Boer and Uitlander

Colonies had committed himself to an out-and-out support of the Uitlanders, it would surely have been advisable that he should have taken steps to have impartially investigated the real facts of the case, and not the garbled version of the facts put forward by the Uitlanders.

The Uitlanders may reckon on receiving at President Kruger's hands what they never have been inclined to do him—justice; and, large-minded, tactful, astute statesman that, amidst trials and difficulties, he has hitherto shown himself, I feel confident that he will redress any genuine grievances the Uitlanders may convince him they possess in a friendly spirit, and with a full desire to in any way promote the prosperity and happiness of the inhabitants of the Transvaal, whatever their nationality. Were any earnest of the President's intentions in this respect needed, it may be found in the friendly speeches by him on the 19th February 1896, on the occasion of the terrible dynamite disaster in Johannesburg, when His Honour expressed a hope that out of this terrible devastation good might result, and the different sections of the community be brought closer together by the disaster. This is assuredly a prayer to which all right-thinking men will respond "Amen." The consummation for which the President hopes rests entirely with the Uitlanders. If they will only rid themselves of their greed, with their petty and personal dislikes, and work honestly and earnestly together for the good of the country which they have voluntarily chosen as their habitation, the Trans-
vaal will in the future be in the happy position of a nation with no history; be, in fact, a rich and prosperous community composed of men of divers races united together for a common aim and a common purpose—the advancement and prosperity of the land which has brought them wealth and everything that wealth can confer.
I feel I cannot conclude this book without devoting a little attention to what I may properly term personal characteristics of some of the men who have come prominently before the public in connection with recent events in the Transvaal.

First and foremost there looms large the imposing figure of the great President of the South African Republic. A man of the time truly this. A man who has writ his name large on history, who has had great opportunities and has risen to them. A man who has shown magnanimity and mercy, clemency and justice. A man of deep religious feeling, honesty of purpose, singleness of life, thoroughness of character. A man moulded by nature for the position he fills and adorns. Not a drawing-room courtier, certainly, not an orator, not a crafty diplomatist, but a man, a real live man, possessing all the qualities and qualifications that his position requires, and free from all those vices and defects which are too often found in
PRESIDENT KRUGER.
FROM A PORTRAIT BY ELLIOT AND FRY.
men holding such positions, or engendered or developed by the office. In the short space of two months, President Kruger has lived down, even in England, an amount of prejudice, not to say hatred, enormous in its extent. It is no exaggeration to say that, towards the latter part of 1895 and in the beginning of 1896, he was the best hated man in this country; but there has been a sudden revulsion of feeling, and wherever one now goes, and events of the day are the subject of conversation, we may hear the remark that “Kruger is not such a bad fellow, after all.” The fact is, that the English people, though very often prejudiced, though liable to be led away for the time by the Press, are ultimately just in their judgments. People here in England have begun to reason thus: “This man, the head of a State, has his territory invaded by an armed force; a treasonable society is in full swing in the largest town in the State arming foreigners with a view of obtaining by force certain reforms which are, rightly or wrongly, demanded. The invading force is defeated, the treasonable movement collapses, Kruger has all these men in the hollow of his hand and he does not harm a hair of their heads. What ruler of any other country of the would would have done likewise? Can one imagine any other Government acting in this apparently philanthropic manner? Clearly this Kruger is not the autocratic, overbearing, cruel master he has been portrayed in certain newspapers,” I myself feel a peculiar satisfaction in this revulsion of public opinion, and I think, and I say it with all
modesty, I may justly claim that my efforts in the Press and elsewhere have to some extent brought about this agreeable state of things. When President Kruger visits England, and I believe there is no doubt that he will visit England, I anticipate that he will receive a reception, not only friendly, but cordial and enthusiastic, and that he will return to South Africa imbued with the idea that the British public are, above all things, just and generous. I sincerely hope that nothing will interfere—and the only thing that now can interfere will be some muddling at the Colonial Office—to prevent President Kruger coming to England, because I believe such an event will tend more than anything else to promote those feelings of friendship and goodwill which it is most important should prevail between the South African Republic and the Paramount Power in South Africa.

Another man who has loomed large in the public gaze in connection with the Transvaal Question is the Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies. Now, I am not about to add to the volume of fulsome adulation of which Mr Chamberlain has been the recipient during the past few weeks, and of which he must be heartily tired. Mr Chamberlain simply did his duty in connection with Dr Jameson’s raid, nothing more nor less, and I rather fail to see why the fact of a man having done his duty should necessitate his being bespattered with fulsome praise. There are thousands, nay, hundreds of thousands of poor, obscure souls in this England who every day of their lives conscientiously and
Some Reflections and a Moral

strictly do their duty, and who yet from one year's end to another never receive one single word of approbation. A recent biographer of Mr Chamberlain, Mr S. H. Jeyes, who has brought his book distinctly up to date, by including in it an account of Mr Chamberlain's course of action in reference to the Transvaal raid, has not paid the subject of his biography much of a compliment by remarking that Mr Chamberlain arrived at the conclusion that Dr Jameson's action was a mistake while the issue was still uncertain, while it was generally believed that Dr Jameson was almost sure of success. Without an hour's hesitation, says the biographer, Mr Chamberlain disavowed and denounced the project, and did all that could be done to prevent it being carried out, and did it knowing that he would be reviled by every chauvinist in the Empire had Dr Jameson but ridden into Johannesburg at the head of a victorious troop. Any statesman, says Mr Jeyes, who was merely possessed of a cool head would eventually have reached the same judgment, but Mr Chamberlain reached it in a moment's notice, and acted upon it without waiting to see how things would turn out. All this is no doubt perfectly true, but why mention it, why point out as a feather in Mr Chamberlain's cap that he did not wait to see how the cat jumped? As I before said, the end can never justify the means, and even if Dr Jameson had ridden into Johannesburg, flushed with victory and elated with success, the duty of Her Majesty's Government would still have been the same.
As regards Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Cape Colony and Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa, I shall say very little. Sir Hercules is an estimable gentleman, who would be in his proper place at home at his own fireside instead of being in the midst of all the toil and turmoil and worry and trouble attendant on his dual, inconsistent, and utterly irreconcilable position in South Africa. Sir Hercules has passed the age of three-score-and-ten years, and, I think I may say as a general rule that when men are getting on for the fourscore years mentioned by Solomon, they are much better by their own fireside than directing and controlling the affairs of the Empire. I was very much struck by a recent remark of Cardinal Vaughan in reference to some action of his great predecessor, the late Cardinal Manning. Cardinal Vaughan observed that he believed that as men advanced in years, towards and above fourscore, although there might be no falling off in the vigour of the intellectual faculties, or even physically, there nearly always was as regards judgment. This seemed to me, even in the light of one's own experience, a particularly true remark, and for this reason I must confess that, where possible, even in business matters, much less in affairs of State and momentous concerns, I like to see younger men with all their faculties about them at the helm exercising full control over the ship, having an accurate knowledge of rocks and shoals and currents and winds and meteorological
Some Reflections and a Moral

conditions generally, with their nerves perfect, their digestion unimpaired and their brain unclouded.

