Is man by nature a political and good animal, according to Aristotle?

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Abstract

According to Aristotle a person is by nature a political animal. He/she is namely predestined to live as a socio-political being. He/she belongs to those gregarious and “political” animals who share a common activity. A person’s politability-sociability certainly reaches its peak with his participation in the political society of the polis where his rational nature is fully realised. However a person is by nature a good animal. This of course applies to all physical beings. All beings as beings are good, since nature in its entirety is in Aristotle’s view good and purposeful. But not only are all beings good but they also pursue good whether this is actually good or it only seems to be good. In each case the good is identified with purpose and constitutes the fullness of its natural appetite thereof. A person is good ontologically in two ways: He/she is good and desires to do good and only the good.

According to Aristotle, man is by nature a political animal. This means that he is destined by his own nature to live as a sociopolitical being. He is a being in which political behavior is an innate possibility, since he is governed by a natural urge to live in the company of other men: φυσική μεν ουν η ορμή εν πασιν επι την τοιαυτήν κοινωνίαν (sc. την πολιτικήν) (1253a 29-30). This phrase however is often misinterpreted. And so it is imperative to provide some answer to the question regarding the real meaning of the natural political behavior of man, as well as regarding the meaning of natural “political behavior” of certain animals. According to Aristotle the biologist, man is not the only political animal, because many of the animals which live in herds are political in his opinion, that is, they participate in some common activity. As a result, political behavior, even in Aristotle’s Politics, a political text par excellence, does not necessarily refer to our familiar Greek polis, since it is compared to the political behavior of the bee - even if human political activity is richer and more complex. Of course human nature is not limited to its political behavior, for there also exists the theory for the sake of theory, which constitutes the most divine human
activity. And as S. Klark correctly notes: “no man’s identity can be exhausted by his social role, none the less in so far as he is a man he is social.” It is obvious that the word “political” must be disconnected from the word “polis”, with respect to its strict political sense, and must be understood in its broader meaning, so that it indicates “that which belongs to a community like the polis”; in other words, the same thing as the word “social”. This identification is made clear in the relevant passage of the Aristotelian treatise on animals mentioned above.

Indeed, the word “political” is used in its broader sense both in the Politics and in the Nicomachaean Ethics. Thus in the Nicomachaean Ethics Aristotle tells us that man, because he is by nature a political animal, that is a social animal, would never prefer to live alone, even if he had at his disposal all the riches of the world: ουδείς γαρ ελοίτ' αν καθ’ αυτον τα παντα εχειν αγαθα. πολιτικον γαρ ο ανθρωπος και συζην πεφυκως (1169b 17-19). Indeed, at another point in the same treatise, Aristotle underlines that the social nature of man is always a step ahead of his political nature, in the sense that the social nature of man in the fundamental form of the sexual union between a man and a woman is more powerful and superior to any other form of human communal cohabitation, because this form of union constitutes the necessary condition of existence not merely of the cohabitating community of the polis, but of the human species itself: ανδρι και γυναικι φιλια δοκει κατα φυσιν υπαρχειν. ανθρωπος γαρ τη φυσει συνδυαστικον μαλλον η πολιτικον, οσω προτερον και αναγκαιοτερον οικια πολεως, και τεκνοποιει κοινοτερον τοις ζωοις (1162a 16-19).

In any case, the adjective ‘political’ is used by Aristotle with two different meanings. At times it is used to denote things and situations that are related to the political society of the polis, and at times to denote something broader; in this latter sense, it means the same as the adjective ‘social.’ The use of the adjective ‘political’ with the meaning of ‘social’ is also two-fold, for sometimes it simply means the cohabitating animals, that is the animals that live in herds, and at other times it means ‘social’ and ‘political’ at the same time, and so it refers exclusively to man. That is, it denotes, both the general need of man for social life in the company of other men, and something else beyond this form of socializing, because it also denotes the political conduct of man, which is the more narrow meaning of the term. It denotes the institutions and the purely political life of the political society of the polis.

