were the same as those granted to that of Cairo, excepting that the latter were allowed to take with them only ten pieces of cannon.

Sir John Hutchinson had some time prior to the event decided upon quitting Egypt, immediately after the surrender of Alexandria, in consequence of the delicate and precarious state of his health, and had resolved upon leaving the Indian army, with the addition of the 22d light dragoons, under the command of General Baird, directing him at the same time not to quit the country until he received further commands from His Majesty's ministers; but on the 18th of September, despatches arrived from England, ordering Sir John to leave six thousand men, exclusive of the Indian troops (the particular regiments to be left being enumerated), with the option of remaining himself in the command, or returning to Europe. The latter step, as we have just observed, he had already determined to take, in consequence of the delicate state of his health.

The despatches from home contained farther instructions to Sir John Hutchinson, which, as it turned out, very materially changed the position of General Baird. Sir John was directed to retain in the country under his command, if he remained in Egypt, Major-General Moore,* Brigade-General Hope,† Brigadier-General Stuart, and Brigadier-General Oakes;‡ but in case Major-General Moore

* Afterwards Sir John Moore, of whom much hereafter.
† Afterwards Lord Hopetoun.
‡ Afterwards Sir Hildebrand Oakes. He entered the army
should return to Europe, then Lord Cavan was to be placed in his room.* This despatch left no alternative; for Sir John Hutchinson, who, as General Moore was gone, was compelled to give the command to Lord Cavan in direct opposition to his lordship's own wishes and inclinations.

By the proposed arrangement, it certainly seemed that the intention of the Government at home was to blend the Indian and European armies; for although the Secretary at War distinctly stated that in Downing Street they did not know of what troops the Indian force was composed, or by whom it was commanded, His Majesty's orders were, that whatever the force might be, it was at all events to remain in Egypt.

General Baird saw at once the difficulties likely in 1787, and served in the American war; in 1792 he went to the West Indies, and remained two years; in 1794, he served in Corsica; became Lieutenant Colonel in 1795; in 1796 went to Portugal; in 1798, as Colonel, was at the capture of Minorca. After the Egyptian campaign, he was employed in the Mediterranean; and in 1808 commanding the force at Malta; and in 1810, Civil and Military Commissioner there. He resigned from ill health 1813; was created a Baronet; in 1814 he was appointed Lieutenant General of the Ordnance, and died Sept. 9, 1822.

* Richard William Lambert, Earl of Cavan, Viscount Kilcoursie, and Baron Lambert of the kingdom of Ireland, G.C.B. and K.C.; born Sept. 10, 1768; married, first, in 1782, Honora, daughter of Judge Gould, by whom he had several children. Her ladyship died October 1, 1803. His lordship married in the following August, Miss Arnold, daughter of the Collector of Customs at Cowes, Isle of Wight, by whom he has three children.

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to arise from this scheme of "brigading" two armies, formed upon totally different principles, receiving different pay and allowances, and whose habits and customs were entirely dissimilar. The East India Company's army, as every body knows, is raised in a perfectly distinct manner from, and regulated (as are indeed even the King's troops serving on the Indian establishments) by arrangements so different from those by which the regular European troops are guided, that as General Baird justly said in his remonstrance against the junction of the forces, it required an internal knowledge of India, of its government, of the many different branches which compose an Indian army, and of the various rules and regulations even of the different Presidencies (no one set of which, is exactly like the other two), to conduct it with anything like propriety or safety.

It was quite clear, that if the plan of uniting these armies were persisted in, and that the Indian troops were no longer to be a separate force under a distinct commander, all these regulations and arrangements would be continually broken in upon, or unattended to, and consequently very serious confusion and inconvenience to the service must occur—great dissatisfaction among the officers would ensue, and the three Presidencies themselves would ultimately be brought into collision.

But, as General Baird forcibly urged, independently of all these impediments, one objection on the score of policy presented itself, which ought, unquestionably, to have defeated the intention at once. The flourishing situation of British India is in a
considerable degree owing to, and in a still more
considerable degree dependent upon, the treatment of
the native troops in our service; by a long course of
attention, to their customs and prejudices they had
been brought to a state of discipline and confidence
in the English, which induced them, contrary to
their engagements, and beyond their obligations, to
consent to embark on foreign service. To any man
at all acquainted with the general character and dis­
position of these people, it must be evident, that no­
thing could be so difficult as for a stranger, even with
the best intentions, to conduct and command them,
without at some time or another offending their pre­
judices, or outraging those customs which, although
to a casual observer apparently trifling, and even
ridiculous, are by them considered of the most
vital importance.

Indeed, worse consequences than those which
might immediately result from the measure, were to
be anticipated by the completion of the proposed
arrangement; for if at a vast distance from their na­
tive country, to which they had trusted themselves
on the faith of the British character, they were to
fall under the command of officers, and serve with
corps entirely strangers to them—strange to their
language and their habits, the disgust which they
must naturally contract, would, on their return to
India, spread throughout the whole native service,
and unquestionably put an end to the hopes of the
Government, of ever inducing them to embark on a
foreign expedition again.

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Another very powerful obstacle to this junction presented itself in the difference of pay and allowances in the two services—the jealousies which must arise, were the two armies blended, would be extremely unpleasant to both parties; but as far as the worse paid were concerned, extremely dangerous. The deductions made from the pay of privates on the Indian establishment for rations, is not more than half that which is stopped from the European soldier—a difference so striking would soon have become generally known, and as no ostensible or satisfactory reason could be given to the European soldier for the difference, it might have led to consequences of the most serious nature; while on the other hand, if it were proposed to remedy the inconvenience by equalizing the two establishments, a still greater difference must arise, for, besides the doubt which must naturally exist, that any authority was vested in anybody in Egypt to reduce the pay and allowances of the East India Company's troops, it would have been, supposing it either possible or legal, the severest of all imaginable infractions, the Indian army being always saddled with expenses which European troops—not in India—have no necessity for incurring, and which really consume the allowances made by the Company, in addition to their pay. For instance, the Company's officers were not allowed soldiers to attend upon them, and therefore, according to the custom of the country, and indeed, as a matter of necessity, they had brought with them a number of Indian
servants, at high wages, whom, let what might happen, they were bound to support and maintain during the campaign.

The movements of an army in India vary very greatly from those of troops in Europe, and all ranks are subject to considerable charges in providing and carrying with them European articles absolutely essential to comfort, and cleanliness, and health, which, from the uncertainty of supply, it is found necessary to travel with, and which in India, can only be purchased in the first instance, at a very high price; so that it appears certain, that at the end of a campaign, although the amount actually paid to the Indian army, during the service, might be considerably larger than that received by a force coming from England, the Indian army would, in point of fact, derive no greater pecuniary advantage. This, in the present case, will be even more clearly proved, when it is recollected that the European army was paid in dollars, at the rate of 4s. 6d. per dollar, and the Indian army in dollars at the rate of 5s. 5d. In short, as General Baird emphatically said, the reduction of the Indian allowances would materially injure the whole body of men, and entirely ruin most of the officers.

General Baird having strongly remonstrated against this most injudicious measure, and as he thought without success, expressed a desire to Sir John Hutchinson to be permitted to give up his command; feeling naturally unwilling to remain in a subordi-
nate position, after having been nominated to the command in chief of a separate army by the Governor-General himself.

