Effectiveness in policy administration

The case of the LRAD programme in the North West Province of South Africa

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ABSTRACT

This article presents the challenges of administering the Land Redistribution and Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme in the North West Province of South Africa. The LRAD, which was launched in August 2001, is a market-led land redistribution programme, which contributes to the redistribution of 30% of White owned agricultural land to Black people by March 2014. In the North West Province, this translated into redistribution of 2 035 680 hectares (i.e. 30% of 6 785 600 ha of White owned agricultural land in the province) by the year 2014, of which by March 2007, 172 656 hectares had already been transferred through land redistribution programmes. Political and administrative authority for administration of the LRAD programme has been decentralised from the National to the Provincial sphere. This is consistent with the intergovernmental arrangements of the Republic of South Africa. It presents a governance regime within which the LRAD programme has to be administered.

For public administration to be effective in achieving the above-mentioned targets, implementing institutions, namely the North West Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment (the DACE) and the North West Provincial Land Reform Office (NWPLRO), had to effectively integrate systems and procedures, as well as co-ordinate the administrative activities required for joint administration of the programme. There was ineffective integration of policies, programmes, systems, and procedures between the DACE and the NWPLRO, which undermined the administration of the
LRAD programme in the North West Province. In addition, the DACE suffered from administrative incapacity, which was partly due to the nature of the governance regime pertaining to LRAD programme administration. Administrative incapacity was also affected by the administration of government policy generally. The most important challenge was the inter-governmental relations arrangements, which imposed limits in terms of the allocation of financial resources. The administrative incapacity also undermined the endeavour to collaborate as far as LRAD programme administration is concerned. This negatively impacted the planning phase as a result of shortage of critical personnel.

Due to ineffective administration of the programme, the North West Province will not reach its target of 30% of White owned agricultural land to be redistributed by March 2014. Effective administration is instrumental towards the achievement of land redistribution goals and objectives of Government.

INTRODUCTION

This article concerns the effectiveness of government policy administration, on the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme, in the North West Province. The study period for this research is from the inception of the programme in August 2001 up until March 2007.

The pattern of land ownership in the democratic Republic of South Africa is mainly a product of discriminatory policies of former governments. Given the economic, cultural, and symbolic value of land, as well as the political imperative of correcting past injustices, the current government introduced the land reform policy in 1995. The LRAD programme was designed such that the state would play a more significant role in its administration. It is in this context that the role of administration in achieving the land redistribution policy goals of the current government is being examined.

ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS FOR LRAD

Coetzee (1988:4-5) and Botes, Brynard, Fourie and Roux (1992:180-188) classify the definitions of the concept administration into four categories. The comprehensive approach views administration as all organised activities undertaken within an institution and aimed at achieving an objective (Botes et al. 1992:295). The limited or functional approach refers to the routine administrative activities assumed to be commonly carried out in both public and private institutions and which are sometimes referred to as clerical work (Coetzee 1988:5-6).

According to the public management approach, large government institutions function like businesses and should be managed as such (Botes et al. 1992:297). The generic view considers administration as the functions that are common among the actions undertaken by a group of organisations within a particular institutional environment (i.e. government
institutions) with the purpose of accomplishing the goals and objectives of public policies (Botes et al. 1992:298).

The generic and integrated functions are classified into conceptual and managerial. These refer to the development of systems and processes for policy making, development of organisational structures, development of systems for appointment and utilisation of human resources, development of systems for the acquisition and utilisation of financial resources, development of efficient and effective work methods and procedures, and development of systems for the maintenance of effective control and accountability (Cloete 1994:58-59; Thornhill 2005:80).

Considering the content of public administration, the aim in the following sections is to indicate its relevance in LRAD. The different components discussed serve as the framework to identify and address the challenges faced in implementing the LRAD as envisaged.

As the prerequisite for effective administration is a clearly defined policy, it is briefly addressed. A policy is defined as “a desired course of action and interaction which is to serve as a guideline for the allocation of resources necessary to realise societal goals and objectives, decided upon by the legislator and made known either in writing or verbally” (Hanekom in Thornhill & Hanekom 1995:54). According to Hill (in Hupe & Hill, 2007:295), a policy system involves “a nested sequence of decisions about structure, financing and about the management of outputs for which different actors may be accountable, perhaps in different ways”. A programme outlines key results (outputs) to be achieved, specific and much more detailed actions to be undertaken by managers, and can thus serve as a parameter to exercise control in terms of achievement of policy goals (Thornhill in Thornhill & Hanekom 1995:229). The role of administration therefore is to integrate policy decisions as well as manage the collective outputs of different actors which are necessary for achieving the outputs of government programmes.

**GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE LRAD PROGRAMME**

The forerunner to the LRAD programme is the Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) (Lyne & Darroch 2003:4; Hall 2004:25). The SLAG programme was a land redistribution programme targeting previously disadvantaged South Africans, who are poor and landless (White Paper on Land Policy 2005; Lyne & Darroch 2003:4; Hall 2004:25). Given the dismal performance of the SLAG programme, a moratorium was imposed by the former Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs in July 1999 on its implementation, with an instruction that the grant programme be re-designed (Hall, 2004:6). This intervention by the Minister resulted in the LRAD programme, which was officially implemented with effect from August 2001 (Lyne & Darroch 2003:4; Hall, 2004: 8). The LRAD is a market-led land redistribution programme based on the willing-seller, willing-buyer principle, which was designed such that the state would play a major role in its administration.

One of the core strategic objectives of the LRAD programme is to contribute to the redistribution of 30% of White owned agricultural land to Black people by March 2014. In the North West Province, this translated into land redistribution of 2 035 680 hectares (i.e. 30% of estimated 6 785 600 hectares of White owned agricultural land in the Province) by the year 2014. Until March 2007, 172 656 hectares of agricultural land had already been
transferred through land redistribution programmes. The Province therefore remained with 1
863 024 ha to be transferred through the redistribution and restitution programmes over the
remaining 7 financial years, up until March 2014.

The LRAD programme departed from some of the policy provisions of the SLAG
programme in that:

- the resource endowed from the previously disadvantaged background were
  accommodated;
- individuals also had the opportunity to purchase farms;
- the size of the grant was increased;
- assets relevant to the envisaged production enterprise/s, as well as debt, could be
  used to supplement the grant;
- the increased size of the grant as well as the use of own contribution to leverage the
  grant increased the credit-worthiness of beneficiaries, thus giving them an opportunity
  to apply for loans; and
- no longer was land acquired just to sustain basic livelihood needs, but also for
  commercial production, thus helping to transform the agricultural sector in South
  Africa.

It can be deduced that the LRAD programme differs significantly from the aborted SLAG
programme. The new initiative provides more flexibility and thus offers a better chance
of success.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS AND
PROCEDURES FOR LRAD ADMINISTRATION

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, is the supreme, enabling law of the
Country. The Constitution (1996) grants authority to the political executive to formulate and
implement policies for LRAD programme administration and prescribes how the executive
should account to Parliament. The executive policy of the new government pertaining to
land reform broadly and land redistribution in particular is based on a number of policy
provisions. The Provision of Land and Assistance Act, 1993 (Act 126 of 1993), is the enabling
policy document with regard to land reform. The Act enables the Minister for Agriculture
and Land Affairs (this authority currently vests in the Minister for Rural Development and
Land Reform) to approve the LRAD grant, which is instrumental in the acquisition and
redistribution of the earmarked agricultural land.

The administration of the LRAD programme took place within intergovernmental
arrangements laid down in the Constitution. This arrangement requires prudent exercise
of co-operative government between the National, provincial, and local spheres of
government, as outlined in section 41 of the Constitution, 1996. Intergovernmental relations
involve complex and interdependent arrangements among various spheres of government,
as well as the co-ordination of public policies among the spheres through programme
reporting requirements, grants in aid, the planning and budgetary process and formal and
informal communication among officials (Fox & Meyer in Fox & Van Rooyen 2004:100). The
Ministerial and Members of Executive Committee (MINMEC), which is currently referred to
as the National Integrated Forum on Agriculture and Lands (NIFAL), after the promulgation of the *Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005* (Act 13 of 2005), is responsible for co-ordination of policy nationally.

