I

In this paper I will attempt to answer the question: To which polis can the philosopher rightly claim citizenship? In order to answer this question, I must clarify some specific issues, such as: 1) From an archeological standpoint, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the constitution of the polis in which the philosopher can dwell, live and act? 2) Which models of politeiai (states) in Greek antiquity are most conducive to the growth and development of the philosophical life? 3) Can the philosopher exist and live as a citizen in any particular historical society, and what are the minimum requirements and principles which must condition such a city-state?

II

There are mainly two political models in classical antiquity which are thought to be most appropriate to the life of philosopher, the Platonic/Aristotelian paradigm of polis, and the Stoic model of cosmopolis.

III

In reference to the Platonic/Aristotelian model, we must inquire into what makes it the most appropriate for the philosopher's citizenship. This kind of model is a result of a long development related to social and political issues and to problems, conceptions and theories which began with Homer, were continued by Solon, Aeschylus, and reached a climax in the model of Cleisthenean and Periclean democracy. During this long period the right conditions and principles of Greek political life were formed and the concept of the citizen and that of polis acquired concrete content. In the Iliad and Odyssey of Homer it is possible to discern the fundamental concepts of Greek political theory, such as power, office, sovereignty, the importance of the majority, the distinction of the one and the many, the concept of the agora.
(assembly) as a place of social gathering and exchange of social and political ideas, the principle of non-direct representation and the concepts of hybris and metron.

The Homeric repository of political conceptions was refined and enriched by the problems put forward by a wide range of thinkers, philosophers, poets and tragedians, such as the following:

First, Hesiod, who emphasises the importance of work (labour) and Dike (right, justice) for the existence and the unity of the polis. Second, Tyrtaeus, who accepts the principle of eunomia, puts forward antagoria (i.e. the principle of having the right to speak freely in the assembly), and establishes the principle of the majority of the deme. Third, perhaps the most significant contributions to the political thinking of the Greeks was made by Solon of Athens, the wise legislator and great statesman, who acted within the environment of eunomia and implemented many of the views and theories of his predecessors, making what was previously theoretical, a political reality. With his poetical political treatises, Solon projects and establishes, among other things, the principle of political freedom and the responsibility of the citizen as a member of the political society, the principle of democracy by creating institutions that make the participation of the citizens in public affairs almost obligatory; hence Solon gave concrete content to political authority in relating it to justice and power (blending strength with justice as the relevant text indicates (frag. 36 - Eunomia)).

Before we examine Periclean democracy, it is perhaps necessary to refer to some views of Presocratic thinkers whose deep conceptions and theories of political life contribute to the structure of the political society appropriate to the citizenship of the philosopher. First, it is useful to emphasise the conceptions of Heraclitus who gives priority to the common logos and the common good, stresses the necessity of the prevalence of meritocracy in the polis and in general his correct conception about the antithetical or dialectical — in Platonic sense — nature of political phenomena. In addition, we must not forget the contributions of the Greek tragedians, significantly the case of Aeschylus, the great and famous Athenian tragic poet and citizen, who made the theatre a political school. In these works many important political concepts are personified on the stage, including: power, right, force, office, sovereignty, the metron and its opposite, hybris, disorder, political harmony, political division, the laws and the common good of the city state. Such dramatisations raised the
political awareness of the citizens with regard to the value and the importance of participation in the affairs of the city and its contribution to the common good.

A special reference must be made to the significance of Cleisthenes’ and Pericles’ theoretical and practical contributions to the model of democratic political society in which the citizen, giving priority to the common good, acquires great prestige, since in this kind of polis the citizen is capable of self-realisation and self-fulfilment.

To this end, Cleisthenes proceeds with his ingenious institutional regulations regarding citizenship, whereby the concept of political citizenship and geographical place are separated. Pericles, accepting and admiring the ideas of his predecessors, solidifies the principle of democracy and strengthens it by providing incentives to the citizens in order to encourage them to actively participate in public affairs. Pericles arranged the affairs of the city so as to ensure the prevalence of meritocracy and quality of life, thus making the human relations in the city better.

