

to be able to bring an eye-witness of the digging up of Mpande's grave, and was told to come again, when I should have returned to Natal. He came a second time, on December 1, bringing two sons of the chief Musi to school, but no "eye-witness." He came a third time, on January 6, 1881, and was dismissed at once, his information being only hearsay evidence, and therefore useless for my purposes. He went away, saying that he would go to bring an eye-witness who lived at some distance from Bishopstowe, and appeared a fourth time, on March 1, 1881, but without his man, and was finally dismissed as worthless. Since that time I had no further communication with him for seventeen months, so that His Excellency must have been misinformed when he wrote on July 22, as above, "There can be no doubt that the man has been frequently at Bishopstowe." But on August 7, 1882, he appeared once more, *after* his visit to Mavumengwana, and then gave an account of it, in which, of course, there was not a word to show that he had said that he had been sent by me, which he strenuously denied, though I myself did not believe him.

His Excellency's attention may very probably not have been called to my public disclaimer of having ever employed this native "of apparently doubtful character"—if not half-witted, as some think—to carry a secret message to Mavumengwana or any one else in Zululand. But it must surely have been seen by the Private Secretary, or by one or more of the officials. Yet no mention of it is made in the Blue Books. And whereas on August 29 the Earl of Kimberley "thought it would be desirable that some inquiry should be made into the truth of Faneyana's statements" [p. 115], there is no sign in the Blue Book of any such inquiry having been made, and certainly no inquiry was made of me.

VII. His Excellency further adopts without inquiry [p. 154] the erroneous statement of Ntshingwayo, that "Magema, a Natal native, in the employment of the Bishop, was sent by him, together with the Zulu Mfunzi, to look for a watch taken from an officer who fell during the war," the effect being to discredit my assertion made repeatedly, but

evidently disbelieved by His Excellency, that I have never at any time during my residence in the colony, for nearly thirty years, before or after the Zulu war, sent a Natal native as an emissary to Zululand. And Ntshingwayo's statement [p. 192], as reported by Mr. Osborn, is transmitted to the Secretary of State, without any further comment or explanation, as if it had been ascertained to be a true statement of facts. "He (the Bishop) has all along been in communication with the Sutu party, who made the disturbances. He commenced shortly after the war, when he sent in Magema and Mfunzi to look for a watch and other property taken from an officer who fell during the war. He sent a message by those two men to the Zulus, to say he wanted to recover the late officer's property before Mr. John Shepstone did so, as he will then be able to take it to the Queen, and thus obtain an opportunity to pray for Cetshwayo's release."

If His Excellency had applied to me for information on this matter, I should have at once explained that Magema was not sent by me at all, but by the then Administrator of the Government, Major-General Sir H. H. Clifford, who sent Magema, recommended by me as intelligent and trustworthy, and, I believe, other messengers, white and black, giving him a pass, with instructions to search in Zululand for the watch of the late Prince Imperial (which was found, I heard, by one of the parties, but with the works destroyed), and paying his expenses on behalf of the Empress. Moreover, Magema was not sent "together with the Zulu Mfunzi;" but, being in Zululand on this business, he made a call on his old friend Mfunzi at his kraal, and received from him, with its envelope unbroken, the last offer of terms of peace which Lord Chelmsford proposed for Cetshwayo. This (I may mention as an historical fact) was the *only* offer which he could have entertained, since it required only the surrender of arms, and not (as all the others did) that the King should send in a regiment of his warriors in person to lay down their arms, an act of authority utterly beyond his power at the time. This document, however was never delivered to him, the

messengers not having been able to reach him, and is now in my possession.

Of course, the message said to have been sent by me to the Zulus by "those men" is a pure fiction.

VIII. But the most serious charge which His Excellency has brought against me, without my knowledge, is one of direct breach of faith, based merely on a report from the Zulu chief Siwunguza [p. 227] that "a Zulu, named Nhlebo, had arrived at his kraal from Sobantu [the Bishop of Natal] with a message from Cetshwayo," and His Excellency adds:—

"On the 8th of April last, Bishop Colenso wrote to me as follows: 'I shall, of course, comply with the desire expressed by your Excellency, that I should not send any more messages on the part of the ex-King to any one in Zululand. Should any such messages reach me from Cetshwayo, which may seem to me such as may be sent, I shall avail myself of your Excellency's permission to forward them to yourself, to be sent, if approved, through the British Resident.'"

His Excellency makes no comment on the above, nor did he bring the matter to my notice in any way; but he leaves it to be understood by the Secretary of State that I had committed a deliberate breach of faith.

I have to reply that, since I gave the above promise, which I did out of respect for His Excellency's wishes only, I have never received from the ex-King any letter except through the Offices of the S.N.A. at Capetown and in Natal; that no such letter contained any message from Cetshwayo to the Zulus; that I have not received from Cetshwayo any message for them in any other way; and that I have forwarded none whatever.

