EUROPE AND AFRICA — THE ENDURING RELATIONSHIP

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ABSTRACT

This article looks at two aspects of interdependence between Europe and Africa. The first relates to economics, the second to security. Under current trends Europe’s future looks distinctively like that of Japan today — an island of inertia where national political changes produce new leaders but with little transformational leadership. Europe, though will remain attractive to non-European migrants from Africa and will remain an important partner of Africa despite its declining global position. The article concludes that European and African economic and security futures are closely linked and it is in the interest of both parties to ensure that the values of democracy, a respect for human rights and a rules-based global system replace the recent tilt towards unilateralism and hubris.

1. INTRODUCTION: DECLINING EUROPEAN POWER

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the 27 member European Union (EU) has a combined economy, at US$14,8 trillion in 2009, slightly larger than that of the United States (US) (at US$14,3 trillion) out of a total global gross domestic product (GDP) of US$69,8 trillion. By way of reminder, the collective value of all of Africa’s economies is US$2,2 trillion — barely more than three per cent of global GDP.1 But whereas Europe’s total GDP is set to increase only moderately in years to come, that of the US is set to
increase faster, largely on the back of its faster population growth, and that of China and India much more rapidly. Reflected in many writings, European relative global power is declining. One projection would be that the Chinese economy overtakes that of the EU around 2025 and the US the following year in total size.

But on a per capita basis, according to the research findings of the International Futures project (Frederick S Pardee Centre, 2010) Americans, Europeans and Japanese for that matter, will remain several times more wealthy and prosperous than Chinese or Indians for generations to come. Perhaps less influential globally, Europe will become, with every year, a rich and desirable island to which many non-Europeans aspire, that provides health care, excellent education systems, public utilities and transport, and the amenities to match.

Under current trends Europe's future therefore looks distinctively like that of Japan today — an island of inertia where national political changes produce new leaders but with little transformational leadership, and where foreigners are treated with acute suspicion if they look and dress differently. Inevitably rich country politics are moving into a more conservative direction, even in a country such as Sweden where, during the most recent polls, the Swedish Democratic Party, the most conservative in mainstream Swedish politics in decades, gained parliamentary representation for the first time.

Declining European influence globally is partly reflected in European trade patterns with Africa. Although US trade growth with Africa has also been strong, China outpaced all other countries to become the continent's largest trading partner in 2009 (Freemantle and Stevens, 19 May 2010). Figure 1 below indicates the extent to which South-South trade is increasing as a component of Africa’s total trade relations (Mc Kinsey, 2010:15). Most of this has occurred at the expense of Western Europe, which has seen its share of trade with Africa decline from 51 per cent in 1990 to just 28 per cent in 2008.

Yet Africa will remain important for Europe. Its very proximity demands constant engagement. For all the hype about China, around 40 per cent of Africa's foreign direct investment originates from the EU (Freemantle and Stevens, 4 August 2010). Concerned about protecting its quality of life and relative prosperity Europe’s relative global decline can only be arrested if it enlarges or at least relaxes border control to include dynamic young labour — and
FIGURE 1: COMPOSITION OF AFRICAN TRADE BY TRADING PARTNER, 1990-2008 (%)

Source: Roxburg et al, Lions on the Move.
through deeper European integration. Both present interesting opportunities and challenges for Africa, North and West Africa in particular, for the proximity of Europe implies that its fortunes are more closely tied to Africa than that of any other continent.

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2. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

However uncomfortable politically, economic growth and interdependence will propel the Arab-African states along the Mediterranean in North Africa to look towards Europe for their economic and possibly eventually their political future — and for Europe to look South in meeting its requirements for energy, labour and markets.

Europe needs cheap labour and the unemployment rates in North Africa are amongst the highest in the world. Backed up against the Sahara desert to their south, North African countries naturally see the Mediterranean as their natural market. Algeria and Egypt — and to a lesser extent Libya — are significant exporters of liquefied natural gas, primarily to European consumers but also exporting to the Americas and a number of Asian customers. Of the three big countries — Algeria, Nigeria and Egypt — Libyan oil reserves account for almost three-quarters of North Africa's total with approximately 43.7 billion barrels (Arabian Oil and Gas, 2010). Algeria recently announced preferential treatment of local companies (but excluding the energy sector) over foreign rivals in preparation of the US$286 billion that that government plans to spend on modernising its economy over the next five years.

