line. The "beacons" were actually put up by an armed patrol of the Boers, on land the property of the Zulu border clans, "in the absence of any representative of these clans, or even of spectators from the neighbouring kraals, whose land was then being given away." This was the pretended act of cession of the disputed territory.

The English Commission of Inquiry, last year, composed of Mr. M. H. Gallwey, Attorney-General for Natal, Mr. J. W. Shepstone, Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, and the late Colonel A. W. Durnford, R. E., with Captain A. C. Jackson, of the Buffs, secretary, decidedly rejects the above Transvaal claim. "We desire it to be understood," say these gentlemen, "that there has been no cession of land at all by the Zulu kings past and present, or by the nation." There has been no recognition by the Zulus of Boer occupation, nor any abandonment of Zulu occupation. The country has been and still is occupied by the Border clans. There has been no jurisdiction exercised by the Transvaal authorities there, nor any overt act amounting to an assertion of their right to the land. "It has never ceased to be Zulu territory, and is Zulu territory by right, and should be considered as such," are the words of Sir Henry Bulwer writing last July to Bartle Frere.
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And this was the opinion which had always been held in Natal, and Ketchwhyo had our moral support in resisting the fraudulent claim, until the Transvaal with all its perquisites became a British possession in the hands of Sir T. Shepstone. We had virtually said to Ketchwhyo, about this valuable territory in dispute with the Boers, “It is yours, not theirs;” but presently we stepped into their shoes, and then we said to him, “It is not yours, but ours.” We at first gave credit to his word of honour, to that of his father, and to the resolutions of his councillors and peers, upon a question concerning both the national territory, and the constitutional right to alienate that territory; for it seems to be, as the Commission reports, “simply impossible, under Zulu customs, that this large tract of border should have been taken from the clans without the full knowledge and sanction of their chiefs.” Ketchwhyo, personally and in his office of king, would be deeply compromised. We at first, in 1876 and long before, disapprove of the Dutch land claim, and take part with Ketchwhyo, intimating our displeasure at the encroachments of the Transvaal Government. In 1873, the Natal Government asked permission to take temporary charge to protect Zulu interests. But in 1877, after we have incontinently leapt into the Transvaal, our Administrator of that province, the
identical Theophilus Shepstone, K.C.M.G., Ketch-whyo's former Mentor and civilising patron in Natal, whom he called "my Father Somtseu," discovers at Pretoria, that the Transvaal has a good title to this land. No, it was "in conversation at Utrecht with some Dutch farmers," as he says in a letter to Lord Carnarvon; it was some weeks after Sir Theophilus had met the Zulu Prime Minister, Mnyamana, and the other Indunas, on the 18th of October, in the conference on the Blood river. A Mr. Conrad Meyer, at Utrecht, opened the eyes of Sir Theophilus, who before that "knew but the Zulu side." He was much surprised by the "self-asserting, aggressive, and arrogant spirit" of the Zulu Prime Minister and Councillors. Much more surprised he must have been "some weeks after," when, from conversation with the Dutch Border farmers, as he says, "I then learned for the first time, what has since been proved by evidence the most incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear, that this boundary line had been formally and mutually agreed upon, and had been formally ratified by the giving and receiving of tokens of thanks; and that the beacons had been built up in the presence of the President and members of the Executive Council of the Republic, in presence of commissioners from both Panda and Cetewayo." Sir T. Shepstone gives this
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information to Lord Carnarvon, on January 2nd, 1878, as an entirely new discovery, upon the faith of what a Dutchman on the Border had then just told him; but the English Commission of Inquiry, a few months later, gives a very different account of the transaction. But Sir T. Shepstone, in his public acts of government of the Transvaal, was already taking part with the Boers against the Zulus, contrary to all that Sir H. Bulwer and the Natal Government had been doing, and were still continuing to do. Ketchwhyo, who is described by "Somtseu" himself as a shrewd, frank, and straightforward man, could not understand this course of dealing with him, or perhaps understood it too well, and naturally resented it. He sends messengers to Sir H. Bulwer in January of last year, thanking the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal for his proposal to get the boundary question settled by arbitration, or by a commission of inquiry. "They are all good words," he says, "that have been sent to Ketchwhyo by the Governor of Natal; they show that the Natal Government still wishes Ketchwhyo to drink water and live. He had hoped that Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone) would have settled all these matters, but he has not done so. He (Somtseu) wishes to cast Ketchwhyo off; he is no more a father, but a firebrand. If he is tired of carrying Ketchwhyo now, as he did
while he was with the Natal Government, then why does he not put him down, and allow the Natal Government to look after him, as it has always done?"

Ah, why not, indeed! The answer is perhaps to be found in the position of our new administration of the Transvaal, and in the political and personal exigencies created by that lawless act of April the 12th, 1877, the false pretexts for which had already been openly belied in the all but unanimous protest of the Dutch population against the overthrow of their independent Free State. The Volksraad, the Executive Council, and the President, had only made their official protest at the time; but since then we have had two special delegates, Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, men formerly high in office, sent by the standing committees of Dutch patriots, to remonstrate in London with Her Majesty's Government. They have twice come to London, and have been met here with the coldest civility, as by the High Commissioner out there, but with the reply, stet pro ratione voluntas, that the annexation will be definitive. Yet it was a provisional and temporary annexation that the Queen spoke of, in her Royal Commission of October 6th, 1876, to Sir T. Shepstone, and that was to be only in case it should seem necessary "for the peace and safety of our Colonies, and of our subjects elsewhere." Let
that pass; the Transvaal and its political rights may possibly be heard of again. The 40,000 Dutchmen over whom Sir T. Shepstone was ruling in 1877 were resolute in opposition. Out of the 8,000 electors or enfranchised burghers in the late Republic, 6,591 have signed 125 separate district or local memorials against their annexation to the British Empire, while only 587 have signed the thirty one memorials in its favour. How was Sir T. Shepstone to conciliate this obstinate people? How, indeed, but through his ostentatious adoption of their Border quarrels with the various native tribes, but especially with Secocooni and Ketchwhyo, their previous antagonists, and by the assertion of Transvaal territorial claims to the north-east and south-east, which our Government had before disapproved? So it came to pass that we have made war against Secocooni, with no better military success than poor Mr. Burgers did, in the Lulu mountains over the Steelpoort, accepting the services, as local volunteer captains, of certain Dutch field-comets, who were denounced at Lydenberg for alleged cruelties in 1876. We have lately invited the ferocious Swazies, the butchers of women and children at Johannes' Kop, to be our allies in the invasion of Zulu Land, as they were the allies of the Dutch Republic. And before the British administration of the Transvaal was six
months old, its author and manager was prepared to repudiate the unquestionable title of the Zulu Kingdom to the border lands south of the Pongolo, and he found out, "in conversation at Utrecht with some Dutch farmers," that the Dutch claim, which we now at least know to be fraudulent, was really well founded. Is that the way to help Ketchwhy to keep his temper? Might not the Zulu King and nation feel themselves a little "sold"?

