Somkeli* expressed their pleasure in the King's return through their representatives, and although Umlandela's messenger expressed objections, Mr. Osborn does not appear to have given much credit to his words, and remarks that he will, in his opinion, "eventually elect to remain under Cetshwayo's authority" [ibid., p. 288].

Dunn, of course, objected; and Zibebu had nothing to do but to send thanks (being ill at the time) for the favour shown him.

As to the people generally, a few of Dunn's personal followers expressed their natural dissatisfaction, and Dabulamanzi and the other chiefs of the district were what Mr. Osborn terms "loud" in their thanks, and "equally loud in denouncing Dunn."

"None of all the other chiefs, headmen, and people, offered any remarks," continues the Resident, "when I made the announcement to them, beyond thanking, in a civil manner, for the information they had received."

* Captain A. E. McCallum wrote to the Morning Post of November 10th, 1882:—"That the old hereditary chiefs of Zululand are unanimous in wishing for the return of Cetshwayo, and that they express the general wish of their people in the matter, may be granted. I visited the chief Somkele at his principal kraal twice in the autumn of last year. He was most anxious for my opinion as to the chances of Cetshwayo's return, and when I observed that his place was already occupied, and his cattle gone, they would not have it, and an induna started up with the exclamation, 'that for cattle there was not a kraal in all Zululand that would not send him a boast, or a chief not a drove of oxen,' which sentiment was echoed and applauded by the crowd present. Nor shall I easily forget the looks exchanged when I gave it as my opinion that 'Cetshwayo would never be seen in Zululand again.' But for the mischief-making of white, and, unhappily, official persons, such universal joy as that anticipated by Captain McCallum would have undoubtedly attended the King's return."
VIEWS OF PRINCIPAL CHIEFS.

But their thanks would hardly have been forthcoming at all had they been horrified by the tidings which, in point of fact, they did not know how to believe, after the long course of insult to which the family of the King had been subjected by British representatives and protégés since the war of 1879. And one would like to know how many were summoned, how many came, and more exactly, what they were told. There is no sign of their having heard a word about the time when they might expect the King; his arrival might have been six months distant for any hint contained in the reports and despatches on the subject of the communication to the Zulus; and this is, in all probability, the true explanation of the discrepancy between Mr. Herbert's statement [ibid., p. 267] in the name of the Earl of Kimberley's successor, Lord Derby, to the Secretary of the Aborigines' Protection Society, that "It is believed that the measures which were being taken for bringing back Cetshwayo were well-known throughout Zululand some time before he arrived;" and the indisputable fact that the majority of the people were taken wholly by surprise. They were told that he was coming back—some day, and in some way, but when or how they were left to discover when he came.

Even now Sir Henry Bulwer had not given up all hopes of taking a little more country from the King. On the 27th December he telegraphed [ibid., p. 239] home that the shape of the reserved territory was inconvenient, beacon No. 19 projecting into it.
so as to divide it into two, and again, on the 8th he inquired [ibid., p. 254] whether Sir T. Shepstone might sound Cetshwayo as to any alteration of the boundary, to which Lord Derby replied that Sir T. Shepstone might sound Cetshwayo, but was not to press the proposal unless it was readily entertained as advantageous by Cetshwayo. This was hardly likely, since the proposal was simply to take another piece of country away from him.

On December 23rd Sir H. Bulwer wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies:—

"Sir Theophilus Shepstone, K.C.M.G., has, at my request, been good enough to undertake the service of meeting Cetshwayo, and formally re-establishing him in authority. . . . It is scarcely necessary for me to say that there is no one so well fitted by his experience, and by his acquaintance with the Zulu people, and with the circumstances of the country, to undertake this service."

True to his fixed disbelief in the general wish of the Zulus for Cetshwayo's return, the Governor next has some controversy with Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. L. Smyth, on the subject of the number of soldiers who would be required to escort the Zulu King through his own country, the nature of which controversy may be sufficiently gathered from its closing communication. The General was personally acquainted with

* This is a very wide figure of speech, as may be seen by reference to Diagram No. 3, p. 238.

† That is to say, from Sir Henry Bulwer's point of view, namely that Cetshwayo was a dangerous, untrustworthy savage and that his restoration must turn out a failure. Without at all supposing that Sir Henry Bulwer deliberately and intentionally set to work to produce this effect, it is plain that his prejudice had so hopelessly blinded him that he was incapable of seeing anything except in its light.
Cetshwayo, and had formed, of course, a very different estimate of him from that of the Governor, and the former telegraphed to Sir Henry Bulwer:—

"Had I known that escort was other than complimentary or that there was any doubt as to the reception Cetshwayo would get on route selected, I should not have urged the lower number (250, being in exact proportion to the available military transport resources)."

There was one further piece of mischief left for the Governor to do, and he now lost no time in doing it. On the 3rd of January he announced [ibid., p. 274] the appointment of Mr. J. Shepstone, S.N.A., to be British Resident Commissioner for the time being in the reserved territory. It wanted but this—that the man whose sincerity had been doubted by the natives, and who had, a few years before, drawn down upon himself the severe rebuke of the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, should be placed in authority in the proposed Reserve—to fill up the measure of the evil days prepared by official duplicity and official wrongheadedness, for Cetshwayo and his people. It was in absolute defiance of the facts concerning Mr. J. Shepstone that Sir H. Bulwer selected him for a post requiring a thoroughly trustworthy person to fill it rightly, and despatched him to Zululand with that salary of 1000l. a year, which Sir T. Shepstone thought so much too little, "to proclaim and declare the reserved territory to be native independent territory, with a resident British Commissioner, who will represent the paramount authority." That Mr. J. Shepstone was quite of one mind with his brother and Sir Henry Bulwer
is soon apparent. In one of his first despatches from Zululand he writes of "a strong feeling of enmity between the Dabulamanzi party, and Mavumengwana, the latter, as I believe, staunch to us, while the others are, as far as I can gather, still intriguing." What a spirit was this in which to begin reserving country for those Zulus "who are unwilling to come again under Cetshwayo's rule," when such are at once looked upon as "staunch to us," and those loyal to their King as "intriguers"! To find that the Government so regarded the matter was enough to produce a fictitious appearance of inclination towards "us," on the part of waverers, or of men either cowardly, self-interested, or indifferent.

A little earlier (December 22nd) a Government Surveyor, Mr. J. E. Fannin, was sent up to mark out, and beacon off, Zibebu's new boundaries, in conjunction with Mr. Osborn, the Zulu Resident, and they were directed to "place beacons along the line so that no question or dispute may arise in the future." A comparison of Diagrams Nos. 2 and 3, will show that Zibebu received a considerable additional corner to the south of his territory beyond Sir Henry Bulwer's proposed line, which ran along a range of mountains as shown in Diagram 2, and to which line the Home Government had agreed, while removing that proposed for the Reserve further south. On consulting the Blue Books for the reason of this fresh concession to Zibebu,* we find that the line was

* A very important one, as the additional portion was part of that belonging to the Princes.
thus altered to please that chief by Mr. Fannin under Mr. Osborn's directions without even a reference to Sir Henry Bulwer for permission. At p. 55 of the Blue Book [3705, p. 55] occurs a sketch plan of the readjusted line furnished by Mr. Fannin, and at p. 58 is found a note from the Governor asking an explanation of the alteration which had been made two months before without his knowledge [ibid., p. 58]. Mr. Fannin replies that [ibid.]: "in laying down the line I acted, by direction of your Excellency, entirely under the instructions received from Mr. Osborn," and the reason given for the alteration was that the line fixed by Sir Henry Bulwer would have cut out a kraal which Zibebu especially valued, as it had been the residence of chiefs of the tribe for some generations, and that "Mr. Osborn was particularly anxious to avoid this, knowing the ill-feeling it would arouse among Zibebu's people."

The fact is that before Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement aroused rivalry and enmity between the various chiefs, Zibebu and his cousins lived side by side in this part of the country, alike subject to Cetshwayo, and apparently at that time alike loyal to him also. The kraals of their people were inextricably mixed, and the land occupied partly by the Sutus stretched away far beyond even Sir Henry Bulwer's line.

"The line as made," continues Mr. Fannin, "cuts out about forty kraals of Zibebu's people; no kraals belonging to the Sutu party are within it."

