Some thoughts on artists' models

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Summary

Prompted by Joel Black's (1984) question “what is before the artwork?”, this article considers key issues in the prefigurative dimension of art, among others, the critical neglect of the artist's model, the former prominence and the demise of technical making models in imitational art, a new interest in mimesis and the representational value of art associated with the heuristics of ideological modellings of the aesthetic potential of the world.

Works of art, like all products of human culture, have a secondary ontic status. Devised by human imagination and crafted by human hands for human use or abuse, they need free, even capricious, participation by others. Primary and secondary objects are woven into a densely interlaced tissue of human actions. Full-bodied human beings with dated commitments and imaginative prospects - the makers and the users of art alike - thus mediate between art products and the objective domain to be investigated here, which could be described as models whose aesthetic potential cues an imaginative response from human beings.

The converse is true as well. Set within changing
institutional frames, secondary objects mediate in human intercourse, notably the many forms of interaction between artists and spectators who are not in face-to-face contact with each other. Interaction with art products incorporates a number of fragile but systemically sound strings of subject-object relations in which subjects have the imaginative initiative - for instance, a heuristic relation between artists and models, a making relation between artists and art products, and a relation of appropriation between beholders and products of visual art.

Hence one may tentatively define “model” as any item which may have been selected by artists to pose an imaginative focus for the primary aesthetic potential of the world at large, modelling this in each individual case in accordance with the initial aims and ideological commitments of producers. As secondary objects made for the participation of others, art products thus represent prior responses to some imagined meaning-realities, though evidently not with the implication that other parties - prospective spectators or recipients, each with their own conjectures about what is represented by an art product - would necessarily be able to recognise the artist's model, or should be expected to identify in each representation a single imagined meaning.

Joel Black (1984: 174) juxtaposes primary and secondary objects in the following terms when he describes the secondary status of art as made objects: “Some thing, some image is always before the artist in a spatial sense; and some other artifact is always before the work he creates in a temporal sense. But it is precisely this inescapable fact of priority, of being before, that is responsible for the neglect by many [critics] - despite renewed attention to mimesis as a poetic principle, artistic activity, or human faculty - of the model (das Vorbild, das Urbild) as that which is before. Rather than engage or confront the model as an essential onto-epistemological category, these critics have all too often resigned themselves to investigating the Nachbild, the artifact's after-image, its residue or supplement, the posthumous or the ‘now’...”

This neglect of the model may well be one of the more remarkable effects of the modernist notion of Erlebniskunst - in other words, art emerging from and intended for the subjective horizon of human experience. Since the eighteenth century at least art has been steadily absorbed into the subjective domain of creative human capabilities, increasingly being associated with inner and private ‘consciousness’, notably conceived in terms of a constitutive, formative and contemplative ‘mind’ - presumed to be individual,
authentic, original, disinterested and immune to social control, detached from economic forces and distanced from political regulation. Such degrees of liberation from contextual constraints ushered in the modern aesthetic notion of art - 'works of art' as the crucial manifestation of art - aesthetic objects considered to be autonomous and thus without immediate usefulness or practical relevance for everyday interests or concerns (cf. Mattick 1996). A prominent feature of curated museum display in modernity's key art institution, the essential function of Erlebniskunst is expressive. Thus the objecthood of works of art is valued primarily as utterance by an artist, alternatively as a receiver, conductor or relay of subjective human experience.

Typically, this expressive and formalist view of art as 'non-mimetic', 'non-figurative' or 'non-representational' rejects the priority, relevance or even the validity of relations between artworks and any pre-existing reality (though the influence of prior histories of art is sometimes conceded). The rise of 'non-mimetic' art concepts have been described in various ways - in terms of a "retreat from likeness" (Blanshard 1949), a shift in the function of art from "mirror" to "lamp" (Abrams 1953) with the emphasis on intelligible artistic 'form' ordering and freely shaping 'nature' (Summers 1998), thus elevating artists to the status of original creators, exceptional individuals with superhuman powers of creatio ex nihilo (cf. Nahm 1956). As a result of this transformation the ancient meaning of mimesis (cf. Peres 1980 on ars imitatur naturae) has become well-nigh incomprehensible to us late-comers on the stage of history - except in the banal technical sense of an accurate depiction of some visible model the artist may have witnessed or experienced. The continuing popularity of the term 'realistic' suggests that mimesis is still often being confused with the nineteenth-century style of social realism (cf. Bruck 1982, Hagen 1986).

