which, unresisted, must inevitably complete the downfall of the Mahomedan authority, not only in Egypt, but in all the neighbouring territories, and must establish the supremacy of the French power in the most sacred seats of the Mahomedan religion.

It has been the uniform policy of the French to endeavour to disarm the resentment of the people whose country they have invaded, by professing the most amicable intentions, and by pretending that the sole motive of their actions is to mitigate the tyranny of oppressive governments; to establish the independence of oppressed nations, and to secure to mankind the full enjoyment of civil and religious rights. By these insidious arts the French have succeeded in reducing to their absolute power many of the states of Europe, which they have invaded and ravaged without the slightest pretence or provocation.

They have employed the same means to reconcile the inhabitants of Egypt to their unprovoked violence and unjust usurpation; and they will endeavour to practise the same perfidious policy for the purpose of subjugating the remaining dependencies of the Ottoman empire in Arabia.

They will labour to impress you with a belief of their amicable disposition, and of their regard for the sanctity of your religion. Under the pretence of establishing your independence, they will endeavour to subvert your government and to erect their tyrannous misrule upon its ruins.

With the most friendly solicitude I warn you to take example from the unhappy fate of other states, and to beware of yielding to the insidious professions of a nation which has forfeited all pretensions to credit by a systematic contempt of the obligations of public faith, and of the law of nations, especially by their unprovoked and unjustifiable invasion of the province of Egypt.

You have no other security for the preservation of your
independence, and for the maintenance of your rights, than by a determination to resist the force and to frustrate the frauds of the French nation.

You are called upon, therefore, by every motive of interest and self-preservation, by every principle of national honour and of religious attachment, to unite your efforts with the combined exertions of the British power and of the Ottoman state for the expulsion of the French from Egypt. A formidable army of Turkish troops is already acting with vigour for the purpose of dispossessing the French of their usurped authority in Egypt, and a numerous body of British troops now co-operate in Egypt with the army of the Porte in effecting the expulsion of the French from Egypt.

With a view to second the operations of the combined army, I have detached a considerable force of European and native troops from India, to unite in a joint effort for the expulsion of the common enemy. This measure, while it favours the success of the operations to be carried on from the side of Syria and the Mediterranean, is calculated to provide for the security of the Mahomedan possessions on the Arabian side of the Red Sea.

As the existence of the Mahomedan dominion in Arabia, and the interests of the Mahomedan religion, are obviously concerned in the expulsion of the French, I cannot doubt that you will employ all the resources of your country and the influence of your authority in promoting the success of the projected enterprise. I am the more induced to rely upon your exertions by the report which has been made to me by Captain Wilson and by Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, who were lately deputed, under my orders, to the Red Sea, of the friendly disposition which you entertain towards the British nation.

I trust you will employ every effort to procure and to facilitate the dispatch of provisions and of stores to the
troops employed in the Red Sea; that you will furnish a reinforcement of the troops of your country to act with the British army, and that you will encourage the several chiefs and states in Arabia and in Egypt to make common cause against the common enemy of your nation and of the British power.

Major-General Baird, the commander-in-chief of the Indian forces, or a proper person deputed by him, will have the honour to deliver to you this letter, and will present to you a few articles, the produce of Europe and of this country, as a token of my friendship and regard.

I request your favourable attention to the suggestions and applications which may be made on my part for your assistance in promoting the object of the expedition.

For the rest, believe me anxious for accounts of your welfare, &c. &c. &c.

**Wellesley.**

The letter written to the Viziers, although shorter, was conceived in a similar spirit, and written in a similar tone. The proclamation follows:

**Proclamation.**

The ancient friendship and harmony subsisting between the Sublime Porte and his Britannic Majesty have recently been confirmed by additional ties of reciprocal danger, and of common injury from the government of France.

That faithless government, disregarding the obligations of amity and the stipulations of treaty, has sent forth its armies to invade the peaceful provinces of Egypt, the acknowledged territory of the Ottoman Porte; the cruelties and outrages practised by the French in Egypt are known to all mankind, and have excited universal horror and indignation.

The French have now unequivocally declared their re-
solution to maintain by force the territory which they have acquired by fraud, and by the violation of every principle of faith, and of every maxim of civil and religious obligation.

It has been the uniform policy of the French to endeavour to disarm the resentment of the people whose country they have invaded, by professing the most amicable intentions, and by pretending that the sole object of the French arms is to mitigate the tyranny of oppressive governments, to establish the independence of suffering nations, and to secure to mankind the full enjoyment of civil and religious rights. By such insidious arts the French have succeeded in reducing many of the states of Europe to the lowest condition of misery and humiliation. The French have employed the same artifice in Egypt, and they will continue to employ it for the purpose of establishing universal dominion and boundless power.

They will profess to maintain the independence of the Mahomedan government, to secure to the inhabitants of the country the enjoyment of their property, and the free exercise of their religion, to administer to the people their own laws, and to protect them from oppression.

Can the enlightened inhabitants of Egypt be deluded by professions of the French, who have forfeited all pretensions to credit by a systematic contempt of the obligations of public faith, and of the established law of nations? Can the people of Egypt persuade themselves that the French who, under the mask of friendship, have treacherously invaded and ravaged the dominions of an ally without pretence or provocation, will maintain faith with the people whose habitations they have usurped, and whose government they have laboured to subvert?

A nation which has openly abjured all religion cannot be expected to regard the sanctity or maintain the interests of the Mahomedan faith.
The real view of the French is to gratify their criminal ambition; their object is the absolute subversion of the Ottoman power, and the permanent establishment of their own dominion.

For the salutary purpose of restoring to the dominion of the Porte the territory which the French have so unjustly usurped, of recovering for the inhabitants of Egypt whatever they may have lost by the unprovoked aggression of France, a formidable body of troops has been sent from England to join the army of the Ottoman state; and the combined forces of the Grand Seignor and of his Britannic Majesty are now employed in the most active operations for the purpose of effecting the expulsion of the French from Egypt. A considerable British force is also arrived from the British empire in India to co-operate from the Red Sea with the allied army now acting from the shores of the Mediterranean.

A favourable opportunity is now afforded to the inhabitants of these provinces of deliverance from the tyranny and usurpation of the French; Major-General Baird, the commander-in-chief of the British forces detached from India, invites all the chiefs and inhabitants of these provinces to avail themselves of the protection and assistance of the British troops, and to unite their efforts in the common cause.

The commander-in-chief, while he offers protection and assistance to those who may be induced to join the British standard, warns the chiefs and inhabitants of these countries of the destructive consequences to which they will expose themselves by supporting the cause of the enemy; the commander-in-chief, however, trusts that a just abhorrence of the principles, views, and conduct of the French, and a firm reliance on the benevolent intentions, justice, and moderation of the British nation, will induce the inhabitants of these provinces to embrace with eager-
ness the opportunity now happily offered to them of uniting in a common effort with the friends and allies of the Ottoman Porte, against the depredations, violence, and outrages of the French nation in this quarter of the globe.

General Baird delivered these letters and the presents according to their different addresses; and at Mocha made an arrangement that Seid Hamed Aga should accompany the expedition, taking his passage in the head-quarter ship; an agreement being entered into that he should be rewarded for his services in proportion to their magnitude and importance.

