From ruination to renewal: The critical value of a proto-crystalline regime in German expressionist cinema

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In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Gilles Deleuze maintains that cinematic time-images first emerged after World War Two against the backdrop of the ‘any-space-whatever’ reflected in Italian neo-realism, and because of the corresponding crisis of the action-image, which occurred around this time. In this regard, in Cinema 2, Deleuze distinguishes the organic regime of the movement-image from the crystalline regime of the time-image, through an explication of the four crystal states of the time-image – namely those found in the films of Max Ophüls, Jean Renoir, Luchino Visconti and Federico Fellini. However, only three years after completing his two-volume work on film, Deleuze made a radically self-reflexive suggestion that time-images might exist in pre-World War Two cinema; that is, in cinema before the advent of Italian neo-realism and its ‘any-space-whatever.’ Arguably, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that German expressionist films of the 1920s were the cinematic domain that Deleuze had in mind as the home of such prototype time-images, and in this article, evidence for this is explored and proto-time-images in films by Robert Wiene, Paul Wegener and Friedrich Murnau are identified. Moreover, the critical value for contemporary film theory of establishing the existence of such a proto-crystalline regime, and of linking it with the ‘any-space-whatever’ that resulted from the ‘death of God’ in the late 19th century, is also investigated.

Key words: German expressionism, Italian neo-realism, movement-image, time-image, ‘any-space-whatever’

Die kritiese waarde van ‘n proto-kristalmatige regime in die Duitse ekspressionistiese film

In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image en Cinema 2: The Time-Image, voer Gilles Deleuze aan dat filmiese tyd-beelde die eerste keer na die Tweede Wêreldoorlog begin gebruik is teen die agtergrond van die “enige-ruimte-wat ookaal” (‘any-space-whatever’) soos weerspieël in die Italiaanse neorealisme, en vanweë die ooreenstemmende krisis van die aksie-beeld wat rondom hierdie tyd voorgekom het. In hierdie verband, in Cinema 2, onderskei Deleuze tussen die organiese regime van die beweging-beeld en van die kristalmatige regime van die tyd-beeld, deur middel van ‘n verduidelik van die vier kristalstadia van die tyd-beeld – naamlik in die films van Max Ophüls, Jean Renoir, Luchino Visconti en Federico Fellini. Drie jaar na die voltooiing van sy tweeelige werk oor film het Deleuze egter ‘n radikale selfrefleksiewe voorstel gemaak dat tyd-beelde wel in die film van voor die Tweede Wêreldoorlog mag bestaan het; dit wil sê, in films voor die aanbreek van die Italiaanse neorealisme en die opvatting oor die “enige-ruimte-wat ookaal.” Daar bestaan genoegsame bewys om te veronderstel dat die Duitse ekspressionistiese film van die twintigerjare die filmdomein was wat Deleuze in gedagte gehad het as die bron van sulke tyd-beelde, en in hierdie artikel word dit ondersoek en veral die proto-tyd-beelde in die films van Robert Wiene, Paul Wegener en Friedrich Murnau geleïdent. Voorts word die kritiese waarde vir eintydse filmteorie van die vsstelling van ‘n proto-kristalmatige regime en die koppeling daarvan aan die opvatting van “enige-ruimte-wat ookaal” as gevolg van die ‘dood van God’ in die laat-negentiende eeu ook ondersoek.

Sleutelwoorde: Duitse ekspressionistiese film, Italiaanse neorealisme, aksie-beeld, tyd-beeld, ‘enige-ruimte-wat ookaal’

The passing of time comprises the nebulous phenomenon around which Gilles Deleuze’s Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image are orientated. While Cinema 1 is dedicated to an exposition of how movement-images provide an indirect image of the passing of time, in Cinema 2 the emergence of time-images and their provision of a direct image of such passing are explored in detail. Deleuze explains that movement-images comprising of perception, affection and action-images – or images through which viewers see not only what the characters in a film see, but also how they are affected by what they see,

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and how such affect translates into action – became severely problematized after World War Two. On the one hand, this was because there emerged after the war a pervasive incredulity toward the possibility of effective agency, as the devastation of the war had shattered the traditional cultural sensory-motor schemata of those who survived the war. As such, they found themselves situated within an ‘any-space-whatever,’ where the direction and orientation of their future actions were severely problematized. ¹ On the other hand, contemporaneous factors “internal to art, to literature and to the cinema in particular,” ² resonated powerfully with the disorientation of such prevailing cultural sentiment, and therefore received endorsement as apt expressions of the zeitgeist of the era (Deleuze 2004: 209-210). ³ Significantly, in Cinema 1, Deleuze privileges Italian neorealism over the various other forms of cinema that emerged around this time, because of the incisiveness with which it penetrated and represented the post-war situation. That is, unlike many other forms of cinema that were contemporaneous with it, neorealism was for the most part devoid of action-images, and contained instead a proliferation of opsigns and sonsigns, or images and sounds which confronted the characters but to which they could not respond, because they could not fully comprehend them (Deleuze 2004: 215-219). ⁴ Yet, accordingly, this incomprehension and corresponding paralysis did not result in stasis, but rather in intensified ontological introspection, the eventual consequence of which was the emergence of time-images, or cinema that provides direct images of the passing of time. In effect, such time-images reflect not the triadic operation of perception–affection–action that is characteristic of movement-images (Deleuze 2004: 65-68), but rather the interface that constantly occurs between the virtual world of the past, and the actual world of the present. As Deleuze explains in Cinema 2, in terms of this interface, a virtual past that is always present with us (for example, our personal and social history, and the myriad of idiosyncratic and intimate connections that we have made between them), is selectively recalled to negotiate with an actual present, which is always in the process of passing (Deleuze 2005: 66-69, 76-80). And it is the imagistic thematization of the nuances and subtleties of this complex interface that comprises the profound intuitive ambit of cinematic time-images. ⁵

In what follows, Deleuze’s intimation that time-images involve direct representations of both the constant passing of time, and the variegated speeds with which time passes, will be explored. In this regard, it will be advanced that the actual/virtual interface of the four crystal states of the time-image that Deleuze points out in Cinema 2 – namely those reflected in the films of Max Ophüls, Jean Renoir, Luchino Visconti and Federico Fellini – range, respectively, from (1) proximal stasis because of the domination of the actual by the virtual, through either (2) sudden/partial or (3) gradual/systemic destabilization of virtual hegemony, to (4) rapid creative interplay between the actual and the virtual. ⁶ After this, Deleuze’s suggestion, in his 1988 Preface to the English edition of Cinema 2, that time-images might exist in pre-World War Two cinema, will be engaged with, in relation to Deleuze’s treatment of German expressionist films in Cinema 1 – treatment which indicates that he had such cinema in mind when he later suggested the possibility of earlier time-images. Next, possible proto-time-images will be identified in Robert Wiene’s The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920), Paul Wegener’s The Golem (1920), and Friedrich Murnau’s Nosferatu (1922) as well as his later film Faust (1926). In short, it will be advanced that each of these four films houses a prototype of one of the four crystal states of the time-image, mentioned by Deleuze in Cinema 2. However, understandably, such proto-time-images cannot be considered in isolation from the thematic orientation of the films in which they occur, which include, respectively, the terrifying tyranny of men who play God, recourse to chthonic forces via occult practices, the frightening encroachment by nefarious supernatural powers upon a protestant bourgeois domain, and the rejection of faith in Christianity. And it will be argued that thematization of such aspects is important, because they situate the films not only
against the backdrop of the ‘any-space-whatever’ of post-World War One Germany, but also against the backdrop of an earlier (and more profoundly disorientating) ‘any-space-whatever’ – namely that which derived from the ‘death of God’ in the late 19th century. Finally, the relevance for contemporary film theory of such a reappraisal of the history of the crystalline regime will be considered. This will be done via an examination of Friedrich Nietzsche’s proclamation of the ‘death of God’ in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, along with his allusion to the transformation of subjectivity made possible by this event, in relation to the three orders of time advanced by Deleuze in his Difference and Repetition.

**Organic and crystalline regimes**

In Cinema 2, Deleuze makes the distinction between the organic regime of the movement-image on the one hand, and the crystalline regime of the time-image on the other hand. In terms of this distinction, the organic regime has four defining features. Firstly, it represents things that exist independently of the film (for example, houses, forests, mountains, rivers, etcetera). Secondly, it is orientated around the linkages – causal, logical, etcetera – that connect such things. Thirdly, it is dependent on (traditional) cultural sensory-motor schemata to lend coherence to its cinematic narratives. And fourthly, its focus falls on events that are possible, historically speaking. In contrast, the crystalline regime differs from the organic regime point for point. Firstly, it represents things that neither exist independently of the film (for example, characters’ memories, dreams, interpretations, etcetera), nor exist as something immutable within the film – insofar as they can be dissolved, changed or contradicted as the film proceeds. Secondly, it is orientated around virtual linkages, and their linkage, in turn, with actual phenomena from which they are indissociable, with the consequence that narrative patterns become highly unstable, fluid and protean. Thirdly, it is dependent on the disintegration of (traditional) cultural sensory-motor schemata, because their dissolution gives rise to opsigns and sonsigns, which comprise the backdrop against which direct time-images emerge. And fourthly, its focus falls less on what is possible, and more on what is incompossible; in other words, co-existent realities that are incompatible with one another but nevertheless indissociable. This occurs in cinema that thematizes how – in terms of Bergson’s schema of time – while certain truths/events of the past cannot but continue to comprise the condition of the possibility of certain truths/events of the present, they are nevertheless, for some or other reason, negated or rendered redundant by the latter (Deleuze 2005: 122-127).

As such, a good metaphor for the organic regime might be a window, which affords the viewer a vision of a world that, although beyond their immediate locality, is still recognizable as a possible domain of existence. Moreover, in this domain, existence is governed by relatively stable sensory-motor schemata and causal/logical linkages, so that effective action – in relation to independently existing phenomena – remains a given. In contrast, a good metaphor for the crystalline regime – one which Deleuze himself employs in his discussion of its dynamics – is that of a mirror; a mirror in which the characters of a film are observed concomitantly losing and finding themselves. Accordingly, this virtual mirror contains all the reflections of a past that always remains contemporaneous with an actual passing present – the passing of which flows into the mirror interminably. Consequently, in such cinema, the viewer does not always encounter actual – or even possible – domains of existence, nor can they rest assured that events will follow either a causal/logical pattern or the imperatives of any sensory-motor schema. More importantly, such cinema concerns not the transformation of the world through effective action, but rather the transformation of the characters’ (and, for that matter, the viewer’s) subjectivity.
This transformation occurs through an encounter with direct time-images and the emergence of the associated insight into the constant, dynamic constitution of the individual – as a point of interface between a constantly deepening virtual past and a perpetually passing actual present.

In this regard, Deleuze advances the importance of crystals of time, in which the ever widening circuits of the organic regime – which sought to represent the world – are rejected, and “the smallest circuit that functions as internal limit for all the others” is pursued, namely the “point of indiscernibility [or]…the coalescence of the actual image and the virtual image” (Deleuze 2005: 66-67). Such “exchange or indiscernibility…follow each other in three ways in the crystalline circuit: the actual and the virtual[…]…the limpid and the opaque; the seed and the environment” (Deleuze 2005: 69). To simplify things: the performance of any actual activity is only afforded through a coexistent virtual double of the experience. On the one hand, this virtual double comprises the gateway through which the actual present rushes into the repository of the virtual past, and contributes to its constant deepening. On the other hand, this virtual double also constitutes the intercessor through which, from out of the depths of the virtual past, the relevant memories become limpid (at the expense of others that become opaque) in order to pass into the actual present – as virtual seeds which will crystallize the actual environment, by responding to its requirements. Moreover, as such crystallization gives rise in turn to new requirements, so the process of such actual/virtual interface reoccurs, in perpetuity.

