veranderlikes wêreldvrede, demokrasie en inligtingstegnologie in teks aangetref word, te analiseer. ‘n Normatiewe navorsingsdoel word ook nagestreef, deur wyses voor te stel waarop inligtingstegnologie aangewend kan word om demokrasie en wêreldvrede te bevorder.

Die aanbreek van die inligtingsera daag navorsers in Internasionale Verhoudinge uit om teorieë en konsepte binne die konteks van inligtingstegnologie te evaluer. Die demokratiese vrede, tradisioneel ‘n liberaal-internasionale benadering tot vrede, veronderstel dat dit onwaarskynlik is dat demokrasieë met mekaar oorlog sal voer, omdat die persepsie wedersyds bestaan dat hul gedrag deur norme en instellings, uniek aan demokrasie, beperk word. Wêreldvrede word dus bevorder deur die verspreiding van demokrasie. Inligtingstegnologie dra tot die verspreiding en institusionalisering van demokratiese norme by deur toegang tot inligting te verskaf langs kanale wat moeilik deur regerings beheer word, deur die mobilisering en organisering van pro-demokrasie bewegings te faciliteer en deur ongeëwenaarde moontlikhede vir demokratiese deelname
aan die politieke proses te bied. Deur deduktiewe beredenering word afgelei dat die
demokratisie vrede en dus wereldvrede, bevorder word in die inligtingsera.

Hierdie gevolgtrekking is gebaseer op 'n neo-liberale beskouing van wereldvrede, as die
afwesigheid van interstaatlike geweld wat minstens 1 000 oorlogsgesneuwelde tot gevolg
het. In die inligtingsera is hierdie definisie van wereldvrede egter te beperkend as grondslag
vir 'n omvattende benadering tot vrede. Die meeste oorloë vind nie meer tussen state of op
die staatsvlak van analyse plaas nie. Oorloë is langdurige, diep-strukturele konflikte wat 'n
mengsel van staats- en nie-staatsrolspelers, privaatbelange, professionele weermagte,
huursoldate en etniese of godsdienstige faksies betrek. Wereldvrede kan dus beter in terme
van menslike sekuriteit as in nasionale veiligheidsterme gedefinieer word. Hiervolgens is
vrede die verwydering van institusionele hindernisse en die bevordering van strukturele
omstandighede wat die groei van sosio-kulturele, ekonomiese en politieke tendense aanhelp
ten einde omstandighede te skep wat die bereiking van vredeswaardes soos veiligheid,
geweldlosheid, identiteit, gelykheid en welsyn moontlik maak.

Deur na die Kantiaanse oorsprong van die demokratiese vrede terug te keer is dit moontlik
om die demokratiese vrede teorieë uit te brei om wereldvrede soos gedefinieer, te bereik.
Kant beklemtoon dat individue burgers van 'n universele staat van die mensdom en
regeer word deur 'n universele moraliteit. Hierdie kosmopolitaanse interpretasie van die
demokratiese vrede weerspieël die verbindtenisse en interafhanklikheidsverhouding wat die
inligtingsera kenmerk en strek verder as die staat as vlak en eenheid van analyse. Die
benadering is lewensvatbaar omdat inligtingstechnologie, met behulp van die globale media'n
globale burgergemeenskap bemagtig om demokratiese norme soos veiligheid, vryheid,
gelykheid en gemeenskap wereldwyd te bevorder en te institutionaliseer.
Burgergemeenskap bewegings maak inligting oor die dikwels versteekte agendas en strukturele
faktore wat oorloë kenmerk, bekend. Deur die openbare mening te mobiliseer en druk op
regerings, internasionale instellings en die privaatsektor te plaas om hul gedrag te skik na
vredeswaardes, bevorder die burgergemeenskap globale demokrasi en die globalisering
van die demokratiese vrede. Die aanneemlikheid van hierdie benadering tot wereldvrede is
afhanklik van die mate waartoe Internetregering en die burgergemeenskap demokraties is,
die digitale gaping oorbrug word en die globale media vredesgeoriënteerd is.