

# THE WORLD IN IDENTITY IN HERACLITUS:

## ΕΙΣ, ΚΟΙΝΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΣ ΚΟΣΜΟΣ

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### Abstract

*Heraclitus is not only the philosopher of the law of constant change but also the philosopher of identity. The fact that the cosmos is one and the same for itself and for all, means that it is in unity and identity with itself. The unity of diverse phenomena is to be found not in their matter, but in their logos. Indeed the very identity of an object depends not on the matter that composes it, but on the regularity and predictability of the changes it undergoes. The world in Heraclitus is the same, one and common and its identity lies exclusively in that it is "everlasting fire" and also in its eternal, same, one and common ontological nature.*

Since the antiquity there is a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Heraclitus as being the philosopher only of change and alteration. In this article I want to correct this misunderstanding about this great Presocratic thinker, by showing that Heraclitus is not only the philosopher of change and alteration, but also the philosopher of identity as well, as far as the world is concerned. Heraclitus is thinking of the cosmos as being simultaneously in change and identity with itself, and not only in change, as most scholars, both ancient and contemporary (Plato, Aristotle, Nietzsche, Cornford, Popper, Guthrie, Barnes) have claimed. There are, however, few contemporary scholars who accept merely the theory of unity in Heraclitus beyond the phenomenal change (Burnet, Reinhardt, Snell, Heidegger, Kirk), but they do not see deeper the theory of *identity* in Heraclitus, and no one has offered yet a systematic demonstration of it. Thus, my scope in this original work is the demonstration that Heraclitus, besides thinking of the world as being in a iteration, is also thinking of the world as being in identity with

itself,<sup>1</sup> an identity which is inferred in fr. B30, B84b and B89 where Heraclitus declares the world to be αὐτός, εἷς καὶ κοινός.

According to the Ephesian philosopher, the cosmos is εἷς καὶ κοινός. This monistic cosmic theory is expressed by Heraclitus in fr. B89,<sup>2</sup> which is saved by Plutarch:

B89, Plutarch, De superstitione, 3p. 166c: ὁ Ἡράκλειτος φησι τοῖς ἐρηγοροῦσιν ἓνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κοιμωμένων ἕκαστον εἰς ἴδιον ἀποστρέφεισθαι. τῶν δὲ δεισιδαίμονι κοινὸς οὐδεὶς ἐστι κόσμος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐρηγορῶς τῷ φρονοῦντι χρῆται οὔτε κοιμώμενος ἀπαλλάττεται τοῦ ταράττοντος...

As far as Plutarch's interpretation is concerned Kirk<sup>3</sup> considers it irrelevant because, firstly, according to him, the word κόσμος declares only the 'order' in Heraclitus (B30) and not the later common notion of 'cosmos', and secondly, his interpretative reference to the religious human being, who because of this reason cannot acquire a reasonable and unified view of things, is a reference to the notion of 'cosmos' and not of 'order'. However, in the Archaic word κόσμος, the universal concept of 'cosmos' is included within the concept of 'order', expressing the 'universal well-ordered totality',<sup>4</sup> and thus Plutarch is not misinterpreting Heraclitus.

In my view, Plutarch uses the above Heraclitean fragment in his work *Περὶ δεισιδαιμονίας* (*De superstitione*) with a theological purpose. He perceives Heraclitus' κοιμώμενοι as δεισιδαίμονες, as god-fearing, and he tries to explain the lack of their prudence, as well as the dreamy flutter which they are in by being constantly god-fearing, and which they can never escape from. However, his interpretation is exclusively based on the fear of god, on δεισιδαιμονία, which he considers as the cause of κοιμώμενοι,

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<sup>1</sup> See more about the demonstration of this changing and simultaneously identified idiosyncratic nature of the Being and the cosmos in Heraclitus in my book, Yiorgo N. Maniatis: *Alteration and Identity in the Philosophy of Heraclitus* (Doct. Diss., Athens: Papazisis Publications, 2001, pp. 422; in Greek).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. in H. Diels – W. Kranz: *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1952, Sechsten Auflage, 3 Bände) also the doxographies 22A1, Diogenes Laertius, IX 8: πεπεράνθαι τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ ἓνα εἶναι κόσμον; IX 12: τρόπου κόσμον ἓνα τῶν ξυμπάντων; 22A10, Aetius, II 1.2 (D. 327): Ἡράκλειτος... ἓνα τὸν κόσμον.

<sup>3</sup> G.S. Kirk: *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), pp. 63-64.

<sup>4</sup> See the Archaic use of the κόσμος as 'well-ordered cosmic totality' in Empedocles, 31B134,5, in Anaxagoras, 59B8, and in Diogenes of Apollonia, 64B2.

and thus, Plutarch misinterprets Heraclitus' fragment in his theological book by using it with a clearly theological aim. There is not such theological meaning in Heraclitus' words, and he does not seem to have in mind something like that when he talks about ἐγρηγορότεες and κοιμώμενοι people. Plutarch's interpretation is very restrictive, because it restricts Heraclitus' κοιμώμενοι only in the domain of the god-fearing, something that neither Heraclitus talks about, nor is it suitable as a generalization of his mind and of the meaning that he wants to give through the picture of ἐγρηγορότεες and κοιμώμενοι people. Consequently, Plutarch's interpretation does not lead to the right way of understanding Heraclitus' words in the fragment.