Yet, such a perfectly balanced, reciprocal exchange between the actual and the virtual is the exception rather than the rule. This is because, while we seldom encounter simple actual situations to which we can respond, we all too often encounter the virtual responses of others, which comprise mirrors – narrative, visual, rhetorical, etcetera – in which we simultaneously lose and find ourselves. Indeed, when a perfectly balanced, reciprocal exchange between the actual and the virtual is achieved, it is usually so extraordinary that it often becomes the stuff of legends. Arguably, the most common of these today – presumably because of the popularization of Buddhism in recent years – concern the quasi-mythical masters of Zen. These figures, because of their consummate meditative skill and long years of ascetic practice, are believed capable of addressing the requirements of any actual situation with exactly the right virtual measure, and in a way that recognizes but does not fall prey to the virtual mirrors of others. In this regard, while books such as Eugen Herrigel’s *Zen in the Art of Archery* precipitated popular Western interest in the ‘mysticism’ of such balanced actual/virtual exchange, works like Robert M. Pirsig’s *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* followed and announced the universality of such experience, along with its modern applicability. In recent years, moreover, this relative trickle of texts has developed into a raging torrent, within which the Zen of *everything* – from golf to guitar playing, and from parenting to stand-up comedy – has become the latest cash cow to be exhaustively milked by the marketing machines of consumerism. However, it would be an exaggeration to say that the widespread contemporary fascination with Zen is solely the consequence of effective advertising campaigns. Although such campaigns have no doubt played their part in engendering such fascination, it is also possible that it derives significantly from the powerful allure of the idea of a balanced exchange between the actual and the virtual. This idea remains attractive because, as Deleuze points out via his discussion of the four crystal states of the time-image in *Cinema 2*, a profoundly unbalanced exchange is more characteristic of the human condition.

As Deleuze intimates, in relation to the time-images reflected in the films of Max Ophüls, Jean Renoir, Luchino Visconti and Federico Fellini, the actual/virtual interface can range in speed, respectively, from (1) proximal stasis because of the domination of the actual by the virtual, through either (2) sudden/partial or (3) gradual/systemic destabilization of virtual hegemony, to (4) rapid creative interplay between the actual and the virtual.
To begin with, in Ophüls’s films, one encounters virtual mirrors that are so encompassing that they dominate the actual/virtual interface, and force the actual to become submerged in the virtual, through enclosing the actual too tightly within an all-embracing virtual scope. When this occurs, the actual can no longer present the virtual with a series of challenges, because the power of the virtual is such that it remains blind to the nuances of such challenges, and responds to them only formulaically – as though all possible answers were given in their entirety in advance.13 The greatest manifestation of such an actual/virtual arrangement, and the most troubling because of its consequences, is of course political fanaticism. In terms of this, the dictates of a past-orientated virtual (meta-)narrative are blindly deferred to, in a way that eclipses rather than addresses the nuanced requirements of any actual situation at hand. Historically, on a national level, such an actual/virtual arrangement became dominant in Germany and Italy during the late 1930s and was instrumental in precipitating the Second World War, which was articulated as a ‘righteous’ reclamation of Aryan heritage and Roman glory, respectively.14 Thus, it is perhaps entirely fitting that, after discussing the incomprehension and corresponding paralysis within the ‘any-space-whatever’ that followed the war, which was succinctly reflected in Italian neorealism, Deleuze advances the films of Ophüls as the first of the four crystal states of the time-image. This first crystal state, which is the product of intensified ontological introspection against the backdrop of the opsigns and sonsigns of Italian neorealism, provides a highly salient imagistic thematization of the actual/virtual dynamic that makes possible the great tragedy of political fanaticism – and for that matter, even the smallest private obsession. Accordingly, “Ophüls’s images are perfect crystals…Crystalline perfection lets no outside subsist: there is no outside of the mirror or the film set, but only an obverse where the characters who disappear or die go, abandoned by life which thrusts itself back into the film set” (Deleuze 2005: 80-81). This is clearly the case in Ophüls’s La Ronde (1950), the narrative of which revolves around the fleeting sexual encounters of an array of characters, all of them orchestrated by the meneur de jeu (Anton Walbrook). This character, not found in Arthur Schnitzler’s Reigen (1903), the play on which the film is based, both directs the actors that surround him – as though he is operating outside of the narrative – while simultaneously constituting an additional character within the narrative, namely the all-comprehending narrator who addresses the audience directly. As such, because he advises the actors how to play their roles while playing a role himself, there are no actual wings into which the actors can escape from the virtual hegemony of the narrative. On the contrary, it is precisely when they begin to approximate such an escape that they encounter the meneur de jeu, who directs them back to centre-stage. Accordingly, “the actual image and the virtual image coexist and crystallize; they enter into a circuit which brings us constantly back from one to the other; they form one and the same ‘scene’ where the characters belong to the real and yet play a role” (Deleuze 2005: 80-81). Similarly, this submersion of the actual in the virtual comprises the most salient theme of Le Plaisir (1952), Ophüls’s cinematic articulation of three short stories by Guy de Maupassant, namely The Mask, Madame Tellier’s Establishment, and The Model. Firstly, in The Mask, an old man, Ambroise (Jean Galland), is dominated by the memories of his glamorous youth to such an extent that they compel him to mimic them. To this end, he dons a rubber mask that disguises him as a young man, and attends a popular ballroom, where he dances exuberantly with young women, until his age undermines his ambitions and he collapses from exhaustion. At this point, a doctor (Claude Dauphin) is obliged to skilfully remove the mask adhered to Ambroise’s face, and to escort the semi-delirious man back home to his aged wife, Denise (Gaby Morlay). Yet, although she thanks the doctor for his trouble, she also explains that her husband is incapable of resisting the power of the virtual past, with the consequence that, upon his recovery, he will again don the mask and dance at some or other ballroom until he collapses. Moreover, she expresses concern that his persistent inability to free himself from his memories will ultimately kill him, because of the physical
strain it places upon his heart. The doctor, realizing there is little he can do, departs, leaving the man to his fate. In short, while the adherence of the mask to the old man’s face constitutes a metaphor for the coalescence of the virtual and the actual, the doctor’s resignation intimates the insurmountable power of the virtual mirror that holds the old man captive. In turn, this theme of virtual captivity is continued in the second tale, namely *Madame Tellier’s Establishment*, which concerns a bordello in a Normandy port, run by Julia Tellier (Madeleine Renaud). On the one hand, the respect the men extend to Madame Tellier and the prostitutes who work for her derives from the service her establishment provides them, namely the opportunity to discard the concerns and responsibilities of their professions and families, and to once again experience the freedom and sensuality of their increasingly distant youth. On the other hand, the prostitutes find themselves uncomfortable without the attentions of the men, because the latter provide them not only with income, but also with psychological security. This is because their age and tenderness recall paternal figures who either exited the lives of the young women at some earlier point, or from whom they have become distanced over time, emotionally or geographically. In this regard, the overarching power of the virtual past emerges when Madame Tellier closes the bordello for one night to attend – along with all her employees – the first holy communion of her niece in the country. While the men’s actualization of their virtual pasts is thereby temporarily denied by the departure of the women, the women’s actualization of their virtual pasts becomes analogously problematized by the absence of the men. Consequently, while the men become increasingly frustrated, irritated and irrational because of their attachment to virtual pasts they can no longer actualize, the women for the same reason experience anxiety and emotional distress in the country. In particular, in their case, such disquiet persists until the substitute paternal presence of God, conjured up by the ritual of communion in Church, brings overwhelming relief that reduces them to tears, and impels them to hasten home after the service, to resume their occupation – much to the relief of their patrons. Yet, it is not only the distant virtual past that can dominate the actual present, because the recent virtual past can prove no less seductive and disempowering, as is communicated through the third tale, namely *The Model*. This concerns the alternating inability of two lovers, the artist Jean Summer (Daniel Gélin) and the model Josédhine (Simone Simon), to excise themselves from the virtual mirror provided by the other, in which they find themselves lost and held captive. To begin with, Jean is captivated by the beauty of Josédhine when he encounters her at a studio, a captivation that increases when she begins to model for him and to inspire his work, leading to its success. However, after reaching a creative plateau through her, Jean becomes increasingly frustrated with their relationship, while Josédhine now finds herself captive of all the virtual images he has produced of her, because they have powerfully elevated her social status and enhanced her self-esteem. Unable to let him go, she locks him in at home with her, an action which results in a terrible domestic dispute. During their confrontation, her frustration at her inability to escape the virtual mirror in which she is caught manifests itself clearly, first, in her destruction of a painting Jean had made of her, and second, in her shattering of the mirrors that line the wall of their room, in which she encountered yet another virtual image of herself in association with Jean. However, although Jean collaborates with her in this and effects the complete destruction of all the actual mirrors in the room, their destruction does not lead to her liberation, because the virtual mirror to which the actual mirrors allude remains intact and inviolable, and continues to hold her captive. Exasperated, she later throws herself from his apartment window, breaking her legs and paralyzing herself for life. At this point, Jean once again finds himself held captive within a virtual mirror, insofar as her paralysis comprises a virtual reflection of his past selfishness and callousness. Haunted by this virtual past he remains with her out of guilt, for the rest of his life. In many ways, in Ophüls’s following film, *The Earrings of Madame de*... (1953), both distant and recent pasts combine to inform the tragic narrative, insofar as an array of competing virtual mirrors – for which the
multi-faceted diamonds of the earrings constitute a metaphor – vie with each other for hegemony, and ultimately destroy the characters of a love triangle. In short, the earrings are not only linked to the distant past of Comtesse Louise (Danielle Darrieux), insofar as they were a wedding gift from her husband, General André (Charles Boyer); in addition, her secret sale of them to pay off her clothing/jewellery debts also reflects her captivation within a more recent virtual mirror, namely her infatuation with her own beauty. In turn, while the General’s secret repurchase of them serves to protect his family name from scandal, and thereby indicates the power that the virtual mirror of his social status has over him, his presentation of them to his mistress, Lola (Lia Di Leo), also reflects his captivation within a more recent virtual mirror, namely the confirmation of his power provided by her affections. Through her subsequent sale of the earrings to pay off a gambling debt – a consequence of her own captivation within the virtual mirror provided by the casino – they land in the hands of Baron Fabrizio (Vittorio De Sica), who finds himself incapable of resisting any object of beauty. This inability leads him not only to purchase the earrings, but also to become lost within the virtual mirror provided by Comtesse Louise, to whom he gives the earrings and with whom he embarks on a love affair – an affair that leads to his murder at the hands of General André and the concomitant death of Comtesse Louise. In effect, all three main characters are lost through their constant deference to virtual mirrors that are too encompassing, and which hold them too powerfully, such that in the narrative “there is only a vertigo, an oscillation” (Deleuze 2005: 82) and, in effect, proximal stasis. Arguably, the proximal stasis of such oscillation is communicated most powerfully through Ophüls’s *Lola Montés* (1955), in the narrative of which the previous sexual exploits of Lola Montés (Martine Carol) are played out nightly as a circus attraction, with Lola as the star of the show. As such, her present is only ever a reflection of her past – a past that is repetitively mirrored in her present, in perpetuity.

