South Africa’s foreign policy: Highlights during 2011

Yolanda Spies

Introduction

The first year of the second decade of the 21st century was replete with enormity in the international relations sphere, ranging from the natural disaster of Japan’s earthquake, to the human-engineered financial meltdown at the heart of the world’s largest economic bloc, the European Union. Within an otherwise turbulent year, some aspiring states took audacious steps: South Sudan became the world’s newest sovereign state when it obtained independence on 9 July 2011 and less than a week later joined the United Nations (UN), while a few months later Palestine tried, with much fanfare but less success, to do the same.¹

The UN General Assembly had proclaimed 2011 as the ‘International Year for People of African Descent’,² and indeed, throughout the year much of the world’s attention was riveted by African events. Sadly though, this had little to do with a celebration of heritage. A massive famine in the Horn of Africa, and conflicts simmering in various other parts of the continent such as the Great Lakes region and West Africa, ensured that Africa remained in the headlines. These events were eclipsed, however, by the ‘Arab Spring’ which started in North Africa and saw despots toppled in unprecedented, apparently leaderless, revolutions. As unrest spilled over into the Middle-East, the domino-effect of popular uprisings sent shivers down the spines of autocrats elsewhere, not least so in the Southern African neighbourhood. Even in democratic South Africa, some pundits³ speculated about when (rather than if) the country would experience its own political ‘Spring’.

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²South Sudan became the 193rd member of the United Nations on 14 July 2011. During November 2011, a motion to admit Palestine as UN member did not muster enough votes in the UN admissions committee (the Security Council) and was deferred – despite the fact that Palestine was admitted as the 195th member of UNESCO on 31 October 2011.
³As declared per UN GA res A/Res/64/169 on 19 March 2010.
⁴For example Moeletsi Mbeki, in several media interviews, and also in an address to the Cape Town Press Club on 26 July 2011.
Therefore, the UN Security Council (UNSC), the world’s highest authority in the maintenance of international peace and security, had a crowded4 agenda during 2011. It was also the first year of South Africa’s second term on the UNSC – keenly anticipated, in light of the country’s lobbying to become a permanent member of the Council. Its policy-makers were thrown in at the deep end of foreign policy decision-making in March when the Council had to vote on its first humanitarian intervention since the UN endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm.5 South Africa’s decision to vote in favour of Resolution 1973, which authorised the use of ‘all necessary means’6 to protect civilians in Libya, became a defining moment of 2011.

This controversial decision, and other salient aspects of South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour during the remainder of the year under review, will be the focus of this paper. First, a lingering concern will be addressed, namely the extent to which the country’s foreign policy is driven by self-interest rather than cosmopolitan norms. Second, the issue of (con)fusing party and state interests in the pursuit of international relations will be considered. Thereafter, the discussion will turn to South Africa’s equivocal leadership position vis-à-vis the rest of the continent. And finally, some aspects of South Africa’s positioning in terms of global governance will be considered in order to determine whether the country is demonstrating the global leadership it aspires to in its foreign policy rhetoric.

**Principle versus expediency**

Since its first democratic elections in 1994 – and despite three disparate presidential leadership eras since then – certain tenets in South Africa’s foreign policy have remained constant: a predilection for multilateralism, prioritisation of an ‘African Agenda’, and ideological solidarity with non-Western nations. The multilateral inclination in particular, combined with South Africa’s initiatives to take normative leadership in multilateral fora, has earned the young democracy the status of a middle power. South African policy makers have enjoyed basking in the glow of the country’s moral high ground in the global arena, benefiting from access to traditional as well as emerging powers, and trumpeting the Republic’s democratic and human rights credentials. But a

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4 During 2011 ‘the Council adopted over 50 resolutions; 30 presidential statements; and over 40 press statements’. As noted by Marius Fransman, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, in an address on ‘South Africa’s second tenure in the UN Security Council: Promoting the African Agenda’ UNISA, Pretoria 3 February 2012.

5 As contained in the UN’s World Summit Outcome par 139 of UN GA res 60/1 15 September 2005. See too subsequent endorsement in UNSC resolutions, *inter alia*, 1674 of 28 April 2006 (Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict); 1706 of 31 August 2006 (on the crisis in Darfur); and 1755 of 30 April 2007 (which extended the UN Mission in Southern Sudan).

proselytising attitude on the global stage has had its drawbacks, and over the years it has invited scrutiny of South Africa’s foreign policy for compliance with the country’s liberal constitutional mores.

Policy makers who have since traded-in principle for expediency probably regret the idealistic worldview that South Africa cemented into its post-apartheid foreign policy. The foreign ministry’s annual ‘Strategic Plans’ have reproduced perfunctory pledges to infuse the conduct of international relations with domestic principles of human rights, democracy and good governance. This undertaking is noble but unrealistic in a world where ‘national interest remains a central preoccupation of foreign policy decision makers’. Quite simply, its implementation is constrained by ‘competing and more pragmatic economic and geopolitical considerations’.

What troubles critics is less the (understandable) fact that South Africa acquiesces to practical imperatives, than the manner in which it ‘often appears to be pursuing two contradictory sets of values’, as The Economist phrases it. The journal’s editors direct their scorn specifically to the South African head of state:

At one moment, Mr Zuma is upholding the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference dear to despot around the world. At the next, he insists that his ‘objective’ is to contribute to the ideals of democracy, human rights and justice. The result is a mishmash of unpredictable responses to apparently similar situations in different countries.

