

With this concession and the recommendation of the High Commissioner to help him, Rhodes went to London to get his charter, his friend Sir Sidney Sheppard, now Administrator of Bechuanaland, keeping affairs straight with Lobengula. Rhodes was opposed by Exeter Hall, organised by his old opponent Mackenzie, and by the Radicals. He was opposed also by Mr. A. E. Maund, a rival concessionaire with a powerful backing, who had nobbled some of Lobengula's indunas. But Rhodes laid his plans too deep and too well. In his usual way he absorbed and conciliated his competitors; he founded his British South Africa Company with a capital of £1,000,000, of which £200,000 was subscribed by De Beers, and by the end of April 1889 he felt strong enough to apply to the Colonial Office for a Royal Charter. Now the Imperial Government had been well informed by the High Commissioner that the rush into Matabeleland was inevitable, and that it was better to have the thing done under the direction of "a gentleman of character and financial standing," who would "secure the cautious development of the country with a proper consideration for the feelings and prejudices of the natives."

Rhodes's project was for the development and government of the country—Bechuanaland, Matabeleland, and Mashonaland—the extension of railways and telegraphs to the Zambesi, the encouragement of colonisation and of British trade, as well as the working of the mineral concessions. The Colonial Office liked the idea, for it saved them trouble. As Lord Knutsford said: "The example of the Imperial East Africa Company shows that such a body may, to some considerable extent, relieve Her Majesty's Government from diplomatic difficulties and heavy

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expenditure." Thus the way was smoothed out at home, and all that remained was to occupy the country. This is where Dr. Jameson comes into our story.

Dr. Jameson was a young Scotch surgeon who had gone to Kimberley in 1878, after making his name as a brilliant operator at London University Hospital. He soon made a great reputation in Kimberley for cool and skilful surgery, and as a man he charmed by his kindness, his courage, and a certain bantering wit, which disarmed those whom it transfixed. Jameson was to appearance all gaiety, frolic, and high spirits; but the manner concealed a character of steely temper and an unselfish idealism that cared nothing for self, but dared anything for others. Jameson and Rhodes soon became bosom friends, Rhodes inspiring Jameson with his immense and brooding conceptions, Jameson lighting up Rhodes's humours with his mercurial and infectious laughter.

Now when Rhodes returned to South Africa in 1889, and began to busy himself recruiting his expeditionary force, he heard that things were not going well at Buluwayo. The rivals and enemies of the Charter, British and foreign, working with the chauvinist element among Lobengula's own people, had at last turned the chief's mind against the Rhodes combination. He had executed the indunas who favoured the scheme, and Rhodes's agent, in fear of his life, had fled from Matabeleland and taken refuge in Mafeking. Lobengula now opposed a hostile front to the undertaking, and the whole scheme was in obvious peril. Rhodes, in great trouble, confided in his friend. Jameson, we are told,<sup>1</sup> grasped the situation in an instant. "I will go," he said;

<sup>1</sup> See Seymour Fort's excellent *Life of Dr. Jameson*.

and to Rhodes's question, "When will you start?" he replied, "To-morrow morning." Now it has to be remembered that Jameson had already visited Lobengula. He had gone the year before, making a holiday of it, with Rhodes's agent, Dr. Rutherford Harris, who was convoying the tribute to the royal kraal. On that occasion the indunas had refused to allow the wagons to cross the border; and Jameson had ridden in alone and made a conquest of Lobengula. Therefore he was not without experience. But the adventure was none the less dangerous as affairs now stood, and Jameson, in undertaking to act as Rhodes's ambassador to the King, was risking his life as well as sacrificing a rich practice and brilliant surgical career in the Colony. But Jameson was not of those who count the cost. He went to Lobengula, and found that obese potentate suffering from a severe attack of gout. He undertook to cure him, and was as good as his word. Just so had Hamilton, another Scotch surgeon, obtained from a Mogul Emperor the firman that made the settlement of Calcutta possible. Lobengula took Jameson into higher favour than any white man had reached before. He made him an induna in his favourite regiment, and before the assembled army invested his guest in the barbaric insignia of the impi—the ostrich plumes, the shoulder cape, the black and white shield, the assegais. Jameson was in favour; but his position was precarious. The intrigues went on, gaining strength from the fact that the expeditionary force was gathering on the frontier. It became dangerous even for the King to show much favour to Jameson, and he refused to declare his attitude on the question of the road to Mashonaland. The time drew near when the ex-

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pedition was to set forth. Jameson went to bid the King good-bye. We have a vivid picture of the incident from Mr. Fort. The door of the royal hut was in two portions, and Jameson had his farewell interview, leaning over the lower half, the King stark naked, somewhat agitated, "an unwieldy mass of dark copper-coloured flesh moving restlessly up and down in the dim uncertain light of the hut."

"Well, King," said Jameson, "as you will not confirm your promise and grant me the road, I shall bring my white impi, and, if necessary, we shall fight."

"I never refused the road to you and your impi," replied Lobengula.

The hint was sufficient. Jameson went straight to Macloutsie, the frontier station, where the expedition was assembled. It consisted of five hundred mounted police, two hundred pioneers, some volunteers and others, amounting in all to about a thousand souls. They were picked men drawn from South Africa and England. There were Imperial officers, farmers, diggers, prospectors, hunters, most of them well accustomed to the open life of the veld. Selous, the great hunter, who had helped also in the negotiations with Lobengula, was the guide. Colonel Pennefather, assisted by Majors Heany and Borrow, was in military command; Major Johnson was in charge of the commissariat; Mr. A. R. Colquhoun accompanied the force as the Administrator of the new territory. There was no time to be lost. It was known that a strong Portuguese force was being organised to enter from the east, and that 1500 Boers had already signed on for a commando that was to enter from the south. The High Commissioner, however, would allow nothing to be done in a hurry. The ship might have a rough passage; it was not

to be launched before it was tested. Lord Methuen inspected it, and found its timbers staunch and tight.

Thus at last, on the 23th June, the expedition started on its great trek of four hundred miles. It was an anxious journey, through bushy and difficult country, with fear of the Boers on the south, and on the north the Matabele impis. The long column, with its train of wagons and its herds of cattle, was vulnerable to attack. A road had to be cut through thick bush and over rough and hilly country. Many rivers had to be forded. On 1st August the Lundi River was reached, and beyond that the country was unknown even to Selous. It was a rugged, broken country of hill and forest, with a chain of mountains barring the horizon. But away in the distance there was one dark gorge. Into that pass Selous pushed forward, and from the crown of a neighbouring hill looked out upon the open downs beyond. Eight days of toil brought the expedition to the gorge. A Matabele party had warned the force to turn back at Tuli; as they toiled through "Providential Pass," Lobengula's messengers gave them a second and more peremptory warning. But they paid no heed, and on the 14th August they encamped at the head of the pass in full view of the high plateau that lay before them. They now marched forward through open country with more security, although the rumour of war gained strength, and on 11th September they hoisted the Union Jack on the site of the present Salisbury. They had turned the flank of Matabeleland, they had secured the road by a chain of garrisoned forts, and now they entrenched themselves in the centre of Mashonaland. Lobengula had kept his word; the traditions of his house, the recent history of South Africa, the fall of

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the Zulu power, told him that resistance was useless. But his braves were all for war, so he kept them in hand by a warlike diplomacy, by marches and counter-marches, by menace and threat. But he did not strike; the inevitable war was to come later.