In contrast, in the films of Renoir and Visconti, there occurs, respectively, a sudden/partial and gradual/systemic destabilization of virtual hegemony. That is, in Renoir’s films, the dominance of virtual mirrors – such as those found in Ophüls’s films – becomes problematized through the introduction of a ‘depth of field.’ This presents the virtual mirror with such broad actuality that *something*, no matter how small, escapes reflection within its confines, and thereby opens up a crack in its hegemony. As Deleuze explains, “in Renoir, the crystal is never pure and perfect; it has a failing, a point of flight, a ‘flaw.’ It is always cracked. And…something is going to slip away in the background, in depth, through the…crack” (Deleuze 2005: 82). Because of this, there is a progression of sorts from Ophüls’s films to those of Renoir, insofar as the latter do not simply provide a salient imagistic thematization of the actual/virtual dynamic that makes political fanaticism and personal obsession possible. Rather, they go further by visually thematizing the first tentative step that leads toward the undoing of such an actual/virtual dynamic, and, by implication, to the dissolution of such virtual hegemony. Arguably, such ‘depth of field’ is both thematic and formal in Renoir’s early films. For example, in *Partie de Campagne* (1936), although the virtual hegemony of bourgeois *mores* evidently demarcates the present and canalizes the future of Henriette (Sylvia Bataille), insofar as her arranged marriage to Anatole (Paul Temps) occurs, and their uneventful life together continues for years, their relationship always remains tepid in comparison with her fleeting love affair with Henri (Georges Saint-Saens). This brief meeting in the countryside, around which the bulk of the narrative of the film is centred, remains the moment in her history that such bourgeois *mores* can neither excise nor eclipse, and her periodic remembrance of it affords her a lifelong escape route from the mediocrity of her relationship with Anatole; an escape into the realm of emotion and desire. Similarly, in the *Grand Illusion* (1937), the French officers Marechal (Jean Gabin) and Rosenthal (Marcel Dalio) become subject to the virtual hegemony of German nationalism after their capture during the
First World War – a hegemony which is not only militaristic in orientation but also historical and cultural, insofar as they are transferred to prisons progressively deeper within the German interior. However, through a concatenation of unforeseen events, chance encounters, and personal predispositions, all of which betray the limitations of such virtual hegemony, they eventually manage a narrow escape to Switzerland. At a formal level, such limitations are emphasized through the deep focus of the final shot, where some German soldiers watch their prey escape over the mountainous border into the neutral neighbouring country – a border too vast to ever police with great efficacy. Because of this, Deleuze advances that a certain degree of playfulness exists in Renoir’s films, a playfulness that derives from the spaciousness afforded by the crack in the crystal. Accordingly, “everything happens as if the circuit served to try out roles…until the right one were found, the one with which we escape to enter a clarified reality” (Deleuze 2005: 83). This is very much the case in *The Rules of the Game* (1939), in which those who accept the playfulness of relationships win, while those who contravene this ‘rule’ – through becoming captivated by the virtual hegemony of one lover – lose and must pay a price that varies from dismissal to death. In this regard, on the one hand, the Marquis Robert de la Cheyniest (Marcel Dalio), at whose La Colinière estate the narrative plays out, is a winner because he maintains the requisite distance from both his wife Christine (Nora Grégor) and his mistress Geneviève de Marras (Mila Parély). On the other hand, Marceau (Julian Carette), Schumacher (Gaston Modot), André Jurieux (Roland Toutain), are all losers within the context of the narrative, because of their inability to practice sufficient circumspection in their respective love relationships; in effect, for their inability to find and adopt a role through which they can both love and maintain their freedom. That is, while Marceau and Schumacher are dismissed from service by the Marquis, because of their inability to temper their desire and jealousy, respectively, André is accidentally shot and killed when his obsession with (and suspicion of) the Marquis’s wife Christine leads him outside of the chateau at night. Therefore, rather than submissiveness to, and inadvertent complicity with, any virtual mirror, in Renoir’s films one finds an actual experimental and revolutionary orientation, which grows steadily and seeks ultimately to flee successfully from virtual hegemony. As Deleuze puts it, in Renoir’s films the most important “question [is:]…where does life begin? Time in the crystal is differentiated into two movements, but one of them takes charge of the future and freedom, provided that it leaves the crystal” (Deleuze 2005: 85). This is very salient in *The River* (1951), the narrative of which unfolds alongside a river in Bengal, India, and concerns the relationship between three young girls, Harriet (Patricia Walters), Valerie (Adrienne Corri) and Melanie (Radha), all of whom fall in *and out of love* with new arrival, Captain John (Thomas Breen). Not only do the girls discover ‘life’ and grow to maturity, through finding pathways that lead them out of their temporary captivity within the virtual hegemony of Captain John – pathways that are a combination of their own initiative and the ultimate departure of the Captain. In addition, Captain John also discovers ‘life’ beyond the virtual hegemony of the war through which he both lost a leg and gained acclaim for heroism – a virtual hegemony from which he seeks to escape by coming to India, and which continues to haunt him on the banks of the river, until freedom from it allows him to return home to America. Indeed, the river itself is not only the ‘lifeblood’ of all the people of the town in which the narrative is set, but also demarcates the limits of any virtual hegemony, insofar as the continual renewal and endless flow of the river erodes the power of the past to hold anyone captive for too long. This is neatly illustrated when Valerie and her family overcome the virtual hegemony of sorrow caused by the death of her young brother, Bogie (Richard Foster), from a cobra bite. That is, such overcoming reflects the flow of time through the river, and ultimately allows the family to embrace the emergence of new life, when Valerie’s mother (Nora Swinburne) later gives birth to a girl. Similarly, albeit on a lighter note, the narratives of both *The Golden Coach* (1952) and *French Cancan* (1952) thematize success in the wake of the
sudden/partial destabilization of virtual hegemony. In the case of the former, set in a remote town in South America in the 18th century, the actress Camilla (Anna Magnani) ultimately frees herself from her infatuation with the social prestige that derived from her ownership of a golden coach – purchased originally by Viceroy Ferdinand (Duncan Lamont) and given to her as a token of love – which enables her to donate the much-coveted vehicle to the Church. In the case of the latter, which depicts the birth of the famous Moulin Rouge, it is the young Cancan dancer Nini’s (Françoise Arnoul’s) final ability to free herself from the virtual hegemony of both her boyfriend Paulo (Franco Pastorino), and her boss Henri Danglard (Jean Gabin), which leads to the success of the show, and indeed to the consequent genesis of this landmark of French culture. That is, while, on the one hand, Paulo’s conservatism threatened to inhibit her career, insofar as he considered her dancing disreputable, on the other hand, her infatuation with Henri also stood to limit her potential, insofar as it rendered her fragile and immature. Thus, in all the narratives of these films by Renoir, freedom and triumph are facilitated via an exit made possible through the sudden/partial destabilization of virtual hegemony.

In Visconti’s films, the dominance of virtual mirrors is also problematized; however, in this case, it occurs through the introduction of ‘decay’ as a motif – decay that facilitates the gradual/systemic destabilization of virtual hegemony. According to Deleuze, this decay emerges most saliently in Visconti’s films in relation to “the aristocratic world of the rich,” the anachronistic discourses and idiosyncratic preoccupations of which render it “a synthetic crystal…outside history and nature, [and] outside divine creation” (Deleuze 2005: 91). That is, while in Ludwig (1972), the character of King Ludwig II (Helmut Berger) is distanced from the world by his profound aestheticism – which causes him to squander his material wealth supporting Wagner (Trevor Howard) and building palaces – in The Leopard (1963), Prince Fabrizio Corbero of Salina (Burt Lancaster) remains detached from the contemporary world of politics out of allegiance to the mores of the old nobility. Similarly, in Death in Venice (1971), the character of Gustav von Aschenbach (Dirk Bogarde) is unable to fulfil his audience’s demand for specious musical enjoyment, because of his fidelity to the pursuit of artistic truth via a rigorously modern style of composition. Yet, despite their beauty and grace, not only are “these crystalline environments…inseparable from a process of decomposition which eats away at them from within.” In addition, such decomposition is often simultaneously accelerated through the new constellations of power that form through history, and which “are not interested in penetrating the secret laws of the old world, but aim to make it disappear” (Deleuze 2005: 91-92). That is, in Ludwig, the rotting of Ludwig’s teeth coincides not only with the onset of madness in his younger brother, Prince Otto (John Moulder-Brown), but also with the renewed aggression of Prussia, which threatens to drag Ludwig’s kingdom of Bavaria either into war or into submissive alliance. In The Leopard, the profound and irremediable decay of the old world of the aristocracy becomes evident not only through the mystery illness that begins to plague Prince Fabrizio Corbero toward the end of the narrative, and which causes him to reflect on his approaching death – along with the decomposition of his noble world – through the medium of an oil painting that depicts the last moments of an old and sick nobleman. In addition, it is also powerfully communicated from the outset of the film, when the Catholic devotions of the Prince and his family are shattered by the discovery of a dead soldier in the orchard of their estate; a fatality of the fighting caused by the arrival of Giuseppe Garibaldi’s troops, who bring with them liberal and progressive ideas. Similarly, in Death in Venice, the cholera that steadily debilitates Gustav von Aschenbach is contemporaneous with the presence of the young boy Tadzio (Björn Andrèsen) with whom he becomes infatuated; a relationship which ultimately reveals to him the utter pointlessness of his previous high-minded elision of all sensuality from his music. Therefore, the tragedy of Visconti’s films derives from the inability of the main characters to
intuit the new dynamics and power of such encroaching history in time, with the consequence that, although they do ultimately realize what might have saved them, always this “revelation… arrives too late” (Deleuze 2005: 93). In Ludwig, the character of Ludwig only realizes how his excesses have alienated him from his people after he is declared insane and forced to abdicate – at which point he loses the requisite power to make amends. In The Leopard, Prince Fabrizio Corberio only realizes the ethical hollowness of the nobility surrounding him when he is too old and too ill either to escape from their ambit, or to change his world through political involvement. Indeed, the Prince’s realization of this is rendered all the more poignant through his final statement that there is no salvation for him apart from birth in a different time; an admission that for him it is de facto too late. Similarly, in Death in Venice, Gustav von Aschenbach has his suspicions of cholera in Venice confirmed only after he has become so infatuated with Tadzio that he cannot leave for the safety of his home country, and instead finds himself compelled to stay – and die – on the beach, mesmerized by the young boy. So, although the proverbial coup de grâce may arrive suddenly for the ‘aristocratic’ world in question, such a blow is only ever the culmination of a long, slow process of decomposition, involving the gradual/systemic destabilization of the virtual hegemony that initially dominated the subjectivity of the ‘noble’ characters in these films by Visconti.

Finally, Fellini’s films are characterized by rapid creative interplay between the actual and the virtual; that is, there is none of the virtual hegemony that one encounters in Ophüls’s films, and hence also an absence of the preoccupation with escaping from, or exploring the decline of, such hegemony, characteristic of Renoir’s and Visconti’s films, respectively. Rather, in Fellini’s films, “the crystal [is] caught in its formation and growth, related to the ‘seeds’ which make it up…[and] which incorporate…the environment and force it to crystallize” (Deleuze 2005: 85-86). Arguably, this is most apparent in Fellini’s films Roma (1972) and AmarCORD (1973). In effect, the narratives of both of these films concern finding oneself, one day in the present, remembering how one used to re-member the past, in ways that transformed the world around one, and ultimately led to one finding oneself, one day in the present, remembering how one used to re-member the past, in a manner that continues to be just as transformative. That is, what one remembers of such (childhood) re-membering is as imperfect as such (childhood) re-membering of an earlier past was; yet, the virtual seeds that emerge cause a crystallization of the actual environment of the present, no less than they did the actual environment of one’s distant childhood. As such, in Fellini’s films, “the question is no longer that of knowing what comes out of the crystal and how, but, on the contrary, how to get into it. For each entrance is itself a crystalline seed, a component element” (Deleuze 2005: 86). Two scenes from Roma and AmarCORD, respectively, which Deleuze himself refers to (Deleuze 2005: 86, 89), provide further clarification of this dynamic. In Roma, the crossing of the Rubicon river (or rather stream) by the school boys and their teacher is a memory of childhood re-membering of Julius Caesar’s approach to Rome in 49 BCE. Such childhood re-membering of the historical event was imprecise and largely an excuse for fun; yet, it nevertheless transformed the actual environment, insofar as teacher and students alike took off their shoes and playfully marched through the water. Similarly, the memory of such childhood re-membering is imprecise and conflated with a host of other memories, which together make up the narrative of Roma; yet, it nevertheless transforms the actual environment of the present, insofar as it comprises part of the answer to the pressing question: What is Rome? In turn, in AmarCORD, the dancing and musical miming of the school boys in the falling snow outside the big hotel, after the holiday season has ended, is a memory of childhood re-membering of the dance steps of the past season, and the playing of musical instruments that had accompanied them. Once more, such childhood re-membering of the activities of the recent summer was imprecise and largely for the purposes of amusement;
yet, it nevertheless transformed the actual environment, both through the patterns the boys traced in the snow as they danced, and via the falling snow that their bodies concomitantly deflected. Similarly, the memory of such childhood re-membering is imprecise and conflated with a host of other memories, which together make up the narrative of Amarcord; yet, it nevertheless transforms the actual environment of the present, insofar as it comprises part of the answer to the pressing question: Who am I? In this regard, both the questions ‘What is Rome?’ and ‘Who am I?’ are actual questions, as it were, which emerge only through growing maturity, an appreciation of mortality, and the related desire to comprehend more fully what it means to have inhabited such an historic space, and what it means to have lived. In this way, in Fellini’s films, “the two aspects, the present that passes and goes to death, [and] the past which is preserved and retains the seed of life, repeatedly interfere and cut into each other” (Deleuze 2005: 89), with the consequence that the actual/virtual interface is characterized by rapid creative interplay.24

The possibility of proto-time-images in German expressionist cinema

As already mentioned, only three years after completing his two-volume work on film, Deleuze, in his Preface to the English edition of Cinema 2, made a radically self-reflexive suggestion that time-images might exist in pre-World War Two cinema. That is, he maintained that “we must look in pre-war cinema, and even in silent cinema, for the workings of a very pure time-image which has always been breaking through...or encompassing the movement-image” (Deleuze 1988b: xiii). To be sure, this call for a critical reappraisal of the historical schema of film transformation that he had recently advanced in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, was neither uncharacteristic of Deleuze’s work in general, nor unexpected in relation to these two volumes in particular. That is, not only did Deleuze always assert that the concepts he created and employed were only ever works in progress; utilized when they proved useful but discarded as soon as their redundancy became evident.25 In addition, already in Cinema 1, he posed the question of whether the crisis of the action-image – out of which time-images emerged – should be construed as something new, or whether it should be regarded as “the constant state of cinema” (Deleuze 2004: 209). Understandably, if the five features of this crisis are construed as constant, nagging elements of critical and self-reflexive cinema – from the very inception of film until the present26 – then there would indeed be no reason to dismiss the possibility that prototype time-images could have been precipitated before the advent of Italian neorealism. Moreover, although this was to remain more or less implicit until Deleuze’s above mentioned statement in the Preface to the English edition of Cinema 2, there is arguably sufficient evidence to suggest that, throughout both Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, German expressionist films of the 1920s were the cinematic domain Deleuze suspected as the home of such proto-time-images.