This, however, could only be asserted from Zibebu's point of view, and from his own account. That of
the Sutus is a very different one, and, coming from Mnyamana, is far more worthy of belief than any statement of Zibebu's. Mnyamana sent the following message to the Bishop of Natal on January 31st, 1883:—

"I do not see where the King is to put the Zulu people, they all wish for the King; but the land has been taken away from us. Mbopa's tribe, Mfusi's tribe, [a third tribe and two sub-tribes mentioned], part of the tribe of Masipula (Mpande's prime-minister) and some of my people, all desiring the King, and even kraals of the Princess Ndabuko and Ziwedu, and those of large portions of their tribes, are given to Zibebu.† Seketwayo's land is reduced by what has been given to the Boers [the "disputed territory"]; and more land is to be cut off from him for Hlubi, the Basuto, besides all the district south of the Umhlatuze. It is a mere strip that will be left to Cetshwayo, and we do not see how this can be done. We protest against it, the whole Zulu people, both those who have always prayed for the King, and those who before his return were weak-kneed, and held back. We protest, all of us, against the cutting off of the land."†

The conditions read over to Cetshwayo on the 15th of January, and those signed by him at Capetown on the 29th of December, distinctly stated that that portion of Zibebu's country which previously belonged to Ndabuko and Ziwedu would be restored to Cetshwayo, so that the Princes would be able to return to their own districts, and live there subject to the King's authority. §

* Mbopa should be remembered as the heroic Zulu who was tortured by us in vain to make him betray the King in 1879.
† This was actually done, though exactly the reverse was laid down in Sir H. Bulwer's scheme, &c., was stated in the "conditions" as delivered to the Zulus, and published in the local papers.
‡ Mnyamana, be it remembered, was the chief accused by Sir Henry Bulwer of wanting an independent territory for himself.
§ Natal Mercury; Natal Times; Cape Times, December 30th
But this was not done. The kraals of all the important chiefs and tribes named by Mnyamana, including those of Ziwedu, and some of Ndabuko's, and those of large portions of their tribes, were left outside the beacons put up to mark off the King's territory, and in point of fact the boundaries to which Cetshwayo signed his submission were, on this side, quite other than, and stretching far beyond, those laid down upon the map, or beaconed out. Both he, with the Princes under him, and Zibebu were thus given by the Government a claim to the same piece of territory. Under the circumstances could any arrangement have been made more certain to bring about war and confusion?

It is impossible to say how far the difficulty may have been increased by Messrs. Osborn and Fannin's unauthorised alteration, for at most it merely made worse a situation which was already intolerably bad. But what is strikingly evident from the latter's reports [3705, pp. 56, 58] is the favour shown to Zibebu, and the anxious consideration for his wishes and feelings, at the expense of the Sutu Princes and people.

"Zibebu and a number of his followers were present at and took over from me all the beacons."

"Although the new line cuts out a considerable number of kraals of Zibebu's people, still I think that on the whole he is contented, having had apprehensions that possibly more land might have been taken from him. None of his own kraals are cut out."

"The chief and his people were exceedingly civil, and rendered me cheerfully all the assistance I required in building beacons, &c."

Zibebu might well be content, seeing that the
territory assigned to him now was considerably larger than that given to him by Sir Garnet Wolseley, and while repeated mention is made of the kraals he lost by the new line the writers seem to forget that he received in exchange the whole of Umgojana’s territory. It does not appear, however, that the Sutu leaders were consulted, or that representatives of theirs were present, so that Mr. Fannin’s remark “no kraals belonging to the Usutu party are within it” (the line), seems to have rested on Zibebu’s own statement. At all events he had it all his own way; to leave him in possession of a single favourite kraal, nearly a third of even that portion of the territory of the Sutus which Sir H. Bulwer proposed to return to them, was left to Zibebu, and “none of his own kraals” were now cut out, while no mention at all is made of the Princes’ own kraals, and those of the other Sutu chiefs within Zibebu’s new boundaries, beyond the following paragraph, by which Sir Henry Bulwer supplements Mr. Fannin’s report:—“This [i.e. the statement “it cuts out none belonging to the Usutu party”] does not refer to the territory that was under the late appointed chief Umgojana, in which, together with some people belonging to Umgojana and a large number of people belonging to Usibebu, are the people of what is known as Masipula’s tribe, which, under Maboko, appears to have joined the Usutu party.” [C. 3705, No. 36].

* [More correctly, “is well-known to be, and to have been all along, loyal to Cetshwayo and the national cause.”]
CHAPTER VI.

The steamer with the Zulu King on board reached the Cape on September 23rd, and he was landed there on the following day. He was, of course, eager to get home, and until he was actually landed at the Cape, it still seemed probable that he would be allowed to go straight on. There were several good reasons for this besides the manifest cruelty of delaying his return after it had once been agreed to, and the conditions settled in England. There was still, at the end of September, ample time for the whole thing to be carried out before the beginning of the season which would be an unhealthy one for the escort of British troops who were to attend the King, as well as for Sir T. Shepstone and other Europeans concerned, through the coast districts of Zululand. But Sir Henry Bulwer's successful attempts at delaying Cetshwayo's visit to England had of course correspondingly delayed his return to Capetown, which would otherwise have taken place in the very middle of the winter, or healthy season for the coast. A further delay of some weeks (for which it is impossible to discover even the shadow of a
good reason) enabled Cetshwayo's white enemies to represent that the summer season having (now) fairly set in, it would be unsafe to carry out the expedition for some months to come, not indeed, as it was freely suggested by the local papers, until the following April.

But there was another strong, and, it might be thought sufficient, reason for taking Cetshwayo on at once. A violent epidemic of small-pox had broken out at the Cape, and the port was cut off as a plague-spot from all others in South Africa by strict quarantine. The mere fact of landing the King there enormously increased the difficulties in the way of his immediate return to Zululand, and this fact was well known to all in authority at the time, and to the public generally.

The telegram in the Natal Mercury which announced Cetshwayo's arrival at the Cape, remarked also, "the small-pox epidemic continues to spread with unabated fury," * and the same paper a few days later says, "Small-pox is terribly rife amongst the Kafirs at Alton, and not far from Oude-Molen."

The Maritzburg correspondent of the Daily News sounds a more decided note:—

"To land Cetshwayo at Capetown under present circumstances, is to expose him to the grave risk of an infection which in his case, if he should unfortunately come in its path, could hardly be otherwise than deadly. Small-pox is spreading around Capetown with all the virulence which utterly undrained and thickly crowded suburbs can give to it. The picturesqueness of the villages that nestle under the shelter of Table Mountain, forms no guarantee against the outbreak of epidemics. In the midst of all these villages, composed as they at first sight seem to be of luxurious villas, there are

* Natal Mercury, Sept. 26th, 1882.
thickly crowded nests of Malays and half-castes, who defy sanitary precautions both for themselves and their neighbours. Their hovels are to the villas that line the high road and the railway, very much as the rookeries behind Oxford Street and Regent Street are to those thoroughfares. There is thus a regular chain of infection established from Capetown, and no one can tell when or where he may not come in contact with it. To land Cetshwayo and leave him there for an indefinite period under these circumstances is to commit an act little short of cruelty, not to speak of its extreme impolicy. It cannot be pretended that the state of things in Capetown was not known in England some weeks ago. With the special view of putting the Colonial Office on its guard, I telegraphed home information as to the virulence and rapid spread of the small-pox in Capetown. Supposing it to have been necessary to detain Cetshwayo till the arrangements in Zululand were complete, and supposing it to have been unadvisable to keep him longer in England, he might at least have been spared the risks of the metropolis of the Cape Colony.”—Daily News, Oct. 19th, 1882.

Possibly in England, where more or less small-pox is usually to be found, but where, on the other hand, sanitary arrangements and regulations do much to minimise the chances of infection, the grave danger to which Cetshwayo was thus exposed may not have been thoroughly appreciated, but those in whose hands his fate really rested, i.e. Sir Henry Bulwer and his advisers, could not avoid being well aware of the fact, so that the landing of Cetshwayo at the Cape, and his detention there for nearly four months, is in itself a conclusive proof of their indifference to his life; if indeed it must not be called by a darker name.

He himself felt the disappointment bitterly, the Cape Times soon after reporting that

"The captive King at Oude-Molen is not in the happiest of moods, and the pleasure of his visit to England is fast disappearing under the detention at his whilom prison farm. Cetywayo hardly

* Author's italics.
HIS ANXIOUS WAITING.

comprehends the reason of his delay at Oude-Molen. He knows that the English Government are negotiating with the chiefs concerning his return, but he is of opinion that he could do that work better for himself than any representative of England could do it for him. He fancies, however, that his detention is owing to the fact of small-pox being in Capetown; and if this is the reason he wishes to know further why he was landed at all, and he says that even now he might be sent to False Bay and embarked from there. The people of Natal would not then put the ship in quarantine, because he has lived outside of the town, has no intercourse in town, and there is no small-pox at False Bay, where he understands he could embark from. Cetywayo will not return to Zululand with much admiration of the statesmanship of England. He wisely points out that if England has decided on his restoration, then that restoration ought to have been done properly.

After three weeks' anxious waiting he wrote as follows (dated 16th, forwarded 23rd):

"I am writing to you, Sir H. Robinson, to ask you to consider my position here, as I am very anxious to get to Zululand and see how all my household are [zuuzi, the family of a private man, but the people of a chief]. It was very nice to me when in England to hear from Lord Kimberley that I was going home, but it would be much nicer for me to hear of my leaving here.* The planting season is passing in Zululand, and I want to go and provide for my children. I know all the Zulu nation wishes for my return, and the chiefs will receive me heartily.† Speak to the Governor of Natal for me, and tell him to send for me soon. If the Natal [people] do not want me to land in Durban, I could be landed at Port Durnford. Now take notice of my pleadings, and get me removed soon. My heart is very small staying here so long. I do not hear any word from Zululand, or any answer to my former letters. I want to get a letter to tell me to start. Do your best for me, and be a friend of mine" [3466, p. 211].