Already the Mediterranean Solar Plan could go a long way to helping the EU meet its 2020 renewable energy pledge. The plan, launched in July 2008 as part of the Union for the Mediterranean's Barcelona Process partnership initiative, envisages generating 20 gigawatt (GW) of renewable energy in North Africa for possible export to Europe — provided, of course, that Europe gets its electricity interconnection systems in place. And the proposed US$13 billion Trans-Sahara gas pipeline could supply up to 30 billion cubic metres of natural gas per year to the EU when it is operational by 2015. It
will run some 2 600 miles from Nigeria, across Niger to Algeria's Mediterranean gas export terminals at el Kala and Beni Safi, then by two existing undersea pipelines to Europe.

In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the environment will also become a shared concern in the Mediterranean. BP will shortly start deepwater drilling in 1 700 metres of water in the Gulf of Sirte (some 200 metres deeper than the well in the Gulf of Mexico that blew in early 2010) under a US$900 million deal that the company signed with Libya in 2007, which it described at the time as its largest single exploration commitment (Industry News, 2010).

Already exports to the EU dominate the trade relations of Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania, although much still remains to change in the protected national economies of North Africa if this potential is to be realised (see, for example, Achy, 2006). The so-called MED-countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority, as well as Turkey) figured around €120 billion, or 9.7 per cent of total EU exports, in 2007. Imports from the MED countries represented around 7.5 per cent of total EU imports, worth €107 billion, in the same year. A key factor driving this relationship is the lack of trade integration in North Africa, the region that is the least integrated regional market in the world, despite the Agadir Free Trade Agreement between Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt that entered into force in 2006 (Europa Press Releases 2008).\(^{\text{ii}}\)

But Europe is clearly being squeezed out of much of the rest of Africa, as its privileged heritage from the colonial era is steadily eroded, particularly by China, and as south-south trade expands. Already south-south trade represents more than 50 per cent of Africa's trade — although the lack of inter-African trade remains one of the major constraints on development on the continent.

Other factors account for the relative decline in European trade with Africa depicted in Figure 1 above. The most important of these is the Asian need for Africa's resources to fuel its domestic growth and the global shift of manufacturing to China and its surrounding countries. Export-led Germany is, of course, the exception here, like China, Germany has adopted an export and manufactured-led model of growth.

A slew of recent reports support positive news about Africa's future growth, particularly the report of the McKinsey Global Institute
of June 2010 called *Lions on the move: The progress and potential of African economies.* The report notes that Africa’s collective GDP in 2008 (US$1.6 trillion) was roughly equal to that of Brazil, with US$860 billion of combined consumer spending, and that these figures were set to increase to a GDP of US$2.6 trillion in 2020 and US$1.4 trillion respectively by 2020. They argue that telecoms, banking and retail are flourishing, construction booming and foreign investment surging.

Africa’s growth acceleration results from more than the resource boom, reflecting structural improvements in the management and composition of African economies. Natural resources, the McKinsey Report notes, accounted for just 24 per cent of Africa’s GDP growth since 2000. Arguably more important were government actions to end political conflicts (reflected in the greater activism by African institutions such as the African Union [AU] and the associated reductions in open armed conflict), improved macroeconomic management (reflected, amongst others, in the findings of the work done by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) governance and the Ibrahim Governance indexes as well as the United Nations Development Programme — UNDP), and efforts to create better business climates (according to the World Bank, in 2009 Rwanda was the most improved country to do business in). These developments enabled growth to accelerate broadly across countries and sectors as African inflation has been reduced from an average of 22 per cent during the 1990s to eight per cent in the 2000s, government debt reduced by 28 per cent in the same period and budget deficits have been brought under control (McKinsey, 2010:12). In fact, for all the demonisation of structural adjustment programmes, Africa may be reaping the benefits of the pain so brutally inflicted in past decades.

Africa’s future growth will be supported by external trends such as the global race for commodities, Africa’s increased access to international capital, and its ability to forge new types of economic partnerships with foreign investors. Currently Africa boasts 10 per cent of the world’s oil reserves, 40 per cent of its gold, and 80 to 90 per cent of the chromium and platinum group metals — with massive future discoveries inevitable (McKinsey, 2010:15). Paul Collier (2010) calculates that the average mineral and energy deposits in Africa amount to just US$23 000 per square kilometre, compared with US$114 000 for the well-explored countries of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Perhaps most impressive, Africa has 60 per cent of the world's total amount of uncultivated, arable land (around 600 million hectares of potentially suitable land that is not currently under cultivation) (McKinsey, 2010:22). This at a time when the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Switzerland projects that new global demand for land could amount to over 500 million hectares by 2030 — about the size of the Indian subcontinent — and that governments and corporations are heavily investing in the same as the interdependence of energy, food and water drive up production costs everywhere. According to De Koning (2009) of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI):

More than half of this land would be for biofuel production. ... The remainder of the land would be for food production, and this demand is also to a certain extent driven by climate change. Climate change is expected to reduce the fertility of land in many parts of the world. In addition, increasingly water-scarce but cash-rich nations, particularly in the Middle East, are seeking to acquire and invest in land overseas in order to ensure their own food supplies.