To begin with, in Chapter Three of Cinema 1, Deleuze juxtaposes the organic montage composition of the American school, the dialectical montage composition of the Soviet school, the quantitative montage composition of the pre-war French school, and the intensive montage composition of the German expressionist school (Deleuze 2004: 30-58). However, the one important difference between the first three and the last is that, while the first three emerged within strong economies and were fuelled by corresponding optimism, the last was a product of a shattered economy and deep pessimism. That is, the American school was situated within the positive context of growing capitalist wealth,27 the Soviet school was informed by the positivity of communist idealism,28 and the French school was intertwined with a positive appraisal of industrial speed and movement.29 In contrast, after the First World War, Germany was plunged into a nightmare of poverty, political unrest, hyperinflation, unemployment, and serious food
shortages and it was out of such dire socio-cultural and politic-economic conditions that the intensive montage composition of the German expressionist school emerged. Deleuze acknowledges as much when he asserts that “a dark swampy life into which everything plunges, whether chopped up by shadows or plunged into mists[,]...the non-organic life of things, a frightful life, which is oblivious to the wisdom and limits of the organism, is the first principle of Expressionism” (Deleuze 2004: 52). Moreover, Deleuze comments on the power of the shadows within German expressionism to fragment reality and render space indeterminate, or an ‘any-space-whatever’ (Deleuze 2004: 114-115), and he even situates German expressionism at one end of a continuum in this regard, while he places Italian neorealism at the other end. Admittedly, in terms of this, he advances the formal features of German expressionism as constitutive of a different type of ‘any-space-whatever’ to that found in Italian neorealism, which drew its inspiration from the ‘any-space-whatever’ of post-World War Two Italy – involving shattered cities and broken communities – and the related crisis of the action image (Deleuze 2004: 124). Yet, these formal differences notwithstanding, as is evident from his above discussion of the first principle of expressionism, the inspiration for and the metaphorical value of the ‘any-space-whatever’ of German expressionism were not unlike those of the ‘any-space-whatever’ of Italian neorealism. That is, both types of film derived from and communicated the concerns of a devastated world, pervaded by trauma, incomprehension and deep anxiety over the future. In fact, Deleuze himself indicates that the distance between these two forms of cinema, as far as the issue of ‘any-space-whatever’ is concerned, is actually very small. This occurs when he takes great care to dissociate and render distinct certain moments of dense opacity in Visconti – which according to him denote “the twilight of the gods” – from the shadows of German expressionism (Deleuze 2005: 92), because the latter, which similarly express a loss of faith in divine providence, could easily be confused with the former.

This close relationship between Italian neorealist cinema and German expressionist film is arguably compounded even further by the level of introspection reflected in the latter, which reaches such intensity that proto-time-images become possible. That is, the level of introspection which Italian neorealism precipitated in later films, and which, in turn, made time-images possible in cinema after World War Two, is already contained – telescoped as it were – in certain German expressionist films, which reflect both such introspection and, following this, proto-time-images. To be sure, these proto-time-images lack the sophistication of the fourfold crystalline regime found in the films of Ophüls, Renoir, Visconti and Fellini, discussed earlier. Nevertheless, in their own way, proto-time-images in Robert Wiene’s The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920), Paul Wegener’s The Golem (1920), and Friedrich Murnau’s Nosferatu (1922) as well as his later film Faust (1926), can similarly be understood as tentative early reflections upon the actual/virtual interface. As will be discussed, they too range, respectively, from (1) proximal stasis because of the domination of the actual by the virtual, through (2) sudden/partial and (3) gradual/systemic destabilization of virtual hegemony, to (4) rapid creative interplay between the actual and the virtual.

A proto-crystalline regime in German expressionist cinema of the 1920s

In Robert Wiene’s The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920), it is through the coalescence of the two stories that comprise the narrative that a proto-time-image emerges. The first story concerns the character of Dr. Caligari (Werner Krauss) and his somnambulist, Cesare (Conrad Veidt), whom he keeps under hypnosis and employs as a murderer; in short, he exhibits Cesare as a psychic at fairs, where he prophesies the imminent death of those he will soon murder. In
this regard, two characters, Francis (Friedrich Feher) and Alan (Han Heinrich von Twardowski), visit the fair in Holstenwall and Alan – after having his fate pronounced by Cesare – is murdered by the latter that very evening. However, after some initial confusion, Caligari’s designs are revealed, in particular through the death of Cesare, after the somnambulist attempted to abduct Francis’s fiancé, Jane (Lil Dagover). It also emerges that Caligari is the director of the local insane asylum, and the story ends with his incarceration in his own institution. The very brief framing story, though, which precedes and succeeds the first story, renders the latter the account of a madman – namely Francis – who is in an insane asylum, where he both narrates the first story to an older inmate and populates it with characters drawn from those around them. Most importantly, Francis derives the characters of his fiancé Jane and Cesare from fellow inmates, and Caligari from the director of the asylum, who, upon learning more about Francis’s delusion, has him restrained and promises to cure him. As Siegfried Kracauer indicates, a great deal of tension was caused by Robert Wiene’s decision to include the framing story. Yet, arguably, the hypothetical economic rationale behind his choice is less important than the hyalosign or crystal-image it produced. In this regard, the framing story is crucial, because through it, the first story or Francis’s delusion emerges as neither a recollection sequence/flashback (mnemosign) – because it has never actually taken place – nor a dream sequence (onirosign), because Francis consciously narrates it to a fellow inmate, and for that matter, to the audience. As Deleuze points out in Cinema 2, both mnemosigns and onirosigns comprise circuits related to the past, in terms of which one searches the past – either pointedly (mnemosigns) or diffusely (onirosigns) – in a way that is clearly discernible from the actual present, which precipitated such recollection or allowed for such dreaming in the first place (Deleuze 2005: 46-49, 54-56). In contrast, in Francis’s delusion there is coalescence of the actual and the virtual, insofar as the actual people with whom he is incarcerated, and the actual director who cares for them, have all become indiscernible from the characters in the virtual mirror of the narrative he has produced, and within which he has become lost. Indeed, this point is powerfully endorsed in the second part of the framing story, just before the denouement of the film. Here, Francis points out another inmate who bears a resemblance to Cesare, but identifies him as Cesare, and even warns the older inmate – who up until this point has been listening to his tale – not to ask Cesare about his future, because if he did Cesare would prophesy his death and then murder him. Similarly, he approaches a female inmate who resembles his fiancé Jane, and pleads with her to finally marry him. This woman, seated on a wooden chair that resembles a throne, and wearing a tiara, gazes off into the distance and laments the fact that, because she is royalty, she is not free to pursue such a relationship with him. Her response is deeply poignant because, through it, one realizes that she – no less than Francis – is trapped in a delusion that derives from the coalescence of the actual and the virtual. That is, the actual people with whom she is incarcerated, along with the various actual apparatuses at hand, have all become indiscernible from the characters and accoutrements of a virtual mirror, the narrative of which she has produced, and in which she has become lost. The consequent proto-time-image within Wiene’s The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari bears an uncanny resemblance to the time-images in Ophüls’s films, and Deleuze’s description of the latter could easily serve as an account of the former. To clarify, Deleuze’s statement concerning Ophüls’s films, namely that in them “the actual image and the virtual image coexist and crystallize; they…form one and the same ‘scene’ where the characters belong to the real and yet play a role” (Deleuze 2005: 80-81), neatly sums up the effect of the framing story in The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari. Similarly, the fact that in the framing story Francis encounters Cesare in the asylum after the latter has already died in terms of the narrative of the first story, adumbrates what Deleuze advanced about Ophüls’s crystal images. In short, he maintained that they “are perfect…[and] let…no outside subsist: there is no outside of the mirror or the film set, but only an obverse where the characters who disappear or die go, abandoned by life which thrusts itself
back into the film set” (Deleuze 2005: 80-81). Indeed, in this regard, the character of Caligari in many ways prefigures the *meneur de jeu* in Ophüls’s *La Ronde*. Just as the *meneur de jeu* both directs the actors that surround him – as though he is operating outside of the narrative – while simultaneously constituting an additional character *within* the narrative, so too Caligari both directs Francis within the asylum, while simultaneously constituting the central character around which the narrative of Francis’s delusions is orientated. As such, Caligari as director, notwithstanding his apparent professionalism and kindness, can never cure Francis, because he could only ever do so on the basis of his authority over Francis, which haunts the latter and drives him mad. Consequently, on account of the constant deference within the asylum to the all-encompassing virtual mirror of Caligari’s power, “there is only a vertigo, an oscillation” (Deleuze 2005: 82), and hence proximal stasis comparable to that found in Ophüls’s films.

