know the fact that I am his 'father,'” the Bishop remarked, “it is of no use to disguise it.” This fact however laid him open to terrible suspicion, as the Prime Minister Masipula informed him

“They had been much alarmed at my coming, thinking that my secret was some device to bring back Umkungo by force;”

while others let out that “the whole uZulu” (as we say “all England”) actually spent the night at the Mfolozi river, on the look out for Sobantu; for they said “he is coming with an impi, and thousands of horses.”

“This report,” says the Bishop, “my dropping in one morning with only a single native follower, must have helped to disperse.”

His whole party indeed numbered twelve, one being a white man, and two Government messengers sent in advance to announce him to the king.

Political suspicions having been allayed, the Bishop completely succeeded in his object. The old king Mpande received him kindly; objecting to his plea that he must hasten back to his work of teaching in Natal. “Well, but you are teaching me now; I want very much to see you, to talk with you.” The king then carefully chose for his station a site at Kwamagwaza, where, as he said, “there is fine timber, good water, good land, and plenty of people,” in fact, as the Bishop saw, “a most desirable spot in all respects”; while Cetshwayo, against whose indubitable right to the succession the party favouring Umbulazi and Umkungo had taken

1 Who claimed to be heir apparent in place of Cetshwayo.
2 Two of the party were schoolboys who with William (see Vol. I. p. 87) were expected to make a first attempt at keeping journals in their own language, which might be “useful in showing how some of our proceedings looked from a native point of view.” These were published with translations, glossary, and grammatical notes.
up arms, expressed his satisfaction on hearing of the arrangement. He was

"very glad that I am going to build at Kwamagwaza, and very glad that I have sent to tell him so . . . . He wishes to see me again . . . . he wants to be protected from white people; he wants persons to come to him who can be trusted, persons who will speak the truth. People say all sorts of things of him which are not at all true.\(^1\) He wants very much to talk with some confidential agent of the governor."

The Bishop describes Cetshwayo at this time as

"a fine, handsome young fellow of about twenty-nine or thirty years of age, tall and stout-limbed, but not at all obese, with a very pleasant smile and good-humoured face, and strong deep voice. He drew himself up now and then with an air of dignity; but altogether the impression he made on us all was very agreeable, and our men, one and all, commended him as a pleasing young prince."

The Bishop, as we have seen,\(^2\) offered soon after this to resign his own already organized diocese and go as a missionary Bishop to Zululand. The proposal fell through, the ecclesiastical contest intervened, and the only communication which he held with Zululand for some years was that he reminded the missionary whom he had placed in charge at Kwamagwaza, and who had chosen to join the schismatic "Church of South Africa," that the land had been granted to him, the Bishop, for the use of the Church of England, and that he might some day feel it to be his duty to assert the claim. The answer published in the *Natal Mercury* was that if such a thing should happen the schismatic had "a box of lucifers," by means of which he could dispose of all the buildings.

\(^1\) The word *Cetshwayo* signifies, curiously enough, "calumniated."

The Bishop’s favourable impression of Cetshwayo was confirmed by Sir T. Shepstone, who, describing the new king on his installation in 1873, says:

"Cetshwayo is a man of considerable ability, much force of character, and has a dignified manner. In all my conversations with him he was remarkably frank and straightforward, and he ranks in every respect far above any native chief I have ever had to do with." ¹

Sir T. Shepstone also refers to the "peaceful and even cordial relations" which had been maintained "during twenty-seven years of close contact" between the Natal Government and the Zulus. It was understood, he said, that these should continue,

"Cetshwayo adding only—let them be more intimate and more cordial. . . . He said his army was ours, and that his quarrels ought to be ours also. I told him that when we wanted the services of his army we should consider it to be ours and send for it, but that we must form our own judgment as to his quarrels. . . . The advantages of our being able to read and write, and the extreme inconvenience of ignorance, were discussed. Cetshwayo heartily concurred in all that was said on these subjects, and said it was education made the English so great; that if he thought he could remember what he might learn he would be taught himself."

Two months after this installation Langalibalele’s location was swept by fire and sword; and one of the first requests made by Cetshwayo, as king, to his English “fathers,” was on behalf of the luckless chief. “That he might be allowed to sweep up this withered husk,” “to pick up the bones of the dead dog,” were the deprecatory terms of his messages; and these, Sir B. Pine writes, on August 3, 1874, were brought by no less than six “embassies.” In the last of these,

consisting of eighty men, "the largest embassy ever sent to this Government," the king had sent representatives of all his principal men to show that his whole people made the request with him. This embassy was "detained until the chief was out of the harbour," and then dismissed with an expression of surprise at Cetshwayo's repeating an application so often refused, and with the information that Langa was on the high seas. But of course these Zulus had learnt that Sobantu was also pleading for Langa; and at the Bishop's request Cetshwayo had sent down two of Matshana's men with one of these embassies, a proceeding which, as we have seen, was resented by the local authorities.

This sympathy for Langa, and the general tone in which these Zulus had invariably spoken of their king, together with his own recent experiences, no doubt made the Bishop more inclined to believe that what they said might be true. Nor was it surprising that Cetshwayo should turn to the Bishop for advice in the astounding difficulty in which the Zulus were placed by their old friend and supporter, Sir T.

1 P. 409, note 2.
2 In a letter to the late Mr. William Shaen written at Plymouth, December 26, 1874, the Bishop translates a message which he had just received from Natal, and which was as follows: "Umfuzi and Unkisimane salute you much, those indunas of Cetshwayo. They have just arrived, being sent by him to summon a man who wishes to go away to Zululand. But they bring this confidential message to wit—Cetshwayo rejoices exceedingly to hear that you have gone to the great indunas of the Queen to tell them all the story about the treatment of the black people of Natal, and to say that he prays that you, sir, would fight with all your might, as you have done already, about the matter of Langalibalele. Cetshwayo says that he is in good hope, and, even if you are worsted that is of no consequence, you will have done what becomes a faithful induna of the Queen. And you are to remember him continually, as he also remembers you. He entreats all the ancestral spirits of his people, Mpfande, Tshaka, and Senzangakona (i.e. his father, uncle, and great-grandfather) to help you, that you may persevere and fight continually. In all this Cetshwayo's heart watches over you; he has held up his finger continually (a form of asseveration) that you are his father."
Shepstone. This official, as Secretary for Native Affairs, had, for sixteen years, received and "adopted" as "correct" their frequent and urgent complaints of Boer aggression. Now suddenly, on the annexation of the Transvaal, he justified the Boer demands, claiming to fix a boundary at will, without the arbitration promised by himself to the Zulus, in the name of the Natal Government, seven years before.1

It should be noted that, so far back as 1865, the Zulus had asked that an English agent should be placed on the border between the Zulus and the Boers "to see that justice was done on both sides." Again, in 1869, Cetshwayo had offered to the English Government a "strip" of country which should shut off the Boers from Zululand; while Sir B. Pine, writing to

1 Ever since 1861 the Zulus had been complaining of Boer encroachments to the English Government, begging them repeatedly to interpose to prevent a war, "which," they said, "we wish to avoid." Throughout these sixteen years Mr. Shepstone had been the mouthpiece of the Natal Government, which had, in reply to Cetshwayo's appeals, always impressed upon him the importance of preserving the peace, and settling all questions in dispute by calm representation. Even in 1870 Sir T. Shepstone promised to arbitrate, and on the faith of this promise the Zulus had been enduring their wrongs ever since, with a patience which is not likely to be repeated in South Africa. In 1875 the Boer Government aggravated the position by a further annexation, followed by threatening notices to quit. The Zulu messenger, who reported this outrage, said, "Cetshwayo desired us to urge upon the Governor of Natal to interfere to save the destruction of perhaps both countries—Zululand and the Transvaal. He requests us to state that he cannot, and will not, submit to be turned out of his own home. It may be that he will be vanquished; but, as he is not the aggressor, death will not be so hard to meet" (Imperial Blue-book, C. 1748, p. 14). On March 30, 1876, Sir T. Shepstone had written, "this [Natal] Government has for years past invariably and incessantly urged upon Cetshwayo the necessity for preserving the peace, and, so far, with great success. But messages from the Zulu king are becoming more frequent and more urgent, and the replies he receives seem to him to be both temporising and evasive" (Ib. p. 24). Cetshwayo, however, still restrained his Zulus, and when in 1877 the annexation of the Transvaal was announced to him, he declared, "Again I say I am glad to know that the Transvaal is English ground. Perhaps now there may be peace" (C. 1961, p. 45).
Lord Carnarvon, referred to a proposed “acquisition” of such territory as a second reason for sending Mr. Shepstone to England in 1874. Lord Carnarvon in February, 1878, expressed himself as most anxious to avoid a Zulu war, “desiring nothing more than a full discussion of the [boundary] case with a view of arriving at an equitable and permanent adjustment of the difficulty;” and he was no doubt in earnest. But it would seem as if he, as well as Sir T. Shepstone, had expected the Zulus to give up now, after the annexation of the Transvaal, not—as they had once offered—a strip to be occupied by the English as a buffer between Zulus and Boers, but—after all these years of patient waiting for the fulfilment of promises—nearly the whole of the land in dispute, and that they should do this on the mere fiat of Sir T. Shepstone as representing the Boers. It was impossible. The Zulu chiefs indignantly declared that such was the feeling and resolve of the whole Zulu nation. “All were agreed, and sooner than give way they would fight for it; . . . the land was theirs.” “My father cannot really mean this,” urged Cetshwayo; “it is right in the middle of the Zulu country.”

