Civil Service in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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ABSTRACT

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a vast country endowed with huge natural and mineral resources. However, for decades, the country has been through coups d’etat, civil wars, rebellions, political turmoil and instability, and it has also faced aggression from its neighbouring countries in recent years. All these events have impacted negatively on the state and have provoked the decay of public institutions, making the country one of the notorious ‘failed states’ of the world. With the introduction of independence in 1960 the DRC inherited a civil service that was successful as an instrument used in meeting the interests of the colonial power that ruled the country. In spite of the fact that the colonial structures were not wholly suitable for the needs of the newly independent citizens, it is clear that, if only these administrative structures could have been reformed and adapted in line with the country’s circumstances, they could have allowed the country to be on the path of development. Instead most of the Congolese leaders neglected the maintenance of the institutions of the state and never committed themselves to establishing a system able to ensure good governance of the country’s resources.

However, 30 June 2010 marked the fiftieth anniversary of independence for the DRC. This occasion brought mixed emotions, as some Congolese citizens were celebrating, while others were shocked by the current situation facing the country. For the latter group this was an opportunity not only to look back and speculate on what went wrong in Congolese public affairs, but also to come up with a strategy to tackle the many challenges faced by the public service particularly. This article focuses on the state of the public service in the DRC after a half century of independence. It attempts to examine the extent to which various policies have influenced the current configuration of the public service and the way it operates. The article will therefore provide a historical background of public affairs and it will consider some of the major civil service reforms that took place in the country from 1960 to date. Finally, the article will outline some of the hindrances to the proper functioning of the public service in the country before it concludes with some recommendations.
INTRODUCTION

The sterling contribution many of Africa’s civil services have made to development and good governance is now nearly a thing of the past. Currently such contributions are restricted to a number of outlier countries. The civil service as an institution was originally bequeathed to Africa as part of the colonial legacy. It was an institution that was originally forged to serve as an instrument for promoting the colonial powers that ruled Africa. As the countries approached independence, this institution was further refined to ensure that it could serve the new political leadership. There is documented evidence that this institution served its purpose. Generally, civil services declined in most African countries from the 1970s onwards (Adamolekun 2002:377). However, most of the African national governments initiated their earliest administrative reforms in the 1970s, shortly after independence. The objective of those reforms was to transform the inherited bureaucracies from colonial systems that were meant to maintain law and order in the colonies (to the benefit of their colonial masters) into administration entities that could promote development. This entailed efforts at increasing the scope and effectiveness of these administrative systems. But many African countries had built economic and political structures within their emerging administrative systems that promoted autocracy, which undermined productivity and effectiveness. With the two oil shocks and the subsequent global recession of the 1970s these countries ran into heavy debt and were compelled by their development partners and international financial institutions to undertake the second set of reforms – associated with a liberal structural adjustment programme (SAP). This included severe cutbacks in the public sector in the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, however, it was already becoming clear that these cutback measures did not improve productivity either. In fact, they led to more bureaucracy and corruption instead of providing an enabling environment in which to realise private sector possibilities. A third round of public sector reforms therefore ensued with the countries pushing for new public management type reforms focused on capacity building and development to promote the three Ms, namely: markets, managerialism and measurement. This reform brought relief from the cutback management associated with stabilisation and SAP reforms. By 2000, a fourth round of reforms focused on service delivery to the citizens as customers. The Millennium Development Goals agreed to by world leaders in 2000 gave new fillip to this focus on service delivery (Olowu 2010: 636-637).

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a vast country endowed with huge natural and mineral resources. But for decades the DRC has been through coups d’état, civil wars, rebellions, political turmoil and instability, and it also faced aggression from its neighbouring countries in recent years. All these events have impacted negatively on the state and have provoked the decay of public institutions, making the country one of the notorious failed states of the world.

With the introduction of independence in 1960 the DRC inherited a civil service that was in good shape, though it had been used mainly as an instrument for promoting the colonial power that ruled the country. In spite of the fact that these structures were not wholly suitable for the needs of the newly independent citizens, it is clear that if they were reformed and adapted properly they would have allowed the country to be on the path of development. Instead most of the Congolese leaders neglected the maintenance of the
institutions of the state and never committed themselves to establishing a system that would ensure good governance of the country’s resources. As a result, the country lies in ruins.