But it is time to move on to the meaning of the word “political” in the phrase ‘political animal’ in the Politics, where it occurs three times:

A) εκ τουτων ουν φανερον οτι των φυσει η πολις εστι, και οτι ο ανθρωπος φυσει πολιτικον ζωον (1253a 1-3).
In the first passage the natural political behavior of man is attached to the natural character of the polis, given that the nature of man reaches its completion inside and through the polis\(^{10}\) to which man is inclined by his very nature.\(^{11}\) As a result, the adjective “political” in the passage in question refers to the political society of the polis, namely, it is used with its more narrow and precise meaning.\(^{12}\)

In the second passage of the Politics listed above, the natural political behaviour of man is compared to that of the bee and generally to that of all animals that live in herds, and it is argued that man is a political animal to a higher degree than the other animals that live in herds. A difference of superiority favors man, and this is certainly due to the fact that man is not merely a ‘political animal’ but also an ‘animal who has rationality’, a trait which clearly enriches and upgrades his social capital in many respects.\(^{13}\)

In the third passage of the Politics, which also contains the phrase ‘man the political animal’, the adjective “political” is used in its broader and more comprehensive sense. It has, that is, the same meaning as the word ‘social’. That the socialization of man is fulfilled within the community of the polis, and therefore, here as in all the parallel texts, that in some way the political society of the city is also implied, cannot be doubted, I believe.

There is no doubt that Aristotle uses the adjective “political” in the phrase “political animal” wishing to state simultaneously two things: first, that man is a social animal, somewhat like many animals that live in herds, and second, that man is the social animal par excellence, because he can move beyond the simple political behavior or social behavior, which he shares with the animals of the herd, and reach the political behavior of the polis, which is the most complex and most perfect society. And it is possible for man to move beyond the simple political behavior, because only man has (superior) intelligence and the ability to communicate in articulated speech, in language, not mere sounds.\(^{14}\) The creation of the political society of the polis also enables the realization of the more complete political behavior of man, which is expressed also in the famous phrase: “man is by nature a political animal”. In other words, political behavior, from mere natural urge\(^{15}\) and the possibility of social cohabitation with other men, becomes true political life (life of the polis), within which man is able to realize completely his nature and so become a ‘good citizen’, and should the circumstances be conducive, also a ‘good man’ as well. The political behavior of man is complex and multi-leveled, because his nature is complex and multi-leveled. This is the reason why man is more of a political
animal than the other political animals. "The polis has the nature of man as its essence, because it is inside the polis that the logos of man is realized".16 The man of nature, being a product of nature, is essentially man only in principle. He becomes true man, according to Aristotle, in stages and through political life, and the life of the polis17 more specifically.18 This, however, does not mean that when Aristotle says in his Politics: man is by nature a political animal, he means exclusively that man is by nature "destined to live inside the polis".19

After what has been argued so far it is, I believe, obvious that the adjective "political" at a first level means social, socialis, gesellschaftlich, and at a second level it means political, politicus, politisch. Thus, when someone claims20 that Thomas Aquinas defines man as a social and political animal, allegedly contrary to Aristotle, who defines him only as a political animal because he presumably does not know the meaning of 'society', he obviously has not understood the meaning of the aforementioned famous Aristotelian phrase — a phrase which covers completely both the notion of civic society and the notion of political society. For Aristotle social behavior-political behavior constitutes an ontological characteristic of man. For this reason Aristotle argues that the man who has no political nature is either something less than man, that is, a wild animal, or he is self-sufficient on his own, that is, something more than man, he is god.21 Of course, this does not at all mean that those who live outside the polis are not men. For Aristotle only he who does not have a political nature is not man; οἱ διὰ φυσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τυχήν απολίς (1253a 3-4).22 For this reason, the thesis that, presumably according to Aristotle, man is by nature an animate being of the polis, a being who lives in the perfect society,23 cannot be accepted.

Let us now see if man is by nature a good animal. To begin with we should say that we shall see goodness ontologically on the one hand, and on the other hand, morally. As far as our first consideration, the ontological one, is concerned, we must say that the good, just as being, is for Aristotle something that can be said in many ways, that is a concept with many meanings, and it corresponds to the ontological categories of being as good.24 refers to the essence and it expresses the ontological good.25 In this sense, all beings are good. The reason for their goodness is purely and simply the fact that they exist. Being and Good at an introductory basic level are identical. They differ only secundum rationem, because the concept of good points to the concept of desirable, and this in turn to the concept of perfection, which is entwined with a real, with an ontologically perfect, being. Whatever exists, is automatically a bearer of perfection, which is founded in the very nature of being, of each being. All beings, nature in its entirety, have inside them the purpose, they are themselves their own
purpose, they exist for a purpose and not in vain. Ἡ δὲ φυσις τελος εστιν\textsuperscript{26} (1252b 32), says Aristotle, and the self-realization of every being equals the realization of its respective nature. And since beings are themselves their own purpose, they are good by themselves.\textsuperscript{27}