On the 28th of April, Colonel Montresor's division of the expedition reached Mocha, and anchored in safety and good health; but the boisterous state of the weather rendered watering the ships a work of extreme labour and difficulty, if not of actual danger; indeed the impediments which were thrown in the way of completing their stock, induced the general to engage pilots, with a view of touching at the island of Camaran, where the water was said to be remarkably pure and good; a measure of great wisdom and prudence, inasmuch as none could reach the ships from Mocha after the 20th of the next month, and the supply from Jeddah was extremely precarious; but in this design he was unexpectedly thwarted by the positive refusal of the pilots to take the ships to that place. This extraordinary conduct Gen-
ral Baird could never exactly account for; but at the moment it was extremely unpleasant, because, independently of the frustration of his prudential arrangement for the comfort and safety of the troops, it afforded, as he thought, evidence of an undue influence over the pilots, exerted in some hostile quarter. He did not, however, suffer this opposition to delay his movements, and taking into consideration all the circumstances, resolved to proceed, without further delay, to Kosseir, by Jeddah.

While these operations were in progress, Lord Wellesley had dispatched the Mornington Packet to the Cape of Good Hope, to Sir George Young, who was governor of that colony, as well as to Sir Roger Curtis, the admiral commanding the station, requesting their aid in furnishing certain supplies to the Indian army in Egypt, desiring them also to send any information of which they might happen to be in possession, relative to the actual state of affairs at Mauritius and Bourbon, upon which islands Lord Wellesley continued to keep a constant, watchful, and jealous eye; and so anxious was his lordship for the intelligence which he considered it probable the packet might bring, that he directed that she should on her return proceed to Mocha, and that as soon as she had landed whatever stores and supplies she might have for the army, she should sail to Calcutta; at the same time instructing General Baird to consult with Admiral Blan-
kett, so that in case the object of the Egyptian expedition should fail, and the enterprise against the French islands could be undertaken, he might endeavour to secure his co-operation to the fullest extent of his means.

Affairs, however, were destined to take a different turn, and it was General Baird’s fortune to succeed in achieving an object till then deemed impracticable. Every movement of this yet unrecorded undertaking, is full of interest; every letter, illustrative of its progress, teems with instruction and information; and while the correspondence of General Baird, during the continuance of his toils and difficulties, marks his firmness and decision, it exhibits in the strongest light the affectionate humanity of the man, united with the comprehensive intelligence and indefatigable activity of the soldier.

It may be easily conceived that Lord Wellesley’s constant anxiety with regard to the French islands, was not a little increased by intelligence which reached Bombay on the 4th of March, that a fleet had sailed from Brest, which was believed to be intended as a reinforcement for those colonies,

* Although that part of Lord Wellesley’s design which originally included Batavia in the conquest to be achieved, was, if not frustrated, at all events necessarily delayed by the new destination given to the troops previously designed for its reduction, the still more desirable object—the capture of Mauritius—might even yet have been effected as early almost as it otherwise would, supposing the efforts of General Baird to join General Hutchinson to have been frustrated.
preparatory to some great attack upon our Indian possessions. General Baird, who had, even be­fore Lord Wellesley received this information, weighed in his mind the probable effects of this measure, and coupling it with the avowed hostility of Russia, which he conceived might have a pow­erful influence over the movements of Sir Ralph Abercrombie in Egypt, began to consider it pro­bable, that his proceeding to Cairo or Alexandria would be superfluous, and that the expedition against Mauritius, would still be undertaken. Under these circumstances he felt an increased anxiety for a reinforcement of European troops; so that, in case of finding on his arrival at Kosseir that the Egyptian campaign was to be abandoned, he might strike at two colonies, the strength of which had always, as we have already shewn, been so judiciously magnified by the French government.

Lord Wellesley, however, formed a more accu­rate opinion of their real state, upon information which he had derived from Mr. Stokes, who, had long been a prisoner at Mauritius, and whom his lordship had appointed, with very considerable powers, as commissary of stores, to the expedition commanded by General Baird; no doubt as well with the view of marking his confidence in that gentleman during the Egyptian expedition, as of securing his services, which he considered might be made particularly available, should the destina­tion of the force be eventually changed to Maur­
ritius, with the localities of which Mr. Stokes appeared to be so well acquainted.

One of the principal difficulties which General Baird contemplated in making his way across the desert, was the hostility, or disaffection, or treachery of the Beys of Upper Egypt. As yet the camels necessary for the transport of the army had not been secured in Arabia, and General Baird's efforts, in the midst of all his uncertainties and difficulties, were constantly directed to the conciliation of the Sheriff of Mecca, upon whose disposition he seemed fully persuaded the success of his great enterprise must depend.

The task of conveying, in the first instance, five thousand troops, and all their followers, from Koseir to Ghennah, across a barren desert, was one which it required a most unshrinking mind even to contemplate; and although bullocks might have been procured (a large number of those animals having been sent from Bombay), they would have been perfectly useless in the conveyance of the army: for their power, as beasts of draught or burden, would not have been adequate to more than the carriage of the forage and water, absolutely necessary for their own existence.

On the 18th of May, General Baird arrived at Jeddah, and found upon his arrival that Colonel Murray, not having received his despatches, had, taking advantage of the earlier part of the season, proceeded with the Bombay detachment, and Colonel Beresford's division, up the Gulf to Suez.
General Baird's first impulse was at all hazards instantly to follow him. But his natural desire for action was checked by the absolute necessity of taking in a fresh stock of water—that invaluable article (so little regarded when in plenty, and so ardently sought when scarce or difficult of access); and accordingly he resolved to remain where he was, for a few days, to fill up the stock, taking advantage of the delay, to secure by every means in his power, the friendship and co-operation of the Sheriff of Mecca.*

On the evening of his arrival at Jeddah, a despatch was received by Captain Hardyman, from Admiral Blankett, announcing the British successes in Egypt, the victory of the 21st of March, and the lamented death of the gallant Sir Ralph Abercrombie.

On the following day, the Sheriff of Mecca having arrived, General Baird had an audience of

* Jeddah, or Juddah, according to Horsburgh (founded on observations taken during the Egyptian expedition), is in lat. 21° 29' N., long. 39° 15' E.; the tomb of Mahomet, at Mecca, is distant twenty one miles inland.

"It would be very imprudent for a stranger to sail out of Juddah roads without a pilot. The native pilots are guided by the eye, as there are no cross bearings or proper marks to lead them clear of the numerous sunken rocks which, in hazy weather, or when the sea is obscured, cannot be discerned until the ship is nearly upon them."—Vide Horsburgh's Sailing Directions, Vol. I. p. 291.

It was on one of the rocks to the southward of the outer gate, as it is called, that his Majesty's frigate La Forte struck and was lost.
him, in company with Mehedi Ali Khan, and delivered to his highness the letters and presents destined for his acceptance. It was a matter of very great satisfaction to General Baird, to find that the sheriff was, or at least expressed himself to be, extremely well disposed towards the English; and that moreover he promised his assistance; so that at the conclusion of the interview, the general felt almost assured that he should eventually obtain, under his highness’s sanction, as many horses and camels as the vessels then in port were competent to convey.*

It was now arranged by General Baird, that instead of proceeding with him, Mehedi Ali Khan should remain behind at Jeddah, and that if his services should be required farther up the gulf, he was to follow.

At this juncture, and just as General Baird was preparing to sail for Kosseir, Sir Home Popham

* This seeming cordiality of the sheriff was the more agreeable to General Baird from being entirely unexpected; the impression upon the general’s mind being that his highness’s conduct would be unfavourable to the English. General Baird had been induced to form this opinion from the fact that when, as has already been stated, the pilots at Mocha decidedly refused to take the ships to Camaran by water, they alleged as a reason their fear of offending the SherifF of Mecca. But General Baird subsequently discovered that their unwillingness to go to that island arose from the interference of the East India Company’s broker, who got no profit if ships were supplied with water at any other place than that at which he himself resided.
arrived off Jeddah, in H. M. S. Romney, 50 guns, with the Victor, of 20 guns, in company. The rest of his squadron (having on board the 61st regiment, several troops of light dragoons, and a detachment of artillery,) were hourly expected; but it was a matter both of regret and surprise to General Baird, to learn from Sir Home Popham, that when he left Mocha, no news whatever had been received there, either of the provision-ships which were expected, or of the division of the army, under the command of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley and Colonel Champagne.