How it came was briefly thus. The Matabele had been in the habit of regarding the Mashona as their natural prey. They raided them periodically, killing their men and old people, and carrying away their girls and cattle. It was the custom of the country, and Lobengula could not prevent it. When the Mashona entered the service of the settlers they expected protection, and the settlers in mere humanity could not stand by and see them massacred. Yet the Matabele impi took an especial delight in murdering the Mashonas who were in the service of the white men, and they also freely raided the settlers' cattle. The settlers saw their servants murdered before their eyes, and demanded protection. A small force of Rhodesian police drove back the impi. Dr. Jameson demanded from Lobengula 1000 head of cattle as indemnity. In return, Lobengula demanded that the Mashona in and around Victoria—men, women, and children—should be handed over to him for execution. At the same time he recalled one of his regiments which was raiding Barotseland, and prepared for war. Jameson rapidly organised a force, amounting in all to between 800 and 900 men. Rhodes, who had sold 50,000 shares in the Chartered Company to provide funds for the war, went up to Salisbury by the East Coast, and joined the little army. The first battle took place on the Shangani River, on 25th October 1893, where a force of 5000 Matabele warriors was defeated with great slaughter. A second engagement on 1st November, near the

head-waters of the Bembezi River, practically finished the war. The Matabele had depended on their old tactics of surrounding and charging the square—tactics fatal when against a defence armed with rifles and machine guns. The only reverse of the war was the destruction of the small detachment under Captain Allan Wilson, which had pressed too far ahead in its pursuit. Thus Matabeleland, as well as Mashonaland, fell into Rhodes's hands. He had secured not only the road to the North, but the North itself.

## CHAPTER IX

### RHODES'S POLICY OF UNION

AND now, having seen how Rhodes secured the key to the North, and the North itself, for the British Empire, let us retrace our steps a little and examine Rhodes's political policy in the Cape Parliament. We have seen that his aim was to establish a United States of South Africa under the British flag, and his experience in the De Beers Mine had led him to believe that this great amalgamation was not to be accomplished all at once, but by one step on another. He had learnt much from looking down upon the checkered claims; he had seen the value of position—how one block might be used to dominate another block—how control over lines of communication might give a vital advantage—how, above all, the dominating interest was able to dictate the character and terms of the amalgamation; and, looking at the map of Africa, he saw the same checker of claims, the same anarchy of working—English, Dutch, and

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Portuguese, Crown Colony and Responsible Government, interior interests and coast interests, a tangle of conflicting forces that had somehow to be reconciled and brought together in a true union.

When Rhodes entered the Cape House in 1881, the Dutch vote, afterwards organised into the Afrikaner Bond by the genius of Mr. Hofmeyr, was a growing force. It was the Conservative agricultural party; it had a single aim and knew what it wanted. The conflicting interests of the various British communities weakened and divided the other side, so that although the British members had almost a monopoly of showy political talent, the control of Cape politics fell more and more under the sway of the Dutch element. Now Rhodes had himself the land-holding instinct: he came of farming stock, and, although he did look "too young and damnably like an Englishman," he soon won the confidence of the farmers by his sympathetic understanding of their needs. In his favourite phrase, he could work with them. The stand he made against the jingoism of Warren and Mackenzie, while it antagonised some of the British stalwarts, made the Dutch farmers his friends. When he protested against the Warren policy of excluding Dutchmen from Bechuanaland, he gave the Dutch a definition of the British Empire which they could accept. "I remember, when a youngster, reading in my English history of the supremacy of my country and its annexations, and that there were two cardinal axioms—that the word of the nation, when once pledged, was never broken; and that, when a man accepted the citizenship of the British Empire, there was no distinction between races." Then his customs policy was after the farmer's heart: "The House," he said in 1886, "has



been wandering year by year in the direction of improper Protection. A Bill has been put in to encourage cotton and woollen manufactures ; we all know that this will be a total failure. The country is not adapted for such manufactures. The true protection lies in the encouragement of the growth of our grain and wine. . . . The real protection is to stop the drain on the country by its payment for foreign corn, and produce our own." To "turn a barren desert into a fruitful cornfield"—that was his definition of a customs policy. Then he believed in irrigation, and in State assistance for great irrigation works ; he advocated an excise that would not bear directly on the wine-grower ; and his policy of expansion was popular because it gave the farmers land for their sons.

Rhodes was a believer in real politics. He saw that South Africa was swayed by two important material interests, land and communications. Land meant expansion, railways meant progress—these were the two dynamic forces which he sought to use. He knew that if he could extend the Cape railway system into the Transvaal, the Cape would dominate the Transvaal ; he feared that if the Transvaal succeeded in opening communications with Delagoa Bay, the Transvaal might dominate the Cape. And here again he appealed to the farming interest to support his Imperial policy, for he pointed out that the Transvaal was a good market for Cape produce, and that railways to the Transvaal were necessary to convey that produce. But the prevailing Cape view at that time was narrow and parochial ; as Rhodes said, "the mist of Table Mountain covered all." The Cape policy was, as to railways, not to build outside their own borders ;