Thus, according to Aristotle, the nature/physis of every being is identified with its telos, its end, which these beings reach only when the course of their ontological growth has been completed, when, that is, they reach that level of perfection which is foreseen by their own nature. That is precisely why the telos is identical to natural perfection, to the good, ontological and moral, because the latter is attached to the natural identity-individuality of every being. And precisely because the good is identified with the natural perfection of all beings, towards which all move, it is defined by Aristotle as that which is desired by everything and is pursued by everything: διὸ καλὼς ἀπεφηναντο τ' αγαθόν, οὐ παντ' εὑρεται (Θ. Νικ. 1094α 2-3)\textsuperscript{28}. It is identified, in other words, with the object of desire/appetite, with the particular end at any given time, since this constitutes the fulfillment of will in the case of man, as well as the cause and the end of every practical and theoretical activity of man,\textsuperscript{29} and also of all cosmic activity becoming, for, in Aristotle's view, physis is the end, and the end, every end, is good. And since good is the telos (end), and nature, the work of nature, is always serving some purpose, the teleological interpretation of both the moral and the natural/cosmic reality for Aristotle is given. In Aristotle, good in its ontological dimension is not limited to the human ontological and moral good, but it includes all beings, animate and inanimate. All natural beings are good, simply because they exist, because the Being is better than the not-Being\textsuperscript{30}, and beings in act (energeia) are more perfect and therefore better than the beings in potentia (δυναμει), because each thing, Aristotle says in his Physics, receives a definition when it has reached its realization rather than when it exists only in potentia (δυναμει)\textsuperscript{31}. The precise nature of every thing, in other words, presupposes its complete development.\textsuperscript{32} For the same reason, the species in Aristotle ranks a step higher than matter (ὑλη),\textsuperscript{33} it is nature to a higher degree than matter is nature. And precisely because the cause of the ontological good is the things themselves, the numbers are not considered an ontological good, because they are neither autonomous natural substances nor composites (matter and species), and so they are not causes of the autonomous natural substances.\textsuperscript{34} For the same reason ontological evil is understood only as privation in relation to the normal nature of the being to which it refers. This means that ontological evil does not have autonomous existence, it does not exist on its own, as it does in Plato.\textsuperscript{35} δῆλον αρα ὅτι οὐκ ἐστι τὸ κακὸν παρὰ τὰ πράγματα (Μεταφ. 1051α 17-18)\textsuperscript{36}. Ontological evil is an imperfection of a particular being, because this being either has not yet attained completely the shape that it is destined
to have by nature (ἐντελεχεία), or it has a defective form (ἐντελεχεία). This means that no being is evil as being, but it is evil only when it lacks certain things which it is destined to have by nature. One such natural evil is, for example, blindness, or various diseases. The same also holds true for moral evil. This too, is a form of privation in relation to the moral perfection which pertains to man according to the potential of his nature. The existence of natural and moral evil is not contradictory with respect to the ontological being which is identified with being itself, but they constitute accidents of being. Thus, a man who, for example, does not have moral virtues or sharp vision, is not ontologically evil, he is not generally evil as a man, but only with respect to one moral and natural dimension.37 This means that the ontological goodness, for example of men, is not absolutely identical, but rather it differs from man to man depending on their ontological perfection because τ' αγαθον ἵσαριμα λεγεται τω ὑπ' Ἡ. Ν.κ. 1096a 23-24).38. This is precisely the reason why Aristotle mentions ‘natural virtues’. These are natural aptitudes which through prudence may become principal qualities, that is moral virtues.39 The natural virtues are not the same for all men. There are qualitative differences. This is why Aristotle speaks of men with optimal nature or corrupted nature.40

Ontological good is understood as the affirmation of Being. This is why all nature is per se good. Ontological good despite its being different from moral good is not irrelevant to it,41 because it is part of the ontological particularity of beings, which operates as the familiar matter with respect to the moral good.42 As far as man is concerned, the ontological good par excellence is identical to his rational soul,43 which is the presupposition and the instrument for all dimensions of moral good.44

