only after consulting President Kruger, and for the sole purpose of protecting the Consulate and the lives and property of German subjects, he should requisition the services of a landing party from the cruiser *Seeadler*, to be employed so long as the disturbances continued.

At the same time the German Minister at Lisbon was directed to acquaint the Portuguese Government that Germany, in resorting to this measure, which was intended to serve only humane purposes, counted the more confidently upon the assent of the Portuguese Government, inasmuch as she had no other way open to her of seeing to the protection of her threatened subjects. The detachment from the cruiser which it was proposed to land would not exceed fifty men at the most, and this was a proof that its object was purely protective.

On 1st January 1896, Count Hatzfeldt telegraphed that his impression was that the Jameson Expedition, which His Excellency alludes to as "the proceedings of the Chartered Company," was in every respect distasteful to the British Government. On the same day the German Consul announced from Pretoria that the danger was over for Germans.

According to another despatch from London, Lord Salisbury, on January 3d, expressed the hope to Count Hatzfeldt that the Transvaal Question might be regarded as ended.

The last despatch in the White Book is a telegram from Baron Marschall to Count Hatzfeldt, dated January 6th, in which the German Foreign Secretary
observes, in reference to some remarks which had been made to him by Sir F. Lascelles, the British Ambassador, that he feels it necessary to protest against the view taken in the English Press that the telegram of the Emperor to President Kruger was an act of hostility to Great Britain or embodied an encroachment upon British rights.

Now, I frankly admit that the German Emperor's cablegram to President Kruger, as well as the one to the German Consul at Pretoria, to which I have referred, were in many respects indiscreet communications. But we must not, if we are to arrive at a right judgment in this matter, disguise from ourselves the fact that the Convention of London, which I have deemed necessary to include in extenso in this book, if carefully read and considered in an impartial spirit, most certainly and to all intents abrogated the Suzerainty of Great Britain over the Transvaal, which was expressly and implicitly defined and declared in the Pretoria Convention of 1881, but was neither implicitly nor yet inferentially set forth in the London Convention of 1884. In fact, when the latter Convention is dispassionately dissected, it will, I contend, be found that not only was the Suzerainty of this country over the Transvaal not therein asserted, but moreover that everything in the Convention leads one to believe that such Suzerainty was at that time permitted to lapse. In regard to the much discussed Article of the 1884 Convention, respecting the treaty-making powers of the South African
Republic, if people would only read the Article in question instead of deriving their opinions from the newspapers, they would see that the Transvaal is not precluded from entering into Treaties with any foreign State. ARTICLE IV. clearly states that the South African Republic will conclude no treaty with a foreign Power until the same has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen. The Article then goes on to say that such approval shall have been considered to have been granted, if Her Majesty's Government shall not, within six months after receiving the copy of such treaty, have notified that the conclusion is in conflict with the interests of this country. Now mark, that this is the only Article in the whole of the Convention of 1884 upon which the claim to exercise Suzerainty is now put forth. And mark also that there is nothing whatever in this clause to justify the assertion I have over and over again seen repeated in the Press, that the Transvaal cannot hold any direct relations or directly negotiate with a foreign State. The words of the Article, if words convey any meaning whatever, are clear and distinct. They, in effect, are that the South African Republic may enter into treaty arrangements with foreign Powers, but that such treaties shall be inoperative, and shall not be deemed to have been concluded until a period of six months after the receipt of such treaty by Her Majesty's Government shall have elapsed when, if no disapproval has been expressed, such treaty shall automatically become valid. A flimsy basis this
upon which to base a claim of Suzerainty, in all conscience. In truth, we never heard of this Suzerainty until the action of the German Emperor and his Government forced Mr Chamberlain into taking up the rôle of a Jingo. Now, as I have said, I think the action of the German Emperor and the German Government was indiscreet, but at the same time the manner in which the British public lost their heads over such indiscretion was a trifle too ludicrous. For the matter of that President Kruger had no more desire for German than he has for English interference in the affairs of his State, and he would most certainly and most justifiably resent one equally with the other. A certain section of the public here at home seems, by some process of mental reasoning or mental obfuscation, to have arrived at the conclusion that President Kruger was waiting with open arms to welcome a German force, and ready to place his country under German protection. Of course all this was the merest chimera. A German Protectorate over the Transvaal or a predominant German influence in South Africa could never, even by the wildest stretch of imagination, come to be considered a question of practical policy.

Out of evil, however, proverbially cometh good, and the proposal of the German Government to despatch a small armed force to Pretoria, incidentally gave occasion for the ancient ally of England, gallant little Portugal, to demonstrate her friendship for this country, and her determination to preserve at any cost the inviolability of her territory. To the
German request for permission to land this force at Delagoa Bay and send it through Portuguese territory to Pretoria, the Lisbon Government returned a distinct and dignified refusal. The action of the Portuguese in this matter seems to me to have escaped in this country the generous recognition it deserved. Portugal does not now claim the position of a first-class power, but the world owes her a debt of gratitude for the achievements of her glorious sons in the past, and the names and fame of the intrepid Portuguese navigators, and the great Portuguese soldiers of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, will endure to the end of time.

At the present moment, Portugal owns a huge slice of Africa, a great portion of which it has proved utterly impossible for her to develop, but I think a meed of praise ought to be given to her for the good work she has done at Delagoa Bay and in the development generally of the Port of Beira.

It was to me inexpressibly sad to witness the terrible outburst of bluster and braggadocio, worthy indeed of the Johannesburg financiers, but unworthy of a great nation like England, which so largely affected the usually stolid, staid and sedate people of this country in January 1896. They have now had time to reflect, and I sincerely hope they see what fools they made of themselves. England has nothing to fear from Germany, or from any other power or combination of powers, so long as she pursues the even tenour of her way, trusting not only in her enormous strength actual and latent,
and in her vast and illimitable resources, but trusting also in the purity of her motives, the uprightness of her actions and the conviction among the nations of the earth, that she will do right and act justly at any cost and at any sacrifice.
CHAPTER XI