The simple fact is that Nhlebo was sent down by the friends of Ngobozana, Siwunguza's cousin, who went with Cetshwayo to England, to ask if there was any news about him, as the time was very long (to their minds) since they had lost him out of their sight. He was informed that Cetshwayo and party had just reached the Cape, all in good health, with some dogs and four waggon-loads of goods, as

stated in a Cape telegram—facts which became at once public property, being known already throughout Natal to white men and black, and certainly to John Dunn and other white men, who read the newspapers in Zululand, and some of whom, no doubt, passed on such news to their Zulu neighbours. These facts, most probably, Nhlebo communicated to Ngobozana's relative and chief, Siwunguza.

There are other statements made in this Blue Book respecting myself and my doings, which I could show to be equally unfounded, and many others respecting the Zulus, in which I am indirectly concerned, which also require correction.

Thus, Mr. Osborn, writing about the Great Deputation, says in reply to an assertion of mine [p. 185]:—

“Nor is the assertion true that they waited the alleged ten days for me. It can be proved that, almost immediately after I started from here on the 29th of March, preparations for their journey were proceeded with and completed, and that they were fairly on their way to Natal three days after my departure.”

To which the Prince Shingana and other headmen with him, now in the colony, reply that it is true that they themselves and other northern Zulus left their homes three days after Mr. Osborn's departure, but they did not leave Zululand, and cross over into Natal, until the twelfth day (about April 9), which agrees with the fact that they reached the Umgeni on April 15 [p. 28].

Again, Mr. Osborn writes [p. 186]:—

“With reference to the statement in the Bishop's letter that Ndabuko and the others, ‘fearing that the same thing might happen as on the former occasion (August 1881), when the Resident came back with orders not to prevent Zibebu and Hamu from calling out their *impis* for the support of their authority, and the punishment of those who had just before taken a part in praying for Cetshwayo, they thought it best to go down after him,’ &c., I can only say that this statement also is entirely void of any foundation in truth, and I am at a loss to know how it could have originated. I received and brought no order of the kind at any time, *neither did I, of*

my own accord, inform any one that those chiefs would not be prevented from calling out their impiis."

But Mr. Osborn quotes his own reply to Hamu's messengers, on Sept. 27, 1831, as follows [3182, p. 118]:—

"If it be true that the Aba Qulusi have eaten up Msebe's tribe, I am unable to advise Hamu against the adoption of such measures as to him may appear necessary and within his power to uphold his authority, and prevent rebellion within his territory."

The Aba Qulusi had "eaten up" the cattle of five kraals of Msebe on September 25, but "did not kill any one when they made the seizures" [*ibid.*], and returned the cattle of three of them, whom they found to be friends [3182, p. 160]; and they did this in retaliation for the seizures made the day before by Hamu "from ten kraals of Kondhlo, headman of the Aba Qulusi" [3182, p. 119]. On Oct. 2, immediately (five days) after this reply of Mr. Osborn, there followed the massacre of the Aba Qulusi, when "a very large number [probably more than 1000 males] were killed, and scarcely any of the male portion escaped with their lives" [3182, p. 151]. Of course, I assumed that Mr. Osborn sent the above message by instructions from his superiors, and not of his own accord.

But I must not dilate further on such points as these. Suffice it to say that there is only one of the charges of any importance brought against me in this Blue Book which I could not rebut as easily as those above considered. That one accusation I fully admit to be true, being based, indeed, on a voluntary statement of my own, viz. that in conversation with the chiefs Ngeongwana and Posile, while waiting some weeks at Bishopstowe to be sent down to the Cape, as also with Zulus who came to see them from time to time, "I explained to them that it was of no use for the ex-King's brothers and his personal friends only to make application on his behalf; but, if it was really true, as they asserted, that 'all Zululand' wished for his restoration, *they should go to the Resident, and ask leave to come down to Maritzburg, and make their wishes known in a proper manner to the Government*" [p. 75]. And His Excellency complains, moreover, that I had "said that

I felt 'perfectly justified' in having given such advice under such circumstances, more especially after reading the recent utterance (London *Times*, April 18) of the Prime Minister in Parliament " [*ibid.*].

I can only say that I still feel "perfectly justified" in having given such advice—rather that I should have been ashamed of myself as an Englishman, and a preacher of the Gospel of peace, if I had not told them, when they came to me for advice in their troubles, that, instead of taking up arms to attack their foes, they should use the orderly and constitutional method, as above described, of presenting their prayer to the Governor. Your Lordship will perceive that I advised them to "go to the Resident and ask leave to come down to Maritzburg." And, but for past experience, I should certainly have expected that he would have given such leave at once, at all events, for the representatives of the three appointed chiefs, Seketwayo, Somkele, and Faku, who came down on this occasion, and perhaps for a few others to accompany them in the name of the rest. I should have expected this, because I knew that the Resident's instructions were [2482, p. 281]: "You shall not prevent any [appointed] chiefs from visiting the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, should they wish to do so." Not receiving such permission, they waited twelve days in Zululand for the possibility of Mr. Osborn's return from Natal, and then crossed the Tugela, acting on the words spoken by Sir E. Wood to Ngeongwana [3182, p. 175]: "If you were refused a pass, I think you were justified in coming to me [i. e. to the Governor himself at Maritzburg] for one."