It was under the pressure of these difficulties that Cetshwayo appealed to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, and asked advice of the Bishop. The Bishop replied that it was usual

1 At the Blood River meeting, October 18, 1877. The Zulus, as will be seen, regard Sir T. Shepstone’s action at this meeting as the beginning of sorrows, and upon the appearance of the despatches the Bishop was compelled to observe as follows:—“Down to this date no trace appears of any hostility towards Cetshwayo in any of Sir T. Shepstone’s despatches. . . . But now the whole tenor of his language is suddenly changed. Moved partly, it would seem, by the sense of the loss of his own personal prestige among the natives, which he regarded as essential to maintaining the authority of the English name in South-Eastern Africa, and partly by the consideration that the Boers . . . must be conciliated at all hazards, . . . Sir T. Shepstone in these despatches, having probably in the interval communicated with Sir B. Frere, sounds now aloud the tocsin of war against the Zulus, and raises the cry, Delendus est Cetshwayo.”
with civilised nations to submit such a matter to arbitration, and advised the king to send a proposal to that effect to Sir H. Bulwer. His Excellency, on hearing from the Bishop what he had done, wrote a letter which, under the circumstances, was, in the strictest sense of the word, impertinent, and in which he took upon himself to inveigh against irresponsible and unauthorised intervention, although compelled to admit that the Bishop's advice was "sound and good." The Secretary of State, however, in writing to him upon the subject, was able not only to agree with Sir H. Bulwer's opinion as to the soundness of the Bishop's advice, but also to perceive that "the course taken by the Bishop . . . would appear to have been judicious." ¹

The Bishop had himself sent the following reply:

"BISHOPSTOWE, December 27, 1877.

"My dear Sir Henry Bulwer,

"I am much obliged by your Excellency's letter of the 26th inst., and I beg to assure your Excellency that any men who may have brought messages from the Zulu king to the Government have never communicated to me the message with which they were charged, nor have been asked to do so. I should have thought it a most irregular and improper course to have pursued, and I imagine that they would have thought the same.

"At the same time, when the colonial journals are in constant communication with Zululand through their own correspondents—probably missionaries or mere illiterate traders—and publish, continually and without reserve, the most unfounded statements as to Cetshwayo's acts and intentions, more especially in respect of the alleged persecution and butchery of Christian natives, it is impossible for me as a man and a Christian, and I may add a Missionary Bishop

¹ Blue-book, C. 2079, p. 21."
having special relations with Zululand, to remain uncon­cerned, and not to endeavour to ascertain, by the best means in my power, the truth or falsehood of these accusations. . . .”

As it afterwards appeared, Sir H. Bulwer had just offered to arbitrate—a proposal which Cetshwayo received, some three or four weeks after the Bishop’s advice reached him, with a hearty and even a joyous welcome.1

The Bishop was now brought into collision with a more important and formidable personage than any of his former political antagonists; but in the issue he was as thoroughly justified in undertaking the one task as the other. In fact, he showed, in the case of the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, how a man believing himself to be animated by a crowning zeal for the furtherance of Christianity, might in his political conduct serve the purpose simply of a firebrand. Carthage fell because its destruction was resolved upon by the Roman Senate before the first move was made in the game which was to lay her prostrate at their feet. Sir Bartle Frere started with the same deliberate design of letting loose the dogs of war on Zululand.2 In short, the spirit which

1 “Cetshwayo hears what the Governor of Natal says . . . and thanks him for these words. For they are all good words that have been sent to Cetshwayo by the Governor of Natal; they show that the Natal Government still wishes for Cetshwayo to drink water and live” (Bluebook, C. 2000, p. 138). The king and his chiefs all appeared to the Natal Government messengers “like men who had been carrying a very heavy burden, and who had only then been told they could put it down and rest” (ib.). Yet Sir B. Frere allowed himself to write “The offers to arbitrate originated with the Natal Government, and were by no means willingly accepted by Cetshwayo!”

2 The whole subject was handled with indefatigable patience in a Digest on Zulu Affairs, running to nearly 2,000 pages of closely-printed matter, set up and printed in the Bishop’s own printing office; but this Digest has not been published, although it has been freely circulated among those who showed any interest in the subject. When first begun, it was called Extracts from the Blue-books; but as it grew into a collection of information drawn from all available sources, with a careful
he showed from first to last was the very opposite to that of
the peacemaker. In his resolution to see provocation and in­
sults everywhere to the power and name of England on the part
of the Zulu king, he stood almost alone among those who were
associated with him in the task of government. Despatch
after despatch from the Colonial Secretary and from the
Lieutenant Governor of Natal conveyed virtual rebukes of
his eagerness to spy out wrong where no wrong had been
done or intended; but he returns like a bulldog to the charge,
and plainly shows that, if it be in his power to prevent it, the
victim shall not escape.

From the first the dispute between the Boers and Zululand
was one which needed delicate handling. The task became
much more delicate when the English annexed the Transvaal;
but when Sir Bartle Frere was intrusted with the work, he
handled it without any delicacy at all, adopting without
hesitation the convenient opinions of Sir T. Shepstone. Wherever he looked he found causes of offence. The Zulus
were a "standing menace" to their neighbours. The method
by which their army was recruited was full of danger. Their
disregard of human life was savage. Their marriage laws
were bad. Their treatment of wizards and witches,¹ or of
those who were reputed such, was disgraceful and barbarous.
Of this indictment the first count alone touched a matter on
which, by any stretch, a foreign Government might rest a
claim of interference. On these and on other grounds, more
or less resembling these, Sir Bartle Frere sedulously fanned

¹ The word umtagati, usually translated wizard, is a very comprehen­sive one, and is very commonly used in cases of suspected poisoning.
the flame of irritation, and fed the prejudices which from the first he had conceived against the Zulu king. The result was an unjust war, unjustly waged, for which the consent of the English nation had neither been obtained nor even asked. The plea of patriotism was held forth as a justification for slaughter and massacre inconsistent with the usages of civilised warfare; and these deeds were done in conflicts of which no warning was given until it was too late to prevent them.

When such things as these came to his knowledge, it was impossible for the Bishop of Natal to remain unconcerned. He had never submitted to the abominable doctrine that it is the business of the clergy to confine themselves to the reading of moral essays or the inculcation of spiritual lessons which may be both important and wholesome, but which have no reference to present circumstances. The Zulu war might be the fruit of mistakes made years and years ago, and the tracing out of its more remote causes might be a wearisome task; but he was resolved that, so far as he himself was concerned, he would not allow his countrymen to evade their duty, and that he would supply them with ample means for determining whether the guilt of aggression lay with the adversary or with themselves; whether a plea for the invasion of Zululand was or was not furnished by persistent and systematic slander and abuse of Cetshwayo before the peace was actually broken by the British; whether a war stated at the outset to be one against the sovereign only was or was not carried out with cynical cruelty against the body of his people; and whether for getting the chief into our power means were or were not employed, which, if adopted in European warfare, would cover with infamy those who stooped to make use of them.

The patience and exactness with which the Bishop had sifted in the case of Langalibalele details of facts misrepresented, distorted, and falsified, furnish a strong presumption
that in the case of Cetshwayo he exercised the same judicial care and impartiality. That the conduct of the High Commissioner was prompted by calculations of what he supposed to be British interests no one could well doubt or deny. The difficulties, however, which led to the war had grown out of the change of policy which followed the annexation of the Transvaal; but this plea could not fasten on Cetshwayo the guilt of any offences of which he had not been convicted. It may be well to bear in mind that on all these matters the judgement of Mr. Froude agreed clearly with that of the Bishop.

"As long as the Transvaal was independent," said the former, "we took the side of the natives against the President; as soon as the Transvaal was ours we changed our views, we went to war with Cetshwayo, and we have been fighting with Secocoeni." ¹

The discovery of an adequate excuse for strife was, in truth no easy matter;² nor was a way out of this difficulty found until Sir Bartle Frere made up his mind to inform the chief that his army, as being quite unnecessary, and as being an instrument which could be used only against the English, must be broken up. If his subjects had, without his knowledge or approval, violated the Natal frontier, Cetshwayo was ready to make reparation, although the Natal police had often disregarded his own; but such offers were of no avail. His

¹ Lectures on South Africa.
² The Attorney-General of Natal stated that "the appointment of Sir Bartle Frere was the result of sending home Commissioners in connexion with Confederation;" that the ultimatum was the joint production of the High Commissioner and himself; and that the latter put forward, as the reason for his embarking in the Zulu War, the resolution "to bring the Zulu nation into such a shape as was compatible with the safety of Natal and the Transvaal." In other words, as the Bishop remarked, the Zulu War was waged not for the trumpery causes put in the foreground as casus belli by Sir B. Frere, but for the purpose of remodelling the Zulu nation with a view to confederation.
regiments must be disbanded; and the ultimatum gave him no alternative, and allowed him no time even to bring the matter before his council. Again, in Mr. Froude's words:

"Sir Bartle Frere knew that the brave, proud chief could give him but one answer. He would have redressed any wrong which had been committed by his people; he could not lay down his arms at the command of a British Governor. A friend of mine lately visited Cetshwayo in his prison at Capetown, and asked him if he did not regret having disobeyed Sir Bartle's commands. Cetshwayo replied that, had he known all that would happen, he would have given the same reply. A brave man might know that he would be beaten, but he would still fight rather than submit like a coward. His people all felt as he did."

Mr. Froude was not exactly informed on all points. Cetshwayo's words were not given as an answer to the ultimatum, for the ultimatum never reached him. He had expressed his readiness to pay the cattle fines, for this he could do alone; for matters which affected his chiefs as well as himself, he asked time in which to deliberate and consult them; but his enemies had good reason for refusing this, and for hurrying on the invasion. There was the fear on the one hand that the Secretary of State might interpose, and on the other that Cetshwayo might manage to pay the cattle fines in time.

Cetshwayo's army was defeated at Ulundi; but his powers of resistance were not broken. Shortly before the battle he had said:

"I was already made aware that the English had at last found out that I did not wish to fight;"

but until they had suffered this reverse, he might try in vain to make his men submit. Had he wished to renew the war, there was nothing to prevent him from so doing. A thousand of his followers, it is reported, were killed in that battle; and
strange stories were told of the treatment of the wounded. Mr. Froude added significantly:—

"It has been said that they were either left to die or were killed after the battle by our native contingent."