In support of his wish to retire, he urged his disbelief that the Government at home intended him to remain in Egypt, because he found that all the other general officers to be retained were specifically mentioned in the despatch to Sir John Hutchinson; and as to the statement made by Sir John, that the Government were not aware what the officer's name was who commanded the Indian army, the General felt sceptical as to the possibility of that circumstance, however firmly General Hutchinson himself might have believed it, because he had received a communication from the Duke of York, Commander-in-chief of the army, dated from the Horse Guards the 10th of May, upwards of two months anterior to General Hutchinson's last despatch, in which His Royal Highness conveyed the gratifying intelligence to General Baird, that His Majesty had been pleased to appoint him to the command of the 54th regiment.

Sir John Hutchinson quite coincided with General Baird, as to the difficulty likely to arise from the union of the two armies; but seemed to think that the stay of the Indian army in Egypt would not be long; and indeed to imagine, that when it did return, the native troops alone would go back to the Presidencies without the King's regiments, which came from them; at all events, however, he declared it to be impossible for him to permit General Baird to leave Egypt without further instructions,
but promised him that he, Sir John Hutchinson, would not of himself think of uniting the force from India with that which came from Europe; suggesting, however, the great probability, that under any circumstances, the King's regiments, if they should remain, would be deprived of the Indian allowances; a suggestion which seems to have been founded upon the evident necessity of equalizing the pay of all the Europeans, and the utter impossibility of incurring so enormous an expense, as that which would have arisen from augmenting the allowances of the army from England, to the scale of those which were made to the army from India.

This suggestion was extremely painful to General Baird, for it involved all the evil consequences to the King's regiments which he had brought with him, which, for their sakes, he so much dreaded, namely, the sudden stoppage to their means of either providing for the followers whom they had brought with them, or of sending them back to their own country, which they were bound to do, as part of the agreement subsisting between them. Another evil of still more serious inconvenience would have resulted to the officers, because they had, upon quitting India, devoted a certain proportion of their pay and allowances to the maintenance of their wives and families whom they had left behind them; which proportion they would have been unable to discontinue for some months, until advices could reach the Presidency to which they belonged, and which they would have been wholly unable to continue to afford to their relations and connexions if
their incomes were so considerably reduced as they must be by the proposed equalization.

General Baird's situation at this period was one of peculiar delicacy and embarrassment. He had arrived in Egypt the commander-in-chief of an army which had achieved one of the most wonderful undertakings that can well be imagined, and now found himself not only reduced to a junior command, but even his name omitted in the despatches from England in the list of officers to be retained on service.

Other causes than mere personal annoyances conspired to harass and agitate General Baird. Disease to an alarming extent began to show itself in the army, and in the hospital of the 88th regiment at Rosetta several cases of plague had actually occurred. Every precaution which ardour and activity could suggest or enforce was of course adopted, but the badness and scarcity of provisions, and the difficulty with which they were procured, contributed not a little to counteract the best and most assiduous exertions which were made for the comfort and security of the men.

Subsequently to this period, in spite of all the measures which had been adopted to prevent the spread of contagion, the dreadful malady broke out in the camp amongst the Bengal Volunteers. General Baird ordered the hospitals to be burned, and again the disease was checked, three sepoys only having fallen victims to its ravages—but at this crisis the appearance was awful and the anticipation terrible!
CHAPTER XX.


It may be recollected that the Beys of Upper Egypt, who had certainly fulfilled the expectations of General Baird, and most conscientiously performed all they had engaged to do for the advantage of the English, had more than once repeated their apprehensions that whenever the British forces should be withdrawn from the country, the Grand Vizier would commence a system of persecution against them. They were only wrong in their conjectures, by flattering themselves that the Vizier would wait for the departure of the Europeans before he began to exhibit his tyranny.

On the 6th of October General Baird, whose kind
and conscientious watchfulness of the interests of the Beys is above all commendation, wrote the following letter to Sir John Hutchinson, and sent it off by express; the emergency appearing to his anxious mind, one of no trifling character.

_El Hamed, Oct. 6th, 1801._

My dear Sir,

I have the honour to address you at the earnest request of Osman Bey Perdicci, who has just arrived from Cairo with Osman Bey Tambourgi, Ibrahim Behar, and several chachifs. They are thus far on their way to Alexandria, at the desire of the Capidan Pacha, and are extremely alarmed on the occasion, as they have no faith in Turkish promises, and are apprehensive of treachery.

They request your Excellency will have the goodness to give them any information you may be in possession of respecting the object of their being ordered down. I have endeavoured to convince them of the impossibility of the Capidan Pacha entertaining any such idea as they seem to dread; but they declared to me that they would not have trusted themselves thus far, did they not consider themselves under the protection of the British, from the assurances you were pleased to grant them in your letter to Osman Bey; and they hope that, should your Excellency be unacquainted with their being ordered down, you will have the goodness to mention to his Highness the Capidan Pacha, in the course of conversation, my having reported to you their arrival, and endeavour to find out the real object of his sending for them. In short, my dear Sir, they have a perfect reliance on your honour for their safety, and will therefore remain here until they hear farther from your Excellency.

Nothing but the most earnest entreaties from Osman
Bey Perdicci, whom I in some measure regard as a personal friend, could have induced me to address your Excellency on this very delicate subject; and I therefore trust you will pardon my taking the liberty. I assure your Excellency that it is neither my wish nor inclination to interfere in the political matters or arrangements of this country.

I have the honour to remain, dear Sir,
Your faithful and obedient servant,

D. Baird.

To this Sir John, on the 7th, returned the following answer.

My dear Sir,

I received your letter, but not till four o'clock this evening, as the bearer was delayed till nine o'clock this morning at the Caravansera. Entre nous, I believe the Beys have every reason to be apprehensive of the designs of the Capidan Pacha.

His Highness came to me a few days ago, and told me, in tones of honey, and with a most lamb-like simplicity, that the Mamelukes had been very useful to us, and that he was therefore determined to do something to mark his regard for them, for which purpose he meant to invite them to go to Constantinople, where some were to be made Pachas of three tails, others of two tails, and some chamberlains. He did not, however, say a word whether they were to keep their heads upon their shoulders or not; but he said he was certain that I would be his guarantee to them for their security. I was so shocked and confounded at his impudence and wickedness, that at the time I gave him no answer. However, the day before yesterday I sent Vincenzio to communicate to the Beys what had passed, and to warn them of their danger.
In my opinion they had better be very cautious what steps they take. You may assure them of my determination to adhere in the most firm manner to the solemn promises which I originally made them, and which they have rendered still more sacred by the many services they have performed towards the whole of the British troops, but more especially to that part of them which were under your immediate command in Upper Egypt.

They certainly ought to make a visit of ceremony to the Capidan Pacha. To decline it, as they are so near, would be not only a marked piece of rudeness, but it would have the appearance of timidity, which is the most dangerous weakness you can possibly display to a Turk, whose boldness is always in the direct ratio of the timidity of his enemy. I do not say that it is necessary they should hurry themselves; they may linger out three or four days, under the pretence of the badness of the roads or the weariness of their horses. Afterwards they had better mount, taking all due precautions, for I will not answer for it that they are not in an enemy's country.

I shall keep so good a watch, that I think no mischief can befall them; caution them, however, to beware of all boats, particularly of those which belong to the squadron of Turkish men-of-war. Even in passing the ferries they ought to reconnoitre the ground well before they trust themselves.