I must leave it to your Lordship to judge whether, under the above circumstances, I can be justly blamed for the fact of the Zulus having "taken up arms" in self-defence on their return from Natal, when they had been peremptorily rebuffed by His Excellency, and even the representatives of the three appointed chiefs received no recognition whatever, not even the usual scanty supplies of food. I am not, of course, now questioning the wisdom of this policy; though I should say that my advice was given when Sir Hercules Robinson was

High Commissioner, who was favourable, I understand, to the restoration of Cetshwayo, whereas Sir Henry Bulwer was "not in favour of it" [p. 92]. But the Zulus had no alternative, if they did not wish to be destroyed by their foes. On May 17, before they could have reached their homes, Mnyamana reported to the Resident [p. 37] that Hamu had expelled the people from two of his kraals and had taken possession of them; on June 17 he came to Mr. Osborn, with Ndabuko, Ziweddu, and Shingana, stating that "their men had collected for the purpose of protecting them" [p. 68]; and on June 23 he replies to a messenger sent from His Excellency [p. 89]:—

"I do not deny that I have had an armed force here with me; but it was not to disturb the country. It was to protect me and the people under me from Hamu, who had never ceased to trouble me and continues to do so. I have sat still all this time and continue to sit still, because I fear the Government. Four of my principal kraals—one being that of my induna—have been seized by Hamu, [and] the women and children driven out; and they are now occupied by Hamu's people, and many of my people have in consequence deserted their kraals. Who am I, that I should make war on any one? What I did was in self-defence."

I believe that my advice, at the time when it was given, helped to soothe embittered feelings in the hearts of the Zulus, by directing them to the exercise of peaceful and constitutional means for the attainment of their desire, and thus helped also to prevent a conflict which would assuredly have deluged the country with blood.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's faithful and obedient servant,

J. W. NATAL.

To the Right Honourable
The EARL of DERBY.

(D.) Letter to Lord Derby from one of the Bishop's Sons.

NORWICH, May 27, 1883.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to make a request concerning the publication of my father's reply to Sir H. Bulwer's accusations against him that I believe your Lordship will admit that I am not without the right to prefer on his behalf.

It is notorious that when any matter is brought to the notice of the Colonial Office in any way affecting the credit of an official in the Colonial service, the statement conveying the information is not accepted for consideration without having been first referred to the person implicated, in order that it may be read by the light of his explanations. And this rule is a convenient and just one. But a very different course has been adopted with regard to the charges made by Sir H. Bulwer against my much venerated father, and while months have elapsed since Sir H. Bulwer's statements were put before the public, the Bishop's letter is still unpublished. I refer your Lordship to last week's for an instance of the advantage which is taken by his unscrupulous enemies of the discreditable fictions that Natal officials and the Natal correspondents of the London papers (well-known and rabid supporters of Sir Bartle Frere's policy) have industriously circulated about my father. Similar articles have appeared elsewhere, as in the , abounding in injurious innuendoes, and giving a totally false impression concerning the course of events in Zululand and the Bishop's attitude and doings.

It is monstrous that he, of all men, should be pursued by such malignant misrepresentation, and that no authoritative voice should be raised in his defence.

My respectful request is that your Lordship will see fit to publish the Bishop's letter as a separate Parliamentary Paper. The slight additional conspicuousness that would thus be given to it would at once be a little compensation for the disadvantages attending so late a defence, and would

be a tribute of respect by the paying of which the interests of the public service would benefit.

I have, &c.,

FRANCIS E. COLENZO.

[The reply to this was that Lord Derby regretted that he was unable to adopt Mr. Colenso's "suggestion," and that the Bishop's letter was included in a collection of papers about to be published. It appeared within five pages of the end of a Blue Book of 162 pages, published on the 9th of June, 1883.]