Only a few months after achieving independence in 1960, the DRC went through a crisis due to political turmoil and instability. It was only in the early 1970s that the country was able to instigate some reforms as Mobutu Sese Seko, a general at the time, was able to settle his power. During that decade, the country’s public services were considered to be among the best in the Sub-Saharan region. The situation deteriorated significantly due to the consequences of inadequate policies that were adopted, particularly the policy of ‘Zairianisation’. Broadly, most of the various reforms adopted after independence can be qualified as masquerade. These so-called reforms were merely attempts made to close up the cracks that were already noticeable in the system of governance, especially during the second republic led by Mobutu. For instance, Nzongola-Ntalaja (1982:44) argues that during the second republic the state became a neo-colonial one that primarily served the interests of externally-based dominant classes and the interests of those who ran it. Rotberg (2002:128) notes that destructive decisions by individual leaders have almost always paved the way to state failure. President Mobutu’s kleptocratic rule of more than three decades sucked Zaïre (now the DRC) dry until he was deposed in 1997. Shekhawat (2009:7) stresses that the Congolese state and economy still bear the deep impact of Mobutu’s predatory rule of thirty-two years. Executive power in Zaïre, a name given to the DRC by Mobutu, was absolute.

The 30th of June 2010 marked the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of independence for the DRC. This occasion brought mixed emotions as some Congolese citizens were celebrating, while others were shocked by the current situation facing the country. For the latter group this was an opportunity not only to look back and speculate on what went wrong in Congolese public affairs, but also to come up with a strategy to tackle the many challenges faced by the civil services particularly. This article focuses therefore on the state of the public service in the DRC after half a century of independence. However, the article specifically examines the extent to which various policies adopted after the country’s gaining of independence have influenced the current configuration of the public service and the way it operates. The article therefore provides a historical background of public affairs and looks at major civil service reforms that took place in the country before it outlines some of the hindrances to a proper functioning of the public service. Then it concludes with some recommendations.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS FROM 1960 TO 2010

In 1960, the Congo/Zaïre emerged from what by all accounts was a brutal colonial period under Belgian authority with an economy that, though it was the second most industrialised in Sub-Saharan Africa, founded largely on its mineral wealth, was also profoundly dualistic. The colonial authorities created a relatively centralised state administration, but inhibited the formation of a nation. However, in its extreme prohibition of non-tribal forms of organisation until the last decade before independence, and in its failure to promote a common language through the territory, Belgium bequeathed to the population an emergent elite characterised by profound ethnic animosities (not only between regions, but within them as well, based on patterns of forced labour migration and systematic patterns of discrimination and privileging between ethnic groups). The
historical overview of public affairs in the Congo/Zaïre can be grouped into two main periods that have influenced what has been happening in the DRC up to the present date.

The First Period: 1960–1965

The first five years of independence (1960-1965) provide a cautionary tale for the younger generation in the DRC today. Elections held soon after independence led almost directly to civil war that pitted radical nationalists against moderate nationalists and both those groups against federalists and tribalists. Secessionist movements drew their fighting strength from members of the Force Publique, which was quickly divided on ethnic lines. The embryonic Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) proved entirely ineffective in asserting control from the centre. Extreme instability led to five lost years of development in economic terms, as sites of production were captured by emergent local elites and resources diverted to finance warfare or to build new fortunes (Putzel, Lindemann and Schouten 2008:iv). The dilemma of the then newly independent country can be summed up by citing a keen observer of the period (Young and Turner 1985:42) who repeats the words spoken by Mobutu as he explained his seizure of power in 1965:

The very existence of the nation was threatened... from the interior and the exterior. From the interior by the sterile conflicts of politicians who sacrificed the country and their compatriots to their own interests. Nothing counted for them but power... Fill their own pockets, exploit the Congo and the Congolese, this was their trademark. Given such examples, both national and provincial administrations were mired in inertia, inefficiency, and worse yet, corruption....

In summation, the first period was characterised by the challenge of establishing a true Congolese leadership in the management of the country’s public affairs. But because of a lack of cadres trained in state management, the country went through a good five years of destruction of inherited structures. For instance, in 1960, the DRC counted only 17 cadres who freshly graduated from the only major University (Lovanium) that the country had by the time of independence. This university, created in 1956, was a private initiative of a Belgian Catholic Priest, Monsignor Luc Gillon. Belgium took charge of the Congo in 1886, and the colonialists never established a proper higher education institution. This demonstrates their unwillingness to prepare Congolese cadres for a take-over.