We believe that this was the first meeting between Sir Home Popham and General Baird, and it is clear that a very strong feeling of mutual friendship arose out of their acquaintance. General Baird was greatly struck by the activity and decision of Sir Home, and upon this, as it will be seen he did on various subsequent occasions, he placed the firmest reliance upon his zeal and exertions in accelerating whatever duty there was to be performed; nor was this opinion at all weakened by the manner in which Sir Home, in an audience with the sheriff, adjusted a misunderstanding which had unfortunately arisen with respect to the detention of one of the sheriff’s vessels at Bombay. The sheriff was entirely soothed and satisfied by Sir Home’s explanations, and requested that the subject might never be mentioned again. Both Sir Home and General Baird were extremely well
pleased with the line of conduct adopted by the sheriff upon this occasion, and met his readiness to forget what he had previously felt as an injury, by declaring their intention to apply immediately and jointly to the governor-general to exempt his highness's vessels from the payment of duties in any of the Indian ports.

In addition to this liberal termination of the difference which had existed, the sheriff offered to raise an Arab force for the purpose of co-operating with the English army; but General Baird hesitated before he accepted this offer, because it was evident to him that he must advance very considerable sums of money to the sheriff for the purpose of equipping these men, without, as he believed, a corresponding certainty of his ever seeing them after the money had once been paid. In consequence of this apprehension, founded upon experience, General Baird directed Mehedi Ali Khan not to conclude any agreement upon that point, until he received further instructions from him.

On the 26th of May, General Baird embarked, at Sir Home Popham's request, on board his ship, the Romney, and sailed for Kosseir, where they expected to meet Admiral Blankett.

In the despatches brought out by Sir Home Popham, many new staff-appointments from England were announced, which had the effect of superseding those which General Baird had provisionally made. Colonel Auchmuty was appointed adjutant-general to the army, and by a
letter from Mr. Huskisson, then under secretary of state, the general was directed to place the whole of the troops from the Cape, on their arrival, on India allowances.

Nothing remarkable occurred on the voyage from Jeddah towards Kosseir. The winds in the Red Sea, as our readers of course are aware, blow six months from the north, and six from the south. The season was now far advanced, and as has been frequently stated, by no means favourable for the voyage; yet on the 8th of June, the Romney arrived at the place of her destination.*

When General Baird reached Kosseir and found that Admiral Blankett was not there, he felt severely disappointed, inasmuch as he expected to have had an opportunity of concerting with him the most eligible plan of operations to be carried on against the enemy; and this disappointment

* Kosseir, Cossier, Cosire, or Kosire, lies in lat. 26° 8' N., long. 34° 15' E.; the road is confined, and cannot contain more than four or five ships safely, the quality of the ground being very indifferent for anchorage, and much exposed to easterly winds. On the first appearance of an easterly wind, ships should put to sea, for the bank of anchorage being of small extent, they are obliged to lie near the shore, and there is always a heavy swell setting into the road.

"The northern part of the road is formed by a reef of rocks, steep to. A ship may anchor in thirteen fathoms, with the body of the fort N. W. half W. a large half-mile off shore, or further-in where the depths are less, 7, 8, and 10 fathoms, and be sheltered from northerly winds."—Horsburgh, Vol. I. p. 224.
was by no means diminished, by finding that the admiral had left no letters, from which the general might collect any information respecting the actual state of affairs in Egypt, or of the force or position of the Turkish and English armies.

General Baird, however, found Colonel Murray with his detachment at Kosseir, having been there nearly three weeks; during which time the colonel had made such active arrangements with respect to procuring camels sufficient for the transport of the troops under his immediate command, to Ghennah, that the general, finding the road open, and the inhabitants apparently well disposed towards the English, resolved to move them forward in the course of a few days; intending as soon as the other division of the army should arrive, for which he determined to wait at Kosseir, to follow with all practicable expedition himself.

After General Baird had been a short time at Kosseir, he received a despatch from Admiral Blankett, informing him of General Hutchinson's success in Lower Egypt, and his consequent junction with the Grand Vizier's army. General Baird immediately wrote off to General Hutchinson, announcing the arrival of the troops from the Cape, and requesting to know as speedily as possible, whether he considered it absolutely necessary for them to join him at Cairo. Colonel Murray, it appears, had written repeatedly to General Hutchinson without receiving any reply,
for in a letter of General Baird's, to General Hutchinson, dated Kosseir, 10th of June, 1801, he says, "As Colonel Murray has repeatedly written to you, without (as yet) receiving any answer, I shall, for fear of accidents, write daily, until I shall have the pleasure of hearing from you."

This trait of resolute perseverance on the public service is highly characteristic, more especially when it is recollected how many, and what totally opposite duties, necessarily occupied General Baird's time and mind on the eve of such an expedition as that he was about to undertake. The general, however, was destined to find General Hutchinson a better correspondent than Colonel Murray had found him; for Admiral Blankett, who arrived himself at Kosseir on the 15th of June, brought with him a despatch for General Baird, which appears to be of sufficient importance to merit insertion here.

Head-quarters, British Camp,
15 miles above Rahamenie, on the Nile,
May 13th, 1801.

Sir,

I have heard, with great satisfaction, from Admiral Blankett of your arrival at Jeddah on the 17th of April, and I am very happy to find that his Majesty's troops from India are under the command of so able and so experienced an officer.

I have thought it necessary to send my aide-de-camp, Major Montresor, who will give you intelligence of every thing that has passed in this country.
It is my intention to push forward towards Cairo, so as to keep the French troops there in check, and to prevent the possibility of their attacking you before you have formed your junction with the Grand Vizier. I have also written, and caused the Captain Pacha to write in the strongest manner to the Grand Vizier, to give you all the assistance required for the passage of the desert. I am afraid that you will find great, but I hope not insurmountable difficulties. The season is advancing—the hot weather is coming on, and, I believe, that you will find no water on the route; but I speak with extreme diffidence, as the minds of men in this country are so brutalized that it is impossible to get just information of the state and circumstances of countries which are even within a few miles' distance. I have a sanguine hope, however, that your troops, more inured to a hot climate than those immediately from Europe, may be enabled to bear up against the fatigues incidental to such a march as that across the desert naturally must be.

I mean to continue in my position near Cairo until I hear that you are in a state of security; it is then my intention to descend the Nile, and to besiege Alexandria in conjunction with the troops under the orders of his Highness the Captain Pacha. It is rather my present opinion that you should join yourself to the army of the Grand Vizier, and take the direction of military affairs with him. It will probably be necessary to besiege the citadel and forts of Cairo, which I do not think will be difficult, as we have found that the stone of this country being of a bad quality, and the masonry new, they do not resist cannon for any lengthened period. I must, however, think of procuring you the necessary heavy artillery for that purpose, as you cannot bring any across the desert, and I know the Grand Vizier has none, from having been placed in similar circum-
I shall not enter into further details, as Major Montresor, a very intelligent officer, and perfectly in my confidence, will give you every intelligence which you can desire, and much more than could be contained in the bounds of a letter.

I am glad to find that you are accompanied by my friend Colonel Wellesley, to whom I desire to be remembered in the kindest manner.

