CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. RESEARCH THEME

Two centuries ago, Immanuel Kant (1795), the German philosopher, anticipated that perpetual peace would come to exist among states with republican constitutions, that is democracies. Since then a *pax democratica* that resembles Kant’s vision of a pacific union of free states has manifested itself so clearly that it is regarded by many as one of the main characteristics of contemporary world politics. It is so apparent that various scholars, for example Babst (1964), Levy (1989), Rummel (1976), Russett and Starr (1981) and Small and Singer (1976), have set out to test Kant’s theory empirically.

Two decades ago the American futurists, Heidi and Alvin Toffler (1970, 1981), announced the dawn of a new era, namely the information era or the Third Wave, as they preferred to call it.¹ The information era is the result of the revolution in the development of information technology (IT), more specifically the electronics (and associated software) that made the design, production, and mass distribution of information devices possible. The past two decades have seen exponential increases in the number, speed and capacity of IT at lowered costs, making IT the fastest growing dimension of human affairs (Bankes & Builder 1991:4).

This study brings together these two phenomena, the democratic peace and the information revolution, by evaluating the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era. At the turn of the twenty-first century, scholars stand bewildered by the complexity of a world that does not conform to simple dichotomies as the Cold War world seemed to do. It is a world characterised by the competing trends of integration, fragmentation, localisation, globalisation, liberation and domination. IT and global communications have played no small part in bringing this world about. The global economic and cultural marketplace is made possible by IT that has provided the ‘infrastructure’ of transborder data, news and image flows. On the one hand, it has greatly

¹ The First Wave being the agricultural era and the Second Wave the industrial era.
facilitated the expansion of capitalism, not least by raising the levels of demand through global advertising. On the other hand, it has also empowered those at the peripheries whose demand for self-determination and social justice often take the form of identity politics against the commodity politics of the centre (Tehranian 1999b:4).

Scholars of the post-Cold War era, when trying to explain the world complexities in simple terms, have come up with three types of scenarios, namely those of continuity, collapse and transformation. Continuity scenarios foresee more of the same: the world system will continue to grow with capitalism as the dominant economic system and liberal democracy as the dominant political system (Fukuyama 1989). The information era provides favourable opportunities for the acceleration of both capitalism and liberal democracy as it facilitates transborder capital flows and empowers social forces in authoritarian countries.

The collapse scenarios also envision the expansion of capitalism, but focus on the inequality and violence that capitalism breeds. The economic and cultural gaps between countries are expected to intensify and to become more visible through global communications, producing tensions and conflicts. These tensions may either lead to a direct clash of civilisations (Huntington 1993) or assume more abstruse forms, such as terrorism and protracted conflicts. In these scenarios the explosion of multiple voices and views that IT makes possible serves to pit cultures against one another as resistance against capitalist and Western domination grows (Tehranian 1999a:159).

The transformation scenarios view neither continuity nor collapse as inevitable. They suppose intervention and education toward a preferred world order, whether it means the establishment of a world government to secure justice on the international terrain, or abolishing governments as the instruments of exploitation and domination.

This analysis adopts a transformation scenario approach, arguing that IT provides for the employment of the democratic peace in a reformist way. It adopts deliberately a discourse that emphasises the application of IT to achieve shared values (democratic norms), common interests and interdependence, in order to establish a world community that co-operates for peace, justice and development on all levels.
In evaluating the democratic peace in the information era, the study thus not only asks the question how plausible, feasible and viable the democratic peace is in practice, but goes beyond it to reinterpret the democratic peace in a way that will incorporate the complex realities of the information era. This poses a challenge to expand the theoretical boundaries within which the democratic peace has traditionally been moulded, a challenge that is intensified by the thematic nexus of international relations and international communications.

2. RESEARCH PROBLEM

The research theme provides the background for the research question, namely to what extent can the democratic peace be employed as a plausible, feasible and viable approach to world peace in the information era? The subsequent research problem is aimed at addressing this question by critically analysing causality and deductive structures associated with IT, democracy and world peace in International Relations and Communication literature.

In response, three specific research objectives can be postulated in order to address the research question, namely:

- to review the democratic peace as an approach to peace by contextualising it within the framework of other approaches to peace, tracing the theoretical origins of the democratic peace and outlining it as a phenomenon in world politics;
- to examine the claim that the developments in IT have brought about a new era, the information era; and
- to critically assess claims, by authors of seminal International Relations and Communication texts, that there are causal relations between IT and democracy and between democracy and world peace respectively, applying deductive logic to reach a conclusion about the correlation between IT and world peace.

In addition, the research problem also leads to a normative objective, namely to recommend ways in which IT should be employed to harness the information revolution and direct it toward democracy and world peace.
3. DEMARCATING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

It is necessary to draw the limits of inquiry so as to provide a comprehensive answer to the research question, yet an answer that is not so all-encompassing to be excessively complex and void of any meaning. In this regard the research problem can be demarcated conceptually, geographically and with respect to the time period to which the study pertains.

Conceptual delineation requires explaining and clarifying the central concepts in the study, namely:

*The information era:* The term is used to describe the contemporary period in the world’s history. It depicts the fundamental structural change in power relationships in the world today attributable to the exploitation of IT. It is an era that Bankes and Builder (1992:4, 5) contend “is not so much defined by governments or alliances, as before, but increasingly by transnational markets, commerce, communities and communications. The change has been driven by the global mobility of people and commodities, but most of all by the nearly instantaneous mobility of information and ideas.” In 1968, McLuhan and Fiore described the world of the information era as a ‘global village’. Most human interactions in the information era can thus be compared to those associated with life in a small village. Consequently, the information era is not so much about IT, but about the implications of the mass distribution of these technologies and the conceptual changes brought about by the awareness of the role of information in human behaviour, organisation and society (Bankes & Builder 1992:159).

*The democratic peace:* The term was coined by Bruce Russett (1993), a leading contemporary scholar of the idea and phenomenon that democracies keep the peace among themselves. According to Russett (in Thompson 1996:141) “one of the strongest, nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations” is that democracies do not engage in war with one another. The democratic peace is also associated with Immanuel Kant’s essay on “perpetual peace” as well as Woodrow Wilson’s arguments during World War I regarding the pacifying effects of democracy on relationships among states.
World peace: In its most elementary sense, the concept world peace refers to the absence of war. The definition of war used in this study is firstly that of interstate hostility amounting to a minimum of 1 000 battle fatalities among all the system members involved (Ray 1997:52). However, the definition is expanded to include so-called post-modern wars. Post-modern wars also include ‘little wars’ or low intensity conflicts within and between states as well as between states and non-state actors (Tehranian 1999a:167-171). World peace goes beyond simply the absence of war (negative peace) and includes conditions of harmony and co-operation (positive peace) (Tehranian 1992:2).

The geographical focus of the study is global, following from the research problem that explores the democratic peace as an approach to world peace. World peace, as is evident from the conceptual delineation, encompasses all states as well as non-state actors in the world.

In respect of the time frame of the study, the information era delineates the period of concern. The antecedents of this era, namely the invention of the telephone and telegraph, can be traced to the latter half of the nineteenth century. It was followed by the invention of the radio, television and computer during the next 50 years and after that by the developments in electronics that enabled the mass production of practical devices. The information era is considered to have commenced during the 1950s. Bankes and Builder (1992:4) explain this as follow: “The basis for the current information revolution is not in the advent of the radio or television or even computers, but in their magical transformation by the silicon chip in all of its manifestations. That is what sets the past 20 to 40 years apart from prior history.” The inquiry will, therefore, not go back beyond the 1960s and, also considering that the information era manifested itself more clearly in the past 10 to 20 years, the last two decades of the twentieth century will be the main focus of attention.

A question relevant to the temporal delineation of the study, is what the duration of the information era will be? If the study is confined to the information era, the end of the era is also a parameter of the study. It is, however, difficult to predict the end of an era as illustrated by the abrupt end of the Cold War. To overcome the problem of prediction, the question of when the information era will end is rephrased into that of how the current
phase of the information era might be characterized. According to Rondfeldt (1992:253), the information revolution was still 10 years from the beginning of maturation in 1992 when he wrote: "The technology remains in an incipient stage of development, compared with what is on the drawing board and in the mind of visionaries. Although the information era has its roots in developments of the previous century the best and worst are yet to come in terms of the technology's effect on society, and especially on its politics." Thus, the information revolution has not yet spent itself completely. This is an important element of the temporal delineation as it impacts on the conclusions drawn from the study, namely that they can only be based on trends that can thus far be identified in the information era.

4. **JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY**

The study evolves around three concepts, namely world peace, democracy and the information era, which are individually as well as collectively regarded as contemporary, topical and relevant research issues. The study thus aims to contribute to both the theoretical and practical realms of international relations.

From a practical point of view, world peace has been a perennial research issue in contemporary International Relations since the inception of the discipline during the interwar period (1919 - 1939). The arrival of a new era (the information era) requires a reinterpretation of traditional concepts, including world peace.

The contemporary nature and relevance of the democratic peace as a research issue are informed by several factors, such as:

- the end of the Cold War and the apparent ideological victory of liberalism over communism;
- Huntington's (1991) claim of a Third Wave of democratisation;\(^2\)

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\(^2\) The Third Wave of democratisation, as proposed by Huntington (1991), refers to the transition of at least 29 previously authoritarian governments to democratic regimes during the period 1973 to 1990. (If the temporal delineation of his book, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century* is extended to 1994, several other democratic transitions can justifiably be regarded as Third Wave transitions, for example that of South Africa.) Although a reverse wave has followed, signalled by ethnic conflict in the Balkans and certain African states, the result has been a net increase in democratic governments.
• a growing trend in international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), to regard the promotion of democratic norms as a fundamental policy principle; and
• a movement toward empiricism in International Relations that favours the study of measurable phenomena.

These factors reignited interest in the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the post-Cold War era.

The information era, the third key concept, is becoming an increasingly topical social science research issue as the societal impact of IT becomes more evident. The Political Sciences, especially International Relations, are no exception. Many events of the past decade, such as the end of the Cold War, the increase in non-state actors on the world arena, the changing nature of national security and the globalisation of markets are attributed to the revolution in IT (Builder 1990:2).

There is, however, a stronger theoretical motivation for undertaking the study than its relevance and contemporary nature. The belief that “the world now taking shape is not only new, but new in entirely new ways” (Barnet, quoted in Bankes and Builder 1992:5) renders existing theories inadequate to fully describe, explain and predict phenomena and events in world politics. The lack of theory interpreting world politics explicitly in terms of the existence of the information era is an impediment to practical research (Bankes & Builder 1992:23). Moreover, inasmuch as theories are not only explanatory of reality, but also constitutive, it is important to propose ways in which democracy and world peace can be enhanced in the information era.

5. METHODOLOGICAL PREMISES

The methodological premises pertain to the approaches, methods of data gathering and interpretation, and level of analysis used in the study. The terms ‘approach’ and ‘method’ are often used interchangeably (Van Dyke 1960:113). In this study, the term approach implies the criteria used to propose research questions and select relevant data, while method refers to the activities that occur when data is gathered and interpreted. In this
study both a descriptive and prescriptive approach are used. The method of data gathering is a literature study and to analyse and interpret data the qualitative method and deduction are used.

Description comprises the process of providing an objective rendering of what is being studied. It is evident that descriptive statements amount to ‘alleged truths of reality’ (Van Dyke 1960:180). Prescription, on the other hand, involves making value statements about “the way the world should be ordered and the value choices decision makers should make” (Viotti and Kauppi 1993:5). In other words, description deals with ‘what is’ whereas prescription deals with what ‘ought to be’ or what ‘should be’ (Dyer 1997:14). However, the description-prescription dichotomy does not imply that these approaches are necessarily incompatible. On the contrary, according to Dyer (1997:15) “only when it is determined (descriptively) what is normal in a given context, may deviation or conformity be viewed as either a pejorative or commendatory basis for prescription”. In this study the relationship between the three key concepts, namely information technology, democracy and world peace, will firstly be approached descriptively. Upon this the study will embark on the more normative exercise of prescribing ways to improve the plausibility, viability and feasibility of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era.

With regard to method, data or information can be accumulated in various ways, for example by making use of direct observations, surveys, conducting interviews or studying documentary sources of other people’s observations and ideas. This study will be confined to the latter. In other words, it is based on a literature study of existing literature and primary documents (such as seminal philosophical works and also government reports) that relate to the subject matter. As a literature study it focuses on the causalities and deductions found in texts regarding the relationship between democracy and world peace, information technology and democracy, and information technology and world peace. These causalities and deductions are indicated, explained, assessed and used to answer the research question, concerning the plausibility, viability and feasibility of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era.

Regarding the interpretation of data, analysis is the “process by which the parts of a whole are identified”, but also involves an effort to find out how these parts are related or
connected to form the whole (Van Dyke 1960:180). This study adopts the qualitative method. In this context, Van Dyke (1960:181) emphasises that the qualitative method relies on the personal qualities of the scholar. These qualities include logic, judgement, insight, imagination, intuition and/or the ability to form accurate impressions and see relationships. Hence, the research problem is based on the interrelationship of world peace, democracy and IT. This relationship is not quantified or measured. Kluckhohn (in Van Dyke 1960:183) argues that “the pertinent fact is not the presence or absence of something in such and such quantity but rather the nature of the arrangement ...”. The study can therefore be considered to be qualitative.

Finally, the deductive method of data interpretation is employed. Deduction, according to Lin (1976:14), is “the process in which certain known propositions or premises make other unknown propositions and conclusions follow logically, empirically or both.” There are, subsequently, three types of deduction that can be used to explain social phenomena, namely:

- logical deduction;
- the empirical deductive system, where propositions relate theoretical or abstract terms or concepts to empirical (observable) terms or variables; and
- a combination of the logical and empirical deductive system, where the two systems are integrated in order to explain certain phenomena.

In this study the first type of deduction is employed, namely logical deduction.

Isaak (1975:108) elucidates the basic structure of the logical deductive explanatory model as follow. Logical deduction is divided into that which explains, the explanans, and into that which is explained, the explanandum. The explanans consists of two statements or postulates. Postulates are true statements from which other statements are deduced (Bailey 1994:45). Collectively these postulates imply the explanandum. The explanans, in other words, contains the premises from which the explanandum (conclusion, deduction) is

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3 This study does, however, refer to quantitative studies correlating democracy and world peace, but does not itself employ the quantitative method.
deduced. Lin (1976:25) points out that there are two variations of the logical deductive model, namely the definitional and the propositional logical deductive systems.

In the definitional logical deductive system, both postulates as well as the deduction (in other words the *explanans* and the *explanandum*) contain definitions. The deduction (*explanandum*) connects the definitions. Since both postulates are by definition true statements, it follows that by deduction the *explanandum* is also true. A typical definitional logical deductive system looks as follows:

**Explanans** (postulates):
1. Humans are mortal.
2. Socrates is human.

**Explanandum** (deduction):
3. Thus, Socrates is mortal.

The postulates are stated in an either-or manner. Humans are either mortal or they are not and Socrates is either human or he is not. Thus, Socrates is either mortal or he is not.

The propositional logical deductive system, on the other hand, contains propositions. In this model the relationship between concepts are probabilistic rather than definitive as in the definitional logical deductive model. Hence, the postulates and the deduction merely describe the likelihood of the occurrence of a relationship than an unquestionable truth. A typical propositional logical deductive system looks as follows:

**Explanans** (postulates):
1. The more educated a person is, the more likely it is that he/she will get a high-ranking job.
2. The higher the rank of the job a person can secure, the more likely it is that he/she will amass wealth.