As soon as they arrive in the camp they ought to wait on the Capidan Pacha, and afterwards, with his permission, to pay me a visit. If he should decline his consent, they are to tell him, they are extremely sorry to act contrary to his opinion, but that they have received the most positive commands from me on that subject, and that I had farther told them, I was determined not to be disobeyed.

I think it will be right for you to send an officer of your army to accompany them, as it would be a demonstration
to the Capidan Pacha that we were serious and determined to protect them to the utmost extent of our power and ability. I send Vincenzio back with this letter; you will of course communicate the contents to the Beys, at least as much of it as you think it right that they should know.

I remain, my dear Sir,

Most faithfully yours,

J. Hely Hutchinson.

In the course of the day Captain Vincenzio arrived at General Baird's head quarters, and the General on the evening of the 8th despatched the following reply to Sir John Hutchinson.

Head Quarters, Indian Army, 8th Oct. 1801,
Camp near El Hamed.

My dear Sir,

I had the honour to receive yours by Captain Vincenzio, and also the verbal message relative to the Beys not traveling at night, and timing their journey to-morrow so as to arrive at the Capidan Pacha's tent before twelve o'clock at noon. I afterwards paid a formal visit to the Beys in Rosetta, on purpose to show the Turks that they were under our protection, and explained to them the contents of your Excellency's letter.

I assured the Beys of your Excellency's determination to protect them, and of your being their warm friend. Such, however, is their dread of Turkish treachery, that they did not appear satisfied to go till I informed them that an officer of rank of this army should accompany, and remain with them during their visit to the Capidan Pacha, and should also carry them to your Excellency. Upon this they were satisfied, and agreed to go, though they still have their apprehensions that violence may be done them
even in the presence of a British officer. They appear to have a very shocking opinion of the character of the Capidan Pacha, and which I fear is too well founded. They are therefore determined to be upon their guard, and they have the fullest reliance upon your Excellency's keeping a watchful eye over them, and being ready to afford them your protection.

After all, my dear Sir, I think they are in a very critical situation, and I really believe it to be impossible to be too cautious. I have offered them (should they wish it) an escort of cavalry; at all events, I shall send a few dragoons as orderlies to the officer who accompanies them, and I shall give him the strictest orders not to allow the Beys to go out of his sight on any pretext whatever till he brings them to your tent.

Soon after I left the Beys yesterday the Capidan Pacha's cousin arrived from Aboukir. He waited on the Beys, and said he was sent by the Pacha to congratulate them on their arrival. In the evening three boats full of Turkish soldiers came, and one of the Turkish men-of-war's boats, on board of which was an officer of considerable importance. This being reported to me by Colonel Barlow, together with the suspicions which had been created in his mind by the circumstance, I ordered the guard (of honour) over the Beys to be reinforced for the night, with as little noise or disturbance as possible. This morning I hear that the stranger is from Constantinople, on his way to Cairo, and last from Aboukir.

The Beys propose leaving this the day after to-morrow, and I shall furnish them with horses and camels. Captain Vincenzio will proceed to-morrow should the Beys maintain their resolution of going; and as he has been present at and acted as interpreter during my interview with them, that gentleman will be able to give your Excellency any further information.
I beg leave to call to your Excellency's attention, that from the bridge at the Caravansera being broken down, and the pontoon at the Block House being destroyed, the communication between this and Alexandria becomes very uncertain.

I have the honour to be, dear Sir,
Your Excellency's faithful and obedient servant,

D. Baird.

The situation of these Beys was now one of particular interest, and General Baird watched over them with a warmth of friendship, and an anxiety almost parental. On the 10th of October the General expresses his feelings towards them plainly and sincerely, in the subjoined letter to Sir John.

Head Quarters, Indian Army,
10th October, 1801.

My dear Sir,

The Beys have been guilty of very great imprudence; they have been weak enough to accept of horses and camels from the Turks to carry them to Alexandria, so that they will be completely in their power to halt or march as the Turk pleases. I must acknowledge to your Excellency that I am a little alarmed for the safety of the Beys. Colonel Montresor is the officer named to attend them; a serjeant, corporal, and twelve, go with him as orderlies, and the like number of infantry, under the pretence of guarding the Colonel's baggage.

I think it right to apprise your Excellency of the preceding circumstances, and also, that a party of Turks left Rosetta this morning for Alexandria, with colours, &c. I shall not close this till I hear from the Beys.
11th October, 10 a.m.

Last night I received intelligence from Colonel Barlow that the Beys propose starting off this morning, but as they did not say to Colonel Barlow whether they wished an officer should accompany them, and as they were by no means explicit, I suspected there might be some underhand business; I therefore resolved to call on them early this morning as if by accident.

On my waiting on them, they expressed a wish that an officer should accompany them, and also requested forty horses for their attendants. Upon this, I introduced Colonel Montresor to them, and ordered the number of horses required, with the addition of twenty accoutred dragoons to take charge of those horses. I now think I may answer for the safe arrival of the Beys in your Excellency's camp. I expect them here every moment in their way to Alexandria, and I shall send this off by express the moment they come.

Believe me, dear Sir,
Your Excellency's faithful servant,

D. Baird.

Having thus far, as he imagined, provided for the safety of his friends, General Baird found his attention claimed by certain alterations, which were proposed in the staff, which too plainly indicated that his efforts and remonstrances with respect to keeping the army from Europe and that from India separate, and, (as far as their internal economy was concerned,) independent of each other, had been unavailing. The following letter from General Baird to Sir John Hutchinson, a copy of which was also transmitted to Lord Cavan, will best explain the
nature of the changes contemplated, and the feelings and opinions of General Baird respecting them.

Head Quarters, Indian Army, Oct. 18th, 1801.

My dear Sir,

As I have just learnt that it is in agitation to remove to the head quarters at Alexandria from this army my two principal public staff officers, one of whom (the Adjutant-General) is in my perfect confidence, I think it absolutely necessary, before I order them to join (or the above event take place), to acquaint your Excellency that Colonel Auchmuty is appointed by special order from his Majesty, Adjutant-General only to the army from India under my command when joined by the troops from the Cape. I beg leave to transmit for your information a copy of his appointment.

Colonel Murray is merely acting as Quarter-Master-General, appointed by my authority, derived from the Marquess Wellesley, Governor and Captain-General of India, and that appointment has not even yet been confirmed by his Excellency. It is also necessary to acquaint your Excellency that Colonel Murray does not belong to any corps serving with this army, and that he holds a civil appointment from the East India Company, as Political resident at Mocha. It is not, therefore, at all improbable that Colonel Murray may be ordered by Lord Wellesley to return to his station at that place.

Whilst the Indian army remains a separate corps under my immediate command, I cannot see the necessity of removing any of my principal public staff officers, as it would be of the greatest inconvenience to me to be without them; and, as I conceive, your Excellency must have a great choice of able and experienced officers fit to hold...
those appointments, as indeed any other in his Majesty's service.

It is also my duty to apprise your Excellency, that I consider it a matter of course, whenever any part of the troops which joined me from the Cape of Good Hope are removed from under my command as Commander-in-chief of the Indian army, they must be struck off the Indian Establishment, as they are ordered by his Majesty's ministers only to be paid by the East India Company while attached to this army.

I have to conclude with assuring your Excellency that I am well aware you will determine as you judge best for the public service; and I have only to add, that should that decision be contrary to my views and opinions on the subject, and that I am compelled to remain here (until his Majesty's pleasure be known) in an inferior situation to that which I now hold, I shall at all times support your Excellency's measures, or those of the Earl of Cavan, with the utmost zeal for the good of the service.