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and, as to customs, to charge full rates upon through trade and keep the whole. In fact, the Cape was like a robber baron who, holding the door to South Africa, charged an extortionate ransom for all goods that passed through. Now this might be a good enough policy if there was only one door; but Rhodes realised that there were three—the side door of Natal, the back door of Delagoa Bay, as well as the front door of the Cape. He also realised that, if these doors were once opened, not only would the Cape lose most of her interior trade, but the union of South Africa upon the lines he favoured would be made far more difficult. Kruger, as Rhodes discovered, had made a proposal to Sir Gordon Sprigg of Free Trade between the two countries, and of a joint railway policy which would have extended the Kimberley line to Pretoria. Rhodes supported the scheme with all his energy; to him it seemed a heaven-sent opportunity for the real union of South Africa. In May 1886 we find him appealing to the Cape House to take a large view of the subject and embrace the offer. He urged both the sentimental and the commercial view. It would give them trade, it would give them union. "What is staring the House in the face at the present moment is that unless action is taken at once, the Delagoa Bay Railroad will be carried out. That means that if the Delagoa Bay Railway is carried out, we shall not get a continuation of the line from Kimberley to Pretoria. Commercial people will be always inspiring or instilling into the rulers of the Transvaal hostile action against the Cape Colony. In other words, if the Delagoa Bay Railway is carried out, the real union of South Africa will be indefinitely deferred. If that is not done this session, it will be too late; the

interests of the Transvaal will be turned towards Delagoa Bay, and their commerce will go with their interests. From being connected in commerce, union will come, and that is the only way in which it can come.<sup>1</sup> . . . Commerce should come first, and union will follow by having our interests in common." He went on to urge a Customs Union with the Transvaal. As it was, the Transvaal was being forced by mere want of money to impose a tariff on goods from the Colony. "We must do away with the internal duties, and, if we are going to improve the feeling that exists, we must deal with them on the basis of giving them some share of the customs." But Rhodes was defeated—he stood almost alone; the parochial view prevailed. The Transvaal offer was, as Rhodes said, "rudely refused." In the same year came the gold rush to the Transvaal, providing the funds for the railway to Delagoa Bay. In 1888 Rhodes had to deplore the inevitable disaster which comes to communities, as to individuals, who repent when it is too late. "The balance of the history is a hideous and humiliating attempt to obtain connection with the Transvaal after the rejection of the proposals which the Transvaal had themselves submitted." A little later Rhodes made a stupendous effort to redress the balance so lost. With the financial backing of Lord Rothschild, he offered to buy Delagoa Bay outright from the Portuguese Government. Sir Thomas Fuller has told us how that negotiation failed. The Portuguese Government would have accepted the offer; but feared to outrage the pride of their people. Thus Rhodes

<sup>1</sup> Here we have the Chamberlain policy in germ, to be developed later on, as we shall see, to promote the union of the Empire.

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was defeated, and events took their evil course. Kruger, to strengthen his Delagoa Bay Railway, first stopped the Cape line at the frontier, and then heaped charges on the Cape trade when the connection was made. The Cape merchants were reduced to unloading their merchandise at the frontier, and conveying it by cart to the gold fields. Then Kruger closed the drifts, and the Colony and the Republic were brought to the verge of war. If Rhodes had been listened to there would have been no such collision—there would have been a practical customs and railway union of the South African States. If that had happened, there would have been no raid, and no war.

On native policy Rhodes again followed a course which conciliated the Dutch vote and made for union. It is true that he set himself dead against the sale of liquor to natives, and thereby risked antagonising the wine farmer; but against that he set a favourable excise policy. But he went some way with the Dutch on the question of the native franchise. He was against the raw native having a vote; if the native became a civilised man, by work and education, then he was to be given the privilege. Rhodes favoured a property and educational franchise; holding that the "blanket Kafir" neither understood nor desired the vote. "Why," he asked, "should we not settle all these grievances that exist between Dutch and English? I offer to the opposite benches the pomegranate; I ask you to clear away all grievances between you and me, and the native question is the greatest. Do not let the real interests of the natives of South Africa be complicated with the question of the franchise. I repeat they do not want it. . . . The liquor ought to be kept from the

natives, and there the missionary sphere ends. The natives on communal tenure must be kept as a subject race." And he showed how the republics could never accept the native policy of the Cape, which must remain a bar to union. "What is the use of talking about a united South Africa if the native question remains undealt with? Does the House think for one moment that the republics of the Transvaal and the Free State would join with the Colony with its native franchise infinitely beyond the native franchise of Natal. It is impossible." This speech was made in the middle of 1887, and Rhodes was, of course, accused of betraying the rights of the native; but long afterwards, when he was in power, he showed that he understood the native's true interests by framing the measure known as the Glen Grey Act, which gives to the native control over his own affairs. I may sum up Rhodes's native policy here, although I have no space to go into it at length. It was to keep them apart from the white man; to encourage them to work; to give them control over their own affairs under the guidance of the magistrate; to give them primogeniture in land; to educate them gradually in work and civilisation. They were, he said, "fellow-tribesmen of the Druids"; they had two thousand years to make up; they must be helped along the road, but they must not be thrust into a position for which they were not yet fitted.

I have, however, left the main lines of Rhodes's policy which I am now engaged in tracing out. We have seen that he sympathised with the Dutch in their land and protection policy, and that he only differed from them when their leaders endeavoured to throw the development of the North, and therefore the balance of power, into the hands of the

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Transvaal. Thus in the nine years before 1890 he showed the Dutch that he was their friend, and when in that year Sir Gordon Sprigg was defeated on his railway policy, it was found that Rhodes was the only man who could carry on the Government. In that year Rhodes took office as Prime Minister, and from then on to 1896 he ruled the Cape Colony with increasing power and authority, not obeying the Bond, as previous Prime Ministers had done, but working with it and through it for certain ends which were common to both. Thus, as to the new territory, he made the Bond his allies by offering its members the land for their sons. His policy is set forth in a letter addressed to the secretary of the Cape Town branch on 17th April 1891. In that letter he invites a deputation to inspect and report upon the new country, and asks the Bond for advice on the terms of settlement. He states that he has arranged for the admission of a hundred farmers from the Transvaal; and as opportunity offers he will admit others from the Transvaal and the Free State, but promises that "no undue preference will be given to them over the Cape Colony farmers." And, having made the point clear, he informs them of the threatened invasion of the Chartered Territory by the Transvaal trekkers, leaving it open to the Cape Dutch to deduce that such an invasion would be hostile to their interests as possible settlers.

Again, in a speech he made to the Afrikaner Bond at Kimberley on 30th March 1891, he held before them the hope (which the Dutch had never altogether abandoned) of regaining the differential rate on Cape wines in the British market. For that he was negotiating, and by that he hoped to get "a good market in preference to and against those who are

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outside the circle of the British Empire and its Colonies." Then he reminded them that their aim was substantially his—"working quietly, year after year, to bring South Africa into one system as to its railways, as to its customs, and as to its trade in the various products of the country." The obstacle to that end was the existence of the independent states, which Sir Bartle Frere had in vain tried to unite with the Cape. And then comes a passage which I must quote, as it put Rhodes's policy as it were in a nutshell :