**Explanandum** (deduction):
3. Thus, the more educated a person is, the more likely it is that he/she will amass wealth.
In the example, it is only stated that a person with greater education is likely to secure a higher-ranking job. It is not stated that all people with greater educations will do so, as the definitional logical deductive system would have read.

The nature of deduction in this study is such that it subscribes to the latter variation of the logical deductive model, in other words, the propositional logical deductive system. The first postulate is based on the premise that democracies are unlikely to wage war with one another. Subsequently, an increase in democracy is likely to lead to an increase in world peace. The second postulate is that the information revolution is likely to enhance democracy worldwide. From these two postulates can be deduced that, as a result of the information era, world peace is likely to be enhanced. The propositional logical deductive model as used in the study can be illustrated as follow:

**Explanans**

Postulates 1 = An increase in democracy is likely to lead to an increase in world peace (because democracies are unlikely to wage war with one another)

Postulate 2 = Progress in information technology is likely to enhance democracy

**Explanandum**

Deduction (Conclusion) = Thus, progress in information technology is likely to enhance world peace

It is evident that the three statements are propositional and not definitional inasmuch as they only state the likelihood of a relationship between democracy, the information revolution and world peace. In subsequent chapters the nature of these propositions is explored. In terms of the postulates contained in the *explanans*, the focus is on the conditions that will increase and decrease the likelihood of a relationship between democracy and world peace on the one hand, and information technology and democracy, on the other. In terms of the
deduced proposition, the study explores its soundness and usefulness to answer the research question.

Concerning the third methodological premise, namely the level of analysis, the study is not limited to a single level of analysis. Although the democratic peace is usually linked to the state level inasmuch as it involves regime types, the information revolution obscures the traditional distinction between sub-state, state and supra-state (or global) levels of analysis. For example, individuals and groups traditionally operating at the sub-state level are empowered by IT to act on the supra-state level. This necessitates an approach to analysis that is not only flexible enough to concentrate on actors and processes on different levels of analysis, but also on actors and processes that cross the levels of analysis with increasing frequency.

6. OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE

The literature consulted in this study relate to three themes, namely:

World peace as a fundamental issue in International Relations: Inasmuch as the field of International Relations was conceived during the interwar period (1919 - 1939), war and peace were regarded as fundamental issues in International Relations and continued to be ever since. As a result, literature concerned with approaches to end war and maintain peace abound. In this respect, Claude’s (1956) Swords into plowshares, Hinsley’s (1963) Power and the pursuit of peace, Lovell’s (1974) The search for peace: An appraisal of alternative approaches and Morgenthau’s (1973, first published in 1948) Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace are typical of writings that explore different approaches to peace. These approaches include among others collective security, the balance of power, world government and the democratic peace. Most of these writings relate the different approaches to peace to a particular theoretical perspective of International Relations, for example Doyle (1997) in Ways of war and peace: realism, liberalism and socialism distinguish between realist, liberalist and socialist views and approaches to war and peace. Other scholars go as far as to organise theories of International Relations in terms of the view that they take on war and peace most notably Waltz (1959). He distinguishes between theories that attribute the causes of war respectively to human nature, regime type and the
anarchical international system. Although earlier literature on war and peace defined these concepts in a statecentric way, there has been a movement to broaden them during the last two decades. This movement has paralleled the more general shift in International Relations literature from a statecentric to a multicentric image of world politics (Tehranian 1999b).

**The democratic peace as an approach to world peace:** Literature on the democratic peace dates back to Kant’s (1795) article *Perpetual Peace: A philosophical sketch*. The article (translated by Beck [1963] in Betts [1994]) shows how giving those who suffer most in war a voice to effectively sanction war between states can contain the aggressive interests of political elites. This implies that states adopt republican constitutions and exercise restraint with respect to their relationships with one another to the extent that they establish a pacific union among themselves. Kant’s article gained renewed interest when Babst (1972) published an article claiming that democracies have never waged war with one another. Doyle (1983a; 1983b), Thompson (1996), Benoit (1996), Kegley and Herman (1995) and Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (1993) are only a few of the scholars that have debated both the empirical and normative plausibility of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace since the end of the Cold War. An important point made by Doyle in most of his articles on the subject is that democracies are not necessarily inherently peace-loving. On the contrary, they will still fight so-called liberal wars against non-democratic states (Doyle 1986:267).

**The information era:** Literature on the information era can be divided into sources that describe the technical aspects of the information revolution, such as Martin (1988) and Saxby (1990), and sources that concentrate on the societal, economical and political impact thereof, such as Kitchin (1998) and Haywood (1995). Although some scholars of International Relations, amongst others Rothkopf (1998) and Cowie (1989), have begun to explore the impact of the information revolution on world politics in particular, the fields of Philosophy and Communication Studies provide valuable supplementary sources. In terms of the former, Feenberg and Hannay (1995) and Heidi and Alvin Toffler (1994a) are examples of scholars who focus on understanding the relationship between society and technology, whereas Wasco and Mosco (1992), Sclove (2000) and Mohammadi (1997) are communications scholars who concentrate on the relationship between the media and politics.
Although there is a vast body of sources that explore the relationship between democracy and world peace on the one hand (for example Gleditsch and Hegre 1997) and between democracy and the information revolution on the other (for example Tsagarousianou, Tambini and Bryan 1998 and Coleman 1999), relatively few sources explore the interrelationship between the three concepts collectively. Alleyne (1994) in “a critical analysis of the assumptions about the relationship between communications, democracy and international peace”, comes close to this, but not in the same way that this study proposes. Alleyne concludes that expectations that the improved efficiency of international communications will contribute significantly to fostering liberal democracies, and in turn world peace, are misplaced and premature. His finding is based on the fact that theoretical contradictions exist inasmuch as liberal democratic norms were never exercised universally by Western states and new technologies of mass communications were from the start used as tools of international conflict. Although this perspective is considered, the study will go beyond the improvements in mass communications (one-to-many media) to include the developments in many-to-many media (for example the Internet) and the opportunities these channels, accessible to the average citizen, will provide for democracy and world peace.

7. STRUCTURE

The structure of the rest of this study, following this chapter that serves as an introduction, is outlined as follow.

Chapter two outlines the different approaches to world peace in International Relations as well as the worldviews or theoretical perspectives framing these approaches. This provides a brief overview of how world peace, as a fundamental issue in the discipline, is treated theoretically. Thus it serves as a reference point for introducing the democratic peace as an approach to world peace.

Chapter three is an intensive survey of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace, starting with the philosophical origins of the idea that democracies do not make war with one another. This is followed by examining the empirical evidence of the existence of a pacific union among democracies on three levels of analysis, namely the monadic level
(whether democracies are inherently more peaceful than other regime types); the dyadic level (whether democracies are only more peaceful in their relations with other democracies); and the system level (whether an increase in the democratic peace translates into an increase in world peace). The chapter also reviews the explanatory models that attribute the existence of peaceful relations among democracies to regime type.

Chapter four sketches the manifestations of the information era in society. It contextualises the information era by describing the eras preceding it and then briefly outlines the technological developments that led to the information revolution. To explain the different conclusions that scholars come to when they analyse the impact of IT on society, the chapter draws on the philosophy of technology. Theories such as utopianism, instrumentalism, social constructivism and the political economy of IT are examined. An integrated approach is used to explore the seemingly contradictory trends that characterise the world of the information era. Although people are virtually integrated into a global village through the globalisation of markets, transportation and media, there are trends of cultural and economical fragmentation. In exploring the impact of IT on space, hierarchy and the basis of wealth, the chapter provides the background and justification for an evaluation of the prospects for democracy, the democratic peace and world peace given the advent of the information era.

Chapter five explores the prospects for democracy in the information era. The extent to which IT can be employed to spread democratic norms and establish democratic institutions is examined to determine the impact of IT on democratisation and democratic consolidation. In this regard, the interaction between individuals across the globe made possible by IT and in turn creating a global citizenry, global public spheres and a global civil society becomes a central theme of the chapter. The aspects that can off-set the benefits for democracy, such as the use of IT by governments to oppress citizens and breach their rights to privacy and freedom of speech or by corporations for the sole purpose of maximising profits, are also explored. In terms of the latter, the chapter elucidates the debate between political economists and cyberlibertarians about the benefits of leaving control of the Internet to markets alone. This is in essence a question of Internet governance and the compromise contest among states, the private sector and civil society groups over control of the Internet.
Finally the chapter turns to the digital divide and the extent to which unequal access to IT inhibits democracy in the information era.

Chapter six evaluates the democratic peace, given the opportunities for democracy in the information era. It goes about doing this in two ways, first in a logical deductive way by arguing that the information revolution is likely to enhance democracy and because democracies do not make war with one another, world peace will be enhanced. This approach is however based on a definition of war as interstate conflict and world peace as the absence of interstate conflict. Thus defined, the relevance of the democratic peace is questioned, because war in the information era is no longer confined to interstate conflict. Hence, the chapter sets out to outline the changing nature of war in the information era (so-called post-modern war) and to reinterpret the democratic peace along reflectivist lines so as to provide an approach to prevent post-modern war.

Chapter seven presents the final analysis, conclusions and recommendations of the study by sketching a transformation scenario of the democratic peace in the information era. The realisation of the basic aim and objectives of the research efforts is assessed as well as the problem areas that may reduce the value of the study.

8. CONCLUSION

World peace has been a salient research issue since the inception of International Relations as a field of study. As the world changes, the prospects for world peace change and this means that approaches to world peace need to be re-evaluated from time to time. The advent of the information era provides a research opportunity for the re-evaluation of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace. In this chapter the grounds and boundaries of such a research effort were outlined as well as the methodology that will be employed throughout the course of the study.

Based on the premise that IT impacts on democracy, the study aims to explore the likelihood of a pax democratica in the information era. This involves not only superimposing the democratic peace as it has hitherto been understood in International Relations on the new circumstances brought about by the information revolution, but going
beyond that. Inasmuch as theories are also constitutive of reality, it is argued that the new context in which the democratic peace is applied also demands a reinterpretation of the democratic peace as such. In the next chapter the theoretical perspectives underlying some of the most prominent approaches to peace are examined including the democratic peace. This serves not only to demarcate the democratic peace theoretically, but also lays the groundwork for theoretically expanding the idea of democratic peace to a more appropriate approach to peace in the information era later in the study.
CHAPTER 2

APPROACHES TO WORLD PEACE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

1. INTRODUCTION

War and peace have been central concepts in International Relations to the extent that the discipline is often organised around them. Waltz (1959) in *Man, the state and war: Perspective on the causes of war* categorises International Relations theories in terms of what he regards as the main cause of war: human nature, the character of the state or the structure of the world order. Gabriel (1994) distinguishes between realist and idealist theories where the former regards war between nations as the norm and the latter regards peace as the norm. Morgenthau (1973:379) explains this preoccupation with war and peace by stressing that the spiritual, moral, intellectual and political preoccupation with the creation of a peaceful world started to converge in the nineteenth century and culminated in theory and practice during the period between the two world wars. It is during this period that International Relations was born.

In International Relations war and peace are often regarded as two sides of the proverbial coin. Peace is ‘nonwar’ in its negative sense and in its positive sense, the conscious effort of engaging in processes of co-operation and integration between major human groups (or states) that will maintain the state of ‘nonwar’. Preconditions for peace are thus preceded by a discussion of the causes of war. What are seen as the causes of war will inform the approach taken to reach world peace. This chapter aims to outline the different approaches toward world peace as well as the worldviews or theoretical perspectives framing these approaches. This is done to provide a cognitive map of International Relations theory, which will serve as a reference point for introducing the democratic peace, the main focus of this dissertation, as one of the approaches to world peace.

2. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND APPROACHES TO PEACE

For much of the 1970s and 1980s International Relations has been trapped in the so-called third great debate of International Relations theory, namely the interparadigm debate.
Whereas the first debate, that is idealism versus realism, was mainly philosophical and political in nature and the second debate, that is behavioralism versus traditionalism, was mainly methodological, the third debate can be defined as ontological. It is ontological inasmuch as it concerns the nature of the discipline and centres around three “incommensurable paradigms” – realism, liberalism (also referred to as pluralism or idealism) and radicalism (also referred to as Marxism/socialism). The third debate differed from the debates preceding it inasmuch as the three paradigms were not rival in the Kuhnian sense of paradigmatic revolutions. Instead of one paradigm becoming more popular than the other and persisting as the new dominant paradigm until it is replaced by another, the nature of the competition between realism, liberalism and radicalism can be described as incommensurable. The idea of incommensurability is best explained by Waever (1996:155), who writes: “In the first two debates, it was expected that one side would eventually win and International Relations would evolve as a coherent discipline in the winning camp. In the third debate, one increasingly got the self-conception that the discipline was the debate. ‘International relations’ was this disagreement, not a truth held by one of the positions. Each saw a side of reality that was important but could only be told from its perspective, no: translated into the other two, nor subsumed in some grand synthesis.” In this sense the three schools of the interparadigm debate also inform different approaches to peace, which will be outlined here.

Realism, as forged by classic philosophers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau and built upon by Carr, Waltz and Morgenthau, holds the following view of the world. World politics is a ‘jungle’ reflecting a state of war. This state of war does not imply continuous or constant wars, but rather the constant possibility of war. The causes of war, whether attributable to human nature, the character of states, the international system or a mixture of all three, require ‘realpolitik’ (or power politics) from state behaviour. Thus, states should be self-interested, prepare for war and calculate balances of power (Doyle 1997:18). In the realist worldview, states are the pre-eminent actors and their sovereignty is second to none. Survival is the supreme national interest to which all political leaders must yield. All other objectives, such as economic prosperity, are secondary. To survive, the state can only rely on itself. No other state or institution can guarantee survival (Dunne 1997:119). Although realists share these propositions, they are divided on a number of
issues, for example the level of analysis, which leads to differing conclusions about the causes of war, the prospects for war and peace and the approaches toward attaining peace.

Doyle (1997:44) distinguishes between four strands of realism on a level-of-analysis basis, namely complex realism (Thucydides), fundamentalism (Machiavelli), structuralism (Hobbes) and constitutionalism (Rousseau). Complex realism as promulgated by Thucydides attributes equal importance to human nature, domestic society (the state) and the international system in explaining the state of war that characterises the realists’ world view. This is best illustrated in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta where the character of individual leaders, the features of the city states and the balance of power existing between them contributed to the origin and eventually the end of the war (Thucydides 1985:22-26). Fundamentalist, structuralist and constitutionalist realism constitute the modern strands of realism and they each emphasise one level of analysis over the other.

Machiavelli bases his explanation for the state of war fundamentally on the leader, citizen or subject and the ambitions, fears and interests held by these individuals. It is thus inherent in human nature to be power-seeking and this is extended onto the state level and eventually onto the inter-state level. Leaders (‘princes’), because they are ambitious and feel threatened by other individuals’ power-seeking behaviour, will engage in aggrandisement and expansion and this will threaten other states’ security, creating a security dilemma and threatening peace (Machiavelli 1986:30). Even republican states, for fear of enslavement and protection of civil liberties will choose to rule rather than be oppressed. Because other states are perceived to have similar preferences, states prepare for imperial expansion. The real cause of war is human nature and the way states deal with the state of war is a Darwinian ‘survival of the fittest’ approach. Although fundamentalists promote imperialism as an approach to peace, Machiavelli had some insights to spare on strategic balance of power, emphasising the role of statesmen in making strategic alliances that will enhance their prestige and may make the difference between victory and defeat in war (Machiavelli 1986:31; Doyle 1997:108).