THE FEELING IN ENGLAND

Why the people of this country are so easily influenced by expressions of opinion in the newspapers, is a question that I have never been able to satisfactorily answer. The ordinary Englishman who goes to his business in the morning and who reads his favourite newspaper on the way, for the rest of the day, if he thinks at all upon current events, thinks only after the manner of the leading articles he has been reading in the morning and adopts as his own particular opinions the opinions therein expressed. This is undoubtedly a time-saving process, but it is hardly an intellectual feat, nor does it seem to me to be either a satisfactory or a fair way of arriving at correct conclusions upon vexed problems. The ordinary newspaper man, be he editor, leader-writer or what not—and I have known many of them—is not a bit more intellectual, or in the slightest degree more fitted to express an opinion upon any subject, than the ordinary man in the street. If the newspaper man
were to ventilate his opinions in the first or third-class carriage, as the case may be, in which he rides to or from his office, he would most probably be put down by his auditors as either a blatant humbug or a bore, and nobody would pay the slightest attention to him. But when he sits down in the editorial chair or mounts upon the sub-editorial stool, and indites his opinions upon all and sundry matters, regarding most of which he usually knows nothing, substituting the pronoun “we” for the pronoun “I,” and when these opinions are printed on paper, the public—that foolish, credulous, idiotic public—imagines it is listening to the voice of an oracle when, instead, it is often only reading the scribblings of the hack journalist, and actually adopts and ratifies and takes as its very own the opinions of this very ordinary, sometimes a penny, sometimes twopence, a liner. Now, when the various occurrences in the South African Republic came about at the end of December and beginning of January last, the newspaper editor and writers of this country, with a few exceptions, went in for sheer and unadulterated and exceptionally wicked Jingoism. I suppose the people who owned and controlled these various journals thought there was money in pandering to this Jingo feeling, and, accordingly, they set about the process with very much the same objects in view as had the Johannesburg financiers in organising an agitation against the Government of the South African Republic. Accordingly, the wildest rumours, the most improbable and impossible stories, legends puerile and fantastic, were for many days
published broadcast by the newspapers of the United Kingdom. One evening journal in London gravely informed its readers that it had received from a most trustworthy source intelligence of a reliable nature that Dr Jameson had defeated the Boers, reached Johannesburg and set up a provisional government. I mention this rumour, not because of any particular importance that attached either to it or the paper in which it appeared, but simply as an example in point of the manner in which the Press of England lost its head at a critical period, and determined to accentuate and exacerbate the feeling against the Boers, which was entirely the outcome of prejudice and ignorance. Certainly, as I have said, there were some laudable exceptions to this fanning of the flame of excitement, which undoubtedly prevailed among the public for many days during an extremely critical period.

I have said much about the trend of public opinion in this country, and in respect of the manner in which the so-called organs of public opinion led the public on a false scent. There was, however, one man in this country, a noble and heroic figure, with whose opinions and actions I have not always been in agreement, but whose general course of conduct, both in political and private life, has ever obtained my profound admiration and respect. I refer to that venerable statesman, the Right Honourable W. E. Gladstone, one of the noblest figures of the nineteenth century, a man who has always raised his voice, in season and out of season, on behalf of the poor, the
oppressed, the down-trodden, and in the interests of truth and justice. It was, therefore, with considerable feelings of pleasure that, when excitement in regard to matters in the Transvaal was almost at its height, that I read the following interesting letter from the pen of the aged statesman:—

"Dear Sir,—I have always thought the Transvaal had rather peculiar claims upon us, and I am much pleased with what I see thus far of Kruger’s conduct. But we are not out of the wood yet, and I am not entitled to interfere. As at present advised, however, I am alike surprised and disgusted at the outrage committed on the Republic; and even if the Uitlanders were the main cause, that is no answer to those whose territory was invaded and their peace disturbed by armed invasion.—Your very faithful and obedient,

"W. E. Gladstone

"January 17, 1896"

Needless to say, Mr Gladstone’s letter gave considerable satisfaction to President Kruger and the Government of the Transvaal, and had no little effect in bringing about the better state of feeling which, I believe, now exists between the Boer population and the Uitlanders. The sympathy expressed by Her Majesty the Queen in reference to the terrible dynamite explosion in Johannesburg also caused considerable satisfaction. In fact, I believe, and I have good reason for saying so, that if Lord
Salisbury's Government deals with President Kruger on just and upright lines, respects the independence of the Transvaal and promises to conserve it, there is every prospect of not only friendly, but cordial, feelings springing up between the Dutch and English races, not in the Transvaal only, but in South Africa. As General Joubert, in thanking the Orange Free State burghers, remarked, there is a great future before South Africa if it is only united. Their cause, said the General, was the cause of the South African people, who would achieve their end by combining all who are under a different rule into one nation. This combination, I may remark, was the aim of Lord Carnarvon, Sir Bartle Frere, and many other eminent statesmen and administrators. It is the hope of every man who has the welfare of South Africa at heart, and I believe in my soul that the psychological moment has almost arrived when such a consummation can be effected.

I have alluded in this chapter to the fictitious and exaggerated reports that appeared in many newspapers published in this country in regard to matters in the Transvaal. When all else failed, we had the old, old stories about Boer atrocities which, as Mr Froude showed in his book, Oceana, were stale garbage, and when investigated, had always been proved to be absolutely false. However, they were once again published here in the month of January 1896, but it is pleasing to be able to state that so soon as they were published and the intelligence was transmitted to the Cape, Sir J. Gordon Sprigg, Mr J.
Hofmeyr, Mr J. Merriman, Mr W. P. Schreiner, Mr J W. Sauer, Sir J. Sivewright, Sir T. Upington, Mr Te. Water, Mr David Graaf, and other prominent persons, signed the following declaration for publication in London:—

"The telegrams sent to the London papers giving accounts of outrages perpetrated by Boers on British subjects are regarded here as mischievous fictions, and are deplored by all Africans as calculated further to embitter race feeling and to retard a peaceful settlement."
CHAPTER XII

LETTERS ON THE TRANSVAAL QUESTION

Shortly after the invasion of the Transvaal by the Chartered Company's force under Dr Jameson, I found public opinion here in England so utterly adrift in regard to the true facts of the case, as between Boers and Uitlanders, that I deemed it necessary, in the interests of truth and justice, to address several letters to the Press in order, if possible, to correct prevalent misconceptions. These letters, if I may make bold to say so, served, I believe, a useful purpose in directing attention to the fact, which had apparently been entirely disregarded, that the Boers had something, and a very considerable amount, to urge on their behalf, and that the "Transvaal Question" was by no means the one-sided matter the Press of this country had deluded the public into believing it to be. I reproduce the letters I refer to for the information of my readers:—
To the Editor of the "Financial Times"

"Sir,—Recent exciting episodes in the Transvaal are quickly passing out of the nine days' wonder stage and becoming a matter of history. While they are to some extent fresh in the public memory, it is, I think, advisable, and it is certainly only fair, that the public should have placed before them some plain unvarnished truths, in order to enable them to arrive at a juster conclusion in respect of the matters in dispute between Boers and Uitlanders than was possible during the period of excitement through which the Transvaal has recently passed.