The second period: 1965–1974

Given the ultimate decline of the state and economy by the end of Mobutu’s 32-year reign, it is often forgotten that the Congo or Zaïre, experienced its only significant period of state-building during his first decade in power. After he seized power with the backing of the notorious Binza Group and Western powers, Mobutu’s regime consolidated authority across the entire territory of the country. The number of provinces was reduced, with a significant reduction in the power of local networks, and a concerted effort was made to marginalise traditional authorities. Mobutu’s government set out to build a modern public administration dependent on the centre, ensuring that officials did not serve in their territories of origin. While there was some effort to maintain an ethnic balance in appointments, those who held office served as officials of the then Zaïre, not of their locality. Nevertheless, the regime made
significant gains in expanding education, achieving a 92% enrolment in primary schools and an impressive expansion of the secondary and tertiary educational sectors. Achievements in health service delivery were also significant, not only with a radical enlargement of educated health personnel, but also a 95% rate of vaccination against childhood diseases and the establishment of a primary health care system that was envied in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa (Putzel et al. 2008:v-vi).

Paradoxically, within a system whose degree of centralisation and authoritarian paternalism was probably second to none in Africa, an administration carved out a zone of autonomy or invulnerability, relatively speaking, vis-à-vis its environment. This is permitted by the class in power which obtains what it needs out of channels and leaves the bureaucracy to its own devices, within the general framework of two widespread watchwords. Débrouillez-vous or Look after yourself was elevated into Article 15 of the Constitution by Premier Albert Kalonji of secessionist Kasaï (a state without a formal budget) when asked in 1960 how his civil servants would get along without salaries. And, in May 1976, President Mobutu told a public assembly in Kinshasa that while brazen theft was bad, people could and perhaps should iba na mayele or steal cleverly. Both of these quotations are revealing less for their literal truth than for their contextual importance. They are widely believed to be the factors which not only motivate bureaucrats at virtually every level, but which also reflect the indifference on the part of the upper classes as to the efficient functioning of the administration (Gould 1977: 359).

These two periods are critical in the history of the Congo as they have, to a large extent, influenced the current configuration of politics and administration in the country. When it achieved its independence, the Congo disposed numerous incentives for development, but because of inadequate policies adopted in the early stage of decolonisation the country is now unable to render to its citizens even the basic public services. The next section highlights some of the major civil service reforms that have influenced the functioning of the public service in the DRC.

MAJOR CIVIL REFORMS

African civil services have been subjected to perpetual rounds of reforms that have, in many cases, aggravated problems because the core issue of how to pay for quality civil service on a sustained basis has not been given the much-deserved emphasis. Many African countries have lost the capacity to pay for a high quality civil service due, in part, to the poverty of their economies, the structure of politics and administration, globalisation, and wrong-headed reform programmes (Olowu 2010:632). As it has been mentioned, most of the African national governments initiated their earliest administrative reforms in the 1970s, shortly after independence. The DRC was not an exception. The first decade of independence in the DRC was characterised by political instability and civil wars of different forms. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1960s Mobutu was able to settle his rule and created a room for reforms to take place in the early 1970s. Here is a summary of the reforms that took place in the first half century of independence:

- Attempts were made to decentralise certain human resources functions in 1970s, but these did not achieve the desired outcome; in fact, they only served to exacerbate nepotism and corruption.
- In the 1980s, the move towards decentralisation was reversed, which was yet another failure. It further contributed to the bloating of the public service and the creation of
ghost employees in the system. According to people who are intimate with the history of the DRC's public service, these responses to the crisis in the public service were not reforms in the true sense of the word. They argue that such steps were mere attempts to tamper with the system, which was either meant to close up cracks or consolidate Mobutism. For example, three major public service initiatives that promised a respite from the stranglehold of excessive centralisation within the public service were launched in 1982, 1983 and 1995. These never really took off. The 1983 decree, hoping to establish a central computerised database of public servants collapsed, allegedly after saboteurs planted a virus in the system.