"It is beyond question," writes Sir Henry Bulwer, "that there is a very large party in Zulu Land eager for war, regardless of all consequences, and that this party has recently been very clamorous. So far, calmer counsels have prevailed; and the answer of the King shows, I think, that he recognises the consequences of a contest with the English, and that he is not indisposed to avail himself of the means of a peaceable settlement of the dispute, if such can be found." That is a description, by the only reliable and highly responsible British authority, of the actual state of our relations with Ketchwhy at the beginning of last year. Sir Henry Bulwer had just then terminated an anxious correspondence with Sir T. Shepstone upon the subject. He had pointed out that there was no chance of a peaceful settlement by direct negotiations between the Transvaal Government and the Zulu
King, as the feeling of the Boers against the Zulus was so bitter, and they were now so angry with the new Government of the Transvaal. He had proposed to Sir Bartle Frere, on the 10th of December, 1877, that the dispute should be referred to a friendly arbitration, and he recommended that the person or persons chosen should come either from England or from the Cape Colony, to be impartial and unprejudiced. He had explained these proposals in a message to Ketchwhyo, from the answer to which I have quoted one or two sentences above; but it was this which had been thankfully accepted by Ketchwhyo, as "good words from the Governor of Natal." The King would be glad, he said, if the Governor of Natal would send his representatives to see what the Zulu claims were; and then, "if these cannot come to an understanding on the matter, a letter can be sent across the sea for other people to come and see what can be done." This was the position into which Sir H. Bulwer, whose conduct from first to last is admirable, had got the perilous business, with scanty and grudging approbation of his official superior, as Sir Bartle Frere already supported the Transvaal claim. It was carefully impressed on Ketchwhyo by Sir H. Bulwer that both the Transvaal and Natal Governments were the general English Government; that "the
English have always treated the Zulus with justice, and in this matter their only desire is that justice shall be done.” Unfortunately, Ketchwhyo has never personally met any Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, or Governor of the Cape Colony; his direct conversation with English Government officers has gone no higher than his “father Somtseu.” It is a pity he was not, in happier days, once invited to Pietermaritzburg or even to Cape Town, and entertained there as we do the Shah of Persia or the Sultan of Zanzibar in London. Our Foreign Office, but again not our Colonial Office, is apt to show these useful courtesies to the princes whose friendship we desire to keep.

The risks of an outbreak of Border hostilities, pending the vexatious discussions which were prolonged for months and years, seem to have been chiefly in the other disputed territory, north of the Pongolo, which the Transvaal Republic had claimed to have procured from the Amaswazi. There were German and English settlers in that region, about Lüneburg and elsewhere; but there were also many resident Zulus, and Ketchwhyo sent a party of men, as it appears, to build a kraal for the abode of a chief whom he appointed to look after them as tribal magistrate. This was exercising a claim of territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty, to which the Zulu king had probably
no right, but the past relations of that Swazi country to Zulu Land have never yet been carefully examined. It had not been considered, here again, previously to the annexation of the Transvaal, that the Swazies could have lawfully transferred all that large extent of territory north of the Pongolo to the Dutch Republic. This was, however, a portion of the affairs in dispute very capable, as Sir H. Bulwer thought, of some amicable arrangement. The difficulty here would lie in persuading Ketchwhyo to renounce his ancient feud with the Swazies, whom he had been longing to attack since 1875, and to "wash his spears" amongst them. But some unfortunate disorders had lately taken place in the mixed Border population; several of the European settlers, who were about twenty families in all, had their property damaged by riotous gangs of the Zulus, and were ordered to leave the country. There was, in fact, no sufficient local resident police authority, either British or Zulu, and outrages were perpetrated by Zulus with impunity, to the injury of the German farmers. But these well-grounded complaints had nothing to do with the subject of inquiry dealt with by the Commissioners in their Report of last June.

That report, as we have seen, was in favour of the Zulus against the Transvaal; but Sir Bartle Frere
had made up his mind against the Zulus long before he came to Natal, and sent Lord Chelmsford there before him to make preparations for war, postponing meanwhile for several months his authoritative "award" upon the disputed questions which had been so laboriously investigated. Several unhappy incidents, but quite occasional and isolated occurrences in this interval of time, furnished very serious themes of severe official denunciation. The worst of these was a really shocking affair which took place in the latter part of July. Two of the wives of Sirayo, the great Zulu chief residing not far from the Natal frontier at Rorke’s Drift, escaped with men of their own country and were pursued over the border. One was seized on British ground by the sons and brother of Sirayo, with whom were threescore armed servants, and was dragged away, in a horridly brutal manner, with a rope about her body, to be shot on the Zulu side of the Buffalo. The other was treated in a somewhat similar manner. I hope no Englishmen have ever been known to have been guilty of brutal cruelty to women, dragging them about, beating, kicking, and murdering them, in revenge for adultery or any other fault of their sex. And I suppose we must agree with the Bishop of Natal in rejecting the Divine origin of the Pentateuch, if the Mosaic law for stoning an adulteress
to death, as set forth in Deuteronomy, was as bad among the children of Israel as it is among the Zulus. I do not excuse the Zulus, as was suggested, because they regard women as cattle; and instead of punishing an adulteress with death, I would only tell her to go and sin no more. But as for this case, the like of which is of common occurrence among barbarous nations—and how do the Turkish Pashas deal with their unfaithful wives?—it has been made the most of to justify a sanguinary war of conquest, and I beg the reader to observe that it had nothing of a political character, and that King Ketchwhyo has earnestly apologised for it as "the rash act of boys," though he did not hasten to give up the young men of Sirayo's house to be tried for their offence in Natal. They might possibly have been punished by his own orders in Zulu Land. This incident, however, is a fair theme of diplomatic remonstrance, to a certain extent, with regard to the casual infringement of British territorial jurisdiction. There is also the case of two colonial engineers, Mr. Smith and another, who were very improperly sent across the frontier river, without Zulu permission, to make a survey of the ford at Middle Drift; they were arrested by a party of Zulus, who detained them an hour and a half, and let them go, taking Mr. Smith's tobacco-pipe and handkerchief.
An apology has been ready to be made likewise for this trifling transgression on the part of the Zulus, if we could have the face to receive it with a consciousness of the warlike preparations against their country which were then being arrayed on our side. No further record appears of any positive outrages committed by them on the Natal frontier; and the Lieutenant Governor of Natal bears testimony that there is "no reason whatever to believe that these acts have been committed with the consent or knowledge of the king." With regard to the local disorders (destruction of houses and gardens, not in any case attended with bloodshed) on the disputed frontier of the Transvaal south of the Pongolo, there are reports by Mr. H. C. Shepstone, Transvaal Native Affairs Secretary, and by the Landdrost of Utrecht. Ketchwhyo said that these things were not done by his orders, but by the Zulus of the border; and Sir H. Bulwer says that they were only done to prevent the Transvaal people settling again on lands which the Zulus regarded as their own.