And now a few reflections in reference to a man, and a very estimable man, too, who has been much maligned in this country, and who has not had any opportunity of being heard in his own defence. I refer to Sir Jacobus De Wet, the British Agent in the Transvaal. Sir Jacobus has a Dutch name and is no doubt of Dutch descent, but the fact of his having a Dutch name is no reason why he should be termed "a Dutchman" by certain newspapers in this country, or that it should be insinuated right and left that the British Agent was nothing more nor less than a Boer spy. There probably never was any libel more gross than this, or more utterly devoid of any foundation and fact. As a matter of fact, Sir Jacobus is in feeling and sympathy a thorough Englishman, and my information leads me to believe that Her Majesty has no more loyal and zealous servant in South Africa than this gentleman. It seems to me that the utterly false ideas which have gained credence here respecting Sir Jacobus De Wet are entirely the outcome of the attacks levelled at him in certain journals. I must apologise to my readers for once more inflicting this subject upon them. It is, however, for the last time, and I purpose quoting here an extract from one of the "open letters," to which I have already referred, published in the Johannesburg Critic, and addressed to Sir Jacobus De Wet. Here is the manner in which the writer addresses publicly Her Majesty's
representative in the Transvaal, in reference to some alleged dereliction of duty on Sir Jacobus' part, of which the writer constituted himself judge and censor.

"Surely if you had been doing your duty, even only in so far as transmitting information, these deliberate falsehoods would have been contradicted as soon as uttered? Were you sampling Mr Kruger's tobacco at the time—not the commando bag, be it understood—or were you passing the bottle with Messrs Leyds and Esselen, or, possibly, getting reliable information in General Joubert's back parlour from that doughty warrior's own lips? Upon my word, it looks like it. Altogether there seem too much Jacobus, and too little De Wet or de Wit about the whole business. I trust I am not wronging you, but you must pardon me if I am, for I can only judge from the evidence of facts. I find a British Commissioner in residence at Pretoria with obvious duties. I find also that the British settlers are treated worse and worse every year, until the last crowning indignity—an attempt on their personal liberty—is even undertaken. I note that no improvement to their position seems possible until they are driven to take the law into their own hands. All the while our Resident continues on the very best possible terms with the oppressors of his own countrymen, the former, be it understood, being his own kith and kin.

"I believe you were chosen to fill the post you occupy for the very reason that you could patter
the *taal* and understood the bucolic peculiarities of the country so well that there was no danger of your offending susceptibilities like any raw Englishman might have done. If such be the case, I can only commend the wisdom of the selection from the Transvaal point of view. I do not think you have trodden on one single Burgher's corn or abraised the most prominent of Republican bunions. I believe that when the time comes for you to be relieved from your onerous position, every member of the dopper and *reimschoen* community will fetch out his private stocking to honour you with a public banquet, and I have no doubt whatever that if the Golden Eagle had not had its unfledged pinions prematurely extracted, after the Executive itself, you would have been the first recipient of this crowning honour.

"In conclusion, I can only say: 'Well done, good and faithful servant, you have succeeded for once in serving two masters.'"

The English language, in my opinion, does not contain words sufficiently strong to characterise an attack such as this on a man, who, from his position, is precluded from replying to it as it deserves.
CHAPTER XVII
THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSVAAL

Any book dealing even in a sketchy manner with the Transvaal and the Boers, cannot, even if it would, omit some consideration, however theoretical it is and must undoubtedly be, of the future of that country. That the future has many problems which must be solved, I cheerfully admit, and that the Government of the Transvaal will have many difficulties to encounter is not only probable but certain. In spite of temporary interruptions in the working of some of the mines and a decreased output for January 1896, in consequence of the disturbances, it is pretty well certain that the population of the Rand will steadily increase and that the immigrants will view, possibly with jealousy and certainly with disfavour, any prolongation of Boer rule. Of course the matter, the "grievance," I suppose, I had better term it, will not be put in this bald way. There has not been, and assuredly there will not be, any difficulty whatever in detailing any number of "grievances," and giving them that air of plausibility necessary to impress
people in this country that they are bona-fide. I was particularly struck with this fact a short time ago in perusing an article contributed to the Pall Mall Gazette, entitled "The Ruin of the Rand." The alliteration is taking, and the article, if I may say so, was eminently readable. And yet its tendency, I will not say its object, was fallacious throughout, and anyone perusing it and accepting the statements therein contained, would have derived an absolutely erroneous and entirely incorrect idea regarding affairs in the Rand. As an example in point of what I say, let me quote the following extract:—

"The settled policy of the Boer, from the moment he perceived that the indefinite expansion of the mining industry meant the downfall of his political ascendency, has been to check the natural growth of the threatening element by studied discouragements and more or less covert restraints. He will now be spurred on by the passions of victory to new and more ambitious efforts in the same direction. What has been complained of in the past? That oppressive monopolies, enjoyed by foreign vampires, needlessly enhanced the cost of producing gold and prevented the working of low-grade ores. Recent events will not cause the foreign vampires to loose their hold, rather will they bring in their train a new horde of monopolists to batten upon the industry, men who have been seeking for years past an opportunity to prey upon its vitals, but who have hitherto been kept at bay. It will be easy for these exploiteurs to establish a claim upon the recognition of a grateful
Government, and their importunity will be no longer denied. The monstrous exactions of the Netherlands Railway Company have been another fertile source of discontent. Will these exactions be lessened after the Chamber of Mines is practically broken up, as it must have been by recent events, and none remain to disturb the hallowed peace of the financiers at Amsterdam and Berlin, in whose behalf that enterprise is run? Hitherto the sole mitigation of Netherlands' extortion has lain in the fact that the Cape Free State railways have come within forty miles of the Rand, but it is virtually certain that the Free State will now throw in its lot with the Transvaal, the railways which were built for the Republic by the Cape Colony will be expropriated by the aid of Transvaal gold, and the last state of the unfortunate industry will, in this matter, be worse than the first. Its isolation will now be complete.

"For several years a fight has been raging over the right to mine numerous deep-level claims, known as bewaarplaatsen. The German bloodsucker fastened with characteristic determination upon these, heedless of the fact that he had no sort of claim to them, equally heedless of the circumstance that in some cases they were a matter of life and death to the outcrop company to whom they legitimately belonged. By dint partly of appeals to the honesty of the better class of Boer representatives, partly to bribery of the baser sort, the fate of these valuable properties has been warded off up to the present time in the hope that
something would happen to bring in the reign of honesty and fairplay. It is easy to forecast what will happen now.