The picture of the alert-asleep people is first offered by Heraclitus already in his first fr. B1.<sup>5</sup> In that fragment the ἀξύνετοι are likened to the asleep who forget what they do. But in this specific fr. B89, these ἀξύνετοι and ἀπειροισιν of fr. B1 are characterized by Heraclitus as κοιμώμενοι, each one turning to his/her own world, exactly for the reason which he mentions in fr. B2,<sup>6</sup> because they do not participate in the cosmic and common prudence of the logos, but in their own individual and restricted prudence, which gives them the dreamy illusion that each one of them lives in his/her own world. What Heraclitus wants to say here is that each one of the πολλοὶ people has the impression that he/she lives in his/her own individualized world, a restricted and small world, and that they are all asleep because of this reason. Because, according to the philosopher, the cosmos is one and common, universal, and in complete unity as ἐν, having united within itself all the individual worlds πάντα of multiplicity, with which it exists in the identity ἐν-πάντα.<sup>7</sup> So, only the people who perceive the cosmos in this way are the alert ones, that is, the people who are truly awake spiritually, the people who participate in the cosmic λόγος,<sup>8</sup> and say it homologously within them, that is, those who in their cosmic prudence perceive the cosmos as ἐν, as ἓνα καὶ κοινόν. This is the meaning of the Heraclitean comparison between the few spiritually

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<sup>5</sup> 22B1, Sextus, *Against the Mathematicians* VII 132: τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὀκόσα ἐγεροθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὀκωσπερ ὀκόσα εὐδόντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.

<sup>6</sup> 22B2, Sextus, *Against the Mathematicians* VII 133: τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδιὰν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. 22B50, Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* IX 9: ἐν πάντα εἶναι.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. 22B50, Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* IX9: τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἐν πάντα εἶναι.

awake people, τοῖς ἐγρηγοροῦσιν, and the many a sleep ones, τῶν κοιμωμένων.

Let us pass, however, beyond this Heraclitean comparison concerning the dual kind of people and the way they view the cosmos, to the clearly Heraclitean cosmology. In the specific fragment Heraclitus formulates a declaration of great importance: he declares that the cosmos is one and common. But what does this declaration of Heraclitus mean that **ένα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι**?

In the domain of research, Vlastos<sup>9</sup> correctly accepts the originality of fr. B89 interpreting the **κόσμος** as 'universe' and not only as 'order', as it is also in fr. B30, and considers that here Heraclitus declares his beautiful idea about the one, common **λόγος**, which is the same for all and everything, but which nevertheless is hidden by the many people who live in their own artificial worlds. Although the interpretation that Vlastos gives to the cosmos as **λόγος** is not wrong, since the **λόγος** constitutes the cosmic mode-of-Being, it is a restricting one, because the **κόσμος** is not only the **λόγος**, but also the **παν**, including also the rest twelve modes-of-Being in Heraclitus.<sup>10</sup> Marcovich<sup>11</sup> rightly accepts as original the whole fr. B89 in its both parts, considering that it says something new, and that it constitutes a Heraclitean simile or metaphor, for which he says: «As the world of those who are awake is one, the same and common to all men, and therefore real and true; whereas the worlds (cf. φάος – φάσματα in fr. 26) of those who sleep are many, different from each other and certainly illusive, unreal and untrue: so also those who have recognized the universal logos, common to all things and real (ἐὼν, fr. 1), possess one single world-order, common to all men (cf. κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων) and true; whereas the rest of men possess each one a different world, untrue and fanciful (cf. δοκέοντα fr. 28a; ἐωντοῖσι δὲ δοκεούσι fr. 17; ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες fr. 2). Thus, the word ἐγρηγοροῦσιν alludes to the recognition of the Logos.»<sup>12</sup> Marcovich correctly interprets fr. B89, perceiving the Heraclitean simile or metaphor and

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<sup>9</sup> G. Vlastos: 'On Heraclitus', *American Journal of Philology* 76, 1955, pp. 344-347.

<sup>10</sup> The world in Heraclitus has the following thirteen modes-of-Being: πῦρ-λόγος-θεὸς-δίκη-ἔρις-πόλεμος-αἰὼν-σοφὸν-χρησιμοσύνη or χρεὴ καὶ κόρος-κεραυνὸς-νόμος-γνώμη.

<sup>11</sup> M. Marcovich: *Heraclitus* (Merida: Los Andes University Press, 1967), pp. 98-100.