From the administrative executive point of view, the programme assigns joint and separate responsibilities to both departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs with regard to policy formulation, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and review. However, the Department of Land Affairs (DLA, and currently designated as the Department of Rural Development and Land Affairs) had the primary responsibility of ensuring the acquisition of land in terms of the *Provisions of the Land and Assistance Act, 126 of 1993*. Both departments had to co-ordinate policy issues and inter-departmental activities pertaining to LRAD programme administration. The Intergovernmental Technical Committee on Agriculture and Land (ITCAL) has been the technical co-ordinating structure with regard to administration of the programme.

Administrative decentralisation implies the transfer of authority from national to sub-national levels/spheres of government (Work 2002:5; Pillay, McCoy & Asia 2001:2). Section 125 (2(b)) of the Constitution, 1996, vests the executive authority of the province in the premier, with regard to implementation of all national legislation within the functional areas listed in schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution, 1996. The exception occurs where national legislation prescribes otherwise. The executive committee of the province appoints the appropriate MEC to chair the Provincial Land Reform Co-ordinating Committee (PLRCC). In the North West Province the MEC for the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment is the responsible MEC. The PLRCC is the political structure responsible for co-ordination of Land Reform policy implementation within the province.

The responsibilities to administer the LRAD programme have been de-concentrated to the Provincial Land Reform Offices (PLROs). A PLRO is a part of the administrative structure of the DLA, and is being managed from the national sphere. A chief director, who is the administrative head of a PLRO, has been given particular limited decision-making powers in terms of approving grants, as well as managing the utilisation of resources in general. Agriculture is defined, in terms of schedule 4 of the Constitution, 1996, as a concurrent function between national and provincial spheres, with the functional area of the national sphere mainly confined to policy formulation, monitoring and evaluation. The provincial sphere of government has more responsibilities regarding policy implementation. Amongst the direct responsibilities of the DACE in terms of the LRAD programme, it has to provide technical planning support during the project design stage, post-transfer technical support to beneficiaries of the programme and post-transfer financial support to beneficiaries through the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP). The Land Bank was, during the period under review, an agency of the National Department of Agriculture (DOA) and delegated some functions by the DLA regarding implementation of the LRAD programme.

This was done through an agency agreement signed by both institutions in August 2001. Some of the roles and obligations of the DLA in terms of this agreement were:

- to budget for and transfer LRAD grant funds to the Land Bank, to enable it to assist those beneficiaries who meet the stipulated requirements; and
- to ensure that the Bank complies with the requirements of the *Public Finance Management Act, 1 of 1999, as amended* with regard to transfer of public funds to a public or private entity.
Implementation of the LRAD policy at the provincial sphere was initially by means of two routes, namely the DLA route and the Land Bank route. The DLA route served mainly clients who required and qualified for the LRAD grants only, while the Land Bank route, which was terminated by the DLA at the end of the 2003/04 financial year, served clients who required and qualified for loan funding, in addition to the LRAD grants. These routes were not mutually exclusive since they had to converge within the DLA, which had the constitutional mandate to manage all processes of acquisition of land under the LRAD programme.

In democratic states, an annual budget is an expression of the popular will of the electorate, as interpreted by political office bearers and is presented to elected representatives in the legislature for consideration and approval (Willoughby in Shafritz & Hyde 1992:25-26). The annual budget, amongst others, serves the following purposes:

- it is an important public policy document spelling out the priorities of government with regard to the administration of the land reform policy, as well as the source of funds (Fourie 2007:734; Thornhill, in Thornhill & Hanekom 1995:22); and
- it is an instrument for stimulating the economy in the agriculture and other sectors, through for example the provision of land purchase and post-settlement grants (Botes et al. 1992:142).

Government funded the LRAD programme through grants provided for in the annual budget. These grants are meant to capacitate beneficiaries by removing constraints such as lack of information, lack of skills, poor education and lack of financial resources (Schneider & Ingram 1990:514-520). The PLRO funded the acquisition of agricultural land under the LRAD programme mainly through the land acquisition grant (LRAD grant) and the planning grant. The land acquisition grant could be used (in part, or in its entirety) for the acquisition of land (including the fees and taxes related to the land purchase), for agricultural purposes, to purchase capital assets and for the development of the land acquired with the LRAD grant. The planning grant provided for the payment of services of design agents, property valuers, transaction costs and costs associated with the subdivision of agricultural land.