If incidents in the statements brought together by the Bishop were facts, the conclusion must be forced upon us, that not merely our native contingents (for whose discipline their employers are responsible), but British officers and soldiers were guilty of far worse offences than the slaughtering of wounded combatants on a field of open battle.

The great contention of Sir Bartle Frere was that the delivery of the Zulus from the tyranny of a king whom they mortally hated would be nothing less than a work of mercy. Anything therefore which tended to show that the king was in the daily habit of slaughtering his people was eagerly caught at. In his volume of *Extracts from the Blue-books* the Bishop examines the reports of such alleged massacres.

He shows, in the first place, that all blood-shedding in the Zulu country is laid, by Sir Bartle Frere and his informants, indiscriminately to the charge of Cetshwayo, although the chiefs administering the government under him had very large powers, and did not scruple to exercise them. The Bishop found, further, that while Cetshwayo claimed the right of killing those who, by Zulu law, were condemned to death, there were no facts to justify the charges of wanton bloodshedding on his part,¹ but that on the contrary there was abundant evidence that he had often protected his subjects’

¹ On July 4, 1877, Cetshwayo said to a Government official:—"I mentioned . . . three classes of wrongdoers to Mr. T. Shepstone, when he came to place me as king over the Zulu nation, as those who had always been killed. I told him that it was our law and those three classes of wrongdoers I would kill . . . I always give a wrongdoer three chances and kill him if he passes the last. Evildoers would go over my head if I did not punish them, and that is our mode of punishing."
lives. In a note to one of Sir B. Frere's despatches, the Bishop writes:

"Sir B. Frere is always very bitter against Cetshwayo, seeking, apparently, by continued iteration of abusive epithets, without a single word of milder character for anything he has said or done, to deprive him of sympathy from Englishmen in his misfortunes and wrongs. But these barbarities, at which Sir B. Frere expresses such 'horror,' have never existed to anything like the extent represented in his despatches, and need not be 'palliated or defended,' by any who regard them as the barbarisms of the Zulu king and people in their present stage of national progress, and are no more to be charged upon Cetshwayo personally than the hangings for petty crimes in England in the beginning of this century, or the executions for witchcraft in England, by burning or otherwise, down to a very late age, can be charged personally upon George III. or Queen Anne."

Norwegian and other missionaries spoke of the Zulu chief as filled with hatred for Christian teachers. After Cetshwayo's fall the missionaries bore witness against themselves. While still on his throne, he was a tyrant to be dreaded and put down. When he was no longer there, they could appreciate, at all events, those of his acts which had reference to themselves.

1 "Frequently when the Indunas have been anxious to have persons put to death they have been saved by the interposition of the king"—Conversation with J. Dunn. And see the remarkable fact as to Zulu "kraals of refuge" established by Cetshwayo for persons accused of being abalagati Official documents are quite silent as to this indisputable fact.

2 But in point of fact the fifteen executions by hanging which appear to have taken place in the colony of Natal since August 1, 1882, have considerably exceeded in number the executions of which Cetshwayo can be shown to have had any cognizance during the five years of his reign.

3 An abstract of what the Bishop has written on this point will be found in the Appendix.
"If Sir G. Wolseley," they wrote, "will concede to us the same rights and privileges as we had under the now deposed heathen king, and will . . . protect our lives and property from violence, as Cetshwayo did, we shall therewith be content."

It was, thus, on hearsay evidence of the flimsiest kind that the High Commissioner charged on the Zulu chief a tyranny over his subjects so persistent, and cruelties on a scale so vast, as to kindle in them the fiercest hatred for his person. So monstrous, indeed, had been his conduct from the day of his accession to power that his people had but one longing—the hope of being set free from his yoke. Before the conflict began these charges were urged with an iteration which shows that Sir Bartle Frere regarded them as essential for the establishment of his case and the justification of his policy. In a multitude of passages cited by the Bishop he speaks of the sufferings of the Zulus under the "grinding despotism" of their "cruel sovereign," of the "atrocious barbarities" of the "irresponsible, bloodthirsty, and treacherous despot," of his power of "murder and plunder," of the "ruthless savage" who is only "anxious to emulate the sanguinary fame of his uncle Chaka," whose "history is written in characters of blood!" "The monster Chaka," he insisted, "is his model; and to emulate Chaka in shedding blood is, as far as I have heard, his highest aspiration." Sir Bartle Frere had made up his mind for war, and writing from Natal in September 1878, he informed the Secretary of State of "reports of raids into Natal territory by large bodies of armed men, headed by two sons of Sihayo," a chief who, in spite of his "extremely anti-English feelings," had been "little in favour with Cetshwayo," but whose appointment by Cetshwayo to represent him at the Boundary
Commission he regarded as significant. He added that unless "the leaders of the murderous gangs" shall be "given up to justice," it would be "necessary to serve to the Zulu king an ultimatum which must put an end to pacific relations with our neighbours."

In his reply to this effusion, the Secretary of State, November 21, 1878, remarks that "The several circumstances which you have reported as tending to cause an open rupture do not appear, in themselves, to present any difficulties which are not capable of a peaceful solution."

Such suggestions were, of course, thrown away on a man like Sir Bartle Frere; but if there was need to offer such counsel the Secretary of State failed in his duty. The whole tenor of Sir B. Frere's despatches should have convinced the Colonial Secretary of the necessity of his recall. The British people had suffered so much and gained so little from South African wars that any attempt to provoke another wantonly ought to have been promptly suppressed. The loss of thousands of lives and of millions of money, not to speak of infinite moral evil, has been the consequence of his neglect.

For Sir Bartle Frere there may perhaps be urged the excuse of a heated and disordered imagination. Like Saul on his way to Damascus, he could not move, seemingly, without breathing threatenings and slaughter. Sir H. Bulwer, the Governor of Natal, had refused to hold Cetshwayo responsible for the raid of the sons of Sihayo, because there was nothing to show that it had his previous concurrence or even cognisance, although he became responsible for the act after its commission. For this act Sir H. Bulwer was ready to accept reparation; but he began soon to yield to the

1 Extracts from Blue-books, p. 258; and see Cetshwayo's Dutchman.
2 Extracts from Blue-books, p. 267.
vehemence of the High Commissioner, who seems never to have had the slightest scruple in listening to and accepting mere hearsay reports and even gossip. The notorious J. Dunn wrote at this time, December 30, 1878, to say that Cetshwayo had "quite changed his tone, and was determined to fight," and to this assertion Sir Bartle Frere at once gave credit. Sir H. Bulwer, it seems, had also changed his tone. Writing on January 10, 1879, he spoke of Cetshwayo as "half tyrant and half child. He cannot realise that we shall take action. He thinks all matters will be settled by words and by delays. He is willing to risk the Zulu monarchy rather than that Sihayo's sons should be sjambokked, which he thinks will be the punishment given them."

Rather, as the Bishop remarks,

"Cetshwayo could not believe that such unjust and violent action would be taken so hastily by Englishmen;"

and, as to his resolution on behalf of the sons of Sihayo, the Bishop adds with unanswerable force,

"there is surely something very noble in this, which is hardly the act of one 'half tyrant and half child.'" ¹

On February 12, 1879, Sir H. Bulwer speaks of the mistaken impression of Cetshwayo that he was about to be attacked; but "events have shown," the Bishop adds, "that the king was right in his suspicions of the good faith of the English authorities, and that from the first, and long before they arrived in the colony, Sir B. Frere and Lord Chelmsford did mean to invade his country, though Sir H. Bulwer had no such object in view." ²

Speaking in the House of Commons, Sir M. Hicks-Beach

¹ Extracts from Blue-books, p. 302.
² ib. p. 309.
³ Times, March 28, 1879.
dismissed as "a very small matter" the alleged ill-treatment of two English surveyors by Cetshwayo's people some months previously.

"I said so," he added, "in my despatch to Sir B. Frere; and I think that Sir B. Frere himself attached no very great importance to it, and it could easily have been settled one way or another."

But on December 6, 1878, Sir B. Frere had already come to speak of it as

"a most serious insult and outrage;"¹ and again the conclusion is that the authorities in England, in failing to recall him, were not strictly faithful to their trust. But, further, the High Commissioner insisted that the Zulu king was bent on invading Natal, and was ready to carry fire and sword through the whole colony. No doubt after the catastrophe at Isandhlwana he had it in his power to do so, as he had it in his power before. But, in spite of all these prognostications, Cetshwayo, the Bishop remarks,

"never made a raid into Natal, though the colony lay for some weeks, before the reinforcements arrived, trembling and practically unprotected, completely at his mercy."²

But long before the disaster at Isandhlwana Sir B. Frere had suggested the need of explanations to Cetshwayo, which carry with them an ominous look of treachery.

"I would explain," he suggests to the Governor of Natal, "that the assemblages of Her Majesty's troops of which he complains are for protective, and not aggressive, purposes, and that it is the threatening attitude of his people, so little in accordance with his own language, which causes distrust. I would inform him that the vessels he sees on the coast are for the most part English merchant-vessels, trading

¹ Extracts from Blue-books, p. 321. ² Ib. p. 342.
to distant countries; but that the war-vessels of the English Government are quite sufficient to protect his coast from any descent by any other Powers.”

Such language is monstrous indeed. What knowledge had the Zulu king of the fleets of any Power except the English? Yet he was to give Sir Bartle Frere credit for protecting him from attack by the Russian Czar and the German Emperor, when Sir Bartle Frere had made up his mind to crush him beneath his own heel.

The series of letters addressed at this time by the Bishop to his friend Mr. Chesson, the Secretary of the Aborigines Protection Society, are of the highest value as furnishing full materials for the history of events which led to the ruin of Zululand. Some extracts only can be given here; but these will suffice to show the nature of the policy against the injustice and cruelty of which he protested.