Dimpho Motsamai makes a similar observation, calling South Africa’s foreign policy ‘utilitarian at best’. According to her

under the Zuma administration, South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy, typified by the country’s commitment to export its model of democratisation to other parts of Africa, is being viewed with increasing suspicion.

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1These are three-year plans, but are updated annually. The most recent Strategic Plan on the DIRCO website covers the period 2010-2013 at http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/strategic%20plan%202010-2013/index.htm (accessed 10 January 2012).

2For example, in media notes for a press briefing on 5 April 2011, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, listed six principles as ‘underpinning South Africa’s Foreign Policy: a commitment to Africa in world affairs; economic development through regional and international cooperation; the promotion of human rights; the promotion of democracy, justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations; and international peace and internationally agreed upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts’ at http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2011/mash0405 (accessed 12 December 2011).

3Alden and Aran Foreign policy analysis: New approaches (2012) at 3.

4Thipanyane ‘South Africa’s foreign policy under the Zuma government’ (2011) 64/December Africa Institute of South Africa Policy Brief at 5.


During the course of 2011, indecisiveness (if not outright ambiguity) around resolution of the humanitarian crises in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, once again raised questions about the purported moral principles that anchor South Africa’s policy towards its external environment. While humanitarian intervention is at best a contentious policy choice for any government, it is the warmth of South African politicians’ relations with despots and illegitimate regimes that has tainted its government’s foreign policy.

The ignominious fall of Muammar Gaddafi is a case in point. It is no secret that the ‘brother leader’ had been generous with financial assistance to his African friends, including successive post-apartheid South African presidents, who fêted him openly. Thus it appeared incongruous when President Zuma, during October 2011, questioned the very foundation of Gaddafi’s authority in Libya. Defending South Africa’s initial support for UNSC Resolution 1973, Zuma slated the moral deficit in Gaddafi’s leadership: ‘There were no principles that guided the authority of Libya’, he noted. ‘Libya was ruled by Gaddafi and Gaddafi alone’.

Conveniently, Zuma’s comments were made only after the Libyan leader had been ousted. But it begs the question of when, given Gaddafi’s four decades of ruthless dictatorship, Zuma and his foreign policy advisors came to the conclusion that the Libyan ruler was an odious character. Perhaps a more compelling question is why the South African government had authorised arms sales to Libya as late as 2010.

Closer to home, foreign policy observers were bemused when the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) extended a loan of R2 billion to Swaziland in September 2011. Africa’s last absolute monarchy has a dismal track-record in governance – a matter the South African government has been reluctant to criticise. The SARB was quick to reassure the public that the loan would hinge on strict conditionalities, but Tseliso Thipanyane calls the latter into question. He notes that the human rights and democratisation conditions of the loan are based on a 2004 bilateral agreement between the two countries that was never really implemented. This raises questions as to why this was allowed to happen when the inadequacy of human rights, democratic governance and respect for the rule of law has contributed to much of Swaziland’s current economic challenges that now require financial support from the South African government.

The discrepancy between the rhetoric of value-driven foreign policy and the implementation thereof was illustrated poignantly when the Dalai Lama...
applied for a visa to attend Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu’s eightieth birthday celebrations. Despite a personal pledge\(^\text{17}\) in 2009 (after a similar controversy) by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation that the Dalai Lama would be welcome to visit, it became apparent that the South African government had no intention of issuing the visa. A range of influential commentators entered the fray (\textit{inter alia}, Human Rights Watch, various Nobel Peace Laureates, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, and even British billionaire Richard Branson). Initially the South African government (even up to the level of the Deputy President) claimed that the delay in issuing the visa was for bureaucratic reasons. However, and as critics had insisted from the outset of the debacle, it transpired that government’s sole concern was its relations with China – since 2009 South Africa’s largest trading partner\(^\text{18}\) and ‘an increasingly important source of investment’.\(^\text{19}\)

A chorus of condemnation, led by Archbishop Tutu, slammed South Africa’s obsequiousness towards China, but to no avail. The Vice-Chancellor of Wits University, Professor Loyiso Nongxa, voiced the exasperation of many critics when he declared that ‘this betrayal of a key constitutional value provides a clear window into the fragility of the democracy we are trying to sustain’.\(^\text{20}\)

In an implicit reference to the furore, President Zuma in a speech on foreign policy later that same month, said:

\begin{quote}
Having outlined our relations with various regions and countries, let me state categorically that our foreign policy is independent and decisions are informed by the national interest. We look at what is of benefit to the South African people, and what will advance our domestic priorities at that given time. We are not dictated to by other countries, individuals or lobby group interests within our own country.\(^\text{21}\)
\end{quote}

During December the Department of Home Affairs finally conceded that the visa decision (or more precisely, the deliberate deferment of a decision) was a result of South Africa’s fear that China would retaliate. In a court affidavit submitted in December 2011, Home Affairs Director-General Mkuseli Apleni said that his advice to his minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was to take into account ‘that the Deputy President had just conducted a successful visit to

\[^{17}\text{Nkoane-Mashabane ‘Media briefing by the South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation’ Pretoria 14 May 2009.}\]
\[^{19}\text{Zuma at n 13 above.}\]
\[^{21}\text{Zuma n 13 above.}\]
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China’. At least it became clear that foreign policy principles had nothing to do with the process. National interest had become the new ‘norm’.