<sup>12</sup> M. Marcovich, *op. cit.*, conjectures that fr. 22B89 was one of the sources of the Sceptic misinterpretation which is included in the doxography 22A16, Sextus, *Against the Mathematicians* VII, 129.

the meaning of the single cosmic order which is the only true one, and which is the result of comprehending the cosmic **λόγος**. On the other hand, Robinson<sup>13</sup> even though linguistically admits of the paraphrasing form of the fragment, he correctly claims that Plutarch does not falsify at all in his quotations Heraclitus' original ideas, for philosophically the notion of a common to all cosmos is indisputably Heraclitean (B30), as also are the opposites **ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ καθεῦδον** (B88), and so, the antithesis between the common cosmos and the 'individual' cosmos of this fragment seems to him as naturally Heraclitean.

According to my interpretation, the fact that the cosmos is **κοινός**, means that it is universal, total, 'same' for all. The fact that the cosmos is **εἷς**, means that it is in unity with itself, that it is the 'same' for itself. The fact that the cosmos is one and the same for itself and for all, means that it is in unity and identity with itself. It means that in the Heraclitean cosmic theory the cosmos is set **εἷς ἐν**, which is **κοινόν**, that is, the same for all who are inside it and perceive it. But the fact that the cosmos is set **εἷς ἐν**, which is common, same for everybody and everything, means that it is in identity with itself, given that identity means that something **τίθεται εἷς ἐν**,<sup>14</sup> and thus it constitutes **ἐν**. Hence, Heraclitus **ταυτίζει**, identifies the cosmos, since **εἷς ἐν τὸν τάττει**, and the world is in identity, since it is **ταυτός, εἷς καὶ κοινός** for all. Then, the unity of the cosmos as **ἐν** and its **κοινόν** also constitutes its identity, since to identify means **τίθεμαι εἷς ἐν**, that is, I am united, I am **ἐν**, and I am the same **ἐν** for all, the **ταυτό ἐν** for all, the **κοινόν**. Consequently, according to the interpretation I adopt here, the world is in identity, according to Heraclitus, an identity that is justified and inferred by the fact that it is **ἐν**, that is in unity, and **κοινός**, that is **ταυτός**, the same for all. These two parameters of the nature of the cosmos, such as they are declared by Heraclitus in fr. B89, lead to the identity of the cosmos with itself, exactly because **ένα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι**, that is, it is set **εἷς ἐν**, which is also **ταυτό** for all of its multiple beings, that is, it is a **κοινὸν ἐν**.

<sup>13</sup> T.M. Robinson: *Heraclitus* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 138.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. H.G. Liddell and R. Scott: *A Greek-English Lexicon*, trans. in Greek by X.P. Moschos, revised by M. Konstantinides and P. Diamantakos (Athens: I. Sideris, 1904, 1995, 6 vols.) [See also the original English version: H.G. Liddell and R. Scott: *A Greek-English Lexicon*, revised by H. Stuart Jones and R. McKenzie (1925-1940, 9<sup>th</sup> ed.)], vol. IV, p. 296: **ταυτότης: τὸ εἶναι τι ταυτόν**, and p. 295: **ταυτίζω (or ταυτίω): εἷς ἐν τάττω**. Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.12,3; *Metaphysics* 2.1,9.

This identity of the cosmos can also be seen more obviously verbally as ὁ αὐτὸς κόσμος in fr. B30, which is saved by Clement:

B30, Clement, *Stromateis* V 105 (II 396, 10) [Plutarch, *De anim.* 5 p. 1014A]: σαφέστατα δ' Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς δόξης [(mean.) ὡς ἐσομένης ποτὲ εἰς τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς οὐσίαν μεταβολῆς], τὸν μὲν τινα κόσμον αἰδίων εἶναι δοκιμάσας, τὸν δὲ τινα φθειρόμενον, τὸν κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν, εἰδὼς οὐχ ἕτερον ὄντα ἐκείνου πως ἔχοντος, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν αἰδίων τὸν ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιὸν κόσμον ἦδει, φανερὸν ποιεῖ λέγων οὕτως· κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰεζῶον, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα. ὅτι δὲ καὶ γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐδογματίζεν μηνύει τὰ ἐπιφερόμενα.

I will be concerned here with the first part of the fragment, *κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων*, which exclusively deals with the cosmos being in identity. Reinhardt<sup>15</sup> and Kirk,<sup>16</sup> who do not accept the phrase *τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων* as Heraclitean but as Clement's intervention,<sup>17</sup> claim that Clement's motive for this addition was his desire to show exactly what his interpretative phrase, *τὸν ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιὸν κόσμον*, refers to, and for this they think that he adds the *τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων*, as «an over-condensed but unmistakable summary of the longer Stoic interpretation.» KIRK ET AL<sup>18</sup> agree with them, claiming that the intervention of Clement and the Stoics has for this reason a very strong motive. On the contrary, Marcovich<sup>19</sup> who correctly accepts the phrase *τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων* as Heraclitean, is opposed to the above scholars, because he considers that if Clement had indeed added this phrase, this would

<sup>15</sup> K. Reinhardt: *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (Bonn, 1916), p. 170n.1; also: 'Herakleitos Lehre vom Feuer', *Hermes* 77, 1942, p. 12ff.

<sup>16</sup> G.S. Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 307-310.