* The extremely bald and imperfect translation of all these letters from Cetshwayo gives but a poor impression of the simple dignity of his actual language. The repeated rendering by the unsuitable word "nice" of every expression implying approval or satisfaction sufficiently illustrates the deficiency in question.

† Cetshwayo plainly here refers to the old hereditary chiefs, the great men of the nation.
And again on October 31st [3466, p. 215]:—

"I am writing to you, Sir H. Robinson, to tell you that I am nearly heart-broken staying here so long and not returning to my people. The time has lapsed which I was to have left here by. I thanked Lord Kimberley for his promise of my speedy return to Zululand, but I have been here now until I almost doubt of my release. I am writing this to you as Governor of his Colony. I am now very solitary, and my heart is very small. I ask you to plead for me and get me away soon. I say all these words to you for you to get me away soon. I have not as yet had any answer to my previous letters, and hear no tidings of my leaving here, and the time has now passed for my leaving here. The Queen released me and sent me out here quiet, and why am I detained here for so long? it is very hard for me to stay here now. Will you telegraph for me to Lord Kimberley and ask him to send me out of this bondage soon? I expect [hope] to reach home and plant for my food before the season is out. I always write [appeal] to you and always will, and I am sure you will do your best for me. The Zulu people are all willing to receive me. I have spoken to Mr. Lister, my custodian, about exchanging a gun and a rifle I have here for two other rifles. I am sure he is trying his best. Could you get him some help? I want to tell you myself to-day that I almost got into trouble a few days ago by sending into Cape-town to buy a few shot cartridges for my own use on this location. I want you to know this from my own lips. Do not forget me.

"Cetshwayo Ka Mpande."

So the time dragged wearily on, and Cetshwayo was kept wearing his heart out at his old prison, without news of his family and people, without receiving any reasonable explanation of the delay—for indeed there was none to give—while his enemies, the Natal officials, did their very utmost to strew his path with thorns before he should set his foot upon it. No other preparations were made, not a single step was taken during all these months of delay except the preparation on paper of Sir Henry Bulwer’s elaborate schemes for the King’s destruction, until,
in December, the first movements were made to put those schemes into execution [3466, No. 106].

Sir Hercules Robinson telegraphs to Sir Henry Bulwer on Dec. 11th [3466, p. 243]—

“Cetshwayo has this day, in the presence of his three chiefs, signed two copies of the further conditions attached to your despatch of the 2nd December just received. I gave him your message about the huts.† He says he would like to fix permanent site of his kraal after his return, and meanwhile will only ask for a few very small huts to be erected at Ulundi, which will serve him to sleep in for a few nights. Umnyamana, or Chingwayo, or Seketwayo will suggest best site for these, as he does not wish them to be placed amongst the bones of those killed in war. He is most anxious to leave as soon as possible.”

The “further conditions,” it will be remembered, were the two framed by Sir Henry Bulwer in addition to those signed by the King in England; the one by which he was required to give up more than a third of his whole country,‡ which was an intolerable injury to both King and people, and the other by which he was made to promise that he would not

* Mr. Osborn directed to inform the chiefs and people of the new settlement, Dec. 4.
Mr. Fannin sent to beacon out Zibebu’s new territory, Dec. 21.
Directions to Mr. J. Shepstone as Commissioner in Reserve, Dec. 22.
Instructions to Sir T. Shepstone about receiving Cetshwayo, Dec. 28.

† “I propose requesting Resident to have huts erected for Cetshwayo. Would you kindly ask where he would like them erected?” [ibid., p. 243].
‡ The southern “reserve,” which is upon the map about a third of the whole country, and the richest part of it, is much more than a third of the inhabitable portion of Zululand, as that to the north-east is to a great extent malarious swamp, while the rich land to the north-west—the disputed territory—had been given to the Boers.
punish the girls of his household who had married during his absence, and "to secure immunity for the people in respect of anything done during the past three years," which were needless, and therefore insulting, stipulations. Cetshwayo had left England satisfied with the conditions there imposed upon him when once he had understood that the piece of land to be kept back from him was to be but an "indawana," a small place, a "little bit," i.e. enough for the reasonable necessities of those few Zulus who he knew would be all who would voluntarily elect to leave him. Cut down as the land he had inherited in trust for the Zulu people already was by encroachments from the Boers, the suggestion that any more should be taken away had been a bitter pill to him at first. But when he thoroughly understood, what was certainly then intended and explained to him, that the reserved land was to be only in proportion to the number of his own subjects who would not acknowledge him, he felt satisfied that it would be so small a piece that the loss would be but a trifling one. And so he agreed to the condition, with the rest, and reached Capetown content in mind, and determined loyally to stand by the promises which he had made. Then followed the long, disheartening waiting, the depressing presence of the deadly plague around him, the growing suspicion that England's fair promises to him would be thwarted by her colonial representatives, and that he would be kept a prisoner still, perhaps till death, but at all events until much of his country had been wrung from his future possession and that of his
successors by the ever-growing land-hunger of the whites. On December 7th the half-expected blow was struck.

Cetshwayo was told that Sir Henry Bulwer had sent "the conditions that the Home Government have finally arranged" [3466, p. 243] with reference to his return to Zululand; and the newly fixed boundaries of the Reserve and of Zibebu's territory (the retention of which in addition to the large Reserve was now explained to him for the first time) were pointed out to him upon the map. The news must have been a shock, indeed, and his first reply shows how thoroughly he understood the wide difference between what he had promised in England, and what he was asked to promise now [ibid., p. 244].

"I have heard all you have to say [?] have said], and I thoroughly understand it. I also understand what was said to me by Lord Kimberley in England, and I know the replies I gave him." *

"I do not wish to make any reply till I get back to the Zulu country," he continued; "I will meet all my great men there, and shall [then] know all those who would like to leave the country that is set apart for me to govern. When I hear what my great men have to say, then I will make a reply" [ibid., p. 245].

The King earnestly pressed this reasonable proposal and pointed out that his reserving his reply would make no difference in the result ("it will be all the same") † by which he expressed the fact that he had no power by himself to give up part of the country of his people. He could only consent as

* Author's italics.
† "I signed under protest, knowing that the land belongs to my people, and that I had no right to sign it away without their consent." (Account of Mr. Mullins, S. C. to the Daily News.)
far as he himself was personally concerned, but it was precisely the point on which neither he nor any other Zulu King could act despotically, or answer for the consent of the "great Zulu Council." It was in this limited sense only that he finally signed the condition after Sir Hercules Robinson had informed him that he would not be allowed to return to Zululand until he had done so, and his meaning is plain enough in spite of the halting and inadequate English translation of his words [ibid., p. 245]:—"I submit to your explanations . . . but undoubtedly when I get back into the country you will hear more of what my great men have to say.* As for myself, I agree to the conditions."

Nevertheless he still pleaded earnestly that the matter might be reconsidered, saying:

"Of course I have no chance of making any reply, my mouth is closed, but it is natural for me to ask for a chance of meeting the great men in the Zulu country previous to my making any answer to what you have said to-day. Any one else would do the same." [Ibid., p. 247.]

And again he proposed that some influential white man should go with him to the Zulu country, and judge for himself. "I am certain if you went up and traversed the reserved country yourself, you would come to the conclusion that the greater part of the Zulu country was taken away from me," he says to Sir Hercules Robinson. The latter, it will be remembered, had pointed out two days before that he had "no responsibility whatever for the settlement

* These words were actually referred to in a leading London newspaper as importing a menace.
determined on "[ibid., p. 241] and he was of course unable to give the Zulu King any encouragement to hope that the Home Government would think better of the decision arrived at.

"I should not be acting as a true friend to you, Cetshwayo," he said, "if I led you to think that you would gain any alteration of the terms by asking me to refer the matter back to the Home Government. It would only cause delay, and I do not think it would be any use! It would only be raising false hopes."

And he took great pains to make sure that the King thoroughly understood the conditions; for, says he, knowing something of Cetshwayo's character, and judging him truly, "if you know them, and say you will agree to them, I am quite sure you will keep your word." He made no attempt to answer the King's arguments, for indeed there was nothing to answer, nor is there any sign of his having for a moment stooped to the farce of making believe that the conditions were, or should be considered, satisfactory. He simply told the King what was demanded of him, and advised him, in a kindly way, to submit. At last Cetshwayo said, "I would be willing to write my name to-day if you asked me to do so,"* but was recommended by the Governor to take a few days for consideration, and full explanation of the conditions, and it was finally agreed that he should come to Government House three days later, the 11th December, and there give his signa-

* Always in the sense in which he had plainly expressed himself, that he promised for himself, and to the extent of his own power, though, without consulting the council of great men, he could not, in this matter, answer for the nation.
tured. He did so, accordingly, without making further remark upon the conditions, Sir Hercules Robinson telling him that all he had said on the previous occasion had been written down, and would be sent home to Lord Kimberley. The King's last quiet protest was, "I thought I should get away from here in a day or two, and it makes my heart sore that the time is so long" ("about 20 days") [ibid., p. 248].