In the months of July, August, and September last, Sir Bartle Frere was at Capetown, a thousand miles from Natal and the Zulus, at the other side of South Africa. He found ingenious reasons for controverting the decision of the Natal Enquiry Commissioners,
earnestly supported by Sir Henry Bulwer, who pleaded for a speedy acknowledgment and settlement of the Zulu rightful claims. It was in vain that inquiry had been procured, by the Lieutenant-Governor's patient and steadfast labours since the previous October, of which the perplexed and harassed Ketchwhyo had said, “I am glad now I shall have peace, now I shall be able to sleep.” The High Commissioner was far otherwise minded; his unsleeping political activity had scarcely conquered the remaining tribes of Kaffraria from the Kei to the Umzimkulu; but he was maturing the plan of a new consolidated British dominion to the north-east, as far as Delagoa Bay. We cannot doubt the benevolence of his intentions, for he is a great and good man, one of the best of Indian rulers, “omnium consensu capax imperii,” an eminent philanthropist and patron of religious missions, and the late successful anti-slavery diplomatist at Zanzibar. Yet from a critical perusal of the ample and minute controversial despatches that passed between Sir Bartle Frere, on the one hand, and Sir Henry Bulwer on the other, with the Minutes and Memoranda of the Natal Commissioners, this eminent person’s sense of equity does not seem equal to his other public and private virtues.

This correspondence begins with Sir H. Bulwer’s letter of July 8th to Sir Bartle Frere upon the Report
of the Commissioners forwarded to his Excellency a week before; and it finishes with the last communication, dated November 18th, from those Commissioners, namely, Mr. Gallwey, the Natal Attorney-General, Mr. J. W. Shepstone, and Colonel Durnford. The first letter, with the Commissioners' Report of June 23rd, will be found in the Blue Book C.—2220 (Appendix), issued on December 6th, and the remainder in the February issue, C.—2222; the whole filling more than a hundred pages. I cannot here enter into a thorough analysis of the multifarious objections raised by Sir Bartle Frere to making the expected award in frank conformity with the deliberate views of those able public servants, men intimately acquainted with Natal and the Zulus, who had been diligently employed from March to June, after going to the spot, in the conduct of this investigation. Their work had been that of collecting and weighing the evidence, and considering the verdict thereupon, in which the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal had quite agreed. "The title and the right must be held to rest with the Zulus." But Sir H. Bulwer suggested that compensation should be given to individuals or families who had been induced to settle and remain in that part of the country, east of the Blood River, which never belonged to the Transvaal. As for the country
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north of the Pongolo, he did not believe the Zulus had any right to it. That was a different affair. But let the verdict now given be executed, "strict justice would be done, and thus would be ended, with some cost to the Transvaal, this long-standing question, which has been an element of mischief and danger in this portion of South Africa for the past sixteen or seventeen years, and to the settlement of which the good faith of English authority in South Africa has unquestionably been committed."

The Queen's High Commissioner in South Africa was thus respectfully invited "to give, at once, a decision by which substantial justice may be done in that matter." The lengthy controversy which ensued between the Government's chiefs of Natal and Cape Town, supported respectively by some of their officials, is an interesting study of forensic special pleading. But I find it distressing, even humiliating, to see how every shift of subtle and evasive argumentation was resorted to for the purpose, apparently, not indeed of reversing the verdict, but of disparaging its imperative necessity as an act of mere justice upon the proof of certain facts at issue, and so colouring the final award as an act of grace—"a cession," as Sir Bartle Frere called it, to which he might attach his own impossible conditions. This was not fair; it was not
right; and this alone is the cause of our present Zulu War.

Sir Theophilus Shepstone, for his part, being consulted as Administrator of the Transvaal, replied with a great amount of detailed criticism of the Commissioners' Report, but could not, in Sir Bartle Frere's opinion, show any sufficient grounds for setting aside their verdict. He had been well aware for a twelve-month previous that to reject this claim of the Zulu Kingdom to its land east of the Blood River would imply going to war against the Zulu king, who was crowned by his patronising hands, and who used to call him "Father." There was little love lost between them after he removed to the Transvaal; that is to say, after the Dutchmen were induced, by fears of a Zulu invasion which he told them he alone could prevent, to acquiesce in his peremptory annexation of their country. Ketchwhyo, up to that event, was prepared to help "Somtseu," if needed and allowed, in a tremendous manner of which he told Mr. Fyuney two or three months afterwards, when news of the annexation was sent him. "I began to wonder," said Ketchwhyo, "why he did not tell me something of what he was doing. I heard that the Boers were not treating him properly, and that they intended to put him into a corner. If they had done so, I should not have
waited for anything more. Had but one shot been fired, I should have said, 'What more do I wait for? they have touched my Father!' I should have poured my men over the land, and I can tell you, the whole land would have burned with fire.'

It is, of course, utterly inconceivable that the British Special Commissioner would, under any circumstances—even if the Transvaal Republican Government had put him under arrest—have accepted the aid of a Zulu army to coerce the Boers. This is only what Ketchwhyo was then willing to do; and Sir T. Shepstone's first care, on the 11th of April, the eve of annexation, was to send a message to warn Ketchwhyo that he must never more think of attacking the Transvaal. "I am glad the English have taken it," he answered. "Perhaps now we shall have rest. But my men are all ready. Will not Somtseu let me have one little raid, among the Swazies, just to wash my spears? I am no king till I have washed my spears."
The frank, fierce, straightforward savage!

It was very different between them at Christmas of that year, after the October meeting of Sir T. Shepstone with Mnyamana and other Indunas at Rorke's Drift to dispute the boundary question. Ketchwhyo then said, to native messengers who saw him, that he had heard Somtseu was going to bring an army against
him, from Natal and the Transvaal and the Swazies; but if this were true he would not resist. They should come and find him unarmed, he could not fight his Father! But he would send to ask his Father, what had he done wrong? He would never fight the English; if he had wished to fight, it should be the Boers who had greatly provoked him. But his soldiers, his people, would never consent to give up this land; they would sooner die for it. "You hear what they say?" the King went on; "that is the Zulu people speaking! I dare not go against what they say about the land; they would turn against me if I did so." This was confirmed by the declarations of Mnyamana and other Indunas.