(E.) *The Conditions formulated by the Bishop of Natal in December 1880 for the Restoration of Cetshwayo.*

(Extract from the Bishop's Digest,* p. 786. *First Series.*)

The Bishop of Natal [he wrote in the third person] never maintained that the Zulu war was provoked "by the Colonists," though, no doubt, after Isandhlwana the great majority of them vehemently supported it. But the inception of the Zulu war was due entirely to the crafty machinations, the unscrupulous assertions, and the unjust actions of Sir Bartle Frere, as shown throughout this "Digest"—most probably with the view of bringing about more speedily and easily the South African Confederation. Otherwise the above statement [the Bishop is reviewing an article in a Natal paper] very correctly expresses the Bishop's views—except that, while believing in the ultimate triumph of the right and just, instead of mere policy and brute force, and maintaining the principle "*Fiat Justitia*," he would not be irrational and extravagant in the application of that principle, and would urge the restoration of Cetshwayo upon such conditions as—after what has already happened—may be laid down by the English Government, with a view to the peace, order, and advancement of Zululand, as well as the safety of Natal and the Transvaal. Such arrangements might be made without difficulty, would be readily acquiesced in by the Zulus as

* See account of this Digest, *supra*, p. 157.

well as by Cetshwayo, and would assuredly promote the above objects infinitely better than the present unmeaning and arbitrary state of anarchy.

For instance, conditions such as these might be laid down, on the assumption that the petty chiefs appointed by Sir Garnet Wolseley were not appointed *for their own aggrandisement*, and that modifications may and should be made in the present arrangement *with a view to the better government and welfare of the Zulu people, and their advancement in civilisation, and the greater security of the adjoining British Colonies*:—

1. Cetshwayo to be restored to his country as King, not to rule it as an independent sovereign, but to be guided in all important matters by the advice of the Natal Government, expressed through the Resident.

2. John Dunn and the other chiefs appointed by Sir Garnet Wolseley to be recognised by Cetshwayo. [*N.B.*]

3. If thirteen petty chiefs are good for the Zulu people, twenty, thirty, or forty would be better still; and the King may, with the approval of the Resident, appoint other petty chiefs, breaking up the present districts, as may seem desirable, into smaller portions, to be managed by them, as the magistracies in Natal are by the resident magistrates.

4. The Emahlabatini district, as the ancestral home of the Zulu Tribe, to be assigned to the King himself, with a petty chief under him.

5. Each recognised chief to administer justice in his own district, but an appeal to be allowed in all cases from the chief's judgment to that of the King, and from the King, if the chief is overruled, to the Resident, who shall in such cases consult the Natal Government, and whose decision shall then be final.

6. No sentence of death to be carried out without the consent of the Resident.

7. A hut-tax of 10s. to be levied, and paid into the Zulu Treasury, to be in charge of the Resident, and to be expended solely for the benefit of Zululand. Cattle, goats, &c., to be taken in payment at a fixed price, as formerly in Natal.

8. All payments for waggon-licenses, ferries, use of forests, fines, &c., to be paid into the Zulu Treasury.

9. From the Treasury are to be paid the Resident's expenses, an allowance for the King's private expenses, and one for the King's Civil List, which last should include an annual stipend (say of 300*l.*) for John Dunn and each of the petty chiefs, thus assimilating their position to that of magistrates in Natal.

10. The balance of revenue from all sources to be employed in building houses and offices for the King, Resident, and chiefs, schools, gaols, bridges, improving roads, &c.

11. The King to collect, through the chiefs, all firearms and ammunition, to be handed over to the Resident.

12. When this is done, the King to be allowed (say) 500 firearms with ammunition, for the use of his bodyguard and police, or in case of danger from the Swazis—the guns to be breechloaders of good quality (e.g. Martini-Henrys), so that all ammunition must be obtained in future through the Natal Government, instead of the Zulus making powder for themselves.

13. These guns, &c., to be kept at the King's place, except when in actual use.

14. Each petty chief to be allowed for his own use (say) 2 guns and ammunition in like manner, and other guns to be granted by the King and Resident, under license, as in Natal.

15. The military system to be discontinued, the army disbanded, and the military kraals destroyed, and all Zulus to be allowed to marry without restriction from the King.

16. The King to be allowed to have a standing force of (say) 1200 men, to be chosen by himself from volunteers in the first instance, or when vacancies occur through marriage, sickness, incapacity, or death, of whom 200 should serve two months at a time at the King's Kraal, as bodyguard or police, and to weed his crops, &c.

17. The Umkosi (Feast of Firstfruits) to be kept in presence of the King and Resident, the men, as of old, and as now in Natal, bringing no weapons, but only sticks and

shields, and no compulsion being used to force their attendance.

18. The petty chiefs to form a Council of Advice to the King and Resident, to be summoned and consulted as occasion may call for it, e. g. as to making new chiefs and districts, levying increased hut-tax or imposing other taxes, spending balance of revenue, fixing punishments for different classes of offences, &c.; but no decision of King and Council to be valid without the approval of the Resident.

19. The King's Civil List should pay for a certain number of police with each chief. But the chiefs are to support themselves and families out of their stipends, as magistrates do in Natal, and must not *force* labour out of their people. If they need men or women to weed their crops, &c., they must be hired and paid for by themselves, as free labourers.