"Year in and year out the cry has gone up that the efficiency of native labour was impaired, crimes and brutalities unspeakable were provoked, and a premium was placed upon the theft of raw gold by the absence of police and the presence of unlimited canteens. Additions are to be made to the standing army of the Republic as a consequence of recent events, but we hear nothing of additions to the civil police, and there is too much reason to fear that bad liquor will flow even more freely in the future than it has flowed in the past.

"The customs' tariff has been a scandal of the first magnitude. Everything the Outlander consumed has been taxed to an extent which few in England can imagine. The Boer, while exceedingly careful not to tax himself, seemed to grudge the unwelcome alien almost the very air he breathed. He will doubtless discover, under the new dispensation, some means of bringing even the greatest of God's gifts within his capacious net. Forts cannot be built to overawe Johannesburg, citadels cannot be raised at the capital to provide a secure retreat for the spurious Republicans in their inevitable hour of need, unless the mining industry can be made to bear the cost."

Of course anyone who knows anything practically of the Rand, and regards the matter, not from a capitalist, but from a moral point of view, will not be taken in by this sort of writing, however deftly it is
executed. The Boers are in the Transvaal because they desired to dwell apart, live to themselves and lead a pastoral life away from the busy haunts of men. They invited no greedy capitalists, no hungry plutocrats, ravenous after pelf and dross, to come and occupy their land and extract its wealth in order to get rich quickly and hurry out of the country to squander their gains in the debaucheries of great cities. If these hunters after pelf choose to come to the Transvaal they must take matters as they find them, and if they don't like it—well, there is the alternative! The Boer, as I have more than once observed in this book, has been abused and maligned and execrated by sundry people who have had an interest, and a deep interest, too, in maligning, abusing and execrating him. Let me, before I conclude, call one witness to the contrary. A great man now gone to his reward, a great writer, a great historian, whose memory will be cherished as long as the English language endures—I refer to the late Mr J. A. Froude—now, what says he of the Boer? Here is his testimony: “They were rough, but they had rude virtues which are not the less virtues because in these latter days they are growing scarce. They are a very devout people, maintaining their churches and ministers with excessive liberality. Their houses being so far apart, they cannot send their children to school and generally have tutors for them at home. Religious observances are attended to scrupulously in their household. The Boers of South Africa, of all human beings now on this
planet, correspond nearest to Horace's description of the Roman peasant soldiers who defeated Pyrrhus and Hannibal. There alone you will find obedience to parents as strict as among the ancient Sabines, the *severa mater*, whose sons fetch and carry at her bidding, who, when those sons go to fight for their country, will hand their rifles to them and bid them return with their arms in their hand, or else not return at all." Proceeding to refer to the Boer methods of administering their country, Mr Froude goes on to remark: "Their methods were not our methods, and, were easily misrepresented. Stories were told—untrue generally, but not wholly without foundation—of Boers on the borders of the Transvaal kidnapping native children or purchasing them, of plundering tribes and bringing them up as slaves under the disguise of apprentices. The Transvaal Government severely and successfully repressed these proceedings. I say successfully, because in the years during which the Transvaal was again a British province, cases of the kind would have been brought to light had any then existed, and not a single child was discovered in the condition described. Yet these practices were reported to England as ascertained facts, and were honestly believed. The Boers were held to have broken their engagement, and many excellent people among us insisted that we were neglecting our duty in leaving them uncontrolled." How history does repeat itself! Lies were the principal weapon in former campaigns against the Boers by interested parties who coveted their land and their heritage, and lies
are seemingly again to-day the only weapon against which the Boers cannot successfully contend.

Mr Froude was not only a man of sound judgment, he was, moreover, a far-seeing statesman. His remarks in his work, *Oceana*, on the future of South Africa, including, of course, the future of the Transvaal, are particularly apposite at the present moment when the future of the Transvaal is likely to become a burning and practical question. Mr Froude, as my readers are no doubt aware, had a mission in the beginning of the eighties in connection with Lord Carnarvon's grandly-conceived but ill-timed scheme for a confederation of the various states and colonies of South Africa.

"If," says Mr Froude, "the Transvaal had ever received proper treatment and fairness from the English Government, or had we lent her a hand in our native difficulties, there would have been some chance of the desired confederation. A little help of money to the Transvaal, a few kind words, the concession of a fair western frontier and an intimation to the border tribes that we and the Dutch were henceforth friends, and that an injury to them would be taken as an injury to the British Crown, and every Dutchman in South Africa would have torn the leaves out of his book of grievances and have forgotten them for ever. But Lord Carnarvon mistook the nature of the warm feeling which he had aroused. He supposed it to be in favour of his confederation scheme, with which it had nothing directly to do, he felt
that to bring about a South African Dominion would be understood and admired in England as a brilliant and useful political achievement. The Transvaal appeared the key of the situation. With the Transvaal an English province again, the Orange Free State would be compelled to follow. He had recovered in some degree the Dutch confidence. It was a plant of tender growth, but he believed that it would now bear pressure. The life of English ministries is short. If they are to achieve anything they must act promptly or they may leave the chance to their successors. The Transvaal treasury was empty, and an occupation of the country would at the moment be unresisted. He was assured by the South African English—at least, by many of them—that the Transvaal farmers were sick of their independence and would welcome annexation. He could count on the support of both parties in Parliament. Mr. Courtney, I believe, was the only English member of the Legislature who protested. I, myself, was certain that to take over (as it was called) the Transvaal would undo the effect of his past action, and would bring back the old bitterness. The step was taken. The 'South African Republic,' so proud of its independence that it had struck a coinage of its own, was declared British territory. 'Confederation,' which had been made absolutely impossible, was next to follow, and Sir Bartle Frere was sent to the Cape as Governor to carry it out. How he fared is fresh in our memories. His task was
from the first hopeless. Yet he could not or would not understand it to be hopeless. He was not even told the truth. It was said that the native tribes were too strong; that if South Africa were confederated, they would have to deal with the Caffres, Basutos, Zulus, etc., single-handed, and that they were not equal to it. If this was the difficulty, Sir Bartle could sweep it away. Hitherto, we had at least affected a wish to protect the coloured races. Now all was changed. He found an excuse in a paltry border dispute for a new Caffre war. He carried fire and sword over the Kei, dismissing his ministers and appointing others who were more willing to go along with him in his dangerous course. He broke up the Zulus after a resistance, which won for them more credit than the ultimate conquest brought honour to ourselves. South Africa was wet with blood, and all these crimes and follies had been committed for a shadow which was no nearer than before. The Zulus had been enemies of the Boers, but their destruction had not reconciled the Boers to the loss of their liberty. They demanded back their independence in dogged, determined tones. Sir Garnet Wolseley's campaign against Secoccoeni, who had once defeated them, made no difference. The Liberal party in England began to declare in their favour. They learnt at last that the Liberal leader had condemned the annexation as adopted under false pretences, and when the Liberals came into power in 1880, they counted with certainty that their com-
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plaints would be attended to. We could at that time have withdrawn with dignity, and the Boers would have perceived again that when we were convinced of a mistake we were willing to repair it. But I suppose (and this is the essential difficulty in our colonial relations) that the Government knew it would be right to do, but were afraid to do it, in fear of an adverse vote in the Parliament to which they were responsible, and party interests at home were too important to be sacrificed to the welfare of remote communities. It was decided that before the complaints of the Transvaal Boers could be heard, they must first acknowledge the Queen's authority. They had taken arms for their freedom, and did not choose to lay them down when the rulers of England had themselves admitted they were in the right. Then followed the war which we all remember, where a series of disasters culminated on Majuba Hill and the death of Sir George Colley.