"Up to the present time I have studiously held aloof from the controversy about the Transvaal in the public Press, which has, for the most part, consisted of acrid and heated denunciations of Mr Kruger and his countrymen. I might, I think, reasonably enough have claimed, from my knowledge of, and interests in, the South African Republic, that my opinion in regard to events therein is as valuable as that of the self-constituted 'authorities' who have been airing their views and advertising themselves and their papers for several weeks past. The champions of the Uitlanders in this country have, in effect, bidden us behold the spectacle of many thousands of our own countrymen—industrious, intelligent, law-abiding Englishmen—rightly struggling to be free in a foreign country where they were under the yoke of, and generally oppressed by, an infinitesimal minority"
Boer and Uitlander

of Dutch farmers. These Uitlanders are, I know, believed by the great mass of the public in England to have been merely sticking up for their rights, including freedom of speech, and many other privileges to which we are accustomed, and that are highly valued in a free country. In connection therewith, we have been told that the Uitlanders have, above all, been asserting the grand old principle, in defence of which our American brethren fought and beat us more than a hundred years ago, namely, no taxation without representation. All this, I say, is the prevalent opinion in England, and it does not say much for the accuracy of the public judgment here, or of the Press, which affects to guide and mould public opinion, that such a burlesque of what has really taken place in the Transvaal, and the motives of the Uitlanders generally in their agitation, should be accepted as the absolute truth.

"First and foremost, the Uitlanders are very far from being all Englishmen; there are men of every nationality in Johannesburg, but of most of them it may be predicted with safety that they are not Englishmen, Frenchmen or German, but, above all things, financiers, whose patriotism is largely a question of £ s. d. These men came out to the Transvaal to exploit its riches, and with a full knowledge of the laws and ordinances of the country. Having amassed wealth, they began to think that it was a thousand pities such an abnormally rich country as the Transvaal, should be in the possession of a parcel of Dutch Boers, who
actually had the insolence to call upon Uitlanders to pay taxes, and thereby hand over to the Government a very minute portion of the gold they were extracting from the Transvaal territory. This feeling, by dint of much writing and speaking, gradually spread. A ‘National Union’ was formed, and the Uitlanders threatened all manner of things when the time came for them to act. Well, the time did come, poor Jameson was lured to his fate, and the Uitlanders began to shake in their shoes, saving those of them, who knowing what was coming, decided, like the good financiers that they are, to make the most of it, and had accordingly gone ‘bears’ of Rand gold mining shares. Some of these ‘bears’ are now in gaol, and their ‘bear’ operations accordingly are not likely to turn out as profitable as they at one time expected.

“'The public will, in my opinion, be very foolish if they waste any sympathy over the Uitlanders. That the latter have grievances I do not deny, but I am just as sensible of the fact that President Kruger and his Government are extremely desirous to ameliorate any reasonable causes of complaint, if the Uitlanders will only take up the position of law-abiding citizens in a foreign country, instead of, as heretofore, posing as rebels, who intend on the first favourable opportunity to make a clean sweep of the board and seize upon the riches of the Rand, or such of them as they do not already possess. President Kruger is probably not an angel, but neither are the Uitlanders angels, and
their behaviour with reference to Dr Jameson scarcely induces one to regard them as men of valour.—I am, etc.,

"W. F. REGAN.

"17th January 1896"

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "ECHO."

"Sir,—Now that the excitement with regard to the various episodes in the Transvaal has to some extent quieted down, it appears to me that, in the interests of justice and fair dealing as between man and man, some publicity should be given to the other side of the Transvaal question; because there is another side to this as to most other questions, as I hope I shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of your readers. For some weeks past the English public have been induced to believe by many writers and financiers, not in every instance disinterested, that the Boers of the Transvaal are a miserable collection of autocratic, pig-headed Dutchmen, who grind beneath their heels all the wealth, intelligence and industry of Johannesburg and the Rand generally, who are oppressed not only in their liberties, but financially. These Uitlanders are generally supposed by the public here at home to be a band of gallant Englishmen struggling day by day against the vicious principle of taxation without representation; in fact, worthy representatives of good old John Hampden, and those other patriotic and venerated Englishman, who, by their struggles in the past, have gained for Englishmen the liberties they now enjoy. Now, sir, any
such idea as this is the merest travesty of the condition of things that actually exists in the South African Republic.

"If we are just, we must not forget that the Boers are in the South African Republic simply because they wished to get free of our South African colonies, and to possess land of their own, where they could govern themselves according to their own ideas, and engage in their rural pursuits unhampered and untrammelled by those colonial laws and regulations which they found irksome. No doubt a good many people think that the Boers are stupid and absurd people for entertaining these ideas. Well, they may be stupid and absurd, but we must recognise the fact that the South African Republic is, except in regard to its foreign relations, an independent nation, and that the rulers thereof are perfectly within their rights in regulating the administration of the country, and deciding who shall and who shall not be admitted to the franchise or other rights of citizenship. As to the autocratic propensities of the Boers, about which we have heard so much of late, it is all the merest fudge. A perusal of the contents of the English newspapers published in Johannesburg would convince the people of this country that the liberty of the Press, is, at any rate, in no danger in that part of the world, because those journals have contained for many months past criticisms and comments on the administration and administrators of the State, and charges of corruption and malfeasance generally against nearly every official of the South African
Republic, all written in language far exceeding in severity and vituperation anything to which even we are accustomed in this country.

"If President Kruger were the despot he has been portrayed here, he would certainly have stopped long ago the gross licence of language indulged in by the English newspapers published in Johannesburg. But not a bit of it, and this fact surely goes far to show that President Kruger is anything but an autocrat, and that the Uitlanders who possess a free—an excessively free—Press have nothing whatever to complain of in that respect. And so in regard to liberty of speech also. It is not too much to say that if the National Reform Union had existed in any other country, great or small, in Europe or America, it would long since have been suppressed, and the members thereof prosecuted and imprisoned. But what do we find in the Transvaal? The National Reform Union is unmolested, and its members are as free in their speech on the platform as the English Press in Johannesburg is free in its comments on men and things in the Transvaal. Clearly, therefore, this Kruger is a peculiar kind of 'autocrat.' In what does his autocracy consist, and wherein does the shoe pinch in respect of these Uitlanders? I will tell your readers. The motley collection of gentlemen who are embraced under the generic term of Uitlander, are men of every nationality, but whose nationality and patriotism are all summed up in the one word—
finance. This Kruger, wicked man that he is, actually has the temerity to tax these Uitlanders who have come to the South African Republic to extract its riches for their own benefit. Those riches, if they belong to anybody, belong to the original inhabitants of the Republic, and the rulers of that State would have been perfectly justified, legally and morally, in preventing any Uitlanders from settling down there and proceeding to extract the great riches of the Rand. These men have grown rich and prosperous upon the great wealth that undoubtedly lies beneath the surface of the Transvaal. They have amassed enormous sums of money, and they cannot for the life of them bear to see the coffers of the Transvaal treasury full, and the Dutch officials of that State receiving adequate remuneration for their services. No. These Uitlanders think that if they had not to pay taxation, they could make more money, and in their greed for pelf, they want to get rid of the ‘autocratic’ Kruger and the other Boers, and obtain possession of the country for themselves.