(F.) *Remarks upon the above, and upon a recent Article in the 'Saturday Review.'*

It will be seen that the above was written by the Bishop before several of the chiefs had proved themselves unfit to rule. The events recorded in this volume necessitated in his opinion, it need hardly be said, important modifications in the conditions proposed by him. They are quoted, however, to meet the assertions of those who, in leading English periodicals, have endeavoured to weaken the force of the Bishop's testimony by representing him as carried away by "sentiment" and oblivious of the real needs of the Zulu people.

The following article has appeared in the *Saturday Review* (June 1884):—

"The coronation by the invaders of Zululand of Cetshwayo's son, Dinuzulu, furnishes a mortifying comment on the policy of the English Government. The new King is, of course, dependent on the adventurers to whom he owes his elevation, and it may be assumed that he has already recognised their title to the lands which they already occupy. The Boers who have exercised the highest

of sovereign rights are not an organised or independent community. The Governments both of the Transvaal and of the Orange Free State have in the first instance censured the aggression, which they may perhaps nevertheless regard with tolerant complacency."

The service which a small party of Boers has rendered the cause of peace in Zululand may be briefly epitomised as follows:—

(a) They have given the National party—commonly described in official language as the Usutus—the moral support which they so much needed.

(b) They have assisted the Zulus to get rid of the firebrand which has desolated Central Zululand—the European-led force, well trained and well supplied, which has operated with Zibebu's territory as a base. The existence and special organisation of this force is the key to the history of Zululand since the "restoration."

Zibebu was allowed to arm and prepare his men, under Sir H. Bulwer as High Commissioner, for ten months before the restoration, whereas Cetshwayo was forbidden to maintain a stronger force than "a few policemen to keep order." But over and above the advantages which Zibebu enjoyed in his firearms and horses, and in having "his men drilled and an organisation more or less complete" (*Natal Mercury*, June 24th, 1882), he was afforded aid by the presence with his force of a contingent of mounted whites. By the help of these Zibebu fell upon Cetshwayo's kraal and upon an unprepared assemblage of chiefs and people from all parts of the country, including the Reserve. After dealing death and destruction far and wide Zibebu has since kept Central Zululand in a state of agitation and unrest.

The chiefs of the National party, with the heroic Mnyamana at their head, and with Cetshwayo's son Dinuzulu under their protection, were awaiting an opportunity of asserting his rights. It seemed unlikely that they could, unassisted, make headway against the great advantages of their opponents. The frown of the Colonial Government had not by the King's death been removed from a people whose attitude bore witness to the falsehood of the official theory

about Cetshwayo. The Reserved Territory—in actual extent one half of Central Zululand, but bearing a much larger ratio to it when the uninhabitable swamps of Cetshwayo's territory are taken into account—had proved the means of severing many loyal Zulus from the National party. (A recent traveller in Zululand, Mr. W. Y. Campbell, after careful inquiries at innumerable kraals in November last, estimated the number of the Zulus well affected towards the King as forming seven-eighths of the whole population.) Moreover there appeared to be some difference of opinion among the chiefs as to the wisdom of placing so young a man as Dinuzulu at the head of affairs at this crisis; Mnyamana, whose loyalty has been exhibited by the self-sacrifice of years (see p. 52 *supra*), and whose sagacity has stood the test of many a temptation to take the field against Zibebu and Hamu, is said to have been in favour of a regency.

Under this state of things the Boers have stepped forward, and, after formally proclaiming Dinuzulu, have aided the National party in attacking Zibebu and his mischievous auxiliaries, and in recovering the cattle looted from Central Zululand. He is stated to have been totally defeated and great sympathy for his white freebooters has been attempted to be evoked by Mr. J. Robinson, of Durban, editor of the *Natal Mercury*, through the instrumentality of his organ, the *London Times*; his telegram running as follows:—“(July 4) Questions have been asked in the Natal Council regarding the fate of the nine British subjects [*sic*] who were with Usibebu before his defeat, but have not since been heard of, and the Government is making inquiries concerning them.”

It will be seen from the above remarks to what extent the National party are now “dependent” on Boer support.

“The district which has been occupied by the Boer invaders is exactly or nearly the same which was formerly the subject of dispute between Cetshwayo and the Boers of the Transvaal.”

A reference to the Blue Books will show that when the Zulu country was parcelled out by Sir G. Wolseley, the award of the Commissioners appointed by the Lieut.-

Governor of Natal, Sir H. Bulwer, upon the Disputed Territory question *was practically reversed, nearly the whole of that territory being handed back to the Boers.* No change has been made in the "resettlement" of the country or in the arrangements made with the Boer Republic, and the only portion preserved to Zululand of the land decreed to be "of strict right belonging to the Zulus" is that which lies on the south of the Pemvana, or Bevana, river, and so much of the strip on the east of the Blood river as lies within Hlubi's territory.