During the interview of the 7th, Cetshwayo had said to Sir Hercules Robinson that unless some provision were made for him (by the British Government) he should return to his country penniless.

"I lost all when I lost the Zulu country; I was rich before, but now I have not a halfpenny. I am going home, but my house is left destitute and hungry, I shall not have the means to buy anything on my return."

Sir Hercules Robinson replied [ibid., p. 247] "anything of that kind I should, of course, have to ask Lord Kimberley about; and upon the 11th, after the conditions had been signed, he promised that he would telegraph home upon the subject [p. 250].

Some time previously (September 7th) Lord Kimberley had written to Sir Henry Bulwer of "the desire of Her Majesty's Government that all cattle formerly belonging to Cetshwayo and their produce should be collected for him before his return" [ibid., p. 128], and he suggested that if it was found impracticable to collect the cattle which formerly belonged to the King, the natural alternative would seem to be that the chiefs and people who are willing to
receive him back should contribute to his support. But it was precisely the chiefs who had got possession of the great royal herds who were not willing to receive the King, Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu; and, as some of the loyal Zulus said to the Bishop of Natal after Cetshwayo's return, "He will certainly die of want, since, on the accusation that we were hiding royal cattle, they (the disloyal "appointed" chiefs) ate up our cattle also, otherwise we could have given him ours now." They did what they could, but Government had allowed them to be impoverished on account of their loyalty, while Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu fattened on the result. But Lord Kimberley continues, "Either, however, by the collection of his cattle, or by some other arrangement, it will obviously be necessary that proper provision should be made for his (Cetshwayo's) maintenance and support on his arrival in his own country" [ibid., p. 129].

And how were these directions carried out?

On November 18th Sir Henry Bulwer replies to this despatch, inclosing the Resident's memorandum on the subject. The latter explains the undeniable possession by Dunn of large herds of "royal cattle," by the fact that Dunn having exerted himself in the collection of the cattle, after the British invasion of 1879 [ibid., p. 284], was allowed by the military authorities to purchase a considerable number of them. It was, in the first instance, a paltry and discreditable action to be committed in England's name that, having wantonly invaded Zululand, slain, ravaged, and destroyed throughout the country, she
THE ROYAL CATTLE.

should demand, at the hands of the conquered people, their cattle—the chief means of their subsistence. The royal cattle, although looked upon as the King's property, were always given out by him for the use of such people as he considered deserving.

As no crops could be planted during 1879, the people had nothing to depend upon but their cattle. But to allow the traitor Dunn to take possession of the royal cattle, which he did at some nominal price (it is said of his own fixing), was an outrage to the feelings of the Zulus which no one less careless in such matters than Sir Garnet Woleseley would have committed. He, of course, is alluded to by Mr. Osborn's expression "the military authorities," and as he has shown so much favour to Dunn the latter probably made a good thing of his bargain. How many King's cattle he may have appropriated without even the pretence of payment is a disputed question between him and the Zulus. At all events he was not required to give up a single head to the King. Of the other kinglets, more especially Hamu and Zibebu, Mr. Osborn says in his reply [ibid., p. 234], "there is, up to the present, no proof that they appropriated any for themselves." But he adds, "I am of opinion that a considerable number of royal cattle were never brought forward by people in whose charge they were on the King's capture, and that these remain still in their possession."

This was written on November 2nd, and on the 18th Sir Henry Bulwer writes, "I have, however, asked the Resident to ascertain if by any chance
Hamu or Zibebu, or indeed any of the other chiefs, are in possession of royal cattle" [ibid.].

On February 17th, 1883, Mr. Osborn writes again, "I am not aware of the wrongful possession of royal cattle by any of the chiefs or people, but at the same time I think it is not at all unlikely that cases of such possession do exist," showing how much the Resident's information had increased, and his ideas developed, during the four-and-a-half months which intervened. In fact, while Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu remained in possession of great herds of the King's cattle, the mere handful (310 in all, including 43 young calves) which were so magnificently presented to Cetshwayo in Her Majesty's name, was all the wealth of which he was possessed upon his so-called "restoration," with the exception of the presents given to him in England.

It will be remembered that Hamu had robbed Umnyamana of 1300 head of cattle in 1880. In 1881 Sir E. Wood ordered him to repay 700 head, and in September 1882 Sir Henry Bulwer repeated the command. Hamu promised to obey, but in October he sent "30 head of cattle, and 10 young calves" to the Resident as "full settlement of the award" [3616, p. 8]. These were, of course, declined, upon which Hamu made another attempt with a herd of 150 head, which met with a like fate. Mr. Osborn writes upon the matter [ibid., p. 10]:—

"Hamu knows that he seized a great many more than the 700 head awarded by General Wood (to Umnyamana), and Sir H. Bulwer replies that, 'whether his continued neglect or refusal to restore these cattle is the result of his own personal disposition, or
of any bad advice that he may have received from others, * I know not; but in any case I fear that his obstinacy in this matter will lead to further trouble for which he must be held responsible."

Hamu never paid the cattle, which, had they come into Umnyamana’s possession, would certainly have gone to support the King, and all the “further trouble” which fell upon the former was the direct result of either his action in this matter, or else his slaughter of the Abaqulusi in 1881.

Finding that his appeal to the Government through Sir Hercules Robinson produced no effect, the King borrowed 50l. from his kind friend Mr. Saul Solomon, in Capetown, in order that he might not return empty-handed to his family. † The following passage occurs in one of the local papers at the time:

“ The luggage of the King— a strange medley of blankets and pots and pans, just a gun or two— was despatched from Oude Molen yesterday, after having been carefully packed under the personal supervision of His Majesty. No prudent housewife was ever more scrupulously careful, on the occasion of shifting from one residence to another, of her household goods, than has been Cetshwayo, King of the Zulus, in superintending the despatch of all the worldly wealth with which he returns from his prison-farm to his kingdom. By an economy, the wisdom of which may be discussed hereafter, the Imperial Government have prevented Cetshwayo from taking back to Zululand anything in the way of luxuries. It may have been considered that those luxuries would take the form of guns and gunpowder. Strange to relate, however, the King’s thoughts have been chiefly occupied in selecting articles, such as blankets and cooking utensils, which he thinks his family will be

* For once, apparently, the Bishop of Natal is not supposed to have given this “bad advice”!

† This loan was punctually repaid by the King through the Bishop of Natal.
badly in need of. . . . The one desponding thought in the King's mind at the present is that, although he may find his family in Zululand, he will be without the means of feeding them; for the cattle, which was his wealth in the days of old, was taken from him under the Wolseley settlement, and is not to be restored to him. There is a promise of some cattle being given to him; but this, like the arrangements consequent upon his restoration, is vague and undefined. The cattle which will be given to the King will, of course, be so given at the expense of the Imperial Treasury, and, in noting this fact, it is worthy of remark that the King will have to pay the cost incidental on the presence of a British Resident at Ulundi. How Cetshwayo, without any source of revenue, is to defray this cost, we shall hear hereafter."

* It is a remarkable fact that this proposition was actually made, and that the Natal officials did allow the Home Government to fall into the error of supposing that it would be possible for Cetshwayo to "pay a round sum of say £3000. a year to Her Majesty's Government, to cover all expenses incurred by them" [3466, p. 232].

In the first place, as the expenses incurred were all in consequence of the unjust war declared in 1879, if not with England's permission, at least by her representatives, it was acting on the old system of making other people pay our debts to charge Cetshwayo with the cost of his restoration. It was as unreasonable a notion as was the suggestion made in the Natal Legislative Council in 1880 that the Zulus should be called upon to contribute to the expenses of the war, i.e. that they should pay us for having wantonly invaded their country, and swept it with fire and sword.

But, besides the question of abstract justice, which, indeed, has had but little to do with any of our actions in Zululand, the demand was an absurdity in itself, of which the Natal officials must have been well aware.

The Zulu nation holds its wealth in cattle, of which, as we have seen, the loyalists had lost large numbers before the King's return. At the best of times to bring down £3000. worth of cattle yearly, to Natal, would have been a heavy tax, made more so by the certainty of considerable loss upon the way, while, to collect the money by selling their herds under the pressure of necessity to traders, &c., would have been as bad. That money was a scarce commodity in the Zulu country is made plain enough even in the official Blue Books, where we find Ungamule saying that he and
Of the conditions the editor of the Cape Times remarked [Cape Times, Dec. 30th]:—

"He has been asked to sign; he has not been consulted as to the justice or the righteousness, or the possibility of the successful working of the conditions. . . . The arrangement is a game of chance. The terms on which he is restored to Zululand are the terms of the British Government. Cetshwayo had to choose between those terms, and an exile at Oude Molen." And the writer predicted that the restoration would "please neither the restored King, nor the people of Natal, nor any one interested party or policy, and can only have one ending."