"Now, sir, in this matter I may claim to be impartial. I have large interests in the Transvaal myself, and in one way my sympathies might be supposed to be with the Uitlanders, but I cannot disguise from myself the fact that the hybrid collection of foreigners in the South African Republic, in their agitation, in their threats, in their vituperation, have been simply and solely influenced by their pockets. The conduct of the Uitlanders, after all
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their tall talk, in leaving Jameson to his fate, has very properly incurred the reprobation of all right-thinking people in this country.—Yours faithfully,

"WM. F. REGAN.

"Jan. 17, 1896"

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "FREEMAN'S JOURNAL."

"SIR,—The people in England have so utterly lost their heads over the Transvaal Question, that it seems to be expedient that one like myself who, with a full knowledge of the country, can claim to be impartial as between Boers and Uitlanders, should state his views publicly in regard to the many matters arising out of Dr Jameson's invasion of the Transvaal that have been agitating the public mind for some weeks past.

To anyone like myself who knows what Johannesburg is, and what description of men the Uitlanders are, and who is intimately acquainted with the ideas, sentiments and characteristics of President Kruger, and other members of the Government, it seems passing strange that public opinion in Great Britain should have been so woefully led astray as appears to have been the case in regard to the 'Transvaal Question.' This 'Question' in its entirety has been manufactured by Uitlanders, whose set purpose for some time past has been to get possession of the country, with its vast actual and latent wealth, and clear the Boers out of it neck and crop. President Kruger has
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from the very first been fully acquainted with the aims and objects of this conspiracy against the Government, and it was hardly to be expected that he would have fallen in with it by granting to these Uitlanders, without the slightest discrimination, the full rights of citizenship, and so, in effect, have signed his own death-warrant. All the fatuous nonsense that has appeared in the Press of this country in regard to the aspirations of the Uitlanders, and their desire to assert at any cost those grand old principles that have made England free and famous, is really ludicrous to anyone like myself who knows what the Uitlanders are and what it is they want. Johannesburg is, as probably your readers are aware, a city with a population of over 100,000, drawn from all parts of the world. It is this motley population of foreigners that has demanded from the Transvaal Government, with menaces, the full rights of citizenship, and when President Kruger, very properly, in my opinion, declined to comply with such extravagant demands, formed themselves into an association which they called a ‘National Union,’ and which if it had existed in England or Ireland, much less in any Continental nation, would have been suppressed by the strong arm of the law, and every member of it prosecuted for treason. When a collection of men go in for treasonable projects, and indulge in threats against a lawfully-constituted Government, their only justification can be success. The Uitlanders blustered and threatened and talked a considerable amount of high-falutin’ nonsense about the dangers
to which their wives and families were subject to in Johannesburg, the only danger, I may remark, being the outcome of the treasonable conspiracy against the existing Government of the South African Republic. But what was the dénouement? When Dr Jameson, lured across the frontier by their wails respecting their wives and families, came to the rescue of these Uitlanders, they made not the slightest attempt to make good their valiant words, they never stirred an inch outside Johannesburg, and they allowed Jameson to be engaged in a fierce combat with an overwhelming Boer force, within fifteen miles of the city, without even making the slightest attempt to render him assistance, direct or indirect. Having defeated Jameson's party, President Kruger had the game in his hands, and if he were the autocrat and cruel monster that he is depicted by not a few English papers, he would have shot every survivor of Jameson's force. Instead of doing this, however, the President handed these several hundred prisoners over to the English authorities, and his behaviour in so acting has certainly been in marked contrast to the bluster and bravado, all ending in smoke, of these pot-valiant Uitlanders. Having done this, President Kruger not unnaturally thinks the time has come to put a stop to the treasonable practices of the foreign population of the Transvaal, and he accordingly arrested the ringleaders of the conspiracy against the Government. Let us wait until the trial of the prisoners now in Pretoria Gaol is concluded, and we shall no doubt find—in fact, I know we
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shall—that President Kruger has no desire to inflict on these men the penalties they have incurred, and, in my opinion, they richly deserve. He will, however, insist that they shall forever rid the South African Republic of their presence, a step which, in my opinion, will tend to the future peace and prosperity of Johannesburg and the Transvaal generally, and enable President Kruger to grant those concessions to the Uitlanders that I know he desires to confer as largely and generously as possible, and which would have been granted long ago had it not been for the arrogant behaviour of the self-constituted leaders of the Uitlanders in Johannesburg and their precious 'National Union,' which was not 'National' in any proper sense of the term.

—Yours obediently,

"Wm. F. Regan.

"17th January 1896."

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "NORTHERN WHIG."

"SIR,—So much has been written in the Press and spoken on public platforms during the past few weeks respecting Boers and Uitlanders, in almost every instance to the disadvantage of the Boers, that I feel impelled by a sense of justice, now that public feeling has to some extent calmed down, to endeavour to afford some enlightenment on the subject respecting which my interests in, and knowledge of, the Transvaal generally, and Johannesburg in particular, enable me, I think, to speak with some authority. Recognising as I do in your journal a
Boer and Uitlander

paper that has during the recent crisis attempted to
calm and control the excited feelings of the multi-
tude and prevent them from jumping to somewhat
erroneous conclusions upon imperfect information, I
venture to ask your permission to calmly and im-
partially narrate in the Northern Whig the circum-
stances that have led up to the recent events in
the Transvaal.