It seems that the aesthetic potential of the world - the 'aesthetic world' in distinction from the institutionalised 'artworld' - may have forfeited its former categorical power and relevance. Nevertheless, 'representation' remains a resilient and still vital issue, both in the theory and practice of art (cf. Nibbrig 1994, Summers 1996), provided it is understood that the representational value of art is not dependent on the fact that some or other appearance might be depicted in art products. Instead 'representation' concerns a "basic communion" which the human imagination discovers between a representation and what is being represented or shown by art products.
The well-known anecdote about the legendary origins of drawing is instructive in this regard. It is a *locus classicus* of the profound bond between secondary and primary objects - a maid of Corinth drawing the ephemeral outline of the shadow cast on a wall by her departing lover's head, catching the likeness of the object of her desire and longing in the silhouette of his face. From her point of view the image kept him present in his absence; for posterity the image memorialises both of them even after their deaths. At the same time the legend also contains a technical making model. By recording and fixing cast shadows we imitate a natural process of image creation - a making ability extended to everyone with the advent of photography and the mechanical reproduction of camera images.

Being a multi-dimensional concept, 'representation' is a source of many puzzling questions, among others the following: Where do the artist's action and labour begin and where do the spectators' efforts end? Where does one look for the origin and the destination of art products? What primary meaning-realities and subject-object relations are imaginatively objectified in art products for actualisation by the recipients of art? What are the 'sources', the 'material', the 'subject-matter', the 'theme' or the Gegenstand of art products (cf. Smuda 1979)? What knowledge can be gained from art and what is the value of human interaction with art?

I cannot cover all of this ground nor find answers for even one of these questions, but hope to provide at least some pointers. The 'aesthetic potential of the world' is a global and abstract category - conjectured in philosophical aesthetics as both system and history. By pointing towards the artist's model, Joel Black's question “what is before the artwork?” captures the pertinence this global category holds for artists, for art products and for spectators. This is the general direction I will be exploring as well.

1. Models

A thorough examination of artist's models always brings to light more than is explicitly depicted, made visible in art works or immediately discernible to spectators. Anything indeed may serve as a model (there are no limits on what may serve as the occasion for artistic creativity) - any singular circumstance, deliberately posed arrangement or examples of earlier art, a fleeting glimpse or troubling thought, some fantasy or memory, perchance a single extraordinary item or a common lifelong experience - that is,
anything in the world which grips an artist’s imaginative attention.

Implicit in any model, however, is always the larger whole of a contextual world of which it is (or once was) a part, the conditions and circumstances from which it arose, the meanings it might have, and the attitude prompted by or adopted towards it. A preliminary answer to Black’s question would thus be that art provides spectators with metaphorical images of the world as seen through the eyes of another - not necessarily a depiction from a particular angle or another point of view but an imaginative interpretation of often strange and unsettling yet accessible and familiar matters.

The ‘model’ concept derives from the formative domain of technology. Its primary concern is technical processes of design, planning, making and construction, especially the selection of elements to be combined in a configured whole according to certain conventions. A *locus classicus* is the legend of the ancient Greek painter Zeuxis and his choice of the five maidens from Croton to serve as models for a portrait of the beautiful Helen. From each of these he selected certain body parts considered as the best, and which he then combined in making an ideal portrait. The five maidens functioned as making models but the effective model was a certain normative idea of feminine beauty.⁴

There are several classes of models, all of them ideologically informed - for instance, normative models of being or transcendent paradigms as well as a variety of functional models for learning, for making, for discovery, for knowing, for orientation and for social behaviour. Histories of models recount a gradual shift in emphasis from transcendent paradigms to functional models, from knowing to making models (cf. Santema 1978). An example of the former is Plato’s divine *eidos*, the ideal supra-sensory form of beauty. A clear case of the latter is the notions of ‘making’ and ‘matching’ which Gombrich advocates in Art and illusion (1962) - the application and subsequent modification of existing schemes of picturing to create persuasive illusions of naturalness or ‘truth to nature’.