If the ontological good of man is his rational soul, understood as the carrier of his unique powers and abilities which of all beings he alone possesses - because it is his soul which enables him to be who he is, in other words it gives him his identity - then the work of man can only be attributed to the work of his rational mind (ψυχή), and as such to be rational deeds and activities,45 because it is not possible for the ontological uniqueness to be purposeless, namely that one or more functions do not correspond to the rational mind. Aristotle states that it is not possible for every man-craftsman and for every member or instrument of man not to have their familiar work, and man as human being, namely man as an ontological type (εἶδος) not to have a familiar function which will express his specific distinction, his ontological identity and his substance.46 The substance is expressed from within its familiar activity or function and the familiar activity or the familiar function are expressions (ἐκφάνασεις) of the substance. However the function of man, as is moreover self-evident is not qualitatively undifferentiated but is distinguished in terms of good and bad. Thus just as the functioning of a
guitarist may be bad, average or excellent (σπουδαίο) so the functioning of man as human being is according to his gifts and abilities, in respect of the appropriate virtue, is in Aristotle’s language good or bad. Subsequently the function of an excellent man, the man with distinct virtues (ἀρεταῖ), will be correspondingly excellent,48 and because the good of man as human being, as a logical necessity, lies for him in the appropriate function: “Ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δόκει ταγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ το εὐ”.49 “For the good (goodness) and the well (efficiency) is thought to reside in that function”, and as this, as already stated, is nothing else than the rational faculties and activities. Aristotle comes thus to the interesting conclusion that the human good turns out to be an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there is more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.50 This means that the most perfect good of man, namely happiness, should be identified with the most perfect function of man.51

But the correctness of this teaching of Aristotle is disputed in the sense that for man as human being there is an own appropriate function and that a good man is a man who performs his function well. Thus there are those who claim52 that to man as human being, - a specific action does not correspond - a function which is not exclusively appropriate to his nature. They say man has not been created for a specific purpose or at least there is no common acceptance of such a view. However those who support this criticism forget that so long as we accept that man has a unique ontological identity, since he is the only rational being, that is, a being who possesses reason both with regard to the meaning of high intelligence and to articulated speech, namely language. We are of necessity - rational necessity - compelled to accept that in this unique rational nature of man also corresponds a unique and analogous function which cannot be anything else but the rational faculties and activities. The function is derivative from the substance of its producer. And as G Santas correctly observes “the question whether man has a distinct function in the Aristotelian sense of the term is tantamount to the question whether man has certain abilities or powers that no other living being has namely to think in terms of means and aims and to conduct theoretical research or in other words to contemplate as to what he has to do and search for the truth. We know that man has indeed these abilities and as far as we know he alone possesses them”.53 Therefore when Aristotle speaks regarding an appropriate function in man, surely he does not mean a particular or unique function, for example as the function of an artist or a mathematician.

Concerning the second objection namely that a good man is a man who performs his function well and as a result of it he is apparently an instrument in the service of others’ aims, something morally unacceptable, since man is an end in himself and he should never become a means and
an instrument in the service of other people. It must be said that the man who performs his function well in the final analysis mainly advances his own happiness and thereby does not become an instrument in the service of others. According to Aristotle, man, every man, is always an end in himself, since the highest aim of every proper state is happiness, this highest good, of all citizens and all people. All people without exception have the right to happiness. G Santas observes as follows: "Aristotle maintains that a man is a good man if he performs his function as man well and therefore man is not assessed on the basis of the quality of services he offers as instrument of someone else's aims".54

But let us return to the good as the object of desire, as desideratum. We have already mentioned that the notion of desire in this case has a special breadth and depth.55