This long development from Homer to Plato (as well as the contributions of Thales, Anaximander, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Melissus, Empedocles, Parmenides, Democritus, Anaxagoras etc.) shows that all of the main issues and problems of Greek political theory were conceived in the Presocratic period. What is most important is that during this period certain things are clarified, namely the content of the concept of polis considered as a political society, and how important it is to belong to a city conditioned by such principles.

Regardless of how the principles were implemented or structured in any given state of the period in question, almost all of these city-states aimed at (and in many cases managed to succeed in) securing the freedom of the citizen, not only as citizen, but as a thinker, i.e. someone who is able to put forth his views about the world, the city and man with coherence and argument. This intellectual characteristic of the Presocratic thinkers is considered to be the genesis of philosophy, which for the first time became a reality in the free and democratic political societies of Greece.

For this reason, in the polis, considered as a political entity (such as Ephesus, Miletus, Colophon, Elea, Samos, Acragas, Clazomenae, Abdera, Athens, etc.) there developed the great intellectual personalities known as the phusicoi philosophoi (as philosopher of
nature). These philosophers, living in the *polis*, thought freely and independently, taking on great challenges,\(^{10}\) in the search to find the truth about nature, the world and generally about the substance of being. Some of these thinkers were not only theoretically skilled, but also dealt with practical issues of political society, such as partaking actively in public affairs, at all levels of political and social life, and they accepted offices and became lawgivers\(^{11}\) and sometimes founders and leaders of colonies.\(^{12}\)

This shows that the work of the philosopher is not in any way separated from the *polis*. In addition, the art\(^{13}\) and knowledge of the philosopher is considered as transcending the simple and practical wisdom of the archaic Greek period; all the same, the involvement of the philosopher in public affairs makes him most importantly a practical man. In any case, practical wisdom and philosophy were not succinctly separated before Plato. For this reason the archaic *polis* can be the home of the philosophers’ activity, in so far as he is a philosopher of nature and a man of *praxis*.

Furthermore philosophy and philosophizing, in order to exist, requires as a necessary condition, among other things, *leisure* necessary for thinking (*schole*), and this shows that the philosopher must have the basic necessities satisfied, in order to have time for thinking.

**IV**

Plato and Aristotle are like the sea into which it seems that all the rivers of Presocratic political problems flow. Plato, recognising the depth and breadth of the political thoughts of the Presocratics, succeeds, without necessarily positing new political principles, to form and project his own consistent political model, and for this he became the first and most important political philosopher of the Greeks.\(^{14}\)

What Plato does, having this kind of deep knowledge in relation to the city and the principles that condition it, is to remove their mythical dress, to conceptualise them abstractly, and to regulate them hierarchically under the aegis of the metaphysical principle of the Good, so that the unity of the *polis* can be secured.

The impression created by reading the Platonic works, and particular the *Republic, Statesman, and Laws*, is that the Athenian philosopher takes as a starting point the definition of *that* political pattern which as an ideal constitutional principle will enable any
person acting or engaged in politics to regulate or to govern rightly any kind of political society. Plato intends to create the kind of state which will enable the citizens to live the life of the good and which will allow the development of the proper conditions, in which the ideal of philosopher and citizen will be not only realised, but be predominant. So to the question, which city-state's citizen can be the philosopher, the reply seems to be the following: The philosopher can be a citizen in the *polis* which is structured according to the principles of philosophical reason and which the first and highest authority is him. This perhaps is the deep meaning of the famous passage in Plato's *Republic* about the Philosopher-King (473c11-e5) which stresses the necessity of the coming together of political power and philosophy.

As an alternative reply to the question in which city state the philosopher can be a citizen, Plato seems to accept the view that the philosopher can be a citizen in the city where the principles of statesmanship and law prevail. In the *Statesman*, the protagonist is the statesman, who is considered as a weaver of the state of affairs of political society. The weaving must be done in accordance with the principle of the good life as it has already indicated in the *Republic*. This statesman is not subject to external political or complex systems of interests of any form which can exist in the *polis*, and which aim solely at private, not the common, good. It is understandable that the principle of law, considered as a distribution of mind, which is necessary for the good life, is a lower level, though still important, principle, in comparison with the principle of the *statesman per se*. It seems that in this kind of state of affairs, the philosopher can be a citizen.