TO F. W. CHESSON, ESQ.

BISHOPSTOWE, December 6, 1878.

. . . “I have just heard from two young officers—who have only now arrived from England at Lord Chelmsford’s summons, with a number of others, volunteers for special services—that in England, when they left, even in military circles, nothing seemed to be known about the enormous military preparations which have been made in this colony for an expected war with the Zulus; and I cannot see in the London papers which have reached us by this mail any trace of such preparations . . . having been communicated to John Bull, who will have to pay for them at the rate (I know, from certain authority) of £100,000 per month, and I have seen it stated at double that amount. . . . It may be that the Aborigines Protection Society will have a very serious work to take in hand, denouncing in the strongest terms they can command the wicked and

1 Extracts from Blue-books, p. 348.
most unjustifiable war of invasion into which we are about immediately to be plunged, if... the 'Jingoes' in the colony are to be believed. . . . Yet I still cling to the hope that Sir Bartle Frere will not be guilty of such a crime as they all complacently assume him to be on the point of committing.

"And what is all this for? Do not believe—I am sure you will not—one word of the lies which have been propagated by deluding telegrams of 'our own correspondent' of the Mercury, &c., as to the defiant position of the Zulus. . . . Now it seems, if we are to believe the Mercury, the Zulu people with their king are to be eaten up amidst bloodshed and misery unimaginable, because they have desired as their own the land which the Boers had filched from them, which Sir T. Shepstone in his famous despatch to Lord Carnarvon declared, after the Blood River meeting, October 18, 1877, he was satisfied 'by evidence the most incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear,' belonged to the Boers, having been suddenly converted to this opinion; but which the Commission appointed by Sir H. Bulwer has—I feel sure, though their decision has not yet been published—pronounced to belong to the Zulus. . . .

"But I still hope for better things from Sir Bartle Frere, though I thus write, and write because to most I seem like a fool for trusting in his good faith to the last, notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary in the present aspect of affairs. . . .

"Do not forget that all this disturbance in our relations with Zululand, as well as with Sikukuni, is the direct consequence of that unfortunate annexation of the Transvaal, which would have fallen into our hands like a ripe fruit, if we had not taken possession of the country like a party of filibusters, partly by trickery, partly by bullying. . . . I have not the least hesitation in saying that both Cetshwayo and his army and people have been greatly misrepresented, for I have lived here now more than twenty-five years, . . . and during all that time not a single defiant act has been committed by Cetshwayo and his army and people against
the English Government; . . . they have shown no desire to disturb the friendly relations which, according to Sir T. Shepstone's own statement, 'during twenty-six years of Panda's reign were never seriously disturbed.' . . . And he [Sir T. S.] adds, 'Practically the government of Zululand had been in the hands of Cetshwayo since 1856.' Thus for twenty-two years, on Sir T. Shepstone's own showing, there has been nothing on Cetshwayo's part to deserve the harsh treatment with which he is now threatened, except that he and his indunas had the manliness to face Sir T. Shepstone at the Blood River, and assert their rights against the Boer incroachments, and have since had the good sense to lay down their weapons and submit the whole matter to arbitration, as proposed by Sir H. Bulwer (metaphorically speaking). Nothing could be more kind and gracious than Sir Bartle Frere's bearing towards myself. He returned my call promptly, came with his staff and Sir H. Bulwer and secretary to luncheon with me, and has always been remarkably friendly in his manner towards me. For instance, he himself broke to me the subject of Langalibalele, and the result was a letter from me, . . . which he acknowledged, not by a written reply, but by word of mouth, saying that the case, as I put it, was a very strong one, . . . and that I might depend upon his not losing sight of the matter. I sent a copy (for prudential reasons) to Sir H. Bulwer, who shortly afterwards replied that he would accept it as if addressed to himself, and would lay it before the Executive Council . . .

"If the Witness gives a correct and complete programme of Sir B. Frere's ultimatum, I should not doubt that the whole affair might and would be settled amicably. But . . . something may be behind these wise and reasonable proposals—viz. the disarmament of the Zulus—which I could only regard as a mere pretext for waging a war of aggression. In that case I should say, 'How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds,' &c. Here are the troops, and they must be employed to do something corresponding to the vast expense incurred on account of them. It does indeed
seem incredible that we should require, as a *sine quâ non*, Cetshwayo to disarm his people, when we are actually arming our own natives against the Zulus. . . . Of course, it might be wise to man the eight or nine fortresses, which have been placed along the frontier, with garrisons consisting of English troops, supported by native levies; a small number of the former might suffice for each fort, and 2000 natives might be distributed among them; . . . and something of this kind should have been done long ago, not to repress attacks from Zululand, for we have had none whatever, . . . but to allay the apprehensions of the white settlers. . . . I still cling to the hope that Sir B. Frere’s policy with respect to Zululand will not turn out to be based upon that principle which the *Guardian* describes as the gist of his letter on Indian affairs: ‘We are very strong, therefore ’—not ‘let us be just,’ but—‘we need not be just.’”

“December 19, 1878.

. . . “I have detained what I wrote about a fortnight ago, being still unwilling even to admit the possibility that Sir B. Frere could insist on terms . . . which could only be a pretext for a war of invasion. Since then the ‘award’ and the ‘ultimatum’ have been published. . . . You will see that the disarmament is not insisted on; but two points are to be enforced, viz. the disbanding of the Zulu army, and the abolition of the present marriage system,1 which

1 The Bishop agreed, of course, that “it would be well that Zulu soldiers should be left free to marry, as he would desire the same, as far as possible, for English soldiers, on whom the present enforced celibacy has a most demoralising effect.”—*Digest*, i. p. 529. But when he agreed in the terms of this portion of the ultimatum, he was “not informed, and never for a moment supposed, that they would be enforced peremptorily with bloody and brutal violence.”—*Digest*, i. p. 537. Of the award he spoke not less plainly. The “milk and water,” as a colonial journal phrased it, of this document, was converted into “fire and brimstone” by the memorandum which followed it, and which was intended to explain for Cetshwayo’s benefit the nature of the cession made to him—a cession in name, and nothing more. Against this mockery of justice the Bishop protested, saying that “as an honourable nation, we had, since the
may still bring on a collision and the shedding of blood. I most sincerely trust, and I hope and believe, that there will be no war, and that the overpowering demonstration made on his border will have the effect of convincing the Zulu king that he had better at once bow to the decision of the superior power, and consent to all that is required of him. I believe (I repeat) that he will do all this; and as to the other points I do not think that there will be any difficulty. Sir B. Frere sent me a private request on Sunday last that I would criticise his doings as severely as I thought it necessary to do. I called on him on Thursday, and had a long talk first with him, and then with Sir H. Bulwer, in which I expressed plainly what I thought. I said that I rejoiced in the two main requirements of the ultimatum, backed up by such a force, that I had every reason to believe that the king would consent to them—in which case England would have done her duty as a mighty Power, in interfering with her barbarous neighbour in enforcing changes in the government of Zululand which would be highly beneficial to the Zulu people; and that if these were all that was contemplated (together with the enforcement of the rules laid down at the coronation), as the result of such an enormous expenditure, I most heartily assented to it as a sign that England was still ready to discharge her duty as a great Christian people. I could have wished, however, that these demands had been based only on the highest grounds, instead of importing charges of 'aggres-
sion,' 'wholesale bloodshedding,' &c., which I believed (and still believe) are partly incorrect, and partly highly coloured and exaggerated. . . .1

"I need hardly say that my recommendation of Sir B. Frere's action is based entirely on the assumption that he has spoken and written, as an English gentleman, words of straightforward simplicity and truth. I should be exceedingly shocked to find that there is anything to be read (as they say) 'between the lines' of the ultimatum.

"It is right that I should repeat that I believe that Sir H. Bulwer has done his utmost to maintain the cause of righteousness and peace in our dealings with the Zulus . . . . I think that he well deserves the high approval of his fellow-Englishmen for what he has done. . . . If we have, as I trust, a peaceable settlement of the Zulu business, we shall owe it primarily to the exertions of Sir H. Bulwer. I hope that justice will be done to him, if anything is said on this subject in Parliament."

"December 6, 1878.

"You may rely, I believe, on the truth of these three statements: (1) that Sir B. Frere fully expected a different result of the labours of the Commission; (2) that Sir T. Shepstone objected strongly to certain parts of the Commissioners' Report, which was communicated to him, but not to Cetshwayo; (3) that Sir B. Frere pressed the Commissioners with these objections, but they triumphantly overthrew them, and consequently that he will be obliged to award substantially in favour of the Zulu claim.

"Cetshwayo sent down messengers to ask what all this [pre-

1 The Bishop's acquaintance with the Zulus had hitherto been but fragmentary. The attitude of Sir H. Bulwer had effectually prevented communication with them on the one hand; and on the other the Blue-books with their various revelations had not yet reached him. He was, therefore, obliged to argue on the assumption that for some at least of Sir B. Frere's accusations there must be a sufficient foundation in fact; and he wrote in a very different tone from that which he would have been justified in using, had he been then as well informed as he was afterwards to become, both of Cetshwayo's personal character and of the general features and working capabilities of the Zulu polity.
paration for war] meant—what had he done? He did not wish to fight with the English, and was ready to send down the young men [demanded by Sir B. Frere] as desired, but could not do so with war, as it were, at his very gates. ... “I strongly advised Cetshwayo to send down the criminals without a moment’s unnecessary delay, as that was required; though what we can do with them, what law of the colony they have broken, or by what process they shall be tried, are questions which seem to me not easy to be answered.”