I have the honour to remain, dear Sir,

Your Excellency's faithful and obedient servant,

D. BAIRD.

On the following day General Baird received the following answer from Sir John Hutchinson.

Head Quarters, October 14th, 1801.

MY DEAR SIR,

I am at a loss to imagine whence you derive your information that it was my intention to remove your two principal staff officers to Alexandria. Lord Cavan asked my consent to write for Colonel Auchmuth, and I refused it.

Colonel Murray must also recollect, that I told him that I had no intention to direct him to do duty here, as having
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no commission of Quarter-Master-General from the King, I did not know how I could consider him as such. You must be well aware, from the whole of my conduct towards you, that I am little disposed to adopt any improper interference, or to do anything which might give you pain.

I was perfectly conscious of the inconvenience of mixing corps with different allowances and different habits; it was therefore my intention to have left you in command. I have been over-ruled by higher authority, and am obliged by the orders of Government to leave the command with Lord Cavan. You know the power will then be in his hands, and he has a right, if he chooses (for the order is in so many words), to bring the sepoys to Alexandria, as they are directed to form part of the garrison; indeed the same order is given with respect to the whole of the troops from India.

As for the allowances, I never have, and never meant to interfere with them in the slightest degree. Had I remained in this country, I should have given Government the most decided opinion upon it, on the most mature consideration I have formed; one, which I think no time or circumstance will ever induce me to alter; but having now done with Egypt for ever, I am determined never to interfere again in its affairs, or to give an opinion which my duty does not call upon me to offer.

I hope to be enabled to pay you a visit by the end of the week, and have the honour to be, with much respect and regard,

My dear Sir,
Your faithful and obedient servant,
J. Hely Hutchinson,
Lt.-General.

While this letter was on its way from Alexandria to General Baird's head-quarters, much was doing
with regard to the unhappy Beys, who had quitted Rosetta with Colonel Montresor the day before. In vain did Sir John Hutchinson inquire about them, in vain did he expect their arrival at his quarters: and we find General Baird in the following letter expressing fears for their security, which soon proved to be too well grounded.

Head Quarters, Indian Army, Oct. 15th, 1801.

My dear Sir,

I am highly gratified by your Excellency's very satisfactory, open, and manly letter of yesterday; believe me, Sir, I feel myself much indebted to you for the truly handsome and delicate manner in which you have all along conducted yourself towards me, and for which I must now beg leave to offer you my best and warmest acknowledgments.

It is with extreme concern I feel myself again under the necessity of addressing your Excellency respecting the disagreeable situation of the Beys. By letters I received from Colonel Montresor, dated last night, it appears clearly to me that they have been forced on board some of the Turkish ships, from their not having made their appearance, or having been heard of in your camp.

They left this with the most solemn assurances from me of protection from you. I read them your Excellency's letter on that subject, and they certainly never would have left this had I not sent Colonel Montresor with them.

On receiving the Capidan Pacha's letter on the road, they were extremely alarmed, not understanding its contents, and were extremely anxious to return, had not Colonel Montresor convinced them of the security and the propriety of their continuing their journey.
After understanding the purport of that letter, and of two others which they received at the Block-house from the Capidan Pacha, and which importuned that "he had learnt that they had placed themselves under the protection of the English; that it was not becoming to seek protection from Christians, and that it scandalized him and the Turkish Government: that whatever the English wished, would most certainly be complied with; but if they meant to come into his camp with the English, they had much better stay away; at the same time swearing by the Sultaun and the Prophet that no harm should befall them," (These are the terms of the letter, as it was interpreted to Colonel Montresor,) the Beys considered it advisable to go to the Capidan Pacha unattended by the English, and they desired Colonel Montresor to proceed, as they did not wish it to be supposed by the Pacha that they were under his protection, or that of his nation.

Colonel Montresor told them that it was for them to consider what degree of reliance might be placed on the Pacha, but he adds, that it did not appear to him that they considered the question with sufficient care or anxiety. They, however, adhered to their determination to go alone.

Colonel Montresor also acquaints me, that on his way to Alexandria he met a Mameluke with a letter from the Capidan Pacha to the Beys, desiring them to come over from the Block-house by water, for which purpose he had sent boats for them. I am therefore convinced they have been forced on board some Turkish man-of-war, and as they went entirely upon the faith of English protection, I am convinced your Excellency will take such steps as must ensure their safety.

I have the honour to be, dear Sir,
Your Excellency's faithful servant,
D. Baird.
It appears that Colonel Montresor was accompanied on this march of the Beys by Captain (now Major-General) Middlemore, and that when, after having considered all the circumstances, they had determined to cross the estuary in one of the Caidan Pacha's boats, the Colonel resolved to go with them to the other side, for his suspicion was excited as to their real destination by the size of the boat which had been sent for them, and the number of people in her, and he thought it possible the Turks might have had the intention of availing themselves of that opportunity of pulling out to sea with their unhappy victims.

The sequel proved that Colonel Montresor was in all probability right in his conjecture; however, be that as it may, he determined not to quit them until they were safely landed; and accordingly, he desired Captain Middlemore to draw up the twelve grenadiers, with the serjeant and corporal, close to the water's edge, and if he saw any scuffle in the boat on its passage, instantly to order the soldiers to fire into her, regardless of any consideration for his (Colonel Montresor's) personal safety. Nothing, however, occurred at that time, probably because the English troops were there, and the Beys and their attendants arrived safely on the opposite shore. Thus General Baird's apprehensions with respect to their fate were, luckily, unfounded at that moment, and in addition to this, Colonel Montresor, who arrived at head quarters on the evening of the 10th, report-
ed that he had seen them in the Capidan Pacha's camp that morning. Still, however, their situation was most perilous.

At this period, intelligence having arrived that General Fox had been appointed Commander-in-chief of all the forces in the Mediterranean and Egypt, General Baird resolved upon making one more effort to prevent the junction of the two armies previous to the departure of Sir John Hutchinson, who had, as it appeared, resolved to let things go on as they were, so long as he remained in the country. As General Baird's letter to General Fox contains a clear recapitulation of all the points of the case, we submit it to the reader.

Head Quarters, Indian Army, Oct. 18th, 1801.

Sir,

I take the liberty to address your Excellency on the present occasion, having understood, although not officially, that his Majesty has been pleased to appoint you Commander-in-chief of the forces serving in the Mediterranean and Egypt.

Having been specially appointed to the chief command of the army from India destined to co-operate with that from this side of the Mediterranean, in the expulsion of the French from Egypt, I left Bengal in the month of February, and after experiencing considerable fatigues and hardships, the army arrived near Rosetta on the 30th of August, when it was halted by Sir John Hutchinson, in consequence of the garrison of Alexandria having agreed to surrender.

At this period no specific orders respecting the force to
be left in Egypt had arrived from England; but his Ex-
cellency Sir John Hutchinson was pleased to communicate
to me his intention of leaving the Indian army (with the
addition of the 22nd light dragoons) under my command,
in order to garrison Alexandria.

On the 18th ult. I had the honour to learn from the
General, that in consequence of orders just received from
home, he was directed to leave in Egypt six thousand men,
exclusive of the corps from India. His Excellency was
also pleased to acquaint me with his having the option of
retaining the command, but which his health would not
permit of. That Major-General the Earl of Cavan, in
consequence of the arrangements from home, would be left
senior officer in Egypt, as Major-General Moore, who also
had the option of remaining, had availed himself of per-
mission to return to England.