"I, for one, cannot blame the Government for declining to prosecute further a bloody struggle in a cause which they had already condemned. I blame them rather for having entered upon it at all. To concede after defeat what might have been conceded gracefully when our defeat was on both sides thought impossible, was not without a nobleness of its own. But it was to diminish infallibly the influence of England in South Africa, and to elate and encourage the growing party, whose hope was, and is to see it vanish altogether. Had we
persisted, superior strength and resources must have succeeded in the end. But the war would have passed beyond the limits of the Transvaal. It must have been a war of conquest against the whole Dutch population who would have taken part in it. We should have brought a scandal on our name. We should and must have brought to the verge of destruction a brave and honourable people. We should have provoked the censure, we might perhaps have even provoked the interposition of other Powers: For these reasons I think that Mr Gladstone did well in consenting to a peace, although it was a peace which affected painfully the position and feelings of the English South African colonists, and could not fail to leave a dangerous sting behind it. The peace was right. It was a pity only that as a balm to our wounded pride we insisted on stipulations which could not, or would not, be observed, while we had left ourselves no means of enforcing them. Some concession, I suppose, was necessary to irritated pride at home, but the conditions which we inserted in the treaty were a legacy from our earlier errors, and that they came to be mentioned at all was a pure calamity. Having swallowed the draught, we might as well have swallowed it completely without leaving drops in the bottom of the cup. The origin of all the anger of the Transvaal people had been the arming the native chiefs against them from the diamond fields. These chiefs had remained our allies in the war. We could not, or thought we could not, leave them without tak-
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...ing security for them and their territories. I think it would have been better, though it might have seemed unhandsome, to have fallen back on the Orange River Treaty and resolved to meddle no more in the disputes between the Boers and these tribes. Had we maintained our authority, we could have maintained the tribes by our side; but to abandon the country and to insist at the same time that the inhabitants of it should fall into their natural relations was to reserve artificially a certain cause of future troubles. The chiefs whom we called our friends had been drawn into an attitude of open menace against the Boers. The Boers were not to be blamed if they preferred to form settlements of their own in those territories that they might not be exposed again to the same danger.

I have inserted this copious extract from Mr. Froude's great work because it seems to me to have a vast bearing upon, not only the present, but the future of the Transvaal, as well of South Africa generally. I, myself, am and always have been, a firm believer in a confederation of the South African Colonies and States. But such a confederation must be the outcome of the spontaneous desire on the part of all the Colonies and States affected, and there must be a total absence, of not merely force, but of anything savouring of undue pressure to bring about such a happy consummation. One thing is certain, the Boers must be permitted not only to retain their independence but to have that pastoral existence conserved, for which they have sacrificed so much.
As Mr Froude rightly remarks, it only requires a little generosity, a little careful handling, some consideration for feelings and sentiments and ideas, with which we are unable to sympathise for the simple reason that we cannot understand them, to make the Dutch population of South Africa as friendly and cordially disposed towards Great Britain as is the French population of Canada. Believe me, there is no hatred of, no ill-feeling towards, Englishmen, as Englishmen, in the Transvaal Republic. What the Boers hate is the crew of gold-grabbers who swarm in the Rand and who are regarded by the simple farmers of the Transvaal as something approaching the children of Satan. These simple-minded, pious, primitive Christians who finish up their uneventful day of dull routine with praise and prayer in the bosom of their family, have nothing in common with, and could hardly be expected to have anything in common with, the gold-grabber who, so far as I know, is not given to indulging in prayer and praise even when his profits have been unduly large. The Boer in his notions of life and his mode of livelihood, his ideas and sentiment is a cross between our Puritan forefathers and the ancient Israelite. The modern Uitlander is essentially a product of the latter part of the nineteenth century, and let me sincerely hope that nature will not reproduce him in any future type. In my humble opinion, if this Boer question is handled with foresight and judgment, and dealt with justly and honestly, the South African problem becomes a very simple one. Once let us conciliate the Boers
The Future of the Transvaal

of the Transvaal, once let us make them believe that they can rely upon the friendship of England, and that their independence is guaranteed and will be safeguarded by England, and we shall find the whole Dutch population of South Africa drawn by imperceptible cords of sympathy and goodwill towards the Paramount Power in South Africa. The outcome of such a state of things, the possibilities, vast and grand beyond question, which it opens up, are to me singularly entrancing. I can see in my mind, though I shall probably not live to see it in the flesh, a vast confederation under the protection of Great Britain occupying, shall I say South Africa, or shall I say the greater portion of that dark Continent which will then be no longer dark? I see a happy and contented and prosperous population, drawn from the unemployed in this country, developing the untold wealth, mineral and vegetable, of that rich land, keeping up the best traditions of the English race, and building up slowly but surely an empire which will in time, in the centuries to come, mayhap rule the world and replace that British Empire which will then, in accordance with those mysterious laws which affect empires and nations, as well as individuals, have ceased to exist, having accomplished the purposes for which Providence permitted it to increase and prosper, and extend and grow in wealth and greatness as did, too, the Greek and Roman Empires.
I have now accomplished the task I had set before me. As I said at the beginning of this book, so now I repeat at the close, it makes no pretensions to literary merit. It is merely a rough-and-ready and hurried production of a man who has no time to cultivate style, and who has to dash off his ideas and impressions during odd moments at various portions of the day. But I felt, and felt deeply, that the Boers had not had justice done to them in this country. I felt, and I still think, that taking the great mass of literature, ephemeral and otherwise, which has appeared in connection with the Transvaal Question, the Boer side of the question has scarcely if at all, been heard. And so I determined that if no one else would take up the cudgels on their behalf, I would to the best of my poor ability. All I ask the reader of this book is that he will, in perusing and considering it, clear his mind of cant
and prejudice and those preconceived ideas generally, which are so fatal to arriving at a sound judgment upon any matter, public or private. No man, at least no honest man, could deny that the Boers have for many decades past been treated by successive British Governments and Cape Governors with gross injustice, or that the time has not assuredly now come when we should attempt to rectify this matter, and to see that they shall, though late in the day, have at least justice. A man can be enthusiastic about these simple peasant farmers, whose only desire is to serve God in solitude, and to possess and till the land and enjoy the fruits thereof in due season, in peace and quietness. But who could get up the slightest enthusiasm for the financiers of Johannesburg, men who think of nothing, speak of little and are concerned about hardly anything but gold? These men have practically deified the precious metal, they have set up another golden calf in Johannesburg, and they cannot understand, much less sympathise, with these poor farmers, these simple heroes, who disdain to fall down and worship this bovine deity. Frankly speaking, I cannot keep my patience with men who prate about the wrongs of the Uitlanders and ask us to rise to heights of pity and to excesses of enthusiasm over the "grievances of the Uitlanders." For myself, I care not whether they get the franchise or not, for I know full well that they themselves care nothing. As I have said, over and over again, I repeat here as my last word, that the so-called grievances of the Uitlanders have been, and are, a
mere blind to the carrying out of their nefarious projects, and that their only object has been, and still is, to get possession of the Rand, in order to possess its riches for themselves and themselves alone.
APPENDIX