When, ten months later, at the close of the war, one of the said criminals was captured, it was found that he could only be fined for trespass. It seems strange that Cetshwayo should not have been allowed to ask counsel in his difficulties from his best and wisest friend, and difficult to understand why Sir H. Bulwer should have objected to the Bishop’s giving any advice at all, seeing that the replies he gave were: (1) to submit to the British demands without delay; (2) not to dream of fighting; and (3), though this came first in point of time, to ask Sir H. Bulwer to arbitrate between Boers and Zulus, which was precisely what Sir H. Bulwer himself professed to desire. The Bishop, however, on hearing the Governor’s objections, gave scrupulous heed to them. He was satisfied that Sir H. Bulwer was striving to prevent the invasion of Zululand, and he felt that it was far better to disappoint Cetshwayo for the moment than to risk the Zulu interests with the Governor.

The award and ultimatum were delivered to the Zulus on the same day, and of the former the Bishop wrote to General Durnford a little later:—

“Sir Bartle Frere, while he adopted the judgement of the Commissioners, as he could not avoid doing, emptied it of all its meaning for the Zulus by a secret document—at least, one which he says was prematurely published, though prepared and signed a fortnight before the award was
delivered—in which he reserved their *private rights* to all those who had settled under the unjust Boer Government upon the disputed territory; in other words, giving to Cetshwayo the empty name of sovereignty. But with this award, such as it was [*i.e.* with the interpretation given to it by Sir B. Frere, but not intended by Colonel Durnford and the other Commissioners], Sir B. Frere coupled demands, to be complied with in a very short time, with which he knew the king could not possibly comply under the circumstances."

It was this "very short time," and the demand for immediate compliance with difficult requirements on pain of war, against which the Bishop protested—not the requirements themselves, although he might have suggested valuable modifications had he been allowed the opportunity, as all other missionaries were, before it was too late.

On December 22, 1878, the Bishop writes to Mr. Chesson:—

"I commend to your careful consideration . . . the cuttings which I send from our colonial papers . . . You will see . . . an ominous paragraph about the farmers who have been settled in the territory now given back to the Zulus being confirmed in their farms under the guarantee of the English Government; in other words, Sir B. Frere gives back to the Zulus the country in question *without* these farms . . .

"In other words, *every bit* of the territory given back to the Zulus will be 'guaranteed' to white farmers. . . . If this is really Sir B. Frere's meaning, then I say that the dishonesty of the whole affair is so palpable—the delaying the award till he had got together all his forces; the announcing it without the slightest intimation to the Zulu king that he was giving with the one hand what he took away with the other; and the leaving the poor Zulus and their friends, especially myself, after my interview with him, in the enjoy-
ment of a fool's paradise, because we trusted in the word and good faith of an English gentleman—that I must leave it to be properly judged by men in England.”

TO THE SAME.

“December 27, 1878.

“I have reason to believe that Sir Henry Bulwer entirely agrees with my view, and that the memorandum had not been submitted to him before it was allowed to see the light. . . . Sir B. Frere told me that it was only a sketch of his ideas, and not meant to be final. So much the worse, say I, since it appears that he could himself entertain the notion of turning the Commission into a mockery, and sacrificing the Zulus in order to please the Boers. It is very clear to me now that he never wished or expected the Commission to have such a result, and that he has done his best to counteract it. . . . It seems to me that in letting that memorandum see the light—for it is absurd to suppose that the Times and Mercury separately published it without implied permission—Sir B. Frere meant to feel the pulse of the colony, and of a few persons in it, whose silence would give consent. I only hope that I have not been too reserved in respect of some of his other proceedings, for his demands upon Cetshwayo are in some respects hard, and very possibly even now they may bring on a war, which unquestionably some greatly desire.”

“December 29, 1878.

“I very much fear that we are about to be plunged by Sir B. Frere into a bloody war. If, indeed, I believed implicitly all that I have heard in town to-day, I could no longer entertain a doubt upon the point, for the opinion is strong, I find, that it is intended to force Cetshwayo into war. . . . Have the terms of the memorandum reached the Zulus? Has J. Dunn, or any other white man, communicated to him the language of the second clause, with the comments of the Mercury and Witness upon it? And was the possibility of such communication contemplated when it was
allowed to get into the papers, though only a draft of Sir B. Frere's first thoughts, or was it intended to reach him? If so, it would be easy to account for his refusing all terms, and in fact he will have been driven to bay and forced into war. . . ."

To the same.

"January 9, 1879.

"I call your attention to the second cutting at the head of this letter, by which you will see what Colonel Wood is about—no doubt with orders in the way of irritating the Zulus at this crisis. All the Zulus living north of the Pongola are in ten days to submit to the Transvaal Government, or to cross into Zululand. . . . I have ascertained to-day [January 10] that Colonel Wood crossed . . . into the land just given back to Cetshwayo, some days ago. . . . I have been told on good authority that he did so when war was declared in the 'notification,' . . . which I supposed notified that war would take place next week if Cetshwayo refused to yield."

To the same.

"January 12.

"The news reaches us of blood being shed in Zululand, . . . and you will see by the cattle carried off how much dependence is to be placed in Sir Bartle Frere's statement that all demands 'were in the interest of the Zulu people,' and that the British Government has no quarrel with the Zulu 'people' (notification), which last has been published in a translation for natives, . . . not in the language of our natives, but in that of the frontier Kafirs. . . . Conceive the mockery of proclaiming in writing or in print to the Zulus, who have no chance of seeing the proclamation, or power of reading it if they saw it, that 'all Zulus who came in unarmed, or who lay down their arms, will be provided for, &c., . . . but all who do not so submit will be dealt with as enemies!' How they will be 'dealt with' may be gathered from the following orders:—'Instructions have been issued
to the volunteers that they are not to fire on the natives excepting as follows: When one comes within 200 yards armed, and when two, three, or more armed natives come within 500 yards. . . . Remember that every Zulu goes about in time of peace 'armed,'—that is, carrying his assegais—as a matter of course. . . . On a somewhat similar principle to the above, I suppose, a shell was fired at a group of five, who stood on the Zulu side of the Tugela, about a mile off, and this took place on Friday, January 9, whereas the thirty days expired on January 10; 'and the shot' (says the Colonist) 'we are confidently assured took fatal effect.'"

TO THE SAME.

"BISHOPSTOWE, January 14, 1879.

. . . "The fact is now plain that Sir Bartle Frere came here fully intending to make this invasion of Zululand; and as the Zulus will not disturb the peace and begin the war, he is obliged to fall back on this affair in order to find reason for the English people, who have been already prepared by a series of false telegrams from Capetown. . . .

"A mere fraction of the money that will now have been spent in war, whether bloody and protracted or not (for which we shall mainly depend on the extent to which the forbearance of a savage can be tried), would have paid the reasonable claims of any Boers who might have been ejected from the new Zulu territory—even if they all desired to quit their hitherto, in many cases, very uncomfortable holdings.'

TO THE SAME.

"BISHOPSTOWE, January 24, 1879.

"Terrible news from the front to-day, as I have just heard by a private note from Sir H. Bulwer. A large body of our troops, under Colonel Pulleine, has been attacked by a strong Zulu force, outnumbered, and five companies of soldiers have been cut to pieces; and I very much fear that Colonel Durnford also has fallen. Meanwhile our own position in
the colony is now somewhat precarious, as the Zulus have gone behind the General, who was in advance of the colonel, and himself engaged at the time with another Zulu force. And I really don't know what is to prevent their entering the colony. It was madness (as it seems to an outsider) to think of guarding a frontier of 200 miles with such a force, more especially when the main body had marched away inland.

"January 26.

"The details of the late disaster have to some extent arrived, and terrible they are even as at present known. The list of missing (almost all of whom are believed to be dead, though some may yet turn up who had escaped) is frightful. . . . It is a disaster such as has not befallen the British arms since the last Afghan War.

"It appears that the General, having crossed into Zululand, with the third column under Colonel Glynn, marched forward on the 22nd, leaving the force in his camp under the command of Colonel Pulleine to come on with baggage-waggons and ammunition. An immense body of Zulus, who had heard from their scouts of this advance (what our own scouts were doing does not appear), fell upon the camp with irresistible daring, utterly reckless of their own lives, and crushing by their multitudes the British force. Colonel Durnford had been ordered to bring up from his post (the second column) his mounted natives and rocket battery to strengthen the convoying force, but only arrived just as the Zulu force was arriving, and only to add his own force and himself to the general loss. I mention this fact particularly, because in a telegram which Sir B. Frere sent to the Commodore at the Port, he says, 'You will have heard of Colonel Durnford's misfortune on the 22nd.' What he means by this I cannot conceive. . . .

"I trust that when all our forces are withdrawn from Zululand they will be strong enough to prevent any general invasion of the colony, though in my opinion—and in that of many others now—we have richly deserved it; for it must not be forgotten that Cetshwayo was true to his word. He never
struck a blow till we invaded his country and began to kill his men and plunder his cattle... 

"I need not say that Sir B. Frere's plans have ended thus far in a miserable failure. But I must leave the judgement on these to be pronounced by Englishmen at home, who will see that all difficulties with Cetshwayo might have been settled long ago by peaceful means, but for the desire to please the Transvaal Boers; and that we are now involved in this disastrous war by an utter miscalculation of the Zulu power."