The downside of all of this positive news is that despite its admirable headway in trade participation and investment attraction, Africa, for the most part, exports raw materials as opposed to processing them internally before either exporting or consuming the end product. The continent's over-reliance on raw material exports reflects Africa's underdeveloped manufacturing sector (with the exception of South Africa), which is significantly smaller than the contributions from agriculture and services (Freemantle and Stevens, 6 July 2010).

Africa needs to develop like the West and indeed Asia does today — through the protection of infant industry, through state investment in selected industry and through limited regulation of financial flows.

The McKinsey report (2010:2) also documents increased capital flow to Africa, noting that total capital flows to the continent increased from just US$15 billion in 2000 to a peak of US$87 billion in 2007, surpassing both aid and remittances in scale. Foreign direct investment, one component of the total, increased from US$9 billion in 2000 to US$62 billion in 2008 — almost as large as the flow into
China, when measured relative to GDP. Most important, the rate of return on foreign investment in Africa is higher than in any other developing region (McKinsey, 2010:16).

In considering these figures it is also important to dwell on the efficacy of development, humanitarian and emergency assistance — or aid — in its various configurations. By 2050 malaria and HIV/AIDS, two of the killers of the current era will have been overcome and receded from their current deadly status largely through massive international charity, both governmental and private. Already the launch, in 2007, of a campaign to eradicate malaria is bearing fruit. The target is no more malaria deaths by the end of 2015 and no malaria at all a decade or two after that. Malaria killed 863 000 people in 2008, 89 per cent of them African, and 88 per cent of those people were children under five — and infected 243 million more. Malaria currently costs Africa US$12 billion a year — 1,3 per cent of its economic growth. Eradicating malaria will be one of the biggest boosts to health and development in history (Perry, 28 June 2010). Already malaria has at least halved in nine African countries since 2000 and global net protection expected to be achieved in 2011 (Perry, 28 June 2010). And it will have been done through aid — a stunning repost to aid critics such as Damisa Moyo (2009). Clearly development assistance, when focussed on productive as opposed to consumption expenditure will be important to Africa’s future — and Europe traditionally the largest provider of development assistance to the continent.

Figure 2 below provides, on a single graph, the recent trends in gross aid inflows, remittances and capital inflows to Africa since 1980 — including the steep drop that followed the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 (McKinsey, 2010:17). Since 2000, Africa’s relative and absolute share of global foreign direct investment has increased, peaking at US$514 billion in 2009. In other words, much like international trade, Africa’s global integration has accelerated in recent years — and given the low levels of savings on the continent, is absolutely crucial in generating economic activity (Freemantle and Stevens, 4 August 2010).

Development assistance should be focused on enabling development and reducing the impediments, therefore on competitiveness, entrepreneurship, and private enterprise. As to the instrumentalisation of aid, Mills (2010:272-273) asks: ‘Was aid actually
FIGURE 2: AFRICAN FINANCIAL INFLOWS ($ BILLION)

less about development than a way of keeping Africans where they were, rather than having them flooding into Europe or wherever else? … Africa’s comparative development advantage in this framework is in perceptions of its helplessness and poverty; and its competitive aspect in its ability to leverage these to best effect’.

The extent to which globalisation is driving development is evident when one considers that Global GDP, in nominal terms, has increased from US$32,1 trillion in 2000 to US$61,2 trillion in 2008, that is, almost doubling. Simultaneously, world trade, also in nominal terms, has increased from US$13,1 trillion to US$32,1 trillion over the same period — an increase of 245 per cent. Clearly, trade growth has outstripped GDP growth by a substantial margin. Meanwhile, global exports have tripled (Freemantle and Stevens, 4 August 2010). By 2050 one out of every four people will be living in Africa. Reflecting the youthfulness of its population, by 2027 Africa will have a larger population than China or India, many of whom will be children. By 2032 Africa will have a larger worker population (15 to 65 years of age) than China and by 2036 a larger worker population than India which, due to the failure of its domestic demographic policies, will face large population growth rates well into the next century. Every scenario that the Institute for Security Studies has run in partnership with the Frederick E Pardee Institute for Future Studies indicates steady GDP growth in Africa. Because of our massive population growth this only translates very slowly in changes in GDP per capita, but eventually it does. At the moment GDP per person per year in Africa is around US$900 (purchasing power parity). By 2030 this would be around US$1 760 per person — despite a population increase from around one billion to around 1,55 billion people. So, our GDP per capita almost doubles while our population increases by 50 per cent. This is good news. As China and India move up the manufacturing value chain it leaves room at the bottom, eventually also for the establishment of low cost mass manufacturing in Africa.