PRESS TELEGRAMS AND LETTERS IN THE DATE OF THEIR ORDER OF RECEIPT

EXTRACT FROM "THE GALWAY VINDICATOR"

12th December 1895

Mr W F Regan

It will be perceived, from an advertisement in our columns, that Mr Regan is 'about to publish a work illustrative of the present state of the Transvaal, giving the respective positions of Boers and Uitlanders. Just now this is a very interesting question, so that Mr Regan's work will be most acceptable to the public, as accurate knowledge is essential. Mr Regan's capability for the task he has undertaken is unquestionable, as he is well informed on all questions connected with the Transvaal Republic.
Appendix

EXTRACT FROM "PALL MALL GAZETTE"
1st January 1896

TRANSVAAL CRISIS

Exaggerations and Alarms

The following telegram from Johannesburg was received in London this morning by Mr Regan of Threadneedle Street:—"The reported exodus of British subjects exaggerated; people leaving on business. If said to be leaving on grounds of alarm, no truth in this. May session of Volksraad will concede many demands, and meet grievance in fair spirit. Mines not closing; no intention. Advise moderation.—VAN BUREN." Subsequently a further telegram was received, stating that President Kruger was calling the citizens to arms, and that the situation was very serious.

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EXTRACT FROM "THE SUN," 2d January 1896

THE RAID ON THE RAND

Mr W. F Regan, of Threadneedle Street, who is the owner of several farms in the Transvaal, informs the Press Association that he has received news from a continental source that Dr Jameson has not arrived at Johannesburg, and that as yet no collision has taken place between his force and the Boers
Appendix

Extract from 'The Evening Standard'
2d January 1896

The Transvaal

A representative of the Exchange Telegraph Company had an interview this afternoon with Mr W. F. Regan, and was informed by that gentleman that as yet it was impossible to receive messages from Johannesburg, but from continental sources he had heard that Jameson was expected there, and that he had not as yet come to blows with the Boers. Mr Regan's impression is that the representative of Her Majesty's Government had come up with Jameson's forces and used influence with President Kruger to prevent a collision.

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Extract from "Pall Mall Gazette"
3d January 1896

The Crisis in the Transvaal

Jameson to be Court-Martialled—His Followers to be Released

Mr Regan, of Threadneedle Street, has received the following message:—'Jameson to be tried—his followers to be released.'
**Appendix**

**Extract from "The Evening Standard"**
3d January 1896

**The Transvaal**

Mr Regan, of Threadneedle Street, has received the following message—"Jameson to be tried by court-martial. Followers will be released."

Mr W. F. Regan, of Threadneedle Street, who is a considerable landowner in the Transvaal, and intimately conversant with Transvaal affairs, in an interview with the representative of the Press Association this morning, called attention to the fact that he was the first to communicate to the Press a cablegram which he received from Johannesburg, in which it was stated that the reports received from that country were greatly exaggerated. He considered that the fact of the citizens of Johannesburg remaining quiet, and not joining hands with Jameson, goes to prove that the message from his correspondent, Mr Van Buren, represented the true state of affairs and the feeling of the people of Johannesburg. From his own experience he felt certain that the Boer Government will exercise moderation, and he considers that our people at home should exercise a little more caution and self-control.

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**Extract from "The Sun," 3d January 1896**

**The Transvaal**

*Jameson to be Tried*

Mr W. F. Regan, who has large interests in South Africa and good sources of information, has received the
following important message:—"Jameson to be tried by court-martial. Followers will be released." This indicates that President Kruger means to use his victory moderately. Peace may now be restored again, and everyone will hope that, grave as was his error, the unlucky doctor will be set free at the end. The danger of taking private enterprise into partnership with foreign statescraft has, by the events of the past few days, been abundantly demonstrated.

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**Extract from "The Star," 3d January 1896**

**The Transvaal—Jameson's Fate**

*His Followers to be Released—Himself to be Court-Martialed*

The Central News says Mr Regan, of Threadneedle Street, has received the following message:—"Jameson to be tried by court-martial. Followers to be released."

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**Extract from "The Evening Standard"**

4th January 1896

**The Transvaal**

This afternoon Mr Regan showed a representative of the Exchange Telegraph Company a letter he had received to-day from Buluwayo, dated 20th November. The writer stated that a force was then being organised, and that serious business was evidently intended. It is believed
that this was the force under Dr Jameson, that its concentration on the Transvaal border was known to Kruger and his colleagues, and that Jameson, assuming that Johannesburg would extend help to him, disregarded secrecy.

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**Extract from "The Sun," 4th January 1896**

**The Transvaal—Battle of Krugersdorp**

*Premeditated*

This afternoon Mr W. F. Regan showed a reporter of the Exchange Telegraph Company a letter he had received to-day from Buluwayo, dated November 20th. The writer stated that a force was then being organised, and that serious business was evidently intended.

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**Extract from "The Observer," 4th January 1896**

**Regan’s Despatches**

The Foreign Office and the English people have again to thank Mr W. F. Regan, whose restless enterprise in Africa and rapid movements by means of a perfectly organised system have astonished everyone. Mr Regan was the first man in England to make public the breaking out of war in the Transvaal. We give to-day a full report of Wednesday’s news. Within 20 minutes after receipt of cable message from Johannesburg, Mr Regan despatched to this office the alarming intelligence that Dr Jameson had crossed the frontier and was marching upon Johannes-
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burg. We believe Mr Regan mailed from his London Office on Wednesday, between the hours of 10 and 11 o’clock a.m. to various parts of Europe no less than 190 telegrams. A section of the London Press compares Mr Regan to Bonaparte, whilst by London City men our townsman is now styled “Lightning William”

EXTRACT FROM “THE PRESS,” 4th January 1896

THE TRANSVAAL WAR—A BRITISH OFFICER PRECIPITATES A CRISIS

Mr W. F. Regan has the First News

On Wednesday the news was flashed across the wires by Mr W. F. Regan that Dr Jameson with 800 men had invaded Transvaal territory. The news created quite a panic all over Europe, and there has been great fluctuations in the money market since.