Morgenthau (1973:9) too asserts that politics have their roots in human nature. Therefore the struggle for power, whether ‘disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional
safeguards as in Western democracies or untamed and barbaric', results in man dominating
man (and state dominating state). But he also acknowledges that stability and peace can be
achieved if the conditions for a balance of power are constructed, an approach most
commonly found among structural realists.

Structural realism, which is the dominant contemporary strand of realism, has its roots in
the work of Hobbes. Hobbes' assumptions about the nature of humans – being rational but
also envious and egoist – and their behaviour under conditions of anarchy underlie his
explanation of why people create sovereign states. Under conditions of international
anarchy these states maintain a state of war because there is no effective international law or
morality (Hobbes 1986:206). Sovereigns of states are in continual competition for goods,
fear of attack and struggle for prestige and these factors, competition, fear and glory, are
reasons for conflict and possibly war. By analogy the state of war is similar to the state of
nature that individuals endure before they create the Leviathan, the state. But, because
states are less vulnerable than individuals in the state of nature, states have less of an
incentive to establish a global Leviathan to ensure global peace (Dunne 1997:113).
International insecurity and thus the state of war continue. Moreover, because there is no
global source of law and order, states have to provide their own security and because states
are similar in this quest, they can be treated like rational unitary (sovereign) and
homogenous actors. The approach to peace following from structuralism is the balance of
power.

The balance of power approach to peace assumes four elements, namely:

- international anarchy where the security of states is interdependent inasmuch as they are
  affected by one another. In the absence of a world government, states have to opt for
  self-help to guarantee their own security;
- states are coherent units, functionally similar in their ends (rational egoist), albeit not in
  their capabilities;
- because of the system of self-help, security and estimations of power are relative; and
- a rational system of estimating power is possible, which means that statesmen can weigh
  the balance at any given time (Doyle 1997:135).
Given these elements, states will form balances of power. These balances of power are the sets of relationships that result from states’ efforts to maximise their security in relation to other states’ power. The balancing act includes methods such as divide and rule, compensations, acquiring arms, and making alliances and alignments. Whenever the balance of power is disturbed either by an external force or a change in one of the units composing it, the tendency is to re-establish the old equilibrium or create a new equilibrium (Morgenthau 1973:168, 178-181).

The balance of power as an approach to peace is embedded in what Gabriel (1994) refers to as an anarchical realist world view. Gabriel (1994:12-17) distinguishes between hierarchical and anarchical world views based on their orientation toward social organisation. Hierarchy and anarchy are structural terms juxtaposing vertical super- and subordination against horizontal co-ordination. Anarchic realism sees the anarchical system as a whole, which is the sum of its parts. Although power is all-important, the object is not to maximise it, but rather to prevent the maximisation of power by any one unit. Power has to be evenly distributed. In reality power hardly ever is evenly distributed and therefore it is up to great powers to discipline themselves for they can either challenge the equilibrium or they can preserve it and in choosing to do the latter preserve stability and peace (Gabriel 1994:161-162).

The development and use of nuclear weapons have changed the calculations of the balance of power in profound ways. The crude destructiveness of these weapons as demonstrated at the end of World War II has cultivated the realisation that nuclear war avoidance is the top priority. The ‘value’ of these weapons is not their use, but their threat potential. The concept of deterrence is thus introduced into the balance of power, which becomes a balance of terror. The fear of assured destruction that each nuclear weapon state poses for the other will prevent them from engaging in hostilities that may lead to nuclear exchange and mutual destruction (Lovell 1974:13). Deterrence, if it is to be successful in avoiding war, requires the successful mixture of seeming willingness and unwillingness to use nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapon states have an overly peaceful image, deterrence fails because their willingness to use nuclear weapons if under threat is not credible. If the state has an overly belligerent image, it may seem eager to use nuclear weapons and induce a pre-emptive
strike, resulting in a nuclear war (Gabriel 1994:96, 97). Attempting to find the exact mix for credible deterrence led to a nuclear arms race between the United States (US) and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. A nuclear balance of power came to exist among the five states that tested nuclear weapons before 1968 (the so-called nuclear weapon states). This balance (and efforts to maintain it at lower levels of nuclear armament) is now jeopardized by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states such as India and Pakistan (overtly) and probably Israel (covertly) as well as the US’ intention to build a national missile defence system.

Constitutionalist realism as devised by Rousseau also assumes the state of war, but more than structuralist and fundamentalist realism, finds the roots for war in the constitution of states (Doyle 1997:140). When the poor are deceived into agreeing to a social contract that will secure the privileges of the rich, the product is a corrupt state. Abusing the power that state structures award, the domestically powerful will wage wars for their own interests such as territory, slaves, money, glory and religion. To overcome the corruption a democratic revolution has to occur. Citizens would swear allegiance to each other and make laws that will encompass the General Will (or the national interest). Wars would only be fought in the national interest and not for the whims of the political elite. Unfortunately this does not necessarily mean annihilation of the state of war, because states’ national interests are not always compatible. Nationalism should therefore not be extreme, but purely rational and democratic. Even this kind of national reform may not be sufficient to prevent certain countries from going to war, but at least it does provide options to countries. Two of these options (and approaches to peace) are isolationism and non-provocative defence.

Neither isolationism nor autarky is a viable policy option in today’s highly interdependent world. Non-provocative defence, as Rousseau proposed for Poland, implied cultivating patriotic participation in public life and a nationalism that would neither threaten other states, nor make Poland attractive. The militia army would not be able to engage in long-distant conquest, but would be able to defend Poland on homeground. Rousseau warned against interdependence. Transnational ties increase the political, social and economic foundations for a balance of power but exacerbate conflict, because they establish more points of contact (Doyle 1997:141-151). Constitutionalist realism thus emphasises domestic societies, the heterogeneity or homogeneity of states in the international system, their
societal strengths and weaknesses and the international system’s toleration of transnational regimes as rules of order and sources of co-operation and conflict.

Gilpin’s (1981) theory of hegemonic change is a modern-day version of constitutional realism. According to his theory the international system is governed by empires, hegemonies or great powers and the state of war is tamed by rules and regimes forming an underlying hierarchy that supports the dominating power. The US has typically played the role of a hegemon dominating the international system after the World Wars. This is best illustrated by the international economic system, established by the Bretton Woods Conference, which reflects the interests of the US and creates the hierarchy necessary for the US to fulfil its role. Stability in Gilpin’s theory is thus not the result of balancing power in an anarchical setting, but the outcome of domination by a hegemon in a hierarchical order. The state of war is, however, not eliminated, because the cost for the hegemon to expand its rule over time yields diminishing returns and eventually subordinate states challenge the hegemon, resulting in hegemonic wars (Doyle 1997:154-156; Gabriel 1994:88-94). This is a cyclical process where great powers rise and fall and new phases are introduced by war.

Hegemony as an approach to peace is a realist hierarchical theory in terms of Gabriel’s classification of International Relations theories. In other words, unlike anarchic realist theories, states are not seen as essentially equal. Some states are stronger than others and these states will emerge as the hegemons.

The end of the Cold War was initially seen as a refutation to realists who predicted the continuance of a bipolar system and the state of war. As war in the Balkans escalated though, the euphoria accompanying the end of the Cold War soon abated and realist claims that war is probable and normal gained renewed strength (Dunne 1997:119). In terms of a peace plan for the post-Cold War era, realists proposed theories of a “Global Policeman” (the US) in stride with global hegemonic strategies and alternatively the replacement of the bipolar system with a multipolar system. Domestic politics have, however, not allowed the US to play the role of world hegemon to the extent that peace can be guaranteed. Multipolarity, on the other hand, is widely considered a cause of World War I. Furthermore, constitutionally inspired realists such as Huntington (1993) warn against a
clash of civilisations where religions will again cause states to rise up against one another. For many scholars the end of the Cold War and the opportunities that technological progress have brought about open the door for more “ambitious” approaches to peace as suggested by liberalism (Doyle 1997:473).

The liberal approach to world politics is firmly rooted in an optimistic view of human nature. Although humans are not perfect, they are capable of being educated. In other words, humans have the potential of being reasonable, informed, non-violent and in control of their passions. The relationship between humans and the state is dictated by individuals’ superiority to states. Individuals are always more important than the collective, which they only form to serve their interests (Gabriel 1994:149). The essential principle in liberal thought is therefore individual freedom. This includes, on the one hand, freedom from the arbitrary use of force by the state, translated into freedoms such as the freedom of speech, of movement, of association and of conscience. On the other hand, it includes social rights such as equality in education and health care that will protect and expand the potential for freedoms to be exercised. The guarantee of these sets of rights and freedoms lies in democratic participation and representation (Doyle 1997:207).

The optimistic view of human nature is extended to the international realm. Unlike realist approaches to peace, which assume a state of war, liberalism concedes only to a heterogeneous state of war and peace, which may even become a state of peace alone. Liberal societies can co-exist in the international system without their relations being dominated by a security motive. When disagreement arises over an issue, this is resolved through international organisation and law, not through war. According to Doyle (1997:211) the liberal view of world politics is grounded in the following assumptions:

- despite existing under conditions of international anarchy, states do not experience a general state of war;
- states are not unitary actors, but can be distinguished on the basis of their orientation towards human rights. There are, thus, liberal and non-liberal, republican and totalitarian, capitalist and communist, fascist and corporatist states. The nature of states will be reflected in their international behaviour; and
• aims of states go beyond security to include the protection and promotion of individual rights.

As is the case with realism, the different liberal approaches to peace can be framed on the basis of their image of world politics. Dunne (1997:148) uses Waltz’s distinction between the causes of war as they relate to man, the state and the international system as levels of analysis, to distinguish among liberal thinkers (see figure 2.1). This framework will be returned to as specific approaches to peace are linked to themes in liberal thought, in this study grouped together under the categories liberal internationalism, idealism and liberal institutionalism.4

Figure 2.1 Liberalism and the causes of war, determinants of peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Images of Liberalism</th>
<th>Public figure/period</th>
<th>Causes of conflict</th>
<th>Determinants of peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First image: Human nature</td>
<td>Richard Cobden (mid-19th Century)</td>
<td>Interventions by governments domestically and internationally disturbing the natural order</td>
<td>Individual liberty, free trade, prosperity, interdependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second image: The state</td>
<td>Woodrow Wilson (early 20th Century)</td>
<td>Undemocratic nature of international politics; especially foreign policy and the balance of power</td>
<td>National self-determination; open governments responsive to public opinion; collective security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third image: The structure of the system</td>
<td>J. A. Hobson (early 20th Century)</td>
<td>The balance of power</td>
<td>A world government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dunne 1997:148

Liberal internationalism is what Burchill (1996:29) refers to as an ‘inside-out’ (or second image) approach to international relations. In other words, liberal internationalists explain

4 These categories are used by Dunne (1997) to distinguish between the varieties of liberalism. It should be noted that there is relatively little uniformity in the way the concepts liberal internationalism, idealism and liberal institutionalism are used with respect to the theorists and ideas incorporated under the headings. With respect to liberal internationalism for example, Burchill (1996), includes Wilson’s ideas on collective security, which is precisely what Dunne (1997) uses to distinguish between idealism and liberal internationalism. While both Burchill and Dunne include the idea of free trade under liberal internationalism, Doyle (1997) addresses it as a separate strand of liberalism, namely commercial pacificism.
the exogenous behaviour of states by examining their endogenous political and economic dispositions. There is a natural order underpinning human society, but it is undermined by undemocratic leaders and consequently there exists between states a state of war. Instead of a balance of power that cannot guarantee a return to a state of peace, but merely reduces the risk of war, liberal internationalists propose that the principles underlying a democratic political system be internationalised. These principles include individual consciousness, republican constitutionalism and a federal contract between citizens. This will lead to a permanent peace treaty of sorts between states to abolish war. Unlike the social contract between the state and citizens this treaty will not establish a government, in this case a world government (Dunne 1997:151). Thus, liberal internationalism promotes anarchical means of maintaining peace. In the absence of hierarchical arrangements, liberal internationalists propose that peace will be cemented by two processes: democracy and free trade.

Democratic processes and institutions will prevent princes, statesmen, soldiers, arms dealers and others of the ruling elite from igniting war for gaining power, while free trade and commerce will break down the artificial barriers between individuals in different states. A familiar theme in liberal international thought is the incompatibility of war and commerce. The contact and communication that international commerce establishes between individuals in different states will unite them in a community and in turn rectify distorted perceptions, so often used in the pursuit of war. Moreover, economic interdependence will decrease the relevance of territorial conquest for states. Trade and co-operation outweigh military competition and territorial control when it comes to what determines the wealth of states. Aggressive behaviour is punished by economic means, which is made possible by interdependence (Burchill 1996: 34, 37).

Idealism, although similar to liberal internationalism in many respects, questions the extent to which peace is the latent order. World War I led liberals to believe that the conditions for peace and prosperity need to be constructed. Woodrow Wilson insisted that an international institution, which will resolve conflicts among states according to democratic processes, must be created to regulate international anarchy. A domestic analogy is thus followed where states become members of an international organisation and are bound by its rules and norms. The League of Nations was to become the first of these organisations,
functioning on the basis of collective security, a liberal approach to peace. Idealists, instead of relying on the natural harmony between the interests of states that will come about through democracy and free trade, favour a hierarchical approach. This approach is also normative inasmuch as it focuses not only on what is, but also on what ought to be (Dunne 1997:152).

Liberal institutionalism, responding to the failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War II, shifted the focus to other international institutions, most notably the United Nations (UN), and transnational co-operation to maintain peace and security. Integration theories, which presume the gradual expansion of transnational co-operation, were formulated as the faith in states' ability to maintain peace diminished. These theories underlie regional institutions such as the European Union (EU), and other international organisations. Liberal institutionalists also emphasise pluralism and the importance of other actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (among which transnational corporations (TNCs)), individuals and interest groups. Accompanying these new actors on the international scene are novel patterns of interaction that no longer reflect a billiard ball (statecentric) international system, but a cobweb (multicentric) system (Wæver 1996:152).

From the various strands of liberalism a number of approaches to peace can be deduced. As will be indicated some of the approaches lean toward a particular strand of liberalism, while others draw from all the strands discussed above. An approach that typically crosses the borders of strands of liberalism is the peaceful settlement of disputes. This approach assumes that though war is a tool to settle disputes, it is an inappropriate one that does not suit the moral quality of humans but of animals. Therefore institutions should be developed to make available a variety of other means of resolving conflict peaceably and parties to a dispute should be persuaded, if not forced, to use these substitutes for violent means of dispute resolution. The UN Charter lists these means in Article 33(1) as "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements". The UN has gone to great lengths to institutionalise these means through the pacifying efforts of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. The UN is, however, often discredited as a forum for resolving disputes for two reasons. Firstly, the five permanent members of the Security Council have been deeply entrenched in Cold War antagonism, which became their focus instead of conciliation. Secondly, the
members of the General Assembly often use this body as an amplifier for their disputes and a way to register their political victories rather than seeking conciliation (Claude 1956:245, 246).

Judicial means of pacifying relations between states are based on international law, which is codified in numerous treaties and in international and domestic judicial decisions. Although international law is generally observed, it does not provide a foolproof guarantee against war (Morgenthau 1973:272). Claude (1954:248) concludes that “the experience of the great international organizations of this century does not reveal the incapacity of collective agencies for the settlement of disputes, but rather the inadequacy of the settlement of disputes as a means to world peace.” Some disputes, being symptomatic of the irrationalities of power politics, are beyond settling through peaceful means.