"Although there may be two different ways of working it out, the object is the same ; and I would say to-night that the only time I ever differed with the Afrikander Bond was when I saw that you were relying too much upon a sentimental arrangement (I am speaking now with regard to the northern states) rather than upon a practical basis. At one time you were prepared to let the whole of the northern territories go from you, in the hope that they would at some future time be united with you. Well, I have been through the fire in the work of amalgamating the diamond mines ; and one powerful rule to follow is that you must never abandon a position. It is perfectly true that the northern states may accept your sentiment as to a union with South Africa ; but you must come to a bargain with every card you have in your hand. That is the secret of the Bechuanaland development, and the development of Zambesia, now going on. I have not one single atom of antagonistic feeling, in so far as the Transvaal or any of the neighbouring states are concerned ; but if your ambition or policy is a union of South Africa, then the Cape Colony must keep as many cards as it may possess. That idea

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led to the settlement of Bechuanaland, and that idea has led to the possession of districts in the Zambesia region. . . . It is not for us to interfere with the independence of the states that are neighbouring to us ; it is for us to obtain customs relations, railway communication, and free trade in products with them, but never to interfere with their independence. But it is for us, when we have the power and the means, to take the balance of the map and say, ' That shall become part of our system.' . . . The mistake that has been made in the past is to think that a union can be made in half an hour, whether rightly or wrongly, for the good of the country. It took me twenty years to amalgamate the diamond mines. The amalgamation was done by detail, step by step, attending to every little matter in connection with the people interested ; and so your union must be done by detail, never opposing any single measure that can bring that union closer, giving up even some practical advantage for a proper union, educating your children to the fact that it is your policy, and that you must and will have it, telling it them and teaching it them in your district *Bestuurs* and households, and demanding that they shall never abandon the idea. In connection with this question, I may meet with opposition ; but if I do, I shall not abandon it."

And here Rhodes touched upon his Education policy. He proposed, he said, to found a Teaching Residential University in Cape Colony, where young men from the Free State, the Transvaal, Natal, even Mashonaland, would meet and would go back to their own countries " tied to one another by the strongest feelings that can be created, because the period in your life when you indulge in friendships



which are seldom broken is from the age of eighteen to twenty-one. Therefore, if we had a Teaching Residential University, these young men would go forth into all parts of South Africa prepared to make the future of the country, and in their hands this great question of union could safely be left. . . . Nothing will overcome the associations and the aspirations they will form under the shadow of Table Mountain."

Here, then, was Rhodes's policy,—to unite South Africa under the Colonial system, and therefore under the British flag, by making the Cape Colony the dominating factor, and using to this end customs, railways, the new territory, even the native question and education. All these various questions fitted into one another as parts of a great scheme. It was a great conception, entitling Rhodes—if there had been nothing else—to the name of Statesman.

In the working out of this project Rhodes gradually obtained complete ascendancy over the Cape Parliament. We have seen how he treated the Bond; as for the opposition, he incorporated its most formidable elements in his Government, so that in time he became as strong in the Cape Colony as Kruger was in the Transvaal, while he had also the advantage of absolute rule over the North. And Kruger by his hostility to the Cape added to Rhodes's power, for it threw the Cape Dutch more and more into his hands. When Kruger finally closed the drifts against the Cape trade, Rhodes had almost the entire Colony, Dutch as well as English, at his back. It is true that there always was a Dutch party in the Cape devoted to the purely racial ideal and willing to make any sacrifice to that end. This party favoured Krugerism, and, being strong in Stellenbosch,

it checkmated Rhodes's scheme of a Teaching University to bring together the two races. Rhodes offered a magnificent site on the slopes of Table Mountain, and promised the support of his great fortune if only the colleges would unite in his scheme. But the Stellenbosch Theological Seminary, the stronghold of Dutch nationalism, stubbornly refused, and in this part of his scheme Rhodes had to acknowledge himself beaten.

Whether this spirit of Dutch nationalism would have beaten him on the greater project if the Raid had not cut across his plans we shall never know, and it is not profitable to guess.

## CHAPTER X

### THE JAMESON RAID

THOSE who study South African history aright see in the Raid only an episode—picturesque and important, but still only an episode in the long struggle between the Imperial and the Republican systems. Rhodes led on the one side, and Kruger on the other. The object of Kruger, as we have seen, was to extend and strengthen the republican system, to make it independent of the Colonies and to force the Colonies into ultimate union upon republican terms. The object of Rhodes was to extend the Colonial system, to make the Cape predominant, and by predominance in customs and railways, as well as by the influence of the increasing British population in the Transvaal, to secure union on Colonial terms. The fight for Bechuanaland, Mashonaland, Swaziland, Zululand, Amatongaland, are all incidents in the same great

contest. Kruger raided freely. He had been raiding all his life. He raided Bechuanaland, he raided Swaziland, he raided Mashonaland. The raid was one of the chief weapons in his armoury. Sometimes it succeeded, and sometimes it failed. And another weapon on which he relied was the blood relationship of the Dutch Cape Colonists. Here Rhodes had a difficult problem to deal with, for it was these Dutch Colonists that he chiefly relied upon in the Cape Parliament. But he skilfully used the hostile policy of Kruger to keep the Dutch on the Colonial side. Thus in 1894, speaking on the high duties imposed by the republic on Colonial products, he said: "Our wagons, our fruit, wine, grain, butter, even our cattle, are being heavily taxed. We have been promised consideration, but the Transvaal has done nothing." And then he skilfully linked the grievance of the Outlanders with this agricultural grievance: "The President is in favour of a system which refuses the franchise to seven-tenths of the population, and rejects commercial relations with a friendly and neighbouring State, which had come forward to help him in time of need. Meanwhile," and here comes the third link in the chain, "we may be thankful that our route to the Zambesi and beyond is open and free, and that the far north will some day be a portion of the Cape Colony. We must, then, be patient and not lose our tempers. Our only course is to maintain a statesmanlike and dignified position."

There were by this time at least forty thousand Outlanders, mostly British subjects, in the Transvaal, and although they were a large majority of the population, and paid nearly the entire amount of the state revenues, they were denied any voice in the government of the country. This in itself was a

situation scarcely tolerable to Englishmen; but it might have been borne with fair treatment and just administration. But there was neither justice nor fairness. The chief public services were in the hands of monopolists; justice was overruled by the Volksraad, so that even a Dutch Chief Justice was fain to resign by way of protest; the Outlanders were forced to fight in native wars in which they had no concern; and a foreign Civil Service composed of Hollanders, and under the domination of Leyds, worked against all Outlander interests. Kruger would yield nothing; as far back as 1892 he had said to a representative deputation: "Go back and tell your people, I shall never give them anything, and now let the storm burst!" The High Commissioner, the British Government, the Cape Government, protested in vain.