EXTRACT FROM “THE LONDON TIMES”

4th January 1896

The Press Association says that Mr Regan, an African merchant in London, has received a telegram, via the Continent, stating that Jameson’s followers will be released by the Boers on proper guarantees being given. Dr Jameson is to be tried before Supreme Court.
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EXTRACT FROM "THE PEOPLE," 5th January 1896

THE TRANSVAAL

_VIEWS OF A SOUTH AFRICAN LAND-OWNER_

The Press Association is informed by Mr W. F. Regan (of Threadneedle Street, the owner of several farms in South Africa) that he has received a letter from the Buluwayo Club, dated November 20th last, in which it was stated that a force was then being organised. This force, Mr Regan is of opinion, was the one under Jameson, which has recently been defeated. A portion of the letter has been produced to us, and the writer goes on to say that serious business is evidently intended, as great attention is being paid to the general character and strength of the force. Mr Regan believes that the concentration of such a force in Bechuanaland and on the Transvaal border was known to President Kruger, and that Dr Jameson, believing that Johannesburg would extend a helping hand to him when he was once over the frontier, disregarded secrecy. Mr Regan says that he does not believe that the Home Government knew anything of the existing state of affairs in Rhodesia, and though Mr Rhodes may have heard of the intention of the Rhodesian commanders, it is quite possible that he advised Dr Jameson to abstain from hostilities. Mr Regan then referred to the fact that he had sent out earlier in the week two telegrams referring to the events in the Transvaal. Mr Regan contends that, in the light of subsequent events, it must be admitted that his information was correct in every detail. All through this business he had his news from the Continent, which went to prove that Germany was in sympathy with the
Boers and had been in a position to obtain intelligence before us. He had been disgusted at reading in the papers during the past few days that "as Jameson and their men had made their beds so they must take the consequences," as any interference on their behalf or a plea for mercy to Kruger would be nothing short of dragging our national honour in the mud. "Shame!" he said. "Were we going to desert a brave man who has helped to build up our power in South Africa?" Away with the national honour for the moment. Let us keep before us the fact that, although the Administrator's act had been a rash one, it was done with the object of protecting, as he thought, the lives of his fellow-countrymen who were supposed to be in danger. It is quite possible that if the request was made to Kruger that Jameson be handed over to the British Government, *who would institute an inquiry and deal with his case*, the request might be granted. Kruger was not the man represented by the majority of the Press in this country. All who knew him intimately admitted that his instincts were humane, and that he had during his term of office endeavoured to do what was right, and hold the scales equally between both parties. Asked what he thought of the situation generally, Mr Regan stigmatised the business as an unfortunate one, and in his opinion it had given the Boer Government a new lease of life for at least ten years, or in any case during Kruger's lifetime. The moral support of Germany and Holland, as well as the Orange Free State, must strengthen the Boer position.

*N.B.*—It will be observed that the suggestion I made in this letter as to handing over Dr Jameson to the British Government has been carried out in its entirety.
Extract from “Weekly Times and Echo”
5th January 1896

The Transvaal Crisis

Yesterday afternoon Mr. W. F. Regan showed a Press representative a letter he had received from Buluwayo, dated November 20th. The writer stated that a force was then being organised, and that serious business was evidently intended. It is believed that this news, with the intention to concentrate the force on the Transvaal border, was known to Kruger and his colleagues, but that Jameson, assuming that Johannesburg would extend help to him, disregarded secrecy.

Extract from “Pall Mall Gazette”
6th January 1896

The Latest Rumour regarding Dr Jameson

Mr Regan, it is stated, has received from Amsterdam a cable to the effect that not a hair of Dr Jameson’s head will be harmed, and he and his followers will presently be released on parole as soon as certain arrangements are completed with the British Representative conferring with the Transvaal Government.

Extract from “The Financial Times”
7th January 1896

The Cape Crisis

Mr W. F. Regan, the well-known South African authority, is confident that Jameson’s life will not be sacrificed.
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He informs us that he has received a telegram from Amsterdam this afternoon, to the effect that not a hair of Jameson's head would be harmed. The Administrator and his followers will presently be released on parole, or as soon as certain arrangements have been completed between the British representative at Pretoria and the Transvaal Government.

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Extract from "The Daily Telegraph"
7th January 1896

German Intrigues Against England

Mr Regan, who is conversant with the affairs of the South African Republic, remarked in an interview — "In regard to the attitude of Germany at this time, it must not be forgotten that during the past six months the Press of that country has been publishing articles from German residents in Johannesburg, the prevalent tone of these communications pointing to the possibility of some such state of affairs as now exists." Mr Regan has received, via Amsterdam, a cable to the effect that not one hair of Dr Jameson's head will be harmed, and that the Administrator and his followers will presently be released on parole, as soon as certain arrangements are completed with the British Representative now conferring with the Transvaal Government.
EXTRACT FROM "THE WESTMINSTER GAZETTE"
8th January 1896

THE CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Exchange Telegraph Company has received the following message from Mr Regan:—"I have it from Transvaal official sources that the Administrator will not be shot. A conference between Kruger and the British Representative is about to take place, and you will hear presently that Kruger has exercised his clemency. If Jameson had happened to be my own brother, I should not feel in the least alarmed."

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EXTRACT FROM "THE PRESS," 8th January 1896

INTERVIEW WITH A TRANSVAAL LANDOWNER

Mr W. F. Regan, of Threadneedle Street, who is a considerable landowner in the Transvaal, and intimately conversant with Transvaal affairs, in the course of an interview with the Press Association stated that it had been known for some days to the people in Johannesburg that Dr Jameson was in the immediate neighbourhood of the Transvaal border, and his opinion was that the British residents in Johannesburg, thinking that their lives and property were in danger, had made an appeal to Jameson for protection. Jameson's men were in a compact body, under a leader, whereas Kruger's forces
were scattered, and some of the Boers might have cut the wires to prevent any news reaching points outside the Transvaal until such time as the Boers could gather in force to strike an effective blow. There was to be a meeting of residents in Johannesburg on the 6th January to demand a redress of grievances from the Boer Government, and President Kruger was under the impression that after that meeting a popular rising might take place, and there was not the least doubt that he was massing his forces in order to quell what he would consider a rebellion. This would naturally alarm the populace, and lead to their appealing to Dr Jameson for assistance. From what he knew of Dr Jameson's determination, he was not a man to be prevented from going to Johannesburg if he thought his presence there was required.