With respect to their quality, Aristotle divides goods into true and apparent. Both the former and the latter are equally objects of desire. Every man always desires and pursues whatever seems good to him, that is pleasant, beneficial, useful, just, beautiful, regardless of whether it is actually good or not: τού γαρ εἶναι δεκαύντος αγαθοῦ χαριν παντα πραπτουσιν παντεσ (1252a 3-4).56 This, though, obviously leads to an extreme subjectivism and to a corresponding relativism—in other words, to a sophistical treatment of things. At this point it is necessary to stress something which of course is absolutely self-evident, namely that Aristotle is not at all indifferent to the question as to whether this is an issue regarding the true good or merely the apparent good. He is indifferent only with respect to approaching the good on an exclusively descriptive and empirical way. If, however, we approach matters as we should and according to the rules, just as Aristotle approaches them, then of course it should not be a matter of indifference to us whether the good is an apparent or true one. So, according to Aristotle, the will always directs itself toward a certain end. And since the telos (end) and the good in Aristotle are one and the same,57 the will is always directed towards a good.58 On this everybody agrees. But the question is whether the object of the will is identical to the true good or merely to whatever is considered good. Others believe that the will is always directed towards the true good, and that if someone happens to desire something after making a bad choice, this cannot be considered the object of the will: τοις μὲν βουλητην τ’ αγαθον λεγουσι μη ειναι βουλητον ο βουλεται ο μη ορθως αιρουμενος (Η.Θ. Νικ. 1113a 17-18).59 Alternatively, others believe that the object of the will is the apparent good, that is, whatever one considers to be good: τοις δ’ αυ το φαινομενον αγαθον βουλητον λεγουσι (Η.Θ. Νικ. 1113a 20).60 Aristotle tries to find the golden mean between these two diametrically opposed moral theories, accepting that according to a more general and correct consideration of things, the
object of the will is the good, the true good, while for man as individual, the object of the will is what under particular circumstances seems good to him: 

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\text{φατεν απλως μεν και κατ' αληθειαν βουλητον εينαι τ' αγαθον, еκαστω δε το \phiανομενον (Hθ. Νικ. 1113a 23-24).}
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And from theory, Aristotle moves one to praxis, creating some form of compromise between the Sophists and Plato, arguing that the true good is the object of the virtuous man’s will, while the morally imperfect, (φαυλος) limits himself to what seems good to him, whatever offers him pleasure or satisfies some temporary interests: τω μεν ουν σπουδαιω το κατ' αληθειαν (sc. αγαθον βουλητον εστι), τω δε φαυλω το τυχον (Hθ. Νικ. 1113a 25-26). With this thesis, a really important one, Aristotle also answers the big question, what is the rule and the measure of the morally right.

According to Aristotle the sure criterium for the morally right or wrong is the excellent one, namely the distinguished man on account of his ethos and sound judgement. This man precisely due to his abilities can act as a rule and measure for the assessment of current moral issues. On the contrary most people are swept by pleasures in making erroneous judgements resulting in them always preferring sensual things, by considering them as good while in reality this is not always the case, and to avoid sad matters viewing them as bad while this does not always hold good. Therefore according to Aristotle the rule and measure of morality is the excellent man. The relationship between excellent and good is dialectical and wavering since the good is whatever seems good to the excellent man and an excellent man is the man to whom the real good seems good. In other words the criterium of the good man’s goodness is the excellent man and the criterium of the excellent man’s goodness is the real good.

The raising of a man, even though an excellent man, to a criterium of goodness and morality is viewed with criticism and scepticism. In other words what is called in question is the correctness of the authority’s criterium. However what must be noted here is that the raising of the excellent man to a rule of morality is neither arbitrary nor is it due to some aristocratic inclination on Aristotle’s part. Aristotle’s excellent man is not self-appointed to be an excellent man neither is he appointed by some other authority but is recognised as such by the political society in which he lives. That is to say he earns the enviable title through a tacit agreement of a society which he expresses in an informal way because he represents in an exemplary manner what in his society constitutes a common conscience and a universal demand on a level of correct speech and virtue. What certainly cannot be proved in an unquestionable way is who is excellent and who is depraved. Besides, in the changing topics of morality and politics, it is both futile and irrational to search for proof.

Regarding the goodness of man from the perspective of morality, as is
known, this is an accomplishment of man, an accomplishment, that is, of the human intellectual and voluntary faculties, and it is founded on man’s nature, exercise and learning. On ethical criteria, man is neither good nor bad by nature: οὐδεμια των ηθικων αρετων φυσει ημιν εγγινεται...ουτ’ αρα φυσει ουτε παρα φυσιν εγγινονται οι αρεται, αλλα περιφυσι μεν ημιν δεξαθαι αυτας, τελειουμενοις δε δια του εθους (Θ. Νικ. 1103a 19-26).67 This is also true for the intellectual virtues.

