a post at Ghennah, and, if possible, another in the Desert between that place and Cosseir, in order to insure his communication between the sea and the Nile. At Ghennah, he should make the depot of his stores, &c. which might be brought across the Desert by degrees, and then he might commence his operations against the enemy.

In the consideration of the question regarding the crossing of the Desert, I have omitted to mention the interruption which may be given to that operation by the enemy, because it is entirely distinct from the difficulties which are peculiar to the operation itself. It is obvious, however, that if the Mamelukes are not on our side, and if they should not have driven out of Upper Egypt the small French force supposed to be in that country, before the operation is attempted, that force, however small, will greatly increase the distress of the British troops who will cross the Desert.

I have not adverted to the supply of arms and ammunition to be given to the natives. As long as their co-operation is doubtful, these supplies ought to be withheld, but promised; when they will have shewn their sincerity in our cause, the arms may be given to almost any extent.

A. W.

Considering the place which its illustrious writer fills in the world, this paper is both curious and interesting. As it turned out, however, General Baird's plans were arranged, and all his measures taken long before it reached him. Indeed, the advantages he possessed, derived from local knowledge, were of a nature to gain no improvement by advice, however ably and distinctly given at a distance from the scene of operation.
Colonel Wellesley's anxiety with respect to the success of the expedition, appears to have been unmitigated by the indisposition which prevented his sharing its perils and its honours. He availed himself of another delay in the sailing of the ships, again to write to General Baird, and the following closes the series of letters which he despatched by the Wasp.

_My dear General,_

The detention of the ships till this morning has given me an opportunity of sending you a farther report on the provisions sent from hence. You will observe from that report, that Major Bell has a tolerably large quantity of provisions, besides what he brought here. Allowance ought also to be made for about one hundred and fifty natives, taken out and drafted from the Rockingham, which of course leaves a larger share of provisions for those who remain.

I am sorry to tell you, that the Dundas and the Nelson are so small, and have so little capacity to hold provisions and water, that there is not a supply of the latter for more than four months on board of each of those ships. The Morad Bey, however, has provisions and water for six months, as indeed have the two others a supply of provisions for the same time.

Believe me, my dear General,

_Yours most sincerely,_

Major General Baird.

Arthur Wellesley.

I must inform you, that none of the ships have their full quantity of rice; the reason is, that rice is scarce at Bombay, and as I knew there was in the fleet about 10,000 bags of rice, I did not wish to press to have a large quantity taken hence.
The day after the arrival of the Wasp, General Baird sent off a despatch to Marquess Wellesley, expressive of his regret at being deprived of the valuable services and advice of his lordship's brother; at the same time stating, that he felt more sanguine of success than he had for the last few days. In that despatch he refers the Marquess to the numerous details of distress and difficulties contained in various letters which he was daily receiving from the officers in command of divisions and corps in advance; but his hopes were cherished in consequence of the almost unvaried success of his expedient of digging for water, wherever a probability of finding it existed.

In this despatch the General reiterates the high opinion he had previously expressed of the zeal and ability of Sir Home Popham, from whom we believe, just before his departure, he had received the following observations with respect to the Nile, on which it was General Baird's intention to embark the army, as soon as it had crossed the Desert. The information contained in this document is curious, and as it may afford serviceable information at some future period, we give it as we find it; more especially as it is calculated, whatever other advantages may be derivable from it, to illustrate the manifold difficulties which combined to assail the General on every side, and the caution, prudence, and resolution which it required to combat, and as it proved, overcome a combination of opposing obstacles to the attainment of his object.
"The accounts of the winds and currents of the Nile," says this paper, "vary so very materially, that it is impossible to calculate the precise time it will require for the army to move from Cosseir to Cairo; but taking for granted that this monsoon prevails there, which is the rising of the Nile, boats will have a favourable current, but a strong wind to contend against, and will in all probability require twenty days from Ghennah to Cairo. If, after their service can be dispensed with at Cairo, they should be enabled to sail during this monsoon from Cairo to Ghennah, they may make the passage in eight days; but if they are delayed till the ensuing monsoon sets in, it will take them in all probability twenty-eight days to accomplish their voyage. This applies to the water conveyance of the Nile; but if that is not to be procured, a calculation must be made of the march, which can certainly be done by information from the most intelligent Arabs; and from what I have learnt on the subject, it will require thirty-five days to go from Ghennah to Cairo. Wishing to ascertain as nearly as possible the time necessary to move the troops from Cosseir to Cairo and to return, I have taken these different suppositions as so many data from which I shall endeavour to produce the object of enquiry; and after hearing General Baird's views subsequent to his reading this paper, I shall be better enabled to make arrangements for the future conduct of the fleet.

"Taking the quickest and most dilatory passage, as well as the mean passage, it is evident that the army cannot reach Cairo in less than twenty-nine days; and if, on their arrival, there is no occasion for their services, they must halt several days less probably, if they can procure boats, than if obliged to march; but in any case it is fair to give a week for the arrangements it will be necessary to make; and this, with the fifty-eight days to go and return will
make sixty-five.* And from what I see at present, it will be impossible for the army to quit this in toto till about this day week, probably later, which will bring their return to Cosseir to the beginning of September, without calculating on the casualties of delay to which an army in such a route must certainly be liable. The embarkation of them and their stores will also take some time, and bring the complete embarkation towards the middle of September, if it were possible for the ships to remain here so long.

"It is possible there may be some error in the theory of this calculation, as it is deduced entirely from information, and not from practical experience; but I dare say it is sufficiently correct to enable a judgment to be formed on the expediency of moving the troops from Cosseir when Admiral Blanket arrives, who is in possession of every information relative to the precise situation of General Hutchinson's army before Cairo. There will be then two bases to consider the embarkation of the army at Cosseir, its future operations, and the disposition of the men-of-war and transports in case the army moves forward. I shall at present confine myself to the latter case, as the other can easily be decided on, when circumstances make it necessary to take it into consideration.

* To Ghennah . . . . . . . . . 8 days
March to Cairo . . . . . . . . 35
Return—Cairo to Ghennah . . . 8
To Kosseir . . . . . . . . . . 8

Mean journey . . . . . . . days 29½
Kosseir to Ghennah . . . . . . . 8
Ghennah by the Nile with this monsoon 20

Days 28
"The position of the ships in the present monsoon, and the situation of this bay in the ensuing one, are points of infinite moment and importance; and I am decidedly of opinion, that if the weather continues to blow as it has done for the last twenty-four hours, in three weeks not one-third of the ships will have an anchor or cable left. Two ships parted yesterday, and the Romney's second cable is very much chafed, and I think in the course of a month her cables will be so much strained, that it will be imprudent for her to go on either coast till the monsoon abates.

"This is a consideration in the present monsoon; but when the south-east one sets in, the road will be much more dangerous, and if it blows as hard as it does at present, lying here will be totally impracticable; indeed, if it should fly suddenly round to the south-east, or if we should have an easterly squall, I think most of the ships would be lost.

"The south-east monsoon is fairly set-in in September, and the Company never suffer their ships to remain at Suez after the 10th of August.

"From this it is evident, that if the army moves to Cairo, it cannot be re-embarked at Cosseir on account of the monsoon, consequently it will be necessary to consider how to dispose of the ships to the best advantage, consistently with the subsequent services in agitation for the army, the want of equipment in the different ships, and the provisions and supplies which will be at that time absolutely requisite for the army in its future operations.

"If it is determined to move the army to Cairo, they must return by Suez; and in that case, I see little probability of being able to carry on any further enterprise this year; but, certainly, advantage may be taken of the earliest time in the ensuing year, to prosecute the different objects pointed out by the Governor-General.