Mr. J. Mullins (Zulu trader) said, "I asked the King how came he to agree to conditions such as we had heard of? He said, 'It was not that I agreed to them. I had no choice given me. I was told that the country was to be cut off from the Umhlatuzo, and that to the north also a large piece was to be cut off for Zibebu; and that if I did not sign, I should never return, but remain always at the Cape. So I signed under protest, knowing that the land belongs to my people, and that I had no right to sign it away without their consent, and trusting that, as the English Government have listened to my prayer once, they will do so again, and set this thing right, and restore to us our country. And this is

his people had to pay an isivumu (tribute) to Zibebu of "20 head of cattle, four goats, and two half-crowns in cash" [3466, p. 99].

Sir Henry Bulwer speaks of "a number of the forfeited cattle, altogether nearly 200 head," having been collected by Mr. Osborn for Cetshwayo's benefit on his return, and, as we have seen, the number went up to 310 by the time he received them. What a contemptible little provision this was for a Zulu King may be gathered from the numbers which habitually constitute a royal herd. Zibebu (who had certainly helped himself freely to his neighbour's property) was said to own 60,000 head of cattle in the early part of 1884, yet his possessions must have been far smaller than were those of the King before the invasion of 1879. This poor 310, however, was all that it was thought necessary to provide for Cetshwayo on his return, and the Zulus raised a subscription amongst themselves that he might have the necessaries of life. Yet, at the same time, the authorities proposed that he should be required to raise 3000l. a year to pay for his release, the expenses of a Resident, &c.!
what I shall tell my people when they inquire of me how I came to do this thing, and I shall tell them that they must be patient and quiet meanwhile. And do you say to Sobantu that I commend this matter to him, and that I pray him to bring it before the English Government, and not to do anything hastily, but just to let all my friends in England know what is being done here.’"

The editor of the *Cape Times* remarks again, on January 5th, still speaking of the King:—

‘When he returned from England, it seemed to me that he had lost somewhat of his old vigour, and, in subsequent interviews, I thought that his captivity had impaired the intellect, which was so subtle and so vigorous when I had, on former occasions, controversies with him regarding the Zulu War. But yesterday morning’s interview convinced me that any conception I had previously entertained, of any falling off in the King’s mental powers, was entirely erroneous; and it was evident that the symptoms of lassitude and depression, previously noticed, had been caused by anxiety as to the arrangements which were being made for his return to Zululand, or doubt as to whether the return would be ever made.

‘After some talk I said, ‘I hope, Cetshwayo, that you will have a long and peaceful reign in Zululand.’ He replied, ‘I hope it will be peaceful; but, until I have seen Shepstone, and he has explained everything to me, I cannot tell what it will be.’ To this I rejoined, ‘When you return to Zululand, be sure that you respect whatever is told you on behalf of the British Government, and on no account let any one tempt you to take up a position of hostility to England.’ The King paused for a few moments, and then he said, looking at me fully in the face, as if he was trying to enforce with his eyes the truth of what he was saying—‘I have given my heart to the English. I promise that I will never forget that the English are my best friends, and I shall listen to the words of the Resident.’ In all the arrangements which have been made, Cetshwayo has had no voice. He only knows that Usibepu, whom he cordially mistrusts, is to remain an independent chief; and that Dunn and Hlubi are to be tribal chiefs. He regards himself as a king under the protection of England, or, as he himself puts it, he is an English governor. He does not comprehend the exact position he is expected to assume; but he
HIS LETTER OF THANKS TO THE QUEEN. 277

says he would rather go back to Zululand and die than remain in exile."—Mercury's Corres., Capetown.

With that innate good taste and courtesy for which, according to his lights, Cetshwayo was certainly distinguished, he wrote to Her Majesty, the Queen, upon the day of his departure for Zululand, a letter which was translated as follows [3466, p. 268]:—

"I am writing to you, Queen Victoria, to thank you for releasing me from the cruel [painful] bondage I was recently kept in, and to say that I am this day leaving the shores of South Africa for my native land.

"I thank you for your kindness, and hope that I will be able to sleep safely in my country. Keep my feet off the ground as a mother would do her infant.

"I do not want to get into trouble any more. Do not think that Cetshwayo will ever neglect you, and if you ever again hear idle reports of me, ask me to come to you and explain all myself. I am the child of the White House; keep me and watch over me always.

"I conclude by thanking you for your kindness to me; and when I leave this place trust to prosper in your name. As long as I am alive I will always want to hear of you."

Meanwhile the Reserve was in a state of extreme disquiet. What had hitherto been known as "Dunn's territory" formed the greater portion of it, and the majority of the chiefs over whom he had been placed, with most of their followers, were staunch adherents of Cetshwayo's. Leader amongst them was the Prince Dabulamanzi, who had taken so active a part in petitioning for his brother's restoration, but who, with so many others, was now called upon to choose between that brother, and their lands and homes in
the Reserve. Dunn's few immediate followers, and one or two vacillating and insincere men, alone were ready to reject the King, though there were some others who, apparently suspecting a trap, temporised a little, and did not venture to reject the proffered British "protection," while Cetshwayo's return seemed a doubtful matter, but who speedily spoke their minds when once their own eyes had seen him.* But until he arrived what must not have been their anxiety and doubt. They saw amongst them Mr. J. Shepstone, representing towards them that British power which they had such good cause to dread, and his tone to them was plainly this:—

"Choose now between the protection of England through Natal, with the favour of her officials, and that of your old ruler Cetshwayo whom we swept away, and whom we mean to bring back (some day), and to place with very little power or wealth, over a portion of the land only."

That such was the tone if not the actual wording of Mr. Shepstone's communications to the Zulus is

* Colonel Durnford, R.E., related a case of similar distrust in 1874. Having procured the release of the Putini tribe, taken prisoners without grounds in Natal during 1873, he induced the Government to offer small loans of money to the destitute people until they could raise their crops, but he had to use his personal influence with them before they would take the loan. "They would not take Government money because they feared they would be put in jail some day, if they took it," wrote Colonel Durnford. "I think this is a very striking fact, as showing the utter want of confidence of the natives in the justice of Government. They feared a trap, laid by Government, and baited with money. If they took the money, and could not repay it when called for, Government would put them in prison, or place them to work as bondmen."—'A Soldier's Life and Work in South Africa,' edited by Lieut. Col. E. Durnford, p. 97.
evident enough even from his own despatches, in an early one of which he speaks of Mavumengwana as "staunch to us,"* and of Dabulamanzi as "intriguing" for the King. In the same letter [3466, p. 290] he himself mentions the incredulity with which the news of the King's return was received, and quotes their reply: "When we see him with our own eyes, we will then say that Mr. Jan has spoken truly."

In all his despatches he shows the same spirit, thoroughly in accordance with Sir Henry Bulwer's views, and it might be imagined from their perusal that he had been sent to the Reserve not to encourage the people there to choose freely, and without fear of the consequences of speaking out their wishes, but rather to induce as many as possible to side with "us" against Cetshwayo. That the Natal Government should set itself in opposition to the Zulu King as a rival can never have been intended by the Imperial Government. The Reserve was to have been a refuge for such Zulus (if any) as were terror-stricken at the news of Cetshwayo's approach, not as a change of residence for every one who, after carefully weighing the pros and cons, might decide that his interest would be better served by his becoming a British subject. The Home Government plainly only meant to take from Cetshwayo as many of his old subjects (if any) as dared not remain under his rule, with land to correspond to their number, and they certainly had not the smallest intention of offering the nation a choice between British rule and that of

* See last chapter.
their King, which practically was what was done in the Reserve. But the Natal Government was determined only to leave to Cetshwayo as many of his people as were so deeply devoted to his person that they were ready to run any risks, and to endure any hardships for his sake. And considerably astonished must the said Government have been to find how many came under even this extreme category.

Mr. J. Shepstone proved himself a most capable agent in carrying out this policy. No one could have done it more successfully. An official of a higher stamp would have been obliged very soon to represent to his chief that British supremacy in the Reserve must be established by force, or not at all, since the majority of its inhabitants were totally averse to the whole proceeding. Not so Mr. J. Shepstone. He served his immediate superior better, though his country not at all. A plain statement of the facts concerning the Reserve, made to the Home Government, would at once have brought the scheme of reservation to an end which would by no means have suited the plans of his chief, Sir H. Bulwer, nor those of his brother, Sir T. Shepstone. But “Mr. Jan” had no such scruples. The Zulus living in the intended Reserve did not prove so grateful for the proffered British protection as Sir

* Supposing that he calls himself an Englishman.
† Sir H. Bulwer originally proposed the title “protected territory” for the reserved portion of Zululand, but the Home Government would not authorise the use of the term on the grounds that it “would give rise to misapprehension, and weaken the sense of responsibility of the inhabitants for their own pro-
Henry Bulwer had confidently expected would be the case. This was an annoying circumstance, but not irremediable, and, of course, no reason at all for modifying the proposals of the Government. No doubt Sir Henry Bulwer sincerely desired the happiness and prosperity of the Zulus, or rather of those Zulus who would submit humbly and gratefully to his arrangements for their good, but they must be happy and
prosperous in the way which he thought best for them, or not at all. Mr. J. Shepstone acted on the palpable though intangible lines laid down for him, and carried the system out to an extent which probably Sir Henry Bulwer could never have sanctioned had the details been forced undeniably upon his notice.