"Now, sir, what is primarily responsible for pro-
ducing the recent and present deplorable condition
of things in the Transvaal? Gold. It is the same
old story that we can perchance remember our-
selves, or, if we cannot, can read in history as having
happened all the world over. The Transvaal un-
fortunately for the Boers, who, rightly or wrongly,
live a rural life away from the din and turmoil of
towns, and 'trekked' to the Transvaal to get away
from men and things that were not in accordance
with their ideas, was a few years ago found to be
rich in the precious metal, and as soon as news of
this was noised abroad, men, good, bad and in-
different, but largely of the latter two classes,
flocked there from all parts of the world, till it has
come about that Johannesburg has a population for
its size probably less reputable than any city on
the face of the globe. Well, in due course, the gold
mines became developed, with the result that there
has been, month by month, a large and steadily-
increasing output of the precious metal therefrom.
Enormous fortunes have consequently been realised
by vendors, promoters, investors and speculators,
all, be it observed, directly or indirectly due to the mineral wealth of the Transvaal Republic. The Republic, not unnaturally, taxed the hybrid inhabitants, who had come there in search of and had found wealth—taxed them not to punish them, but merely to defray the cost of Government and other expenses incidental to the service of the State. Thereupon the immigrants resented this, talked glibly about 'taxation without representation,' referred to the revolt of the American colonies against Great Britain, because the latter ignored this great principle, and demanded, there is no other word for it, to be admitted to all the rights and privileges of citizenship of the Transvaal Republic without further ado. President Kruger, who, whatever his faults is certainly not lacking in shrewdness, saw clearly enough that were he to accede to these preposterous proposals, he and his fellow Boers might as well at once commence about 'trekking' afresh if they could find any uninhabited portion of Africa to 'trek' to, and declined to grant such demands, but promised to consider any reasonable grievances the Uitlanders might desire to put forward. Thereupon the latter indulged in scarcely veiled threats, and much vituperative language in the English papers published in Johannesburg, and organised a society which made no secret of its intentions to resort to force if necessary. Arms were imported in large quantities by devious methods, and a gigantic conspiracy was formed to get possession of the Transvaal for the Uitlanders, not from any patriotic or even
plausibly upright motives, but simply and solely in order that the Uitlanders might come into full possession of the country with all its wealth and expel the Boers therefrom. The object of this precious scheme is now full well known to your readers, and I think it may be truthfully averred that the only man who comes well out of the whole business is President Kruger. He has shown that he knows how to be magnanimous and merciful, and no honest man can say justly that the words of congratulations addressed to him by the Queen, the High Commissioner, the Governor of Natal and others have in any way gone beyond the merits of the case. Even in the hour of triumph, President Kruger has promised to alleviate any substantial grievances which the Uitlanders could show they suffered from, and from my knowledge of him, I verily believe the President will keep his promise in the spirit as well as in the letter.—Yours, etc.,

"Wm. F. Regan.

"17th January 1896"
Mr Chamberlain's conduct generally, in regard to the invasion of the Transvaal by the Chartered Company's forces under Dr Jameson, has been so admirable that I am loth to make what may be deemed hypercritical remarks in respect of any action on his part in regard to matters arising out of that invasion. Nevertheless, in a book such as this some reference must undoubtedly be made to the voluminous despatch, published in the London Gazette of 7th February, addressed by Mr Chamberlain to Sir Hercules Robinson, and propounding what was virtually a scheme of Home Rule for the Rand. Whatever the merits of Mr Chamberlain's proposals, it was, I think, a thousand pities that they should ever have been made public before the contents of the despatch had reached the person for whom it was primarily intended, viz., President Kruger. As it was, the President gleaned, in the first instance, from other sources details of the far-reaching, if not revolutionary, proposals put forward
by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in regard to the future of the State of which Mr. Kruger is the head. In this matter I feel bound to say Mr. Chamberlain has "played to the gallery," and in his love of public approbation has made a distinct faux pas, the consequences of which are likely to be more serious than is at present foreseen.

Mr. Chamberlain's despatch was a direction to the High Commissioner as to the general tenour which the Colonial Office desired him to adopt in negotiations with President Kruger, with a view to induce the Transvaal Boers to modify their institutions in an enlarged and pretendedly liberal sense, with a view to remove, if possible, some of the chief causes of complaint which the Uitlanders represented as being "grievances" for them. In the first place, as I have said, Mr. Chamberlain committed a great blunder in publishing that despatch before it could possibly have reached Sir Hercules. Secondly, I think Sir Hercules, after having previously replied to Mr. Chamberlain's more confidential communication, to the like general effect, to the purport that "it would be inopportune and premature under the existing circumstances to broach such questions," would have committed another blunder in forwarding to President Kruger a copy of the cabled précis, had it not been that it was published in extenso quite as soon as the copy précis could reach him, and that it was reported direct to the President by the Transvaal Consul-General by cable.
Thirdly, I do not think Mr Chamberlain's scheme to be at all well-considered or politic. Municipal self-government the Uitlanders would readily obtain, and that is really all they can reasonably ask for. But this they repudiate in declaring that "Municipal Government, subject to the legislation of the President and Volksraad (Raad), as at present constituted, would be only a gift from one hand taken away with the other," which is as much as to say that the authority of the City of London Corporation, or of the London County Council, is a mockery, because both, and, in fact, all our own municipal institutions are subject to the supreme authority of the State and of Parliament.

What the Uitlanders want—but will certainly not obtain through the instrumentality of Chamberlain's somewhat curious contrivances and expedients—is admission to the National Franchise and Representation, so that they could swamp the Burghers altogether (as they would) in the Raad, and reduce any Boer President to the position of a mere cipher—thus doing much more to gratify the rapacity of the mine gamblers than would the reinstatement of the odious Annexation of 1877, which led to the disasters of 1880 and 1881, and to the all but absolute independence of the Boers, would or could accomplish for British colonists. It would be virtually to reannex the Transvaal, not to the empire but to the financiers of Johannesburg. The Boers are very well aware that this is the
real purpose, and that Mr Chamberlain and the Imperial Government were being used as mere tools to this end. Accordingly, the President and the Raad, who framed the constitution for themselves and not for intrusive interlopers into the country, which their Burghers first occupied as a retreat when they were fugitives from the British colonies and colonial Government, would be simpletons to accede to Mr Chamberlain's inconsistent scheme.

The Uitlanders are, as I have previously said, aliens and intruders, and have no natural right to representation except in their own municipalities. They have voluntarily rushed into the country, in which they have occupied twenty-six mining districts at least, almost exclusively in pursuit of gold. If the Rand were granted representation in the Raad, the twenty-five other districts would have equal claims to the like representation, and the Uitlander members of the Raad would outnumber the Burgher members. Thus the Uitlanders would virtually appropriate the State and the country, which have been erected and occupied by the Boers for themselves, from out of the Boers' hands, power and control.

It is not surprising, therefore, that so far from manifesting any intention of accepting a single one of Mr Chamberlain's ill-timed propositions, President Kruger is very busy in turning to account the most ample and acceptable supply of arms, transport, vehicles and animals, ammunition, accoutrements, etc., which the Chartered Company's people and the
Uitlanders have been so opportunely compelled to surrender to the Boers (and they have acquired, free of cost), by distributing arms and ammunition in abundance amongst the Burghers in the distant country districts, and especially along the western, northern and north-eastern frontiers, that the Burghers throughout may be ready for sudden commandeering and for relentless action, in case a conflict be once more forced upon them.