"By the journals I am in possession of, I think it possible for ships to beat down from Suez in December; the months
of September, October, and November, being the most violent for the southerly monsoon. But although I say the ships will be able to beat down in December, I do not mean that they should absolutely remain below till that month; on the contrary, I should propose, that the moment the decision is made to move the army to Cairo, the ships (except two or three to contain all the provisions now remaining, and two or three small cruisers which may move to Suez as soon as the monsoon abates,) should proceed to Bombay and Calcutta, and respectively quit those places in the month of August, with a complete and regular supply of every thing which may be necessary for the army, and such reinforcements as the Governor-General may think proper to send.

The ships in this case will be at Suez by the end of September at the very latest, ready to supply the army with every thing it may want, and to take the earliest advantage of the abating of the monsoon, or its becoming sufficiently variable to allow the ships to proceed downwards, and commence their future operations.

The troops, if they move to Cairo, and have any service to perform, if General Hutchinson thinks their presence necessary for a short time to give respectability to his force, cannot in that case well be at Suez till September, and if they are obliged to remain a short time for the transports, they will suffer little inconvenience from the climate at that season, and they will be plentifully supplied with provisions.

Every argument urges the necessity of ordering the transports to Bombay and Bengal, if the troops move to Cairo; and no time ought to be lost in that respect in order to ensure their speedier return to Suez.

What I have already said has reference more immediately to the army at Cosseir, as it is generally presumed to be morally impossible for the ships with the last division to
get up from Mocha; and, indeed, doubts arise in my mind whether the remainder of the ships at Jeddah will be able to accomplish this object. It however becomes proper to consider how far it may be expedient to negotiate or enforce a landing of the troops at Mocha, as essential to their health, or to move them to Aden; in either case the ships will naturally attend upon them; and I do not think it absolutely necessary, on second consideration, for all the ships in Cosseir Roads to go to India; only a proportion to bring provisions and stores, and such reinforcements as General Baird conceives the Governor-General may be inclined to send him. But the whole of the ships should be moved as soon as practicable, to some harbour, probably Jeddah, to save their anchors and cables, and be ready to proceed to Suez when the monsoon abates, laden with bullocks and such other articles as the army may require, and the place produce.

"It is hardly necessary to say, that Le Sensible has but three weeks' salt provisions for her own complement, and not a biscuit on board.

"The Romney has about seven weeks' salt provisions, and three weeks' bread. The latter article can be obtained, or expedients devised in lieu of it, at least for a short time.

"As I have before observed, it is not my intention to say any thing at present on the subsequent operations, till it is determined to embark the army, and not go to Cairo, when I may probably trouble General Baird with my ideas on that head. The present ones have been written in vast haste, hurried probably a little by the weather last night, though it has been my intention, as well as it is my duty, as soon as I became a little acquainted with the subject."

On the 30th of June, General Baird quitted Kossier, and on the 1st of July took up his head quarters at Moilah, determined to move the army
with all possible expedition, having for that purpose entered into a negotiation, the object of which was, that the camels, as soon as they arrived at Ghennah, should return direct to Kossier, without being stopped at any intermediate station.

A description of the march is given in a letter from Colonel Auchmuty, the Adjutant-General, to Colonel Montresor, dated Moilah, July 2nd, 1801. He says:—

The 10th marched from Moilah Wells, about five miles in front of Moilah, last night; and the artillery from hence to the wells this morning.

The 10th were met with by Lieutenant Warden, the Commissary of Stores, suffering greatly, and getting on badly. We are certainly in a sad scrape. We can hardly get forward or go back, and the prospect does not brighten; but we must not despair. Among many causes of uneasiness, is not hearing from Hutchinson. The General is much alarmed at it, and his plan now is, to push everything forward on the road to Ghennah, collect all the camels we can muster, (and I fear we shall not muster many,) and send them back to Kossier until we get a letter—we must then finally decide.

In the mean time you must continue your preparations; order the cavalry to send aboard their painted cloths which are too weighty for their horses, order twelve camel loads of rice to Moilah; the camels to deposit their rice, and then to push forward with two Bengal companies to Ghennah.

These extracts will serve to shew the state of the expedition, which was traversing the sea of sand under the rays of the fiercest sun.
On the evening of the 3rd, the General removed from Moilah Wells, and reached Legeta, a distance of forty-one miles, on the 5th; and on the 6th, he arrived at Ghennah. Colonel Auchmuty describes Ghennah as being in some degree cultivated, that it produced figs and peaches, in which, together with "copious draughts" from the Nile, the nearly exhausted troops indulged themselves, full of gratitude to Heaven for the alleviation of their miseries.

There are some details given by the Count de Noé, in his work already quoted, which, as the narrative of the progress of the army given in this memoir is purely official, may be advantageously brought to the notice of the reader, as having been recorded by an officer whose duties did not interfere with the task of keeping a journal of the march, and from whose notes may be derived a fair and faithful account of the difficulties which he in common with the rest of the army was destined to undergo.

The Count de Noé, who, as we have already stated, held a lieutenant's commission in the English 10th regiment of foot, marched with his corps in the division under Colonel Beresford.

"At four o'clock in the afternoon," he tells us in his narrative, "we began to move from Kosseir; and at two o'clock on the following morning arrived at the first springs, sixteen miles from that place. During the whole of this dreary progress, not the smallest trace of vegetation was visible. It was only when we reached the station where the springs were, that we saw a few straggling stumps of
a plant, the leaves of which were round, and highly aromatic, resembling in appearance pieces of grey velvet. The water, without being exactly good," says the Count, "was better than that which we had left at Kosseir. We established ourselves in the valley, and rested ourselves under a steep and rugged rock, at the foot of which the springs were situated.

"Some of our rear-guard who had straggled, were obliged to increase their rate of marching, in order to come up with us; and to effect this object, they had ventured to brave the scorching rays of the sun, and all the miseries of excessive thirst. They at length rejoined us, but so exhausted by fatigue, that one of the party actually died in my tent soon after his arrival. We buried him at the foot of the rock.

"At this place we made a melancholy discovery; one of our officers having thought proper to climb up the side of the rock, was shocked by the sight of the corpses of five or six English marines, which the sun had completely dried up. They no doubt had belonged to His Majesty's frigate Fox, which had some time before landed some men at Kosseir; and, as we have already stated, received a very warm reception from the French.

"General Baird," continues the Count de Noé, "came to pay us a visit at this place, and told us that Colonel Beresford was in want of provisions and water. We immediately despatched as much of both as we could possibly spare, and sent them forward notwithstanding that our own stock was by no means abundant. The springs were nearly dry, and we were obliged frequently to wait till nature replenished them. In the midst of the suffocating heat, only two bottles and a half of water per man, per diem, could be spared. But our comrades at Moilah were in absolute want, and we did not pause for a moment to calculate the probability of any distress which might arise to ourselves,
but gave them all we could spare. Amongst the expe-
dients which it occurred to me to try in order if not to
quench, at least to allay my thirst, was that of carrying a
small pebble in my mouth, which kept my tongue moist,
and very materially alleviated the distress of the march."

This expedient was found so successful, that it
was adopted throughout the English army, by order
of General Baird.

Count de Noé proceeds to describe the difficulties
they had to contend with, and the painful effects
produced on their sight by the drifts of sand, and
the powerful reflection of the sun upon it, and attri-
butes the most beneficial properties to tea, the tonic
qualities of which, while its grateful flavour overcame
the bad taste of the water, he seems to think were
highly conducive to strengthening the system against
the deleterious attacks of the heat. Indeed, he
declares it to be the very best beverage that can be
used in crossing the Desert.*

It was on the 9th of July, that General Baird,
growing daily more uneasy at not hearing direct
from General Hutchinson, and still keeping in view
the object for which the expedition had first been

* The sufferers from Ophthalmia have been so numerous,
that it may not be unserviceable to observe that the Count de
Noé states, that at the time when all his brother soldiers were
labouring under the most violent attacks of that dreadful com-
plaint, he never felt the slightest disorder in his eyes; a circum-
stance which he attributes with great probability to a precau-
tion which he adopted of covering his face during the march,
with a piece of green gauze, in the manner of a veil."
formed, addressed a letter to His Royal Highness the Duke of York, expressive of his anxiety to know whether his continuance in Egypt was likely to be productive of any beneficial results to the service; his natural solicitude for instructions being considerably increased by the fact, that so very much depended upon the period of the monsoon, whether he should be enabled (if he were not required to stay and co-operate in Egypt) to secure his return to India in time to carry into effect his other contemplated and favourite enterprise against Mauritius and Batavia.