I suppose, as you are coming from a wealthy country, that you have brought your own means with you; don't hope to derive any assistance from us, for we are plunged in the most abject state of poverty; perhaps, in this respect, you may be able to assist us. If you could lend us ten or twenty thousand pounds it would be a great object. Every thing is in arrear, even the pay of the soldier. You know that this arises from most of the ports of Europe being shut against us.

I fear I shall be under the necessity of making requisitions on the country; I shall endeavour, however, to avoid this painful extremity as long as possible.

Colonel Wellesley being senior to Brigadier-General Oakes, now acting under my command, I suppose he also is to be a brigadier-general; I tell you this for your information, as I do not know how it may interfere with the regulations laid down in India, and whether there are any company's officers acting with you, of the rank of colonel, senior to him.

If I can be of any manner of use to you, I need not say that you may command me, and that you may believe me to be, with much regard,

Sir,

Your most obedient, and most humble servant,

J. H. Hutchinson.

Major-General Baird, &c. &c. &c.
To this General Baird sent an immediate reply, in which he informed General Hutchinson, that Admiral Blankett's opinion against attempting to proceed by sea to Suez was fixed and irrevocable, lamenting at the same time that the difficulties of effecting a junction by that means with General Hutchinson's army were rendered insurmountable by the lateness of the season. Under these circumstances, and under the advice of Sir Home Popham, in whom upon all occasions General Baird reposed the most perfect confidence, the general resolved upon sending off Colonel Murray, the quarter-master-general, to Ghennah, whence he would transmit the letter he was then writing, and that the colonel should either remain at Ghennah or proceed down the Nile, for the purpose of opening an immediate communication with General Hutchinson, and gaining from him every possible information.

According to this arrangement Colonel Murray quitted Kosseir for Ghennah, on the route towards which place General Baird had already established posts for nearly half the distance, at which he had directed the men to dig for water. Having fortunately succeeded in all the spots where they halted, the general was naturally encouraged to push forward by corps, and on the 19th, the first body of troops began the march, having been delayed by the unsoundness of the mussels or bags in which they were to convey their water.

Just as General Baird was closing his despatch
to General Hutchinson, announcing this movement, and expressing his zealous determination to effect a junction with him as speedily as possible, he received the following letter from that officer.

_Head-quarters, Camp near Akesa_,
3rd June, 1801.

_Sir_,

I send you this letter by one of Osman Bey's mamalukes: Osman Bey promises every assistance in his power, and I dare say will keep his word. He joined our army three days ago with about a thousand cavalry. We march to-morrow and shall arrive at the head of the Delta on the 7th instant; I mean to besiege the Citadel of Cairo as soon as ever the Turks arrive. The Grand Vizier's army acts on the other side of the river; we shall be enabled to assemble a considerable force, and I do not believe that the works of the enemy are very formidable.

There is some difficulty in bringing up the heavy cannon, on account of the present low state of the river; the French have about 5,000 men in Cairo, and Gizeh, and probably near the same number at Alexandria; General Coote occupies an entrenched camp in front of that town, with about 5,000 men; should the enemy not receive reinforcements they will find it hardly possible to continue the contest. We took from them in the course of the last month 1,600 men; some of their best troops; and we are in possession of the whole country but Cairo and Alexandria. I hope after you have once got over the desert, you will find your march an easy one. The country I understand is abundant, and boats are numerous. I do not suppose that the enemy will march into Upper Egypt, in order to oppose your progress; should they venture it, I
mean to march a strong corps of cavalry, and some pieces of cannon to your assistance. I hope you have received my letter of the 13th of May, which I forwarded to Admiral Blankett.

I have sent camels to Suez, to bring up the detachments of the 86th regiment embarked on board the fleet; Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd is to join the Grand Vizier's army, where I have also ordered three other British battalions. I shall be happy to hear from you as often as you conveniently can. I beg my best compliments to Colonel Wellesley. I hope you have brought money with you; for our part we have not sufficient even to pay the subsistence of the troops, nor is there much probability of our situation being bettered; this country affords no money resources, and our communication with England is extremely slow and uncertain.

The plague has by this time ceased in Upper Egypt; you had better, I think, be cautious about entering the villages, as there may still be a lurking remnant of the disorder in the country; it has been in our hospital at Rosetta, and I believe at Aboukir; there has been no appearance of it in this corps, and we are much more healthy than that which is stationary at Alexandria; indeed, I have observed that it is uniformly the case in all armies, and that fixed camps are very prejudicial to the health of the soldier.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. Hely Hutchinson.

Major-General Baird, &c. &c. &c.

The contents of this letter were of a nature to increase General Baird's anxiety for despatch, and accordingly the troops destined for the advance began to move.
The corps which first started on this perilous enterprise, was commanded by Colonel Beresford, and as we have already expressed our conviction that every detail by which the progress of the expedition can be authentically traced, even to the most minute particulars, will be interesting in the highest degree, we do not hesitate to subjoin the following order of march, which was issued to the several officers in command.

You will march this evening to the new wells, distance ten miles, there fill your water.
22d. Half-way, if possible, to Mollah, distance 15 or 20 miles.
23d. To Mollah, distance 15 or 20 miles. There you will find water and provisions. You may halt a day there if you find it necessary.
24th. Half-way to Legeta; about 15 miles, no water.
26th. Half-way to the Nile, 15 miles.
27th. To the Nile.

The camels are not to be allowed to drink at the wells at Mollah; if it is necessary the camels should drink, they can have water at a short distance forward from Mollah, bullocks and asses must also be sent there.

Colonel Beresford thinks the best mode of marching, is fifteen miles at night, and five early in the morning, you, however, will judge for yourself. I would recommend marching the whole distance without halting, if you find your men are not too much fatigued.

You will give particular attention to the orders of the 19th instant, for your guidance on the march.

You will not issue more than one gallon of water per man, which may be given to them as soon as you arrive at your ground in the morning, but on no account is any to be distributed whilst on the march.
The bags which leak most to be first emptied, and as your camp-kettles will not be wanted for cooking, water may be started into them from leaky bags whilst you halt.

As your route is discretionary, you will of course be guided by any information Colonel Beresford may give you. He is directed to correspond with you.

General Baird, anxious to watch the first movement of the troops, accompanied the division to its first halting place, nearly twelve miles from Kosseir, and it was then discovered that a very great number of the bags had entirely emptied themselves through the leaks: a circumstance which the more alarmed him, because although the wells which had been dug, yielded water, it was still to be procured but in small quantities.

This misfortune operated dreadfully upon the movement of the troops: however, General Baird was compelled to forward the camels laden with water which were ready and intended for the second division, to Colonel Beresford, delaying of course the march of that division; but during all these harassing events General Baird never lost his presence of mind, nor seemed moved by the difficulties which surrounded him, declaring, even at the moment of this discomfiture, his conviction that he should eventually succeed, and that each division would have crossed the desert in nine days.

But the general had need of all his firmness. The accounts received from Colonel Beresford of the situation of the first division were most dis-
tressing. One hundred camels from the 10th regiment were immediately forwarded, fifty of which were laden with water. The general, under the circumstances, desired Beresford, when he arrived at Moilah, to halt there until further orders, and in the meantime to endeavour to ascertain the exact distance between that place and Legeta, and whether water was procurable at the latter; and if not, whether the plan which they had tried in other places, of digging for it, would be likely to succeed there, and in the event of that being the case, immediately to set working parties to sink wells.