V

The Stagirite philosopher follows in many ways the views put forward by Plato’s political philosophy, which institute the ideal political pattern, in which the *polis* is the most important thing. Aristotle, however, differs in some respects from Plato, and sees things from a different metaphysical point of view and more realistically. In Aristotelian political philosophy are found all the main principles of Greek political theory, subject to further revision (as happens for example with the principle of justice) and adaptation of these principles to particular city-states. Politics in Aristotle is considered primarily as architectonic; the architect of the *polis* is naturally the statesman who is mainly a moral personality, working for the good of all citizens and promoting their participation in public affairs. In the
Aristotelian *polis*, it is clear that the philosopher can live and act as a citizen; in this state of affairs philosophising can definitely exist and the philosopher can think and act.

So we may conclude that the philosopher in the Presocratic sense of the word has the possibility of being a citizen in those cities referred to above in which *eunomia*, freedom and democracy prevail, and in which the primary needs of people are being satisfied. The Philosopher, with the meaning which Plato and Aristotle gave to the term (considered as a lover and seeker of the truth about beings, as the main representative of the principle of the Good and a defender of the happiness (*eudaimonia*) of all citizens) can be first of all the citizen of such a *polis*, like the one in which Plato lived and to which he affixed his seal, by his life, actions, work and *philosophical paradigm*. This kind of ideal has its genesis in the *polis* (the city) of Solon, Cleisthenes and reached a climax in the Periclean form of democracy.

**VI**

The other political pattern is the one projected by the Stoic philosophers during the Hellenistic and Roman period. It is the model of the *cosmopolis* or *megalopolis*. During this period, the city as a political entity (in its original meaning) no longer exists, but the Empire prevails. In that political situation the authority exercised by the ruler embodies only *some* of the values of the paradigmatic *polis*. This kind of situation leads man to search for another political ideal, which would help and direct him in acting in politics, and which of course would be different from the Platonic/Aristotelian model. This new required model must be adaptable to new political situations of the Empire, thus securing in part the possibilities of communication and collectivity of the citizens.

The ideal of the *cosmopolis* or *megalopolis* adopts the principles of *common Logos* and natural law. From these principles arguments are drawn in order to enforce the lawful order in various forms of political societies. Embodiment of this ideal of *cosmopolis* can only be the wise who can participate in Logos and can know the natural law. These wise men can live in and sometimes direct the historical, although deviant, cities, and some rule the Empire itself as in the case of Marcus Aurelius. Inside the ideal of the *cosmopolis*, the feeling of devotion of the people to the city is reduced and this obviously entails the Stoic Sage.
As the meaning of the term "polis" changes, so changes the meaning of the term "philosopher" during this period. For the wise person, although his involvement in common affairs is not forbidden, he has not given priority and care for the whole and the common good as it happened in the classical polis. The Stoic as the paradigm of philosopher (in Platonic sense) looks inside himself, adorns himself with values and virtues inquires to find the principles of reason, and can live and act in cosmopolitan collectivities, although such activities seem to be not attractive to him, because they do not appeal to his deep demands as a person.

VII

From what we said above in response to the question "Which polis is appropriate to the citizenship of the philosopher?", we highlight the following points:

The philosopher as a citizen, or the citizen who might become philosopher, can exist in a political society where first all his primary needs are satisfied. This is a necessary condition for every kind of theoretical engagement. In addition, eunomia, freedom of thought, speech and expression of views, even those considered as opposed and contradictory to the constitutive principles of a society, (as the case of the Cynics shows) are required in the polis in question. The most benevolent climate for the existing and flourishing of the philosopher is the intellectual and cultural atmosphere of the classical Greek polis.