The first thing to be done was, of course, to get as many chiefs as possible to declare against Cetshwayo. Mr. J. Shepstone set about this busily, and, by the middle of March, produced a list which has a formidable aspect in the eyes of the uninitiated to whom one Zulu name is much the same as another except for degrees of difficulty in the matter of pronunciation, but which loses much of its importance when submitted to any one acquainted with the subject. Up to January 12th, 1883, four chiefs only had "declared their intention of remaining under the protection of the British Government" [3616, p. 6], two of whom returned to their allegiance to Cetshwayo the moment their own eyes told them that he had returned, while a third, "Ndosi," appears somewhat oddly upon the scene, having been dead many years, his son and successor dying also about 1872.* On February 9th, Mr. J. Shepstone reports the names of thirty-one chiefs and headmen who, he says, elect to remain in the intended Reserve, after

* The fourth, Ngidhlana, a younger brother of Cetshwayo's, had belonged to the opposite party in the civil war of 1856, and fled for a time to the Transvaal, but, returning to Zululand, was received by Cetshwayo, and placed at the head of a kraal. He was, however, a man of no importance in the country, and would have carried no following with him.
taking some time to consider their decision, and who, with the four others mentioned already, make up thirty-five. He concludes [3616, p. 33], "I . . . hope now in a few days to obtain those of the remainder, who are on their return from Cetshwayo." But, before this, a list had been sent to Sir Henry Bulwer by Mr. Fynn, the Resident with the King, of thirty-one chiefs and headmen residing in the proposed Reserve [3616, p. 34],

"who believed it was not Cetshwayo who was coming back, but an image of him. They therefore preferred the plan of the Reserve territory, but, now that the Zulu nation have really seen their King alive, Cetshwayo, they wish to adhere to him, hence the salutation of all, Who is it; is it him? [sic]. It is; it is Cetshwayo himself, and alive."

Upon this list appear eight of Mr. J. Shepstone’s thirty-five, amongst them one Palane, of whom we shall hear again, a chief who was almost the first to meet and welcome the King when he landed, and who explained his previous action on the above-mentioned grounds. The list was taken down by Mr. Fynn from the mouths of ten headmen (sent to him by Umnyamana on the King’s authority), the names of two of whom, Sirayo and Sigananda, appear on the list itself. Nevertheless, so suspicious was Sir Henry Bulwer of every word in favour of Cetshwayo that he persists in speaking of “Cetshwayo’s representations” and “the headmen . . . whom Cetshwayo claims as his adherents.”

Many of these men who, in utter disbelief that the King would ever return, had accepted the proffer of British protection in preference to the uncertainty
existing before that return throughout the Zulu country, proved, from the hour of the King's appearance amongst them, his most loyal supporters. A little later (March 11th) Mr. J. Shepstone speaks of one of them (Zeise) as "one of the extreme Usutu [i.e. loyal] party" [3616, p. 86].

Of the thirty-one reported by Mr. Shepstone on February 9th as desiring British protection, eight withdrew their names as soon as they had seen the King themselves, and five others soon after showed their loyalty to him by their actions. Yet Mr. Shepstone gives all their names, without exception, in his subsequent list of March 22nd [pp. 125 and 126]. But few of the chiefs whom he can justly claim as "staunch to us" are men of much importance, or with large followings, while five of the six whom he calls "chiefs and headmen who have not declared themselves either way" were precisely the five most powerful chiefs in the Reserve (equalled at most by one upon Mr. Shepstone's list) with large tribes, thoroughly loyal to Cetshwayo. Why they had not declared themselves, and what measures were taken to secure declarations favourable to the establishment of the country south of the Umhlatuze under British authority, we shall presently consider.

While there was a hope of inducing the Government to see what a mistake they were about to put into practice, the active and energetic Prince Dabulamanzi spared no pains to open their eyes to the fact, and industriously spread the news that the Queen had no wish to deprive the Zulus of any portion of
their country, and only proposed to institute a Reserve because she had been given to understand that many Zulus desired it. Cetshwayo's own replies to the questions of his people upon the subject were to the same effect, and of course the Bishop of Natal could only answer in similar terms those sent to learn the truth from him before the promulgation of Sir Henry Bulwer's "additional conditions" (containing the boundaries fixed without any reference to the wishes of the people). The newspapers had, indeed, made public the just and reasonable intentions of the Home Government some months before anything was heard of Sir Henry Bulwer's scheme for check-mating them. On the other hand, the Zulus had nothing to convince them of their coming misfortunes except the word of two Government officials, Mr. Osborn and Mr. J. Shepstone, whom they had long learnt thoroughly to distrust. This state of feeling aroused great indignation on the part of Mr. Shepstone, who writes repeatedly and vehemently to Sir Henry Bulwer upon the subject, accusing Dabulamanzi of outrageous conduct, and, as a matter of course, announcing that "Bishop Colenso" was at the bottom of it. The (apparently) half-witted Faneyana is again quoted, with as much assurance as though the Bishop of Natal had not long since made it plain that he knew very little of the man, and had never put the smallest confidence in him, and the name of another supposed "emissary," Mabika, is given, who was absolutely unknown at Bishopstowe. On the authority of these two very
doubtful characters, with a little assistance from the estimable Dunn, Mr. Shepstone writes that they were “sent by Bishop Colenso, with a message from Cetshwayo” to Umnyamana, the message being of a most sanguinary nature. Dabulamanzi, assisted [only] by Fane yana and Mabika, and authorised by Cetshwayo and the Bishop of Natal, is represented as “causing mischief,” spreading “false statements with a mischievous intent” [p. 2], and much more to the same effect, and Mr. Shepstone declares that in consequence his own action is “hampered” [p. 7], and that his authority will be undermined. Yet, not to give too much importance to the movement, he says that Dabulamanzi “appears to be the only agitator” in the territory; “he has aids, but they do not appear,”* except the two named above. So we are required to believe that the inhabitants of the proposed Reserve being (so the officials maintained), with but few exceptions, altogether adverse to Cetshwayo’s rule, and eager to put themselves under British protection, were yet withheld from doing the latter by the (from the official point of view) unwelcome word of one who was, in official parlance, a person of “well-known unscrupulous character” [3466, p. 172] and untruthfulness, &c. &c., assisted by two vagabond natives, simply because he spoke—or was supposed to speak—in the names of “Sobantu” and Cetshwayo. This implies an influence on the part of the Bishop and the King to which the former, certainly, laid no claim. On such flimsy evidence

* Author’s italics.
and mere rumours, however, Sir Henry Bulwer once more seizes upon the oft-refuted idea of the Bishop's interference, coupled, of course, with an accusation against Cetshwayo of breaking faith. Without even mentioning the matter to the Bishop, he writes [3616, p. 26]:—

"Already the partisans of Cetshwayo in this country have taken advantage of the disavowal there has been of any intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to annex the country, by endeavours to persuade the people living in the territory that it will come under Cetshwayo, that the action taken by the Resident Commissioner * . . . has been the act only of the local authorities of Natal, that it has been and will be disowned by Her Majesty's Government, that the people must place no faith in the Resident Commissioner," and more to the same effect.

It is hardly necessary, perhaps, to say that the Bishop had nothing whatever to do with any such messages, while the words really spoken by Cetshwayo were simply such as he had spoken to Mr. Mullins;† as shown, indeed, by Mr. J. Shepstone himself, who, after all his angry denunciations on the subject, remarks [3616, p. 12]:—

"The object Cetshwayo has in sending messages is obvious, viz. to show to the satisfaction of the Government that no necessity for a reserved territory exists; this I am convinced from the wording of the messages."

It is difficult to understand why, in this case, any objection should have been made to the said messages. If this was all, what had Cetshwayo done which he had not a perfect right to do? It was absurd to talk of "unsettling" what had certainly

* Mr. J. Shepstone.  
† See pp. 21 and 27.
not yet been settled. The Zulus of the proposed Reserve had still to choose under which authority they would place themselves, and, until that was done, there could surely be no reason why Cetshwayo should not exercise such influence as his mere word might have over the people. The Home Government certainly did not mean to take from beneath his rule any Zulus who could be thus influenced to adhere to him, and if he could have thus shown "to the satisfaction" of that Government that no Reserve was needed, it would certainly have been very much to their satisfaction indeed.

It is easy, however, to see how readily the prejudiced official mind might misinterpret the King's actual words, of which misinterpretation a single instance will suffice as an example.