It would not be easy to exaggerate the panic felt in the colony on receiving the tidings of the Isandhlwana disaster. It must be remembered (and none probably will now venture to deny) that the catastrophe which here befel the British force was the result of an accident. It was the black day of the new moon, when it is unlucky and even impious for the Zulus to begin an undertaking. The battle was begun by Lord Chelmsford's attack on Matshana, who was coming quietly to the rendezvous to help to talk matters over, and Matshana's fugitives roused the Zulu army. The defeat of the English was followed by panic. An immediate invasion of Natal was looked for. After describing some of the measures taken to meet the supposed emergency, the Bishop adds:—

"It cannot be believed that one of such great and varied experience as the High Commissioner was really in such a state of alarm as would seem to be indicated by some of these proceedings, at a time when the exhibition of calmness and confidence was needed to reassure the citizens. But the existence of such a scare in Natal would, no doubt, help to support his policy in the eyes of those at home, as an actual inroad of the Zulus would have still more effectually justified the charges he had made against the king, and the violent measures he had taken in invading Zululand for the good of the Zulus themselves and the
safety of the colony. After the disaster at Isandhlwana, Sir B. Frere, of course, repeats his charge against Cetshwayo of intending to invade the colony. 1

But, if all that Sir Bartle Frere had said of Cetshwayo should be true, what would follow? Nothing less than this, that a war waged against such a monster must end in the surrender or death of the despot after the first serious reverse sustained by the arms of his unwilling warriors. In short, there would be no trouble in seizing a man of whom his people wished only to be rid, and with whom alone the British Government professed to have any grounds of quarrel. But what are the facts? To make this clear, the Bishop published, under the title of Cetshwayo's Dutchman, the private journal of a white trader in Zululand during the British invasion, which was professedly to deliver the Zulus from an execrable and unbearable tyranny. For this journal he wrote a preface and some notes, which throw a terrible light on the modes of warfare employed in this miserable war.

The Dutchman who wrote the journal, Mr. Cornelius Vijn, tells his story (which anticipates the narrative to be gathered from some of the Bishop's letters later on) to the following effect. He had gone into Zululand to barter blankets for cattle, and he did his best to entrap the Zulu king and hand him over to his enemies. Scarcely had he crossed the border, when he found that the outbreak of war was imminent. He began to experience at once the benefit of Cetshwayo's generous policy of self-defence. Cetshwayo's followers, or rather those of his subordinate chiefs, would have made short work with him but for the knowledge that the king was resolved to call them to strict account if they should do him harm. 2 Of this resolution Mr. Vijn was perfectly aware, and

1 Extracts from Blue-books, p. 359.
2 It may be noted that the chief who, but for Cetshwayo's orders, would have killed Vijn was Sir Henry Bulwer's favourite, Zibebu.
he had abundant proof that Cetshwayo was scrupulous in avoiding even the faintest show of wrong to the enemy who, he suspected, were on the point of invading his country. Thus protected, he seems to have made some very good bargains; but the benefits which he had received from the Zulu chief were for him not worth a thought when an opportunity offered of enriching himself at his cost. Had Cetshwayo been even slack in protecting him, still more had he in any way tried to threaten or frighten him, Mr. Vijn might with some colour have treated him as an enemy. Having availed himself of his friendship, and relying on his kingly good faith, the sharpsighted Dutchman defiled his hands with the price of blood; and he did this when he was sent to Sir Garnet Wolseley by Cetshwayo himself to assure the English General that he was

"employed in collecting his cattle to hand them over to the whites."

"Being a Dutchman," says Mr. Vijn, "and having been in close intimacy with the king, I was afraid of the consequences of refusing to do his bidding, and I undertook the task. Sir G. Wolseley then offered me a bribe of £200, and promised to keep the matter of this payment secret. He would give me three days to bring him in; but if I managed it in two days he would give me £50 more."

His interested zeal was not altogether successful. The king was taken at last; but as Mr. Vijn's guidance fell short of the mark he received only £50. Having thus done what he could to better himself at his benefactor's cost, he returned to take possession of his waggon and oxen, and over seventy head of cattle, which, during the whole interval, had been safely kept for him under the king's protection. This portrait of Mr. Vijn is drawn by himself. Its repulsiveness is heightened by the quietness with which, after this vile ingratitude, he
expresses his absolute disbelief that Cetshwayo was a bloodthirsty tyrant.

"He had, of course," he adds, "to enforce from time to time the laws of his country; and if he had not done so, where should I have been, who owed my safety to the order maintained by the king?"

The fact is, that the pretence of a quarrel with the Zulu king, apart from his people, could not be sustained. Lord Chelmsford was obliged to admit that the limiting the operations of the war to the defeat of the chief only was impracticable, although he thought that that announcement was "politic and proper, because it afforded an opportunity to those chiefs who were averse to Cetshwayo's rule to come over to our side."

Either, however, they were not averse to his rule, or they would not come; and the people would not admit the distinction. In the issue, British officers or agents had to menace and even to torture the subjects of Cetshwayo in order to compel them to betray a chief whose tyranny was said to be unbearable. The narrative of his capture is, indeed, a very striking one, and exhibits a devotion on their part scarcely less touching than that which shielded Charles Edward from the day of Culloden fight till he left Scotland. By fair means, and by any persuasion short of those of the scourge and the rifle, it was found impossible to attain the desired end. In the notes to Cetshwayo's Dutchman, the Bishop gives the terrible tale as it was related in the Cape Times of September 11, 1879, and by the

1 A repetition of this wanton, cruel, and groundless libel will be found in the pages of Miss Charlotte Yonge's Jubilee History, for which she claims the special merit of being strictly accurate, on the ground that it has passed under the eyes of the highest authorities.
Government interpreter attached to the expedition. Nothing more than this story is needed to prove that the epithets by which Sir Bartle Frere justified his designs against Cetshwayo were slanderously untrue. If the conduct of a nation under the most trying conditions goes for anything, the inference follows that the High Commissioner's charges had absolutely no foundation in fact. But a series of incidents, openly avowed, and even boasted of, in this narrative and in others, go far towards shifting upon British shoulders the infamy with which Sir Bartle Frere did his best to overthrow the Zulu chieftain. One specimen may be cited, as it may serve to show the depth of horror, of righteous indignation and anguish, with which the Bishop went through the terrible series. The party in search of Cetshwayo, having failed to make any impression on the men whom they caught, lighted on a solitary woman in the bush. In her terror she told them where the king had slept two nights before. But three men seized at the kraal to which she directed them

"denied in the most solemn way that they knew anything about the king. We threatened to shoot them; but they said, 'If you kill us, we shall die innocently.' This was about 9 P.M., a beautiful moonlight night, and the picture was rather an effective one. There were all our men sitting round at their fire-places, our secret tribunal facing the three men, who were calm and collected; whilst we, as a sort of Inquisition, were trying to force them to divulge their secret. As a last resource, we took one man and led him away blindfolded behind a bush, and then a rifle was fired off to make believe that he was shot. We then separated and blindfolded the remaining two, and said to one of them: 'You saw your brother led away blindfolded; we have shot him; now we shall shoot you. You had better tell the truth.' After a good deal of coaxing, one told us where the king had slept the night before. Lord Gifford gave orders for our party to saddle up, which was smartly done, and we
started off with the two brothers as guides. We left the one brother behind, so as to keep on the screw and make the two believe he had been shot."

Mr. Longcast added,

"We could get nothing from the Zulus. We were treated the same at every kraal. I had been a long time in Zululand, I knew the people and their habits, and although I believed they would be true to their king, I never expected such devotion: nothing would move them; neither the loss of their cattle, the fear of death, nor the offering of large bribes would make them false to their king."

Deeds of a like kind were done after the proclamation of peace. But there is not a shred of evidence that Cetshwayo departed from his policy of strict self-defence. Some of his men in the pursuit on the day of Isandhlwana were about to cross into Natal (and Natal, as we have seen, lay absolutely at his mercy), when an induna, or officer on horseback, shouted to them, "Has he said you were to cross? Come back!"

For the plea of wanton assault on the part of Cetshwayo there is not even a semblance of colour. In the words of Mr. Gladstone, at Chester,

"That is a statement which beats all description. When it is really asserted by the responsible Minister of the Crown that the Zulus invaded us, we ought to be on our guard. The error is to be found in this—that not only did we invade the land of the Zulus, but unfortunately, by that terrible calamity which befell our troops, they practically drove us out of the land; they made a broad road towards the dominions of the Queen; but, having broken our bands with a heavy hand, they did not cross the stream which separated their land from ours, but simply were contented to wait within their own territories for the renewal of our wanton, unprovoked, mischievous, terrible attack."

This attack was marked by the employment of all the destructive agencies placed at our command by modern
science; but we have yet to learn that the employment of some of these would be held justifiable in such a struggle even as that of the Franco-German war. Cetshwayo undoubtedly had his rifles; but his men would have been more dangerous without them. They did not know how to use them,—proof surely how little he had been preparing to measure himself with the English. With his rifles, however used, he met us in the open field, and with rifles, if it be granted that our cause of quarrel was adequate and righteous, we were justified in meeting him. But he refused on his side to use means against which his conscience revolted. When a Tonga doctor offered his services for killing the whites by poisoning the springs of water, Cetshwayo, according to Mr. Vijn, said that

"he would not fight with the whites in any such inhuman manner, but he would fight in honourable fashion, for he had men enough for this. Also he gave orders always to his people that, whenever they were able to get white men into their hands alive, they were not to kill them, but must bring them to him."