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**EXTRACT FROM "THE GALWAY VINDICATOR"**

8th January 1896

**STATEMENT BY MR REGAN**

Our *Irish Times*' representative had some conversation with Mr Regan, of Threadneedle Street, who, speaking of circumstances within his knowledge, remarked:—

"In regard to the attitude of Germany at this time it must not be forgotten that during the past six months the Press of that country has been publishing attacks from German residents in Johannesburg, the prevalent tone of these communications pointing to the possibility of some such state of affairs as now exists."
Later in the day, Mr Regan informed us that he had received, via Amsterdam, a cable to the effect that not one hair of Dr Jameson's head will be harmed, and that the Administrator and his followers will presently be released on parole, as soon as certain arrangements are completed with the British Representative conferring with the Transvaal Government.

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**EXTRACT FROM “THE SUN,” 8th January 1896**

**Transvaal Crisis**

*Jameson Tried and Sentenced to Death*

The Exchange Telegraph Company has received the following message from Mr W. F. Regan, 41 Threadneedle Street:—

"It is quite true that Jameson has been tried and sentenced to death, but I have it from Transvaal official sources that the Administrator will not be shot. A conference between Kruger and the British Representative is about to take place"

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**EXTRACT FROM “THE ECHO,” 10th January 1896**

**Telegraphic Difficulties**

One feature of the present crisis has been the great interruption of the telegraphic service. Private enterprise has, however, on several occasions supplied the deficiency, and the public have to thank, among others Mr W. F. Regan, of Threadneedle Street, who has forwarded from time to time to the newspapers copies of
important and authentic cablegrams received by him some hours before the same intelligence has reached the Government.

Message from Mr Regan

Mr W. F. Regan has sent a message to the Exchange Telegraph Company, in which he says:—"It is not true that President Kruger has made exorbitant demands. Certain claims have been made and guarantees demanded, of a nature that will be impossible, under the circumstances, for Her Majesty's Government to refuse; and Sir Hercules Robinson and Sir Jacobus de Wet have admitted the moderation of the Transvaal Government. Under the treaty entered into with Mr Gladstone's Government, it was laid down that the frontier should be protected, and the British covenanted to prevent raids on the Transvaal. That being so, the Boer executive are justified in claiming, under the law of nations, adequate compensation for infringement. President Kruger has withheld the just resentment of his people, and in a difficult andmomentous crisis exhibited chivalrous forbearance. It is quite true that a commission is about to proceed to Rhodesia with the object of inquiring into the circumstances of Jameson's raid. All the evidence necessary for Mr Chamberlain's purposes will be furnished."

EXTRACT FROM "THE MINING WORLD"
11th January 1896

THE TRANSVAAL AND RHODESIA

Mr W. F. Regan is one of the largest buyers and sellers of land in South Africa, and his name is just now pro-
minently before the public. He buys and sells on a grand
scale, and he himself has stated that few of the Rhodesian
Companies have had a connection more or less remote
with him. He has also large properties in the Transvaal,
and is believed to know more about the Boers, and,
perhaps, to be more in their confidence, than any English-
man, not actually in the country. It is also mysteriously
whispered that some of the telegrams that he has, to the
surprise of most people, been able to get through during
the past few days, have come from his Boer friends, but of
this we have no actual knowledge, and merely mention the
rumour we have heard. The opinions of such a man as Mr
Regan, at such a juncture as the present, are worth having,
and that gentleman freely expressed them. There is no
mystery about him, and when listening to some of his out-
spoken views, our representative mildly observed.—“Do
you wish these placed under your name?” Mr Regan
at once answered in the affirmative, and said—“I am
absolutely neutral, and am speaking to you less as a
politician than as a business man, though I find it difficult
to dissociate the one position from the other.” It will, there-
fore, be seen that Mr Regan inherits in a marked degree
the courage of the race, and, like John Knox, “Fears the
face of no man.”

“Last November,” said Mr Regan, “I knew of this move-
ment, and had confirmation of it. I am of opinion that
Mr Rhodes has not given the instructions to Dr Jameson
on which the latter acted, although his utterances may
have led the latter to rely at least on his moral support.
I am further of opinion that Kruger has demanded the
disbandment of the Chartered Company’s forces as being
a menace to his Republic, and this request should be
granted. I am also of opinion that the troops being
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gathered on this side are intended for Mashonaland and Matabeleland, which must not remain unprotected. Furthermore, I think Kruger will grant reasonable concessions, and that harmony, though perhaps not absolute unity, will be restored. It is to our Government Kruger will look for the payment of his indemnity, as under our treaty with him we undertook to prevent raids, a point upon which sufficient stress has not been laid. If the Home Government have to pay, the Executive will want to prevent a recurrence of similar raids, and so they will take possession of the country. History repeats itself. Look back at the circumstances surrounding every charter issued to a group of individuals, and you will find that complications have arisen owing to the ambition of one or two of the group. I know for a fact that within the last six months there has been a ‘Young England party’ in Rhodesia, and few persons in London have a better opportunity of knowing this than I, because I own large properties there, and Rhodesians fresh from the spot, including the leading spirits of this Young England party, have been visiting my office day by day. Jameson and Willoughby were at the head, and, in my opinion, have been acting independently of Mr Rhodes, who is both judicious and shrewd, and would not give instructions to either to advance unless he had positive proof that the Johannesburgers meant business. Any man who knows Johannesburg and its peculiar population, made up of all nationalities, must conclude that, without a leader and a union (the latter has never existed) the people could not possibly give effectual assistance to Jameson."

“What of the National Union?”

“It is a house divided against itself. A waiting policy should have been pursued, and in time the Boers would be
compelled to give the franchise and then the majority would have elected their own President. But now the Boers have the moral support of the greater part of Europe. Jealousy of England unites them; but hatred of each other disunites them. If Germany did or could send troops to Africa, it would be tantamount to a declaration of war, and every British subject there capable of bearing arms would do so. Reading German papers, and conversing with Germans who are interested in the Transvaal, I gather that the object of Germany would be to send as many of her Socialist subjects to the Transvaal as possible. And this is the problem we shall have to face. The Emperor's telegram is a partial carrying out of this party policy. The threatened despatch of the fleet by our Government is intended to bring about an immediate settlement of the question, and to prove to Europe that England is prepared to meet, and will not brook interference. Of this action I most strongly approve. As to Dr Jameson, the Government can only try him for misdemeanour under the Foreign Enlistment Act, and were he fined, a subscription would be raised to pay the amount within twenty-four hours. As to its own officers—that is another question. Out of evil will come good. We have been on the brink of a rupture with America, but Congress and the American people approve our action in South Africa. This, I think, will lead to a settlement of our differences with the United States. The Government there, and I know the States well, have to contend with foreign influences of various kinds, including the large German element."

"How did you get your cables through?"

At this point Mr Regan, who had previously been communicative, lapsed into reticence. He applied a match to
a cigar that was already alight; he smoothed the lappets of his coat—in fact, he did everything but answer the question, but went on to say:—"I consider I was in duty bound to let the public know the news, in order to ease the minds of people who have relatives out there, as to the true state of affairs. My system in Africa is so perfect, that I can command the best news at any time. I have in my employment men on whom I can rely, who have ample funds at their disposal, and whose instructions in an emergency are neither to spare those funds nor themselves. I have been severely criticised over the Ashantee business, because I attacked the policy of the Government in sending out an expedition at enormous expense. I said this expenditure was unnecessary, as not a blow would be struck. I adhere to that opinion, because King Prempeh has made up his mind not to fight the British.