But it was an opinion already expressed by Sir T. Shepstone in writing to Lord Carnarvon, and by his son, Mr. J. W. Shepstone, who had succeeded to his office in Natal, that a war made by us against Ketchwhyo would really be acceptable to the majority of the Zulu nation. Ketchwhyo himself would rather not fight, and there was no war party against us; but there was a very large party ready to take advantage of the war, to make a revolution, and to overthrow his sanguinary despotism. Much was thought of the King's brother Uhamu having taken offence because of an accidental conflict at the New Year's Assembly
between his regiment and another, where many were killed. These calculations upon the chances of a revolution in the Zulu Kingdom in case of an English war seem to have been cherished by Sir Bartle Frere, but not by Sir Henry Bulwer, who rather believed the effect would be to make that warlike nation rally around its King.

Rumours of war grew rife on the Tugela frontier in September, when Lord Chelmsford was busy there, and his troops were brought up from their late field of warfare on the Kei. The Zulu frontier was disturbed by military movements on our side; while on the opposite bank of the Tugela, during a few days, there had been large "hunting parties," or so called, which our frontier agents watched with some uneasiness, but these came to nothing.

The High Commissioner arrived from Capetown in the last week of September. It is probable that Sir Bartle Frere at that date knew little more about the Zulus and Ketchwhyo than he might have learned while presiding over the Royal Geographical Society in London. But he had projected the conquest of their country six months before, as he wrote in May that it would be necessary, sooner or later, "to extend the British Protectorate over all between the Transvaal and the sea." The political motives are easily
comprehended; they had long been familiar to every South African colonist. The Western metropolitan province of the old Cape Colony will never agree to the Colonial Office favourite scheme of a Confederation until the Zulus are subdued, because of the enormous Native risk and responsibility attached to Natal and the Transvaal. In all South Africa there are less than half a million of white men, against two millions, at least, of Kaffirs; and the latter grow fast in numbers, in possession of cattle, in political intelligence, and in courage now that they are furnished with guns. Sir Bartle Frere was advised, both by Sir T. Shepstone, and by the Cape Colony Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Brownlee, that the way to meet this approaching danger was by striking down the Zulu military kingdom. I do not say that this was an erroneous opinion; but I do say that false pretexts were adopted, slanders were disseminated, every device of an immoral sophistry was used, and the obvious duty of justice to our neighbour was shamefully violated, to find a way to making war upon Ketchwhyo at this particular moment, and with the unusual military force that was at hand. If such statecraft as this be governing South Africa on civilized principles, rather let honest savagery prevail till God, in His own good time, shall send the True Light among its dusky
nations, "to guide their feet into the way of peace!"

We have been long enough led by the nose in the hands of official mystery-men, who deal forth huge and vague generalities of assertion to prejudice the ill-informed Parliamentary mind, that they may securely hoodwink the Queen's Government at home, and carry on their perilous projects in remote dependencies of the Empire. If they know so much more than they choose to tell us in the printed despatches and minutes laid before Parliament, which I or anybody else can study, how are we to know that their judgment or temper is always to be relied upon, so that any Colonial Governor may be trusted with the prerogative of declaring war? High personal character, like that of Sir Bartle Frere, for whom, out of South Africa, we all feel great respect, is apparently no security for the really good man's official conduct when placed in that deceptive and seducing position, with that fallacious social atmosphere of a colonial capital around him, where speculators and intriguers of every class beset the petty throne of provincial administration. And it is the good men who do the bad things; a man in that position betrays his own character; he is one beside himself. A famous Benthamite moralist and preacher of the Peace Society is sent to Hong Kong
to promote our trade with China; and he bombards
the commercial city of Canton. A brave and generous
man, known long since in Australia not only as an
explorer but as a friend of the native race—he is sent
to Jamaica; and lo, there is an alarming negro riot,
with several murders, the consequence of magisterial
injustice and of some rash volunteers firing on the
people; but presently we see the lawless military
butchery of hundreds, and harmless villages in flames,
and half-naked women scourged with whips of wire,
and the deadly hatred of race and class indulged with
a reign of terror. Colonial Governors are not always
to be trusted; read once more in this volume the
story of Langalibalele's broken tribe! There is no
feature of contemporary politics, to my mind, that so
urgently demands the most earnest attention for the
sake of English honour and humanity; not only of
that "civilisation" which in these days enlists a
fanatical zeal, but of that Christianity which should
be recommended by our practical example of Christian
equity, veracity, and charity, "doing unto others as
we would have them do to us," whatever be the colour
of their skin, their fashion of dress or nudity, and their
grotesque fancies of heathen superstition. May God
mend us all!

I do not care now to fill up the small gap left in
this narrative by describing Sir Bartle Frere’s pretended award to the Zulus of their own territory, and his annexed demands of their king. The award was itself subject to conditions which no independent Native State could accept; making its few European intruders the lords of the land, opponents of its native rule—instead of giving them pecuniary compensation from the Transvaal, and allowing them to remove within the colonial pale. The arguments upon this question were discussed with Sir Bartle, to no avail, by Bishop Colenso as the faithful friend of the Zulu nation, and may be read in their latest printed correspondence in the Blue Book, C.—2252. “The war has begun,” are the Bishop’s parting words, “and will be carried on to the end, with results beyond our power of calculating; but over all, we know, is the living God; just and right is He.” With regard to the international claim of satisfaction for two or three frontier transgressions already related, there was little cause to doubt that Ketchwhyo would speedily have paid the fines of so many cattle proposed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal. But what the High Commissioner aimed at was no apology, no satisfaction, no compensation for these alleged positive injuries, none of which, it is confessed, were ever intended or sustained by the Zulu king. Nor could he have thought
it worth a great and costly war to gratify the spite of a few disappointed mercenary foreign missionaries in Zulu Land, who had never been threatened or insulted, but who had failed to make converts, and knowing the king's dislike to their ways, came into Natal with unproved tales of slaughter. Of such tales it is enough to say—as of the alleged horrible killing of girls and young women for refusing to marry old soldiers—that no credible European witness, actually resident in Zulu Land, has come forward to give direct personal evidence of these atrocities reported by fugitive Zulus to one or two official persons in Natal. Bishop Colenso does not much believe in them, but then he does not much believe in the Pentateuch, or in the Divine appointment of barbarous Hebrew examples of political morality for the edification of Christian nations. Indeed, a white-robed minister of the Lord of Love, on Sundays in church reading out those wild passages of antiquated history from the Book of Joshua, the favourite of the Dutch Boers, savours of the Thirty-nine Articles and the indelibility of holy orders, but I prefer the Sermon on the Mount!