General Baird, though disappointed and much disturbed by the long delay which occurred in receiving despatches, took every necessary precaution under existing circumstances; and although in consequence of his confident expectation of having free communication with Hutchinson, he had, as it were, cut off the retreat of his own advanced corps by sending back the camels to bring up the troops who were in the rear, his resources did not fail him; and finding the country as he advanced much better calculated for defence than he had anticipated, he made every arrangement that the nature of the ground admitted, to establish himself in force at Ghennah, so that, if any misadventure had befallen General Hutchinson (which his silence gave very plausible grounds for imagining), he should be able to oppose the enemy if they attempted to land a reinforcement at Alexandria.

In this state of perplexing suspense did General
Baird remain; day passed after day, and not a line from the General in command, by which he could form the slightest opinion of the actual state of affairs, till at length he received a letter from Admiral Blankett, containing a copy of a letter written to him by Major Holloway, in which he gave the Admiral the very important intelligence, that the Governor of Cairo, not thinking it prudent to make any resistance to the combined armies, had entered into a treaty with General Hutchinson.

The moment General Baird received, by this very circuitous route, intelligence so vitally important to the interests of his army, he was convinced that there could be no longer any cause for his farther advance, and still less for bringing up any more troops; on the contrary, feeling assured that their presence must be perfectly useless, he directed every preparation to be made for their return and re-embarkation at Kossier, although he did not think proper to begin to fall back until he had obtained something more official and satisfactory than a letter written by one officer to another, having received a copy even of that, at second hand.

Accordingly, he despatched an aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Budgeon, down the Nile to Colonel Murray, in order to ascertain from that officer whether it was not possible to open a direct communication with General Hutchinson, through which, even late as it must now inevitably be, he might receive something like authenticated information, and specific instructions. The only active measure General Baird took,
upon the strength of the news he had received, was that of discontinuing the entertainment of the Turks and Arabs, whom he had taken into his pay, and ordering them to be distributed in their respective neighbourhoods.

At last, however, the long-expected despatch arrived, the contents of which immediately decided General Baird's future proceedings. The following letter from General Hutchinson, dated the 10th, which is a reply to the despatch forwarded by General Baird to him by the hands of Lieutenant Budgeon, contains a full account of his proceedings and wishes, and is therefore given instead of that of the 5th, to avoid needless repetition.

*Cairo, July 10th, 1800.*

SIR,

I have this morning received your communication by Lieutenant Burdon,† who deserves much credit for the diligence he has made use of. I have written to you frequently; I did not inform you of the surrender of Cairo, because from my letters I concluded that you were then marching towards me, and I did not think it advisable to stop your march, for two reasons—because I doubted the sincerity of the French, and, though the capture of Cairo may be an event decisive of the fate of Egypt, yet still I could not think myself justified in giving you orders which might be contradictory to the instructions of the Government; indeed, every thing that related to you, tended to embarrass me in a most extraordinary degree.

* General Hutchinson's letter is so dated by mistake for 1801.
† *Sic orig.*; the officer's name was Budgeon.
Before your arrival, we had nothing but an unauthenticated rumour of a force coming from India, which Sir Ralph himself did not believe; consequently I could not have any idea of your force, or of the time when you were likely to arrive. Your second destination was a matter of which I had never heard, and indeed, when you mentioned it in cypher, I was incapable of comprehending it, as I do not possess the key.

Lord Hobart's despatch, though he says but very little, has put the matter out of doubt, and it is clearly intended that you should march into the interior of Egypt, as it is specified that the sepoys are to compose part of the garrison of Alexandria. I should rather suppose, from the terms in which the letter is couched, that the remainder of the troops are destined for another service; but this is rather conjecture than otherwise, though I have little doubt that I am founded in my opinion, provided the siege of Alexandria should not take up too much time.

Menou has refused to receive the French officer who was sent by General Belliard to lay before him the capitulation of Cairo, of which his garrison might have availed themselves, as it is so stipulated by an express article of the treaty. He is likely to defend himself with great obstinacy, and certainly may give us a great deal of trouble. I should be extremely glad, therefore, to have your able assistance and co-operation. I am thoroughly aware, that from the season, and from the inundation, the march by land will be impracticable. You must do all you can to collect boats, but whether you should use force or not, is entirely out of the question, because, for the last thousand years force has been the only law in this country, and the inhabitants are so little used to think for themselves, that they are at a great loss how to act when it is not adopted against them.

Upon my part, I will do every thing in my power to
procure you boats, and have given Colonel Stewart, Commandant of Giza, directions upon this subject—but there are great difficulties in our way. We were obliged to furnish three hundred to transport the French baggage and sick; the Turks have seized on an immense number; our Commissariat and artillery occupy not a few. Upon this subject you had better apply to Osman Bey Perdicci; he knows the country, and I think will be active and diligent. There is a Frenchman with him, in whom I think you may place some kind of confidence.

In my last letter I gave you some intelligence of what was going on in the ports of France and Spain. They certainly have a great expedition in view, probably against Egypt; a reinforcement of six thousand men is ordered out to us, part of which is already arrived, and I have no doubt of receiving the whole in the course of ten days. The Government at home attaches at least as much importance to Egypt as it deserves—they appear to have set their hearts upon it, and are determined not to be foiled. I should wish you to advance as soon as you conveniently can, without pressing or fatiguing your troops. You may march by detachments; and let them be ever so small there can be no risk in making your general rendezvous at Giza, which I have occupied entirely for your convenience. You have only to intimate your wishes to Colonel Stewart, and every thing will be procured for you that this country affords.

The army marched yesterday, and will arrive at Rosetta about the 29th. From thence I shall proceed, without loss of time, to besiege Alexandria. I wrote you a letter, dated the 2nd or 3rd of this month, but it was detained for several days, and could not have reached you in course. The conveyance in this country is very uncertain; it is often tardy, and frequently never reaches the place of its destination at all. I have sometimes received your first,
second, and third copy at the same moment, and from the same messenger. Your last letter was three weeks on the road. I should recommend you either to send forward your Quarter-Master-General, or one of his department, to make preparations for you at Gizeh. I thank you very much for your offer of money, but we have no occasion for it, as we have received lately upwards of two hundred thousand pounds from England.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. HELY HUTCHINSON,
Lieut.-Gen.

The moment that General Baird was satisfied of General Hutchinson's wish that he should join him, and that a new prospect of active service opened upon his view, he proceeded instantly to push forward the troops, who were already in advance, and to bring up as rapidly as possible those who were in the rear.*

He directed Colonel Montresor, to whom he had entrusted the arrangements for moving the army,

* The route from Kossier to Ghennah is thus officially stated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kossier to the New Wells</td>
<td>11 miles. Water may be had.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half-way to Moilah</td>
<td>17 — No water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moilah</td>
<td>17 — Water and provisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Wells</td>
<td>9 — Water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half-way to Legeta</td>
<td>19 — No Water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legeta</td>
<td>19 — Water and provisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baromba</td>
<td>18 — Water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghennah</td>
<td>10 — The Nile.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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to put them in motion without loss of time, having assured himself of their being well provisioned, not only from Kossier but from the depôts which he had established on the Desert; by having concentrated an adequate supply of camels for the carriage of water, by having had the muzzacks repaired, and by having opened more wells in various places along the route. By thus taking advantage of the experience he had painfully acquired, he provided the means of saving his followers much of the toil and fatigue which he had himself undergone, and at the same time accelerated their progress in a manner most conducive to his own views, for the good of the service, and most in accordance with the wishes of General Hutchinson.
CHAPTER XVIII.