Whose ‘national’ interest?

According to Chris Alden and Amnon Aran, ‘what constitutes national interest, how it is determined and ultimately implemented are crucial to understanding the choices and responses pursued by states in international affairs’. In the heady first days of post-apartheid foreign policy, the term ‘national interest’ was studiously avoided in foreign policy rhetoric, presumably as it was deemed too politically incorrect and reminiscent of hegemonic intentions. But this coyness has dissipated slowly, especially with the advent of the Zuma presidency in 2009, and over the past few years ‘national interest’ has become a fixture in the foreign policy lexicon of government officials.

This was formalised during 2011, when the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) concluded the process (started during 2010) of drafting a White Paper on foreign policy. The final draft was published on 13 May 2011, and during August the document was approved by cabinet for submission to parliament. This intention in itself, and the extensive consultative meetings in the drafting process (involving business, labour, foreign policy analysts and wider civil society) are laudable and indicative of a desire on the part of government to ground foreign policy in a democratic mandate. But old habits die hard and the Department could not resist giving the White Paper a rather pretentious title: ‘Building a better world: The diplomacy of Ubuntu’. This crusading inclination was mirrored in the document itself, which declares that

> [s]ince 1994, the international community has looked to South Africa to play a leading role in championing values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment. South Africa has risen to the challenge and plays a meaningful role in the region, on the continent and globally.

Despite the ambitious name and consultation process, the document itself turned out to be mediocre, revealing very little beyond the rehearsed contents

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23Alden and Aran n 9 above at 4.
25The Nguni word means humanity, or literally, ‘to be human’, thus it could broadly be equated with cosmopolitan values.
of the Department’s various successive strategic plans. As expected, it announced the imminent formation of a South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR). This idea has been modelled on the reputation of institutions in other countries, such as the influential Council on Foreign Relations in the United States and its British sister organisation, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, known as ‘Chatham House’.

The White Paper states that the formation of SACOIR will reflect the ‘spirit of a more inclusive and open foreign policy approach’ in order to ‘engage key stakeholders ... with the aim of creating dynamic partnerships for development and cooperation’.\textsuperscript{27} This is a positive concept, but as in all advisory processes, the autonomy of the council will be pivotal to its legitimacy. In this regard it is regrettable that the terms of reference of the council were not subjected to the same consultation process that resulted in the White Paper, and therefore arbitrarily provide for a council under the full authority of DIRCO, with members appointed and dismissed by the minister alone. Even the appointment of the Chair and the Vice-Chair of SACOIR will be the minister’s prerogative.\textsuperscript{28} SACOIR will therefore battle to establish non-partisan credentials among its peer think-tanks in other democracies.

Something the White Paper did, and emphatically so, was to acknowledge national interest as a key driver of South African foreign policy. In so doing, it conceded (despite the usual moralistic rhetoric throughout the paper) that reality might induce pragmatism.\textsuperscript{29} It also emphasised the idea of national interest as being an inclusive consideration, by asserting:

\begin{quote}
The business of national interest cannot be the purview of the state alone, but it can encourage an enabling environment of dialogue and discourse among all stakeholders to interrogate policies and strategies, and their application in the best interests of the people.\textsuperscript{30}
\end{quote}

However, it would seem that in South Africa’s foreign policy, some stakeholders assume a role more equal than that of others. Traditionally, foreign policy analysis (FPA) has paid attention to the domestic drivers of policy decisions, but as Alden and Aran point out, the field of research has tended to neglect the role of political parties. They argue that:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{27} Id at 6.
\textsuperscript{28} DIRCO ‘Terms of Reference of the South African Council on International Relations’. See par 4 (Composition of SACOIR) and par 6 (Chair and Vice-Chair of SACOIR and Minister’s attendance of Plenary Meetings) at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/docs/2011/SACOIR.pdf (accessed 31 January 2012).
\textsuperscript{29} White Paper n 24 above at 11. It explains that ‘[a]t times, South Africa faces the challenge of balancing its national interests against global realities in a rapidly changing world. Our foreign policy imperatives will need to be able to address and manage these dynamics’.
\textsuperscript{30} Id Foreword.
\end{quote}
by focusing on political parties and foreign policy it is possible to move away from the normative tendency towards concentrating on democratic forms of governance and imbuing them with special attributes to examining dispassionately how single-party regimes, for example the Communist Party of China, operate in ways that mimic these key functions. Political parties utilise their international networks in ways that complement, supplement or even contradict the formal diplomatic bilateral state apparatus.

Arguably, Alden and Aran’s observation applies to dominant party systems as well, and this is where the South African case is instructive: since 1994, its multiparty democracy has been dominated by the ruling African National Congress (ANC). The extended rule by a single dominant party has played up concerns about democratic accountability, especially in a party-list electoral system where parliamentarians are beholden to the party rather than constituencies for keeping their jobs. With opposition parties posing no viable threat to the hegemony of the ANC, the media has stepped into the watchdog void. As Wasserman and Soloman observe, ‘[South African] journalists ... often fashion themselves in terms of an unofficial political opposition against the dominant ANC and its allies’. Hence the ‘ANC’ s hostility is widely perceived to result from the vigorous reporting of corruption, mismanagement and non-delivery’ by journalists, and this hostility explains the party’s threats to establish a statutory Media Appeals Tribunal in an attempt ‘to impose stronger sanctions on offending media’.