The DOA had the responsibility for funding and disbursing funds, as well as monitoring the implementation of the CASP. CASP was a conditional grants programme (i.e. funds allocated to provinces with specific conditions attached to them) which came into effect in the 2004/05 financial year. Part of the conditions attached to the CASP was that 70% of funds disbursed by National government to provincial governments had to provide post-transfer financial support to land reform beneficiaries. The other funding provided by National government to provinces in terms of the equitable share of national revenue, is to support provincial departments of agriculture in carrying out their constitutional mandate, as well as build administrative capacity in a form of human resource acquisition and development. The added functional responsibility to the DACE of having to support land reform programmes meant that it had to draw on the same human resource capacity required to administer agricultural programmes. In terms of the resource dependence theory, organisations are viewed as social entities that interact with other organisations in order to secure supply of critical human resources (Jackson 1995:239-243). The NWPLRO depended on and interacted with the DACE for the constant supply of technical planning skills required for designing LRAD projects. Thus in executing work procedures for the LRAD programme, the DACE and the NWPLRO had to jointly contribute human resources. Work procedures
for the LRAD programme, which are “ways in which officials carry out work in order to give legality and legitimacy to government actions” (Botes et al. 1992:331), are such that the willing buyer initiates the project design stage for an LRAD project, after agreeing with the willing seller on the basic terms of the land sale. Thereafter, any application which meets the basic requirements set for the LRAD programme, would be evaluated by the District Land Reform Committee (DLRC), and approved by the Provincial Grants Committee (PGC) for implementation. Information generated during the execution of work procedures for the LRAD programme, enables the accounting officers of both departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs, to jointly and separately account to the National Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs, who has to render account to Parliament. Political accountability refers to accountability to political organs in a system of representative democracy (Hupe and Hill 2007:288). Legal accountability (derived from implementation of rules and regulations) refers to the requirement that executive actions must comply with the relevant actions authorising the actions. Organisational accountability refers to accountability to supervisors for the performance of duties (Hupe and Hill 2007:288). Public accountability for government programmes such as the LRAD cannot be effected properly unless relevant and timely information are made available (Cameron 2004:59). Thus assists in assessing the effectiveness of public institutions administering the programme.

ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS

The adjective effective is defined as ‘able to cause something’ and ‘able to cause some desired result’ (The World Book Dictionary 1988). In both definitions the cause/effect relationship is implied between the end result and the cause of the end result. In organisation theory, there is no universal agreement to the meaning of the adjective effectiveness as well as the categories used to describe it (Rainey & Steinbauer 1999: 9). This is epitomised by the prevalence of models used for conceptualising organisational effectiveness (Daft & Rainey in Rainey & Steinbauer 1999:13) such as goals models, internal process models, participant satisfaction models, resource dependence models and stakeholder models. However, whilst acknowledging the difficulties in reconciling the above-mentioned concern, Rainey and Steinbauer (1999: 13), defines effectiveness as “…when the agency performs well in discharging its administrative and operational functions pursuant to the mission”. According to Rainey and Steinbauer. (1999:13) the definition explicitly and implicitly addresses the following facets of effectiveness namely:

- whether the organisation does well what it is supposed to do;
- whether employees perform their duties well;
- whether the actions and procedures of the organisation support the attainment of organisational mission; and
- whether the organisation achieves its mission.

Goal models perceive effectiveness in terms of achievement of organisational goals. When compared to the average annual transfer of 28 776 hectares between the 2001/02 and 2006/07 financial years, the performance of the LRAD programme in the North West Province has the following implications:
The programme requires an annual target increase of 825%, or additional 237 370 hectares of agricultural land to be transferred annually (i.e. in addition to the 28 776 hectares the Province has on average been transferring annually since 2001) by the North West Province in order to reach the target of 2 035 680 hectares to be transferred by March 2014.

Given the fact that the NWPLRO was targeting to transfer 10 325 hectares during the 2003/04 financial year, 33 166 hectares during the 2004/05 financial year, 36 482 hectares during the 2005/06 financial year and 40 130 hectares during the 2006/07 financial year, the annual targets which the NWPLRO considered ‘realistic’, these annual targets by the NWPLRO were well below the area of White owned agricultural land to be redistributed annually if the target of March 2014 is to be achieved.