The consideration for others, and the anxiety which he began to feel for the men under his command, operated upon General Baird's feelings in a way which no personal ill or inconvenience could have produced, and at the time the camels were pushed forward, to rescue the advance from the horrors of the most dreadful of deaths under a scorching sun, he sent to Colonel Beresford to desire him to communicate openly, fairly, and fearlessly his real opinions as to the ulterior practicability of the undertaking. He ordered the guns and tumbrils to be sent back, and gave directions to the head camel-man, whom he dispatched with them, to the effect, that if Colonel Beresford should feel convinced that the failure of the mussacks or water-bags had destroyed the probability of their continuing the march—a conviction which General Baird himself appeared apprehensive might be confirmed by the absolute
impossibility of getting the bags repaired or rendered serviceable—the advanced force should immediately fall back.

The general's solicitude for the men is well illustrated by the following extract from a letter to Colonel Beresford, written by Captain Molle, his aid-de-camp and secretary.

"One day's provisions were sent from camp last night, and forwarded by Captain Sturt, which the general trusts have reached you, and he has desired Colonel Quarrel immediately to forward you by the camels now sent, one half day's provision out of his own stock, if possible. The general suggests the expediency of moving on to Moilah as many of your sick and fatigued as there may be camels without burthen, and to desire Mr. Shubrick immediately to forward by them such supply of water and provisions as may be required till you reach Moilah. The general trusts you will husband the provisions at Moilah as much as possible—more will be forwarded in order to make up your consumption. You will order Mr. Shubrick to forward provisions to Legeta. Colonel Murray informs the general that water is to be had about four miles from Moilah, on the road to Legeta—good, but in small quantities; and that about seven or eight miles from Moilah, he found water at a place called Manah-har, and where plenty might be had by digging for. If this is possible, and sufficiency can be found, it would ensure the first stage from Moilah, as this does from Kosseir."

When the 10th regiment, and first company of sepoys began their march next night, it was discovered that their water-bags were in as bad a state as those of Colonel Beresford's division; in-
Indeed the loss was so great, and their efforts to secure the water so precarious, that they could not depend on more than twelve hours' supply. Under these circumstances, and seeing that it was impossible to march the army on foot across the desert, and equally impossible, under any circumstances, to transport the artillery, General Baird began to falter—not in his hopes—but in the certainty which till now he had felt of carrying his plan into execution.

At this period of our narrative it may not be amiss to give a brief account of the town of Kosseir, which has derived considerable interest from having been the landing-place of General Baird's expedition.

Count de Noé, who served in the expedition as an officer in the English 10th regiment of foot, published in 1826 a work called "Memoirs relatifs à l'Expedition Anglaise de l'Inde en Egypte," in which he says, speaking of Kosseir:

"I shall never forget the deep impression of melancholy made upon my mind by the first sight of this desolate coast. Such barrenness, such solitude, such a total and wretched absence of every thing like verdure or foliage, except indeed in the shape of a few blighted date trees. The heart shuddered at the idea of even a temporary residence upon its arid shores.

"Kosseir itself is a miserable cluster of wretched hovels, built with shells and mud, yet it is nevertheless a port of considerable commercial impor-
tance; in fact it is the point of communication between Arabia and Egypt, and is the regular mart for the exchange of corn and other productions of the country, against the coffee of Mocha and the muslins of India. The town of Ghennáh is the general entrepot, and although several days' journey distant from Kosseir, is the source whence the latter derives all the necessaries of life.

"The water at Kosseir is exceedingly bad, and so bitter that even boiling does not correct it; but the merit of finding the springs—bad as the water is—is due to the soldiers of the 21st demi-brigade, under General Belliard; before their discovery all water consumed at Kosseir was brought over from Arabia. The fort which defends the place, and which was built by Generals Belliard and Donzelet, is so well masqued as to be entirely imperceptible to troops in their approach, until they are literally under its fire. In 1800 a detachment of English soldiers were landed here from H.M.S. Fox, who were repulsed with considerable loss and compelled precipitately to re-embark."

The account given by Bruce of this place, and the country between it and Ghennáh, is even more unfavourable than that of the count. "Our road," says he, "was all the way on an open plain, bounded by hillocks of sand and fine gravel, perfectly hard, and not perceptible above the level of the plain country of Egypt. About twelve miles distant there is a ridge of mountains, of no considerable height, perhaps the most bar-
ren in the world—between them our road lay, through plains near three miles broad, but without trees, shrubs, or herbs; there are not even the traces of any living creatures, neither serpent nor lizard, antelope nor ostrich, the usual inhabitants of the most dreary deserts; there is no sort of water on the surface, brackish or sweet; even the birds seem to avoid the place as pestilential, not having seen one of any kind so much as flying over. The sun was burning hot, and upon rubbing two sticks together, in half a minute they flamed."

His description of starting on the march is highly graphic:—"When all was ready, the whole party, at a funeral pace, slowly advanced into the gloomy region of the desert. There was nothing in the prospect to excite the energies of the mind, or to arouse the feelings. Men, and camels, and horses, drooping as they went, seemed alike to be aware, that the courage they had now to exert, was only of the passive description—all that was required of them was to suffer! Anger, hatred, and other revengeful feelings, which, like brandy, too often make men careless and insensible to danger, afforded them no such excitement—they had not the savage pleasure of contending with human beings—the burning sand,

* Vide Life of Bruce, Murray's Family Library, No. 17, p. 90.
and the burning sun, it was out of their power to injure."

The wilds of Egypt are inhabited, or to speak more correctly, traversed successively by bands of Arabs, known by the distinctive name of Bedouins, who again are subdivided into numerous tribes. They are thieves by profession, and are in themselves the strongest possible living proofs of the existence of honour among that fraternity. The striking point of character amongst them, is that of defending to the death any one once under their protection, either from having purchased their services, or from having been led by accident to their dwellings, and partaken of their hospitality.

They levy tributes on the caravans which pass through their territories; and woe be to those who should refuse to pay. They possess great numbers of cattle, horses, and goats. Their dress consists only of a linen shirt, with large sleeves, which descends to their heels, and over that a black or white woollen jacket. They occasionally throw a shawl across their shoulders, and wear turbans, the under part of which consists of a handsome crimson cap. Always mounted either on horses or dromedaries, of which the fleetness is proverbial, they are constantly armed with fusils and pistols, sabres, and sometimes spears. They are the self-constituted proprietors of the wells,

* Ibid.
near which their camps are pitched, a circum-
stance which renders it impossible for the car-
avans that cross the desert to escape their exac-
tions.

Kosseir, however, if not fertile on its surface,
contains some hidden treasures. Bruce says, "it
has been a wonder among all travellers, and myself
among the rest, where the ancients procured the
prodigious quantity of fine marble with which all
their buildings abound. That wonder now ceases;
after having passed in four days, in the neighbour-
hood of Kosseir, more granite, porphyry, marble,
and jasper, than would build Rome, Athens, Co-
rinth, Syracuse, Memphis, Alexandria, and half-a-
dozen such cities."

We have devoted some space to these accounts,
because they serve to illustrate the progress of the
gallant subject of our memoir, and enable the
reader to form some opinion of what he and his
gallant army were doomed to undergo. Only let
it be recollected, that in addition to the hard-
ships, the exertions of mind and body, the
fatigues and vexations, and the hopes and dis-
appointments incidental to his elevated and re-
sponsible situation, General Baird had to endure
all the other afflictions so sensitively described by
De Noé and Bruce.

Think, too, what must have been General
Baird's feelings on the discovery of the failure of
the conveyance for water, by which his whole
arrangement would be destroyed, and the expe-
dition in all probability itself terminated; add to this another serious evil which he experienced, and which he describes in a letter to General Hutchinson, dated from the New Wells, (to which place he had gone forward,) arising from the misinformation which he almost invariably received as to the relative positions of places on the route—distances estimated by the natives at twenty miles, almost always proved to be double that amount—in some instances more; so that he found the calculations which he had made, not only as regarded time, but in estimating the number of camels requisite for the performance of the journeys on different days, all erroneous.