The sufficient conditions which are related to our question can vary according to the case. However, the quality, breadth and strength of philosophising as a way and commitment of life (airesis biou) cannot exist except where the political ideal as defined by Plato and Aristotle is dominant.

So it seems that there is a close relation between the question "To which polis can a philosopher belong as a citizen?", and the question "What is philosophy, and what is the task of the philosopher per se?"
Notes

1. See the following relevant texts from Iliad and Odyssey of Homer.

Odyssey, ε (Book 5) 103-104:
"But it is no way possible for any other god to evade or make void the will of Zeus, who bears the aegis" (transl. by A. T. Murray, Homer, The Odyssey, an English Translation, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1919) Iliad, B 204-206 (Book 2):
"No good thing is a multitude of lords; let there be one lord, one king, to whom the son of crooked-counselling Cronos hath vouchsafed the sceptre and judgements, that he may take counsel for his people" (transl. by A. T. Murray, Homer, Iliad, an English translation, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1924) Iliad, B 100-101 (Book 2):
"Then among them lord Agamemnon uprose, bearing in his hands the sceptre which Hephaestus had wrought with toil" (transl. A. T. Murray) Iliad, A 278-279 (Book 1):
"for it is no common honour that is the portion of a sceptred king to whom Zeus giveth glory" (transl. A. T. Murray) Iliad, A 281 (Book 1):
"he (sc. Agamemnon) is the mightier, seeing he is king over more" (transl. A. T. Murray)

Iliad, B 203 (Book 2):
"In no wise shall we Achaeans all be kings here" (transl. A. T. Murray)

Iliad, A 184-187 (Book 1):
"... I will myself come to thy hut and take the fair-cheeked Briseis, that prize of thine; that thou mayest know full well how far mightier am I than thou, and another too may shrink from declaring himself my peer and likening himself to me to my face" (transl. A. T. Murray)

Odyssey, ζ 194-197 (Book 6):
"I will show you the way to the city, and will tell you the name of the people. The Phaeacians possess this city and land, and I am the daughter of great-hearted Alcinoous, in whom are vested the power and might of the Phaeacians" (transl. A. T. Murray) Here however it must be observed that the translation of Murray obscures the meaning of the original Homeric text. The phrase "τον δ’ ἑκ Φαιήκων ἐχεταν κάρτος τε βίη τε" means that Alcinoous bases his power and might on the will of Phaeacians. The Phaeacians can be either the eminent Phaeacians (gêne) or the whole populace.

Odyssey, η 186 (Book 7):
"Listen to me, leaders and councilors of the Phaeacians" (transl. A. T. Murray) Iliad, A 54 (Book 1):
"... Achilles let call the folk to the place of gathering" (transl. A. T. Murray) Iliad, B 207-210 (Book 2):
"they hastened back to the place of gathering from their ships and huts with noise as when a wave of the loud-resounding sea thundereth on the long beach, and the deep roareth" (transl. A. T. Murray) Iliad, B 333 (Book 2):
"So spoke he, and the Argives shouted aloud" (transl. A. T. Murray) Odyssey, ζ 53-55 (Book 6):
"... and her father she met as he was going out to join the glorious kings in the place of council to which the lordly Phaeacians called him" (transl. A. T. Murray)

Odyssey, ς 266-267 (Book 6):
"There, too, is their place of assembly around the beautiful temple of Poseidon, marked by huge stones set deep in the earth" (transl. A. T. Murray) Odyssey, β 68-69 (Book 2):
"I pray you by Olympian Zeus and by Themis who dissolves and gathers the assemblies of men" (transl. A. T. Murray) Odyssey, η 136 (Book 7):
"There he found the leaders and counsellors of the Phaeacians" (transl. A. T. Murray) Iliad, B 373 (Book 2):
"that I had ten such counsellors" (transl. A. T. Murray) Odyssey, ζ 257 (Book 6):
"you shall come to know all the noblest of the Phaeacians" (transl. A. T. Murray) Odyssey, θ 40-41 (Book 8):
"... but do you others, the sceptered kings, come to my beautiful palace" (transl. A. T. Murray) Odyssey, η 310 (Book 7):
"... Better is due measure in all things" (transl. A. T. Murray) Odyssey, ε 30-32 (Book 5):
"declare to the fair-tressed nymph our fixed resolve, the return of steadfast Odysseus, that he may return with guidance neither of gods nor of mortal men" (transl. A. T. Murray).