GENERAL BAIRD's mind being now freed from all anxiety, but that of proceeding, and all responsibility, except such as attached to the expeditious accomplishment of General Hutchinson's wishes, it might be supposed that he was destined to carry on the preparations for doing so, without any new accession of annoyances; but the difficulty of communication with General Hutchinson, the uncertainty of the conveyance and receipt of his letters, kept him in a continued state of anxiety.

On the other hand, it must be confessed, that in addition to the advantages so surely derivable from the system he had adopted, founded upon experience...
and practical knowledge, he received great encouragement in his enterprise from the friendly disposition of the principal inhabitants of Upper Egypt, who exhibited every inclination to assist the army in its progress; but this apparent friendship was greatly deteriorated by an instability and carelessness of obligations quite natural, perhaps, in narrow minds, ignorant of the world, and under the domination of a Government corrupt in itself, and either unwilling or unable to correct corruption in its subjects. In promises, these people were as liberal as Portuguese politicians, but the just fulfilment of those promises, it was soon ascertained, depended very considerably upon the effect it would have upon their personal interests; and not unfrequently upon the possibility of their being able to do, what in fact, and in spite of their large professions, they never had it in their power to effect.*

* The liberality of profession on the part of the natives may be tolerably well appreciated by the following letter, addressed to General Baird on his arrival at Ghennah, by the Capidan Pacha.

"His Highness Hussein Capidan Pacha, &c. &c. &c. to his friend General Baird, commanding a Corps of British Troops.

"Having learnt that you are happily arrived at Ghennah with the troops under your command, and desiring nothing so much as to provide for the repose and welfare of British troops, we have selected Osman Bey Perdicci, (a Prince of Cairo, and who will join you with all expedition,) and have charged him with firmans, and orders written in Arabic, to facilitate the requisition and procuring of provisions and other necessaries, of
But although affairs looked thus prosperously, and the greater part of General Baird's army had succeeded in struggling across the burning sands of the Desert, with the loss of only three men, between Kossier and Ghennah, there were difficulties of another kind now threatening them in their front. The Nile had, during the last few days, risen so considerably, that the intention of marching by its bank, (a circumstance which, it must be evident, was of the greatest importance, inasmuch as upon which you may be in want during your march, and when you halt. We therefore hope, that on his joining you, you will begin your march and proceed to us with as little delay as possible.

"With respect to us, having in concert with the English troops, our companions, and our dear friend General Hutchinson, and his Highness the Grand Vizier, laid siege to the City of Cairo, to Barlak and Gizeh, and having had some actions, the besieged, convinced that they ought not to resist our combined force, have offered to evacuate Cairo and its dependencies at the end of twelve days, on condition of being sent back to France with their arms and baggage, and they have begun by giving us possession of a fort, and one of the fortresses of Gizeh.

"As we proceed in fulfilling the terms agreed on, the French are employed in transporting their effects from Cairo to Gizeh, and on the Wednesday next of this present month, we shall take possession, God being willing, of the city and the different works that surround it.

"This letter is written in great haste, and hurried off for the purpose of communicating the above intelligence to you.

"Head Quarters of His Highness Hussein Capidan Pacha,

"Before Gizeh, 28th Saphar, 1216."

(Corresponding to 9th July, 1801.)

2 B 2
that route the essential difficulty of carrying water for the army would have been entirely obviated,) was necessarily abandoned.

This interruption to the arrangements of the General had been, as it will be seen, anticipated by General Hutchinson, who appears by his letter to have considered a march by the inland route out of the question; although dreadful as it appeared to him, and would appear to any one acquainted with the dreary waste of sand which it presented, that course was, in many respects, infinitely preferable to the trials which the same brave troops had already overcome.

General Baird, however, decided upon trying every possible means of conveying the army to Cairo by water; and besides forwarding a despatch to General Hutchinson, begging him to send him as many boats as he could procure, he adopted the General's plan of taking by force all those, which, notwithstanding their protestations of friendship, the natives would not voluntarily grant the use of, and sent out parties in various directions to press whatever vessels they could meet with. This measure was rendered absolutely necessary, not only by the importance of the object in view, but by the great demand for boats at this particular season of the year.

But with all his exertions, General Baird never, from the first, anticipated that he should be able to convey the whole army by the river. On the contrary, he was fully convinced that the means upon which, at the very best, he could calculate, would be
wholly inadequate to the purpose; he, therefore, determined to send the principal part of his guns and stores by water, and as many of the men as were least able to bear the fatigues of a land march as could be accommodated in boats, taking the best men, the cattle, and the remainder of the stores by the inland route; leaving a battalion of Bombay troops in Kossier and on the Desert, and another battalion at Ghennah, so as to keep up an easy and certain communication with the ships at the former place; in order the more effectually to do which, he caused the fort at Ghennah, which the French had (after having built it) dismantled, to undergo such repair as might render it serviceable.

Nothing could exceed the prudence and activity of the General, surrounded as he was by difficulties, and having only a variety of evils to choose from. If he delayed his departure from Ghennah, until he could receive an answer to his application from General Hutchinson, and ascertain from him what number of boats he might be able to send him, and if that number should prove insufficient, he would lose the possibility of using any part of the road along the bank of the Nile; whereas if he proceeded immediately to embark his forces in the boats, of which he was certain, it was evident that the greater proportion of the troops would be compelled to march for a very considerable part of the way by the inland route at all events.*

* The Nile, swelled by the rains which fall in Abyssinia, begins to rise in Egypt about the month of May, but the in-
About this period the General was reinforced by the arrival at Kossier, of four companies of the 61st regiment, Colonel Ramsay and two companies of the 80th, the horse artillery from Bengal, and the artillery and pioneers from Madras; but this addition to his gallant little army brought with it much mortification. The Susannah (the ship in which Colonel Wellesley was to have sailed) was lost on the passage, and the Rockingham, another of the store-ships, unfortunately had struck and was forced to remain at Jeddah. The Rockingham struck at eight o'clock in the evening of June 8th, 1801, upon a shoal which now bears her name; it lies eleven leagues from the Arabian shore, and has other shoals between it and the coast, and more dangers to the northward; the south part of the shoal is in lat. 20° 16' W. and lon. 39° 39' E. The coast of Cape Ibrahím, opposite to the shoal,

crease is inconsiderable until towards the end of June, when it is proclaimed by a public crier in the streets of Cairo, about the time it has usually risen five or six cubits; and when it has risen to sixteen, great rejoicings are made, and the people cry Waffah Allah! — that is, "God has given them abundance." This commonly takes place about the latter end of July, or at farthest before the middle of August, and the earlier it occurs, the greater the hopes of a good crop. In the year 1705, it did not swell to sixteen cubits, and the consequence was a general pestilence and famine.

In order to secure the advantage derivable from this irrigation, canals are cut at right angles with the river, which convey the water to places remote from its banks. Almost every town and village has one of these canals.
appears by the observations of the Rockingham, to be about 1° 50' west from Gebel Tor.

To these mortifications were added, the protracted absence of Colonel Champagné, who was expected from Goa, and that of the provision ships long due from Bengal; while in minor matters, the General found himself contravened and inconvenienced by the friendly Mehemed Ali Khan, who had been making very extensive purchases of camels and horses, on account of the English army. He had made these purchases from the Sherriff, who would not permit anybody except himself to deal with him, and accordingly had sold him beasts of such a description, that out of one troop of forty-nine horses, which arrived in a dow, ten only were serviceable; and although he had spared him five hundred camels at his own price, of the first fifty which were delivered, seventeen only were alive, and of those seventeen not one was capable of doing any work.