<sup>17</sup> Kirk claims that it is rather Clement's intervention, because as it also seems from other fragments that Clement sets out for Heraclitus – but also for other writers –, he used to add such short phrases; cf. 22B14: *τούτοις ἀπειλεῖ*; 22B20: *μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναπαύεσθαι*; 22B26: *ἀποθανόν*; 22B28: *καὶ μέντοι*.

<sup>18</sup> G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield: *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957, 1983), p. 198n.1.

<sup>19</sup> M. Marcovich, *op. cit.*, pp. 268-269, 273n.1.

mean that the eternal cosmos is the same «for all possible particular world-orders or διακοσμήσεις [= *ἀπάντων*],» something that is opposed to the Stoic cosmic theory and terminology which talks about one *κόσμος* and not many *κόσμοι*, and so «Clement is following here literally his Stoic source.»<sup>20</sup> Besides, this phrase is very different from Clement's interpretative comments, as Gigon,<sup>21</sup> Kerschensteiner<sup>22</sup> and Wiese<sup>23</sup> have correctly noticed.

Clement indeed misinterprets Stoically Heraclitus' cosmos as being born and perishable, based on the Stoic misinterpretation that the cosmos is *καὶ γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν*, saying that these worlds are not different between them: that the *αἰδῖος κόσμος οὐχ ἕτερον ὄντα ἐκείνου πως ἔχοντος* from *φθειρόμενος κόσμος*, identifying thus these two worlds. But Clement's interpretation lies in the identification of the *τινές* forms of the cosmos as *κόσμος αἰδῖος, φθειρόμενος, γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτός*. However, these forms of the cosmos are Stoic and not Heraclitean, since Heraclitus neither does he talk anywhere about birth and decay, nor does he explain the identity of the cosmos as an identity of birth-decay, but he just says that this cosmos is the same, *ὁ αὐτὸς* for all, and that it eternally is an ever-living fire, without ever being born or dead. This misinterpretation of 'cosmogony-cosmic decay' is clearly Stoic, and thus, Clement does not justify correctly the identity of the cosmos that Heraclitus has here in mind.

Let us see then Heraclitus' fragment itself, beyond Clement's misinterpretative comments. What does Heraclitus mean by saying *κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων*?

First of all, the research up today presents some disagreements regarding the precise meaning of the word *κόσμος* in Heraclitus. The first right notion that instantly comes to the scholar's mind is the standard one of the 'cosmos' as the 'world'. But Cornford<sup>24</sup> believes that this common notion of the word *κόσμος* is

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<sup>20</sup> For the Stoic terminology, cf. Diogenes Laertius VII, 137: *τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιόν*; 138: *καὶ ἔστι κόσμος ὁ ἰδίως ποιὸς <ἐκ> τῆς τῶν ὄλων οὐσίας*; Arius Didymus ap. Eus., P.E. XV 15,3 (D. 464): *καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ τῆς πάσης οὐσίας ποιὸν κόσμον αἰδῖον εἶναι καὶ θεόν*; M. Pohlenz: *Die Stoa II* (Göttingen, 1955), p. 44. For a same opinion with that of Marcovich, see H. Wiese: *Heraklit bei Klemens von Alexandrien* (Diss. Kiel, 1963), p. 241.

<sup>21</sup> O. Gigon: *Untersuchungen zu Heraklit* (Basel Dissertation, Leipzig, 1935), p. 51.

<sup>22</sup> J. Kerschensteiner: *Kosmos* (Zetemata 30) (München: Beck, 1962), p. 101.

<sup>23</sup> H. Wiese, *op. cit.*, p. 242n.5.

<sup>24</sup> F.M. Cornford: 'Innumerable Worlds in Presocratic Cosmogony', *Classical Quarterly*, 1934, p. 1ff.

used only after the fourth century B.C. Attempts to find the first meaning of the word κόσμος have been carried out. So, Reinhardt,<sup>25</sup> Gigon<sup>26</sup> and Kranz<sup>27</sup> correctly consider the reference τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους, in the doxographies 12A9<sup>28</sup> and 12A11<sup>29</sup> about Anaximander, a s Anaximandrian, with whom Kirk<sup>30</sup> wrongly disagrees. Furthermore, Kranz<sup>31</sup> and all the scholars in general correctly regard Anaximenes' reference in fragment 13B2<sup>32</sup>: καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἄηρ περιέχει, as reference to the common notion 'cosmos'; this opinion wrongly again is not accepted by Reinhard,<sup>33</sup> Wilamowitz,<sup>34</sup> Gigon<sup>35</sup> and Kirk,<sup>36</sup> even though here too the universal meaning of the κόσμος is very obvious. Kirk,<sup>37</sup> who proceeds to an extensive research of the notions of the word κόσμος, finally asserts that until the fifth century the primary notion of the word is 'order' with several similar meanings, and that it gradually acquires the meaning of 'world-order' by Empedocles, Diogenes, and maybe by Philolaus, until it takes from the fourth century the common meaning 'cosmos' that it has up today. So, he accepts that Heraclitus' meaning of the κόσμος in fr. B30, which he wrongly<sup>38</sup> claims to be the only fragment where the word is found, is 'order' and not 'cosmos', as it has been established by the research. Nevertheless, a problem arises about the meaning of the κόσμος in connection with ἐποίησεν, since this sentence does not make any sense under the notion of 'order'. Thus, Kirk finally accepts that the word concerns the 'ordered whole', which he paradoxically

<sup>25</sup> K. Reinhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 174ff.