Theoretical reflection on artist’s models began in Greek and Roman antiquity when the visual arts were conceived and practised as skilled making or crafts (*techne* or *ars*), and artifacts were the results of productive ability (*poiesis*) and mimetic skill, rather than ‘magical’ powers. The Sophists were among the first to conceptualise the technical nature of art by analysing aptness of design (planning and control) and illusion-cre-
ating effects. The *locus classicus* for the ‘art of artlessness’ or ‘hidden artifice’ is the legendary competition between the painters Zeuxis and Parhassios. Birds pecked at the Zeuxis still-life painting of grapes;\(^5\) Parhassios depicted a trompe l’œil cloth\(^6\) apparently covering his painting, even deceiving Zeuxis with this illusion (cf. Bann 1989, Peres 1990).

Here ‘mimetic’ art denotes the creation of an illusion of a model’s real presence in an ‘art of hidden art’ (*ars est celare artem*, alternatively an art of ‘make-believe’ in a current psychological version, cf. Walton 1992). This is the origin of the banal and reduced notion of mimesis as a technical trick, a mere sleight of hand or illusory artifice. In this narrow sense of the term, Joel Black thus is justified in speaking of a gradual disappearance of the model from the history of art.\(^7\) Understandably, the spread of the narrow technical notion of mimesis was met with growing resistance, centring in our time on the contentious notion of simulacra - surface value copies, with no originals, disseminated in the mass media or in the virtual reality of ‘cyber-space’ (cf. Camille 1996). The critique of modern technology as ideological source of human autonomy opened new avenues of exploration into constructive *poiesis* (cf. Jaufl 1982), bringing into focus the prefigurative stage of modeling processes in artistic work and extending it beyond the technical ambit of making models. The point of technical conceptions of mimesis is the control exercised, the command attained by means of making models (e.g., the comparative function of scale models or blueprints). It should be remembered, moreover, that it is the spectator’s response that is being manipulated by the persuasive powers of art (cf. Hyman 1989). Rather than being deceived by demonstrations of artists’ imitational skill, spectators are overpowered by the ‘semiotic effect of reality’. Hence, what mainstream modernists rejected with their ‘non-mimetic’ notions of art, is the priority of the making model, the understanding of likeness as replication of an original, or the mere aping of a model.\(^8\) However, once mimesis is reduced to the imitation of a making model, the idea of representation is unfortunately rejected as a whole. Yet the making model is in fact only a minor ingredient of mimetic views of art. Hence we need to explore additional dimensions of the model.

2. Mimesis

Current views clearly advocate the opposite of a technical making model at the command of the artist. The reduction to rational control or tech-
nical mastery is being challenged by associating mimesis instead with notions like the 'primary', 'elementary', 'primitive', 'original', 'powerful' and 'authoritative'. The maker's command of a model and persuasive manipulation of audiences are being superseded by a recognition of the affective power of made images, an awareness of human powerlessness in the face of authoritative or canonic models of being, or an alertness concerning the ideological power and influence of knowing models of reality made visible by and in art (cf Blinder 1986, Van den Berg 1996).

The archaic origins of mimesis, commonly associated with so-called magical 'representation' 'present-making' by ritual miming or the reverential mimicry of nature (cf Blumenberg 1957, Srbom 1966.) - have survived modernity's demystifying force. It survives, among others, as historical traces of classical notions like 'inspiration', 'enthusiasm' or overpowerment by superhuman and divine powers (the 'Muses', cf. Nancy 1996), and eros as a desire to participate in this power, a longing to be united with, or consumed by the source of such power. Significantly, the title of Joel Black's (1984) essay on a critical theory of the model ('idology') refers to idols and, if the extrapolation is permitted, to ideology in terms of idolised values.

Repudiating the modern desire for human autonomy, the archaic import of mimesis is being revived in recent ideas about 'human bonding'9 with normative models of being (cf. Morrison 1982 & 1988). Understood in this sense, mimetic concepts of representation like 'heteronomy', 'dependence', 'obedience', 'subjection' and 'authority' restore links with ancient Israel's view of man as imago Dei, the image or representative of God, as well as the medieval doctrine of imitatio Christi. Such mimetic concepts are embodied in a number of founding legends of Western artistry which became popular subjects of canonic paintings, for instance, the legends of Narcissus, of Pygmalion and Galatea, or of St Luke as the painter of the icon of the Virgin Mary.