We mention these circumstances, not as exhibiting any very serious obstacle to the completion of the great design of General Baird, but to show how constantly and how variously employed the mind of that man must have been, who, in addition to all the ordinary details of an extensive expedition, had to contend with difficulties of a nature which nothing but actual experience and practical knowledge could have rendered him adequate to encounter and overcome.

On the 24th of July, General Baird ordered Co-
lonel Quarrill with the 10th regiment to Girjee with all possible expedition. At that place, or coming from it, Colonel Quarrill was to meet Colonel Murray returning to command at Ghennah during the advance of the army, in company with Osman Bey, who had instructions to supply the troops during their march with provisions, according to the promise contained in the Captain Pacha's letter to General Baird; and who brought his orders for the supply of the army with meat, bread, salt, grain, and all other articles of provision from the different towns and villages.

A letter received by General Baird about this period from General Hutchinson, will serve to throw a little light on the character of this Osman Bey, and the carefulness and fidelity with which he executed the trust reposed in him, as well as the activity of his exertions in forwarding the service, the success of which, so materially depended upon the rapid and constant communication between the two Generals.

To Major-General Baird.

Head Quarters, Camp near Gizeh, July 13th 1801.

SIR,

I received your letters of the 22nd of June only three days ago, as they were near three weeks coming. The delay has been very vexatious, but, however, there is no relying on an Arab, or even on a Mameluke. Osman Bey Perdicci, kept my last letter for you, five days, and then lost it! The accounts you give of your own proceedings are very afflicting. I was always apprehensive that European troops would find difficulties almost insurmountable in passing the Desert.
SIR DAVID BAIRD.

I yesterday received despatches from Lord Hobart, dated the 19th of May. From their contents I am led to imagine, that should you not be able to penetrate into the lower part of Egypt, and form a junction with me, it will be a great disappointment.

In my last letter to you, I expressed some doubts about bringing the sepoys forward, but from a paragraph in his Lordship's letter, it has now become absolutely necessary, as he expresses a wish that they should be left in garrison at Alexandria; and provided that it is not inconsistent with any stipulations entered into with them, I am directed to leave them as part of that garrison, whenever it shall fall into our hands.

I tell you this and what follows in the utmost confidence. There are six thousand men to arrive immediately from Europe, and after the final departure of the French from this country, we are ordered to rendezvous at Malta, there to wait for further instructions. I have no doubt, from the tone and tenor of the letter, that it is meant to employ the remainder of this army on some other service. I do not think of leaving above four thousand men behind in Egypt, so that I hope there will remain a considerable body of disposable troops. Should you not be able, however, to approach us, our calculation on the subject will be miserably defective.

We move from this the day after to-morrow, (15th July,) and shall reach Rosetta about the 29th or 30th. I leave six hundred men, under Colonel Stewart, as a garrison for Gizeh. You had better communicate with him as frequently as you can. I shall direct him to do the same by you.

I hear of nothing of any great importance. I am to congratulate you on succeeding to the command of the 1st battalion of the 54th regiment, by the death of General Frederick. Major-General Cradock has got the 2nd bat-
talion. His Majesty has been pleased to appoint me to the chief command of the troops in Egypt, with the rank of Lieutenant-General in the Mediterranean.

I have the honour to be with respect and regard, Sir,

Your faithful and obedient servant,

J. Hely Hutchinson,
Lieutenant-General.

P.S. I enclose a letter for Lord Wellesley, the Governor General, which I beg you will be pleased to forward as soon as possible.

J. H. H.

This letter was not altogether agreeable to General Baird, inasmuch as he had never yet, during the operations in Egypt, lost sight of the ulterior, or rather, as we have before said, the primary object of his expedition; and, indeed, Colonel Murray, who had been at Gizeh, and was well acquainted with the actual state of the British force there, and the certainty of the speedy reduction of all obstacles in its way, had suggested to General Baird that when the Egyptian campaign was over, General Hutchinson would probably not only spare him adequate stores for his army, without the necessity of making a circuitous voyage back again to India and thence to Mauritius, but that he would allow him to take an additional regiment with him; for which, as Colonel Murray said, room might be made in the ships with a little crowding, and by sending the numerous female followers of the army back by some other conveyance. The announcement in General Hutchinson's letter of a totally different destination for
the whole of the forces, of course terminated all hope of assistance from him.

General Hutchinson about the same time also put an end to General Baird's expectations of seeing Colonel Champagné, whom he had so long looked for, by announcing that that officer had been appointed to the command of a regiment, and that his commission was actually filled up. This intelligence General Hutchinson forwarded under the belief that Colonel Champagné was then with the army. A similar promotion had been accorded to Colonel Ramsey, who had actually arrived.*

Colonel Quarrill was directed by General Baird, on his arrival at Girjeh, to inquire into the state of the roads and the inundations, upon which their practicability depends; and if he found that he could with safety proceed to Syout, or any town capable of furnishing adequate supplies for his detachment, he was to march thither and so proceed as rapidly as he could towards Cairo, taking care never to expose himself to the chance of being overtaken by the flooding of the Nile at any considerable distance from a large town.

He was farther instructed, if he found the roads impassable, to select some high ground, and wait the arrival of the river fleet with the commander-in-chief.

The service of pressing and otherwise procuring

* Colonel, now General Sir Joseph Champagné, who is Colonel of the 17th foot, received the Grand Cross of the Guelphic Order in February, 1832.
boats for the transport of the army, went on briskly, and much more successfully than had at first been anticipated; indeed so plentiful was the supply, that Colonel Quarrill was permitted, when he reached Girjeh, to keep a sufficient number for the conveyance of his regiment down the river. In order that he might form some estimate of the number he should require, he was informed by Colonel Auchmuty, the Adjutant-General, that the largest boats were capable of carrying one hundred and fifty men, three field officers, with the regular proportion of officers not of that rank, and their servants; that the next sized boats would carry one hundred and twenty men, and the smallest size, not including fishing-boats, thirty-five men each. The 88th regiment, consisting of five hundred and ninety men and officers with eight horses, occupied seven boats of these different sizes.

Every arrangement for the march of the force from Ghennah having been made, and Colonel Murray appointed to the command of the troops in Upper Egypt, and having received instructions to remain at Ghennah until the rear of the army should have come up and been forwarded to Gizeh, and himself to proceed with it, General Baird embarked for Lower Egypt on the 31st day of July.

A short extract from the work of M. Regnier may not here be unacceptable to the reader. He says:

In Upper Egypt a chain of mountains present themselves to the eye of the traveller on either side of the Nile;
the valley between these mountains, through which the course of the river is directed, is nearly five leagues broad, which the periodical inundations of the river completely cover; this valley alone is inhabited and susceptible of cultivation. The eastern chain of mountains by which the Nile is separated from the Red Sea, surpasses that on the west in respect of height, terminating by precipices towards the valley, assuming in different places the appearance of an immense wall broken irregularly by narrow valleys, which have owed their origin to the sudden and temporary torrents of water, and serve as passes over these stupendous mountains. The western chain, by which the valleys of the Nile is separated from that of Oasis, has in general a gradual and gentle declivity, although it becomes more abrupt towards Syout, and is steep from the angle formed by the Nile towards Hennh till it reaches Syene, at which place the mountain has a more considerable height, affording but a narrow passage to the river.

The distance between these two chains of mountains is increased as you approach Cairo, the eastern chain terminating near the extremity of the Red Sea, without the appearance of any junction with the Arabian mountains, which have a similar termination. The western chain declines towards Fayoum, taking a north-west direction near Grand Cairo, and forming the Mediterranean coast in a direction to the west. Lower Egypt lies between these two great chains of mountains and the sea, which has most probably been formed, at least in a great measure, by the slime or mud which the Nile deposits, as it is intersected by its branches and a vast number of canals.