<sup>26</sup> O. Gigon, *op. cit.*, p. 52ff.

<sup>27</sup> W. Kranz: 'Kosmos als Philosophischer Begriff Frühgriechischer Zeit,' *Philologus* 93, 1939, p. 430ff.

<sup>28</sup> 12A9, Theophrastus, *Physic. Opin.*, fr. 2, D. 476, ap. Simplicius in *Aristot. Phys.* 24, 13: ἐξ ἧς ἀπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους.

<sup>29</sup> 12A11, Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* I, 6, 1: ἐξ ἧς γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμον.

<sup>30</sup> G.S. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

<sup>31</sup> W. Kranz, *op. cit.*, p. 430ff.

<sup>32</sup> 13B2, Aetius I 3, 4 (D. 278).

<sup>33</sup> K. Reinhardt: *Kosmos u. Sympathie*, p. 209ff.

<sup>34</sup> U.v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf: *Der Glaube der Hellenen* I (Berlin: Weidmann, 1932), p. 374n.3.

<sup>35</sup> O. Gigon, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

<sup>36</sup> G.S. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

<sup>37</sup> G.S. Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-314, 317.

<sup>38</sup> The word κόσμος is also found in Heraclitus' following fragments: 22B75: τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γινομένων; 22B89: ἓνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι; 22B124: ὁ κάλλιστος...[ὁ] κόσμος.



considers as having the meaning of 'cosmos', but without being identified with it, because priority is given to the idea of 'order'. Guthrie<sup>39</sup> also accepts all of the extensive research of the meanings of the word **κόσμος** by Kirk, agreeing with him that finally **κόσμος** means «the natural world and the order in it.» So, we see that even the few scholars who disagree, although at first they reject the universal notion of the 'cosmos', they finally accept it, giving to the **κόσμος** the right meaning of the 'well-ordered cosmos'.

Furthermore, as far as the interpretation of the phrase is concerned, Zeller<sup>40</sup> correctly considers that **ἀπάντων** does not refer to **ἀπάντων <τῶν κόσμων>**, and that the meaning of the phrase is not 'the same order for all the worlds', believing that the double use of **κόσμος** would be completely impossible. But as he translates the cosmos only as 'order', he loses the meaning of the cosmic identity, remaining only in the meaning of the 'same order'. Gigon<sup>41</sup> does the same thing, and even though he interprets the **κόσμον... ἐποίησεν** as **διεκόσμησεν**, giving thus to the word **κόσμος** the double meaning both of the 'ordered whole' and of 'order', he unjustifiably claims that the phrase **τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων** is a suitable addition to the fragment, only if the **κόσμον τόνδε** means 'this order', and not 'this world', without saying why, believing that the **ἀπάντων** means 'all existing things'. So, he interprets the phrase with the broad meaning of this order which is 'the same for everything', that is, for all the things comprehended in it, obviously losing the meaning of the cosmic identity, since he finally accepts the cosmos only as 'order'. Kirk,<sup>42</sup> who as I have already mentioned, does not accept the phrase as Heraclitean but as Clement's addition, claims that **τὸν αὐτὸν** means «that there is a **κόσμος** which is somehow not the same for, or does not include, all things,» and that this interpretation is similar to Clement's Stoic differentiation of the worlds. But he is led to this misinterpretation, first, because he rejects the universal notion of the **κόσμος**, and second, because he rejects the **τὸν αὐτὸν** as Clement's addition. So, he loses sight of the very important meaning regarding the obvious cosmic identity here, consuming his attempts in finding supposedly Stoic differentiated worlds, which is not in line with Heraclitus' thought.

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<sup>39</sup> W.K.C. Guthrie: *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962, vol. I), pp. 208n.1, 455.

<sup>40</sup> E. Zeller: *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* I, II, ed. W. Nestle (Leipzig: Reisland, 1920, 6<sup>th</sup> ed.), p. 812.

<sup>41</sup> O. Gigon, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

<sup>42</sup> G.S. Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-310.