Nothing could have been more inopportune that the proposal even (excepting its publication) than the introduction of such a scheme at such a time. And even if it had been workable (which could only have been if very carefully prepared by a jurisconsult thoroughly *au fait* about the Boers generally, and about President Kruger in particular) it invited rejection by anachronism. Not being even workable, and being so ill-timed, in my humble opinion it is doomed to failure, and it would be more politic not to attempt its revival from asphyxiation.
CHAPTER XIV

THE CHARTERED COMPANY IN RHODESIA

In an early portion of this book I reproduced the Charter of the British South Africa Company in extenso, and I then remarked that in regard to questions wholly and solely concerning the South African Republic, the British South Africa Company ought, strictly speaking, to have no concern. But the unfortunate expedition of Dr Jameson has altered all that, and the future of the South Africa Company will most certainly be considerably affected, and its powers be assuredly largely modified, as a direct result of the invasion of a friendly State by its late Administrator and its forces.

Whatever modifications may be made in the Charter, it may, however, I think, be taken as certain that no question will arise of the withdrawal of the Charter from the Company. In many respects I am totally out of sympathy with the aims, objects, and aspirations of, not only the Company itself, but many of the persons connected therewith, but still I cannot help admitting the fact, and I do admit it fully and freely, that the
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Company has done a great work in South Africa, and that the potentialities of the vast territories under its control are such as the mind can hardly realise. Now, I may frankly remark that this is a matter upon which I may assuredly claim to speak with that knowledge which comes from experience. My interests in Rhodesia, as in the Transvaal, are considerable. I have invested every penny I have in the world therein, and I look to the future with absolute confidence. My belief is that Rhodesia, as it becomes developed and better known, will prove to be the El Dorado of the twentieth century. Of its enormous latent mineral wealth there can be no question any more than of the fertility of the soil, the fineness of the climate and its capacity for supporting in prosperity, if not in wealth, an enormous European population. As I have said, I gladly recognise the great work which the Chartered Company has done so far in Rhodesia, and I feel assured, with Mr Rhodes and Earl Grey actively superintending operations at Buluwayo, we may expect in the near future to see the prosperity of Rhodesia, and with it, of course, of the Chartered Company, advancing by leaps and bounds. In this connection it is to be hoped the public will diligently read and carefully digest the report of the Chartered Company which was published in the newspapers during the course of the last week in February 1896. This report was only made up to the end of March 1895, and I am not concerned with the finances or financial operation of the Company as detailed therein. My
interest in the report is simply in respect of what it states as to the operations then in progress to develop the resources of the Chartered Company's territory. We have been told incessantly—as a matter of fact—that there is no gold in Rhodesia. Evidently the man who writes nonsense of this nature relies upon his imagination for his facts. That gold exists in Rhodesia, not only in paying quantities, but largely and richly, there can be no doubt. What has prevented mining operations in Rhodesia being successfully carried out hitherto, is not the lack of gold there, but the lack of the means of transport and the enormous expense attendant on conveying and erecting suitable machinery, to say nothing of the cost of milling. When roads are constructed and railways made, the prosperity of the country will, I firmly believe, proceed apace. Railway facilities are now the required desiderata, and railway construction is at present in full swing. The Bechuanaland Railway has for some time past been open as far as Mafeking, and another section of ninety-five miles is to be completed in July next, when further extensions will be taken in hand, while the Beira or east coast route, part of which is now open, is being rapidly extended. The development of mining business will assist the agricultural interest, creating, as it must, a demand for all the necessities of life. In the Chartered Company's report, to which I have referred, there is a list of eleven mining companies in which the Chartered Company has an interest, and a further list of some two hundred, in the mining interests of
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which the Chartered Company has a share. As the development of the country proceeds, these mining interests must necessarily return a large revenue to the Chartered Company.

In respect of the Chartered Company, and its future, considerable interest must necessarily attach to an article which appeared in the March number, 1896, of the New Review, from the pen of Mr Rutherford Harris, Secretary to the British South Africa Company, and member of the Legislative Assembly of Cape Colony. Mr Harris, who entitles his article "The Fate of South Africa," states that although he came home and landed in England in company with Mr Cecil Rhodes, nevertheless, he does not write officially or in any sense as the mouthpiece of the Company, but simply as one whose connection with it has afforded him unusual opportunities of gauging British sentiment and studying British enterprise in South Africa. I shall not stop to inquire how far a man can differentiate between his public and his private capacity. I shall, in spite of Mr Harris' disclaimer, regard him as the mouthpiece of Mr Cecil Rhodes, and I shall look at his opinions from that point of view. Mr Harris indignantly repudiates the assertion that the late troubles in Johannesburg were brought on by stock-jobbing schemes, and he speaks in high terms of Jameson's tact and diplomacy. Mr Harris contends, that not English speculation but German intrigue was at the root of the mystery. By concessions to German companies, by unfair rates on the railways,
and by other unfair manipulations of traffic, there has, he asserts, been a deliberate attempt to divert into German channels the stream of commerce which is bound to increase in volume every year, and to transfer into German pockets that mighty harvest of wealth of which British capital and British enterprise have sown the seed. In support of these sweeping assertions, Mr Harris adduces not one scintilla of evidence. His statement that German intrigue has been at the root of all the mischief in the Transvaal is utterly grotesque.

Mr Harris, there can be no doubt, in this article is but the mouthpiece of Mr Cecil Rhodes, Privy Councillor and now Administrator of Rhodesia, and it is therefore interesting to learn on such high authority that “a community of 14,000 male Boers may claim the divine right of a pastoral oligarchy and coquet with the power of a military despot, but, even so, the laws of political evolution cannot be arrested to humour their political intelligence. We may, therefore, take it that, sooner or later, and sooner rather than later, the Uitlanders will obtain the political rights enjoyed by all civilised communities. But this political emancipation of the Transvaal, which is bound to come, must affect every State in South Africa. The Transvaal, as an opulent and thickly-populated State, surrounded by poorer and less-favoured neighbours, cannot fail to drag the Free State, the Cape Colony and Natal into some closer communion with its political and commercial organisation. There will be a federation
of South Africa. But what time will the Transvaal set to that federation? What policy will the States of South Africa adopt towards England and the world? The answer to these questions depends on the attitude of England during the present crisis. If England does her duty, she will some day have a dominion of South Africa loyal as the dominion of Canada, but if not, then a dominion loyal to Germany, or a United States of Africa with a Monroe doctrine of their own. I have used Canada as an illustration, because the French Canadians appreciate the blessings of British rule, and because the great majority of the Dutch in Cape Colony do and will continue to appreciate those blessings, provided always that Great Britain shall continue to respect the language, religion and racial sentiment of the Dutch as of equal importance to their own. And in this connection the question of native labour must not be overlooked."

There is an implied threat in all this which surely does not come with a good grace from the mouth-piece of a Privy Councillor, but there is more behind it and even stronger language. "Unless," says Mr Harris, "the British people will consent to look a few years ahead, and to consider the South African question as a whole, we of British blood in South Africa cannot, with all the goodwill in the world, avert a disaster to British power as great as the loss of the American Colonies. We may some few of us struggle against the stream, but if the 'imperial factor' be found wanting in the first elements of
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imperial rule, we shall be swept away in a swelling current of Afrikander patriotism. There is no room for a roi fainéant south of the Zambesi."