The following military opinion of General Regnier is curious—

"Egypt," says he, "is separated from Asia by deserts of considerable extent, and should a hostile army attempt to
approach it on that side, it would have to take its route through marshy grounds, below its general level, and presenting to the traveller little else than brackish water. Its flat shore towards the Mediterranean and the mouth of the Nile, gorged up with mounds of sand, presents to the enemy very few places which will be found proper for the debarkation of troops. Immense deserts constitute its natural boundaries on the west, on which account it has nothing to dread but the incursions of the Arabs from Barbary. A desert also separates Egypt from the Red Sea, which gives no flattering invitation to an enemy to invade it from that quarter; the two ports of that sea being destitute of resources, and Egypt itself being the only country from which a hostile army could procure provisions and camels sufficient to enable them to cross the Desert.

"It is obvious," continues General Regnier, "from this succinct account of the general face of the country, that no invading army could carry on any military operations in Lower Egypt during more than seven months in the year. It may perhaps be admitted with truth, that the confines of the Desert might be traversed during the five remaining months, but the villages in that direction are ill qualified to grant those necessary supplies to an army, which after crossing the Desert must be in want of every thing. No communication could be kept open from the Desert with the interior from September to December inclusive. At this period, therefore, an enemy could not carry on any military operations in the interior but by water."

These opinions and statements, made by an officer of Regnier’s ability little more than two years before General Baird overcame all the difficulties which he enumerates, are full of interest.
Kenne or Ghennah itself, which had been so long the head-quarters of General Baird, perhaps deserves a word or two of remark here. It is the Coptos of the ancients, and is of considerable extent. To an eye which has rested for days and weeks on the arid sameness of the Desert, the country immediately round it, which is laid out in gardens, where the vine is cultivated with industry and success, and in which fruit-trees of great produce grow even luxuriantly, affords a most delightful contrast.

The town itself is surrounded by a wall, and the houses are flat-roofed and of one story. It has a pottery, in which jars and vessels are made possessing the quality peculiar to Egyptian ware, of keeping water cool and rendering it clear. Of these jars they make immense rafts, by tying them together in vast numbers, and floating them down the Nile, carrying them sometimes afterwards even as far as Rosetta, where, from their singularly advantageous properties, they meet a ready sale. Oranges, dates, and melons are to be procured at Ghennah in abundance, and the sugar-cane has been successfully cultivated there. All this refreshing produce is eagerly sought by the merchants and pilgrims who travel from Cairo to barter the cloths of Europe, the corn of Egypt, and the carpets of Turkey against the coffee of Mocha and the shawls and muslins of India.

The people of Ghennah are darker than those of Lower Egypt, whom, however, they very closely resemble in the form of their features and the character of their countenances; like all Mahommedans
the women remain continually veiled, but nevertheless they blacken their eyelashes, and in order to give an Oriental delicacy to their hands, tinge their finger-nails with red.

During the stay of the troops at Ghennah they were constantly exposed to the whirlwinds peculiar to that part of the world. Their tremendous force, and the effects of their irresistible violence, have so often been described, that an observation upon them may seem superfluous; but as constituting one only of the innumerable ills and difficulties by which the army was assailed, they certainly deserve mention in this place. Mr. Bruce describes a visitation of this sort, which must have been most awful.

"We were here," says he, (at a place called Wodi el Halbout,) "at once surprised and terrified by a sight, surely one of the most magnificent in the world. In the vast expanse of desert, from W. to N. W. of us, we saw a number of prodigious pillars of sand at different distances, at times moving with great celerity, at others stately or with a majestic slowness; at intervals we thought they were coming in a very few minutes to overwhelm us, and small quantities of sand had actually reached us. Again they would retreat so as to be almost out of sight—their tops reaching to the very clouds—there the tops very often separated from the bodies, and then, once disjointed, dispersed in the air and did not appear any more. Sometimes they were broken near the middle, as if struck by a large cannon shot.

"About noon they began to advance with considerable swiftness upon us, the wind being very strong at north. Eleven of them ranged alongside of us, about the distance
of three miles; the greatest diameter of the largest appeared to me at that distance, as if it would measure ten feet. They retired from us with a wind at S. E. leaving an impression upon my mind to which I can give no name, though surely one ingredient in it was fear, with a considerable deal of wonder and astonishment. It was in vain to think of flying, the swiftest horse, the fastest sailing ship, could be of no use to carry us out of this danger, and the full persuasion of this riveted me as if to the spot where I stood.”

In the next chapter we shall have to trace the conduct of General Baird through a series of difficulties, which if not so perilous personally, as those which he had already seen, were, to an officer of his character and principles, perhaps not less painful to endure.

CHAPTER XIX.

GENERAL BAIRD ARRIVES AT GIZEH—REMOVES HIS HEADQUARTERS TO RHOUDE—PROCEEDS TOWARDS ROSETTA—DAMIETTA—LEBANON—REFUSAL OF THE GRAND VIZIER TO SURRENDER THE FORMER—RECALL OF COLONEL LLOYD—SURRENDER OF ALEXANDRIA—GENERAL BAIRD'S DISAPPOINTMENT—SIR JOHN HUTCHINSON RESOLVES TO QUIT EGYPT ON ACCOUNT OF HIS HEALTH—ARRANGEMENTS CONSEQUENT THEREUPON—DESPATCH FROM ENGLAND—LORD CAVAN APPOINTED TO COMMAND IN CHIEF—THE INDIAN ARMY TO BE UNITED WITH THE EUROPEAN FORCE—GENERAL BAIRD'S REMONSTRANCE—REASONS AGAINST THE MEASURE—APPEARANCE OF THE PLAGUE AMONG THE TROOPS.

General Baird, it will be recollected, before he embarked, placed Colonel Murray in command of the whole army of Upper Egypt until the rear should have come up to Ghennah (where his headquarters were fixed), whence it was to be sent forward to Gizeh with all practicable expedition, leaving two companies of the 1st, and six companies of the 7th Bombay regiment in possession of different parts on the route, so as to keep up a free and constant communication between the army and Kosseir.

Orders were despatched to that place to send forward the 80th, or any other regiment, the moment
it arrived, and Colonels Ramsay and Montresor were ordered forthwith to proceed to Gizeh, which place General Baird himself reached on the 8th of August.*

The General lost not a moment after his arrival in making arrangements for the supplies and comforts of his men, whose welfare and accommodation were always objects nearest his heart; and having completed those arrangements, he shifted his head-quarters to the little island of Rhouda, to which he removed on the 16th.†

* Gizeh is a considerable town built along the banks of the river, which is here above four miles in width. M. De Noé says, that the house in which he was quartered at the northern extremity of the town, on a very handsome quay, was surrounded by gardens filled with flowers and orange-trees; the rooms were spacious, and the stables sufficiently extensive to contain three hundred horses.

This sounds capacious, but falls very far short of Dr. Clarke’s account of Murad Bey’s residence, in which Colonel Stewart was quartered. “Of this edifice,” says the Doctor, “it is difficult to give an idea by description. It contained barracks capable of containing SIXTY THOUSAND MEN, including a great proportion of cavalry, a cannon foundry, and everything necessary for the system of war carried on by that prince,” &c.—Vide Clarke’s Travels, vol. i. p. 83.

M. de Noé writes in favourable terms of the civilization of the inhabitants, and observes, that the greater part of them spoke French. Gizeh is distant from the Pyramids about nine miles.