Sir John Hutchinson farther informed me, that he was
directed to retain in Egypt Brigadier Generals Hope,
Stuart, and Oakes.

I did myself the honour to address his Excellency in
answer, and stated to him, that as my name did not appear
among the General officers to remain in Egypt, and as the
corps from India were actually directed to be retained, I
was naturally led to conclude that the Indian army was
meant to be kept a distinct corps under my immediate
command, but subject of course to the orders of the senior
officer in Egypt; or that it was intended that I should
return to my station in India.

I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's
perusal, the correspondence which has taken place between
Sir John Hutchinson and myself, which I have also judged
proper to communicate to Lord Cavan, together with a
copy of a letter from his Lordship to me, which will point
out to your Excellency the measures he intends to adopt
on the departure of Sir John Hutchinson.
We here insert the letter of Lord Cavan to which General Baird refers as an enclosure, in order to condense and consolidate the correspondence which, as relating to a delicate point of service, is extremely interesting. Lord Cavan's letter is dated, Camp, East of Alexandria, Oct. 15th, 1801. His Lordship says—

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I was last night honoured by the receipt of your letter of the 14th, enclosing a copy of your letter to Sir John Hutchinson, and a copy of Colonel Auchmuty's appointment and instructions from his Majesty, to act as Adjutant-General to the forces employed on an expedition to the Red Sea, and I beg leave to thank you for your obliging communication.

I hope you will pardon me for the liberty I shall take in making any observations at present upon some particular points they allude to, but from my presuming it will soon be a duty incumbent on me to consider the army under your command as under my orders, I feel myself more excusable for thus prematurely saying anything.

Before Colonel Auchmuty, or any officer, is removed to this army from any situation or employment he holds in the one under your command, I should conceive it indispensably necessary that your army should be publicly specified in general orders, as forming part of this army under the command of your senior officer; and until then I am convinced no removal will take place.

Colonel Auchmuty's authority to be Deputy-Adjutant-General, I am of opinion, under present circumstances, he might claim whenever the armies are united as one, should he think proper so to do. Evidently, the original object of his being sent to the Red Sea with the troops from the
Cape of Good Hope was, to co-operate with other troops sent from Europe by the Mediterranean, for the expulsion of the French from Egypt. That service has been well and effectually accomplished. By subsequent orders from Great Britain, the troops from India, and those he brought with him from the Cape, and which are now under your command, are directed to remain in Egypt to assist in keeping possession of it and repelling any fresh attack the enemy may make to regain it; and they further specially direct that the sepoys shall form part of the garrison of Alexandria.

From what you have represented concerning Colonel Murray, I do not see how he can with propriety be much longer detained in Egypt.*

Respecting the subsistence of his Majesty's troops that were brought from India and the Cape, I do not think it necessary at the present moment to discuss that point. It is a difficulty that I think can be removed; nor shall I at present trouble you with any ideas of how I intend locally to dispose of the troops, as I have really not formed any that are decisive. It is my intention, unless I receive orders from Europe to the contrary, not to consider the troops now under your command as forming a distinct or separate army, but as part of one army under my orders, and with only one military staff establishment.

I particularly mention my intention, as I much apprehend our ideas on the subject do not coincide; should that unfortunately be the case, I am much relieved from my consequent distress by the very handsome manner in which you express, in your letter to Sir John Hutchinson, your readiness and zeal to support and enforce such measures as

* Colonel Murray resigned the Quarter-Master-Generalship on the 16th of October, and returned to his station at Mocha, where he was Political Resident.
I may think best for the present service. These expressions tend to confirm more firmly what I was before assured of, that whenever in the present instance his Majesty's troops in Egypt are entrusted to my command, I shall derive every assistance from you, that your well-known abilities and experience can afford.

I will write again to you to-morrow, and beg you will excuse my concluding so suddenly, as I write this very early in the morning, and just before I am to meet the Capidan Pacha. I will write to-morrow to Colonel Murray and Colonel Auchmuty, but on no official business.

I remain, my dear General,

Yours very much obliged,

Cavan, Maj.-Gen.

This letter was sufficiently explicit, and rendered General Baird's immediate exertions necessary to counteract the mischief which he anticipated from the union of the armies. The General continues to General Fox as follows:—

In thus troubling your Excellency, I have to request your favourable indulgence; and I entertain a confidence that you will see the impropriety of blending the two armies together when there is no necessity for it, who are on different establishments and under different regulations.

I need not point out to your Excellency the confusion that must arise if Lord Cavan's intentions are carried into execution, which I much fear will be the case before I can receive an answer from your Excellency.

My own situation is particularly unpleasant, as it is most probable that the treasure which has been entrusted to me by the East India Company for the payment of this army, will be taken from me by an officer who is neither in
their service nor under their control, and who cannot of course be made responsible for its expenditure.

Should the Indian army be broken up, and blended with that from England, I must either retire from it, or remain in an inferior situation to that which I now hold. On the above event, therefore, taking place, I shall of course consider myself as exonerated from my responsibility and command. It is my intention to return to my station in India, unless positively ordered by Sir John Hutchinson to remain in this country, in which case I hope to be honoured with your Excellency's commands.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your Excellency's obedient servant,

D. BAIRD.

His Excellency, Lt.-Gen. Fox, Malta.

On the 20th of October, General Baird received a letter from Sir John Hutchinson, stating that he had had a relapse of his complaint, and that it would be impossible to fulfil his intention of visiting him, begging at the same time to see him at Alexandria before his departure.

In the mean while General Baird's anxiety respecting the Beys remained unmitigated, nor was it by any means groundless; for although Colonel Montresor had seen them safe in the Capidan Pacha's camp on his way back to Rosetta, their never having yet visited Sir John Hutchinson, could not fail to cause the most serious apprehensions that, if their lives had been spared, they had been deprived of their liberty.

The truth at last was ascertained. Two or three days after they had (implicitly relying upon the
faith and promises of the Capidan Pacha) surrendered themselves to his power, the Capidan Pacha proposed to them to accompany him upon a visit of ceremony which he was about to make to one of the Turkish frigates in the roads. The reliance which they placed upon this man, mingled with the awe they felt for his office and character, and which had in the first instance induced them to trust themselves to his power, led them also to agree to this proposition; and they accordingly embarked with the Capidan Pacha in one of his large boats, and pulled out to sea.

They had not proceeded far, when a lighter and faster vessel, belonging to the Capidan Pacha, was seen coming towards them in the greatest haste; it soon reached them, and a messenger in it delivered a packet to His Highness, who, upon opening it, uttered some strong expressions of surprise, and immediately declared to the Beys, that sorry as he was to do it, he must leave them, and return instantly to the camp; and for that purpose would avail himself of the swift vessel which had last come off.

At this time the Beys began to be alarmed; their suspicions were excited, and they made strong demonstrations of resistance. The Capidan Pacha quitted them, and a violent scuffle ensued in the boats, in the midst of which one of the frigates opened her guns upon it. Solyman Aga, one of the intended victims, and who is described as being of Herculean strength, seized one of the Turkish boat-
men by the collar, and held him forcibly before him, so as to make the struggling wretch a shield from the fire of the ship.

In this affair three or four of the Mamelukes lost their lives, and several others were wounded: their resistance, however, was vain, and they were eventually placed in close confinement.

While this piece of treachery was acting at Alexandria, the Grand Vizier was pursuing a course equally declaratory of his views and intentions at Cairo.