In the absence of a complete commitment by all states to pacific settlement devices, liberals propose an alternative approach, namely collective security. In essence collective security presupposes a collective commitment from all members to defend any one member if attacked, no matter which state the aggressor may be (Doyle 1997:168). War will thus be prevented because would-be aggressors will be deterred from aggression by the assured reprisal of not only the victim and states traditionally hostile to them, but by all members of the international system, even allies (Lovell 1974:16). It is important not to confuse this approach with military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), where two or more states engage in joint military action in the case of a crisis. Collective security is also not an enforcement mechanism for the whole body of international law. It is a last resort when peaceful settlement fails or when a warning against violence from the international community is ignored and force is used in an arbitrary and aggressive manner. Collective security is similar to the balance of terror inasmuch as it is built upon deterrence. However, it differs from the balance of terror to the extent that it requires a positive commitment to the value of world peace by the majority of (if not all) states. Breaches of peace should be seen as affecting not only the victims, but the whole system. It also requires on the one hand power diffusion, which means that ideally no single state can grow so strong that the system cannot deter it from aggressive behaviour successfully. On the other hand, collective security requires organisational comprehensiveness, which means that all
states should be regarded as potential victims and aggressors and be assured of protection or collective reprisal (Claude 1954:255-265).

The theory of collective security has been compromised by the failure of the League of Nations. Its failure can mainly be attributed to three factors, namely a power distribution that favoured the victors of World War I, the US choosing not to be included in the system and states being unwilling to forego their own national interests on the grounds of principle. To this can be added the difficulty of identifying the ‘aggressor’ in a conflict, a difficulty surfacing during the Vietnam War (Lovell 1974:17). The UN also had to contend with Cold War fault lines, which paralysed collective security in the Security Council. It was hoped that the end of the Cold War would revive Wilsonian ideas, and for a brief moment the Gulf War was seen as precisely that. Closer analysis indicates, however, that the Gulf War was to a great extent an American effort (Dunne 1997:153). Furthermore, if peacekeeping – which is rooted in the philosophy of collective security – serves as a barometer of the UN’s ability to provide collective security, it can be said that collective security is in deep crisis.\(^5\)

Unlike the head-on approaches to peace that have been discussed above, liberalism also grounds what Lovell (1974:18,19) refers to as a functional approach to peace. This approach involves the expansion of international linkages established for the reasons of mutual self-interest. Functional co-operation in spheres such as science, and telecommunication will eventually achieve a world community where the level of integration is so high that war is unthinkable. The EU, although regionally based, is an example of a manifestation of this approach. The conditions for inclusion in the EU are, however, indicative of the criticism of the functional approach, namely that economic disparities between states inhibit integration between states and instead promote cultural and economic domination. The role of TNCs in world politics is also considered more of a destabilising factor than a source of peace (an aspect that will subsequently be discussed). Lastly, the economic integration, which characterised Anglo-German relations before World War I, did not prevent these states from making war (Dunne 1997:151).

\(^5\) Since the end of the Cold War collective measures, including humanitarian intervention, have been taken in numerous cases. The success of these measures is questionable, most notably in cases such as Somalia and Rwanda. What has become of greater concern for collective security proponents, is the “notorious selectiveness” of the Security Council, which seems to suggest that Western powers, especially the US, is using the UN umbrella for its own interests (Malanczuk 1997:427).
Related to the idea of establishing a world community, is the notion of a pacific union of democratic states. This approach, traditionally underpinned by liberal internationalism, is based on the idea and observation that democratic countries do not go to war with one another because their politically similar institutions and norms are reciprocally perceived to favour peaceful resolution of disputes. It is therefore argued that if more states convert to democracy, more states will observe peaceful relations among themselves, thus expanding the pacific union. Although democracies keep the peace among themselves, they are just as war-prone as non-democracies when confronted with relations outside the pacific union (Doyle 1986:264). Furthermore, in the quest for a pacific union, democracies have at times engaged in war to make the world safe for democracy. Although the democratic peace is an anarchical approach to international organisation, it also draws from idealism, especially the work of Woodrow Wilson, whose ideas can be interpreted to go beyond creating a world community to creating a world government (Dunne 1997:152).

The idea of establishing a world government is based on similar arguments as establishing a world community, but propagates the creation of concrete political institutions on the international level. It is not left to functional co-operation to create a world community, but the formation of institutions that can override the sovereignty of states is necessary. A world government can take many forms, whether an empire, such as the Roman Empire or in the form of the UN Security Council. The cost of maintaining cultural diversities, individual rights and achieving the social change necessary to achieve world government seems to outweigh the plausibility of such an approach at least for the present (Lovell 1974:20, 21).

More recent idealist thought contends that democratisation of state structures should be accompanied by democratisation of international institutions. A ‘cosmopolitan model democracy’ should be constructed by creating regional parliaments (according to the EU model), entrenching human rights conventions in national parliaments and monitoring them through a new International Court of Justice and reforming the UN into or replacing it by a truly democratic and accountable global parliament. Also associated with idealism is the emancipatory role of global civil society that will become much greater in democratising institutions on the national and international levels (Dunne 1997:158).
The initial optimism for liberal approaches to peace that accompanied the end of the Cold War has been met by discrediting phenomena. Firstly, post-Cold War conflicts such as those in Somalia, Rwanda, Chechnya and the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan, and the inability to resolve these conflicts in a timely manner, has led to a reassertion of realist claims. Secondly, liberalism is often interpreted as favouring modernisation in the Western sense. Western culture is thus universalised with no heed paid to ethnic, linguistic and religious differences between nations (Dunne 1997:162). Thirdly, the spread of free trade and liberal economic principles has not led to equality between nations. It seems as if the gap between the developed and developing worlds is growing and the social ills of poverty and environmental degradation are fertile ground for local conflicts with the potential of spilling across borders (Tehranian 1999b:8). It is especially the latter point that informs the third world view or paradigm of the interparadigm debate in International Relations, namely that of socialism discussed here under radical approaches to peace.

The third paradigm of the interparadigm debate is often labelled globalism to refer to the global capitalist world economy. Other designations such as structuralism, to indicate the structured super- and subordination of the world order, and Marxism or socialism are also widely used. Wæver (1996:154), however, labels it radicalism and in doing so leaves room for non-Marxist perspectives and residual writings of the 1970s and 1980s, for example post-modernism, feminism and critical theory. These theories do not resort under realism, liberalism or Marxism but take the same positions vis-à-vis realism and liberalism as Marxism does.

Marxist socialist approaches to war and peace are based on a perspective of world politics as interclass solidarities and interclass war both within and between countries. Although socialists agree with liberals that domestic interests determine the political character of states, in turn influencing the foreign policy of states (inside-out approach), they disagree that this is a result of any consensus on domestic political regime. Instead, they emphasise that a 'war' between classes within and across national boundaries exists. The evolution of socialism, inasmuch as it is a world revolution, demands that workers around the world unite in the struggle that will bring about socialism. Alternatively, when the bourgeoisie of
one country makes war against another, the proletariat should resist it in solidarity with the workers of the other country who can only suffer under a bourgeois war (Doyle 1997:334).

Marx held that countries with similar modes of production will maintain fraternal relations. The development of the bourgeoisie, free trade, uniformity of conditions of life and so forth may lead capitalist societies to peaceable relations among themselves, a familiar liberal internationalist assertion. War would prove too costly an enterprise for the bourgeoisie and the military may even revolt against a bourgeois war over competition for profits. This is, however, a tentative peace that cannot be guaranteed. The only true peace is the peace that will come to exist among socialists when the proletariat has been liberated in all countries. For Marx the source of war is thus class exploitation and his approach to peace is democratic revolution (Doyle 1997:336).

For Lenin, on the other hand, peace cannot come about without war. Because leading elements of the working class are bribed by the financial oligarchy, which dominates industry and the state in the final monopoly stage of the evolution of capitalism, Marx’s democratic revolution is precluded. Furthermore, the uneven development between capitalist societies will drive them to war, in turn weakening the imperialist state to the extent that the vanguard of communists can lead the revolution and establish peaceful relations with other revolutionary states (Doyle 1997:366, 367). In other words, Lenin sees monopoly competition and uneven development between states as the sources of war. His strategy for peace entails both war and revolution.

Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) world system theory finds its roots in Marxist thought. According to Wallerstein the world capitalist order incorporates three layers of states, namely core (industrialised, developed, rich) states, periphery (underdeveloped, poor) states and semi-periphery (intermediate) states. World system theory is based on the premise that the rich and the powerful prosper at the expense of the poor and the destitute. War and other international political events cannot be explained without reference to global capitalism. Core states have far greater military capability than periphery states and use this to maintain the structure of the world system, in other words, to make the world safe for capitalism. The most obvious example in this respect is the US intervention in Guatemala in 1954 to
lost the democratically elected government in favour of a military dictatorship so as to maintain US commercial interests (Hobden & Wyn Jones 1997:138).

The structure of the world capitalist system is maintained through the use of hegemonic leadership and military force, semi-peripheral states, the *comprador* class within peripheral states and geoculture. The stability of this structure is, however, still undermined by the following factors. Economically, the problem of recurrent depression that is associated with capitalism can no longer be overcome by capitalist expansion, because geographically the world economy has already expanded globally. Commodification and urbanisation, the two ways of intensifying capitalism, have also seen almost global completion. Thus, it is becoming more difficult to avert depression. A second economic source of instability is related to the environment and the devastating effect that centuries of capitalist accumulation has had on it. Environmental disasters and resource wars will become more widespread and the market does not provide an incentive to deal with this problem proactively. Politically, inequalities and environmental degradation due to world capitalism have fuelled opposition toward the world system. Opposition groups are termed anti-systemic movements. In the past it has been possible to co-opt these groups and incorporate them into the system through social welfare programmes, giving them enough of a stake to be dependent on the continuation of the world system. It is, however, becoming increasingly difficult for states to co-opt these groups, not only because it will undermine the process of capital accumulation, but also because the nature of these groups is changing. They realise that controlling state power is no longer sufficient to oppose the system and therefore do not organise as disciplined political parties within the political system, but as loosely organised, decentralised coalitions (Hobden & Wyn Jones 1997:140-141). These groups differ in their approach – some are violent and called international terrorist groups, others are less or non-violent such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Seattle (1999) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank protesters in Washington (2000).

The world system is also facing instability as a result of the decline of liberalism, in Wallerstein’s view the only ideology that provides for the continuous reinforcement of the state system. This is because liberalism sees the state as the only mechanism of creating a better society and does not appeal to any notion of society beyond the state system. Anti-systemic groups are cutting themselves loose from this notion. Scientism, the second aspect
of geoculture that Wallerstein emphasises as a stabilising force of the world system, is also being questioned. The manipulation of the material world that led to the discovery of universal laws impacted on production processes and became a re-enforcement for capital accumulation. The idea of absolute truths is challenged, most notably by natural scientists, and this contributes to the crisis of the world system (Hobden & Wyn Jones 1997:139, 142). Although Wallerstein’s world system theory does not convert into specific approaches to world peace, it does provide an alternative world view that can be used to evaluate other approaches to peace. It highlights important factors, such as inequality, poverty, and the sometimes, ruthless nature of capitalist accumulation. Although often negated by approaches to peace, these factors intensify wars and endanger peace processes.

The challenge that is posed to scientism introduces a fourth debate in International Relations theory, namely that of rationalist versus reflectivist theories. This debate was initiated around 1980 when writers such as Waltz (1979), Gilpin (1981), Cox (1981) and Ashley (1984) relaunched an attempt to achieve a more ‘scientific’ realism, which became known as neo-realism. The neo-realist shift entailed doing away with ethico-philosophical positions and imprecise statements on the nature of life and politics in general. It involved self-limination to exact statements that can be tested through developing theory and engaging in empirical study. A similar process of minimising general interpretations to precise questions followed in liberalism. This resulted in the transformation of liberalism into neo-liberal institutionalism, which concentrated on answering the question ‘how institutions affect incentives facing states’. Reducing liberalism to this question meant moving closer to neo-realism inasmuch as it accepted the state system and international anarchy as basic premises of international relations. The fact that both neo-realism and neo-liberalism now searched for more rational, anti-metaphysical approaches to research made them more compatible and less incommensurable. This process is commonly referred to as the neo-neo synthesis and it involves an opening of the debate between realism and liberalism to the extent that they can be compared and even tested against one another (Wæver 1996:162-164).

Theories that reject the positivism associated with the neo-neo synthesis are labelled reflectivist theories. These theories are constitutive as opposed to explanatory theories, because they do not see the world as external to theories. Reality is constructed through the
theories and language that are chosen to interpret world politics. Reflectivist theories are also anti-foundational, because they are premised on the idea that truth claims cannot be judged against any neutral or objective procedure. This epistemological position acknowledges that all knowledge has a measure of subjectivity and relativity to it. Theories resorting in this cadre are post-modernism, feminist theory, normative theory, critical theory and historical sociology (Smith 1997:167-168). Instead of outlining each of these theories some of the central themes of reflectivist theories and their value in providing an alternative view on war and peace, will be highlighted.

Reflectivist theories take a strong stance against the ‘certainty’ of rationalist theories and the belief that universal laws govern politics. They argue that international relations, especially power politics and institutions, such as states, that make up international relations are affected by ideas. In other words, states and anarchy are not given realities in world politics, but they are socially constructed. According to critical theory and historical sociology they are constructed through interpretations that are time and space bound and should not be elevated to universal truths. This critique is shared by post-modernists, illustrated in their challenge to the realist narrative of Thucydides’s Melian Dialogue. Thucydides is transformed into a caricatured precursor of conservative scientism by realists who present him as a scholar trying to invoke a universalised, a-historical truth about interstate conduct, instead of a classical scholar searching for “contextually appropriate practical-normative standards of just conduct and institutional worth” (Alker in George 1994:193).

Post-modernism sees ideas and discourse as the ‘software’ that informs actions. History is in this sense a series of interpretations imposed upon interpretations of the world. Realism for example, with its emphasis on power politics and the discourse about security dilemmas, encourages behaviour that focuses on security competition. This is clearly evident in the nuclear arms race where a discourse was started that involved “thinking about the unthinkable”, that is thermo-nuclear war. The perceptions based on the interpretation of what constituted security, as well as enemies and the threats they posed induced nuclear

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6 *Thinking about the unthinkable* was the title of a book by Herman Kahn (1960, 1962) who also authored *On thermonuclear war*. Kahn’s analysis and his insistence on thinking through nuclear warfare is widely criticised as bordering on an intellectual game.
weapons stockpiling that in retrospect seems irrational. Replacing a discourse of power politics with a discourse of peace and harmony will be as good as a change of ‘software’. The new discourse involves emphasising normative values and issues, such as human security that is not accounted for in military statistics and have been ignored by traditional approaches to peace (Baylis 1997:205, 206).

Standpoint feminist theory also emphasises a more contextual and multi-dynamic approach of national and international security. Moral command cannot be separated from political action. By focusing on order realism favours power and control as morally superior to justice and the satisfaction of basic needs, a typically masculine interpretation of power. This does not mean that power is an unimportant element of world politics, but the definition of power as domination needs to be replaced by a more dynamic interpretation of the concept, for example the possibility of collective empowerment. Although states do not ascribe to a universal morality, common moral elements should be found to de-escalate conflict and build an international community (Tickner 1988:430-431).