Obviously one cannot compare Africa with its 53 countries with a single country such as India or China. But Africa’s demographic momentum (high population growth and high urbanisation) will translate into economic momentum.

But there is also an uncomfortable trade-off between globalisation and radicalisation that may have particular relevance for
African-European relations. This is because a large portion of Africans will remain poor, uneducated and desperate, despite improvements in GDP *per capita*. Globalisation and economic growth has been particularly unequal with Africa left far behind.

## 3. SHARED SECURITY

The war on terror and associated stereotyping of 'non-Europeans', Muslims in particular, have accentuated a sense of ‘fortress Europe’, a rich continent with a low birth-rate, nervous about allowing entry of foreign nationals from the wider region into its territory, located in close proximity to a continent that will shortly have several times the population of Europe. Poverty and instability are closely related, borne out by the fact that a country with US$250 *per capita* income has a 15 per cent likelihood of internal conflict over five years — many times greater than the one per cent risk to an economy with US$5 000 *per capita* income. According to Ekaterina Stepanova (2010:2), writing for the SIPRI 2010 *Yearbook*: 'On a global level, criminal violence is far more widespread than organized political violence. Decline in numbers of armed conflicts since the early 1990s has not been matched by a global decline in homicide rates. While overall global crime levels increase slowly, 2009 saw a notable rise in some types of transnational crime, including in armed conflict.'

The growing reliance by armed non-state actors on shadow economic activity is eroding the boundaries between political and criminal violence, especially in fragile states, but also elsewhere. Armed violence, conflict and crime are increasingly related. In Afghanistan the deeply embedded opium economy plays a crucial role in fuelling that war and the same is happening in Africa. Current trends in West Africa, the region most affected by the global drug trade, therefore provide an interesting snapshot of future shared security concerns between Africa and Europe.

Similar to the way in which US drug-addiction has destabilised Central America, Europe's addiction to cocaine is already set to present West Africa with massive challenges. Cocaine is almost exclusively produced in the Andean-Amazonian region of South America (Columbia, Peru and Bolivia are the three largest producers) and a significant portion of output is now destined for Europe where the number of the seizures has tripled over the last decade with Spain
being at the forefront. Estimates of recent annual cocaine transhipments through West Africa to Europe range between 60 and 250 tons, yielding wholesale revenues of anything between US$3 and US$14 billion. During November 2009 investigators even found the remains of a Boeing 727 with traces of cocaine still evident as its ten-ton payload on a dry lakebed in northern Mali (O'Regan, 2010:1).

In 2009 an estimated US$1 billion worth of drugs were trafficked through Guinea-Bissau alone en route from Latin America to Europe — an amount larger than that country's total GDP. A country already reeling from a fratricidal civil war (1998/99), various military coups or attempted ones since 1999 and the double assassination, in March 2009, of its Army Chief of Staff and Head of State and a subsequent attempted coup, is rapidly turning into a narco state. One of the six poorest countries on earth, Guinea-Bissau largely depends on fish and cashew nuts to survive. More than two-thirds of the population live below the poverty line. In this environment drugs prove irresistible to the destitute, poor people of Guinea-Bissau — despite the fact that only a very small group will make a very small amount of money from it. The most worrying sign is the alleged involvement of some military officers in trafficking, as denounced by the country's President in a speech in July 2010.

Once it has been established as the source of political power in the country, the influence of drug lords will be impossible to displace — ask the Columbians and the leadership in Mexico where Rodolfo Torre, the front-runner to become governor of the northern state of Tamaulipas was shot dead by masked gunmen in mid-2010 having run on an anti-narco ticket.

With the limited exception of recent pronouncements by Hillary Clinton, the US has never admitted culpability in the war on drugs (a term that has also fallen out of favour under the Obama administration), but consistently emphasises the supply side instead of the demand side of the problem, whilst adopting what can at best be described as a punitive domestic approach (with an estimated one million Americans incarcerated annually). Without the steady supply of cocaine, heroin and other drugs from outside the US, the land of the free and the brave would not have a drug problem; except for the fact that California's largest cash crop is not wine but marijuana.