"The conflicting claims were, by consent of both parties, referred to the English High Commissioner, who ultimately gave an award in favour of the Zulus. It happened by a disastrous fatality that between the announcement and the execution of the award the Government of the Transvaal was induced to transfer the dominions of the Republic to the English Crown."

The astounding incorrectness of this account must be apparent to all. The Proclamation annexing the Transvaal was issued on the 12th of April, 1877. The Boundary Commissioners reported their judgment to Sir H. Bulwer on the 20th of June, 1878. On the 11th of November, 1878, Sir B. Frere wrote that he accepted the Commissioners' verdict. On the 11th of December the award was announced to the King's chiefs, coupled with the Ultimatum that preceded our invasion.

"Sir Bartle Frere, who, having soon afterwards succeeded to the office of High Commissioner, was now a party to the litigation, construed the award of his predecessor [*sic*] as applicable only to territorial sovereignty, and not to proprietary rights. The Boers who had taken possession of the debated lands were consequently confirmed in their occupancy; and if the patrons of Dinuzulu are the same persons, they may establish a plausible claim to their former property. The unexpected, and probably unintelligible, interpretation of the award was the main cause of Cetshwayo's alienation from the English interest."

It was the Ultimatum and consequent invasion which, naturally enough, alienated Cetshwayo.

“His formidable military force had been organised in the expectation of hostilities with the Transvaal, but he now found that his enemies had become English subjects, and that, at the same time, he was deprived of the fruits of a regular and legal judgment. Having converted a friendly potentate into an antagonist, Sir Bartle Frere thought it prudent to anticipate a not improbable attack. There is no doubt that he was cordially supported by the public opinion of South Africa; and after the victory at Ulundi his policy appeared to be justified by success.”

(a) The formidable military force received none but natural additions in Cetshwayo's reign. Of the twenty-one regiments named in ‘The Zulu Army,’ published by direction of Lord Chelmsford, only two had been raised by Cetshwayo.

(b) For the nature of the force organised at the time of Sir T. Shepstone's exploit in the Transvaal, see p. 59 *supra*.

(c) As to the real motives which led to the Zulu war, the Attorney-General of Natal, speaking in the Legislative Council in December 1880, and referring to the Ultimatum as the joint production of himself and Sir Bartle Frere, admitted that the war was waged—not for the trumpery causes put forward by Sir Bartle Frere as *casus belli*—but for the purpose of remodelling the Zulu nation with a view to confederation!

“If the English Government had then declared a protectorate in Zululand, the subsequent anarchy and bloodshed, with much loss and discredit, might have been averted.”

See the Bishop's Conditions, p. 358 *supra*. He favoured a protectorate, provided only that the outrageous fictions, upon the strength of which Cetshwayo and his powers of beneficially ruling his people were condemned to destruction, were exploded.

“The Zulus themselves appear to have regarded the previously reigning dynasty as the product and symbol of the military organisation which was shattered at Ulundi. Cetshwayo as a prisoner and an exile had, therefore, no hold on the loyalty of his

former subjects, and the chiefs who succeeded to fractions of his power would lose nothing by acknowledged allegiance to England.”

This is as gross a misstatement as that referred to above. See the abundant evidence to the contrary in this volume, in particular consider the note appended to p. 174 *supra*. Consider, in fact, almost any evidence other than the *dicta* of discredited officials.

“The modern prejudice against the extension of Imperial responsibility deterred the Government from assenting to the more or less direct annexation which was recommended by Sir Bartle Frere and by almost all competent authorities. The division of the country into thirteen provinces, under as many petty chiefs, was perhaps the best alternative for simple annexation. The Zulus, being naturally intelligent, doubted the sincerity of self-denying professions, and took it for granted that the provincial chiefs would be controlled and protected by the power which had brought them into existence. If their reasonable expectations had not been disappointed, the petty quarrels among some of the chiefs would have been from time to time adjusted without resort to arms.”

See what is related in this volume of the massacre of the 1200 Aba Qulusi, and of the grounds for the “petty quarrels” in the country. See, for the influence of the Resident, the Sitimela slaughter.

“Repeated experience has proved that it is cheaper and more convenient to manage warlike barbarians as subjects than as nominally independent neighbours. The rough-and-ready arrangement which was effected by Sir Garnet Wolseley might have been tolerable, and, if not permanent, at least moderately durable, but for a sentimental agitation which was directed to the restoration of Cetshwayo.”

Granted that a feeling directed exclusively to the performance of an act of abstract justice to an individual may be stigmatised as “sentimental.” But compare the “sentiments” which actuated the Bishop in espousing the

cause of Cetshwayo (e. g. those expressed by him in the words prefaced to the above conditions) with the "sentiment" known in popular language as Jingoism, which can ignore the most patent facts and invent or recklessly adopt the most extravagant fictions for the sake of justifying the conduct of distinguished officers of the Empire, and discrediting the life-work of an unpopular prophet.