Rationalist and reflectivist theories have the same measure of incommensurability that characterised the interparadigm debate inasmuch as their versions of the key issues of world politics differ. Reflectivists reject not only the identities that rationalists accept as given, but also the very fact that they accept them as given. The epistemological and methodological gap between the two camps makes discourse between them difficult. It is argued that social constructivism can bridge the gap between rationalist and reflectivist theories. Social constructivists accept the centrality of states and anarchy in international relations on the premise that they are not a given, but constructed and can be made different. They believe that it is the interaction between states that causes states’ identities and their behaviour. This self-perpetuating process of intersubjectivity is what leads to the self-help system that seems to be dominating the international system (Smith 1997:183-185). Whether this is a sufficiently intermediate position to allow a bridge between rationalist and reflectivist theories, is debatable, but it does underline an alternative approach to peace.

This approach agrees with reflectivist theories that greater international security can be achieved by changing the way scholars and policy makers think of international relations. The structure of self-help that realism takes as a given in world politics is nothing more than
a system of social relationships based on worst-case assumptions about the actors in the international system. However, the logic of reciprocity also provides a positive outcome. Mutual reassurance between states, such as the perception of the rule of law, co-operation and restraint creates a different set of understandings, expectations and knowledge about other actors, which can induce peaceful social change (Baylis 1997:204, 205). The end of the Cold War was induced by the ideas that Gorbachev introduced in the late 1980s and it stunned scholars to see how easily a change in shared knowledge could bring about the dissolution of a fifty year old institution.

Hence, the rationalist versus reflectivist debate differs from the second great debate in International Relations, namely the behavioralist versus traditionalist debate, in the sense that it is not so much a methodological debate as it is a philosophical debate. It questions the basic assumptions about objectivity, subjectivity, object/subject distinctions, the use of dichotomies, the domination of Western domination over other ways of thought, in short it involves “how one perceives basic articles in the world we live in: language, society, praxis, politics, individuals and such like” (Wæver 1996:157). As such, reflectivists hold that any approach to peace has to start with a change in these basic perceptions.

3. REPOSITIONING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE APPROACH

The positivist streamlining of liberalism that occurred under the auspices of the ‘neo’ movement in International Relations led to the democratic peace approach virtually dominating neo-liberal institutionalism (Dunne 1997:155). The approach lends itself to empirical testing and theory-guiding research. The occurrence of war between democratic dyads can be counted and compared with the number of times that non-democratic dyads, and democratic and non-democratic (mixed) dyads have made war. From this can be inferred whether a pacific union among democracies really exists and if so hypotheses about the reasons why this is the case can be made. These hypotheses can be tested through quantitative methods, such as correlation techniques and qualitative methods, such as case studies. Although the neo-liberal interpretation of the democratic peace approach provides valuable insights for understanding the democratic peace as a phenomenon it is too restrictive for the purposes of this study. This is the case for two reasons, namely:
Theoretical reductionism: The theoretical reductionism that accompanies neo-liberal internationalism undermines the philosophical premises that underlie democratic peace theory. It does not allow for the general Kantian interpretations of human nature as essentially good or universal cosmopolitan morality or normative statements that prescribe a code of conduct for states to establish peace among themselves. It also prohibits the idealism associated with the Wilsonian ideas of democratic peace. It confines the democratic peace to a second image approach to peace. In other words, the emphasis that is placed on the internal character of states assumes an international system where sovereign states are the main actors. It is doubtful whether such an interpretation of the democratic peace will offer the heuristic reach necessary to explain the implications of the globalisation of democracy in the information era.

Theoretical baggage: Liberal internationalism’s emphasis on liberal economic values, such as privatisation and free trade, is theoretical baggage that clouds the usefulness of the democratic peace approach in the information era. Liberal internationalism is often interpreted as neo-imperialism, where liberalisation means nothing but the relentless expansion of capitalism. Illustrative of this interpretation of liberal internationalism in the information era is a critique by Venturelli (1998) against the contradictions between liberal internationalism and the democratisation of nation states in the information society. She writes (1998:81): “Liberalisation of the information infrastructure is one of the most important forces for advancing the political aims of liberal internationalism which predominantly favours the reconstitution of the world system on the basis of large-scale proprietary interests.” The neo-neo synthesis is also part of this baggage as identified by Venturelli (1998:83): “The realist approach to foreign policy is the notion that among societies and states power is the predominant currency and self-interest the predominant motivation. In the late twentieth century it has fully merged with liberal internationalism because of the essential consistency with liberalism’s postulates of competitive private self-interest and the preservation of existing conditions of social power as the basis for the organisation of society.” Universal imperialism manifests itself in liberal international thought, which holds proprietary self-interest as a progressive force that should be exercised through a foreign policy rooted in realist bilateral and multilateral trade and economic arrangements.
Neo-liberalism's emphasis on science and truth, especially in terms of its view of IT, provides a second source of theoretical baggage. It is argued that the universal spread of IT devices will, by virtue of their technological components, transfer decision-making power to individuals. Technological innovation is value-free and thus applicable in all societies irrespective of political constitutions of power, proprietary conditions, culture, religion, or social development. This argument is technologically deterministic and is widely criticised by scholars as overly simplistic and unrealistic (Winner 1997:367).

The democratic peace, if it is to be taken as a viable approach to world peace in the information era, cannot be burdened with theoretical connotations of imperialism and technological determinism. A more appropriate theoretical positioning of the democratic peace approach is not only to acknowledge the philosophical origins of the approach as interparadigm liberal internationalism does, but to go beyond that. The new (and in many ways uncertain) circumstances brought about by the information era, probes a more radical or reflectivist theoretical interpretation of the democratic peace. Such an interpretation would recognise IT as more than just a way to develop "value-free" instruments that will have a liberalising effect regardless of the societal context in which it is deployed. To this extent the various radical theories have much to offer. Socialist theory, for example, may be employed to acknowledge the impact of IT on the global expansion of capitalism and the adverse effects this may have on social democracy and in turn, the pacific union. Social constructivism and its emphasis on shared knowledge, expectations and understandings can be called upon to explain why democracies keep the peace with each other. An historical sociological interpretation may be employed to describe the impact of IT in the history of humankind to the extent that a new era has come about and the implications this may have for the democratic peace. Feminist theory, on the other hand, provides a powerful analogy to evaluate the democratic peace in the information era. The same logic behind feminism's problematising of accepted constructs in international relations to expose its often, masculine foundations can be used to problematise the assumptions associated with democracy and democratic peace in the light of the information era.

A neo-liberal internationalist interpretation of the democratic peace in the information era means introducing IT as an independent variable that influences democracy (the intermediate variable) and in turn world peace (the dependent variable). But the impact of
IT on world politics and daily lives requires a broader approach, namely viewing IT as constitutive of reality. IT transforms the reality of world politics and this process is tainted with ethical and moral considerations. As yet the information era has not spent itself and therefore the world that it makes possible holds contradictory potentials. In this respect the study will draw from normative theory, which allows for the study of both what is and what ought to be and facts and values in a descriptive and prescriptive way. The democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era will not only be studied objectively, but it will subjectively be argued that IT should be employed to enhance democracy and pursue world peace and that this approach is preferred to realist approaches to peace.

4. CONCLUSION

The evolution of International Relations theory is currently in its fourth phase if the discourse of ‘great debates’ as a way of organising International Relations theories is adhered to. The four debates have respectively focused on politics (idealism versus realism), methodology (behavioralism versus traditionalism), ontology (the interparadigm debate) and philosophy (rationalism versus reflectivism). Categorising theories in this way facilitates the construction of a framework of alternative approaches and contributions to thinking about world peace. For example, the interparadigm debate resulted in a triangular model of International Relations theory with the three corners of the triangle respectively labelled realism, liberalism and radicalism. The approaches to peace most commonly associated with realism are imperialism (realist fundamentalism), balance of power (realist structuralism) and isolation, defence and revolution (realist constitutionalism) (Doyle 1997:198). The approaches to peace most commonly associated with liberalism are peaceful settlement of disputes, collective security, functional interdependence, democratic peace, and world government. The approaches most commonly associated with radicalism, in particular socialism are revolution (Marxism) and imperialist war in association with democratic revolution (Leninism) that will lead to a socialist peace. Radicalism also provides theories such as the world system perspective that illuminates structural political-economic sources of war.
The positivist streamlining of realism and liberalism led to theoretical self-limitation, which filtered to the approaches to peace. Constructs such as statesmanship (in the case of realism) and ethics (in the case of liberalism) were replaced by theory-guiding and theory-testing constructs at the neo-neo interface such as regimes, hegemonic stability, alliance theory, co-operation under anarchy and broadened security analysis. Reflectivist theories have entered into the vacuum left by the neo-neo synthesis by emphasising the importance of values, ethics and subjectivity in International Relations. Reflectivist contributions to thinking about peace entail a conscious deconstruction of the discourse and history of institutions to understand the origin and possible solutions to war and maintenance of peace.

Positioning approaches to peace in such a theoretical framework is valuable inasmuch as it provides a cognitive map for comparing different approaches to peace with one another and in doing so identifies the theoretical position of the democratic peace as an approach to peace, the focus of this study. It may, however, also be limiting if it assumes that there are absolute boundaries between theoretical perspectives and their respective variants and that approaches to peace cannot be influenced by more than one theoretical perspective. This criticism is especially prevalent in the case of the democratic peace, traditionally positioned in the realm of liberal internationalism. Although the spread of democracy and free trade that grounds the liberal internationalist approach underlie democratic peace theory, the latter is also informed by Wilsonian ideas, often classified as idealism. Moreover, in the fourth debate the democratic peace approach would seem within the realm of rationalist theories and yet, in the information era reflectivist theories provide valuable ways of interpreting the democratic peace.

In the light of the research problem of this study, namely to evaluate the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era, the liberal internationalist interpretation of the democratic peace will be used to introduce the democratic peace as an approach to world peace. Reflectivist theories will, however, be employed to enrich interpretations of the democratic peace as it applies to the temporal delineation, namely the information era.
CHAPTER 3

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

1. INTRODUCTION

The idea that a world with more democracies will be a more peaceful world is derived from democratic peace theory. According to democratic peace theory democracies will not go to war with one another because democratic forms of regimes have certain characteristics pacifying relations between them. This idea was proposed in 1795 by Immanuel Kant and it was reiterated by Woodrow Wilson during the period of World War I. It is, however, only recently that the theory resurfaced in literature, but this time not as a prescription for perpetual world peace, the sense in which Kant and Wilson intended it, but as an explanation for an empirical fact. In the early 1970s Dean Babst (1972:55) published an article in which he claims “no wars have been fought between nations with elective governments.” Michael Doyle (1983a; 1983b) explained this by drawing on the Kantian prediction that republican states (the equivalent of today’s liberal democratic states) do not make war with one another because their democratic institutions and democratic norms prevent them from doing so. The gradual acceptance of democratic norms by the international community since the end of the Cold War resulted in an abundance of research into “the democratic peace”, as Bruce Russett (1993) has come to call the idea and phenomenon of peace between democracies.

This chapter aims to introduce the democratic peace approach as it has been proposed in theory and has manifested itself in practice. To achieve this aim it will firstly trace the intellectual and philosophical precursors of the idea of a separate peace between democracies with specific reference to Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson. Secondly, it will examine the relationship between democracy and peace at three levels of analysis, namely the dyadic level, the monadic (nation) level and the system level. At the dyadic level the existence of a democratic peace is investigated by asking the question: do democracies usually keep the peace among themselves? At the monadic or nation level, the reasons why the democratic peace exists are explored by asking the question: are

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7 Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) employ the three levels of analysis to study the democratic peace empirically.
democracies inherently more peaceful forms of government? At the system level the implications of the democratic peace for world peace are examined by asking the question: is an international system with a higher proportion of democratic states more peaceful? By answering these questions the plausibility of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace is explored.

2. THE INTELLECTUAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Although the idea that democracies and war are incompatible can be traced to various scholars, the work of Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson offers the best guidance to an understanding of the democratic peace thesis in the sense it is used today.

In an article *Perpetual Peace: A philosophical sketch* (1795) Kant acknowledges that the international state of nature is one of war and that a state of peace needs to be consciously established. In this article, consisting of two main sections, he proposes how such a state of peace can be brought about. In the first section he sets out the preliminary articles for perpetual peace, namely (Kant 1996: 368-370):

- no conclusion of peace shall be considered valid if it was made with secret reservations for future war;
- no independently existing state, whether it be large or small, may be acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift;
- standing armies should gradually be abolished;
- no national debt shall be contracted in connection with the external affairs of the state;
- no state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another; and
- no state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace.

In content, the preliminary articles are reminiscent of modern international norms such as open diplomacy, non-aggression, self-determination, non-intervention, the delineation of lawful means of making war and disarmament (Brown 1992:35). As such, these articles
are like a code of conduct, specifying how actors in the international arena should act in the absence of perpetual peace and if adhered to, this code can guide the international system in the direction of perpetual peace.

In the second section of *Perpetual Peace*, Kant turns his focus to determining the nature of agents (states) that will be law-abiding enough to comply with the preliminary articles. This section contains the three definitive articles for perpetual peace, namely that the civil constitution of every state shall be republican, the right of nations shall be based on a federation of free states and cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality (Kant 1996:371-373).

A republic, as implied by the first definitive article, is a state founded on the rule of law, guaranteed by a constitution and the separation of legislative and executive power. It is further based upon the consent of the governed and represents their will. For this reason republican states can be treated as rational agents, capable of consistent and responsible action and deserving of respect. A republican nature is also desirable for achieving perpetual peace because states with such a nature are less inclined to go to war than despotic states. In this regard Kant (1996:370) states: “Under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing in the world to go to war. For the head of state is not a fellow citizen, but the owner of the state, and war will not force him to make the slightest sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, pleasure palaces and court festivals are concerned.” Thus, republics are conducive to peace because their citizens, the ones carrying the costs of war, need to consent to war, which Kant believes they will not do without great hesitation.

The second definitive article proposes that states leave the international Hobbesian state of nature and war and voluntarily join a federation of free states. This is not a world-state. In fact, Kant emphasises that the member-states of the federation retain their sovereignty. Yet, sovereignty here does not imply sovereignty to make war with other states, since it must be compatible with “the establishment of a pacific federation based on the treaty to abolish war” (Brown 1992:37). The laws governing the states, which enter into the federation will be acknowledged and honoured voluntarily by the states. Among these laws, according to the third definitive article, will be “those guaranteeing the entitlements of individuals as
world citizens – the entitlement not to be treated as enemies, not to be enslaved or exploited by foreign governments” (Thompson 1992:48). It should, however, be clear that this is not a matter of philanthropy, but a right of strangers, as long as they are peaceful, not to be treated with hostility on foreign soil.

According to Brown (1992:35, 36) Kant clarifies the difference between the preliminary and definitive articles in a footnote to this section. Whereas the preliminary articles are a code of conduct for states still in the state of nature, the definitive articles set the stage for the formal institution of peace, which is more than just the absence of war. Instituting peace requires that the state of nature, where citizens of different states live in mutual hostility, will be overcome. This will be achieved by adhering to a constitution albeit a constitution based on the civil right of individuals within a nation, the international right of states in their relationship with one another or cosmopolitan right. In the latter case individuals may be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind because individuals and states coexist in an external relationship of mutual influence.

In this footnote Kant reconciles the two states of nature, the national state of nature, composed of people and the international state of nature, composed of states. In this context Brown (1992:36) writes that “the requirement to establish a legal order, a constitution, applies to both people and states; people are enjoined to create a civil constitution, states a lawful international order and people and states together a system of cosmopolitan Recht.”8 This is then how Kant proposes to solve the inherent conflict between the person’s role as man and citizen and install perpetual peace.