During November 2011, in a move that was widely construed as an attack on media freedom, the ANC used its parliamentary majority to pass the unpopular Protection of State Information Bill. Nic Dawes, Judith February and Zackie Achmat explain that, if signed into law, the so-called ‘secrecy bill’ would criminalise the possession and disclosure of classified information without state approval. It would also give bureaucrats new powers to classify information, making yet more information inaccessible to the public. The authors recall South Africa’s constitutional guarantee of access to information as a basic right, and

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31 Alden and Aran n 9 above at 60-61.
32 The tribunal was announced for the first time in 2007 at the ANC’s Polokwane conference. As explained by Wasserman and Soloman ‘this was based on the ANC’s criticism of the self-regulatory South African Press Council and Press Ombudsman’ ‘Outcry and protest’ TheWorldToday.Org January 2012 at 25.
33 Id at 25. The authors point out that the Secrecy Bill might actually impact even more adversely on civil society organisations that attempt to expose government wrongdoing, because they generally do not have the media’s easy access to legal resources.
warn that the bill would have ‘a chilling effect on freedom of speech and reverse the strides we have made toward more transparent governance’.35

In the run-up to the tabling of the bill, coordinated protests were held across the country. Dubbed the Right to Know (‘R2K’) campaign, the peaceful revolt found international resonance in the larger transnational movement to support freedom of speech and access to information. It also linked into the adoption by African media and civil society organisations (representing a wide range of countries in the continent) of the African Platform on Access to Information (APAI) which agitates for access to information legislation throughout the continent.36

Despite the domestic and international pressure, the party’s – rather than ‘national’ – interests prevailed. Similarly, in the handling of the Dalai Lama’s visa application, party interests seemed to have been a concern. In the same week the Dalai Lama cancelled his visa application to defuse the furore over it, Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe undertook an official visit to Beijing ‘to strengthen and consolidate political and economic relations’.37 This prompted Mzukisi Qobo to accuse the leadership of the ANC of going on ‘a pilgrimage to Beijing to genuflect before the Chinese Communist Party’.38 To be sure, in a foreign policy speech just a few weeks later, President Zuma singled out this specific bilateral relationship for effusive praise.39

Therefore, South Africa’s domestic policy, amplified in its foreign policy, increasingly manifests a blurred party-state distinction. It is not appropriate for diplomats or foreign policy leaders from democratic states to present themselves on the global stage as representatives of political parties, yet this practice has become commonplace in the case of South Africa. An example is President Zuma’s address to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) during September 2011. In an otherwise lacklustre speech (but following the usual template of reiterating support for ideological allies such as Palestine, Cuba, and Western Sahara) President Zuma reminded the world that it would be the ruling party’s centenary celebration during 2012.40 He used the opportunity of addressing a global audience to sing the praises of the ANC, and did so again a month later, in a foreign policy speech at the University of Pretoria. Inter alia, he observed that:

35Ibid.
36Wasserman and Soloman n 32 above at 27.
37DIRCO press release of 21 September 2011 n 18 above.
39Zuma n 13 above.
former ANC President Mr Oliver Reginald Tambo further enunciated our foreign policy thrust at the First Congress of the Angolan ruling party, the MPLA in Luanda in 1977.\footnote{Zuma n 13 above.}

As in this example, the party-state conflation is done seamlessly. It is reproduced in policy speeches both at the domestic and international levels. Apart from concerns about national accountability, a resultant problem is that any intra-party tension infiltrates foreign policy decisions. The most high-profile example of this was in December 2007, at the ANC’s 52nd national conference in Polokwane, where a ‘palace coup’ within the party led to the forced resignation of President Thabo Mbeki a few months later, compelling him hastily to cancel a scheduled appearance at the UNGA. During the year under review, the leadership battle in the ANC once again became acrimonious in the build-up to the party’s leadership elections scheduled for 2012. The leader of the ANC Youth League openly challenged the authority of the party, infamously even calling for ANC-supported regime change in Botswana. Julius Malema was eventually disciplined by his party, but other potential leadership contenders posed a more delicate challenge.

Some commentators\footnote{See, eg, Eno ‘The South African candidature for the post of chairperson of the African Union Commission: An affront or a ploy’ 30 Nov 2011 internet blog at http://opinion.myjoyonline.com/pages/feature/201111/77391.php (accessed 10 January 2012).} have wagered that it was for party-political reasons that, during the latter half of 2011, Home Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was nominated by the South African government to chair the African Union (AU) Commission. If successful, she would have to vacate her Cabinet post to move to Addis Ababa for the four-year term. This would be a tactical move to sideline an individual whose track-record and stature, both at home and abroad, has positioned her as a candidate for the presidency not only of the ANC, but of South Africa. It would also dispose of a Cabinet minister whose recent (and highly acclaimed) fight against corruption in the Department of Home Affairs, has seen her ‘taking on some very well-connected party funders’\footnote{Editor of the Mail & Guardian, Nick Dawes, in introductory remarks to the annual ‘Cabinet Report Cards’. Mail & Guardian Online December 2011 at http://cabinet.mg.co.za/ (accessed 31 December 2011).}.

**South Africa and leadership in Africa**

Speculation about Machiavellian plotting in the ruling party notwithstanding, the nomination of Dlamini-Zuma sheds light on the complex, often fraught, relationship between South Africa and the rest of the continent.