A recent editorial in the Financial Times (2 July 2010) noted that the North American cocaine market generates about US$38 billion of
profits a year. Of that, 85 per cent goes to US-based dealers; local South American producers and traffickers, meanwhile, scrape by on a mere two per cent. The drug trade is driven from the US, not from Columbia or Mexico.

The same alarming statistics are evident in Europe. More people die in England and Wales every year from opiate-related deaths than British soldiers have died in Afghanistan since 2001. A report released by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and EUROPOL (April, 2010) notes that 'cocaine use and cocaine-related problems in Europe have increased markedly since the mid-1990s. Surveys have shown that in many EU countries — and in Europe overall — cocaine is now the second most commonly used illicit substance among the general population, after cannabis. Three million, or 2.2 %, of young adults aged 15–34 are reported to have used cocaine in the previous year.'

If there are lessons to be drawn from the war on drugs (and indeed also from the war on terror) it is that the European response in West Africa does not follow the US example in Central America, but considers drugs as a policing rather than a military problem. That would mean keeping AFRICOM (the US military combatant command responsible for all of Africa except Egypt) and its attendant resources away — possibly an unrealistic challenge as US oil interests in the region already ensure a heavy military presence. This is an issue to watch. For many years the war on drugs was used to justify US military or paramilitary operations to fight leftist insurgencies and prop up pliable regimes in Latin America, such as that in Columbia. And with a vast military-industrial complex driving influence in Washington, many in the US have a long-standing and vested interest to find a use for its massive armed forces and their associated equipment beyond Afghanistan and Iraq.

4. GLOBALISATION, INEQUALITY AND INSTABILITY

But there is a bigger danger. In 1996 the conservative American scholar, Samuel Huntington published his controversial but bold and sweeping study entitled The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Largely a cultural explanation of the superiority of the
Anglo-Protestant way of life, the study remains influential, despite its questionable assumptions. Africa did not feature much in this sweeping ethnographic study, but that was because Huntington could not distinguish any particular dominant culture. For him, Africa was in any case, largely irrelevant in global political developments. Yet Africa’s global relevance is on the rise and will increase in tandem with its importance as a source of commodities and as a market. During the Cold War the continent served as a proxy battlefield for the West versus the East, particularly in the Horn and in Southern Africa. This could happen again, but with some important changes. It all depends on how Africans are drawn into the US war against terror and the extent to which radical Islam can be mobilised to serve domestic political agenda’s across a large swathe of the continent and how religion plays out. This development could have important implications for European security.

In some senses the reaction of the Bush administration to the terror attacks on 9/11, and the ongoing efforts to combat its off-spring’s and variants elsewhere have resurrected Huntington’s bogy of regionally dominant cultures that violently grind against one another where they meet. Africa does not have a single dominant culture — but in sharp contrast with Europe and the US, very few people are religiously unaffiliated and, according to a global PEW study (2010), for roughly nine in ten Africans religion is very important in their lives. Africa is simply more religious than any other continent. How Africans allow the global superpower to fights its war on international terrorism in Africa could have wide-ranging implications for the future stability of the continent. This is not because of anything specific in either Islam or Christianity, but a view borne of the relentless and grinding poverty that ordinary Africans experience and their search for meaning and explanation — a phenomenon not dissimilar to the massive (but generally unreported) Hindutva terrorism, Islamic fundamentalist and Naxalite radical movement insurgency in India. As of 2006, at least 232 of India’s 608 districts were afflicted, at differing intensities, by various insurgent and terrorist movements in the country. In August 2008, National Security Advisor M K Narayanan said that there were as many as 800 terrorist cells operating in the country (Wikipedia 2010). Much of this is unreported as global reporting focuses on India rising and not, as is the case with Africa, on its massive internal violence and instability.
According to a PEW report (2010:2) on religion in Africa 'While sub-Saharan Africa has almost twice as many Christians as Muslims, on the African continent as a whole the two faiths are roughly balanced, with 400 million to 500 million followers each. Since northern Africa is heavily Muslim and southern Africa is heavily Christian, the great meeting place is in the middle, a 4,000-mile swath from Somalia in the east to Senegal in the west.'

Religion is, of course, both a source of hope and accommodation as much as it serves as a source of intolerance and conflict. To some observers this is a volatile religious fault line that has seen repeated attacks on US embassies and Jewish targets in Uganda and Kenya in the East, and battles between the security forces of Mali and Algeria with al-Qaeda's movement in the Maghreb in the West. More ominously is the evidence of dozens; some say hundreds, of al-Qaeda combatants in Somalia (see Figure 3).