● More genuine reform efforts came in the wake of the 1997 ousting of President Mobutu by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who soon afterward embarked on a massive programme of national reconstruction. But yet again, any hope of breaking away from the country’s violent legacy seemed to disappear with the January 2001 assassination of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila (Moloi 2010:77).

● Since President Joseph Kabila came to power in 2001, the international community has invested significantly in efforts to rebuild the Congo. State-building efforts, however, have not achieved the expected results. International partners and the Congolese authorities share responsibility for failing to bring about genuine political change and institutional reconstruction. The former have underestimated the complexities of Congolese political culture while the latter deliberately hamper reform. Administrative weaknesses and the particular nature of public service provision in the Congo constitute overwhelming obstacles to state-building (Trefon 2010:702).

The above-mentioned reforms have in some way influenced what has been going on in the Congolese public service up to the present. At the moment, the public service is almost nonexistent; it is weak and in bad shape, and it cannot play one of its fundamental roles of supporting governmental initiatives. However, since 2005 the Congolese government, in partnership with the South African government, initiated the head count of public servants as an important step to streamline the Congolese public service. This inventory was not an end but a stride in the process of tackling the many challenges facing the public service in the DRC. Although this process has been successful thus far, there are many other challenges that need to be addressed at the same time. As long as the challenges which hinder a proper functioning of the civil service are not addressed holistically even the best policies drafted for the reconstruction of the country will not bear positive results in their implementation phase. The next section enumerates some of the hindrances to the functioning of the civil service in the DRC.

IMPEDIMENTS TO THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF THE CIVIL SERVICE

There are three main developments which can explain the decline of civil service in most of African states. The first is the policy of indigenisation, the second is the systematic politicisation of the civil service’s higher echelons and, finally, there is the drift to dictatorship and military rule. Each of these political developments led to a situation in which several of the key bureaucratic values of merit, objectivity, political neutrality and integrity, became
casualties (Olowu 2010:635-636). The DRC has faced all the above-mentioned challenges and will for quite some time suffer the effects of this unfortunate past. The key impediments hindering a proper functioning of the civil service in the DRC are as follows:

**Governance by predation**

In the DRC today, there is little questioning of cronyism at the individual level and, logically, criticism of it in governance circles tends to be muted. The same cannot be said of predation. Predation in the modes documented here (illegal taxation and rent-seeking, administrative *tracasseries*, physical violence, coercion and deprivation) may be a common feature of the contemporary Congolese administration, but ordinary citizens consider it exceptionally base and highly reprehensible (Rackley 2006:429). Governance by predation started long before the country’s independence. The patterns of rule established by the Belgians have been used by Congolese rulers. For instance, Mobutu firmly established a precedent of neo-patrimony and cronyism, which are maintained even today. The control of mines in Kasai and Katanga by the transitional government before the 2006 elections has been classified as the most lucrative and militarised predation documented in 2004. Given the predatory behaviour of rulers, it is difficult to enforce the rule of law as there is neither consideration nor respect for the institutions of the state. This behaviour which has persisted in the country’s system of governance for the last fifty years has destroyed the ruler-citizen relationship as the citizens no longer have confidence in their rulers. This has tarnished the image of the public service, which is also incapable of delivering the basic public services to the citizens.

**Relationship politics and administration**

The way the administration is instrumentalised by the state’s political elite contributes to reform failure in the DRC. They exploit the administration in the same way that they exploit mafia type networks for political survival and personal enrichment. Instrumentalisation is a dynamic and constant process, notably in strategic areas targeted for reform. The state manifests itself via the administration for security purposes, for example, which is one of its fundamental sovereign prerogatives. The branches involved in the protection of territory and population, but especially protection of the elite themselves, are the army, the police, the intelligence services (Agence Nationale de Renseignements – ANR) and border control (Direction Générale des Migrations – DGM). Although the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior theoretically control these services, important decisions come directly from President Joseph Kabila and his advisers (Trefon 2010:713). In this context, the administration is instrumentalised to reinforce and stabilise the political elite (Diouf 2002:33). As a result, it is difficult for the civil service to function properly and to be responsive to the expectations of society as civil servants are merely striving for their own survival.