"He had been harshly treated, and the gallant defence of his kingdom could not be punished or resented as a crime; but the interests of the Zulus had become irreconcilable with his own."

It was because the contrary of this last proposition had been established by the most overwhelming evidence that the Bishop so strongly advocated the ex-King's restoration. And his view was taken by numbers of persons on the spot, e. g. the Boer Colonists of Natal and the administrators of the Government of the Transvaal, none of whom could be suspected of false sentiment about a Zulu. The persons who in various parts of Natal pronounced by means of petitions against the Bishop's view on this point, constituted, according to population returns not quite one-fortieth of the whole European population, making no allowance for the undoubted fact that names were in not a few cases counted more than once because affixed to different petitions. It will be seen that the reviewer changes his ground from "cheaper and more convenient" to "irreconcilable with Zulu interests." But regard for Zulu interests was "sentiment in the Bishop."

"No politician could have anticipated that an English minister would be found to receive a dethroned potentate as an interesting pretender, and then, with romantic sympathy, to restore him to his throne. Sir Henry Bulwer, the experienced and judicious Governor of Natal, urged upon his superiors the expediency of securing a retreat for the chiefs who were to be capriciously dispossessed in a territory to be reserved for the purpose. Lord Kimberley, apparently for the purpose of thwarting a too zealous subordinate, drew his pen through the middle (*sic*) of the district which Sir Henry Bulwer had marked for the proposed Reserve on the map. It is in this diminished space that John Dunn and other

[dis]loyal chiefs have taken refuge under the protection of an English Resident. But for Lord Kimberley's arbitrary interference nearly half of Zululand would now enjoy the benefits which might well have been extended to the whole."

Among the false premises that admit of being most readily disproved is this fiction respecting the necessity of providing a reserve for Zulus unwilling to be under the King's rule. As far as the disposition of the people is concerned it has been most plainly shown that in the reduced reserve an overwhelming majority of the people were strongly attached to the King and anxious that his rule should be extended over them. Great efforts have been made by the Natal officials to conceal this fact. No efforts at all have ever been made by the Home Government to obtain testimony on the subject from persons not pledged to sustain the official view. J. Dunn and Hlubi the Basuto no doubt voted against the National party for obvious reasons hardly entitling them to be called "loyal." With regard to the extension of the British Protectorate to the whole of Zululand, this is what Cetshwayo desired and what he could not get.

"The Boer adventurers have not hesitated to appropriate supreme authority, as it has dropped from the nerveless hands which now administer a once vigorous Empire. It seems that they have effected at least a temporary reconciliation among the native belligerents."

This was written in dependence upon Mr. J. Robinson's telegrams to the *Times* and before the news of Zibebu's defeat reached us.

"But Usibebu and Oham [Uhamu] were represented at the ceremony which accompanied the re-establishment of the dynasty of Pandu in a mutilated and dependent kingdom. Many years ago an English agent exercised at the coronation of Cetshwayo the right of investiture which is now assumed without dispute by a voluntary gathering of settlers from the Transvaal. The new King, or those who control his policy, may probably think it prudent to discontinue the menaces and occasional incursions

which have placed the English Resident on the defensive in the Reserve."

We have yet to learn the full truth concerning the fighting in the Reserve. What has transpired only serves to show the hollowness of the official view already commented on. Many of the Zulus whom Mr. Osborn attacked were residents in the Reserve, and refusal to pay taxes is alleged in telegrams as a cause of the hostilities.

"Although the rule of hereditary succession is but capriciously observed among the natives of South Africa [?], there is no reason for objecting to the elevation of Cetshwayo's son, except that he derives his title from the choice of lawless usurpers. If he keeps the peace, he will probably be recognised, after a reasonable delay, by the Imperial and local authorities. In the probable contingency of a revival of the struggle with the King's uncle Oham and with his rival Usibepu, the Boers will probably find an opportunity of occupying additional territory as a reward of intervention on one side or the other. According to their own convenience, the new settlers will either retain their political connection with the Transvaal or set up a little Republic of their own, in accordance with the Stellaland precedent. Any attempt on the part of Dinuzulu to restore the warlike organisation which made his ancestors formidable will be summarily and sternly repressed by his new patrons; nor would such an experiment be regarded with favour by the English colonists. It is true that Cetshwayo during the height of his power always maintained friendly relations with the Government of Natal; but it is possible that his successor might rather incline to alliance with the Boers. Within a few years the military and political reputation of England in South Africa has been gravely impaired, and it is possible that native chiefs may exaggerate the decadence which better-informed politicians attribute to Cabinets at home, and not to provincial administrators.