For the social and political ideas in Homer see G. Vlachos, Politikes koinonies ston Homer (in Greek), transl. M. Paizi - Apostolopoulos and Dim. Apostolopoulos, Athina 1981, pp. 55-80, 111-136 and 141-144.

2. Hesiod, Works and Days, 298-299:
Ibid., 308-311:
"Through work men grow rich in flocks and substance, and working they are much better loved by the immortals. Work is no disgrace; it is idleness which is a disgrace" (transl. Hugh G. Evelyn-White). Ibid., 275-280:
"and listen now to right, ceasing altogether to think of violence. For the son of Cronos has ordained this law for men, that fishes and beasts and winged fowls should devour one another, for right is not in them, but to mankind he gave right which proves far the best" (transl. Hugh G. Evelyn-White) Ibid., 225-227:
"But they who give straight judgements to strangers and to the men of the land, and go not aside from what is just, their city flourishes, and the people prosper in it" (transl. Hugh G. Evelyn-White).

For the social and political ideas of Hesiod see P. Patriarcheas, Ε katigorike prostaktike tis ergasias kata ton Hesiodon, Athenai 1969.

3. See the fragment 4 (West) from Tyrtaeus' Elegy with the title "Eunomia":
"... First in debate shall heaven's favourites, the kings, the guardians of fair Sparta's polity, speak, and the elders. After them the commoners shall to direct proposals make response with conscientious speech and all just consequence, making no twisted plans against our realm; and commoners' majority shall win the day. Phoebus brought forth this guidance for the state" (transl. by M. L. West, Greek Lyric poetry, (an English translation and notes) Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press 1993.

4. For Solon's conception of politics see Aristotle's Atheniensium Respublica and the relevant textes from his poem.
Solon, according to the work of Aristotle Atheniensium Respublica "First appear as the champion of the people" (Chapter II, line 12-13), mediator and Archon" (Chaptr V. line5). Aristotle continues by saying that "as soon as he was at the head of affairs
Solon liberated the people once and for all, by prohibiting all loans on the security of the debtor's person.

In his elegy «Eunomia» (Lawfulness) Solon says the following: "This lesson I desire to teach the Athenians: Lawlessness brings the city countless ills, while lawfulness sets all in order as is due many a criminal it puts in irons" (Fragm. 4 (W), 30-31, W. L. West, Greek Lyric poetry, English translation with notes, Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1993).

Fragment 36 (Eunomia) 11-16: "... and others here in ugly serfdom at their master's mercy I set free. These things I did in power blending strength with justice, carried out all that I promised. I wrote laws for all for high and low alike, made straight and just" (transl. W. L. West)

Fragment 4,14-16:
"Careless of Righteousness' august shrine the silent one, who knows what is and has been done, and comes at last to claim the payment due" (transl. W. L. West) Fragment 4, 22-23:
"For if men injure their own people, they soon find their lovely city scarred and faction torn" (transl. W. L. West) Fragment 34, 7-9:
"... since I have no taste by dictator's force to ... or to see our fruitful land portioned out to good — for— nothing equally with men of worth" (transl. W. L. West). For Solon's social and political views see: Simon Hornblower, "Creation and development of democratic institutions in Ancient Greece" in John Dunn (ed.) Democracy. The unfinished Journey, 508 BC to AD 1993, Oxford University Press 1993, pp. 1-16. See also V. Tejera, The city-state foundations of Western political thought. A study in intellectual method and the History of Political thought, University Press of America 1984, pp. 17-41.

5. For Heraclitus' political views see the relevant Heraclitean texts (H. Diels - W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Weidmann, Dublin-Zurich 1966).