Kant is not a revolutionary for at least two reasons. Firstly, he does not promote the replacement of the state system with a world republic, but wants to transform it in terms of international Recht. Secondly, this transformation is not to take place overnight, but is a gradual process (Brown 1992:39). He outlines this process in the first supplement to Perpetual Peace, stating that “Perpetual Peace is guaranteed by no less an authority than the great artist nature herself”. This supplement is better understood if read together with another of Kant’s work, Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose. Kant

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8 The concept Recht is a German term that can be interpreted to mean something similar to justice, legality and right.
regards the intentions of individuals as not reliably good. Thus, left to the individuals’ own devices, the establishment of perpetual peace is not guaranteed. But, as a part of the natural order, humans learn from their historical experience. At first they formed societies for protection, but soon realised that it could be a source of benefit and eventually societies became moral wholes. In the course of time, states will also become republics as their experience will teach them that this is the best form of government to optimise their benefits and moral well-being. In promoting morality, individuals and states are progressing towards perpetual peace, “they now appreciate the incompatibility between morality and war, they are civilised enough to regard war as unacceptable, and moreover they are in the habit of obeying law” (Thompson 1992:52). Through the gradual development and exercise of being law-abiding, the pacific federation of free states will be able to establish and maintain perpetual peace.

Woodrow Wilson’s idea of a “partnership of democratic nations” to create “a steadfast concert for peace” rests largely on the same premises as those of the Kantian pacific federation of republican states, namely that states should be democratic, that the maintenance of peace rests on a partnership between all democracies and that cosmopolitan right shall be observed. In his address to the US Congress asking for Declaration of War against Germany in 1917, he emphasises that the German people are not to blame for the war but their autocratic government that acts in its own selfish interest, using the German people as pawns and tools. Wars and other acts of aggression towards neighbouring countries are “happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation’s affairs” (Wilson 1996:37). Thus, peace originates in states where people are free to govern themselves, that is in democracies. Democratic nations are then to form a league that will maintain the principles of peace and justice and do this as champions of the right of mankind. The cosmopolitan character of Wilson’s reasoning is even more distinct in his Fourteen Points where he states: “All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest [assuring justice and fair dealings against force and selfish aggression], and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us” (1996:39). The Fourteen Points form a programme for peace based on, among others, the following principles:
• open diplomacy;
• arms reduction to the lowest point that can still guarantee domestic safety;
• freedom of navigation in war and peace outside territorial waters;
• free and fair trade among nations consenting to peace;
• national sovereignty, autonomy, independence and self-determination especially with regard to the colonial and occupied territories of the time; and
• the formation of a general association of nations under specific covenants affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity for small and large states alike.

Similar to Kant’s preliminary articles, Wilson’s Fourteen Points reflect a code of conduct for nations and if adhered to world peace will be the reward. But, unlike Kant, Wilson does not leave the creation and expansion of the pacific federation and adherence to the code of conduct up to nature, but argues that the world should consciously be made safe for democracy even if it takes war against autocratic governments. These wars will not only be fought in protection of existing democracies and the peace among them, but also for “the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its people, the German people included” (Wilson 1996:38). This aggressive pursuit of a democratic peace as opposed to Kant’s gradual approach has been dominating US foreign policy since World War I and therefore it is often argued that Wilson has had a greater impact on contemporary work on the democratic peace than Kant (Ray 1997:50).

In both Kant and Wilson’s blueprints for world peace, three propositions can be delineated, namely firstly that democracies will foster peaceful relations among themselves; secondly that the separate peace which exists between democracies is a result of democratic norms and structures; and thirdly that an international system with a larger proportion of democracies will be more peaceful. These three propositions are also the principal propositions associated with the democratic peace thesis as it is used today. In the next section the first of these propositions is tested against empirical evidence.
3. **PEACE BETWEEN DEMOCRACIES**

The absence of war between democracies has since the early-1980s been regarded by some as "one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalisations that can be made about international relations" (Levy quoted in Brown, Lynr-Jones & Miller 1993:iix). Although there is considerable empirical evidence supporting the propositions that democracies do not go to war with one another, there has been growing criticism against the way in which this evidence is accumulated and the conclusions that are based on it. To establish whether peace between democracies is really typical in international relations it is not only important to explore the empirical evidence democratic peace proponents claim supports Kant and Wilson’s predictions, but also to evaluate the criticism levelled against this claim.

Empirical research designs usually start by identifying the proposition(s) that need(s) to be proven or disproven, and continue, by identifying the dependent and independent variables of the proposition(s) and then operationalising the variables in measurable terms. Two propositions are generally associated with the relationship between democracy and peace (or the absence of war), namely the democratic pacifism proposition and the democratic peace proposition.

The democratic pacifism proposition states that democracies are generally less war-prone than other regimes. This proposition is monadic in nature inasmuch as there need not be two democracies to make the proposition true; democracies are not only more peaceful in relation to other democracies, but in general. The democratic peace proposition, on the other hand, states that democracies keep the peace among themselves or alternatively, democracies do not go to war with one another. It clearly implies the dyadic nature of the democratic peace, namely that it takes two democracies to make peace.

In both these propositions the dependant variable is war and the independent variable is democracy and these two variables can be defined and operationalised as follow:

*War:* War is defined as "institutionally organized lethal violence" (Russett 1993:12) between sovereign states recognised as such by other states in the international community.
Intrastate wars (civil wars) are thus not included in this definition. The definition further excludes the colonial wars against “primitive” people in the nineteenth century and the liberation wars fought to liberate those people in the twentieth century, because these civilisations were not regarded as independent states.

To distinguish wars from violent events resulting from, for example, accidents, unauthorised actions by local commanders leading to border incidents or authorised military action undertaken as a bargaining move and not necessarily intended to develop into full-scale violent conflict, a threshold of 1 000 annual battle fatalities is used.

This definition of war also excludes covert action or support of violent actors to overthrow another government. The secrecy and denial of the government that engages in covert actions indicate that an official, public war is not undertaken (Russett 1993:12,13 and Small & Singer 1976:52).

**Democracy:** Although democracy is a highly contentious term, there are certain criteria generally accepted as indicators of the presence of democracy, namely the existence of “competition for government positions, citizen participation in the selection of political leaders and a number of civil and political liberties – or human rights in the narrow sense” (Martinussen 1997:195). Described in broader terms, the most powerful collective decision-makers must be selected through fair, honest and periodic elections. In these elections candidates must be able to compete freely for votes and virtually all the adult population must be enfranchised. To allow contested elections and free participation also implies civil freedoms such as the freedom of speech and association (Huntington 1991:7).

A state may, however, be more or less democratic and therefore it is evident that a simple dichotomy between democracy and autocracy will not accommodate mixed systems or different “shades” of democracy. Gleditsch and Hegre (1997:285) combine indices of democracy and autocracy from the Polity III data set. This gives them an index ranging from −10 to 10 and combines assessments of the competitiveness of political participation, regulation of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. The cut-off for regarding a state as democratic is set at three.
The nineteenth century understanding of democracy can also not be measured against modern day criteria and therefore most theorists progressively adapt their criteria for regarding a state as democratic. Russett (1993:15), for example, admits countries before the late-nineteenth century with 10 percent of all adults eligible to vote as democratic, but raises this criteria to a substantially universal franchise for the middle- to the late-twentieth century.

A democracy may also be more or less stable. Therefore, one further qualification is usually stipulated to determine which states should be included in a quantitative study about democracies and peace, namely stability or longevity of democracy. Huntington (1991:9) states that a country can only really be regarded as being democratic if a time period has elapsed from the time democracy was introduced during which democratic processes and institutions could become consolidated. Doyle sets this time period at three years, but it could be argued that any period giving the new democracy's citizens and adversaries a chance to acknowledge that the country is governed by democratic principles, will suffice (Russett 1993:16).

The quantitative studies that have correlated democracies and the absence of war on the monadic level yield mixed results at best. The first of these studies, conducted by Small and Singer (1976), concluded that democracies are just as war prone as non-democracies. Doyle (1983a; 1983b), Chan (1984) support this conclusion. Rummel (1983), on the other hand, concluded that democracies committed less acts of "official violence". His conclusions are supported by Ray (1993) and Benoit (1996). Gleditsch and Hegre (1997:307), noting this controversy, state: "At the national level, the evidence is mixed. Our own empirical evidence confirms most previous studies in suggesting that ... democratic states are about as prone to participate in war as other states. Democracies have fewer battle fatalities, but it is not obvious what this implies for their peacefulness. The war participation of democracies is inflated by their tendency to ally in war. Finally, the question of war initiation is marred by problems of interpretation; the possibility that democracies are less aggressive cannot be ruled out." The democratic pacifism proposition can thus not be considered proven.
Contrary to the democratic pacifism proposition, empirical studies that have correlated democracy and the absence of war on the dyadic level conclude that democracies hardly ever go to war with one another. Some theorists, such as Weede (1992), found a strong relationship between the variables, democracy and peace, at this level, whilst others, such as Rummel (1983) and Russett (1993), found virtually no exception to the democratic peace proposition. Gleditsch and Hegre's study (1997) for the period 1816 to 1994, found that democracies were at war with one another for 62 581 out of 549 374 dyad years (see table 3.1). Democracies and non-democracies were at war for 219 563 dyad years and non-democracies were at war for 227 537 dyad years. This means that the relative frequency of war between democracies is about two-fifths of the relative frequency for war between non-democracies, and mixed dyads (democracies and non-democracies) go to war about twice as many times as democratic dyads.

Table 3.1: Democracy and dyadic relationships at war, 1816-1994 (percentage of dyad years at war)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of relationship</th>
<th>Two democracies</th>
<th>One democracy</th>
<th>No democracy</th>
<th>Missing regime data or regime transition</th>
<th>Ad dyad years</th>
<th>Number of dyad years</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At war with each other</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>1.2*10-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied in war</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>1 268</td>
<td>396.9</td>
<td>4.2*10-87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>99.44</td>
<td>99.65</td>
<td>99.76</td>
<td>98.65</td>
<td>98.60</td>
<td>547 094</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>594 374</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dyad years</td>
<td>62 581</td>
<td>219 563</td>
<td>227 537</td>
<td>39 693</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Interstate wars from the Correlates of War project, updated to 1994. Democracy defined as 3 or higher on the difference between the democracy and autocracy indices in the correlated Polity III data. Each dyad is counted separately for each year. The number of dyads in the system increases from 253 in 1816 to 19 020 in 1994. The 2 tests at the end of the first two rows refer to the 2 x 3 tables that emerge when the other rows are merged and the missing or transition column eliminated. Two possible objections to our use of chi-square tests are the following: (1) the observed counts of war are not independent because wars continuing over several years are counted as several observations. We admit the validity of this objection and discuss it in a later section. Figures are later presented where this dependency has been reduced and even eliminated. (2) The number of observations has been inflated by dividing time into short spans (years) and thus securing significant results. This objection, however, is not valid as long as there is no dependency between the units counted as in war. The number of onsets of dyadic conflict or war would not change if we had chosen the dyad month as the unit of measurement. Further, because 2=ij(observed countij - expected countij)/expected countij) and the expected counts for nonwar are much higher than those for war, the nonwar cells hardly contribute at all to the statistics.

a Means that the two countries in the dyad are at war and on the same side of the war.
b Includes all dyads where neither country is at war or where only one country is at war (with someone else).

Source: Gleditsch and Hegre 1997:287
Although it is clear that a strong and statistically significant relationship exists between democracy and peace on the dyadic level, it is not a perfect relationship. Several exceptions to the general pattern are encountered (see table 3.2). These are, however, not the only exceptions mentioned in the literature on the democratic peace (see Appendix A for a complete list of alleged exceptions to the rule that democracies never fight wars against each other).

Table 3.2: Anomalous cases: war between democracies, 1816-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country 1</th>
<th>Country 2</th>
<th>War</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Anomalous Dyad Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Spanish-American Lithuanian-Polish</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States</td>
<td>1941-1944</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Second Kashmir</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Turko-Cypriot</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Gleditsch and Hegre 1997:288*

According to democratic peace proponents it is possible to reclassify most of these exceptions by systematically reconsidering each case. The following aspects are most often identified as reasons why contested cases do not classify as wars between democracies (Ray 1993:261-271):

**One of the warring parties is not an independent state:** In the case of the American Civil War (1847) the Confederacy was not recognised as an independent state. The Second Philippines War (1899) is considered a colonial war, because the Philippine resistance that the US encountered when they attempted to strengthen their hold on this Spanish colony, was not on behalf of an independent government.
One of the warring parties is not democratic: In the case of the Anglo-Boer War the South African Republic (ZAR) at the time only allowed white males to vote and included a property right and long-term residence requirement for voting rights. Thus, it is argued that the ZAR was not a democracy. It is, however, a questionable argument because most states at the turn of the nineteenth century did not allow universal suffrage. A similar argument is made in the case of the Confederacy in the American Civil War. Not only were women excluded from the voting roll, but so was the 35 to 40 percent of the population that were slaves. Furthermore, the 1861 election is considered a one-party election, because only one ticket was provided, effectively resulting in the re-election of Jefferson Davis.

In the case of the Spanish-American War (1898) Spain’s democratic nature is in question. It seems as if most national political leaders in Spain at the time were elected in competitive elections between opposing parties with at least half of the adult population enfranchised and that the Conservative-Liberals and Liberals alternated in power. Spain’s political system was, however, characterised by what is referred to as the turno pacifico, the alternation of political parties in power arranged by the leaders of the major political parties and the monarch. Ray (1993:265) thus concludes that because “the electoral system in Spain was manipulated ... and half of the Senate, and a relatively powerful monarch were selected in clearly undemocratic ways” the Spanish-American War was not a war between democracies. In both the World Wars, Germany’s democratic character is questioned and in the Israeli War of Independence (1948), during which Israel invaded Lebanon, it is argued that Israel had not yet had democratic elections and therefore did not qualify as a democracy.

The empirical evidence has led to the conclusion that “the phenomenon of war between democracies becomes impossible or almost impossible to find.” (Russett 1993:20). The proposition is thus supported by empirical evidence and the existence of the democratic peace is confirmed. But, the results of the quantitative analyses and the case by case reclassification of alleged exceptions have not gone unchallenged.

Critics raise the following objections against the empirical evidence of the democratic peace proposition as suggested above:
**A question of definition:** The way in which proponents of the democratic peace define war and democracy is criticised on various accounts. Firstly, definitions are said to be too restricted. With respect to the definition of war, Spiro (1996:211) argues that by excluding civil wars one of the bloodiest wars in history, the American Civil War - in essence a war between democracies fighting over national identity - is excluded from analysis. The threshold of 1 000 battle fatalities is also seen as a way of undercounting wars between democracies. For example, this qualification exempts the case of Finland against the Allied Powers in World War I. If it is to be concluded that democracies maintain the peace among themselves and if policy decisions are to be based on this conclusion, lower-level militarised interstate disputes should also be considered (Farber & Gowa 1996:250).

With respect to the definition of democracy, it is especially criticised for being subjective. According to this argument "(d)emocratic peace is not about democracy *per se*; rather, it should be understood as a special case of an argument about peace among polities that are similar to some normative benchmarks. What is special about the benchmarks represented by the coding rules of ‘democracy’ is that they are American” (Oren 1996:266, 267). Democracy is thus defined according to prevalent American values and states are coded as such on the basis of US foreign relations with the state.

An interesting case in point is Russia. From 1917 to 1918, while Russia was allied with the US against Germany, Woodrow Wilson declared that “Russia was known by those who knew her best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all vital habits of her thought.” This perception of Russia alternated with “backward autocracy” as relations between the US and Russia deteriorated and improved respectively. During the 1941 alliance between the two countries, the former Soviet Union were even said to move in the direction of ideas that broadly can be called democratic.