On the other hand, Vlastos<sup>43</sup> correctly disagrees with Kirk, accepting the phrase as Heraclitean and considering the *ἀπάντων* as masculine, interpreting it as a contrast between the real, common cosmos and the individual, artificial cosmos of the people who do not understand the *λόγος* (B2). Vlastos<sup>44</sup> considers that «the world is not made and unmade in alternate eons; generation and destruction are concurrent and constant, hence the form of the world is also constant. Fire, 'kindled' by 'gathering' into its own substance a measure of fuel, is also 'extinguished' by 'scattering abroad' the same measure of light. This measured give-and-take accounts for the permanence of the world which 'was and is and is to be'.<sup>45</sup>» But despite of his right interpretation, Vlastos does not succeed in finding further any account of identity in the fragment, and so he remains only in the one and common real cosmos; nevertheless, the world is also declared here as *αὐτός*. Kirk et al<sup>46</sup> do not accept the phrase as Heraclitean too, and disagree with Vlastos because they consider that his interpretation would be correct if fr. B30 was followed by a Heraclitean reference to the deceitfulness of people; but nothing like that happens in the fragment, and the phrase in question is not found in the other two texts of Plutarch and Simplicius<sup>47</sup> where fr. B30 is saved. But the fact that the phrase is not found in these two texts of those ancient writers neither does it mean nor does it prove that it is not Heraclitean, so the allegation of Kirk et al is irrelevant.

Guthrie<sup>48</sup> agrees with Vlastos and correctly accepts the phrase as Heraclitean, believing that it reflects the Ephesian's thought. According to him, the *κόσμος* is the 'cosmic order', which is an organized well-ordered 'harmony of opposites' and of warring beings which is universal, that is, *τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων*. The emphasis that is given to this 'universality' is not superficial, for Guthrie, because common people do not comprehend it, as they are cut off from the *κοινὸς κόσμος*. Although his interpretation is not wrong, unfortunately, it still cannot convey the meaning of cosmic identity in the *αὐτόν*, remaining only in the 'universality' of the cosmos. Finally,

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<sup>43</sup> G. Vlastos, *op. cit.*, p. 344ff.

<sup>44</sup> G. Vlastos: 'Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies', *Classical Philology* 42, 1947; also in *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy*, (eds.) D.J. Furley and R.E. Allen (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970, vol. I), p. 67ff.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. K. Reinhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 169ff, 176n.2.

<sup>46</sup> G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-198.

<sup>47</sup> Plutarch, *De anim.* 5, 1014A; Simplicius, *De caelo* 294 Heiberg.

<sup>48</sup> W.K.C. Guthrie, *op. cit.*, p. 454n.2.

Marcovich<sup>49</sup> who correctly accepts the phrase as Heraclitean, claims that by its acceptance we can also easily understand the τῶν ἀνθρώπων, as the phrase is meaning «this world-order, the same of all men,» agreeing with Vlastos and Guthrie. So, he interprets Heraclitus' phrase as follows: «This world-order of our experience, which is, by the way, the only real world-order, common to all men.» Finally, he agrees with Vlastos' interpretation that the idea of the real cosmic order by contrast with the dreamy worlds of people who do not follow the λόγος matches with fr. B89: τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἓνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι, and he considers that there is a kind of 'suture' between Heraclitus' principle of πῦρ and λόγος.<sup>50</sup> However, even though his interpretation also is not wrong, unfortunately, it too cannot conceive of the identity of the cosmos as Heraclitus obviously declares it in the αὐτόν.

On the contrary, Verdenius<sup>51</sup> who wonders how is it possible for fire to be ἀείζωον since it is altered to the rest cosmic elements (B31, B90), is opposed to the theories which support that the cosmos is only in some of its parts put out fire, while as a whole it is fire, and indeed αἰθήρ (Kirk, Kirk et al), and considers that Heraclitus says that it is ἀεὶ fire and everywhere, without declaring any other forms of fire. So, he claims that fire is ἀείζωον and this is its idiosyncratic substantial nature, which likes to be hidden in its alterations (B123), and not to be revealed as the Delphic god (B93) to anyone's observation, but only to someone clear-sighted such as Heraclitus, who is able to 'see' this universal 'same' substance under the changed masses of the cosmos. So, with this interpretation he perceives of the cosmic identity in Heraclitus, justifying it correctly in the fire-Being. On the other hand, Kahn<sup>52</sup> is led to a misinterpretation, for he accepts the phrase as Heraclitean, but he interprets the κόσμος only as 'order', and not as 'world' or 'world order', thinking that the phrase is talking about the order which is naturally 'common' and the same for all people and all things. He considers that this order also includes the early meaning of the right political and moral order that is applied commonly to all people, like the divine law by which all human laws are fed (B114). So, by interpreting the κόσμος only as order, and not universally,

<sup>49</sup> M. Marcovich, *op. cit.*, pp. 268-273.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. fr. 22B67, 22B90: θνώματα - χρήματα.

<sup>51</sup> W.J. Verdenius: 'Heraclitus' Conception of Fire', in J. Mansfeld and L.M. de Rijk (eds.), *Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Continuation Offered to Professor C.L. de Vogel* (Assen, 1975), pp. 1-8.

<sup>52</sup> C.H. Kahn: *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 132-133.