Fragm. 1:
"Although this account [logos] holds forever, men ever fail to comprehend, both before hearing it and once they have heard. Although all things come to pass in accordance with this account, men are like the untried when they try such words and works as I set forth, distinguishing each according to its nature and telling how it is. But other men are oblivious of what they do awake, just as they are forgetful of what they do asleep" (transl. By Ch. Kahn, Charles H. Kahn, The art and thought of Heraclitus, An edition of the fragments with translation and commentary . University Press of Cambridge, 1979). Fragm. 2:
"Although the account [logos] is shared [common], most men live as though their thinking were a private possession" (transl. Charles H. Kahn) Fragm. 114:
"Speaking with understanding they must hold fast to what is shared (common) by all, as a city holds to its law, and even more firmly. For all human laws are nourished by a divine one. It prevails as it will and suffices for all and is more than enough" (transl. Charles H. Kahn) Fragm. 49:
"One man is ten thousand, if he is the best"
combined with the fragment 121:
"What the Ephesians deserve is to be hanged to the last man, every one of them, and leave the city to the boys, since they drove out their best man, Hermodorus, saying 'Let no one be the best among us; if he is, let him be so else where and among others'..." (transl. Charles H. Kahn) Fragm. 80:
"One must realise that war is shared and conflict is justice, and that all things come to pass (and are ordained?) in accordance with conflict" (transl. Charles H. Kahn).

6. For Aeschylus' political views, see: Jacqueline De Romilly, Problemata tis archaeas Ellininikis Demokratias, Athina 1992, pp. 200-207. N. Kontoleon, "En schema politikon ennoion ton Arhaeon", ΕΕΦΣΠΑ 16, 1965-1966, and Miller, To politiko noema tis tragodias. Concerning Aeschylus' work see especially Prometheus Bound and Oresteia. In the beginning of Prometheus Bound (The Loeb Classical Library, p. 214) the personified Power and Force enter the orchestra, bringing along the captive Prometheus to Hephaestus, who salutes them by saying:


7. See Aristotle's Atheniensium Respublica, paragraph 21, lines 1 to 28. Cleisthenes increased the number of demos giving the chance to more people to take part in the public affairs.

8. See Aristotle's Atheniensium Respublica, paragraph 27, 16-17:

"Pericles was also the first to institute pay for service in the law-courts, as a bid for popular favour...".

See also Plato, Gorgias 515b6-516d4.

9. For Pericles' contribution to the development of Athenian democracy, see the views expressed by the great historian Thucydides.

Thucydides, History, Book 2, Chapter 37:

"We live under a form of government which does not emulate the institutions of our neighbours; on the contrary, we are ourselves a model which some follow, rather than the imitators of other peoples. It is true that our government is called a democracy, because its administrations is in the hands not of the few, but of the many; yet while as regards the law all men are on an equality for the settlement of their private disputes, as regards the value set on them it is as each man is in any way distinguished that he is preferred to public honours, not because he belongs to a particular class, but because of personal merits; nor, again, on the ground of poverty is a man barred from a public career by obscurity of rank if he but has it in him to do the state a service. And not only in our public life are we liberal, but also as regards our freedom from suspicion of one another in the pursuits of every-day life; for we do not feel resentment at our neighbour if he does as he likes, nor yet do we put on sour looks which, though harmless, are painful to behold. But while we thus avoid giving offence in our private intercourse, in our public life we are restrained from lawlessness chiefly through reverence, for we render obedience to those in authority and to the laws, and especially to those laws which are ordained for the succour of the oppressed and those which though unwritten, bring upon the transgressor a disgrace which all men recognise" (tranl. Charles Forster Smith. Charles Forster Smith, Thucydides with an English translation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1928). See also book 2, Chapter 40: "For we are lovers of beauty yet with no extravagance and lovers of wisdom yet without weakness. Wealth we employ rather as an opportunity for action than as a subject for boasting; and with us it is not a shame for a man to acknowledge poverty, but the greater shame is for him not to do his best to avoid it. And you will find united in the same persons an interest at once in private and in public affairs, and in others of us who give attention chiefly to business, you will find no lack of insight into political matters. For we alone regard the man who takes no part in public affairs, not as one who minds
his own business, but as good for nothing" (transl. Charles Forster Smith). For Thucydides political views, see V. Tejera, ibid. pp. 43-65.