The coding of Imperial Germany as autocratic during World War I is similarly a result of changing US values (Oren 1996:297, 298). Imperial Germany is usually not regarded as democratic because of the emperor’s interference in foreign policy decisions and the questionable relations between the legislature and the chancellor. However, it is argued that before World War I the most important strategic decisions by the United Kingdom (UK)
and France were made without any legislative control or oversight and therefore Germany
should not be regarded as any less a democracy than these two states (Layne 1996:195). In
fact, before foreign relations started to deteriorate between Germany and the US, Imperial
Germany was indeed thought of as democratic and John Burgess, one of the fathers of the
discipline of Political Science, maintained that view until he died in 1931. Hence, it is
argued that the definition according to which states are coded, is not value-free, but biased
to reflect American values and interests.

Proponents of the democratic peace are also charged with shifting definitions of democracy
and war to “hide” anomalous and discrepant evidence. Exceptions to the democratic peace
pattern, are explained away by showing that one of the participants to a war was not
democratic or independent or that the conflict was not a war in the 1 000 battle fatalities
threshold sense. The Israeli-Lebanon dyad in the 1948 war when Lebanon joined the Arab
side against Israel is a case in point. The war is explained by saying that Israel had not
previously been independent and had not had elections by that time. Consequently Israel’s
democratic nature does not pass the criteria of stability and longevity. Researchers of the
time agree, however, that Lebanon had 25 years (since the 1920s) to see Israel’s democracy
at work and that there was no reason for Lebanon to think that Israel would abandon its
democratic practices once independent (Elman 1997:22). Other cases in which critics
contend that democratic peace proponents shift definitions of democracy and war to prove
the democratic peace proposition include the Spanish-American War (1898) and the
Philippines War (1899). Hence, it is argued that too restricted, subjective and shifting
definitions spur statistics in favour of the democratic peace.

*Insufficient data:* A second point of criticism pertains to the data that exist to prove the
democratic peace proposition. It is argued that existing data is not sufficient to prove
decisively that it is typical for democracies to maintain peaceful relations among
themselves, because democracy is a relatively new phenomenon and interstate war is in
general rare. Spiro (1996:214) explains that zero wars is not statistically significant because
“in statistical analysis, the measure of the significance of a relationship between variables is
usually compared to the “null hypothesis” of random chance. If we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of random chance, it does not mean we must accept random chance as
explanation, but it does mean that we should reject the hypothesis being tested.” For zero
wars to be significant, it is necessary to prove that random chance is not an explanation for zero wars. In other words, if the distribution of wars between democracies is not statistically different than what random chance predicts then zero wars is not enough evidence for democratic peace theory. It is similar to a family that doesn’t win the lottery. If the probability for that family to win the lottery is low, the fact that they are not winning it is not strange. To determine whether it is strange that democracies do not make war with one another, the probability of war between them should first be determined.

According to the probability analysis Spiro (1996:215) has done, the probability that democracies will go to war with one another is so low that it is not striking that they don’t go to war with one another. For the year 1980, for example, “the 156 nations in the world made 12, 090 possible dyads, of which 780 were dyads of liberal democracies, and only 2 dyads were at war. Put this way, only 6 percent of the possible one-on-one pairings of nations were liberal, and the dyads at war were two hundredths of 1 percent of the total. It no longer seems so striking that democracies were not at war, because dyads at war were extremely rare in 1980.” Spiro analyses the probability of war between democracies in the same way for the entire temporal domain and concludes that only during World War I is the zero wars fought different from what random chance predicts. In World War II, random chance predicts that democracies will fight, and Spiro argues that that was indeed the case between Finland and the Allied Powers.

Spiro’s analysis is questioned by Russett (1996:343) in various respects. Firstly, the claim that zero wars between democracies are no different from what chance would predict does not disprove the democratic peace: it simply implies that evidence is so sparse that the proposition cannot be confirmed. Secondly, Spiro is said to be inconsistent in his use of data. Although he includes the Finland-Allied dyads during World War II, despite the fact that they do not satisfy the 1 000 casualties threshold, he excludes some of the non-democratic dyads during the Korean War for precisely this reason. Lastly, instead of counting each year of dyads at war as a separate year of analysis, Spiro only counts the year in which war commenced. According to Russett (1996:344) this is a “divide-and-conquer” approach, stating that “by splitting the data into small enough parts, (Spiro) has guaranteed a low rate of war outbreak in each year, so most of the tests he runs will have zero statistical power.” The quantitative basis of Spiro’s criticism is thus not void of suspicion itself.
It is, however, not only Spiro that questions the quantitative evidence of the democratic peace. Farber and Gowa (1996:239) attempted a similar exercise of probability analysis and although their findings confirm that wars occur at a significantly lower rate between democracies than between mixed dyads or autocratic dyads, they found that the democratic peace phenomenon is of very recent origin. They conclude that for the period prior to World War I the probability of democracies not going to war equals reality. Thus, zero wars in this period need not be explained. World War I and World War II are regarded as general wars that do not yield observations that can be used to determine whether democracies maintain peace between them. For the post-World War II period, though, the democratic peace phenomenon is statistically significant. The fact that the democratic peace is typical only for this period challenges the theory that it is really regime type, which resulted in peaceful relations between democracies or whether it is a result of Cold War defence pacts. In the next section the issue of alternative explanations for peace between democracies is discussed. What is important at this point, is that critics argue that it is not more typical for democracies to maintain peace between them, than for any other two states to maintain peace. This charge is not only based on a critique of empirical evidence of the democratic peace, but also by making use of the case study method.

**Case studies:** Case studies lay bare “the factors to which decision-makers respond, how those factors influence decisions, the actual course of events, and the possible effects of other variables on the outcome.” (Layne 1996:165). According to Elman (1997) and Layne (1996), who make use of case study analysis the valicity of the democratic peace theory can be tested by examining a small number of cases intensively. The first step in case study analysis is the selection of politically relevant cases. For Elman and Layne only “states that have a potential for crisis and conflict” can be regarded as politically relevant. Peace between states that are too far apart to have conflicting interests is not a vindication for the democratic peace theory. As such Layne (1996:164-189) chooses four instances in which he argues that democratic major powers were on the verge of war, but resolved the crises peacefully, namely “the Trent affair” between the US and the UK in 1861, the Venezuela crises involving the US and the UK again in 1895-96, the Fashoda crisis between France and the UK in 1895-96 and the Ruhr crises involving Germany and France in 1923. The question is whether war was averted in these cases because factors that the democratic
peace theory proposes will lead to peaceful relations between democracies were present, or not. Among these factors are:

- public opinion in the two states is pacific;
- policy-making elites refrain from making military threats and preparing to carry out these threats; and
- democracies bend over backwards to accommodate each other in a crisis.

Layne (1996:190) argues that none of these factors were present in any of the four cases. On the contrary, he concludes that “(i)n each of the four crises, war was avoided not because of the ‘live and let live’ spirit of peaceful dispute resolution at democratic peace theory’s core, but because of realist factors.” At this point the debate between proponents and critics of the democratic peace theory deepens to the underlying debate between neo-realists and neo-liberals. According to neo-realists states base their decisions about war and peace on the constraints and opportunities that the anarchic international system generate. Domestic regime type and shared democratic values have little to do with these decisions. Similar to all states, democracies are also driven by strategic considerations and the absence or occurrence of war between democracies is explained by power politics (Elman 1997:473). Thus, Elman and Layne come to the conclusion that democracies do not have any more or any less of an incentive to make or prevent war than any other states.

The findings of these case study analyses are questioned in various respects. Firstly, the democratic peace proposition is formulated in a probabilistic and not a deterministic way, which would have stated “democracies will never wage war against each other”. The examination of a limited number of cases cannot decisively disprove a probabilistic statement. Russett (1996:340) refers to this as the “logical fallacy of inducing a principle of universal non-existence merely by finding a few cases of non-existence”.

Secondly, by selecting only dyads that were in a crisis period of their relationship, conflicts between democracies that were settled amicably and without the threat of war, or as Russett refers to these cases, “the dogs that did not bark”, are excluded from analysis. The real relevance of the democratic peace may precisely be to moderate everyday relations between states and prevent a conflict in interest to escalate to crisis levels. Owen (1996), for
example, examined 12 case studies from the period 1794 to 1917 and several of them support democratic peace considerations.

Thirdly, qualitative analysis is not only subject to bias in the selection of cases, but also in the interpretation. Some interpreters seem to require, as a condition of a crisis between democracies being taken as evidence confirming the democratic peace proposition, that the decision-makers involved have been aware of the pacifying effect of democracy and made their awareness plain. This is problematic inasmuch as people are not always aware of, nor do they express factors that may have influenced their behaviour. Just because people, for example, do not account for their behaviour by referring to the way in which their parents socialised them, it does not mean that their parents had no impact on how they behave. In the same sense it is unwarranted to expect explicit statements attributing the resolution of a crisis between democracies to underlying values (Ray 1993:57).

Although the criticisms cited here raise a few important questions relating to the peace between democracies, they are not substantive enough to disprove the democratic peace proposition. On the contrary, the empirical correlation between democratic dyads and peace is so robust that it requires further investigation into the causal mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of peace between democracies.

4. EXPLAINING PEACE BETWEEN DEMOCRACIES

In terms of Waltz's (1959) classification of the causes of war democratic peace theory explains the absence of war between democracies primarily from a second image perspective, thus attributing the existence of the democratic peace to the domestic structure and norms of democracies. Since the resurgence of the democratic peace theme in scholarly research, various explanatory factors for the phenomenon have been proposed in literature (see Appendix B). Some of these factors have been mentioned as supplements to the democratic peace explanation, such as the psychological factors and the communication factor, but others are mentioned in contrast to the democratic peace theory. In this sense the debate between proponents and critics of the democratic peace thesis is continued on a different level. It is now no longer whether the democratic peace exists or not, but whether it can be explained by regime factors or not.
The democratic peace theory offers the following explanatory models for the absence of war between democracies:

*The normative/cultural model:* Domestically democracies are characterised by the following central norms:

- disputes can be resolved peacefully through democratic political processes that in an equilibrium of sorts protects minority rights, while ensuring majority rule;
- equality exists both in voting equality but also in the egalitarian right to human dignity;
- the state is ruled by the consent of the governed, but justice prevails to the extent that consent is not abused; and
- dissent within broad limits from an opposition loyal to democratic practice is tolerated and even needed to ensure good policy-making.

The common assertion is that these norms produce a culture favouring the resolution of foreign policy disputes without violent conflict. The democratic processes produce restraint by the populace who have to foot war bills in terms of money and blood, thus making democracies inherently more peaceful (Russett 1993:30). But, as was stated previously the democratic pacifism proposition has not been proven convincingly and various empirical studies (Small & Singer 1976; Chan 1984; Maoz & Abdolali 1989; Geldtsch & Hegre 1997) have established findings contrary to this view. In fact, democratic states seem to be just as war-prone as other states when it comes to their relations with non-democracies. This raises a fundamental puzzle in the causal relationship between norms and the democratic peace, namely why democratic norms would lead to peace between democracies (the dyadic level), but not to general pacifism (the monadic level).

The answer to this puzzle seems to lie in the two assumptions of the normative/cultural explanatory model, namely (i) that states externalise, as far as possible, the norms and behaviour that are developed within and characterise their internal political processes and institutions; and (ii) that in the anarchic international system, a clash between democratic and non-democratic norms is dominated by the latter rather than the former.
Russett 1993:625). The first of these assumptions suggests that democratic norms result in a "live and let live" atmosphere, which in turn creates domestic stability. Non-democratic norms, such as the winner takes all, violent and coercive conflict resolution mechanisms and denying the opposition the right of existence lead to mistrust, fear and the absence of stability in the presence of opposition. The second assumption suggests that when it comes to applying these norms internationally states will be limited by their perception of the environment in which they are applied. If they perceive their survival to be endangered by their application of domestic norms, they will adapt their behaviour to that of their rival. Because democratic norms are more likely to be exploited in an anarchic system, democratic states in a mixed dyad are more inclined to change their norms than non-democracies are to change to democratic norms (Maoz & Russett 1993:625).

The normative/cultural model explains democracies' tendency to maintain a separate peace by referring to the sense of reciprocity experienced by democratic dyads. This is best explained by Russett (1993:31) who argues that "if people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing people who share norms of live and let live, they will respect the right of others to self-determination if those others are also perceived as self-governing and hence not easily led into aggressive foreign policies by a self-serving elite." Democratic norms thus apply across borders to other democratic countries and in this transnational democratic culture democracies can prevent conflicts from escalating to war in the same way each state prevents domestic disputes from escalating into violent conflict. However, when confronted with a non-democratic state, a democracy will not expect that country to be restrained by democratic norms and therefore it will resort to non-democratic norms of conflict resolution, such as engaging in war. It is also now understandable that democratic peace theorists place emphasis on the longevity or stability of democracy in their definition and coding of democratic states. Images of political stability in a democracy communicate to the external environment that democratic norms are domestically at work and that these norms can be expected to govern the state's external relations as well. Similarly, internal instability is an indication that norms of peaceful conflict resolution are either absent or not enshrined to the extent that it can be inferred that a state's foreign policy will also be characterised by pacifism (Maoz & Russett 1993:625).
The structural/institutional model: Democracies are characterised by various structures and institutions which constrain government decision-making, such as the division of power, checks and balances, public opinion and the role of the bureaucracy and key interest groups in the system of government. When the existence of these structures and institutions is used to explain why democracies do not go to war with one another, two assumptions are made, namely (i) international threats compel political leaders to mobilise internal support for their policies from those groups that will provide the legitimacy that is needed for international action; and (ii) only emergency situations can justify short-cuts to political mobilisation of relevant political support (Maoz & Russett 1993:626).

This set of assumptions suggests that “(d)emocracies are constrained in going to war by the need to ensure broad popular support, manifested in various institutions of government.” (Russett 1993:38). Because of the complexity of the democratic process to obtain formal approval for a war, and the difficulty of justifying fighting a war, democratic structures and institutions often result in the structural delay of the decision to wage war. In non-democracies political leadership needs only secure the support of key elite groups without much regard for public opinion or due political processes. The preparation time for war is thus much shorter than is the case in democracies. In democratic dyads these structural delays provide time for non-military resolution, such as negotiations, to end the conflict before it erupts in all-out war.

This explanation again leaves the question why the democratic peace proposition prevails, but not the democratic pacifism proposition. Non-democracies are not constrained by democratic structures and institutions and this exacerbates existing conflicts between democracies and non-democracies. Leaders in non-democracies may exploit the reluctance of leaders in democracies to go to war and conversely, leaders in democracies may create an image of non-democracies as “ready and eager to fight” and respond by calling on their emergency powers. These powers enable democracies to mobilise support speedily and the decision to go to war is usually beyond the due political process normally followed in such situations.

A comparison of the two models shows that though the normative and structural models are not mutually exclusive, they do emphasise two different elements of democratic politics,
namely the norms of internal democratic behaviour on international politics, on the one hand and constitutional and legal constraints on executive action in international politics on the other. Maoz and Russett (1993:624-637) found that both these models are supported by data, but that the support for the normative model is more robust and consistent. They came to this conclusion by identifying two key differences in the predictions which these models make. Firstly, because norms take longer to develop, the normative model predicts that the older democracies are the less likely they would be to clash with one another. In terms of the structural model, on the other hand, the age of democracy should not matter as long as democratic constraints exist. Secondly, the structural model predicts that a democracy’s conflict behaviour will be dependent on the constraints on its executive. A presidential system, for example will be less constrained than parliamentary systems and coalition governments or minority cabinets will be less constrained than dominant party systems. The normative model does not predict variation in a state’s conflict behaviour based on the different executive structures, because all democracies operate in the same normative context. Based on these differences, two hypotheses are stated, namely:

- The more deeply rooted democratic norms are in the political processes operating in two states, the less likely it will be that conflict will break out or escalate between them.
- The higher the political constraints on the executives of two states, the less likely it will be that conflict will break out or escalate between them.