Thus the storm-cloud grew until it covered the whole land. By 1895 the Cape Colony, Dutch and English, was ready to fight the Transvaal on the drifts question. The Imperial Government was also behind Rhodes. On the 1st November of that year the two Governments, the Imperial Government and the Cape, had agreed to send an expedition into the Transvaal at joint expense. Kruger was informed of this decision, and on 5th November he showed his cleverness as a politician by opening the drifts as a temporary measure, while maintaining his iron grip on the Outlanders. This move was calculated to divide the forces against him; the Cape Dutch were pacified by the opening of the drifts, and the issue was narrowed to a question of Dutch *versus* British. Thus Rhodes, in the midst of his preparations, with his Chartered Police upon the Transvaal border and the Reformers arming in Johannesburg, was deprived of the cause which gave him the sympathy

of the Dutch and the assistance of the British Government.

But the Outlander grievance remained—a wrong, degrading and intolerable. It was resolved between the Reformers in Johannesburg, Jameson on the border, and Rhodes at Cape Town, that in the last resort the Rhodesian Police should be used in support of the Reform movement. The general scheme had fair possibilities of success—to seize Johannesburg by a concerted movement, to hold the Boers at bay, and thus to force the Imperial Government to intervene and make a settlement. That settlement was to guarantee the independence of the Boers in return for redress of grievances, a customs union, equalisation of railway rates, and a common court of appeal—the elements of a future federation; <sup>1</sup> but whether these were to form part of the settlement, or were to be the political result of the extension of the franchise in the Transvaal, is not clear. And it is doubtful if Rhodes's intention was to send in the police at all. It was, no doubt, in his mind that on two occasions, when either force had been shown or the threat of force had been used, Kruger had given way. The Warren Expedition in Bechuanaland was one; the recent threat of an expedition to open the drifts another. Thus Rhodes may have thought that the show of force would be sufficient. On both sides, it was part of the game well understood. Kruger had made several raids and threatened several more. The use of the Rhodesian Police upon the border as a factor of persuasion was then an almost normal incident in South African politics.

But to Jameson it was something more. He had recently conducted an amazingly swift and successful

<sup>1</sup> See Michell, vol. ii. p. 144.

campaign against Lobengula. He had an admirable little force, and it is said that his imagination was fired by the story of Garibaldi and the Thousand. He believed that the scheme of a rapid invasion, and the seizure of the Rand and possibly Pretoria, was the best way out of a situation that had become intolerable.

Thus there may have been two minds at cross-purposes, and it is certain also that Jameson was at cross purposes with the Reformers. They were not ready; they had contrived to smuggle in only two thousand rifles, five guns, and twenty thousand rounds of ammunition; they were divided on the subject of the flag to be raised, and found the date of the proposed rising in Pretoria coincided with the New Year's *Nacht-Maal*, the Communion Services, when the Boers flocked into town from the country districts. On the other hand, Jameson was ready; his five hundred troopers were fretting at Pitsani on the border; his relays of horses and provisions along the route of march awaited him; he may well have felt that if the opportunity went, no such chance would ever occur again. At the last moment the Reformers tried to stop him; but Jameson rode in nevertheless. He was without orders from Rhodes, and was acting against the advice of his fellow-conspirators. He thought he could manage the affair by himself. The sight of his troopers in Johannesburg, he no doubt believed, would unite all the waverers, and inspire the whole community to a general rising. But his proverbial luck for once went against him. Everything went wrong, as if inspired by a malicious fate. The troopers bungled over the cutting of the wires; many of the relay horses were found to be crocks. Weary, and deceived by firing

when Johannesburg was only twenty miles distant, they took the wrong turning, and went some way towards Krugersdorp. Even so, they covered one hundred and ninety miles in eighty-six hours, and were within an ace of getting into Johannesburg.

But the failure was no less disastrous. It destroyed Rhodes's work, his party, his position, at a blow. On 2nd January 1896, Jameson surrendered at Doornkop; on the evening of the same day Rhodes tendered his resignation to the High Commissioner at Cape Town. His credit with the Imperial Government was destroyed; his alliance with the Bond was at an end; the most powerful part of the Dutch party in Cape Colony, unable to withstand the tide of racial feeling let loose by the Raid, took the side of Kruger and the Republic. Rhodes's party, as far as he had a party left, was the British party, which condemned him to a minority: and as Rhodes fell Kruger rose in strength; the President had all the prestige of victory, and the Reform Party were completely in his power. He triumphed; but he failed, for his use of the triumph made inevitable the great war that swept away the republican system in South Africa.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE MATABELE REBELLION

WHEN Jameson was riding into the Transvaal, Rhodes was at Groote Schuur, consumed with anxiety. Groote Schuur, the "Great Barn" of the Dutch governors, is, as we know it now, a noble house in the Dutch colonial style, upon the lower slopes of

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Table Mountain, upon a corner of the great estate which stretches upwards to the crags and precipices of the rock itself and along the mountain side for some seven miles to Constantia Nek. Here Rhodes made a beautiful home, not so much for himself or even his friends, but for all the world. He laid it out in roads, and parks, and gardens, through which, from end to end, the people whom he loved had freedom to wander. Here the news came to him, and we know from trustworthy witnesses that it struck him an almost mortal blow. He had no sleep for five nights,<sup>1</sup> Jourdan tells us, and for several days he was seen by none, but wandered about in the tempest of his thoughts among the woods and boulders of the mountain side. When Jourdan came with the messages which showered upon them, "he would select a telegram, look at it for a second, then replace it with the others, and resume his pacing up and down in an absent-minded manner." One remark he made which has the ring of the man's heart in it: "Now that I am down, I shall see who are my real friends." His rushings to and fro at this time seem part instinctive as of a creature in pain. First he went to Kimberley, which he loved; a week there, and he made for England: little comfort there in the deafening yap and clatter of censorious tongues. Four days in England, and he set out by the East Coast for Rhodesia, where at last he found work to occupy and distract his mind. The Matabele, hearing of the defeat of Jameson and his troopers, had risen in rebellion, and begun operations with a massacre of the white settlers.

<sup>1</sup> *Cf.* Jourdan, p. 28. "I do not think he slept a wink for five nights. Tony, his personal servant, told me that 'The Baas walks up and down his bedroom, which is locked, at all times of the night.'"



It was a formidable rising. The Matabele, wiser from recent experience, fought in guerilla fashion, taking cover in the bush and granite caves of the Matoppos, and conducting an active and dangerous, if desultory warfare. At this time the affairs of the Company were at a low ebb, and Rhodesia itself was in a bad way, for, besides its losses by the rising, which paralysed mining and agriculture, its cattle had been swept clean by the rinderpest. Rhodes saw that as the war was going it might last long enough to bring his Colony to ruin. He had no official standing, the Imperial Government having compelled him to resign his position as Managing Director of the Chartered Company. But without other authority than the man himself, he assumed control of the situation, and opened peace negotiations with the rebels.