† It is on the island of Rhouda, situated on the Nile, between Gizeh and Cairo, that the Méhéas, or, as we translate it, Nilometer, is erected for the purpose of measuring the rise of the inundation. The Nilometer is a round tower, containing an
When General Baird quitted Gizeh he appointed Colonel Ramsay to the command of that place, a situation which, however high and honourable, connected as it inevitably must become with the negotiations to be carried on with the Grand Vizier, Colonel Ramsay felt very much disinclined to fill, apprehensive that being fixed at Gizeh he might be deprived of a chance of more active service in the field. The General also appointed Colonel Lloyd to the command of a force destined for Damietta, consisting of about three hundred men of the 80th regiment, and three hundred sepoys, together with a proportionate force of artillery and engineers. The object of this detachment was to garrison Damietta and Lesbie, which General Hutchinson had ordered the Turks to surrender to the English troops whenever they should arrive. But it appears, that some difficulty interposed at the time of their arrival, for the Grand Vizier, whose professions of friendship we have already observed upon, seems to have hesitated about giving up the whole of the works and barracks at that place to the British force, and to have

apartment, in the middle of which, is a cistern lined with marble, the bottom of which reaches the bottom of the river, having a large opening through which the water can freely enter.

The rise of the water is shewn upon an octagonal column of blue and white marble, on which are marked twenty cubits of twenty-two inches each. The two lowermost have no divisions, but all the others are divided into twenty-four parts, each part called a digit; the whole height of the pillar being thirty-six feet eight inches.
proposed that the place should be garrisoned by a force half Turkish and half European.

As this was the line taken by the Grand Vizier, and as General Baird found that the works required very extensive repairs, he suggested to the Vizier, that unless the English troops had entire possession of the place, he should not feel justified in permitting his Government to incur any expense on account of it. In the propriety of General Baird's view the Grand Vizier, as it turned out, entirely coincided, and accordingly promised an immediate supply of men and money to put the works in good order.

Although General Baird succeeded in obtaining this promise from the Vizier, he had, on the other hand, new difficulties to contend with, from Osman Bey. Tambourga Osman Bey and Hussein Bey, who had relied implicitly upon General Hutchinson for arranging their several claims upon the Grand Vizier previously to his quitting the country, began to consider themselves in an extremely perilous position, and accordingly pressed the delicacy and difficulty of their different cases upon General Baird, with no small degree of pertinacity; and (as it eventually turned out, not without reason) expressed their opinion to him, that the moment the British force should be entirely withdrawn from Egypt, the Turks would fall upon and persecute them in utter violation of all their most solemn engagements.

The Beys declared themselves ready not only to obey any orders that General Hutchinson might think
fit to make, but even to obey the commands of the Grand Vizier or of the Porte itself, if General Hutchinson desired it; and there can be little doubt that General Baird, who had all along placed great reliance in their affection for the English, most conscientiously coincided in their views, and sympathized in their apprehensions of danger, and pressed upon General Hutchinson the absolute necessity of interposing his authority in their behalf. With what degree of success this interposition was crowned, we shall hereafter see.

By the 27th of August General Baird had assembled all his force in the Isle of Rhouda; and on the night of that day the right wing of the army began to move.*

We have observed, in an earlier part of this memoir, upon the extraordinary difficulty which exists at getting at anything like truth in affairs of this world. A very striking instance, certainly not of wilful misrepresentation (for the writer who makes the statement was an amiable and generally veracious man) occurs at page 59 of the late Dr. Clarke's Travels, in which he describes an entertainment of

* As a proof of the energy and activity displayed by General Baird during his arduous enterprise, it may not be uninteresting to observe, that in a letter from General Hutchinson to General Baird, dated Cairo, July 25, 1801, the former says—

"Every exertion in my power shall be used to procure you boats, as soon as the French prisoners are once embarked on board the ships. You shall have the earliest intelligence of everything that takes place at Alexandria; but I fear your corps cannot be collected at Gizeh before the end of September.

—They had left it before the end of August!"
which he partook, in General Baird's tent, while his head-quarters were at this very island of Rhouda.

"A dinner," says Dr. Clarke, "given by General Baird to the English officers, and others, our countrymen, in Cairo, took place while the camp remained upon the Isle of Rhoda. We were invited, and the scene was so extraordinary, that it ought to be noticed. The dinner was given in the pavilion before-mentioned. This was lighted by glass lustres suspended from an enormous bamboo cane, sustaining the inner covering of the tent, and by wax candles in glass cylinders. English porter, roasted pigs, and other English fare, together with, Port, Claret, and Madeira wines, appeared upon the table.

"The dinner was cooked by Indian servants, upon the sand, before the tent, and a view of the extraordinary cleanliness observed by these cooks, as well as their peculiar habits, were among the most curious parts of the exhibition. Having drawn a line around them, they suffered no person to pass this boundary. The rules of their caste enjoined that none of their cookery vessels should be touched except by their own hands. After dinner the officers smoked the hookah: every pipe had its peculiar attendant upon the outside of the tent, the long flexible tubes alone being brought under the sides of the pavilion to those seated at table.

"The servants in waiting were principally negroes, dressed in white turbans, with muslin jackets, but without stockings or shoes. The upper part of the pavilion was adorned with beautiful net-work; the hangings were of green silk, and the floor covered with Indian mats. The tables were of polished mahogany, and the company present were in full uniform. An association of things so incongruous, with the natural horrors and barbarism of the country, upon the border of an interminable desert,
and in the midst of such a river as the Nile, where persons from India and from England were met to banquet together, that perhaps no similar result of commerce and of conquest is ever likely to occur again in any part of the habitable globe."

It will scarcely be believed, that of all this detail there is scarcely one particular in which it is correct (true is perhaps too strong a word). The glass lustres were two common lamps; the hangings of the tent, instead of green silk, consisted of a green baize lining to the canvass, and the tent itself, instead of a pavilion, was the mess-tent of the 10th Regiment; the mahogany tables were of teak wood; and there was not a single negro present. Such however is the effect of unexpected impressions, and such the difficulty afterwards of believing that those impressions could have been so strong at the moment, unless the objects by which they were produced were much more splendid than in fact they either were or could have been, that the "traveller" is frequently incorrect, even without meaning it.

It is curious enough, that in the same page of his book, Dr. Clarke undertakes to justify Bruce against the calumnies which have been occasionally levelled at his fidelity of narration, and illustrates his justification by the fact, that General Baird himself assured him that he considered Great Britain indebted to Bruce's invaluable chart of the Red Sea for the safety of the transports which had been employed in conveying the British forces.

As Dr. Clarke's description of the magnificent
banquet at which he was a guest has frequently been quoted ill-naturedly, in evidence of the luxuriousness and effeminacy of a portion of the brave men who composed the army under General Baird, and as more recent writers have availed themselves of various similar misrepresentations to substantiate a charge of this nature against their character, it is only justice to the troops as well as to the historian, to give another passage from Dr. Clarke, which we find in page 55 of the same work, and where, although still labouring under a delusion, hardly intelligible, as to the splendour and comforts of the officers, the writer at least does justice to their qualities as soldiers.

"Every morning at sunrise," says the Doctor, "as in Lord Hutchinson's army, a gun was fired, and the whole line of the troops from India were under arms, amounting to three thousand men."

The anachronism in this passage, by which Sir John Hutchinson's peerage is anticipated, is not worth noticing; the strength of the Indian army, however, is inaccurately stated; the force amounted to seven, and not three thousand men as the Doctor states.

"At this hour," continues the Doctor, "we often resorted to the Isle of Rhouda, to view the magnificent parade; an immense grove of the most enormous sycamore fig-trees, larger than any of our forest trees, secured almost the whole army from the rays of the sun. Troops in such a state of military perfection, or better suited for active service, were never seen, not even in the famous
parade of the chosen ten thousand belonging to Buonaparte's legion, which he was so vain of displaying before the present war in front of the Tuileries at Paris; not an unhealthy soldier was to be seen."

The testimony here borne to the actual state of this army—the greater portion of which, as the Doctor says, were volunteers, who never before had been out of their native country—seems to show that the luxury and comfort which he so much magnifies and expatiates upon, had no very ill effect either upon the privates or the officers who commanded them.