On this the Bishop of Natal remarked (and his words demand the serious consideration of Englishmen):—

"No doubt Cetshwayo was right in his decision according to ordinary principles of humanity. But it is not easy to see where the line is to be drawn in planning means of death for an enemy in war, when 'dynamite' has been employed in Zululand, and elsewhere in South Africa, to destroy the ignorant savage, and smoking out of caves has been practised in Natal, and terrible engines, horribly destructive of human life, though requiring only skill in their use, and not any special display of valour, . . . have swept away the legs and arms and heads, or cruelly smashed the bodies, of thousands of brave but helpless Zulus. . . . If civilised men by their secret arts may poison the earth, why may not savages poison the water?"
If it be urged that the application of all scientific results is fair in war, the reply must be that there was a time when the man who knew how to poison water was the possessor of a scientific secret which gave him over his opponent a vantage-ground similar to that which the knowledge of dynamite and other substances gives to us. But it is incredible that the English nation could ever urge or sanction such a plea as this; and it is still more monstrous to suppose that they would, if they had known the facts, justify their employment for the purpose of smothering to death in caves multitudes of women and children who, with the men, had taken refuge in them. Of such deeds the Bishop of Natal cited, in his notes to Mr. Vijn's journal, a series of sickening and revolting narratives, written, some of them, by the perpetrators themselves. In one instance, when the inmates offered a stout resistance, the mouth of the cave was walled up, and

"bricks of gun-cotton [dynamite] were thrown inside, and blew up the cave, destroying 400 or 500 men, women, and children who were in the inner recesses of the cave. My informant, a white man, said that there is no doubt about this, as the prisoners taken assured them that all their women and children were inside." 1

The mode in which Cetshwayo was dealt with in the negotiations was not less astonishing. His messengers were in some instances treated as spies, and manacled. Sufficient time was not allowed for the return of answers to English letters; and these letters all contained impossible demands, with the exception of the last, which never reached him at all. 2 It was not in the chief's power to compel his regiments to lay down their weapons in the sight of the Queen's forces, and unhappily the assurances of an English General could scarcely convey to Zulus the satisfaction which they would

reasonably give to a European enemy. Even after the declaration of peace at Ulundi, Colonel Villiers had a "brush" with Manyonyoba's people (north of the Pongola), who had sought refuge in caves near Luneberg. From one cave nine head-ringed men were induced to come out on solemn promise of their lives and of fair treatment, given them on the word of the staff interpreter with General Wood. They came out, and a few minutes after they were killed by Teteleku's people, who formed part of the British force. Throughout the whole struggle the usages of war were, to say the least, strained to the uttermost. At the moment when Lord Chelmsford was insisting on his "utterly impracticable demand" that a thousand of the Zulu warriors should in person lay down their arms before him, he had accepted from Cetshwayo through General Crealock, and sent to England, an elephant's tusk of huge size, and by this act, the Bishop remarks,

"according to native usage, as well as by Lord Chelmsford's accepting the Prince Imperial's sword, we were pledged in honour and good faith, on the word of an English General, to amicable relations with the king himself."

It was perhaps owing only to the time of day when his capture was effected that Cetshwayo lived to await at Cape-town the judgement of the English people. Of his party of twenty-three, eleven tried to escape in the evening dusk, and five were shot. It is easy to see, the Bishop adds,

"what would have been almost to a certainty the fate of Cetshwayo, if Lord Gifford had carried out his plan of making his capture at night, . . . and if the king had made an effort to escape . . . in the evening shade and

1 On the alleged price put by Sir Garnet Wolseley on the head of Cetshwayo, see Cetshwayo's Dutchman, p. 154.
2 Ib. p. 139.
uncertain moonlight. A rifle-shot would in all probability have... relieved Sir Garnet Wolseley and the Government of the difficulty of deciding how to deal with him in the face of the English people and of all civilised and Christian men. In this case the unfortunate and noble-minded king would have perished without the chance of justice being done to him by word or act—his name blackened and his whole character misrepresented through the ceaseless vituperations of Sir Bartle Frere.¹

To a certain extent it seems that a layman is allowed to charge his countrymen with making mistakes in matters of policy, and English Governments not merely with blunders but with downright duplicity and wrong-doing. But there seems to be a tacit assumption that clergymen have nothing to do but approve and laud the action of Governments for the time being; and when now and then a clergyman refuses to do this, and speaks his mind frankly and openly, the multitude stand aghast at what they call his folly and his daring. The bearing of the clergy with reference to things political has not a little to do with this general assumption on the part of the laity. We have had many wars in the present century, as in those which have gone before it. We have

¹ The examination of the charges brought against Cetshwayo for killing persons accused of sorcery or witchcraft, reduces them almost to nothing, even if we are agreed as to the meaning of the words. Still a belief, whatever it may be, in soothsayers, divination, the evil eye, is as deeply rooted amongst the Zulus as amongst other South African tribes. But it is deeply to be regretted that these superstitions should have been confirmed and strengthened indefinitely by the act of British soldiers, who, on the day before Cetshwayo's capture, full in sight of the English headquarters' camp, dug up and carried away the bones of his father, the old King Mbanda, which had been seven years buried. It is difficult to frame any excuse for such a crime as this; but to every Zulu and to every native in Natal the explanation immediately suggested itself. The white men intended by some unlawful and horrible means to gain power over Cetshwayo. Having dug up his father, they would soon catch the king. His immediate capture was for the Zulus proof positive of the successful sorcery.
had forms of prayer set forth at the beginning, during the course, and at the end of these conflicts; but can anyone call to mind one single form, whether of supplication or of thanksgiving, which has not merely implied but roundly asserted that the English or British were always in the right, and their opponents always and altogether in the wrong? There is something sickening in the remembrance of words in which God was addressed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in the first and second Afghan Wars, during the siege of Sebastopol, or the operations in Northern or Southern Africa. It has been always the same story—the parading of our own nobleness, the imprecation of defeat and disaster upon our enemies. It may be said that Bishop Colenso was not an Archbishop of Canterbury. The fact speaks for itself. It may also be said that he could afford to say what the Archbishop dared not utter; that he had little or nothing to lose, and the Archbishop had a great deal. This is not the case. The tax on courage was as great in the one instance as in the other, even if it needed not a higher effort to stem the tide of public opinion among people whose heads are turned by fear, and who are rendered irritable or even savage by dread of personal loss.

With a spirit in singular contrast with the tone of all prayers put forth in England by authority, the Bishop of Natal's prayer "to be used during the continuance of the Zulu War," in 1879, spoke of "the terrible scourge of war laid by our hands upon a neighbouring people," and besought the righteous Father "to watch over all near and dear to us, and all our fellow-men, whether white or black, engaged in this deadly struggle;" ending with the words "In Thy wisdom, we pray Thee, Merciful Father, overrule Thou all events for good, and in Thine own time restore
to us, and to those whose land we have invaded, the bless­ings of peace, for Thy Name's sake declared to us in Jesus Christ our Lord."

In the sermon which he preached at Maritzburg on the Day of Humiliation (ordered by the Government) after the disaster at Isandhlwana he spoke with not less firmness and candour. Each result has its own cause; and knowingly to assign it to some other cause is to be guilty of deception and mockery. This is, however, a course by no means unusual with those who profess to be giving themselves to the work of humiliation and prayer.

"I will not," the Bishop said, "prostitute my sacred office by speaking peace to you when there is no peace; by hiding the sins which we are bound to confess, and telling you of faults which are not the real burden which weighs us down. Rather, I will not dare to provoke the Most High God with such cowardly delinquency in duty, such base hypocrisy, in pretending to lead your prayers and your con­fessions, while yet, like Ananias, I keep back the substance of those confessions, 'lying not unto men, but unto God.' Let us beware lest we 'agree together to tempt the Spirit of the Lord.'"

Most assuredly the Bishop did not keep back the true cause, so far as it was known to him. He "plunged," as the phrase goes, into politics, and gave a history of the dealings which had led to disaster. In justice to himself, this history must be given in his own words. It was useless, he said, to suppose that the requirements of God were different now from what they had been in the days of Micah, who summed them up under the three heads of doing justly, loving mercy, and walking humbly. Have we, he asked, been doing justly in the past?

"What colonist doubts that what has led directly to this Zulu War, and thus to the late great disaster, has been the
annexation of the Transvaal—by which, as the Boers complain, we came by stealth, 'as a thief in the night,' and deprived them of their rights and took possession of their land? We all know that, while the Secretary of State, on April 23, 1877, was saying in his place in the House of Lords that, 'as to the supposed threat of annexing the Transvaal, the language of the Special Commissioner had been greatly exaggerated,' it had already been annexed on 'April 12, under authority issued months before by himself.' No doubt he had been beguiled by the semblance of great unanimity, of the general desire for annexation, among the Transvaal people; whereas the expression of such a desire we know came chiefly from Englishmen, most of them recent arrivals in the land, and not from the great body of old Dutch residents. He had also been, of course, very deeply impressed by the reports which had reached him about the state of the country, the weakness of the Government, its empty exchequer, its failure in warlike measures against the natives, and the cruel outrages committed by individual Boers in some of these conflicts. But those outrages were repudiated by their own fellow-countrymen. And the friendly services, advice, and aid, which were at first supposed and were, in fact, professed to be offered, might have done much to straighten what was crooked, and strengthen what was weak, in the machinery of government, and rectify the other evils complained of. And thus would have been laid at the same time the foundation of a deep and lasting friendship between the two white peoples, which before long would have resulted, if not in a willing union, yet at all events in a happy confederation, under the British flag, an event to be desired by all when the time is ripe for it. But no! we could not wait; confederation was desired at once; it was the idol of the hour. It would have been too long to look for it to be brought about in the ordinary course of things, by those gradual, though sure, processes of change which Nature loves. And so the deed was done, and we sent some of our officials to help in the work, and twenty-five of our mounted police—a small body
indeed in appearance, but quite enough of armed force for
the purpose in view—with a body of soldiers stationed within
call on our northern frontier, and with the armies of England
at their back; for we know full well, and the Boers knew,
that, if one single shot had been fired in anger at that
escort, the violent subjugation, and perhaps desolation, of
that land would have surely and speedily followed.

"So we annexed the Transvaal, and that act brought with it
as its Nemesis the Zulu difficulty, with respect to the terri­
tory disputed with the Boers. Have we done justly here?
I assume what is stated in the published award, that the
three English Commissioners have reported their opinion
that the land in question, south of the Pongolo—almost
identically what was claimed by the Zulus—belongs of
strict right to them, and not to the Boers. I assume that
the Commissioners conscientiously discharged their duty in
the matter, heard and considered carefully all the evidence
produced on both sides, and produced in the presence of
the representatives of both (an essential requisite in such
an inquiry), and came to the deliberate conclusion that the
Transvaal claim had not been sustained, and that the Zulu
claim was justified. But how have we been acting all along
in respect of this matter? From the year 1861, in which
the Boer claim was first made, and in which also the Zulus
first complained to this Government of Boer incroachments,
sixteen years were allowed to pass before we took any
effectual steps to settle the dispute—we, the dominant
Power in South Africa. During all that time, with one
exception, we quietly looked on, allowing these alleged
incroachments on the lands of those who were looking up
to us for justice to grow and be established, as if they were
acknowledged rights; while the Zulu king and people were
sending to our Government continually their complaints and
protests, as shown by official documents. From year to
year we allowed this question to smoulder on, the feelings
of both peoples growing hotter and hotter; but we did not
‘do justly,’ as from our commanding position we were bound
to have done—we did not interfere in the interests of
peace, and insist on settling equitably this difference between our white and black neighbours. And in 1876, the fifteenth year, our Secretary for Native Affairs reported as follows:

"This Government has for years past invariably and incessantly urged upon Cetshwayo the necessity for preserving the peace, and, so far, with great success. But messages from the Zulu king are becoming more frequent and more urgent, and the replies he receives seem to him to be both temporising and evasive."