And here Rhodes showed in a supreme degree his genius for dealing with men. General Carrington's little army lay within easy reach of the hills in which the enemy were hidden ; but Rhodes moved his own camp to the very skirts of the hills, and two miles from the army. This he did "in order to win their confidence," and in that exposed and perilous position he lay for six weeks coaxing first one chief and then another, as it were, to feed from his hand. By slow degrees he won their complete confidence. "He sat," says Jourdan, "day after day throughout the heat of the day talking to the chiefs and cracking jokes with them, until we were tired to death of the sight of them. . . . He chaffed and teased the chiefs, and sometimes one fancied he was one of them by the way he adapted himself to their customs and methods of expression. He delighted in chaffing them. His face would beam all over when he thought he had

the best of an argument and had them in a corner." By such means a great peace *indaba* or council was arranged, and Rhodes, unarmed and without escort, accompanied only by three friends, rode into the hills and faced the line of armed warriors. For three or four hours they discussed their grievances and the terms of peace, and the natives, we are told, listened with downcast eyes when Rhodes sternly rebuked them for their massacre of women and children.

Then, as if indifferently, he said, "Is there to be peace or war?" The leading chiefs threw their spears at his feet.

The three with Rhodes were Colenbrander, Hans Sauer, and Captain Stent. Captain Stent tells us that as they rode back to camp, Rhodes turned to Dr. Sauer and said: "It is such scenes as this that make life worth living."

We may believe that this great work was medicine to his mind, and he found further comfort in riding through the great new country from town to town, and from farm to farm, hearing and redressing grievances, and setting settlers upon their legs again by the bounty of his private purse.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE WAR

By January 1897 he was in England once more, as he said, "to face the music." He was in good heart: "When I arrived in London," he said, "and saw the 'busmen and cabbies and other working men touch their hats to me in a friendly way, I knew I

was all right and that the man in the street had forgiven me." Rhodes loved the working men. He knew their contact with hard realities gave them a sense which the upper classes often lack—a sense to cut down to the rough justice of the business. He had also a deep regard for the opinion of good women. One, the wife of an old friend whom he met after the Raid in a London house, he drew aside, and said to her quite simply that the blow of Fate had done him good; it had made him more humble, less arbitrary.

To the Select Committee he made a fair and frank statement of his case. What he had done he did to gain civic rights for "the majority of the population, possessing more than half the land, nine-tenths of the wealth, and paying nineteen-twentieths of the taxes in the country," who were denied any share in the administration. There is no need to go further into the case; it had yet to be decided; it was Kruger that was on his trial, and when doom was pronounced it was Kruger that fell.

In the meantime, the Raid had produced what might be called a precipitation in Cape politics. Parties had divided anew upon nearly racial lines, and stood, the Progressives for the Empire and the South African party for the Republics. Rhodes's old friends and colleagues were now opponents and usually enemies—Hofmeyr, Sauer, Merriman, Schreiner; all, somewhat against their will but by the force of circumstances, were driven into the service of Kruger. None of them, it may be believed, approved of Kruger's policy. Merriman certainly had encouraged the rebellion of the Outlanders before the Raid.

It will help us to understand some of these ani-

mosities, if I go back for a moment to the Cabinet split of 1893, an affair which I had omitted owing to the narrow compass of this little book. Three members of Rhodes's Cabinet, Merriman, Sauer, and Sir James Innes, combined against their colleague, Sir James Sivewright, owing to his treatment of a railway refreshment contract. The charges somewhat resembled those made as to the recent Marconi contract—that Sivewright had given to a personal friend, and without tender, what amounted to "a virtual monopoly for twenty years." Rhodes was in England when the charges were made, and, although he tried his best to settle matters amicably, he refused to side with the majority by prejudging the case. The upshot was that he formed a new Ministry which excluded all four, and from that time on Merriman and Sauer were his enemies. Their animosity, which, like all their motives, was personal in its origin, was, however, impotent until the Raid gave it a pretext and a weapon. Mr. Schreiner was a later colleague, who fell away from his chief and friend after the Raid. He was honest, but weak, sentimental, and self-deceiving, and became the tool of less scrupulous men. Behind, there was Hofmeyr, always obedient in the last resort to the racial impetus, which drove him forward, and giving an unwilling allegiance to the power behind Setebos, Kruger, the true antagonist of Rhodes.

Rhodes held his own well against great odds. He had still the affection, open or secret, of a large number of the Dutch Cape Colonists, although the Bond was officially against him. He stood for a United South Africa under the British flag against the corrupt republicanism of the Transvaal; and he gained power from the persistent refusal of Kruger to grant

any concession, the scandalous corruption of his government, and its continued hostility to the interests of the Cape Colony. Rhodes was able to point out that he had developed the North on lines that helped the trade and agriculture of the Cape: "There are 10,000 people taking the whole of their wheat from Malmesbury, Piquetberg, and Caledon, because we have given them this protection on the railways, namely, a halfpenny per ton per mile for 600 miles, instead of the ordinary rate paid on the flour purchased in Australia." In the Transvaal, on the other hand, "all they thought of was of excluding us. This state tries to isolate itself and exclude all South Africa." The Transvaal Government was "attempting the impossible." It had even driven out its Chief Justice, a Dutch colonial, because he could not stand the depravity of the administration. Such arguments were well designed to gain the support of the Dutch Colonial farmer, and they naturally led up to the great argument of the advantages of union: "We human atoms may divide this country, but nature does not, and the Almighty does not; and whether you are residents here, or in Durban, Johannesburg, or the newly formed state of Rhodesia, the interests are the same, connected in family and thought and domestic relations, and any one who tries to separate them in thought, dealing, and connection is attempting an impossibility."

But things had gone too far for argument, however reasonable and self-evident in its truth. There is an element in life of which Rhodes perhaps never quite appreciated the full strength, and that is racialism. The call of the blood is stronger than reason, and silences the voice even of interest. War was now

inevitable, although almost to the last moment Rhodes believed that Kruger would give way, as he had given way before force in Bechuanaland, in Matabeleland. Rhodes was wrong: affairs had reached that tragic pitch when it becomes impossible for anyone to give way.

When war was at last seen to be certain, Rhodes went to Kimberley, the place he loved best, and the place to him of most danger. He threw his whole energy into the defence of the town; saw to the reserves of coal and food in the mines; gave his gardeners orders to plant large quantities of vegetables, organised a weekly distribution of fruit among the troops, built a fort where he thought the line of fortifications was weak on the Kenilworth side, organised its garrison, and raised and provided horses for a corps of mounted men. In the course of these activities, it was almost inevitable that there should be friction with the commandant of the garrison, Colonel Kekewich, a good soldier, with his own ideas of what was to be done and whose orders were to be obeyed. As for Rhodes he had grown accustomed to authority, and had never known discipline, while the progress of the disease which was to kill him made him arbitrary and irritable in his manner. It is none the less true that Rhodes was the life and soul of the civilian side of the defence, and that such measures as he took were considerate, humane, practical. Here, as in Rhodesia, he showed himself personally brave. He rode everywhere on his pony, the white flannel trousers which he always wore on horseback making him a conspicuous mark for Boer riflemen.