Kahn loses the meaning of the cosmic identity of the αὐτόν. On the contrary, Robinson<sup>53</sup> gives a more correct interpretation as he accepts the universal meaning of 'cosmos' in the word κόσμος, and with some doubt he also accepts the meaning of the 'ordered world', for as he says, the meaning of the 'ordered world' is found in Anaxagoras<sup>54</sup> and in Diogenes of Apollonia,<sup>55</sup> while the meaning of 'cosmos' is found in Empedocles,<sup>56</sup> and thus it is quite possible that also Heraclitus uses the same meaning since he writes only one generation before them. He also considers that the cosmos «is a given,» and that in that sense it is 'the same' for all beings, as a universe with κοινὸς λόγος (B2). But this means that we find here ontologically the identity of the cosmos in its Being as κοινὸς λόγος.

According to my interpretation, in fr. B30 the Ephesian philosopher defines the Being of the cosmos as ἀείζωον πῦρ. But before this ontological definition of his, he talks about the cosmos saying that this cosmos – which is about to define its Being as ἀείζωον πῦρ – is the 'same' for all, ὁ αὐτὸς κόσμος. So, the κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων refers to the identity of the cosmos, in the sense that the cosmos is 'the same' for all, it is ὁ αὐτὸς ἀπάντων. But how does the αὐτὸν presuppose identity of itself as far as the others are concerned, and what does it mean that the cosmos is αὐτὸς ἀπάντων? It means that the cosmos is εἷς καὶ κοινός, as Heraclitus declares in fr. B89. That the cosmos is ὁ αὐτὸς ἀπάντων means both that the cosmos is in identity in the perceptions of all the beings of multiplicity, and also that the cosmos is in identity ontologically since the cosmos is ἀεὶ ἀείζωον πῦρ, which is its Being. There are not many, private, individual, ἴδιοι<sup>57</sup> worlds, but εἷς καὶ κοινός, ὁ αὐτὸς for all, and ontologically it is always the 'same' Being-πῦρ. That the cosmos is 'one' is also proved by the singular number κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτόν. So, the cosmos in the Heraclitean cosmotheory is εἷς καὶ κοινός, 'one and common' (B89), but also ὁ αὐτός, the 'same' for all (B30). Hence, Heraclitus defines here more specifically linguistically the identity of the cosmos by the αὐτόν; because, as I have already mentioned, τὸ εἶναι τι ταυτόν means in ancient Greek ταυτότης,<sup>58</sup> 'identity'. So, according to Heraclitus, the cosmos exists in identity as ὁ αὐτὸς κόσμος.

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<sup>53</sup> T.M. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

<sup>54</sup> See 59B8.

<sup>55</sup> See 64B2.

<sup>56</sup> See 31B134.5.

<sup>57</sup> See 22B89.

<sup>58</sup> H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 296.

My research also finds the same in meaning identity of the αὐτὸς κόσμος in fr. B84a, b:

B84a, b, Plotinus, Enneads IV 8, 1: μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται. κάματός ἐστι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μοχθεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι.

The two words μεταβάλλον and τοῖς αὐτοῖς must refer to and mean correspondingly the cosmos as a whole, as ἐν, and the cosmos as multiplicity, as πάντα. Because, firstly, the indefinite τι of μεταβάλλον generally refers to everything, and taking into consideration of the Heraclitean cosmotheory of the universal alteration of the πάντα, I conclude that Heraclitus' μεταβάλλον must refer to the πᾶν, that is, to all the cosmos as ἐν. Secondly, the τοῖς αὐτοῖς must refer to nothing else but to the 'same' things and beings of all the world, that is, to the cosmos as multiplicity, as πάντα, because the τοῖς αὐτοῖς μοχθεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι cannot refer to anything else – being used with an indefinite subject as here – but only to πάντα, that is, to all the multiple beings of the world. Because the ones which are ruled and for which eternal weariness is toiled, are all the beings of the world, that is, the cosmos as multiplicity-πάντα. Consequently, by the μεταβάλλον Heraclitus is talking about the cosmos as ἐν, and by the τοῖς αὐτοῖς he is talking about the cosmos as πάντα, which is one and the same in his thought as the world ἐν-πάντα.<sup>59</sup>

But my interest is focused here on fr. B84b, and specifically on the τοῖς αὐτοῖς. What is the meaning of this fragment and particularly of the τοῖς αὐτοῖς? In the domain of research, Reinhardt<sup>60</sup> correctly claims that fr. B84b refers to the macrocosm, while Gigon<sup>61</sup> considers it simply as obscure, but they both do not offer any further comments. Kirk<sup>62</sup> correctly considers that the fragment refers to weariness and to identity – that is, to the opposites rest and alteration of the first fr. B84a –, and that its meaning is «no-change is weariness.» He accepts that it constitutes an explanation of the peculiar character of the first fr. B84a, with a

<sup>59</sup> See 22B50, Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* IX 9: ἐν πάντα εἶναι.

<sup>60</sup> K. Reinhardt, p. 194n.2, considers that in fr. 22B84b Heraclitus refers to the macrocosm, while in fr. 22B20 he refers to the microcosm, with common reference the ἀναπαύεσθαι.

<sup>61</sup> O. Gigon, *op. cit.*, p. 94ff.