Africa is therefore a highly religious continent and has become more, rather than less divided on this matter. In recognition of these concerns the US, countries such as France and Spain, have already deployed considerable resources in the Sahel and in the Horn of Africa to protect the Christian South from suffering the radicalisation of the Muslim North as al-Qaeda fighters from places such as Algeria and Egypt returned as experienced battle-hardened Mujahideen combatants from Afghanistan.

There is, already, some indication of this trend. Most recently, on 11 July 2010, al-Shabaab, an Islamist Somali militia with ties to al-Qaeda, detonated three massive explosions during the screening of the 2010 soccer world cup final match that killed 74 and wounded a further 85 innocents. The result was much discussion about beefing AMISOM (African Union Mission to Somalia) up with an additional 2 000 African troops to its authorised level of 8 000 with more to follow, changes to make its mandate more robust and numerous other proposed measures such as making AMISOM a joint AU/UN mission as is the case with the UNAMID (African Union/United Nations Mission in Darfur) hybrid operation in Darfur.

Terrorism is not mindless violence. The purpose of terrorism is to elicit a reaction that will serve a particular purpose. The al-Shabaab attacks on the Kyandondo Rugby Club and the Ethiopian Village restaurant has the explicit intention of drawing foreign forces into Somalia and to further inflame what is already a regional crisis.
FIGURE 3: GROWTH OF ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SINCE 1900

Source: PEW Research, 2010:1
This was what al-Qaeda brilliantly achieved with its attack on 9/11 — possibly the most cost-effective terrorist attack in history. In a spasm of overreaction, the US eventually invaded a country (Iraq) that had little, if anything, to do with the attacks on the US, while largely ignoring the real source of the problem — Afghanistan — until it was too late. The result is evident. Pashtun guerrillas operating with impunity from Pakistan into Afghanistan are slowly wrestling the great US military to the ground. Coalition forces in Afghanistan have suffered almost 2 000 casualties with the number of civilian Afghan civilians who have been killed and maimed in the process many, many times greater. US overstretch is achieving what Bin Laden set out to do — undermine its global hegemony and inflame passions worldwide against pax-America.

There are many examples of religion being used as a resource that enables leaders to mobilise poor people against government in Africa, ranging from Boko Haram in northern Nigeria to the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda. The danger in Africa is that religion be used to mobilise against globalisation and Westernisation — often seen to be one and the same.

Without a mention, thus far, of the migration bogey, the traditional source of European fears about Africa, the analysis presented thus far should indicate that Europe and Africa share many security concerns, are bound together by an often painful history and by economic and security interdependence into the future.

5. MIGRATION

Despite the high level of attention given to emigration from Africa to Europe, less than one per cent of Africans live in Europe (UNDP, 2009:24). The numbers are, however, increasing. In the early 2000s, OECD countries officially received 1.2 million West Africans. With over one million migrants a year and 299 000 asylum applications in 2006 alone, Europe is the primary destination for international migrants. In four European countries, African migration is sizeable although Africans do not constitute the majority immigrant community in any, namely the Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom (UK) and Italy. In three other European countries, more than 50 per cent of immigrants from developing countries are Africans — these are Belgium, Portugal and France.
Under the 2003 Dublin II Regulation, the first country in which an asylum seeker lands is solely responsible for examining that person's asylum application. Predictably, this has placed greater strains on countries closest to Africa, the source of the vast majority of immigrants. Already, in 2006, Spain received at least 636 000 migrants, representing almost half of the EU's total and 122 500 more than the number of migrants arriving in Germany, France, Italy, and Britain combined. During that year the authorities on the Canary Islands apprehended almost 30 000 Africans trying to enter, sometimes at a rate of more than 1 000 per day. In response Spain embarked on its 'Global Approach to Migration' consisting of efforts to combat illegal migration, allowing for more avenues for legal migration and development assistance (Spain now spends around €80 million per annum in Senegal). By 2009 the tide had been turned with no Senegalese landing in the Canary Islands as Spain now has an agreement to deploy maritime capabilities, helicopters and aircraft within Senegalese territorial waters (code-named Operation Era) and is allowed to repatriate planeloads of Senegalese from the Canary Islands and mainland Spain on a case-by-case basis. As a result all illegal Senegalese citizens in the Canary Islands have been repatriated.

Other countries have not been able, or indeed willing, to follow these practices and time will tell if this approach is sustainable in places such as Malta, located only two hundred miles from Libya's coastline, where up to 200 immigrants a week have landed at peak time, and the Italian island of Lampedusa which has also been affected.

A new development in recent years, however, is that a number of African emigrants embark on risky journeys through North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Libya in particular) with the aim of reaching Europe via Spain, Malta or Italy. Most African emigrants, with the notable exception of North Africans, begin their journeys somewhere in West Africa.