"In those fifteen years eighteen messages were sent by the Zulu king on this subject, the fourth of which, on July 5, 1869, nearly ten years ago, contained these words:—"

"The heads of the Zulu people have met in council with their chiefs, and unanimously resolved to appeal to the kind offices of the Government of Natal, to assist them to avert a state of things which otherwise appears inevitable:—"

"They beg the friendly intervention and arbitration of this Government between them and the Boer Government."

"They beg that the Lieutenant-Governor will send a Commission to confer with both sides, and decide, with the concurrence of the Zulus, what their future boundary shall be, and that this decision shall be definite and final as regards them."

"They beg that the Governor will take a strip of country, the length and breadth of which is to be agreed upon between the Zulus and the Commissioners sent from Natal, so as to interfere in all its length between the Boers and the Zulus, and to be governed by the colony of Natal, and form a portion of it if thought desirable."

"The Zulu people earnestly pray that this arrangement may be carried out immediately; because they have been neighbours of Natal for so many years, separated only by a stream of water, and no question of boundary or other serious difficulty has arisen between them and the Government of Natal. They know that, where the boundary is fixed by agreement with the English, there it will remain."

"Panda, Cetshwayo, and all the heads of the Zulu people assembled, directed us to urge in the most earnest manner
upon the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal the prayer we have stated.

"Our then Lieutenant-Governor, the late Mr. Keate—all honour be to his memory!—on the receipt of this request, promised to take steps in the matter, and did so. For two years and a half a correspondence was carried on with the Boer Government on the subject; arbitration was agreed to, Lieutenant-Governor Keate himself to be the arbitrator; the requisite papers were promised to be sent; the time for arbitration was settled. But all came to nothing; the promised papers were never sent; the arbitration never took place. Lieutenant-Governor Keate's term of office came to an end in 1872; and on May 25, 1875, the Acting President issued a proclamation annexing the land in dispute to the Transvaal.

"And thus this matter, which might have been settled easily in 1861, was allowed to grow into very serious importance. Farm-houses were built and small townships founded within the disputed territory; and we—the dominant Power—did nothing to check these proceedings, which were certain to embarrass greatly any future attempt to settle the dispute. At last, our present Governor, with a true Englishman's sense of right and justice, took the matter in hand, and at the end of 1877 proposed, and in due time appointed, the Boundary Commission, which reported in favour of the Zulus.

"Did we even then 'do justly'? I must speak the truth this day before God, and honestly say that in my judgement we did not. Some time before the Commissioners' report was made, the High Commissioner had said that we must be 'ready to defend ourselves against further aggression'; that 'the delay caused' by the Commissioners 'would have compensating advantages'; that 'it appeared almost certain that serious complications must shortly arise with the Zulus, which will necessitate active operations'; when all the while the Zulus were only claiming, south of the Pongolo, land which has now been declared to be 'of strict right' their own, and, north of it, land east of the Drakensberg,
which may as justly be their own, but respecting which no inquiry has yet been made. And we know that before the award was given large bodies of troops had been collected on the frontier, but volunteers called out, our native levies raised; and that award which might have been the herald of peace, was converted, by the demands coupled with it, into a declaration of war. Nay, the award itself was, in my judgement, stripped of almost all its value for the Zulus by a clause of the memorandum reserving under British guarantee all private rights acquired under the Boer Government, which had granted out in farms, it is said, the whole land in question, though it had no right to grant any of it. The Zulu king would have had no control over it; he would not have been able to send any of his people to live on it, or any of his cattle to graze on it, or even to assign places in it to any Zulus who might have elected to remove from the Transvaal to the Zulu side of the boundary.

"II. Have we shown ourselves in the character of men who 'love mercy?' Truly, it would have been a noble work to have used the power and influence of England for improving the social and moral condition of the Zulu people. Having first 'done justly' in respect of the award, we should have had a vantage-ground from which much might have been done by peaceful means in this direction. A Resident might have been placed in Zululand, with the hearty consent of the king and people, who had asked more than once for such an officer to be appointed on the border, to keep the peace between them and the Boers. His presence would have had great effect in forwarding such changes in the Zulu system of government as we all desire. . . . But even if, instead of waiting for the gradual improvement of the people, as wise men would do, we determined to inforse them at once, there was a way of doing this, which at one time indeed was talked of as if it had been really contemplated, viz. by advancing into the country slowly and gradually, intrenching at short stages, neither killing people nor plundering cattle, but repeating our demand from time
to time, showing thus that we had only the welfare of the Zulus at heart. . . . Of course, if we took such a work in hand at all, we were bound not to heed any additional expenses such delay would entail, which, in point of fact, would have been as nothing to that which must now be incurred. The success, however, of such an experiment would, obviously, have greatly depended on our receiving daily the surrender of chiefs and people in large numbers, wishing to shake off the yoke of the Zulu king and coming to seek our protection. And of such surrenders, so confidently expected at one time, we have seen, as yet, no sign whatever.

"I repeat the question—Wherein, in our invasion of Zululand, have we shown that we are men who 'love mercy'? Did we not lay upon the people heavily, from the very moment we crossed their border, the terrible scourge of war? Have we not killed already, it is said, 5,000 human beings, and plundered 10,000 head of cattle? It is true that, in that dreadful disaster, on account of which we are this day humbling ourselves before God, we ourselves have lost very many precious lives; and widows and orphans, parents, brothers, sisters, friends, are mourning bitterly their sad bereavements. But are there no griefs—no relations that mourn their dead—in Zululand? Have we not heard how the wail has gone up in all parts of the country for those who have bravely died—no gallant soldier, no generous colonist will deny this—have bravely and nobly died in repelling the invaders and fighting for their king and fatherland? And shall we kill 10,000 more to avenge the losses of that dreadful day? . . . Will such vengeance be anything else but loathsome and abominable in God's sight—a pandering to one of the basest passions of our nature, bringing us Christians below the level of the heathen with whom we are fighting? Alas! that a great English statesman could find no nobler word at such a time as this than to speak of 'wiping out the stain,' if he really meant that the stain on our name was to be 'wiped out' with the blood of a brave and loyal people, who had done us no harm, nor
threatened to do us harm, before we invaded their land—if he did not rather mean that our faults in the past should now, when our hands are made strong again, be redeemed with acts of true greatness, acts worthy of Englishmen, acts of Divine power, the just and merciful actions of Christian men.

III. . . . Our mother country has wakened up at the cry of distress and terror which has reached her from Natal, when friends in England, and many here, were thinking but of a pleasant march, a military promenade, into Zululand. They are sending us vast reinforcements with all speed. To human eyes our power will be overwhelming, our victory triumphant and sure. But do we really believe in the Living God, who requires of us, if we would receive His blessing, 'to do justly and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with Him'? . . . Let those who will, bow down and worship their dumb idols, brute force, and proud prestige, and crafty policy. But we believe, I trust, in the Living God, and, if so, then we are sure that not His blessing but His judgement will rest on us if we are not just and merciful now. . . .

The Zulu king, it is well known, has sued at our hands for peace. It may be that he has done this, as some think, because his army has suffered much—because his counsels are divided—because he fears that some of his great chiefs will desert him—because he is laying some deep plot against us. But it may be (as I trust and believe) that he is sincere in his expressions of grief for the present war and the slaughter at Isandhlwana. As far as I can read the obscure and evidently confused and incorrect reports of his message which have appeared in the newspapers, he seems to say:—'This war is all a dreadful mistake—a horrible nightmare! Is it possible that I am fighting with my English father, with whom I have lived all along in unbroken friendly intercourse? I have no wish whatever to do so. My young men did wrong in crossing at Rorke's Drift. I ordered them not to cross, and, when I struck, I struck only in self-defence; and as before, in my own and
my father's time, so ever since that bloody day, the Zulus have never invaded Natal. As Englishmen, speak the word that no more blood be shed; let the war be brought to an end; and give me only such terms as I and my people can accept.'

"I say that, with the very possibility of such feelings having impelled the Zulu king to send this message—and it closely agrees in tone with the last message which he sent before the ultimatum was delivered—if we would walk humbly with God and put our trust in Him, and not in the god of force, we are bound to meet the Zulu king on the way, when he comes with a prayer for peace—to propose to him, from a higher and stronger position, such terms as it shall be within his power to accept, to show him that we Christians trust more in our strength Divine as a just and merciful nation than in mere military power; and, having done this, to leave the rest with God."

What the Bishop said to his people from the pulpit, that he did not shrink from pressing on the attention of those who were highest in authority. The series of letters which passed between himself and the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, in the early months of 1879, show the same impartial but earnest desire to do justice to all sides, while he also urged that the greatest care should be taken to insure fair treatment for the weak and the helpless. Of the annexation of the Transvaal territory and its results he spoke again as he had spoken before. In this instance he looked on the Zulus as having claims against the Boers, in the settlement of which the English would not merely have been justified in interfering, but were bound to do so. For a long time the dispute could have been easily settled. Sir Bartle Frere had been assured on very high authority that the Zulu king, Cetshwayo, "would recognise the justice of our giving him the utmost we honestly could out of the land he claimed"—amounting, as it seems, to a name and little more: but of