11. Lawgivers were Solon, Protagoras, Zaleucus and others.

12. Founders and leaders of colonies were persons like Anaximander from Miletus.

13. See frag. 2 (D. K.) of Xenophanes of Colophon, in which Xenophanes puts forward the view that his wisdom is superior to the other practices, arts and qualities which are characteristic of athletes:

"But if any one were to win a victory with fleetness of foot, or fighting in the Pentathlon, where the precinct of Zeus lies between the springs of Pisa at Olympia, or in wrestling, or in virtue of the painful science of boxing, or in a dread kind of contest called Pancration: to the citizens he would be more glorious to look upon, and he would acquire a conspicuous seat of honour at competitions, and his maintenance would be provided out of the public stores by the city-state, as well as a gift for him to lay aside as treasure. So too if he won a prize with his horses, he would obtain all these rewards, though not deserving of them as I am; for my craft (wisdom) is better than the strength of men or of horses. Yet opinion is altogether confused in this matter, and it is not right to prefer physical strength to noble Wisdom..." (translated by Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers, A complete translation of the Fragments in Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948).


15. Plato's Republic, Book V, 473c10-e7:

"Unless, said I, either philosopher become kings in our states or those whom we now call kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, and there is a conjunction of these two things, political power and philosophical intelligence, while the motley horde of the natures who at present pursue either apart from the other are compulsorily excluded, there can be no cessation of troubles, dear Glaucon, for out states, nor, I fancy, for the human race either. Nor, until this happens, will this constitution which we have been expounding in theory ever be put into practice within the limits of possibility and see the light of the sun. But this is the thing that has made me so long shrink from speaking out, because I saw that it would be a very paradoxical saying. For it is not easy to see that there is no other way of happiness either for private or public life" (transl. by Paul Shorey. P. Shorey Plato's Republic, an English Translation, The collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Bollingen Series LXXI, New York 1963).

16. Plato's *Statesman*, 31 Ib8-e9:
"Now we have reached the appointed end of the weaving of the web of state. It is fashioned by the statesman's weaving; the strands run true, and these strands are the gentle and the brave. Here these strands are woven together into a unified character. For this unity is won where the kingly art draws the life of both types into a true fellowship by mutual concord and by ties of friendship. It is the finest and best of all fabrics. It infolds all who dwell in the city, bond or free, in its firm contexture. Its kingly weaver maintains his control and oversight over it, and it lacks nothing that makes for happiness so far as happiness is obtainable in a human community.

Socrates: You have done what we requested of you, sir, and you have set beside your definition of the Sophist a picture drawn to perfection of the true king and statesman" (transl. by J. B. Skemp. J. B. Skemp, Plato's Statesman, An English Translation, The collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Bollingen Series LXXI, New York 1963).

17. Plato's, Laws, 713e5-714a:
"We should do our utmost — this is the moral — to reproduce the life of the age of Cronus, and therefore should order our private households and our public societies alike in obedience to the immortal element within us, giving the name of law to the appointment of understanding" (transl. by A. E. Taylor. A. E. Taylor, Plato's Laws, An English Translation, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Bollingen Series LXXI, New York 1963).

18. For the political philosophy of Aristotle see his works Politics and Nicomachean Ethics. See especially in the Politics the definition of the citizen:
Aristotle's Politics, 1275a23-25:
"A citizen pure and simple is defined by nothing else so much as by the right to participate in judicial functions and in office" (transl. by H. Rackham. H. Rackhan, Aristotle's Politics with an English translation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1932).


See also V. Tejera, The city-state foundations of Western Political thought, A study in Intellectual Method and the History of Political thought, University Press of America 1984, pp. 149-168.