Moaz and Russett’s (1993:636) statistical analysis proved both of these hypotheses, in other words, the level of democratic norms is inversely related to conflict and so is the level of political constraints. To determine which model withstands empirical testing to a greater extent, the scholars examined cases where high levels of democratic norms and low levels of political constraints and vice versa are present. They found that institutional constraints prevent the escalation of conflict into war, but they do not prevent the emergence of lower-level disputes. Normative restraints even prevent the emergence of conflict as such. Although both democratic norms and institutional constraints explain the phenomenon of peace between democracies, the normative model is thus empirically superior.

In both models, however, the explanation for peace between democracies is rooted in the nature of democracy itself. It is because two states share democratic norms and culture and
democratic structures and institutions that they refrain from engaging in war, not because they have similar regime forms. After all, if the explanation lay in identity of regime type, autocratic regimes would also maintain peace between themselves, which is not the case. There are, however, alternative explanations for the absence of war between democracies, which emphasise other factors that can be correlated with democracy and, it is argued, result in a spurious relationship between democracy and peace.

The following factors are often cited in contrast to the two explanatory models that the democratic peace theory propose for the phenomenon of peace between democracies:

**Distance:** It is argued that wars are mostly fought between adjacent states, because their physical proximity enlarges the threat they pose for one another (whether perceived or real). Because democracies have not populated the international system to the extent that many adjacent democratic dyads existed (Western Europe excluded), the distance between democracies, at least until 1945, explains the absence of war between democracies. Since Huntington's (1991) Third Wave of democratisation, however, the world map shows many contiguous democracies in the Western Hemisphere. Hence, distance is no longer an apt explanation for peace between them.

**Institutional and economic interdependence:** Transnational and international institutions as well as economic ties are often cited as alternative explanations for the democratic peace. Shared institutions become forums where conflicting interests are resolved and in terms of economic interdependence, it is arguable whether a state will declare war against its main trading partners. It is typically asked whether the peace among states of the EU is due to their being democratic or their being institutionally and economically interdependent to such a high degree.

Russett (1996:84), however, found that states sharing the same institutions are more likely to be involved in violent conflict. Oneal and Ray (1997:751) controlled for economic interdependence and still concluded that "democracies are unlikely to fight other democracies". Institutional and economic interdependence are thus not an independent explanation for the democratic peace, but it is possible that the individual autonomy and pluralism which allow individuals, private groups and government organisations to form
transnational networks among democratic states can contribute to establishing a transnational democratic culture and in turn maintaining peaceful relations. Democracy is, however, a prerequisite for this.

**Alliance:** It is assumed that military allies will not wage war against one another because of their common interests. Perhaps the fact that democracies were allied during both world wars and since then in NATO, rather than their democratic nature, explains the absence of war between these states. De Mesquita (in Russett 1993:27) found, however, that militarised allied states are generally more likely to fight one another than non-allies, a conclusion that Bremer confirmed, although he also found that democratic allies are less likely to engage in violent conflict than is the case with other non-democratic militarised allies.

**Geopolitics:** The geopolitical interpretation of the democratic peace holds that linking subsequent peaceful tendencies to antecedent types of regime (democracy) is like putting the cart before the horse. The settlement of regional primacy issues creates co-operative regional niches, which insulate states from extremely competitive regional and international politics. The zones of peace resulting from these niches have positive implications for democratisation inasmuch as a less hostile regional environment does not require the centralisation of power as is the case when a state is frequently exposed to national security threats. The geopolitical explanation does not necessarily exclude the possibility that there is a causal or reciprocal relationship between democracy and peace but it is argued that by focusing only on regime attributes, important historical explanations such as geopolitical context are negated (Thompson 1996:141-174).

**Economic and political stability:** Closely linked to the argument that economic interdependence makes peace is the argument that “for politically stable, economically advanced, and rapidly growing countries the cost/benefit ratio of any war fought on or near their home territories with another advanced state looks extraordinary unpromising” (Russett 1993:28). Not only is a war costly in terms of domestic damages, but interdependence with the adversary’s economy can also mean that damage to the adversary’s economy harms one’s own investments, export markets, and import sources.
A second variant of this explanation is that states may initiate conflicts with other states to divert public attention from domestic economic and political problems. For economically and politically stable states the incentive for externalising internal discontent is less and should an incentive nevertheless occur, it is very unlikely that a stable state will target another economically stable state whose population has legitimised their system and will be prepared to engage in conflict to protect their political system. Because democracies are often wealthy and stable, the peace between them may be attributed to these factors and not to democracy per se. Democratic peace proponents have, as explained, incorporated political stability in their definitions of democracy as well as their models of explaining the democratic peace. Political stability is thus more complementary than alternative to the normative/cultural and structural/institutional explanatory models.

Although these alternative explanations surely are plausible and can indeed be explanatory to some incidents of peaceful relations between democracies, various empirical studies (Maoz & Russett: 1993; Bremer 1992; and Oneal & Ray 1997) have indicated the independent explanatory role of democracy through controlling for distance, interdependence, alliance, geopolitics, wealth and political stability (Russett 1993:30). It has thus been established that a separate peace exists between democracies, that this peace is the result of shared democratic norms and institutions, and that in the absence of these shared norms democracies may or may not be just as war-prone as non-democracies. What remains now is to establish what the effect of these findings is for world peace.

5. THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND WORLD PEACE

Once it is tested and proven that democracies do not make war with one another, it is often taken for granted that a world with more and better democracies will be a more peaceful world. Based on this inference from the dyadic to the system level, trends of democratisation such as the Third Wave identified by Huntington (1991) yield widespread enthusiasm about the prospects for world peace in the future. This inference is, however, too simplistic for at least two reasons. It negates the mixed results obtained at the monadic level and it does not reckon with the Wilsonian element in democratic peace theory.
Although there are those theorists who argue that democracies are generally less inclined to war than non-democracies (Benoit 1996), this argument cannot be maintained unequivocally. In fact, more democratic peace proponents acknowledge that "(e)ven though liberalism [read: democracy] has achieved striking success in creating a zone of peace ... and co-operation among states similar in character, liberalism has been equally striking as a failure in guiding foreign policy outside the liberal world." (Doyle 1996:30). Democracies, for example, fail to negotiate the peaceful resolution of conflicting interests with stronger non-democracies and often raise these conflicts to battles and campaigns. The US policies towards Cuba and Iran are typical examples of such campaigns. In relation to weaker non-democracies, democracies have often engaged in imperial ventures. It is thus very likely that democracies outside the pacific federation, will act as realists predict all states will act – war-prone in an anarchic international system with its insecurities, scarce resources and prestige hungry state leaders.

The Wilsonian element refers to the task, which democracies have taken upon themselves to free the coerced citizens of non-democratic states and make the world safe for democracy even if it takes forceful means. The most recent example of the Wilsonian element is NATO's attacks on Serbia in response to its oppression of the ethnic Albanians in the province Kosovo (1999), but the Gulf War after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (1990-91) also serves as a case in point. This does not mean that democracies will engage in a crusade for democracy, fighting, beating and turning authoritarian regimes into democracies. For one reason, many authoritarian regimes are not aggressive and therefore do not pose a threat to their own citizens or to other states in the world. But, when authoritarian states become aggressive, democracies have shown that they will react violently whether in the name of human rights or eradicating a threat to democracy.

A return to Gleditsch and Hegre's (1997:291-287) study shows the striking statistical evidence of the war-proneness of democracies outside the pacific federation. Like Small and Singer (1976), Doyle (1983a; 1983b) and Chan (1984), they found that there is no clear relationship between the war participation of democracies and non-democracies. They do, however, go further than the other theorists arguing that mixed dyads have a higher propensity for war than authoritarian dyads. Democracies and non-democracies are thus more likely to go to war with one another than non-democracies are to go to war with one
another. Taken together with the findings that democratic dyads do not engage in war the results propose that the relationship between democracy and the frequency of war at the system level will be parabolic. In other words, as the number of democracies increases world-wide, the number of mixed dyads with a higher probability of war increases as well. If all states in the international system become democratic, the result will of cause be consistent with the direct inference from the dyadic to the system level, namely that an increase in democracy will result in a more peaceful world. But as long as democracies and consequently democratic dyads are in a minority, however, it is likely that the lack of war between democracies will be off-set by the higher incidence of war in mixed dyads. An increase in democracies will only have more peaceful returns, when democracies become the majority.

Gleditsch and Hegre (1997:305) tested their hypothesis by plotting the number of democracies in the world and the incidence of war (see figure 3.1. and 3.2) for the period 1816 to 1994. From these graphs they concluded that for the first 100 years the world became more democratic and more war prone. After the world wars the world still democratised, but became more peaceful. Although for the World War I period (1885-1918) there is too little war and for the Cold War period (1954-1986) (see figure 3.1) there is too little democracy to result in a pattern consistent with what is theoretically expected, as a whole the curve suggests that increasing democratisation is firstly associated with more war and then with less.

Figure 3.1 Relative number of democracies in the world and incidence of war, 1816 to 1994

Source: Gleditsch and Hegre 1997:305
Figure 3.2 Degree of democratisation by war incidence at the system level, 1816 to 1994

Source: Gleditsch and Hegre 1997:306

So far democratisation has been viewed strictly in dichotomous terms, in other words, as authoritarian states that convert to democracy. Democratisation will thus quantitatively increase democracies in the international system. There is, however, another way of approaching democratisation, namely in continuous terms where democracy and autocracy are the two extreme poles of a continuum. Democratisation of a state means a qualitative increase in the level of democracy in the state, or alternatively, the state moves closer to the democracy pole on the continuum. O’neal and Ray (1997:751-775), using this approach to study the effects of democratisation on mixed dyads, conclude that “(t)he prospects for peace are influenced by the level of democracy in a dyad; but they are also significantly affected by the political distance separating the regimes along the democracy – autocracy continuum.” Hence, it is not enough to study the effects of one autocracy converting to democracy, but the political distance between states in the dyad on the democracy – autocracy continuum needs to be considered as well.

In this sense it can now be concluded that making the lesser democracy in a mixed dyad more democratic has unambiguously positive effects for peace between the countries, because it increases the level of democracy for the pair and it decreases the political distance between the states. Increasing the level of democracy for the more democratic state will increase the average level of democracy for the pair, but it will also increase the political distance, therefore increasing the possibility for conflict. What this implies is largely supportive of Gleditsch and Hegre’s findings, namely that in a world largely made up of autocracies, democratisation will lead to a larger incidence of war, but in a world consisting largely of democracies, democratisation will reduce the incidence of war.
This implies that there is a turning point where a system shift will occur and spreading democracy will then mean spreading peace. In terms of Gleditsch and Hegre’s findings the end of the long European conflict (the two World Wars) or the end of the Cold War can plausibly be suggested as points where a system shift has occurred. This observation is related to the very high levels of democratisation in the world in general, but especially in certain regions such as Europe (Gleditsch & Hegre 1997:306).

The most prominent philosophical support for the postulate that a system shift has occurred towards the end of the Cold War comes from the influential article *The end of history?* by Francis Fukuyama (1989). He writes: “In watching the flow of events over the past decade or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that something very fundamental has happened in world history. The past year has seen a flood of articles commemorating the end of the Cold War, and the fact that ‘peace’ seems to be breaking out in many regions of the world” (Fukuyama in Betts 1994:5). Fukuyama relates this “outbreak of peace” to the victory of liberalism over other ideologies resulting in the end of history. Although terrorism and wars of national liberation will continue, large-scale conflicts can only occur between states still caught up in history or between states still in history and those at the end of history. In both cases, the dyads satisfying these criteria are passing from the scene as more states liberalise (democratise).

If it is accepted that the end of the Cold War has brought about a system shift, there is reason to believe that future democratisation will indeed lead to a more peaceful world in general. This is dependent on whether democratisation will occur in the Kantian sense or in the Wilsonian sense. In other words, it can be left up to “nature” to bring about democratisation (the Kantian sense) or already democratised states can take it upon themselves to forcefully impose democracy on non-democracies (the Wilsonian sense).

Although a democratic crusade will probably establish a pacific federation composed of all states much faster than nature, there are various factors discouraging this approach. Firstly,

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9 Fukuyama’s article in particular and so-called endism in general have come under attack for being historically deterministic, most notably from Huntington (1989) in an article entitled *No exit - the errors of endism*. Historical analysis conducted by Huntington (1991) himself, however, concludes that the number of democracies have substantially increased since the mid-1970s and more than a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there has not been a reverse wave towards communism.
the cost of imposing democracy is very high both in terms of forcefully instating democracy and in terms of consolidating the new democracy. This was true for the US in both the cases of Japan and Germany after World War I. It not only took the Marshall Plan, but also years of virtual occupation in the case of Japan to ensure democracy. Secondly, liberal imperialism, where democracies intervene and even take over countries to protect cosmopolitan rights, have shown to be ineffective, considering that most colonies have after independence resorted back to non-democracy. Thirdly, there is reason to believe that the technological progress witnessed in the past four decades is quickening the pace of democratisation in the Kantian sense.

6. CONCLUSION

Although the democratic peace, as it is referred to in this dissertation is confined to the relationship between democracy and peace on the dyadic level, the causes and consequences of the democratic peace phenomenon in world politics cannot be understood unless the monadic and system levels are taken into account. In terms of these three levels, the following conclusions can be made about the relationship between peace and democracy. Democracies do not go to war with one another (dyadic level). This is not because democracies are inherently peaceful, for then they would be less war-prone overall (the monadic level), but because they share democratic norms and institutions. The impact of the democratic peace on world peace in general (the system level) can be negative (reducing world peace) or positive (increasing world peace), depending on whether democratic dyads comprise a majority in the world system or not. It has been argued that, since the end of the Cold War, the pacific federation has enlarged to the extent that further democratisation will have a net positive effect on world peace.

Democratisation should, however, not only entail the quantitative increase in democracies world-wide, but also the qualitative increase of democracy within states. Since Huntington (1991) identified a global trend of democratisation termed the Third Wave several authors have expressed reserve about the nature of many of these newly democratised states. Fareed Zakaria (1997), for example, writes about the rise of illiberal democracies, that is, democracies satisfying the minimum prescription of democracy, namely elections. Schedler (1998) refers to these formal democracies as electoral democracies. Democracy, as defined
by democratic peace theory though, is essentially liberal. Democratisation that only involves the installation of electoral democracies will thus not necessarily have the impact on world peace that this chapter predicts.

The democratic peace as it has been treated in International Relations theory and discussed in this chapter, is by distinction a statecentric approach toward world peace. It defines war as lethal violence between states in an anarchic international system and democracy as a form of government of states. Unless domestic norms and structures dictate otherwise there is the potential for a Clausewitzian extension of politics to resolve conflicts of interests between states. This interpretation of the democratic peace may be restrictive in the light of the multiplication of non-state actors in the international arena and the increasingly complex patterns of interaction between state and non-state actors, especially in the realm of war and warfare. The globalisation of democratic norms may also have implications for the way democracy is defined in democratic peace theory. Both the rise of non-state actors and the globalisation of democracy have been facilitated by the information revolution. This revolution and the broader changes in circumstances that it gives rise to, will subsequently be discussed before turning to the impact it has on the relationship among democracy, the democratic peace and world peace.