"He sent messengers here whose credentials Mr Chamberlain doubted because they were not sealed; but how ridiculous it is to lay stress upon such a trifle. I doubt if you could get a seal in all Coomassie, and in my judgment we are very much more savage in asking for such a thing. The bone of contention is the residence of a British Representative in Coomassie. Well, we may establish our agent there in what we think a strong position, but when he retires to the coast he will carry, on return, his life in his hands. Not only will he be subject to dangers that actually exist; but there is one, Samory by name, who is very ambitious to found an empire of his own, and has given the French a good deal of trouble. We will have, in the near future, to fit out an expedition against this man, which will probably cost two or three millions. Mark you" (said Mr Regan, warningly), "I am certain of this from what I hear from my agents in his country."
"What are your views about the Chartered Company?"

"I should be pleased to hear that the charter had been cancelled, for the Company has, from its inception, adopted a suicidal policy. Take, for instance, one of my properties in Rhodesia. I ship machinery and develop it, and as soon as profitable returns are made, the Company step in and ask for 50 per cent. Such a state of things is unknown elsewhere, and the most the Company should ask for is 10 or 15 per cent. all round. This would be the means of inducing capitalists on a grander scale to develop the mineral resources of the country."

"Where are your properties?"

"I have about 190,000 acres in the Transvaal, in the districts of Rustenburg, Waterburg, Lydenburg and Pretoria. I have about 350,000 acres in farms of from 3000 to 6000 acres each in Rhodesia, principally at Buluwayo, Salisbury, Gwelo and Victoria. Having purchased these properties at bed-rock prices, and having improved them, I look to their future profitable sale without misgiving. This crisis has proved to continental nations that countries like the Transvaal and Rhodesia must be very wealthy when more than one power seems ready to go to the brink of war to gain a slice. I have abundant evidence during the past twelve months (and it is on this evidence I have purchased) that Rhodesia is equal in mineral wealth to the Transvaal, and it is on this mineral wealth my chief reliance as a business man is placed. This very day, in this building—Gresham House" (the interview took place in our editorial sanctum), "in the face of this crisis I have sold at a large price a property 3½ miles south of Buluwayo. Last week, I sold in London 60 claims 18 miles from Buluwayo, and I have had during the week three applications from Berlin for
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Rhodesian properties. Bear in mind that these are my own properties, and that I am not an agent. I keep on buying and selling. At present there are on the way from Rhodesia the deeds of no fewer than nine separate properties purchased by cable. I have sold estates to almost every Rhodesian Company in London, as well as to private capitalists on the Continent, and look forward in the coming spring to a big boom in South African securities, and to those of Rhodesia more than anywhere else. I purchased recently a property, located close to Buluwayo, some ore from which, when sent to Mr Claudet (assayer to the Bank of England), gave the extraordinary return of 69 ozs. to the ton from one shaft, and 14 ozs. from another. I could scarcely credit these results, but I had confirmation sent by the Mining Commissioner of Buluwayo that a packet of ore crushed by him gave but a little under the above returns. Of course, it is not possible for these returns to be kept up along the line of reef, but they go to prove that the gold is there, and in the immediate neighbourhood of Buluwayo. My policy has been to buy my mining claims as near to a thriving centre or town as possible, so that a purchaser can cable out and ascertain whether my statements are correct. For outlying districts, you have to purchase oxen, and several weeks elapse before you can determine the value of your security. I find that the most promising properties are located close to the towns in Rhodesia, and can only account for this by the fact that, in Lobengula's time, he concentrated his forces as close as possible to that part where minerals could be found; and the ancient workings appear to prove this."

Mr Regan left with the air of a man confident that his views would prove correct, and most confident of all in the
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coming upward movement in Transvaal shares in general, and Rhodesian shares in particular.

EXTRACT FROM “THE PRESS,” 11th January 1896

BLACK FOR THE UITLANDERS

The important telegram which I publish from South Africa this morning clears up much that was obscure, and confirms the general view of affairs at which we had arrived up to a period, and which I put before you yesterday, in the form of a diary. With regard to the moral aspect of Dr Jameson's action, I must make some remarks in my notes. But so far as the failure of it was concerned, the explanation of it is now perfectly clear. He was betrayed by the Uitlanders, to whose rescue he set forth on the spur of the moment, and for whose relief, in what he believed to be pressing dangers, he and his fellow Englishmen endured the most cruel privations and faced the most terrible risks. The precise details of the conduct of these Uitlander gentry are still somewhat obscure. It is not quite clear whether they made a move at all or whether they made some feeble move and then thought better of it. But two things seem clear, first, they did not support the advance of Dr Jameson, which they had asked for. On the contrary, when Dr Jameson had come within easy distance of Johannesburg, he found not any Uitlanders to meet him, but compact forces of Boers who (as my correspondent describes) replenished their ammunition from Johannesburg while the Uitlanders looked on. Secondly, the Uitlanders, having sent to Dr Jameson to
come and help them, went also to President Kruger to
discuss conciliatory measures for averting a crisis. That
astute old campaigner was fully equal to the occasion in
which the apparently craven conduct of the Uitlanders
gave him such signal advantage. He parleyed with Dr
Jameson's invokers, while he massed his forces to cut off
Dr Jameson himself, and thus it was that Dr Jameson's
blunder—for such it was in any case—became also so miser-
able a failure. I do not wonder that feeling at Cape Town
has been deeply moved alike at the desperate pluck of Dr
Jameson's Englishmen, and at their despicable betrayal by
the Uitlanders of Johannesburg. Unless any information
is forthcoming, the feeling of nausea at the spectacle of this
betrayal which will prevail on all hands is expressed by my
correspondent in a phrase that will stick when he refers to
money-grabbers who have not "the pluck of a rat."

But President Kruger has got to live with his rats for
all that. The state of feeling at the Cape will give Sir
Hercules Robinson a very free hand in negotiating with
President Kruger. Men who have no spirit in the assertion
of their rights must expect to have those rights as lightly re-
garded. Still even the meekest of God's creatures, if they
are very numerous, must in the long run have some conces-
sions made to them, especially if they are the creatures
who do all the money grabbing. President Kruger, there-
fore, if he is wise, will still grant them something; but in
view of the state of feeling in Cape Colony, Sir Hercules
Robinson will not be compelled to get as much as otherwise
he would. The whole situation is indeed, as I have already
said, one which eminently leads into "a great deal," and in
the following article I can recall some previous unofficial
bargaining But the first will have to be over Dr Jameson
and his fellow prisoners, and it is here that the conduct