Mimesis thus denotes the deepest bonds of humanity, the identity and value of human beings at the level of commitment to such bonding, and the image-worthiness of the undivided aesthetic potential of the world as a whole - conversely, human powerlessness in the face of dominant ideological powers and, consequently, insurmountable divisions at the very heart of human subjectivity, at the levels of conscious and unconscious experience as well as individual and communal life-worlds. Perennial phenomena like image-power, idolatry and iconoclasm
cannot be explained satisfactorily as mere passing symptoms of ‘primitive’ superstition, prior to human emancipation, autonomy and secular modernity (cf. Freedberg 1989). Ideological service is a permanent condition of all the arts. Thus mimesis has the implication that the history of the arts is part of an all-inclusive history of ideological images or idolised values, a history of images made to represent and to serve ideological powers at work in many guises within human lives and bodies, culture and society (cf. Belting 1994).

Representation has various functional dimensions beyond the technical control of making models (cf. Bernheimer 1961). Besides being a technical imitation or prothesis of the model and a visual depiction or portrayal of the model, a representation is thus also a physical substitute or replacement for the model, a present sign referring to absent references, an example or case representing knowledge about an analytical class of objects, a voucher or tender of a certain value for economic exchange; a deputy for, witness or procurator of a person’s legal position, a trustworthy stand-in for somebody or a solicitating caretaker of another person. Given the appropriate circumstances, any or all of these functions might be performed by an image or a work of visual art.

Implicit in the representational capacity peculiar to art, however, is the human task of responding in a dated way to the aesthetic potential of the world - imaginatively interpreting the effects of historical powers, the legitimacy of social orders, the fundamental commitments and attitudes of human communities. Art products in an allusive and ambiguous manner represent dated lifestyles, communal ways of living in epochal worlds. In fulfilling this task, artists are guided by the traditions and customs of preceding generations - a principal historical way in which we experience ‘primary givens’ or the ‘aesthetic potential of the world’. Artists gain access to models, conventions, schemes, codes, formulas, genres and types mainly by learning from and appropriating existing traditions of representation.

In contrast with a modernist approach that evolved from Kantian philosophy, models are not obsolete examples or prototypes that artists of genius have to conquer in order to surmount the ‘anxiety of influence’ by demonstrating their originality. Emulation of learning models is essential whenever people are being educated in the acquisition of indispensable cultural competences, standards and attitudes - especially in training artists in mastering a distinctly artificial ‘language’ for competent performance in sys-
tems of visual meaning. Always a bone of contention in the bloody history and uneasy co-existence of cultural communities, various heritages of so-called canonic works and exemplary procedures provide access to ideological steering powers, guiding worldview frames and normative models of being that are essential as heuristic models for discovering novel artistic interpretations in new situations.

The aesthetic potential of individual things or events in the world is rendered in, or better still, worked into the configured import of art products - into the imaginary "world projected in the work of art" (cf. Wolterstorff 1980). Due to the multi-dimensional scope the representation of such imaginary worlds, Paul Ricoeur (1984-85) distinguishes three types or phases of mimesis - the prefigurative mimesis\(^1\) where processes of metaphorical modelling dominate; the configurative mimesis\(^2\) of the work of art's composition, and the regenerative mimesis\(^3\) transpiring during the reception of art. Art products should thus be understood as committed human interpretations of the dated and ideologically charged, aesthetic possibilities of life-worlds, rather than mere copies of any single making model (cf. Gilmour 1986). Metaphorical modelling of meaning play across a number of areas, a few examples of which can be mentioned in conclusion:

3. Inscape

Any entity an artist takes as a model - whatever it may be in any particular case - has latent aesthetic qualities. The function of a model is to specify aestheticity by highlighting the individual aesthetic nuances of such entities. The objective aesthetic functions of natural phenomena is a significant category of 'primary givens' in the global category of the aesthetic world. Natural kinds and the order of their interaction determine the latent aesthetic nuances of entities drawn from any habitat or ecological network of conditions. The global coherence of these properties constitutes what was generally known as the 'beauty of nature', nowadays the field of ecological aesthetics (cf. Berleant 1991).

The modern decline of a mimetic view of art is closely allied to a progressive reduction of 'nature' to its modern meaning - the totality of non-human phenomena (cf. Snyman 1990). Thus it is said that cultures of classical antiquity 'tamed' the numinous experience of nature common to archaic cultures, that christianity 'demythologised' the experience of mythic nature in antiquity and, more generally, that modernisation 'disenchanted' pre-modern experiences of nature and the supernatural. Prior to the rise of modernity, 'nature' denoted the evi-
dent human subjection to commanding totalities of divine, cosmic and social orders. 'Mimetic art' signified obedience to the mythical origins of these orders; conversely, 'non-mimetic art' rose with the modern subjectifying and interiorising of these orders (cf. Harries 1968).