But it is developments in the longer term that are most concerning. According to a recent report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (Brown, 2009:11-12):

In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted that the greatest single impact of climate change could be on human migration — with millions of people displaced by shore-
line erosion, coastal flooding and agricultural disruption. Since then various analysts have tried to put numbers on future flows of climate migrants (sometimes called "climate refugees") — the most widely repeated prediction being 200 million by 2050. This is a daunting figure; representing a ten-fold increase over today's entire documented refugee and internally displaced populations. To put the number in perspective it would mean that by 2050 one in every 45 people in the world will have been displaced by climate change.

Beyond the fact that migration can have positive effects on countries' development (brain gain, remittances, economic and cultural diversification) experience shows that if not properly managed, migration flows can negatively impact on human security and have significant potential to trigger violent conflicts. In particular:

— The presence of a significant number of very motivated 'foreigners' in recipient countries, especially at times of economic hardship, may lead to conflicts or tensions between the migrants and local communities. And if the authorities in the host countries mismanage the crisis or become overwhelmed by it, this may lead to the souring of relations between the different countries in the region: expulsions in Côte d'Ivoire (1964 and since 1999); Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1960s); Ghana (1969); Nigeria (1983 and 1985); Mauritania and Senegal (1989); Benin in 1998; Libya, Angola and Mozambique on many occasions in the 1990s and lately the xenophobic attacks in South Africa (May 2008).

— Some migrants, especially those (refugees) who moved as a consequence of armed conflicts or natural disasters, may find themselves in situations in which they may be exploited (forced prostitution, ill-treatment by employers) or engage in criminal activities out of despair.

— Social and psychological impacts on families through the split of family members because of migration or while fleeing armed conflicts and disaster zones.

— Brain drain as a result of the migration of skilled people who do not return: this has an impact on the health sector, the academia and, generally, the economic sector in originating African
countries.
— The conditions in which some 'undocumented' migrants travel cause many of them to die on their way, which is a loss on both their families as well as their countries of origin. Many of them are also forced to engage in activities they would not have otherwise done, such as prostitution, criminality and banditry in order to survive.

6. CONCLUSION

Global competition may have lost much of its stark ideological content since the collapse of communism, but has regained relevance when considering the shifts in relative power and influence from West to East and from the current crop of industrial, elderly, rich countries, Europe in particular, to the upstarts BRIC 'new kids on the block'. vii) Africa, for all its global marginalisation and miniscule contribution to the global economy, is increasing in importance. It remains the most unexplored region for mineral resources and its vast empty agricultural spaces and potential consumer bulge present huge future opportunities. Already, in the first half of 2010, Angola became China's main supplier of oil, overtaking Saudi Arabia — at a time when China is the world's second-largest oil importer after the US. In a world where global governance reform requires the support or at least acquiescence of the majority of the 192 members of the United Nations, the African block of 53 members reflects a coalition large enough to determine the fate of any initiative, more so because of its role within the Group of 77 (which actually has 130 members) and the traditional alliance amongst countries of the 'global South' that include India and China.

Europeans, indeed the developed world, have a jaundiced view of Africa, which remains in their view, a calamitous continent evidenced by bad leadership, corruption, murder, poverty, poor governance, fragile states and vast, ungoverned spaces that have to be 'controlled'. Whatever one's view about whom carries the greater blame for this situation, Africans or Europeans, it is often fair comment when comparing Africa's poor performance with most other regions. But leaving blame aside for the moment, this negative view is not shared in China, India, Brazil, Russia and elsewhere, where the discussions
are about the opportunities and future market space in Africa, of the need for investment in infrastructure and the vast unexplored resource potential, even of Africa’s potential for agricultural and manufacturing. This is not to make light of the challenges in the continent for even under the best conditions African growth will take generations rather than decades to recover from the ravages of post-liberation politics.

Depending on one’s view about the desired future, the relationship between Africa and Europe remains important for both. In the aftermath of the disastrous Bush-era politics, Europe is in many senses the remaining ideological power through its support for democracy, civil society, human rights, and efforts to advance gender issues and support to civil society and the worst excesses of African dictators. In this process European support and that of others including USAid and private foundations such as that of George Soros and Bill and Melinda Gates, have protected millions of Africans from hunger, exploitation, persecution and death. European partnerships with Africa are particularly important in terms of global efforts to advance a rules-based system where criteria, not power, determine decisions.