"The report that one of the ablest and most loyal officers of the Crown has tendered his resignation may possibly not be confirmed; but Sir Henry Bulwer has by a long course of public service fairly earned promotion. As Lieutenant-Governor of Natal he steadily protested against Sir Bartle Frere's warlike policy; but he is not one of the pedants who regulate their conduct after the close of

a war with exclusive reference to the original merits of the quarrel."

Compare these words with page 174 *supra*, and with the Bishop's language. Sir H. Bulwer's policy has proceeded entirely upon a false view of Cetshwayo's character, and, without reference to the "original merits of the *quarrel*," it is clear that it was very material not to lose sight of the fact that the Home Government had been grossly deceived on this subject.

"When the Zulu dynasty was overthrown, Sir Henry Bulwer seems to have agreed with Sir Bartle Frere in the opinion that some kind of English protectorate should be substituted for the despotism of Cetshwayo."

Compare Cetshwayo's words on p. 283 : "There has been more bloodshed since I have been a prisoner than during the whole of my reign. The bloodshed in my reign was to the bloodshed since as an ant in a pond of water."

"The determination of the Home Government to reverse Sir Bartle Frere's policy at all points must since have caused incessant trouble and anxiety to its unwilling agent. It would have been equitable, and perhaps it might have been safe, to avoid a collision with the Zulu King; but neither expediency nor justice required that no advantage should be taken of his fall."

Compare the Bishop's language on p. 358 *supra*.

"Soon after the end of the war Sir Henry Bulwer called the attention of the Colonial Office to the intrigues of officious philanthropists for the restoration of Cetshwayo. He must afterwards have been greatly surprised at the conversion of Downing Street to the sentimental theories of Bishopstowe."

The "intrigues" and "sentimental theories of Bishopstowe" are fully set forth in the Bishop's own language in the letters referred to under his name in the index.

"But he had perhaps become habituated to the rejection of his advice, when his proposed frontier line was capriciously shifted to

the south. In the midst of danger and dishonour, arising from blind timidity, there is some consolation in the fact that English civilians and soldiers, removed from the influence of constituencies and caucuses, are not inferior in capacity or courage to their predecessors. It was against the advice of the commander of the forces that Mr. Gladstone capitulated to the insurgent Boers. The restoration of Cetshwayo was not recommended by a single competent and responsible adviser on the spot."

This is true if it means that the officials of the Natal Native Department and those accepting their version of facts did not advise the restoration. If the words "and responsible" (in the sense animadverted upon on p. 2 *supra*) be struck out, the statement is false.

"It may also be observed that colonists who are exposed to the aggressions of savage tribes or of civilised neighbours seldom fail to urge on the Imperial Government an active and vigilant policy. The Australian Governments and Legislatures almost openly advocate the establishment of a Monroe doctrine in the South Pacific. The English inhabitants of South Africa for the most part approved of the Zulu war, notwithstanding the trivial nature of the alleged provocation. All the colonies from the Cape to Natal publicly express their regret for the death of Sir Bartle Frere, who was studiously neglected and disparaged by the dominant party in England. He may have made mistakes; but he was right in his fundamental conviction that the Empire would be best maintained by the bold and energetic policy to which it owes its existence. It is easy to sneer at a supposed devotion to 'gunpowder and glory.' If gunpowder means force and readiness to use it, the effect which it produces is with few exceptions pacific. 'Glory' is not an ordinary English motive, and it assuredly had no influence on such a career as that of Sir Bartle Frere. Inglorious avoidance of responsibility is almost always dangerous."

In a letter to the Secretary of State dated 4th of April, 1880, Sir H. Bulwer wrote, "The view of his Excellency the Lieut.-General, and also of his Excellency the High Commissioner, were both based on the assumption of an invasion of Natal by the Zulus—a contingency which, though it was of course a *possibility*, as it had been a possibility for the last

thirty years, was, in the opinion of this Government, in the highest degree improbable, unless indeed it should be brought about by compromising action on our part." And again, in another despatch, "Now I venture to say that up to that time we, in this colony, had not so much as heard the word of war . . . the idea of a Zulu war had not yet occurred to any one. The idea was an imported idea. It was imported at the time of the arrival of the troops and the head-quarters staff from the Cape Colony. Once introduced under such circumstances the idea spread fast enough."

The above article closes with some essentially unchristian sentiments. Many more obvious comments might be made on it. It is produced here for comparison with the Bishop's own words, because it is a fair sample of the matter which has appeared over and over again in the journal from which it is taken—a journal the influence of which was probably well characterised by a University professor who wrote recently of "the Sadducees of the *Saturday Review*, that Philistine print that has done so much to vulgarise its University readers and writers." And it may be added that one may look in vain through the columns of such journals for a recognition of the supreme importance of the "sentiment," never absent from the Bishop's mind, which he expressed in the words that close the passage printed in this volume beneath his portrait.

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
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