The King said, "... and I shall tell them [his people] that they must be patient and quiet meanwhile," i.e. while he appealed on their behalf to the British Government. And this he said, knowing well that they would not submit to the partition of the land, and that it would take all his influence to induce them to remain quiet even for awhile. But Mr. Shepstone's version of Cetshwayo's words is that the latter has directed "all living in the country between the rivers Umblatuze and Tugela, who prefer becoming the subjects of Cetshwayo, to remain where they are [to remain quiet—make no disturbance] and to inform me of their determination to do so, as he (Cetshwayo) will see that they are not disturbed" [3616, p. 16].
That part of our story of the ruin of Zululand which describes the return of Cetshwayo and the period immediately following it, demands special attention, as the official (and other) labour which was spent in misrepresenting the events of these few months, and deceiving the British Government and public, exceeded, perhaps, in extent and persistence, the industry of the Zulu King's foes during all the preceding years.

Every care had been taken by the Natal officials to prepare a failure for the policy they opposed, but that was not enough: great pains were also required to represent all that happened as being in accordance with the predictions and desires of the official circle concerned. No one more thoroughly equal to the task could have been selected than the person who undertook the greater part of it, and it requires some knowledge of the subject, and no little care, to fully expose the fact that his reports are written entirely in support of a preconceived plan.

Meanwhile special correspondents of the local papers were extremely useful in preparing the official way.

A Mr. Carter, editor of the Times of Natal, acted as correspondent to that paper and to the Natal Mercury, these two journals, but especially the latter, having always been Cetshwayo's bitter opponents, and the latter the special supporter of Sir Bartle Frere's policy.* This correspondent

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* The editor of the Mercury was also Durban correspondent of the (London) Times. One instance will suffice to show the
somewhat overshot the mark, for, from first to last, his accounts were so laden with malice towards the Zulu King, groundless and violent accusations, and coarse sneers, that every temperate reader must have felt repelled by them and disinclined to accept the conclusions of so palpably prejudiced a writer.

On the other hand, Dr. Seaton, the correspondent of the Natal Mercantile Advertiser,* a Natal colonist of some years' standing, and who frankly acknowledged that, to begin with, his sympathies were all against Cetshwayo, evidently endeavoured to describe accurately what he saw and heard, although he occasionally makes mistakes through want of acquaintance with the Zulus, their manners and customs, and, above all, their language, being, therefore, very much at the mercy of interpreters, of whom, according to Mr. Carter, "there were many in the country and in the service of the diplomatic circle." This latter was, like Dr. Seaton, utterly unacquainted with the Zulus themselves, their language, and their country, and had, moreover, for his interpreter, Mr. M. Oftebro, one of Dunn's late "magistrates," and especially hostile to Cetshwayo, his father having been a noted supporter of Sir Bartle Frere's war policy.

* And also, it is understood, of the (London) Standard.
The actual truth may be best gathered by a comparison between, first, the account of the Zulus themselves; second, that of the two newspaper correspondents—the one honestly trying to make his way to the truth through considerable difficulties, and, although starting with a prejudice against Cetshwayo and the restoration policy, forced, by a respect for the truth, continually to take the King’s part,* the other violently opposed to him, and supporting through thick and thin the ideas and intentions of the officials; and, thirdly, the actual official account carefully prepared, a little later, with the object already mentioned. What the bias of this latter was likely to be was early detected by one certainly not predisposed to suspect it of injustice in this case [Advertiser, Jan. 26th, 1883]:—

"We repeat here," writes the editor of the Advertiser, "because of its great significance and importance, a statement from the letter published this morning from our special correspondent with the expedition in Zululand. 'I regret,' our correspondent says, 'to have to note it is unquestionable that, from Her Majesty's Special Commissioner downwards through all the chief officials, there is

* Dr. Seaton writes on January 19th:—"It is true that, failing as an inventor, I might develop my facts to further some special line of policy, or to land or abuse some individual; but you have pitilessly tied me down to the truth." This respect for fact was so extraordinary, and so objectionable, in the eyes of Cetshwayo’s white opponents, that they immediately referred it indignantly to the Bishop of Natal’s influence. The editor of the Times of Natal (Carter) went so far as to write of Dr. Seaton as "a gentleman who, we may say, without any breach of confidence, is a personal friend of Bishop Colenso," the mere fact that the Bishop and Dr. Seaton did not happen even to be acquaintances, having only once met, casually, many years before, not being worth consideration.
a decided feeling against Cetshwayo, or, more correctly to express it, a desire to minimise any spontaneous outburst of welcome on the part of the main body of his future subjects.”

And the writer describes the process as

“a sort of wet-blanketing, indescribable in detail, but all tending to make it appear that, however enthusiastic the reception of the King may be, it is not due to the spontaneous feeling of the Zulu nation, but to the direct order of Her Britannic Majesty’s representatives.”

All accounts agree in describing the Zulus as greatly alarmed by the entry of the troops. The Mercury correspondent says [Mercury, Jan. 4th]:—

“I believe they are dubious as to the meaning of the entry of troops; the word of the white man, of course, counts for nothing with them now. Marching as we are, as though in British territory, and with the British flag flying at the Headquarter lines, the Zulus may be pardoned if they fail to understand the full meaning and intention of the umlungu (whiteman) now.”

The Advertiser describes the fear and distrust shown along the line of march, and Sir T. Shepstone speaks of “a very serious distrust of, and disbelief in our professed intentions,” as having soon become very evident. “It [‘our programme’] seemed to them so preposterous and improbable that they could not accept it as true” [3616, p. 41].

The escort, in fact, was large enough to rouse suspicion and dread in the natives, consisting of about 440 Europeans, of whom 429 were regular troops, each with 180 rounds of ammunition, and about 60 natives, described as “Sir T. Shepstone’s body-guard of armed Kafirs,” including mounted
Basutos and Edendale men who had acted as scouts during the Zulu war, with a train of about 150 wagons, and it was sent under the direction of Sir T. Shepstone himself.

It is no wonder that the Zulus should have been even more distrustful than the appearance of British troops would naturally make them after their experiences of 1879. The rumours of Government intentions with regard to the Reserve which had reached them were quite enough to produce doubt and dissatisfaction.

What was generally known to the people was the original intention of the Home Government to restore Cetshwayo "on the principle that no more country should be reserved than is necessary to enable us to fulfil our obligations to the chiefs and people unwilling to remain in Cetshwayo's territory" [3466, p. 216]. It was carefully explained to Cetshwayo himself in England that the only reason for reserving any at all was the (supposed) existence of Zulus adverse to his rule, and that the extent of the Reserve would be in accordance with their number. All Lord Kimberley's replies to his representations on the subject were on this understanding, and the facts had been freely published in the local papers, and were well known to the Zulus through those amongst them who had visited Natal between August 1883 and January 1884. This they believed, and had good reason to believe, was the truth, the Queen's word, and a promise in which they might hope. Cetshwayo's release was granted to the prayers of
his people; his complete or partial restoration rested with themselves, and depended on their own unani-
imity or division. The majority were, therefore, naturally and rightly extremely anxious to show that they were all loyal to Cetshwayo, and upon this feeling are founded all Mr. J. Shepstone's accusations against Dabulamanzi of "intriguing" in the Reserve. But of the distortion of the original intentions of Her Majesty's Government by Sir Henry Bulwer, and of the "cutting off" of half the country by an arbitrary line which had nothing to do with the number of izihlupeki (dissatisfied-injured ones), they knew no-
thing until within a few weeks of the King's arrival. Mr. Osborn only received his orders to make it known on December 8th, while Mr. John Shepstone, to whom the instruction and arrangement of the Reserve was entrusted, did not reach it till the end of the month (December 30th), ten days before Cetshwayo landed [3466, p. 288]. It is perfectly plain indeed that the Zulus simply did not believe a word the latter official said, as shown by his own report that their reply to him was "when we see him [Cetshwayo] with our own eyes, we will then say that Mr. Jan [Mr. J. Shepstone] has spoken truly."
This distrust was not remarkable: for these simple people have no further confidence in any one whom they have once known untrue, and Matshana, be it remembered, had been a resident in Zululand ever since the treachery practised against him in Natal, 1858, and lives there still. These facts should be borne in mind in reading the following Zulu account,
given by messengers especially sent for the purpose by Mnyamana, once more the Prime Minister of Zululand:

On February 10th Mtakwane, Melakanya, and Mbewana reached Bishopstowe from Zululand. Mtkwane stated as follows.

When we last returned from Natal, taking up the news that the King was starting from the Cape . . . we found that Dabulamanzi and most of the headmen had been called and had gone up to Mr. Osborn. We gave the copy of the telegram * for Dabulamanzi to his mother. When we reached Mnyama’s, the royal women wept for joy, but said, “It cannot be true that it is time to meet him on the shore.”

Mnyamana himself told us, “We have just come from Mr. Osborn, who said that we were to build a kraal for the King. But I refused, saying that I was not going to make such a fool of myself. I am now laughed at as the man of ‘the coming-back King,’ and as the man of ‘the dog-King,’”† and I am not going to be ‘King’s kraal man’ into the bargain. Besides, a royal kraal cannot be built until the King himself has pointed out the site.” They could not believe that our statement was true; but, as we persisted in

* This was a Cape telegram, cut out from the Mercury, giving the date on which Cetshwayo was to start from the Cape.