Man, then, is good in a double sense. On the one hand, he is good per se (ontological good), and on the other hand, he is good as subject and bearer of the desire of the good, apparent or real. Inside him coexist simultaneously the good as subject and the good as object, as the fulfillment of biological and emotional needs.

Endnotes
7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1169b 17-19. I do not agree with R G Mulgan (Aristotle's Doctrine, 441) who thinks that the present excerpt refers to the political society of the polis.
8. The complete misconception of the present excerpt by R G Mulgan (Aristotle's Doctrine, 440) comes as a surprise: “Once again here we have to do with the same allusion, namely that man’s political nature refers to the need for the polis rather than other forms of society.”
10. Aristotle, Politics, 1252b 27- 1253a 1.
12. R G Mulgan did not grasp the relation of the naturalness of polis with the natural civility of man, namely that the naturalness of polis belongs to man’s political nature who is brought to the polis, so that his nature may be realized. Muller has been evidently carried away by the fact that polis as the broader and more accomplished society comprises all the smaller and more incomplete associations, and as such thought that the word πολιτικος is used here in a broader and inclusive sense. “The term πολιτικον ζων is here clearly used in the inclusive sense. Το πολις embraces all the lesser associations in a self-sufficient unit, and man is naturally πολιτικον because this unit is the one in which his nature finds its perfect development” (Aristotle’s Doctrine, 442).
13. In this respect quite indicative of man’s superiority are the following excerpts: Eudemian Ethics, 1242a 21-26, Nicomachean Ethics, 1162a 16-19, 1097a 8-12, and Politics, 1278b 17-21.
14. (Superior) intelligence is a unique privilege of man and is mainly expressed as 

βουλευτικόν and διανοητικόν, whose expressions are generally theoretical reflection and 

more specifically foresight (προοραν). Politics, 1252a 31-32, 1260a 10-14.

15. This urge is not purely instinctive – animalistic but human, since it mainly expresses 

man’s civility which in spite of its commonality with the “civility” of some animals, 

constitutes specific distinction of man, for it belongs to his peculiar rational nature.


17. Aristotle surely knows very well that humans exist also outside the Greek cities.

18. In Aristotle the distinction, not the contrast, is clear between nature and civilization. 

(Eudemian Ethics, 1214a 14, Nicomachean Ethics, B 1-7, and Politics, 1332a 38-40). Therefore Heidegger and Kullmann are at fault as well as others who do not accept that 

Aristotle makes a distinction between animal and man, nature and logos, nature and 

civilization. (See M Heidegger, Brief über den Humanismus, 65 and W Kullmann, The 

political thought of Aristotle, 54-58).


20. As for example in A Kamp, Die politische Philosophie des Aristoteles, Freiburg- 

München 1985, p. 131. This unsubstantiated and paradoxical view is also supported by 

H Arendt, (The Human Condition, Athens 1986, p. 41), when she writes that the word 

social (socialis) is of Roman origin and it has no equivalent in the Greek language and 

thought).


22. Aristotle, Politics, 1253a 3-4. Therefore D Keyt’s objection in (“three fundamental 

theorems in Aristotle’s Politics” Phronesis 32, 1987, p.77-79) that it is possible for 

someone to live outside the polis and to still be a man does not rescind Aristotle’s 

premise.


28. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a 2-3. It is not certain whether the definition 

refers exclusively to man or to the entire physical world.


31. Aristotle, Physics 193b 7-8. Metaphysics, 1029a 29-30, 1035a 1, 1035b 9-10, 

1042a 32 and On the Soul, 412b 9. Also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I 

22, n. 208: non enim dicitur esse aliquid ex hoc quod est in potential, sed ex eo quod est 

in actu.

32. Aristotle, Politics, 1252b 32-33.


34. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1093b 16-25.
42. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103a 23-26 and the previous endnote.
54. G Santas, op. cit., p. 91.
58. The will is always directed toward a good in the sense of purpose. In the present case the good is identified with the object, aiming at an ontological-biological desire that is inherent to all living beings.
65. F Dirlmeier, in (Aristoteles, *Nikomachische Ethik*, Darmstadt 1956, p. 284, 18.1) who amongst other things observes: In our view the boundary between the Protagorian proposal of "all things the measure is man" and the raising of the excellent man to the criterion of morality is frighteningly thin.