The move to install her in the AU’s top-job by challenging the incumbent, Jean Ping, induced heated debate in the African foreign policy community.
Supporters of her candidacy emphasised the many positive considerations: the declared support of the Southern African sub-region; her undisputed track-record as a strong leader, which bodes well for management of the AU’s day-to-day affairs; and the fact that she would be the first woman, first Anglophone and first Southern African to lead the AU Commission.

In similar positive vein, Handy and Kjeldgaard speculate that South Africa’s decision to send a top official for the AU Commission chair is a sign that the AU is growing in importance and is considered by the continent’s biggest economy as a critical position to influence the country’s international relations and Africa’s voice in the world.

This is certainly a message which the South African government has been advancing. Indeed, all South Africa’s initiatives to impact governance at the regional and global levels – including the nomination of Dlamini-Zuma – have been diplomatically packaged as efforts to promote the so-called African Agenda, with the implication that South Africa is willing to take leadership on behalf of the continent. But whether the country is willing or able to take leadership within the continent, and whether it is trusted by the rest of the continent to do so, is another matter.

A first concern is that South Africa, in hegemonic fashion, is acting unilaterally. As Sipho Hlongwane puts it, ‘[South Africa is] adding an element of schoolyard bullying to [its] interactions with other African countries’. The nomination of Dlamini-Zuma to replace a chair of the AU Commission who had served only one

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45Since the AU’s inception in 2002, its Commission has been chaired by three West Africans: former Ivorian Foreign Minister Amara Essy, former Malian President Alpha Omar Konaré, and since February 2008, former Gabonese Foreign Minister Jean Ping.
47For example, in his State of the Nation Address on 10 February 2011, President Zuma said, ‘We have taken up our non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, which we will use to promote the African agenda as well as peace and security in Africa and the world’. See too, DIRCO White Paper n 24 above at 26 which promises that South Africa ‘will use [its] membership [of BRICS] as a strategic opportunity to advance the interests of Africa in global issues such as the reform of global governance, the work of the G20, international trade, development, energy and climate change’.
term, was seen by many observers as a confrontational gesture. Moreover, South Africa’s bid (notwithstanding SADC support) is alleged to have taken place without adequate consultation among the wider AU membership. This, according to Handy and Kjeldgaard, created the impression that South Africa was ‘relying on its own strength as a regional power in Africa to get this position’.  

Another concern was that the bid trampled on a customary rule within the AU that the position of the chairperson should not go to any dominant economic and military power of the continent, in order to prevent power politics from upsetting the diplomatic balance in the AU, and possibly paralysing vital decisions on the continent’s collective interests. It also raised suspicions about a hidden South African agenda, possibly linked to the country’s ambition to become a permanent member of the UNSC.

The latter point raises a sensitive matter, namely South Africa’s positioning of itself vis-à-vis perceived competition in the continent, with other influential states such as Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Kenya, Senegal, and within SADC, Angola. This competitive flip-side to the African Agenda is revealed in DIRCO’s 2011 White Paper:

A number of regional trends could combine to result in challenges to South Africa’s regional leadership position. High energy prices and rapid growth rates could see the emergence of other regional economic centres, with aspirations for regional influence and leadership. The rapid development of a growing number of developing countries is also likely to result in increased competition among states to position themselves in order to maximise their international profiles and visibility.

Commenting on the White Paper, Peter Fabricius observes that South Africa’s ‘anxiety’ about challenges to its leadership in Africa is ‘revealing because it suggests quite strongly that South Africa ultimately wants to be a global player not for Africa’s sake but for its own’. He notes the White Paper’s ambivalence in this regard, because a rise in the stature of Africa’s resource-rich countries will create not just political competition for South Africa, but also opportunities in the sense of bigger export markets.

South Africa’s ambition to take a leading role on the global stage makes it all the more important that its leadership credentials within Africa are above

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49 Handy and Kjeldgaard n 46 above.
50 For example, Eno n 42 above, points out that South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt and Libya wield considerable influence by virtue of their financial, military and material contributions to the AU.
51 Ibid, see too Cilliers and Louw-Vaudran n 44 above.
52 Handy and Kjeldgaard n 46 above.
53 White Paper n 24 above at19.
board. During the course of 2011 there were certainly some successes in this regard. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Africa provided massive logistical assistance to ensure peaceful elections during December 2011. Madagascar is also a case in point: a political breakthrough was achieved when its cabinet resigned and South Africa engineered the signing of a ‘road map’ to the achievement of democratic elections. And, in the case of Zimbabwe, there were signs that ‘South Africa may ... have reached the limits of liberatory solidarity’ as Deon Geldenhuys phrases it. Geldenhuys credits President Zuma with being the driving force behind a critical SADC report of June 2011, but adds the caveat that South Africa’s more forceful position towards Zimbabwe may have been induced by the anti-government revolts that swept across North Africa.

Unfortunately, South Africa’s normative leadership in the continent was overshadowed by areas where its foreign policy seemed to be ‘on a collision course’ with that of other African states. Marius Fransman, one of the Deputy Ministers of International Relations and Cooperation, acknowledged that during their joint tenure on the Security Council ‘the three African countries did not always adopt common positions or stance on African issues before the agenda of the Council’. He prefaced this comment with the assurance that ‘most of the policy positions adopted and pursued by the country since January 2011 were guided largely by African and AU positions on African conflicts’.