With his mind full of these distracting difficulties, but with a firm heart and an unshaken resolution, General Baird, having despatched Colonel Murray's detachment, returned to Kosseir, on the evening of the 22d of June.
CHAPTER XVII.


While General Baird continued busily occupied in making the necessary preparations for the march, the perils and difficulties of which seemed awfully to increase in number and magnitude as he approached them more nearly, in repairing the mischief which had already occurred to the muzzaks, upon which so much, in fact everything, depended, and in providing against a recurrence of similar misfortunes, his active mind had been employed in endeavouring to turn to advantage some intelligence which he had, as he believed, exclusively obtained from an
SIR DAVID BAIRD.

Arab, that there was a force of fifteen thousand French troops and ten thousand Greeks and Copts in the neighbourhood of Cairo.*

It appeared quite possible to General Baird that supposing that to be the case, a large detachment of troops might be pushed forward from Cairo to Ghennah by the Nile, in order to check his progress, long before any intelligence of their movement could reach him from General Hutchinson; and considering the practicability of such a measure, he consulted Sir Home Popham as to the expediency of deferring the march of his forces on to Ghennah until he should be reinforced by European troops; since the detachment which was to advance under Colonel Murray amounted to no more than seven hundred men.

Finding it impossible to communicate with Admiral Blankett, as he very much wished, by an overland dispatch to Suez, on account of the wars in which the different tribes of Arabs, in all directions, round that place, were engaged, Sir Home Popham, at his solicitation, put a fast-sailing vessel at General Baird's disposal, by which the General forwarded the important information which he had received. "Indeed," says the general, in a letter to Lord Wellesley, "I feel myself highly indebted to Sir Home Popham for his ready assistance and cordial co-oper-

* To ordinary readers, the importance attached to the supply of water may appear somewhat over-rated, but it is an established fact, that if General Baird had not, with his inherent foresight, caused wells to be dug at the halting-place on the road to Moilah, every man of the advanced detachment would have perished in consequence of the failure of the mussacks.
ation on this, and on every other occasion; his zeal for the service is so great, that he determined to accompany me to Ghennáh with a body of seamen, in order to assist us in making our arrangements for embarking on the Nile."

After Admiral Blankett's arrival, and that the communication between Generals Baird and Hutchinson was opened, and the falsehood of the story told by the Arab respecting the French and Copts force established, General Baird determined to lose not a moment in pushing forward, to cross the desert and effect a junction with the English army; at the same time, with a view to the ulterior operations projected against the Isles of France and Bourbon, so constantly remembered, and so frequently referred to by him, he wrote to Mehedi Ali Khan not to purchase any additional camels or horses at Jeddah, but on the contrary, to dispose of those which he had already bought, to the best advantage.

But when General Baird had, by every possible care and activity, overcome the leading difficulties which presented themselves in opposition to the march, a new misfortune assailed him. The troops that had advanced under the command of Colonel Beresford and the other officers, were attacked with a dreadful dysenterial complaint, brought on by the badness of the water, the heat of the weather, and the exertion of marching in such a climate over such a country, after a long confinement on ship-board, where indeed, their food (consisting necessarily,
almost entirely, of salted provisions,) had not a little contributed to render their constitutions more susceptible of the malady which so severely assailed them.

Under these circumstances, and as Sir Home Popham, in consequence of orders issued by Admiral Blankett, was unable himself to accompany General Baird, and as the general became more and more convinced of the great difficulty of moving Europeans, he declined taking any of the seamen from the ships. Seamen on shore, unless commanded by their own officers, and those officers accustomed to act with troops, are seldom very efficient.

Another source of uneasiness to General Baird was, the extraordinary delay in the arrival of the detachments under Colonel Wellesley and Colonel Champagne, the hopes of a junction with which he now was compelled, at least for that season, to abandon. To wait any longer on their account would have been an unjustifiable waste of time, because under the circumstances the period of such a delay must have been indefinite; and accordingly the general made up his mind to try the result without the aid and co-operation of that re-inforcement, for which he had been so long and so anxiously looking out.

As many of the names of the officers composing the staff of this gallant force under General Baird have since become familiar to the ears of their countrymen, we think it may not be unacceptable to give them as they stood on the 24th of June 1801.
Major-General Baird, His Majesty's 54th Regiment, Command-in-chief.

Colonel Samuel Auchmuty,* H. M. 10th Foot, Adjutant-Gen.

Colonel John Murray,† H. M. 84th Foot, Quart.-Mast.-Gen.

* Colonel Auchmuty entered the army in 1776, as a volunteer in the 48th Foot, and received an ensigncy in the following year. He was shortly after made Lieutenant, and served in the actions of Brooklyn and Whale-plains. He exchanged, and went to India, where he served from 1783 to 1796, having obtained in 1795 the Majority of the 75th Foot. In 1801 he went from the Cape to Egypt, with troops, and the rank of Adjutant-General to the army. He afterwards served in South America, and took Monte Video in 1807, and held the command of the army until the arrival of General Whitelock. In 1810 he was appointed Commander-in-chief at Madras, and obtained a complete victory over the Dutch, the result of which was the capture of the Island of Java. In 1813 he returned to England, and was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General. He also received the thanks of Parliament, a medal for the capture of Java, and was made a Knight Grand Cross of the Bath. Sir Samuel was afterwards appointed Commander of the Forces in Ireland, where he died in the year 1823.

† Colonel John Murray, a native and Baronet of Scotland, entered the army in 1788, and served in the campaigns in the Netherlands in 1793 and 1794, during which he was aid-de-camp to Marshal Freytag, and subsequently to His Royal Highness the Duke of York. In May 1794 he obtained the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. He was at the capture of the Cape, and proceeded with a division of troops to Egypt, where, in 1801, he acted with the rank of Colonel, as Quarter-Master-General to Sir David Baird's army. He afterwards commanded the Bombay division at Poona, and subsequently the British army during the wars with Scindiah and Holkar. In 1805 he attained the rank of Major-General, and from that period till 1808 was on the staff of the Eastern District in Great Britain. In 1808 and 1809 he commanded the King's German Legion
Major L. Macquarie, H. M. 77th Foot, Deputy Adj.-Gen.
Captain H. Falconer, H. M. 71st Reg. Deputy Quarter-
Master-General.
Capt. George Moll, Scotch Brigade, Sec. and Aid-de-Camp.
Capt. George Tucker, H. M. 22nd Foot, Major of Brigade.
Dr. W. R. Shapter, Inspector of the Hospitals.
Mr. J. Foreman, Surgeon to the Forces.
Mr. R. Moss, Purveyor to the Forces.
Mr. J. Paterson, Field Apothecary.
Mr. J. Rice, Hospital Mate.
Mr. T. Price, ditto.
J. Ryder, Esq. Paymaster to the Bengal Troops.
T. White, Esq. ditto, ditto.

On the 24th of June we find, by a letter to General Hutchinson, that General Baird had, by great exertions, completed such arrangements about the
provisions and water as made him, as he says himself, "again sanguine in his views." The bags had been repaired, and rendered, as he hoped, serviceable; and on the 24th the General issued the following order, from the tenor of which it appears that some persons, who had neither his perception nor his perseverance, had suggested the absolute necessity of using casks on the march, instead of what no doubt appeared to them the more fragile and precarious receptacles for water, which, besides their general inefficiency, had, in the present instance, given signs of uncertainty and insecurity.