But to return to our narrative.—Before the troops were put in motion General Baird had despatched Colonel Montresor to Rosetta, to make all the necessary arrangements for securing there an adequate supply of provisions on the march to Alexandria; for although our ally, the Grand Vizier had promised to furnish them with everything essential, not only for their subsistence but their comfort, he had not as yet begun to fulfil those promises, and therefore the General considered it only prudent to take care that the men should be provided for, as in ordinary cases, by the commissariat department.

On the 26th, General Baird took leave of the Grand Vizier, and notwithstanding the want of zeal and activity which his Highness had uniformly exhibited, presented him and his officers and the Beys, according to the custom of the country, with some valuable presents.

The news which was received just on the eve of
SIR DAVID BAIRD.

the departure of the army, announcing the favourable commencement of the siege of Alexandria, will come more agreeably to the reader in its original shape, namely, a letter from General Hutchinson, which will at the same time serve to throw a little light on the hesitation of the Grand Vizier with respect to Damietta and Lesbie.

Head Quarters, Camp before Alexandria,
August 25th, 1801.

SIR,

I received your letter of the 20th of August last night, and am happy to find that we are likely to meet so soon. I shall make every exertion in my power to make your march from Rosetta to Alexandria as little irksome and fatiguing as possible; and I would recommend you to leave all your guns and unnecessary baggage there.

We commenced our operations against Alexandria, both on the east and west side, on the 17th of this month. It is weak on the west side, and cannot, I should imagine, hold out more than three weeks or a month longer; but in this I may be mistaken. We are in great want of engineers and artillery men. I wish you could send us forward a few engineers, and a detachment of artillery, as soon as possible, it would be a great relief to us.

I had agreed previous to my departure from Cairo, to send a garrison of our troops to Damietta; at that time, the Grand Vizier expressed a high sense of obligation, and supposed it was a great favour done him. He ought doubly to wish it now, as his own troops lately mutinied at that place, and insisted on being embarked on board transports, in order to return to Constantinople. I have not heard how the matter ended; but I know that they were in possession of the town for two days, threw every thing
into the greatest confusion, and levied contributions. Should the enemy make their appearance there, the Turks would be very glad to give up the command to the senior British officer. I do not know that it is absolutely necessary that Colonel Lloyd should for the present occupy the fort. He may either encamp, or place himself in Damietta. We are to have nothing to do with the expense of the repairs. I do not imagine that they can be considerable, unless the Turks themselves have been extremely industrious, and destroyed the works. The French left them in a perfect state of defence, and with many guns mounted. Some of the guns have been removed, but can easily be replaced.

When first I spoke to the Grand Vizier, he was extremely rejoiced that we should occupy Damietta; the Turks are as ignorant as children, and as suspicious as women: at any rate, had he even refused his consent, I should have done the same thing. It is a post of too great military importance, to leave unoccupied; besides, it affords such natural advantages, that I understand a few men might prevent the advance of a numerous corps.

Half the stores and cannon captured at Cairo and Gizeh, certainly belong to the British army, and the other half to the Turks. I so stated it to the Reis Effendi, and claimed it on the part of our army. He acquiesced, and thought it very reasonable; but then, as it would be difficult to remove the cannon and stores, the British Government must be ultimately our debtor to the amount of their value. They may claim it from the Turkish Government if they please, or place it as a set-off in part payment for the quantity of forage and provisions which the Turks have furnished to our army. You had better, therefore, supply them with what they demand, and desire Colonel Ramsay to take receipts from their commissaries, not only for what he issues, but for what was issued before. I think you
judge very right, to appoint him Commandant of Gizeh; it was necessary to have an old and experienced officer there. There is no late news. I suppose you have heard of the brilliant success of Sir James Saumarez. Every thing looks like peace. I have no official accounts, however, to that effect. On the 16th of July, the French had twenty-five sail of the line at Brest, ready to put to sea with fifteen thousand men on board!*

I have the honour to be, with great respect and regard,

Sir,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

J. H. HutchINsHoN,

&c. &c. &c.

With respect to the occupation of Damietta, however, it eventually turned out that it had been agreed upon by our Ambassador, that it should remain entirely in the possession of the Turks, and accordingly Colonel Lloyd, with his detachment, was withdrawn from the place, and ordered to join the army at

* Sir James Saumarez was second in command to Lord Nelson in the battle of the Nile, and for his gallantry in the action alluded to by Sir John Hutchinson, received the Order of the Bath. He was born March 11, 1757, and married October 27, 1788, Martha, daughter of Thomas le Marchant, of the Island of Guernsey, of which he himself is a native. In 1831, thirty years after this memorable battle, he was created a Peer of the Realm, in Lord Grey's ministry, by the title of Baron de Saumarez, just before the Reform Bill of that year was carried up to the Lords—The venerable peer voted for it, and in 1832 was appointed to that lucrative sinecure, a Generalship of Marines.
Rosetta, sending however the four companies of the 7th Native Infantry (which formed a part of it) back to Gizeh.

Colonel Lloyd was further directed, before his departure from Damietta, to urge the Turkish Officer, in command there, to put the forts in a proper condition of defence, and also to ascertain the exact state of the works, the number of pieces of cannon, and the amount of military stores in the place.

General Baird left Rhouda on the 27th of August, and arrived at Rosetta on the 30th, where the first division of his army, which had reached it the day before, were already encamped. The moment he found himself so near Alexandria, with his force concentrated, he evinced the greatest anxiety to push forward to that place direct; but his ardour was checked, and his enthusiasm restrained by a letter from General Hutchinson, announcing that the French had sent a flag of truce to him, to treat for the surrender; a measure, no doubt, mainly attributable (at all events as to time) to the arrival of so large an addition to General Hutchinson's force as the army from India under General Baird. The General received the order to "halt," with indescribable dissatisfaction; and much as he rejoiced at the success of His Majesty's arms, the pleasure he felt at the national triumph was not a little alloyed by the reflection, that after all their exertions and toils, he and his gallant comrades should have arrived too late to participate in the honour and glory acquired by their more fortunate countrymen.
The soldier-like apprehensions to which this first check gave alarm, were soon confirmed, and when General Baird proceeded the next day to Sir John Hutchinson's head quarters, he found that the capitulation was actually signed, and that the British troops were to take possession of the outworks on the following morning.*

The terms granted to the garrison of Alexandria

* Sir John Hutchinson had just received the Order of the Bath. Sir John Hely Hutchinson was born May 15, 1757; his father was an eminent barrister, and for a long time member of the Irish House of Commons, and Secretary of State for Ireland. He married 8th June 1751, Christiana, daughter of Lorenzo Nixon, Esq. niece and heiress of Richard Hutchinson, Esq. and she was created Baroness Donoughmore. By her, Mr. Hutchinson had issue Richard, the first Earl of Donoughmore, who died unmarried August 22, 1825, Sir John Hely Hutchinson, and the Hon. Mary, who married Thomas Smith, Esq. and is still living.

Sir John Hutchinson, who at the period to which our narrative here refers, had been honoured with the Red Riband, was subsequently created, in the same year, Lord Hutchinson, as a reward for his services in Egypt. In 1825 his Lordship succeeded his brother; and is now Earl of Donoughmore, Viscount Suirdale, Viscount and Baron Donoughmore of Knocklofty, in the Peerage of Ireland, and also Viscount Hutchinson of Knocklofty, and Baron Hutchinson of Alexandria, and Knocklofty, county of Tipperary, in that of the United Kingdom.

His Lordship, besides being a Knight of the Bath, (termed since the last extension of that Order, a Grand Cross of the Bath,) is also a Knight of the Turkish Order of the Crescent, a General in the Army, Colonel of the 18th Foot, Governor of Stirling Castle, Lord Lieutenant of the County of Tipperary, and Vice-Admiral of the Province of Munster.