† “As to Zibebu, his heart was hardened again by seeing that the Governor’s word about the restoring of the Princes (Ndbuko and Ziwedu) to their old places was only a mockery. He says: ‘These are your Kings—the only ones you will ever get!—these dogs which Sobantu (Bishop Colenso) has bought and sent up to humbug you! You thought that the Governor was going to take your part; but you see you were mistaken, just as you were before when Wood came!’ And truly he was right there, for we did expect great things when Wood came, and we were horribly disappointed. ‘And,’ says he, ‘it will be just the same again this time, when, as you say, you are going to meet the King. Or, if he is brought back, he will only be allowed to be a kinglet—a chief over a tribe, like the rest of us—not a king.’” This was related on another occasion. The dogs spoken of were some fine English ones, brought back by the King, which he sent on before him from the Cape, and which were kept some little time at Bishopstowe.
going to meet him at the landing-place, they sent messages by us in case we proved to be right.

So we two (Mtokwane and Malakanya) went to meet him. At the Prince Siteku's we heard of Mr. Jan [Shepstone]. He had called Siwusenuza* to him at Entumeni, who, on hearing Mr. Jan's words, said, "If it is really true, Sir, that you are bringing back the King, you will have won the hearts (tola) of all Zululand."

We then came to Dabulamansi, not at his own kraal, as he had been with the other headmen to Mr. Jan, who told them, "We are now bringing back the King. But the country is to be cut off at the Umhlatuze; this land now belongs to the (Hulumente) Natal Government; and any one crossing the Umhlatuze will require a pass. Whitemen will not be allowed to live there, but those Zulus who are dissatisfied at Cetshwayo's return."

And, Dabulamansi and his party having gone, Mr. Jan said the same to Mavumenguana and his party, viz., "We are bringing back the King; those who wish for him, let them cross the Umhlatuze, and those who don't wish for him let them stay where they are, or, if on the other side, come over." Said Mavumenguana, "If you say that you are really bringing back the King, then we see that we are born again, for we all belong to him." Said Mr. Jan, "Why, I thought that you were an isigele (= one who has withdrawn from Cetshwayo)." Said he, "It is all right, now that the Inkos' says it. All that I did was to hold my head down as one being killed. It is all right since it is you who tell me that he is coming back."

Mr. Jan had already said the same words to Sigcwecewele and party, viz., "This land south of the Umhlatuze now belongs to the Government." Sigcwecewele answered, "We all belong to the King, if you say that he is coming back; we all belong to him in the face of Dunn. We only put ourselves under him while the King was gone." Manyonyo also was there. Some of Dabulamansi's men were present, who told him, and he told us.

We went on to the sea, and there we found at a certain kraal Dabulamansi's son, and some others. Said they, "You are going to no purpose. We have been beset and are driven off, it being said that we are Dabulamansi's spies, sent to frighten the people

* Throughout this narrative the names of Sir Garnet Wolseley's kinglets are printed in small capitals, and those of chiefs lately under Dunn, living in the intended Reserve, in italics.
into saying that they want the King when they don’t.” • Dabulamanzi had sent a messenger to Somopo, to tell him to stand firm, and say nothing to Mr. John’s words about cutting off the land, but merely to thank for the King’s return.† But that messenger, before he reached Somopo, was frightened back, being told “Down here on the coast Dabulamanzi’s men are being arrested for telling the people what to say.” So he went back and told the Prince, who sent and ordered his son and party to retire a bit, and they were just packing up when we arrived. We said, however, that we should go on, and they made up their minds to stay by us. The first ship had now appeared, and some said “The King has come!” But we told them “The right day has not come; this is the baggage-ship, which we were told would come first.”

In the morning early Palane, a chief living near the coast, passed with his men, over 100, having been called by Mr. Jan. We asked him to announce us to Somtseu (Sir T. S.) as people from Mnyamana. The headman of the kraal at which we had slept went with him, being one of Palane’s tribe. We two followed, and on the way we met this headman coming back to us, accompanied by two Natal native policemen armed with guns. He said,

* "DABULAMANZI’S DEVILRY.—Very nasty rumours are flying about here. Dabulamanzi is trying all he can to cause trouble, telling the people that, when the ship arrives, they are to seize the King, and kill the white people as they are only a few. I should not be surprised at any moment to hear that the troops are in laager, as the present temper of the country is anything but satisfactory.”—Mercury (S. C.), Jan. 11th.

† Dabulamanzi’s efforts to make plain the fact (which he had every right to suppose that the Government were ready to receive with a view to decreasing the size of the reserved country), viz. how large a proportion of its inhabitants were loyal to Cetshwayo, were always spoken of in indignant terms by the officials and their friends. He did nothing more, however, than investigation will show that he had a perfect right to do. Such “rumours” as the above are, of course, simply absurd, and have not the shadow of a foundation in fact.

† These men were authorities on the point, because they had received the telegraphic news of the King’s departure at Bishopstowe, and had been told there by what day he might reasonably be expected. Official notice of the sort the people certainly never received.
"I am come to fetch you." But the policemen, when they saw who we were, men well known to them in Maritzburg as messengers to the Government and to Sobantu [the Bishop], gave in, saying, "Oh! is it you?" and let us alone. We left them sitting there in the road, and accompanied the headman to Somtseu. Said I, "So! we are to be shot down here!" "Yes, truly," said the headman, "if you had made any resistance, they were to fire upon you, and, if you had escaped, I was to be held responsible."

When we reached the camp, we found that Mr. Jan was there with his brother and the latter's son [Mr. A. Shepstone]. In another tent were Mr. Jan's Indunas, Luzindela, Tom, and Mtungwana, and Somtseu's [Sir T. S.] Induna, Mqundane, sitting eating beef with Palane, Habana, and some of their men. Mqundane came out to us, saying, "So! is it you? Why, then, did you not come in yesterday, since you had arrived?" Said we, "Where was the need of hurrying? The King has not arrived yet. Sobantu told us to go and tell Mnyamana that the King was now coming, and that we should just be in time to meet him here, and should find Somtseu here too." Luzindela tried to make out that we had come to Mr. Jan. But we said, "No such thing! We have come to meet the King with Somtseu." Mqundane announced us and took us in to Somtseu. He said, "What is it you who have been carrying letters from Sobantu, and telling the people that the little whiteman Mr. John has no commission, and speaks falsely if he says that the land is to be cut off?" * Said we, "We have nothing to do with the present state of affairs in

* "We learn that Dabulamanzi has been at his old games again, sending round on the sly to the people, telling them not to believe what Mr. John Shepstone tells them, as the whole of the country is to be given back to Cetshwayo, and all who say they wish to be under the English Government will be killed. It remains to be seen whether this troublesome chief will be allowed any longer to propagate falsehood and foment intrigue." Telegram sent by Mr. John Shepstone.

The correspondent of the Advertiser remarks upon the above that the statement is glaringly false, and "must have originated in either an insane or spirituously-excited brain. And," he continues, "were proof to the contrary required, the fact of only eight mounted men being drawn up on the beach to receive the King would show that such an idea never entered the heads of those in authority." As we have already seen, what Dabulamanzi did tell them was that
southern Zululand, nor with those words which you say have been spread. We were told by Sobantu to tell Mnyamana that the King is now coming, and to come on and meet him here with you. Who are they that have accused us, that you should treat us as enemies and arrest us? Set them here before us! You know us, Sir, well enough; have we concealed words from you? We do not deny that we have brought telegrams. We answer nothing to the charge made against us, but ask you to set your informant before us.” * This he refused to do, and told us to return to the kraal at which we had slept. But we said, “No, Sir! we have come to meet the King, and here he is arriving!” “No!” said he, “Do you want to run and tell him that I have been ill-treating you?” and he insisted that we should go back to the kraal. “He had some business to attend to now, and he would send for us, when the time was come for us to see the King.” The King landed that very day; but night came, and Somtseu had not sent for us.

Well! we went away as ordered, though we had great difficulty in persuading Melakanya to go. And Mqundane told us that the order was that, “if any Zulu showed his face on the shore, the soldiers would speak to him with bullets. Only Natal natives might remain.” And presently we saw all the Zulus, who had gone down to different parts of the shore, running back in troops, saying that they had been threatened with bullets. Their numbers could not be counted by tens; they were more like 900 or 1000. We did not speak with Mr. John, who went off in John Dunn’s carriage just after we arrived.† From the kraal where we slept we could not see the shore because of the bush.

as the Queen had said that only land enough for those adverse to Cetshwayo was to be reserved, they had the matter in their own hands. But as Mr. J. Shepstone was doing all he could to induce the people to be what he called “staunch to us,” i.e. to reject their King, he, of course, highly objected to Dabulamanzi’s proceedings.

* Mr. J. Shepstone had just (between 7th and 11th January) reported to Sir T. Shepstone that Dabulamanzi and messengers from Bishop Colenso were said to be making these very assertions [3616, pp. 4–16]. By thus reproaching these respectable men, who had lately been at Bishopstowe, and bore a very different character from that of the wandering Natal natives Faneyana & Co., Sir T. Shepstone would appear to have accepted the accusations against the Bishop as well as against Dabulamanzi.

† An encouraging sight for the Zulus!