**The nature of the Congolese administration**

The interface politics/administration outlined in the previous section has made the Congolese public administration ambiguous, arbitrary and somewhat of a hybrid. For instance, in the DRC administrative procedures are conditioned by the mood, availability
and personal expectations and needs of civil servants who thrive on the ambiguity of their work environment. Depending on the context, they may adopt a formal discourse (strictly adhering to rules and regulations) just as they may opt for an informal approach (inventing or interpreting rules). From a strictly formal perspective, the administration is based on legal instruments that define state–society relations, specifying rights and responsibilities (Trefon 2010:714). This has promoted the decay of public institutions as the public service is not able to play a meaningful role within the society.

The administrative reform flaws

A fundamental flaw in the reform process is reliance on the Congolese administrative structure. In the context of state crisis, Congolese administrations are unable and often unwilling to work towards reform. Instead of facilitating reform, they undermine it. State crisis in the DRC is characterised by the loss of legitimacy, abdication from the development agenda, inability to maintain security (or assure the monopoly of coercion), shortcomings in the management of political and technical priorities, and the inability to mobilise, generate or manage internal and external financial resources. Despite these overwhelming problems, the DRC endures in an administrative space in which state agents and citizens seem to have reached a complex but workable form of accommodation. It is also a space where international partners persist in believing in the role of the Congolese civil servant as reform intermediary. The reform planning process in the DRC is flawed. There is a missing link, which is a qualified, dynamic, honest, hard-working cadre of civil servants who are decently paid, respected by service users and motivated to rebuild the country. This explains in large part why reform initiatives have not achieved the expected results (Trefon 2010:712, 719). For instance, Congolese authorities cunningly smother reform initiatives, but without completely suffocating them. The two fold objective is to keep them alive (for funding, to maintain tolerable relations with foreign partners, or to stay on board as part of a process) but, at the same time, to slow down, block or sabotage reform. It will be difficult for the public service to function effectively as long as those in leadership positions who are supposed to bring about change have double minds, wanting one thing and its opposite at the same time.

Human resource management dilemmas

Most African countries are confronted with human resource management (HRM) dilemmas. One of these dilemmas is that the demand for and supply of high quality human (technical) resource skills has fallen over time for the civil services of most African countries. And, in an era of globalisation, these indigenous experts are moving to countries where they can attract the highest pay to support their families (Olowu 2010:637-638). A major problem complicating HRM improvement in many African countries is the absence of reliable data, in spite of many years of reforms aimed at lowering the size of and numbers in the civil service (Olowu 2010:647). Although the DRC is sorting out the latter issue, other challenges are the enforcement of administrative structures, the availability of human and financial resources, and the regular payment of the salaries of public servants to motivate them to do their jobs properly. The civil servants of the DRC earn some of the lowest salaries in the world, well below the poverty line, which creates incentives for corruption. In addition,
these insignificant salaries are not even paid regularly. For months and years public servants in certain institutions have not received their salaries.

All the above challenges constitute the barriers that hinder the revitalisation of civil services in the DRC. The next section provides recommendations for redressing the situation faced by the public service in the DRC.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Public bureaucracy is crucial in developing states. This is recognised even by liberal scholars, who point to the importance of improving the management dimension in development programmes if the functional requisites of governmental capacity are to be achieved (Uphoff and Ilchman 1963). Thus, it is necessary to emphasise the role of administration in the political economy of any state. The new ruling class in contemporary Africa has no independent economic existence except insofar as it controls the state apparatus, which it then uses to manipulate the commercial sector. Administration is not merely the linchpin but the motor of the state apparatus (Hydén *et al.* 1970). In the DRC, although the social and institutional cost of crisis, war and a failed reform package is enormous, it has helped people appropriate the sentiment of being Congolese. There is a Congolese nation, plural indeed, yet with an emerging sense of collective belonging and destiny. It will take a very long time to heal the wounds of state failure but perhaps this sentiment of ‘being Congolese’ can be transformed into the energy needed to reinvent state and society. A prerequisite for this reinvention is the retooling of an administrative system that makes sense to the Congolese people (Trefon 2010:720). In order to address the flaws that characterise the civil service in the post-independence Congo, one can consider the following recommendations.