Now, this Ultimatum of Sir Bartle Frere's which he sent in December to the King of the Zulus, a naked heathen savage but nevertheless a legitimate and constitutional king, the head of a haughty Royal House,
the ruler of a valiant and unconquered nation—what was the Ultimatum? "You must instantly disband your army; you must keep only such troops, and for such services, as we shall henceforth direct; you shall forthwith repeal those Spartan laws of regulated marriages and civil settlement, designed to facilitate your military organisation, which your powerful ancestors, the founders of an imperial dynasty, have bequeathed to your nation. You are the vassal of the British Government; we require you to perform the promises of your Coronation day to us, that you would rule your people more humanely and discreetly than before." Such promises, as the reader will have seen, had not been stipulated with the British Government, nor had the British Government taken any pains to inquire how Ketchwhyo does actually rule his own people. There is scarcely any well authenticated information upon that subject. But what was the Ultimatum to which the King of Zulu Land, a proud man, "frank and straightforward," and I think somewhat chivalrous, with a princely sense of honour and a regard for public duty in his station, was harshly told he must return his consent within thirty days? It was merely the challenge to a duel of rival nations for political life or death—a contest of "man-slaying machines," of Martini-Henry rifles, Woolwich shells and Gatling
guns, against naked human warriors armed with spears and clubs—all the scientific appliances of modern civilisation on our side, all the "preparation of the Gospel of Peace," wherewith to evangelize the heathen!

Sir Bartle Frere ends his last letter to Bishop Colenso almost with these words, that the questions they were discussing, which are those shown in this long chapter, are now, since the war had commenced, "only of quasi-historical importance." They are of moral, and therefore of eternal and universal importance; else this chapter should not have been written. Sir Bartle Frere wrote those words on the 22nd of January; and on that day in the same hour, a fearful disaster, non sine numine, befell the British army at Isandhlwana.
CHAPTER XV.

OUR PRESENT ZULU WAR: ISANDHLWANA.

Sir Bartle Frere's apology for invading Zulu Land.—Lord Chelmsford's army.—Formation and positions of its five columns.—They cross the frontier, January 11th.—Lord Chelmsford with Colonel Glyn's column.—Capture of Sirayo's kraal.—The camp at Isandhlwana.—The General moves on in advance, January 22nd.—What happened in his absence.—Colonel Durnford and Colonel Pulleine.—The beginning of the conflict.—Colonel Durnford falls back.—Defence of the camp.—Destruction of our troops.—Heroic defence of the post at Rorke's Drift.—A few remarks.

With regard to this war, which has commenced so disastrously for the British arms, there seems to be a prevalent opinion that the High Commissioner showed great rashness in precipitating a conflict with such a formidable enemy. This is a question of expediency, quite apart from the absence of any pronounced infraction of the law of nations, or tangible "casus belli," which would appear to justify so extreme a measure. Indeed the tremendous disparity in numbers between the native and European races in South Africa might seem to render the success of such an undertaking eminently hazardous. It is difficult for the
general English public to form an opinion on the merits of this question, so far removed as we are from the country, but Sir Bartle Frere appears to have been of opinion that the Zulu King was quite ready for war, and that its outbreak was only a question of time and opportunity with him. Ketchwhyo, it was thought, had come to entertain an overweening confidence in the number and strength of his warriors. This assurance was much heightened latterly by the great increase in his supply of firearms imported through Delagoa Bay, and other channels of trade. In this position of affairs, Sir Bartle Frere decided that the bold course was the best; more especially as he had a considerable force of British troops at his disposal at the time. There has always been a tendency on our part to underrate our native enemies. It has been indeed, the fault of nearly all our commanding officers in former Kaffir wars. Sir Harry Smith was a notable instance of this disposition; and Lord Chelmsford at the outset of the present campaign evidently fell into the same error, when he neglected to take the most ordinary tactical precautions against surprise, in his advance against so active an enemy.

Sir Bartle Frere, in his despatch of February 16th, gives an explanation of his reasons for commencing the war against the Zulus, before obtaining the sanc-
tion of the English Ministry to that extreme measure. He expresses himself as follows:

"My reply is, that it was impossible to delay without incurring the danger of even greater evils than a Zulu war, and possibly even precipitating a war. Cetewayo well knew that he had got every acre of land he was ever likely to get without fighting for it; and he was, as I had anticipated, not in the least satisfied with having got only a small portion of what he demanded, and little if anything more than he had already seized for himself. He had nothing now to gain by dissimulation and delay, unless he could get Lord Chelmsford and his troops removed.

Amid all the conflicting and most unsatisfactory information which came in at this time, this fact seemed clear to my mind,—that Cetewayo had not the least intention of conceding anything except to force; and that, with all his conceit in his own prowess and ignorance of ours, he would rather take the first opportunity to fight Lord Chelmsford as he was, than wait till the General had got reinforcements.

"Such an opportunity as Cetewayo might desire would, I felt assured, not be long in coming. The impetuosity of his young men, or the dissatisfaction of the old ones, inducing him to fear treason, might at any moment precipitate his action, and compel
him to attack some one, in order to avoid revolution and his own assassination. I had no doubt he saw as clearly as I did, that his surest safety was in action. He had already, since I left Cape Town, twice placed his regiments, under pretence of hunting, on the Natal border; and each time, their return without crossing was a subject of marvel to most well-informed persons who had experience of Zulu ways. A fall in the river rendering it easily fordable, a very usual occurrence at this season, or the escape of game, or of human wretches running for refuge across the river, might bring an ‘impi’ into the colony; and, once let loose, the massacres of former days, within living memory, would most certainly have been repeated.

"But probably, the greatest risk of an irresistible temptation to attack the colony would have been afforded by any occurrence in the Transvaal, which might draw our troops up thither; or by a native outbreak among any of the numerous tribes to which Cetewayo's emissaries, during the past two years, have been directed. I have already repeatedly described his system of Zulu envoys travelling as far as Port Elizabeth in the old Colony, and the borders of the Kalahari Desert to the north-west. I found that many people have thought I attached far too much importance to these missions; but during the last
year, I have received from every tribe with which we have had any communication clear evidence of the unrest they occasioned. The feverish excitement, of which they were among the many causes, was constantly increasing; and I expected from day to day to hear of some outbreak, which would carry to the minds of the Transvaal population a stronger conviction than ever that we could not control the natives, and that we had seized their country under false pretences. Nothing, I felt assured, could, under such circumstances, have saved Natal from a desolating inroad of Zulus.