And when the siege was raised, Rhodes lost no time in pointing the moral of the war. On 23rd February

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1900, a few days after the siege was raised, he made a speech at the annual meeting of De Beers. "All contention will be over," he said, "with the recognition of equal rights for every civilised man south of the Zambesi. That principle, for which we have been so long struggling, is the crux of the present struggle, and my belief is that, when the war is over, a large number of the Dutch in this country will throw in their lot with us on this basis, that neither race shall claim any right of preference over the other. We have no feeling against them. We have lived with them, shot with them, visited with them, and we find, owing I suppose to the race affinity, that there is not much difference between us."

## CHAPTER XIII

### HOW RHODES DIED AND WAS BURIED

THUS, indeed, union was to come; but Rhodes was not to see it. The fatal heart disease now made rapid progress. He was still a young man; he had led a clean, healthy, virtuous, open-air life; in all his habits he was temperate, even frugal; but he had never spared himself, never taken care of himself; he had never married, and there was no woman's love to watch over him. His last days were indeed tormented, and his disease aggravated, by cruel persecution by a woman of the baleful and desolating order. The true story of this miserable affair is told in Mr. Jourdan's work, which, as I gather

from other sources, is to be relied upon in every detail. Poor Rhodes, nearing his end and defenceless by reason of his chivalry, was hunted and then slandered. His good name was sullied without a shadow of justification, and the climax came with the forging of Rhodes's name to a series of bills which were taken up in Cape Town and made a trial for forgery necessary. Rhodes was then in England; but insisted on returning to give his evidence. The journey was too much for his failing strength; he gave his evidence at the preparatory examination, but did not live to see his name completely cleared by the trial. He retired to die in the little seaside village of Muizenburg. There in a little cottage, with the sound of the league-long rollers of the Indian Ocean in his ears, with its spume in his nostrils, he faced at last an enemy too strong for him.

"It was most heartrending," says Jourdan, "to see him sit on the edge of his bed with one limb resting on the floor and the other akimbo in front of him on the bed, at one moment gasping for breath, and at another with his head sunk so low that his chin almost touched his chest." He was surrounded by his friends, and that to Rhodes was the greatest of comforts. Sir Edmund Stevenson, Dr. Jameson, Dr. Smartt, both as friends and doctors did for him what could be done. Sir Charles Metcalfe, his old Oxford friend, and his right-hand man in Rhodesia, and a few other intimates, were constantly with him. To the end he was brave, cheerful, and unselfish, and even in death, as Jourdan says, and as the death-mask testifies, "he looked determined, dignified, and masterful."



"On the afternoon of Wednesday, the 26th March,"<sup>1</sup> says Sir Lewis Michell, "I sat for a while by his bedside, while Dr. Jameson, worn out by persistent watching day and night, took a short rest. The patient was restless and uneasy. Once he murmured, 'So little done, so much to do,' and then after a long pause I heard him singing softly to himself, maybe a few bars of an air he had once sung at his mother's knee. Then, in a clear voice, he called for Jameson."

The end came within an hour.

Rhodes was buried as he wished, in a grave cut in the granite on a summit of the Matoppos—"The World's View" he had called it. Beneath and around his grave, stretches the great land he had given to the Empire.

## CHAPTER XIV

### RHODES—THE MAN AND HIS WORK

IN this brief sketch, I have tried to give the main outline of Rhodes's life and work, and wherever possible I have let his own words testify. This method I hope has made clear the large conception of duty that ruled his life, as well as the ruling principles of his statesmanship. But one aspect of this statesmanship I have hitherto neglected,—his interest in the affairs of England and the British Empire as a whole. He was a believer in what the Germans call "real politik"—he believed, that is to say, that politics were ruled and determined by the

<sup>1</sup> 1902.

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interests of mankind, as well as by the facts of the physical world. Thus he believed that the union of the British Empire must be laid on a foundation of common interests. He was a preferentialist, or, as we now say, a Tariff Reformer, long before Chamberlain. It is worth remembering that the great friend of his early days in Cape politics was Jan Hofmeyr. Hofmeyr was a man of the wine-farming South-West, and, in common with all his people, looked upon the Cobden Treaty with France as the most momentous and disastrous fact in Imperial politics. The Cape wine trade with England had been built up on a preference of six shillings a gallon, and when that preference was abolished in 1860, this flourishing trade had been completely destroyed. It had brought many farmers to ruin; it had ruined the wine industry. More than any other single act of policy, it had made the Cape Dutchman distrust and dislike England. Now it is remarkable that in the Colonial Conference of 1887 Hofmeyr, as the Cape representative, proposed an Imperial tariff to be imposed by England and all the Dominions on foreign goods, and the proceeds to be used for the navy. I feel certain, although there is no proof, that Rhodes gave this Imperial turn to Hofmeyr's desire to get the wine preference back again. In 1891, in a speech made to the wine farmers of the Paarl, Rhodes recounts a conversation he had with Lord Salisbury. He had said to the Prime Minister: "If you wish to retain the sentiment of the Colonies, you must consider day by day how you can give the people some commercial advantage, and thus show them that the tie with England is one that is of practical advantage to themselves." He had then told Lord Salisbury of the destruction of the Cape wine trade,

and he added : " When I discussed this with Lord Salisbury, I adopted the suggestions I had had from Mr. Hofmeyr about a differential rate, and said the greatest tie England could make with the Cape Colony was to return to the system of 1858."

But Rhodes did not propose a one-sided arrangement. On the contrary, he regarded the Colonies as the great future markets for British manufactures that by statesmanship might be kept open when other markets were closed by hostile tariffs. At the second annual meeting of the Chartered Company he had much to say on this question :

" Cobden had his idea of Free Trade for all the world, but that idea has not been realised. The whole world can see that we can make the best goods in this country, and the countries of the world therefore establish against us, not protective tariffs, but prohibitive tariffs. . . . It seemed to be forgotten in talking about these islands that there are thirty-six millions of people, and that the islands only produce sufficient to support six millions, the other thirty millions being entirely dependent on the trade of the world. . . . I know full well if President Harrison's policy is continued by the Yankees they will absorb Canada, make reciprocal arrangements with South America, and declare the New World to be self-supporting. . . . I want to show the masses that the question of the day for them is the Tariff question, and this country is the last country that should abstain from dealing with it."