In contrast, in Paul Wegener’s *The Golem* (1920), there occurs a sudden/partial destabilization of virtual hegemony through the introduction of something akin to a ‘depth of field.’ That is, like the ‘depth of field’ in Renoir’s films discussed earlier, it also presents the different virtual mirrors that dominate at different moments in the narrative, with such broad actuality that something escapes reflection, and thereby allows for a crack in their hegemony. In short, the narrative of *The Golem* concerns the various attempts by Rabbi Loew (Albert Steinrück) to save the Jews of the Prague ghetto from the misfortune foretold in the stars. Although this misfortune manifests itself in the decree of Emperor Luhois (Otto Gebhür) that the Jews be evicted from the ghetto, Rabbi Loew prepares for the negative event by constructing the Golem (Paul Wegener), and imbuing him with life, through a combination of secret rites and magical incantations performed under an auspicious constellation of stars. Subsequently, through impressing the emperor with his new creation, and through saving him and the members of his court from certain death, Rabbi Loew has the decree revoked, and thereby spares the Jews from homelessness. However, although he manages to wrest the ‘shem’ from the Golem’s chest, and thereby renders him inanimate again, before he can destroy the Golem – which he is obliged to do as the Golem has already begun to resist his authority – the power of the Golem is co-opted by Famulus (Ernst Deutsch), Rabbi Loew’s assistant. While the latter returns the ‘shem’ to the Golem’s chest and uses him to defeat his rival for the affections of Rabbi Loew’s daughter, Miriam (Lyda Salmonova), soon thereafter Famulus loses control of the Golem, who revolts against his authority, sets fire to the ghetto, and escapes its confines. Outside the main gate of the ghetto, however, the Golem encounters not only freedom, but also a group of ‘Aryan’ children at play, and is drawn toward them, only to have the ‘shem’ plucked from his chest by an inquisitive small girl (Loni Nest), which effectively leads to his demise. As such, what Deleuze explains about Renoir’s films, namely that their crystals are characterized by “a failing, a point of flight, a ‘flaw’ [or a]...crack,” through which something always slips away (Deleuze 2005: 82), comprises an apt description of the dynamics of the crystal operative in Wegener’s *The Golem*. In this regard, the virtual hegemony of, firstly, the emperor over the Jews of Prague, secondly, Rabbi Loew over Famulus, thirdly, Famulus over the Golem, and finally, the Golem over the ‘Aryan’ children, are all successively problematized. That is, firstly, the virtual hegemony of the emperor over the Jews of Prague, which derives from both secular and sacred history, becomes problematized by the ‘depth of field’ of the night sky. This is because the star constellations not only foretell of an impending calamity that will befall the Jews, and thereby warn Rabbi Loew so that he can prepare for it by creating the Golem, but also comprise the key through which the latter gains control of the Golem to life – a feat which leads to his ingratiation with the emperor. Accordingly, star constellations comprise the crack through which the emperor’s virtual hegemony is suddenly/partially destabilized, insofar as, through them, part of his power slips away into the hands of Rabbi Loew, who is thereby
able to wield sufficient influence over the emperor to have the decree for the Jews’ eviction from the ghetto revoked. Yet, secondly, the virtual hegemony of Rabbi Loew over Famulus, which derives from his knowledge of magic and Jewish lore, becomes problematized by the ‘depth of field’ of Famulus’s desire for Miriam. Although, to begin with, he unquestioningly does the bidding of Rabbi Loew, Famulus’s desire later causes him to reject his servility and to pursue personal fulfilment, by returning the ‘shem’ – which Rabbi Loew had only just managed to remove – to the Golem’s chest, in order to bring the Golem back to life to defeat his rival for Miriam’s affections. Accordingly, Famulus’s desire comprises the crack through which Rabbi Loew’s virtual hegemony is suddenly/partially destabilized, insofar as, through it, part of his power slips away into the hands of Famulus, who succeeds in orchestrating the death of his rival. However, thirdly, the virtual hegemony of Famulus over the Golem, which derives from the earlier spell that gave the latter life, becomes problematized by the ‘depth of field’ of the Golem’s growing personality. This empowers the Golem to override the limitations imposed upon him by the incantation and to pursue freedom; in this regard, after killing Famulus’s rival, the Golem revolts against Famulus’s authority by setting fire to the ghetto and breaking down the main gates. Accordingly, the Golem’s growing personality comprises the crack through which Famulus’s virtual hegemony is suddenly/partially destabilized, insofar as, through it, part of his power slips away into the hands of the Golem and allows him to effect his escape. Finally, the virtual hegemony of the Golem over the ‘Aryan’ children, which derives from the combination of his strength and newfound independence, becomes problematized by the ‘depth of field’ of an ‘Aryan’ child’s inquisitiveness. That is, although the Golem takes an interest in a group of ‘Aryan’ children at play just outside the gates of the ghetto, and affectionately picks up one small girl, the inquisitiveness of the latter ultimately proves to be his undoing, insofar as it impels her to pull the ‘shem’ from his chest, which immediately robs him of life. Accordingly, the ‘Aryan’ girl’s inquisitiveness comprises the crack through which the Golem’s virtual hegemony is suddenly/partially destabilized, insofar as, through it, part of his power slips away into her hands, so that she is able to wield influence over him. Consequently, Deleuze’s statement concerning Renoir’s films, namely that within them “everything happens as if the circuit served to try out roles… until the right one were found…with which we escape to enter a clarified reality” (Deleuze 2005: 83), also emerges as a particularly apposite description of the rules governing the slippage of virtual hegemony within Wegener’s *The Golem*. This is, of course, not to advance that the ultimate ‘clarified reality’ belongs to the virtual hegemony of the ‘Aryan’ children, although such an interpretation is possible. In this regard, the representations of the children do seem to adumbrate the focus on German children in certain of Leni Riefenstahl’s films, and certain of the young ‘Aryan’ children of the 1920s did ultimately become the Nazi soldiers of the 1940s. However, if there is one thing that *The Golem* clarifies about reality, it is that the wielding of virtual hegemony is only ever a transient exercise, destined to be lost through an irremediable ‘depth of field’ which surrounds it, and which contains cracks that suddenly/partially destabilize virtual hegemony, and cause power to slip into the hands of another. As such, even if one does choose to read the film as culminating in the virtual hegemony of the ‘Aryan’ children, it would be important to remember that their wielding of such power could only ever be a temporary arrangement – as history ultimately proved. This is not least because the question that plagues Renoir’s films also plagues *The Golem*, namely the “question…[of:] where does life begin? Time in the crystal is differentiated into two movements, but one of them takes charge of the future and freedom, provided that it leaves the crystal” (Deleuze 2005: 85), via an exit made possible through the sudden/partial destabilization of virtual hegemony. And as discussed above, such exiting of the crystal remains something ultimately unavoidable.

In turn, in Friedrich Murnau’s *Nosferatu* (1922), there occurs a gradual/systemic
destabilization of virtual hegemony through the introduction of ‘decay’ as a motif, which in many ways performs a similar function within the narrative to the motif of decay in Visconti’s films, discussed earlier. The narrative of Nosferatu, which borrows heavily from Bram Stoker’s novel Dracula, is very well-known; in short, it involves the character of Hutter (Gustav Von Wangenheim) travelling to Transylvania to finalize the sale of a large property – opposite his own in Misburg – to one Count Orlock (Max Schreck), who unbeknown to him is Nosferatu the vampire. Nosferatu then not only proceeds to feed off Hutter, but also, after encountering a photograph of Hutter’s wife, Ellen (Greta Schroeder), becomes obsessed with her and leaves for Misburg, to take up residence in the house opposite hers. Meanwhile, as Hutter races home with, among other things, a small book he discovered at an inn in Transylvania that details not only what Nosferatu is, but also how he can be destroyed, Nosferatu travels by ship to the same destination. During the voyage, however, he feeds off the crew and kills them all, so that the arrival of his ship at Misburg is understood as heralding the outbreak of plague, to which the town responds in strategic disciplinary fashion, under the watchful medico-scientific gaze of Professor Bulwer (John Gottowt). Soon afterward, the character of Knock (Alexander Granach) – a local devotee of Nosferatu – is apprehended after escaping from the insane asylum, while Ellen reads in Hutter’s book how to destroy Nosferatu. Accordingly, she then lures Nosferatu to her and keeps him feeding on her until dawn, at which point he is caught in the rays of the morning sun and disintegrates. As such, the motif of decay in Murnau’s Nosferatu functions in a manner akin to the motif of decay in Visconti’s films, insofar as decomposition plagues “the aristocratic world” of Count Orlock, which is rendered “a synthetic crystal…outside history and nature, [and] outside divine creation” (Deleuze 2005: 91), by the anachronistic discourses and idiosyncratic preoccupations which characterize it. Indeed, if one takes into account the relationship between Bram Stoker’s novel Dracula and Murnau’s film Nosferatu – as one is obliged to do – the appropriateness of Deleuze’s above description to the latter is further augmented by the historical figure upon whom Stoker based his narrative, namely Vlad Dracula. In short, Vlad Dracula, who ruled Wallachia, Romania, in the latter half of the 15th century, and who regularly meted out the punishment of impalement not only to captured Turkish soldiers, but also to his own Christian subjects for the slightest moral infraction, emerges as a tragic aristocratic figure not unlike the characters found in Visconti’s films. Like them, he became lost in a virtual mirror – one composed of extreme, unforgiving, puritanical moralism and a penchant for excessive cruelty – which, although it afforded him power in the short term, in the long term progressively alienated him from others, and led to both the death of his loved ones and his own brutal demise. Related to this, although the character of Nosferatu does not readily command sympathy in a manner akin to the main characters in Visconti’s films, such as the youthful King Ludwig II, he can nevertheless be understood as the final product of a tragic fall into a hegemonic virtual mirror, which alienates him from the world. In this regard, Nosferatu might be said to prefigure the older King Ludwig II – replete with rotten teeth and an insatiable appetite for young life – while at the same time comprising a stranger and more terrifying synthesis of man and devil, through his preternatural status as ‘undead.’ Yet, while Nosferatu for centuries defied decomposition through consuming the lifeblood of the living, such that he came to haunt their dreams, the corollary of this is that he was also always haunted by the prospect of decomposition; and like in Visconti’s films, this prospect progressively becomes a reality through the changes ushered in by modernity. This is because it involves not only the “process of decomposition which eats away at…[him] from within,” and which he keeps at bay through consuming the blood of others. In addition, it also entails the decomposition of his virtual world, brought about by the new constellations of power that form through history, and which “are not interested in penetrating the secret laws of the old world, but aim to make it disappear” (Deleuze 2005: 91-92). That is, the year 1838, in which the narrative of Murnau’s
*Nosferatu* unfolds, is within the period of the great democratic movements and reactionary responses in Europe, in relation to which violence erupted repeatedly, before social reform was begun. Moreover, this period was also the era of capitalism, photography, increasing literacy, the disciplinary organization of society, and the reification of scientific medicine, the combination of which sounded the death knell for Nosferatu’s aristocratic traditions. In short, it is into the rapidly changing world of the 19th century – profoundly hostile to all that he represents – that Count Orlock/Nosferatu is precipitated by economic necessity, insofar as he is forced to integrate his wealth into the capitalist economy to avoid its steady diminishment. As mentioned, this takes the form of his investment in the property opposite Hutter’s home in Misburg. However, through his contact with Hutter, he is also drawn into the virtual world of the latter, via the photograph of Ellen, which erodes his own ancient virtual world that for centuries has spiralled in on itself, and leads toward his obsession with her, and his related journey to Misburg. Ultimately, his demise in Misburg is, for two reasons, inexorable; while, unlike in the feudal era, the disciplinary organization of society now allows for a formidable, collective response to the kind of threat he poses, industrial printing and increasing literacy levels have also led to the wide availability of booklets that describe his nature and vulnerabilities. That is, while through the former, Knock, his devotee in Misburg, is apprehended after his escape from the insane asylum, it is the booklet in the hands of Ellen that ultimately leads to his demise, in the manner already described. Indeed, even if he were to have survived her strategy, he would no doubt have been captured at some point and analyzed as an anomaly of nature, under the auspices of 19th century medical science. Arguably, this much is indicated by the ambiguous disappointment of Professor Bulwer at the door of Ellen’s room, after she has died and after Nosferatu has disintegrated – disappointment that might derive just as easily from the loss of a young woman’s life, as from the loss of a fascinating prey in the form of Nosferatu. As such, just as the main characters in Visconti’s films fail to intuit in time the new dynamics and power of encroaching history, such that, although they do ultimately realize what might have saved them, this “revelation…arrives too late” (Deleuze 2005: 93), so too, Nosferatu succumbs because of the changes of modernity. Like Visconti’s characters, though, his failure in this regard is quite understandable, because the encroaching history to which he falls prey is largely the product of slow, almost imperceptible alterations within the social and technological fabric of life, and it is ultimately these that gradually/systemically destabilize his virtual hegemony.