Any increase in the annual land redistribution targets by the North West Province has the following additional implications:

- The budget allocation by the national government to the land redistribution programme would have to increase drastically if the land redistribution target for the year 2014 has to be realised. The land reform budget allocation for the NWPLRO for the 2006/07 financial year was less than that of the 2005/06 financial year by 27%, after an amount of R183 000 000 was deducted in the 2006/07 financial year through the virement process from the national land redistribution programme. The land reform budget allocation for the NWPLRO for the 2004/05 financial year represents an 8% increase over the 2003/04 financial year of R35 033 000 and the 2005/06 financial year allocation represents a 34% increase over the 2004/05 financial year allocation of R40 400 000. Other than the 2006/07 financial year, the budget allocation for land reform programmes (i.e. LRAD programme, Extension of Security of Tenure, and Commonage projects) for the NWPLRO has been on the increase. However, it would have to increase significantly more than the annual increase described above if the current backlog of agricultural land redistributed to Black people has to be addressed. Further motivation for the land reform budget increase is based on the high price of agricultural land, whose market value is increasing every year.

Internal process models perceive effectiveness in terms of the extent to which internal processes and procedures support the achievement of organisational goals. The NWPLRO has since the 2004/05 financial year, been complaining about the lack of alignment of systems between the NWPLRO, the DACE and the municipalities, specifically indicating that the DACE does not support land reform projects sufficiently with CASP funds. In the 2006/07 financial year, only 22% of the CASP grant funds in North West Province were used to support land reform projects, as opposed to the prescribed minimum of 70%. Given that CASP grant funds are conditional funds, the conditions attached to the programme were not complied with by DACE management. The failure of DACE management to sufficiently support land reform projects with CASP programme grant funds as was intended by national government is indicative of ineffective integration of development planning between the NWPLRO and the DACE, especially during the project design and approval phases. A lack of integrated planning results in the NWPLRO and the DACE engaging in separate project approval processes for grant funds under their jurisdiction thus creating a possible area of contention. This results
in LRAD projects that require post-transfer funding being approved by the PGC without any indication from the DACE as to whether they will receive CASP grant funding.

Resource dependence models perceive effectiveness in terms of the extent to which the organisation has been able to reduce its’ vulnerability by securing critical resources needed for achievement of organisational goals. The DACE has been suffering from administrative incapacity (i.e. in terms of financial and human resources), due mainly to the shortage of agricultural engineers and agricultural economists, both of which play a very important role in the planning/design phase of development projects. This constraint not only impacted negatively on the ability of the DACE to deliver services for programmes which are its functional responsibilities, but also for the LRAD programme. In the context of the LRAD programme, the administrative incapacity of the DACE resulted in late submission of feasibility reports, a situation that results in prolonging the approval process for LRAD projects. The NWPLRO had a target to approve LRAD applications within 90 days from the submission of an application. Between the financial years 2001/02 and 2006/07, it has been taking on average 130 days (calendar days) for a project to be approved by PGC (this long average period was influenced by a few projects which took extremely long before they could be approved). The prolonged approval process means that not all projects planned to be transferred in a given financial year, are transferred within that financial year.

Stakeholder models perceive effectiveness in terms of the extent to which competing expectations of stakeholders have been managed and satisfied. The ineffective alignment of systems between the NWPLRO and the DACE is also due to the differences in decentralisation of administrative authority between the two institutions. With agriculture being a concurrent function between the DOA and the DACE, the DACE decides before the beginning of each financial year which projects will be funded, and after the DOA has satisfied itself that the DACE has met the basic conditions attached to the CASP, approves the projects and releases the funds. The funds for the DACE are allocated to the DACE through the annual Division of Revenue Act (as promulgated each year). The projects to be funded from the CASP are approved all at once before the beginning of the financial year. Implementation of such projects, including spending all of the allocated funds under the CASP programme forms part of the performance contracts of senior management of the DACE.

The Land function is a national sphere competency. As such the NWPLRO is performing the functions of the DLA which have been de-concentrated to the provinces. Though the Chief Director for the NWPLRO has been granted the authority to approve the release of the LRAD grant after the PGC has approved the project, control of the LRAD grant funds has been centralised at the national sphere. Given the fact that the LRAD programme is market-led and demand-driven, the NWPLRO (i.e. through the PGC) does not approve LRAD projects all at once before the beginning of the financial year as the DACE does, but approves them as and when they are submitted to the PGC.