In romantic reaction against secularisation and the industrial exploitation of nature, the nineteenth-century poet-priest, Gerard Manley Hopkins revived certain ideas from medieval scholasticism in formulating the notion of inscape or instress. These terms connote the profusion of latent aesthetic nuances that individual natural phenomena, under certain circumstances, may reveal to the imagination of the poet of nature - "Glory be to God for dappled things". To human imagination the ambience of an ecological habitat may manifest a particular Stimmung, since the inscape of various natural phenomena can reveal a marvelous aura of aesthetic nuances, the peculiar 'natural' expressivity of physiognomic qualities (cf. Gombrich 1963), or the dangerous and disruptive powers of the sublime in life-threatening situations. These terms signal pertinent categories of aesthetic potential.

Inscape structures the aesthetic potential of natural phenomena in relation to subjective human imagination. The imagination objectifies the aesthetic potential in accordance with metaphoric models of 'nature' - various models being favoured by alternative ideological attitudes. Based on the human sense of wonder, the appreciation of natural beauty (e.g., scenic values, cf. Tunnard 1978) is always determined by changing cultural conventions of interpretation. As a response to ecological conditions, it is influenced by competing life-styles of the human habitus and by the frames of traditional world views.

4. Landscape

Landscape painters and land artists inherited a number of poetic commonplaces from ancient rhetoric, such as the idyllic tradition's beloved place (locus amoenis), walled garden, pleasure garden or paradise (hortus conclusus) or the heroic tradition's inhospitable wilderness (locus terribilis) (cf. Pochat 1973). However, as a global aesthetic category, 'landscape' is a modern invention (cf. Smuda 1986) and as such the source of a number of familiar notions which apply not only to art but to global prospects - for instance, the picturesque (cf. Hipple 1957), the sublime (cf. Monk 1960) or the spirit of place (cf. Norberg-Schultz 1980). The 'aesthetic land-
scape' category evolved from earlier metaphoric models of cosmic totality - for example, universal world harmony, the divine book of nature, nationalist politics of ethnic self-determination, or the social self-regulation of the market mechanism. The 'green' notion of an organic unity of nature and culture, or landscape and culturescape (cf. Snyman 1990) gave rise to metaphoric models which artistic representations share with the political discourses of ecological movements - for example, the anti-industrial utopia of an aboriginal communal life deeply rooted in nature ('Africa'), the all-healing and fecund mother nature ('Gaia'), the pioneer ethic ('homeland'), the reconciled cultures of anti-international regionalism ('Heimat'), the unspoiled and untamed, alternatively endangered and polluted nature ('wilderness'), and the inherently contradictory industrialisation of tourist and recreation resorts and conservation areas ('conservation' vs 'development').

The idea of aesthetic landscape proclaims the promises of a potential global reconciliation - a secular response to the distressing experience of a fundamental break between human subjectivity and the perceptible whole of nature. Thus localised types of landscape often provide a metaphorical basis for several normative models of society and the environment - for instance, the 'desert', 'wasteland', 'wilderness', 'shelter', 'vista', 'cultivated garden', 'greenhouse' or 'earth capsule'. Nevertheless, the aesthetic landscape notion has to be entertained with considerable critical reserve. Instead of a natural or permanent condition of humanity, it rather represents variable and exploitative relations between nature and culture, habitat and habitus, or ecological Umwelt and the built environments of human settlement. Art which represents historically organised societal formations as if these were the 'natural order' impart an appearance of normative power to often arbitrary relations of dominance and authority (cf. Warnke 1992).

5. Habitus

The inexhaustible natural potential of a habitat is made manifest in any human habitus. The 'primary givens' of art are not brute material, raw matter ready for manipulation and control which bears or attains aesthetic meaning only through artistic processing - in other words, the deep-seated aversion to nature in the Hegelian heritage. We always experience primary aesthetic object-functions as already patented in the symbolic forms of current life-styles, in accordance with aesthetic conventions which bear the marks of dominant ideologies and prevailing
spiritual directions.