Finally, in Friedrich Murnau’s *Faust* (1926) – as in Fellini’s films – the actual/virtual interface is characterized by rapid creative interplay. Consequently, there is none of the virtual hegemony that one encounters in Wiene’s *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari*, and also a corresponding absence of the preoccupation with escaping from, and exploring the decline of, such hegemony, found in Wegener’s *The Golem* and Murnau’s *Nosferatu*, respectively. In short, in the narrative of *Faust*, the character of Faust (Gösta Ekman) is caught up in a wager between the Archangel Gabriel (Werner Fuetterer) and Mephisto (Emil Jannings), in terms of which, if the latter can obtain the allegiance of Faust, he will win the world. In this regard, he is given the freedom to alternately torment and tempt Faust, whose moral righteousness Gabriel has faith in, and he begins by augmenting the plague in Faust’s town, until the old man loses his faith in God’s mercy, burns his books (including his Bible), and summons Mephisto through the black arts. Mephisto then not only grants him the power to heal the sick, but also offers to return to him his youth, which Faust progressively embraces, until the detrimental effects of his choice become apparent to him. These emerge most saliently through the ensuing poverty and ostracism of the young woman, Gretchen (Camilla Horn), with whom Faust produces a child and who he then abandons, and the related death through exposure of their child, which leads in turn to Gretchen being sentenced to death. At this point, Faust not only rejects his youth, but also (as
an old man once more) joins Gretchen as she is being burned at the stake. As such, because his final choice and act involved deep repentance and love, Gabriel wins the wager with the devil and the world is spared from damnation. Yet, although the story of Faust is relatively simple, arguably, its cinematic representation by Murnau involves a number of complex features that effectively comprise proto-time-images, which portend those found in Fellini’s films. These are evident, firstly, in the scenes that deal with Faust’s attainment of youth, and secondly, in those which concern the suffering of Gretchen. That is, firstly, when Mephisto offers an aged Faust his youth again, this offer occurs through a series of reflections – in liquid and a mirror – in which Faust’s old countenance is transformed into his erstwhile youthful face. These are of course not actual reflections, but rather virtual reflections, insofar as the features of his old face, which he actually sees in the mirror, are virtually complemented and smoothed over, as it were, by the remembered features of his youthful face. For this to occur, Faust is obliged to dive into the virtual past, so to speak, and to seek and make limpid the features of the young face he encountered in mirrors long ago, while simultaneously rendering opaque the very recent memory of the old face he has just seen. Moreover, what becomes limpid in this way is neither a dream (onirosign) – because Faust is awake – nor simply a recollection (mnemosign), insofar as it advances beyond the latter by becoming a virtual seed that ultimately crystallizes the environment of Faust’s body. This crystallization occurs when Mephisto covers the aged Faust with a sheet – thereby rendering him opaque – and then removes the sheet to render limpid the young Faust. Yet, importantly, the old Faust is not thereby erased; on the contrary, he is only rendered opaque, because he continues to exist in virtual form in a small mirror, which Mephisto places in his pocket for future use. In this regard, later, when the young Faust has begun to enjoy life, Mephisto renders the virtual reflection of the old Faust limpid again, as a threatening spectre above the young Faust’s head. Here it comprises the virtual seed that crystallizes the environment of the relationship between Mephisto and the young Faust, insofar as the latter, in order to keep his youth in perpetuity, pledges his allegiance to the devil. However, although Faust thereby obtains a new lease on life and the opportunity for power, pleasure, and love, ultimately, these achievements are indissociable from an array of negative consequences. And these haunt Faust to the point where he, again, dives into the virtual past, to render opaque the memory of his young face while simultaneously making limpid his old countenance; as before, the latter is not merely a recollection (mnemosign), because it advances beyond that by becoming a virtual seed that crystallizes the environment of Faust’s body. In the last instance, this allows Faust the opportunity – as an old man once more – to join Gretchen at the stake. As such, what Deleuze asserts about Fellini’s films, namely that within them “the crystal [is] caught in its formation and growth, related to the ‘seeds’ which make it up [and]…which incorporate…the environment and force it to crystallize” (Deleuze 2005: 85-86), is also true of Murnau’s Faust, at least in a rudimentary way. Secondly, after everyone has rejected Gretchen for her relationship with Faust – a relationship which resulted in the death of her mother and brother – she finds herself in a state of utter destitution, after giving birth to the child she conceived with Faust. At this point, alone and starving in the snow at Christmastime, she finds herself remembering how she used to re-member the past, in ways that transformed the world around her, and ultimately led to her finding herself, in the present, remembering how she used to re-member the past, in a manner that continues to be just as transformative. In this regard, in relation to Gretchen’s suffering – like in Fellini’s films – “the question is no longer that of knowing what comes out of the crystal…but….how to get into it[, because]…each entrance is itself a crystalline seed, a component element” (Deleuze 2005: 86). That is, Gretchen experiences a memory of childhood re-membering of the birth of Jesus, which under the auspices of Christian pageantry involved, among other things, the recollection of a beautiful cradle, radiantly illuminated. In this regard, the spectral nature of the cradle that appears before her in a snowdrift indicates that what she
remembers of such (childhood) re-membering is as imperfect as such (childhood) re-membering of an earlier past was. After all, the conditions of the birth of the historical figure of Jesus were very different to their later representation in terms of Christian pageantry. Nevertheless, just as such childhood re-membering – however imperfect – transformed the world around her, through lending progressive impetus to the Christian religious discourse, in terms of which she was later condemned for her relationship with Faust and forced into her current predicament, so too, her memory of such childhood re-membering transforms her current world further. This is because she places her baby within the snowdrift before her (which she misapprehends as the above mentioned cradle) where the child dies, and for this crime she is subsequently arrested and condemned to death. As such, the virtual seed that emerges from such remembering causes a crystallization of Gretchen’s actual environment of the present – to the detriment of her child and herself – no less than other virtual seeds crystallized the actual environment of her distant childhood, in ways that ultimately prepared for her such a fate. Thus, in a manner akin to Fellini’s films, in Murnau’s Faust, “the two aspects, the present that passes and goes to death, [and] the past which is preserved and retains the seed of life, repeatedly interfere and cut into each other” (Deleuze 2005: 89). The result of this is that the actual/virtual interface is characterized by rapid creative interplay.

**Time-images, the ‘death of God’ and contemporary film theory**

Arguably, together, the above four German expressionist films adumbrate the four-fold reflection upon the actual/virtual interface that occurs later in the films of Ophüls, Renoir, Visconti and Fellini. However, in this regard, Wiene’s *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari*, Wegener’s *The Golem*, and Murnau’s *Nosferatu* and *Faust*, nevertheless also entail more of a repetition than a point of genesis; and what they repeat are the consequences for subjectivity of the ‘death of God’ first advanced by Friedrich Nietzsche in his book *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

To be sure, Wiene’s, Wegener’s and Murnau’s respective films are not devoid of originality; on the contrary, the ‘any-space-whatever’ of post-World War One Germany, which comprised the historical backdrop against which these films emerged, did inflect certain thematic and formal aspects of these films in very particular ways. It is precisely for this reason that they are readily recognized *tout court* as films that exemplify German expressionist cinema. However, there exists an additional thematic element within all four films that indicates another trauma – one prior to the ‘any-space-whatever’ of post-World War One Germany – as a genetic point; namely the ‘death of God’ announced in the late 19th century. That is, while Wiene’s *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* concerns the terrifying tyranny of men who play God, and while Wegener’s *The Golem* concerns recourse to chthonic forces via occult practices – because of a loss of faith in God – Murnau’s *Nosferatu* and his later film *Faust* concern, respectively, the frightening encroachment by nefarious supernatural powers upon a protestant bourgeois domain, and the rejection of faith in Christianity. Admittedly, this is not very surprising; after all, the post-World War One context was not the first occasion on which the idols of Europe had fallen, opening up an ‘any-space-whatever’ in which their erstwhile dominance could be disinterestedly reflected upon. Less than half a century before, Nietzsche’s proclamation of the ‘death of God’ in his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, was neither the product of idiosyncratic fantasy nor the result of a proclivity for blasphemy, but rather a fair appraisal of both the orientation of modern society around the secular and prosaic, and its concomitant rejection of the sacred and sublime. And while it fell to others, most notably Michel Foucault, to elaborate later on the details of the historical transition to modern banality, it was Nietzsche himself who responded
immediately to the related ‘any-space-whatever’ that opened up in the late 19th century, not with incomprehension and paralysis, but with radical innovation. In this regard, “Of the Three Metamorphoses” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which details “how the spirit shall become a camel, and the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child” (Nietzsche 1969: 54), is arguably the most succinct expression of the ontological transformation thematized in Nietzsche’s oeuvre. Moreover, that this transformation preoccupied Nietzsche personally in his later years is solidly evinced by his reiteration of its dynamics not only in his Preface to Human, All-Too-Human, written in 1886 after his completion of Thus Spoke Zarathustra the previous year, but also in the Foreword to his last book Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, written in 1888. While even the subtitle of the latter work points toward such ontological transformation, from the outset of the text Nietzsche advances his enmity toward any ‘idols’ or ideals which stand to block such an unfolding of possibility. According to him, “reality has been deprived of its value, its meaning, its veracity to the same degree as an ideal world has been fabricated…The lie of the ideal has hitherto been the curse on reality [and]…through it mankind itself has become mendacious and false down to its deepest instincts” (Nietzsche 2004: 4). The importance of Nietzsche’s enmity should not be underestimated, because it is the very spark that ignites the fire of problematization, which is the first step that sets the wheel of the great ontological transformation in motion. In terms of the “three metamorphoses of the spirit” detailed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the first metamorphosis involves the camel as the “weight-bearing spirit in which dwell respect and awe…who takes upon itself all the…heaviest things.” However, “in the loneliest desert the second metamorphosis occurs: the spirit…becomes a lion, it wants to capture freedom and be lord in its own desert,” and in the interest of doing so, it negates its duties and asserts instead its independence. Yet, while the lion is able “to create freedom for itself,” what lies beyond its capacity is the ability “to create new values.” For this, the third metamorphosis of the lion into the child is still required; “the child [who] is innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning,…a sacred Yes” (Nietzsche 1969: 54-55).

Deleuze, in Difference and Repetition, elaborates upon the importance of the above schema of ontological transformation in relation to the new ‘third’ order of time that opened up in the 19th century. According to him, the 17th century philosophy of Descartes, although it is construed as the birth of modern philosophy, still operated in terms of a first order of time, insofar as time – as something in which all exists and unfolds – was guaranteed by God. Thus, the stability and integrity of the self continued to be confirmed as it had been throughout the Middle Ages, because the soul comprised the enduring aspect of the self, the immortality of which lent an underlying constancy to identity. As such, through “reducing the Cogito to an instant and entrusting time to the operation of continuous creation carried out by God,” Descartes’s philosophy constituted a manifestation of the ‘weight-bearing spirit’ of the camel. This was because the virtual hegemony of the Christian Church and its associated first order of time were shouldered by, and inscribed within, this new philosophy, rather than contested and rejected. However, in the 18th century philosophy of Kant, a second order of time became operative, which derived from “the speculative death of God [and]…the fracture of the I” – this fracture was the consequence of such death because in its wake the identity of the I could no longer be guaranteed. As Deleuze explains, this fracture was temporarily addressed by Kant through “a new form of identity – namely, active synthetic identity,” in terms of which sensibility – comprising of the intuitions of time and space – in conjunction with the judging faculty of understanding, produced new synthetic knowledge for a relatively stable identity. Yet, while this constituted, at least to some extent, a manifestation of the ‘spirit of freedom’ of the lion, a third order of time was always implicit in this second order of time. In terms of this third order, “time itself unfolds…instead of things unfolding within it,” and it is in relation to such unfolding time that the self emerges
as a constant ‘work in progress,’ as it were. Under the auspices of the ‘spirit of creation’ of the child, it becomes a perpetually transforming dynamic, the transformations of which are the very means by which time passes; time measured not chronologically but in series orientated around ‘overcoming.’ That is, in terms of this third order of time, when confronted with an obstacle, “there is always a time at which the imagined act [of overcoming it] is supposed ‘too big for me.’” However, when this is followed by “a becoming-equal to the act” there occurs the concomitant transformation of the self and the passing of time, because, what the self becomes equal to through performing the act is necessarily unequal to what the self was before, when it still supposed the act to be too great to accomplish. And it is for this reason that the self, after accomplishing the act, becomes something radically new and finds “a common descendent in the man without name, without family, without qualities,…the already-Overman” (Deleuze 1994: 86-90). As such, the dynamics of this third order of time repeat the ‘history of time’ as it proceeded from the first through the second to the third order. That is, the dynamic creativity of the third order of time, as communicated via the three metamorphoses of the spirit in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is predicated not on a forgetting of the first and second orders of time, but rather on a constant remembering of them – and indeed on their repetitive compression and articulation as a series in relation to any act of ‘overcoming.’ And it is this repetitive critical reflection on the ‘history of time’ that makes a radically indeterminable future possible.

Deleuze also says of this ‘already-Overman’ that his “scattered members gravitate around the sublime image” of the passing of time through ‘overcoming’ (Deleuze 1994: 90). Arguably, in cinematic terms, the earliest forms of such a ‘sublime image’ occur in the time-images of the proto-crystalline regime reflected in the films of Wiene, Wegener and Murnau. Firstly, there occurred a reflection upon the ‘weight-bearing spirit’ of the first order of time in Wiene’s The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, via a reflection of proximal stasis that derives from the domination of the actual by the virtual. Secondly, there occurred a reflection upon the ‘spirit of freedom’ of the second order of time, via a reflection of both the sudden/partial destabilization of virtual hegemony in Wegener’s The Golem, and the gradual/systemic destabilization of virtual hegemony in Murnau’s Nosferatu. Thirdly, there occurred a reflection upon the ‘spirit of creation’ of the third order of time, via a reflection of the rapid creative interplay between the actual and the virtual in Murnau’s later film Faust. In short, while the ‘death of God’ in the late 19th century opened up a new third order of time, these German expressionist films of the early 20th century provided concordant imagistic thematization of the new way in which such time passes, via the four states of a proto-crystalline regime.