"Till last week, few Natal civilians shared my opinions as to the very serious danger of the mischief a Zulu 'impi' might do. 'They were things of the past;' and one very able and influential member of the Legislative Council assured me of his conviction that 200 of her Majesty's soldiers might at any time march through Zulu Land from end to end and not meet an enemy who dared oppose them. No one talks in that way now.

"Had Cetewayo met my messages in the spirit confidently predicted by those who said they knew him best; had he temporised and made excuses or promises, or availed himself of any of the many openings left for discussion, I should, of course, have
postponed my active operations till I had full sanction to commence. But, except by semi-sarcastic unofficial messages, each contradicting the one sent before it, through Mr. John Dunn and others, he took no notice of my messages, nor commenced any action, such as laying the matter before his councillors, or collecting cattle to pay fines demanded, to show that he really intended to take into consideration what I had said to him. His only action I could clearly hear of was his summoning his young regiment prepared for immediate field service.

"With an irruption into British territory so imminent, with so many contingent dangers in the shape of resistance to authority in the Transvaal, or of native outbreaks away from Zulu Land, should I have been justified in delaying to put the defence of the frontier into the hand of the only man who could defend it, viz., the General commanding her Majesty's forces? I am charged, as High Commissioner, with the duty of preventing such inroads; I am specially enjoined 'to take all measures, and to do all that can and may lawfully and discreetly be done, for preventing the recurrence of any irruption into her Majesty's possessions by hostile tribes, and for maintaining the said possessions in peace and safety.' I felt it was a choice between making such an inroad almost certain
by delay, and taking the responsibility of placing the
defence of the colony in the General's hands. I had
exhausted without success every device I could think
of, consistent with honour, to obtain reparation for the
past or security for the future; and had the attack,
which I believed to be almost inevitable, been en-
couraged by inaction, I should hardly have deserved
forgiveness for inviting it, by any delay in taking the
responsibility of immediate armed precaution.

"It will probably be asked, 'Why not have stood
upon the defensive, and allowed him to commence the
war, and thus have given time for a reference to her
Majesty's Government?' To this I answer, that, after
most careful consideration of the position, with the best
advice I could obtain here, I came to the conclusion
that the only real defence was to take up such positions
in Zulu Land as should make it more improbable that
the Zulus would cross the border. I have no reason,
even now, to think that this was a mistake."

The thirty days prescribed in Sir Bartle Frere's
ultimatum having expired without any sign that the
Zulu King would comply with its demands, the
invading forces under command of Lieutenant-General
Lord Chelmsford, on the 11th and 12th of January,
crossed the frontier at several points quite distant
from one another. They were divided into five
separate columns. The first, under the command of Colonel Pearson, 3rd regiment (Buffs) consisted of 1500 infantry, including Naval Brigade, 300 cavalry, and two or three thousand of the Native Contingent, with four seven-pounder guns of the Royal Artillery, one Gatling gun and two rocket tubes. It crossed the Tugela near the mouth of that river at the sea-coast, to advance upon Etchowe, the old Norwegian missionary station, twenty or thirty miles on the road to Ketchwhyo's capital. The second column, that of Colonel Durnford, R.E., was placed on the frontier at Fort Buckingham, which is near the same river forty or fifty miles above its mouth; this force was composed entirely of native troops, and was intended not to cross the frontier by itself, but to act as a support to either of the columns on its left or right hand. The third column advanced from Helpmakaar, by the ford over the Buffalo River called Rorke's Drift, which is at the angle where the old reputed Transvaal boundary with Zulu Land meets the Natal frontier, and close to which is the district so long in dispute. This was the headquarters' column, accompanied by Lord Chelmsford and his staff. The commanding officer was Colonel Glyn, C.B., of the 24th, so lately engaged in the Trans-Kei war against the Galekas; and his force consisted of the first and second battalions of that
regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonels Pulcine and Degacher; a squad of Mounted Infantry, under Major Russell, of the 12th Lancers; the N battery of the 5th brigade of Royal Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Harness, and the 5th Company of Royal Engineers; the Natal Mounted Police, under Major Dartnell; the Natal Carbineers, the Newcastle Mounted Rifles, and Buffalo Border Guard; and the Natal Native Contingent, under Commandant Lonsdale; the total being 1500 infantry, 200 cavalry, and nearly 400 natives, with six guns. The fourth column, which acted in combination with that of Colonel Glyn, under the immediate direction of the Commander-in-Chief, was commanded by Colonel Evelyn Wood, V.C., C.B., and mustered 2278 officers and men, being formed of the first battalion of the 13th Regiment, the 90th Regiment, the Frontier Light Horse, under Lieutenant-Colonel Redvers Buller, C.B., of the 60th Foot, and six guns of the Royal Artillery, with a few irregular and native troops; this force moved forward from Utrecht, in the Transvaal, to support the left flank of the head-quarters’ column as it entered Zulu Land at Rorke's Drift. The fifth column, that of Colonel Hugh Rowlands, V.C., C.B., was too far removed northward, on the Pongolo near Lüneburg, to render any direct assistance to the central portion of the army, but served to protect
the eastern districts of the Transvaal from an irruption of the enemy; this force comprised the 80th Foot and several local volunteer corps, with three guns. The whole army numbered under 16,000 men, of whom less than half were British troops.

On the 11th of January, the four columns above detailed under Colonels Pearson, Durnford, Glyn, and Wood, advanced simultaneously from Fort Williamson, Fort Buckingham, Rorke's Drift, and Utrecht respectively; the objective point of their combined advance being Undini, the Zulu capital. The first column, under Colonel Pearson, crossed the Lower Tugela Drift at Fort Pearson; and this advanced as far as Inyezane without experiencing any opposition, but at that place, which is about five miles from Etchowe, it was attacked by the Zulus in considerable force, losing two officers of the native contingent, three privates of the Buffs, and one of Mounted Infantry. The Zulus were defeated with a loss of 300 of their number; and Colonel Pearson then marched on to Etchowe, where he intrenched his camp. The headquarters or left centre column, namely the 3rd, under Colonel Glyn, crossed the Buffalo River at Rorke's Drift into Zulu Land, also without opposition; while the 2nd, or right centre column, under Colonel Durnford, having crossed the Tugela at Middle Drift, afterwards moved up the
left bank of the river, and effected a junction with the 3rd column, under Lord Chelmsford’s command. The 4th column, under Colonel Wood, advanced into Zulu Land by the Blood River, having Utrecht for its base. Colonel Wood in his advance succeeding in capturing cattle, and disarming some of the natives: he halted at Bemba’s Kop, thirty-five miles from Rorke’s Drift.