And at the general meeting of 1895 he explained how he had applied this doctrine in Rhodesia. He pointed out that the Colonies when they were given

self-government put on protective tariffs, and thus built up what he called "bastard industries." They were bastard industries because a young country, with coal and iron undeveloped, and with a sparse population, could make no real profit out of them; they were expensive and unremunerative. "The only chance for a Colony," he said, "is to stop these ideas before they are created, and, taking this new country of ours, I thought it would be a wise thing to put in the Constitution that the tariff (on British goods) should not exceed the present Cape tariff, which is a revenue and not a protective tariff." This clause gave security that, if ever the Rhodesian tariff was heightened, British goods would be given a preference. Moreover, "this clause, being in our own charter, would have governed the rest of Africa, and therefore you would have had Africa preserved to British goods as one of your markets." This proposal, he went on to say, had been refused by the British Government, and he asked the shareholders to use all their political influence to have it reinserted.

"All these big questions, remember, come from little things. If you carry that clause in the Constitution of Matabeleland, you do not know how it will spread, the basis being that your goods shall not be shut out from the markets of the world. That clause will extend from Matabeleland to Mashonaland, throughout Africa, and then, perhaps, Australia and Canada may consider the question. You will be retaining the market for your goods. You have been actually offered this, but have refused it, because you did not understand it."

Here, then, was Rhodes's Empire policy—a policy of closer union on the basis of preferential trade

arrangements—a policy which was later to be adopted by our greatest Colonial Minister and by the Unionist Party—a policy which, as Rhodes prophesied, has been adopted by Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

In politics Rhodes used to call himself a Liberal, no doubt because he believed in democracy and popular government. He believed also in a system of federalism for the Empire, and was alarmed to find in Gladstone's Home Rule Bill of 1886 that no provision was made for Irish representation in Parliament. To secure that end he subscribed £10,000 to the funds of the Irish Nationalists. The object of the gift, like most of Rhodes's actions, has been misrepresented: it is made quite clear by the letter to Parnell which accompanied it. "Side by side," he wrote, "with the tendency to decentralisation in local affairs, there is growing up a feeling for the necessity of greater union in Imperial matters. The primary tie which binds our Empire together is the one of self-defence. The Colonies are already commencing to co-operate with and contribute to the Mother Country for this purpose; but if they are to contribute permanently and beneficially, they will have to be represented in the Imperial Parliament, where the disposition of their contributions must be decided upon." For the same purpose he sent in 1891 a cheque for £5000 to the Liberal Party funds, with another condition—that the money should be given to a charity if it became Liberal policy to clear out of Egypt. "It would be an awful thing," he said in his postscript, "to give my money to breaking up the Empire."

Rhodes's Education policy was directed to the same end—first to the union of South Africa, and, when

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racial bigotry refused the splendid gift, to the union of the Empire, by the instrumentality of Oxford. That is the meaning of his will ; but not the entire meaning, for American students are included in the scheme, one proof out of several that Rhodes dreamed of the federation of the Anglo-Saxon race.

So much for the man's work : I have left myself but a page or two in which to speak of the man himself. His character has been much maligned and much misunderstood. In business he was scrupulously honourable : to do anything crooked or underhand was not in his character. On this point not only his friends but his rivals in business are unanimous. Even Cohen, who never errs on the side of reticence, never said a word against the honour of Rhodes. As to the Raid, the massing of troops on the Transvaal border has always seemed to me an act of sound statesmanship fully justified by the circumstances. It is as to the crossing of the border that there may be two opinions, and there Rhodes had no hand. But as he did not shirk responsibility, the defence may rest upon this, that it was a blow, ill-aimed and ill-judged perhaps, but a blow for freedom.

While honourable, then, in business and public life, Rhodes was also unselfish. There was no base taint of personality. His thought was never for himself, but for the Commonwealth. And so in private life all his thoughts were for his friends, and for the poor and the oppressed. His benefactions were so enormous that, although his income amounted to something like a quarter of a million a year, his account was nearly always overdrawn at the bank. Few men and no women in distress ever appealed to

him in vain. And his actions were not the gross and thoughtless charities of the man with too much money for his needs, for his telegraph and railway schemes to link the North with the South of Africa were financed so largely from his private purse that he was always in need. No, he valued money for what it could do, and he spent for the joy of helping. He spent carefully and thoughtfully, his kind acts being all marked by the same tact, care, and tenderness. Even when he was a poor digger he would take infinite pains, and spend more than he could afford, in helping some lame dog over the stile. Sometimes even the lame dog did not know who helped him over.

He was a man who delighted in the society of friends and in the community of ideas. He loved argument and discourse, and his habit of thought was to brood over some clear and simple principle, following it out into its practical ramifications. When he spoke in public it was as if he thought aloud, and even his private conversation was often a soliloquy.

He never spoke evil of any man or any woman; but had an art to see the best in them. Once in his hearing a clever young man, now risen to eminence, said he had praised Lord Cromer in the press, "because it paid." "No," said Rhodes, "you praised him because it was right."

He kept open house to all men and to the whole population of South Africa. When he lived, he let people wander at will over his estates, and even through his house; when he died, house and estates became the property of South Africa.

He thought much of the future, and this is perhaps the chief distinction between great men and small

—that small men are occupied by the present, and great men occupy themselves with what is to come. There is upon this point a passage of such beauty in one of his speeches about Rhodesia that I cannot refrain from quoting it.

“I remember,” he said, “in the impetuosity of my youth I was talking to a man advanced in years, who was planting—what do you think? He was planting oak trees, and I said to him, very gently, that the planting of oak trees by a man advanced in years seemed to me rather imaginative. He seized the point at once, and said to me, ‘You feel that I shall never enjoy the shade?’ I said, ‘Yes,’ and he replied, ‘I had the imagination, and I know what that shade will be, and at any rate no one will ever alter these lines. I have laid my trees on certain lines; I know that I cannot expect more than to see them beyond a shrub, but with me rests the conception, and the shade, and the glory.’”

Rhodes never said that every man had his price; but he said there was no man with whom he could not deal. That was his method of doing things—to deal with other men, to show them what their interests were, and, in his favourite phrase, “to have it out with them.” His whole method was an appeal to reason. With every man he crossed, whether it was Kruger or Lobengula or Barnato, he always “had it out with him.”

Rhodes believed in religious education, and in religion as an influence; but as for himself he did not know. As he said to the Jesuit Father Barthélemy, all he knew was that he must do his best in this world according to his lights, and do no harm intentionally to anyone. And he added: “Yes, in fact, if I was to go before the Almighty



to-morrow, and He was to tell me that He thought I had acted very badly at times, and had wronged some people wittingly, say Kruger, for instance, well—I should be prepared to have it out with Him.”

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
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