The performance of the DACE and the NWPLRO is measured in terms of achievement of targets as indicated in their strategic and operational plans, consistent with the New Public Management approach that became a feature of the South African public service since 1996 (White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service 1995:14-15). However, it is the DACE management that is experiencing more pressure to perform. Like all senior managers in the South African public service, the DACE management performance is incentive based. They are expected to spend 100% of all the CASP funds allocated to the Department
within a given financial year. Of the amount allocated, 25% must be spent each quarter on a cumulative basis. Failure to successfully spend the CASP grant funds not only impacts negatively on their performance based incentives, but it carries with it the risk of CASP funds being diverted to other provinces, as well as the possibility of reduced future allocation of CASP funds to the DACE.

The two systems for managing the LRAD grant funds and CASP grant funds as described above are incompatible. Performance contracts can promote:

● a ‘check-list’ mentality (Christensen & Laegreid 2001:86), i.e. an attitude whereby if managers are of the view that responsibilities pertaining to LRAD programme administration do not form part of their performance targets, they will not perform them even though such responsibilities are instrumental for promoting the general welfare of society;

● self-interest (Christensen & Laegreid 2001:86), whereby managers would pursue those objectives that increase their chances of realising their performance incentives, such as achieving 100% expenditure of the CASP budget irrespective of whether particular prescribed conditions have been met; and

● a failure to pursue collective interest, an attitude whereby managers would be reluctant to co-operate with other institutions for collective achievement of LRAD programme objectives, if these do not form a part of their performance contracts, or will reduce their chances of getting performance incentives.

The pressure to meet expenditure targets in terms of the CASP programme grant funds can promote a spirit of individualism from the DACE management. This is more so, given the fact that performance by the DACE management in respect of CASP funds has been incentivised by the DOA more on the basis of them meeting the CASP programme expenditure targets and less on having supported LRAD projects or having integrated the CASP grants with LRAD grants. Ineffective integration of the CASP with the LRAD programme has been incentivised by the NDA as evidenced by the predictable, continuous and increasing supply of CASP funds to the DACE, funds which are not being entirely used in accordance with the conditions attached for their release.

Participant satisfaction models perceive effectiveness in terms of the extent to which the needs of participants have been satisfied. Unless LRAD projects are given post-transfer resources, they will not be able to sustain agricultural production. Failure to produce and generate income will ultimately result in the beneficiaries being forced to either lease out their farms or sell them altogether thus defeating the long term goal of redistributing White owned agricultural land to Black people.

**A SYNTHESIS**

The discussion highlights the importance of the notion that processes are as important as the goals they are trying to achieve. The different meanings of the adjective effectiveness have been discussed, namely:

● goals models,

● internal process models,
participant satisfaction models,
resource dependence models, and
stakeholder models.

These models, which are not mutually exclusive, have been discussed in context, with a view of highlighting and understanding the administrative inadequacies pertaining to administering the LRAD programme in the North West Province. Given the pre-occupation by government with the goals model, the significance of other models in realising the LRAD programme goals have been emphasised. The discussion of the models also highlights the challenges of administering a government programme within a regime of intergovernmental policy arrangements which have not been clearly defined, such as is the case in South Africa.

CONCLUSION

The article locates the challenges of effective administration of the LRAD programme in the North West Province in the governance regime designed for administering the programme, as well as the structure and systems of intergovernmental relations. It has been argued that due to administrative incapacity of the DACE and human resource dependence of the NWPLRO on the DACE, the processing of LRAD project applications was hampered. The incompatibility of the decision making processes, as well as the performance measurement requirements pertaining to the LRAD programme and CASP have also been highlighted as factors which tend to promote poor policy integration. The DACE has also not been meeting all the conditions attached to the CASP. The allocation of the provincial equitable share funds as well as funds for land redistribution are not geared towards building adequate administrative capacity for achievement of land redistribution targets.

All the above-mentioned factors are indicative of ineffective administration of the LRAD programme in the North West Province. The importance of the LRAD programme in the achievement of the land redistribution goals and objectives in the North West Province is supported by the fact that LRAD projects constituted 80% of all land reform projects approved by the PGC. Ineffective administration of the LRAD programme will therefore result in the land redistribution targets set by the North West Province not being achieved by March 2014.

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