The significance for contemporary film theory of identifying such a proto-crystalline regime now emerges, along with the reason for Deleuze’s insistence on the importance of such an investigation. That is, the crystalline regime found in Ophüls’s, Renoir’s, Visconti’s and Fellini’s respective films involves reflections on time that are synonymous with those of the proto-crystalline regime found in the films of Wiene, Wegener and Murnau – reflections on time which are strongly Nietzschean in orientation. Yet, via Deleuze’s Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, the crystalline regime is not only situated historically in films that emerged after the Second World War, but also positioned theoretically as the inadvertent result of the opsigns and sonsigns of Italian neorealism. Consequently, insofar as the crystalline regime is thereby rendered the confluent product of unfortunate international conflict and post-World War Two directorial aestheticism, its profoundly philosophical orientation – and indeed its intimate connection with philosophical developments from the 17th to the 19th century – is obscured. This obfuscation, in turn, has led to limited emphasis being placed on time-images in contemporary film theory, insofar as they have become construed as merely another technique of ‘critical’ cinema or yet
another feature of ‘art’ cinema, rather than as the cinematic image of our time. However, the identification of a proto-crystalline regime, situated historically in the first rather than the second half of the 20th century, and positioned theoretically as a repetition of Nietzschean reflection on the ‘history of time,’ allows the critical value of the time-image for contemporary film theory to become conspicuous. In short, through the identification of such a proto-crystalline regime, the role of time-images as an imagistic thematization of the third order of time that emerged in the 19th century, becomes clear. Moreover, in clarifying the relationship between Nietzschean reflection on time, on the one hand, and the later crystalline regime found in Ophüls’s, Renoir’s, Visconti’s and Fellini’s respective films, on the other hand, the proto-crystalline regime also prepares the way for the time-images of the 21st century. That is, through allowing for a fuller appreciation of the philosophical inheritance contained within the time-image, the identification of a proto-crystalline regime stands to engender the continuous development of this critical legacy through cinematic reflection on time; reflection that is crucial if a radically indeterminable future is to remain possible.

Notes

1 Pervasive doubt in the viability of any new and ambitious designs, which offered alternatives to such shattered traditional cultural sensory-motor schemata, also derived from the fact that it was precisely the new and ambitious designs of demagogues like Hitler and Mussolini which had led to the horror of World War Two and the misery of its aftermath.

2 Deleuze advances analogous problematization as “the constant state of cinema,” insofar as, “at all times[,]…the cinema’s potentialities…have caused directors to wish to limit or even to suppress the unity of action, to undo the action, the drama, the plot or the story and to carry further an ambition with which literature was already permeated” (Deleuze 2004: 209-210).

3 With regard to cinema, Deleuze describes the new image that emerged as “dispersive” rather than “globalizing or synthetic,” in which “linkages, connections, or liaisons are deliberately weak,” and in which “the sensory-motor action or situation has been replaced by the stroll, the voyage and the continual return journey.” Moreover, these images are not only composed of “anonymous clichés,” but also orientated around a belief “in a powerful concerted organisation…which has found the way to make [such] clichés circulate” (Deleuze 2004: 211-214).

4 In Cinema 2 Deleuze advances that “a pure…optical or sound situation becomes established in what we might call ‘any-space-whatever’ [Here,]… sensory-motor connections are now valid only by virtue of the upsets that affect, loosen, unbalance, or uncouple them: the crisis of the action-image…[T]he optical and sound situation is, therefore, neither an index nor a synsign [but]…a new breed of signs, opsigns and sonsigns” (Deleuze 2005: 5-6).

5 Deleuze’s idea of the time-image is indissociable from his reading of Henri Bergson’s philosophy. In terms of this, “the past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two elements which co-exist: One is the present, which does not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through which all presents pass…Not only does the past coexist with the present that has been, but…it is all our past, which coexists with each present” (Deleuze 1988a: 59).

6 It is interesting to note that the four crystal states of the time-image that Deleuze points to in Cinema 2, in many ways correspond with the four signs that Deleuze proffers as a hermeneutic key through which the dynamics of Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time may be approached – namely “worldly signs,… deceptive signs of love, sensuous material signs, and…the essential signs of art” (Deleuze 2000: 14). In order to help clarify the dynamics of the four crystal states of the time image, this correspondence will briefly be commented upon during the course of the article.

7 See note 4.
8 See note 5.

9 For example, at a macro level, the ‘problem’ of *incompossibility* often plagues new political regimes, when they seek to negate a previous political regime, while simultaneously inhabiting the politico-legal structures – and on occasion even the buildings – of the former administration. Similarly, at a micro level, a private experience of incompossibility indicates self-transformation, insofar as, while the emergence of a new constellation of concerns may be experienced as incompatible with one’s previous concerns, such new concerns are always predicated upon their predecessors. That is, these predecessors comprise the condition of their possibility and – according to Bergson – do not pass but remain present, interminably.

10 “The circuit itself is an exchange: the mirror-image is virtual in relation to the actual character that the mirror catches, but it is actual in the mirror which now leaves the character with only a virtuality and pushes him back out-of-field” (Deleuze 2005: 68).

11 It must be stressed that what is being referred to here is not traditional Japanese Zen, but rather the modern, international, form of Zen, which emerged out of the 20th century meeting of Meiji period intellectuals with Western Buddhist enthusiasts. As Robert Sharf points out in “The Zen of Japanese Nationalism,” this modern, “iconoclastic and antinomian,” “ahistorical, transcultural [and]…popular conception of Zen is not only conceptually incoherent but also a woeful misreading of traditional Zen doctrine, altogether controverted by the lived contingencies of Zen monastic practice” (Sharf 1995: 107). Nevertheless, this form of Zen is increasingly being embraced around the world, and a possible reason for this is that it is understood as holding out the promise of a balanced, reciprocal exchange between the actual and the virtual; a balance otherwise so difficult to achieve.


13 See note 6. Such proximal stasis corresponds with the first of the four signs that Deleuze identifies in Proust’s text, namely the “worldly… empty signs” that indicate “time wasted.” In short, such virtual hegemony, “from the viewpoint of thought,…appears stupid. One does not think, and one does not act…one [only] makes signs” (Deleuze 2000: 6, 14, 24), formulaically and unimaginatively.

14 In this regard, on the one hand, “the Nazi party and state…rall[ied] the German Volk around myths old and new…[in which t]he opposition of Aryan and Jew was thematized as essential. Inscribed in their nature from time immemorial, it could end only in Armageddon” (Lincoln 1999: 75). On the other hand, Italian “Fascist symbolism, as it developed in the 1920s, located the Roman legacy at its core and depended heavily upon romanità for its coherence,” or, the glorification and adoption of imagery, motifs and gestures that derived from ancient Rome, along with the obligation to continue the ‘civilizing’ mission of the latter (Stone 1999: 207, 208-220).

15 See note 6. Such sudden/partial destabilization of virtual hegemony through the introduction of a ‘depth of field’ corresponds with the second of the four signs that Deleuze identifies in Proust’s text, namely the “deceptive signs of love” that indicate “time lost.” In short, while “to love is to try to explicate, to develop these unknown worlds that remain enveloped within the beloved,” this endeavour is always doomed to fail through the ‘depth of field’ of the beloved. This is because in this ‘depth of field’ there are always other worlds that either remain undetected or inspire jealousy when glimpsed, because they involve a “possible world in which others might be or are preferred” (Deleuze 2000: 7-8, 14, 24).

16 There is good reason to consider this as progression. Renoir was Visconti’s mentor (Düttman 2009: 2; Steimatsky 2004: 205-206), and Visconti himself readily acknowledged the great influence of Renoir’s work on his own films; however, he also hinted that his own films contain something new. In this regard, he advanced, “Renoir had an enormous influence on me. One always learns from someone. One invents nothing. Or yes, one does invent, but one is enormously influenced…Renoir…taught me…and this brief contact with him was enough” (Visconti quoted in Durgnat 1974: 215).

17 See note 6. Such gradual/systemic destabilization of virtual hegemony through ‘decay’ corresponds with the third of the four
signs that Deleuze identifies in Proust’s text, namely the “sensuous material signs” that “afford us the means of regaining time” (Deleuze 2000: 14, 24). In this regard, at the end of Chapter One of Part One of Swann’s Way, the memories of Combray that return via waves of recollection to the narrator – when he tastes the piece of madeleine – is a good case in point (Proust 2001: 48). Through it, the narrator discovers how the present, although lived outwardly in terms of a virtual socio-cultural mirror that informs the expectations of one’s age, gender and class, is always susceptible to intermittent and unexpected erosion when flooded by layers of the past. Such flooding occurs in response to a sensuous material sign, which brings “joy” that inspires “further…mental effort” that, in turn, allows “the sign’s meaning [to]…appear…. Combray for the Madeleine” (Deleuze 2000: 12).

In many ways, this definition by Deleuze draws heavily on Visconti’s The Leopard (1963); in particular, on the explanation of the ‘separateness’ of the world of the wealthy and its incomprehensibility to the lower classes, given by the character of Father Pirrone (Romolo Valli) to the peasants in a tavern. In this regard, while his status as priest allows him to play the role of hermeneutic mediator between the two strata of society, in effect, the definitive factors that he discusses comport with the four dynamics described by Deleuze almost point for point.

Indeed, even when Visconti orientates the narratives of his films around non-aristocratic characters, they too emerge as clinging obsessively to certain ideas or principles, which distance them from the world around them. In this regard, while in Bellissima (1951) the character of Maddalena Cecconi (Anna Magnani) cannot relinquish the idea that her daughter Maria (Tina Apicella) will become a film star, even though the child is still very immature, in Rocco and His Brothers (1960), the character of Rocco Parondi (Alain Delon) is unable to let go of the high moral principles he learned in his village in Lucania, even though they rapidly emerge as anachronisms in Milan.

Similarly, in Bellissima, Maddalena Cecconi steadiest loses all of her limited financial means in an effort to prepare her daughter Maria for stardom, only to encounter the historical forces of prejudice and elitism in the laughter of the film director and his colleagues, when they view her daughter’s screen test. In turn, in Rocco and His Brothers, the integrity of Rocco’s family is not only subject to internal decomposition though the increasing arrogance and cruel self-absorption of his brother Simone (Renato Salvatori), who rapes and eventually murders the character of Nadia (Annie Girardot) for her involvement with Rocco. In addition, its integrity is also steadily eroded from without by the financial difficulties of living in Milan, the conscription of Rocco, the pressures of the social elite with whom his brother Vincenzo (Spiros Focás) is involved, and the schemes of the criminal underworld.

Similarly, in Bellissima, Maddalena Cecconi only realizes the importance of letting her daughter Maria remain a happy child, once the possibility of such happiness has been destroyed by the bankruptcy of the family, brought about by Maddalena’s expenditure on the gamble of her daughter’s stardom. In turn, in Rocco and His Brothers, Rocco dreams of returning to his village in southern Italy only once such return has been rendered impossible, on account of his family’s integration into the network of Milanese life.

See note 6. Such rapid creative interplay between the actual and the virtual corresponds with the fourth of the four signs that Deleuze identifies in Proust’s text, namely the “essential signs of art” that “give us a time regained, an original absolute time that includes all the others.” Although “the final revelation of ‘time regained’ is announced by a multiplication of [such] signs” at the end of In Search of Lost Time (Deleuze 2000: 11, 14, 24), arguably, we already encounter its adumbration in Swann’s Way. In this regard, early in Chapter Two of Part One of Swann’s Way, the narrator remembers how through books he used to re-member fictional worlds on Sunday afternoons in Combray, in ways that transformed the world around him, and gave birth to the very preoccupations that continue to inform his current search for lost time – a search which, moreover, continues to transform him. Indeed, the “crystalline succession” (Proust 2001: 86) to which the narrator refers at this point, may even comprise a possible origin of Deleuze’s “crystalline regime” (Deleuze 2005: 122).

Elena Theodorakopoulos provides support for this through her wonderful description of Fellini’s Roma, when she advances that in the film one encounters “the city’s own fabric and history, Fellini’s dreams and experiences of it, and its cinematic and spectacular past [via]…
the complete absence of any linear or cohesive routes through the city…We never get a full grasp of the city…[r]ather it is a collection of fragments, or moments, in which, as in a dream, the protagonists move about freely” (Theodorakopoulos 2007: 355-361). Many of these features are refined further and articulated with greater complexity in Fellini’s following film *Amarcord*. “Amarcord – a word that, in the dialect of Fellini’s native Rimini, means ‘I remember’ – is rich with memory, desire for memory, memory of desire…In any event, the viewer recognizes the fundamental verity of the film: that memory is the only place toward which life heads certainly” (Cardullo 2008: 44).