I am given to understand that not a few people in this country are under the impression that Mr Cecil Rhodes has vast political ambition, and I have heard it gravely asserted by men of light and leading, that if Mr Cecil Rhodes has any obstacles placed in the path that he has marked out for himself, he is quite prepared to "cut the painter" and erect a South African Republic which shall extend from Cape Town to Cairo. It is not, of course, for me to say how much or how little truth there may be in rumours of this nature; I am fully aware that public men and even quasi public men are often misrepresented and maligned, and have motives and opinions attributed to them which they not only do not entertain but never even dreamt of. But a man in Mr Rhodes's position, especially in view of recent events, ought to be circumspect, and he ought to see that those under him and those associated with him in a confidential capacity are likewise; and in all seriousness, I would ask whether opinions such as the following ought to be publicly propounded by the Secretary of the Chartered Company of which Mr Cecil Rhodes is the moving spirit? In the article in the New Review, Mr Harris took upon himself to express the opinion, that "all the South African States must eventually form a federation, either of United States independent of, and hostile to, Great Britain, or a Dominion like that of Canada,
with either England or Germany for its sovereign power," and he agrees with those who consider that "on the Transvaal, or rather on the fate of the Uitlanders in that State, depends the solution of the problem. At present 14,000 male Boers, a pastoral people and opposed to all progress, rule absolutely an Uitlander population of some 120,000 people, the majority of whom are either British born or of British descent, speaking the English language as their mother-tongue. They comprise the intelligence, the wealth, the energy, and all that makes for progress and civilisation in a country as large as Italy. By their resources and determination they have increased the export of gold from nothing, until it now amounts to 8,000,000 sterling per annum, and by the end of this century, now only four years distant, the development of their 'deep levels' will increase this export of gold to twenty millions sterling, and thereafter for the next thirty or forty years they will maintain their production at that figure. The Transvaal will, therefore, furnish in the near future two-thirds of the yellow metal of the world, and with this increase of prosperity, the present population of 120,000 Uitlanders must increase also until, by the year 1900, it may safely be put at 240,000, and a few years later at half a million. At the present moment the Uitlanders own, by actual purchase of the soil, more than one-half of the Transvaal, and contribute nine-tenths of the entire revenue, yet they have no share in the Government of their country. It is
not to be supposed that such a position can last."

Of the morality of such sentiments as these it is not for me to judge, but my readers who have got thus far will, I feel sure, clearly comprehend that in view of all the circumstances which have led to these poor hunted farmers settling in the Transvaal, the fact that gold has, unfortunately for them, been found there, cannot justify their vineyards being seized by the greedy plutocrats of the Rand. I conclude as I commenced, by saying that the Chartered Company has done a great work in Africa, and that a great work lies before it, but if the Chartered Company is to perform that work adequately and efficiently, it must devote all its energies, and all the energies of all its officials and servants, to its proper sphere of operations, and hold strictly aloof from matters political and otherwise that do not properly appertain to it.
CHAPTER XV

THE ALLEGED WRONGS OF THE UITLANDERS

The Boers, including the first emancipated section of the Orange River, have throughout, as I have already endeavoured to make my readers understand, only sought to wander farther and farther away from the English settlers by successively "trekking" to the outermost confines of the colony (and beyond its actual boundaries to the north-eastward), in search of an isolation such as they have always coveted, either by displacing native tribes or by squatting in unoccupied wilderneses, such as was, firstly, Graaffreynet, secondly, the Orange River Settlement, thirdly, the interior (and unsettled part of Natal), fourthly, the howling wilderness of the Transvaal. In all these movements, they were but seeking to remove themselves from contact with the English colonists, and to dwell in new lands apart and to themselves. They went to regions, one after another, to which the English settlers were then quite averse from going, in order to be by themselves, and to enjoy their own habits and pursuits, un congenial as
they were to Englishmen, in absolutely new and segregated settlements of their own making exclusively. They, in effect, were emigrants who renounced the British connection altogether and formed new settlements of their own, and which they wished and hoped to preserve for themselves as emancipated communities, in the independence of total severance from any other European concessions. Owing to their effectual co-operation against the Basutos, those amongst them who had squatted beyond the Orange River, parcelling out the whole territory amongst themselves in the large farms or holdings which it is one of their marked characteristics to long for, were recognised (in 1854), politically, in the independence which they had enjoyed by their total segregation from the rest of Cape Colony. Those who were excluded from that settlement by the appropriation of all the territory amongst the first settlers, "trekked" further to the eastward, until, ultimately, finding themselves crowded out in interior Natal even, by the influx thither also of more English settlers, who had then been attracted chiefly by the sugar cultivation nearer to the coast, and had spread themselves beyond the Quaklamba Ranges, even to Pietermaritzburg and along the Tugela, they (the Boers) sought refuge, for isolation again, in the wilderness beyond the Vaal. They, like the Orange River people, were the first possessors (of European origin) of the whole country. They had occupied it when no other European race had the least idea of colonising it.
and, in that sense, they were denationalised colonists, acknowledging no allegiance whatever to any power save that of their own Burgher community, which they organised into a sort of rude State, adapted to their own requirements in the way of government, and institutions, which they fashioned congenially, according to their own wants, tastes and social combination. True, as originally denizens of the Cape Colony, conquered by Great Britain in a certain sense, they were British subjects, although they never acknowledged that relation, and the only colourable pretext for annexing their territory and thus again forcibly reducing them to a second subjection, was that territory which they (as British subjects) had colonised had been thus, ipso facto, rendered British territory. But as the Boers had migrated into the Transvaal wilderness, far away from the confines of recognised British territory, for the express purpose and with the avowed and express object of totally detaching themselves from British connection, and from every kind of British institution, in order to frame and enjoy institutions upon a sort of patriarchal model of their own, which they had accordingly established for themselves, it most certainly was an arbitrary, if not an unnatural, exercise of power by a State of overpowering strength, whose connection they had repudiated, and from which they had fled in their exodus, to suddenly, and without warning or reason, declare by a mere proclamation, ex mero motu, that their institutions were abrogated and null, their laws, such as they
were, a dead letter, their territory appropriated, and themselves amenable to the operation of legislation most of which they abhorred.