On the 23rd of October the Reis Effendi dispatched a messenger from Cairo to Colonel Ramsay, who commanded at Gizeh, desiring that if one of the Beys, Keasif Selim Diap, or any of his Mamelukes, should go to that place for protection, Colonel Ramsay would give him immediate information of it.

The same evening, as the Reis Effendi had truly anticipated, a party of the Bey's Mamelukes arrived at Gizeh, stating that they had been attacked by a party of Turks, and most barbarously treated; that the Bey himself having fortunately obtained information of their intentions, not more than an hour before they carried them into execution, had made his escape in a boat, directing his followers to hasten to Gizeh to claim the protection of the English; their families and their property they had been forced to leave at the mercy of their enemies.

Colonel Ramsay gave them the protection they sought, but in order to maintain a perfect neutrality
with the Turks, sent the Reis Effendi notice of their arrival. The next morning M. Stephano, the principal interpreter of the Porte, went to Gizeh and endeavoured to persuade the Mamelukes to go over to Cairo, and put themselves under the protection of the Grand Vizier; but this they declined, and expressed their determination of remaining where they were.

He then proceeded to question them as to the fate and destination of the Bey himself, but they declared their entire ignorance of anything concerning him, beyond the fact of his having escaped by water.

In the evening M. Stephano returned to them from Cairo, with a firman from the Grand Vizier, offering his pardon and protection to the Bey if he would give himself up; but the Mamelukes continued steadfastly to deny any knowledge of him. Stephano in this visit was accompanied by an officer of the Turkish Government, who was to take charge of the Bey if he should surrender himself, and convey him to Cairo. The officer begged to be permitted to stay at Gizeh; and as the Mamelukes evinced no unwillingness, he was allowed to do so. Colonel Ramsay made arrangements for the accommodation of the Mamelukes, who amounted in number to seventy, exclusive of the Aga and five other officers, all of whom, together with their horses, were provisioned from the garrison; the Turkish interpreter having led Colonel Ramsay to believe that his government would be at no expense whatever on their account.
On the 24th of October the Bey himself arrived at Gizeh, and, as he had advised his followers to do before, claimed protection. Colonel Ramsay granted his request, and, as he had done upon the former occasion, wrote to apprise the Reis Effendi of the fact.

In a very short time similar attempts to those which had been made upon the Mamelukes were tried upon the Bey—the interpreter and the officer endeavoured to persuade him to go to Cairo, but he strenuously refused; indeed his health was so extremely bad, that even if he had wished to avail himself of the clemency of the Grand Vizier, he would not have been able to move.

At Alexandria, however, Sir John Hutchinson took more decisive measures,—having immediately on hearing of the infamous conduct of the Capidan Pacha, peremptorily demanded and obtained the release of the surviving Beys whom he had imprisoned, he despatched the following letter addressed to the Grand Vizier, which he sent open to General Baird, with instructions to forward it immediately to Colonel Ramsay, at the same time directing that that officer should deliver it personally to the Grand Vizier, and in his interview, use the strongest possible language, and exhibit a firm determination not to be trifled with.

The following is a copy of the letter.

*Head Quarters, English Army, Alexandria, 27th October 1801.*

I have just heard with the greatest astonishment, that notwithstanding your most sacred promises, you have
caused the Beys to be arrested; that one of them has been assassinated, and that the others are your prisoners. I have frequently notified to your Highness, that the Mamelukes are under the protection of the English Government, and that I had given them the strongest assurances of their property and lives being in safety. You know then, what honour and the right of nations require of me; you have left me the choice to avenge an assassination or to become an accomplice in it. As I will not dishonour my nation in the face of the universe, nor bathe my hands in the blood of the unfortunate, I have formed my determination.

I declare to you, then, in the most explicit manner, that you must deliver up all the Beys and Mamelukes, with their baggage, effects, and families, and send them without the least delay to Gizeh, and place them under the orders of Colonel Ramsay, as he will have the disposal of them until he receives farther instructions from me.

The Capidan Pacha has already given up to me those who were in his possession. But four of the Beys, the Kiage, and two Cachiefs, have perished by the hands of assassins.

Your Highness, there is not a moment to lose; I have just reinforced the Governor of Gizeh, and General Baird is charged with the execution of my orders; be assured that I will never retract them in the smallest degree. You have heaped oaths upon oaths. You have violated them all. I supplicate God to pardon my credulity, but I will not add to it, the baseness of suffering you to enjoy the fruits of your enormous crime, and to say to indignant Europe, that you have deceived the English and massacred the Beys.

Give me up the Mamelukes—respect the rights of nations—adhere faithfully to your promises, or you will be responsible for all the unhappy events which must be the
inevitable result of your obstinately persevering in a system of conduct which has already covered you with shame and opprobrium.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration, your Highness’s most humble and most obedient servant,

J. HELY HUTCHINSON,
Commander-in-chief.

P.S. You will also have the goodness to furnish provisions and forage necessary for the subsistence of the Mamelukes and their horses. I shall persist in this demand; because it is no more than what justice requires. You have taken everything from them, it is therefore just that you support them.

The moment General Baird received this letter he forwarded it to Colonel Ramsay, together with another from himself, highly approving of that officer’s conduct under the circumstances.

General Baird also despatched the following to Sir John Hutchinson.

Head Quarters, Indian Army, near El Hamed, 28th October 1801.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency’s letter to the Grand Vizier, about three o’clock

* There perhaps never was a more striking exemplification of the absurd formulary with which public and even private letters conclude, than this before us. After having denounced the Grand Vizier as a monster capable of every crime, and having told him that his conduct had already covered him with shame and opprobrium, Sir John Hutchinson subscribes himself, with the highest consideration, his Highness’s most humble and most obedient servant.
yesterday morning, which I immediately forwarded to Colonel Ramsay for his perusal and subsequent delivery.

Should the Vizier refuse to give up the Beys, I request to know whether it is your intention that I should embark with this army for Gizeh, as it will be requisite to take immediate steps to press all boats, in order to be prepared for such an event. Most of the boats that are as yet here, have passes either from the Naval Commissary, or from the Commissariat of your army.

Application was made to me about an hour ago by the second Turkish Commandant of Rosetta, for permission to take boats sufficient for the conveyance of about 400 or 500 Turkish troops to Cairo, which I declined complying with, on account of our own probable necessity for them. I request your Excellency's orders on the subject.

The 86th Regiment embarked and sailed yesterday. I have given orders to prevent all boats passing up the river, and made a requisition to Lieutenant Smith, of the navy, who is in command of a gun-boat, to take a station in the middle of the river, in order to examine all boats coming down, in case of the Beys and Mamelukes being on board, and to stop all boats going up with troops.

The soldiers for whom the boats were required, were the same as were mentioned in a letter to me from Colonel Auchmuty, as having arrived from Rahamanie. They now say they came from Cairo to escort Mahomed Pacha thither, in the course of a few days from Alexandria; and it was but yesterday that the Turkish Commandant told me, that they were on their way to Alexandria from Rahamanie. They made a great variety of pretexts in order to get the boats, which they were most anxious to procure by my consent; and I conceive that they want the boats for more men whom they expect from Alexandria, for the men who are here, are still in the boats they came in.

I have manned the gun-boat with seamen from the regi-
ments and artillery, Lieut. Smith having represented to me that the Admiral had withdrawn all the sailors, and has ordered the boat to be sold. May I request your Excellency to have the goodness to explain this to Sir Richard Bickerton.