<sup>62</sup> G.S. Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-254.

universal application to the human experience, saying: «just as it is wearisome for a servant to continue toiling for the same master without change of scene or occupation, so (it may be inferred) it is wearisome for matter of any kind to remain indefinitely in the same relationship with its surroundings.» So, as a conclusion, Kirk interprets the identity of the **τοῖς αὐτοῖς** as the remaining of matter in the same relationship with its environment. Although his interpretation is not wrong, I consider that Heraclitus does not make here any metaphorical reference to the human experience, but he talks literally referring to the 'same' universe and to the weariness that it feels because of its eternal toiling for its multiple 'same' self-**πάντα**. Hence, Heraclitus does not talk exactly about matter and about its 'same' relation with its environment, but about the identity of the universe.

Guthrie<sup>63</sup> agrees with Gigon about the obscurity of fr. B84b, and claims that Heraclitus should say – following the same style of the identity of the opposites of fr. B111: **λιμὸς κόρον, κάματος ἀνάπανσιν** –, that the **μοχθεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι** is rather rest instead of weariness, and furthermore, that if the subject is the lack of alteration, so Heraclitus should say: **ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένειν**, or **ἡρεμεῖν**. But as a consequence, he loses the meaning of the cosmic identity, and also misinterprets the fragment, because Heraclitus regards here the cosmic identity as the cause of the cosmic alteration, defining alteration as rest, because of the weariness of identity; if he should have said that the **μοχθεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι** was rest, then there wouldn't be any reason for alteration, since alteration happens here as the result of the weariness from the cosmic identity.

Axelos<sup>64</sup> gives a correct interpretation, considering that «the weariness and the exhaustion that are caused by the kingdom of the identical, are avoided because the same eternally becomes other.» So, he correctly perceives of the cosmic reference in the fragment and its simultaneous alteration-identity. On the other hand, Marcovich<sup>65</sup> finds the meaning of the fragment very hypothetical, because of its later Neoplatonic salvation, and he considers it as an explanation or proof of the first fr. B84a, claiming that both fragments justify the specific alteration of fire, as Diels conceives of it, and not the general alteration as Kirk and Gigon conceive of. He interprets the **τοῖς αὐτοῖς** as **τοῖς δεσπόταις** claiming that the fragment says: «it is weariness to be ruled always by the same

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<sup>63</sup> W.K.C. Guthrie, *op. cit.*, p. 445, n.3.

<sup>64</sup> K. Axelos: *Heraclitus and Philosophy*, trans. D. Dimitriadis (Athens: Exantas, 1974), p. 111.

<sup>65</sup> M. Marcovich, *op. cit.*, pp. 303-304.

masters.» He regards fire as the servant, whose service refers to those stages where fire is being reduced to more than half of its original stuff, similar to the **χρημοσύνη** of fr. B65. He also considers that Heraclitus declares that it is tiring for the divine fire to toil eternally for the same master, and so, it is justified every time it changes its master into water (B36: **ψυχῆσιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι**; B117: **ύγρην τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων**), into earth, into heavenly fire (**σκάφαι**), or into anything else (B90: **χρήματα**) – and not only into the rest constituent elements of the human body, as Diels interprets it –. Marcovich's specific interpretation is not wrong, since what is really changing in the cosmos is the **πῦρ**, which toils for the same master-cosmos changing it eternally; but he does not indicate clearly the cosmic identity which he perceives in the master-cosmos-**αὐτοῖς** with more emphasis.

Kahn<sup>66</sup> gives a misinterpretation as he considers the rest of fr. B84a and the weariness of fr. B84b as a couple of opposites – because that is the way they are found in fr. B111 –. Kahn is cautious against the traditional interpretation of the **τοῖς αὐτοῖς** as the masters by Burnet, Diels, Kirk and Marcovich, and he finally supports the interpretation of Bollack-Wismann who consider that the **τοῖς αὐτοῖς μοχθεῖν** does not refer to the person whom somebody labors for, but to the object of toil or to the cause of suffering. For the **ἄρχεσθαι** he accepts the interpretation of the 'beginning' and not that of 'governing'. Thus, Kahn misinterprets the meaning of the fragments as: «it is weariness 'to be (always) beginning': never to get to the end of the job but toil continually at the same work and thus never find rest by changing.» But Heraclitus here obviously defines alteration as rest (B84a), and not the opposite as Kahn misinterprets, who besides that, also misinterprets the meaning of identity talking about the 'same work' and not about the 'same cosmos'. Heraclitus does not refer to the 'same work', but to the work for the 'same things', which in their universal 'indefinite' form as **αὐτοῖς** here cannot be anything else but the **κόσμος - πάντα**. Robinson<sup>67</sup> also gives a misinterpretation, as he has many doubts about the exact reference of the problematic words of fr. B84b, claiming that it is 'specific and sociological' in its character, and declaring that 'the life of the slaves is monotonous and wearisome'. But this partial interpretation is a 'pure conjecture', because as Plotinus says about Heraclitus, **ἀμελήσας σαφῆ ἡμῖν ποιῆσαι τὸν λόγον**. This happens on purpose, according to my opinion, because

<sup>66</sup> C.H. Kahn, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-170.

<sup>67</sup> T.M. Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-134.