After effecting his passage at Rorke’s Drift, Lord Chelmsford pushed forward with a cavalry division to meet Colonel Wood, for the purpose of making arrangements with him for their mutual support during the advance on Undini. This cavalry force succeeded in bringing in from three to four hundred head of cattle, sheep, horses, and goats, while the inhabitants of the kraals fled at the first sight of the troops, and were too much surprised at the suddenness of our movements to offer any resistance.

The captured cattle being sent to the rear, the march was resumed on the following day, through an undulating grass country, sufficiently broken to render an advance very difficult, except along the ridges over which the track led; while to the right rose the long Nqutu Hill, which forms a semi-circle of some twenty miles’ length, its more westerly portion being very abrupt and precipitous, and covered with thorn bush.
Here the stronghold of the chief, Sirayo, was situated. On reaching the Bashee, the mounted scouts reported that armed Zulus were leaving the kraals, and driving the cattle up under the precipices. Colonel Glyn then directed three companies of the 24th Regiment, and the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Regiment, with the Natal Native Contingent, to advance and capture the cattle, while Major Russell, with the mounted portion of the force, was to continue along the waggon track to the high ground above. As soon as the precipitous sides of the mountain were occupied by the infantry, a fire was opened upon them by the Zulus, who were occupying very strong positions in the caves and rocks above; and a fight ensued, which lasted about half an hour, till the mountain side was cleared. The cattle and horses were captured, but the Zulus left behind to defend the cattle made a stubborn resistance. Among the dead was a son of Sirayo, the chief whose two runaway wives were pursued into British territory last year.

Early on the morning of the 20th of January, the headquarters column commenced its further advance into Zulu Land. Lord Chelmsford and his Staff left the camp at Rorke’s Drift, and arrived at the advanced camp on the Bashee. The force here consisted of four companies of the 2nd Battalion of the
24th Regiment, and 2nd Battalion of the Natal Native Contingent. The camp was struck, and the troops were soon ready to march, the pioneers having made the roads practicable. By noon all the troops had reached the southern face of the Isandhlwana hill, on the southern slope of which the camp was to be pitched.

The Isandhlwana hill rises abruptly, almost as a precipice, to the west of the position, as abruptly descending again to the east. At either end of it is a neck connecting it with the smaller ridges of undulating hills, of which the lower portion of the country is composed. The road from Rorke’s Drift passes over the westerly portion, while on the north side, that opposite to the camp, is a deep glen and watercourse, beyond which are open level ridges, until the Isipczi, the Isiluwarri, the Umpindo, and nearer on the right the Ndhlazakaki and Mabakata hills were reached. To the immediate right was a small stony kopjie, or little hill, beyond which the ground is extremely broken, presenting many irregular krantzes and boulder-strewn hills, until the Buffalo River is reached. On the left, about a mile and a quarter distant from the camp, ran a long low ridge towards the south, a neck connecting it with the Isandhlwana hill; and this ridge has a table-land top, which ult...
mately leads down into a great open valley to the east.

The different bodies composing the camp were distributed as follows:

On the extreme left, looking up towards the ridge of which I have spoken, were the tents of the Natal Native Contingent, a space of 100 or 200 yards separating the two battalions. Next to them, and occupying the centre of the camp, were the tents of the English Infantry; immediately above which was the headquarters camp of the Lieutenant-General, in close proximity with the headquarters of the column, under Colonel Glyn, C.B. On the right were the guns, and the Mounted Corps lining the edge of the road. Not far beyond, over the neck at the back of the camp, the ground rises considerably, until the bottom of the precipitous face of the Isandhlwana is reached, so that literally the camp was placed with its back to a wall. Such, roughly speaking, was the position occupied by the camp and the troops, on the morning of the fatal 22nd of January.

On his arrival at the camp at Isandhlwana, Lord Chelmsford rode out accompanied by his Staff, escorted by the Mounted Infantry under Major and Brevet-Colonel Russell, to reconnoitre the natural stronghold in which spies stated that two Zulu chiefs, ruling over
the district of Matyana-ka-Usityakusa, had taken refuge with their cattle. This stronghold was a remarkable fissure in the earth, with a cliff falling precipitously into the depths beneath, which are densely covered with thick thorn bush, and rocky boulders. Here nothing was seen of the enemy, and the General returned to camp. Orders were issued for an early advance next morning. The two battalions of the Natal Native Contingent and the Mounted Police were to work over the ground towards the stronghold above described. Hearing that a large number of cattle had been driven into the ravine on that morning, Commandant Lonsdale, with part of the Native Contingent, started to gain the table-land dominating it. The Mounted Police, under the command of Major Dartnell, had meantime come across a body of the enemy estimated at 1,000 strong on the Umpindo hill east of the stronghold. Being too weak to engage these, they returned to effect a junction with the Carbineers and Native Contingent upon the table-land. Thinking that this force was on its way to join the Zulus, already said to be concealed in the stronghold, Commandant Lonsdale decided to bivouac on the spot that night, that he might prevent such a junction; intending to commence operations in the morning. The General, to whom this step was
reported, approved of the plan, and gave instructions for sending out the necessary supplies. Parties of the Natives had been also seen from the camp, hovering in an easterly direction; and in addition to these, one or two mounted bodies of Zulus had been hovering about the left front.

During the night, despatches came in from Major Dartnell, saying that the enemy had shown themselves in greater force; and expressing a wish for some British Infantry to come to his assistance in the morning. At three o'clock in the morning, Lord Chelmsford ordered an advance, with the Mounted Infantry, the 1st Battalion of the 24th Regiment, and four guns, to reinforce Major Dartnell and the force under his command. In the mean time, orders had been sent to Colonel Durnford, R.E., who was at Rorke's Drift, to move up with two hundred and fifty mounted men, and two hundred and fifty Native Infantry, with a rocket battery to the camp.

Preparations were now made by the General to storm the Isilulwani hill. This was an immensely strong position; but the Zulus, although seen descending in considerable force, kept retiring according to what was afterwards seen to be a preconceived plan. A general advance was accordingly now ordered. The General and his Staff, however, made a halt for
breakfast. At this period, news was received from Colonel Pulleine and the camp at Isandhlwana, that the enemy were observed in force on the left, to the amount of some five or six hundred, and that the mounted men in camp had just gone out to patrol in that direction. About half-past ten, the General ordered the Natal Native Contingent to retire to the left on the camp at Isandhlwana. At this time, several officers who had merely come out for a ride left to return to the camp. Among these were Captain Alan Gardner, Lieutenant McDougall, R.E., Lieutenant Griffiths, of the 2nd Battalion 24th, and Lieutenant Dyer, of the 1st Battalion of that regiment. An escort of mounted men accompanied them.