Many critics would beg to differ. Indeed, 2011 was punctuated by several foreign policy blunders in Africa, of which the two most prominent were the political crises in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. Echoing the criticism of South Africa’s behaviour during the AU Commission chairperson bid, Jakkie Cilliers and Liesl Louw-Vaudran point out that in both these cases, ‘South Africa was seen to act without due consultation and made a number of contradictory decisions’. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa supported the incumbent initially, and remained ‘largely idle’ for months while Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down and recognise Alassane Ouattara’s victory in the presidential elections of

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55 Cabinet Report Card on the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation’ n 43 above.
56 Geldenhuys n 14 above at 7.
57 Hlongwane n 48 above.
58 Nigeria and Gabon were the other two non-permanent African members during 2011.
59 Fransman n 4 above.
60 Cilliers and Louw-Vaudran n 44 above.
61 See, eg, comment in The Economist n 11 above, and ‘Cabinet Report Cards’ at n 43 above.
62 Vasco Martins accuses the South African government of ambiguity on the crisis, variously congratulating Ouattara on his victory, ‘only to announce its neutrality afterwards’ and then on 21 January 2012, Zuma alleged that ‘there were some discrepancies on the manner in which the election had come to the final pronouncement of the vote’, while labelling the international calls for Gbagbo’s departure as ‘counter-productive’. The Côte d’Ivoire crisis in retrospect’ (2011) 5/Spring/Summer Portuguese Journal of International Affairs at 78.
November 2010 – this despite the fact that the outcome of the election had been endorsed by the relevant sub-regional organisation (the Economic Community of West African States), the AU and the broader international community. During January 2011, South Africa even positioned a naval frigate, the SAS Drakensberg, off the Ivorian coast, a move that was construed by ECOWAS as military support for Gbagbo (even if the government argued that the frigate was a supply vessel, on a routine training mission in West Africa). Arguably, South Africa’s mixed messages afforded Gbagbo an opportunity to dig in his heels while the death toll and scope of destruction escalated. It also infuriated Nigeria, the regional powerhouse and an ECOWAS anchor state, which is all too experienced in the spill-over devastation of civil wars in West Africa.

In fairness, it should be noted that the South Africans were pushing for a negotiated settlement between the two Ivorian sides, proposing a power-sharing agreement in which Gbagbo would retain the presidency and Ouattara would assume a position as Vice-President. This approach is aligned to the broader South African policy framework, specifically the respect for sovereignty and rejection of foreign interference. Having previously mediated in the same country, the South Africans also realised that the technical outcome of the elections would not necessarily secure long-term peace in the deeply divided country. However, the ‘quiet’ diplomatic strategy, pursued at a bilateral level, happened to the detriment of South Africa’s much vaunted commitment to multilateralism.

The initial insistence on appeasing Gbagbo also reminded critics of the South African approach to the crisis in Zimbabwe, where South African support bolstered a recalcitrant Robert Mugabe for many years. Handy and Kjeldgaard summarise the criticism of the Côte d’Ivoire policy by noting increasing ‘doubts ... about SA’s commitment to the promotion of democracy in Africa and respect for the stabilising role of regional organisations’. Hlongwane is blunter. He says ‘South Africa could be acting as a beacon of morality, but it isn’t’ and adds that all three post-apartheid South African presidents have had an attitude of ‘you don’t let go of old friends, no matter how rotten they are’.

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64 Martins n 62 above at 80. See too, Motsamai n 12 above at 32.
65 Motsamai n 12 above at 32. She points out that ‘Zuma’s prioritisation of bilateralism, as illustrated by the proliferation of “strategic” partnerships and binational commissions since 2009, may be counterproductive to Pretoria’s African agenda’.
66 Handy and Kjeldgaard n 46 above.
67 Hlongwane n 48 above.
Eventually South Africa reversed its position in March 2011 and joined the call of the AU’s Peace and Security Council for Gbagbo to step down. However, the bloody stand-off continued and was only ended during April 2011 when French troops, with UN support and authorisation, intervened militarily. The fact that the Ivorian crisis was defused through foreign intervention, as opposed to intervention initiated by ECOWAS or the AU, exposed ‘institutional weaknesses and divisions within the AU’, and saw the organisation sidelined because it is ‘unable to authoritatively speak with one voice and take full charge to resolve a conflict in its own backyard’. Festus Aboagye, in a review of the AU’s recent interventions, refers to the diplomacy of the organisation as ‘dysfunctional’ and ‘fossilized’.

Yet another foreign policy morass for South Africa (and the AU) was the international intervention in Libya. The legal and political debate about the modalities of the case has been covered extensively by analysts and will not be explored in this article. Suffice to state that on 17 March 2011, South Africa voted in favour of UNSC Resolution 1973 which imposed a ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya. This decision was neither as irrational nor as mercenary as many observers alleged. South Africa went into its second term as UNSC member cognisant of the legacy of its voting behaviour during its previous (2007/2008) term, when it was widely criticised, also by other African states, for siding with oppressive regimes. In anticipation of the second term, policy leaders vowed to be more consistent and transparent in adhering to constitutional values. During February, for example, on her way to attend a UN Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva, Minister Nkoana-Mashabane declared that South Africa would show ‘zero tolerance on impunity for grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms globally’. The AU had been tardy and ambiguous in its
response\textsuperscript{71} to the crisis in Libya, and arguably this allowed leeway for all three African members of the UNSC to support the intervention to protect civilians. A third consideration was that during the immediately preceding events in Tunisia and Egypt, public revolt was followed by largely peaceful and rapid exits of autocratic leaders, and that had created the expectation that Libya would follow suit. Another, and perhaps more compelling, fact was that the Arab League had appealed for the intervention\textsuperscript{74} – a variable which convinced even the most resolute opponents of intervention, the Russians and Chinese, to withhold their vetoes. And, finally, Resolution 1973 contained no reference to foreign occupation or regime change in its operative paragraphs. This explains President Zuma’s confidence when he declared several months later that, given a similar situation, South Africa would have made the same decision.\textsuperscript{75} In its voting behaviour on Resolution 1973, South Africa may have acted in haste or endorsed a vaguely worded resolution, but it did not contravene any of its foreign policy principles.