In many ways, Fellini’s earlier films, *La Dolce Vita* (1960) and *8½* (1963) – which also involve rapid creative interplay between the actual and the virtual – prepared the way for *Roma* and *Amarcord*, albeit in each case through the medium of an identifiable character played by Marcello Mastroianni. That is, in contrast to the quasi-mystical, ‘free’ interplay between the present and the past in *Roma* and *Amarcord*, in *La Dolce Vita*, such interplay is partly anchored to the character of Marcello Rubini (Marcello Mastroianni). On the one hand, he is burdened by the monotonous imperatives of the present, which derive from his relationship with Emma (Yvonne Furneaux) and her expectations of him. On the other hand, he is drawn toward the profound sensual and aesthetic history of Rome – which both surrounds the members of the hedonistic social group he becomes involved with, and is re-membered, as it were, through their words and gestures. Torn between Emma and the latter group, he struggles to become a great writer; however, his endeavour to capture the essence of this history is undermined interminably because he is, effectively, an expression of the very history he tries to capture – a history that is always in constant reflective formation. In *8½*, such rapid creative interplay between the actual and the virtual is taken a step further, by being refined around the aesthetic ambitions and personal history of the director Guido Anselmi (Marcello Mastroianni). In short, the latter’s attempt to make a film is constantly interrupted by memories and the reappearance of acquaintances from the past, all of which inflect the orientation of his present project in either implicit or explicit ways. After the subsequent ‘free’ interplay of *Roma* and *Amarcord*, Fellini returned to the use of an anchoring character in films such as *City of Women* (1980), where the character of Snáporaz (Marcello Mastroianni) encounters the actualization – in the form of discursive compression – of the virtual history of discrimination against women. In short, he finds himself obliged to re-member and respond to this virtual history, because both his initial sexism and his subsequent disempowerment comprise important components of its continuous formation.

For Deleuze, “doing philosophy is [about] trying to invent or create concepts…which…express an event rather than an essence” (Deleuze 1980: 25), with the result that changing circumstances require a constant creation of new concepts. Thus, philosophy is not about “monitoring or reflecting another…discipline [because]…truth isn’t something already out there we have to discover, but has to be created in every domain…There’s no truth that doesn’t ‘falsify’ established ideas[; consequently,…]the production of truth involves a series of operations that amount to…a series of falsifications” (Deleuze 1985: 125-126), and this process is interminable.

As Ross Collins points out, America “end[ed] up reaping huge economic benefit from the war,[which facilitated]…a historic shift in world power and influence from the Old World to the New” (Collins 2008: 67-85). Indeed, while “in the United States there was boom and prosperity, with the beginning of widespread ownership of cars and consumer durables,” in the years “from 1919 to 1929 [it also]…exported $12.9 billion of capital…to Europe” (Maddison 1989: 52).

In the wake of the Russian Civil War, there occurred a progressive “consolidation of Soviet power” from 1924 onward (Lovell 2009: 81), and the associated new sense of focus and direction in the country had a marked effect on Soviet cinema. This is clearly evinced through the work of “Eisenstein and other Russian directors of the 1920s, who were ideologically committed to the revolutionary order” (Chapman 2005: 146).

Arguably, such cinematic focus was at least partly a consequence of the “industrial growth in the 1920s” that occurred within France, and which “was accompanied by large scale technical changes and by a reorganization of production methods which became more and more openly capitalistic” (Caron 1979: 257-258). See also Kemp, T. 1972. *The French Economy, 1913-39: The History of a Decline.*
all historical bonds in the state and in
historically shallow society, in which “all things alienation and blasé attitude, as generating an compensatory intellectualism, pervasive equivalence,” along with its associated relation to the latter, he cites the new “money metropolis, and its related mental ills. In religion,” and asserts that this comprised an important step toward the 19th century metropolis, and its related mental ills. In relation to the latter, he cites the new “money equivalence,” along with its associated compensatory intellectualism, pervasive alienation and blasé attitude, as generating an historically shallow society, in which “all things lie on the same level.” Within this new context, the penetration of memory into the past – in the manner described by Proust – becomes an increasingly difficult task, and hence an ever more rare occurrence (Simmel 1903: 51-54). Indeed, perhaps because of this rarity, it became all the more revered and the subject of architectural fantasy, particularly after World War One when, because of “the war-crippled economy…most architects had little option but to dream their designs.” This situation gave rise to intensive experimentation, as evinced by, among others, “Wassily Luckhardt’s drawings of gargantuan faceted monoliths meant to advance the religious unification of humanity” (Schulze 1996: 65-66). These “crystalline structures” comprised “moral beacons of a shining future” (Wise 1998: 12), insofar as they opposed the shallowness, complacency and apathy of the metropolis decried by Simmel. In short, Luckhardt “insisted that an essential element of architectural composition should be… movement,” and he envisioned his buildings as freeing deep dynamic forces so that the unification of humanity would be achieved through a constant balancing of these moving energies – rather than via their arrival at a point of stasis (Szalapaj 2005: 12). It can scarcely be missed that Luckhardt’s proposed “Monument of Labour” both reintroduces depth – albeit inversely – into a flattened landscape, and facilitates movement within such depth. Analogously, within art, the Creative Forces series of etchings by Wenzel Hablik, for example, entails a similar reintroduction of the density of time and the contemplation of the crystalline possibilities harboured therein. In this work, “the crystal is…a symbol of a unifying principle inherent in [not only] the inorganic but also the organic world” (Welter 2002: 160), and this principle is, arguably, time. That is, the time of the imagination and geological time meet in the crystal, because while the production of the latter through geothermal forces comprises the condition of the possibility of the former, the endless oneric expansion of the former comprises the teleological fulfillment of the latter. In other words, our organic history is traced back into the deep history of the inorganic, while the inorganic contains within it evocative seeds that allow for the fulfillment of that history, through imagination. In short, for Hablik, “the study of natural phenomena, especially…crystals, for their intrinsic laws of form and structure would inspire new possibilities of expression” (Proufoot 1994: 77). Consequently, because crystalline regimes such as these were operative in German sociology, architectural theory and art of the early 20th century, the contemporaneous presence of a thematically consonant crystalline regime within German expressionist cinema, is not at all surprising.

As Siegfried Kracauer explains in “From Caligari to Hitler,” while the original story of The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari was written by Hans Janowitz and Carl Mayer, Robert Wiene – as director – situated it within “a framing story which introduces Francis as a madman…Janowitz and Mayer…raged against the framing story [because]…it perverted…their intrinsic intentions. While the original story exposed the madness inherent in authority, Wiene’s Caligari glorified authority.” Yet, Wiene nevertheless followed through with his design, supposedly to avoid alienating the masses in a way that would jeopardize the economic viability of the film (Kracauer 1947: 186-188). According to Omer Bartov, “What is most important to recognize about this early venture into cinematic stereotypes is the extent to which it reflected existing notions about Jews, further popularized them among ever-larger audiences, and provided models for their depiction that generations of filmmakers with very different goals and agendas have employed”
(Bartov 2005: 3). Similarly, Lester Friedman maintains that the fact that Aryan children destroy the Golem is of comparable significance, as the other face of the same anti-Semitic coin; indeed, he suggests that “this Aryan sensibility is only slightly removed from overt anti-Semitism where…evil is more openly defined as Jewish and the cure more drastic” (Friedman 2004: 89).

34 In Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will (1935), among some of her other Nazi propaganda films, “shots of Hitler are intercut with shots not only of enormous crowds but of individuals, especially children, laughing and smiling” (Devereaux 2006: 349). In effect, such children comprised symbols of innocence and racial purity, and constituted the embodiment of hope in a brighter Aryan future.

35 As Joshi points out, this involved more than mere cinematic allusion to the novel; as such, when “Murnau and Prana Films released Nosferatu in 1922, based on Dracula but without requesting permission from Stoker’s Estate[,]…Bram Stoker’s widow Florence Stoker won a copyright infringement suit against Murnau, and all copies of Nosferatu were ordered destroyed” (Joshi 2010: 93).

36 As Michel Foucault advances in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, the measures put in place from the late 17th century onward to combat the plague, which involved observation, supervision, division and recording, comprised “a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism.” In short, the humid chaos of the plague was met with a cold order of analysis, predicated on “a political dream of the…penetration of regulation into even the smallest details of everyday life.” This dream was progressively realized in the 18th and 19th century in “the formation of…disciplinary society” (Foucault 1991: 192-198, 209).


38 King Ludwig II’s growing abuse of his power to satisfy his homosexual desires is increasingly thematized in Visconti’s film Ludwig.

39 In short, “the Napoleonic conquest of Europe completely dislocated the established order…The map was redrawn, the ancient royal families had lost their domains, and the people of Europe were openly demanding democratic reforms…Time and again the flag of rebellion was raised. In 1821, again in 1830, and yet again in 1848, the barricades were thrown up in Belgium, Germany, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Bohemia, Spain, Portugal, and especially in France” (Baradat 1994: 152-153).

40 Admittedly, the revolution of 1848 may not have the same significance as those of 1789 or 1917, but its lasting repercussions belie the impression of its short-term failure. One of the major achievements of the revolution was the abolition of feudal rule in the countryside. In particular, most of the Hapsburg lands experienced a modernization of their agrarian constitution. As for Germany, it is now generally agreed that its political parties had their origins in the revolution” (Evans and Pogge van Strandmann 2002: 8).

41 Admittedly, Murnau appears to have taken some liberties with chronology here. As Mary Warren Marien points out in Photography: A Cultural History, Nicéphore Niépce, Henry Fox Talbot and Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre all contributed to the development of photography between 1826 and 1837 (Marien 2006: 9-13,17-18); however “the official date for the start of photography is considered to be 1839.” This was because “the long exposure times required left the achievement of portraits…in the realm of the utopic” until at least the 1840s (Koetzle 2005: 7-9). Nevertheless, notwithstanding the unlikelihood of Hutter possessing a portrait photograph of his wife in 1838, the development of photography was well underway at this time, and this invention, moreover, was soon to have a radically democratic effect on images, as Walter Benjamin points out in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (Benjamin 1999: 212-216).

42 See note 36.

43 The asylum itself is an important feature of the disciplinary landscape; it was not only a domain of normalizing surveillance in which “everything was organized so that the madman would recognize himself in a world of judgment that enveloped him on all sides” (Foucault 1967: 214). In addition, it was also a site where “judiciary and psychiatry join[ed] hands” (Foucault 1977: 209) to effect the transformation of anomalous individuals into docile, disciplinary
subjects. Understandably, because he comprised even more of an anomaly than his disciple Knock, the incarceration of Nosferatu within some asylum would have been inevitable, had he escaped Ellen’s trap.

44 In “Zarathustra’s Prologue,” Zarathustra, upon meeting with and departing from a devout old man, remarks to himself, “Could it be possible! This old saint has not yet heard in his forest that God is dead!” (Nietzsche 1969: 41).


46 Although the metaphors of the camel, lion and child do not feature explicitly in the Preface of Human, All-Too-Human, their trace is nevertheless palpable in Nietzsche’s reflections on the “free spirit.” Accordingly, these free spirits proceed beyond their constraints via “a violent, dangerous curiosity,” and, after enduring “the desert of…experiment,” finally emerge as capable of comprehending the answer “to the riddle of [the great] emancipation” (Nietzsche 1886: 8-12); an answer that – like the “sacred Yes” of the child (Nietzsche 1969: 55) – contains no pessimism.

47 Foucault presents a succinct philosophical, rather than mythopoetic, description of this process in “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations,” when he advances that “thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and to question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem” (Foucault 1984: 117).

48 “What Kant saw so profoundly in the Critique of Pure Reason, at least at one point[,] was[…]the manner in which the speculative death of God entails the fracture of the I, the simultaneous death of rational theology and rational psychology. If the greatest initiative of transcendental philosophy was to introduce the form of time into thought as such, then this pure and empty form in turn signifies indissolubly the death of God, the fractured I and the passive self” (Deleuze 1994: 87).

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