"I have," says the General, "very attentively considered every mode by which water can be carried across the Desert, and can devise no means in our power, except with casks or puckallies (mussacks). As to the former, I am now convinced that even if we had small casks, (which we have not,) and they could be slung between two camels, or on the camel's back—both of which modes I have endeavoured to adopt, with larger ones, without success—the plan would not succeed. If a corps with casks were to move from the wells, the next morning, the water of many of the casks would be consumed, and the empty casks exposed to the sun and land-wind during the whole of that day, would be so warped that they would be unserviceable at Moilah.

"Casks, therefore, would not answer, and we must either trust to the puckallies or find water on the desert, or re-embark.

"To-day's march of the 88th will decide the first
point, and if it is possible to carry water, it should be done in this way.

"The 88th should take their bags on to Legeta, and after the next day's march thence, send them back to Legeta, for the next corps.

"The 10th should take their bags to Moilah, and after the next day's march send their bags back to Moilah, for the next division. The artillery, increased to a hundred puckallie camels, should take their bags one day's march to the wells, and send them back. By these three divisions of bags the whole army could, in succession, be supplied. Careful steady men should be appointed to each division, and the principle should be well explained to everybody. A European officer should also go with each division of puckallies.

"If the puckallies will not answer, and the 88th get on to Moilah, a company should be sent to clear the wells, seven miles from Moilah, and two companies should be sent half-way from that towards Legeta to dig wells, and, as fast as they find water, more companies should follow.

"In the same manner, the 10th should send two companies half way to Moilah, and endeavour to dig wells.

"If water is found at these stations, the 88th must halt at Legeta, and send on two companies to dig wells between that and Ghenné.

"The sepoys at the stations may go and assist, and the two companies at Legeta should immediately begin between that and Ghenné."
On the 27th of June, the day fixed for General Baird's departure from Kossier, His Majesty's sloop Wasp arrived from Bombay, bringing intelligence that Colonel Wellesley was prevented by serious illness from quitting that presidency. In a letter to General Lake, General Baird expresses his sincere regret at the absence of "that able and experienced officer" on the occasion, and trusts that his recovery may soon take place.

By the Wasp, General Baird received several letters, public and private, from Colonel Wellesley himself, which, for various reasons (independently of the general feeling of interest attaching to the names connected with them) are so important in themselves, in relation to the Egyptian expedition, that it would be something like sacrilege to mutilate them; we therefore make no apology for giving them entire.

We begin with Colonel Wellesley's public letter of the 9th of April, a few days (as the reader will re-collect) after General Baird's departure from Bombay.

_Bombay, April 9th, 1801._

_Sir,_

I have the honour to enclose a letter from Captain Moore, the garrison store-keeper of Bombay, which will explain the arrangements which have been made at this Port to complete the supply of provisions to me for six months for the Europeans and natives embarked. Besides the supply noticed in the inclosed letter to have been sent, there is a farther supply on board the other ships despatched from hence, and one will sail in a few days for the
troops on board the Wellesley, London, Experiment, Ann and Maria, Hydra Grab, and Fancy Brig, of the amount of which Captain Moore will apprise you in due course.

I likewise inclose a packet containing the invoices and bills of lading of treasure sent for the service of the armament when I had the honour of commanding it. Inclosed is the receipt of Mr. Rider, the Paymaster, for the treasure on board the Experiment, which he has carried to account.

I have the honour to inclose a packet of papers and returns relating to the armament, the nature of which their titles will explain. In obedience to your orders, I despatched Lieutenant-Colonel Capper to Sir Ralph Abercromby on the 7th instant, with a letter, of which a copy is inclosed.

I have the honour to inclose copies of the Orders which I have signed for money received from the Pay Office at Bombay since your departure. When all the troops will have gone from hence, I propose to take up all the vouchers, and to forward them to Mr. Rider, and to give the Paymaster-General at Bombay a receipt according to the form inclosed.

I beg leave to refer you to my private letter of this date for a statement of the reasons which have prevented me from joining you.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with great respect,

Your most obedient humble servant,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The following is another public letter, of a date two days later.

Bombay, April 11th, 1801.

SIR,

I have the honour to inclose a letter from Captain Moore, giving an account of the provisions which have
been embarked in some of the ships in this harbour. I likewise inclose a letter from Colonel Champagné; and a copy of a letter which I have written to the Governor of Bombay upon the subject of the mode of settling the account of the money received from the Paymaster-General since the departure of Mr. Rider and yourself. This mode appears well calculated to insure the satisfactory settlement of the account without the risk of the loss of the vouchers. If it should meet with your approbation, I request that you will order Mr. Rider to transmit his receipt to the Paymaster-General in Bombay, as soon as certified copies of the vouchers, as proposed in the inclosed copy of my letter to the Governor, will reach him.

I have the honour to inclose accounts of the sums of money which have been received from the Paymaster-General under authority from me since I wrote to you last.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with great respect,

Your most obedient humble servant,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The next is a private letter from Colonel Wellesley to the General, which does so much honour to the manly straight-forward feeling of one party, and the high character of the other, that we are quite sure it will be read with pleasure and admiration.

Bombay, April 9th, 1801.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

The first circumstance I have to detail to you is the state of my health, which is indeed the cause of this letter. I have had no fever since I saw you, but I am sorry to say that the breaking out of which I complained, is worse than it was, and has become so bad as to induce Mr. Scott to order me to begin a course of nitrous baths. This reme-
SIR DAVID BAIRD.

Dy, exclusive of the disease itself, is sufficient to induce me to be desirous to wait at least rather longer than the Susannah will, if not to give over all thoughts of joining you.

I do this, I assure you, with reluctance, notwithstanding that I think it very probable that I shall soon hear of your being recalled; however, considering that circumstance, and the bad state of my body, and the remedy which I am obliged to use, I should be mad if I were to think of going at this moment.

As I am writing upon this subject, I will freely acknowledge that my regret at being prevented from accompanying you has been greatly increased by the kind, candid, and handsome manner in which you have behaved towards me; and I will confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such treatment, but that my wishes before you arrived regarding going upon the expedition, were directly the reverse of what they are at this moment. I need not enter farther into this subject than to intreat that you will not attribute my stay to any other motive than that, to which I have above assigned it; and to inform you, that as I know what has been said and expected by the world in general, I propose, as well for my own credit as for yours, to make known to my friends and to yours, not only the distinguished manner in which you have behaved towards me, but the causes which have prevented my demonstrating my gratitude, by giving you every assistance in the arduous service which you have to conduct.

I shall stay here as long as the season will permit, and then I propose to go round to Madras, and if I cannot get well, I believe I must try a cold climate.

The Maria Louisa is unable to go on at present, and the 80th will sail by Saturday in the Morad Bey, 160; the Nelson, 70; the Dundas, 70; and about seventy followers distributed in the three ships. They will have six months provisions of every thing, even of meat. The
Asia would have been taken up for this detachment, according to your desire, only that she is dismasted, and wants copper on her bottom, and the owners were desirous that she should go into dock, if only for three days, before she should take her departure for the Red Sea. This operation, however, and the equipment of her with masts, &c. was likely to take more time than will be lost by the slow sailing of the vessels above-mentioned, and I therefore preferred them, and they will be ready immediately.

I inclose the memorandum upon your operations, and I refer you to my public letter for other matters. Wishing you every success, believe me,

My dear General, ever yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The memorandum to which Colonel Wellesley alludes in the above letter, and which was an inclosure in his despatch, we also lay before the reader.

Memorandum on the Operations in the Red Sea.