Alternate attitudes to life, particularly when they enter the stage of history as established ways of living, each claim the right of being represented in the cultural power struggle of every age. A critical sensitivity for the bias and partiality of the aesthetic meaning-potential of established culture patterns often result in typical forms of aesthetic resistance. Complex relations of compromised representation therefore hold between art and contemporaneous life-styles. Works of art do not merely mirror and automatically reflect, blandly affirm nor blatantly negate the complexities of their contextual Sitz im Leben. Rather, the affective power and the material heterogeneity of artworks critically interpret and indirectly betray the social conventions and ideological interests.

Everyday life-styles are evidently one of the main sources of art styles. Thus Michael Baxandall (1972) proposes the notion of ‘period eye’ (ways of seeing peculiar to various historical periods). Life-styles establish possibilities of collusion, certain spectator expectations towards which, or against which the artists project the images they make. The view of the artist as someone who lives and works in social isolation or in utopian disengagement is a modernist myth. Rather than reacting solely to examples of preceding art, the artist’s experience of the aesthetic dimension of reality is mediated by the dated and ideologically charged forms of their time’s communal life-styles. At the same time, inherited worldview frames provide them with historical keys to understand and represent the aesthetic coherence of natural phenomena, cultural products, societal formations and life-worlds, human attitudes, symbolic forms and everyday events.

Worldview frames are modelling schemes which belong to the prefigurative dimension of art. They are acquired initially as learning models. During their training artists gain competence and performance in a particular ‘visual langage’, perhaps similar to the unconscious mastering of a mother tongue or the conscious acquisition of a second language. Guided by normative knowing models, artists furthermore attain a mature identity by emulating role models, possibly following alternative examples distinctly different from those met during initial training. From such inherited worldview frames they appropriate the modelling schemes of typiconic formats for the imaginative discovery of the world’s aesthetic potential, illuminated as well as distorted by governing ideological powers. Artists may be the makers of works of art yet, in turn, they are made by the roles modelled for them in the
imaginary worlds of their works - typiconic roles shared in a number of traditions.

Bibliography


2 Cf. Gadamer (1967) on the notion of an "ontological communion" between images and
that which they make present to the imagination of a spectator on the basis of the Bild or made image's "augmentation of being".

3 A sitter posing for a portrait would be a typical example of an artist's model. Yet a 'speaking' likeness or striking resemblance is not achieved by a mere point-for-point correspondence between the pictorial depiction and the visual appearance of the sitter.

4 Feminists have alerted us to the ideological charged status of such ideas (cf. the survey of the social history of artists' models in Borzello 1982).

5 Zeuxis's still-life painting itself became an exemplary model, a widely emulated notion in the history of painting. Hence, nature mort paintings often allude to the theme of the artist's model - the composed arrangement as a selection and combination of artifacts or natural objects.

6 The Sophists called illusion-creating effects (such as the Parhassios cloth or veil) the 'colours of rhetoric' or rhetorical apate - persuasion or conviction by means of deceptive make-believe.

7 Black (1984: 192) notes three phases in the history of the model's disappearance (classical, romantic and modernistic): "By renouncing the model, aesthetics has in effect converted mediated representation (i.e., the imitation of a primary object or model) first into unmediated presentation (i.e., the direct revelation and transmission of the aesthetic eidos itself, apparently without reference to an external model or modus/-modulus), and finally into reproduction (i.e., the gradual emergence of the secondary object itself, whether as idea, as insight, or as imaginative experience through negation of the unique value of the work of art itself)."

8 Note in this connection the venerable tradition of disparaging references to art as simia veri - the aping of the truth.

9 The term religio denotes 'to bind', for instance, the convenanting God and his people in Judeo-Christian traditions.

10 Cf the poem "Pied Beauty" (1877): Glory be to God for dappled things - For skies of couple-colour as a brindled cow; For rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim; Fresh-firecoal chesnut-falls; finches wings; Landscape plotted and pieced - fold, fallow, and plough.
And all trades, their gear and tackle and trim.
All things counter, original, spare, strange;
Whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how?)
With swift, slow; sweet, sour; adazzle, dim;
He fathers-forth whose beauty is past change:
Praise him.

11 Stimmung denotes 'harmony' or the 'attune-
ment' of a landscape to a viewer's subjective
mood, cf. Spitzer 1963

12 Habitus refers to changing habits and habi-
tation - in a sense that includes human clothing,
dwelling and custom - and therefore to life-
worlds and life-styles in general, to any commu-
nally established patterns of culture.