What caused more controversy was South Africa’s subsequent lambasting of the international intervention, and the diplomatic mud-slinging that accompanied the debate. The anti-western rhetoric\textsuperscript{76} caused much resentment among NATO members, but the latter’s ‘rather generous interpretation’ of its UNSC mandate\textsuperscript{77} cannot be doubted: as the intervention escalated in ferocity, it became clear that NATO’s goal was nothing less than regime change.\textsuperscript{78} Therefore, South Africa had ample reason to baulk at the manner in which the intervention was handled. Where the country’s foreign policy floundered, however, was in the belated attempt at mediation as part of the AU’s high-level mediation panel. Despite the AU’s much-vaunted institutional provision for intervention in cases of crimes against humanity – envisaged under article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act – the organisation failed to invoke any punitive measures, not even sanctions.\textsuperscript{79} Therefore, Zuma’s various visits to Tripoli to seek audience with Gaddafi seemed spurious, if not downright naïve, and predictably ended in failure.

\textsuperscript{71}The AU did in fact, a week before the adoption of UNSC resolution 1973, release a ‘road map’ which encouraged a political solution to the conflict, and discouraged military intervention. The wording of the AU document was, however, not sufficiently emphatic to preclude its members’ support for UNSC resolution 1973.
\textsuperscript{74}Christie n 71 above.
\textsuperscript{75}Zuma n 13 above.
\textsuperscript{76}Handy and Kjeldgaard n 46 above.
\textsuperscript{77}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79}Dersso n 78 above.
South Africa at the high table of global governance

A pervasive theme thus far has been international scrutiny of South Africa’s continental and global leadership role, given its confidence that, in President Zuma’s words, ‘we believe we can play a critical role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, advancing the interests of the continent’. As part of its strategy to be included at the highest levels of global governance (representing Africa’s or its own interests or both, depending on the view of commentators), South Africa has increasingly resorted to ‘club diplomacy’. Also known as mini-lateralism, this implies the formation of diplomatic associations with small groups of selected strategic partners. Examples of the latter are South Africa’s well-documented membership of the trilateral India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) forum, and its status as sole African member of the G-20.

A highlight of 2011 was South Africa’s joining of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) group of powerful emerging economies. In his inaugural address at the BRICS summit (held on 14 April 2011 in China) President Zuma proclaimed, ‘We are now equal co-architects of a new equitable international system’ and added, on the same idealistic note, ‘such a new world order will be to the benefit of all humanity and aims at securing shared prosperity for all’. Six months later, Zuma again used the opportunity to attach a normative agenda to South Africa’s joining of BRICS:

South Africa uses its membership of BRICS as a strategic opportunity to advance the interests of Africa in global issues such as the reform of global governance, the work of the G20, international trade, development, energy and climate change.

Zuma echoed the sentiments of many commentators on the significance of this recently constituted diplomatic node within the emerging world order. The relevance of BRICS is not restricted to the economic sphere, but as Lubomir Georgiev opines,

the distinct need for taking into account the BRICs in the global economic policy-making...[has resulted in] a sui generis political club that posts on the agenda their inclusion in the political processes on shaping a new multi-polar world.

Zuma n 13 above.


Georgiev ‘The BRICs – one of the manifestations of the future multi-polar world’ (2011) 6 Diplomacy at 214 points out the substantial economic influence of the BRICS: 15% share in global trade, 20% -plus share in global GDP, and significantly, in terms of growth potential, ‘42% of the world population, 2/3 of which being of working age’. At 207, he also notes the stabilising role of BRICS ‘against the background of the shrinking economies in the developed countries and the ageing population in most of them’.

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The idea that BRICS poses an alternative power pole to counter not only the economic but also the political hegemony of the west, is supported by the fact that it includes two permanent members of the UNSC, and three aspiring permanent members.

All five BRICS countries served on the UNSC during 2011, a coincidence that afforded some insight into their potential alignment of foreign policy positions at the highest table of global governance. But as the year progressed, the various contentious issues on the agenda of the Council did not generate coordinated foreign policy responses. Rather, as Nganje points out, the voting behaviour of the five countries exposed ‘the divergent national interest considerations of emerging economies’. He warns that ‘contrary to what might have been hoped for when South Africa joined the BRICS club, Pretoria cannot safely depend on its emerging power allies for the promotion of the African agenda in the UNSC’.

Indeed, South African policy makers’ penchant for trumpeting a normative international agenda and their zeal to bond with non-Western allies, may have blinded them to the fact that BRICS has neither an ideational foundation nor a value-driven mission. As Andrew Cooper has pointed out, the club is ‘largely silent on most political, strategic and social matters’.