I have the honour to remain, dear Sir,

Your Excellency's obedient faithful servant,

D. Baird.

In reply to this letter, Sir John Hutchinson wrote as follows on the 31st of October.

My dear Sir,

I send you a letter under a flying seal to Colonel ——
I have said to that gentleman as much as he deserves.†

I beg you will express to Colonel Ramsay my strong approbation of his conduct. By his firmness he has saved the British name from indelible disgrace.

I have received a letter from the Grand Vizier, not at all satisfactory, in which he has the insolence to demand that I should deliver up the Beys now in my possession. I rather think it right that you should take immediate possession of Fort St. Julien. I leave this, however, entirely to

† This passage relates to the conduct of an officer of high rank and previously high character, connected with the negotiations between the Grand Vizier and the English Government on the subject of the Mamelukes, for which it would be almost impossible to account;—having purposely abstained from any reference to this extraordinary case, lest we might wound the feelings of any of his surviving connexions, we have expunged the passage relative to the letter of Sir John Hutchinson, which is, perhaps, the severest ever written by a general, to a field officer under his command.
your own discretion. You might do so, I suppose, in the quietest manner, and desire the Turks to go about their business. But then I would be at the gates of the fort, and ready to take possession before I took this step, otherwise they might play you a trick. You know what they are capable of as well as I do. Take the government of everything into your own hands: press all the boats you can meet with, to make every show, as if you were preparing to march upon Cairo. I fear it is impossible for at least a fortnight, as the country is still so wet.

I have ordered part of the 79th to be disembarked which were on board the Thetis, and to sail in the morning. I have gone too far to recede. My own and the national honour are committed, and I am determined to persevere.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Sir,

Your very faithful and obedient servant,

Major General Baird,
&c. &c. &c.

In order to exhibit the promptitude and readiness with which General Baird was in the habit of executing the commands of his superiors, we submit the following.

Camp near El Hamed,
November 2nd, 1801.

My dear Sir,

I received your Excellency's express at eleven o'clock A.M. and immediately forwarded by a despatch boat your letter to ———. I enclosed it to Colonel Ramsay for his transmission to that officer.

I had the honour to convey to Colonel Ramsay your Excellency's approbation of his conduct on this critical
occasion, by which he has indeed justly merited the high compliment you have been pleased to pay him.

According to your Excellency's directions, I have quietly taken full possession of Fort St. Julien. Lieutenant-Colonel Harness, with a party of the 80th, and a small detachment of artillery, are now there: they marched from camp about two o'clock this morning, and met with no opposition on entering the fort. The Turks withdrew shortly afterwards, on Colonel Harness saying he did not think there was room enough for the accommodation of all the troops.

I have to report to your Excellency, that the best guns were removed about eight days since, and that three only remain. The Turkish Commander of Rosetta, who has this moment been here, says the guns belonged to a gun-boat which had been stranded, and that he had been ordered by the Capidan Pacha to send them to Alexandria. I, however, informed him, that I understood guns had been removed from the fort which belonged to it, and desired they might be replaced.

The Commandant informed me yesterday, that the Albanians whom I formerly mentioned to your Excellency, had been ordered by the Pacha to proceed immediately to Cairo, and he begged me to allow them to proceed thither in their own boats, which I refused. He has to-day renewed his request, and I said it was quite impossible to grant it, as I required the whole of the boats at Rosetta for the removal of my army to Cairo; and I desired him to communicate my answer to the Capidan Pacha, as well as to represent to his Highness, that the orders of the officer at Fort Julien are not to suffer any boats to go up or down the river without passports, and not to permit any of the Turkish gun-boats to pass the fort. The fort is in very bad repair, but I shall put it into as decent a state as possible.
SIR DAVID BAIRD.

I shall take the management of everything within my reach agreeably to your Excellency's instructions, leaving the Turks, however, (which I presume is your intention for the present,) nominally in command, and sending my orders through them. They are now as abject and crest-fallen as they were formerly haughty and insolent.

Believe me, my dear Sir,
Your faithful and obedient servant,

D. BAIRD.

His Excellency Sir J. Hutchinson, K.B.

While this correspondence was in progress, circumstances had occurred at Gizeh since Colonel Ramsay had received Sir John Hutchinson's letter for the Grand Vizier, which induced him not to deliver it immediately, but to wait the arrival of the 86th regiment, which General Baird had informed him was marching to his support; he accordingly watched with great anxiety in the hourly expectation of its appearance. But before it reached Gizeh, he received a message from the Grand Vizier, stating, that his Highness had heard from the Capidan Pacha, that a letter had been sent to him by the Commander-in-chief, and not having received it, he was extremely anxious to know the reason of the delay.

The Grand Vizier added, that as he had some very important matters to discuss with Colonel Ramsay, he should be glad if he would come over to Cairo in the course of the day, or if that were inconvenient, that he would send over some accredited and confidential officer to whom his Highness
might make a communication. Colonel Ramsay, anxious to gain time until the arrival of the troops, promised that he would either wait upon his Highness, or send such a person as he might safely rely upon.

In the afternoon, Colonel Ramsay sent over his Brigade-Major, charged with a message to the Vizier, stating that he, the Colonel, had in his hands a letter to his Highness from Sir John Hutchinson, and that if he were not prevented by indisposition, he would do himself the honour of waiting upon his Highness the following day, and deliver it in person. The Vizier expressed his entire satisfaction at this announcement, but stated to Brigade-Major Harvey, that he understood the letter contained information, that General Baird or some other British officer of high rank, had been directed by the Commander-in-chief to come at the head of an armed force to Cairo, and demand the Beys and Mamelukes at the very door of his palace—that such a threat, and such conduct, he deprecated in the strongest terms—that he was aware that the alliance between Great Britain and the Sublime Porte was most carefully and anxiously maintained by both Governments, and that they were naturally extremely desirous to strengthen the amity and good understanding which had so long subsisted between them by every means in their power. Knowing such to be the sentiments of his own Government, he professed the sincerest desire for pacific measures and amicable discussions, and that he wished
Colonel Ramsay to let General Baird understand that he was prepared to treat upon the subject with any person duly authorized.

He added, that he was led to make these suggestions, because some of the people about him were impressed with an idea that he was about to be insulted by the English; and that if that feeling gained ground, their anger and resentment would be excited to a degree which would place them beyond his power of remonstrance or control—the consequences of a movement of that nature would be such, as he could not endure to anticipate, and for these considerations he requested Colonel Ramsay's mediation on the following day.*

Colonel Ramsay, however, declined his Highness's invitation, and sent the letter we have already mentioned by the hands of Brigade-Major Harvey, at the same time directing that officer to inform his Highness, that Colonel Ramsay would not fail to make known his Highness's views and feelings to any officer who might arrive in command of any force such as he anticipated.

* Major-General Middlemore, in one of his valuable memoranda, with which we have been favoured, observes upon this conduct of the Grand Vizier:—"The Turks were more particularly alarmed when they heard it reported that Sir John Hutchinson proposed to despatch General Baird against them, unless they came to his terms of liberating the Beys; and I sincerely think that General Baird's character as a soldier, which they had had so many opportunities of studying, awed them more effectually into submission than anything else could have done."
When the Vizier had heard Sir John Hutchinson's letter—translated to him by the Reis Effendi—he seemed more surprised than hurt by its contents—he utterly denied any knowledge of the murders with which he was charged—and said with great emotion, "This letter is exactly what the English General ought to have written to me, under the belief that I had been guilty of the crimes he speaks of—but he has been misinformed." He again entreated that Colonel Ramsay would come to him the next day.