Without European (and even US) assistance, through the EU’s African Peace Facility, the AU’s much vaunted Peace and Security Architecture would, for example, not have been translated into the capabilities evident today in the African Standby Force and its three operational brigade-size capabilities for conflict prevention and management in South, West and East Africa.\textsuperscript{viii)}

In this sense a two-tiered partnership is developing for Africa — economically with Asia and on governance, peace and security with Europe. As African heads of state look with envy at the example of top-down state-led development exemplified by China and the Asian tigers such as Singapore and Taiwan of some decades earlier, African citizenry who stand to suffer the worst excesses of these outdated examples look towards the freedoms in North America and Europe as more desirable visions to alleviate their stricken situation.

The argument, amongst some, that democracy (and its associated values such as respect for human rights) is a mere projection of Western values is a gross misrepresentation for it reflects more on the failure of African leadership than it does on the dominance of any particular ideology. If democracy was indeed a Western invention, how does one explain India, Japan, Indonesia, Namibia, Botswana,
Taiwan, Ghana and South Korea?

Democratisation has admittedly not been able to replace neo-patrimonialism for the vast majority of Africans. The deficits include hollow citizenship, a lack of accountability, abuse of power and the manipulation of checks and balances — reflected in a global obsession with the extent of corruption in Africa forgetting that it was on Wall Street where white collar crime was exposed in its most virulent form at the end of 2008. With the exception of South Africa, free countries in Africa are limited to smaller states, with the more populous countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) all part of Freedom House's 'partly-free' category. As a result the percentage of people living in freedom in Africa is considerably less than those that are either partly free or not free at all. In addition, some, for example, Jeffrey Herbst (forthcoming) argue that smaller size lends itself more easily to political liberalisation — where governance is easier and leaders more in touch with their subjects. Interesting enough, none of the three countries produce oil.

The current global economic recession has already made resource competition in Africa more desperate and violent in the last two or three years. As a result the number of coup d'états has increased and the military appear set to return to African politics. These are developments that should be of central concern to Europe for, as this article has argued, European and African economic and security futures are closely linked. Eventually ordinary Africans and Europeans share a common desire to live in safety, freedom and prosperity. Their close proximity would indicate that their future destinies are inexorably linked. And it is in both their interests to ensure that the values of democracy, a respect for human rights and a rules-based global system replace the recent tilt towards unilateralism and hubris.

As its influence seeps away, Europeans and Africans need allies in the global tussle of values and principles.

ENDNOTES

i. Calculated on the basis of 2009 purchasing power parity (PPP) figures.

ii. The relationship between the MED countries and the European Union is governed by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (or the Barcelona Process). EU exports to the MED countries have grown at an annual aver-
age of eight per cent since the mid-1990s, an increase in export value of about 250 per cent between 1995 and 2007. The largest average annual growth rates are recorded for the West Bank and Gaza, albeit from a low level, followed by Turkey, Morocco, Jordan and Algeria.

iii. Moyo writes: 'The notion that aid can alleviate systemic poverty, and has done so, is a myth. Millions in Africa are poorer today because of aid; misery and poverty have not end but have increased.' Her book largely deals with what she calls 'systemic aid', that is payments made to governments, excluding humanitarian, emergency and charity, that she argues 'has been, and continues to be, an unmitigated political, economic, and humanitarian disaster for most parts of the developing world' (Moyo, 2009:xix; 7).

iv. This thesis would become even more evident in his subsequent publications such as Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress co-edited with Lawrence Harrison in 2000) and Who are we? — America's Great Debate (2004).

v. The Naxalites are a Maoist communist group that, by 2009, was active across approximately 220 districts in twenty states of India, accounting for about 40 per cent of India's geographical area (Wikipedia).

vi. In September 2005, the Spanish border police, armed with riot gear and rubber bullets, faced hundreds of sub-Saharan African emigrants prepared to risk their lives to get across the razor wire topped perimeter fence around Ceuta and Mellila, two disputed Spanish enclaves off the Moroccan coast. More than 500 of those would-be migrants, including pregnant women and children, were later found abandoned in the Moroccan desert after being expelled from the two enclaves (BBC Online 7 October 2005). In another development, Italian coastguards claimed to have rescued more than 400 migrants off the southern island of Lampedusa on 14 September 2007, including a group of 300 men, women and children crammed into a wooden boat (International Herald Tribune 7 September 2007).

vii. Power is always relative. So it is not the absolute size of a country's economy that matters, but its relative size to those that it competes with.

viii. In 2009 the EU spent nine per cent (€12 billion) of the total EU budget (€143 billion) on external aid, of which €618 million was for North Africa and €3.9 billion for Sub-Saharan Africa (EU press release on the release of its Annual Report 2010).

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