South Africa has ample value-driven foreign policy projects and diplomatic affiliations (such as IBSA, which does indeed have a normative agenda) and its policy makers do not have to attach this label to all their diplomatic endeavours. For example, the year 2011 ended on a high (and ‘green’) note when the country successfully hosted yet another international summit, this time the UN’s COP17, on climate change. The two-week summit in Durban reached a deal labelled the ‘Durban Package’: it undertakes to negotiate a new and more inclusive treaty and the establishment of a Green Climate Fund, and provides for legally binding targets on greenhouse gas emissions that will come into force as from 2020. The emission targets are much lower, and the target date much later, than hoped for and the outcome of the conference was therefore by all accounts a watered down compromise. In foreign policy analysis such a phenomenon can be described as ‘satisficing’, a result not optimal or satisfactory to the policy makers involved, but nonetheless meeting a bare minimum of adequacy.

Although reviews of South Africa’s (and in particular conference president, Nganje n 69 above at 3.


The COP17/CMP7 UN Framework on Climate Change Conference was held from 28 November to 9 December 2011 in Durban, South Africa.

Alden and Aran n 9 above at 23.
Minister Nkoana-Mashabane’s) handling of the negotiations have been mixed, the fact of the matter is that the COP 17 meeting was never going to be easy, regardless of the host country. And few insiders expected the conference to result in any level of success, given the acrimonious tenor of the global debate on climate change. The modest success of the conference, and South Africa’s procedural handling thereof, is therefore not to be sneered at. As Patel remarks:

Climate change is one of the most divisive and complex areas [in international relations] today and a failure in Durban would have hindered the future of multilateral decision making. South Africa’s mediation efforts were aimed at securing an inclusive, transparent and multilateral process.

COP 17 thus offered a positive manifestation of South African foreign policy practice adhering to its guiding principles.

**Conclusion**

A perusal of the literature on South Africa’s foreign policy over the course of 2011, yields little consensus on the substance or trends in the policy. Commentary across the spectrum of critics (and even supporters) of government decisions, is punctuated by terms such as ‘contradictory’, ‘unpredictable’, ‘ambiguous’, ‘temperamental’, ‘regressive’, ‘controversial’, ‘clumsy’, ‘sometimes-racist’ and even ‘disastrous’. In essence, it has been a year of mixed messages. What is becoming obvious, is that there is a leadership deficit – or as Gilbert Khadiagala says, ‘lack of a clear sense of leadership, inspiration and purpose’ in this domain of South African policy formulation and implementation.

Naturally, criticism starts with a comparison of rhetoric (what policy professes

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90 Cilliers and Louw-Vaudran n 44 above.
91 *The Economist* n 11 above.
92 Martins n 62 above at 80.
93 Motsamai n 12 above, at 31.
94 Qobo n 38 above.
95 Handy and Kjeldgaard n 46 above.
96 Christie n 71 above.
97 Handy n 70 above at 9.
98 ‘Cabinet Report Card’ n 43 above. See also Patel n 89 above, regarding the peculiar and ‘unhurried’ mediation style of the South Africans, which irked allies and foes alike.
to be) and revelation (how the policy manifests in practice). In this regard, it was found that almost two decades after the country’s transition to democracy, South African foreign policy still displays moralistic verbosity. A normative approach, which is in keeping with South Africa’s constitutional mores, is desirable. Excessive proselytising, paired with flagrant displays of political expediency, devalues South Africa’s international credibility.

If foreign policy leaders have finally owned up to the centrality of South Africa’s self interest in foreign policy implementation, many of them are yet to see the line which (should) exist(s) between state and party interests. ‘National interest’ in a democratic dispensation means exactly that, and on the global stage, South African leaders should be proud to represent a country of rich (and sometimes unwieldy) diversity. This is not just an idealised code of public conduct, it is a constitutional imperative, and it is implied in the South African foreign policy principle that projects ‘the promotion of democracy’ into the international arena.

An area that remains problematic, is South Africa’s leadership credentials within its own continent. Many worthy diplomatic initiatives are being implemented, but their success is shadowed by doubts about South Africa’s intentions and mandate, and bewilderment over the complex emergencies where the Republic shies away from decisive leadership. At issue is not South Africa’s insistence on peaceful solutions to conflicts (and definitely not its prudent hesitation to join armed intervention), but rather the methodology involved: indulging unrepentant dictators, insisting on drawn-out political procedures when an humanitarian catastrophe is unfolding, and not reading the diplomatic mood of a region. Something many commentators have pointed out, is that grave situations demand decisive leadership, which includes the threat of military action by a regional or global power who has the ability and political will to execute an ultimatum. South Africa’s ability to lead the AU in matters of peace and security – and by analogy its credentials to assume a permanent position in the UNSC – hinges not only on its soft power, but on its hard power as well. Any ambiguity in this regard undermines credibility.

South Africa has a track-record of punching above its weight in international forums, and its 2011 admission to the BRICS is evidence of this. In some spheres of global governance, its diplomacy is assertive, even transformative. Yet in other respects, and often within Africa, it fumbles and contradicts itself. Nganje makes the point that South Africa’s defence of ‘the African agenda in the UNSC should ... begin in Addis Ababa and not in New York’. Likewise, its defence of the South African agenda should start in Pretoria. It is a matter of leadership.

100 See Nkoana-Mashabane n 8 above.
101 Handy and Kjeldgaard n 46 above. See too Martins n 62 above at 83 and 84.
102 Nganje n 69 above at 4.