Colonel Ramsay accordingly visited his Highness, accompanied by Brigade-Major Harvey, and a conversation of considerable length ensued, in which the Vizier went very minutely into the history of the Mamelukes from the earliest period, arguing forcibly, as he went along, that they, who were originally slaves, had gone on progressively, until they had possessed themselves of the entire revenues of Egypt, which in point of right belonged to the Turks; and that by the manifestation of feeling conveyed in Sir John Hutchinson's letter, he was placed in a situation of great delicacy and embarrassment. That he was quite of opinion, that the friendship and alliance which existed between England and the Porte should not be endangered by a question which he considered of such trifling importance as the surrender of the Beys and their followers; but that, in point of fact, their remaining with him and the Capidan Pacha was a matter of choice on their parts; that he had assembled those who were at
Cairo, and told them they were perfectly at liberty to go to Colonel Ramsay at Gizeh, according to the wishes and directions of Sir John Hutchison, and to take their families and property with them; but they had positively declined the offer, and declared their wish to stay where they were.

In confirmation of this statement, the Vizier offered Colonel Ramsay the opportunity of interrogating the Beys themselves, or of deputing his Brigade-Major to do so; Colonel Ramsay, however, having no instructions to take such a step, declined his Highness's offer, but agreed to communicate what the Vizier had said to the Commander-in-chief, and to state that he really had no means of enforcing their departure if they were determined not to quit Cairo, which he again and again repeated they were.

Whether the Grand Vizier had worked himself up into believing what he told Colonel Ramsay upon this point, it is impossible to say; but it is true that he wrote to the Grand Sultan, in the name of all the Beys at Cairo, expressing their entire satisfaction with his government and regulations, and declaring themselves to be in the actual enjoyment of his Highness's protection for their persons, families, and property.

To this general testimonial of their happiness and security, it seems, none of the unfortunate captives ventured to refuse putting their seals, although intelligence was conveyed by Ibrahim Bey to the English army, from which it appeared, that upon the occasion of a British officer visiting Cairo, the guards, who
were at all other times placed round the Beys, were removed, in order to make it appear that the movements of the prisoners were perfectly unrestrained; and that after the officer went away, the Vizier sent for him (Ibrahim Bey), and told him that the English wanted him and his Mamelukes at Gizeh, and asked him if he would go; to which, Ibrahim Bey, under the most serious apprehensions from the anger of the Vizier if he were offended, replied, that he was under the Turkish government, and had no connexion whatever with the English.

All these facts Ibrahim Bey communicated, through the Bey Selim Diap, for General Baird's information, and to prove to him that whatever accounts he might receive of the satisfaction which the Beys had expressed at their present situation, their declarations of contentment were only extorted by fear, and were in direct opposition to their real feelings; that their only trust was in God and the English; that the English had promised them protection, and that if they would only replace them in the situation in which they had found them in Upper Egypt, and when they came down to assist in driving the French out of the country, they should consider that promise honourably and completely fulfilled; for that once being reinstated in their original position, they would take care that the Turks should never again obtain any advantage over them.

The Grand Vizier, whose peculiar activity and
energy afforded powerful evidence of his anxiety with regard to the Beys, and the importance he attached to the subject of their liberation or subjection, addressed another letter to General Baird, which he sent by M. Rosetti, who, when he delivered it, was accompanied by a Turkish officer of high rank recently arrived from Constantinople.

This officer was the bearer of a basket of presents, designed for General Baird and the officers of his army, and of a letter from the Grand Vizier, begging the General to accept them. General Baird, however, told the officer that in the present position of affairs it was impossible for him to do so, adding, that it was by no means his wish either intemperately or abruptly to refuse the marks of the Grand Seignior's favour and consideration, and that therefore he begged the presents might be left, but under the seal of the officer, until he returned from Alexandria.

Upon the subject of the Beys, General Baird, (who if not quite so violent in the demonstration of his feelings as Sir John Hutchinson, was at least as fully determined to save them,) told both M. Rosetti and the Turkish officer that it was mere idleness on the part of the Vizier to talk of negociating, until, as the primary step which could alone lead to any discussion upon the subject, the Beys and the Mamelukes were released.

To this observation of General Baird the officer answered, that the case was one of peculiar delicacy, because his Britannic Majesty's ambassador at Con-
stantinople had given the sanction of his sovereign to the Grand Seignior to arrange the affair of the Beys exactly as he thought proper.

General Baird strongly demurred to this supposition; he told the officer that it was wholly out of the question that such an arrangement could have been sanctioned without either his hearing of it, or its having been communicated to Sir John Hutchinson, whose faith and promise, like his own, were solemnly pledged to these active and useful partizans.*

After the interview with the Turkish officer, M.

* Major-General Middlemore, who has previously been mentioned as having accompanied Colonel Montresor on the march with the Beys, says, in a memorandum connected with these events—"The Mamelukes universally looked up to General Baird as a man upon whom the firmest reliance could be placed. His fine manly figure and dignified manner, were quite in accordance with their tastes and chivalrous character. It is well known how much he was venerated by the noble fellows who were afterwards massacred at Alexandria; and when the poor mangled Osman Bey first saw his "friend Baird," after his escape from the slaughter of his too-confiding brethren, he held out his arms to him and burst into tears, lamenting his own folly in ever separating from his noble protector.

"There was," continues General Middlemore, speaking of General Baird, "something about him which gave at once complete confidence in him: his countenance bespoke a mind spotless from guile or subterfuge; you felt that truth beamed in all his features—it was impossible to doubt him—you might implicitly place your life, and honour, and happiness, on his bare word; he could not deceive; and as he was firm and inflexible upon every point of discipline and duty, so was he incapable of injuring a human being—with the courage of a hero, his heart was as kind and gentle as a woman's."

Rosetti informed General Baird, in a private conference, that he was the bearer of one of those letters, to which the Vizier contrived to obtain the seals and signatures of the Beys, expressive of their readiness to obey the order of the Grand Seignior and proceed to Constantinople, if they had the permission of the English Commander-in-chief—that they acknowledged themselves subjects of the Sublime Porte, and that they only desired to submit themselves to the will of their illustrious master.

This letter was intended for Sir John Hutchinson, but M. Rosetti told General Baird that the Beys had begged him to explain to the General that in this, as in all the other cases, they had been compelled to sign the letter, and that, so far from acknowledging the government of the Grand Seignior, or wishing to proceed to Constantinople, they still entirely relied upon the English for protection for themselves and their families. Thus enlightened, General Baird sent forward M. Rosetti to Sir John Hutchinson, having previously despatched an express to explain to his Excellency the real nature and value of the testimonial of which M. Rosetti was the bearer, which might reach Alexandria before that gentleman's arrival there.

Whatever might have been Sir John Hutchinson's feelings and anxiety with respect to the unhappy objects of General Baird's unceasing solicitude, they were neither likely to be known nor to be productive of any very powerful effect, for in consequence of increasing debility it appeared that Sir John
Hutchinson had embarked on board His Majesty's ship L'Egyptienne on, the morning of the 6th of November, long before the arrival of M. Rosetti or of the letters before him, having the evening before that, resigned the command of the whole army to Lord Cavan.

END OF VOLUME I.