The object proposed by Mr. Dundas, and by the Governor-General, in the expedition to the Red Sea, are—First, to get possession of the forts and posts which the French may have on its shores. Secondly, to urge and encourage the natives of Upper Egypt (Mamelukes and Arabs) to commence hostilities against them. Thirdly, to assist, the operations of the natives, by giving them arms and ammunition, or by a junction with them, either of a part or of the whole of the force.

The advanced state of the season renders it probable that it will be so difficult to reach Suez that that object is not attainable. It is possible, however, that the force which left Bombay in December last, under the orders of Admiral Blankett, may have succeeded in effecting the
objects in view when it was fitted out, as far as they relate to Suez.

Cosseir will then be the first object of attention, and the operations of the army ought to be directed, in the first instance, to gain possession of that place.*

The General is already acquainted with the measures which have been taken to facilitate those operations, and it is needless to enumerate them here; and I shall now proceed to the consideration of the second object of the expedition, viz. to encourage the natives of Upper Egypt to shake off the French yoke, and to act on our side. The success of this measure, it is evident, will operate most forcibly in favour of Sir Ralph Abercromby; and it appears to me to be the principal object of the expedition.

From the intelligence lately received from the Red Sea, I am induced to believe, that after the Turkish army was beat by Kleber, in March last, and after Colonel Murray had evacuated Suez, Morad Bey made peace with the French, and that the latter ceded to him all Upper Egypt.

He is now stationed there, and from the accounts and distribution of the French force in Egypt, which I have occasionally seen, I am induced to believe that they have no troops in Upper Egypt excepting such as are necessary to watch Morad Bey, who are encamped with him, and such as are necessary to keep up the communication with their post at Cosseir. It is probable, that when Sir Ralph Abercromby commences his operations, they will draw to Lower Egypt all the troops not absolutely necessary for their safety in Upper Egypt, and thus they will leave to Morad Bey the power of acting as his own sense of his own interest may point out.

* It may be as well to observe, that Kossier is frequently spelt Cossier and Cosier, and Ghennah or Ghenné equally often used for Kennah, Kenné, or Kené.
I have always understood this man to be the head of the Mamelukes, and certainly, till the French made peace with him, he was supposed to be a friend of the English, and shewed his power of doing injury to the French by keeping in constant employment a large part of their army under Dessaix in pursuit of him.

It is probable that he does not deem his tenure of Upper Egypt very secure; he must be aware that as soon as the French gain quiet possession of Lower Egypt, they will have the power to break their engagement with him, and from his own experience of their fidelity in adhering to treaties, he must expect that they will use that power to his disadvantage. Indeed, the fact that the French have found it necessary to have a body of their troops encamped with Morad Bey's army, is a clear proof that they do not place much faith in him; and as he must know that he is suspected and watched, he has still stronger reason to expect, that as soon as the French have the power, they will not fail to exert it to get rid of a neighbour and an ally in whom they have so little confidence. Without being too sanguine, we may expect then that as soon as Morad Bey shall perceive a prospect of driving the French from Egypt, he will co-operate and join with those employed in that object. For this reason, the very first opportunity ought to be taken to open a communication with him; his situation and his prospects, if the French should remain in Egypt, ought to be clearly pointed out to him, and he ought to be urged in the strongest manner to exert himself to shake off the yoke. The power of the armies employed on the side of Lower Egypt ought to be made known to him; their prospects of success, founded as well on their own strength as on the impossibility that the French should receive assistance, ought to be stated to him; and finally, an offer ought to be made to supply him with arms and ammunition, and even to join him with a
part or the whole of the army in the Red Sea, in order to insure the speedy success of the objects which he, as well as the English, must have in view.

The possession of the Port of Cosseir, and of the navigation of the Red Sea, will be a strong inducement to Morad Bey, as the Governor of Upper Egypt, to be favourable to the English.

The trade in corn is carried on by this Port to Jedda in Arabia; and this trade is such an object both to Upper Egypt and to Arabia (and to Mecca in particular), that it may be expected that the Governor of Upper Egypt will not be disinclined towards those who will have it so much in their power to annoy him. Having now stated the reasons which induce me to believe that it will not be difficult to urge the head of the Mamelukes to shake off the French yoke, I proceed to a consideration of the third object of the expedition, viz. to assist the natives with arms and ammunition, and even to join them with a part or the whole of the army.

The first question which I shall consider, and which will lay the grounds for a consideration of, and decision upon others, is, whether it would be practicable, or even desirable, to cross the Desert from Cosseir at all, if that operation is not performed in concert and co-operation with a body of the natives posted upon the Nile.

It is needless to enter into a statement of the difficulties to be apprehended in crossing the Desert; they are certainly great, but I imagine not insurmountable. But, if it is not certain that the army or detachment which will cross the Desert, will partake of the plenty of the banks of the Nile when they reach them, if they should be certain of having water only, and such forage as their cattle should be able to pick up, I apprehend that the difficulty will become so great that the operation ought not to be attempted. It is impossible that the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt
can be neutral in the contest in contemplation; they must take part with the French or with us. If they take part with the French, the army will be in the situation in which I have above described it, enjoying no advantage from having reached the banks of the Nile, excepting water, and probably some forage; and it is needless to point out, that if the Desert is to be crossed under those circumstances, care must be taken not only to send with the body of troops which will cross, a very large proportion of provisions, but means must be adopted to add to them until the operations of this body shall have given them such a hold of the country as to leave no doubt of their steady supply of provisions. It is obvious that this will require a great number of cattle, a number much larger than the Governments of India, with all the zealous exercise of their power and means, can supply; but there is another consideration connected with this subject besides the supply of the cattle, and that is, the means of feeding them when landed from the ships.

Upon this point I need only call to the General's recollection the difficulties to which he has been a witness in moving large supplies of stores and provisions even in fertile, cultivated, and inhabited countries, well supplied with water, and under every advantage of arrangement in the supply, in the distribution, the care, and the food of the cattle, and draw a comparison between such difficulties, and those to be expected in a march through a desert. But that is not the worst that is to be apprehended; the cattle will of course land in weak condition, in a desert; and it must be expected that even those which survive the voyage will starve, or at least be in such a state before they commence their march, as to render it very probable that they will not carry their loads to the end of it. Upon the whole, then, I am decidedly of opinion, that if the
Mamelukes are not on our side, no attempt ought to be made to cross the Desert.

This opinion the General will observe is by no means founded on the impracticability of crossing with troops, because I am convinced that it can be done; but it is founded upon the danger that the troops will starve, if they do not return immediately, and upon the inutility of the measure if they do.

It may be imagined that (supposing the Mamelukes to be wavering,) if an attempt is not made to cross the Desert, the advantage of their co-operation will be lost. Upon this point I observe, that a knowledge of our strength (not of our weakness) will induce them to come forward, and that it might be expected that the sight of our weakness, occasioned by our march over the Desert without concert with them, might induce them to take advantage of it, and to join the French.

But those who will urge this consideration, must suppose it possible that the Mamelukes can be neutral for a moment; and this their history from the beginning of time, particularly since the French invasion, will shew to be impossible.

I come now to consider the propriety and mode of crossing the Desert, supposing that the Mamelukes should be inclined to shake off the French yoke, and to co-operate with us. The first point for the General to ascertain is, their sincerity in the cause, of which, as I have above stated, there is every probability. As soon as he will have ascertained this, it will be necessary that he should make arrangements with them for posting a supply of water on that part of the Desert where it is most wanted, and for having a supply of provisions ready on the Nile; and he might cross over a part of his army immediately. The first object on his arrival on the Nile should be to establish