An encounter soon afterwards took place with a small body of the enemy, of whom forty were killed, and some prisoners taken, with a loss on our side of two of the Natal Contingent, and three wounded. It was at this period of the day, half an hour after noon, that a suspicion that something was going wrong at the camp first arose in the General's party. One of the prisoners taken stated that a large army was expected up from the King that day. It was estimated by those who knew the regiments named at 20,000 or 25,000 men. Whilst this cross-examination of the
prisoner was going on, those standing near heard the report of big guns in the direction of the camp; and the Kaffirs about said, "Do you hear that? There is fighting going on at the camp." This was at once reported to the General, who was then on his way towards the lower part of the range, where he was about to select a place for his camp. While doing so, a native on horseback, who had just galloped down the opposite ridge, from which he could see the camp, hallooed out; saying that he could see firing, and hear big guns going off at the camp.

Lord Chelmsford and his Staff instantly galloped up to the crest of the hill. Looking through a field-glass in the direction of the camp, however, all seemed quiet. The sun was shining brightly on the white tents. No signs of firing were discerned; and though bodies of men could be seen moving about, these were put down as some of own troops. This was at a quarter before two o'clock, and not the faintest suspicion of any fatality seems to have crossed the minds of the General and his Staff. It was not until a quarter to three that Lord Chelmsford turned his horse towards the camp.

When the General with Colonel Glyn's force came about four miles from the camp, they met with the Natal Native Contingent, which seeing that the camp
had been attacked by a force much its superior in numbers, had halted. About half an hour afterwards, a solitary horseman was perceived wending his way at a foot pace, towards the General's party. As he came nearer, it was perceived to be Commandant Lonsdale, who was known to have ridden on in advance. The first words he uttered struck everyone with consternation: "The camp is in the possession of the enemy, sir!"

It appears that Lonsdale was quietly returning to the camp, after leaving the General, and had approached it very near, when his attention was arrested by a bullet passing disagreeably close to him. Looking up, he saw a native, who had just fired. At the same time, he saw what appeared to be our red-coated soldiers, sitting in groups around the tents. When he got within ten yards of the tents, to his surprise he saw a Zulu come out of one of them, with a bloody assegai in his hand. Lonsdale then perceived that the wearers of the red uniforms were all Zulus. His self-possession did not desert him, but quietly turning his pony round, he galloped off. He escaped by a miracle the shower of bullets which fell around him on all sides, and was thus enabled to warn Lord Chelmsford, and probably to save the approaching party from being cut off to a man.
We will now go back to what took place in the camp at Isandhlwana. Before the General left there, written orders were sent to Colonel Pulleine to take command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn, and to draw in his line of defence and his infantry outposts, but to keep his cavalry vedettes still far advanced. After the departure of the main body of the column, nothing unusual occurred in camp, until about eight o'clock, when a report arrived from a picket, stationed at a point about 1,000 yards distant on a hill to the north, that a body of the enemy could be seen approaching from the north-east. Colonel Pulleine then ordered the whole of the troops available to assemble near the eastern side of the camp. He also despatched a mounted man, with a report to the General.Shortly after nine, a small body of the enemy showed itself just over the crest of the hills, but retired in a few minutes, disappearing completely. Soon afterwards, information arrived from the picket, that the enemy was in three columns, two of which were retiring, but were still in view; the third column had disappeared in a north-westerly direction. About ten o'clock, Colonel Durnford arrived in the camp, with 250 Mounted Natives and a rocket battery. On his arrival, he took over command of the camp from Colonel Pulleine, who gave him a verbal
account of the troops, and stated the orders he had received to defend the camp.

A report now came in from the front that the Zulus were retiring. Upon hearing this, Colonel Durnford sent two troops of Mounted Natives to the top of the hills on the left, and took with him two troops and the rocket battery, with an escort of one company of the Native Contingent, on to the front of the camp, about four or five miles off. Before leaving, he asked Colonel Pulleine to give him two companies of the 24th Regiment. This Colonel Pulleine refused to do, saying that his orders were to defend the camp. He agreed, however, to send reinforcements to Colonel Durnford, should he get into difficulties.

Colonel Durnford cantered on four or five miles ahead to meet the enemy on the hills, leaving the infantry and the rocket battery to follow him slowly. When he got near the summit, an orderly rode down and reported that the enemy were in force behind the summit. He had hardly uttered the words when the Zulus came over the crest in thousands, throwing out a dense cloud of skirmishers as they advanced; they also appeared on the left.

A company of the 1st Battalion of the 24th was then pushed up to the neck between the Isandhlwana hill and the position occupied by the Zulus, where
they at once became engaged with the Umcityu Zulu regiments along the waggon road. These Zulus are supposed to have gone after the baggage waggons brought by Colonel Durnford. This company of the 24th never returned to the camp, having been destroyed by the overwhelming attack of the Zulus, upon whom it is said by natives to have inflicted frightful loss.

Colonel Durnford retreated steadily with his force about two miles. He then came upon the remains of the rocket battery, which had been destroyed. It appears that Captain Nourse of the Natal Native Contingent, who had charge of it, hearing heavy firing on the left, had changed his direction to that side before reaching the crest of the hills. He had nevertheless been attacked on all sides. The first volley had dispersed the mules and the natives, who had returned to the camp as they best could. Colonel Durnford’s force was here reinforced by about forty mounted men from the camp, but was eventually obliged to retreat.

Colonel Pulleine now sent out two companies of the 1st Battalion of the 24th, to support Colonel Durnford, while he formed up the remaining companies in line. The guns were brought into action on the extreme left flank, facing the hill on the left.
The two companies of the 24th Regiment sent out to reinforce Colonel Durnford were drawn up in extended order at about two yards' distance, at the foot of the slope; and Captain Younghusband's company, *en échelon*, on the left. The enemy was still descending the hill.

The companies of the 24th were presently becoming short of ammunition; and a fresh supply was sent for. These troops had meantime retired to within 900 yards of that portion of the camp occupied by the Native Contingent. The Zulus were now surrounding the camp on the right and rear. The men of the Native Contingent took alarm, and retreated in the utmost disorder; thus laying open the right and rear of the companies of the 24th Regiment on the left. By this means, the enemy pouring in at that part of the line, all was soon in confusion. Only a few of the men of the 1st Battalion had time to fix bayonets; but the Zulus had already closed with our troops, and were using their stabbing assegais with fearful effect. The remaining men of that small body hastened off in the direction of Rorke's Drift. It was about half-past one in the afternoon. Major Smith and Lieutenant Curling of the Royal Artillery had brought their guns into action for some time previously, when the Zulus