The Boers of the Transvaal were as much entitled as had been those of the Orange River to respect for that spirit of independence which had prompted all their migration. They could not claim or vindicate it (nor did they) in Natal, because there the whole coast line of the colony had previously become the sphere of British settlement. But when they advisedly removed so far into the interior, where it was at that time contrary to British colonial policy to encourage settlements—and whence (no more than from beyond the Orange River did their kinsmen) they neither did nor threatened to molest the British settlements they had abandoned—I cannot understand upon what principle the attempt to coerce them back into the condition of British Colonists could be justified. The reconquest of the Transvaal after Majuba Hill was, however, considered by most Englishmen obligatory, in order to avenge the fallen British soldiers who had been recklessly hurled against them, even though the Boer resistance had been justified. But inasmuch as no such reconquest was attempted, but the Boer independence, which we had so recently outraged and wantonly molested, was at length restored by treaty, it is clearly incumbent upon Englishmen to respect that acknowledged independence, and the laws and institutions which the Boers have framed and set up in the exercise of their undoubted rights, and not to seek their violent overthrow; least of all, indeed, to
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subserve the insatiable greed of gangs of stock-jobbing gamblers, without any kind of scruple, compunction or moral sense, such as abound in Johannesburg. They affect to complain that they are unfairly (unjustly) taxed, that they are excluded from the franchise, etc., etc. But, clearly, the Boer Government have the undoubted right to legislate as it pleases, with the concurrence of its own Burghers, within and for its own territory. Their Raad has as much right to enact and apportion taxes, and to reserve or otherwise regulate the franchise, in and for the Transvaal, as has the House of Commons in and for the United Kingdom. The Uitlanders flocked into the Transvaal for their own behests and not to serve or please the Boers, who would prefer their room to their company; and all the more noisy and demonstrative of them (such as are now undergoing prosecution) were quite aware before they went into the Transvaal what were those laws, powers, privileges and institutions which the Boers have, in their absolute independence, enacted, reserved and established, and to which such Uitlanders have voluntarily subjected themselves. Under these circumstances, the Uitlanders are not, by any means, victims of hardship, nor can they reasonably complain of grievance. On the contrary, it is they themselves who are the wanton aggressors. The Boers established their own polity expressly to hold themselves aloof from all Uitlanders and to retain complete independence of them. It were, therefore, insanity in them if they were to admit the Uitlanders to national
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legislative power, which would quickly enable the Uitlanders to reverse all Boer legislation, and to reduce the Burghers to the enforced suppression of everything for which they have isolated themselves from the rest of the world. It has been pretended that this could not result from the admission of one representative for Johannesburg into the Raad, because he would be in a singular minority against twenty-five or more other members. But President Kruger has very truly pointed out, that there are more than twenty-five mining centres in the Transvaal, all of which are the thronged resorts of Uitlanders, and that, if representation were granted to Johannesburg, it could not be refused to the other mining communities. Then, with respect to the alleged oppressive inequality of taxation as affecting the Uitlanders exclusively, these complainants seem to forget that the proceeds of such differential taxation are almost (if not quite) exclusively devoted to public works, such as roads, railways, etc. (and to the interest and amortisation of public debt incurred for such purposes), constructed for the almost exclusive benefit of the Uitlanders themselves and their operations.

Except it were by a successful revolution in the interest of the Uitlanders, and achieved by them, knowing the peculiarities, the aspirations, the temper and the predilection of the Boers and their leaders as well as I do—a revolution which would probably drive the Boers en masse into Matabeleland, where there would be no adequate force to resist them, I
do not think there is any way in which the system of government in the Transvaal can be changed, except with the free consent of the Burghers themselves. The raison d'être of that system of government is to insure the permanency of an isolated independence for the Boers themselves. The constitution of the Transvaal, like that of the Orange Free State, is framed with this express object. The immense majority secured by the extreme Boer candidate, Steyn, for the Presidency of the Orange State conclusively proves that recent events have revived the rigid spirit of independent exclusiveness, even amongst the far less rugged Boers of that State. If the barriers of Boer exclusiveness in the Transvaal were once removed, or even lowered, the Burghers know very well that all they cherish in existence would be torn from them.

In the matters of education and of the admission of the English language into use for public affairs, the Transvaal Government is, I know, quite prepared to make concessions. So it is also in the way of municipal institutions, but this the Uitlanders appear to scout and with disdain, in which I cannot but think they are very ill-advised, inasmuch, especially, as by that means they would control the larger part of the imposts and expenditures levied and devoted to public works. And I believe that the creation of Uitlander municipalities in the Kaap, Zoutpensburg and Waterberg districts (and in any others that might be proclaimed), as well as in the Witwatersrand, would answer all the legitimate purposes of the
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Uitlanders. And I feel quite sure that any attempt at such interference as Mr Chamberlain sketched out in his despatch, and made public before the contents thereof had been communicated to President Kruger, would immediately array the whole force of the Orange Free State in unison with the Transvaal for resistance à outrance. Anything that conflicts with the exclusiveness principle of the constitutions of the Boers, strikes fatally at their national existence from which exclusiveness with independence is inseparable. Exclusive independence and independent exclusiveness are the prime motives of the people, and, therefore, of the States which they have constructed to that end, and to which they consequently adhere with desperate tenacity.

Now I do not desire my readers to suppose that the Uitlanders have no grievances that require adjustment and rectification. There is no perfect system of Government in the world, and even in this country year after year, we hear clamouring for reforms and witness agitation for the amelioration of the lot of some particular class of the community. As I have already admitted, the Transvaal system of government may not be in all respects suited for a mass of people educated in Great Britain, France, Germany or the United States, and bringing to South Africa the prejudices and ideas of the land of their birth. On the other hand, these people sought the Transvaal and not the Transvaal them, and they would have little in reality to complain of if President Kruger and his Government pointed
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out this obvious fact to them, and advised them accordingly to make the best of things as they found them. But President Kruger has not at any time taken up this *non possumus* attitude. The President who, in spite of all that his assailants have said of him, is a just man, has desired, and I believe, still desires and intends to institute such reforms as will eventuate in the redress of all legitimate grievances. The Uitlanders may protest, but neither the President nor the Volskraad intends to be hurried or frightened into any drastic uprooting of the Constitution of the Transvaal. The Press of this country have been urging Mr Chamberlain to bring the requisite pressure to bear on President Kruger, to extort from him a promise to comply with the preposterous demands of the Uitlanders *en bloc*, and Mr Chamberlain has shown symptoms of compliance in the matter. His despatch to President Kruger contained a scheme in regard to Home Rule for the Rand, a scheme, too, which was favoured by neither party, and of which it is safe to assert we shall hear no more. Mr Chamberlain has apparently accepted all the alleged grievances of the Uitlanders as genuine, and not only genuine but urgent, and he has to all intents taken these grievances under his wing. Even if they were genuine, the Uitlanders, as I have said in another chapter, have put themselves completely out of court, inasmuch as they endeavoured to obtain by force what they could only claim as an act of grace. Before the Secretary of State for the