*Firstly*, it is apparent that a new paradigm for African development is required. Such a paradigm must place a greater premium on the importance of politics, domestic will and ownership, the demand side, a longer-term perspective, and more effective donor and recipient country coordination in developing a qualitative civil service that has both intelligence and integrity (Roll 2009). The proposed way forward is to seek to integrate these diverse reform efforts as part of a Strategic Performance Management (SPM) initiative. This is the major instrument that is being used by Botswana, South Africa and many other advanced and industrialising nations to drive the multi-faceted reforms of governance in the twenty-first century. SPM has been borrowed from the private sector and adapted, and is being used in most industrialised and emerging economies (Heinrich 2004; Finland, 2006; Syett 2007; Bouckaert and Halligan 2008; Lah and Perry 2008). SPM can be defined as a strategic and integrated approach to delivering sustained success, results or outcomes desired by the key stakeholders of an organisation by improving and integrating plans, budgets, and human and other resources available to the organisation. The key stakeholders for public agencies include citizens, consumers of services and elected political office holders who are directly accountable to the public (Olowu 2010:644).

*Secondly*, the Congolese government should take the lead in developing an overall strategy for a coordinated implementation of the various governance reforms with the participation of all stakeholders to ensure ownership and smooth implementation.
Thirdly, Africa is indeed undergoing a triple revolution of globalisation, urbanisation and democratisation. To ensure that Africa and Africans benefit maximally from these multiple revolutions, a new approach to African civil service reforms is required. Such civil service reform should seek to raise the size and quality of the African civil service in critical areas by attracting and retaining skilled personnel while ensuring that the public service is better structured for improved performance-based management, especially at the higher strategic levels. This is a long-term agenda, which will have a starting point of the adoption of a comprehensive strategic performance management that places great premium on performance, intelligence and integrity of the civil services in Africa. Only this kind of service will help to rebuild Africa’s decaying and crumbling infrastructures that are the preconditions for development and to make the continent an active player in twenty-first century global competition (Olowu, 2010:649).

Fourthly, the civil service reform should go beyond the introduction and implementation of basic administrative systems, rules and procedures to include the following measures: professionalisation of civil servants; increasing their salaries and benefits; a census of the workforce to eliminate ghost employees; revitalising the Ecole Nationale de Droit et d’Administration (a civil service college in the DRC); and adopting and implementing the Code of Ethics of Public Officials more widely and making the general public aware of its contents. At this stage, particular attention should be paid to public procurement, where much of the corruption and irregularities occur. In finalising the procurement code, the rules and regulations governing it should be updated and adequate control mechanisms established. The code should also include mechanisms for transparency and public disclosure of information. The staff in charge of procurement should be trained (Kodi 2007:21).

Finally, the key to effectiveness and good governance is capacity, both institutional and human. Appropriate institutional incentives must exist for high productivity, but even this is impossible in the absence of scarce skills (Olowu 2010:649). Following recommendations made during a World Bank seminar on good governance and the fight against corruption in September 2002, steps were taken to reform the civil service. So far the reform has focused on establishing basic administrative systems, rules and procedures. It is time that efforts are started to professionalise the civil service. The civil service in the DRC is in a dire situation and it is almost non-existent. The recommendations proposed in this article can be thoroughly applied in order to revitalise this sector and give it the much needed boost to work in an effective way and contribute to the process of rebuilding the country.

CONCLUSION

This article attempted to do a retrospective study of the evolution of civil service in the DRC in its first half century of independence. It focused on the reforms that took place in the post-independence era and outlined some of the impediments that are currently impacting on the proper functioning of the public service in the country. In this article it was made clear that before and slightly after independence in 1960, the DRC disposed of one of the best administrative systems on the continent. But instead of being developed, as was the case in Botswana for example, politico-administrative structures in Congo/Zaïre faced a phase of decay that persisted throughout the years leading to a considerable deterioration of the
public service. Currently, the civil service is almost non-existent in the DRC as it is not able to render even the most basic public services to society.

However, the 2006 elections brought hope as they represented a means to an end. These elections had the purpose of putting in place democratic institutions which were thereafter going to revitalise state institutions and set the country on the path of development. But because of lack of a pronounced political will towards restoring and revitalising public sector institutions, the country is not being rebuilt. In this context, strong leadership and good political will are required in order to promote the establishment of a system that promotes good governance in the country. Without adequate public institutions, especially a proper administrative system, it will be difficult for the DRC to implement the policies which are drafted to promote the reconstruction process.

REFERENCES


